Datasets:

burgerbee

/

philosophy_wiki

like 0

Andragogy

Andragogy refers to methods and principles used in adult education. The word comes from the Greek ἀνδρ- (andr-), meaning "adult male", and ἀγωγός (agogos), meaning "leader of". Therefore, andragogy literally means "leading men (adult males)", whereas "pedagogy" literally means "leading children". Definitions There are many different theories in the areas of learning, teaching and training. Andragogy commonly is defined as the art or science of teaching adults or helping adults learn. In contrast to pedagogy, or the teaching of children, andragogy is based on a humanistic conception of self-directed and autonomous learners where teachers are defined as facilitators of learning. Although Malcolm Knowles proposed andragogy as a theory, others posit that there is no single theory of adult learning or andragogy. In the literature where adult learning theory is often identified as a principle or an assumption, there are a variety of different approaches and theories that are also evolving in view of evolving higher education instruction, workplace training, new technology and online learning (Omoregie, 2021). Malcolm Knowles identified these adult learner characteristics related to the motivation of adult learning.   Need to know: Adults need to know the reason for learning something. Foundation: Experience (including error) provides the basis for learning activities. Self-concept: Adults need to be responsible for their decisions on education; involvement in the planning and evaluation of their instruction. Readiness: Adults are most interested in learning subjects having immediate relevance to their work and/or personal lives. Orientation: Adult learning is problem-centered rather than content-oriented. Motivation: Adults respond better to internal versus external motivators. Blaschke (2012) described Malcolm Knowles' 1973 theory as "self-directed" learning. The goals include helping learners develop the capacity for self-direction, supporting transformational learning and promoting "emancipatory learning and social action" (Blaschke, 2019, p. 76). Although Knowles' andragogy is a well-known theory in the English-speaking world, his theory has an ancillary role internationally. This is especially true in European countries where andragogy is a term used to refer to a field of systematic reflection. The acceptance of andragogy in European countries, according to St. Clair and Käpplinger (2021) is to accept andragogy as the "scientific study of learning in adults and the concomitant teaching approaches" (p. 485). Further, the definition of andragogy and its application to adult learning is more variable currently due to both the impact of globalization and the rapid expansion of adult online learning. History The term was originally coined by German educator Alexander Kapp in 1833. Andragogy was developed into a theory of adult education by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. It later became very popular in the US by the American educator Malcolm Knowles. Knowles asserted that andragogy (Greek: "man-leading") should be distinguished from the more commonly used term pedagogy (Greek: "child-leading"). Knowles collected ideas about a theory of adult education from the end of World War II until he was introduced to the term "androgogy". In 1966, Knowles met Dušan Savićević in Boston. Savićević was the one who shared the term andragogy with Knowles and explained how it was used in the European context. In 1967, Knowles made use of the term "andragogy" to explain his theory of adult education. Then after consulting with Merriam-Webster, he corrected the spelling of the term to "andragogy" and continued to make use of the term to explain his multiple ideas about adult learning. Knowles' theory can be stated with six assumptions related to the motivation of adult learning: Need to know: Adults need to know the reason for learning something. Foundation: Experience (including error) provides the basis for learning activities. Self-concept: Adults need to be responsible for their decisions on education; involvement in the planning and evaluation of their instruction. Readiness: Adults are most interested in learning subjects having immediate relevance to their work and/or personal lives. Orientation: Adult learning is problem-centered rather than content-oriented. Motivation: Adults respond better to internal versus external motivators. In most European countries, the Knowles discussion played at best, a marginal role. "Andragogy" was, from 1970 on, connected with emerging academic and professional institutions, publications, or programs, triggered by a similar growth of adult education in practice and theory as in the United States. "Andragogy" functioned here as a header for (places of) systematic reflections, parallel to other academic headers like "biology", "medicine", and "physics". Early examples of this use of andragogy are the Yugoslavian (scholarly) journal for adult education, named Andragogija in 1969, and the Yugoslavian Society for Andragogy; at Palacky University in Olomouc (Czech Republic) the Katedra sociologie a andragogiky (Sociology and Andragogy Department) was established in 1990. Also, Prague University has a Katedra Andragogiky (Andragogical Department); in 1993, Slovenia's Andragoski Center Republike Slovenije (Slovenian Republic Andragogy Center) was founded with the journal Andragoska Spoznanja; in 1995, Bamberg University (Germany) named a Lehrstuhl Andragogik (Androgogy Chair). On this formal level "above practice" and specific approaches, the term "andragogy" could be used relating to all types of theories, for reflection, analysis, training, in person-oriented programs, or human resource development. Principles Adult learning is based upon comprehension, organization and synthesis of knowledge rather than rote memory. Some scholars have proposed seven principles of adult learning: Adults must want to learn: They learn effectively only when they are free to direct their own learning and have a strong inner motivation to develop a new skill or acquire a particular type of knowledge, this sustains learning. Adults will learn only what they feel they need to learn – Adults are practical in their approach to learning; they want to know, "How is this going to help me right now? Is it relevant (content, connection, and application) and does it meet my targeted goals?" Adults learn by doing: Adolescents learn by doing, but adults learn through active practice and participation. This helps in integrating component skills into a coherent whole. Adult learning focuses on problem solving: Adolescents tend to learn skills sequentially. Adults tend to start with a problem and then work to find a solution. A meaningful engagement, such as posing and answering realistic questions and problems is necessary for deeper learning. This leads to more elaborate, longer lasting, and stronger representations of the knowledge (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Experience affects adult learning: Adults have more experience than adolescents. This can be an asset and a liability, if prior knowledge is inaccurate, incomplete, or immature, it can interfere with or distort the integration of incoming information (Clement, 1982; National Research Council, 2000). Adults learn best in an informal situation: Adolescents have to follow a curriculum. Often, adults learn by taking responsibility for the value and need of content they have to understand and the particular goals it will achieve. Being in an inviting, collaborative and networking environment as an active participant in the learning process makes it efficient. Adults want guidance and consideration as equal partners in the process: Adults want information that will help them improve their situation. They do not want to be told what to do and they evaluate what helps and what doesn't. They want to choose options based on their individual needs and the meaningful impact a learning engagement could provide. Socialization is more important among adults. Academic discipline In the field of adult education during recent decades, a process of growth and differentiation emerged as a scholarly and scientific approach, andragogy. It refers to the academic discipline(s) within university programs that focus on the education of adults; andragogy exists today worldwide. The term refers to a new type of education which was not qualified by missions and visions, but by academic learning including: reflection, critique, and historical analyses. Dušan Savićević, who provided Knowles with the term andragogy, explicitly claims andragogy as a discipline, the subject of which is the study of education and learning of adults in all its forms of expression' (Savicevic, 1999, p. 97, similarly Henschke, 2003,), Reischmann, 2003. Recent research and the COVID 19 pandemic have expanded andragogy into the online world internationally, as evidenced by country and international organizations that foster the development of adult learning, research and collaboration in educating adults. New and expanding online instruction is fostered by national organizations, literacy organizations, academic journals and higher education institutions that are helping adults to achieve learning and skills that will contribute to individual economic improvement. New learning resources and approaches are identified, such as finding that using collaborative tools like a wiki can encourage learners to become more self-directed, thereby enriching the classroom environment. Andragogy gives scope to self-directed learners and helps in designing and delivering the focused instructions. The methods used by andragogy can be used in different educational environments (e.g. adolescent education). Internationally there are many academic journals, adult education organizations (including government agencies) and centers for adult learning housed in a plethora of international colleges and universities that are working to promote the field of adult learning, as well as adult learning opportunities in training, traditional classes and in online learning. In academic fields, andrologists are those who practice and specialize in the field of andragogy. Andragologists have received a doctoral degree from an accredited university in Education (EdD) or a Philosophy (PhD) and focused their dissertation utilizing andragogy as a main component of their theoretical framework. Differences in learning: The Pedagogy, andragogy and heutagogy continuum In the 20th century, adult educators began to challenge the application of pedagogical theory and teacher-centered approaches to the teaching of adults. Unlike children, adult learners are not transmitted knowledge. Rather, the adult learner is an active participant in their learning. Adult students also are asked to actively plan their learning process to include identifying learning objectives and how they will be achieved. Knowles (1980) summarized the key characteristics of andragogy in this model: 1) independency or self-directedness 2) using past experiences to construct learning, 3) association with readiness to learn, and 4) changing education perspectives from subject-centered one to performance centered perspectives. A new educational strategy has evolved in response to globalization that identifies learners as self-determined, especially in higher education and work-place settings: heutagogy, a process where students learn on their own with some guidance from the teacher. The motivation to learn comes from the students' interest in not only performing, but being recognized for their accomplishment (Akiyildiz, 2019). In addition, in heutagogy, learning is learner-centric - where the decisions relating to the learning process are managed by the student. Further, the student determines whether or not the learning objectives are met. Differences between pedagogy, andragogy, and heutagogy include: Critique There is no consensus internationally on whether andragogy is a learning theory or a set of principles, characteristics or assumptions of adult learning. Knowles himself changed his position on whether andragogy applied only to adults and came to believe that "pedagogy-andragogy represents a continuum ranging from teacher-directed to student-directed learning and that both approaches are appropriate with children and adults, depending on the situation." Hanson (1996) argues that the difference in learning is not related to the age and stage of one's life, but instead related to individual characteristics and the differences in "context, culture and power" within different educational settings. In another critique of Knowles' work, Knowles was not able to use one of his principles (Self-concept) with adult learners to the extent that he describes in his practices. In one course, Knowles appears to allow "near total freedom in learner determination of objectives" but still "intended" the students to choose from a list of 18 objectives on the syllabus. Self-concept can be critiqued not just from the instructor's point of view, but also from the student's point of view. Not all adult learners will know exactly what they want to learn in a course and may seek a more structured outline from an instructor. An instructor cannot assume that an adult will desire self-directed learning in every situation. Kidd (1978) goes further by claiming that principles of learning have to be applied to lifelong development. He suggested that building a theory on adult learning would be meaningless, as there is no real basis for it. Jarvis even implies that andragogy would be more the result of an ideology than a scientific contribution to the comprehension of the learning processes. Knowles himself mentions that andragogy is a "model of assumptions about learning or a conceptual framework that serves as a basis for an emergent theory." There appears to be a lack of research on whether this framework of teaching and learning principles is more relevant to adult learners or if it is just a set of good practices that could be used for both children and adult learners. The way adults learn is different from the pedagogical approach used to foster learning in K-12 settings. These learning differences are key and can be used to show that the six characteristics/principles of andragogy remain applicable when designing teaching and learning materials, in English as a Foreign Language (EFL), for example. See also References Further reading Loeng, S. (2012). Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy – an andragogical pioneer. Studies in Continuing Education, Reischmann, Jost (2005): Andragogy. In: English, Leona (ed): International Encyclopedia of Adult Education. London: Palgrave Macmillan. S. 58–63. (.pdf-download) Smith, M. K. (1996; 1999) 'Andragogy', in the Encyclopedia of Informal Education. Andragogy and other Learning Theories Philosophy of education

Descriptive research

Descriptive research is used to describe characteristics of a population or phenomenon being studied. It does not answer questions about how/when/why the characteristics occurred. Rather it addresses the "what" question (what are the characteristics of the population or situation being studied?). The characteristics used to describe the situation or population are usually some kind of categorical scheme also known as descriptive categories. For example, the periodic table categorizes the elements. Scientists use knowledge about the nature of electrons, protons and neutrons to devise this categorical scheme. We now take for granted the periodic table, yet it took descriptive research to devise it. Descriptive research generally precedes explanatory research. For example, over time the periodic table's description of the elements allowed scientists to explain chemical reaction and make sound prediction when elements were combined. Hence, descriptive research cannot describe what caused a situation. Thus, descriptive research cannot be used as the basis of a causal relationship, where one variable affects another. In other words, descriptive research can be said to have a low requirement for internal validity. The description is used for frequencies, averages, and other statistical calculations. Often the best approach, prior to writing descriptive research, is to conduct a survey investigation. Qualitative research often has the aim of description and researchers may follow up with examinations of why the observations exist and what the implications of the findings are. Social science research In addition, the conceptualizing of descriptive research (categorization or taxonomy) precedes the hypotheses of explanatory research. (For a discussion of how the underlying conceptualization of exploratory research, descriptive research and explanatory research fit together, see: Conceptual framework.) Descriptive research can be statistical research. The main objective of this type of research is to describe the data and characteristics of what is being studied. The idea behind this type of research is to study frequencies, averages, and other statistical calculations. Although this research is highly accurate, it does not gather the causes behind a situation. Descriptive research is mainly done when a researcher wants to gain a better understanding of a topic. That is, analysis of the past as opposed to the future. Descriptive research is the exploration of the existing certain phenomena. The details of the facts won't be known. The existing phenomena's facts are not known to the person. Descriptive science Descriptive science is a category of science that involves descriptive research; that is, observing, recording, describing, and classifying phenomena. Descriptive research is sometimes contrasted with hypothesis-driven research, which is focused on testing a particular hypothesis by means of experimentation. David A. Grimaldi and Michael S. Engel suggest that descriptive science in biology is currently undervalued and misunderstood: "Descriptive" in science is a pejorative, almost always preceded by "merely," and typically applied to the array of classical -ologies and -omies: anatomy, archaeology, astronomy, embryology, morphology, paleontology, taxonomy, botany, cartography, stratigraphy, and the various disciplines of zoology, to name a few. [...] First, an organism, object, or substance is not described in a vacuum, but rather in comparison with other organisms, objects, and substances. [...] Second, descriptive science is not necessarily low-tech science, and high tech is not necessarily better. [...] Finally, a theory is only as good as what it explains and the evidence (i.e., descriptions) that supports it. A negative attitude by scientists toward descriptive science is not limited to biological disciplines: Lord Rutherford's notorious quote, "All science is either physics or stamp collecting," displays a clear negative attitude about descriptive science, and it is known that he was dismissive of astronomy, which at the beginning of the 20th century was still gathering largely descriptive data about stars, nebulae, and galaxies, and was only beginning to develop a satisfactory integration of these observations within the framework of physical law, a cornerstone of the philosophy of physics. Descriptive versus design sciences Ilkka Niiniluoto has used the terms "descriptive sciences" and "design sciences" as an updated version of the distinction between basic and applied science. According to Niiniluoto, descriptive sciences are those that seek to describe reality, while design sciences seek useful knowledge for human activities. See also Methodology Normative science Procedural knowledge Scientific method References External links Descriptive Research from BYU linguistics department Research Descriptive statistics Philosophy of science

Apologetics

Apologetics (from Greek ) is the religious discipline of defending religious doctrines through systematic argumentation and discourse. Early Christian writers (c. 120–220) who defended their beliefs against critics and recommended their faith to outsiders were called Christian apologists. In 21st-century usage, apologetics is often identified with debates over religion and theology. Etymology The term apologetics derives from the Ancient Greek word . In the Classical Greek legal system, the prosecution delivered the , the accusation or charge, and the defendant replied with an , the defence. The was a formal speech or explanation to reply to and rebut the charges. A famous example is Socrates' Apologia defense, as chronicled in Plato's Apology. In the Koine Greek of the New Testament, the Apostle Paul employs the term apologia in his trial speech to Festus and Agrippa when he says "I make my defense" in Acts 26:2. A cognate form appears in Paul's Letter to the Philippians as he is "defending the gospel" in Philippians 1:7, and in "giving an answer" in 1 Peter 3:15. Although the term apologetics has Western, primarily Christian origins and is most frequently associated with the defense of Christianity, the term is sometimes used referring to the defense of any religion in formal debate involving religion. Apologetic positions Baháʼí Faith Many apologetic books have been written in defence of the history or teachings of the Baháʼí Faith. The religion's founders wrote several books presenting proofs of their religion; among them are the Báb's Seven Proofs and Bahá'u'lláh's Kitáb-i-Íqán. Later Baháʼí authors wrote prominent apologetic texts, such as Mírzá Abu'l-Fadl's The Brilliant Proof and Udo Schaefer et al.'s Making the Crooked Straight. Buddhism One of the earliest Buddhist apologetic texts is The Questions of King Milinda, which deals with the Buddhist metaphysics such as the "no-self" nature of the individual and characteristics such as wisdom, perception, volition, feeling, consciousness and the soul. In the Meiji Era (1868-1912), encounters between Buddhists and Christians in Japan as a result of increasing contact between Japan and other nations may have prompted the formation of Japanese New Buddhism, including the apologetic Shin Bukkyō magazine. In recent times, A. L. De Silva, an Australian convert to Buddhism, has written a book, Beyond Belief, providing Buddhist apologetic responses and a critique of Christian Fundamentalist doctrine. Gunapala Dharmasiri wrote an apologetic critique of the Christian concept of God from a Theravadin Buddhist perspective. Christianity Christian apologetics combines Christian theology, natural theology, and philosophy in an attempt to present a rational basis for the Christian faith, to defend the faith against objections and misrepresentation, and to show that the Christian doctrine is the only world-view that is faultless and consistent with all fundamental knowledge and questions. Christian apologetics has taken many forms over the centuries. In the Roman Empire, Christians were severely persecuted, and many charges were brought against them. Examples in the Bible include the Apostle Paul's address to the Athenians in the Areopagus (Acts 17: 22-34). J. David Cassel gives several examples: Tacitus wrote that Nero fabricated charges that Christians started the burning of Rome. Other charges included cannibalism (due to a literal interpretation of the Eucharist) and incest (due to early Christians' practice of addressing each other as "brother" and "sister"). Paul the Apostle, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and others often defended Christianity against charges that were brought to justify persecution. Later apologists have focused on providing reasons to accept various aspects of Christian belief. Christian apologists of many traditions, in common with Jews, Muslims, and some others, argue for the existence of a unique and personal God. Theodicy is one important aspect of such arguments, and Alvin Plantinga's arguments have been highly influential in this area. Many prominent Christian apologists are scholarly philosophers or theologians, frequently with additional doctoral work in physics, cosmology, comparative religions, and other fields. Others take a more popular or pastoral approach. Some prominent modern apologists are Douglas Groothuis, Frederick Copleston, John Lennox, Walter R. Martin, Dinesh D'Souza, Douglas Wilson, Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark, Francis Schaeffer, Greg Bahnsen, Edward John Carnell, James White, R. C. Sproul, Hank Hanegraaff, Alister McGrath, Lee Strobel, Josh McDowell, Peter Kreeft, G. K. Chesterton, William Lane Craig, J. P. Moreland, Hugh Ross, David Bentley Hart, Gary Habermas, Norman Geisler, Scott Hahn, RC Kunst, Trent Horn, and Jimmy Akin. Apologists in the Catholic Church include Bishop Robert Barron, G. K. Chesterton, Dr. Scott Hahn, Trent Horn, Jimmy Akin, Patrick Madrid, Kenneth Hensley, Karl Keating, Ronald Knox, and Peter Kreeft. John Henry Newman (1801–1890) was an English convert to Roman Catholicism, later made a cardinal, and beatified in 2010. In early life he was a major figure in the Oxford Movement to bring the Church of England back to its Catholic roots. Eventually his studies in history persuaded him to become a Roman Catholic. When John Henry Newman entitled his spiritual autobiography Apologia Pro Vita Sua',' in 1864, he was playing upon both this connotation, and the more commonly understood meaning of an expression of contrition or regret. Christian apologists employ a variety of philosophical and formal approaches, including ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. The Christian presuppositionalist approach to apologetics uses the transcendental argument for the existence of God. Tertullian was an early Christian apologist. He was born, lived, and died in Carthage. He is sometimes known as the "Father of the Latin Church". He introduced the term Trinity to the Christian vocabulary and probably the formula "three Persons, one Substance" as the Latin "tres Personae, una Substantia" (from the Koine Greek "treis Hypostaseis, Homoousios"), and the terms Vetus Testamentum (Old Testament) and Novum Testamentum (New Testament). Latter-day Saints There are Latter-day Saint apologists who focus on the defense of Mormonism, including early church leaders, such as Parley P. Pratt, John Taylor, B. H. Roberts, and James E. Talmage, and modern figures, such as Hugh Nibley, Daniel C. Peterson, John L. Sorenson, John Gee, Orson Scott Card, and Jeff Lindsay. Several well known apologetic organizations of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, such as the Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies (a group of scholars at Brigham Young University) and FairMormon (an independent, not-for-profit group run by Latter Day Saints), have been formed to defend the doctrines and history of the Latter Day Saint movement in general and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in particular. Deism Deism is a form of theism in which God created the universe and established rationally comprehensible moral and natural laws but no longer intervenes in human affairs. Deism is a natural religion where belief in God is based on application of reason and evidence observed in the designs and laws found in nature. The World Order of Deists maintains a web site presenting deist apologetics that demonstrate the existence of God based on evidence and reason, absent divine revelation. Hinduism Hindu apologetics began developing during the British colonial period. A number of Indian intellectuals had become critical of the British tendency to devalue the Hindu religious tradition. As a result, these Indian intellectuals, as well as a handful of British Indologists, were galvanized to examine the roots of the religion as well as to study its vast arcana and corpus in an analytical fashion. This endeavor drove the deciphering and preservation of Sanskrit. Many translations of Hindu texts were produced which made them accessible to a broader reading audience. In the early 18th century, Christian missionary Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg engaged in dialogues with several Tamil-speaking "Malabarian" Hindu priests, and recorded arguments of these Hindu apologists. These records include German-language reports submitted to the Lutheran headquarters in Halle, and 99 letters written by the Hindu priests to him (later translated into German under the title Malabarische Korrespondenz from 1718 onwards). During 1830–1831, missionary John Wilson engaged in debates with Hindu apologists in Bombay. In 1830, his protege Ram Chandra, a Hindu convert to Christianity, debated with several Hindu Brahmin apologists in public. Hindu pandit Morobhatt Dandekar summarized his arguments from his 1831 debate with Wilson in a Marathi-language work titled Shri-Hindu-dharma-sthapana. Narayana Rao, another Hindu apologist, wrote Svadesha-dharma-abhimani in response to Wilson. In the mid-19th century, several Hindu apologist works were written in response to John Muir's Mataparīkṣā. These include Mata-parīkṣā-śikṣā (1839) by Somanatha of Central India, Mataparīkṣottara (1840) by Harachandra Tarkapanchanan of Calcutta, Śāstra-tattva-vinirṇaya (1844-1845) by Nilakantha Gore of Benares, and a critique (published later in 1861 as part of Dharmādharma-parīkṣā-patra) by an unknown Vaishnava writer. A range of Indian philosophers, including Swami Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghose, have written rational explanations regarding the values of the Hindu religious tradition. More modern proponents such as the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi have also tried to correlate recent developments from quantum physics and consciousness research with Hindu concepts. The late Reverend Pandurang Shastri Athavale has given a plethora of discourses regarding the symbolism and rational basis for many principles in the Vedic tradition. In his book The Cradle of Civilization, David Frawley, an American who has embraced the Vedic tradition, has characterized the ancient texts of the Hindu heritage as being like "pyramids of the spirit". Islam '''Ilm al-Kalām, literally "science of discourse", usually foreshortened to kalam and sometimes called Islamic scholastic theology, is an Islamic undertaking born out of the need to establish and defend the tenets of Islamic faith against skeptics and detractors. A scholar of kalam is referred to as a mutakallim (plural mutakallimūn) as distinguished from philosophers, jurists, and scientists. Judaism Jewish apologetic literature can be traced back as far as Aristobulus of Paneas, though some discern it in the works of Demetrius the chronographer (3rd century BCE) traces of the style of "questions" and "solutions" typical of the genre. Aristobulus was a Jewish philosopher of Alexandria and the author of an apologetic work addressed to Ptolemy VI Philometor. Josephus's Contra Apion is a wide-ranging defense of Judaism against many charges laid against Judaism at that time, as too are some of the works of Philo of Alexandria. In response to modern Christian missionaries, and congregations that "are designed to appear Jewish, but are actually fundamentalist Christian churches, which use traditional Jewish symbols to lure the most vulnerable of our Jewish people into their ranks", Jews for Judaism is the largest counter-missionary organization in existence, today. Kiruv Organization (Mizrachi), founded by Rabbi Yosef Mizrachi, and Outreach Judaism, founded by Rabbi Tovia Singer, are other prominent international organizations that respond "directly to the issues raised by missionaries and cults, by exploring Judaism in contradistinction to fundamentalist Christianity." Pantheism Some pantheists have formed organizations such as the World Pantheist Movement and the Universal Pantheist Society to promote and defend the belief in pantheism. Native Americans In a famous speech called "Red Jacket on Religion for the White Man and the Red" in 1805, Seneca chief Red Jacket gave an apologetic for Native American religion. In literature Plato's Apology may be read as both a religious and literary apology; however, more specifically literary examples may be found in the prefaces and dedications, which proceed many Early Modern plays, novels, and poems. Eighteenth century authors such as Colley Cibber, Frances Burney, and William Congreve, to name but a few, prefaced the majority of their poetic work with such apologies. In addition to the desire to defend their work, the apologetic preface often suggests the author's attempt to humble his- or herself before the audience. See also Christian apologetics Dawah Existence of God Kalam List of apologetic works References Bibliography External links Rhetoric Persuasion

Principle

A principle may relate to a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of beliefs or behavior or a chain of reasoning. They provide a guide for behavior or evaluation. A principle can make values explicit, so they are expressed in the form of rules and standards. Principles unpack the values underlying them more concretely so that the values can be more easily operationalized in policy statements and actions. In law, higher order, overarching principles establish rules to be followed, modified by sentencing guidelines relating to context and proportionality. In science and nature, a principle may define the essential characteristics of the system, or reflect the system's designed purpose. The effective operation would be impossible if any one of the principles was to be ignored. A system may be explicitly based on and implemented from a document of principles as was done in IBM's 360/370 Principles of Operation. It is important to differentiate an operational principle, including reference to 'first principles' from higher order 'guiding' or 'exemplary' principles, such as equality, justice and sustainability. Higher-order, 'superordinate' principles (Super-Ps) provide a basis for resolving differences and building agreement/alignment. Examples of principles are, entropy in a number of fields, least action in physics, those in descriptive comprehensive and fundamental law: doctrines or assumptions forming normative rules of conduct, separation of church and state in statecraft, the central dogma of molecular biology, fairness in ethics, etc. In common English, it is a substantive and collective term referring to rule governance, the absence of which, being "unprincipled", is considered a character defect. It may also be used to declare that a reality has diverged from some ideal or norm as when something is said to be true only "in principle" but not in fact. As law As moral law A principle represents values that orient and rule the conduct of persons in a particular society. To "act on principle" is to act in accordance with one's moral ideals. Principles are absorbed in childhood through a process of socialization. There is a presumption of liberty of individuals that is restrained. Exemplary principles include First, do no harm, the Golden Rule and the Doctrine of the Mean. As a juridic law It represents a set of values that inspire the written norms that organize the life of a society submitting to the powers of an authority, generally the State. The law establishes a legal obligation, in a coercive way; it therefore acts as principle conditioning of the action that limits the liberty of the individuals. See, for examples, the territorial principle, homestead principle, and precautionary principle. As scientific law Archimedes principle, relating buoyancy to the weight of displaced water, is an early example of a law in science. Another early one developed by Malthus is the population principle, now called the Malthusian principle. Freud also wrote on principles, especially the reality principle necessary to keep the id and pleasure principle in check. Biologists use the principle of priority and principle of Binominal nomenclature for precision in naming species. There are many principles observed in physics, notably in cosmology which observes the mediocrity principle, the anthropic principle, the principle of relativity and the cosmological principle. Other well-known principles include the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics and the pigeonhole principle and superposition principle in mathematics. As axiom or logical fundament Principle of sufficient reason The principle states that every event has a rational explanation. The principle has a variety of expressions, all of which are perhaps best summarized by the following: For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why x exists. For every event e, if e occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why e occurs. For every proposition p, if p is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why p is true. However, one realizes that in every sentence there is a direct relation between the predicate and the subject. To say that "the Earth is round", corresponds to a direct relation between the subject and the predicate. Principle of non-contradiction According to Aristotle, “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect.” For example, it is not possible that in exactly the same moment and place, it rains and does not rain. Principle of excluded middle The principle of the excluding third or "principium tertium exclusum" is a principle of the traditional logic formulated canonically by Leibniz as: either A is B or A isn't B. It is read the following way: either P is true, or its denial ¬P is. It is also known as "tertium non datur" ('A third (thing) is not'). Classically it is considered to be one of the most important fundamental principles or laws of thought (along with the principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason). See also Ahimsa Axiom Corollary Deduction Logical consequence Non-aggression principle Self-evidence References External links Actus Essendi and the Habit of the First Principle in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Einsiedler Press, 2019). Concepts in epistemology Concepts in ethics Concepts in metaphysics Concepts in the philosophy of mind Concepts in the philosophy of science Metaphysics of mind Ontology

Environmental resource management

Environmental resource management or environmental management is the management of the interaction and impact of human societies on the environment. It is not, as the phrase might suggest, the management of the environment itself. Environmental resources management aims to ensure that ecosystem services are protected and maintained for future human generations, and also maintain ecosystem integrity through considering ethical, economic, and scientific (ecological) variables. Environmental resource management tries to identify factors between meeting needs and protecting resources. It is thus linked to environmental protection, resource management, sustainability, integrated landscape management, natural resource management, fisheries management, forest management, wildlife management, environmental management systems, and others. Significance Environmental resource management is an issue of increasing concern, as reflected in its prevalence in several texts influencing global sociopolitical frameworks such as the Brundtland Commission's Our Common Future, which highlighted the integrated nature of the environment and international development, and the Worldwatch Institute's annual State of the World reports. The environment determines the nature of people, animals, plants, and places around the Earth, affecting behaviour, religion, culture and economic practices. Scope Environmental resource management can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. It involves the management of all components of the biophysical environment, both living (biotic) and non-living (abiotic), and the relationships among all living species and their habitats. The environment also involves the relationships of the human environment, such as the social, cultural, and economic environment, with the biophysical environment. The essential aspects of environmental resource management are ethical, economical, social, and technological. These underlie principles and help make decisions. The concept of environmental determinism, probabilism, and possibilism are significant in the concept of environmental resource management. Environmental resource management covers many areas in science, including geography, biology, social sciences, political sciences, public policy, ecology, physics, chemistry, sociology, psychology, and physiology. Environmental resource management as a practice and discourse (across these areas) is also the object of study in the social sciences. Aspects Ethical Environmental resource management strategies are intrinsically driven by conceptions of human-nature relationships. Ethical aspects involve the cultural and social issues relating to the environment, and dealing with changes to it. "All human activities take place in the context of certain types of relationships between society and the bio-physical world (the rest of nature)," and so, there is a great significance in understanding the ethical values of different groups around the world. Broadly speaking, two schools of thought exist in environmental ethics: Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism, each influencing a broad spectrum of environmental resource management styles along a continuum. These styles perceive "...different evidence, imperatives, and problems, and prescribe different solutions, strategies, technologies, roles for economic sectors, culture, governments, and ethics, etc." Anthropocentrism Anthropocentrism, "an inclination to evaluate reality exclusively in terms of human values," is an ethic reflected in the major interpretations of Western religions and the dominant economic paradigms of the industrialised world. Anthropocentrism looks at nature as existing solely for the benefit of humans, and as a commodity to use for the good of humanity and to improve human quality of life. Anthropocentric environmental resource management is therefore not the conservation of the environment solely for the environment's sake, but rather the conservation of the environment, and ecosystem structure, for humans' sake. Ecocentrism Ecocentrists believe in the intrinsic value of nature while maintaining that human beings must use and even exploit nature to survive and live. It is this fine ethical line that ecocentrists navigate between fair use and abuse. At an extreme of the ethical scale, ecocentrism includes philosophies such as ecofeminism and deep ecology, which evolved as a reaction to dominant anthropocentric paradigms. "In its current form, it is an attempt to synthesize many old and some new philosophical attitudes about the relationship between nature and human activity, with particular emphasis on ethical, social, and spiritual aspects that have been downplayed in the dominant economic worldview." Economics Main article: Economics The economy functions within and is dependent upon goods and services provided by natural ecosystems. The role of the environment is recognized in both classical economics and neoclassical economics theories, yet the environment was a lower priority in economic policies from 1950 to 1980 due to emphasis from policy makers on economic growth. With the prevalence of environmental problems, many economists embraced the notion that, "If environmental sustainability must coexist for economic sustainability, then the overall system must [permit] identification of an equilibrium between the environment and the economy." As such, economic policy makers began to incorporate the functions of the natural environment – or natural capital – particularly as a sink for wastes and for the provision of raw materials and amenities. Debate continues among economists as to how to account for natural capital, specifically whether resources can be replaced through knowledge and technology, or whether the environment is a closed system that cannot be replenished and is finite. Economic models influence environmental resource management, in that management policies reflect beliefs about natural capital scarcity. For someone who believes natural capital is infinite and easily substituted, environmental management is irrelevant to the economy. For example, economic paradigms based on neoclassical models of closed economic systems are primarily concerned with resource scarcity and thus prescribe legalizing the environment as an economic externality for an environmental resource management strategy. This approach has often been termed 'Command-and-control'. Colby has identified trends in the development of economic paradigms, among them, a shift towards more ecological economics since the 1990s. Ecology There are many definitions of the field of science commonly called ecology. A typical one is "the branch of biology dealing with the relations and interactions between organisms and their environment, including other organisms." "The pairing of significant uncertainty about the behaviour and response of ecological systems with urgent calls for near-term action constitutes a difficult reality, and a common lament" for many environmental resource managers. Scientific analysis of the environment deals with several dimensions of ecological uncertainty. These include: structural uncertainty resulting from the misidentification, or lack of information pertaining to the relationships between ecological variables; parameter uncertainty referring to "uncertainty associated with parameter values that are not known precisely but can be assessed and reported in terms of the likelihood…of experiencing a defined range of outcomes"; and stochastic uncertainty stemming from chance or unrelated factors. Adaptive management is considered a useful framework for dealing with situations of high levels of uncertainty though it is not without its detractors. A common scientific concept and impetus behind environmental resource management is carrying capacity. Simply put, carrying capacity refers to the maximum number of organisms a particular resource can sustain. The concept of carrying capacity, whilst understood by many cultures over history, has its roots in Malthusian theory. An example is visible in the EU Water Framework Directive. However, "it is argued that Western scientific knowledge ... is often insufficient to deal with the full complexity of the interplay of variables in environmental resource management. These concerns have been recently addressed by a shift in environmental resource management approaches to incorporate different knowledge systems including traditional knowledge, reflected in approaches such as adaptive co-management community-based natural resource management and transitions management among others. Sustainability Sustainability in environmental resource management involves managing economic, social, and ecological systems both within and outside an organizational entity so it can sustain itself and the system it exists in. In context, sustainability implies that rather than competing for endless growth on a finite planet, development improves quality of life without necessarily consuming more resources. Sustainably managing environmental resources requires organizational change that instills sustainability values that portrays these values outwardly from all levels and reinforces them to surrounding stakeholders. The result should be a symbiotic relationship between the sustaining organization, community, and environment. Many drivers compel environmental resource management to take sustainability issues into account. Today's economic paradigms do not protect the natural environment, yet they deepen human dependency on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Ecologically, massive environmental degradation and climate change threaten the stability of ecological systems that humanity depends on. Socially, an increasing gap between rich and poor and the global North–South divide denies many access to basic human needs, rights, and education, leading to further environmental destruction. The planet's unstable condition is caused by many anthropogenic sources. As an exceptionally powerful contributing factor to social and environmental change, the modern organisation has the potential to apply environmental resource management with sustainability principles to achieve highly effective outcomes. To achieve sustainable development with environmental resource management an organisation should work within sustainability principles, including social and environmental accountability, long-term planning; a strong, shared vision; a holistic focus; devolved and consensus decision making; broad stakeholder engagement and justice; transparency measures; trust; and flexibility. Current paradigm shifts To adjust to today's environment of quick social and ecological changes, some organizations have begun to experiment with new tools and concepts. Those that are more traditional and stick to hierarchical decision making have difficulty dealing with the demand for lateral decision making that supports effective participation. Whether it be a matter of ethics or just strategic advantage organizations are internalizing sustainability principles. Some of the world's largest and most profitable corporations are shifting to sustainable environmental resource management: Ford, Toyota, BMW, Honda, Shell, Du Port, Sta toil, Swiss Re, Hewlett-Packard, and Unilever, among others. An extensive study by the Boston Consulting Group reaching 1,560 business leaders from diverse regions, job positions, expertise in sustainability, industries, and sizes of organizations, revealed the many benefits of sustainable practice as well as its viability. Although the sustainability of environmental resource management has improved, corporate sustainability, for one, has yet to reach the majority of global companies operating in the markets. The three major barriers to preventing organizations from shifting towards sustainable practice with environmental resource management are not understanding what sustainability is; having difficulty modeling an economically viable case for the switch; and having a flawed execution plan, or a lack thereof. Therefore, the most important part of shifting an organization to adopt sustainability in environmental resource management would be to create a shared vision and understanding of what sustainability is for that particular organization and to clarify the business case. Stakeholders Public sector The public sector comprises the general government sector plus all public corporations including the central bank. In environmental resource management the public sector is responsible for administering natural resource management and implementing environmental protection legislation. The traditional role of the public sector in environmental resource management is to provide professional judgement through skilled technicians on behalf of the public. With the increase of intractable environmental problems, the public sector has been led to examine alternative paradigms for managing environmental resources. This has resulted in the public sector working collaboratively with other sectors (including other governments, private and civil) to encourage sustainable natural resource management behaviours. Private sector The private sector comprises private corporations and non-profit institutions serving households. The private sector's traditional role in environmental resource management is that of the recovery of natural resources. Such private sector recovery groups include mining (minerals and petroleum), forestry and fishery organisations. Environmental resource management undertaken by the private sectors varies dependent upon the resource type, that being renewable or non-renewable and private and common resources (also see Tragedy of the Commons). Environmental managers from the private sector also need skills to manage collaboration within a dynamic social and political environment. Civil society Civil society comprises associations in which societies voluntarily organise themselves and which represent a wide range of interests and ties. These can include community-based organisations, indigenous peoples' organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs). Functioning through strong public pressure, civil society can exercise their legal rights against the implementation of resource management plans, particularly land management plans. The aim of civil society in environmental resource management is to be included in the decision-making process by means of public participation. Public participation can be an effective strategy to invoke a sense of social responsibility of natural resources. Tools As with all management functions, effective management tools, standards, and systems are required. An environmental management standard or system or protocol attempts to reduce environmental impact as measured by some objective criteria. The ISO 14001 standard is the most widely used standard for environmental risk management and is closely aligned to the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). As a common auditing standard, the ISO 19011 standard explains how to combine this with quality management. Other environmental management systems (EMS) tend to be based on the ISO 14001 standard and many extend it in various ways: The Green Dragon Environmental Management Standard is a five-level EMS designed for smaller organisations for whom ISO 14001 may be too onerous and for larger organisations who wish to implement ISO 14001 in a more manageable step-by-step approach, BS 8555 is a phased standard that can help smaller companies move to ISO 14001 in six manageable steps, The Natural Step focuses on basic sustainability criteria and helps focus engineering on reducing use of materials or energy use that is unsustainable in the long term, Natural Capitalism advises using accounting reform and a general biomimicry and industrial ecology approach to do the same thing, US Environmental Protection Agency has many further terms and standards that it defines as appropriate to large-scale EMS, The UN and World Bank has encouraged adopting a "natural capital" measurement and management framework. Other strategies exist that rely on making simple distinctions rather than building top-down management "systems" using performance audits and full cost accounting. For instance, Ecological Intelligent Design divides products into consumables, service products or durables and unsaleables – toxic products that no one should buy, or in many cases, do not realize they are buying. By eliminating the unsaleables from the comprehensive outcome of any purchase, better environmental resource management is achieved without systems. Another example that diverges from top-down management is the implementation of community based co-management systems of governance. An example of this is community based subsistence fishing areas, such as is implemented in Ha'ena, Hawaii. Community based systems of governance allow for the communities who most directly interact with the resource and who are most deeply impacted by the overexploitation of said resource to make the decisions regarding its management, thus empowering local communities and more effectively managing resources. Recent successful cases have put forward the notion of integrated management. It shares a wider approach and stresses out the importance of interdisciplinary assessment. It is an interesting notion that might not be adaptable to all cases. Case Study: Kissidougou, Guinea (Fairhead, Leach) Kissidougou, Guinea’s dry season brings about fires in the open grass fires which defoliate the few trees in the savanna. There are villages within this savanna surrounded by “islands” of forests, allowing for forts, hiding, rituals, protection from wind and fire, and shade for crops. According to scholars and researchers in the region during the late-19th and 20th centuries, there was a steady decline in tree cover. This led to colonial Guinea’s implementation of policies, including the switch of upland to swamp farming; bush-fire control; protection of certain species and land; and tree planting in villages. These policies were carried out in the form of permits, fines, and military repression. But, Kissidougou villagers claim their ancestors’ established these islands. Many maps and letters evidence France’s occupation of Guinea, as well as Kissidougou’s past landscape. During the 1780s to 1860s “the whole country [was] prairie.” James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, both environmental anthropologists at the University of Sussex, claim the state’s environmental analyses “casts into question the relationships between society, demography, and environment.” With this, they reformed the state’s narratives: Local land use can be both vegetation enriching and degrading; combined effect on resource management is greater than the sum of their parts; there is evidence of increased population correlating to an increase in forest cover. Fairhead and Leach support the enabling of policy and socioeconomic conditions in which local resource management conglomerates can act effectively. In Kissidougou, there is evidence that local powers and community efforts shaped the island forests that shape the savanna’s landscape. See also Citizen science, cleanup projects that people can take part in. Cleaner production Environmental impact assessment Environmental management scheme Environmental manager Integrated landscape management ISO 14000 Natural resource management Planetary management Political ecology Resource justice Stakeholder analysis Sustainable management References Further reading External links Economic Costs & Benefits of Environmental Management NOAA Economics business.gov – provides businesses with environmental management tips, as well as tips for green business owners (United States) Nonprofit research on managing the environment Resource economics Natural resource management Systems ecology Human-Environment interaction

Nous

Nous (, ), from , is a concept from classical philosophy, sometimes equated to intellect or intelligence, for the faculty of the human mind necessary for understanding what is true or real. Alternative English terms used in philosophy include "understanding" and "mind"; or sometimes "thought" or "reason" (in the sense of that which reasons, not the activity of reasoning). It is also often described as something equivalent to perception except that it works within the mind ("the mind's eye"). It has been suggested that the basic meaning is something like "awareness". In colloquial British English, nous also denotes "good sense", which is close to one everyday meaning it had in Ancient Greece. The nous performed a role comparable to the modern concept of intuition. In Aristotle's philosophy, which was influential on later conceptions of the category, nous was carefully distinguished from sense perception, imagination, and reason, although these terms are closely inter-related. The term was apparently already singled out by earlier philosophers such as Parmenides, whose works are largely lost. In post-Aristotelian discussions, the exact boundaries between perception, understanding of perception, and reasoning have sometimes diverged from Aristotelian definitions. In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For him then, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. Derived from this it was also sometimes argued, in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of a spiritual and divine type. By this type of account, it also came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it. Such explanations were influential in the development of medieval accounts of God, the immortality of the soul, and even the motions of the stars, in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, amongst both eclectic philosophers and authors representing all the major faiths of their times. Pre-Socratic usage In early Greek uses, Homer used nous to signify mental activities of both mortals and immortals, for example what they really have on their mind as opposed to what they say aloud. It was one of several words related to thought, thinking, and perceiving with the mind. In pre-Socratic philosophy, it became increasingly distinguished as a source of knowledge and reasoning opposed to mere sense perception or thinking influenced by the body such as emotion. For example, Heraclitus complained that "much learning does not teach nous". Among some Greek authors, a faculty of intelligence known as a "higher mind" came to be considered as a property of the cosmos as a whole. The work of Parmenides set the scene for Greek philosophy to come, and the concept of nous was central to his radical proposals. He claimed that reality as perceived by the senses alone is not a world of truth at all, because sense perception is so unreliable, and what is perceived is so uncertain and changeable. Instead he argued for a dualism wherein nous and related words (the verb for thinking which describes its mental perceiving activity, noein, and the unchanging and eternal objects of this perception, noēta) describe another form of perception which is not physical, but intellectual only, distinct from sense perception and the objects of sense perception. Anaxagoras, born about 500 BC, is the first person who is definitely known to have explained the concept of a nous (mind), which arranged all other things in the cosmos in their proper order, started them in a rotating motion, and continuing to control them to some extent, having an especially strong connection with living things. (However Aristotle reports an earlier philosopher, Hermotimus of Clazomenae, who had taken a similar position.) Amongst the pre-Socratic philosophers before Anaxagoras, other philosophers had proposed a similar ordering human-like principle causing life and the rotation of the heavens. For example, Empedocles, like Hesiod much earlier, described cosmic order and living things as caused by a cosmic version of love, and Pythagoras and Heraclitus, attributed the cosmos with "reason" (logos). According to Anaxagoras the cosmos is made of infinitely divisible matter, every bit of which can inherently become anything, except Mind (nous), which is also matter, but which can only be found separated from this general mixture, or else mixed into living things, or in other words in the Greek terminology of the time, things with a soul (psychē). Anaxagoras wrote: Concerning cosmology, Anaxagoras, like some Greek philosophers already before him, believed the cosmos was revolving, and had formed into its visible order as a result of such revolving causing a separating and mixing of different types of chemical elements. Nous, in his system, originally caused this revolving motion to start, but it does not necessarily continue to play a role once the mechanical motion has started. His description was in other words (shockingly for the time) corporeal or mechanical, with the moon made of earth, the sun and stars made of red hot metal (beliefs Socrates was later accused of holding during his trial) and nous itself being a physically fine type of matter which also gathered and concentrated with the development of the cosmos. This nous (mind) is not incorporeal; it is the thinnest of all things. The distinction between nous and other things nevertheless causes his scheme to sometimes be described as a peculiar kind of dualism. Anaxagoras' concept of nous was distinct from later platonic and neoplatonic cosmologies in many ways, which were also influenced by Eleatic, Pythagorean and other pre-Socratic ideas, as well as the Socratics themselves. Socratic philosophy Xenophon Xenophon, the less famous of the two students of Socrates whose written accounts of him have survived, recorded that he taught his students a kind of teleological justification of piety and respect for divine order in nature. This has been described as an "intelligent design" argument for the existence of God, in which nature has its own nous. For example, in his Memorabilia 1.4.8, he describes Socrates asking a friend sceptical of religion, "Are you, then, of the opinion that intelligence (nous) alone exists nowhere and that you by some good chance seized hold of it, while—as you think—those surpassingly large and infinitely numerous things [all the earth and water] are in such orderly condition through some senselessness?" Later in the same discussion he compares the nous, which directs each person's body, to the good sense (phronēsis) of the god, which is in everything, arranging things to its pleasure (1.4.17). Plato describes Socrates making the same argument in his Philebus 28d, using the same words nous and phronēsis. Plato Plato used the word nous in many ways that were not unusual in the everyday Greek of the time, and often simply meant "good sense" or "awareness". On the other hand, in some of his Platonic dialogues it is described by key characters in a higher sense, which was apparently already common. In his Philebus 28c he has Socrates say that "all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind (nous) is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right." and later states that the ensuing discussion "confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (nous) always rules the universe". In his Cratylus, Plato gives the etymology of Athena's name, the goddess of wisdom, from Atheonóa (Ἀθεονόα) meaning "god's (theos) mind (nous)". In his Phaedo, Plato's teacher Socrates is made to say just before dying that his discovery of Anaxagoras' concept of a cosmic nous as the cause of the order of things, was an important turning point for him. But he also expressed disagreement with Anaxagoras' understanding of the implications of his own doctrine, because of Anaxagoras' materialist understanding of causation. Socrates said that Anaxagoras would "give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me". On the other hand, Socrates seems to suggest that he also failed to develop a fully satisfactory teleological and dualistic understanding of a mind of nature, whose aims represent the Good, which all parts of nature aim at. Concerning the nous that is the source of understanding of individuals, Plato is widely understood to have used ideas from Parmenides in addition to Anaxagoras. Like Parmenides, Plato argued that relying on sense perception can never lead to true knowledge, only opinion. Instead, Plato's more philosophical characters argue that nous must somehow perceive truth directly in the ways gods and daimons perceive. What our mind sees directly in order to really understand things must not be the constantly changing material things, but unchanging entities that exist in a different way, the so-called "forms" or "ideas". However he knew that contemporary philosophers often argued (as in modern science) that nous and perception are just two aspects of one physical activity, and that perception is the source of knowledge and understanding (not the other way around). Just exactly how Plato believed that the nous of people lets them come to understand things in any way that improves upon sense perception and the kind of thinking which animals have, is a subject of long running discussion and debate. On the one hand, in the Republic Plato's Socrates, in the Analogy of the Sun and Allegory of the Cave describes people as being able to perceive more clearly because of something from outside themselves, something like when the sun shines, helping eyesight. The source of this illumination for the intellect is referred to as the Form of the Good. On the other hand, in the Meno for example, Plato's Socrates explains the theory of anamnesis whereby people are born with ideas already in their soul, which they somehow remember from previous lives. Both theories were to become highly influential. As in Xenophon, Plato's Socrates frequently describes the soul in a political way, with ruling parts, and parts that are by nature meant to be ruled. Nous is associated with the rational (logistikon) part of the individual human soul, which by nature should rule. In his Republic, in the so-called "analogy of the divided line", it has a special function within this rational part. Plato tended to treat nous as the only immortal part of the soul. Concerning the cosmos, in the Timaeus, the title character also tells a "likely story" in which nous is responsible for the creative work of the demiurge or maker who brought rational order to our universe. This craftsman imitated what he perceived in the world of eternal Forms. In the Philebus Socrates argues that nous in individual humans must share in a cosmic nous, in the same way that human bodies are made up of small parts of the elements found in the rest of the universe. And this nous must be in the genos of being a cause of all particular things as particular things. Aristotle Like Plato, Aristotle saw the nous or intellect of an individual as somehow similar to sense perception but also distinct. Sense perception in action provides images to the nous, via the "sensus communis" and imagination, without which thought could not occur. But other animals have sensus communis and imagination, whereas none of them have nous. Aristotelians divide perception of forms into the animal-like one which perceives species sensibilis or sensible forms, and species intelligibilis that are perceived in a different way by the nous. Like Plato, Aristotle linked nous to logos (reason) as uniquely human, but he also distinguished nous from logos, thereby distinguishing the faculty for setting definitions from the faculty that uses them to reason with. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI Aristotle divides the soul (psychē) into two parts, one which has reason and one which does not, but then divides the part which has reason into the reasoning (logistikos) part itself which is lower, and the higher "knowing" (epistēmonikos) part which contemplates general principles (archai). Nous, he states, is the source of the first principles or sources (archai) of definitions, and it develops naturally as people gain experience. This he explains after first comparing the four other truth revealing capacities of soul: technical know how (technē), logically deduced knowledge (epistēmē, sometimes translated as "scientific knowledge"), practical wisdom (phronēsis), and lastly theoretical wisdom (sophia), which is defined by Aristotle as the combination of nous and epistēmē. All of these others apart from nous are types of reason (logos). Aristotle's philosophical works continue many of the same Socratic themes as his teacher Plato. Amongst the new proposals he made was a way of explaining causality, and nous is an important part of his explanation. As mentioned above, Plato criticized Anaxagoras' materialism, or understanding that the intellect of nature only set the cosmos in motion, but is no longer seen as the cause of physical events. Aristotle explained that the changes of things can be described in terms of four causes at the same time. Two of these four causes are similar to the materialist understanding: each thing has a material which causes it to be how it is, and some other thing which set in motion or initiated some process of change. But at the same time according to Aristotle each thing is also caused by the natural forms they are tending to become, and the natural ends or aims, which somehow exist in nature as causes, even in cases where human plans and aims are not involved. These latter two causes (the "formal" and "final") encompass the continuous effect of the intelligent ordering principle of nature itself. Aristotle's special description of causality is especially apparent in the natural development of living things. It leads to a method whereby Aristotle analyses causation and motion in terms of the potentialities and actualities of all things, whereby all matter possesses various possibilities or potentialities of form and end, and these possibilities become more fully real as their potential forms become actual or active reality (something they will do on their own, by nature, unless stopped because of other natural things happening). For example, a stone has in its nature the potentiality of falling to the earth and it will do so, and actualize this natural tendency, if nothing is in the way. Aristotle analyzed thinking in the same way. For him, the possibility of understanding rests on the relationship between intellect and sense perception. Aristotle's remarks on the concept of what came to be called the "active intellect" and "passive intellect" (along with various other terms) are amongst "the most intensely studied sentences in the history of philosophy". The terms are derived from a single passage in Aristotle's De Anima, Book III. Following is the translation of one of those passages with some key Greek words shown in square brackets. ...since in nature one thing is the material [hulē] for each kind [genos] (this is what is in potency all the particular things of that kind) but it is something else that is the causal and productive thing by which all of them are formed, as is the case with an art in relation to its material, it is necessary in the soul [psychē] too that these distinct aspects be present; the one sort is intellect [nous] by becoming all things, the other sort by forming all things, in the way an active condition [hexis] like light too makes the colors that are in potency be at work as colors [to phōs poiei ta dunamei onta chrōmata energeiai chrōmata]. This sort of intellect [which is like light in the way it makes potential things work as what they are] is separate, as well as being without attributes and unmixed, since it is by its thinghood a being-at-work [energeia], for what acts is always distinguished in stature above what is acted upon, as a governing source is above the material it works on. Knowledge [epistēmē], in its being-at-work, is the same as the thing it knows, and while knowledge in potency comes first in time in any one knower, in the whole of things it does not take precedence even in time. This does not mean that at one time it thinks but at another time it does not think, but when separated it is just exactly what it is, and this alone is deathless and everlasting (though we have no memory, because this sort of intellect is not acted upon, while the sort that is acted upon is destructible), and without this nothing thinks. The passage tries to explain "how the human intellect passes from its original state, in which it does not think, to a subsequent state, in which it does" according to his distinction between potentiality and actuality. Aristotle says that the passive intellect receives the intelligible forms of things, but that the active intellect is required to make the potential knowledge into actual knowledge, in the same way that light makes potential colours into actual colours. As Davidson remarks: Just what Aristotle meant by potential intellect and active intellect—terms not even explicit in the De anima and at best implied—and just how he understood the interaction between them remains moot. Students of the history of philosophy continue to debate Aristotle's intent, particularly the question whether he considered the active intellect to be an aspect of the human soul or an entity existing independently of man. The passage is often read together with Metaphysics, Book XII, ch. 7–10, where Aristotle makes nous as an actuality a central subject within a discussion of the cause of being and the cosmos. In that book, Aristotle equates active nous, when people think and their nous becomes what they think about, with the "unmoved mover" of the universe, and God: "For the actuality of thought (nous) is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal." Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, equated this active intellect which is God with the one explained in De Anima, while Themistius thought they could not be simply equated. (See below.) Like Plato before him, Aristotle believes Anaxagoras' cosmic nous implies and requires the cosmos to have intentions or ends: "Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind (nous) moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other Good—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health." In the philosophy of Aristotle the soul (psyche) of a body is what makes it alive, and is its actualized form; thus, every living thing, including plant life, has a soul. The mind or intellect (nous) can be described variously as a power, faculty, part, or aspect of the human soul. For Aristotle, soul and nous are not the same. He did not rule out the possibility that nous might survive without the rest of the soul, as in Plato, but he specifically says that this immortal nous does not include any memories or anything else specific to an individual's life. In his Generation of Animals Aristotle specifically says that while other parts of the soul come from the parents, physically, the human nous, must come from outside, into the body, because it is divine or godly, and it has nothing in common with the energeia of the body. This was yet another passage which Alexander of Aphrodisias would link to those mentioned above from De Anima and the Metaphysics in order to understand Aristotle's intentions. Post-Aristotelian classical theories Until the early modern era, much of the discussion which has survived today concerning nous or intellect, in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, concerned how to correctly interpret Aristotle and Plato. However, at least during the classical period, materialist philosophies, more similar to modern science, such as Epicureanism, were still relatively common. The Epicureans believed that the bodily senses themselves were not the cause of error, but the interpretations can be. The term prolepsis was used by Epicureans to describe the way the mind forms general concepts from sense perceptions. To the Stoics, more like Heraclitus than Anaxagoras, order in the cosmos comes from an entity called logos, the cosmic reason. But as in Anaxagoras this cosmic reason, like human reason but higher, is connected to the reason of individual humans. The Stoics however, did not invoke incorporeal causation, but attempted to explain physics and human thinking in terms of matter and forces. As in Aristotelianism, they explained the interpretation of sense data requiring the mind to be stamped or formed with ideas, and that people have shared conceptions that help them make sense of things (koine ennoia). Nous for them is soul "somehow disposed" (pôs echon), the soul being somehow disposed pneuma, which is fire or air or a mixture. As in Plato, they treated nous as the ruling part of the soul. Plutarch criticized the Stoic idea of nous being corporeal, and agreed with Plato that the soul is more divine than the body while nous (mind) is more divine than the soul. The mix of soul and body produces pleasure and pain; the conjunction of mind and soul produces reason which is the cause or the source of virtue and vice. (From: “On the Face in the Moon”) Albinus was one of the earliest authors to equate Aristotle's nous as prime mover of the Universe, with Plato's Form of the Good. Alexander of Aphrodisias Alexander of Aphrodisias was a Peripatetic (Aristotelian) and his On the Soul (referred to as De anima in its traditional Latin title), explained that by his interpretation of Aristotle, potential intellect in man, that which has no nature but receives one from the active intellect, is material, and also called the "material intellect" (nous hulikos) and it is inseparable from the body, being "only a disposition" of it. He argued strongly against the doctrine of immortality. On the other hand, he identified the active intellect (nous poietikos), through whose agency the potential intellect in man becomes actual, not with anything from within people, but with the divine creator itself. In the early Renaissance his doctrine of the soul's mortality was adopted by Pietro Pomponazzi against the Thomists and the Averroists. For him, the only possible human immortality is an immortality of a detached human thought, more specifically when the nous has as the object of its thought the active intellect itself, or another incorporeal intelligible form. Alexander was also responsible for influencing the development of several more technical terms concerning the intellect, which became very influential amongst the great Islamic philosophers, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. The intellect in habitu is a stage in which the human intellect has taken possession of a repertoire of thoughts, and so is potentially able to think those thoughts, but is not yet thinking these thoughts. The intellect from outside, which became the "acquired intellect" in Islamic philosophy, describes the incorporeal active intellect which comes from outside man, and becomes an object of thought, making the material intellect actual and active. This term may have come from a particularly expressive translation of Alexander into Arabic. Plotinus also used such a term. In any case, in Al-Farabi and Avicenna, the term took on a new meaning, distinguishing it from the active intellect in any simple sense—an ultimate stage of the human intellect where a kind of close relationship (a "conjunction") is made between a person's active intellect and the transcendental nous itself. Themistius Themistius, another influential commentator on this matter, understood Aristotle differently, stating that the passive or material intellect does "not employ a bodily organ for its activity, is wholly unmixed with the body, impassive, and separate [from matter]". This means the human potential intellect, and not only the active intellect, is an incorporeal substance, or a disposition of incorporeal substance. For Themistius, the human soul becomes immortal "as soon as the active intellect intertwines with it at the outset of human thought". This understanding of the intellect was also very influential for Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, and "virtually all Islamic and Jewish philosophers". On the other hand, concerning the active intellect, like Alexander and Plotinus, he saw this as a transcendent being existing above and outside man. Differently from Alexander, he did not equate this being with the first cause of the Universe itself, but something lower. However he equated it with Plato's Idea of the Good. Plotinus and Neoplatonism Of the later Greek and Roman writers Plotinus, the initiator of neoplatonism, is particularly significant. Like Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, he saw himself as a commentator explaining the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. But in his Enneads he went further than those authors, often working from passages which had been presented more tentatively, possibly inspired partly by earlier authors such as the neopythagorean Numenius of Apamea. Neoplatonism provided a major inspiration to discussion concerning the intellect in late classical and medieval philosophy, theology and cosmology. In neoplatonism there exists several levels or hypostases of being, including the natural and visible world as a lower part. The Monad or "the One" sometimes also described as "the Good", based on the concept as it is found in Plato. This is the dunamis or possibility of existence. It causes the other levels by emanation. The Nous (usually translated as "Intellect", or "Intelligence" in this context, or sometimes "mind" or "reason") is described as God, or more precisely an image of God. It thinks its own contents, which are thoughts, equated to the Platonic ideas or forms (eide). The thinking of this Intellect is the highest activity of life. The actualization (energeia) of this thinking is the being of the forms. This Intellect is the first principle or foundation of existence. The One is prior to it, but not in the sense that a normal cause is prior to an effect, but instead Intellect is called an emanation of the One. The One is the possibility of this foundation of existence. Soul (psychē). The soul is also an energeia: it acts upon or actualizes its own thoughts and creates "a separate, material cosmos that is the living image of the spiritual or noetic Cosmos contained as a unified thought within the Intelligence". So it is the soul which perceives things in nature physically, which it understands to be reality. Soul in Plotinus plays a role similar to the potential intellect in Aristotelian terminology. Lowest is matter. This was based largely upon Plotinus' reading of Plato, but also incorporated many Aristotelian concepts, including the unmoved mover as energeia. They also incorporated a theory of anamnesis, or knowledge coming from the past lives of our immortal souls, like that found in some of Plato's dialogues. Later Platonists distinguished a hierarchy of three separate manifestations of nous, like Numenius of Apamea had. Medieval nous in religion Greek philosophy had an influence on the major religions that defined the Middle Ages, and one aspect of this was the concept of nous. Gnosticism Gnosticism was a late classical movement that incorporated ideas inspired by Neoplatonism and Neopythagoreanism, but which was more a syncretic religious movement than an accepted philosophical movement. Valentinus In Valentinianism, Nous is the first male Aeon. Together with his conjugate female Aeon, Aletheia (truth), he emanates from the Propator Bythos ( "Forefather Depths") and his co-eternal Ennoia ( "Thought") or Sigē ( "Silence"); and these four form the primordial Tetrad. Like the other male Aeons he is sometimes regarded as androgynous, including in himself the female Aeon who is paired with him. He is the Only Begotten; and is styled the Father, the Beginning of All, inasmuch as from him are derived immediately or mediately the remaining Aeons who complete the Ogdoad (eight), thence the Decad (ten), and thence the Dodecad (twelve); in all, thirty Aeons constitute the Pleroma. He alone is capable of knowing the Propator; but when he desired to impart like knowledge to the other Aeons, was withheld from so doing by Sigē. When Sophia ("Wisdom"), youngest Aeon of the thirty, was brought into peril by her yearning after this knowledge, Nous was foremost of the Aeons in interceding for her. From him, or through him from the Propator, Horos was sent to restore her. After her restoration, Nous, according to the providence of the Propator, produced another pair, Christ and the Holy Spirit, "in order to give fixity and steadfastness to the Pleroma." For this Christ teaches the Aeons to be content to know that the Propator is in himself incomprehensible, and can be perceived only through the Only Begotten (Nous). Ophites The Ophites held that the demiurge Ialdabaoth, after coming into conflict with the archons he created, created a son, Ophiomorphus, who is called the serpent-formed Nous. This entity would become the serpent in the garden, who was compelled to act on behest of Sophia. Basilides A similar conception of Nous appears in the later teaching of the Basilideans, according to which he is the first begotten of the Unbegotten Father, and himself the parent of Logos, from whom emanate successively Phronesis, Sophia, and Dunamis. But in this teaching, Nous is identified with Christ, is named Jesus, is sent to save those that believe, and returns to Him who sent him, after a Passion which is apparent only, Simon of Cyrene being substituted for him on the cross. It is probable, however, that Nous had a place in the original system of Basilides himself; for his Ogdoad, "the great Archon of the universe, the ineffable" is apparently made up of the five members named by Irenaeus (as above), together with two whom we find in Clement of Alexandria, Dikaiosyne and Eirene, added to the originating Father. Simon Magus The antecedent of these systems is that of Simon, of whose six "roots" emanating from the Unbegotten Fire, Nous is first. The correspondence of these "roots" with the first six Aeons that Valentinus derives from Bythos, is noted by Hippolytus. Simon says in his Apophasis Megalē, To Nous and Epinoia correspond Heaven and Earth, in the list given by Simon of the six material counterparts of his six emanations. The identity of this list with the six material objects alleged by Herodotus to be worshipped by the Persians, together with the supreme place given by Simon to Fire as the primordial power, leads us to look to Iran for the origin of these systems in one aspect. In another, they connect themselves with the teaching of Pythagoras and of Plato. Gospel of Mary According to the Gospel of Mary, Jesus himself articulates the essence of Nous: Mandaeism In Mandaic, mana has been variously translated as "mind," "nous," or "treasure." The Mandaean formula "I am a mana of the Great Life" is a phrase often found in the numerous hymns of Book 2 of the Left Ginza. Medieval Islamic philosophy During the Middle Ages, philosophy itself was in many places seen as opposed to the prevailing monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The strongest philosophical tradition for some centuries was amongst Islamic philosophers, who later came to strongly influence the late medieval philosophers of western Christendom, and the Jewish diaspora in the Mediterranean area. While there were earlier Muslim philosophers such as Al-Kindi, chronologically the three most influential concerning the intellect were Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and finally Averroes, a westerner who lived in Spain and was highly influential in the late Middle Ages amongst Jewish and Christian philosophers. Al-Farabi The exact precedents of al-Farabi's influential philosophical scheme, in which nous (Arabic ʿaql) plays an important role, are no longer perfectly clear because of the great loss of texts in the Middle Ages which he would have had access to. He was apparently innovative in at least some points. He was clearly influenced by the same late classical world as neoplatonism, neopythagoreanism, but exactly how is less clear. Plotinus, Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias are generally accepted to have been influences. However while these three all placed the active intellect "at or near the top of the hierarchy of being", al-Farabi was clear in making it the lowest ranking in a series of distinct transcendental intelligences. He is the first known person to have done this in a clear way. He was also the first philosopher known to have assumed the existence of a causal hierarchy of celestial spheres, and the incorporeal intelligences parallel to those spheres. Al-Farabi also fitted an explanation of prophecy into this scheme, in two levels. According to Davidson (p. 59):The lower of the two levels, labeled specifically as "prophecy" (nubuwwa), is enjoyed by men who have not yet perfected their intellect, whereas the higher, which Alfarabi sometimes specifically names "revelation" (w-ḥ-y), comes exclusively to those who stand at the stage of acquired intellect. This happens in the imagination (Arabic mutakhayyila; Greek phantasia), a faculty of the mind already described by Aristotle, which al-Farabi described as serving the rational part of the soul (Arabic ʿaql; Greek nous). This faculty of imagination stores sense perceptions (maḥsūsāt), disassembles or recombines them, creates figurative or symbolic images (muḥākāt) of them which then appear in dreams, visualizes present and predicted events in a way different from conscious deliberation (rawiyya). This is under the influence, according to al-Farabi, of the active intellect. Theoretical truth can only be received by this faculty in a figurative or symbolic form, because the imagination is a physical capability and can not receive theoretical information in a proper abstract form. This rarely comes in a waking state, but more often in dreams. The lower type of prophecy is the best possible for the imaginative faculty, but the higher type of prophecy requires not only a receptive imagination, but also the condition of an "acquired intellect", where the human nous is in "conjunction" with the active intellect in the sense of God. Such a prophet is also a philosopher. When a philosopher-prophet has the necessary leadership qualities, he becomes philosopher-king. Avicenna In terms of cosmology, according to Davidson (p. 82), "Avicenna's universe has a structure virtually identical with the structure of Alfarabi's" but there are differences in details. As in al-Farabi, there are several levels of intellect, intelligence or nous, each of the higher ones being associated with a celestial sphere. Avicenna however details three different types of effect which each of these higher intellects has, each "thinks" both the necessary existence and the possible being of the intelligence one level higher. And each "emanates" downwards the body and soul of its own celestial sphere, and also the intellect at the next lowest level. The active intellect, as in Alfarabi, is the last in the chain. Avicenna sees active intellect as the cause not only of intelligible thought and the forms in the "sublunar" world we people live, but also the matter. (In other words, three effects.) Concerning the workings of the human soul, Avicenna, like al-Farabi, sees the "material intellect" or potential intellect as something that is not material. He believed the soul was incorporeal, and the potential intellect was a disposition of it which was in the soul from birth. As in al-Farabi there are two further stages of potential for thinking, which are not yet actual thinking, first the mind acquires the most basic intelligible thoughts which we can not think in any other way, such as "the whole is greater than the part", then comes a second level of derivative intelligible thoughts which could be thought. Concerning the actualization of thought, Avicenna applies the term "to two different things, to actual human thought, irrespective of the intellectual progress a man has made, and to actual thought when human intellectual development is complete", as in al-Farabi. When reasoning in the sense of deriving conclusions from syllogisms, Avicenna says people are using a physical "cogitative" faculty (mufakkira, fikra) of the soul, which can err. The human cogitative faculty is the same as the "compositive imaginative faculty (mutakhayyila) in reference to the animal soul". But some people can use "insight" to avoid this step and derive conclusions directly by conjoining with the active intellect. Once a thought has been learned in a soul, the physical faculties of sense perception and imagination become unnecessary, and as a person acquires more thoughts, their soul becomes less connected to their body. For Avicenna, different from the normal Aristotelian position, all of the soul is by nature immortal. But the level of intellectual development does affect the type of afterlife that the soul can have. Only a soul which has reached the highest type of conjunction with the active intellect can form a perfect conjunction with it after the death of the body, and this is a supreme eudaimonia. Lesser intellectual achievement means a less happy or even painful afterlife. Concerning prophecy, Avicenna identifies a broader range of possibilities which fit into this model, which is still similar to that of al-Farabi. Averroes Averroes came to be regarded even in Europe as "the Commentator" to "the Philosopher", Aristotle, and his study of the questions surrounding the nous were very influential amongst Jewish and Christian philosophers, with some aspects being quite controversial. According to Herbert Davidson, Averroes' doctrine concerning nous can be divided into two periods. In the first, neoplatonic emanationism, not found in the original works of Aristotle, was combined with a naturalistic explanation of the human material intellect. "It also insists on the material intellect's having an active intellect as a direct object of thought and conjoining with the active intellect, notions never expressed in the Aristotelian canon." It was this presentation which Jewish philosophers such as Moses Narboni and Gersonides understood to be Averroes'. In the later model of the universe, which was transmitted to Christian philosophers, Averroes "dismisses emanationism and explains the generation of living beings in the sublunar world naturalistically, all in the name of a more genuine Aristotelianism. Yet it abandons the earlier naturalistic conception of the human material intellect and transforms the material intellect into something wholly un-Aristotelian, a single transcendent entity serving all mankind. It nominally salvages human conjunction with the active intellect, but in words that have little content." This position, that humankind shares one active intellect, was taken up by Parisian philosophers such as Siger of Brabant, but also widely rejected by philosophers such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Ramon Lull, and Duns Scotus. Despite being widely considered heretical, the position was later defended by many more European philosophers including John of Jandun, who was the primary link bringing this doctrine from Paris to Bologna. After him this position continued to be defended and also rejected by various writers in northern Italy. In the 16th century it finally became a less common position after the renewal of an "Alexandrian" position based on that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, associated with Pietro Pomponazzi. Christianity The Christian New Testament makes mention of the nous or noos, generally translated in modern English as "mind", but also showing a link to God's will or law: , refers to the law (nomos) of God which is the law in the writer's nous, as opposed to the law of sin which is in the body. , demands Christians should not conform to this world, but continuously be transformed by the renewing of their nous, so as to be able to determine what God’s will is. Discusses "speaking in tongues" and says that a person who speaks in tongues that they can not understand should prefer to also have understanding (nous), and it is better for the listeners also to be able to understand. Discusses how non-Christians have a worthless nous, while Christians should seek to renew the spirit (pneuma) of their nous. . Uses the term to refer to being troubled of mind. : "here is the nous which has wisdom". In the writings of the Christian fathers a sound or pure nous is considered essential to the cultivation of wisdom. Philosophers influencing western Christianity While philosophical works were not commonly read or taught in the early Middle Ages in most of Europe, the works of authors like Boethius and Augustine of Hippo formed an important exception. Both were influenced by neoplatonism, and were amongst the older works that were still known in the time of the Carolingian Renaissance, and the beginnings of Scholasticism. In his early years Augustine was heavily influenced by Manichaeism and afterwards by the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. After his conversion to Christianity and baptism (387), he developed his own approach to philosophy and theology, accommodating a variety of methods and different perspectives. Augustine used Neoplatonism selectively. He used both the neoplatonic Nous, and the Platonic Form of the Good (or "The Idea of the Good") as equivalent terms for the Christian God, or at least for one particular aspect of God. For example, God, nous, can act directly upon matter, and not only through souls, and concerning the souls through which it works upon the world experienced by humanity, some are treated as angels. Scholasticism becomes more clearly defined much later, as the peculiar native type of philosophy in medieval catholic Europe. In this period, Aristotle became "the Philosopher", and scholastic philosophers, like their Jewish and Muslim contemporaries, studied the concept of the intellectus on the basis not only of Aristotle, but also late classical interpreters like Augustine and Boethius. A European tradition of new and direct interpretations of Aristotle developed which was eventually strong enough to argue with partial success against some of the interpretations of Aristotle from the Islamic world, most notably Averroes' doctrine of their being one "active intellect" for all humanity. Notable "Catholic" (as opposed to Averroist) Aristotelians included Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, the founder of Thomism, which exists to this day in various forms. Concerning the nous, Thomism agrees with those Aristotelians who insist that the intellect is immaterial and separate from any bodily organs, but as per Christian doctrine, the whole of the human soul is immortal, not only the intellect. Eastern Orthodox The human nous in Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the "eye of the heart or soul" or the "mind of the heart". The soul of man, is created by God in His image, man's soul is intelligent and noetic. Saint Thalassius of Syria wrote that God created beings "with a capacity to receive the Spirit and to attain knowledge of Himself; He has brought into existence the senses and sensory perception to serve such beings". Eastern Orthodox Christians hold that God did this by creating mankind with intelligence and noetic faculties. Human reasoning is not enough: there will always remain an "irrational residue" which escapes analysis and which can not be expressed in concepts: it is this unknowable depth of things, that which constitutes their true, indefinable essence that also reflects the origin of things in God. In Eastern Christianity it is by faith or intuitive truth that this component of an object’s existence is grasped. Though God through his energies draws us to him, his essence remains inaccessible. The operation of faith being the means of free will by which mankind faces the future or unknown, these noetic operations contained in the concept of insight or noesis. Faith (pistis) is therefore sometimes used interchangeably with noesis in Eastern Christianity. Angels have intelligence and nous, whereas men have reason, both logos and dianoia, nous and sensory perception. This follows the idea that man is a microcosm and an expression of the whole creation or macrocosmos. The human nous was darkened after the Fall of Man (which was the result of the rebellion of reason against the nous), but after the purification (healing or correction) of the nous (achieved through ascetic practices like hesychasm), the human nous (the "eye of the heart") will see God's uncreated Light (and feel God's uncreated love and beauty, at which point the nous will start the unceasing prayer of the heart) and become illuminated, allowing the person to become an orthodox theologian. In this belief, the soul is created in the image of God. Since God is Trinitarian, Mankind is Nous, reason, both logos and dianoia, and Spirit. The same is held true of the soul (or heart): it has nous, word and spirit. To understand this better first an understanding of Saint Gregory Palamas's teaching that man is a representation of the trinitarian mystery should be addressed. This holds that God is not meant in the sense that the Trinity should be understood anthropomorphically, but man is to be understood in a triune way. Or, that the Trinitarian God is not to be interpreted from the point of view of individual man, but man is interpreted on the basis of the Trinitarian God. And this interpretation is revelatory not merely psychological and human. This means that it is only when a person is within the revelation, as all the saints lived, that he can grasp this understanding completely (see theoria). The second presupposition is that mankind has and is composed of nous, word and spirit like the trinitarian mode of being. Man's nous, word and spirit are not hypostases or individual existences or realities, but activities or energies of the soul—whereas in the case with God or the Persons of the Holy Trinity, each are indeed hypostases. So these three components of each individual man are 'inseparable from one another' but they do not have a personal character" when in speaking of the being or ontology that is mankind. The nous as the eye of the soul, which some Fathers also call the heart, is the centre of man and is where true (spiritual) knowledge is validated. This is seen as true knowledge which is "implanted in the nous as always co-existing with it". Early modern philosophy The so-called "early modern" philosophers of western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries established arguments which led to the establishment of modern science as a methodical approach to improve the welfare of humanity by learning to control nature. As such, speculation about metaphysics, which cannot be used for anything practical, and which can never be confirmed against the reality we experience, started to be deliberately avoided, especially according to the so-called "empiricist" arguments of philosophers such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The Latin motto "nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu" (nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses) has been described as the "guiding principle of empiricism" in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. (This was in fact an old Aristotelian doctrine, which they took up, but as discussed above Aristotelians still believed that the senses on their own were not enough to explain the mind.) These philosophers explain the intellect as something developed from experience of sensations, being interpreted by the brain in a physical way, and nothing else, which means that absolute knowledge is impossible. For Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, who wrote in both English and Latin, "intellectus" was translated as "understanding". Far from seeing it as secure way to perceive the truth about reality, Bacon, for example, actually named the intellectus in his Novum Organum, and the proœmium to his Great Instauration, as a major source of wrong conclusions, because it is biased in many ways, for example towards over-generalizing. For this reason, modern science should be methodical, in order not to be misled by the weak human intellect. He felt that lesser known Greek philosophers such as Democritus "who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things", have been arrogantly dismissed because of Aristotelianism leading to a situation in his time wherein "the search of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence". The intellect or understanding was the subject of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. These philosophers also tended not to emphasize the distinction between reason and intellect, describing the peculiar universal or abstract definitions of human understanding as being man-made and resulting from reason itself. Hume even questioned the distinctness or peculiarity of human understanding and reason, compared to other types of associative or imaginative thinking found in some other animals. In modern science during this time, Newton is sometimes described as more empiricist compared to Leibniz. On the other hand, into modern times some philosophers have continued to propose that the human mind has an in-born ("a priori") ability to know the truth conclusively, and these philosophers have needed to argue that the human mind has direct and intuitive ideas about nature, and this means it can not be limited entirely to what can be known from sense perception. Amongst the early modern philosophers, some such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, tend to be distinguished from the empiricists as rationalists, and to some extent at least some of them are called idealists, and their writings on the intellect or understanding present various doubts about empiricism, and in some cases they argued for positions which appear more similar to those of medieval and classical philosophers. The first in this series of modern rationalists, Descartes, is credited with defining a "mind-body problem" which is a major subject of discussion for university philosophy courses. According to the presentation his 2nd Meditation, the human mind and body are different in kind, and while Descartes agrees with Hobbes for example that the human body works like a clockwork mechanism, and its workings include memory and imagination, the real human is the thinking being, a soul, which is not part of that mechanism. Descartes explicitly refused to divide this soul into its traditional parts such as intellect and reason, saying that these things were indivisible aspects of the soul. Descartes was therefore a dualist, but very much in opposition to traditional Aristotelian dualism. In his 6th Meditation he deliberately uses traditional terms and states that his active faculty of giving ideas to his thought must be corporeal, because the things perceived are clearly external to his own thinking and corporeal, while his passive faculty must be incorporeal (unless God is deliberately deceiving us, and then in this case the active faculty would be from God). This is the opposite of the traditional explanation found for example in Alexander of Aphrodisias and discussed above, for whom the passive intellect is material, while the active intellect is not. One result is that in many Aristotelian conceptions of the nous, for example that of Thomas Aquinas, the senses are still a source of all the intellect's conceptions. However, with the strict separation of mind and body proposed by Descartes, it becomes possible to propose that there can be thought about objects never perceived with the body's senses, such as a thousand sided geometrical figure. Gassendi objected to this distinction between the imagination and the intellect in Descartes. Hobbes also objected, and according to his own philosophical approach asserted that the "triangle in the mind comes from the triangle we have seen" and "essence in so far as it is distinguished from existence is nothing else than a union of names by means of the verb is". Descartes, in his reply to this objection insisted that this traditional distinction between essence and existence is "known to all". His contemporary Blaise Pascal, criticised him in similar words to those used by Plato's Socrates concerning Anaxagoras, discussed above, saying that "I cannot forgive Descartes; in all his philosophy, Descartes did his best to dispense with God. But Descartes could not avoid prodding God to set the world in motion with a snap of his lordly fingers; after that, he had no more use for God." Descartes argued that when the intellect does a job of helping people interpret what they perceive, not with the help of an intellect which enters from outside, but because each human mind comes into being with innate God-given ideas, more similar then, to Plato's theory of anamnesis, only not requiring reincarnation. Apart from such examples as the geometrical definition of a triangle, another example is the idea of God, according to the 4th "Meditation", comes about because people make judgments about things which are not in the intellect or understanding. This is possible because the human will, being free, is not limited like the human intellect. Spinoza, though considered a Cartesian and a rationalist, rejected Cartesian dualism and idealism. In his "pantheistic" approach, explained for example in his Ethics, God is the same as nature, the human intellect is just the same as the human will. The divine intellect of nature is quite different from human intellect, because it is finite, but Spinoza does accept that the human intellect is a part of the infinite divine intellect. Leibniz, in comparison to the guiding principle of the empiricists described above, added some words nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipsi ("nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses" except the intellect itself). Despite being at the forefront of modern science, and modernist philosophy, in his writings he still referred to the active and passive intellect, a divine intellect, and the immortality of the active intellect. Berkeley, partly in reaction to Locke, also attempted to reintroduce an "immaterialism" into early modern philosophy (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by others). He argued that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas depend on perceiving minds for their very existence. This belief later became immortalized in the dictum, esse est percipi ("to be is to be perceived"). As in classical and medieval philosophy, Berkeley believed understanding had to be explained by divine intervention, and that all our ideas are put in our mind by God. Hume accepted some of Berkeley's corrections of Locke, but in answer insisted, as had Bacon and Hobbes, that absolute knowledge is not possible, and that all attempts to show how it could be possible have logical problems. Hume's writings remain highly influential on all philosophy afterwards, and are for example considered by Kant to have shaken him from an intellectual slumber. Kant, a turning point in modern philosophy, agreed with some classical philosophers and Leibniz that the intellect itself, although it needed sensory experience for understanding to begin, needs something else in order to make sense of the incoming sense information. In his formulation the intellect (Verstand) has a priori or innate principles which it has before thinking even starts. Kant represents the starting point of German idealism and a new phase of modernity, while empiricist philosophy has also continued beyond Hume to the present day. See also References Further reading Etymology and history of the term Stella, F. "La notion d'Intelligence (Noûs-Noeîn) dans la Grèce antique. D'Homère au Platonisme" [archive], sur journals.openedition.org, 17 février 2016 Stella, F. "L'origine des termes νόος-νοεῖν" [archive], sur journals.openedition.org, 22 février 2016 Stella, F. Noos e noein da Omero a Platone, PUFC, 2021. Aristotle's theory of nous Alexander of Aphrodisias . Supplement to On the Soul. Trans. by R.W. Sharples. London: Duckworth, 2004. Burnyeat, M. "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)." In Essays on Aristotle’s de Anima. Ed. C. MarthaNussbaum and Amelie OksenbergRorty . Clarendon Press, 1992. 15–26. Burnyeat, M. "De Anima II 5." Phronesis 47.1 (2002) Burnyeat, M. 2008. Aristotle's Divine Intellect. Milwaukee : Marquette University Press. Caston, V. "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal". Phronesis 44 (1999). Kosman, A. "What Does the Maker Mind Make?" In Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Ed. Nussbaum and Rorty. Oxford University Press, 1992. 343–58. Kislev, S. F. "A Self-Forming Vessel: Aristotle, Plasticity, and the Developing Nature of the Intellect", Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 51.3, 259–274 (2020). Lowe, M. F. "Aristotle on Kinds of Thinking". Phronesis 28.1 (1983). External links Definition of nous on Perseus Project website. Aristotle's Psychology from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy What is the Human Nous? by John Romanides Aristotelianism Concepts in ancient Greek metaphysics Concepts in ancient Greek philosophy of mind Concepts in ancient Greek epistemology Gnosticism History of psychology Intelligence Mental content Metaphysics of mind Neoplatonism Ontology Perception Platonism Reasoning New Testament Greek words and phrases Philosophy of Aristotle Theories in ancient Greek philosophy

Systematic theology

Systematic theology, or systematics, is a discipline of Christian theology that formulates an orderly, rational, and coherent account of the doctrines of the Christian faith. It addresses issues such as what the Bible teaches about certain topics or what is true about God and his universe. It also builds on biblical disciplines, church history, as well as biblical and historical theology. Systematic theology shares its systematic tasks with other disciplines such as constructive theology, dogmatics, ethics, apologetics, and philosophy of religion. Method With a methodological tradition that differs somewhat from biblical theology, systematic theology draws on the core sacred texts of Christianity, while simultaneously investigating the development of Christian doctrine over the course of history, particularly through philosophy, ethics, social sciences, and natural sciences. Using biblical texts, it attempts to compare and relate all of scripture which led to the creation of a systematized statement on what the whole Bible says about particular issues. Within Christianity, different traditions (both intellectual and ecclesial) approach systematic theology in different ways impacting a) the method employed to develop the system, b) the understanding of theology's task, c) the doctrines included in the system, and d) the order those doctrines appear. Even with such diversity, it is generally the case that works that one can describe as systematic theologies begin with revelation and conclude with eschatology. Since it is focused on truth, systematic theology is also framed to interact with and address the contemporary world. Many authors have explored this area, including Charles Gore, John Walvoord, Lindsay Dewar, and Charles Moule. This process concludes with applications to contemporary issues. In a seminal article, "Principles of Systematic Theology," Anglican theologian John Webster describes systematic theology as proceeding along a series of principles, which he draws from various theologians including Thomas Aquinas: The Trinity: The Ontological Principle (principium essendi) Scripture: The External/Objective Cognitive Principle (principium cognoscendi externum) The Redeemed Intelligence of the Saints: The Internal/Subjective Cognitive Principle (principium cognoscendi internum) Categories Since it is a systemic approach, systematic theology organizes truth under different headings and there are certain basic areas (or categories), although the exact list may vary slightly. These are: Angelology – The study of angels Bibliology – The study of the Bible Hamartiology - The study of sin Christology – The study of Christ Ecclesiology – The study of the church Eschatology – The study of the end times Pneumatology – The study of the Holy Spirit Soteriology – The study of salvation Theological anthropology – The study of the nature of humanity Theology proper – The study of the character of God History The establishment and integration of varied Christian ideas and Christianity-related notions, including diverse topics and themes of the Bible, in a single, coherent and well-ordered presentation is a relatively late development. The first known church father who referred to the notion of devising a comprehensive understanding of the principles of Christianity was Clement of Alexandria in the 3rd century, who stated thus: "Faith is then, so to speak, a comprehensive knowledge of the essentials." Clement himself, along with his follower Origen, attempted to create some systematic theology in their numerous surviving writings. In Eastern Orthodoxy, an early example is provided by John of Damascus's 8th-century Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, in which he attempts to set in order and demonstrate the coherence of the theology of the classic texts of the Eastern theological tradition. In the West, Peter Lombard's 12th-century Sentences, wherein he thematically collected a great series of quotations of the Church Fathers, became the basis of a medieval scholastic tradition of thematic commentary and explanation. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae best exemplifies this scholastic tradition. The Lutheran scholastic tradition of a thematic, ordered exposition of Christian theology emerged in the 16th century with Philipp Melanchthon's Loci Communes, and was countered by a Calvinist scholasticism, which is exemplified by John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion. In the 19th century, primarily in Protestant groups, a new kind of systematic theology arose that attempted to demonstrate that Christian doctrine formed a more coherent system premised on one or more fundamental axioms. Such theologies often involved a more drastic pruning and reinterpretation of traditional belief in order to cohere with the axiom or axioms. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, for example, produced Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche (The Christian Faith According to the Principles of the Protestant Church) in the 1820s, in which the fundamental idea is the universal presence among humanity, sometimes more hidden, sometimes more explicit, of a feeling or awareness of 'absolute dependence'. See also Biblical exegesis Biblical theology :Category:Systematic theologians Christian apologetics Christian theology Constructive theology Dispensationalist theology Dogmatic Theology Feminist theology Hermeneutics Historicism (Christianity) Liberal Christianity Liberation theology Philosophical theology Philosophy of religion Political theology Postliberal theology Process theology Theology of Anabaptism References Resources Barth, Karl (1956–1975). Church Dogmatics. (thirteen volumes) Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Berkhof, Hendrikus (1979). Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Berkhof, Louis (1996). Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Bloesch, Donald G. (2002–2004). Christian Foundations (seven volumes). Inter-varsity Press. (, , , , , , ) Calvin, John (1559). Institutes of the Christian Religion. Chafer, Lewis Sperry (1948). Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Kregel Chemnitz, Martin (1591). Loci Theologici. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1989. Erickson, Millard (1998). Christian Theology (2nd ed.). Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998. Frame, John. Theology of Lordship Fruchtenbaum, Arnold (1989). Israelology: The Missing Link in Systematic Theology. Tustin, CA: Ariel Ministries Fruchtenbaum, Arnold (1998). Messianic Christology. Tustin, CA: Ariel Ministries Geisler, Norman L. (2002–2004). Systematic Theology (four volumes). Minneapolis: Bethany House. Grenz, Stanley J. (1994). Theology for the Community of God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Grider, J. Kenneth (1994). A Wesleyan-Holiness Theology Grudem, Wayne (1995). Systematic Theology. Zondervan. Hodge, Charles (1960). Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Jenson, Robert W. (1997–1999). Systematic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Melanchthon, Philipp (1543). Loci Communes. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992. Miley, John. Systematic Theology. 1892. Newlands, George (1994). God in Christian Perspective. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Oden, Thomas C. (1987–1992). Systematic Theology (3 volumes). Peabody, MA: Prince Press. Pannenberg, Wolfhart (1988–1993). Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Pieper, Francis (1917–1924). Christian Dogmatics. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. Reymond, Robert L. (1998). A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (2nd ed.). Word Publishing. Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1928). The Christian Faith. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430). De Civitate Dei Thielicke, Helmut (1974–1982). The Evangelical Faith. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Thiessen, Henry C. (1949). Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: William B. Erdsmans Publishing Co. Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. (3 volumes). Turretin, Francis (3 parts, 1679–1685). Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Van Til, Cornelius (1974). An Introduction to Systematic Theology. P & R Press. Watson, Richard. Theological Institutes. 1823. Weber, Otto. (1981–1983) Foundations of Dogmatics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Christian theology Christian terminology

Ecosophy

Ecosophy or ecophilosophy (a portmanteau of ecological philosophy) is a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. The term was coined by the French post-structuralist philosopher and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari and the Norwegian father of deep ecology, Arne Næss. Félix Guattari Ecosophy also refers to a field of practice introduced by psychoanalyst, poststructuralist philosopher, and political activist Félix Guattari. In part Guattari's use of the term demarcates a necessity for the proponents of social liberation, whose struggles in the 20th century were dominated by the paradigm of social revolution, to embed their arguments within an ecological framework which understands the interconnections of social and environmental spheres. Guattari holds that traditional environmentalist perspectives obscure the complexity of the relationship between humans and their natural environment through their maintenance of the dualistic separation of human (cultural) and nonhuman (natural) systems; he envisions ecosophy as a new field with a monistic and pluralistic approach to such study. Ecology in the Guattarian sense, then, is a study of complex phenomena, including human subjectivity, the environment, and social relations, all of which are intimately interconnected. Despite this emphasis on interconnection, throughout his individual writings and more famous collaborations with Gilles Deleuze, Guattari has resisted calls for holism, preferring to emphasize heterogeneity and difference, synthesizing assemblages and multiplicities in order to trace rhizomatic structures rather than creating unified and holistic structures. Guattari's concept of the three interacting and interdependent ecologies of mind, society, and environment stems from the outline of the three ecologies presented in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, a collection of writings by cyberneticist Gregory Bateson. Næss's definition Næss defined ecosophy in the following way: While a professor at the University of Oslo in 1972, Arne Næss, introduced the terms "deep ecology movement" and "ecosophy" into environmental literature. Næss based his article on a talk he gave in Bucharest in 1972 at the Third World Future Research Conference. As Drengson notes in Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy and the Deep Ecology Movement: An Overview, "In his talk, Næss discussed the longer-range background of the ecology movement and its connection with respect for Nature and the inherent worth of other beings." Næss's view of humans as an integral part of a "total-field image" of Nature contrasts with the alternative construction of ecosophy outlined by Guattari. The term ecological wisdom, synonymous with ecosophy, was introduced by Næss in 1973. The concept has become one of the foundations of the deep ecology movement. All expressions of values by Green Parties list ecological wisdom as a key value—it was one of the original Four Pillars of the Green Party and is often considered the most basic value of these parties. It is also often associated with indigenous religion and cultural practices. In its political context, it is necessarily not as easily defined as ecological health or scientific ecology concepts. See also Ecology Environmental philosophy Global Greens Charter Green syndicalism Silvilization Simple living Spiritual ecology Sustainable living Yin and yang Notes References Drengson, A. and Y. Inoue, eds. (1995) The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology. Berkeley: North Atlantic Publishers. Guattari, Félix: »Pour une refondation des pratiques sociales«. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (Oct. 1992): 26-7. Guattari, Félix: »Remaking Social Practices«. In: Genosko, Gary (Hg.) (1996): The Guattari Reader. Oxford, Blackwell, S. 262-273. Maybury-Lewis, David. (1992) "On the Importance of Being Tribal: Tribal Wisdom." Millennium: Tribal Wisdom and the Modern World. Binimun Productions Ltd. Næss, Arne. (1973) The Shallow and the Deep Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary". Inquiry, 16:95-100 Drengson A. & B. Devall (2008) (Eds) The Ecology of Wisdom. Writings by Arne Naess. Berkeley: Counterpoint Levesque, Simon (2016) Two versions of ecosophy: Arne Næss, Félix Guattari, and their connection with semiotics. Sign Systems Studies'' 44(4): 511-541. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2016.44.4.03 External links Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy and the Deep Ecology Movement: An Overview by Alan Drengson Ecospherics.net. Accessed 2005-08-14. The Trumpeter, A Journal of Ecosophy. Ecology Postmodern theory Environmental philosophy Environmentalism Arne Næss

Samkhya

Samkhya or Sankhya (; ) is a dualistic orthodox school of Hindu philosophy. It views reality as composed of two independent principles, Puruṣa ('consciousness' or spirit) and Prakṛti (nature or matter, including the human mind and emotions). Puruṣa is the witness-consciousness. It is absolute, independent, free, beyond perception, above any experience by mind or senses, and impossible to describe in words. Prakriti is matter or nature. It is inactive, unconscious, and is a balance of the three guṇas (qualities or innate tendencies), namely sattva, rajas, and tamas. When Prakṛti comes into contact with Purusha this balance is disturbed, and Prakriti becomes manifest, evolving twenty-three tattvas, namely intellect (buddhi, mahat), ego (ahamkara), mind (manas); the five sensory capacities known as ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose; the five action capacities known as hasta, pada, bak, anus, and upastha; and the five "subtle elements" or "modes of sensory content" (tanmatras), from which the five "gross elements" or "forms of perceptual objects" (earth, water, fire, air and space) emerge, in turn giving rise to the manifestation of sensory experience and cognition. Jiva ('a living being') is the state in which Puruṣa is bonded to Prakriti. Human experience is an interplay of the two, Puruṣa being conscious of the various combinations of cognitive activities. The end of the bondage of Puruṣa to Prakriti is called Moksha (Liberation) or Kaivalya (Isolation). Samkhya's epistemology accepts three of six pramanas ('proofs') as the only reliable means of gaining knowledge, as does yoga. These are pratyakṣa ('perception'), anumāṇa ('inference') and śabda (āptavacana, meaning, 'word/testimony of reliable sources'). Sometimes described as one of the rationalist schools of Indian philosophy, it relies exclusively on reason. While Samkhya-like speculations can be found in the Rig Veda and some of the older Upanishads, some western scholars have proposed that Samkhya may have non-Vedic origins, developing in ascetic milieus. Proto-Samkhya ideas developed c. 8th/7th BC and onwards, as evidenced in the middle Upanishads, the Buddhacharita, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Mokshadharma-section of the Mahabharata. It was related to the early ascetic traditions and meditation, spiritual practices, and religious cosmology, and methods of reasoning that result in liberating knowledge (vidya, jnana, viveka) that end the cycle of duḥkha (suffering) and rebirth allowing for "a great variety of philosophical formulations". Pre-Karika systematic Samkhya existed around the beginning of the first millennium CE. The defining method of Samkhya was established with the Samkhyakarika (4th c. CE). Samkhya might have been theistic or nontheistic, but with its classical systematization in the early first millennium CE, the existence of a deity became irrelevant. Samkhya is strongly related to the Yoga school of Hinduism, for which it forms the theoretical foundation, and it has influenced other schools of Indian philosophy. Etymology Sāṃkhya (सांख्य) or sāṅkhya, also transliterated as samkhya and sankhya, respectively, is a Sanskrit word that, depending on the context, means 'to reckon, count, enumerate, calculate, deliberate, reason, reasoning by numeric enumeration, relating to number, rational'. In the context of ancient Indian philosophies, Samkhya refers to the philosophical school in Hinduism based on systematic enumeration and rational examination. The word samkhya means 'empirical' or 'relating to numbers'. Although the term had been used in the general sense of metaphysical knowledge before, in technical usage it refers to the Samkhya school of thought that evolved into a cohesive philosophical system in early centuries CE. The Samkhya system is called so because 'it "enumerates'" twenty five Tattvas or true principles; and its chief object is to effect the final emancipation of the twenty-fifth Tattva, i.e. the puruṣa or soul'. Philosophy Puruṣa and Prakṛti Samkhya makes a distinction between two "irreducible, innate and independent realities", Purusha, the witness-consciousness, and Prakṛti, "matter", the activities of mind and perception. According to Dan Lusthaus, Puruṣa is considered as the conscious principle, a passive enjoyer (bhokta) and the Prakṛti is the enjoyed (bhogya). Samkhya believes that the puruṣa cannot be regarded as the source of inanimate world, because an intelligent principle cannot transform itself into the unconscious world. It is a pluralistic spiritualism, atheistic realism and uncompromising dualism. Puruṣa – witness-consciousness Puruṣa is the witness-consciousness. It is absolute, independent, free, imperceptible, unknowable through other agencies, above any experience by mind or senses and beyond any words or explanations. It remains pure, "nonattributive consciousness". Puruṣa is neither produced nor does it produce. No appellations can qualify Purusha, nor can it be substantialized or objectified. It "cannot be reduced, can't be 'settled'". Any designation of Purusha comes from Prakriti, and is a limitation. Unlike Advaita Vedanta, and like Purva-Mīmāṃsā, Samkhya believes in plurality of the Puruṣas. Prakṛti - cognitive processes Prakṛti is the first cause of the world of our experiences. Since it is the first principle (tattva) of the universe, it is called the pradhāna (chief principle), but, as it is the unconscious and unintelligent principle, it is also called the jaḍa (unintelligent). It is composed of three essential characteristics (trigunas). These are: Sattva – poise, fineness, lightness, illumination, and joy; Rajas – dynamism, activity, excitation, and pain; Tamas – inertia, coarseness, heaviness, obstruction, and sloth. Unmanifested Prakriti is infinite, inactive, and unconscious, with the three gunas in a state of equilibrium. When this equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed then unmanifest Prakṛti, along with the omnipresent witness-consciousness, Purusha, gives rise to the manifest world of experience. Prakriti becomes manifest as twenty-three tattvas: intellect (buddhi, mahat), ego (ahamkara) mind (manas); the five sensory capacities; the five action capacities; and the five "subtle elements" or "modes of sensory content" (tanmatras: form (rūpa), sound (shabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touch (sparsha)), from which the five "gross elements" or "forms of perceptual objects" emerge (earth (prithivi), water (jala), fire (Agni), air (Vāyu), ether (Ākāsha)). Prakriti is the source of our experience; it is not "the evolution of a series of material entities," but "the emergence of experience itself". It is description of experience and the relations between its elements, not an explanation of the origin of the universe. All Prakriti has these three guṇas in different proportions. Each guṇa is dominant at specific times of day. The interplay of these guṇa defines the character of someone or something, of nature and determines the progress of life. The Samkhya theory of guṇa was widely discussed, developed and refined by various schools of Indian philosophies. Samkhya's philosophical treatises also influenced the development of various theories of Hindu ethics. Thought processes and mental events are conscious only to the extent they receive illumination from Purusha. In Samkhya, consciousness is compared to light which illuminates the material configurations or 'shapes' assumed by the mind. So intellect, after receiving cognitive structures from the mind and illumination from pure consciousness, creates thought structures that appear to be conscious. Ahamkara, the ego or the phenomenal self, appropriates all mental experiences to itself and thus, personalizes the objective activities of mind and intellect by assuming possession of them. But consciousness is itself independent of the thought structures it illuminates. Liberation or mokṣa Samkhya school considers moksha as a natural quest of every jiva. The Samkhyakarika states, Samkhya regards ignorance (avidyā) as the root cause of suffering and bondage (Samsara). Samkhya states that the way out of this suffering is through knowledge (viveka). Mokṣa (liberation), states Samkhya school, results from knowing the difference between Prakṛti (avyakta-vyakta) and Puruṣa (jña). More specifically, the Puruṣa that has attained liberation is to be distinguished from a Puruṣa that is still bound on account of the liberated Puruṣa being free from its subtle body (synonymous with buddhi), in which is located the mental dispositions that individuates it and causes it to experience bondage. Puruṣa, the eternal pure consciousness, due to ignorance, identifies itself with products of Prakṛti such as intellect (buddhi) and ego (ahamkara). This results in endless transmigration and suffering. However, once the realization arises that Puruṣa is distinct from Prakṛti, is more than empirical ego, and that puruṣa is deepest conscious self within, the Self gains isolation (kaivalya) and freedom (moksha). Though in conventional terms the bondage is ascribed to the Puruṣa, this is ultimately a mistake. This is because the Samkhya school (Samkhya karika Verse 63) maintains that it is actually Prakriti that binds itself, and thus bondage should in reality be ascribed to Prakriti, not to the Puruṣa: Vacaspati gave a metaphorical example to elaborate the position that the Puruṣa is only mistakenly ascribed bondage: although the king is ascribed victory or defeat, it is actually the soldiers that experience it. It is then not merely that bondage is only mistakenly ascribed to the Puruṣa, but that liberation is like bondage, wrongly ascribed to the Puruṣa and should be ascribed to Prakriti alone. Other forms of Samkhya teach that Mokṣa is attained by one's own development of the higher faculties of discrimination achieved by meditation and other yogic practices. Moksha is described by Samkhya scholars as a state of liberation, where sattva guṇa predominates. Epistemology Samkhya considered Pratyakṣa or Dṛṣṭam (direct sense perception), Anumāna (inference), and Śabda or Āptavacana (verbal testimony of the sages or shāstras) to be the only valid means of knowledge or pramana. Unlike some other schools, Samkhya did not consider the following three pramanas to be epistemically proper: Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, deriving from circumstances) or Anupalabdi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof). Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception: Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe). Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state). Further, some schools considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama, so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment). Anumāna (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion). Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts. Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. He must cooperate with others to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words). The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of Vedas. The disagreement between the schools has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability. Causality The Samkhya system is based on Sat-kārya-vāda or the theory of causation. According to Satkāryavāda, the effect is pre-existent in the cause. There is only an apparent or illusory change in the makeup of the cause and not a material one, when it becomes effect. Since, effects cannot come from nothing, the original cause or ground of everything is seen as Prakṛti. More specifically, Samkhya system follows the prakṛti-Parināma Vāda. Parināma denotes that the effect is a real transformation of the cause. The cause under consideration here is Prakṛti or more precisely Moola-Prakṛti ("Primordial Matter"). The Samkhya system is therefore an exponent of an evolutionary theory of matter beginning with primordial matter. In evolution, Prakṛti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle back into Prakṛti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other. But this theory is very different from the modern theories of science in the sense that Prakṛti evolves for each Jiva separately, giving individual bodies and minds to each and after liberation these elements of Prakṛti merges into the Moola-Prakṛti. Another uniqueness of Sāmkhya is that not only physical entities but even mind, ego and intelligence are regarded as forms of Unconsciousness, quite distinct from pure consciousness. Samkhya theorizes that Prakṛti is the source of the perceived world of becoming. It is pure potentiality that evolves itself successively into twenty four tattvas or principles. The evolution itself is possible because Prakṛti is always in a state of tension among its constituent strands or gunas – sattva, rajas and tamas. In a state of equilibrium of three gunas, when the three together are one, "unmanifest" Prakṛti which is unknowable. A guṇa is an entity that can change, either increase or decrease, therefore, pure consciousness is called nirguna or without any modification. The evolution obeys causality relationships, with primal Nature itself being the material cause of all physical creation. The cause and effect theory of Samkhya is called "Satkārya-vāda" ("theory of existent causes"), and holds that nothing can really be created from or destroyed into nothingness – all evolution is simply the transformation of primal Nature from one form to another. Samkhya cosmology describes how life emerges in the universe; the relationship between Purusha and Prakṛti is crucial to Patanjali's yoga system. The strands of Samkhya thought can be traced back to the Vedic speculation of creation. It is also frequently mentioned in the Mahabharata and Yogavasishta. Historical development Larson (1969) discerns four basic periods in the development of Samkhya: 8/9th c. BCE - 5th c. BCE: "ancient speculations," including speculative Vedic hymns and the oldest prose Upanishads 4th.c. BCE-1st c. CE: proto-Samkhya speculations, as found in the middle Upanishads, the Buddhacarita, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Mahabharata 1st-10/11th c. CE: classical Samkhya 15th-17th c.: renaissance of later Samkhya Larson (1987) discerns three phases of development of the term samkhya, relating to three different meanings: Vedic period and the Mauryan Empire, until the 4th and 3rd c. BCE: "relating to number, enumeration or calculation." Intellectual inquiry was "frequently cast in the format of elaborate enumerations; references to samkhya do not denote integrated systems of thought. 8th/7th c. BCE - first centuries CE: as a masculine noun, referring to "someone who calculates, enumerates, or discriminates properly or correctly." Proto-samkhya, related to the early ascetic traditions,reflected in the Moksadharma section of the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, and the cosmological speculations of the Puranas. The notion of samkhya becomes related to methods of reasoning that result in liberating knowledge (vidya, jnana, viveka) that end the cycle of dukkha and rebirth. During this period, samkhya becomes explicitly related to meditation, spiritual practices, and religious cosmology, and is "primarily a methodology for attaining liberation and appears to allow for a great variety of philosophical formulations." According to Larson, "Samkhya means in the Upanishads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge." As such, it contains "psychological analyses of experience" that "become dominant motifs in Jain and Buddhist meditation contexts." Typical Samkhya terminology and issues develop. While yoga emphasizes asanas breathing, and ascetic practices, samkhya is concerned with intellectual analyses and proper discernment, but samkhya-reasonong is not really differentiated from yoga. According to Van Buitenen, these ideas developed in the interaction between various sramanas and ascetic groups. Numerous ancient teachers are named in the various texts, including Kapila and Pancasikha. 1st c. BCE - first centuries CE: as a neuter term, referring to the beginning of a technical philosophical system. Pre-karika-Samkhya (ca. 100 BCE – 200 CE). This period ends with Ishvara Krishna's (Iśvarakṛṣṇa, 350 CE) Samkhyakarika. According to Larson, the shift of Samkhya from speculations to the normative conceptualization hints—but does not conclusively prove—that Samkhya may be the oldest of the Indian technical philosophical schools (e.g. Nyaya, Vaisheshika and Buddhist ontology), one that evolved over time and influenced the technical aspects of Buddhism and Jainism. Ancient speculations The early, speculative phase took place in the first half of the first millennium BCE, when ascetic spirituality and monastic (sramana and yati) traditions came into vogue in India, and ancient scholars combined "enumerated set[s] of principles" with "a methodology of reasoning that results in spiritual knowledge (vidya, jnana, viveka)." These early non-Samkhya speculations and proto-Samkhya ideas are visible in earlier Hindu scriptures such as the Vedas, early Upanishads such as the Chandogya Upanishad, and the Bhagavad Gita. However, these early speculations and proto-Samkhya ideas had not distilled and congealed into a distinct, complete philosophy. Ascetic origins While some earlier scholars have argued for Upanishadic origins of the Samkhya-tradition, and the Upanisads contain dualistic speculations which may have influenced proto-samkhya, other scholars have noted the dissimilarities of Shamkhya with the Vedic tradition. As early as 1898, Richard Karl von Garbe, a German professor of philosophy and Indologist, wrote in 1898, Dandekar, similarly wrote in 1968, 'The origin of the Sankhya is to be traced to the pre-Vedic non-Aryan thought complex'. Heinrich Zimmer states that Samkhya has non-Aryan origins. Anthony Warder (1994; first ed. 1967) writes that the Samkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools appear to have been established before the Sramana traditions in India (~500 BCE), and he finds that "Samkhya represents a relatively free development of speculation among the Brahmans, independent of the Vedic revelation." Warder writes, '[Samkhya] has indeed been suggested to be non-Brahmanical and even anti-Vedic in origin, but there is no tangible evidence for that except that it is very different than most Vedic speculation – but that is (itself) quite inconclusive. Speculations in the direction of the Samkhya can be found in the early Upanishads." According to Ruzsa in 2006, "Sāṅkhya has a very long history. Its roots go deeper than textual traditions allow us to see," stating that "Sāṅkhya likely grew out of speculations rooted in cosmic dualism and introspective meditational practice." The dualism is rooted in agricultural concepts of the union of the male sky-god and the female earth-goddess, the union of "the spiritual, immaterial, lordly, immobile fertilizer (represented as the Śiva-liṅgam, or phallus) and of the active, fertile, powerful but subservient material principle (Śakti or Power, often as the horrible Dark Lady, Kālī)." In contrast, According to Ruzsa, Burley argues for an ontegenetic or incremental development of Shamkya, instead of being established by one historical founder. Burley states that India's religio-cultural heritage is complicated and likely experienced a non-linear development. Samkhya is not necessarily non-Vedic nor pre-Vedic nor a 'reaction to Brahmanic hegemony', states Burley. It is most plausibly in its origins a lineage that grew and evolved from a combination of ascetic traditions and Vedic guru (teacher) and disciples. Burley suggests the link between Samkhya and Yoga as likely the root of this evolutionary origin during the Vedic era of India. According to Van Buitenen, various ideas on yoga and meditation developed in the interaction between various sramanas and ascetic groups. Rig Vedic speculations The earliest mention of dualism is in the Rigveda, a text that was compiled in the late second millennium BCE., in various chapters. At a mythical level, dualism is found in the Indra–Vritra myth of chapter 1.32 of the Rigveda. Enumeration, the etymological root of the word samkhya, is found in numerous chapters of the Rigveda, such as 1.164, 10.90 and 10.129. According to Larson, it is likely that in the oldest period these enumerations were occasionally also applied in the context of meditation themes and religious cosmology, such as in the hymns of 1.164 (Riddle Hymns) and 10.129 (Nasadiya Hymns). However, these hymns present only the outline of ideas, not specific Samkhya theories and these theories developed in a much later period. The Riddle hymns of the Rigveda, famous for their numerous enumerations, structural language symmetry within the verses and the chapter, enigmatic word play with anagrams that symbolically portray parallelism in rituals and the cosmos, nature and the inner life of man. This hymn includes enumeration (counting) as well as a series of dual concepts cited by early Upanishads . For example, the hymns 1.164.2 - 1.164-3 mention "seven" multiple times, which in the context of other chapters of Rigveda have been interpreted as referring to both seven priests at a ritual and seven constellations in the sky, the entire hymn is a riddle that paints a ritual as well as the sun, moon, earth, three seasons, the transitory nature of living beings, the passage of time and spirit. The chapter 1.164 asks a number of metaphysical questions, such as "what is the One in the form of the Unborn that created the six realms of the world?". Dualistic philosophical speculations then follow in chapter 1.164 of the Rigveda, particularly in the well studied "allegory of two birds" hymn (1.164.20 - 1.164.22), a hymn that is referred to in the Mundaka Upanishad and other texts . The two birds in this hymn have been interpreted to mean various forms of dualism: "the sun and the moon", the "two seekers of different kinds of knowledge", and "the body and the atman". The emphasis of duality between existence (sat) and non-existence (asat) in the Nasadiya Sukta of the Rigveda is similar to the vyakta–avyakta (manifest–unmanifest) polarity in Samkhya. The hymns about Puruṣa may also have had some influence on Samkhya. The Samkhya notion of buddhi or mahat is similar to the notion of hiranyagarbha, which appears in both the Rigveda and the Shvetashvatara Upanishad. Early Upanishads The oldest of the major Upanishads (c. 900–600 BCE) contain speculations along the lines of classical Samkhya philosophy. The concept of ahamkara was traced back by Van Buitenen to chapters 1.2 and 1.4 of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and chapter 7.25 of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, where it is a "cosmic entity," and not a psychological notion. Satkaryavada, the theory of causation in Samkhya, may in part be traced to the verses in sixth chapter which emphasize the primacy of sat (being) and describe creation from it. The idea that the three gunas or attributes influence creation is found in both Chandogya and Shvetashvatara Upanishads. Yajnavalkya's exposition on the Self in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, and the dialogue between Uddalaka Aruni and his son Svetaketu in the Chandogya Upanishad represent a more developed notion of the essence of man (Atman) as "pure subjectivity - i.e., the knower who is himself unknowable, the seer who cannot be seen," and as "pure conscious," discovered by means of speculations, or enumerations. According to Larson, "it seems quite likely that both the monistic trends in Indian thought and the dualistic samkhya could have developed out of these ancient speculations." According to Larson, the enumeration of tattvas in Samkhya is also found in Taittiriya Upanishad, Aitareya Upanishad and Yajnavalkya–Maitri dialogue in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Proto classical samkhya Buddhist and Jainist influences Buddhism and Jainism had developed in eastern India by the 5th century BCE. It is probable that these schools of thought and the earliest schools of Samkhya influenced each other. According to Burely, there is no evidence that a systematic samkhya-philosophy existed prior to the founding of Buddhism and Jainism, sometime in the 5th or 4th century BCE. A prominent similarity between Buddhism and Samkhya is the greater emphasis on suffering (dukkha) as the foundation for their respective soteriological theories, than other Indian philosophies. However, suffering appears central to Samkhya in its later literature, which likely suggests a Buddhist influence. Eliade, however, presents the alternate theory that Samkhya and Buddhism developed their soteriological theories over time, benefiting from their mutual influence. Likewise, the Jain doctrine of plurality of individual souls (jiva) could have influenced the concept of multiple purushas in Samkhya. However Hermann Jacobi, an Indologist, thinks that there is little reason to assume that Samkhya notion of Purushas was solely dependent on the notion of jiva in Jainism. It is more likely, that Samkhya was moulded by many ancient theories of soul in various Vedic and non-Vedic schools. Larson, Bhattacharya and Potter state it to be likely that early Samkhya doctrines found in oldest Upanishads (~700-800 BCE) provided the contextual foundations and influenced Buddhist and Jaina doctrines, and these became contemporaneous, sibling intellectual movements with Samkhya and other schools of Hindu philosophy. This is evidenced, for example, by the references to Samkhya in ancient and medieval era Jaina literature. Middle upanishads Samkhya and Yoga are mentioned together for first time in chapter 6.13 of the Shvetashvatra Upanishad, as samkhya-yoga-adhigamya (literally, "to be understood by proper reasoning and spiritual discipline"). The Katha Upanishad (5th-1st c. BCE) in verses 3.10–13 and 6.7–11 describes a concept of puruṣa, and other concepts also found in later Samkhya. The Shvetashvatara Upanishad in chapter 6.13 describes samkhya with Yoga philosophy, and Bhagavad Gita in book 2 provides axiological implications of Samkhya, therewith providing textual evidence of samkhyan terminology and concepts. Katha Upanishad conceives the Purusha (cosmic spirit, consciousness) as same as the individual soul (Ātman, Self). Bhagavad Gita and Mahabharata The Bhagavad Gita identifies Samkhya with understanding or knowledge. The three gunas are also mentioned in the Gita, though they are not used in the same sense as in classical Samkhya. The Gita integrates Samkhya thought with the devotion (bhakti) of theistic schools and the impersonal Brahman of Vedanta. The Mokshadharma chapter of Shanti Parva (Book of Peace) in the Mahabharata epic, composed between 400 BCE to 400 CE, explains Samkhya ideas along with other extant philosophies, and then lists numerous scholars in recognition of their philosophical contributions to various Indian traditions, and therein at least three Samkhya scholars can be recognized – Kapila, Asuri and Pancasikha. The 12th chapter of the Buddhacarita, a buddhist text composed in the early second century CE, suggests Samkhya philosophical tools of reliable reasoning were well formed by about 5th century BCE. According to Rusza, "The ancient Buddhist Aśvaghoṣa (in his Buddha-Carita) describes Āḷāra Kālāma, the teacher of the young Buddha (ca. 420 B.C.E.) as following an archaic form of Sāṅkhya." Classical Samkhya According to Ruzsa, about 2,000 years ago "Sāṅkhya became the representative philosophy of Hindu thought in Hindu circles", influencing all strands of the Hindu tradition and Hindu texts. Traditional credited founders Sage Kapila is traditionally credited as a founder of the Samkhya school. It is unclear in which century of the 1st millennium BCE Kapila lived. Kapila appears in Rigveda, but context suggests that the word means 'reddish-brown color'. Both Kapila as a 'seer' and the term Samkhya appear in hymns of section 5.2 in Shvetashvatara Upanishad (~300 BCE), suggesting Kapila's and Samkhya philosophy's origins may predate it. Numerous other ancient Indian texts mention Kapila; for example, Baudhayana Grhyasutra in chapter IV.16.1 describes a system of rules for ascetic life credited to Kapila called Kapila Sannyasa Vidha. A 6th century CE Chinese translation and other texts consistently note Kapila as an ascetic and the founder of the school, mention Asuri as the inheritor of the teaching and a much later scholar named Pancasikha as the scholar who systematized it and then helped widely disseminate its ideas. Isvarakrsna is identified in these texts as the one who summarized and simplified Samkhya theories of Pancasikha, many centuries later (roughly 4th or 5th century CE), in the form that was then translated into Chinese by Paramartha in the 6th century CE. Samkhyakarika The earliest surviving authoritative text on classical Samkhya philosophy is the Samkhya Karika (c. 200 CE or 350–450 CE) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There were probably other texts in early centuries CE, however none of them are available today. Iśvarakṛṣṇa in his Kārikā describes a succession of the disciples from Kapila, through Āsuri and Pañcaśikha to himself. The text also refers to an earlier work of Samkhya philosophy called Ṣaṣṭitantra (science of sixty topics) which is now lost. The text was imported and translated into Chinese about the middle of the 6th century CE. The records of Al Biruni, the Persian visitor to India in the early 11th century, suggests Samkhyakarika was an established and definitive text in India in his times. Samkhyakarika includes distilled statements on epistemology, metaphysics and soteriology of the Samkhya school. For example, the fourth to sixth verses of the text states it epistemic premises, The most popular commentary on the Samkhyakarika was the Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya attributed to Gauḍapāda, the proponent of Advaita Vedanta school of philosophy. Other important commentaries on the karika were Yuktidīpīka (c. 6th century CE) and Vācaspati’s Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī (c. 10th century CE). Yuktidipika Between 1938 and 1967, two previously unknown manuscript editions of Yuktidipika (ca. 600–700 CE) were discovered and published. Yuktidipika is an ancient review by an unknown author and has emerged as the most important commentary on the Samkhyakarika, itself an ancient key text of the Samkhya school. This commentary as well as the reconstruction of pre-karika epistemology and Samkhya emanation text (containing cosmology-ontology) from the earliest Puranas and Mokshadharma suggest that Samkhya as a technical philosophical system existed from about the last century BCE to the early centuries of the Common Era. Yuktidipika suggests that many more ancient scholars contributed to the origins of Samkhya in ancient India than were previously known and that Samkhya was a polemical philosophical system. However, almost nothing is preserved from the centuries when these ancient Samkhya scholars lived. Samkhya revival The 13th century text Sarvadarsanasangraha contains 16 chapters, each devoted to a separate school of Indian philosophy. The 13th chapter in this book contains a description of the Samkhya philosophy. The Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra (c. 14th century CE) renewed interest in Samkhya in the medieval era. It is considered the second most important work of Samkhya after the karika. Commentaries on this text were written by Anirruddha (Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti, c. 15th century CE), Vijñānabhikṣu (Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya, c. 16th century CE), Mahādeva (vṛttisāra, c. 17th century CE) and Nāgeśa (Laghusāṁkhyasūtravṛtti). In his introduction, the commentator Vijnana Bhiksu stated that only a sixteenth part of the original Samkhya Sastra remained, and that the rest had been lost to time. While the commentary itself is no doubt medieval, the age of the underlying sutras is unknown and perhaps much older. According to Surendranath Dasgupta, scholar of Indian philosophy, Charaka Samhita, an ancient Indian medical treatise, also contains thoughts from an early Samkhya school. Views on God Although the Samkhya school considers the Vedas a reliable source of knowledge, samkhya accepts the notion of higher selves or perfected beings but rejects the notion of God, according to Paul Deussen and other scholars, although other scholars believe that Samkhya is as much theistic as the Yoga school. According to Rajadhyaksha, classical Samkhya argues against the existence of God on metaphysical grounds. Samkhya theorists argue that an unchanging God cannot be the source of an ever-changing world and that God was only a necessary metaphysical assumption demanded by circumstances. The oldest commentary on the Samkhakarika, the Yuktidīpikā, asserts the existence of God, stating: "We do not completely reject the particular power of the Lord, since he assumes a majestic body and so forth. Our intended meaning is just that there is no being who is different from prakrti and purusa and who is the instigator of these two, as you claim. Therefore, your view is refuted. The conjunction between prakrti and purusa is not instigated by another being. A medieval commentary of Samkhakarika such as in verse no. 1.92 directly states that existence of "Ishvara (God) is unproved". Hence there is no philosophical place for a creationist God in this system. It is also argued by commentators of this text that the existence of Ishvara cannot be proved and hence cannot be admitted to exist. However, later in the text, the commentator Vijnana Bhiksu clarified that the subject of dispute between the Samkhyas and others was the existence of an eternal Isvara. Samkhya did accept the concept of an emergent Isvara previously absorbed into Prakriti. A key difference between the Samkhya and Yoga schools, state scholars, is that the Yoga school accepts a 'personal, yet essentially inactive, deity' or 'personal god'. However, Radhanath Phukan, in the introduction to his translation of the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna has argued that commentators who see the unmanifested as non-conscious make the mistake of regarding Samkhya as atheistic, though Samkhya is equally as theistic as Yoga. A majority of modern academic scholars are of view that the concept of Ishvara was incorporated into the nirishvara (atheistic) Samkhya viewpoint only after it became associated with the Yoga, the Pasupata and the Bhagavata schools of philosophy. Others have traced the concept of the emergent Isvara accepted by Samkhya to as far back as the Rig Veda, where it was called Hiranyagarbha (the golden germ, golden egg). This theistic Samkhya philosophy is described in the Mahabharata, the Puranas and the Bhagavad Gita. Chandradhar Sharma in 1960 affirmed that Samkhya in the beginning was based on the theistic absolute of Upanishads, but later on, under the influence of Jaina and Buddhist thought, it rejected theistic monism and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism. This also explains why some of the later Samkhya commentators, e.g. Vijnanabhiksu in the sixteenth century, tried to revive the earlier theism in Samkhya. Arguments against Ishvara's existence According to Sinha, the following arguments were given by Samkhya philosophers against the idea of an eternal, self-caused, creator God: If the existence of karma is assumed, the proposition of God as a moral governor of the universe is unnecessary. For, if God enforces the consequences of actions then he can do so without karma. If however, he is assumed to be within the law of karma, then karma itself would be the giver of consequences and there would be no need of a God. Even if karma is denied, God still cannot be the enforcer of consequences. Because the motives of an enforcer God would be either egoistic or altruistic. Now, God's motives cannot be assumed to be altruistic because an altruistic God would not create a world so full of suffering. If his motives are assumed to be egoistic, then God must be thought to have desire, as agency or authority cannot be established in the absence of desire. However, assuming that God has desire would contradict God's eternal freedom which necessitates no compulsion in actions. Moreover, desire, according to Samkhya, is an attribute of prakṛti and cannot be thought to grow in God. The testimony of the Vedas, according to Samkhya, also confirms this notion. Despite arguments to the contrary, if God is still assumed to contain unfulfilled desires, this would cause him to suffer pain and other similar human experiences. Such a worldly God would be no better than Samkhya's notion of higher self. Furthermore, there is no proof of the existence of God. He is not the object of perception, there exists no general proposition that can prove him by inference and the testimony of the Vedas speak of prakṛti as the origin of the world, not God. Therefore, Samkhya maintained that the various cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments could not prove God. Influence on other schools Vaisheshika and Nyaya The Vaisheshika atomism, Nyaya epistemology may all have roots in the early Samkhya school of thought; but these schools likely developed in parallel with an evolving Samkhya tradition, as sibling intellectual movements. Yoga The Yoga school derives its ontology and epistemology from Samkhya and adds to it the concept of Isvara. However, scholarly opinion on the actual relationship between Yoga and Samkhya is divided. While Jakob Wilhelm Hauer and Georg Feuerstein believe that Yoga was a tradition common to many Indian schools and its association with Samkhya was artificially foisted upon it by commentators such as Vyasa. Johannes Bronkhorst and Eric Frauwallner think that Yoga never had a philosophical system separate from Samkhya. Bronkhorst further adds that the first mention of Yoga as a separate school of thought is no earlier than Śankara's (c. 788–820 CE) Brahmasūtrabhaśya. Tantra The dualistic metaphysics of various Tantric traditions illustrates the strong influence of Samkhya on Tantra. Shaiva Siddhanta was identical to Samkhya in its philosophical approach, barring the addition of a transcendent theistic reality. Knut A. Jacobsen, Professor of Religious Studies, notes the influence of Samkhya on Srivaishnavism. According to him, this Tantric system borrows the abstract dualism of Samkhya and modifies it into a personified male–female dualism of Vishnu and Sri Lakshmi. Dasgupta speculates that the Tantric image of a wild Kali standing on a slumbering Shiva was inspired from the Samkhyan conception of prakṛti as a dynamic agent and Purusha as a passive witness. However, Samkhya and Tantra differed in their view on liberation. While Tantra sought to unite the male and female ontological realities, Samkhya held a withdrawal of consciousness from matter as the ultimate goal. According to Bagchi, the Samkhya Karika (in karika 70) identifies Sāmkhya as a Tantra, and its philosophy was one of the main influences both on the rise of the Tantras as a body of literature, as well as Tantra sadhana. Advaita Vedanta The Advaita Vedanta philosopher Adi Shankara called Samkhya as the 'principal opponent' (pradhana-malla) of the Vedanta. He criticized the Samkhya view that the cause of the universe is the unintelligent Prakriti (Pradhan). According to Shankara, the Intelligent Brahman only can be such a cause. He considered Samkhya philosophy as propounded in Samkhyakarika to be inconsistent with the teachings in the Vedas, and considered the dualism in Samkhya to be non-Vedic. In contrast, ancient Samkhya philosophers in India claimed Vedic authority for their views. See also Advaita Vedanta of Adi Shankara, a non-dualist strand within Hinduism Darshanas Khyativada Ratha Kalpana Subtle body Notes References Sources Further reading External links Ferenc Ruzsa, Dan Lusthaus, Samkhya Samkhya and Yoga: An Introduction, Russell Kirkland, University of Georgia PDF file of Ishwarkrishna's Sankhyakarika, in English Bibliography of scholarly works: see [S] for Samkhya by Karl Potter, University of Washington Lectures on Samkhya, The Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Oxford University Āstika Hindu philosophical concepts Schools and traditions in ancient Indian philosophy

Common sense

Common sense is "knowledge, judgement, and taste which is more or less universal and which is held more or less without reflection or argument". As such, it is often considered to represent the basic level of sound practical judgement or knowledge of basic facts that any adult human being ought to possess. It is "common" in the sense of being shared by nearly all people. The everyday understanding of common sense is ultimately derived from historical philosophical discussions. Relevant terms from other languages used in such discussions include Latin , Ancient Greek , and French . However, these are not straightforward translations in all contexts, and in English different shades of meaning have developed. In philosophical and scientific contexts, since the Age of Enlightenment the term "common sense" has been used for rhetorical effect both approvingly and disapprovingly. On the one hand it has been a standard for good taste, good sense, and source of scientific and logical axioms. On the other hand it has been equated to conventional wisdom, vulgar prejudice, and superstition. "Common sense" has at least two older and more specialized meanings which have influenced the modern meanings, and are still important in philosophy. The original historical meaning is the capability of the animal soul (, ), proposed by Aristotle to explain how the different senses join and enable discrimination of particular objects by people and other animals. This common sense is distinct from the several sensory perceptions and from human rational thought, but it cooperates with both. The second philosophical use of the term is Roman-influenced, and is used for the natural human sensitivity for other humans and the community. Just like the everyday meaning, both of the philosophical meanings refer to a type of basic awareness and ability to judge that most people are expected to share naturally, even if they cannot explain why. All these meanings of "common sense", including the everyday ones, are interconnected in a complex history and have evolved during important political and philosophical debates in modern Western civilisation, notably concerning science, politics and economics. The interplay between the meanings has come to be particularly notable in English, as opposed to other western European languages, and the English term has in turn become international. It was at the beginning of the 18th century that this old philosophical term first acquired its modern English meaning: "Those plain, self-evident truths or conventional wisdom that one needed no sophistication to grasp and no proof to accept precisely because they accorded so well with the basic (common sense) intellectual capacities and experiences of the whole social body." This began with Descartes's criticism of it, and what came to be known as the dispute between "rationalism" and "empiricism". In the opening line of one of his most famous books, Discourse on Method, Descartes established the most common modern meaning, and its controversies, when he stated that everyone has a similar and sufficient amount of common sense, but it is rarely used well. Therefore, a skeptical logical method described by Descartes needs to be followed and common sense should not be overly relied upon. In the ensuing 18th century Enlightenment, common sense came to be seen more positively as the basis for empiricist modern thinking. It was contrasted to metaphysics, which was, like Cartesianism, associated with the . Thomas Paine's polemical pamphlet Common Sense (1776) has been described as the most influential political pamphlet of the 18th century, affecting both the American and French revolutions. Today, the concept of common sense, and how it should best be used, remains linked to many of the most perennial topics in epistemology and ethics, with special focus often directed at the philosophy of the modern social sciences. Aristotelian The origin of the term "common sense" is in the works of Aristotle. writes that "In different ways the philosophers of medieval Latin and Arabic tradition, from Al-Farabi to Avicenna, Averroës, Albert, and Thomas, found in the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia the scattered elements of a coherent doctrine of the "central" faculty of the sensuous soul." It was "one of the most successful and resilient of Aristotelian notions". The best-known case is Book III, chapter 1, especially at line 425a27. The passage is about how the animal mind converts raw sense perceptions from the five specialized sense perceptions, into perceptions of real things moving and changing, which can be thought about. According to Aristotle's understanding of perception, each of the five senses perceives one type of "perceptible" or "sensible" which is specific (, ) to it. For example, sight can see colour. But Aristotle was explaining how the animal mind, not just the human mind, links and categorizes different tastes, colours, feelings, smells and sounds in order to perceive real things in terms of the "common sensibles" (or "common perceptibles"). In this discussion, "common" (, ) is a term opposed to specific or particular. The Greek for these common sensibles is , which means shared or common things, and examples include the oneness of each thing, with its specific shape and size and so on, and the change or movement of each thing. Distinct combinations of these properties are common to all perceived things. In this passage, Aristotle explained that concerning these (such as movement) people have a sense — a "common sense" or sense of the common things — and there is no specific sense perception for movement and other , because then we would not perceive the at all, except by accident. As examples of perceiving by accident Aristotle mentions using the specific sense perception vision on its own to try to see that something is sweet, or to try to recognize a friend only by their distinctive color. explains that "when I see Socrates, it is not insofar as he is Socrates that he is visible to my eye, but rather because he is coloured". So the normal five individual senses do sense the common perceptibles according to Aristotle (and Plato), but it is not something they necessarily interpret correctly on their own. Aristotle proposes that the reason for having several senses is in fact that it increases the chances that we can distinguish and recognize things correctly, and not just occasionally or by accident. Each sense is used to identify distinctions, such as sight identifying the difference between black and white, but, says Aristotle, all animals with perception must have "some one thing" that can distinguish black from sweet. The common sense is where this comparison happens, and this must occur by comparing impressions (or symbols or markers; ) of what the specialist senses have perceived. The common sense is therefore also where a type of consciousness originates, "for it makes us aware of having sensations at all". And it receives physical picture imprints from the imaginative faculty, which are then memories that can be recollected. The discussion was apparently intended to improve upon the account of Aristotle's friend and teacher Plato in his Socratic dialogue, the Theaetetus. But Plato's dialogue presented an argument that recognising is an active thinking process in the rational part of the human soul, making the senses instruments of the thinking part of man. Plato's Socrates says this kind of thinking is not a kind of sense at all. Aristotle, trying to give a more general account of the souls of all animals, not just humans, moved the act of perception out of the rational thinking soul into this , which is something like a sense, and something like thinking, but not rational. The passage is difficult to interpret and there is little consensus about the details. has argued that this may be because Aristotle did not use the term as a standardized technical term at all. For example, in some passages in his works, Aristotle seems to use the term to refer to the individual sense perceptions simply being common to all people, or common to various types of animals. There is also difficulty with trying to determine whether the common sense is truly separable from the individual sense perceptions and from imagination, in anything other than a conceptual way as a capability. Aristotle never fully spells out the relationship between the common sense and the imaginative faculty (, ), although the two clearly work together in animals, and not only humans, for example in order to enable a perception of time. They may even be the same. Despite hints by Aristotle himself that they were united, early commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Al-Farabi felt they were distinct, but later, Avicenna emphasized the link, influencing future authors including Christian philosophers. argues that Aristotle used the term "common sense" both to discuss the individual senses when these act as a unity, which Gregorić calls "the perceptual capacity of the soul", or the higher level "sensory capacity of the soul" that represents the senses and the imagination working as a unity. According to Gregorić, there appears to have been a standardization of the term as a term for the perceptual capacity (not the higher level sensory capacity), which occurred by the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias at the latest. Compared to Plato, Aristotle's understanding of the soul has an extra level of complexity in the form of the or "intellect"—which is something only humans have and enables humans to perceive things differently from other animals. It works with images coming from the common sense and imagination, using reasoning (, ) as well as the active intellect. The identifies the true forms of things, while the common sense identifies shared aspects of things. Though scholars have varying interpretations of the details, Aristotle's "common sense" was in any case not rational, in the sense that it implied no ability to explain the perception. Reason or rationality exists only in man according to Aristotle, and yet some animals can perceive "common perceptibles" such as change and shape, and some even have imagination according to Aristotle. Animals with imagination come closest to having something like reasoning and . Plato, on the other hand was apparently willing to allow that animals could have some level of thought, meaning that he did not have to explain their sometimes complex behavior with a strict division between high-level perception processing and the human-like thinking such as being able to form opinions. Gregorić additionally argues that Aristotle can be interpreted as using the verbs and to distinguish two types of thinking or awareness, the first being found in animals and the second unique to humans and involving reason. Therefore, in Aristotle (and the medieval Aristotelians) the universals used to identify and categorize things are divided into two. In medieval terminology these are the used for perception and imagination in animals, and the or apprehendable forms used in the human intellect or . Aristotle also occasionally called the (or one version of it) the (, ). (According to Gregorić, this is specifically in contexts where it refers to the higher order common sense that includes imagination.) Later philosophers developing this line of thought, such as Themistius, Galen, and Al-Farabi, calling it the of the senses or sense, apparently a metaphor developed from a section of Plato's Timaeus (70b). Augustine and some of the Arab writers, also called it the "inner sense". The concept of the inner senses, plural, was further developed in the Middle Ages. Under the influence of the great Persian philosophers Al-Farabi and Avicenna, several inner senses came to be listed. "Thomas Aquinas and John of Jandun recognized four internal senses: the common sense, imagination, , and memory. Avicenna, followed by Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, and Roger Bacon, argued for five internal senses: the common sense, imagination, fantasy, , and memory." By the time of Descartes and Hobbes, in the 1600s, the inner senses had been standardized to five wits, which complemented the more well-known five "external" senses. Under this medieval scheme the common sense was understood to be seated not in the heart, as Aristotle had thought, but in the anterior Galenic ventricle of the brain. The anatomist Andreas Vesalius found no connections between the anterior ventricle and the sensory nerves, leading to speculation about other parts of the brain into the 1600s. Roman "" is the Latin translation of the Greek , which came to be recovered by Medieval scholastics when discussing Aristotelian theories of perception. In the earlier Latin of the Roman empire, the term had taken a distinct ethical detour, developing new shades of meaning. These especially Roman meanings were apparently influenced by several Stoic Greek terms with the word ; not only , but also such terms as , , and , all of which involve —something, at least in Aristotle, that would not be present in "lower" animals. is a term from Stoic philosophy, a Greek philosophy, influenced by Aristotle, and influential in Rome. This refers to shared notions, or common conceptions, that are either in-born or imprinted by the senses on to the soul. Unfortunately few true Stoic texts survive, and our understanding of their technical terminology is limited. is a term found in Epictetus (III.vi.8), a Stoic philosopher. C.S. believed this to be close to a modern English meaning of "common sense", "the elementary mental outfit of the normal man", something like intelligence. He noted that could be a translation of , (for example in the Vulgate Bible), but he only found one clear case of a Latin text showing this apparent meaning, a text by Phaedrus the fable writer. is found only in the work of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (Meditations I.16), also known as a Stoic. He uses the word on its own in a list of things he learned from his adopted father. Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury felt it represented the Stoic Greek original, which gave the special Roman meaning of , especially when used to refer to someone's public spirit. He explained the change of meaning as being due to the specific way that Stoics understood perception and intellect, saying that one should "consider withal how small the distinction was in that Philosophy, between the [conjecture], and the vulgar [perception]; how generally Passion was by those Philosophers brought under the Head of Opinion". Another link between Latin and Aristotle's Greek was in rhetoric, a subject that Aristotle was the first to systematize. In rhetoric, a prudent speaker must take account of opinions (, ) that are widely held. Aristotle referred to such commonly held beliefs not as (, ), which is a term he used for self-evident logical axioms, but with other terms such as . In his Rhetoric for example Aristotle mentions "" or "common beliefs", saying that "our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, [...] when speaking of converse with the multitude". In a similar passage in his own work on rhetoric, De Oratore, Cicero wrote that "in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the language of everyday life and the usage approved by the sense of the community." The sense of the community is in this case one translation of "" in the Latin of Cicero. Whether the Latin writers such as Cicero deliberately used this Aristotelian term in a new more peculiarly Roman way, probably also influenced by Greek Stoicism, therefore remains a subject of discussion. has proposed for example that the Roman republic maintained a very "oral" culture whereas in Aristotle's time rhetoric had come under heavy criticism from philosophers such as Socrates. argues, in agreement with Shaftesbury, that the concept developed from the Stoic concept of ethical virtue, influenced by Aristotle, but emphasizing the role of both the individual perception, and shared communal understanding. But in any case a complex of ideas attached itself to the term, to be almost forgotten in the Middle Ages, and eventually returning into ethical discussion in 18th-century Europe, after Descartes. As with other meanings of common sense, for the Romans of the classical era "it designates a sensibility shared by all, from which one may deduce a number of fundamental judgments, that need not, or cannot, be questioned by rational reflection". But even though Cicero did at least once use the term in a manuscript on Plato's Timaeus (concerning a primordial "sense, one and common for all [...] connected with nature"), he and other Roman authors did not normally use it as a technical term limited to discussion about sense perception, as Aristotle apparently had in De Anima, and as the Scholastics later would in the Middle Ages. Instead of referring to all animal judgment, it was used to describe pre-rational, widely shared human beliefs, and therefore it was a near equivalent to the concept of . This was a term that could be used by Romans to imply not only human nature, but also humane conduct, good breeding, refined manners, and so on. Apart from Cicero, Quintilian, Lucretius, Seneca, Horace and some of the most influential Roman authors influenced by Aristotle's rhetoric and philosophy used the Latin term "" in a range of such ways. As C. S. Lewis wrote: Compared to Aristotle and his strictest medieval followers, these Roman authors were not so strict about the boundary between animal-like common sense and specially human reasoning. As discussed above, Aristotle had attempted to make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, imagination and the sense perception which both use the sensible , and which animals also have; and, on the other hand, (intellect) and reason, which perceives another type of , the intelligible forms, which (according to Aristotle) only humans have. In other words, these Romans allowed that people could have animal-like shared understandings of reality, not just in terms of memories of sense perceptions, but in terms of the way they would tend to explain things, and in the language they use. Cartesian One of the last notable philosophers to accept something like the Aristotelian "common sense" was Descartes in the 17th century, but he also undermined it. He described this inner faculty when writing in Latin in his Meditations on first philosophy. The common sense is the link between the body and its senses, and the true human mind, which according to Descartes must be purely immaterial. Unlike Aristotle, who had placed it in the heart, by the time of Descartes this faculty was thought to be in the brain, and he located it in the pineal gland. Descartes' judgement of this common sense was that it was enough to persuade the human consciousness of the existence of physical things, but often in a very indistinct way. To get a more distinct understanding of things, it is more important to be methodical and mathematical. This line of thought was taken further, if not by Descartes himself then by those he influenced, until the concept of a faculty or organ of common sense was itself rejected. Contemporaries such as Gassendi and Hobbes went beyond Descartes in some ways in their rejection of Aristotelianism, rejecting explanations involving anything other than matter and motion, including the distinction between the animal-like judgement of sense perception, a special separate common sense, and the human mind or , which Descartes had retained from Aristotelianism. In contrast to Descartes who "found it unacceptable to assume that sensory representations may enter the mental realm from without"... But Descartes used two different terms in his work, not only the Latin term "", but also the French term , with which he opens his Discourse on Method. And this second concept survived better. This work was written in French, and does not directly discuss the Aristotelian technical theory of perception. is the equivalent of modern English "common sense" or "good sense". As the Aristotelian meaning of the Latin term began to be forgotten after Descartes, his discussion of gave a new way of defining in various European languages (including Latin, even though Descartes himself did not translate as , but treated them as two separate things). writes that "Descartes is the source of the most common meaning of common sense today: practical judgment". Gilson noted that Descartes actually gave two related meanings, first the basic and widely shared ability to judge true and false, which he also calls ; and second, wisdom, the perfected version of the first. The Latin term Descartes uses, , derives from the Stoic author Seneca who only used it in the second sense. Descartes was being original. The idea that now became influential, developed in both the Latin and French works of Descartes, though coming from different directions, is that common good sense (and indeed sense perception) is not reliable enough for the new Cartesian method of skeptical reasoning. The Cartesian project to replace common good sense with clearly defined mathematical reasoning was aimed at certainty, and not mere probability. It was promoted further by people such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and others and continues to have important impacts on everyday life. In France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy, it was in its initial florescence associated with the administration of Catholic empires of the competing Bourbon, and Habsburg dynasties, both seeking to centralize their power in a modern way, responding to Machiavellianism and Protestantism as part of the Counter-Reformation. So after Descartes, critical attention turned from Aristotle and his theory of perception, and more towards Descartes' own treatment of common good sense, concerning which several 18th-century authors found help in Roman literature. The Enlightenment after Descartes Epistemology: versus claims of certainty During the Enlightenment, Descartes' insistence upon a mathematical-style method of thinking that treated common sense and the sense perceptions sceptically, was accepted in some ways, but also criticized. On the one hand, the approach of Descartes is and was seen as radically sceptical in some ways. On the other hand, like the Scholastics before him, while being cautious of common sense, Descartes was instead seen to rely too much on undemonstrable metaphysical assumptions in order to justify his method, especially in its separation of mind and body (with the linking them). Cartesians such as Henricus Regius, Geraud de Cordemoy, and Nicolas Malebranche realized that Descartes's logic could give no evidence of the "external world" at all, meaning it had to be taken on faith. Though his own proposed solution was even more controversial, Berkeley famously wrote that enlightenment requires a "revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense". Descartes and the Cartesian "rationalists", rejected reliance upon experience, the senses and inductive reasoning, and seemed to insist that certainty was possible. The alternative to induction, deductive reasoning, demanded a mathematical approach, starting from simple and certain assumptions. This in turn required Descartes (and later rationalists such as Kant) to assume the existence of innate or "" knowledge in the human mind—a controversial proposal. In contrast to the rationalists, the "empiricists" took their orientation from Francis Bacon, whose arguments for methodical science were earlier than those of Descartes, and less directed towards mathematics and certainty. Bacon is known for his doctrine of the "idols of the mind", presented in his Novum Organum, and in his Essays described normal human thinking as biased towards believing in lies. But he was also the opponent of all metaphysical explanations of nature, or over-reaching speculation generally, and a proponent of science based on small steps of experience, experimentation and methodical induction. So while agreeing upon the need to help common sense with a methodical approach, he also insisted that starting from common sense, including especially common sense perceptions, was acceptable and correct. He influenced Locke and Pierre Bayle, in their critique of metaphysics, and in 1733 Voltaire "introduced him as the "father" of the scientific method" to a French audience, an understanding that was widespread by 1750. Together with this, references to "common sense" became positive and associated with modernity, in contrast to negative references to metaphysics, which was associated with the . As mentioned above, in terms of the more general epistemological implications of common sense, modern philosophy came to use the term common sense like Descartes, abandoning Aristotle's theory. While Descartes had distanced himself from it, John Locke abandoned it more openly, while still maintaining the idea of "common sensibles" that are perceived. But then George Berkeley abandoned both. David Hume agreed with Berkeley on this, and like Locke and Vico saw himself as following Bacon more than Descartes. In his synthesis, which he saw as the first Baconian analysis of man (something the lesser known Vico had claimed earlier), common sense is entirely built up from shared experience and shared innate emotions, and therefore it is indeed imperfect as a basis for any attempt to know the truth or to make the best decision. But he defended the possibility of science without absolute certainty, and consistently described common sense as giving a valid answer to the challenge of extreme skepticism. Concerning such sceptics, he wrote: Ethics: "humanist" Once Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza had applied Cartesian approaches to political philosophy, concerns about the inhumanity of the deductive approach of Descartes increased. With this in mind, Shaftesbury and Giambattista Vico presented new arguments for the importance of the Roman understanding of common sense, in what is now often referred to, after Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a humanist interpretation of the term. Their concern had several inter-related aspects. One ethical concern was the deliberately simplified method that treated human communities as made up of selfish independent individuals (methodological individualism), ignoring the sense of community that the Romans understood as part of common sense. Another connected epistemological concern was that by considering common good sense as inherently inferior to Cartesian conclusions developed from simple assumptions, an important type of wisdom was being arrogantly ignored. The Earl's seminal 1709 essay Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour was a highly erudite and influential defense of the use of irony and humour in serious discussions, at least among men of "Good Breeding". He drew upon authors such as Seneca, Juvenal, Horace and Marcus Aurelius, for whom, he saw, common sense was not just a reference to widely held vulgar opinions, but something cultivated among educated people living in better communities. One aspect of this, later taken up by authors such as Kant, was good taste. Another very important aspect of common sense particularly interesting to later British political philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson was what came to be called moral sentiment, which is different from a tribal or factional sentiment, but a more general fellow feeling that is very important for larger communities: Hutcheson described it as, "a Publick Sense, viz. "our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery."" which, he explains, "was sometimes called or Sensus Communis by some of the Antients". A reaction to Shaftesbury in defense of the Hobbesian approach of treating communities as driven by individual self-interest, was not long coming in Bernard Mandeville's controversial works. Indeed, this approach was never fully rejected, at least in economics. And so despite the criticism heaped upon Mandeville and Hobbes by Adam Smith, Hutcheson's student and successor in Glasgow university, Smith made self-interest a core assumption within nascent modern economics, specifically as part of the practical justification for allowing free markets. By the late enlightenment period in the 18th century, the communal sense had become the "moral sense" or "moral sentiment" referred to by Hume and Adam Smith, the latter writing in plural of the "moral sentiments" with the key one being sympathy, which was not so much a public spirit as such, but a kind of extension of self-interest. Jeremy Bentham gives a summary of the plethora of terms used in British philosophy by the nineteenth century to describe common sense in discussions about ethics: This was at least to some extent opposed to the Hobbesian approach, still today normal in economic theory, of trying to understand all human behaviour as fundamentally selfish, and would also be a foil to the new ethics of Kant. This understanding of a moral sense or public spirit remains a subject for discussion, although the term "common sense" is no longer commonly used for the sentiment itself. In several European languages, a separate term for this type of common sense is used. For example, French and German are used for this feeling of human solidarity, while (good sense) and (healthy understanding) are the terms for everyday "common sense". According to Gadamer, at least in French and British philosophy a moral element in appeals to common sense (or ), such as found in Reid, remains normal to this day. But according to Gadamer, the civic quality implied in discussion of in other European countries did not take root in the German philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries, despite the fact it consciously imitated much in English and French philosophy. " was understood as a purely theoretical judgment, parallel to moral consciousness (conscience) and taste." The concept of "was emptied and intellectualized by the German enlightenment". But German philosophy was becoming internationally important at this same time. Gadamer notes one less-known exception—the Württemberg pietism, inspired by the 18th century Swabian churchman, M. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, who appealed to Enlightenment figures in his critique of the Cartesian rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, who were the most important German philosophers before Kant. Giambattista Vico Vico, who taught classical rhetoric in Naples (where Shaftesbury died) under a Cartesian-influenced Spanish government, was not widely read until the 20th century, but his writings on common sense have been an important influence upon Hans-Georg Gadamer, Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci. Vico united the Roman and Greek meanings of the term . Vico's initial use of the term, which was of much inspiration to Gadamer for example, appears in his On the Study Methods of our Time, which was partly a defense of his own profession, given the reformist pressure upon both his University and the legal system in Naples. It presents common sense as something adolescents need to be trained in if they are not to "break into odd and arrogant behaviour when adulthood is reached", whereas teaching Cartesian method on its own harms common sense and stunts intellectual development. Rhetoric and elocution are not just for legal debate, but also educate young people to use their sense perceptions and their perceptions more broadly, building a fund of remembered images in their imagination, and then using ingenuity in creating linking metaphors, in order to make enthymemes. Enthymemes are reasonings about uncertain truths and probabilities—as opposed to the Cartesian method, which was skeptical of all that could not be dealt with as syllogisms, including raw perceptions of physical bodies. Hence common sense is not just a "guiding standard of eloquence" but also "the standard of practical judgment". The imagination or fantasy, which under traditional Aristotelianism was often equated with the , is built up under this training, becoming the "fund" (to use Schaeffer's term) accepting not only memories of things seen by an individual, but also metaphors and images known in the community, including the ones out of which language itself is made. In its mature version, Vico's conception of is defined by him as "judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, and entire nation, or the entire human race". Vico proposed his own anti-Cartesian methodology for a new Baconian science, inspired, he said, by Plato, Tacitus, Francis Bacon and Grotius. In this he went further than his predecessors concerning the ancient certainties available within vulgar common sense. What is required, according to his new science, is to find the common sense shared by different people and nations. He made this a basis for a new and better-founded approach to discuss Natural Law, improving upon Grotius, John Selden, and Pufendorf who he felt had failed to convince, because they could claim no authority from nature. Unlike Grotius, Vico went beyond looking for one single set of similarities amongst nations but also established rules about how natural law properly changes as peoples change, and has to be judged relative to this state of development. He thus developed a detailed view of an evolving wisdom of peoples. Ancient forgotten wisdoms, he claimed, could be re-discovered by analysis of languages and myths formed under the influence of them. This is comparable to both Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, as well as much later Hegelian historicism, both of which apparently developed without any awareness of Vico's work. Thomas Reid and the Scottish school Contemporary with Hume, but critical of Hume's scepticism, a so-called Scottish school of Common Sense formed, whose basic principle was enunciated by its founder and greatest figure, Thomas Reid: Thomas Reid was a successor to Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith as Professor of Moral Philosophy, Glasgow. While Reid's interests lay in the defense of common sense as a type of self-evident knowledge available to individuals, this was also part of a defense of natural law in the style of Grotius. He believed his use of "common sense" encompassed both the communal common sense described by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the perceptive powers described by Aristotelians. Reid was criticised, partly for his critique of Hume, by Kant and J. S. Mill, who were two of the most important influences in nineteenth century philosophy. He was blamed for over-stating Hume's scepticism of commonly held beliefs, and more importantly for not perceiving the problem with any claim that common sense could ever fulfill Cartesian (or Kantian) demands for absolute knowledge. Reid furthermore emphasized inborn common sense as opposed to only experience and sense perception. In this way his common sense has a similarity to the assertion of knowledge asserted by rationalists like Descartes and Kant, despite Reid's criticism of Descartes concerning his theory of ideas. Hume was critical of Reid on this point. Despite the criticism, the influence of the Scottish school was notable for example upon American pragmatism, and modern Thomism. The influence has been particularly important concerning the epistemological importance of a for any possibility of rational discussion between people. Kant: In aesthetic taste Immanuel Kant developed a new variant of the idea of , noting how having a sensitivity for what opinions are widely shared and comprehensible gives a sort of standard for judgment, and objective discussion, at least in the field of aesthetics and taste: Kant saw this concept as answering a particular need in his system: "the question of why aesthetic judgments are valid: since aesthetic judgments are a perfectly normal function of the same faculties of cognition involved in ordinary cognition, they will have the same universal validity as such ordinary acts of cognition". But Kant's overall approach was very different from those of Hume or Vico. Like Descartes, he rejected appeals to uncertain sense perception and common sense (except in the very specific way he describes concerning aesthetics), or the prejudices of one's "", and tried to give a new way to certainty through methodical logic, and an assumption of a type of knowledge. He was also not in agreement with Reid and the Scottish school, who he criticized in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics as using "the magic wand of common sense", and not properly confronting the "metaphysical" problem defined by Hume, which Kant wanted to be solved scientifically—the problem of how to use reason to consider how one ought to act. Kant used different words to refer to his aesthetic , for which he used Latin or else German , and the more general English meaning which he associated with Reid and his followers, for which he used various terms such as , , or . According to Gadamer, in contrast to the "wealth of meaning" brought from the Roman tradition into humanism, Kant "developed his moral philosophy in explicit opposition to the doctrine of 'moral feeling' that had been worked out in English philosophy". The moral imperative "cannot be based on feeling, not even if one does not mean an individual's feeling but common moral sensibility". For Kant, the only applied to taste, and the meaning of taste was also narrowed as it was no longer understood as any kind of knowledge. Taste, for Kant, is universal only in that it results from "the free play of all our cognitive powers", and is communal only in that it "abstracts from all subjective, private conditions such as attractiveness and emotion". Kant himself did not see himself as a relativist, and was aiming to give knowledge a more solid basis, but as Richard J. Bernstein remarks, reviewing this same critique of Gadamer: Contemporary philosophy Epistemology Continuing the tradition of Reid and the enlightenment generally, the common sense of individuals trying to understand reality continues to be a serious subject in philosophy. In America, Reid influenced C. S. Peirce, the founder of the philosophical movement now known as Pragmatism, which has become internationally influential. One of the names Peirce used for the movement was "Critical Common-Sensism". Peirce, who wrote after Charles Darwin, suggested that Reid and Kant's ideas about inborn common sense could be explained by evolution. But while such beliefs might be well adapted to primitive conditions, they were not infallible, and could not always be relied upon. Another example still influential today is from G. E. Moore, several of whose essays, such as the 1925 "A Defence of Common Sense", argued that individuals can make many types of statements about what they judge to be true, and that the individual and everyone else knows to be true. Michael Huemer has advocated an epistemic theory he calls phenomenal conservatism, which he claims to accord with common sense by way of internalist intuition. Ethics: what the community would think In twentieth century philosophy the concept of the as discussed by Vico and especially Kant became a major topic of philosophical discussion. The theme of this discussion questions how far the understanding of eloquent rhetorical discussion (in the case of Vico), or communally sensitive aesthetic tastes (in the case of Kant) can give a standard or model for political, ethical and legal discussion in a world where forms of relativism are commonly accepted, and serious dialogue between very different nations is essential. Some philosophers such as Jacques Rancière indeed take the lead from Jean-François Lyotard and refer to the "postmodern" condition as one where there is "". Hannah Arendt adapted Kant's concept of as a faculty of aesthetic judgement that imagines the judgements of others, into something relevant for political judgement. Thus she created a "Kantian" political philosophy, which, as she said herself, Kant did not write. She argued that there was often a banality to evil in the real world, for example in the case of someone like Adolf Eichmann, which consisted in a lack of and thoughtfulness generally. Arendt and also Jürgen Habermas, who took a similar position concerning Kant's , were criticised by Lyotard for their use of Kant's as a standard for real political judgement. Lyotard also saw Kant's as an important concept for understanding political judgement, not aiming at any consensus, but rather at a possibility of a "euphony" in "dis-sensus". Lyotard claimed that any attempt to impose any in real politics would mean imposture by an empowered faction upon others. In a parallel development, Antonio Gramsci, Benedetto Croce, and later Hans-Georg Gadamer took inspiration from Vico's understanding of common sense as a kind of wisdom of nations, going beyond Cartesian method. It has been suggested that Gadamer's most well-known work, Truth and Method, can be read as an "extended meditation on the implications of Vico's defense of the rhetorical tradition in response to the nascent methodologism that ultimately dominated academic enquiry". In the case of Gadamer, this was in specific contrast to the concept in Kant, which he felt (in agreement with Lyotard) could not be relevant to politics if used in its original sense. Gadamer came into direct debate with his contemporary Habermas, the so-called . Habermas, with a self-declared Enlightenment "prejudice against prejudice" argued that if breaking free from the restraints of language is not the aim of dialectic, then social science will be dominated by whoever wins debates, and thus Gadamer's defense of effectively defends traditional prejudices. Gadamer argued that being critical requires being critical of prejudices including the prejudice against prejudice. Some prejudices will be true. And Gadamer did not share Habermas' acceptance that aiming at going beyond language through method was not itself potentially dangerous. Furthermore, he insisted that because all understanding comes through language, hermeneutics has a claim to universality. As Gadamer wrote in the "Afterword" of Truth and Method, "I find it frighteningly unreal when people like Habermas ascribe to rhetoric a compulsory quality that one must reject in favor of unconstrained, rational dialogue". Paul Ricoeur argued that Gadamer and Habermas were both right in part. As a hermeneutist like Gadamer he agreed with him about the problem of lack of any perspective outside of history, pointing out that Habermas himself argued as someone coming from a particular tradition. He also agreed with Gadamer that hermeneutics is a "basic kind of knowing on which others rest". But he felt that Gadamer under-estimated the need for a dialectic that was critical and distanced, and attempting to go behind language. A recent commentator on Vico, John D. Schaeffer has argued that Gadamer's approach to exposed itself to the criticism of Habermas because it "privatized" it, removing it from a changing and oral community, following the Greek philosophers in rejecting true communal rhetoric, in favour of forcing the concept within a Socratic dialectic aimed at truth. Schaeffer claims that Vico's concept provides a third option to those of Habermas and Gadamer and he compares it to the recent philosophers Richard J. Bernstein, Bernard Williams, Richard Rorty, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and the recent theorist of rhetoric, Richard Lanham. "Moral sense" as opposed to "rationality" The other Enlightenment debate about common sense, concerning common sense as a term for an emotion or drive that is unselfish, also continues to be important in discussion of social science, and especially economics. The axiom that communities can be usefully modeled as a collection of self-interested individuals is a central assumption in much of modern mathematical economics, and mathematical economics has now come to be an influential tool of political decision making. While the term "common sense" had already become less commonly used as a term for the empathetic moral sentiments by the time of Adam Smith, debates continue about methodological individualism as something supposedly justified philosophically for methodological reasons (as argued for example by Milton Friedman and more recently by Gary S. Becker, both members of the so-called Chicago school of economics). As in the Enlightenment, this debate therefore continues to combine debates about not only what the individual motivations of people are, but also what can be known about scientifically, and what should be usefully assumed for methodological reasons, even if the truth of the assumptions are strongly doubted. Economics and social science generally have been criticized as a refuge of Cartesian methodology. Hence, amongst critics of the methodological argument for assuming self-centeredness in economics are authors such as Deirdre McCloskey, who have taken their bearings from the above-mentioned philosophical debates involving Habermas, Gadamer, the anti-Cartesian Richard Rorty and others, arguing that trying to force economics to follow artificial methodological laws is bad, and it is better to recognize social science as driven by rhetoric. Catholic theology Among Catholic theologians, writers such as theologian François Fénelon and philosopher Claude Buffier (1661–1737) gave an anti-Cartesian defense of common sense as a foundation for knowledge. Other Catholic theologians took up this approach, and attempts were made to combine this with more traditional Thomism, for example Jean-Marie de Lamennais. This was similar to the approach of Thomas Reid, who for example was a direct influence on Théodore Jouffroy. This meant basing knowledge upon something uncertain, and irrational. Matteo Liberatore, seeking an approach more consistent with Aristotle and Aquinas, equated this foundational common sense with the of Aristotle, that correspond to the of Aquinas. In the twentieth century, this debate is especially associated with Étienne Gilson and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Gilson pointed out that Liberatore's approach means categorizing such common beliefs as the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, under the same heading as (in Aristotle and Aquinas) such logical beliefs as that it is impossible for something to exist and not exist at the same time. This, according to Gilson, is going beyond the original meaning. Concerning Liberatore he wrote: Gilson argued that Thomism avoided the problem of having to decide between Cartesian innate certainties and Reid's uncertain common sense, and that "as soon as the problem of the existence of the external world was presented in terms of common sense, Cartesianism was accepted". Projects McCarthy's advice-taker proposal of 1958 represents an early proposal to use logic for representing common-sense knowledge in mathematical logic and using an automated theorem prover to derive answers to questions expressed in logical form. Compare Leibniz's calculus ratiocinator and characteristica universalis. The Cyc project attempts to provide a basis of common-sense knowledge for artificial-intelligence systems. The Open Mind Common Sense project resembles the Cyc project, except that it, like other on-line collaborative projects depends on the contributions of thousands of individuals across the World Wide Web. See also References Bibliography . The Loeb Classical Library edition of 1986 used the 1936 translation of W.S Hett, and the standardised Greek text of August Immanuel Bekker. The more recent translation by Joe Sachs (see below) attempts to be more literal. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Descartes discusses his use of the notion of the common sense in the sixth meditation. . Translated by Stephen H. Voss. Stebbins, Robert A. Leisure's Legacy: Challenging the Common Sense View of Free Time. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Vico, Giambattista. On the Study Methods of our Time, trans. Elio Gianturco. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. . Translated by Bergin and Fisch. Further reading Aristotelianism Belief Concepts in epistemology Consensus reality Folklore German philosophy Rhetoric

Autonomy

In developmental psychology and moral, political, and bioethical philosophy, autonomy is the capacity to make an informed, uncoerced decision. Autonomous organizations or institutions are independent or self-governing. Autonomy can also be defined from a human resources perspective, where it denotes a (relatively high) level of discretion granted to an employee in his or her work. In such cases, autonomy is known to generally increase job satisfaction. Self-actualized individuals are thought to operate autonomously of external expectations. In a medical context, respect for a patient's personal autonomy is considered one of many fundamental ethical principles in medicine. Sociology In the sociology of knowledge, a controversy over the boundaries of autonomy inhibited analysis of any concept beyond relative autonomy, until a typology of autonomy was created and developed within science and technology studies[citation needed]. According to it, the institution of science's existing autonomy is "reflexive autonomy": actors and structures within the scientific field are able to translate or to reflect diverse themes presented by social and political fields, as well as influence them regarding the thematic choices on research projects. Institutional autonomy Institutional autonomy is having the capacity as a legislator to be able to implant and pursue official goals. Autonomous institutions are responsible for finding sufficient resources or modifying their plans, programs, courses, responsibilities, and services accordingly. But in doing so, they must contend with any obstacles that can occur, such as social pressure against cut-backs or socioeconomic difficulties. From a legislator's point of view, to increase institutional autonomy, conditions of self-management and institutional self-governance must be put in place. An increase in leadership and a redistribution of decision-making responsibilities would be beneficial to the research of resources. Institutional autonomy was often seen as a synonym for self-determination, and many governments feared that it would lead institutions to an irredentist or secessionist region. But autonomy should be seen as a solution to self-determination struggles. Self-determination is a movement toward independence, whereas autonomy is a way to accommodate the distinct regions/groups within a country. Institutional autonomy can diffuse conflicts regarding minorities and ethnic groups in a society. Allowing more autonomy to groups and institutions helps create diplomatic relationships between them and the central government. Politics In governmental parlance, autonomy refers to self-governance. An example of an autonomous jurisdiction was the former United States governance of the Philippine Islands. The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 provided the framework for the creation of an autonomous government under which the Filipino people had broader domestic autonomy than previously, although it reserved certain privileges to the United States to protect its sovereign rights and interests. Other examples include Kosovo (as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo) under the former Yugoslav government of Marshal Tito and Puntland Autonomous Region within Federal Republic of Somalia. Although often being territorially defined as self-governments, autonomous self-governing institutions may take a non-territorial form. Such non-territorial solutions are, for example, cultural autonomy in Estonia and Hungary, national minority councils in Serbia or Sámi parliaments in Nordic countries. Philosophy Autonomy is a key concept that has a broad impact on different fields of philosophy. In metaphysical philosophy, the concept of autonomy is referenced in discussions about free will, fatalism, determinism, and agency. In moral philosophy, autonomy refers to subjecting oneself to objective moral law. According to Kant Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) defined autonomy by three themes regarding contemporary ethics. Firstly, autonomy as the right for one to make their own decisions excluding any interference from others. Secondly, autonomy as the capacity to make such decisions through one's own independence of mind and after personal reflection. Thirdly, as an ideal way of living life autonomously. In summary, autonomy is the moral right one possesses, or the capacity we have in order to think and make decisions for oneself providing some degree of control or power over the events that unfold within one's everyday life. The context in which Kant addresses autonomy is in regards to moral theory, asking both foundational and abstract questions. He believed that in order for there to be morality, there must be autonomy. "Autonomous" is derived from the Greek word autonomos where 'auto' means self and 'nomos' means to govern (nomos: as can be seen in its usage in nomárchēs which means chief of the province). Kantian autonomy also provides a sense of rational autonomy, simply meaning one rationally possesses the motivation to govern their own life. Rational autonomy entails making your own decisions but it cannot be done solely in isolation. Cooperative rational interactions are required to both develop and exercise our ability to live in a world with others. Kant argued that morality presupposes this autonomy in moral agents, since moral requirements are expressed in categorical imperatives. An imperative is categorical if it issues a valid command independent of personal desires or interests that would provide a reason for obeying the command. It is hypothetical if the validity of its command, if the reason why one can be expected to obey it, is the fact that one desires or is interested in something further that obedience to the command would entail. "Don't speed on the freeway if you don't want to be stopped by the police" is a hypothetical imperative. "It is wrong to break the law, so don't speed on the freeway" is a categorical imperative. The hypothetical command not to speed on the freeway is not valid for you if you do not care whether you are stopped by the police. The categorical command is valid for you either way. Autonomous moral agents can be expected to obey the command of a categorical imperative even if they lack a personal desire or interest in doing so. It remains an open question whether they will, however. The Kantian concept of autonomy is often misconstrued, leaving out the important point about the autonomous agent's self-subjection to the moral law. It is thought that autonomy is fully explained as the ability to obey a categorical command independently of a personal desire or interest in doing so—or worse, that autonomy is "obeying" a categorical command independently of a natural desire or interest; and that heteronomy, its opposite, is acting instead on personal motives of the kind referenced in hypothetical imperatives. In his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant applied the concept of autonomy also to define the concept of personhood and human dignity. Autonomy, along with rationality, are seen by Kant as the two criteria for a meaningful life. Kant would consider a life lived without these not worth living; it would be a life of value equal to that of a plant or insect. According to Kant autonomy is part of the reason that we hold others morally accountable for their actions. Human actions are morally praise- or blame-worthy in virtue of our autonomy. Non- autonomous beings such as plants or animals are not blameworthy due to their actions being non-autonomous. Kant's position on crime and punishment is influenced by his views on autonomy. Brainwashing or drugging criminals into being law-abiding citizens would be immoral as it would not be respecting their autonomy. Rehabilitation must be sought in a way that respects their autonomy and dignity as human beings. According to Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about autonomy and the moral fight. Autonomy in this sense is referred to as the free self and entails several aspects of the self, including self-respect and even self-love. This can be interpreted as influenced by Kant (self-respect) and Aristotle (self-love). For Nietzsche, valuing ethical autonomy can dissolve the conflict between love (self-love) and law (self-respect) which can then translate into reality through experiences of being self-responsible. Because Nietzsche defines having a sense of freedom with being responsible for one's own life, freedom and self-responsibility can be very much linked to autonomy. According to Piaget The Swiss philosopher Jean Piaget (1896–1980) believed that autonomy comes from within and results from a "free decision". It is of intrinsic value and the morality of autonomy is not only accepted but obligatory. When an attempt at social interchange occurs, it is reciprocal, ideal and natural for there to be autonomy regardless of why the collaboration with others has taken place. For Piaget, the term autonomous can be used to explain the idea that rules are self-chosen. By choosing which rules to follow or not, we are in turn determining our own behaviour. Piaget studied the cognitive development of children by analyzing them during their games and through interviews, establishing (among other principles) that the children's moral maturation process occurred in two phases, the first of heteronomy and the second of autonomy: Heteronomous reasoning: Rules are objective and unchanging. They must be literal because the authority are ordering it and do not fit exceptions or discussions. The base of the rule is the superior authority (parents, adults, the State), that it should not give reason for the rules imposed or fulfilled them in any case. Duties provided are conceived as given from oneself. Any moral motivation and sentiments are possible through what one believes to be right. Autonomous reasoning: Rules are the product of an agreement and, therefore, are modifiable. They can be subject to interpretation and fit exceptions and objections. The base of the rule is its own acceptance, and its meaning has to be explained. Sanctions must be proportionate to the absence, assuming that sometimes offenses can go unpunished, so that collective punishment is unacceptable if it is not the guilty. The circumstances may not punish a guilty. Duties provided are conceived as given from the outside. One follows rules mechanically as it is simply a rule, or as a way to avoid a form of punishment. According to Kohlberg The American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) continues the studies of Piaget. His studies collected information from different latitudes to eliminate the cultural variability, and focused on the moral reasoning, and not so much in the behavior or its consequences. Through interviews with adolescent and teenage boys, who were to try and solve "moral dilemmas", Kohlberg went on to further develop the stages of moral development. The answers they provided could be one of two things. Either they choose to obey a given law, authority figure or rule of some sort or they chose to take actions that would serve a human need but in turn break this given rule or command. The most popular moral dilemma asked involved the wife of a man approaching death due to a special type of cancer. Because the drug was too expensive to obtain on his own, and because the pharmacist who discovered and sold the drug had no compassion for him and only wanted profits, he stole it. Kohlberg asks these adolescent and teenage boys (10-, 13- and 16-year-olds) if they think that is what the husband should have done or not. Therefore, depending on their decisions, they provided answers to Kohlberg about deeper rationales and thoughts and determined what they value as important. This value then determined the "structure" of their moral reasoning. Kohlberg established three stages of morality, each of which is subdivided into two levels. They are read in progressive sense, that is, higher levels indicate greater autonomy. Level 1: Premoral/Preconventional Morality: Standards are met (or not met) depending on the hedonistic or physical consequences. [Stage 0: Egocentric Judgment: There is no moral concept independent of individual wishes, including a lack of concept of rules or obligations.] Stage 1: Punishment-Obedience Orientation: The rule is obeyed only to avoid punishment. Physical consequences determine goodness or badness and power is deferred to unquestioningly with no respect for the human or moral value, or the meaning of these consequences. Concern is for the self. Stage 2: Instrumental-Relativist Orientation: Morals are individualistic and egocentric. There is an exchange of interests but always under the point of view of satisfying personal needs. Elements of fairness and reciprocity are present but these are interpreted in a pragmatic way, instead of an experience of gratitude or justice. Egocentric in nature but beginning to incorporate the ability to see things from the perspective of others. Level 2: Conventional Morality/Role Conformity: Rules are obeyed according to the established conventions of a society. Stage 3: Good Boy–Nice Girl Orientation: Morals are conceived in accordance with the stereotypical social role. Rules are obeyed to obtain the approval of the immediate group and the right actions are judged based on what would please others or give the impression that one is a good person. Actions are evaluated according to intentions. Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation: Morals are judged in accordance with the authority of the system, or the needs of the social order. Laws and order are prioritized. Level 3: Postconventional Morality/Self-Accepted Moral Principles: Standards of moral behavior are internalized. Morals are governed by rational judgment, derived from a conscious reflection on the recognition of the value of the individual inside a conventionally established society. Stage 5: Social Contract Orientation: There are individual rights and standards that have been lawfully established as basic universal values. Rules are agreed upon by through procedure and society comes to consensus through critical examination in order to benefit the greater good. Stage 6: Universal Principle Orientation: Abstract ethical principles are obeyed on a personal level in addition to societal rules and conventions. Universal principles of justice, reciprocity, equality and human dignity are internalized and if one fails to live up to these ideals, guilt or self-condemnation results. According to Audi Robert Audi characterizes autonomy as the self-governing power to bring reasons to bear in directing one's conduct and influencing one's propositional attitudes. Traditionally, autonomy is only concerned with practical matters. But, as Audi's definition suggests, autonomy may be applied to responding to reasons at large, not just to practical reasons. Autonomy is closely related to freedom but the two can come apart. An example would be a political prisoner who is forced to make a statement in favor of his opponents in order to ensure that his loved ones are not harmed. As Audi points out, the prisoner lacks freedom but still has autonomy since his statement, though not reflecting his political ideals, is still an expression of his commitment to his loved ones. Autonomy is often equated with self-legislation in the Kantian tradition. Self-legislation may be interpreted as laying down laws or principles that are to be followed. Audi agrees with this school in the sense that we should bring reasons to bear in a principled way. Responding to reasons by mere whim may still be considered free but not autonomous. A commitment to principles and projects, on the other hand, provides autonomous agents with an identity over time and gives them a sense of the kind of persons they want to be. But autonomy is neutral as to which principles or projects the agent endorses. So different autonomous agents may follow very different principles. But, as Audi points out, self-legislation is not sufficient for autonomy since laws that do not have any practical impact do not constitute autonomy. Some form of motivational force or executive power is necessary in order to get from mere self-legislation to self-government. This motivation may be inherent in the corresponding practical judgment itself, a position known as motivational internalism, or may come to the practical judgment externally in the form of some desire independent of the judgment, as motivational externalism holds. In the Humean tradition, intrinsic desires are the reasons the autonomous agent should respond to. This theory is called instrumentalism. Audi rejects instrumentalism and suggests that we should adopt a position known as axiological objectivism. The central idea of this outlook is that objective values, and not subjective desires, are the sources of normativity and therefore determine what autonomous agents should do. Child development Autonomy in childhood and adolescence is when one strives to gain a sense of oneself as a separate, self-governing individual. Between ages 1–3, during the second stage of Erikson's and Freud's stages of development, the psychosocial crisis that occurs is autonomy versus shame and doubt. The significant event that occurs during this stage is that children must learn to be autonomous, and failure to do so may lead to the child doubting their own abilities and feel ashamed. When a child becomes autonomous it allows them to explore and acquire new skills. Autonomy has two vital aspects wherein there is an emotional component where one relies more on themselves rather than their parents and a behavioural component where one makes decisions independently by using their judgement. The styles of child rearing affect the development of a child's autonomy. Autonomy in adolescence is closely related to their quest for identity. In adolescence parents and peers act as agents of influence. Peer influence in early adolescence may help the process of an adolescent to gradually become more autonomous by being less susceptible to parental or peer influence as they get older. In adolescence the most important developmental task is to develop a healthy sense of autonomy. Religion In Christianity, autonomy is manifested as a partial self-governance on various levels of church administration. During the history of Christianity, there were two basic types of autonomy. Some important parishes and monasteries have been given special autonomous rights and privileges, and the best known example of monastic autonomy is the famous Eastern Orthodox monastic community on Mount Athos in Greece. On the other hand, administrative autonomy of entire ecclesiastical provinces has throughout history included various degrees of internal self-governance. In ecclesiology of Eastern Orthodox Churches, there is a clear distinction between autonomy and autocephaly, since autocephalous churches have full self-governance and independence, while every autonomous church is subject to some autocephalous church, having a certain degree of internal self-governance. Since every autonomous church had its own historical path to ecclesiastical autonomy, there are significant differences between various autonomous churches in respect of their particular degrees of self-governance. For example, churches that are autonomous can have their highest-ranking bishops, such as an archbishop or metropolitan, appointed or confirmed by the patriarch of the mother church from which it was granted its autonomy, but generally they remain self-governing in many other respects. In the history of Western Christianity the question of ecclesiastical autonomy was also one of the most important questions, especially during the first centuries of Christianity, since various archbishops and metropolitans in Western Europe have often opposed centralizing tendencies of the Church of Rome. , the Catholic Church comprises 24 autonomous (sui iuris) Churches in communion with the Holy See. Various denominations of Protestant churches usually have more decentralized power, and churches may be autonomous, thus having their own rules or laws of government, at the national, local, or even individual level. Sartre brings the concept of the Cartesian god being totally free and autonomous. He states that existence precedes essence with god being the creator of the essences, eternal truths and divine will. This pure freedom of god relates to human freedom and autonomy; where a human is not subjected to pre-existing ideas and values. According to the first amendment, In the United States of America, the federal government is restricted in building a national church. This is due to the first amendment's recognizing people's freedom's to worship their faith according to their own belief's. For example, the American government has removed the church from their "sphere of authority" due to the churches' historical impact on politics and their authority on the public. This was the beginning of the disestablishment process. The Protestant churches in the United States had a significant impact on American culture in the nineteenth century, when they organized the establishment of schools, hospitals, orphanages, colleges, magazines, and so forth. This has brought up the famous, however, misinterpreted term of the separation of church and state. These churches lost the legislative and financial support from the state. The disestablishment process The first disestablishment began with the introduction of the bill of rights. In the twentieth century, due to the great depression of the 1930s and the completion of the second world war, the American churches were revived. Specifically the Protestant churches. This was the beginning of the second disestablishment when churches had become popular again but held no legislative power. One of the reasons why the churches gained attendance and popularity was due to the baby boom, when soldiers came back from the second world war and started their families. The large influx of newborns gave the churches a new wave of followers. However, these followers did not hold the same beliefs as their parents and brought about the political, and religious revolutions of the 1960s. During the 1960s, the collapse of religious and cultural middle brought upon the third disestablishment. Religion became more important to the individual and less so to the community. The changes brought from these revolutions significantly increased the personal autonomy of individuals due to the lack of structural restraints giving them added freedom of choice. This concept is known as "new voluntarism" where individuals have free choice on how to be religious and the free choice whether to be religious or not. Medicine In a medical context, respect for a patient's personal autonomy is considered one of many fundamental ethical principles in medicine. Autonomy can be defined as the ability of the person to make his or her own decisions. This faith in autonomy is the central premise of the concept of informed consent and shared decision making. This idea, while considered essential to today's practice of medicine, was developed in the last 50 years. According to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (in Principles of Biomedical Ethics), the Nuremberg trials detailed accounts of horrifyingly exploitative medical "experiments" which violated the subjects' physical integrity and personal autonomy. These incidences prompted calls for safeguards in medical research, such as the Nuremberg Code which stressed the importance of voluntary participation in medical research. It is believed that the Nuremberg Code served as the premise for many current documents regarding research ethics. Respect for autonomy became incorporated in health care and patients could be allowed to make personal decisions about the health care services that they receive. Notably, autonomy has several aspects as well as challenges that affect health care operations. The manner in which a patient is handled may undermine or support the autonomy of a patient and for this reason, the way a patient is communicated to becomes very crucial. A good relationship between a patient and a health care practitioner needs to be well defined to ensure that autonomy of a patient is respected. Just like in any other life situation, a patient would not like to be under the control of another person. The move to emphasize respect for patient's autonomy rose from the vulnerabilities that were pointed out in regards to autonomy. However, autonomy does not only apply in a research context. Users of the health care system have the right to be treated with respect for their autonomy, instead of being dominated by the physician. This is referred to as paternalism. While paternalism is meant to be overall good for the patient, this can very easily interfere with autonomy. Through the therapeutic relationship, a thoughtful dialogue between the client and the physician may lead to better outcomes for the client, as he or she is more of a participant in decision-making. There are many different definitions of autonomy, many of which place the individual in a social context. Relational autonomy, which suggests that a person is defined through their relationships with others, is increasingly considered in medicine and particularly in critical and end-of-life care. Supported autonomy suggests instead that in specific circumstances it may be necessary to temporarily compromise the autonomy of the person in the short term in order to preserve their autonomy in the long-term. Other definitions of the autonomy imagine the person as a contained and self-sufficient being whose rights should not be compromised under any circumstance. There are also differing views with regard to whether modern health care systems should be shifting to greater patient autonomy or a more paternalistic approach. For example, there are such arguments that suggest the current patient autonomy practiced is plagued by flaws such as misconceptions of treatment and cultural differences, and that health care systems should be shifting to greater paternalism on the part of the physician given their expertise.  On the other hand, other approaches suggest that there simply needs to be an increase in relational understanding between patients and health practitioners to improve patient autonomy. One argument in favor of greater patient autonomy and its benefits is by Dave deBronkart, who believes that in the technological advancement age, patients are capable of doing a lot of their research on medical issues from their home. According to deBronkart, this helps to promote better discussions between patients and physicians during hospital visits, ultimately easing up the workload of physicians. deBronkart argues that this leads to greater patient empowerment and a more educative health care system. In opposition to this view, technological advancements can sometimes be viewed as an unfavorable way of promoting patient autonomy. For example, self-testing medical procedures which have become increasingly common are argued by Greaney et al. to increase patient autonomy, however, may not be promoting what is best for the patient. In this argument, contrary to deBronkart, the current perceptions of patient autonomy are excessively over-selling the benefits of individual autonomy, and is not the most suitable way to go about treating patients. Instead, a more inclusive form of autonomy should be implemented, relational autonomy, which factors into consideration those close to the patient as well as the physician. These different concepts of autonomy can be troublesome as the acting physician is faced with deciding which concept he/she will implement into their clinical practice. It is often references as one of the four pillars of medicine, alongside beneficence, justice and nonmaleficence Autonomy varies and some patients find it overwhelming especially the minors when faced with emergency situations. Issues arise in emergency room situations where there may not be time to consider the principle of patient autonomy. Various ethical challenges are faced in these situations when time is critical, and patient consciousness may be limited. However, in such settings where informed consent may be compromised, the working physician evaluates each individual case to make the most professional and ethically sound decision. For example, it is believed that neurosurgeons in such situations, should generally do everything they can to respect patient autonomy. In the situation in which a patient is unable to make an autonomous decision, the neurosurgeon should discuss with the surrogate decision maker in order to aid in the decision-making process. Performing surgery on a patient without informed consent is in general thought to only be ethically justified when the neurosurgeon and his/her team render the patient to not have the capacity to make autonomous decisions. If the patient is capable of making an autonomous decision, these situations are generally less ethically strenuous as the decision is typically respected. Not every patient is capable of making an autonomous decision. For example, a commonly proposed question is at what age children should be partaking in treatment decisions. This question arises as children develop differently, therefore making it difficult to establish a standard age at which children should become more autonomous. Those who are unable to make the decisions prompt a challenge to medical practitioners since it becomes difficult to determine the ability of a patient to make a decision. To some extent, it has been said that emphasis of autonomy in health care has undermined the practice of health care practitioners to improve the health of their patient as necessary. The scenario has led to tension in the relationship between a patient and a health care practitioner. This is because as much as a physician wants to prevent a patient from suffering, they still have to respect autonomy. Beneficence is a principle allowing physicians to act responsibly in their practice and in the best interests of their patients, which may involve overlooking autonomy. However, the gap between a patient and a physician has led to problems because in other cases, the patients have complained of not being adequately informed. The seven elements of informed consent (as defined by Beauchamp and Childress) include threshold elements (competence and voluntariness), information elements (disclosure, recommendation, and understanding) and consent elements (decision and authorization). Some philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt consider Beauchamp and Childress criteria insufficient. They claim that an action can only be considered autonomous if it involves the exercise of the capacity to form higher-order values about desires when acting intentionally. What this means is that patients may understand their situation and choices but would not be autonomous unless the patient is able to form value judgements about their reasons for choosing treatment options they would not be acting autonomously. In certain unique circumstances, government may have the right to temporarily override the right to bodily integrity in order to preserve the life and well-being of the person. Such action can be described using the principle of "supported autonomy", a concept that was developed to describe unique situations in mental health (examples include the forced feeding of a person dying from the eating disorder anorexia nervosa, or the temporary treatment of a person living with a psychotic disorder with antipsychotic medication). While controversial, the principle of supported autonomy aligns with the role of government to protect the life and liberty of its citizens. Terrence F. Ackerman has highlighted problems with these situations, he claims that by undertaking this course of action physician or governments run the risk of misinterpreting a conflict of values as a constraining effect of illness on a patient's autonomy. Since the 1960s, there have been attempts to increase patient autonomy including the requirement that physician's take bioethics courses during their time in medical school. Despite large-scale commitment to promoting patient autonomy, public mistrust of medicine in developed countries has remained. Onora O'Neill has ascribed this lack of trust to medical institutions and professionals introducing measures that benefit themselves, not the patient. O'Neill claims that this focus on autonomy promotion has been at the expense of issues like distribution of healthcare resources and public health. One proposal to increase patient autonomy is through the use of support staff. The use of support staff including medical assistants, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, nurses, and other staff that can promote patient interests and better patient care. Nurses especially can learn about patient beliefs and values in order to increase informed consent and possibly persuade the patient through logic and reason to entertain a certain treatment plan. This would promote both autonomy and beneficence, while keeping the physician's integrity intact. Furthermore, Humphreys asserts that nurses should have professional autonomy within their scope of practice (35–37). Humphreys argues that if nurses exercise their professional autonomy more, then there will be an increase in patient autonomy (35–37). International human rights law After the Second World War, there was a push for international human rights that came in many waves. Autonomy as a basic human right started the building block in the beginning of these layers alongside liberty. The Universal declarations of Human rights of 1948 has made mention of autonomy or the legal protected right to individual self-determination in article 22. Documents such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reconfirm international law in the aspect of human rights because those laws were already there, but it is also responsible for making sure that the laws highlighted when it comes to autonomy, cultural and integrity; and land rights are made within an indigenous context by taking special attention to their historical and contemporary events The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples article 3 also through international law provides Human rights for Indigenous individuals by giving them a right to self-determination, meaning they have all the liberties to choose their political status, and are capable to go and improve their economic, social, and cultural statuses in society, by developing it. Another example of this, is article 4 of the same document which gives them autonomous rights when it comes to their internal or local affairs and how they can fund themselves in order to be able to self govern themselves. Minorities in countries are also protected as well by international law; the 27th article of the United Nations International covenant on Civil and Political rights or the ICCPR does so by allowing these individuals to be able to enjoy their own culture or use their language. Minorities in that manner are people from ethnic religious or linguistic groups according to the document. The European Court of Human rights, is an international court that has been created on behalf of the European Conventions of Human rights. However, when it comes to autonomy they did not explicitly state it when it comes to the rights that individuals have. The current article 8 has remedied to that when the case of Pretty v the United Kingdom, a case in 2002 involving assisted suicide, where autonomy was used as a legal right in law. It was where Autonomy was distinguished and its reach into law was marked as well making it the foundations for legal precedent in making case law originating from the European Court of Human rights. The Yogyakarta Principles, a document with no binding effect in international human rights law, contend that "self-determination" used as meaning of autonomy on one's own matters including informed consent or sexual and reproductive rights, is integral for one's self-defined or gender identity and refused any medical procedures as a requirement for legal recognition of the gender identity of transgender. If eventually accepted by the international community in a treaty, this would make these ideas human rights in the law. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities also defines autonomy as principles of rights of a person with disability including "the freedom to make one's own choices, and independence of persons". Celebrity culture on teenage autonomy A study conducted by David C. Giles and John Maltby conveyed that after age-affecting factors were removed, a high emotional autonomy was a significant predictor of celebrity interest, as well as high attachment to peers with a low attachment to parents. Patterns of intense personal interest in celebrities was found to be conjunction with low levels of closeness and security. Furthermore, the results suggested that adults with a secondary group of pseudo-friends during development from parental attachment, usually focus solely on one particular celebrity, which could be due to difficulties in making this transition. Various uses In computing, an autonomous peripheral is one that can be used with the computer turned off. Within self-determination theory in psychology, autonomy refers to 'autonomy support versus control', "hypothesizing that autonomy-supportive social contexts tend to facilitate self-determined motivation, healthy development, and optimal functioning." In mathematical analysis, an ordinary differential equation is said to be autonomous if it is time-independent. In linguistics, an autonomous language is one which is independent of other languages, for example, has a standard variety, grammar books, dictionaries or literature, etc. In robotics, "autonomy means independence of control. This characterization implies that autonomy is a property of the relation between two agents, in the case of robotics, of the relations between the designer and the autonomous robot. Self-sufficiency, situatedness, learning or development, and evolution increase an agent's degree of autonomy.", according to Rolf Pfeifer. In spaceflight, autonomy can also refer to crewed missions that are operating without control by ground controllers. In economics, autonomous consumption is consumption expenditure when income levels are zero, making spending autonomous to income. In politics, autonomous territories are States wishing to retain territorial integrity in opposition to ethnic or indigenous demands for self-determination or independence (sovereignty). In anti-establishment activism, an autonomous space is another name for a non-governmental social center or free space (for community interaction). In social psychology, autonomy is a personality trait characterized by a focus on personal achievement, independence, and a preference for solitude, often labeled as an opposite of sociotropy. Limits to autonomy Autonomy can be limited. For instance, by disabilities, civil society organizations may achieve a degree of autonomy albeit nested within—and relative to—formal bureaucratic and administrative regimes. Community partners can therefore assume a hybridity of capture and autonomy—or a mutuality—that is rather nuanced. Semi-autonomy The term semi-autonomy (coined with prefix semi- / "half") designates partial or limited autonomy. As a relative term, it is usually applied to various semi-autonomous entities or processes that are substantially or functionally limited, in comparison to other fully autonomous entities or processes. Quasi-autonomy The term quasi-autonomy (coined with prefix quasi- / "resembling" or "appearing") designates formally acquired or proclaimed, but functionally limited or constrained autonomy. As a descriptive term, it is usually applied to various quasi-autonomous entities or processes that are formally designated or labeled as autonomous, but in reality remain functionally dependent or influenced by some other entity or process. An example for such use of the term can be seen in common designation for quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. See also Autonomism List of autonomous areas by country Autonomy Day Cornelius Castoriadis Counterdependency Direct democracy Equality of autonomy Essential facilities doctrine Flat organization Takis Fotopoulos Home rule Job autonomy Personal boundaries Self-governing colony Self-sufficiency Teaching for social justice Viable system model Workplace democracy Notes References Citations Sources External links Kastner, Jens. "Autonomy" (2015). University Bielefeld – Center for InterAmerican Studies. "Self-sustainability strategies for Development Initiatives: What is self-sustainability and why is it so important?" Ethical principles Individualism Organizational cybernetics

Idea

In common usage and in philosophy, ideas are the results of thought. Also in philosophy, ideas can also be mental representational images of some object. Many philosophers have considered ideas to be a fundamental ontological category of being. The capacity to create and understand the meaning of ideas is considered to be an essential and defining feature of human beings. An idea arises in a reflexive, spontaneous manner, even without thinking or serious reflection, for example, when we talk about the idea of a person or a place. A new or an original idea can often lead to innovation. Etymology The word idea comes from Greek ἰδέα idea "form, pattern", from the root of ἰδεῖν idein, "to see." History The argument over the underlying nature of ideas is opened by Plato, whose exposition of his theory of forms—which recurs and accumulates over the course of his many dialogs—appropriates and adds a new sense to the Greek word for things that are "seen" (re. εἶδος) that highlights those elements of perception which are encountered without material or objective reference available to the eyes (re. ἰδέα). As this argument is disseminated the word "idea" begins to take on connotations that would be more familiarly associated with the term today. In the fifth book of his Republic, Plato defines philosophy as the love of this formal (as opposed to visual) way of seeing. Plato advances the theory that perceived but immaterial objects of awareness constituted a realm of deathless forms or ideas from which the material world emanated. Aristotle challenges Plato in this area, positing that the phenomenal world of ideas arises as mental composites of remembered observations. Though it is anachronistic to apply these terms to thinkers from antiquity, it clarifies the argument between Plato and Aristotle if we call Plato an idealist thinker and Aristotle an empiricist thinker. This antagonism between empiricism and idealism generally characterizes the dynamism of the argument over the theory of ideas up to the present. This schism in theory has never been resolved to the satisfaction of thinkers from both sides of the disagreement and is represented today in the split between analytic and continental schools of philosophy. Persistent contradictions between classical physics and quantum mechanics may be pointed to as a rough analogy for the gap between the two schools of thought. Philosophy Plato Plato in Ancient Greece was one of the earliest philosophers to provide a detailed discussion of ideas and of the thinking process (in Plato's Greek the word idea carries a rather different sense of our modern English term). Plato argued in dialogues such as the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Timaeus that there is a realm of ideas or forms (eidei), which exist independently of anyone who may have thoughts on these ideas, and it is the ideas which distinguish mere opinion from knowledge, for unlike material things which are transient and liable to contrary properties, ideas are unchanging and nothing but just what they are. Consequently, Plato seems to assert forcefully that material things can only be the objects of opinion; real knowledge can only be had of unchanging ideas. Furthermore, ideas for Plato appear to serve as universals; consider the following passage from the Republic: René Descartes Descartes often wrote of the meaning of the idea as an image or representation, often but not necessarily "in the mind", which was well known in the vernacular. Despite Descartes' invention of the non-Platonic use of the term, he at first followed this vernacular use.b In his Meditations on First Philosophy he says, "Some of my thoughts are like images of things, and it is to these alone that the name 'idea' properly belongs." He sometimes maintained that ideas were innate and uses of the term idea diverge from the original primary scholastic use. He provides multiple non-equivalent definitions of the term, uses it to refer to as many as six distinct kinds of entities, and divides ideas inconsistently into various genetic categories. For him knowledge took the form of ideas and philosophical investigation is devoted to the consideration of these entities. John Locke John Locke's use of idea stands in striking contrast to Plato's. In his Introduction to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defines idea as "that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; And I could not avoid frequently using it." He said he regarded the contribution offered in his essay as necessary to examine our own abilities and discern what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. In this style of ideal conception other outstanding figures followed in his footsteps — Hume and Kant in the 18th century, Arthur Schopenhauer in the 19th century, and Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Karl Popper in the 20th century. Locke always believed in the good sense — not pushing things to extremes and while taking fully into account the plain facts of the matter. He prioritized common-sense ideas that struck him as "good-tempered, moderate, and down-to-earth." As John Locke studied humans in his work "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" he continually referenced Descartes for ideas as he asked this fundamental question: "When we are concerned with something about which we have no certain knowledge, what rules or standards should guide how confident we allow ourselves to be that our opinions are right?" Put in another way, he inquired into how humans might verify their ideas, and considered the distinctions between different types of ideas. Locke found that an idea "can simply mean some sort of brute experience." He shows that there are "No innate principles in the mind." Thus, he concludes that "our ideas are all experienced in nature." An experience can either be a sensation or a reflection: "consider whether there are any innate ideas in the mind before any are brought in by the impression from sensation or reflection." Therefore, an idea was an experience in which the human mind apprehended something. In a Lockean view, there are really two types of ideas: complex and simple. Simple ideas are the building blocks for more complex ideas, and "While the mind is wholly passive in the reception of simple ideas, it is very active in the building of complex ideas…" Complex ideas, therefore, can either be modes, substances, or relations. Modes combine simpler ideas in order to convey new information. For instance, David Banach gives the example of beauty as a mode. He points to combinations of color and form as qualities constitutive of this mode. Substances, however, are distinct from modes. Substances convey the underlying formal unity of certain objects, such as dogs, cats, or tables. Relations represent the relationship between two or more ideas that contain analogous elements to one another without the implication of underlying formal unity. A painting or a piece of music, for example, can both be called 'art' without belonging to the same substance. They are related as forms of art (the term 'art' in this illustration would be a 'mode of relations'). In this way, Locke concluded that the formal ambiguity around ideas he initially sought to clarify had been resolved. David Hume Hume differs from Locke by limiting idea to only one of two possible types of perception. The other one is called "impression", and is more lively: these are perceptions we have "when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will." Ideas are more complex and are built upon these more basic and more grounded perceptions. Hume shared with Locke the basic empiricist premise that it is only from life experiences (whether their own or others') that humans' knowledge of the existence of anything outside of themselves can be ultimately derived, that they shall carry on doing what they are prompted to do by their emotional drives of varying kinds. In choosing the means to those ends, they shall follow their accustomed associations of ideas.d Hume has contended and defended the notion that "reason alone is merely the 'slave of the passions'." Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant defines ideas by distinguishing them from concepts. Concepts arise by the compositing of experience into abstract categorial representations of presumed or encountered empirical objects whereas the origin of ideas, for Kant, is a priori to experience. Regulative ideas, for example, are ideals that one must tend towards, but by definition may not be completely realized as objects of empirical experience. Liberty, according to Kant, is an idea whereas "tree" (as an abstraction covering all species of trees) is a concept. The autonomy of the rational and universal subject is opposed to the determinism of the empirical subject. Kant felt that it is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists. The business of philosophy he thought was not to give rules, but to analyze the private judgement of good common sense.e Rudolf Steiner Whereas Kant declares limits to knowledge ("we can never know the thing in itself"), in his epistemological work, Rudolf Steiner sees ideas as "objects of experience" which the mind apprehends, much as the eye apprehends light. In Goethean Science (1883), he declares, "Thinking ... is no more and no less an organ of perception than the eye or ear. Just as the eye perceives colors and the ear sounds, so thinking perceives ideas." He holds this to be the premise upon which Goethe made his natural-scientific observations. Wilhelm Wundt Wundt widens the term from Kant's usage to include conscious representation of some object or process of the external world. In so doing, he includes not only ideas of memory and imagination, but also perceptual processes, whereas other psychologists confine the term to the first two groups. One of Wundt's main concerns was to investigate conscious processes in their own context by experiment and introspection. He regarded both of these as exact methods, interrelated in that experimentation created optimal conditions for introspection. Where the experimental method failed, he turned to other objectively valuable aids, specifically to those products of cultural communal life which lead one to infer particular mental motives. Outstanding among these are speech, myth, and social custom. Wundt designed the basic mental activity apperception — a unifying function which should be understood as an activity of the will. Many aspects of his empirical physiological psychology are used today. One is his principles of mutually enhanced contrasts and of assimilation and dissimilation (i.e. in color and form perception and his advocacy of objective methods of expression and of recording results, especially in language. Another is the principle of heterogony of ends — that multiply motivated acts lead to unintended side effects which in turn become motives for new actions. Charles Sanders Peirce C. S. Peirce published the first full statement of pragmatism in his important works "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) and "The Fixation of Belief" (1877). In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" he proposed that a clear idea (in his study he uses concept and idea as synonymic) is defined as one, when it is apprehended such as it will be recognized wherever it is met, and no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure. He argued that to understand an idea clearly we should ask ourselves what difference its application would make to our evaluation of a proposed solution to the problem at hand. Pragmatism (a term he appropriated for use in this context), he defended, was a method for ascertaining the meaning of terms (as a theory of meaning). The originality of his ideas is in their rejection of what was accepted as a view and understanding of knowledge as impersonal facts which had been accepted by scientists for some 250 years. Peirce contended that we acquire knowledge as participants, not as spectators. He felt "the real", sooner or later, is composed of information that has been acquired through ideas and knowledge and ordered by the application of logical reasoning. The rational distinction of the empirical object is not prior to its perception by a knowledgeable subject, in other words. He also published many papers on logic in relation to ideas. G. F. Stout and J. M. Baldwin G. F. Stout and J. M. Baldwin, in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, define the idea as "the reproduction with a more or less adequate image, of an object not actually present to the senses." They point out that an idea and a perception are by various authorities contrasted in various ways. "Difference in degree of intensity", "comparative absence of bodily movement on the part of the subject", "comparative dependence on mental activity", are suggested by psychologists as characteristic of an idea as compared with a perception. It should be observed that an idea, in the narrower and generally accepted sense of a mental reproduction, is frequently composite. That is, as in the example given above of the idea of a chair, a great many objects, differing materially in detail, all call a single idea. When a man, for example, has obtained an idea of chairs in general by comparison with which he can say "This is a chair, that is a stool", he has what is known as an "abstract idea" distinct from the reproduction in his mind of any particular chair (see abstraction). Furthermore, a complex idea may not have any corresponding physical object, though its particular constituent elements may severally be the reproductions of actual perceptions. Thus the idea of a centaur is a complex mental picture composed of the ideas of man and horse, that of a mermaid of a woman and a fish. Walter Benjamin "Ideas are to objects [of perception] as constellations are to stars," writes Walter Benjamin in the introduction to his The Origin of German Tragic Drama. "The set of concepts which assist in the representation of an idea lend it actuality as such a configuration. For phenomena are not incorporated into ideas. They are not contained in them. Ideas are, rather, their objective virtual arrangement, their objective interpretation." Benjamin advances, "That an idea is that moment in the substance and being of a word in which this word has become, and performs, as a symbol." as George Steiner summarizes. In this way techne--art and technology—may be represented, ideally, as "discrete, fully autonomous objects...[thus entering] into fusion without losing their identity." In anthropology and the social sciences Diffusion studies explore the spread of ideas from culture to culture. Some anthropological theories hold that all cultures imitate ideas from one or a few original cultures, the Adam of the Bible, or several cultural circles that overlap. Evolutionary diffusion theory holds that cultures are influenced by one another but that similar ideas can be developed in isolation. In the mid-20th century, social scientists began to study how and why ideas spread from one person or culture to another. Everett Rogers pioneered diffusion of innovations studies, using research to prove factors in adoption and profiles of adopters of ideas. In 1976, in his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins suggested applying biological evolutionary theories to the spread of ideas. He coined the term meme to describe an abstract unit of selection, equivalent to the gene in evolutionary biology. Ideas and intellectual property Relationship between ideas and patents On susceptibility to exclusive property Patent law regulates various aspects related to the functional manifestation of inventions based on new ideas or incremental improvements to existing ones. Thus, patents have a direct relationship to ideas. Relationship between ideas and copyrights In some cases, authors can be granted limited legal monopolies on the manner in which certain works are expressed. This is known colloquially as copyright, although the term intellectual property is used mistakenly in place of copyright. Copyright law regulating the aforementioned monopolies generally does not cover the actual ideas. The law does not bestow the legal status of property upon ideas per se. Instead, laws purport to regulate events related to the usage, copying, production, sale and other forms of exploitation of the fundamental expression of a work, that may or may not carry ideas. Copyright law is fundamentally different from patent law in this respect: patents do grant monopolies on ideas (more on this below). A copyright is meant to regulate some aspects of the usage of expressions of a work, not an idea. Thus, copyrights have a negative relationship to ideas. Work means a tangible medium of expression. It may be an original or derivative work of art, be it literary, dramatic, musical recitation, artistic, related to sound recording, etc. In (at least) countries adhering to the Berne Convention, copyright automatically starts covering the work upon the original creation and fixation thereof, without any extra steps. While creation usually involves an idea, the idea in itself does not suffice for the purposes of claiming copyright. Relationship of ideas to confidentiality agreements Confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements are legal instruments that assist corporations and individuals in keeping ideas from escaping to the general public. Generally, these instruments are covered by contract law. See also Idealism Brainstorming Creativity techniques Diffusion of innovations Form Ideology List of perception-related topics Notion (philosophy) Object of the mind Think tank Thought experiment History of ideas Intellectual history Concept Philosophical analysis Notes References The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1973 Dictionary of the History of Ideas Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1973–74, - Nous ¹ Volume IV 1a, 3a ² Volume IV 4a, 5a ³ Volume IV 32 - 37 Ideas Ideology Authority Education Liberalism Idea of God Pragmatism Chain of Being The Story of Thought, DK Publishing, Bryan Magee, London, 1998, a.k.a. The Story of Philosophy, Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2001, (subtitled on cover: The Essential Guide to the History of Western Philosophy) a Plato, pages 11 - 17, 24 - 31, 42, 50, 59, 77, 142, 144, 150 b Descartes, pages 78, 84 - 89, 91, 95, 102, 136 - 137, 190, 191 c Locke, pages 59 - 61, 102 - 109, 122 - 124, 142, 185 d Hume, pages 61, 103, 112 - 117, 142 - 143, 155, 185 e Kant, pages 9, 38, 57, 87, 103, 119, 131 - 137, 149, 182 f Peirce, pages 61, How to Make Our Ideas Clear 186 - 187 and 189 g Saint Augustine, pages 30, 144; City of God 51, 52, 53 and The Confessions 50, 51, 52 - additional in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas for Saint Augustine and Neo-Platonism h Stoics, pages 22, 40, 44; The governing philosophy of the Roman Empire on pages 46 - 47. - additional in Dictionary of the History of Ideas for Stoics, also here , and here , and here . The Reader's Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition 1965, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, An Encyclopedia of World Literature ¹apage 774 Plato (427–348 BC) ²apage 779 Francesco Petrarca ³apage 770 Charles Sanders Peirce ¹bpage 849 the Renaissance This article incorporates text from the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, a publication now in the public domain. Further reading A. G. Balz, Idea and Essence in the Philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza (New York 1918) Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the divine ideas as exemplar causes (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008) Patricia A. Easton (ed.), Logic and the Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview 1997) Pierre Garin, La Théorie de l'idée suivant l'école thomiste (Paris 1932) Marc A. High, Idea and Ontology. An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas ( Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008) Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York 2001) Paul Natorp, Platons Ideenlehre (Leipzig 1930) W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951) Peter Watson, Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud, Weidenfeld & Nicolson (London 2005) J. W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford 1956) Cognition Creativity Concepts in metaphysics Idealism Innovation Ontology Platonism

Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a term used to refer to a variety of artistic, cultural, and philosophical movements that claim to mark a break from modernism. They have in common the conviction that it is no longer possible to rely upon previous ways of representing reality. Still, there is disagreement among experts about its more precise meaning even within narrow contexts. The term began to acquire its current range of meanings in literary criticism and architectural theory during the 1950s–1960s. In opposition to modernism's alleged self-seriousness, postmodernism is characterized by its playful use of eclectic styles and performative irony, among other features. Critics claim it supplants moral, political, and aesthetic ideals with mere style and spectacle. In the 1990s, "postmodernism" came to denote a general – and, in general, celebratory – response to cultural pluralism. Proponents align themselves with feminism, multiculturalism, and postcolonialism. Building upon poststructural theory, postmodern thought defined itself by the rejection of any single, foundational historical narrative. This called into question the legitimacy of the Enlightenment account of progress and rationality. Critics allege that its premises lead to a nihilistic form of relativism. In this sense, it has become a term of abuse in popular culture. Definitions "Postmodernism" is "a highly contested term", referring to "a particularly unstable concept", that "names many different kinds of cultural objects and phenomena in many different ways". It is "diffuse, fragmentary, [and] multi-dimensional". Critics have described it as "an exasperating term" and claim that its indefinability is "a truism". Put otherwise, postmodernism is "several things at once". It has no single definition, and the term does not name any single unified phenomenon, but rather many diverse phenomena: "postmodernisms rather than one postmodernism". Although postmodernisms are generally united in their effort to transcend the perceived limits of modernism, "modernism" also means different things to different critics in various arts. Further, there are outliers on even this basic stance; for instance, literary critic William Spanos conceives postmodernism, not in period terms, but in terms of a certain kind of literary imagination so that pre-modern texts such as Euripides' Orestes or Cervantes' Don Quixote count as postmodern. All this notwithstanding, scholar Hans Bertens offers the following: If there is a common denominator to all these postmodernisms, it is that of a crisis in representation: a deeply felt loss of faith in our ability to represent the real, in the widest sense. No matter whether they are aesthestic [sic], epistemological, moral, or political in nature, the representations that we used to rely on can no longer be taken for granted.In practice, across its many manifestations, postmodernism shares an attitude of skepticism towards grand explanations and established ways of doing things. In art, literature, and architecture, it blurs boundaries between styles and genres, and encourages freely mixing elements, challenging traditional distinctions like high art versus "popular art". In science, it emphasizes multiple ways of seeing things, and how our cultural and personal backgrounds shape our realities, making it impossible to be completely neutral and "objective". In philosophy, education, history, politics, and many other fields, it encourages critical re-examination of established institutions and social norms, embracing diversity and breaking down disciplinary boundaries. Though these ideas weren't strictly new, postmodernism amplified them, using an often playful, at times deeply critical, attitude of pervasive skepticism to turn them into defining features. Historical overview The term first appeared in print in 1870, but it only began to enter circulation with its current range of meanings in the 1950s—60s. Early appearances The term "postmodern" was first used in 1870 by the artist John Watkins Chapman, who described "a Postmodern style of painting" as a departure from French Impressionism. Similarly, the first citation given by the Oxford English Dictionary is dated to 1916, describing Gus Mager as "one of the few 'post' modern painters whose style is convincing". Episcopal priest and cultural commentator J. M. Thompson, in a 1914 article, uses the term to describe changes in attitudes and beliefs in the critique of religion, writing, "the raison d'être of Post-Modernism is to escape from the double-mindedness of modernism by being thorough in its criticism by extending it to religion as well as theology, to Catholic feeling as well as to Catholic tradition". In 1926, Bernard Iddings Bell, president of St. Stephen's College and also an Episcopal priest, published Postmodernism and Other Essays, which marks the first use of the term to describe an historical period following modernity. The essay criticizes lingering socio-cultural norms, attitudes, and practices of the Enlightenment. It is also critical of a purported cultural shift away from traditional Christian beliefs. The term "postmodernity" was first used in an academic historical context as a general concept for a movement by Arnold J. Toynbee in a 1939 essay, which states that "Our own Post-Modern Age has been inaugurated by the general war of 1914–1918". In 1942, the literary critic and author H. R. Hays describes postmodernism as a new literary form. Also in the arts, the term was first used in 1949 to describe a dissatisfaction with the modernist architectural movement known as the International Style. Although these early uses anticipate some of the concerns of the debate in the second part of the 20th century, there is little direct continuity in the discussion. Just when the new discussion begins, however, is also a matter of dispute. Various authors place its beginnings in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Theoretical development In the mid-1970s, the American sociologist Daniel Bell provided a general account of the postmodern as an effectively nihilistic response to modernism's alleged assault on the Protestant work ethic and its rejection of what he upheld as traditional values. The ideals of modernity, per his diagnosis, were degraded to the level of consumer choice. This research project, however, was not taken up in a significant way by others until the mid-1980s when the work of Jean Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson, building upon art and literary criticism, reintroduced the term to sociology. Discussion about the postmodern in the second part of the 20th century was most articulate in areas with a large body of critical discourse around the modernist movement. Even here, however, there continued to be disagreement about such basic issues as whether postmodernism is a break with modernism, a renewal and intensification of modernism, or even, both at once, a rejection and a radicalization of its historical predecessor. According to scholar Steven Connor, discussions of the 1970s were dominated by literary criticism, to be supplanted by architectural theory in the 1980s. Some of these conversations made use of French poststructuralist thought, but only after these innovations and critical discourse in the arts did postmodernism emerge as a philosophical term in its own right. In literary and architectural theory According to Hans Bertens and Perry Anderson, the Black Mountain poets Charles Olson and Robert Creeley first introduced the term "postmodern" in its current sense during the 1950s. Their stance against modernist poetry – and Olson's Heideggerian orientation – were influential in the identification of postmodernism as a polemical position opposed to the rationalist values championed by the Enlightenment project. During the 1960s, this affirmative use gave way to a pejorative use by the New Left, who used it to describe a waning commitment among youth to the political ideals socialism and communism. The literary critic Irving Howe, for instance, denounced postmodern literature for being content to merely reflect, rather than actively attempt to refashion, what he saw as the "increasingly shapeless" character of contemporary society. In the 1970s, this changed again, largely under the influence of the literary critic Ihab Hassan's large-scale survey of works that he said could no longer be called modern. Taking the Black Mountain poets an exemplary instance of the new postmodern type, Hassan celebrates its Nietzschean playfulness and cheerfully anarchic spirit, which he sets off against the high seriousness of modernism. (Yet, from another perspective, Friedrich Nietzsche's attack on Western philosophy and Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics posed deep theoretical problems not necessarily a cause for aesthetic celebration. Their further influence on the conversation about postmodernism, however, would be largely mediated by French poststructuralism.) If literature was at the center of the discussion in the 1970s, architecture is at the center in the 1980s. The architectural theorist Charles Jencks, in particular, connects the artistic avant-garde to social change in a way that captures attention outside of academia. Jenckes, much influenced by the American architect Robert Venturi, celebrates a plurality of forms and encourages participation and active engagement with the local context of the built environment. He presents this as in opposition to the "authoritarian style" of International Modernism. The influence of poststructuralism In the 1970s, postmodern criticism increasingly came to incorporate poststructuralist theory, particularly the deconstructive approach to texts most strongly associated with Jacques Derrida. Derrida attempted to demonstrate that the whole foundationalist approach to language and knowledge was untenable and misguided. He was also critical of what he claimed to expose as the artificial binary oppositions (e.g., subject/object, speech/writing) that he claims are at the heart of Western culture and philosophy. It is during this period that postmodernism comes to be particularly equated with a kind of anti-representational self-reflexivity. In the 1980s, some critics begin to take an interest in the work of Michel Foucault. This introduces a political concern about social power-relations into discussions about postmodernism. Much of Foucault's project is, against the Enlightenment tradition, to expose modern social institutions and forms of knowledge as historically contingent forces of domination. He aims to detotalize or decenter historical narratives to display modern consciousness as it is constituted by specific discourses and institutions that shape individuals into the docile subjects of social systems. This is also the beginning of the affiliation of postmodernism with feminism and multiculturalism. The art critic Craig Owens, in particular, not only made the connection to feminism explicit, but went so far as to claim feminism for postmodernism wholesale, a broad claim resisted by even many sympathetic feminists such as Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson. In social theory Although postmodern criticism and thought drew on philosophical ideas from early on, "postmodernism" was only introduced to the expressly philosophical lexicon by Jean-François Lyotard in his 1979 The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. In this influential work, Lyotard offers the following definition: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives [such as Enlightenment progress or Marxist revolution]". In a society with no unifying narrative, he argues, we are left with heterogeneous, group-specific narratives (or "language games", as adopted from Ludwig Wittgenstein) with no universal perspective from which to adjudicate among them. According to Lyotard, this introduces a general crisis of legitimacy, a theme he adopts from the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, whose theory of communicative rationality Lyotard rejects. While he was particularly concerned with the way that this insight undermines claims of scientific objectivity, Lyotard's argument undermines the entire principle of transcendent legitimization. Instead, proponents of a language game must make the case for their legitimacy with reference to such considerations as efficiency or practicality. Far from celebrating the apparently relativistic consequences of this argument, however, Lyotard focused much of his subsequent work on how links among games could be established, particularly with respect to ethics and politics. Nevertheless, the appearance of linguistic relativism inspired an extensive rebuttal by the Marxist critic Fredric Jameson. Building upon the theoretical foundations laid out by the Marxist economist Ernst Mandel and observations in the early work of the French sociologist Jean Baudrillard, Jameson develops his own conception of the postmodern as "the cultural logic of late capitalism" in the form of an enormous cultural expansion into an economy of spectacle and style, rather than the production of goods. Baudrillard himself broke with Marxism, but continued to theorize the postmodern as the condition in which the domain of reality has become so heavily mediated by signs as to become inaccessible in itself, leaving us entirely in the domain of the simulacrum, an image that bears no relation to anything outside of itself. Scholars, however, disagree about whether his later works are intended as science fiction or truthful theoretical claims. In the 1990s, postmodernism became increasingly identified with critical and philosophical discourse directly about postmodernity or the postmodern idiom itself. No longer centered on any particular art or even the arts in general, it instead turns to address the more general problems posed to society in general by a new proliferation of cultures and forms. It is during this period that it also comes to be associated with postcolonialism and identity politics. Around this time, postmodernism also begins to be conceived in popular culture as a general "philosophical disposition" associated with a loose sort of relativism. In this sense, the term also starts to appear as a "casual term of abuse" in non-academic contexts. Others identify it as an aesthetic "lifestyle" of eclecticism and playful self-irony. Others argue that postmodernism utilizes compositional and semantic practices such as inclusivity, intentional indiscrimination, nonselection, and "logical impossibility." In various arts Architecture Scholarship regarding postmodernism and architecture is closely linked with the writings of critic-turned-architect Charles Jencks, beginning with lectures in the early 1970s and his essay "The Rise of Post-Modern Architecture" from 1975. His magnum opus, however, is the book The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, first published in 1977, and since running to seven editions (in which he famously wrote: "Modern architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri, on 15 July 1972 at 3:32 p.m. (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt–Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final coup de grâce by dynamite."). Jencks makes the point that postmodernism (like modernism) varies for each field of art, and that for architecture it is not just a reaction to modernism but what he terms double coding: "Double Coding: the combination of Modern techniques with something else (usually traditional building) in order for architecture to communicate with the public and a concerned minority, usually other architects." In their book, "Revisiting Postmodernism", Terry Farrell and Adam Furman argue that postmodernism brought a more joyous and sensual experience to the culture, particularly in architecture. For instance, in response to the modernist slogan of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe that "less is more", the postmodernist Robert Venturi rejoined that "less is a bore". Dance The term "postmodern dance" is most strongly associated with the Judson Dance Theater located in New York's Greenwich Village during the 1960s and 1970s. Arguably its most important principle is taken from the composer John Cage's efforts to break down the distinction between art and life. The Judson dancers "[stripped] dance of its theatrical conventions such as virtuoso technique, fanciful costumes, complex storylines, and the traditional stage [and] drew on everyday movements (sitting, walking, kneeling, and other gestures) to create their pieces, often performing them in ordinary spaces." This was developed in particular by the American dancer and choreographer Merce Cunningham, Cage's partner. In the 1980s and 1990s, dance began to incorporate other typically postmodern features such as the mixing of genres, challenging high–low cultural distinctions, and incorporating a political dimension. Fashion One manifestation of postmodernism in fashion explored alternatives to conventional concepts of elegance. Rei Kawakubo’s Spring/Summer 1997 collection featured "dresses asymmetrically padded with goose down, creating bumps in unexpected areas of the body". Issey Miyake’s 1985 dreadlocks hat "offered an immediate, yet impermanent, 'multi-culti' fashion experience". Vivienne Westwood took "an extremely polyglot approach", from early work with copies of 1950s clothes, to exploration of historic modes and ethnic influences: her first runway show, "Pirate", merged British history, 18th- and 19th-century dress, and African textile design. Film Postmodern film aims to subvert the mainstream conventions of narrative structure and characterization, and to test the audience's suspension of disbelief. Typically, such films also break down the cultural divide between high and low art and often upend typical portrayals of gender, race, class, genre, and time with the goal of creating something that does not abide by traditional narrative expression. Postmodern film is often separated from modernist cinema and traditional narrative film by three key characteristics. One is an extensive use of homage or pastiche. The second is meta-reference or self-reflexivity, highlighting the construction and relation of the image to other images in media and not to any kind of external reality. A self-referential film reminds the viewer – either through characters' knowledge of their own fictional nature, or through visuals – that the film itself is only a film. One technique used to achieve meta-reference is the use of intertextuality, in which the film's characters reference or discuss other works of fiction. A third characteristic is stories that unfold out of chronological order, deconstructing or fragmenting time to highlight that what is appearing on screen is constructed. Another common element is a bridging of the gap between highbrow and lowbrow activities and artistic styles, for example, a parody of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel ceiling in which Adam is reaching for a McDonald's burger rather than the hand of God. Contradictions of all sorts – whether it be in visual technique, characters' morals, etc. – are crucial to postmodernism. Ridley Scott's Blade Runner (1982) might be the best-known postmodernist film, about a future dystopia where "replicants", androids with enhanced abilities and all but indistinguishable from humans, have been invented and are deemed dangerous enough to hunt down when they escape. There is extensive blurring of boundaries between genres and cultures, and styles that are generally more separate, along with the fusion of disparate styles and times, a common trope in postmodern cinema. In particular, the blending of film noir and science-fiction into tech noir is an example of the film deconstructing cinema and genre. Graphic design Early mention of postmodernism as an element of graphic design appeared in the British magazine, "Design". A characteristic of postmodern graphic design is that "retro, techno, punk, grunge, beach, parody, and pastiche were all conspicuous trends. Each had its own sites and venues, detractors and advocates." Literature In 1971, the American scholar Ihab Hassan made the term popular in literary studies as a description of the new art emerging in the 1960s. According to scholar David Herwitz, writers such as John Barth and Donald Barthelme (and, later, Thomas Pynchon) responded in various ways to the aesthetic innovations of Finnegans Wake and the late work of Samuel Beckett. Postmodern literature often calls attention to issues regarding its own complicated connection to reality. The French critic Roland Barthes declared the novel to be an exhaustive form and explored what it means to continue to write novels under such a condition. In Postmodernist Fiction (1987), Brian McHale details the shift from modernism to postmodernism, arguing that the former is characterized by an epistemological dominant and that postmodern works have developed out of modernism and are primarily concerned with questions of ontology. McHale's "What Was Postmodernism?" (2007) follows Raymond Federman's lead in now using the past tense when discussing postmodernism. Music Music critic Andy Cush described Talking Heads as "New York art-punks" whose "blend of nervy postmodernism and undeniable groove made them one of the defining rock bands of the late 1970s and ’80s." Media theorist Dick Hebdige, examining the "Road to Nowhere" (1985) music video, said the group "draw eclectically on a wide range of visual and aural sources to create a distinctive pastiche or hybrid 'house style' which they have used since their formation in the mid-1970s deliberately to stretch received (industrial) definitions of what rock/pop/video/Art/ performance/audience are", calling them "a properly postmodernist band." According to lead vocalist/guitarist/songwriter David Byrne, commenting for a 2011 museum exhibition, Postmodernism: Style and Subversion 1970-1990: "Anything could be mixed and matched – or mashed up, as is said today – and anything was fair game for inspiration.” The composer Jonathan Kramer has written that avant-garde musical compositions (which some would consider modernist rather than postmodernist) "defy more than seduce the listener, and they extend by potentially unsettling means the very idea of what music is." In the 1960s, composers such as Terry Riley, Henryk Górecki, Bradley Joseph, John Adams, Steve Reich, Philip Glass, Michael Nyman, and Lou Harrison reacted to the perceived elitism and dissonant sound of atonal academic modernism by producing music with simple textures and relatively consonant harmonies, whilst others, most notably John Cage challenged the prevailing narratives of beauty and objectivity common to Modernism. Author on postmodernism, Dominic Strinati, has noted, it is also important "to include in this category the so-called 'art rock' musical innovations and mixing of styles associated with groups like Talking Heads, and performers like Laurie Anderson, together with the self-conscious 'reinvention of disco' by the Pet Shop Boys". In the late-20th century, avant-garde academics labelled American singer Madonna as the "personification of the postmodern" because "the postmodern condition is characterized by fragmentation, de-differentiation, pastiche, retrospection and anti-foundationalism", which they argued Madonna embodied. Christian writer Graham Cray also said that "Madonna is perhaps the most visible example of what is called post-modernism", and Martin Amis described her as "perhaps the most postmodern personage on the planet". She was also suggested by literary critic Olivier Sécardin to epitomise postmodernism. Sculpture Sculptor Claes Oldenberg, at the forefront of the pop art movement, declared in 1961: "I am for an art that is political-erotical-mystical … I am for an art that embroils itself with everyday crap and still comes out on top." That year, he opened The Store in New York's Lower East Side, where he blurred the line between art and commerce by selling brightly painted plaster reliefs and sculptures of commercial and manufactured objects. Oldenburg was one of the most recognizable sculptors identified with postmodernism, a group that included Jeff Koons, Eva Hesse, Louise Bourgeois, Anish Kapoor, Damien Hirst, Rachel Whiteread, and Richard Serra. Theater Postmodern theater emerged as a reaction against modernist theater. Most postmodern productions are centered on highlighting the fallibility of definite truth, instead encouraging the audience to reach their own individual understanding. Essentially, thus, postmodern theater raises questions rather than attempting to supply answers. In philosophy In the 1970s, a disparate group of poststructuralists in France developed a critique of modern philosophy with roots discernible in Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger. Although few themselves relied upon the term, they became known to many as postmodern theorists. Notable figures include Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and others. By the 1980s, this spread to America in the work of Richard Rorty and others. According to scholar Stuart Sim, one of the best ways to describe a specifically philosophical conception of postmodernism is as an anti-foundational "scepticism about authority, received wisdom, cultural and political norms and so on", which he says places it within a tradition dating back to ancient Greece. Poststructuralism Poststructuralists, like structuralists, start from the assumption that people's identities, values, and economic conditions determine each other rather than having intrinsic properties that can be understood in isolation. While structuralism explores how meaning is produced by a set of essential relationships in an overarching quasi-linguistic system, poststructuralism accepts this premise, but rejects the assumption that such systems can ever be fixed or centered. Deconstruction Deconstruction is a practice of philosophy, literary criticism, and textual analysis developed by Jacques Derrida. Derrida's work has been seen as rooted in a statement found in Of Grammatology: "" ("there is no outside-text"). This statement is part of a critique of "inside" and "outside" metaphors when referring to the text, and is a corollary to the observation that there is no "inside" of a text as well. This attention to a text's unacknowledged reliance on metaphors and figures embedded within its discourse is characteristic of Derrida's approach. Derrida's method sometimes involves demonstrating that a given philosophical discourse depends on binary oppositions or excluding terms that the discourse itself has declared to be irrelevant or inapplicable. Derrida's philosophy inspired a postmodern movement called deconstructivism among architects, characterized by a design that rejects structural "centers" and encourages decentralized play among its elements. Derrida discontinued his involvement with the movement after the publication of his collaborative project with architect Peter Eisenman in Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman. Michel Foucault on power relations French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that power operates according to the logics of social institutions that have become unmoored from the intentions of any actual individuals. Individuals, according to Foucault, are both products and participants in these dynamics. In the 1970s, Foucault employed a Nietzsche-inspired "genealogical method" to analyze power-relations across their historical permutations. Both his political orientation and the consistency of his positions continue to be debated among critics and defenders alike. Nevertheless, Foucault's political works share two common elements: a historical perspective and a discursive methodology. He analyzed social phenomena in historical contexts and focused on how they have evolved over time. Additionally, he employed the study of texts, usually academic texts, as the material for his inquiries. In this way, Foucault sought to understand how the historical formation of discourses has shaped contemporary political thinking and institutions. Gilles Deleuze on productive difference The work of Gilles Deleuze develops a concept of as a productive mechanism, rather than as a merely negative phenomenon. He advocates for a critique of reason that emphasizes sensibility and feeling over rational judgment. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze argues that philosophical critique is an encounter between thought and what forces it into action, and that this requires training, discipline, inventiveness, and even a certain "cruelty". He believes that thought cannot activate itself, but needs external forces to awaken and move it. Art, science, and philosophy can provide such activation through their transformative and experimental nature. The criticisms of Jürgen Habermas The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, a prominent critic of philosophical postmodernism, argues in his 1985 work The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity that postmodern thinkers are caught in a performative contradiction, more specifically, that their critiques of modernism rely on concepts and methods that are themselves products of modern reason. Habermas criticizes these thinkers for their rejection of the subject and their embrace of experimental, avant-garde strategies. He asserts that their critiques of modernism ultimately lead to a longing for the very subject they seek to dismantle. Habermas also takes issue with postmodernists' leveling of the distinction between philosophy and literature. He argues that such rhetorical strategies undermine the importance of argument and communicative reason. Habermas's critique of postmodernism set the stage for much of the subsequent debate by clarifying some of its key underlying issues. Additionally, according to scholar Gary Aylesworth, "that he is able to read postmodernist texts closely and discursively testifies to their intelligibility", against those who would dismiss them as simple nonsense. His engagement with their ideas has led some postmodern philosophers, such as Lyotard, to similarly engage with Habermas's criticisms. The Postmodern Condition Jean-François Lyotard is credited with being the first to use the term "postmodern" in a philosophical context, in his 1979 work . In it, he follows Wittgenstein's language games model and speech act theory, contrasting two different language games, that of the expert, and that of the philosopher. He talks about the transformation of knowledge into information in the computer age and likens the transmission or reception of coded messages (information) to a position within a language game. Lyotard defined philosophical postmodernism in The Postmodern Condition, writing: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives...." where what he means by metanarrative (in French, grands récits) is something like a unified, complete, universal, and epistemically certain story about everything that is. Against totalizing metanarratives, Lyotard and other postmodern philosophers argue that truth is always dependent upon historical and social context rather than being absolute and universal—and that truth is always partial and "at issue" rather than being complete and certain. Jean Baudrillard on hyperreality In postmodernism, hyperreality refers to a state where experiences are mediated by technology, resulting in a network of images and signs without a corresponding external reality. Baudrillard describes hyperreality as the terminal stage of simulation, where signs and images become entirely self-referential. Drawing upon some of the technical vocabulary of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Baudrillard argues that production has shifted from creating real objects to producing signs and symbols. This system of symbolic exchange, detached from the real, constitutes hyperreality. In the words of one commentartor, "the hyperreal is a system of simulation that simulates itself." Richard Rorty's neopragmatism Richard Rorty was an American philosopher known for his linguistic form of neopragmatism. Initially attracted to analytic philosophy, Rorty later rejected its representationalism. His major influences include Charles Darwin, Hans Georg Gadamer, G. W. F. Hegel, and Martin Heidegger. In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty challenged the notion of a mind-independent, language-independent reality. He argued that language is a tool used to adapt to the environment and achieve desired ends. This naturalistic approach led him to abandon the traditional quest for a privileged mental power that allows direct access to things-in-themselves. Instead, Rorty advocated for a focus on imaginative alternatives to present beliefs rather than the pursuit of well-grounded truths. He believed that creative, secular humanism, free from authoritarian assertions about truth and goodness, is the key to a better future. Rorty saw his neopragmatism as a continuation of the Enlightenment project, aiming to demystify human life and replace traditional power relations with those based on tolerance and freedom. In society Postmodernism has influenced society at large, in such diverse fields as law, education, media, urban planning, science, religious studies, politics and others. Law Postmodern interpretations of the law can involve critically considering legal inequalities connected to gender, class, race and ethnicity by acknowledging "diversity and multiplicity". Critical practices connected to postmodern philosophy, such as critical literacy and deconstruction, can be used as an interpretative tool to ensure that a range of different and diverse values and norms are acknowledged or considered. Marketing Postmodern marketing focuses on customized experiences where broad market generalizations are no-longer applied. According to academic Stephen Brown, from the University of Ulster, "Marketers know about consumers, consumers know about marketers, marketers know consumers know about marketers, and consumers know marketers know consumers know about marketers." Brown, writing in the European Journal of Marketing in 1993, stated that the postmodern approach in many ways rejects attempts to impose order and work in silos. Instead marketers should work collectively with "artistic" attributes of intuition, creativity, spontaneity, speculation, emotion and involvement. A 2020 paper in the Journal of Business Research sought to identify the transition from postmodernism to post-postmodernism, to benefit marketing efforts. Focusing on "the changing social conditions that lead the consumer to consume in a particular manner", the study takes the approach of analyzing and comparing song lyrics. Madonna is identified as postmodern and Taylor Swift as post-postmodern, with Lady Gaga used as a transitional example. Noting that "definitions of postmodernism are notoriously messy, frequently paradoxical and multi-faceted", five themes and characteristics of postmodernism consistently found in marketing literature – anti-foundationalism, de-differentiation, fragmentation, the reversal of production and consumption, and hyper-reality – were employed in the comparative analysis. Urban planning Modernism sought to design and plan cities that followed the logic of the new model of industrial mass production; reverting to large-scale solutions, aesthetic standardisation, and prefabricated design solutions. Modernism eroded urban living by its failure to recognise differences and aim towards homogeneous landscapes (Simonsen 1990, 57). Jane Jacobs' 1961 book The Death and Life of Great American Cities was a sustained critique of urban planning as it had developed within modernism and marked a transition from modernity to postmodernity in thinking about urban planning. Postmodernism has involved theories that embrace and aim to create diversity. It exalts uncertainty, flexibility and change and rejects utopianism while embracing a utopian way of thinking and acting. Postmodernity of 'resistance' seeks to deconstruct modernism and is a critique of the origins without necessarily returning to them. As a result of postmodernism, planners are much less inclined to lay a firm or steady claim to there being one single 'right way' of engaging in urban planning and are more open to different styles and ideas of 'how to plan'. Emerging in the mid-1980s, the "Los Angeles School" of urbanism, an academic movement loosely centered around the University of California, Los Angeles' Urban Planning Department, considered contemporary Los Angeles to be the quintessential postmodern city. This was in contrast with what had been the dominant ideas of the Chicago School, formed in the 1920s at the University of Chicago, with its framework of urban ecology and emphasis on functional areas of use within a city, and the concentric circles to understand the sorting of different population groups. Edward Soja of the Los Angeles School combined Marxist and postmodern perspectives and focused on the economic and social changes (globalization, specialization, industrialization/deindustrialization, neo-liberalism, mass migration) that lead to the creation of large city-regions with their patchwork of population groups and economic uses. Legacy Since the late 1990s, there has been a growing sentiment in popular culture and in academia that postmodernism "has gone out of fashion". Others argue that postmodernism is dead in the context of current cultural production. In "White Noise/White Heat, or Why the Postmodern Turn in Rock Music Led to Nothing but Road" (2004), literary critic and professor of English and comparative literature Larry McCaffery reexamined his rock music essay, "White Noise", published in the journal American Book Review in 1990. He noted "the almost casual assurance" of its definition of postmodernism, and the "easy assumption throughout that it is possible to draw analogies about the 'innovative features' of fundamentally different media, such as music and fiction." From his 2004 perspective, he says, "If I were writing such an essay today I would omit 'postmodernism' entirely because I no longer believe that I (or anyone else for that matter) can articulate with any degree of coherence or specificity what 'postmodernism' is, or was, what it's supposed to mean, or, indeed, whether it ever existed at all." In 2011, Postmodernism: Style and Subversion 1970 –1990, at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, was billed as "the first in-depth survey of art, design and architecture of the 1970s and 1980s". The exhibition was organized in three "broadly chronological" sections. The first focused mainly on architecture, "the discipline in which the ideas of postmodernism first emerged", introducing architects like Aldo Rossi, Charles Moore and James Stirling, also designers like Ron Arad, Vivienne Westwood and Rei Kawakubo. The second focused on 1980s design, art, music, fashion, performance, and club culture, with artists like Grace Jones, Leigh Bowery, Klaus Nomi, Guy Bourdin, and Helmut Newton, and artifacts employed by Annie Lennox, Devo, Grandmaster Flash, Karole Armitage, Kazuo Ohno, and Michael Clark. The final section examined "the hyper-inflated commodity culture of the 1980s", focusing on money as "a source of endless fascination for artists, designers and authors", including Andy Warhol, Karl Lagerfeld, Swatch, MTV and Disney. A review in the journal Design Issues noted the "daunting prospect" of reviewing an exhibition "on what might be considered the most slippery, indefinable 'movement'", and wondered what the curators must have felt: "One reviewer thought it 'a risky curatorial undertaking,' and even the curators themselves admit it could be seen as 'a fool's errand.'" Post-postmodernism The connection between postmodernism, posthumanism, and cyborgism has led to a challenge to postmodernism, for which the terms Post-postmodernism and postpoststructuralism were first coined in 2003: More recently metamodernism, post-postmodernism and the "death of postmodernism" have been widely debated: in 2007 Andrew Hoberek noted in his introduction to a special issue of the journal Twentieth-Century Literature titled "After Postmodernism" that "declarations of postmodernism's demise have become a critical commonplace". A small group of critics has put forth a range of theories that aim to describe culture or society in the alleged aftermath of postmodernism, most notably Raoul Eshelman (performatism), Gilles Lipovetsky (hypermodernity), Nicolas Bourriaud (altermodern), and Alan Kirby (digimodernism, formerly called pseudo-modernism). None of these new theories or labels have so far gained very widespread acceptance. Sociocultural anthropologist Nina Müller-Schwarze offers neostructuralism as a possible direction. Criticisms Criticisms of postmodernism are intellectually diverse. Since postmodernism criticizes both conservative and modernist values as well as universalist concepts such as objective reality, morality, truth, reason, and social progress, critics of postmodernism often defend such concepts from various angles. Media theorist Dick Hebdige criticized the vagueness of the term, enumerating a long list of otherwise unrelated concepts that people have designated as postmodernism, from "the décor of a room" or "a 'scratch' video", to fear of nuclear armageddon and the "implosion of meaning", and stated that anything that could signify all of those things was "a buzzword". The analytic philosopher Daniel Dennett criticized its impact on the humanities, characterizing it as producing conversations' in which nobody is wrong and nothing can be confirmed, only asserted with whatever style you can muster." Criticism of postmodernist movements in the arts include objections to departure from beauty, the reliance on language for the art to have meaning, a lack of coherence or comprehensibility, deviation from clear structure, and consistent use of dark and negative themes. See also Theory Culture and politics Religion History Opposed by Notes Citations Bibliography External links Discourses of Postmodernism. Multilingual bibliography by Janusz Przychodzen (PDF file) Modernity, postmodernism and the tradition of dissent, by Lloyd Spencer (1998) Postmodernism and truth by philosopher Daniel Dennett Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on postmodernism 1880s neologisms Criticism of rationalism Metanarratives Modernism Science fiction themes Philosophical schools and traditions Theories of aesthetics Art movements Cultural trends

Ecology

Ecology is the natural science of the relationships among living organisms, including humans, and their physical environment. Ecology considers organisms at the individual, population, community, ecosystem, and biosphere levels. Ecology overlaps with the closely related sciences of biogeography, evolutionary biology, genetics, ethology, and natural history. Ecology is a branch of biology, and is the study of abundance, biomass, and distribution of organisms in the context of the environment. It encompasses life processes, interactions, and adaptations; movement of materials and energy through living communities; successional development of ecosystems; cooperation, competition, and predation within and between species; and patterns of biodiversity and its effect on ecosystem processes. Ecology has practical applications in conservation biology, wetland management, natural resource management (agroecology, agriculture, forestry, agroforestry, fisheries, mining, tourism), urban planning (urban ecology), community health, economics, basic and applied science, and human social interaction (human ecology). The word ecology was coined in 1866 by the German scientist Ernst Haeckel. The science of ecology as we know it today began with a group of American botanists in the 1890s. Evolutionary concepts relating to adaptation and natural selection are cornerstones of modern ecological theory. Ecosystems are dynamically interacting systems of organisms, the communities they make up, and the non-living (abiotic) components of their environment. Ecosystem processes, such as primary production, nutrient cycling, and niche construction, regulate the flux of energy and matter through an environment. Ecosystems have biophysical feedback mechanisms that moderate processes acting on living (biotic) and abiotic components of the planet. Ecosystems sustain life-supporting functions and provide ecosystem services like biomass production (food, fuel, fiber, and medicine), the regulation of climate, global biogeochemical cycles, water filtration, soil formation, erosion control, flood protection, and many other natural features of scientific, historical, economic, or intrinsic value. Levels, scope, and scale of organization The scope of ecology contains a wide array of interacting levels of organization spanning micro-level (e.g., cells) to a planetary scale (e.g., biosphere) phenomena. Ecosystems, for example, contain abiotic resources and interacting life forms (i.e., individual organisms that aggregate into populations which aggregate into distinct ecological communities). Because ecosystems are dynamic and do not necessarily follow a linear successional route, changes might occur quickly or slowly over thousands of years before specific forest successional stages are brought about by biological processes. An ecosystem's area can vary greatly, from tiny to vast. A single tree is of little consequence to the classification of a forest ecosystem, but is critically relevant to organisms living in and on it. Several generations of an aphid population can exist over the lifespan of a single leaf. Each of those aphids, in turn, supports diverse bacterial communities. The nature of connections in ecological communities cannot be explained by knowing the details of each species in isolation, because the emergent pattern is neither revealed nor predicted until the ecosystem is studied as an integrated whole. Some ecological principles, however, do exhibit collective properties where the sum of the components explain the properties of the whole, such as birth rates of a population being equal to the sum of individual births over a designated time frame. The main subdisciplines of ecology, population (or community) ecology and ecosystem ecology, exhibit a difference not only in scale but also in two contrasting paradigms in the field. The former focuses on organisms' distribution and abundance, while the latter focuses on materials and energy fluxes. Hierarchy The scale of ecological dynamics can operate like a closed system, such as aphids migrating on a single tree, while at the same time remaining open about broader scale influences, such as atmosphere or climate. Hence, ecologists classify ecosystems hierarchically by analyzing data collected from finer scale units, such as vegetation associations, climate, and soil types, and integrate this information to identify emergent patterns of uniform organization and processes that operate on local to regional, landscape, and chronological scales. To structure the study of ecology into a conceptually manageable framework, the biological world is organized into a nested hierarchy, ranging in scale from genes, to cells, to tissues, to organs, to organisms, to species, to populations, to guilds, to communities, to ecosystems, to biomes, and up to the level of the biosphere. This framework forms a panarchy and exhibits non-linear behaviors; this means that "effect and cause are disproportionate, so that small changes to critical variables, such as the number of nitrogen fixers, can lead to disproportionate, perhaps irreversible, changes in the system properties." Biodiversity Biodiversity (an abbreviation of "biological diversity") describes the diversity of life from genes to ecosystems and spans every level of biological organization. The term has several interpretations, and there are many ways to index, measure, characterize, and represent its complex organization. Biodiversity includes species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity and scientists are interested in the way that this diversity affects the complex ecological processes operating at and among these respective levels. Biodiversity plays an important role in ecosystem services which by definition maintain and improve human quality of life. Conservation priorities and management techniques require different approaches and considerations to address the full ecological scope of biodiversity. Natural capital that supports populations is critical for maintaining ecosystem services and species migration (e.g., riverine fish runs and avian insect control) has been implicated as one mechanism by which those service losses are experienced. An understanding of biodiversity has practical applications for species and ecosystem-level conservation planners as they make management recommendations to consulting firms, governments, and industry. Habitat The habitat of a species describes the environment over which a species is known to occur and the type of community that is formed as a result. More specifically, "habitats can be defined as regions in environmental space that are composed of multiple dimensions, each representing a biotic or abiotic environmental variable; that is, any component or characteristic of the environment related directly (e.g. forage biomass and quality) or indirectly (e.g. elevation) to the use of a location by the animal." For example, a habitat might be an aquatic or terrestrial environment that can be further categorized as a montane or alpine ecosystem. Habitat shifts provide important evidence of competition in nature where one population changes relative to the habitats that most other individuals of the species occupy. For example, one population of a species of tropical lizard (Tropidurus hispidus) has a flattened body relative to the main populations that live in open savanna. The population that lives in an isolated rock outcrop hides in crevasses where its flattened body offers a selective advantage. Habitat shifts also occur in the developmental life history of amphibians, and in insects that transition from aquatic to terrestrial habitats. Biotope and habitat are sometimes used interchangeably, but the former applies to a community's environment, whereas the latter applies to a species' environment. Niche Definitions of the niche date back to 1917, but G. Evelyn Hutchinson made conceptual advances in 1957 by introducing a widely adopted definition: "the set of biotic and abiotic conditions in which a species is able to persist and maintain stable population sizes." The ecological niche is a central concept in the ecology of organisms and is sub-divided into the fundamental and the realized niche. The fundamental niche is the set of environmental conditions under which a species is able to persist. The realized niche is the set of environmental plus ecological conditions under which a species persists. The Hutchinsonian niche is defined more technically as a "Euclidean hyperspace whose dimensions are defined as environmental variables and whose size is a function of the number of values that the environmental values may assume for which an organism has positive fitness." Biogeographical patterns and range distributions are explained or predicted through knowledge of a species' traits and niche requirements. Species have functional traits that are uniquely adapted to the ecological niche. A trait is a measurable property, phenotype, or characteristic of an organism that may influence its survival. Genes play an important role in the interplay of development and environmental expression of traits. Resident species evolve traits that are fitted to the selection pressures of their local environment. This tends to afford them a competitive advantage and discourages similarly adapted species from having an overlapping geographic range. The competitive exclusion principle states that two species cannot coexist indefinitely by living off the same limiting resource; one will always out-compete the other. When similarly adapted species overlap geographically, closer inspection reveals subtle ecological differences in their habitat or dietary requirements. Some models and empirical studies, however, suggest that disturbances can stabilize the co-evolution and shared niche occupancy of similar species inhabiting species-rich communities. The habitat plus the niche is called the ecotope, which is defined as the full range of environmental and biological variables affecting an entire species. Niche construction Organisms are subject to environmental pressures, but they also modify their habitats. The regulatory feedback between organisms and their environment can affect conditions from local (e.g., a beaver pond) to global scales, over time and even after death, such as decaying logs or silica skeleton deposits from marine organisms. The process and concept of ecosystem engineering are related to niche construction, but the former relates only to the physical modifications of the habitat whereas the latter also considers the evolutionary implications of physical changes to the environment and the feedback this causes on the process of natural selection. Ecosystem engineers are defined as: "organisms that directly or indirectly modulate the availability of resources to other species, by causing physical state changes in biotic or abiotic materials. In so doing they modify, maintain and create habitats." The ecosystem engineering concept has stimulated a new appreciation for the influence that organisms have on the ecosystem and evolutionary process. The term "niche construction" is more often used in reference to the under-appreciated feedback mechanisms of natural selection imparting forces on the abiotic niche. An example of natural selection through ecosystem engineering occurs in the nests of social insects, including ants, bees, wasps, and termites. There is an emergent homeostasis or homeorhesis in the structure of the nest that regulates, maintains and defends the physiology of the entire colony. Termite mounds, for example, maintain a constant internal temperature through the design of air-conditioning chimneys. The structure of the nests themselves is subject to the forces of natural selection. Moreover, a nest can survive over successive generations, so that progeny inherit both genetic material and a legacy niche that was constructed before their time. Biome Biomes are larger units of organization that categorize regions of the Earth's ecosystems, mainly according to the structure and composition of vegetation. There are different methods to define the continental boundaries of biomes dominated by different functional types of vegetative communities that are limited in distribution by climate, precipitation, weather, and other environmental variables. Biomes include tropical rainforest, temperate broadleaf and mixed forest, temperate deciduous forest, taiga, tundra, hot desert, and polar desert. Other researchers have recently categorized other biomes, such as the human and oceanic microbiomes. To a microbe, the human body is a habitat and a landscape. Microbiomes were discovered largely through advances in molecular genetics, which have revealed a hidden richness of microbial diversity on the planet. The oceanic microbiome plays a significant role in the ecological biogeochemistry of the planet's oceans. Biosphere The largest scale of ecological organization is the biosphere: the total sum of ecosystems on the planet. Ecological relationships regulate the flux of energy, nutrients, and climate all the way up to the planetary scale. For example, the dynamic history of the planetary atmosphere's CO2 and O2 composition has been affected by the biogenic flux of gases coming from respiration and photosynthesis, with levels fluctuating over time in relation to the ecology and evolution of plants and animals. Ecological theory has also been used to explain self-emergent regulatory phenomena at the planetary scale: for example, the Gaia hypothesis is an example of holism applied in ecological theory. The Gaia hypothesis states that there is an emergent feedback loop generated by the metabolism of living organisms that maintains the core temperature of the Earth and atmospheric conditions within a narrow self-regulating range of tolerance. Population ecology Population ecology studies the dynamics of species populations and how these populations interact with the wider environment. A population consists of individuals of the same species that live, interact, and migrate through the same niche and habitat. A primary law of population ecology is the Malthusian growth model which states, "a population will grow (or decline) exponentially as long as the environment experienced by all individuals in the population remains constant." Simplified population models usually starts with four variables: death, birth, immigration, and emigration. An example of an introductory population model describes a closed population, such as on an island, where immigration and emigration does not take place. Hypotheses are evaluated with reference to a null hypothesis which states that random processes create the observed data. In these island models, the rate of population change is described by: where N is the total number of individuals in the population, b and d are the per capita rates of birth and death respectively, and r is the per capita rate of population change. Using these modeling techniques, Malthus' population principle of growth was later transformed into a model known as the logistic equation by Pierre Verhulst: where N(t) is the number of individuals measured as biomass density as a function of time, t, r is the maximum per-capita rate of change commonly known as the intrinsic rate of growth, and is the crowding coefficient, which represents the reduction in population growth rate per individual added. The formula states that the rate of change in population size will grow to approach equilibrium, where, when the rates of increase and crowding are balanced, . A common, analogous model fixes the equilibrium, as K, which is known as the "carrying capacity." Population ecology builds upon these introductory models to further understand demographic processes in real study populations. Commonly used types of data include life history, fecundity, and survivorship, and these are analyzed using mathematical techniques such as matrix algebra. The information is used for managing wildlife stocks and setting harvest quotas. In cases where basic models are insufficient, ecologists may adopt different kinds of statistical methods, such as the Akaike information criterion, or use models that can become mathematically complex as "several competing hypotheses are simultaneously confronted with the data." Metapopulations and migration The concept of metapopulations was defined in 1969 as "a population of populations which go extinct locally and recolonize". Metapopulation ecology is another statistical approach that is often used in conservation research. Metapopulation models simplify the landscape into patches of varying levels of quality, and metapopulations are linked by the migratory behaviours of organisms. Animal migration is set apart from other kinds of movement because it involves the seasonal departure and return of individuals from a habitat. Migration is also a population-level phenomenon, as with the migration routes followed by plants as they occupied northern post-glacial environments. Plant ecologists use pollen records that accumulate and stratify in wetlands to reconstruct the timing of plant migration and dispersal relative to historic and contemporary climates. These migration routes involved an expansion of the range as plant populations expanded from one area to another. There is a larger taxonomy of movement, such as commuting, foraging, territorial behavior, stasis, and ranging. Dispersal is usually distinguished from migration because it involves the one-way permanent movement of individuals from their birth population into another population. In metapopulation terminology, migrating individuals are classed as emigrants (when they leave a region) or immigrants (when they enter a region), and sites are classed either as sources or sinks. A site is a generic term that refers to places where ecologists sample populations, such as ponds or defined sampling areas in a forest. Source patches are productive sites that generate a seasonal supply of juveniles that migrate to other patch locations. Sink patches are unproductive sites that only receive migrants; the population at the site will disappear unless rescued by an adjacent source patch or environmental conditions become more favorable. Metapopulation models examine patch dynamics over time to answer potential questions about spatial and demographic ecology. The ecology of metapopulations is a dynamic process of extinction and colonization. Small patches of lower quality (i.e., sinks) are maintained or rescued by a seasonal influx of new immigrants. A dynamic metapopulation structure evolves from year to year, where some patches are sinks in dry years and are sources when conditions are more favorable. Ecologists use a mixture of computer models and field studies to explain metapopulation structure. Community ecology Community ecology is the study of the interactions among a collection of species that inhabit the same geographic area. Community ecologists study the determinants of patterns and processes for two or more interacting species. Research in community ecology might measure species diversity in grasslands in relation to soil fertility. It might also include the analysis of predator-prey dynamics, competition among similar plant species, or mutualistic interactions between crabs and corals. Ecosystem ecology Ecosystems may be habitats within biomes that form an integrated whole and a dynamically responsive system having both physical and biological complexes. Ecosystem ecology is the science of determining the fluxes of materials (e.g. carbon, phosphorus) between different pools (e.g., tree biomass, soil organic material). Ecosystem ecologists attempt to determine the underlying causes of these fluxes. Research in ecosystem ecology might measure primary production (g C/m^2) in a wetland in relation to decomposition and consumption rates (g C/m^2/y). This requires an understanding of the community connections between plants (i.e., primary producers) and the decomposers (e.g., fungi and bacteria). The underlying concept of an ecosystem can be traced back to 1864 in the published work of George Perkins Marsh ("Man and Nature"). Within an ecosystem, organisms are linked to the physical and biological components of their environment to which they are adapted. Ecosystems are complex adaptive systems where the interaction of life processes form self-organizing patterns across different scales of time and space. Ecosystems are broadly categorized as terrestrial, freshwater, atmospheric, or marine. Differences stem from the nature of the unique physical environments that shapes the biodiversity within each. A more recent addition to ecosystem ecology are technoecosystems, which are affected by or primarily the result of human activity. Food webs A food web is the archetypal ecological network. Plants capture solar energy and use it to synthesize simple sugars during photosynthesis. As plants grow, they accumulate nutrients and are eaten by grazing herbivores, and the energy is transferred through a chain of organisms by consumption. The simplified linear feeding pathways that move from a basal trophic species to a top consumer is called the food chain. Food chains in an ecological community create a complex food web. Food webs are a type of concept map that is used to illustrate and study pathways of energy and material flows. Empirical measurements are generally restricted to a specific habitat, such as a cave or a pond, and principles gleaned from small-scale studies are extrapolated to larger systems. Feeding relations require extensive investigations, e.g. into the gut contents of organisms, which can be difficult to decipher, or stable isotopes can be used to trace the flow of nutrient diets and energy through a food web. Despite these limitations, food webs remain a valuable tool in understanding community ecosystems. Food webs illustrate important principles of ecology: some species have many weak feeding links (e.g., omnivores) while some are more specialized with fewer stronger feeding links (e.g., primary predators). Such linkages explain how ecological communities remain stable over time and eventually can illustrate a "complete" web of life. The disruption of food webs may have a dramatic impact on the ecology of individual species or whole ecosystems. For instance, the replacement of an ant species by another (invasive) ant species has been shown to affect how elephants reduce tree cover and thus the predation of lions on zebras. Trophic levels A trophic level (from Greek troph, τροφή, trophē, meaning "food" or "feeding") is "a group of organisms acquiring a considerable majority of its energy from the lower adjacent level (according to ecological pyramids) nearer the abiotic source." Links in food webs primarily connect feeding relations or trophism among species. Biodiversity within ecosystems can be organized into trophic pyramids, in which the vertical dimension represents feeding relations that become further removed from the base of the food chain up toward top predators, and the horizontal dimension represents the abundance or biomass at each level. When the relative abundance or biomass of each species is sorted into its respective trophic level, they naturally sort into a 'pyramid of numbers'. Species are broadly categorized as autotrophs (or primary producers), heterotrophs (or consumers), and Detritivores (or decomposers). Autotrophs are organisms that produce their own food (production is greater than respiration) by photosynthesis or chemosynthesis. Heterotrophs are organisms that must feed on others for nourishment and energy (respiration exceeds production). Heterotrophs can be further sub-divided into different functional groups, including primary consumers (strict herbivores), secondary consumers (carnivorous predators that feed exclusively on herbivores), and tertiary consumers (predators that feed on a mix of herbivores and predators). Omnivores do not fit neatly into a functional category because they eat both plant and animal tissues. It has been suggested that omnivores have a greater functional influence as predators because compared to herbivores, they are relatively inefficient at grazing. Trophic levels are part of the holistic or complex systems view of ecosystems. Each trophic level contains unrelated species that are grouped together because they share common ecological functions, giving a macroscopic view of the system. While the notion of trophic levels provides insight into energy flow and top-down control within food webs, it is troubled by the prevalence of omnivory in real ecosystems. This has led some ecologists to "reiterate that the notion that species clearly aggregate into discrete, homogeneous trophic levels is fiction." Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that real trophic levels do exist, but "above the herbivore trophic level, food webs are better characterized as a tangled web of omnivores." Keystone species A keystone species is a species that is connected to a disproportionately large number of other species in the food-web. Keystone species have lower levels of biomass in the trophic pyramid relative to the importance of their role. The many connections that a keystone species holds means that it maintains the organization and structure of entire communities. The loss of a keystone species results in a range of dramatic cascading effects (termed trophic cascades) that alters trophic dynamics, other food web connections, and can cause the extinction of other species. The term keystone species was coined by Robert Paine in 1969 and is a reference to the keystone architectural feature as the removal of a keystone species can result in a community collapse just as the removal of the keystone in an arch can result in the arch's loss of stability. Sea otters (Enhydra lutris) are commonly cited as an example of a keystone species because they limit the density of sea urchins that feed on kelp. If sea otters are removed from the system, the urchins graze until the kelp beds disappear, and this has a dramatic effect on community structure. Hunting of sea otters, for example, is thought to have led indirectly to the extinction of the Steller's sea cow (Hydrodamalis gigas). While the keystone species concept has been used extensively as a conservation tool, it has been criticized for being poorly defined from an operational stance. It is difficult to experimentally determine what species may hold a keystone role in each ecosystem. Furthermore, food web theory suggests that keystone species may not be common, so it is unclear how generally the keystone species model can be applied. Complexity Complexity is understood as a large computational effort needed to piece together numerous interacting parts exceeding the iterative memory capacity of the human mind. Global patterns of biological diversity are complex. This biocomplexity stems from the interplay among ecological processes that operate and influence patterns at different scales that grade into each other, such as transitional areas or ecotones spanning landscapes. Complexity stems from the interplay among levels of biological organization as energy, and matter is integrated into larger units that superimpose onto the smaller parts. "What were wholes on one level become parts on a higher one." Small scale patterns do not necessarily explain large scale phenomena, otherwise captured in the expression (coined by Aristotle) 'the sum is greater than the parts'. "Complexity in ecology is of at least six distinct types: spatial, temporal, structural, process, behavioral, and geometric." From these principles, ecologists have identified emergent and self-organizing phenomena that operate at different environmental scales of influence, ranging from molecular to planetary, and these require different explanations at each integrative level. Ecological complexity relates to the dynamic resilience of ecosystems that transition to multiple shifting steady-states directed by random fluctuations of history. Long-term ecological studies provide important track records to better understand the complexity and resilience of ecosystems over longer temporal and broader spatial scales. These studies are managed by the International Long Term Ecological Network (LTER). The longest experiment in existence is the Park Grass Experiment, which was initiated in 1856. Another example is the Hubbard Brook study, which has been in operation since 1960. Holism Holism remains a critical part of the theoretical foundation in contemporary ecological studies. Holism addresses the biological organization of life that self-organizes into layers of emergent whole systems that function according to non-reducible properties. This means that higher-order patterns of a whole functional system, such as an ecosystem, cannot be predicted or understood by a simple summation of the parts. "New properties emerge because the components interact, not because the basic nature of the components is changed." Ecological studies are necessarily holistic as opposed to reductionistic. Holism has three scientific meanings or uses that identify with ecology: 1) the mechanistic complexity of ecosystems, 2) the practical description of patterns in quantitative reductionist terms where correlations may be identified but nothing is understood about the causal relations without reference to the whole system, which leads to 3) a metaphysical hierarchy whereby the causal relations of larger systems are understood without reference to the smaller parts. Scientific holism differs from mysticism that has appropriated the same term. An example of metaphysical holism is identified in the trend of increased exterior thickness in shells of different species. The reason for a thickness increase can be understood through reference to principles of natural selection via predation without the need to reference or understand the biomolecular properties of the exterior shells. Relation to evolution Ecology and evolutionary biology are considered sister disciplines of the life sciences. Natural selection, life history, development, adaptation, populations, and inheritance are examples of concepts that thread equally into ecological and evolutionary theory. Morphological, behavioural, and genetic traits, for example, can be mapped onto evolutionary trees to study the historical development of a species in relation to their functions and roles in different ecological circumstances. In this framework, the analytical tools of ecologists and evolutionists overlap as they organize, classify, and investigate life through common systematic principles, such as phylogenetics or the Linnaean system of taxonomy. The two disciplines often appear together, such as in the title of the journal Trends in Ecology and Evolution. There is no sharp boundary separating ecology from evolution, and they differ more in their areas of applied focus. Both disciplines discover and explain emergent and unique properties and processes operating across different spatial or temporal scales of organization. While the boundary between ecology and evolution is not always clear, ecologists study the abiotic and biotic factors that influence evolutionary processes, and evolution can be rapid, occurring on ecological timescales as short as one generation. Behavioural ecology All organisms can exhibit behaviours. Even plants express complex behaviour, including memory and communication. Behavioural ecology is the study of an organism's behaviour in its environment and its ecological and evolutionary implications. Ethology is the study of observable movement or behaviour in animals. This could include investigations of motile sperm of plants, mobile phytoplankton, zooplankton swimming toward the female egg, the cultivation of fungi by weevils, the mating dance of a salamander, or social gatherings of amoeba. Adaptation is the central unifying concept in behavioural ecology. Behaviours can be recorded as traits and inherited in much the same way that eye and hair colour can. Behaviours can evolve by means of natural selection as adaptive traits conferring functional utilities that increases reproductive fitness. Predator-prey interactions are an introductory concept into food-web studies as well as behavioural ecology. Prey species can exhibit different kinds of behavioural adaptations to predators, such as avoid, flee, or defend. Many prey species are faced with multiple predators that differ in the degree of danger posed. To be adapted to their environment and face predatory threats, organisms must balance their energy budgets as they invest in different aspects of their life history, such as growth, feeding, mating, socializing, or modifying their habitat. Hypotheses posited in behavioural ecology are generally based on adaptive principles of conservation, optimization, or efficiency. For example, "[t]he threat-sensitive predator avoidance hypothesis predicts that prey should assess the degree of threat posed by different predators and match their behaviour according to current levels of risk" or "[t]he optimal flight initiation distance occurs where expected postencounter fitness is maximized, which depends on the prey's initial fitness, benefits obtainable by not fleeing, energetic escape costs, and expected fitness loss due to predation risk." Elaborate sexual displays and posturing are encountered in the behavioural ecology of animals. The birds-of-paradise, for example, sing and display elaborate ornaments during courtship. These displays serve a dual purpose of signalling healthy or well-adapted individuals and desirable genes. The displays are driven by sexual selection as an advertisement of quality of traits among suitors. Cognitive ecology Cognitive ecology integrates theory and observations from evolutionary ecology and neurobiology, primarily cognitive science, in order to understand the effect that animal interaction with their habitat has on their cognitive systems and how those systems restrict behavior within an ecological and evolutionary framework. "Until recently, however, cognitive scientists have not paid sufficient attention to the fundamental fact that cognitive traits evolved under particular natural settings. With consideration of the selection pressure on cognition, cognitive ecology can contribute intellectual coherence to the multidisciplinary study of cognition." As a study involving the 'coupling' or interactions between organism and environment, cognitive ecology is closely related to enactivism, a field based upon the view that "...we must see the organism and environment as bound together in reciprocal specification and selection...". Social ecology Social-ecological behaviours are notable in the social insects, slime moulds, social spiders, human society, and naked mole-rats where eusocialism has evolved. Social behaviours include reciprocally beneficial behaviours among kin and nest mates and evolve from kin and group selection. Kin selection explains altruism through genetic relationships, whereby an altruistic behaviour leading to death is rewarded by the survival of genetic copies distributed among surviving relatives. The social insects, including ants, bees, and wasps are most famously studied for this type of relationship because the male drones are clones that share the same genetic make-up as every other male in the colony. In contrast, group selectionists find examples of altruism among non-genetic relatives and explain this through selection acting on the group; whereby, it becomes selectively advantageous for groups if their members express altruistic behaviours to one another. Groups with predominantly altruistic members survive better than groups with predominantly selfish members. Coevolution Ecological interactions can be classified broadly into a host and an associate relationship. A host is any entity that harbours another that is called the associate. Relationships between species that are mutually or reciprocally beneficial are called mutualisms. Examples of mutualism include fungus-growing ants employing agricultural symbiosis, bacteria living in the guts of insects and other organisms, the fig wasp and yucca moth pollination complex, lichens with fungi and photosynthetic algae, and corals with photosynthetic algae. If there is a physical connection between host and associate, the relationship is called symbiosis. Approximately 60% of all plants, for example, have a symbiotic relationship with arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi living in their roots forming an exchange network of carbohydrates for mineral nutrients. Indirect mutualisms occur where the organisms live apart. For example, trees living in the equatorial regions of the planet supply oxygen into the atmosphere that sustains species living in distant polar regions of the planet. This relationship is called commensalism because many others receive the benefits of clean air at no cost or harm to trees supplying the oxygen. If the associate benefits while the host suffers, the relationship is called parasitism. Although parasites impose a cost to their host (e.g., via damage to their reproductive organs or propagules, denying the services of a beneficial partner), their net effect on host fitness is not necessarily negative and, thus, becomes difficult to forecast. Co-evolution is also driven by competition among species or among members of the same species under the banner of reciprocal antagonism, such as grasses competing for growth space. The Red Queen Hypothesis, for example, posits that parasites track down and specialize on the locally common genetic defense systems of its host that drives the evolution of sexual reproduction to diversify the genetic constituency of populations responding to the antagonistic pressure. Biogeography Biogeography (an amalgamation of biology and geography) is the comparative study of the geographic distribution of organisms and the corresponding evolution of their traits in space and time. The Journal of Biogeography was established in 1974. Biogeography and ecology share many of their disciplinary roots. For example, the theory of island biogeography, published by the Robert MacArthur and Edward O. Wilson in 1967 is considered one of the fundamentals of ecological theory. Biogeography has a long history in the natural sciences concerning the spatial distribution of plants and animals. Ecology and evolution provide the explanatory context for biogeographical studies. Biogeographical patterns result from ecological processes that influence range distributions, such as migration and dispersal. and from historical processes that split populations or species into different areas. The biogeographic processes that result in the natural splitting of species explain much of the modern distribution of the Earth's biota. The splitting of lineages in a species is called vicariance biogeography and it is a sub-discipline of biogeography. There are also practical applications in the field of biogeography concerning ecological systems and processes. For example, the range and distribution of biodiversity and invasive species responding to climate change is a serious concern and active area of research in the context of global warming. r/K selection theory A population ecology concept is r/K selection theory, one of the first predictive models in ecology used to explain life-history evolution. The premise behind the r/K selection model is that natural selection pressures change according to population density. For example, when an island is first colonized, density of individuals is low. The initial increase in population size is not limited by competition, leaving an abundance of available resources for rapid population growth. These early phases of population growth experience density-independent forces of natural selection, which is called r-selection. As the population becomes more crowded, it approaches the island's carrying capacity, thus forcing individuals to compete more heavily for fewer available resources. Under crowded conditions, the population experiences density-dependent forces of natural selection, called K-selection. In the r/K-selection model, the first variable r is the intrinsic rate of natural increase in population size and the second variable K is the carrying capacity of a population. Different species evolve different life-history strategies spanning a continuum between these two selective forces. An r-selected species is one that has high birth rates, low levels of parental investment, and high rates of mortality before individuals reach maturity. Evolution favours high rates of fecundity in r-selected species. Many kinds of insects and invasive species exhibit r-selected characteristics. In contrast, a K-selected species has low rates of fecundity, high levels of parental investment in the young, and low rates of mortality as individuals mature. Humans and elephants are examples of species exhibiting K-selected characteristics, including longevity and efficiency in the conversion of more resources into fewer offspring. Molecular ecology The important relationship between ecology and genetic inheritance predates modern techniques for molecular analysis. Molecular ecological research became more feasible with the development of rapid and accessible genetic technologies, such as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). The rise of molecular technologies and the influx of research questions into this new ecological field resulted in the publication Molecular Ecology in 1992. Molecular ecology uses various analytical techniques to study genes in an evolutionary and ecological context. In 1994, John Avise also played a leading role in this area of science with the publication of his book, Molecular Markers, Natural History and Evolution. Newer technologies opened a wave of genetic analysis into organisms once difficult to study from an ecological or evolutionary standpoint, such as bacteria, fungi, and nematodes. Molecular ecology engendered a new research paradigm for investigating ecological questions considered otherwise intractable. Molecular investigations revealed previously obscured details in the tiny intricacies of nature and improved resolution into probing questions about behavioural and biogeographical ecology. For example, molecular ecology revealed promiscuous sexual behaviour and multiple male partners in tree swallows previously thought to be socially monogamous. In a biogeographical context, the marriage between genetics, ecology, and evolution resulted in a new sub-discipline called phylogeography. Human ecology Ecology is as much a biological science as it is a human science. Human ecology is an interdisciplinary investigation into the ecology of our species. "Human ecology may be defined: (1) from a bioecological standpoint as the study of man as the ecological dominant in plant and animal communities and systems; (2) from a bioecological standpoint as simply another animal affecting and being affected by his physical environment; and (3) as a human being, somehow different from animal life in general, interacting with physical and modified environments in a distinctive and creative way. A truly interdisciplinary human ecology will most likely address itself to all three." The term was formally introduced in 1921, but many sociologists, geographers, psychologists, and other disciplines were interested in human relations to natural systems centuries prior, especially in the late 19th century. The ecological complexities human beings are facing through the technological transformation of the planetary biome has brought on the Anthropocene. The unique set of circumstances has generated the need for a new unifying science called coupled human and natural systems that builds upon, but moves beyond the field of human ecology. Ecosystems tie into human societies through the critical and all-encompassing life-supporting functions they sustain. In recognition of these functions and the incapability of traditional economic valuation methods to see the value in ecosystems, there has been a surge of interest in social-natural capital, which provides the means to put a value on the stock and use of information and materials stemming from ecosystem goods and services. Ecosystems produce, regulate, maintain, and supply services of critical necessity and beneficial to human health (cognitive and physiological), economies, and they even provide an information or reference function as a living library giving opportunities for science and cognitive development in children engaged in the complexity of the natural world. Ecosystems relate importantly to human ecology as they are the ultimate base foundation of global economics as every commodity, and the capacity for exchange ultimately stems from the ecosystems on Earth. Restoration Ecology Ecology is an employed science of restoration, repairing disturbed sites through human intervention, in natural resource management, and in environmental impact assessments. Edward O. Wilson predicted in 1992 that the 21st century "will be the era of restoration in ecology". Ecological science has boomed in the industrial investment of restoring ecosystems and their processes in abandoned sites after disturbance. Natural resource managers, in forestry, for example, employ ecologists to develop, adapt, and implement ecosystem based methods into the planning, operation, and restoration phases of land-use. Another example of conservation is seen on the east coast of the United States in Boston, MA. The city of Boston implemented the Wetland Ordinance, improving the stability of their wetland environments by implementing soil amendments that will improve groundwater storage and flow, and trimming or removal of vegetation that could cause harm to water quality. Ecological science is used in the methods of sustainable harvesting, disease, and fire outbreak management, in fisheries stock management, for integrating land-use with protected areas and communities, and conservation in complex geo-political landscapes. Relation to the environment The environment of ecosystems includes both physical parameters and biotic attributes. It is dynamically interlinked and contains resources for organisms at any time throughout their life cycle. Like ecology, the term environment has different conceptual meanings and overlaps with the concept of nature. Environment "includes the physical world, the social world of human relations and the built world of human creation." The physical environment is external to the level of biological organization under investigation, including abiotic factors such as temperature, radiation, light, chemistry, climate and geology. The biotic environment includes genes, cells, organisms, members of the same species (conspecifics) and other species that share a habitat. The distinction between external and internal environments, however, is an abstraction parsing life and environment into units or facts that are inseparable in reality. There is an interpenetration of cause and effect between the environment and life. The laws of thermodynamics, for example, apply to ecology by means of its physical state. With an understanding of metabolic and thermodynamic principles, a complete accounting of energy and material flow can be traced through an ecosystem. In this way, the environmental and ecological relations are studied through reference to conceptually manageable and isolated material parts. After the effective environmental components are understood through reference to their causes; however, they conceptually link back together as an integrated whole, or holocoenotic system as it was once called. This is known as the dialectical approach to ecology. The dialectical approach examines the parts but integrates the organism and the environment into a dynamic whole (or umwelt). Change in one ecological or environmental factor can concurrently affect the dynamic state of an entire ecosystem. Disturbance and resilience A disturbance is any process that changes or removes biomass from a community, such as a fire, flood, drought, or predation. Disturbances are both the cause and product of natural fluctuations within an ecological community. Biodiversity can protect ecosystems from disturbances. The effect of a disturbance is often hard to predict, but there are numerous examples in which a single species can massively disturb an ecosystem. For example, a single-celled protozoan has been able to kill up to 100% of sea urchins in some coral reefs in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean. Sea urchins enable complex reef ecosystems to thrive by eating algae that would otherwise inhibit coral growth. Similarly, invasive species can wreak havoc on ecosystems. For instance, invasive Burmese pythons have caused a 98% decline of small mammals in the Everglades. Metabolism and the early atmosphere The Earth was formed approximately 4.5 billion years ago. As it cooled and a crust and oceans formed, its atmosphere transformed from being dominated by hydrogen to one composed mostly of methane and ammonia. Over the next billion years, the metabolic activity of life transformed the atmosphere into a mixture of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and water vapor. These gases changed the way that light from the sun hit the Earth's surface and greenhouse effects trapped heat. There were untapped sources of free energy within the mixture of reducing and oxidizing gasses that set the stage for primitive ecosystems to evolve and, in turn, the atmosphere also evolved. Throughout history, the Earth's atmosphere and biogeochemical cycles have been in a dynamic equilibrium with planetary ecosystems. The history is characterized by periods of significant transformation followed by millions of years of stability. The evolution of the earliest organisms, likely anaerobic methanogen microbes, started the process by converting atmospheric hydrogen into methane (4H2 + CO2 → CH4 + 2H2O). Anoxygenic photosynthesis reduced hydrogen concentrations and increased atmospheric methane, by converting hydrogen sulfide into water or other sulfur compounds (for example, 2H2S + CO2 + hv → CH2O + H2O + 2S). Early forms of fermentation also increased levels of atmospheric methane. The transition to an oxygen-dominant atmosphere (the Great Oxidation) did not begin until approximately 2.4–2.3 billion years ago, but photosynthetic processes started 0.3 to 1 billion years prior. Radiation: heat, temperature and light The biology of life operates within a certain range of temperatures. Heat is a form of energy that regulates temperature. Heat affects growth rates, activity, behaviour, and primary production. Temperature is largely dependent on the incidence of solar radiation. The latitudinal and longitudinal spatial variation of temperature greatly affects climates and consequently the distribution of biodiversity and levels of primary production in different ecosystems or biomes across the planet. Heat and temperature relate importantly to metabolic activity. Poikilotherms, for example, have a body temperature that is largely regulated and dependent on the temperature of the external environment. In contrast, homeotherms regulate their internal body temperature by expending metabolic energy. There is a relationship between light, primary production, and ecological energy budgets. Sunlight is the primary input of energy into the planet's ecosystems. Light is composed of electromagnetic energy of different wavelengths. Radiant energy from the sun generates heat, provides photons of light measured as active energy in the chemical reactions of life, and also acts as a catalyst for genetic mutation. Plants, algae, and some bacteria absorb light and assimilate the energy through photosynthesis. Organisms capable of assimilating energy by photosynthesis or through inorganic fixation of H2S are autotrophs. Autotrophs—responsible for primary production—assimilate light energy which becomes metabolically stored as potential energy in the form of biochemical enthalpic bonds. Physical environments Water Diffusion of carbon dioxide and oxygen is approximately 10,000 times slower in water than in air. When soils are flooded, they quickly lose oxygen, becoming hypoxic (an environment with O2 concentration below 2 mg/liter) and eventually completely anoxic where anaerobic bacteria thrive among the roots. Water also influences the intensity and spectral composition of light as it reflects off the water surface and submerged particles. Aquatic plants exhibit a wide variety of morphological and physiological adaptations that allow them to survive, compete, and diversify in these environments. For example, their roots and stems contain large air spaces (aerenchyma) that regulate the efficient transportation of gases (for example, CO2 and O2) used in respiration and photosynthesis. Salt water plants (halophytes) have additional specialized adaptations, such as the development of special organs for shedding salt and osmoregulating their internal salt (NaCl) concentrations, to live in estuarine, brackish, or oceanic environments. Anaerobic soil microorganisms in aquatic environments use nitrate, manganese ions, ferric ions, sulfate, carbon dioxide, and some organic compounds; other microorganisms are facultative anaerobes and use oxygen during respiration when the soil becomes drier. The activity of soil microorganisms and the chemistry of the water reduces the oxidation-reduction potentials of the water. Carbon dioxide, for example, is reduced to methane (CH4) by methanogenic bacteria. The physiology of fish is also specially adapted to compensate for environmental salt levels through osmoregulation. Their gills form electrochemical gradients that mediate salt excretion in salt water and uptake in fresh water. Gravity The shape and energy of the land are significantly affected by gravitational forces. On a large scale, the distribution of gravitational forces on the earth is uneven and influences the shape and movement of tectonic plates as well as influencing geomorphic processes such as orogeny and erosion. These forces govern many of the geophysical properties and distributions of ecological biomes across the Earth. On the organismal scale, gravitational forces provide directional cues for plant and fungal growth (gravitropism), orientation cues for animal migrations, and influence the biomechanics and size of animals. Ecological traits, such as allocation of biomass in trees during growth are subject to mechanical failure as gravitational forces influence the position and structure of branches and leaves. The cardiovascular systems of animals are functionally adapted to overcome the pressure and gravitational forces that change according to the features of organisms (e.g., height, size, shape), their behaviour (e.g., diving, running, flying), and the habitat occupied (e.g., water, hot deserts, cold tundra). Pressure Climatic and osmotic pressure places physiological constraints on organisms, especially those that fly and respire at high altitudes, or dive to deep ocean depths. These constraints influence vertical limits of ecosystems in the biosphere, as organisms are physiologically sensitive and adapted to atmospheric and osmotic water pressure differences. For example, oxygen levels decrease with decreasing pressure and are a limiting factor for life at higher altitudes. Water transportation by plants is another important ecophysiological process affected by osmotic pressure gradients. Water pressure in the depths of oceans requires that organisms adapt to these conditions. For example, diving animals such as whales, dolphins, and seals are specially adapted to deal with changes in sound due to water pressure differences. Differences between hagfish species provide another example of adaptation to deep-sea pressure through specialized protein adaptations. Wind and turbulence Turbulent forces in air and water affect the environment and ecosystem distribution, form, and dynamics. On a planetary scale, ecosystems are affected by circulation patterns in the global trade winds. Wind power and the turbulent forces it creates can influence heat, nutrient, and biochemical profiles of ecosystems. For example, wind running over the surface of a lake creates turbulence, mixing the water column and influencing the environmental profile to create thermally layered zones, affecting how fish, algae, and other parts of the aquatic ecosystem are structured. Wind speed and turbulence also influence evapotranspiration rates and energy budgets in plants and animals. Wind speed, temperature and moisture content can vary as winds travel across different land features and elevations. For example, the westerlies come into contact with the coastal and interior mountains of western North America to produce a rain shadow on the leeward side of the mountain. The air expands and moisture condenses as the winds increase in elevation; this is called orographic lift and can cause precipitation. This environmental process produces spatial divisions in biodiversity, as species adapted to wetter conditions are range-restricted to the coastal mountain valleys and unable to migrate across the xeric ecosystems (e.g., of the Columbia Basin in western North America) to intermix with sister lineages that are segregated to the interior mountain systems. Fire Plants convert carbon dioxide into biomass and emit oxygen into the atmosphere. By approximately 350 million years ago (the end of the Devonian period), photosynthesis had brought the concentration of atmospheric oxygen above 17%, which allowed combustion to occur. Fire releases CO2 and converts fuel into ash and tar. Fire is a significant ecological parameter that raises many issues pertaining to its control and suppression. While the issue of fire in relation to ecology and plants has been recognized for a long time, Charles Cooper brought attention to the issue of forest fires in relation to the ecology of forest fire suppression and management in the 1960s. Native North Americans were among the first to influence fire regimes by controlling their spread near their homes or by lighting fires to stimulate the production of herbaceous foods and basketry materials. Fire creates a heterogeneous ecosystem age and canopy structure, and the altered soil nutrient supply and cleared canopy structure opens new ecological niches for seedling establishment. Most ecosystems are adapted to natural fire cycles. Plants, for example, are equipped with a variety of adaptations to deal with forest fires. Some species (e.g., Pinus halepensis) cannot germinate until after their seeds have lived through a fire or been exposed to certain compounds from smoke. Environmentally triggered germination of seeds is called serotiny. Fire plays a major role in the persistence and resilience of ecosystems. Soils Soil is the living top layer of mineral and organic dirt that covers the surface of the planet. It is the chief organizing centre of most ecosystem functions, and it is of critical importance in agricultural science and ecology. The decomposition of dead organic matter (for example, leaves on the forest floor), results in soils containing minerals and nutrients that feed into plant production. The whole of the planet's soil ecosystems is called the pedosphere where a large biomass of the Earth's biodiversity organizes into trophic levels. Invertebrates that feed and shred larger leaves, for example, create smaller bits for smaller organisms in the feeding chain. Collectively, these organisms are the detritivores that regulate soil formation. Tree roots, fungi, bacteria, worms, ants, beetles, centipedes, spiders, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and other less familiar creatures all work to create the trophic web of life in soil ecosystems. Soils form composite phenotypes where inorganic matter is enveloped into the physiology of a whole community. As organisms feed and migrate through soils they physically displace materials, an ecological process called bioturbation. This aerates soils and stimulates heterotrophic growth and production. Soil microorganisms are influenced by and are fed back into the trophic dynamics of the ecosystem. No single axis of causality can be discerned to segregate the biological from geomorphological systems in soils. Paleoecological studies of soils places the origin for bioturbation to a time before the Cambrian period. Other events, such as the evolution of trees and the colonization of land in the Devonian period played a significant role in the early development of ecological trophism in soils. Biogeochemistry and climate Ecologists study and measure nutrient budgets to understand how these materials are regulated, flow, and recycled through the environment. This research has led to an understanding that there is global feedback between ecosystems and the physical parameters of this planet, including minerals, soil, pH, ions, water, and atmospheric gases. Six major elements (hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, sulfur, and phosphorus; H, C, N, O, S, and P) form the constitution of all biological macromolecules and feed into the Earth's geochemical processes. From the smallest scale of biology, the combined effect of billions upon billions of ecological processes amplify and ultimately regulate the biogeochemical cycles of the Earth. Understanding the relations and cycles mediated between these elements and their ecological pathways has significant bearing toward understanding global biogeochemistry. The ecology of global carbon budgets gives one example of the linkage between biodiversity and biogeochemistry. It is estimated that the Earth's oceans hold 40,000 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon, that vegetation and soil hold 2070 Gt, and that fossil fuel emissions are 6.3 Gt carbon per year. There have been major restructurings in these global carbon budgets during the Earth's history, regulated to a large extent by the ecology of the land. For example, through the early-mid Eocene volcanic outgassing, the oxidation of methane stored in wetlands, and seafloor gases increased atmospheric CO2 (carbon dioxide) concentrations to levels as high as 3500 ppm. In the Oligocene, from twenty-five to thirty-two million years ago, there was another significant restructuring of the global carbon cycle as grasses evolved a new mechanism of photosynthesis, C4 photosynthesis, and expanded their ranges. This new pathway evolved in response to the drop in atmospheric CO2 concentrations below 550 ppm. The relative abundance and distribution of biodiversity alters the dynamics between organisms and their environment such that ecosystems can be both cause and effect in relation to climate change. Human-driven modifications to the planet's ecosystems (e.g., disturbance, biodiversity loss, agriculture) contributes to rising atmospheric greenhouse gas levels. Transformation of the global carbon cycle in the next century is projected to raise planetary temperatures, lead to more extreme fluctuations in weather, alter species distributions, and increase extinction rates. The effect of global warming is already being registered in melting glaciers, melting mountain ice caps, and rising sea levels. Consequently, species distributions are changing along waterfronts and in continental areas where migration patterns and breeding grounds are tracking the prevailing shifts in climate. Large sections of permafrost are also melting to create a new mosaic of flooded areas having increased rates of soil decomposition activity that raises methane (CH4) emissions. There is concern over increases in atmospheric methane in the context of the global carbon cycle, because methane is a greenhouse gas that is 23 times more effective at absorbing long-wave radiation than CO2 on a 100-year time scale. Hence, there is a relationship between global warming, decomposition and respiration in soils and wetlands producing significant climate feedbacks and globally altered biogeochemical cycles. History Early beginnings Ecology has a complex origin, due in large part to its interdisciplinary nature. Ancient Greek philosophers such as Hippocrates and Aristotle were among the first to record observations on natural history. However, they viewed life in terms of essentialism, where species were conceptualized as static unchanging things while varieties were seen as aberrations of an idealized type. This contrasts against the modern understanding of ecological theory where varieties are viewed as the real phenomena of interest and having a role in the origins of adaptations by means of natural selection. Early conceptions of ecology, such as a balance and regulation in nature can be traced to Herodotus (died c. 425 BC), who described one of the earliest accounts of mutualism in his observation of "natural dentistry". Basking Nile crocodiles, he noted, would open their mouths to give sandpipers safe access to pluck leeches out, giving nutrition to the sandpiper and oral hygiene for the crocodile. Aristotle was an early influence on the philosophical development of ecology. He and his student Theophrastus made extensive observations on plant and animal migrations, biogeography, physiology, and their behavior, giving an early analogue to the modern concept of an ecological niche. Ernst Haeckel (left) and Eugenius Warming (right), two founders of ecology Ecological concepts such as food chains, population regulation, and productivity were first developed in the 1700s, through the published works of microscopist Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723) and botanist Richard Bradley (1688?–1732). Biogeographer Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was an early pioneer in ecological thinking and was among the first to recognize ecological gradients, where species are replaced or altered in form along environmental gradients, such as a cline forming along a rise in elevation. Humboldt drew inspiration from Isaac Newton, as he developed a form of "terrestrial physics". In Newtonian fashion, he brought a scientific exactitude for measurement into natural history and even alluded to concepts that are the foundation of a modern ecological law on species-to-area relationships. Natural historians, such as Humboldt, James Hutton, and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (among others) laid the foundations of the modern ecological sciences. The term "ecology" was coined by Ernst Haeckel in his book Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (1866). Haeckel was a zoologist, artist, writer, and later in life a professor of comparative anatomy. Opinions differ on who was the founder of modern ecological theory. Some mark Haeckel's definition as the beginning; others say it was Eugenius Warming with the writing of Oecology of Plants: An Introduction to the Study of Plant Communities (1895), or Carl Linnaeus' principles on the economy of nature that matured in the early 18th century. Linnaeus founded an early branch of ecology that he called the economy of nature. His works influenced Charles Darwin, who adopted Linnaeus' phrase on the economy or polity of nature in The Origin of Species. Linnaeus was the first to frame the balance of nature as a testable hypothesis. Haeckel, who admired Darwin's work, defined ecology in reference to the economy of nature, which has led some to question whether ecology and the economy of nature are synonymous. From Aristotle until Darwin, the natural world was predominantly considered static and unchanging. Prior to The Origin of Species, there was little appreciation or understanding of the dynamic and reciprocal relations between organisms, their adaptations, and the environment. An exception is the 1789 publication Natural History of Selborne by Gilbert White (1720–1793), considered by some to be one of the earliest texts on ecology. While Charles Darwin is mainly noted for his treatise on evolution, he was one of the founders of soil ecology, and he made note of the first ecological experiment in The Origin of Species. Evolutionary theory changed the way that researchers approached the ecological sciences. Since 1900 Modern ecology is a young science that first attracted substantial scientific attention toward the end of the 19th century (around the same time that evolutionary studies were gaining scientific interest). The scientist Ellen Swallow Richards adopted the term "oekology" (which eventually morphed into home economics) in the U.S. as early as 1892. In the early 20th century, ecology transitioned from a more descriptive form of natural history to a more analytical form of scientific natural history. Frederic Clements published the first American ecology book in 1905, presenting the idea of plant communities as a superorganism. This publication launched a debate between ecological holism and individualism that lasted until the 1970s. Clements' superorganism concept proposed that ecosystems progress through regular and determined stages of seral development that are analogous to the developmental stages of an organism. The Clementsian paradigm was challenged by Henry Gleason, who stated that ecological communities develop from the unique and coincidental association of individual organisms. This perceptual shift placed the focus back onto the life histories of individual organisms and how this relates to the development of community associations. The Clementsian superorganism theory was an overextended application of an idealistic form of holism. The term "holism" was coined in 1926 by Jan Christiaan Smuts, a South African general and polarizing historical figure who was inspired by Clements' superorganism concept. Around the same time, Charles Elton pioneered the concept of food chains in his classical book Animal Ecology. Elton defined ecological relations using concepts of food chains, food cycles, and food size, and described numerical relations among different functional groups and their relative abundance. Elton's 'food cycle' was replaced by 'food web' in a subsequent ecological text. Alfred J. Lotka brought in many theoretical concepts applying thermodynamic principles to ecology. In 1942, Raymond Lindeman wrote a landmark paper on the trophic dynamics of ecology, which was published posthumously after initially being rejected for its theoretical emphasis. Trophic dynamics became the foundation for much of the work to follow on energy and material flow through ecosystems. Robert MacArthur advanced mathematical theory, predictions, and tests in ecology in the 1950s, which inspired a resurgent school of theoretical mathematical ecologists. Ecology also has developed through contributions from other nations, including Russia's Vladimir Vernadsky and his founding of the biosphere concept in the 1920s and Japan's Kinji Imanishi and his concepts of harmony in nature and habitat segregation in the 1950s. Scientific recognition of contributions to ecology from non-English-speaking cultures is hampered by language and translation barriers. Ecology surged in popular and scientific interest during the 1960–1970s environmental movement. There are strong historical and scientific ties between ecology, environmental management, and protection. The historical emphasis and poetic naturalistic writings advocating the protection of wild places by notable ecologists in the history of conservation biology, such as Aldo Leopold and Arthur Tansley, have been seen as far removed from urban centres where, it is claimed, the concentration of pollution and environmental degradation is located. Palamar (2008) notes an overshadowing by mainstream environmentalism of pioneering women in the early 1900s who fought for urban health ecology (then called euthenics) and brought about changes in environmental legislation. Women such as Ellen Swallow Richards and Julia Lathrop, among others, were precursors to the more popularized environmental movements after the 1950s. In 1962, marine biologist and ecologist Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring helped to mobilize the environmental movement by alerting the public to toxic pesticides, such as DDT, bioaccumulating in the environment. Carson used ecological science to link the release of environmental toxins to human and ecosystem health. Since then, ecologists have worked to bridge their understanding of the degradation of the planet's ecosystems with environmental politics, law, restoration, and natural resources management. See also Carrying capacity Chemical ecology Climate justice Circles of Sustainability Cultural ecology Dialectical naturalism Ecological death Ecological empathy Ecological overshoot Ecological psychology Ecology movement Ecosophy Ecopsychology Human ecology Industrial ecology Information ecology Landscape ecology Natural resource Normative science Philosophy of ecology Political ecology Theoretical ecology Sensory ecology Sexecology Spiritual ecology Sustainable development Lists Glossary of ecology Index of biology articles List of ecologists Outline of biology Terminology of ecology Notes References External links The Nature Education Knowledge Project: Ecology Biogeochemistry Emergence

Deductive reasoning

Deductive reasoning is the process of drawing valid inferences. An inference is valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises, meaning that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. For example, the inference from the premises "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" to the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is deductively valid. An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true. One approach defines deduction in terms of the intentions of the author: they have to intend for the premises to offer deductive support to the conclusion. With the help of this modification, it is possible to distinguish valid from invalid deductive reasoning: it is invalid if the author's belief about the deductive support is false, but even invalid deductive reasoning is a form of deductive reasoning. Deductive logic studies under what conditions an argument is valid. According to the semantic approach, an argument is valid if there is no possible interpretation of the argument whereby its premises are true and its conclusion is false. The syntactic approach, by contrast, focuses on rules of inference, that is, schemas of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises based only on their logical form. There are various rules of inference, such as modus ponens and modus tollens. Invalid deductive arguments, which do not follow a rule of inference, are called formal fallacies. Rules of inference are definitory rules and contrast with strategic rules, which specify what inferences one needs to draw in order to arrive at an intended conclusion. Deductive reasoning contrasts with non-deductive or ampliative reasoning. For ampliative arguments, such as inductive or abductive arguments, the premises offer weaker support to their conclusion: they indicate that it is most likely, but they do not guarantee its truth. They make up for this drawback with their ability to provide genuinely new information (that is, information not already found in the premises), unlike deductive arguments. Cognitive psychology investigates the mental processes responsible for deductive reasoning. One of its topics concerns the factors determining whether people draw valid or invalid deductive inferences. One such factor is the form of the argument: for example, people draw valid inferences more successfully for arguments of the form modus ponens than of the form modus tollens. Another factor is the content of the arguments: people are more likely to believe that an argument is valid if the claim made in its conclusion is plausible. A general finding is that people tend to perform better for realistic and concrete cases than for abstract cases. Psychological theories of deductive reasoning aim to explain these findings by providing an account of the underlying psychological processes. Mental logic theories hold that deductive reasoning is a language-like process that happens through the manipulation of representations using rules of inference. Mental model theories, on the other hand, claim that deductive reasoning involves models of possible states of the world without the medium of language or rules of inference. According to dual-process theories of reasoning, there are two qualitatively different cognitive systems responsible for reasoning. The problem of deduction is relevant to various fields and issues. Epistemology tries to understand how justification is transferred from the belief in the premises to the belief in the conclusion in the process of deductive reasoning. Probability logic studies how the probability of the premises of an inference affects the probability of its conclusion. The controversial thesis of deductivism denies that there are other correct forms of inference besides deduction. Natural deduction is a type of proof system based on simple and self-evident rules of inference. In philosophy, the geometrical method is a way of philosophizing that starts from a small set of self-evident axioms and tries to build a comprehensive logical system using deductive reasoning. Definition Deductive reasoning is the psychological process of drawing deductive inferences. An inference is a set of premises together with a conclusion. This psychological process starts from the premises and reasons to a conclusion based on and supported by these premises. If the reasoning was done correctly, it results in a valid deduction: the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the conclusion. For example, in the syllogistic argument "all frogs are amphibians; no cats are amphibians; therefore, no cats are frogs" the conclusion is true because its two premises are true. But even arguments with wrong premises can be deductively valid if they obey this principle, as in "all frogs are mammals; no cats are mammals; therefore, no cats are frogs". If the premises of a valid argument are true, then it is called a sound argument. The relation between the premises and the conclusion of a deductive argument is usually referred to as "logical consequence". According to Alfred Tarski, logical consequence has 3 essential features: it is necessary, formal, and knowable a priori. It is necessary in the sense that the premises of valid deductive arguments necessitate the conclusion: it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false, independent of any other circumstances. Logical consequence is formal in the sense that it depends only on the form or the syntax of the premises and the conclusion. This means that the validity of a particular argument does not depend on the specific contents of this argument. If it is valid, then any argument with the same logical form is also valid, no matter how different it is on the level of its contents. Logical consequence is knowable a priori in the sense that no empirical knowledge of the world is necessary to determine whether a deduction is valid. So it is not necessary to engage in any form of empirical investigation. Some logicians define deduction in terms of possible worlds: A deductive inference is valid if and only if, there is no possible world in which its conclusion is false while its premises are true. This means that there are no counterexamples: the conclusion is true in all such cases, not just in most cases. It has been argued against this and similar definitions that they fail to distinguish between valid and invalid deductive reasoning, i.e. they leave it open whether there are invalid deductive inferences and how to define them. Some authors define deductive reasoning in psychological terms in order to avoid this problem. According to Mark Vorobey, whether an argument is deductive depends on the psychological state of the person making the argument: "An argument is deductive if, and only if, the author of the argument believes that the truth of the premises necessitates (guarantees) the truth of the conclusion". A similar formulation holds that the speaker claims or intends that the premises offer deductive support for their conclusion. This is sometimes categorized as a speaker-determined definition of deduction since it depends also on the speaker whether the argument in question is deductive or not. For speakerless definitions, on the other hand, only the argument itself matters independent of the speaker. One advantage of this type of formulation is that it makes it possible to distinguish between good or valid and bad or invalid deductive arguments: the argument is good if the author's belief concerning the relation between the premises and the conclusion is true, otherwise it is bad. One consequence of this approach is that deductive arguments cannot be identified by the law of inference they use. For example, an argument of the form modus ponens may be non-deductive if the author's beliefs are sufficiently confused. That brings with it an important drawback of this definition: it is difficult to apply to concrete cases since the intentions of the author are usually not explicitly stated. Deductive reasoning is studied in logic, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. Some theorists emphasize in their definition the difference between these fields. On this view, psychology studies deductive reasoning as an empirical mental process, i.e. what happens when humans engage in reasoning. But the descriptive question of how actual reasoning happens is different from the normative question of how it should happen or what constitutes correct deductive reasoning, which is studied by logic. This is sometimes expressed by stating that, strictly speaking, logic does not study deductive reasoning but the deductive relation between premises and a conclusion known as logical consequence. But this distinction is not always precisely observed in the academic literature. One important aspect of this difference is that logic is not interested in whether the conclusion of an argument is sensible. So from the premise "the printer has ink" one may draw the unhelpful conclusion "the printer has ink and the printer has ink and the printer has ink", which has little relevance from a psychological point of view. Instead, actual reasoners usually try to remove redundant or irrelevant information and make the relevant information more explicit. The psychological study of deductive reasoning is also concerned with how good people are at drawing deductive inferences and with the factors determining their performance. Deductive inferences are found both in natural language and in formal logical systems, such as propositional logic. Conceptions of deduction Deductive arguments differ from non-deductive arguments in that the truth of their premises ensures the truth of their conclusion. There are two important conceptions of what this exactly means. They are referred to as the syntactic and the semantic approach. According to the syntactic approach, whether an argument is deductively valid depends only on its form, syntax, or structure. Two arguments have the same form if they use the same logical vocabulary in the same arrangement, even if their contents differ. For example, the arguments "if it rains then the street will be wet; it rains; therefore, the street will be wet" and "if the meat is not cooled then it will spoil; the meat is not cooled; therefore, it will spoil" have the same logical form: they follow the modus ponens. Their form can be expressed more abstractly as "if A then B; A; therefore B" in order to make the common syntax explicit. There are various other valid logical forms or rules of inference, like modus tollens or the disjunction elimination. The syntactic approach then holds that an argument is deductively valid if and only if its conclusion can be deduced from its premises using a valid rule of inference. One difficulty for the syntactic approach is that it is usually necessary to express the argument in a formal language in order to assess whether it is valid. This often brings with it the difficulty of translating the natural language argument into a formal language, a process that comes with various problems of its own. Another difficulty is due to the fact that the syntactic approach depends on the distinction between formal and non-formal features. While there is a wide agreement concerning the paradigmatic cases, there are also various controversial cases where it is not clear how this distinction is to be drawn. The semantic approach suggests an alternative definition of deductive validity. It is based on the idea that the sentences constituting the premises and conclusions have to be interpreted in order to determine whether the argument is valid. This means that one ascribes semantic values to the expressions used in the sentences, such as the reference to an object for singular terms or to a truth-value for atomic sentences. The semantic approach is also referred to as the model-theoretic approach since the branch of mathematics known as model theory is often used to interpret these sentences. Usually, many different interpretations are possible, such as whether a singular term refers to one object or to another. According to the semantic approach, an argument is deductively valid if and only if there is no possible interpretation where its premises are true and its conclusion is false. Some objections to the semantic approach are based on the claim that the semantics of a language cannot be expressed in the same language, i.e. that a richer metalanguage is necessary. This would imply that the semantic approach cannot provide a universal account of deduction for language as an all-encompassing medium. Rules of inference Deductive reasoning usually happens by applying rules of inference. A rule of inference is a way or schema of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises. This happens usually based only on the logical form of the premises. A rule of inference is valid if, when applied to true premises, the conclusion cannot be false. A particular argument is valid if it follows a valid rule of inference. Deductive arguments that do not follow a valid rule of inference are called formal fallacies: the truth of their premises does not ensure the truth of their conclusion. In some cases, whether a rule of inference is valid depends on the logical system one is using. The dominant logical system is classical logic and the rules of inference listed here are all valid in classical logic. But so-called deviant logics provide a different account of which inferences are valid. For example, the rule of inference known as double negation elimination, i.e. that if a proposition is not not true then it is also true, is accepted in classical logic but rejected in intuitionistic logic. Prominent rules of inference Modus ponens Modus ponens (also known as "affirming the antecedent" or "the law of detachment") is the primary deductive rule of inference. It applies to arguments that have as first premise a conditional statement and as second premise the antecedent of the conditional statement. It obtains the consequent of the conditional statement as its conclusion. The argument form is listed below:   (First premise is a conditional statement)   (Second premise is the antecedent)   (Conclusion deduced is the consequent) In this form of deductive reasoning, the consequent obtains as the conclusion from the premises of a conditional statement and its antecedent. However, the antecedent cannot be similarly obtained as the conclusion from the premises of the conditional statement and the consequent. Such an argument commits the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. The following is an example of an argument using modus ponens: If it is raining, then there are clouds in the sky. It is raining. Thus, there are clouds in the sky. Modus tollens Modus tollens (also known as "the law of contrapositive") is a deductive rule of inference. It validates an argument that has as premises a conditional statement (formula) and the negation of the consequent and as conclusion the negation of the antecedent. In contrast to modus ponens, reasoning with modus tollens goes in the opposite direction to that of the conditional. The general expression for modus tollens is the following: . (First premise is a conditional statement) . (Second premise is the negation of the consequent) . (Conclusion deduced is the negation of the antecedent) The following is an example of an argument using modus tollens: If it is raining, then there are clouds in the sky. There are no clouds in the sky. Thus, it is not raining. Hypothetical syllogism A hypothetical syllogism is an inference that takes two conditional statements and forms a conclusion by combining the hypothesis of one statement with the conclusion of another. Here is the general form: Therefore, . In there being a subformula in common between the two premises that does not occur in the consequence, this resembles syllogisms in term logic, although it differs in that this subformula is a proposition whereas in Aristotelian logic, this common element is a term and not a proposition. The following is an example of an argument using a hypothetical syllogism: If there had been a thunderstorm, it would have rained. If it had rained, things would have gotten wet. Thus, if there had been a thunderstorm, things would have gotten wet. Fallacies Various formal fallacies have been described. They are invalid forms of deductive reasoning. An additional aspect of them is that they appear to be valid on some occasions or on the first impression. They may thereby seduce people into accepting and committing them. One type of formal fallacy is affirming the consequent, as in "if John is a bachelor, then he is male; John is male; therefore, John is a bachelor". This is similar to the valid rule of inference named modus ponens, but the second premise and the conclusion are switched around, which is why it is invalid. A similar formal fallacy is denying the antecedent, as in "if Othello is a bachelor, then he is male; Othello is not a bachelor; therefore, Othello is not male". This is similar to the valid rule of inference called modus tollens, the difference being that the second premise and the conclusion are switched around. Other formal fallacies include affirming a disjunct, denying a conjunct, and the fallacy of the undistributed middle. All of them have in common that the truth of their premises does not ensure the truth of their conclusion. But it may still happen by coincidence that both the premises and the conclusion of formal fallacies are true. Definitory and strategic rules Rules of inferences are definitory rules: they determine whether an argument is deductively valid or not. But reasoners are usually not just interested in making any kind of valid argument. Instead, they often have a specific point or conclusion that they wish to prove or refute. So given a set of premises, they are faced with the problem of choosing the relevant rules of inference for their deduction to arrive at their intended conclusion. This issue belongs to the field of strategic rules: the question of which inferences need to be drawn to support one's conclusion. The distinction between definitory and strategic rules is not exclusive to logic: it is also found in various games. In chess, for example, the definitory rules state that bishops may only move diagonally while the strategic rules recommend that one should control the center and protect one's king if one intends to win. In this sense, definitory rules determine whether one plays chess or something else whereas strategic rules determine whether one is a good or a bad chess player. The same applies to deductive reasoning: to be an effective reasoner involves mastering both definitory and strategic rules. Validity and soundness Deductive arguments are evaluated in terms of their validity and soundness. An argument is valid if it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false. In other words, the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. An argument can be “valid” even if one or more of its premises are false. An argument is sound if it is valid and the premises are true. It is possible to have a deductive argument that is logically valid but is not sound. Fallacious arguments often take that form. The following is an example of an argument that is “valid”, but not “sound”: Everyone who eats carrots is a quarterback. John eats carrots. Therefore, John is a quarterback. The example's first premise is false – there are people who eat carrots who are not quarterbacks – but the conclusion would necessarily be true, if the premises were true. In other words, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Therefore, the argument is “valid”, but not “sound”. False generalizations – such as "Everyone who eats carrots is a quarterback" – are often used to make unsound arguments. The fact that there are some people who eat carrots but are not quarterbacks proves the flaw of the argument. In this example, the first statement uses categorical reasoning, saying that all carrot-eaters are definitely quarterbacks. This theory of deductive reasoning – also known as term logic – was developed by Aristotle, but was superseded by propositional (sentential) logic and predicate logic. Deductive reasoning can be contrasted with inductive reasoning, in regards to validity and soundness. In cases of inductive reasoning, even though the premises are true and the argument is “valid”, it is possible for the conclusion to be false (determined to be false with a counterexample or other means). Difference from ampliative reasoning Deductive reasoning is usually contrasted with non-deductive or ampliative reasoning. The hallmark of valid deductive inferences is that it is impossible for their premises to be true and their conclusion to be false. In this way, the premises provide the strongest possible support to their conclusion. The premises of ampliative inferences also support their conclusion. But this support is weaker: they are not necessarily truth-preserving. So even for correct ampliative arguments, it is possible that their premises are true and their conclusion is false. Two important forms of ampliative reasoning are inductive and abductive reasoning. Sometimes the term "inductive reasoning" is used in a very wide sense to cover all forms of ampliative reasoning. However, in a more strict usage, inductive reasoning is just one form of ampliative reasoning. In the narrow sense, inductive inferences are forms of statistical generalization. They are usually based on many individual observations that all show a certain pattern. These observations are then used to form a conclusion either about a yet unobserved entity or about a general law. For abductive inferences, the premises support the conclusion because the conclusion is the best explanation of why the premises are true. The support ampliative arguments provide for their conclusion comes in degrees: some ampliative arguments are stronger than others. This is often explained in terms of probability: the premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true. Strong ampliative arguments make their conclusion very likely, but not absolutely certain. An example of ampliative reasoning is the inference from the premise "every raven in a random sample of 3200 ravens is black" to the conclusion "all ravens are black": the extensive random sample makes the conclusion very likely, but it does not exclude that there are rare exceptions. In this sense, ampliative reasoning is defeasible: it may become necessary to retract an earlier conclusion upon receiving new related information. Ampliative reasoning is very common in everyday discourse and the sciences. An important drawback of deductive reasoning is that it does not lead to genuinely new information. This means that the conclusion only repeats information already found in the premises. Ampliative reasoning, on the other hand, goes beyond the premises by arriving at genuinely new information. One difficulty for this characterization is that it makes deductive reasoning appear useless: if deduction is uninformative, it is not clear why people would engage in it and study it. It has been suggested that this problem can be solved by distinguishing between surface and depth information. On this view, deductive reasoning is uninformative on the depth level, in contrast to ampliative reasoning. But it may still be valuable on the surface level by presenting the information in the premises in a new and sometimes surprising way. A popular misconception of the relation between deduction and induction identifies their difference on the level of particular and general claims. On this view, deductive inferences start from general premises and draw particular conclusions, while inductive inferences start from particular premises and draw general conclusions. This idea is often motivated by seeing deduction and induction as two inverse processes that complement each other: deduction is top-down while induction is bottom-up. But this is a misconception that does not reflect how valid deduction is defined in the field of logic: a deduction is valid if it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false, independent of whether the premises or the conclusion are particular or general. Because of this, some deductive inferences have a general conclusion and some also have particular premises. In various fields Cognitive psychology Cognitive psychology studies the psychological processes responsible for deductive reasoning. It is concerned, among other things, with how good people are at drawing valid deductive inferences. This includes the study of the factors affecting their performance, their tendency to commit fallacies, and the underlying biases involved. A notable finding in this field is that the type of deductive inference has a significant impact on whether the correct conclusion is drawn. In a meta-analysis of 65 studies, for example, 97% of the subjects evaluated modus ponens inferences correctly, while the success rate for modus tollens was only 72%. On the other hand, even some fallacies like affirming the consequent or denying the antecedent were regarded as valid arguments by the majority of the subjects. An important factor for these mistakes is whether the conclusion seems initially plausible: the more believable the conclusion is, the higher the chance that a subject will mistake a fallacy for a valid argument. An important bias is the matching bias, which is often illustrated using the Wason selection task. In an often-cited experiment by Peter Wason, 4 cards are presented to the participant. In one case, the visible sides show the symbols D, K, 3, and 7 on the different cards. The participant is told that every card has a letter on one side and a number on the other side, and that "[e]very card which has a D on one side has a 3 on the other side". Their task is to identify which cards need to be turned around in order to confirm or refute this conditional claim. The correct answer, only given by about 10%, is the cards D and 7. Many select card 3 instead, even though the conditional claim does not involve any requirements on what symbols can be found on the opposite side of card 3. But this result can be drastically changed if different symbols are used: the visible sides show "drinking a beer", "drinking a coke", "16 years of age", and "22 years of age" and the participants are asked to evaluate the claim "[i]f a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19 years of age". In this case, 74% of the participants identified correctly that the cards "drinking a beer" and "16 years of age" have to be turned around. These findings suggest that the deductive reasoning ability is heavily influenced by the content of the involved claims and not just by the abstract logical form of the task: the more realistic and concrete the cases are, the better the subjects tend to perform. Another bias is called the "negative conclusion bias", which happens when one of the premises has the form of a negative material conditional, as in "If the card does not have an A on the left, then it has a 3 on the right. The card does not have a 3 on the right. Therefore, the card has an A on the left". The increased tendency to misjudge the validity of this type of argument is not present for positive material conditionals, as in "If the card has an A on the left, then it has a 3 on the right. The card does not have a 3 on the right. Therefore, the card does not have an A on the left". Psychological theories of deductive reasoning Various psychological theories of deductive reasoning have been proposed. These theories aim to explain how deductive reasoning works in relation to the underlying psychological processes responsible. They are often used to explain the empirical findings, such as why human reasoners are more susceptible to some types of fallacies than to others. An important distinction is between mental logic theories, sometimes also referred to as rule theories, and mental model theories. Mental logic theories see deductive reasoning as a language-like process that happens through the manipulation of representations. This is done by applying syntactic rules of inference in a way very similar to how systems of natural deduction transform their premises to arrive at a conclusion. On this view, some deductions are simpler than others since they involve fewer inferential steps. This idea can be used, for example, to explain why humans have more difficulties with some deductions, like the modus tollens, than with others, like the modus ponens: because the more error-prone forms do not have a native rule of inference but need to be calculated by combining several inferential steps with other rules of inference. In such cases, the additional cognitive labor makes the inferences more open to error. Mental model theories, on the other hand, hold that deductive reasoning involves models or mental representations of possible states of the world without the medium of language or rules of inference. In order to assess whether a deductive inference is valid, the reasoner mentally constructs models that are compatible with the premises of the inference. The conclusion is then tested by looking at these models and trying to find a counterexample in which the conclusion is false. The inference is valid if no such counterexample can be found. In order to reduce cognitive labor, only such models are represented in which the premises are true. Because of this, the evaluation of some forms of inference only requires the construction of very few models while for others, many different models are necessary. In the latter case, the additional cognitive labor required makes deductive reasoning more error-prone, thereby explaining the increased rate of error observed. This theory can also explain why some errors depend on the content rather than the form of the argument. For example, when the conclusion of an argument is very plausible, the subjects may lack the motivation to search for counterexamples among the constructed models. Both mental logic theories and mental model theories assume that there is one general-purpose reasoning mechanism that applies to all forms of deductive reasoning. But there are also alternative accounts that posit various different special-purpose reasoning mechanisms for different contents and contexts. In this sense, it has been claimed that humans possess a special mechanism for permissions and obligations, specifically for detecting cheating in social exchanges. This can be used to explain why humans are often more successful in drawing valid inferences if the contents involve human behavior in relation to social norms. Another example is the so-called dual-process theory. This theory posits that there are two distinct cognitive systems responsible for reasoning. Their interrelation can be used to explain commonly observed biases in deductive reasoning. System 1 is the older system in terms of evolution. It is based on associative learning and happens fast and automatically without demanding many cognitive resources. System 2, on the other hand, is of more recent evolutionary origin. It is slow and cognitively demanding, but also more flexible and under deliberate control. The dual-process theory posits that system 1 is the default system guiding most of our everyday reasoning in a pragmatic way. But for particularly difficult problems on the logical level, system 2 is employed. System 2 is mostly responsible for deductive reasoning. Intelligence The ability of deductive reasoning is an important aspect of intelligence and many tests of intelligence include problems that call for deductive inferences. Because of this relation to intelligence, deduction is highly relevant to psychology and the cognitive sciences. But the subject of deductive reasoning is also pertinent to the computer sciences, for example, in the creation of artificial intelligence. Epistemology Deductive reasoning plays an important role in epistemology. Epistemology is concerned with the question of justification, i.e. to point out which beliefs are justified and why. Deductive inferences are able to transfer the justification of the premises onto the conclusion. So while logic is interested in the truth-preserving nature of deduction, epistemology is interested in the justification-preserving nature of deduction. There are different theories trying to explain why deductive reasoning is justification-preserving. According to reliabilism, this is the case because deductions are truth-preserving: they are reliable processes that ensure a true conclusion given the premises are true. Some theorists hold that the thinker has to have explicit awareness of the truth-preserving nature of the inference for the justification to be transferred from the premises to the conclusion. One consequence of such a view is that, for young children, this deductive transference does not take place since they lack this specific awareness. Probability logic Probability logic is interested in how the probability of the premises of an argument affects the probability of its conclusion. It differs from classical logic, which assumes that propositions are either true or false but does not take into consideration the probability or certainty that a proposition is true or false. History Aristotle, a Greek philosopher, started documenting deductive reasoning in the 4th century BC. René Descartes, in his book Discourse on Method, refined the idea for the Scientific Revolution. Developing four rules to follow for proving an idea deductively, Descartes laid the foundation for the deductive portion of the scientific method. Descartes' background in geometry and mathematics influenced his ideas on the truth and reasoning, causing him to develop a system of general reasoning now used for most mathematical reasoning. Similar to postulates, Descartes believed that ideas could be self-evident and that reasoning alone must prove that observations are reliable. These ideas also lay the foundations for the ideas of rationalism. Related concepts and theories Deductivism Deductivism is a philosophical position that gives primacy to deductive reasoning or arguments over their non-deductive counterparts. It is often understood as the evaluative claim that only deductive inferences are good or correct inferences. This theory would have wide-reaching consequences for various fields since it implies that the rules of deduction are "the only acceptable standard of evidence". This way, the rationality or correctness of the different forms of inductive reasoning is denied. Some forms of deductivism express this in terms of degrees of reasonableness or probability. Inductive inferences are usually seen as providing a certain degree of support for their conclusion: they make it more likely that their conclusion is true. Deductivism states that such inferences are not rational: the premises either ensure their conclusion, as in deductive reasoning, or they do not provide any support at all. One motivation for deductivism is the problem of induction introduced by David Hume. It consists in the challenge of explaining how or whether inductive inferences based on past experiences support conclusions about future events. For example, a chicken comes to expect, based on all its past experiences, that the person entering its coop is going to feed it, until one day the person "at last wrings its neck instead". According to Karl Popper's falsificationism, deductive reasoning alone is sufficient. This is due to its truth-preserving nature: a theory can be falsified if one of its deductive consequences is false. So while inductive reasoning does not offer positive evidence for a theory, the theory still remains a viable competitor until falsified by empirical observation. In this sense, deduction alone is sufficient for discriminating between competing hypotheses about what is the case. Hypothetico-deductivism is a closely related scientific method, according to which science progresses by formulating hypotheses and then aims to falsify them by trying to make observations that run counter to their deductive consequences. Natural deduction The term "natural deduction" refers to a class of proof systems based on self-evident rules of inference. The first systems of natural deduction were developed by Gerhard Gentzen and Stanislaw Jaskowski in the 1930s. The core motivation was to give a simple presentation of deductive reasoning that closely mirrors how reasoning actually takes place. In this sense, natural deduction stands in contrast to other less intuitive proof systems, such as Hilbert-style deductive systems, which employ axiom schemes to express logical truths. Natural deduction, on the other hand, avoids axioms schemes by including many different rules of inference that can be used to formulate proofs. These rules of inference express how logical constants behave. They are often divided into introduction rules and elimination rules. Introduction rules specify under which conditions a logical constant may be introduced into a new sentence of the proof. For example, the introduction rule for the logical constant (and) is . It expresses that, given the premises and individually, one may draw the conclusion and thereby include it in one's proof. This way, the symbol is introduced into the proof. The removal of this symbol is governed by other rules of inference, such as the elimination rule , which states that one may deduce the sentence from the premise . Similar introduction and elimination rules are given for other logical constants, such as the propositional operator , the propositional connectives and , and the quantifiers and . The focus on rules of inferences instead of axiom schemes is an important feature of natural deduction. But there is no general agreement on how natural deduction is to be defined. Some theorists hold that all proof systems with this feature are forms of natural deduction. This would include various forms of sequent calculi or tableau calculi. But other theorists use the term in a more narrow sense, for example, to refer to the proof systems developed by Gentzen and Jaskowski. Because of its simplicity, natural deduction is often used for teaching logic to students. Geometrical method The geometrical method is a method of philosophy based on deductive reasoning. It starts from a small set of self-evident axioms and tries to build a comprehensive logical system based only on deductive inferences from these first axioms. It was initially formulated by Baruch Spinoza and came to prominence in various rationalist philosophical systems in the modern era. It gets its name from the forms of mathematical demonstration found in traditional geometry, which are usually based on axioms, definitions, and inferred theorems. An important motivation of the geometrical method is to repudiate philosophical skepticism by grounding one's philosophical system on absolutely certain axioms. Deductive reasoning is central to this endeavor because of its necessarily truth-preserving nature. This way, the certainty initially invested only in the axioms is transferred to all parts of the philosophical system. One recurrent criticism of philosophical systems build using the geometrical method is that their initial axioms are not as self-evident or certain as their defenders proclaim. This problem lies beyond the deductive reasoning itself, which only ensures that the conclusion is true if the premises are true, but not that the premises themselves are true. For example, Spinoza's philosophical system has been criticized this way based on objections raised against the causal axiom, i.e. that "the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves knowledge of its cause". A different criticism targets not the premises but the reasoning itself, which may at times implicitly assume premises that are themselves not self-evident. See also Abductive reasoning Analogical reasoning Argument (logic) Argumentation theory Correspondence theory of truth Decision making Decision theory Defeasible reasoning Fallacy Fault tree analysis Geometry Hypothetico-deductive method Inference Inquiry Legal syllogism Logic and rationality Logical consequence Logical reasoning Mathematical logic Natural deduction Peirce's theory of deductive reasoning Propositional calculus Retroductive reasoning Scientific method Subjective logic Theory of justification Notes and references Further reading Vincent F. Hendricks, Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression, New York: Automatic Press / VIP, 2005, Philip Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Deduction, Psychology Press 1991, Zarefsky, David, Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning Parts I and II, The Teaching Company 2002 Bullemore, Thomas. The Pragmatic Problem of Induction. External links Logic Problem solving skills Reasoning

Nomenclature

Nomenclature (, ) is a system of names or terms, or the rules for forming these terms in a particular field of arts or sciences. The principles of naming vary from the relatively informal conventions of everyday speech to the internationally agreed principles, rules and recommendations that govern the formation and use of the specialist terminology used in scientific and any other disciplines. Naming "things" is a part of general human communication using words and language: it is an aspect of everyday taxonomy as people distinguish the objects of their experience, together with their similarities and differences, which observers identify, name and classify. The use of names, as the many different kinds of nouns embedded in different languages, connects nomenclature to theoretical linguistics, while the way humans mentally structure the world in relation to word meanings and experience relates to the philosophy of language. Onomastics, the study of proper names and their origins, includes: anthroponymy (concerned with human names, including personal names, surnames and nicknames); toponymy (the study of place names); and etymology (the derivation, history and use of names) as revealed through comparative and descriptive linguistics. The scientific need for simple, stable and internationally accepted systems for naming objects of the natural world has generated many formal nomenclatural systems. Probably the best known of these nomenclatural systems are the five codes of biological nomenclature that govern the Latinized scientific names of organisms. Etymology The word nomenclature is derived from the Latin ('name'), and ('to call'). The Latin term refers to a list of names, as does the word nomenclator, which can also indicate a provider or announcer of names. Onomastics and nomenclature The study of proper names is known as onomastics, which has a wide-ranging scope that encompasses all names, languages, and geographical regions, as well as cultural areas. The distinction between onomastics and nomenclature is not readily clear: onomastics is an unfamiliar discipline to most people, and the use of nomenclature in an academic sense is also not commonly known. Although the two fields integrate, nomenclature concerns itself more with the rules and conventions that are used for the formation of names. Influence of social, political, religious factors Due to social, political, religious, and cultural motivations, things that are the same may be given different names, while different things may be given the same name; closely related similar things may be considered separate, while on the other hand significantly different things might be considered the same. For example, Hindi and Urdu are both closely related, mutually intelligible Hindustani languages (one being sanskritised and the other arabised). However, they are favored as separate languages by Hindus and Muslims respectively, as seen in the context of Hindu-Muslim conflict resulting in the violence of the 1947 Partition of India. In contrast, mutually unintelligible dialects that differ considerably in structure, such as Moroccan Arabic, Yemeni Arabic, and Lebanese Arabic, are considered to be the same language due to the pan-Islamism religious identity. Cultural nomenclature Names provide us with a way of structuring and mapping the world in our minds so, in some way, they mirror or represent the objects of our experience. Names, words, language, meaning Elucidating the connections between language (especially names and nouns), meaning, and the way we perceive the world has provided a rich field of study for philosophers and linguists. Relevant areas of study include: the distinction between proper names and proper nouns; as well as the relationship between names, their referents, meanings (semantics), and the structure of language. Folk taxonomy Modern scientific taxonomy has been described as "basically a Renaissance codification of folk taxonomic principles." Formal systems of scientific nomenclature and classification are exemplified by biological classification. All classification systems are established for a purpose. The scientific classification system anchors each organism within the nested hierarchy of internationally accepted classification categories. Maintenance of this system involves formal rules of nomenclature and periodic international meetings of review. This modern system evolved from the folk taxonomy of prehistory. Folk taxonomy can be illustrated through the Western tradition of horticulture and gardening. Unlike scientific taxonomy, folk taxonomies serve many purposes. Examples in horticulture would be the grouping of plants, and naming of these groups, according to their properties and uses: annuals, biennials and perennials (nature of life cycle); vegetables, fruits, culinary herbs and spices (culinary use); herbs, trees and shrubs (growth habit); wild and cultivated plants (whether they are managed or not); and weeds (whether they are considered to be a nuisance or not), etc. Folk Taxonomy is generally associated with the way rural or indigenous peoples use language to make sense of and organise the objects around them. Ethnobiology frames this interpretation through either "utilitarianists" like Bronislaw Malinowski who maintain that names and classifications reflect mainly material concerns, and "intellectualists" like Claude Lévi-Strauss who hold that they spring from innate mental processes. The literature of ethnobiological classifications was reviewed in 2006. Folk classification is defined by the way in which members of a language community name and categorize plants and animals whereas ethnotaxonomy refers to the hierarchical structure, organic content, and cultural function of biological classification that ethnobiologists find in every society around the world. Ethnographic studies of the naming and classification of animals and plants in non-Western societies have revealed some general principles that suggest pre-scientific man's conceptual and linguistic method of organising the biological world in a hierarchical way. Such studies indicate that the urge to classify is a basic human instinct. in all languages natural groups of organisms are distinguished (present-day taxa) these groups are arranged into more inclusive groups or ethnobiological categories in all languages there are about five or six ethnobiological categories of graded inclusiveness these groups (ethnobiological categories) are arranged hierarchically, generally into mutually exclusive ranks the ranks at which particular organisms are named and classified is often similar in different cultures The levels, moving from the most to least inclusive, are: "unique beginner" — e.g. plant or animal. A single all-inclusive name rarely used in folk taxonomies but loosely equivalent to an original living thing, a "common ancestor" "life form" — e.g. tree, bird, grass and fish. These are usually primary lexemes (basic linguistic units) loosely equivalent to a phylum or major biological division. "generic name" — e.g. oak, pine, robin, catfish. This is the most numerous and basic building block of all folk taxonomies, the most frequently referred to, the most important psychologically, and among the first learned by children. These names can usually be associated directly with a second level group. Like life-form names these are primary lexemes. "specific name" — e.g. white fir, post oak. More or less equivalent to species. A secondary lexeme and generally less frequent than generic names. "varietal name" — e.g. baby lima bean, butter lima bean. In almost all cultures objects are named using one or two words equivalent to 'kind' (genus) and 'particular kind' (species). When made up of two words (a binomial) the name usually consists of a noun (like salt, dog or star) and an adjectival second word that helps describe the first, and therefore makes the name, as a whole, more "specific", for example, lap dog, sea salt, or film star. The meaning of the noun used for a common name may have been lost or forgotten (whelk, elm, lion, shark, pig) but when the common name is extended to two or more words much more is conveyed about the organism's use, appearance or other special properties (sting ray, poison apple, giant stinking hogweed, hammerhead shark). These noun-adjective binomials are just like our own names with a family or surname like Simpson and another adjectival Christian or forename name that specifies which Simpson, say Homer Simpson. It seems reasonable to assume that the form of scientific names we call binomial nomenclature is derived from this simple and practical way of constructing common names—but with the use of Latin as a universal language. In keeping with the utilitarian view other authors maintain that ethnotaxonomies resemble more a "complex web of resemblances" than a neat hierarchy. Likewise, a recent study has suggested that some folk taxonomies display more than six ethnobiological categories. Others go further and even doubt the reality of such categories, especially those above the generic name level. Names and nouns A name is a label for any noun: names can identify a class or category of things; or a single thing, either uniquely or within a given context. Names are given, for example, to humans or any other organisms, places, products—as in brand names—and even to ideas or concepts. It is names as nouns that are the building blocks of nomenclature. The word name is possibly derived from the Proto-Indo-European language hypothesised word . The distinction between names and nouns, if made at all, is extremely subtle, although clearly noun refers to names as lexical categories and their function within the context of language, rather that as "labels" for objects and properties. Personal names Human personal names, also referred to as prosoponyms, are presented, used and categorised in many ways depending on the language and culture. In most cultures (Indonesia is one exception) it is customary for individuals to be given at least two names. In Western culture, the first name is given at birth or shortly thereafter and is referred to as the given name, the forename, the baptismal name (if given then), or simply the first name. In England prior to the Norman invasion of 1066, small communities of Celts, Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians generally used single names: each person was identified by a single name as either a personal name or nickname. As the population increased, it gradually became necessary to identify people further—giving rise to names like John the butcher, Henry from Sutton, and Roger son of Richard...which naturally evolved into John Butcher, Henry Sutton, and Roger Richardson. We now know this additional name variously as the second name, last name, family name, surname or occasionally the byname, and this natural tendency was accelerated by the Norman tradition of using surnames that were fixed and hereditary within individual families. In combination these two names are now known as the personal name or, simply, the name. There are many exceptions to this general rule: Westerners often insert a third or more names between the given and surnames; Chinese and Hungarian names have the family name preceding the given name; females now often retain their maiden names (their family surname) or combine, using a hyphen, their maiden name and the surname of their husband; some East Slavic nations insert the patronym (a name derived from the given name of the father) between the given and the family name; in Iceland the given name is used with the patronym, or matronym (a name derived from the given name of the mother), and surnames are rarely used. Nicknames (sometimes called hypocoristic names) are informal names used mostly between friends. Common names and proper names The distinction between proper names and common names is that proper names denote a unique entity e.g. London Bridge, while common names are used in a more general sense in reference to a class of objects e.g. bridge. Many proper names are obscure in meaning as they lack any apparent meaning in the way that ordinary words mean, probably for the practical reason that when they consist of Collective nouns, they refer to groups, even when they are inflected for the singular e.g. "committee". Concrete nouns like "cabbage" refer to physical bodies that can be observed by at least one of the senses while abstract nouns, like "love" and "hate" refer to abstract objects. In English, many abstract nouns are formed by adding noun-forming suffixes ('-ness', '-ity', '-tion') to adjectives or verbs e.g. "happiness", "serenity", "concentration." Pronouns like "he", "it", "which", and "those" stand in place of nouns in noun phrases. The capitalization of nouns varies with language and even the particular context: journals often have their own house styles for common names. -onym nouns Distinctions may be made between particular kinds of names simply by using the suffix -onym, from the Greek ónoma (ὄνομα, 'name'). So we have, for example, hydronyms name bodies of water, synonyms are names with the same meaning, and so on. The entire field could be described as chrematonymy—the names of things. Toponyms Toponyms are proper names given to various geographical features (geonyms), and also to cosmic features (cosmonyms). This could include names of mountains, rivers, seas, villages, towns, cities, countries, planets, stars etc. Toponymy can be further divided into specialist branches, like: choronymy, the study of proper names of regions and countries; econymy, the study of proper names of villages, towns and citties; hodonymy, the study of proper names of streets and roads; hydronymy, the study of proper names of water bodies; oronymy, the study of proper names of mountains and hills, etc. Toponymy has popular appeal because of its socio-cultural and historical interest and significance for cartography. However, work on the etymology of toponyms has found that many place names are descriptive, honorific or commemorative but frequently they have no meaning, or the meaning is obscure or lost. Also, the many categories of names are frequently interrelated. For example, many place-names are derived from personal names (Victoria), many names of planets and stars are derived from the names of mythological characters (Venus, Neptune), and many personal names are derived from place-names, names of nations and the like (Wood, Bridge). Scientific nomenclature Nomenclature, classification, identification In a strictly scientific sense, nomenclature is regarded as a part of taxonomy (though distinct from it). Moreover, the precision demanded by science in the accurate naming of objects in the natural world has resulted in a variety of codes of nomenclature (worldwide-accepted sets of rules on biological classification). Taxonomy can be defined as the study of classification including its principles, procedures and rules, while classification itself is the ordering of taxa (the objects of classification) into groups based on similarities or differences. Doing taxonomy entails identifying, describing, and naming taxa; therefore, in the scientific sense, nomenclature is the branch of taxonomy concerned with the application of scientific names to taxa, based on a particular classification scheme, in accordance with agreed international rules and conventions. Identification determines whether a particular organism matches a taxon that has already been classified and named – so classification must precede identification. This procedure is sometimes referred to as determination. Biology Although Linnaeus' system of binomial nomenclature was rapidly adopted after the publication of his Species Plantarum and Systema Naturae in 1753 and 1758 respectively, it was a long time before there was international consensus concerning the more general rules governing biological nomenclature. The first botanical code was produced in 1905, the zoological code in 1889 and cultivated plant code in 1953. Agreement on the nomenclature and symbols for genes emerged in 1979. International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants International Code of Nomenclature of Prokaryotes International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants International Code of Zoological Nomenclature Virus nomenclature – used in Virus classification Enzyme nomenclature PhyloCode (the International Code of Phylogenetic Nomenclature) – a recent code of biological nomenclature that took effect in 2020 (see also Phylogenetic nomenclature). Terminologia Anatomica – international standard on human anatomic terminology Gene nomenclature Red Cell Nomenclature Global Medical Device Nomenclature (GMDN) – used in medical devices. Astronomy Over the last few hundred years, the number of identified astronomical objects has risen from hundreds to over a billion, and more are discovered every year. Astronomers need universal systematic designations to unambiguously identify all of these objects using astronomical naming conventions, while assigning names to the most interesting objects and, where relevant, naming important or interesting features of those objects. Planetary nomenclature Meteorite nomenclature International Astronomical Union Chemistry The IUPAC nomenclature is a system of naming chemical compounds and for describing the science of chemistry in general. It is maintained by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry. the Blue Book and the Red Book: the two publications containing the rules for naming organic and inorganic compounds. the Green Book, contains recommendations for the use of symbols for physical quantities (in association with the IUPAP) the Gold Book, defines a large number of technical terms used in chemistry. Similar compendia exist for biochemistry (in association with the IUBMB), analytical chemistry and macromolecular chemistry. These books are supplemented by shorter recommendations for specific circumstances which are published from time to time in the journal Pure and Applied Chemistry. These systems can be accessed through the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). Other sciences Metallurgy: the classic English translation of De re metallica includes an appendix (Appendix C) detailing problems of nomenclature in weights and measures. Physics: symbols, units and nomenclature. Archaeology: typology and archaeological record See also International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology British Approved Name Controlled vocabulary Metadata Naming convention Terminology Nomenklatura References Sources Further reading Scheetz, George H. (1988). Names' Names: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Onymicon. ("What's In a Name?" Chapbook Series; 2.) Sioux City, Ia.: Schütz Verlag. External links International Council of Onomastic Sciences Retrieved 2009-09-23. American Name Society Promote onomastics, the study of names and naming practices, both in the United States and abroad. Retrieved 2010-01-11. Namingschemes.com A wiki dedicated to the education and sharing of naming schemes. Retrieved 2010-01-11. Ontology Naming Conventions The application of unified labeling or naming conventions in ontology engineering will help to harmonize the appearance and increase the robustness of ontological representational units such as class and relation names. A full free access paper with the naming conventions is accessible online under http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/10/125 Retrieved 2010-01-11. + Linguistics terminology

Modal logic

Modal logic is a kind of logic used to represent statements about necessity and possibility. It plays a major role in philosophy and related fields as a tool for understanding concepts such as knowledge, obligation, and causation. For instance, in epistemic modal logic, the formula can be used to represent the statement that is known. In deontic modal logic, that same formula can represent that is a moral obligation. Modal logic considers the inferences that modal statements give rise to. For instance, most epistemic modal logics treat the formula as a tautology, representing the principle that only true statements can count as knowledge. However, this formula is not a tautology in deontic modal logic, since what ought to be true can be false. Modal logics are formal systems that include unary operators such as and , representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal formula can be read as "possibly " while can be read as "necessarily ". In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to a possible world. A formula's truth value at one possible world can depend on the truth values of other formulas at other accessible possible worlds. In particular, is true at a world if is true at some accessible possible world, while is true at a world if is true at every accessible possible world. A variety of proof systems exist which are sound and complete with respect to the semantics one gets by restricting the accessibility relation. For instance, the deontic modal logic D is sound and complete if one requires the accessibility relation to be serial. While the intuition behind modal logic dates back to antiquity, the first modal axiomatic systems were developed by C. I. Lewis in 1912. The now-standard relational semantics emerged in the mid twentieth century from work by Arthur Prior, Jaakko Hintikka, and Saul Kripke. Recent developments include alternative topological semantics such as neighborhood semantics as well as applications of the relational semantics beyond its original philosophical motivation. Such applications include game theory, moral and legal theory, web design, multiverse-based set theory, and social epistemology. Syntax of modal operators Modal logic differs from other kinds of logic in that it uses modal operators such as and . The former is conventionally read aloud as "necessarily", and can be used to represent notions such as moral or legal obligation, knowledge, historical inevitability, among others. The latter is typically read as "possibly" and can be used to represent notions including permission, ability, compatibility with evidence. While well-formed formulas of modal logic include non-modal formulas such as , it also contains modal ones such as , , , and so on. Thus, the language of basic propositional logic can be defined recursively as follows. If is an atomic formula, then is a formula of . If is a formula of , then is too. If and are formulas of , then is too. If is a formula of , then is too. If is a formula of , then is too. Modal operators can be added to other kinds of logic by introducing rules analogous to #4 and #5 above. Modal predicate logic is one widely used variant which includes formulas such as . In systems of modal logic where and are duals, can be taken as an abbreviation for , thus eliminating the need for a separate syntactic rule to introduce it. However, separate syntactic rules are necessary in systems where the two operators are not interdefinable. Common notational variants include symbols such as and in systems of modal logic used to represent knowledge and and in those used to represent belief. These notations are particularly common in systems which use multiple modal operators simultaneously. For instance, a combined epistemic-deontic logic could use the formula read as "I know P is permitted". Systems of modal logic can include infinitely many modal operators distinguished by indices, i.e. , , , and so on. Semantics Relational semantics Basic notions The standard semantics for modal logic is called the relational semantics. In this approach, the truth of a formula is determined relative to a point which is often called a possible world. For a formula that contains a modal operator, its truth value can depend on what is true at other accessible worlds. Thus, the relational semantics interprets formulas of modal logic using models defined as follows. A relational model is a tuple where: is a set of possible worlds is a binary relation on is a valuation function which assigns a truth value to each pair of an atomic formula and a world, (i.e. where is the set of atomic formulae) The set is often called the universe. The binary relation is called an accessibility relation, and it controls which worlds can "see" each other for the sake of determining what is true. For example, means that the world is accessible from world . That is to say, the state of affairs known as is a live possibility for . Finally, the function is known as a valuation function. It determines which atomic formulas are true at which worlds. Then we recursively define the truth of a formula at a world in a model : iff iff iff and iff for every element of , if then iff for some element of , it holds that and According to this semantics, a formula is necessary with respect to a world if it holds at every world that is accessible from . It is possible if it holds at some world that is accessible from . Possibility thereby depends upon the accessibility relation , which allows us to express the relative nature of possibility. For example, we might say that given our laws of physics it is not possible for humans to travel faster than the speed of light, but that given other circumstances it could have been possible to do so. Using the accessibility relation we can translate this scenario as follows: At all of the worlds accessible to our own world, it is not the case that humans can travel faster than the speed of light, but at one of these accessible worlds there is another world accessible from those worlds but not accessible from our own at which humans can travel faster than the speed of light. Frames and completeness The choice of accessibility relation alone can sometimes be sufficient to guarantee the truth or falsity of a formula. For instance, consider a model whose accessibility relation is reflexive. Because the relation is reflexive, we will have that for any regardless of which valuation function is used. For this reason, modal logicians sometimes talk about frames, which are the portion of a relational model excluding the valuation function. A relational frame is a pair where is a set of possible worlds, is a binary relation on . The different systems of modal logic are defined using frame conditions. A frame is called: reflexive if w R w, for every w in G symmetric if w R u implies u R w, for all w and u in G transitive if w R u and u R q together imply w R q, for all w, u, q in G. serial if, for every w in G there is some u in G such that w R u. Euclidean if, for every u, t, and w, w R u and w R t implies u R t (by symmetry, it also implies t R u, as well as t R t and u R u) The logics that stem from these frame conditions are: K := no conditions D := serial T := reflexive B := reflexive and symmetric S4 := reflexive and transitive S5 := reflexive and Euclidean The Euclidean property along with reflexivity yields symmetry and transitivity. (The Euclidean property can be obtained, as well, from symmetry and transitivity.) Hence if the accessibility relation R is reflexive and Euclidean, R is provably symmetric and transitive as well. Hence for models of S5, R is an equivalence relation, because R is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. We can prove that these frames produce the same set of valid sentences as do the frames where all worlds can see all other worlds of W (i.e., where R is a "total" relation). This gives the corresponding modal graph which is total complete (i.e., no more edges (relations) can be added). For example, in any modal logic based on frame conditions: if and only if for some element u of G, it holds that and w R u. If we consider frames based on the total relation we can just say that if and only if for some element u of G, it holds that . We can drop the accessibility clause from the latter stipulation because in such total frames it is trivially true of all w and u that w R u. But this does not have to be the case in all S5 frames, which can still consist of multiple parts that are fully connected among themselves but still disconnected from each other. All of these logical systems can also be defined axiomatically, as is shown in the next section. For example, in S5, the axioms , and (corresponding to symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity, respectively) hold, whereas at least one of these axioms does not hold in each of the other, weaker logics. Topological semantics Modal logic has also been interpreted using topological structures. For instance, the Interior Semantics interprets formulas of modal logic as follows. A topological model is a tuple where is a topological space and is a valuation function which maps each atomic formula to some subset of . The basic interior semantics interprets formulas of modal logic as follows: iff iff iff and iff for some we have both that and also that for all Topological approaches subsume relational ones, allowing non-normal modal logics. The extra structure they provide also allows a transparent way of modeling certain concepts such as the evidence or justification one has for one's beliefs. Topological semantics is widely used in recent work in formal epistemology and has antecedents in earlier work such as David Lewis and Angelika Kratzer's logics for counterfactuals. Axiomatic systems The first formalizations of modal logic were axiomatic. Numerous variations with very different properties have been proposed since C. I. Lewis began working in the area in 1912. Hughes and Cresswell (1996), for example, describe 42 normal and 25 non-normal modal logics. Zeman (1973) describes some systems Hughes and Cresswell omit. Modern treatments of modal logic begin by augmenting the propositional calculus with two unary operations, one denoting "necessity" and the other "possibility". The notation of C. I. Lewis, much employed since, denotes "necessarily p" by a prefixed "box" (□p) whose scope is established by parentheses. Likewise, a prefixed "diamond" (◇p) denotes "possibly p". Similar to the quantifiers in first-order logic, "necessarily p" (□p) does not assume the range of quantification (the set of accessible possible worlds in Kripke semantics) to be non-empty, whereas "possibly p" (◇p) often implicitly assumes (viz. the set of accessible possible worlds is non-empty). Regardless of notation, each of these operators is definable in terms of the other in classical modal logic: □p (necessarily p) is equivalent to ("not possible that not-p") ◇p (possibly p) is equivalent to ("not necessarily not-p") Hence □ and ◇ form a dual pair of operators. In many modal logics, the necessity and possibility operators satisfy the following analogues of de Morgan's laws from Boolean algebra: "It is not necessary that X" is logically equivalent to "It is possible that not X". "It is not possible that X" is logically equivalent to "It is necessary that not X". Precisely what axioms and rules must be added to the propositional calculus to create a usable system of modal logic is a matter of philosophical opinion, often driven by the theorems one wishes to prove; or, in computer science, it is a matter of what sort of computational or deductive system one wishes to model. Many modal logics, known collectively as normal modal logics, include the following rule and axiom: N, Necessitation Rule: If p is a theorem/tautology (of any system/model invoking N), then □p is likewise a theorem (i.e. ). K, Distribution Axiom: The weakest normal modal logic, named "K" in honor of Saul Kripke, is simply the propositional calculus augmented by □, the rule N, and the axiom K. K is weak in that it fails to determine whether a proposition can be necessary but only contingently necessary. That is, it is not a theorem of K that if □p is true then □□p is true, i.e., that necessary truths are "necessarily necessary". If such perplexities are deemed forced and artificial, this defect of K is not a great one. In any case, different answers to such questions yield different systems of modal logic. Adding axioms to K gives rise to other well-known modal systems. One cannot prove in K that if "p is necessary" then p is true. The axiom T remedies this defect: T, Reflexivity Axiom: (If p is necessary, then p is the case.) T holds in most but not all modal logics. Zeman (1973) describes a few exceptions, such as S10. Other well-known elementary axioms are: 4: B: D: 5: These yield the systems (axioms in bold, systems in italics): K := K + N T := K + T S4 := T + 4 S5 := T + 5 D := K + D. K through S5 form a nested hierarchy of systems, making up the core of normal modal logic. But specific rules or sets of rules may be appropriate for specific systems. For example, in deontic logic, (If it ought to be that p, then it is permitted that p) seems appropriate, but we should probably not include that . In fact, to do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. to state that what is natural is also good, by saying that if p is the case, p ought to be permitted). The commonly employed system S5 simply makes all modal truths necessary. For example, if p is possible, then it is "necessary" that p is possible. Also, if p is necessary, then it is necessary that p is necessary. Other systems of modal logic have been formulated, in part because S5 does not describe every kind of modality of interest. Structural proof theory Sequent calculi and systems of natural deduction have been developed for several modal logics, but it has proven hard to combine generality with other features expected of good structural proof theories, such as purity (the proof theory does not introduce extra-logical notions such as labels) and analyticity (the logical rules support a clean notion of analytic proof). More complex calculi have been applied to modal logic to achieve generality. Decision methods Analytic tableaux provide the most popular decision method for modal logics. Modal logics in philosophy Alethic logic Modalities of necessity and possibility are called alethic modalities. They are also sometimes called special modalities, from the Latin species. Modal logic was first developed to deal with these concepts, and only afterward was extended to others. For this reason, or perhaps for their familiarity and simplicity, necessity and possibility are often casually treated as the subject matter of modal logic. Moreover, it is easier to make sense of relativizing necessity, e.g. to legal, physical, nomological, epistemic, and so on, than it is to make sense of relativizing other notions. In classical modal logic, a proposition is said to be possible if it is not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false); necessary if it is not possibly false (i.e. true and necessarily true); contingent if it is not necessarily false and not necessarily true (i.e. possible but not necessarily true); impossible if it is not possibly true (i.e. false and necessarily false). In classical modal logic, therefore, the notion of either possibility or necessity may be taken to be basic, where these other notions are defined in terms of it in the manner of De Morgan duality. Intuitionistic modal logic treats possibility and necessity as not perfectly symmetric. For example, suppose that while walking to the convenience store we pass Friedrich's house, and observe that the lights are off. On the way back, we observe that they have been turned on. "Somebody or something turned the lights on" is necessary. "Friedrich turned the lights on", "Friedrich's roommate Max turned the lights on" and "A burglar named Adolf broke into Friedrich's house and turned the lights on" are contingent. All of the above statements are possible. It is impossible that Socrates (who has been dead for over two thousand years) turned the lights on. (Of course, this analogy does not apply alethic modality in a truly rigorous fashion; for it to do so, it would have to axiomatically make such statements as "human beings cannot rise from the dead", "Socrates was a human being and not an immortal vampire", and "we did not take hallucinogenic drugs which caused us to falsely believe the lights were on", ad infinitum. Absolute certainty of truth or falsehood exists only in the sense of logically constructed abstract concepts such as "it is impossible to draw a triangle with four sides" and "all bachelors are unmarried".) For those having difficulty with the concept of something being possible but not true, the meaning of these terms may be made more comprehensible by thinking of multiple "possible worlds" (in the sense of Leibniz) or "alternate universes"; something "necessary" is true in all possible worlds, something "possible" is true in at least one possible world. These "possible world semantics" are formalized with Kripke semantics. Physical possibility Something is physically, or nomically, possible if it is permitted by the laws of physics. For example, current theory is thought to allow for there to be an atom with an atomic number of 126, even if there are no such atoms in existence. In contrast, while it is logically possible to accelerate beyond the speed of light, modern science stipulates that it is not physically possible for material particles or information. Metaphysical possibility Philosophers debate if objects have properties independent of those dictated by scientific laws. For example, it might be metaphysically necessary, as some who advocate physicalism have thought, that all thinking beings have bodies and can experience the passage of time. Saul Kripke has argued that every person necessarily has the parents they do have: anyone with different parents would not be the same person. Metaphysical possibility has been thought to be more restricting than bare logical possibility (i.e., fewer things are metaphysically possible than are logically possible). However, its exact relation (if any) to logical possibility or to physical possibility is a matter of dispute. Philosophers also disagree over whether metaphysical truths are necessary merely "by definition", or whether they reflect some underlying deep facts about the world, or something else entirely. Epistemic logic Epistemic modalities (from the Greek episteme, knowledge), deal with the certainty of sentences. The □ operator is translated as "x is certain that…", and the ◇ operator is translated as "For all x knows, it may be true that…" In ordinary speech both metaphysical and epistemic modalities are often expressed in similar words; the following contrasts may help: A person, Jones, might reasonably say both: (1) "No, it is not possible that Bigfoot exists; I am quite certain of that"; and, (2) "Sure, it's possible that Bigfoots could exist". What Jones means by (1) is that, given all the available information, there is no question remaining as to whether Bigfoot exists. This is an epistemic claim. By (2) he makes the metaphysical claim that it is possible for Bigfoot to exist, even though he does not: there is no physical or biological reason that large, featherless, bipedal creatures with thick hair could not exist in the forests of North America (regardless of whether or not they do). Similarly, "it is possible for the person reading this sentence to be fourteen feet tall and named Chad" is metaphysically true (such a person would not somehow be prevented from doing so on account of their height and name), but not alethically true unless you match that description, and not epistemically true if it is known that fourteen-foot-tall human beings have never existed. From the other direction, Jones might say, (3) "It is possible that Goldbach's conjecture is true; but also possible that it is false", and also (4) "if it is true, then it is necessarily true, and not possibly false". Here Jones means that it is epistemically possible that it is true or false, for all he knows (Goldbach's conjecture has not been proven either true or false), but if there is a proof (heretofore undiscovered), then it would show that it is not logically possible for Goldbach's conjecture to be false—there could be no set of numbers that violated it. Logical possibility is a form of alethic possibility; (4) makes a claim about whether it is possible (i.e., logically speaking) that a mathematical truth to have been false, but (3) only makes a claim about whether it is possible, for all Jones knows, (i.e., speaking of certitude) that the mathematical claim is specifically either true or false, and so again Jones does not contradict himself. It is worthwhile to observe that Jones is not necessarily correct: It is possible (epistemically) that Goldbach's conjecture is both true and unprovable. Epistemic possibilities also bear on the actual world in a way that metaphysical possibilities do not. Metaphysical possibilities bear on ways the world might have been, but epistemic possibilities bear on the way the world may be (for all we know). Suppose, for example, that I want to know whether or not to take an umbrella before I leave. If you tell me "it is possible that it is raining outside" – in the sense of epistemic possibility – then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if you just tell me that "it is possible for it to rain outside" – in the sense of metaphysical possibility – then I am no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment. Some features of epistemic modal logic are in debate. For example, if x knows that p, does x know that it knows that p? That is to say, should □P → □□P be an axiom in these systems? While the answer to this question is unclear, there is at least one axiom that is generally included in epistemic modal logic, because it is minimally true of all normal modal logics (see the section on axiomatic systems): K, Distribution Axiom: . It has been questioned whether the epistemic and alethic modalities should be considered distinct from each other. The criticism states that there is no real difference between "the truth in the world" (alethic) and "the truth in an individual's mind" (epistemic). An investigation has not found a single language in which alethic and epistemic modalities are formally distinguished, as by the means of a grammatical mood. Temporal logic Temporal logic is an approach to the semantics of expressions with tense, that is, expressions with qualifications of when. Some expressions, such as '2 + 2 = 4', are true at all times, while tensed expressions such as 'John is happy' are only true sometimes. In temporal logic, tense constructions are treated in terms of modalities, where a standard method for formalizing talk of time is to use two pairs of operators, one for the past and one for the future (P will just mean 'it is presently the case that P'). For example: FP : It will sometimes be the case that P GP : It will always be the case that P PP : It was sometime the case that P HP : It has always been the case that P There are then at least three modal logics that we can develop. For example, we can stipulate that, = P is the case at some time t = P is the case at every time t Or we can trade these operators to deal only with the future (or past). For example, = FP = GP or, = P and/or FP = P and GP The operators F and G may seem initially foreign, but they create normal modal systems. FP is the same as ¬G¬P. We can combine the above operators to form complex statements. For example, PP → □PP says (effectively), Everything that is past and true is necessary. It seems reasonable to say that possibly it will rain tomorrow, and possibly it will not; on the other hand, since we cannot change the past, if it is true that it rained yesterday, it cannot be true that it may not have rained yesterday. It seems the past is "fixed", or necessary, in a way the future is not. This is sometimes referred to as accidental necessity. But if the past is "fixed", and everything that is in the future will eventually be in the past, then it seems plausible to say that future events are necessary too. Similarly, the problem of future contingents considers the semantics of assertions about the future: is either of the propositions 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', or 'There will not be a sea battle tomorrow' now true? Considering this thesis led Aristotle to reject the principle of bivalence for assertions concerning the future. Additional binary operators are also relevant to temporal logics (see Linear temporal logic). Versions of temporal logic can be used in computer science to model computer operations and prove theorems about them. In one version, ◇P means "at a future time in the computation it is possible that the computer state will be such that P is true"; □P means "at all future times in the computation P will be true". In another version, ◇P means "at the immediate next state of the computation, P might be true"; □P means "at the immediate next state of the computation, P will be true". These differ in the choice of Accessibility relation. (P always means "P is true at the current computer state".) These two examples involve nondeterministic or not-fully-understood computations; there are many other modal logics specialized to different types of program analysis. Each one naturally leads to slightly different axioms. Deontic logic Likewise talk of morality, or of obligation and norms generally, seems to have a modal structure. The difference between "You must do this" and "You may do this" looks a lot like the difference between "This is necessary" and "This is possible". Such logics are called deontic, from the Greek for "duty". Deontic logics commonly lack the axiom T semantically corresponding to the reflexivity of the accessibility relation in Kripke semantics: in symbols, . Interpreting □ as "it is obligatory that", T informally says that every obligation is true. For example, if it is obligatory not to kill others (i.e. killing is morally forbidden), then T implies that people actually do not kill others. The consequent is obviously false. Instead, using Kripke semantics, we say that though our own world does not realize all obligations, the worlds accessible to it do (i.e., T holds at these worlds). These worlds are called idealized worlds. P is obligatory with respect to our own world if at all idealized worlds accessible to our world, P holds. Though this was one of the first interpretations of the formal semantics, it has recently come under criticism. One other principle that is often (at least traditionally) accepted as a deontic principle is D, , which corresponds to the seriality (or extendability or unboundedness) of the accessibility relation. It is an embodiment of the Kantian idea that "ought implies can". (Clearly the "can" can be interpreted in various senses, e.g. in a moral or alethic sense.) Intuitive problems with deontic logic When we try to formalize ethics with standard modal logic, we run into some problems. Suppose that we have a proposition K: you have stolen some money, and another, Q: you have stolen a small amount of money. Now suppose we want to express the thought that "if you have stolen some money, it ought to be a small amount of money". There are two likely candidates, (1) (2) But (1) and K together entail □Q, which says that it ought to be the case that you have stolen a small amount of money. This surely is not right, because you ought not to have stolen anything at all. And (2) does not work either: If the right representation of "if you have stolen some money it ought to be a small amount" is (2), then the right representation of (3) "if you have stolen some money then it ought to be a large amount" is . Now suppose (as seems reasonable) that you ought not to steal anything, or . But then we can deduce via and (the contrapositive of ); so sentence (3) follows from our hypothesis (of course the same logic shows sentence (2)). But that cannot be right, and is not right when we use natural language. Telling someone they should not steal certainly does not imply that they should steal large amounts of money if they do engage in theft. Doxastic logic Doxastic logic concerns the logic of belief (of some set of agents). The term doxastic is derived from the ancient Greek doxa which means "belief". Typically, a doxastic logic uses □, often written "B", to mean "It is believed that", or when relativized to a particular agent s, "It is believed by s that". Metaphysical questions In the most common interpretation of modal logic, one considers "logically possible worlds". If a statement is true in all possible worlds, then it is a necessary truth. If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is not true in all possible worlds, then it is a contingent truth. A statement that is true in some possible world (not necessarily our own) is called a possible truth. Under this "possible worlds idiom", to maintain that Bigfoot's existence is possible but not actual, one says, "There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists; but in the actual world, Bigfoot does not exist". However, it is unclear what this claim commits us to. Are we really alleging the existence of possible worlds, every bit as real as our actual world, just not actual? Saul Kripke believes that 'possible world' is something of a misnomer – that the term 'possible world' is just a useful way of visualizing the concept of possibility. For him, the sentences "you could have rolled a 4 instead of a 6" and "there is a possible world where you rolled a 4, but you rolled a 6 in the actual world" are not significantly different statements, and neither commit us to the existence of a possible world. David Lewis, on the other hand, made himself notorious by biting the bullet, asserting that all merely possible worlds are as real as our own, and that what distinguishes our world as actual is simply that it is indeed our world – this world. That position is a major tenet of "modal realism". Some philosophers decline to endorse any version of modal realism, considering it ontologically extravagant, and prefer to seek various ways to paraphrase away these ontological commitments. Robert Adams holds that 'possible worlds' are better thought of as 'world-stories', or consistent sets of propositions. Thus, it is possible that you rolled a 4 if such a state of affairs can be described coherently. Computer scientists will generally pick a highly specific interpretation of the modal operators specialized to the particular sort of computation being analysed. In place of "all worlds", you may have "all possible next states of the computer", or "all possible future states of the computer". Further applications Modal logics have begun to be used in areas of the humanities such as literature, poetry, art and history. In the philosophy of religion, modal logics are commonly used in arguments for the existence of God. History The basic ideas of modal logic date back to antiquity. Aristotle developed a modal syllogistic in Book I of his Prior Analytics (ch. 8–22), which Theophrastus attempted to improve. There are also passages in Aristotle's work, such as the famous sea-battle argument in De Interpretatione §9, that are now seen as anticipations of the connection of modal logic with potentiality and time. In the Hellenistic period, the logicians Diodorus Cronus, Philo the Dialectician and the Stoic Chrysippus each developed a modal system that accounted for the interdefinability of possibility and necessity, accepted axiom T (see below), and combined elements of modal logic and temporal logic in attempts to solve the notorious Master Argument. The earliest formal system of modal logic was developed by Avicenna, who ultimately developed a theory of "temporally modal" syllogistic. Modal logic as a self-aware subject owes much to the writings of the Scholastics, in particular William of Ockham and John Duns Scotus, who reasoned informally in a modal manner, mainly to analyze statements about essence and accident. In the 19th century, Hugh MacColl made innovative contributions to modal logic, but did not find much acknowledgment. C. I. Lewis founded modern modal logic in a series of scholarly articles beginning in 1912 with "Implication and the Algebra of Logic". Lewis was led to invent modal logic, and specifically strict implication, on the grounds that classical logic grants paradoxes of material implication such as the principle that a falsehood implies any proposition. This work culminated in his 1932 book Symbolic Logic (with C. H. Langford), which introduced the five systems S1 through S5. After Lewis, modal logic received little attention for several decades. Nicholas Rescher has argued that this was because Bertrand Russell rejected it. However, Jan Dejnozka has argued against this view, stating that a modal system which Dejnozka calls "MDL" is described in Russell's works, although Russell did believe the concept of modality to "come from confusing propositions with propositional functions", as he wrote in The Analysis of Matter. Ruth C. Barcan (later Ruth Barcan Marcus) developed the first axiomatic systems of quantified modal logic — first and second order extensions of Lewis' S2, S4, and S5. Arthur Norman Prior warned her to prepare well in the debates concerning quantified modal logic with Willard Van Orman Quine, because of bias against modal logic. The contemporary era in modal semantics began in 1959, when Saul Kripke (then only a 18-year-old Harvard University undergraduate) introduced the now-standard Kripke semantics for modal logics. These are commonly referred to as "possible worlds" semantics. Kripke and A. N. Prior had previously corresponded at some length. Kripke semantics is basically simple, but proofs are eased using semantic-tableaux or analytic tableaux, as explained by E. W. Beth. A. N. Prior created modern temporal logic, closely related to modal logic, in 1957 by adding modal operators [F] and [P] meaning "eventually" and "previously". Vaughan Pratt introduced dynamic logic in 1976. In 1977, Amir Pnueli proposed using temporal logic to formalise the behaviour of continually operating concurrent programs. Flavors of temporal logic include propositional dynamic logic (PDL), (propositional) linear temporal logic (LTL), computation tree logic (CTL), Hennessy–Milner logic, and T. The mathematical structure of modal logic, namely Boolean algebras augmented with unary operations (often called modal algebras), began to emerge with J. C. C. McKinsey's 1941 proof that S2 and S4 are decidable, and reached full flower in the work of Alfred Tarski and his student Bjarni Jónsson (Jónsson and Tarski 1951–52). This work revealed that S4 and S5 are models of interior algebra, a proper extension of Boolean algebra originally designed to capture the properties of the interior and closure operators of topology. Texts on modal logic typically do little more than mention its connections with the study of Boolean algebras and topology. For a thorough survey of the history of formal modal logic and of the associated mathematics, see Robert Goldblatt (2006). See also Accessibility relation Conceptual necessity Counterpart theory David Kellogg Lewis De dicto and de re Description logic Doxastic logic Dynamic logic Enthymeme Free choice inference Hybrid logic Interior algebra Interpretability logic Kripke semantics Metaphysical necessity Modal verb Multimodal logic Multi-valued logic Neighborhood semantics Provability logic Regular modal logic Relevance logic Strict conditional Two-dimensionalism Notes References This article includes material from the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, used with permission under the GFDL. Barcan-Marcus, Ruth JSL 11 (1946) and JSL 112 (1947) and "Modalities", OUP, 1993, 1995. Beth, Evert W., 1955. "Semantic entailment and formal derivability", Mededlingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, N.R. Vol 18, no 13, 1955, pp 309–42. Reprinted in Jaakko Intikka (ed.) The Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 1969 (Semantic Tableaux proof methods). Beth, Evert W., "Formal Methods: An Introduction to Symbolic Logic and to the Study of Effective Operations in Arithmetic and Logic", D. Reidel, 1962 (Semantic Tableaux proof methods). Blackburn, P.; van Benthem, J.; and Wolter, Frank; Eds. (2006) Handbook of Modal Logic. North Holland. Blackburn, Patrick; de Rijke, Maarten; and Venema, Yde (2001) Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press. Chagrov, Aleksandr; and Zakharyaschev, Michael (1997) Modal Logic. Oxford University Press. Chellas, B. F. (1980) Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. Cresswell, M. J. (2001) "Modal Logic" in Goble, Lou; Ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Basil Blackwell: 136–58. Fitting, Melvin; and Mendelsohn, R. L. (1998) First Order Modal Logic. Kluwer. James Garson (2006) Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press. . A thorough introduction to modal logic, with coverage of various derivation systems and a distinctive approach to the use of diagrams in aiding comprehension. Girle, Rod (2000) Modal Logics and Philosophy. Acumen (UK). . Proof by refutation trees. A good introduction to the varied interpretations of modal logic. Goldblatt, Robert (1992) "Logics of Time and Computation", 2nd ed., CSLI Lecture Notes No. 7. University of Chicago Press. —— (1993) Mathematics of Modality, CSLI Lecture Notes No. 43. University of Chicago Press. —— (2006) "Mathematical Modal Logic: a View of its Evolution", in Gabbay, D. M.; and Woods, John; Eds., Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 6. Elsevier BV. Goré, Rajeev (1999) "Tableau Methods for Modal and Temporal Logics" in D'Agostino, M.; Gabbay, D.; Haehnle, R.; and Posegga, J.; Eds., Handbook of Tableau Methods. Kluwer: 297–396. Hughes, G. E., and Cresswell, M. J. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge. Jónsson, B. and Tarski, A., 1951–52, "Boolean Algebra with Operators I and II", American Journal of Mathematics 73: 891–939 and 74: 129–62. Kracht, Marcus (1999) Tools and Techniques in Modal Logic, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics No. 142. North Holland. Lemmon, E. J. (with Scott, D.) (1977) An Introduction to Modal Logic, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, no. 11 (Krister Segerberg, series ed.). Basil Blackwell. Lewis, C. I. (with Langford, C. H.) (1932). Symbolic Logic. Dover reprint, 1959. Prior, A. N. (1957) Time and Modality. Oxford University Press. Snyder, D. Paul "Modal Logic and its applications", Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971 (proof tree methods). Zeman, J. J. (1973) Modal Logic. Reidel. Employs Polish notation. "History of logic", Britannica Online. Further reading Ruth Barcan Marcus, Modalities, Oxford University Press, 1993. D. M. Gabbay, A. Kurucz, F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev, Many-Dimensional Modal Logics: Theory and Applications, Elsevier, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, volume 148, 2003, . [Covers many varieties of modal logics, e.g. temporal, epistemic, dynamic, description, spatial from a unified perspective with emphasis on computer science aspects, e.g. decidability and complexity.] Andrea Borghini, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Modality, New York: Bloomsbury, 2016. External links Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Modal Logic: A Contemporary View" – by Johan van Benthem. "Rudolf Carnap's Modal Logic" – by MJ Cresswell. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Modal Logic" – by James Garson. "Modern Origins of Modal Logic" – by Roberta Ballarin. "Provability Logic" – by Rineke Verbrugge. Edward N. Zalta, 1995, "Basic Concepts in Modal Logic." John McCarthy, 1996, "Modal Logic." Molle a Java prover for experimenting with modal logics Suber, Peter, 2002, "Bibliography of Modal Logic." List of Logic Systems List of many modal logics with sources, by John Halleck. Advances in Modal Logic. Biannual international conference and book series in modal logic. S4prover A tableaux prover for S4 logic "Some Remarks on Logic and Topology" – by Richard Moot; exposits a topological semantics for the modal logic S4. LoTREC The most generic prover for modal logics from IRIT/Toulouse University Logic Philosophical logic Mathematical logic Semantics

Verisimilitude

In philosophy, verisimilitude (or truthlikeness) is the notion that some propositions are closer to being true than other propositions. The problem of verisimilitude is the problem of articulating what it takes for one false theory to be closer to the truth than another false theory. This problem was central to the philosophy of Karl Popper, largely because Popper was among the first to affirm that truth is the aim of scientific inquiry while acknowledging that most of the greatest scientific theories in the history of science are, strictly speaking, false. If this long string of purportedly false theories is to constitute progress with respect to the goal of truth, then it must be at least possible for one false theory to be closer to the truth than others. Karl Popper Popper's formal definition of verisimilitude was challenged since 1974 by Pavel Tichý, John Henry Harris, and David Miller, who argued that Popper's definition has an unintended consequence: that no false theory can be closer to the truth than another. Popper himself stated: "I accepted the criticism of my definition within minutes of its presentation, wondering why I had not seen the mistake before." This result gave rise to a search for an account of verisimilitude that did not deem progress towards the truth an impossibility. Post-Popperian theories Theories proposed by David Miller and by Theo Kuipers build on Popper's approach, guided by the notion that truthlikeness is a function of a truth factor and a content factor. Others (e.g. those advanced by in collaboration with , by Mortensen, and by Ken Gemes) are also inspired by Popper's approach but locate what they believe to be the error of Popper's proposal in his overly generous notion of content, or consequence, proposing instead that the consequences that contribute to closeness to truth must be, in a technical sense, "relevant". A different approach (already proposed by Tichý and and developed especially by Ilkka Niiniluoto and Graham Oddie) takes the "likeness" in truthlikeness literally, holding that a proposition's likeness to the truth is a function of the overall likeness to the actual world of the possible worlds in which the proposition would be true. An attempt to use the notion of point-free metric space is proposed by Giangiacomo Gerla. There is currently a debate about whether or to what extent these different approaches to the concept are compatible. See also AI Trust Paradox Imagination McNamara fallacy Truthiness References Concepts in epistemology Concepts in the philosophy of science Epistemology of science Karl Popper

Mathematics

Mathematics is a field of study that discovers and organizes methods, theories and theorems that are developed and proved for the needs of empirical sciences and mathematics itself. There are many areas of mathematics, which include number theory (the study of numbers), algebra (the study of formulas and related structures), geometry (the study of shapes and spaces that contain them), analysis (the study of continuous changes), and set theory (presently used as a foundation for all mathematics). Mathematics involves the description and manipulation of abstract objects that consist of either abstractions from nature orin modern mathematicspurely abstract entities that are stipulated to have certain properties, called axioms. Mathematics uses pure reason to prove properties of objects, a proof consisting of a succession of applications of deductive rules to already established results. These results include previously proved theorems, axioms, andin case of abstraction from naturesome basic properties that are considered true starting points of the theory under consideration. Mathematics is essential in the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, finance, computer science, and the social sciences. Although mathematics is extensively used for modeling phenomena, the fundamental truths of mathematics are independent of any scientific experimentation. Some areas of mathematics, such as statistics and game theory, are developed in close correlation with their applications and are often grouped under applied mathematics. Other areas are developed independently from any application (and are therefore called pure mathematics) but often later find practical applications. Historically, the concept of a proof and its associated mathematical rigour first appeared in Greek mathematics, most notably in Euclid's Elements. Since its beginning, mathematics was primarily divided into geometry and arithmetic (the manipulation of natural numbers and fractions), until the 16th and 17th centuries, when algebra and infinitesimal calculus were introduced as new fields. Since then, the interaction between mathematical innovations and scientific discoveries has led to a correlated increase in the development of both. At the end of the 19th century, the foundational crisis of mathematics led to the systematization of the axiomatic method, which heralded a dramatic increase in the number of mathematical areas and their fields of application. The contemporary Mathematics Subject Classification lists more than sixty first-level areas of mathematics. Areas of mathematics Before the Renaissance, mathematics was divided into two main areas: arithmetic, regarding the manipulation of numbers, and geometry, regarding the study of shapes. Some types of pseudoscience, such as numerology and astrology, were not then clearly distinguished from mathematics. During the Renaissance, two more areas appeared. Mathematical notation led to algebra which, roughly speaking, consists of the study and the manipulation of formulas. Calculus, consisting of the two subfields differential calculus and integral calculus, is the study of continuous functions, which model the typically nonlinear relationships between varying quantities, as represented by variables. This division into four main areasarithmetic, geometry, algebra, calculusendured until the end of the 19th century. Areas such as celestial mechanics and solid mechanics were then studied by mathematicians, but now are considered as belonging to physics. The subject of combinatorics has been studied for much of recorded history, yet did not become a separate branch of mathematics until the seventeenth century. At the end of the 19th century, the foundational crisis in mathematics and the resulting systematization of the axiomatic method led to an explosion of new areas of mathematics. The 2020 Mathematics Subject Classification contains no less than first-level areas. Some of these areas correspond to the older division, as is true regarding number theory (the modern name for higher arithmetic) and geometry. Several other first-level areas have "geometry" in their names or are otherwise commonly considered part of geometry. Algebra and calculus do not appear as first-level areas but are respectively split into several first-level areas. Other first-level areas emerged during the 20th century or had not previously been considered as mathematics, such as mathematical logic and foundations. Number theory Number theory began with the manipulation of numbers, that is, natural numbers and later expanded to integers and rational numbers Number theory was once called arithmetic, but nowadays this term is mostly used for numerical calculations. Number theory dates back to ancient Babylon and probably China. Two prominent early number theorists were Euclid of ancient Greece and Diophantus of Alexandria. The modern study of number theory in its abstract form is largely attributed to Pierre de Fermat and Leonhard Euler. The field came to full fruition with the contributions of Adrien-Marie Legendre and Carl Friedrich Gauss. Many easily stated number problems have solutions that require sophisticated methods, often from across mathematics. A prominent example is Fermat's Last Theorem. This conjecture was stated in 1637 by Pierre de Fermat, but it was proved only in 1994 by Andrew Wiles, who used tools including scheme theory from algebraic geometry, category theory, and homological algebra. Another example is Goldbach's conjecture, which asserts that every even integer greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers. Stated in 1742 by Christian Goldbach, it remains unproven despite considerable effort. Number theory includes several subareas, including analytic number theory, algebraic number theory, geometry of numbers (method oriented), diophantine equations, and transcendence theory (problem oriented). Geometry Geometry is one of the oldest branches of mathematics. It started with empirical recipes concerning shapes, such as lines, angles and circles, which were developed mainly for the needs of surveying and architecture, but has since blossomed out into many other subfields. A fundamental innovation was the ancient Greeks' introduction of the concept of proofs, which require that every assertion must be proved. For example, it is not sufficient to verify by measurement that, say, two lengths are equal; their equality must be proven via reasoning from previously accepted results (theorems) and a few basic statements. The basic statements are not subject to proof because they are self-evident (postulates), or are part of the definition of the subject of study (axioms). This principle, foundational for all mathematics, was first elaborated for geometry, and was systematized by Euclid around 300 BC in his book Elements. The resulting Euclidean geometry is the study of shapes and their arrangements constructed from lines, planes and circles in the Euclidean plane (plane geometry) and the three-dimensional Euclidean space. Euclidean geometry was developed without change of methods or scope until the 17th century, when René Descartes introduced what is now called Cartesian coordinates. This constituted a major change of paradigm: Instead of defining real numbers as lengths of line segments (see number line), it allowed the representation of points using their coordinates, which are numbers. Algebra (and later, calculus) can thus be used to solve geometrical problems. Geometry was split into two new subfields: synthetic geometry, which uses purely geometrical methods, and analytic geometry, which uses coordinates systemically. Analytic geometry allows the study of curves unrelated to circles and lines. Such curves can be defined as the graph of functions, the study of which led to differential geometry. They can also be defined as implicit equations, often polynomial equations (which spawned algebraic geometry). Analytic geometry also makes it possible to consider Euclidean spaces of higher than three dimensions. In the 19th century, mathematicians discovered non-Euclidean geometries, which do not follow the parallel postulate. By questioning that postulate's truth, this discovery has been viewed as joining Russell's paradox in revealing the foundational crisis of mathematics. This aspect of the crisis was solved by systematizing the axiomatic method, and adopting that the truth of the chosen axioms is not a mathematical problem. In turn, the axiomatic method allows for the study of various geometries obtained either by changing the axioms or by considering properties that do not change under specific transformations of the space. Today's subareas of geometry include: Projective geometry, introduced in the 16th century by Girard Desargues, extends Euclidean geometry by adding points at infinity at which parallel lines intersect. This simplifies many aspects of classical geometry by unifying the treatments for intersecting and parallel lines. Affine geometry, the study of properties relative to parallelism and independent from the concept of length. Differential geometry, the study of curves, surfaces, and their generalizations, which are defined using differentiable functions. Manifold theory, the study of shapes that are not necessarily embedded in a larger space. Riemannian geometry, the study of distance properties in curved spaces. Algebraic geometry, the study of curves, surfaces, and their generalizations, which are defined using polynomials. Topology, the study of properties that are kept under continuous deformations. Algebraic topology, the use in topology of algebraic methods, mainly homological algebra. Discrete geometry, the study of finite configurations in geometry. Convex geometry, the study of convex sets, which takes its importance from its applications in optimization. Complex geometry, the geometry obtained by replacing real numbers with complex numbers. Algebra Algebra is the art of manipulating equations and formulas. Diophantus (3rd century) and al-Khwarizmi (9th century) were the two main precursors of algebra. Diophantus solved some equations involving unknown natural numbers by deducing new relations until he obtained the solution. Al-Khwarizmi introduced systematic methods for transforming equations, such as moving a term from one side of an equation into the other side. The term algebra is derived from the Arabic word al-jabr meaning 'the reunion of broken parts' that he used for naming one of these methods in the title of his main treatise. Algebra became an area in its own right only with François Viète (1540–1603), who introduced the use of variables for representing unknown or unspecified numbers. Variables allow mathematicians to describe the operations that have to be done on the numbers represented using mathematical formulas. Until the 19th century, algebra consisted mainly of the study of linear equations (presently linear algebra), and polynomial equations in a single unknown, which were called algebraic equations (a term still in use, although it may be ambiguous). During the 19th century, mathematicians began to use variables to represent things other than numbers (such as matrices, modular integers, and geometric transformations), on which generalizations of arithmetic operations are often valid. The concept of algebraic structure addresses this, consisting of a set whose elements are unspecified, of operations acting on the elements of the set, and rules that these operations must follow. The scope of algebra thus grew to include the study of algebraic structures. This object of algebra was called modern algebra or abstract algebra, as established by the influence and works of Emmy Noether. Some types of algebraic structures have useful and often fundamental properties, in many areas of mathematics. Their study became autonomous parts of algebra, and include: group theory field theory vector spaces, whose study is essentially the same as linear algebra ring theory commutative algebra, which is the study of commutative rings, includes the study of polynomials, and is a foundational part of algebraic geometry homological algebra Lie algebra and Lie group theory Boolean algebra, which is widely used for the study of the logical structure of computers The study of types of algebraic structures as mathematical objects is the purpose of universal algebra and category theory. The latter applies to every mathematical structure (not only algebraic ones). At its origin, it was introduced, together with homological algebra for allowing the algebraic study of non-algebraic objects such as topological spaces; this particular area of application is called algebraic topology. Calculus and analysis Calculus, formerly called infinitesimal calculus, was introduced independently and simultaneously by 17th-century mathematicians Newton and Leibniz. It is fundamentally the study of the relationship of variables that depend on each other. Calculus was expanded in the 18th century by Euler with the introduction of the concept of a function and many other results. Presently, "calculus" refers mainly to the elementary part of this theory, and "analysis" is commonly used for advanced parts. Analysis is further subdivided into real analysis, where variables represent real numbers, and complex analysis, where variables represent complex numbers. Analysis includes many subareas shared by other areas of mathematics which include: Multivariable calculus Functional analysis, where variables represent varying functions Integration, measure theory and potential theory, all strongly related with probability theory on a continuum Ordinary differential equations Partial differential equations Numerical analysis, mainly devoted to the computation on computers of solutions of ordinary and partial differential equations that arise in many applications Discrete mathematics Discrete mathematics, broadly speaking, is the study of individual, countable mathematical objects. An example is the set of all integers. Because the objects of study here are discrete, the methods of calculus and mathematical analysis do not directly apply. Algorithmsespecially their implementation and computational complexityplay a major role in discrete mathematics. The four color theorem and optimal sphere packing were two major problems of discrete mathematics solved in the second half of the 20th century. The P versus NP problem, which remains open to this day, is also important for discrete mathematics, since its solution would potentially impact a large number of computationally difficult problems. Discrete mathematics includes: Combinatorics, the art of enumerating mathematical objects that satisfy some given constraints. Originally, these objects were elements or subsets of a given set; this has been extended to various objects, which establishes a strong link between combinatorics and other parts of discrete mathematics. For example, discrete geometry includes counting configurations of geometric shapes. Graph theory and hypergraphs Coding theory, including error correcting codes and a part of cryptography Matroid theory Discrete geometry Discrete probability distributions Game theory (although continuous games are also studied, most common games, such as chess and poker are discrete) Discrete optimization, including combinatorial optimization, integer programming, constraint programming Mathematical logic and set theory The two subjects of mathematical logic and set theory have belonged to mathematics since the end of the 19th century. Before this period, sets were not considered to be mathematical objects, and logic, although used for mathematical proofs, belonged to philosophy and was not specifically studied by mathematicians. Before Cantor's study of infinite sets, mathematicians were reluctant to consider actually infinite collections, and considered infinity to be the result of endless enumeration. Cantor's work offended many mathematicians not only by considering actually infinite sets but by showing that this implies different sizes of infinity, per Cantor's diagonal argument. This led to the controversy over Cantor's set theory. In the same period, various areas of mathematics concluded the former intuitive definitions of the basic mathematical objects were insufficient for ensuring mathematical rigour. This became the foundational crisis of mathematics. It was eventually solved in mainstream mathematics by systematizing the axiomatic method inside a formalized set theory. Roughly speaking, each mathematical object is defined by the set of all similar objects and the properties that these objects must have. For example, in Peano arithmetic, the natural numbers are defined by "zero is a number", "each number has a unique successor", "each number but zero has a unique predecessor", and some rules of reasoning. This mathematical abstraction from reality is embodied in the modern philosophy of formalism, as founded by David Hilbert around 1910. The "nature" of the objects defined this way is a philosophical problem that mathematicians leave to philosophers, even if many mathematicians have opinions on this nature, and use their opinionsometimes called "intuition"to guide their study and proofs. The approach allows considering "logics" (that is, sets of allowed deducing rules), theorems, proofs, etc. as mathematical objects, and to prove theorems about them. For example, Gödel's incompleteness theorems assert, roughly speaking that, in every consistent formal system that contains the natural numbers, there are theorems that are true (that is provable in a stronger system), but not provable inside the system. This approach to the foundations of mathematics was challenged during the first half of the 20th century by mathematicians led by Brouwer, who promoted intuitionistic logic, which explicitly lacks the law of excluded middle. These problems and debates led to a wide expansion of mathematical logic, with subareas such as model theory (modeling some logical theories inside other theories), proof theory, type theory, computability theory and computational complexity theory. Although these aspects of mathematical logic were introduced before the rise of computers, their use in compiler design, formal verification, program analysis, proof assistants and other aspects of computer science, contributed in turn to the expansion of these logical theories. Statistics and other decision sciences The field of statistics is a mathematical application that is employed for the collection and processing of data samples, using procedures based on mathematical methods especially probability theory. Statisticians generate data with random sampling or randomized experiments. Statistical theory studies decision problems such as minimizing the risk (expected loss) of a statistical action, such as using a procedure in, for example, parameter estimation, hypothesis testing, and selecting the best. In these traditional areas of mathematical statistics, a statistical-decision problem is formulated by minimizing an objective function, like expected loss or cost, under specific constraints. For example, designing a survey often involves minimizing the cost of estimating a population mean with a given level of confidence. Because of its use of optimization, the mathematical theory of statistics overlaps with other decision sciences, such as operations research, control theory, and mathematical economics. Computational mathematics Computational mathematics is the study of mathematical problems that are typically too large for human, numerical capacity. Numerical analysis studies methods for problems in analysis using functional analysis and approximation theory; numerical analysis broadly includes the study of approximation and discretization with special focus on rounding errors. Numerical analysis and, more broadly, scientific computing also study non-analytic topics of mathematical science, especially algorithmic-matrix-and-graph theory. Other areas of computational mathematics include computer algebra and symbolic computation. History Etymology The word mathematics comes from the Ancient Greek word máthēma, meaning , and the derived expression mathēmatikḗ tékhnē, meaning . It entered the English language during the Late Middle English period through French and Latin. Similarly, one of the two main schools of thought in Pythagoreanism was known as the mathēmatikoi (μαθηματικοί)which at the time meant "learners" rather than "mathematicians" in the modern sense. The Pythagoreans were likely the first to constrain the use of the word to just the study of arithmetic and geometry. By the time of Aristotle (384–322 BC) this meaning was fully established. In Latin and English, until around 1700, the term mathematics more commonly meant "astrology" (or sometimes "astronomy") rather than "mathematics"; the meaning gradually changed to its present one from about 1500 to 1800. This change has resulted in several mistranslations: For example, Saint Augustine's warning that Christians should beware of mathematici, meaning "astrologers", is sometimes mistranslated as a condemnation of mathematicians. The apparent plural form in English goes back to the Latin neuter plural (Cicero), based on the Greek plural ta mathēmatiká and means roughly "all things mathematical", although it is plausible that English borrowed only the adjective mathematic(al) and formed the noun mathematics anew, after the pattern of physics and metaphysics, inherited from Greek. In English, the noun mathematics takes a singular verb. It is often shortened to maths or, in North America, math. Ancient In addition to recognizing how to count physical objects, prehistoric peoples may have also known how to count abstract quantities, like timedays, seasons, or years. Evidence for more complex mathematics does not appear until around 3000 , when the Babylonians and Egyptians began using arithmetic, algebra, and geometry for taxation and other financial calculations, for building and construction, and for astronomy. The oldest mathematical texts from Mesopotamia and Egypt are from 2000 to 1800 BC. Many early texts mention Pythagorean triples and so, by inference, the Pythagorean theorem seems to be the most ancient and widespread mathematical concept after basic arithmetic and geometry. It is in Babylonian mathematics that elementary arithmetic (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division) first appear in the archaeological record. The Babylonians also possessed a place-value system and used a sexagesimal numeral system which is still in use today for measuring angles and time. In the 6th century BC, Greek mathematics began to emerge as a distinct discipline and some Ancient Greeks such as the Pythagoreans appeared to have considered it a subject in its own right. Around 300 BC, Euclid organized mathematical knowledge by way of postulates and first principles, which evolved into the axiomatic method that is used in mathematics today, consisting of definition, axiom, theorem, and proof. His book, Elements, is widely considered the most successful and influential textbook of all time. The greatest mathematician of antiquity is often held to be Archimedes of Syracuse. He developed formulas for calculating the surface area and volume of solids of revolution and used the method of exhaustion to calculate the area under the arc of a parabola with the summation of an infinite series, in a manner not too dissimilar from modern calculus. Other notable achievements of Greek mathematics are conic sections (Apollonius of Perga, 3rd century BC), trigonometry (Hipparchus of Nicaea, 2nd century BC), and the beginnings of algebra (Diophantus, 3rd century AD). The Hindu–Arabic numeral system and the rules for the use of its operations, in use throughout the world today, evolved over the course of the first millennium AD in India and were transmitted to the Western world via Islamic mathematics. Other notable developments of Indian mathematics include the modern definition and approximation of sine and cosine, and an early form of infinite series. Medieval and later During the Golden Age of Islam, especially during the 9th and 10th centuries, mathematics saw many important innovations building on Greek mathematics. The most notable achievement of Islamic mathematics was the development of algebra. Other achievements of the Islamic period include advances in spherical trigonometry and the addition of the decimal point to the Arabic numeral system. Many notable mathematicians from this period were Persian, such as Al-Khwarizmi, Omar Khayyam and Sharaf al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. The Greek and Arabic mathematical texts were in turn translated to Latin during the Middle Ages and made available in Europe. During the early modern period, mathematics began to develop at an accelerating pace in Western Europe, with innovations that revolutionized mathematics, such as the introduction of variables and symbolic notation by François Viète (1540–1603), the introduction of logarithms by John Napier in 1614, which greatly simplified numerical calculations, especially for astronomy and marine navigation, the introduction of coordinates by René Descartes (1596–1650) for reducing geometry to algebra, and the development of calculus by Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716). Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), the most notable mathematician of the 18th century, unified these innovations into a single corpus with a standardized terminology, and completed them with the discovery and the proof of numerous theorems. Perhaps the foremost mathematician of the 19th century was the German mathematician Carl Gauss, who made numerous contributions to fields such as algebra, analysis, differential geometry, matrix theory, number theory, and statistics. In the early 20th century, Kurt Gödel transformed mathematics by publishing his incompleteness theorems, which show in part that any consistent axiomatic systemif powerful enough to describe arithmeticwill contain true propositions that cannot be proved. Mathematics has since been greatly extended, and there has been a fruitful interaction between mathematics and science, to the benefit of both. Mathematical discoveries continue to be made to this very day. According to Mikhail B. Sevryuk, in the January 2006 issue of the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, "The number of papers and books included in the Mathematical Reviews (MR) database since 1940 (the first year of operation of MR) is now more than 1.9 million, and more than 75 thousand items are added to the database each year. The overwhelming majority of works in this ocean contain new mathematical theorems and their proofs." Symbolic notation and terminology Mathematical notation is widely used in science and engineering for representing complex concepts and properties in a concise, unambiguous, and accurate way. This notation consists of symbols used for representing operations, unspecified numbers, relations and any other mathematical objects, and then assembling them into expressions and formulas. More precisely, numbers and other mathematical objects are represented by symbols called variables, which are generally Latin or Greek letters, and often include subscripts. Operation and relations are generally represented by specific symbols or glyphs, such as (plus), (multiplication), (integral), (equal), and (less than). All these symbols are generally grouped according to specific rules to form expressions and formulas. Normally, expressions and formulas do not appear alone, but are included in sentences of the current language, where expressions play the role of noun phrases and formulas play the role of clauses. Mathematics has developed a rich terminology covering a broad range of fields that study the properties of various abstract, idealized objects and how they interact. It is based on rigorous definitions that provide a standard foundation for communication. An axiom or postulate is a mathematical statement that is taken to be true without need of proof. If a mathematical statement has yet to be proven (or disproven), it is termed a conjecture. Through a series of rigorous arguments employing deductive reasoning, a statement that is proven to be true becomes a theorem. A specialized theorem that is mainly used to prove another theorem is called a lemma. A proven instance that forms part of a more general finding is termed a corollary. Numerous technical terms used in mathematics are neologisms, such as polynomial and homeomorphism. Other technical terms are words of the common language that are used in an accurate meaning that may differ slightly from their common meaning. For example, in mathematics, "or" means "one, the other or both", while, in common language, it is either ambiguous or means "one or the other but not both" (in mathematics, the latter is called "exclusive or"). Finally, many mathematical terms are common words that are used with a completely different meaning. This may lead to sentences that are correct and true mathematical assertions, but appear to be nonsense to people who do not have the required background. For example, "every free module is flat" and "a field is always a ring". Relationship with sciences Mathematics is used in most sciences for modeling phenomena, which then allows predictions to be made from experimental laws. The independence of mathematical truth from any experimentation implies that the accuracy of such predictions depends only on the adequacy of the model. Inaccurate predictions, rather than being caused by invalid mathematical concepts, imply the need to change the mathematical model used. For example, the perihelion precession of Mercury could only be explained after the emergence of Einstein's general relativity, which replaced Newton's law of gravitation as a better mathematical model. There is still a philosophical debate whether mathematics is a science. However, in practice, mathematicians are typically grouped with scientists, and mathematics shares much in common with the physical sciences. Like them, it is falsifiable, which means in mathematics that, if a result or a theory is wrong, this can be proved by providing a counterexample. Similarly as in science, theories and results (theorems) are often obtained from experimentation. In mathematics, the experimentation may consist of computation on selected examples or of the study of figures or other representations of mathematical objects (often mind representations without physical support). For example, when asked how he came about his theorems, Gauss once replied "durch planmässiges Tattonieren" (through systematic experimentation). However, some authors emphasize that mathematics differs from the modern notion of science by not on empirical evidence. Pure and applied mathematics Until the 19th century, the development of mathematics in the West was mainly motivated by the needs of technology and science, and there was no clear distinction between pure and applied mathematics. For example, the natural numbers and arithmetic were introduced for the need of counting, and geometry was motivated by surveying, architecture and astronomy. Later, Isaac Newton introduced infinitesimal calculus for explaining the movement of the planets with his law of gravitation. Moreover, most mathematicians were also scientists, and many scientists were also mathematicians. However, a notable exception occurred with the tradition of pure mathematics in Ancient Greece. The problem of integer factorization, for example, which goes back to Euclid in 300 BC, had no practical application before its use in the RSA cryptosystem, now widely used for the security of computer networks. In the 19th century, mathematicians such as Karl Weierstrass and Richard Dedekind increasingly focused their research on internal problems, that is, pure mathematics. This led to split mathematics into pure mathematics and applied mathematics, the latter being often considered as having a lower value among mathematical purists. However, the lines between the two are frequently blurred. The aftermath of World War II led to a surge in the development of applied mathematics in the US and elsewhere. Many of the theories developed for applications were found interesting from the point of view of pure mathematics, and many results of pure mathematics were shown to have applications outside mathematics; in turn, the study of these applications may give new insights on the "pure theory". An example of the first case is the theory of distributions, introduced by Laurent Schwartz for validating computations done in quantum mechanics, which became immediately an important tool of (pure) mathematical analysis. An example of the second case is the decidability of the first-order theory of the real numbers, a problem of pure mathematics that was proved true by Alfred Tarski, with an algorithm that is impossible to implement because of a computational complexity that is much too high. For getting an algorithm that can be implemented and can solve systems of polynomial equations and inequalities, George Collins introduced the cylindrical algebraic decomposition that became a fundamental tool in real algebraic geometry. In the present day, the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is more a question of personal research aim of mathematicians than a division of mathematics into broad areas. The Mathematics Subject Classification has a section for "general applied mathematics" but does not mention "pure mathematics". However, these terms are still used in names of some university departments, such as at the Faculty of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge. Unreasonable effectiveness The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics is a phenomenon that was named and first made explicit by physicist Eugene Wigner. It is the fact that many mathematical theories (even the "purest") have applications outside their initial object. These applications may be completely outside their initial area of mathematics, and may concern physical phenomena that were completely unknown when the mathematical theory was introduced. Examples of unexpected applications of mathematical theories can be found in many areas of mathematics. A notable example is the prime factorization of natural numbers that was discovered more than 2,000 years before its common use for secure internet communications through the RSA cryptosystem. A second historical example is the theory of ellipses. They were studied by the ancient Greek mathematicians as conic sections (that is, intersections of cones with planes). It was almost 2,000 years later that Johannes Kepler discovered that the trajectories of the planets are ellipses. In the 19th century, the internal development of geometry (pure mathematics) led to definition and study of non-Euclidean geometries, spaces of dimension higher than three and manifolds. At this time, these concepts seemed totally disconnected from the physical reality, but at the beginning of the 20th century, Albert Einstein developed the theory of relativity that uses fundamentally these concepts. In particular, spacetime of special relativity is a non-Euclidean space of dimension four, and spacetime of general relativity is a (curved) manifold of dimension four. A striking aspect of the interaction between mathematics and physics is when mathematics drives research in physics. This is illustrated by the discoveries of the positron and the baryon In both cases, the equations of the theories had unexplained solutions, which led to conjecture of the existence of an unknown particle, and the search for these particles. In both cases, these particles were discovered a few years later by specific experiments. Specific sciences Physics Mathematics and physics have influenced each other over their modern history. Modern physics uses mathematics abundantly, and is also considered to be the motivation of major mathematical developments. Computing Computing is closely related to mathematics in several ways. Theoretical computer science is considered to be mathematical in nature. Communication technologies apply branches of mathematics that may be very old (e.g., arithmetic), especially with respect to transmission security, in cryptography and coding theory. Discrete mathematics is useful in many areas of computer science, such as complexity theory, information theory, and graph theory. In 1998, the Kepler conjecture on sphere packing seemed to also be partially proven by computer. Biology and chemistry Biology uses probability extensively in fields such as ecology or neurobiology. Most discussion of probability centers on the concept of evolutionary fitness. Ecology heavily uses modeling to simulate population dynamics, study ecosystems such as the predator-prey model, measure pollution diffusion, or to assess climate change. The dynamics of a population can be modeled by coupled differential equations, such as the Lotka–Volterra equations. Statistical hypothesis testing, is run on data from clinical trials to determine whether a new treatment works. Since the start of the 20th century, chemistry has used computing to model molecules in three dimensions. Earth sciences Structural geology and climatology use probabilistic models to predict the risk of natural catastrophes. Similarly, meteorology, oceanography, and planetology also use mathematics due to their heavy use of models. Social sciences Areas of mathematics used in the social sciences include probability/statistics and differential equations. These are used in linguistics, economics, sociology, and psychology. Often the fundamental postulate of mathematical economics is that of the rational individual actor – Homo economicus. In this model, the individual seeks to maximize their self-interest, and always makes optimal choices using perfect information. This atomistic view of economics allows it to relatively easily mathematize its thinking, because individual calculations are transposed into mathematical calculations. Such mathematical modeling allows one to probe economic mechanisms. Some reject or criticise the concept of Homo economicus. Economists note that real people have limited information, make poor choices and care about fairness, altruism, not just personal gain. Without mathematical modeling, it is hard to go beyond statistical observations or untestable speculation. Mathematical modeling allows economists to create structured frameworks to test hypotheses and analyze complex interactions. Models provide clarity and precision, enabling the translation of theoretical concepts into quantifiable predictions that can be tested against real-world data. At the start of the 20th century, there was a development to express historical movements in formulas. In 1922, Nikolai Kondratiev discerned the ~50-year-long Kondratiev cycle, which explains phases of economic growth or crisis. Towards the end of the 19th century, mathematicians extended their analysis into geopolitics. Peter Turchin developed cliodynamics since the 1990s. Mathematization of the social sciences is not without risk. In the controversial book Fashionable Nonsense (1997), Sokal and Bricmont denounced the unfounded or abusive use of scientific terminology, particularly from mathematics or physics, in the social sciences. The study of complex systems (evolution of unemployment, business capital, demographic evolution of a population, etc.) uses mathematical knowledge. However, the choice of counting criteria, particularly for unemployment, or of models, can be subject to controversy. Philosophy Reality The connection between mathematics and material reality has led to philosophical debates since at least the time of Pythagoras. The ancient philosopher Plato argued that abstractions that reflect material reality have themselves a reality that exists outside space and time. As a result, the philosophical view that mathematical objects somehow exist on their own in abstraction is often referred to as Platonism. Independently of their possible philosophical opinions, modern mathematicians may be generally considered as Platonists, since they think of and talk of their objects of study as real objects. Armand Borel summarized this view of mathematics reality as follows, and provided quotations of G. H. Hardy, Charles Hermite, Henri Poincaré and Albert Einstein that support his views. Nevertheless, Platonism and the concurrent views on abstraction do not explain the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. Proposed definitions There is no general consensus about the definition of mathematics or its epistemological statusthat is, its place inside knowledge. A great many professional mathematicians take no interest in a definition of mathematics, or consider it undefinable. There is not even consensus on whether mathematics is an art or a science. Some just say, "mathematics is what mathematicians do". A common approach is to define mathematics by its object of study. Aristotle defined mathematics as "the science of quantity" and this definition prevailed until the 18th century. However, Aristotle also noted a focus on quantity alone may not distinguish mathematics from sciences like physics; in his view, abstraction and studying quantity as a property "separable in thought" from real instances set mathematics apart. In the 19th century, when mathematicians began to address topicssuch as infinite setswhich have no clear-cut relation to physical reality, a variety of new definitions were given. With the large number of new areas of mathematics that have appeared since the beginning of the 20th century, defining mathematics by its object of study has become increasingly difficult. For example, in lieu of a definition, Saunders Mac Lane in Mathematics, form and function summarizes the basics of several areas of mathematics, emphasizing their inter-connectedness, and observes: Another approach for defining mathematics is to use its methods. For example, an area of study is often qualified as mathematics as soon as one can prove theoremsassertions whose validity relies on a proof, that is, a purely-logical deduction. Rigor Mathematical reasoning requires rigor. This means that the definitions must be absolutely unambiguous and the proofs must be reducible to a succession of applications of inference rules, without any use of empirical evidence and intuition. Rigorous reasoning is not specific to mathematics, but, in mathematics, the standard of rigor is much higher than elsewhere. Despite mathematics' concision, rigorous proofs can require hundreds of pages to express, such as the 255-page Feit–Thompson theorem. The emergence of computer-assisted proofs has allowed proof lengths to further expand. The result of this trend is a philosophy of the quasi-empiricist proof that can not be considered infallible, but has a probability attached to it. The concept of rigor in mathematics dates back to ancient Greece, where their society encouraged logical, deductive reasoning. However, this rigorous approach would tend to discourage exploration of new approaches, such as irrational numbers and concepts of infinity. The method of demonstrating rigorous proof was enhanced in the sixteenth century through the use of symbolic notation. In the 18th century, social transition led to mathematicians earning their keep through teaching, which led to more careful thinking about the underlying concepts of mathematics. This produced more rigorous approaches, while transitioning from geometric methods to algebraic and then arithmetic proofs. At the end of the 19th century, it appeared that the definitions of the basic concepts of mathematics were not accurate enough for avoiding paradoxes (non-Euclidean geometries and Weierstrass function) and contradictions (Russell's paradox). This was solved by the inclusion of axioms with the apodictic inference rules of mathematical theories; the re-introduction of axiomatic method pioneered by the ancient Greeks. It results that "rigor" is no more a relevant concept in mathematics, as a proof is either correct or erroneous, and a "rigorous proof" is simply a pleonasm. Where a special concept of rigor comes into play is in the socialized aspects of a proof, wherein it may be demonstrably refuted by other mathematicians. After a proof has been accepted for many years or even decades, it can then be considered as reliable. Nevertheless, the concept of "rigor" may remain useful for teaching to beginners what is a mathematical proof. Training and practice Education Mathematics has a remarkable ability to cross cultural boundaries and time periods. As a human activity, the practice of mathematics has a social side, which includes education, careers, recognition, popularization, and so on. In education, mathematics is a core part of the curriculum and forms an important element of the STEM academic disciplines. Prominent careers for professional mathematicians include math teacher or professor, statistician, actuary, financial analyst, economist, accountant, commodity trader, or computer consultant. Archaeological evidence shows that instruction in mathematics occurred as early as the second millennium BCE in ancient Babylonia. Comparable evidence has been unearthed for scribal mathematics training in the ancient Near East and then for the Greco-Roman world starting around 300 BCE. The oldest known mathematics textbook is the Rhind papyrus, dated from in Egypt. Due to a scarcity of books, mathematical teachings in ancient India were communicated using memorized oral tradition since the Vedic period. In Imperial China during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), a mathematics curriculum was adopted for the civil service exam to join the state bureaucracy. Following the Dark Ages, mathematics education in Europe was provided by religious schools as part of the Quadrivium. Formal instruction in pedagogy began with Jesuit schools in the 16th and 17th century. Most mathematical curricula remained at a basic and practical level until the nineteenth century, when it began to flourish in France and Germany. The oldest journal addressing instruction in mathematics was L'Enseignement Mathématique, which began publication in 1899. The Western advancements in science and technology led to the establishment of centralized education systems in many nation-states, with mathematics as a core componentinitially for its military applications. While the content of courses varies, in the present day nearly all countries teach mathematics to students for significant amounts of time. During school, mathematical capabilities and positive expectations have a strong association with career interest in the field. Extrinsic factors such as feedback motivation by teachers, parents, and peer groups can influence the level of interest in mathematics. Some students studying math may develop an apprehension or fear about their performance in the subject. This is known as math anxiety or math phobia, and is considered the most prominent of the disorders impacting academic performance. Math anxiety can develop due to various factors such as parental and teacher attitudes, social stereotypes, and personal traits. Help to counteract the anxiety can come from changes in instructional approaches, by interactions with parents and teachers, and by tailored treatments for the individual. Psychology (aesthetic, creativity and intuition) The validity of a mathematical theorem relies only on the rigor of its proof, which could theoretically be done automatically by a computer program. This does not mean that there is no place for creativity in a mathematical work. On the contrary, many important mathematical results (theorems) are solutions of problems that other mathematicians failed to solve, and the invention of a way for solving them may be a fundamental way of the solving process. An extreme example is Apery's theorem: Roger Apery provided only the ideas for a proof, and the formal proof was given only several months later by three other mathematicians. Creativity and rigor are not the only psychological aspects of the activity of mathematicians. Some mathematicians can see their activity as a game, more specifically as solving puzzles. This aspect of mathematical activity is emphasized in recreational mathematics. Mathematicians can find an aesthetic value to mathematics. Like beauty, it is hard to define, it is commonly related to elegance, which involves qualities like simplicity, symmetry, completeness, and generality. G. H. Hardy in A Mathematician's Apology expressed the belief that the aesthetic considerations are, in themselves, sufficient to justify the study of pure mathematics. He also identified other criteria such as significance, unexpectedness, and inevitability, which contribute to mathematical aesthetics. Paul Erdős expressed this sentiment more ironically by speaking of "The Book", a supposed divine collection of the most beautiful proofs. The 1998 book Proofs from THE BOOK, inspired by Erdős, is a collection of particularly succinct and revelatory mathematical arguments. Some examples of particularly elegant results included are Euclid's proof that there are infinitely many prime numbers and the fast Fourier transform for harmonic analysis. Some feel that to consider mathematics a science is to downplay its artistry and history in the seven traditional liberal arts. One way this difference of viewpoint plays out is in the philosophical debate as to whether mathematical results are created (as in art) or discovered (as in science). The popularity of recreational mathematics is another sign of the pleasure many find in solving mathematical questions. Cultural impact Artistic expression Notes that sound well together to a Western ear are sounds whose fundamental frequencies of vibration are in simple ratios. For example, an octave doubles the frequency and a perfect fifth multiplies it by . Humans, as well as some other animals, find symmetric patterns to be more beautiful. Mathematically, the symmetries of an object form a group known as the symmetry group. For example, the group underlying mirror symmetry is the cyclic group of two elements, . A Rorschach test is a figure invariant by this symmetry, as are butterfly and animal bodies more generally (at least on the surface). Waves on the sea surface possess translation symmetry: moving one's viewpoint by the distance between wave crests does not change one's view of the sea. Fractals possess self-similarity. Popularization Popular mathematics is the act of presenting mathematics without technical terms. Presenting mathematics may be hard since the general public suffers from mathematical anxiety and mathematical objects are highly abstract. However, popular mathematics writing can overcome this by using applications or cultural links. Despite this, mathematics is rarely the topic of popularization in printed or televised media. Awards and prize problems The most prestigious award in mathematics is the Fields Medal, established in 1936 and awarded every four years (except around World War II) to up to four individuals. It is considered the mathematical equivalent of the Nobel Prize. Other prestigious mathematics awards include: The Abel Prize, instituted in 2002 and first awarded in 2003 The Chern Medal for lifetime achievement, introduced in 2009 and first awarded in 2010 The AMS Leroy P. Steele Prize, awarded since 1970 The Wolf Prize in Mathematics, also for lifetime achievement, instituted in 1978 A famous list of 23 open problems, called "Hilbert's problems", was compiled in 1900 by German mathematician David Hilbert. This list has achieved great celebrity among mathematicians, and at least thirteen of the problems (depending how some are interpreted) have been solved. A new list of seven important problems, titled the "Millennium Prize Problems", was published in 2000. Only one of them, the Riemann hypothesis, duplicates one of Hilbert's problems. A solution to any of these problems carries a 1 million dollar reward. To date, only one of these problems, the Poincaré conjecture, has been solved by the Russian mathematician Grigori Perelman. See also Law (mathematics) List of mathematical jargon Lists of mathematicians Lists of mathematics topics Mathematical constant Mathematical sciences Mathematics and art Mathematics education Philosophy of mathematics Relationship between mathematics and physics Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics References Notes Citations Sources . Further reading Available online (registration required).  – A translated and expanded version of a Soviet mathematics encyclopedia, in ten volumes. Also in paperback and on CD-ROM, and online. . Formal sciences Main topic articles

Problem of universals

The problem of universals is an ancient question from metaphysics that has inspired a range of philosophical topics and disputes: "Should the properties an object has in common with other objects, such as color and shape, be considered to exist beyond those objects? And if a property exists separately from objects, what is the nature of that existence?" The problem of universals relates to various inquiries closely related to metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, as far back as Plato and Aristotle, in efforts to define the mental connections a human makes when they understand a property such as shape or color to be the same in nonidentical objects. Universals are qualities or relations found in two or more entities. As an example, if all cup holders are circular in some way, circularity may be considered a universal property of cup holders. Further, if two daughters can be considered female offspring of Frank, the qualities of being female, offspring, and of Frank, are universal properties of the two daughters. Many properties can be universal: being human, red, male or female, liquid or solid, big or small, etc. Philosophers agree that human beings can talk and think about universals, but disagree on whether universals exist in reality beyond mere thought and speech. Ancient philosophy The problem of universals is considered a central issue in traditional metaphysics and can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle's philosophy, particularly in their attempt to explain the nature and status of forms. These philosophers explored the problem through predication. Plato Plato believed that there was a sharp distinction between the world of perceivable objects and the world of universals or forms (eidos): one can only have mere opinions about the former, but one can have knowledge about the latter. For Plato it was not possible to have knowledge of anything that could change or was particular, since knowledge had to be forever unfailing and general. For that reason, the world of the forms is the real world, like sunlight, while the sensible world is only imperfectly or partially real, like shadows. This Platonic realism, however, in denying that the eternal Forms are mental artifacts, differs sharply with modern forms of idealism. One of the first nominalist critiques of Plato's realism was that of Diogenes of Sinope, who said "I've seen Plato's cups and table, but not his cupness and tableness." Aristotle Plato's student Aristotle disagreed with his tutor. Aristotle transformed Plato's forms into "formal causes", the blueprints or essences of individual things. Whereas Plato idealized geometry, Aristotle emphasized nature and related disciplines and therefore much of his thinking concerns living beings and their properties. The nature of universals in Aristotle's philosophy therefore hinges on his view of natural kinds. Instead of categorizing being according to the structure of thought, he proposed that the categorical analysis be directed upon the structure of the natural world. He used the principle of predication in Categories, where he established that universal terms are involved in a relation of predication if some facts expressed by ordinary sentences hold. In his work On Interpretation, he maintained that the concept of "universal" is apt to be predicated of many and that singular is not. For instance, man is a universal while Callias is a singular. The philosopher distinguished highest genera like animal and species like man but he maintained that both are predicated of individual men. This was considered part of an approach to the principle of things, which adheres to the criterion that what is most universal is also most real. Consider for example a particular oak tree. This is a member of a species and it has much in common with other oak trees, past, present and future. Its universal, its oakness, is a part of it. A biologist can study oak trees and learn about oakness and more generally the intelligible order within the sensible world. Accordingly, Aristotle was more confident than Plato about coming to know the sensible world; he was a prototypical empiricist and a founder of induction. Aristotle was a new, moderate sort of realist about universals. Medieval philosophy Boethius The problem was introduced to the medieval world by Boethius, by his translation of Porphyry's Isagoge. It begins: "I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and subsist about these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation". Boethius, in his commentaries on the aforementioned translation, says that a universal, if it were to exist, has to apply to several particulars entirely. He also specifies that they apply simultaneously at once and not in a temporal succession. He reasons that they cannot be mind-independent, i.e. they do not have a real existence, because a quality cannot be both one thing and common to many particulars in such a way that it forms part of a particular's substance, as it would then be partaking of universality and particularity. However, he also says that universals can't also be of the mind since a mental construct of a quality is an abstraction and understanding of something outside of the mind. He concludes that either this representation is a true understanding of the quality, in which case we revert to the earlier problem faced by those who believe universals are real; or, if the mental abstractions were not a true understanding, then 'what is understood otherwise than the thing is false'. His solution to this problem was to state that the mind is able to separate in thought what is not necessarily separable in reality. He cites the human mind's ability to abstract from concrete particulars as an instance of this. This, according to Boethius, avoids the problem of Platonic universals being out there in the real world, but also the problem of them being purely constructs of the mind in that universals are simply the mind thinking of particulars in an abstract, universal way. His assumption focuses on the problems that language create. Boethius maintained that the structure of language corresponds to the structure of things and that language creates what he regarded as philosophical babble of confused and contradictory accounts of the nature of things. To illustrate his view, suppose that although the mind cannot think of 2 or 4 as an odd number, as this would be a false representation, it can think of an even number that is neither 2 nor 4. Medieval realism Boethius mostly stayed close to Aristotle in his thinking about universals. Realism's biggest proponents in the Middle Ages, however, came to be Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Aquinas argued that both the essence of a thing and its existence were clearly distinct; in this regard he is also Aristotelian. Duns Scotus argues that in a thing there is no real distinction between the essence and the existence; instead, there is only a formal distinction. Scotus believed that universals exist only inside the things that they exemplify, and that they "contract" with the haecceity of the thing to create the individual. As a result of his realist position, he argued strongly against both nominalism and conceptualism, arguing instead for Scotist realism, a medieval response to the conceptualism of Abelard. That is to say, Scotus believed that such properties as 'redness' and 'roundness' exist in reality and are mind-independent entities. Furthermore, Duns Scotus wrote about this problem in his own commentary (Quaestiones) on Porphyry's Isagoge, as Boethius had done. Scotus was interested in how the mind forms universals, and he believed this to be 'caused by the intellect'. This intellect acts on the basis that the nature of, say, 'humanity' that is found in other humans and also that the quality is attributable to other individual humans. Medieval nominalism The opposing view to realism is one called nominalism, which at its strongest maintains that universals are verbal constructs and that they do not inhere in objects or pre-exist them. Therefore, universals in this view are something which are peculiar to human cognition and language. The French philosopher and theologian Roscellinus (1050–1125) was an early, prominent proponent of this view. His particular view was that universals are little more than vocal utterances (voces). William of Ockham (1285–1347) wrote extensively on this topic. He argued strongly that universals are a product of abstract human thought. According to Ockham, universals are just words or concepts (at best) that only exist in the mind and have no real place in the external world. His opposition to universals was not based on his eponymous Razor, but rather he found that regarding them as real was contradictory in some sense. An early work has Ockham stating that 'no thing outside the soul is universal, either through itself or through anything real or rational added on, no matter how it is considered or understood'. Nevertheless, his position did shift away from an outright opposition to accommodating them in his later works such as the Summae Logicae (albeit in a modified way that would not classify him as a complete realist). Modern and contemporary philosophy Hegel The 19th-century German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel discussed the relation of universals and particulars throughout his works. Hegel posited that both exist in a dialectical relationship to one another; that is, one exists only in relation and in reference to the other. He stated the following on the issue: Mill The 19th-century British philosopher John Stuart Mill discussed the problem of universals in the course of a book that eviscerated the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. Mill wrote, "The formation of a concept does not consist in separating the attributes which are said to compose it from all other attributes of the same object and enabling us to conceive those attributes, disjoined from any others. We neither conceive them, nor think them, nor cognize them in any way, as a thing apart, but solely as forming, in combination with numerous other attributes, the idea of an individual object". However, he then proceeds to state that Berkeley's position is factually wrong by stating the following: In other words, we may be "temporarily unconscious" of whether an image is white, black, yellow or purple and concentrate our attention on the fact that it is a man and on just those attributes necessary to identify it as a man (but not as any particular one). It may then have the significance of a universal of manhood. Peirce The 19th-century American logician Charles Sanders Peirce, known as the father of pragmatism, developed his own views on the problem of universals in the course of a review of an edition of the writings of George Berkeley. Peirce begins with the observation that "Berkeley's metaphysical theories have at first sight an air of paradox and levity very unbecoming to a bishop". He includes among these paradoxical doctrines Berkeley's denial of "the possibility of forming the simplest general conception". He wrote that if there is some mental fact that works in practice the way that a universal would, that fact is a universal. "If I have learned a formula in gibberish which in any way jogs my memory so as to enable me in each single case to act as though I had a general idea, what possible utility is there in distinguishing between such a gibberish... and an idea?" Peirce also held as a matter of ontology that what he called "thirdness", the more general facts about the world, are extra-mental realities. James William James learned about pragmatism. Though James certainly agreed with Peirce and against Berkeley that general ideas exist as a psychological fact, he was a nominalist in his ontology: There are at least three ways in which a realist might try to answer James' challenge of explaining the reason why universal conceptions are more lofty than those of particulars: the moral–political answer, the mathematical–scientific answer, and the anti-paradoxical answer. Each has contemporary or near-contemporary advocates. Weaver The moral or political response is given by the conservative philosopher Richard M. Weaver in Ideas Have Consequences (1948), where he describes how the acceptance of "the fateful doctrine of nominalism" was "the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence". Quine The noted American philosopher, W. V. O. Quine addressed the problem of universals throughout his career. In his paper, 'On Universals', from 1947, he states the problem of universals is chiefly understood as being concerned with entities and not the linguistic aspect of naming a universal. He says that Platonists believe that our ability to form general conceptions of things is incomprehensible unless universals exist outside of the mind, whereas nominalists believe that such ideas are 'empty verbalism'. Quine himself does not propose to resolve this particular debate. What he does say however is that certain types of 'discourse' presuppose universals: nominalists therefore must give these up. Quine's approach is therefore more an epistemological one, i.e. what can be known, rather than a metaphysical one, i.e. what is real. Cocchiarella Nino Cocchiarella put forward the idea that realism is the best response to certain logical paradoxes to which nominalism leads ("Nominalism and Conceptualism as Predicative Second Order Theories of Predication", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 21 (1980)). It is noted that in a sense Cocchiarella has adopted Platonism for anti-Platonic reasons. Plato, as seen in the dialogue Parmenides, was willing to accept a certain amount of paradox with his forms. Cocchiarella adopts the forms to avoid paradox. Armstrong The Australian philosopher David Malet Armstrong has been one of the leading realists in the twentieth century, and has used a concept of universals to build a naturalistic and scientifically realist ontology. In both Universals and Scientific Realism (1978) and Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (1989), Armstrong describes the relative merits of a number of nominalist theories which appeal either to "natural classes" (a view he ascribes to Anthony Quinton), concepts, resemblance relations or predicates, and also discusses non-realist "trope" accounts (which he describes in the Universals and Scientific Realism volumes as "particularism"). He gives a number of reasons to reject all of these, but also dismisses a number of realist accounts. Penrose Roger Penrose contends that the foundations of mathematics can't be understood without the Platonic view that "mathematical truth is absolute, external and eternal, and not based on man-made criteria ... mathematical objects have a timeless existence of their own..." Indian philosophy Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (Realist position) Indian philosophers raise the problem of universals in relation to semantics. Universals are postulated as referents for the meanings of general terms. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school conceives of universals as perceptible eternal entities, existing independently of our minds. Nyāya postulates the existence of universals based on our experience of a common characteristic among particulars. Thus, the meaning of a word is understood as a particular further characterized by a universal. For example, the meaning of the term 'cow' refers to a particular cow characterized by the universal of 'cowness'. Nyāya holds that although universals are apprehended differently from particulars, they are not separate, given their inherence in the particulars. Not every term, however, corresponds to a universal. Udāyana puts forward six conditions for identifying genuine universals. Mīmaṃsã (Realist position) Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, Mīmaṃsã characterizes universals as referents for words. The fundamental difference between Bhāṭṭa Mīmaṃsā's and Nyāya is that Bhāṭṭa Mīmaṃsa rejects the Nyāya understanding of the universals' relation of inherence to the particulars. The Hindu philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa argues that if inherence is different from the terms of the relation, it would continuously require another common relation, and if the inherence is non-different, it would be superfluous. Buddhist Nominalism Buddhist ontology regards the world as consisting of momentary particulars and mentally constructed universals. In contrast to the realist schools of Indian philosophy, Buddhist logicians put forward a positive theory of nominalism, known as the apoha theory, which denies the existence of universals. The apoha theory identifies particulars through double negation, not requiring for a general shared essence between terms. For instance, the term 'cow' can be understood as referring to every entity of its exclusion class 'non-cow'. Positions There are many philosophical positions regarding universals. Platonic realism (also called extreme realism" or exaggerated realism) is the view that universals or forms in this sense, are the causal explanation behind the notion of what things exactly are; (the view that universals are real entities existing independent of particulars). Aristotelian realism (also called strong realism or moderate realism) is the rejection of extreme realism. This position establishes the view of a universal as being that of the quality within a thing and every other thing individual to it; (the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them). Anti-realism is the objection to both positions. Anti-realism is divided into two subcategories; (1) Nominalism and (2) Conceptualism. Taking "beauty" as example, each of these positions will state the following: Beauty is a property that exists in an ideal form independently of any mind or description. Beauty is a property that exists only when beautiful things exist. Beauty is a property constructed in the mind, so exists only in descriptions of things. Realism The school of realism makes the claim that universals are real and that they exist distinctly, apart from the particulars that instantiate them. Two major forms of metaphysical realism are Platonic realism (universalia ante res), meaning "'universals before things'" and Aristotelian realism (universalia in rebus), meaning "'universals in things'". Platonic realism is the view that universals are real entities existing independent of particulars. Aristotelian realism, on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them. Realists tend to argue that universals must be posited as distinct entities in order to account for various phenomena. A common realist argument said to be found in Plato's writings, is that universals are required for certain general words to have meaning and for the sentences in which they occur to be true or false. Take the sentence "Djivan Gasparyan is a musician" for instance. The realist may claim that this sentence is only meaningful and expresses a truth because there is an individual, Djivan Gasparyan, who possesses a certain quality: musicianship. Therefore, it is assumed that the property is a universal which is distinct from the particular individual who has the property. Nominalism Nominalists assert that only individuals or particulars exist and deny that universals are real (i.e. that they exist as entities or beings; universalia post res). The term "nominalism" comes from the Latin nomen ("name"). Four major forms of nominalism are predicate nominalism, resemblance nominalism, trope nominalism, and conceptualism. One with a nominalist view claims that we predicate the same property of/to multiple entities, but argues that the entities only share a name and do not have a real quality in common. Nominalists often argue this view by claiming that nominalism can account for all the relevant phenomena, and therefore—by Occam's razor, and its principle of simplicity—nominalism is preferable, since it posits fewer entities. Different variants and versions of nominalism have been endorsed or defended by many, including Chrysippus, Ibn Taymiyyah, William of Ockham, Ibn Khaldun, Rudolf Carnap, Nelson Goodman, David Lewis, H. H. Price, and D. C. Williams. Conceptualism Conceptualism is a position that is meshed between realism and nominalism. Conceptualists believe that universals can indeed be real, but only existing as concepts within the mind. Conceptualists argue that the "concept" of universals are not mere "inventions but are reflections of similarities among particular things themselves." For example, the concept of 'man' ultimately reflects a similarity amongst Socrates and Kant. See also Abstract and concrete Bundle theory Constructor theory Non-physical entity, an object that exists outside physical reality Object (philosophy) Qualia Philosophical realism Reification (fallacy), a fallacy of ambiguity when an abstraction is treated as if it were a physical entity Self Similarity (philosophy) Transcendental nominalism Tianxia Ubuntu philosophy Fallacy of composition Notes References and further reading Historical studies Klima, Gyula (2008). "The Medieval Problem of Universals", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) Pinzani, Roberto (2018). The Problem of Universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury, Leiden: Brill. Spade, Paul Vincent. (1994, ed., transl.), "Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham", Hackett Pub Co Inc. Contemporary studies Armstrong, David (1989). Universals, Westview Press. Bacon, John (2008). "Tropes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) Cocchiarella, Nino (1975). "Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic", Synthese. Feldman, Fred (2005). "The Open Question Argument: What It Isn't; and What It Is", Philosophical Issues vol. 15. The Open Question Argument: What it Isn’t; and What it Is 1 Lewis, David (1983). "New Work for a Theory of Universals", Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Loux, Michael J. (1998). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, N.Y.: Routledge. Loux, Michael J. (2001). "The Problem of Universals" in Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Michael J. Loux (ed.), N.Y.: Routledge, pp. 3–13. MacLeod, M. & Rubenstein, E. (2006). "Universals", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.). (link) Moreland, JP. (2001). "Universals." Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Price, H. H. (1953). "Universals and Resemblance", Ch. 1 of Thinking and Experience, Hutchinson's University Library. Quine, W. V. O. (1961). "On What There is," in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd/ed. N.Y: Harper and Row. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2008). "Nominalism in Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) Russell, Bertrand (1912). "The World of Universals," in The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. Swoyer, Chris (2000). "Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) Williams, D. C. (1953). "On the Elements of Being", Review of Metaphysics, vol. 17. External links Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Universals The Problem of Universals in Antiquity and the Middle Ages with an annotated bibliography The Catholic Encyclopedia on Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism The Friesian School on Universals Cognition Substance theory Concepts in metaphysics Universals

Aletheia

Aletheia or Alethia (; ) is truth or disclosure in philosophy. Originating in Ancient Greek philosophy, the term was explicitly used for the first time in the history of philosophy by Parmenides in his poem On Nature, in which he contrasts it with doxa. It was revived in the works of 20th-century philosopher Martin Heidegger. Although often translated as "truth", Heidegger argued that it is distinct from common conceptions of truth. Antiquity is variously translated as "unconcealedness", "disclosure", "revealing", or "unclosedness". The literal meaning of the word is "the state of not being hidden; the state of being evident." It also means "reality". It is the antonym of , which literally means "forgetting", "forgetfulness". In Greek mythology, was personified as a Greek goddess, Aletheia, the goddess of Truth. She was a daughter of Zeus. Her Roman equivalent is Veritas. Heidegger and aletheia In the early to mid 20th-century, Martin Heidegger brought renewed attention to the concept of aletheia, by relating it to the notion of disclosure, or the way in which things appear as entities in the world. While he initially referred to aletheia as "truth", specifically a form that is pre-Socratic in origin, Heidegger eventually corrected this interpretation, writing: Heidegger gave an etymological analysis of aletheia and drew out an understanding of the term as "unconcealedness". Thus, aletheia is distinct from conceptions of truth understood as statements which accurately describe a state of affairs (correspondence), or statements which fit properly into a system taken as a whole (coherence). Instead, Heidegger focused on the elucidation of how an ontological "world" is disclosed, or opened up, in which things are made intelligible for human beings in the first place, as part of a holistically structured background of meaning. Heidegger began his discourse on the reappropriation of aletheia in his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), and expanded on the concept in his Introduction to Metaphysics. For more on his understanding of aletheia, see Poetry, Language, Thought, in particular the essay entitled The Origin of the Work of Art, which describes the value of the work of art as a means to open a "clearing" for the appearance of things in the world, or to disclose their meaning for human beings. Heidegger revised his views on aletheia as truth, after nearly forty years, in the essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in On Time and Being. See also References Further reading External links Aletheia and Other Terms for Truth in Ancient Greek Pre-Philosophical Conceptions of Truth: Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Alexandrine Poets, Thucydides Martin Heidegger on Aletheia (Truth) as Unconcealment Concepts in metaphysics Martin Heidegger Truth Personifications in Greek mythology

Polymath

A polymath (; ) or polyhistor is an individual whose knowledge spans many different subjects, known to draw on complex bodies of knowledge to solve specific problems. Embodying a basic tenet of Renaissance humanism that humans are limitless in their capacity for development, the concept led to the notion that people should embrace all knowledge and develop their capacities as fully as possible. This is expressed in the term Renaissance man, often applied to the gifted people of that age who sought to develop their abilities in all areas of accomplishment: intellectual, artistic, social, physical, and spiritual. Etymology In Western Europe, the first work to use the term polymathy in its title was published in 1603 by Johann von Wowern, a Hamburg philosopher. Von Wowern defined polymathy as "knowledge of various matters, drawn from all kinds of studies ... ranging freely through all the fields of the disciplines, as far as the human mind, with unwearied industry, is able to pursue them". Von Wowern lists erudition, literature, philology, philomathy, and polyhistory as synonyms. The earliest recorded use of the term in the English language is from 1624, in the second edition of The Anatomy of Melancholy by Robert Burton; the form polymathist is slightly older, first appearing in the Diatribae upon the first part of the late History of Tithes of Richard Montagu in 1621. Use in English of the similar term polyhistor dates from the late 16th century. Renaissance man The term "Renaissance man" was first recorded in written English in the early 20th century. It is used to refer to great thinkers living before, during, or after the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci has often been described as the archetype of the Renaissance man, a man of "unquenchable curiosity" and "feverishly inventive imagination". Many notable polymaths lived during the Renaissance period, a cultural movement that spanned roughly the 14th through to the 17th century that began in Italy in the Late Middle Ages and later spread to the rest of Europe. These polymaths had a rounded approach to education that reflected the ideals of the humanists of the time. A gentleman or courtier of that era was expected to speak several languages, play a musical instrument, write poetry, and so on, thus fulfilling the Renaissance ideal. The idea of a universal education was essential to achieving polymath ability, hence the word university was used to describe a seat of learning. However, the original Latin word refers in general to "a number of persons associated into one body, a society, company, community, guild, corporation, etc". At this time, universities did not specialize in specific areas, but rather trained students in a broad array of science, philosophy, and theology. This universal education gave them a grounding from which they could continue into apprenticeship toward becoming a master of a specific field. When someone is called a "Renaissance man" today, it is meant that rather than simply having broad interests or superficial knowledge in several fields, the individual possesses a more profound knowledge and a proficiency, or even an expertise, in at least some of those fields. Some dictionaries use the term "Renaissance man" to describe someone with many interests or talents, while others give a meaning restricted to the Renaissance and more closely related to Renaissance ideals. In academia Robert Root-Bernstein and colleagues Robert Root-Bernstein is considered the principal responsible for rekindling interest in polymathy in the scientific community. His works emphasize the contrast between the polymath and two other types: the specialist and the dilettante. The specialist demonstrates depth but lacks breadth of knowledge. The dilettante demonstrates superficial breadth but tends to acquire skills merely "for their own sake without regard to understanding the broader applications or implications and without integrating it". Conversely, the polymath is a person with a level of expertise that is able to "put a significant amount of time and effort into their avocations and find ways to use their multiple interests to inform their vocations". A key point in the work of Root-Bernstein and colleagues is the argument in favor of the universality of the creative process. That is, although creative products, such as a painting, a mathematical model or a poem, can be domain-specific, at the level of the creative process, the mental tools that lead to the generation of creative ideas are the same, be it in the arts or science. These mental tools are sometimes called intuitive tools of thinking. It is therefore not surprising that many of the most innovative scientists have serious hobbies or interests in artistic activities, and that some of the most innovative artists have an interest or hobbies in the sciences. Root-Bernstein and colleagues' research is an important counterpoint to the claim by some psychologists that creativity is a domain-specific phenomenon. Through their research, Root-Bernstein and colleagues conclude that there are certain comprehensive thinking skills and tools that cross the barrier of different domains and can foster creative thinking: "[creativity researchers] who discuss integrating ideas from diverse fields as the basis of creative giftedness ask not 'who is creative?' but 'what is the basis of creative thinking?' From the polymathy perspective, giftedness is the ability to combine disparate (or even apparently contradictory) ideas, sets of problems, skills, talents, and knowledge in novel and useful ways. Polymathy is therefore the main source of any individual's creative potential". In "Life Stages of Creativity", Robert and Michèle Root-Bernstein suggest six typologies of creative life stages. These typologies are based on real creative production records first published by Root-Bernstein, Bernstein, and Garnier (1993). Type 1 represents people who specialize in developing one major talent early in life (e.g., prodigies) and successfully exploit that talent exclusively for the rest of their lives. Type 2 individuals explore a range of different creative activities (e.g., through worldplay or a variety of hobbies) and then settle on exploiting one of these for the rest of their lives. Type 3 people are polymathic from the outset and manage to juggle multiple careers simultaneously so that their creativity pattern is constantly varied. Type 4 creators are recognized early for one major talent (e.g., math or music) but go on to explore additional creative outlets, diversifying their productivity with age. Type 5 creators devote themselves serially to one creative field after another. Type 6 people develop diversified creative skills early and then, like Type 5 individuals, explore these serially, one at a time. Finally, his studies suggest that understanding polymathy and learning from polymathic exemplars can help structure a new model of education that better promotes creativity and innovation: "we must focus education on principles, methods, and skills that will serve them [students] in learning and creating across many disciplines, multiple careers, and succeeding life stages". Peter Burke Peter Burke, Professor Emeritus of Cultural History and Fellow of Emmanuel College at Cambridge, discussed the theme of polymathy in some of his works. He has presented a comprehensive historical overview of the ascension and decline of the polymath as, what he calls, an "intellectual species". He observes that in ancient and medieval times, scholars did not have to specialize. However, from the 17th century on, the rapid rise of new knowledge in the Western world—both from the systematic investigation of the natural world and from the flow of information coming from other parts of the world—was making it increasingly difficult for individual scholars to master as many disciplines as before. Thus, an intellectual retreat of the polymath species occurred: "from knowledge in every [academic] field to knowledge in several fields, and from making original contributions in many fields to a more passive consumption of what has been contributed by others". Given this change in the intellectual climate, it has since then been more common to find "passive polymaths", who consume knowledge in various domains but make their reputation in one single discipline, than "proper polymaths", who—through a feat of "intellectual heroism"—manage to make serious contributions to several disciplines. However, Burke warns that in the age of specialization, polymathic people are more necessary than ever, both for synthesis—to paint the big picture—and for analysis. He says: "It takes a polymath to 'mind the gap' and draw attention to the knowledges that may otherwise disappear into the spaces between disciplines, as they are currently defined and organized". Bharath Sriraman Bharath Sriraman, of the University of Montana, also investigated the role of polymathy in education. He poses that an ideal education should nurture talent in the classroom and enable individuals to pursue multiple fields of research and appreciate both the aesthetic and structural/scientific connections between mathematics, arts and the sciences. In 2009, Sriraman published a paper reporting a 3-year study with 120 pre-service mathematics teachers and derived several implications for mathematics pre-service education as well as interdisciplinary education. He utilized a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to recreate the emotions, voices and struggles of students as they tried to unravel Russell's paradox presented in its linguistic form. They found that those more engaged in solving the paradox also displayed more polymathic thinking traits. He concludes by suggesting that fostering polymathy in the classroom may help students change beliefs, discover structures and open new avenues for interdisciplinary pedagogy. Michael Araki Michael Araki is a professor at the UNSW Business School at the University of New South Wales, Australia. He sought to formalize in a general model how the development of polymathy takes place. His Developmental Model of Polymathy (DMP) is presented in a 2018 article with two main objectives: organize the elements involved in the process of polymathy development into a structure of relationships that is wed to the approach of polymathy as a life project, and; provide an articulation with other well-developed constructs, theories, and models, especially from the fields of giftedness and education. The model, which was designed to reflect a structural model, has five major components: polymathic antecedents polymathic mediators polymathic achievements intrapersonal moderators environmental moderators Regarding the definition of the term polymathy, the researcher, through an analysis of the extant literature, concluded that although there are a multitude of perspectives on polymathy, most of them ascertain that polymathy entails three core elements: breadth, depth and integration. Breadth refers to comprehensiveness, extension and diversity of knowledge. It is contrasted with the idea of narrowness, specialization, and the restriction of one's expertise to a limited domain. The possession of comprehensive knowledge at very disparate areas is a hallmark of the greatest polymaths. Depth refers to the vertical accumulation of knowledge and the degree of elaboration or sophistication of one's sets of one's conceptual network. Like Robert Root-Bernstein, Araki uses the concept of dilettancy as a contrast to the idea of profound learning that polymathy entails. Integration, although not explicit in most definitions of polymathy, is also a core component of polymathy according to the author. Integration involves the capacity of connecting, articulating, concatenating or synthesizing different conceptual networks, which in non-polymathic persons might be segregated. In addition, integration can happen at the personality level, when the person is able to integrate their diverse activities in a synergic whole, which can also mean a psychic (motivational, emotional and cognitive) integration. Finally, the author also suggests that, via a psychoeconomic approach, polymathy can be seen as a "life project". That is, depending on a person's temperament, endowments, personality, social situation and opportunities (or lack thereof), the project of a polymathic self-formation may present itself to the person as more or less alluring and more or less feasible to be pursued. Kaufman, Beghetto and colleagues James C. Kaufman, from the Neag School of Education at the University of Connecticut, and Ronald A. Beghetto, from the same university, investigated the possibility that everyone could have the potential for polymathy as well as the issue of the domain-generality or domain-specificity of creativity. Based on their earlier four-c model of creativity, Beghetto and Kaufman proposed a typology of polymathy, ranging from the ubiquitous mini-c polymathy to the eminent but rare Big-C polymathy, as well as a model with some requirements for a person (polymath or not) to be able to reach the highest levels of creative accomplishment. They account for three general requirements—intelligence, motivation to be creative, and an environment that allows creative expression—that are needed for any attempt at creativity to succeed. Then, depending on the domain of choice, more specific abilities will be required. The more that one's abilities and interests match the requirements of a domain, the better. While some will develop their specific skills and motivations for specific domains, polymathic people will display intrinsic motivation (and the ability) to pursue a variety of subject matters across different domains. Regarding the interplay of polymathy and education, they suggest that rather than asking whether every student has multicreative potential, educators might more actively nurture the multicreative potential of their students. As an example, the authors cite that teachers should encourage students to make connections across disciplines, use different forms of media to express their reasoning/understanding (e.g., drawings, movies, and other forms of visual media). Waqas Ahmed In his 2018 book The Polymath, British author Waqas Ahmed defines polymaths as those who have made significant contributions to at least three different fields. Rather than seeing polymaths as exceptionally gifted, he argues that every human being has the potential to become one: that people naturally have multiple interests and talents. He contrasts this polymathic nature against what he calls "the cult of specialisation". For example, education systems stifle this nature by forcing learners to specialise in narrow topics. The book argues that specialisation encouraged by the production lines of the Industrial Revolution is counter-productive both to the individual and wider society. It suggests that the complex problems of the 21st century need the versatility, creativity, and broad perspectives characteristic of polymaths. For individuals, Ahmed says, specialisation is dehumanising and stifles their full range of expression whereas polymathy "is a powerful means to social and intellectual emancipation" which enables a more fulfilling life. In terms of social progress, he argues that answers to specific problems often come from combining knowledge and skills from multiple areas, and that many important problems are multi-dimensional in nature and cannot be fully understood through one specialism. Rather than interpreting polymathy as a mix of occupations or of intellectual interests, Ahmed urges a breaking of the "thinker"/"doer" dichotomy and the art/science dichotomy. He argues that an orientation towards action and towards thinking support each other, and that human beings flourish by pursuing a diversity of experiences as well as a diversity of knowledge. He observes that successful people in many fields have cited hobbies and other "peripheral" activities as supplying skills or insights that helped them succeed. Ahmed examines evidence suggesting that developing multiple talents and perspectives is helpful for success in a highly specialised field. He cites a study of Nobel Prize-winning scientists which found them 25 times more likely to sing, dance, or act than average scientists. Another study found that children scored higher in IQ tests after having drum lessons, and he uses such research to argue that diversity of domains can enhance a person's general intelligence. Ahmed cites many historical claims for the advantages of polymathy. Some of these are about general intellectual abilities that polymaths apply across multiple domains. For example, Aristotle wrote that full understanding of a topic requires, in addition to subject knowledge, a general critical thinking ability that can assess how that knowledge was arrived at. Another advantage of a polymathic mindset is in the application of multiple approaches to understanding a single issue. Ahmed cites biologist E. O. Wilson's view that reality is approached not by a single academic discipline but via a consilience between them. One argument for studying multiple approaches is that it leads to open-mindedness. Within any one perspective, a question may seem to have a straightforward, settled answer. Someone aware of different, contrasting answers will be more open-minded and aware of the limitations of their own knowledge. The importance of recognising these limitations is a theme that Ahmed finds in many thinkers, including Confucius, Ali ibn Abi Talib, and Nicolas of Cusa. He calls it "the essential mark of the polymath." A further argument for multiple approaches is that a polymath does not see diverse approaches as diverse, because they see connections where other people see differences. For example da Vinci advanced multiple fields by applying mathematical principles to each. Related terms Aside from Renaissance man, similar terms in use are (Latin) and (Italian), which translate to 'universal man'. The related term generalist—contrasted with a specialist—is used to describe a person with a general approach to knowledge. The term universal genius or versatile genius is also used, with Leonardo da Vinci as the prime example again. The term is used especially for people who made lasting contributions in at least one of the fields in which they were actively involved and when they took a universality of approach. When a person is described as having encyclopedic knowledge, they exhibit a vast scope of knowledge. However, this designation may be anachronistic in the case of persons such as Eratosthenes, whose reputation for having encyclopedic knowledge predates the existence of any encyclopedic object. See also Amateur Competent man Creative class Genius Interdisciplinarity Jack of all trades, master of none Multipotentiality Opsimath Philomath Polyglotism Polygraph (author) Polymatheia – a muse of knowledge in Greek mythology References and notes Further reading Edmonds, David (August 2017). Does the world need polymaths? , BBC. Frost, Martin, "Polymath: A Renaissance Man". Grafton, A, "The World of the Polyhistors: Humanism and Encyclopedism", Central European History, 18: 31–47. (1985). Jaumann, Herbert, "Was ist ein Polyhistor? Gehversuche auf einem verlassenen Terrain", Studia Leibnitiana, 22: 76–89. (1990) . Mirchandani, Vinnie, "The New Polymath: Profiles in Compound-Technology Innovations" , John Wiley & Sons. (2010). Twigger, Robert, "Anyone can be a Polymath" We live in a one-track world, but anyone can become a polymath Aeon Essays. Waquet, F, (ed.) "Mapping the World of Learning: The 'Polyhistor' of Daniel Georg Morhof" (2000) ISBN 978-3447043991. Brown, Vincent Polymath-Info Portal . Age of Enlightenment Giftedness Renaissance

Animal rights

Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals have moral worth independent of their utility to humans, and that their most basic interests—such as avoiding suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings. Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare. Many advocates of animal rights oppose the assignment of moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone. They consider this idea, known as speciesism, a prejudice as irrational as any other. They maintain that animals should not be viewed as property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or beasts of burden merely because they are not human. Multiple cultural traditions around the world such as Jainism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto and Animism also espouse forms of animal rights. In parallel to the debate about moral rights, law schools in North America now often teach animal law, and several legal scholars, such as Steven M. Wise and Gary L. Francione, support the extension of basic legal rights and personhood to non-human animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are hominids. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than on sentience alone. , 29 countries had enacted bans on hominoid experimentation; Argentina has granted captive orangutans basic human rights since 2014. Outside of primates, animal-rights discussions most often address the status of mammals (compare charismatic megafauna). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—insects relatively little (outside Jainism) and animal-like bacteria hardly any. The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights. Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights. Another argument, associated with the utilitarian tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably. Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of fur farms and of animal laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front, have attracted criticism, including from within the animal-rights movement itself, and prompted the U.S. Congress to enact laws, including the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as terrorism. History The concept of moral rights for animals dates to Ancient India, with roots in early Jain and Hindu history, while Eastern, African, and Indigenous peoples also have rich traditions of animal protection. In the Western world, Aristotle viewed animals as lacking reason and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment. Major religious traditions, chiefly Indian or Dharmic religions, opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like Descartes saw animals as unconscious automata and Kant denied direct duties to animals, Jeremy Bentham emphasized their capacity to suffer. The publications of Charles Darwin eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals. Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering. The anti-vivisection movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, driven significantly by women. From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships. In religion For some the basis of animal rights is in religion or animal worship (or in general nature worship), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered unclean. Hindu and Buddhist societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE. One of the most important sanctions of the Jain, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ahimsa, or refraining from the destruction of life. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings. The Dharmic interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being. These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the Tolkāppiyam and Tirukkural, which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings. In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the Sharia. This recognition is based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. Muhammad forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights. Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals. According to Christianity, all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. According to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things." It further says God "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry." Philosophical and legal approaches Overview The two main philosophical approaches to animal ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by Peter Singer, and the latter by Tom Regan and Gary Francione. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle behind the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts we should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse outcome. There are a number of positions that can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the capabilities approach, represented by Martha Nussbaum, and the egalitarian approach, which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and Peter Vallentyne. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their environment, company, play, and physical health. Stephen R. L. Clark, Mary Midgley, and Bernard Rollin also discuss animal rights in terms of animals being permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind. Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness among all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more important than those of the better off. Another approach, virtue ethics, holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the actor, and what kind of moral agents we should be. Rosalind Hursthouse has suggested an approach to animal rights based on virtue ethics. Mark Rowlands has proposed a contractarian approach. Utilitarianism Nussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory. The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton University. Singer is not a rights theorist, but He is a preference utilitarian, meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected. His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration. Singer quotes the English philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other." Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer. Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. Bernard Rollin, professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes's influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain. Scientific publications have made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans or to remember the suffering as vividly. The ability of animals to suffer, even it may vary in severity, is the basis for Singer's application of equal consideration. The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals have no language. Singer writes that, if language were needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though we can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the pain behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans. Subjects-of-a-life Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights. He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients". Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "intrinsic value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life. He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify: Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict Kantian ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves. Abolitionism Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers Law School in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals need only one right, the right not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that paradigm shift. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries there are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law only requires that any suffering not be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal's interests are weighed against the interests of human beings, and the latter almost always prevail. Francione's Animals, Property, and the Law (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of slaves in the United States, where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable. He offers as an example the United States Animal Welfare Act, which he describes as an example of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public concern about the treatment of animals, but difficult to implement. He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the "new welfarists", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States. Contractarianism Mark Rowlands, professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the original position and the veil of ignorance—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form. The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property similar to characteristics including race, sex and intelligence. Prima facie rights theory American philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of prima facie rights. In a philosophical context, a prima facie (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, Lawrence Hinman characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation". The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of prima facie rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing: In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought not to, have uninfringible rights against humans. Feminism and animal rights Women have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century. The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingsford, Lizzy Lind af Hageby and Caroline Earle White (1833–1916). Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900. The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest animal rights demonstration held until then in the United States—most of the participants were women, but most of the platform speakers were men. Nevertheless, several influential animal advocacy groups have been founded by women, including the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection by Cobbe in London in 1898; the Animal Welfare Board of India by Rukmini Devi Arundale in 1962; and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, co-founded by Ingrid Newkirk in 1980. In the Netherlands, Marianne Thieme and Esther Ouwehand were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals. The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights, such as feminism and vegetarianism or veganism, the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an association that several feminist writers have embraced. Lori Gruen writes that women and animals serve the same symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "Other". When the British feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Thomas Taylor (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended as reductio ad absurdum. In her works The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (1990) and The Pornography of Meat (2004), Carol J. Adams focuses in particular on what she argues are the links between the oppression of women and that of non-human animals. Transhumanism Some transhumanists argue for animal rights, liberation, and "uplift" of animal consciousness into machines. Transhumanism also understands animal rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious artificial intelligences (posthuman rights). Socialism and anti-capitalism According to sociologist David Nibert of Wittenberg University, the struggle for animal liberation must happen in tandem with a more generalized struggle against human oppression and exploitation under global capitalism. He says that under a more egalitarian democratic socialist system, one that would "allow a more just and peaceful order to emerge" and be "characterized by economic democracy and a democratically controlled state and mass media", there would be "much greater potential to inform the public about vital global issues—and the potential for "campaigns to improve the lives of other animals" to be "more abolitionist in nature." Philosopher Steven Best of the University of Texas at El Paso states that the animal liberation movement, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front and its various offshoots, "is a significant threat to global capital." Critics R. G. Frey R. G. Frey, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian. In his early work, Interests and Rights (1980), Frey disagreed with Singer—who wrote in Animal Liberation (1975) that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given equal consideration when judging the consequences of an act—on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no desire can exist without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the ability to hold a second-order belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences." Carl Cohen Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general. Richard Posner Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer. Posner posits that his moral intuition tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog." Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues: Roger Scruton Roger Scruton, the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species. He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" anthropomorphism, attributing traits to animals that are, he says, Beatrix Potter-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argued, a fantasy, a world of escape. Scruton singled out Peter Singer, a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer's works, including Animal Liberation, "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction between persons and animals." Tom Regan countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients. Public attitudes According to a paper published in 2000 by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes towards animal rights have tended to suffer from small sample sizes and non-representative groups. However, a number of factors appear to correlate with the attitude of individuals regarding the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There has also been evidence to suggest that prior experience with pets may be a factor in people's attitudes. According to some studies, women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men. A 1996 study suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards feminism and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women. A common misconception on the concept of animal rights is that its proponents want to grant non-human animals the exact same legal rights as humans, such as the right to vote. This is not the case, as the concept is that animals should have rights with equal consideration to their interests (for example, cats do not have any interest in voting, so they should not have the right to vote). A 2016 study found that support for animal testing may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales, and more open debate is warranted. A 2007 survey to examine whether or not people who believed in evolution were more likely to support animal rights than creationists and believers in intelligent design found that this was largely the case—according to the researchers, the respondents who were strong Christian fundamentalists and believers in creationism were less likely to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous research, such as a 1992 study which found that 48% of animal rights activists were atheists or agnostic. A 2019 study in The Washington Post found that those who have positive attitudes toward animal rights also tend to have a positive view of universal healthcare, favor reducing discrimination against African Americans, the LGBT community and undocumented immigrants, and expanding welfare to aid the poor. Two surveys found that attitudes towards animal rights tactics, such as direct action, are very diverse within the animal rights communities. Near half (50% and 39% in two surveys) of activists do not support direct action. One survey concluded "it would be a mistake to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous." Even though around 90% of US adults regularly consume meat, almost half of them appear to support a ban on slaughterhouses: in Sentience Institute's 2017 survey of 1,094 U.S. adults' attitudes toward animal farming, 49% "support a ban on factory farming, 47% support a ban on slaughterhouses, and 33% support a ban on animal farming". The 2017 survey was replicated by researchers at the Oklahoma State University, who found similar results: 73% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Were you aware that slaughterhouses are where livestock are killed and processed into meat, such that, without them, you would not be able to consume meat?" In the U.S., many public protest slaughters were held in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the National Farmers Organization. Protesting low prices for meat, farmers killed their animals in front of media representatives. The carcasses were wasted and not eaten. This effort backfired because it angered television audiences to see animals needlessly and wastefully killed. See also Animal cognition Animal consciousness Animal–industrial complex Animal liberation Animal liberation movement Animal liberationist Animal rights by country or territory Animal studies Animal suffering Animal trial Animal Welfare Institute Antinaturalism (politics) Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness Chick culling Cruelty to animals Critical animal studies Deep ecology Do Animals Have Rights? (book) List of animal rights advocates List of songs about animal rights Moral circle expansion Non-human electoral candidate Open rescue Plant rights Sentientism Timeline of animal welfare and rights Wild animal suffering World Animal Day References Bibliography Books and papers are cited in short form in the footnotes, with full citations here. News and other sources are cited in full in the footnotes. Benthall, Jonathan (2007). "Animal liberation and rights", Anthropology Today, volume 23, issue 2, April. Bentham, Jeremy (1781). Principles of Penal Law. Beauchamp, Tom (2009). "The Moral Standing of Animals", in Marc Bekoff. Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood. Beauchamp, Tom (2011a). "Introduction," in Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. Beauchamp, Tom (2011b). "Rights Theory and Animal Rights," in Beauchamp and Frey, op cit. Clark, Stephen R. L. (1977). The Moral Status of Animals. Oxford University Press. Cohen, Carl (1986). "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research" , New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 315, issue 14, October, pp. 865–870. Cohen, Carl and Regan, Tom (2001). The Animal Rights Debate. Rowman & Littlefield. Craig, Edward (ed.) (1988). "Deontological Ethics" and "Consequentalism." Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. DeGrazia, David (2002). Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Donovan, Josephine (1993). "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," in Greta Gaard. Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature. Temple University Press. Francione, Gary (1996). Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Temple University Press. Francione, Gary (1995). Animals, Property, and the Law. Temple University Press. Francione, Gary (2008). Animals as Persons. Columbia University Press. Francione, Gary and Garner, Robert (2010). The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition Or Regulation? Columbia University Press. Fellenz, Mark R. (2007). The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights. University of Illinois Press. Frey, R.G. (1980). Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals. Clarendon Press. Frey, R.G. (1989). "Why Animals Lack Beliefs and Desires," in Peter Singer and Tom Regan (eds.). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Prentice Hall. Garner, Robert (2004). Animals, Politics and Morality. Manchester University Press. Garner, Robert (2005). The Political Theory of Animals Rights. Manchester University Press. Giannelli, Michael A. (1985). "Three Blind Mice, See How They Run: A Critique of Behavioral Research With Animals". In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (eds.), Advances in Animal Welfare Science 1985/1986 (pp. 109–164). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States Gruen, Lori (1993). "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals", in Greta Gaard. Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature. Temple University Press. Griffin, Donald (1984). Animal Thinking. Harvard University Press. Horta, Oscar (2010). "What Is Speciesism?", The Journal of Environmental and Agricultural Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 3, June, pp. 243–266. Hursthouse, Rosalind (2000a). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press. Hursthouse, Rosalind (2000b). Ethics, Humans and Other Animals. Routledge. Jakopovich, Daniel (2021). "The UK's Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill Excludes the Vast Majority of Animals: Why We Must Expand Our Moral Circle to Include Invertebrates" , Animals & Society Research Initiative, University of Victoria, Canada. Kant, Immanuel (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Kean, Hilda (1995). "The 'Smooth Cool Men of Science': The Feminist and Socialist Response to Vivisection" , History Workshop Journal, No. 40 (Autumn), pp. 16–38. Lansbury, Coral (1985). The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England. University of Wisconsin Press. Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon (1997). Law Relating to Animals. Cavendish Publishing. Leneman, Leah (1999). "No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909–1944," Society and Animals, 7, 1–5. Locke, John (1693). Some Thoughts Concerning Education. MacKinnon, Catharine A. (2004). "Of Mice and Men," in Nussbaum and Sunstein, op cit. Mason, Peter (1997). The Brown Dog Affair. Two Sevens Publishing. Midgley, Mary (1984). Animals and Why They Matter. University of Georgia Press. Molland, Neil (2004). "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best and Nocella, op cit. Monaghan, Rachael (2000). "Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights," in Taylor, Maxwell and Horgan, John. The Future of Terrorism. Routledge. Murray, L. (2006). "The ASPCA–Pioneers in Animal Welfare" , Encyclopædia Britannica's Advocacy for Animals. Nash, Roderick (1989). The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics. University of Wisconsin Press. Newkirk, Ingrid (2004). "The ALF: Who, Why, and What?", in Steven Best and Anthony Nocella. (eds).Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Lantern 2004. Nussbaum, Martha (2004). "Beyond Compassion and Humanity: Justice for Nonhuman Animals", in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds.). Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Belknap Press. Posner, Richard and Singer, Peter (June 15, 2001). Posner-Singer debate , Slate. Posner, Richard and Singer, Peter (2004). "Animal rights" in Sunstein and Nussbaum, op cit. Rachels, James (2009). "Darwin, Charles," in Bekoff, op cit. Redclift, Michael R. (2010). The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology. Edward Elgar Publishing. Regan, Tom (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press. Regan, Tom (2001). Defending Animal Rights. University of Illinois Press. Rollin, Bernard (1981). Animal Rights and Human Morality. Prometheus Books. Rollin, Bernard (1989). The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. New York: Oxford University Press. Rollin, Bernard (2007). "Animal research: a moral science" , Nature, EMBO Reports 8, 6, pp. 521–525. Rowlands, Mark (2009) [1998]. Animal Rights. A Defense. Palgrave Macmillan. Ryder, Richard (2000) [1989]. Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism. Berg. Sapontzis, Steve (1985). "Moral Community and Animal Rights" , American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July), pp. 251–257. Scruton, Roger (1998). Animal Rights and Wrongs. Claridge Press. Scruton, Roger (2000). "Animal Rights" , City Journal, summer. Singer, Peter (April 5, 1973). "Animal liberation" , The New York Review of Books, Volume 20, Number 5. Singer, Peter (1990) [1975]. Animal Liberation. New York Review Books. Singer, Peter (2000) [1998]. Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Singer, Peter (2003). "Animal liberation at 30" , The New York Review of Books, vol 50, no. 8, May 15. Singer, Peter (2004). "Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond Instincts," in Sunstein and Nussbaum, op cit. Singer, Peter (2011) [1979]. Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press. Sprigge, T.L.S. (1981) "Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals" , Journal of Medical Ethics. June, 7(2): 95–102. Stamp Dawkins, Marian (1980). Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare. Chapman and Hall. Stucki, Saskia (2020) "Towards a Theory of Legal Animal Rights: Simple and Fundamental Rights" , Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40:533-560. Sunstein, Cass R. (2004). "Introduction: What are Animal Rights?" in Sunstein and Nussbaum, op cit. Sunstein, Cass R. and Nussbaum, Martha (2005). Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. Taylor, Angus (2009). Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate. Broadview Press. Taylor, Thomas (1792). "A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes," in Craciun, Adriana (2002). A Routledge Literary Sourcebook on Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Routledge. Vallentyne, Peter (2005). "Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals" , The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3/4, pp. 403–433. Vallentyne, Peter (2007). "Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals" in Nils Holtug, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.) (2007). Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford University Press. Walker, Stephen (1983). Animal Thoughts. Routledge. Weir, Jack (2009). "Virtue Ethics," in Marc Bekoff. Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood. Williams, Erin E. and DeMello, Margo (2007). Why Animals Matter. Prometheus Books. Wise, Steven M. (2000). Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals. Da Capo Press. Wise, Steven M. (2002). Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights. Perseus. Wise, Steven M. (2004). "Animal Rights, One Step at a Time," in Sunstein and Nussbaum, op cit. Wise, Steven M. (2007). "Animal Rights" , Encyclopædia Britannica. Further reading Lubinski, Joseph (2002). "Overview Summary of Animal Rights", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. "Great Apes and the Law", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. Bekoff, Marc (ed.) (2009). The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood. Best, Steven and Nocella II, Anthony J. (eds). (2004). Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Lantern Books Chapouthier, Georges and Nouët, Jean-Claude (eds.) (1998). The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights. Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal. Dawkins, Richard (1993). Gaps in the mind, in Cavalieri, Paola and Singer, Peter (eds.). The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin. Dombrowski, Daniel (1997). Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases. University of Illinois Press. Finlayson, Lorna, "Let them eat oysters" (review of Peter Singer, Animal Liberation Now, Penguin, 2023, , 368 pp; and Martha Nussbaum, Justice for Animals, Simon & Schuster, 2023, , 372 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 45, no.19 (5 October 2023), pp. 3, 5–8. The question of animal rights has been approached from a variety of theoretical orientations, including utilitarianism and capabilities approach ("CA") – none of them satisfactory to reviewer Lorna Finlayson, who teaches philosophy at England's University of Essex and ends up (p. 8) suggesting "think[ing] politically [and pragmatically] about animals: "It ought to be – it is – possible to arrange society differently." (p. 8.) Foltz, Richard (2006). Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures. Oneworld Publications. Franklin, Julian H. (2005). Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. University of Columbia Press. Gruen, Lori (2003). "The Moral Status of Animals", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 1, 2003. Gruen, Lori (2011). Ethics and Animals. Cambridge University Press. Hall, Lee (2006). Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror. Nectar Bat Press. Linzey, Andrew and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology. Columbia University Press. Mann, Keith (2007). From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement. Puppy Pincher Press. McArthur, Jo-Anne and Wilson, Keith (eds). (2020). Hidden: Animals in the Anthropocene. Lantern Publishing & Media. Neumann, Jean-Marc (2012). "The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium between Species". Animal Law Review volume 19–1. Nibert, David (2002). Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation. Rowman and Litterfield. Patterson, Charles (2002). Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. Lantern. Rachels, James (1990). Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford University Press. Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Prentice-Hall. Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery. Mirror Books. Sztybel, David (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" Ethics and the Environment 11 (Spring): 97–132. Tobias, Michael (2000). Life Force: The World of Jainism. Asian Humanities Press. Wilson, Scott (2010). "Animals and Ethics" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S. (2011) Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press. Bioethics Political movements Ethical schools and movements Animal ethics

Verisimilitude (fiction)

Verisimilitude is the "lifelikeness" or believability of a work of fiction. The word comes from meaning truth and similis meaning similar. Language philosopher Steve Neale distinguishes between two types: cultural verisimilitude, meaning plausibility of the fictional work within the cultural and/or historical context of the real world, outside of the work; and generic verisimilitude, meaning plausibility of a fictional work within the bounds of its own genre (so that, for example, characters regularly singing about their feelings is a believable action within the fictional universe of a musical). Original roots Verisimilitude has its roots in both the Platonic and Aristotelian dramatic theory of mimesis, the imitation or representation of nature. For a piece of art to hold significance or persuasion for an audience, according to Plato and Aristotle, it must have grounding in reality. This idea laid the foundation for the evolution of mimesis into verisimilitude in the Middle Ages particularly in Italian heroic poetry. During this time more attention was invested in pinning down fiction with theory. This shift manifested itself in increased focus on unity in heroic poetry. No matter how fictionalized the language of a poem might be, through verisimilitude, poets had the ability to present their works in a way that could still be believed in the real world. Verisimilitude at this time also became connected to another Aristotelian dramatic principle, decorum: the realistic union of style and subject. Poetic language of characters in a work of fiction as a result had to be appropriate in terms of the age, gender or race of the character. This classical notion of verisimilitude focused on the role of the reader in his/her engagement in the fictional work of art. The goal of the novel therefore, as it became a more popular form of verisimilitude, was to instruct and offer a pleasurable experience to the reader. The novel had to facilitate the reader's willingness to suspend his/her disbelief, a phrase used originally by Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Verisimilitude became the means to accomplish this mindset. To promote the willing suspension of disbelief, a fictional text needed to have credibility. Anything physically possible in the worldview of the reader or humanity's experience was defined as credible. Through verisimilitude then, the reader was able to glean truth even in fiction because it would reflect realistic aspects of human life. Continued evolution The idea that credibility, and in turn verisimilitude, rested on the reader's sense of the world encountered opposition because of the dilemma it created: every reader and every person does not have the same knowledge of the world. This kind of theory suggests that the novel consisted of distinct parts. The way novelists avoided this dilemma initially was by adding a preface to the work of fiction stating its credibility or by including more references to known history within the text of the fiction. As more criticism on the novel surfaced, the inclusion of a preface or a scattering of some historical references was not enough to engage the reader. French theorist Pierre Nicolas Desmolets' notion that the author should obscure the fiction or art of the novel to avoid destroying illusion: the made up attributes of the text. The novel before was perceived as a work of distinct parts. Now the novel was not thought of in terms of separate parts, but rather as a work as a whole. The novel was a total illusion of life within itself. It was a closed fictional world that could establish its own rules and laws. Verisimilitude then became deeply rooted in structure. The focus of credibility did not rest solely on the external world of the reader; the novel's credibility then could be seen in terms of the novel's own internal logic. The focus of verisimilitude was no longer concerned with the reader. The focus shifted to the novel itself. Verisimilitude was a technical problem to resolve within the context of the novel's fictional world. Detail centered on the creation of a logical cause web in the text that then could reinforce the overarching structural logic of the plot. Postmodern perspective During the rise of the postmodern novel, some critics suggested that truth or significance lies beyond verisimilitude and that only by complete non-discursive freedom to encounter a novel could meaning truly be discovered. Verisimilitude, they argued, was not the first aspect of the text a reader experiences. The reader instead first tries to observe if the novel works as an intelligible narrative. The lens of verisimilitude is applied only after the reader establishes if the novel makes sense or not. The reader can understand the novel as art but not necessarily as a cultural construction. The novel should challenge the construction of reality. In this sense, it was possible for art to precede reality. Reality had to catch up to the text rather than text staying present to reality. A boundary existed establishing that text does not belong to a current time or situation. In the postmodern context, verisimilitude was less of a concern for the novelist according to some critics. Application of the concept in the arts In the production of the classic superhero film, Superman, director Richard Donner had a picture of the title character holding a sash with the word "verisimilitude" on it in his office during the project. That display was to remind Donner that he intended to approach the story of the fantasy superhero in a way true to the source material that would make it feel intuitively real to the audience within the context of the story's world. The result was a highly acclaimed film that would set the standard for a film genre that would become dominant decades later. See also Description False document Tiffany Problem References Descriptive technique Literature Narratology Fiction

Mereology

Mereology ( (root: , mere-, 'part') and the suffix -logy, 'study, discussion, science') is the philosophical study of part-whole relationships, also called parthood relationships. As a branch of metaphysics, mereology examines the connections between parts and their wholes, exploring how components interact within a system. This theory has roots in ancient philosophy, with significant contributions from Plato, Aristotle, and later, medieval and Renaissance thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Mereology gained formal recognition in the 20th century through the pioneering works of Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski, who introduced it as part of a comprehensive framework for logic and mathematics, and coined the word "mereology". The field has since evolved to encompass a variety of applications in ontology, natural language semantics, and the cognitive sciences, influencing our understanding of structures ranging from linguistic constructs to biological systems. Mereology challenges traditional set theory by offering an alternative that focuses on the least inclusive whole comprising its parts, proposing that individuals or objects are mereological sums of their parts. Despite some controversies and counterexamples, particularly concerning organic wholes, the theoretical framework continues to be influential. Notably, mereology is used in discussions of entities as varied as musical groups, geographical regions, and abstract concepts, demonstrating its broad applicability and ongoing relevance in philosophical and scientific discourses. Mereology has been explored in various ways as applications of predicate logic to formal ontology, in each of which mereology is an important part. Each of these fields provides its own axiomatic definition of mereology. A common element of such axiomatizations is the assumption, shared with inclusion, that the part-whole relation orders its universe, meaning that everything is a part of itself (reflexivity), that a part of a part of a whole is itself a part of that whole (transitivity), and that two distinct entities cannot each be a part of the other (antisymmetry), thus forming a poset. A variant of this axiomatization denies that anything is ever part of itself (irreflexivity) while accepting transitivity, from which antisymmetry follows automatically. Although mereology is an application of mathematical logic, what could be argued to be a sort of "proto-geometry", it has been wholly developed by logicians, ontologists, linguists, engineers, and computer scientists, especially those working in artificial intelligence. In particular, mereology is also on the basis for a point-free foundation of geometry (see for example the quoted pioneering paper of Alfred Tarski and the review paper by Gerla 1995). In general systems theory, mereology refers to formal work on system decomposition and parts, wholes and boundaries (by, e.g., Mihajlo D. Mesarovic (1970), Gabriel Kron (1963), or Maurice Jessel (see Bowden (1989, 1998)). A hierarchical version of Gabriel Kron's Network Tearing was published by Keith Bowden (1991), reflecting David Lewis's ideas on gunk. Such ideas appear in theoretical computer science and physics, often in combination with sheaf theory, topos, or category theory. See also the work of Steve Vickers on (parts of) specifications in computer science, Joseph Goguen on physical systems, and Tom Etter (1996, 1998) on link theory and quantum mechanics. History Informal part-whole reasoning was consciously invoked in metaphysics and ontology from Plato (in particular, in the second half of the Parmenides) and Aristotle onwards, and more or less unwittingly in 19th-century mathematics until the triumph of set theory around 1910. Metaphysical ideas of this era that discuss the concepts of parts and wholes include divine simplicity and the classical conception of beauty. Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2001) sheds much light on part-whole reasoning during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and reviews how Cantor and Peano devised set theory. It appears that the first to reason consciously and at length about parts and wholes was Edmund Husserl, in 1901, in the second volume of Logical Investigations – Third Investigation: "On the Theory of Wholes and Parts" (Husserl 1970 is the English translation). However, the word "mereology" is absent from his writings, and he employed no symbolism even though his doctorate was in mathematics. Stanisław Leśniewski coined "mereology" in 1927, from the Greek word μέρος (méros, "part"), to refer to a formal theory of part-whole he devised in a series of highly technical papers published between 1916 and 1931, and translated in Leśniewski (1992). Leśniewski's student Alfred Tarski, in his Appendix E to Woodger (1937) and the paper translated as Tarski (1984), greatly simplified Leśniewski's formalism. Other students (and students of students) of Lesniewski elaborated this "Polish mereology" over the course of the 20th century. For a good selection of the literature on Polish mereology, see Srzednicki and Rickey (1984). For a survey of Polish mereology, see Simons (1987). Since 1980 or so, however, research on Polish mereology has been almost entirely historical in nature. A. N. Whitehead planned a fourth volume of Principia Mathematica, on geometry, but never wrote it. His 1914 correspondence with Bertrand Russell reveals that his intended approach to geometry can be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, as mereological in essence. This work culminated in Whitehead (1916) and the mereological systems of Whitehead (1919, 1920). In 1930, Henry S. Leonard completed a Harvard PhD dissertation in philosophy, setting out a formal theory of the part-whole relation. This evolved into the "calculus of individuals" of Goodman and Leonard (1940). Goodman revised and elaborated this calculus in the three editions of Goodman (1951). The calculus of individuals is the starting point for the post-1970 revival of mereology among logicians, ontologists, and computer scientists, a revival well-surveyed in Simons (1987), Casati and Varzi (1999), and Cotnoir and Varzi (2021). Axioms and primitive notions Reflexivity: A basic choice in defining a mereological system, is whether to consider things to be parts of themselves. In naive set theory a similar question arises: whether a set is to be considered a "member" of itself. In both cases, "yes" gives rise to paradoxes analogous to Russell's paradox: Let there be an object O such that every object that is not a proper part of itself is a proper part of O. Is O a proper part of itself? No, because no object is a proper part of itself; and yes, because it meets the specified requirement for inclusion as a proper part of O. In set theory, a set is often termed an improper subset of itself. Given such paradoxes, mereology requires an axiomatic formulation. A mereological "system" is a first-order theory (with identity) whose universe of discourse consists of wholes and their respective parts, collectively called objects. Mereology is a collection of nested and non-nested axiomatic systems, not unlike the case with modal logic. The treatment, terminology, and hierarchical organization below follow Casati and Varzi (1999: Ch. 3) closely. For a more recent treatment, correcting certain misconceptions, see Hovda (2008). Lower-case letters denote variables ranging over objects. Following each symbolic axiom or definition is the number of the corresponding formula in Casati and Varzi, written in bold. A mereological system requires at least one primitive binary relation (dyadic predicate). The most conventional choice for such a relation is parthood (also called "inclusion"), "x is a part of y", written Pxy. Nearly all systems require that parthood partially order the universe. The following defined relations, required for the axioms below, follow immediately from parthood alone: An immediate defined predicate is "x is a proper part of y", written PPxy, which holds (i.e., is satisfied, comes out true) if Pxy is true and Pyx is false. Compared to parthood (which is a partial order), ProperPart is a strict partial order. 3.3 An object lacking proper parts is an atom. The mereological universe consists of all objects we wish to think about, and all of their proper parts: Overlap: x and y overlap, written Oxy, if there exists an object z such that Pzx and Pzy both hold. 3.1 The parts of z, the "overlap" or "product" of x and y, are precisely those objects that are parts of both x and y. Underlap: x and y underlap, written Uxy, if there exists an object z such that x and y are both parts of z. 3.2 Overlap and Underlap are reflexive, symmetric, and intransitive. Systems vary in what relations they take as primitive and as defined. For example, in extensional mereologies (defined below), parthood can be defined from Overlap as follows: 3.31 The axioms are: Parthood partially orders the universe: M1, Reflexive: An object is a part of itself. P.1 M2, Antisymmetric: If Pxy and Pyx both hold, then x and y are the same object. P.2 M3, Transitive: If Pxy and Pyz, then Pxz. P.3 M4, Weak Supplementation: If PPxy holds, there exists a z such that Pzy holds but Ozx does not. P.4 M5, Strong Supplementation: If Pyx does not hold, there exists a z such that Pzy holds but Ozx does not. P.5 M5', Atomistic Supplementation: If Pxy does not hold, then there exists an atom z such that Pzx holds but Ozy does not. P.5' Top: There exists a "universal object", designated W, such that PxW holds for any x. 3.20 Top is a theorem if M8 holds. Bottom: There exists an atomic "null object", designated N, such that PNx holds for any x. 3.22 M6, Sum: If Uxy holds, there exists a z, called the "sum" or "fusion" of x and y, such that the objects overlapping of z are just those objects that overlap either x or y. P.6 M7, Product: If Oxy holds, there exists a z, called the "product" of x and y, such that the parts of z are just those objects that are parts of both x and y. P.7 If Oxy does not hold, x and y have no parts in common, and the product of x and y is undefined. M8, Unrestricted Fusion: Let φ(x) be a first-order formula in which x is a free variable. Then the fusion of all objects satisfying φ exists. P.8 M8 is also called "General Sum Principle", "Unrestricted Mereological Composition", or "Universalism". M8 corresponds to the principle of unrestricted comprehension of naive set theory, which gives rise to Russell's paradox. There is no mereological counterpart to this paradox simply because parthood, unlike set membership, is reflexive. M8', Unique Fusion: The fusions whose existence M8 asserts are also unique. P.8' M9, Atomicity: All objects are either atoms or fusions of atoms. P.10 Various systems Simons (1987), Casati and Varzi (1999) and Hovda (2008) describe many mereological systems whose axioms are taken from the above list. We adopt the boldface nomenclature of Casati and Varzi. The best-known such system is the one called classical extensional mereology, hereinafter abbreviated CEM (other abbreviations are explained below). In CEM, P.1 through P.8' hold as axioms or are theorems. M9, Top, and Bottom are optional. The systems in the table below are partially ordered by inclusion, in the sense that, if all the theorems of system A are also theorems of system B, but the converse is not necessarily true, then B includes A. The resulting Hasse diagram is similar to Fig. 3.2 in Casati and Varzi (1999: 48). There are two equivalent ways of asserting that the universe is partially ordered: Assume either M1-M3, or that Proper Parthood is transitive and asymmetric, hence a strict partial order. Either axiomatization results in the system M. M2 rules out closed loops formed using Parthood, so that the part relation is well-founded. Sets are well-founded if the axiom of regularity is assumed. The literature contains occasional philosophical and common-sense objections to the transitivity of Parthood. M4 and M5 are two ways of asserting supplementation, the mereological analog of set complementation, with M5 being stronger because M4 is derivable from M5. M and M4 yield minimal mereology, MM. Reformulated in terms of Proper Part, MM is Simons's (1987) preferred minimal system. In any system in which M5 or M5' are assumed or can be derived, then it can be proved that two objects having the same proper parts are identical. This property is known as Extensionality, a term borrowed from set theory, for which extensionality is the defining axiom. Mereological systems in which Extensionality holds are termed extensional, a fact denoted by including the letter E in their symbolic names. M6 asserts that any two underlapping objects have a unique sum; M7 asserts that any two overlapping objects have a unique product. If the universe is finite or if Top is assumed, then the universe is closed under Sum. Universal closure of Product and of supplementation relative to W requires Bottom. W and N are, evidently, the mereological analog of the universal and empty sets, and Sum and Product are, likewise, the analogs of set-theoretical union and intersection. If M6 and M7 are either assumed or derivable, the result is a mereology with closure. Because Sum and Product are binary operations, M6 and M7 admit the sum and product of only a finite number of objects. The Unrestricted Fusion axiom, M8, enables taking the sum of infinitely many objects. The same holds for Product, when defined. At this point, mereology often invokes set theory, but any recourse to set theory is eliminable by replacing a formula with a quantified variable ranging over a universe of sets by a schematic formula with one free variable. The formula comes out true (is satisfied) whenever the name of an object that would be a member of the set (if it existed) replaces the free variable. Hence any axiom with sets can be replaced by an axiom schema with monadic atomic subformulae. M8 and M8' are schemas of just this sort. The syntax of a first-order theory can describe only a denumerable number of sets; hence, only denumerably many sets may be eliminated in this fashion, but this limitation is not binding for the sort of mathematics contemplated here. If M8 holds, then W exists for infinite universes. Hence, Top need be assumed only if the universe is infinite and M8 does not hold. Top (postulating W) is not controversial, but Bottom (postulating N) is. Leśniewski rejected Bottom, and most mereological systems follow his example (an exception is the work of Richard Milton Martin). Hence, while the universe is closed under sum, the product of objects that do not overlap is typically undefined. A system with W but not N is isomorphic to: a Boolean algebra lacking a 0; a join semilattice bounded from above by 1. Binary fusion and W interpret join and 1, respectively. Postulating N renders all possible products definable, but also transforms classical extensional mereology into a set-free model of Boolean algebra. If sets are admitted, M8 asserts the existence of the fusion of all members of any nonempty set. Any mereological system in which M8 holds is called general, and its name includes G. In any general mereology, M6 and M7 are provable. Adding M8 to an extensional mereology results in general extensional mereology, abbreviated GEM; moreover, the extensionality renders the fusion unique. On the converse, however, if the fusion asserted by M8 is assumed unique, so that M8' replaces M8, then—as Tarski (1929) had shown—M3 and M8' suffice to axiomatize GEM, a remarkably economical result. Simons (1987: 38–41) lists a number of GEM theorems. M2 and a finite universe necessarily imply Atomicity, namely that everything either is an atom or includes atoms among its proper parts. If the universe is infinite, Atomicity requires M9. Adding M9 to any mereological system, X results in the atomistic variant thereof, denoted AX. Atomicity permits economies, for instance, assuming that M5' implies Atomicity and extensionality, and yields an alternative axiomatization of AGEM. Set theory The notion of "subset" in set theory is not entirely the same as the notion of "subpart" in mereology. Stanisław Leśniewski rejected set theory as related to but not the same as nominalism. For a long time, nearly all philosophers and mathematicians avoided mereology, seeing it as tantamount to a rejection of set theory. Goodman too was a nominalist, and his fellow nominalist Richard Milton Martin employed a version of the calculus of individuals throughout his career, starting in 1941. Much early work on mereology was motivated by a suspicion that set theory was ontologically suspect, and that Occam's razor requires that one minimise the number of posits in one's theory of the world and of mathematics. Mereology replaces talk of "sets" of objects with talk of "sums" of objects, objects being no more than the various things that make up wholes. Many logicians and philosophers reject these motivations, on such grounds as: They deny that sets are in any way ontologically suspect Occam's razor, when applied to abstract objects like sets, is either a dubious principle or simply false Mereology itself is guilty of proliferating new and ontologically suspect entities such as fusions. For a survey of attempts to found mathematics without using set theory, see Burgess and Rosen (1997). In the 1970s, thanks in part to Eberle (1970), it gradually came to be understood that one can employ mereology regardless of one's ontological stance regarding sets. This understanding is called the "ontological innocence" of mereology. This innocence stems from mereology being formalizable in either of two equivalent ways: Quantified variables ranging over a universe of sets Schematic predicates with a single free variable. Once it became clear that mereology is not tantamount to a denial of set theory, mereology became largely accepted as a useful tool for formal ontology and metaphysics. In set theory, singletons are "atoms" that have no (non-empty) proper parts; many consider set theory useless or incoherent (not "well-founded") if sets cannot be built up from unit sets. The calculus of individuals was thought to require that an object either have no proper parts, in which case it is an "atom", or be the mereological sum of atoms. Eberle (1970), however, showed how to construct a calculus of individuals lacking "atoms", i.e., one where every object has a "proper part" (defined below) so that the universe is infinite. There are analogies between the axioms of mereology and those of standard Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF), if Parthood is taken as analogous to subset in set theory. On the relation of mereology and ZF, also see Bunt (1985). One of the very few contemporary set theorists to discuss mereology is Potter (2004). Lewis (1991) went further, showing informally that mereology, augmented by a few ontological assumptions and plural quantification, and some novel reasoning about singletons, yields a system in which a given individual can be both a part and a subset of another individual. Various sorts of set theory can be interpreted in the resulting systems. For example, the axioms of ZFC can be proven given some additional mereological assumptions. Forrest (2002) revises Lewis's analysis by first formulating a generalization of CEM, called "Heyting mereology", whose sole nonlogical primitive is Proper Part, assumed transitive and antireflexive. There exists a "fictitious" null individual that is a proper part of every individual. Two schemas assert that every lattice join exists (lattices are complete) and that meet distributes over join. On this Heyting mereology, Forrest erects a theory of pseudosets, adequate for all purposes to which sets have been put. Mathematics Husserl never claimed that mathematics could or should be grounded in part-whole rather than set theory. Lesniewski consciously derived his mereology as an alternative to set theory as a foundation of mathematics, but did not work out the details. Goodman and Quine (1947) tried to develop the natural and real numbers using the calculus of individuals, but were mostly unsuccessful; Quine did not reprint that article in his Selected Logic Papers. In a series of chapters in the books he published in the last decade of his life, Richard Milton Martin set out to do what Goodman and Quine had abandoned 30 years prior. A recurring problem with attempts to ground mathematics in mereology is how to build up the theory of relations while abstaining from set-theoretic definitions of the ordered pair. Martin argued that Eberle's (1970) theory of relational individuals solved this problem. Topological notions of boundaries and connection can be married to mereology, resulting in mereotopology; see Casati and Varzi (1999: ch. 4,5). Whitehead's 1929 Process and Reality contains a good deal of informal mereotopology. Natural language Bunt (1985), a study of the semantics of natural language, shows how mereology can help understand such phenomena as the mass–count distinction and verb aspect. But Nicolas (2008) argues that a different logical framework, called plural logic, should be used for that purpose. Also, natural language often employs "part of" in ambiguous ways (Simons 1987 discusses this at length). Hence, it is unclear how, if at all, one can translate certain natural language expressions into mereological predicates. Steering clear of such difficulties may require limiting the interpretation of mereology to mathematics and natural science. Casati and Varzi (1999), for example, limit the scope of mereology to physical objects. Metaphysics In metaphysics there are many troubling questions pertaining to parts and wholes. One question addresses constitution and persistence, another asks about composition. Mereological constitution In metaphysics, there are several puzzles concerning cases of mereological constitution, that is, what makes up a whole. There is still a concern with parts and wholes, but instead of looking at what parts make up a whole, the emphasis is on what a thing is made of, such as its materials, e.g., the bronze in a bronze statue. Below are two of the main puzzles that philosophers use to discuss constitution. Ship of Theseus: Briefly, the puzzle goes something like this. There is a ship called the Ship of Theseus. Over time, the boards start to rot, so we remove the boards and place them in a pile. First question, is the ship made of the new boards the same as the ship that had all the old boards? Second, if we reconstruct a ship using all of the old planks, etc. from the Ship of Theseus, and we also have a ship that was built out of new boards (each added one-by-one over time to replace old decaying boards), which ship is the real Ship of Theseus? Statue and Lump of Clay: Roughly, a sculptor decides to mold a statue out of a lump of clay. At time t1 the sculptor has a lump of clay. After many manipulations at time t2 there is a statue. The question asked is, is the lump of clay and the statue (numerically) identical? If so, how and why? Constitution typically has implications for views on persistence: how does an object persist over time if any of its parts (materials) change or are removed, as is the case with humans who lose cells, change height, hair color, memories, and yet we are said to be the same person today as we were when we were first born. For example, Ted Sider is the same today as he was when he was born—he just changed. But how can this be if many parts of Ted today did not exist when Ted was just born? Is it possible for things, such as organisms to persist? And if so, how? There are several views that attempt to answer this question. Some of the views are as follows (note, there are several other views): (a) Constitution view. This view accepts cohabitation. That is, two objects share exactly the same matter. Here, it follows, that there are no temporal parts. (b) Mereological essentialism, which states that the only objects that exist are quantities of matter, which are things defined by their parts. The object persists if matter is removed (or the form changes); but the object ceases to exist if any matter is destroyed. (c) Dominant Sorts. This is the view that tracing is determined by which sort is dominant; they reject cohabitation. For example, lump does not equal statue because they're different "sorts". (d) Nihilism—which makes the claim that no objects exist, except simples, so there is no persistence problem. (e) 4-dimensionalism or temporal parts (may also go by the names perdurantism or exdurantism), which roughly states that aggregates of temporal parts are intimately related. For example, two roads merging, momentarily and spatially, are still one road, because they share a part. (f) 3-dimensionalism (may also go by the name endurantism), where the object is wholly present. That is, the persisting object retains numerical identity. Mereological composition One question that is addressed by philosophers is which is more fundamental: parts, wholes, or neither? Another pressing question is called the special composition question (SCQ): For any Xs, when is it the case that there is a Y such that the Xs compose Y? This question has caused philosophers to run in three different directions: nihilism, universal composition (UC), or a moderate view (restricted composition). The first two views are considered extreme since the first denies composition, and the second allows any and all non-spatially overlapping objects to compose another object. The moderate view encompasses several theories that try to make sense of SCQ without saying 'no' to composition or 'yes' to unrestricted composition. Fundamentality There are philosophers who are concerned with the question of fundamentality. That is, which is more ontologically fundamental the parts or their wholes. There are several responses to this question, though one of the default assumptions is that the parts are more fundamental. That is, the whole is grounded in its parts. This is the mainstream view. Another view, explored by Schaffer (2010) is monism, where the parts are grounded in the whole. Schaffer does not just mean that, say, the parts that make up my body are grounded in my body. Rather, Schaffer argues that the whole cosmos is more fundamental and everything else is a part of the cosmos. Then, there is the identity theory which claims that there is no hierarchy or fundamentality to parts and wholes. Instead wholes are just (or equivalent to) their parts. There can also be a two-object view which says that the wholes are not equal to the parts—they are numerically distinct from one another. Each of these theories has benefits and costs associated with them. Special composition question (SCQ) Philosophers want to know when some Xs compose something Y. There are several kinds of response: One response is nihilism. According to nihilism, there are no mereological complex objects (composite objects), only simples. Nihilists do not entirely reject composition because they think simples compose themselves, but this is a different point. More formally, nihilists would say: Necessarily, for any non-overlapping Xs, there is an object composed of the Xs if and only if there is only one of the Xs. This theory, though well explored, has its own problems: it seems to contradict experience and common sense, to be incompatible with atomless gunk, and to be unsupported by space-time physics. Another prominent response is universal composition (UC). According to UC, as long as Xs do not spatially overlap, they can compose a complex object. Universal compositionalists also support unrestricted composition. More formally: Necessarily, for any non-overlapping Xs, there is a Y such that Y is composed of the Xs. For example, someone's left thumb, the top half of another person's right shoe, and a quark in the center of their galaxy can compose a complex object. This theory also has some drawbacks, most notably that it allows for far too many objects. A third response (perhaps less explored than the other two) includes a range of restricted composition views. There are several views, but they all share an idea: that there is a restriction on what counts as a complex object: some (but not all) Xs come together to compose a complex Y. Some of these theories include: (a) Contact—Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are in contact; (b) Fastenation—Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are fastened; (c) Cohesion—Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs cohere (cannot be pulled apart or moved in relation to each other without breaking); (d) Fusion—Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are fused (joined together such that there is no boundary); (e) Organicism—Xs compose a complex Y if and only if either the activities of the Xs constitute a life or there is only one of the Xs; and (f) Brutal Composition—"It's just the way things are." There is no true, nontrivial, and finitely long answer. Many more hypotheses continue to be explored. A common problem with these theories is that they are vague. It remains unclear what "fastened" or "life" mean, for example. And there are other problems with the restricted composition responses, many of them which depend on which theory is being discussed. A fourth response is deflationism. According to deflationism, the way the term "exist" is used varies, and thus all the above answers to the SCQ can be correct when indexed to the appropriate meaning of "exist". Further, there is no privileged way in which the term "exist" must be used. There is therefore no privileged answer to the SCQ, since there are no privileged conditions for when Xs compose Y. Instead, the debate is reduced to a mere verbal dispute rather than a genuine ontological debate. In this way, the SCQ is part of a larger debate in general ontological realism and anti-realism. While deflationism successfully avoids the SCQ, it comes at the cost of ontological anti-realism, such that nature has no objective reality, for, if there is no privileged way to objectively affirm the existence of objects, nature itself must have no objectivity. Important surveys The books by Simons (1987) and Casati and Varzi (1999) differ in their strengths: Simons (1987) sees mereology primarily as a way of formalizing ontology and metaphysics. His strengths include the connections between mereology and: The work of Stanisław Leśniewski and his descendants Various continental philosophers, especially Edmund Husserl Contemporary English-speaking technical philosophers such as Kit Fine and Roderick Chisholm Recent work on formal ontology and metaphysics, including continuants, occurrents, class nouns, mass nouns, and ontological dependence and integrity Free logic as a background logic Extending mereology with tense logic and modal logic Boolean algebras and lattice theory. Casati and Varzi (1999) see mereology primarily as a way of understanding the material world and how humans interact with it. Their strengths include the connections between mereology and: A "proto-geometry" for physical objects Topology and mereotopology, especially boundaries, regions, and holes A formal theory of events Theoretical computer science The writings of Alfred North Whitehead, especially his Process and Reality and work descended therefrom. Simons devotes considerable effort to elucidating historical notations. The notation of Casati and Varzi is often used. Both books include excellent bibliographies. To these works should be added Hovda (2008), which presents the latest state of the art on the axiomatization of mereology. See also Glossary of mereology Gunk (mereology) Holism Holon (philosophy) Implicate and explicate order according to David Bohm Laws of Form by G. Spencer-Brown Mereological essentialism Mereological nihilism Mereotopology Meronomy Meronymy Monad (philosophy) Plural quantification Quantifier variance Simple (philosophy) Whitehead's point-free geometry Composition (objects) Emergence References Sources Bowden, Keith, 1991. Hierarchical Tearing: An Efficient Holographic Algorithm for System Decomposition, Int. J. General Systems, Vol. 24(1), pp 23–38. Bowden, Keith, 1998. Huygens Principle, Physics and Computers. Int. J. General Systems, Vol. 27(1–3), pp. 9–32. Bunt, Harry, 1985. Mass terms and model-theoretic semantics. Cambridge Univ. Press. Burgess, John P., and Rosen, Gideon, 1997. A Subject with No Object. Oxford Univ. Press. Burkhardt, H., and Dufour, C.A., 1991, "Part/Whole I: History" in Burkhardt, H., and Smith, B., eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Muenchen: Philosophia Verlag. Casati, Roberto, and Varzi, Achille C., 1999. Parts and Places: the structures of spatial representation. MIT Press. Cotnoir, A. J., and Varzi, Achille C., 2021, Mereology, Oxford University Press. Eberle, Rolf, 1970. Nominalistic Systems. Kluwer. Etter, Tom, 1996. Quantum Mechanics as a Branch of Mereology in Toffoli T., et al., PHYSCOMP96, Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Physics and Computation, New England Complex Systems Institute. Etter, Tom, 1998. Process, System, Causality and Quantum Mechanics. SLAC-PUB-7890, Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre. Forrest, Peter, 2002, "Nonclassical mereology and its application to sets", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43: 79–94. Gerla, Giangiacomo, (1995). "Pointless Geometries", in Buekenhout, F., Kantor, W. eds., "Handbook of incidence geometry: buildings and foundations". North-Holland: 1015–31. Goodman, Nelson, 1977 (1951). The Structure of Appearance. Kluwer. Goodman, Nelson, and Quine, Willard, 1947, "Steps toward a constructive nominalism", Journal of Symbolic Logic 12: 97–122. Gruszczynski, R., and Pietruszczak, A., 2008, "Full development of Tarski's geometry of solids", Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14: 481–540. A system of geometry based on Lesniewski's mereology, with basic properties of mereological structures. Hovda, Paul, 2008, "What is classical mereology?" Journal of Philosophical Logic 38(1): 55–82. Husserl, Edmund, 1970. Logical Investigations, Vol. 2. Findlay, J.N., trans. Routledge. Kron, Gabriel, 1963, Diakoptics: The Piecewise Solution of Large Scale Systems. Macdonald, London. Lewis, David K., 1991. Parts of Classes. Blackwell. Leonard, H. S., and Goodman, Nelson, 1940, "The calculus of individuals and its uses", Journal of Symbolic Logic 5: 45–55. Leśniewski, Stanisław, 1992. Collected Works. Surma, S.J., Srzednicki, J.T., Barnett, D.I., and Rickey, V.F., editors and translators. Kluwer. Lucas, J. R., 2000. Conceptual Roots of Mathematics. Routledge. Ch. 9.12 and 10 discuss mereology, mereotopology, and the related theories of A.N. Whitehead, all strongly influenced by the unpublished writings of David Bostock. Mesarovic, M.D., Macko, D., and Takahara, Y., 1970, "Theory of Multilevel, Hierarchical Systems". Academic Press. Nicolas, David, 2008, "Mass nouns and plural logic", Linguistics and Philosophy 31(2): 211–44. Pietruszczak, Andrzej, 1996, "Mereological sets of distributive classes", Logic and Logical Philosophy 4: 105–22. Constructs, using mereology, mathematical entities from set theoretical classes. Pietruszczak, Andrzej, 2005, "Pieces of mereology", Logic and Logical Philosophy 14: 211–34. Basic mathematical properties of Lesniewski's mereology. Pietruszczak, Andrzej, 2018, Metamerology, Nicolaus Copernicus University Scientific Publishing House. Potter, Michael, 2004. Set Theory and Its Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press. Simons, Peter, 1987 (reprinted 2000). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford Univ. Press. Srzednicki, J. T. J., and Rickey, V. F., eds., 1984. Lesniewski's Systems: Ontology and Mereology. Kluwer. Tarski, Alfred, 1984 (1956), "Foundations of the Geometry of Solids" in his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers 1923–38. Woodger, J., and Corcoran, J., eds. and trans. Hackett. Varzi, Achille C., 2007, "Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes, and Locations" in Aiello, M. et al., eds., Handbook of Spatial Logics. Springer-Verlag: 945–1038. Whitehead, A. N., 1916, "La Theorie Relationiste de l'Espace", Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 23: 423–454. Translated as Hurley, P.J., 1979, "The relational theory of space", Philosophy Research Archives 5: 712–741. ------, 1919. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. Cambridge Univ. Press. 2nd ed., 1925. ------, 1920. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge Univ. Press. 2004 paperback, Prometheus Books. Being the 1919 Tarner Lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge. ------, 1978 (1929). Process and Reality. Free Press. Woodger, J. H., 1937. The Axiomatic Method in Biology. Cambridge Univ. Press. External links Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Material Composition" – David Cornell Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Mereology" – Achille Varzi "Boundary" – Achille Varzi Mathematical logic Ontology Predicate logic Semantic relations

Theory of knowledge (IB course)

Theory of Knowledge (TOK) is a compulsory core subject of the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme covering, for example, epistemological topics. It is marked on a letter scale (A-E) and aims to "provide an opportunity for students to reflect on the nature of knowledge, and on how we know what we claim to know." Students who attain an E will not be able to receive their final IB Diploma. Course description Theory of Knowledge is a course created by the IB organization and must not be conceived as pure epistemology. This course involves a process of exploring and sharing students' views on "knowledge questions" (an umbrella term for "everything that can be approached from a TOK point of view"), so "there is no end to the valid questions that may arise", "there are many different ways to approach TOK," "the sheer scope of the TOK course is daunting" and "teachers and students need the confidence to go too far outside their traditional comfort zones." Teachers are entitled to select a teaching methodology and course material that will convey the theoretical foundation of essential concepts and may provide an environment in which these concepts can be discussed and debated. The focus of the discussion should not be the differentiation between "right" and "wrong" ideas but on the quality of justification and a balanced approach to the knowledge claim in question. The TOK course uses a combination, in no particular order ("many entry points and sequences are possible"): Ways of knowing: (sense perception, reason, emotion, faith, imagination, intuition, memory, and language). Note that this is no longer mandatory in the new ToK course (first assessment 2022). How do we gain knowledge of the world, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each way in which we learn of the world and our place in it. Until 2014, there were only four ways of knowing (sense perception, reason, emotion, and language, but the IB curriculum then changed to include four other ways of knowing: intuition, imagination, faith, and memory). Areas of knowledge (mathematics, natural sciences, human sciences, history, religious knowledge systems, indigenous knowledge systems, the arts and ethics): their distinct natures and methods of gaining knowledge, the types of claim each makes and the issues to consider (e.g., "How do you know that the scientific method is a valid method of gaining knowledge?", "What is the reason for having historical knowledge, and how is it applied in life?"). The IB originally had six areas of knowledge: mathematics, natural sciences, human sciences, history, the arts and ethics. In 2014, the IB curriculum changed to include two more areas of knowledge: religious knowledge systems and indigenous knowledge systems. Factors that transcend individual ways of knowing and areas of knowledge: Nature of knowing: what are the differences between information, data, belief, faith, opinion, knowledge and wisdom? Knowledge communities: what is taken for granted in a community? How can we decide which beliefs we ought to check further? Knowers' perspective and applications of knowledge: how do age, education, culture and experience influence selection of sources and formation of knowledge claims? If you know something, or how to do something, do you have a responsibility to use your knowledge? By using different types of AOK (areas of knowledge) and WOK (ways of knowing) you can then start to write counterclaims and claims in different types of texts. Justifications of knowledge claims: why should claims be assessed critically? Are logic, sensory perception, revelation, faith, memory, consensus, intuition, and self-awareness equally reliable justifications? Use of coherence, correspondence, pragmatism, and consensus as criteria of truth. The TOK course is expected to involve 100 teaching hours over the two years of the Diploma Programme. Having followed the course, students should be competent to analyse knowledge claims and respond to knowledge issues in the context of different areas of knowledge and ways of knowing, expressing ideas accurately and honestly, using examples from their own experiences as learners and in outside life. Personal knowledge is the systematic assimilation of shared knowledge acquired in different areas of knowledge through a process that vary within disciplines. Shared knowledge is the accumulation of bodies of knowledge in different areas of knowledge, the media and society. The Knowledge Framework is a scheme that contains five elements: scope and application, language, methodology, historical development and links to personal knowledge. Assessment In the past, Theory of Knowledge was assessed in two parts: an externally examined 1200- to 1600-word essay and an internally assessed presentation. As of 2022, this has been replaced with an exhibition. Each part is scored using assessment criteria, which differ between the essay and presentation. The total score is converted into a grade from A to E. A similar system is used for the Extended Essay. Students can gain up to 3 points for the diploma based on the grades achieved for TOK and EE. No diploma is awarded if a candidate fails to submit either the TOK essay or TOK exhibition, or receives grade E for either the Extended Essay or Theory of Knowledge. TOK essay For each exam session, the IB prescribes six essay titles from which students must choose. Each title raises generic cross-disciplinary questions about knowledge, and the student is expected to consider the issues raised in the title and reach conclusions about them. The essay should put forward claims and counterclaims, linking knowledge issues to areas of knowledge and ways of knowing, and show evidence of original thinking by the student. Essays over the maximum word count of 1,600 are penalised with a one mark reduction, and any content beyond the 1600th word of the essay is not read by the examiner. TOK presentation (Last exam 2021) During the Theory of Knowledge course, students must plan and deliver at least one (as individuals or in small groups, each comprising a maximum of three students) presentation to the class. The topic is based on a real-life situation of interest to the student, e.g. "Reliability of media reporting of science", "What makes something a work of art?" and the presentation is expected to show why the topic is significant, linking it to a relevant main knowledge question (KQ), and discussing those issues and examining the implications of approaching the question from different perspectives, given by WOKs (ways of knowing), and at least one AOK (area of knowledge). Teachers have wide latitude to help with topic selection and identifying suitable approaches. About ten minutes should be allowed for each presenter. TOK exhibition (First exam 2022) The TOK exhibition is a new assessment component implemented for all the candidates graduating in 2022 and after. It replaces the TOK presentation and bears the same assessment weight (33%). According to the 2022 IB Guide, the TOK exhibition explores how TOK manifests in the world around us by creating an exhibition of three objects (or images of objects) that connect to only one of the themes (either core or optional) and on only one of the 35 prompts provided within the new Guide. Each object must be accompanied by a written commentary. The total word count must be at most 950 words. These 35 prompts are knowledge questions such as: What counts as knowledge? Who owns knowledge? Are some things unknowable? etc. See also Epistemology Consensus gentium References International Baccalaureate Philosophy education

Axiological ethics

In philosophy, axiological ethics is concerned with the values by which people uphold ethical standards, and the investigation and development of theories of ethical behaviour. Axiological ethics investigates and questions what the intellectual bases for a system of values. Axiologic ethics explore the justifications for value systems, and examine if there exists an objective justification, beyond arbitrary personal preference, for the existence and practise of a given value system. Moreover, although axiological ethics are a subfield of Ethical philosophy, axiological investigation usually includes epistemology and the value theory. Ethics and axiology To understand axiological ethics, an understanding of axiology and ethics is necessary. Axiology is the philosophical study of goodness (value) and is concerned with two questions. The first question regards defining and exploring understandings of 'the good' or value. This includes, for example, the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. The second area is the application of such understandings of value to a variety of fields within the social sciences and humanities. Ethics is a philosophical field which is concerned with morality, and in particular, the conduction of the right action. The defining of what the 'right' action is influenced by axiological thought in itself, much like the defining of 'beauty' within the philosophical branch of aesthetics. Objectives Axiological ethics can be understood as the application of axiology onto the study of ethics. It is concerned with questioning the moral grounds which we base ethical judgements on. This is done through questioning the values in which ethical principles are grounded on. Once there is recognition and understanding of the underlying values hidden within ethical claims, they can be assessed and critiqued. Through breaking ethics down to an examination of values, rather than the good, morality can be reconstructed based on redefined values or confirmed on already set values. History Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology constitutes an important precursor of axiological ethics. He classifies all mental phenomena into three groups: representations, judgments and phenomena of love. Of particular interest for axiological ethics are phenomena of love since they constitute the basis for our knowledge of values: an object has value if it is fitting to love this object. This insight into what is good then informs the discipline of ethics: "the right end consists in the best of what is attainable". Max Scheler, one of the main early proponents of axiological ethics, agrees with Brentano that experience is a reliable source for the knowledge of values. Scheler, following the phenomenological method, holds that this knowledge is not just restricted to particular cases but that we can gain insight a priori into the essence of values. This insight reveals that there are different types of values, which form a hierarchy from lower to higher values: pleasure, useful, noble, good and true and beautiful, sacred. This order is essential to ethics: we ought to promote the higher values rather than the lower ones in our actions. The order of values is objective but our perception of this order is subjective and may therefore be distorted. Such distortions may lead us to prefer the lower values to the higher ones. Nicolai Hartmann builds in many important aspects on Scheler's axiological ethics. He also provides a platonist metaphysics of values, complementing the intuitive insight a priori into values. John Niemeyer Findlay, a moral philosophy and metaphysics professor at Yale University, wrote Axiological Ethics in 1970. Findlay's book is a modern historical account of academic discussion around axiological ethics. As such, it contains discussion of other philosophers' and his own concluding remarks regarding the topic. Findlay advocates for inquiry into values behind ethical theories and what justifications exist for them. Through assessing the thoughts of his academic peers, Findlay's final thoughts on the topic is that an objective justification for values would be unlikely. Rather, since validation is recognized as coming from the subject, values would have to be assessed internally. Opposed views Proponents of axiological ethics often contrast their view with both Kantian ethics and eudaimonism. Kantian ethics is rejected mainly on grounds of its formalism, which is exemplified e.g. in Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law". The main criticism of ethical formalism is that it tries to define right action in purely formal terms without reference to whether the resulting action is valuable in any sense. It ignores that our actions are guided by various values which we try to realize. The critique of eudaimonism is not that it ignores values altogether but that its view of what is valuable is too narrow. Our actions should be guided by a wide variety of values, including promoting pleasure and avoiding pain, but also other values like health, beauty, etc. This can be seen in Scheler's hierarchy of values, in which only one level of values, the lowest, is reserved for pleasure and pain. Criticism Axiological ethics has been criticized for its epistemology and metaphysics. Most of its proponents rely on the idea that we can gain an insight a priori into the essence of values. While this thesis is itself controversial, it becomes even more problematic when combined with the idea of value-blindness, the thesis that some people may be (for various reasons) unable to properly intuit the essences of values. This can easily lead to a dogmatic position where the proponent of axiological ethics justifies her own view through intuition and dismisses opposing views as misguided due to value-blindness. The metaphysical critique of axiological ethics concerns the tendency to reify values and treat them as proper entities of their own. This tendency is present in many proponents of axiological ethics but it is most explicit in Hartmann's position. See also Axiology Ethics Value theory References Axiology Normative ethics

Possibility

Possibility is the condition or fact of being possible. Latin origins of the word hint at ability. Possibility may refer to: Probability, the measure of the likelihood that an event will occur Epistemic possibility, a topic in philosophy and modal logic Possibility theory, a mathematical theory for dealing with certain types of uncertainty and is an alternative to probability theory Subjunctive possibility, (also called alethic possibility) is a form of modality studied in modal logic. Logical possibility, a proposition that will depend on the system of logic being considered, rather than on the violation of any single rule Possible world, a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been Other Possible (Italy), a political party in Italy Possible Peru, a political party in Peru Possible Peru Alliance, an electoral alliance in Peru Entertainment Kim Possible, a US children's TV series Kim Possible (character), the central character of the TV series Kim Possible (video game series), games related to the TV series The Possible, a 2006 film The Possible (band), a Japanese band Possibility Pictures, a film production company which made the 2010 film Letters to God Possibility (album), a 1985 album by Akina Nakamori "Possibility" (song), a 2009 song by Lykke Li See also Impossible (disambiguation) Possibilities (disambiguation) Possible Worlds (disambiguation) :Category:Possibly living people Absolutely (disambiguation) Definitely (disambiguation) Maybe (disambiguation)

Basic belief

Basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs or core beliefs) are, under the epistemological view called foundationalism, the axioms of a belief system. Categories of beliefs Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be known. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories: Beliefs that are properly basic, in that they do not depend upon justification of other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief (a "non-doxastic justification"). Beliefs that derive from one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity. Description Within this basic framework of foundationalism exist a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as properly basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs. In classical foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either self-evident axioms, or evident to the senses (empiricism). However Anthony Kenny and others have argued that this is a self-refuting idea. In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or incorrigible. One such axiom is René Descartes's axiom, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. uncorrectable) beliefs are those one can believe without possibly being proven wrong. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion. In what Keith Lehrer has called "fallible foundationalism", also known as "moderate foundationalism", the division between inferential and non-inferential belief is retained, but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This, it is claimed, allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility. In Reformed epistemology, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible world view. Anti-foundationalism rejects foundationalism and denies there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge. See also Doxastic logic First principle Mental model Mental representation Mindset Paradigm Set (psychology) Schema (psychology) Worldview Notes and references Belief Concepts in epistemology Foundationalism

Fact–value distinction

The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between: Statements of fact (positive or descriptive statements), which are based upon reason and observation, and examined via the empirical method. Statements of value (normative or prescriptive statements), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology. This barrier between fact and value, as construed in epistemology, implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter. The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume. The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics. David Hume's skepticism In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), David Hume discusses the problems in grounding normative statements in positive statements, that is in deriving ought from is. It is generally regarded that Hume considered such derivations untenable, and his 'is–ought' problem is considered a principal question of moral philosophy. Hume shared a political viewpoint with early Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704). Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs. In effect, Hume contended that such hostilities are not found in nature, but are a human creation, depending on a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict. Prior to Hume, Aristotelian philosophy maintained that all actions and causes were to be interpreted teleologically. This rendered all facts about human action examinable under a normative framework defined by cardinal virtues and capital vices. "Fact" in this sense was not value-free, and the fact-value distinction was an alien concept. The decline of Aristotelianism in the 16th century set the framework in which those theories of knowledge could be revised. Naturalistic fallacy The fact–value distinction is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy, a topic debated in ethical and moral philosophy. G. E. Moore believed it essential to all ethical thinking. However, contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot have called into question the validity of such assumptions. Others, such as Ruth Anna Putnam, argue that even the most "scientific" of disciplines are affected by the "values" of those who research and practice the vocation. Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact–value distinction is derived from the manner in which modern social science has used the fact–value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines. Moralistic fallacy The fact–value distinction is also closely related to the moralistic fallacy, an invalid inference of factual conclusions from purely evaluative premises. For example, an invalid inference "Because everybody ought to be equal, there are no innate genetic differences between people" is an instance of the moralistic fallacy. Where the naturalistic fallacy attempts to move from an "is" to an "ought" statement, the moralistic fallacy attempts to move from an "ought" to an "is" statement. Nietzsche's table of values Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra said that a table of values hangs above every great people. Nietzsche argues that what is common among different peoples is the act of esteeming, of creating values, even if the values are different from one people to the next. Nietzsche asserts that what made people great was not the content of their beliefs, but the act of valuing. Thus the values a community strives to articulate are not as important as the collective will to act on those values. The willing is more essential than the intrinsic worth of the goal itself, according to Nietzsche. "A thousand goals have there been so far," says Zarathustra, "for there are a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. Humanity still has no goal." Hence, the title of the aphorism, "On The Thousand And One Goals." The idea that one value-system is no more worthy than the next, although it may not be directly ascribed to Nietzsche, has become a common premise in modern social science. Max Weber and Martin Heidegger absorbed it and made it their own. It shaped their philosophical endeavor, as well as their political understanding. Religion and science In his essay Science as a Vocation (1917) Max Weber draws a distinction between facts and values. He argues that facts can be determined through the methods of a value-free, objective social science, while values are derived through culture and religion, the truth of which cannot be known through science. He writes, "it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the value of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems." In his 1919 essay Politics as a Vocation, he argues that facts, like actions, do not in themselves contain any intrinsic meaning or power: "any ethic in the world could establish substantially identical commandments applicable to all relationships." According to Martin Luther King Jr., "Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values. The two are not rivals. They are complementary." He stated that science keeps religion from "crippling irrationalism and paralyzing obscurantism" whereas Religion prevents science from "falling into ... obsolete materialism and moral nihilism." Albert Einstein remarked that Criticisms Virtually all modern philosophers affirm some sort of fact–value distinction, insofar as they distinguish between science and "valued" disciplines such as ethics, aesthetics, or the fine arts. However, philosophers such as Hilary Putnam argue that the distinction between fact and value is not as absolute as Hume envisioned. Philosophical pragmatists, for instance, believe that true propositions are those that are useful or effective in predicting future (empirical) states of affairs. Far from being value-free, the pragmatists' conception of truth or facts directly relates to an end (namely, empirical predictability) that human beings regard as normatively desirable. Other thinkers, such as N. Hanson among others, talk of theory-ladenness, and reject an absolutist fact–value distinction by contending that our senses are imbued with prior conceptualizations, making it impossible to have any observation that is totally value-free, which is how Hume and the later positivists conceived of facts. Functionalist counterexamples Several counterexamples have been offered by philosophers claiming to show that there are cases when an evaluative statement does indeed logically follow from a factual statement. A. N. Prior argues, from the statement "He is a sea captain," that it logically follows, "He ought to do what a sea captain ought to do." Alasdair MacIntyre argues, from the statement "This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and too heavy to carry about comfortably," that the evaluative conclusion validly follows, "This is a bad watch." John Searle argues, from the statement "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars," that it logically follows that "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars", such that the act of promising by definition places the promiser under obligation. Moral realism Philippa Foot adopts a moral realist position, criticizing the idea that when evaluation is superposed on fact there has been a "committal in a new dimension". She introduces, by analogy, the practical implications of using the word "injury". Not just anything counts as an injury. There must be some impairment. When we suppose a man wants the things the injury prevents him from obtaining, haven’t we fallen into the old naturalist fallacy? Foot argues that the virtues, like hands and eyes in the analogy, play so large a part in so many operations that it is implausible to suppose that a committal in a non-naturalist dimension is necessary to demonstrate their goodness. Of Weber Philosopher Leo Strauss criticizes Weber for attempting to isolate reason completely from opinion. Strauss acknowledges the philosophical trouble of deriving "ought" from "is", but argues that what Weber has done in his framing of this puzzle is in fact deny altogether that the "ought" is within reach of human reason. Strauss worries that if Weber is right, we are left with a world in which the knowable truth is a truth that cannot be evaluated according to ethical standards. This conflict between ethics and politics would mean that there can be no grounding for any valuation of the good, and without reference to values, facts lose their meaning. See also Baden School Empiricism Is–ought problem Non-overlapping magisteria Relativism References Bibliography Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 1739–1740 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 1883–1891. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin, 1969 Silvestri P. (ed.), L. Einaudi, On Abstract and Historical Hypotheses and on Value judgments in Economic Sciences, Critical edition with an Introduction and Afterword by Paolo Silvestri, Routledge, London & New York, 2017. Concepts in epistemology Belief Conceptual distinctions Value (ethics) Religion and science Concepts in aesthetics

TESCREAL

TESCREAL is an acronym neologism proposed by computer scientist Timnit Gebru and philosopher Émile P. Torres that stands for "transhumanism, extropianism, singularitarianism, cosmism, rationalism, effective altruism, and longtermism". Gebru and Torres argue that these ideologies should be treated as an "interconnected and overlapping" group with shared origins. They say this is a movement that allows its proponents to use the threat of human extinction to justify expensive or detrimental projects. They consider it pervasive in social and academic circles in Silicon Valley centered around artificial intelligence. As such, the acronym is sometimes used to criticize a perceived belief system associated with Big Tech. Origin Gebru and Torres coined "TESCREAL" in 2023, first using it in a draft of a paper titled "The TESCREAL bundle: Eugenics and the promise of utopia through artificial general intelligence". First Monday published the paper in April 2024, though Torres and Gebru popularized the term elsewhere before the paper's publication. According to Gebru and Torres, transhumanism, extropianism, singularitarianism, (modern) cosmism, rationalism, effective altruism, and longtermism are a "bundle" of "interconnected and overlapping ideologies" that emerged from 20th-century eugenics, with shared progenitors. They use the term "TESCREAList" to refer to people who subscribe to, or appear to endorse, most or all of the ideologies captured in the acronym. Analysis According to critics of these philosophies, TESCREAL describes overlapping movements endorsed by prominent people in the tech industry to provide intellectual backing to pursue and prioritize projects including artificial general intelligence (AGI), life extension, and space colonization. Science fiction author Charles Stross, using the example of space colonization, argued that the ideologies allow billionaires to pursue massive personal projects driven by a right-wing interpretation of science fiction by arguing that not to pursue such projects poses an existential risk to society. Gebru and Torres write that, using the threat of extinction, TESCREALists can justify "attempts to build unscoped systems which are inherently unsafe". Media scholar Ethan Zuckerman argues that by only considering goals that are valuable to the TESCREAL movement, futuristic projects with more immediate drawbacks, such as racial inequity, algorithmic bias, and environmental degradation, can be justified. Speaking at Radio New Zealand, politics writer Danyl McLauchlan said that many of these philosophies may have started off with good intentions but might have been pushed "to a point of ridiculousness." Philosopher Yogi Hale Hendlin has argued that by both ignoring the human causes of societal problems and over-engineering solutions, TESCREALists ignore the context in which many problems arise. Camille Sojit Pejcha wrote in Document Journal that TESCREAL is a tool for tech elites to concentrate power. In The Washington Spectator, Dave Troy called TESCREAL an "ends justifies the means" movement that is antithetical to "democratic, inclusive, fair, patient, and just governance". Gil Duran wrote that "TESCREAL", "authoritarian technocracy", and "techno-optimism" were phrases used in early 2024 to describe a new ideology emerging in the tech industry. Gebru, Torres, and others have likened TESCREAL to a secular religion due to its parallels to Christian theology and eschatology. Writers in Current Affairs compared these philosophies and the ensuing techno-optimism to "any other monomaniacal faith... in which doubters are seen as enemies and beliefs are accepted without evidence". They argue pursuing TESCREAL would prevent an actual equitable shared future. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Much of the discourse about existential risk from AGI occurs among supporters of the TESCREAL ideologies. TESCREALists are either considered "AI accelerationists", who consider AI the only way to pursue a utopian future where problems are solved, or "AI doomers", who consider AI likely to be unaligned to human survival and likely to cause human extinction. Despite the risk, many doomers consider the development of AGI inevitable and argue that only by developing and aligning AGI first can existential risk be averted. Gebru has likened the conflict between accelerationists and doomers to a "secular religion selling AGI enabled utopia and apocalypse". Torres and Gebru argue that both groups use hypothetical AI-driven apocalypses and utopian futures to justify unlimited research, development, and deregulation of technology. By considering only far-reaching future consequences, creating hype for unproven technology, and fear-mongering, Torres and Gebru allege TESCREALists distract from the impacts of technology that may adversely affect society, disproportionately harm minorities through algorithmic bias, and have a detrimental impact on the environment. Pharmaceuticals Neşe Devenot has used the TESCREAL acronym to refer to "global financial and tech elites" who promote new uses of psychedelic drugs as mental health treatments, not because they want to help people, but so that they can make money on the sale of these pharmaceuticals as part of a plan to increase inequality. Claimed bias against minorities Gebru and Torres claim that TESCREAL ideologies directly originate from 20th-century eugenics and that the bundle of ideologies advocates a second wave of new eugenics. Others have similarly argued that the TESCREAL ideologies developed from earlier philosophies that were used to justify mass murder and genocide. Some prominent figures who have contributed to TESCREAL ideologies have been alleged to be racist and sexist. McLauchlan has said that, while "some people in these groups want to genetically engineer superintelligent humans, or replace the entire species with a superior form of intelligence" others "like the effective altruists, for example, most of them are just in it to help very poor people ... they are kind of shocked ... that they've been lumped into this malevolent ... eugenics conspiracy". Criticism and debate Writing in Asterisk, a magazine related to effective altruism, Ozy Brennan criticized Gebru's and Torres's grouping of different philosophies as if they were a "monolithic" movement. Brennan argues Torres has misunderstood these different philosophies, and has taken philosophical thought experiments out of context. James Pethokoukis, of the American Enterprise Institute, disagrees with criticizing proponents of TESCREAL. He argues that the tech billionaires criticized in a Scientific American article for allegedly espousing TESCREAL have significantly advanced society. McLauchlan has noted that critics of the TESCREAL bundle have objected to what they see as disparate and sometimes conflicting ideologies being grouped together, but opines that TESCREAL is a good way to describe and consolidate many of the "grand bizarre ideologies in Silicon Valley". Eli Sennesh and James Hughes, publishing in the blog for the transhumanist Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, have argued that TESCREAL is a left-wing conspiracy theory that unnecessarily groups disparate philosophies together without understanding the mutually exclusive tenets in each. According to Torres, "If advanced technologies continue to be developed at the current rate, a global-scale catastrophe is almost certainly a matter of when rather than if." Torres believes that "perhaps the only way to actually attain a state of 'existential security' is to slow down or completely halt further technological innovation", and criticized the longtermist view that technology, although dangerous, is essential for human civilization to achieve its full potential. Brennan contends that Torres's proposal to slow or halt technological development represents a more extreme position than TESCREAL ideologies, preventing many improvements in quality of life, healthcare, and poverty reduction that technological progress enables. Alleged TESCREALists Venture capitalist Marc Andreessen has self-identified as a TESCREAList. He published the "Techno-Optimist Manifesto" in October 2023, which Jag Bhalla and Nathan J. Robinson have called a "perfect example" of the TESCREAL ideologies. In the document, he argues that more advanced artificial intelligence could save countless future potential lives, and that those working to slow or prevent its development should be condemned as murderers. Elon Musk has been described as sympathetic to some TESCREAL ideologies. In August 2022, Musk tweeted that William MacAskill's longtermist book What We Owe the Future was a "close match for my philosophy". Some writers believe Musk's Neuralink pursues TESCREAList goals. Some AI experts have complained about the focus of Musk's XAI company on existential risk, arguing that it and other AI companies have ties to TESCREAL movements. Dave Troy believes Musk's natalist views originate from TESCREAL ideals. It has also been suggested that Peter Thiel is sympathetic to TESCREAL ideas. Benjamin Svetkey wrote in The Hollywood Reporter that Thiel and other Silicon Valley CEOs who support the Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign are pushing for policies that would shut down "regulators whose outdated restrictions on things like human experimentation are slowing down progress toward a technotopian paradise". Sam Altman and much of the OpenAI board has been described as supporting TESCREAL movements, especially in the context of his attempted firing in 2023. Gebru and Torres have urged Altman not to pursue TESCREAL ideals. Lorraine Redaud writing in Charlie Hebdo described Sam Altman and multiple other Silicon Valley executives as supporting TESCREAL ideals. Self-identified transhumanists Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky, both influential in discussions of existential risk from AI, have also been described as leaders of the TESCREAL movement. Redaud said Bostrom supported some ideals "in line with the TESCREALists movement". Sam Bankman-Fried, former CEO of the FTX cryptocurrency exchange, was a prominent and self-identified member of the effective altruist community. According to The Guardian, since FTX's collapse, administrators of the bankruptcy estate have been trying to recoup about $5 million that they allege was transferred to a nonprofit to help secure the purchase of a historic hotel that has been repurposed for conferences and workshops associated with longtermism, rationalism, and effective altruism. The property hosted liberal eugenicists and other speakers the Guardian said had racist and misogynistic histories. Longtermist and effective altruist William MacAskill, who frequently collaborated with Bankman-Fried to coordinate philanthropic initiatives, has been described as a TESCREAList. See also Effective accelerationism Utilitarianism The Californian Ideology References 2023 neologisms Acronyms Effective altruism Ethical theories Ethics of science and technology Eugenics Existential risk from artificial general intelligence Extropianism Futures studies Ideologies Philosophy of artificial intelligence Philosophy of technology Rationalism Singularitarianism Subcultures Transhumanism Political neologisms Natalism

Deism

Deism ( or ; derived from the Latin term deus, meaning "god") is the philosophical position and rationalistic theology that generally rejects revelation as a source of divine knowledge and asserts that empirical reason and observation of the natural world are exclusively logical, reliable, and sufficient to determine the existence of a Supreme Being as the creator of the universe. More simply stated, Deism is the belief in the existence of God—often, but not necessarily, an impersonal and incomprehensible God who does not intervene in the universe after creating it, solely based on rational thought without any reliance on revealed religions or religious authority. Deism emphasizes the concept of natural theology—that is, God's existence is revealed through nature. Since the 17th century and during the Age of Enlightenment, especially in 18th-century England, France, and North America, various Western philosophers and theologians formulated a critical rejection of the several religious texts belonging to the many organized religions, and began to appeal only to truths that they felt could be established by reason as the exclusive source of divine knowledge. Such philosophers and theologians were called "Deists", and the philosophical/theological position they advocated is called "Deism". Deism as a distinct philosophical and intellectual movement declined toward the end of the 18th century but had a revival in the early 19th century. Some of its tenets continued as part of other intellectual and spiritual movements, like Unitarianism, and Deism continues to have advocates today, including with modern variants such as Christian deism and pandeism. Early developments Ancient history Deistical thinking has existed since ancient times; the roots of Deism can be traced back to the philosophical tradition of Ancient Greece. The 3rd-century Christian theologian and philosopher Clement of Alexandria explicitly mentioned persons who believed that God was not involved in human affairs, and therefore led what he considered a licentious life. However, Deism did not develop as a religio-philosophical movement until after the Scientific Revolution, which began in the mid-16th century in early modern Europe. Divinity schools in Islamic theology In the history of Islam, one of the earliest systematic schools of Islamic theology to develop was the Muʿtazila in the mid-8th century CE. Muʿtazilite theologians emphasized the use of reason and rational thought, positing that the injunctions of God are accessible through rational thought and inquiry, and affirmed that the Quran was created (makhlūq) rather than co-eternal with God, an affirmation that would develop into one of the most contentious questions in the history of Islamic theology. In the 9th–10th century CE, the Ashʿarī school developed as a response to the Muʿtazila, founded by the 10th-century Muslim scholar and theologian Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. Ashʿarītes still taught the use of reason in understanding the Quran, but denied the possibility to deduce moral truths by reasoning. This position was opposed by the Māturīdī school; according to its founder, the 10th-century Muslim scholar and theologian Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, human reason is supposed to acknowledge the existence of a creator deity (bāriʾ) solely based on rational thought and independently from divine revelation. He shared this conviction with his teacher and predecessor Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān (8th century CE), whereas al-Ashʿarī never held such a view. According to the Afghan-American philosopher Sayed Hassan Hussaini, the early schools of Islamic theology and theological beliefs among classical Muslim philosophers are characterized by "a rich color of Deism with a slight disposition toward theism". Origins of Deism The terms deism and theism are both derived from words meaning "god": the Latin term deus and the Ancient Greek term theós (θεός), respectively. The word déiste first appeared in French in 1563 in a theological treatise written by the Swiss Calvinist theologian named Pierre Viret, but Deism was generally unknown in the Kingdom of France until the 1690s when Pierre Bayle published his famous Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, which contained an article on Viret. In English, the words deist and theist were originally synonymous, but by the 17th century the terms started to diverge in meaning. The term deist with its current meaning first appears in English in Robert Burton's The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621). Herbert of Cherbury and early English Deism The first major statement of Deism in English is Lord Herbert of Cherbury's book De Veritate (1624). Lord Herbert, like his contemporary Descartes, searched for the foundations of knowledge. The first two-thirds of his book De Veritate (On Truth, as It Is Distinguished from Revelation, the Probable, the Possible, and the False) are devoted to an exposition of Herbert's theory of knowledge. Herbert distinguished truths from experience and distinguished reasoning about experience from innate and revealed truths. Innate truths are imprinted on our minds, as evidenced by their universal acceptance. Herbert referred to universally accepted truths as notitiae communes—Common Notions. Herbert believed there were five Common Notions that unify all religious beliefs. There is one Supreme God. God ought to be worshipped. Virtue and piety are the main parts of divine worship. We ought to be remorseful for our sins and repent. Divine goodness dispenses rewards and punishments, both in this life and after it. Herbert himself had relatively few followers, and it was not until the 1680s that Herbert found a true successor in Charles Blount (1654 – 1693). The peak of Deism (1696–1801) The appearance of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) marks an important turning-point and new phase in the history of English Deism. Lord Herbert's epistemology was based on the idea of "common notions" (or innate ideas). Locke's Essay was an attack on the foundation of innate ideas. After Locke, deists could no longer appeal to innate ideas as Herbert had done. Instead, deists were forced to turn to arguments based on experience and nature. Under the influence of Newton, they turned to the argument from design as the principal argument for the existence of God. Peter Gay identifies John Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious (1696), and the "vehement response" it provoked, as the beginning of post-Lockian Deism. Among the notable figures, Gay describes Toland and Matthew Tindal as the best known; however, Gay considered them to be talented publicists rather than philosophers or scholars. He regards Conyers Middleton and Anthony Collins as contributing more to the substance of debate, in contrast with fringe writers such as Thomas Chubb and Thomas Woolston. Other English Deists prominent during the period include William Wollaston, Charles Blount, Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, and, in the latter part, Peter Annet, Thomas Chubb, and Thomas Morgan. Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury was also influential; though not presenting himself as a Deist, he shared many of the deists' key attitudes and is now usually regarded as a Deist. Especially noteworthy is Matthew Tindal's Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), which became, very soon after its publication, the focal center of the Deist controversy. Because almost every argument, quotation, and issue raised for decades can be found here, the work is often termed "the Deist's Bible". Following Locke's successful attack on innate ideas, Tindal's "Bible" redefined the foundation of Deist epistemology as knowledge based on experience or human reason. This effectively widened the gap between traditional Christians and what he called "Christian Deists", since this new foundation required that "revealed" truth be validated through human reason. Enlightenment Deism Aspects of Deism in Enlightenment philosophy Enlightenment Deism consisted of two philosophical assertions: (1) reason, along with features of the natural world, is a valid source of religious knowledge, and (2) revelation is not a valid source of religious knowledge. Different Deist philosophers expanded on these two assertions to create what Leslie Stephen later termed the "constructive" and "critical" aspects of Deism. "Constructive" assertions—assertions that deist writers felt were justified by appeals to reason and features of the natural world (or perhaps were intuitively obvious or common notions)—included: God exists and created the universe. God gave humans the ability to reason. "Critical" assertions—assertions that followed from the denial of revelation as a valid source of religious knowledge—were much more numerous, and included: Rejection of all books (including the Quran and the Bible) that claimed to contain divine revelation. Rejection of the incomprehensible notion of the Trinity and other religious "mysteries". Rejection of reports of miracles, prophecies, etc. The origins of religion A central premise of Deism was that the religions of their day were corruptions of an original religion that was pure, natural, simple, and rational. Humanity lost this original religion when it was subsequently corrupted by priests who manipulated it for personal gain and for the class interests of the priesthood, and encrusted it with superstitions and "mysteries"—irrational theological doctrines. Deists referred to this manipulation of religious doctrine as "priestcraft", a derogatory term. For deists, this corruption of natural religion was designed to keep laypeople baffled by "mysteries" and dependent on the priesthood for information about the requirements for salvation. This gave the priesthood a great deal of power, which the Deists believed the priesthood worked to maintain and increase. Deists saw it as their mission to strip away "priestcraft" and "mysteries". Tindal, perhaps the most prominent deist writer, claimed that this was the proper, original role of the Christian Church. One implication of this premise was that current-day primitive societies, or societies that existed in the distant past, should have religious beliefs less infused with superstitions and closer to those of natural theology. This position became less and less plausible as thinkers such as David Hume began studying the natural history of religion and suggested that the origin of religion was not in reason but in emotions, such as the fear of the unknown. Immortality of the soul Different Deists had different beliefs about the immortality of the soul, about the existence of Hell and damnation to punish the wicked, and the existence of Heaven to reward the virtuous. Anthony Collins, Bolingbroke, Thomas Chubb, and Peter Annet were materialists and either denied or doubted the immortality of the soul. Benjamin Franklin believed in reincarnation or resurrection. Lord Herbert of Cherbury and William Wollaston held that souls exist, survive death, and in the afterlife are rewarded or punished by God for their behavior in life. Thomas Paine believed in the "probability" of the immortality of the soul. Miracles and divine providence The most natural position for Deists was to reject all forms of supernaturalism, including the miracle stories in the Bible. The problem was that the rejection of miracles also seemed to entail the rejection of divine providence (that is, God taking a hand in human affairs), something that many Deists were inclined to accept. Those who believed in a watch-maker God rejected the possibility of miracles and divine providence. They believed that God, after establishing natural laws and setting the cosmos in motion, stepped away. He did not need to keep tinkering with his creation, and the suggestion that he did was insulting. Others, however, firmly believed in divine providence, and so, were reluctantly forced to accept at least the possibility of miracles. God was, after all, all-powerful and could do whatever he wanted including temporarily suspending his own natural laws. Freedom and necessity Enlightenment philosophers under the influence of Newtonian science tended to view the universe as a vast machine, created and set in motion by a creator being, that continues to operate according to natural law without any divine intervention. This view naturally led to what was then called "necessitarianism" (the modern term is "determinism"): the view that everything in the universe—including human behavior—is completely, causally determined by antecedent circumstances and natural law. (See, for example, La Mettrie's L'Homme machine.) As a consequence, debates about freedom versus "necessity" were a regular feature of Enlightenment religious and philosophical discussions. Reflecting the intellectual climate of the time, there were differences among Deists about freedom and determinism. Some, such as Anthony Collins, were actually necessitarians. David Hume Views differ on whether David Hume was a Deist, an atheist, or something else. Like the Deists, Hume rejected revelation, and his famous essay On Miracles provided a powerful argument against belief in miracles. On the other hand, he did not believe that an appeal to Reason could provide any justification for religion. In the essay Natural History of Religion (1757), he contended that polytheism, not monotheism, was "the first and most ancient religion of mankind" and that the psychological basis of religion is not reason, but fear of the unknown. In Waring's words: Deism in the United States The Thirteen Colonies of North America – which became the United States of America after the American Revolution in 1776 – were part of the British Empire, and Americans, as British subjects, were influenced by and participated in the intellectual life of the Kingdom of Great Britain. English Deism was an important influence on the thinking of Thomas Jefferson and the principles of religious freedom asserted in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Other Founding Fathers who were influenced to various degrees by Deism were Ethan Allen, Benjamin Franklin, Cornelius Harnett, Gouverneur Morris, Hugh Williamson, James Madison, and possibly Alexander Hamilton. In the United States, there is a great deal of controversy over whether the Founding Fathers were Christians, Deists, or something in between. Particularly heated is the debate over the beliefs of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington. In his Autobiography, Franklin wrote that as a young man "Some books against Deism fell into my hands; they were said to be the substance of sermons preached at Boyle's lectures. It happened that they wrought an effect on me quite contrary to what was intended by them; for the arguments of the Deists, which were quoted to be refuted, appeared to me much stronger than the refutations; in short, I soon became a thorough Deist." Like some other Deists, Franklin believed that, "The Deity sometimes interferes by his particular Providence, and sets aside the Events which would otherwise have been produc'd in the Course of Nature, or by the Free Agency of Man," and at the Constitutional Convention stated that "the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth—that God governs in the affairs of men." Thomas Jefferson is perhaps the Founding Father who most clearly exhibits Deistic tendencies, although he generally referred to himself as a Unitarian rather than a Deist. His excerpts of the canonical gospels (now commonly known as the Jefferson Bible) strip all supernatural and dogmatic references from the narrative on Jesus' life. Like Franklin, Jefferson believed in God's continuing activity in human affairs. Thomas Paine is especially noteworthy both for his contributions to the cause of the American Revolution and for his writings in defense of Deism, alongside the criticism of Abrahamic religions. In The Age of Reason (1793–1794) and other writings, he advocated Deism, promoted reason and freethought, and argued against institutionalized religions in general and the Christian doctrine in particular. The Age of Reason was short, readable, and probably the only Deistic treatise that continues to be read and influential today. The last contributor to American Deism was Elihu Palmer (1764–1806), who wrote the "Bible of American Deism", Principles of Nature, in 1801. Palmer is noteworthy for attempting to bring some organization to Deism by founding the "Deistical Society of New York" and other Deistic societies from Maine to Georgia. Deism in France and continental Europe France had its own tradition of religious skepticism and natural theology in the works of Montaigne, Pierre Bayle, and Montesquieu. The most famous of the French Deists was Voltaire, who was exposed to Newtonian science and English Deism during his two-year period of exile in England (1726–1728). When he returned to France, he brought both back with him, and exposed the French reading public (i.e., the aristocracy) to them, in a number of books. French Deists also included Maximilien Robespierre and Rousseau. During the French Revolution (1789–1799), the Deistic Cult of the Supreme Being—a direct expression of Robespierre's theological views—was established briefly (just under three months) as the new state religion of France, replacing the deposed Catholic Church and the rival atheistic Cult of Reason. There were over five hundred French Revolutionaries who were deists. These deists do not fit the stereotype of deists because they believed in miracles and often prayed to God. In fact, over seventy of them thought that God miraculously helped the French Revolution win victories over their enemies. Furthermore, over a hundred French Revolutionary deists also wrote prayers and hymns to God. Citizen Devillere was one of the many French Revolutionary deists who believed God did miracles. Devillere said, "God, who conducts our destiny, deigned to concern himself with our dangers. He commanded the spirit of victory to direct the hand of the faithful French, and in a few hours the aristocrats received the attack which we prepared, the wicked ones were destroyed and liberty was avenged." Deism in Germany is not well documented. We know from correspondence with Voltaire that Frederick the Great was a Deist. Immanuel Kant's identification with Deism is controversial. Decline of Enlightenment Deism Peter Gay describes Enlightenment Deism as entering slow decline as a recognizable movement in the 1730s. A number of reasons have been suggested for this decline, including: The increasing influence of naturalism and materialism. The writings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant raising questions about the ability of reason to address metaphysical questions. The violence of the French Revolution. Christian revivalist movements, such as Pietism and Methodism (which emphasized a personal relationship with God), along with the rise of anti-rationalist and counter-Enlightenment philosophies such as that of Johann Georg Hamann. Although Deism has declined in popularity over time, scholars believe that these ideas still have a lingering influence on modern society. One of the major activities of the Deists, biblical criticism, evolved into its own highly technical discipline. Deist rejection of revealed religion evolved into, and contributed to, 19th-century liberal British theology and the rise of Unitarianism. Contemporary Deism Contemporary Deism attempts to integrate classical Deism with modern philosophy and the current state of scientific knowledge. This attempt has produced a wide variety of personal beliefs under the broad classification of belief of "deism." There are a number of subcategories of modern Deism, including monodeism (the default, standard concept of deism), pandeism, panendeism, spiritual deism, process deism, Christian deism, polydeism, scientific deism, and humanistic deism. Some deists see design in nature and purpose in the universe and in their lives. Others see God and the universe in a co-creative process. Some deists view God in classical terms as observing humanity but not directly intervening in our lives, while others see God as a subtle and persuasive spirit who created the world, and then stepped back to observe. Recent philosophical discussions of Deism In the 1960s, theologian Charles Hartshorne scrupulously examined and rejected both deism and pandeism (as well as pantheism) in favor of a conception of God whose characteristics included "absolute perfection in some respects, relative perfection in all others" or "AR," writing that this theory "is able consistently to embrace all that is positive in either deism or pandeism," concluding that "panentheistic doctrine contains all of deism and pandeism except their arbitrary negations." Charles Taylor, in his 2007 book A Secular Age, showed the historical role of Deism, leading to what he calls an "exclusive humanism". This humanism invokes a moral order whose ontic commitment is wholly intra-human with no reference to transcendence. One of the special achievements of such deism-based humanism is that it discloses new, anthropocentric moral sources by which human beings are motivated and empowered to accomplish acts of mutual benefit. This is the province of a buffered, disengaged self, which is the locus of dignity, freedom, and discipline, and is endowed with a sense of human capability. According to Taylor, by the early 19th century this Deism-mediated exclusive humanism developed as an alternative to Christian faith in a personal God and an order of miracles and mystery. Some critics of Deism have accused adherents of facilitating the rise of nihilism. Deism in Nazi Germany In Nazi Germany, Gottgläubig (literally: "believing in God") was a Nazi religious term for a form of non-denominationalism practised by those German citizens who had officially left Christian churches but professed faith in some higher power or divine creator. Such people were called Gottgläubige ("believers in God"), and the term for the overall movement was Gottgläubigkeit ("belief in God"); the term denotes someone who still believes in a God, although without having any institutional religious affiliation. These National Socialists were not favourable towards religious institutions of their time, nor did they tolerate atheism of any type within their ranks. The 1943 Philosophical Dictionary defined Gottgläubig as: "official designation for those who profess a specific kind of piety and morality, without being bound to a church denomination, whilst however also rejecting irreligion and godlessness." The Gottgläubigkeit is considered a form of deism, and was "predominantly based on creationist and deistic views". In the 1920 National Socialist Programme of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), Adolf Hitler first mentioned the phrase "Positive Christianity". The Nazi Party did not wish to tie itself to a particular Christian denomination, but with Christianity in general, and sought freedom of religion for all denominations "so long as they do not endanger its existence or oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race" (point 24). When Hitler and the NSDAP got into power in 1933, they sought to assert state control over the churches, on the one hand through the Reichskonkordat with the Roman Catholic Church, and the forced merger of the German Evangelical Church Confederation into the Protestant Reich Church on the other. This policy seems to have gone relatively well until late 1936, when a "gradual worsening of relations" between the Nazi Party and the churches saw the rise of Kirchenaustritt ("leaving the Church"). Although there was no top-down official directive to revoke church membership, some Nazi Party members started doing so voluntarily and put other members under pressure to follow their example. Those who left the churches were designated as Gottgläubige ("believers in God"), a term officially recognised by the Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick on 26 November 1936. He stressed that the term signified political disassociation from the churches, not an act of religious apostasy. The term "dissident", which some church leavers had used up until then, was associated with being "without belief" (glaubenslos), whilst most of them emphasized that they still believed in a God, and thus required a different word. A census in May 1939, six years into the Nazi era, and after the annexation of the mostly Catholic Federal State of Austria and mostly Catholic German-occupied Czechoslovakia into German-occupied Europe, indicates that 54% of the population considered itself Protestant, 41% considered itself Catholic, 3.5% self-identified as Gottgläubig, and 1.5% as "atheist". Deism in Turkey An early April 2018 report of the Turkish Ministry of Education, titled The Youth is Sliding towards Deism, observed that an increasing number of pupils in İmam Hatip schools was repudiating Islam in favour of Deism (irreligious belief in a creator God). The report's publication generated large-scale controversy in the Turkish press and society at large, as well as amongst conservative Islamic sects, Muslim clerics, and Islamist parties in Turkey. The progressive Muslim theologian Mustafa Öztürk noted the Deistic trend among Turkish people a year earlier, arguing that the "very archaic, dogmatic notion of religion" held by the majority of those claiming to represent Islam was causing "the new generations [to become] indifferent, even distant, to the Islamic worldview." Despite a lack of reliable statistical data, numerous anecdotes and independent surveys appear to point in this direction. Although some commentators claim that the secularization of Turkey is merely a result of Western influence or even an alleged "conspiracy", other commentators, even some pro-government ones, have come to the conclusion that "the real reason for the loss of faith in Islam is not the West but Turkey itself". Deism in the United States Though Deism subsided in the United States post-Enlightenment, it never died out entirely. Thomas Edison, for example, was heavily influenced by Thomas Paine's The Age of Reason. Edison defended Paine's "scientific deism", saying, "He has been called an atheist, but atheist he was not. Paine believed in a supreme intelligence, as representing the idea which other men often express by the name of deity." In 1878, Edison joined the Theosophical Society in New Jersey, but according to its founder, Helena Blavatsky, he was not a very active member. In an October 2, 1910, interview in the New York Times Magazine, Edison stated: Edison was labeled an atheist for those remarks, and although he did not allow himself to be drawn into the controversy publicly, he clarified himself in a private letter: He also stated, "I do not believe in the God of the theologians; but that there is a Supreme Intelligence I do not doubt." The 2001 American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) report estimated that between 1990 and 2001 the number of self-identifying Deists grew from 6,000 to 49,000, representing about 0.02% of the U.S. population at the time. The 2008 ARIS survey found, based on their stated beliefs rather than their religious identification, that 70% of Americans believe in a personal God: roughly 12% are atheists or agnostics, and 12% believe in "a deist or paganistic concept of the Divine as a higher power" rather than a personal God. The term "ceremonial deism" was coined in 1962 and has been used since 1984 by the Supreme Court of the United States to assess exemptions from the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, thought to be expressions of cultural tradition and not earnest invocations of a deity. It has been noted that the term does not describe any school of thought within Deism itself. See also American Enlightenment Atheism during the Age of Enlightenment Ceremonial deism Deism in England and France in the 18th century Deistic evolution Great Architect of the Universe Ietsism Infinitism List of deists Moralistic therapeutic deism Nicodemite Non-physical entity Nontheism Philosophical theism Religious affiliations of presidents of the United States Religious interpretations of the Big Bang theory Spiritual but not religious Theistic rationalism Transcendentalism Unitarian Universalism References Notes Citations Bibliography Histories Betts, C. J. Early Deism in France: From the so-called 'deistes' of Lyon (1564) to Voltaire's 'Lettres philosophiques' (1734) (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) Craig, William Lane. The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus During the Deist Controversy (Edwin Mellen, 1985) Hazard, Paul. European thought in the eighteenth century from Montesquieu to Lessing (1954). pp 393–434. Hudson, Wayne. Enlightenment and modernity: The English deists and reform (Routledge, 2015). Israel, Jonathan I. Enlightenment contested: philosophy, modernity, and the emancipation of man 1670-1752 (Oxford UP, 2006). Lemay, J. A. Leo, ed.Deism, Masonry, and the Enlightenment. Essays Honoring Alfred Owen Aldridge. (U of Delaware Press, 1987). Lucci, Diego. Scripture and deism: The biblical criticism of the eighteenth-century British deists (Peter Lang, 2008). McKee, David Rice. Simon Tyssot de Patot and the Seventeenth-Century Background of Critical Deism (Johns Hopkins Press, 1941) Orr, John. English Deism: Its Roots and Its Fruits (1934) Schlereth, Eric R. An Age of Infidels: The Politics of Religious Controversy in the Early United States (U of Pennsylvania Press; 2013) 295 pages; on conflicts between deists and their opponents. Willey, Basil. The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period (1940) Yoder, Timothy S. Hume on God: Irony, deism and genuine theism (Bloomsbury, 2008). Primary sources Deism: An Anthology by Peter Gay (Van Nostrand, 1968) Deism and Natural Religion: A Source Book by E. Graham Waring (Frederick Ungar, 1967) The American Deists: Voices of Reason & Dissent in the Early Republic by Kerry S. Walters (University of Kansas Press, 1992), which includes an extensive bibliographic essay by Bob Johnson, founder of the World Union of Deists by Bob Johnson by Bob Johnson Secondary sources Further reading External links

The Archaeology of Knowledge

The Archaeology of Knowledge (L’archéologie du savoir, 1969) by Michel Foucault is a treatise about the methodology and historiography of the systems of thought (epistemes) and of knowledge (discursive formations) which follow rules that operate beneath the consciousness of the subject individuals, and which define a conceptual system of possibility that determines the boundaries of language and thought used in a given time and domain. The archaeology of knowledge is the analytical method that Foucault used in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961), The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (1963), and The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966). Summary The contemporary study of the History of Ideas concerns the transitions between historical world-views, but ultimately depends upon narrative continuities that break down under close inspection. The history of ideas marks points of discontinuity between broadly defined modes of knowledge, but those existing modes of knowledge are not discrete structures among the complex relations of historical discourse. Discourses emerge and transform according to a complex set of relationships (discursive and institutional) defined by discontinuities and unified themes. An énoncé (statement) is a discourse, a way of speaking; the methodology studies only the “things said” as emergences and transformations, without speculation about the collective meaning of the statements of the things said. A statement is the set of rules that makes an expression — a phrase, a proposition, an act of speech — into meaningful discourse, and is conceptually different from signification; thus, the expression “The gold mountain is in California” is discursively meaningless if it is unrelated to the geographic reality of California. Therefore, the function of existence is necessary for an énoncé (statement) to have a discursive meaning. As a set of rules, the statement has special meaning in the archaeology of knowledge, because it is the rules that render an expression discursively meaningful, while the syntax and the semantics are additional rules that make an expression significative. The structures of syntax and the structures of semantics are insufficient to determine the discursive meaning of an expression; whether or not an expression complies with the rules of discursive meaning, a grammatically correct sentence might lack discursive meaning; inversely, a grammatically incorrect sentence might be discursively meaningful; even when a group of letters are combined in such a way that no recognizable lexical item is formulated can possess discursive meaning, e.g. QWERTY identifies a type of keyboard layout for typewriters and computers. The meaning of an expression depends upon the conditions in which the expression emerges and exists within the discourse of a field or the discourse of a discipline; the discursive meaning of an expression is determined by the statements that precede and follow it. To wit, the énoncés (statements) constitute a network of rules that establish which expressions are discursively meaningful; the rules are the preconditions for signifying propositions, utterances, and acts of speech to have discursive meaning. The analysis then deals with the organized dispersion of statements, discursive formations, and Foucault reiterates that the outlined archaeology of knowledge is one possible method of historical analysis. Reception The philosopher Gilles Deleuze describes The Archaeology of Knowledge as, "the most decisive step yet taken in the theory-practice of multiplicities." See also Foucauldian discourse analysis References Further reading Deleuze, Gilles. 1986. Foucault. Trans. Sean Hand. London: Althone, 1988. . Foucault, Michel. 1969. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. . 1969 non-fiction books Books about discourse analysis Éditions Gallimard books French non-fiction books Philosophy books Works by Michel Foucault

Mootness

The terms moot, mootness and moot point are used in both English and American law, although with different meanings. In the legal system of the United States, a matter is "moot" if further legal proceedings with regard to it can have no effect, or events have placed it beyond the reach of the law. Thereby the matter has been deprived of practical significance or rendered purely academic. The U.S. development of this word stems from the practice of moot courts, in which hypothetical or fictional cases were argued as a part of legal education. These purely academic issues led the U.S. courts to describe cases where developing circumstances made any judgment ineffective as "moot". The terms mootness and moot court should therefore not be confused. The mootness doctrine can be compared to the ripeness doctrine, another court rule (rather than law), that holds that judges should not rule on cases based entirely on anticipated disputes or hypothetical facts. These rules and similar doctrines, taken together, prevent the federal courts of the United States from issuing advisory opinions, as required by the Case or Controversy Clause of the United States Constitution. The usage in the British legal system, on the other hand, is that the term "moot" has the meaning of "remains open to debate" or "remains unresolved". The divergence in usage was first observed in the United States and the extent to which the U.S. definition is used in U.S. jurisprudence and public discourse has ensured it is rarely used in a British courtroom. This is partially to avoid ambiguity, but also because the British definition is rarely relevant in practical cases. U.S. federal courts In the U.S. federal judicial system, a moot case must be dismissed, there being a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The reason for this is that Article Three of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of all federal courts to "cases and controversies". Thus, a civil action or appeal in which the court's decision will not affect the rights of the parties is ordinarily beyond the power of the court to decide, provided it does not fall within one of the recognized exceptions. A textbook example of such a case is the United States Supreme Court case DeFunis v. Odegaard, . The plaintiff was a student who had been denied admission to law school, and had then been provisionally admitted during the pendency of the case. Because the student was slated to graduate within a few months at the time the decision was rendered, and there was no action the law school could take to prevent that, the Court determined that a decision on its part would have no effect on the student's rights. Therefore, the case was dismissed as moot. However, there is disagreement as to both the source of the standards, and their application in the courts. Some courts and observers opine that cases must be dismissed because this is a constitutional bar, and there is no "case or controversy"; others have rejected the pure constitutional approach and adopted a so-called "prudential" view, where dismissal may depend upon a host of factors, whether the particular person has lost a viable interest in the case, or whether the issue itself survives outside the interests of the particular person, whether the circumstance are likely to recur, etc. In actual practice, the U.S. federal courts have been uneven in their decisions, which has led to the accusation that determinations are ad hoc and 'result-oriented.' There are four major exceptions to this mootness rule. These are cases of "voluntary cessation" on the part of the defendant; questions that involve secondary or collateral legal consequences; questions that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review"; and questions involving class actions where the named party ceases to represent the class. Voluntary cessation Where a defendant is acting wrongfully, but as a tactic to avoid an adverse decision, ceases to engage in such conduct once a litigation has been threatened or commenced, the court will still not deem this correction to moot the case. Obviously, a party could stop acting improperly just long enough for the case to be dismissed and then resume the improper conduct. For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., , the Supreme Court held that an industrial polluter, against whom various deterrent civil penalties were being pursued, could not claim that the case was moot, even though the polluter had ceased polluting and had closed the factory responsible for the pollution. The court noted that so long as the polluter still retained its license to operate such a factory, it could open similar operations elsewhere if not deterred by the penalties sought. A separate situation occurs when a court dismisses as "moot" a legal challenge to an existing law, in the case where the law being challenged is either amended or repealed through legislation before the court case could be settled. Since the remedy available for a bad law is simply the removal or changing of the law, the court's decision cannot create an outcome different than that which has already occurred. As such, any decision would merely be advisory, in violation of the Case or Controversy clause. While this sometimes casually referred to as voluntary cessation, the differences in available remedy make it distinct from technical voluntary cessation. A recent instance of this occurred in Moore v. Madigan, where Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan declined to appeal a ruling from the Seventh Circuit striking down Illinois' handgun carry ban to the United States Supreme Court. As Illinois subsequently passed a law legalizing concealed carry with a state-issued license, the appeal would have been moot since the original case or controversy was no longer relevant. Secondary or collateral legal consequences "The obvious fact of life is that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. The mere possibility that this will be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case from ending ignominiously in the limbo of mootness." Sibron v. New York. Capable of repetition, yet evading review A court will allow a case to go forward if it is the type for which persons will frequently be faced with a particular situation, but will likely cease to be in a position where the court can provide a remedy for them in the time that it takes for the justice system to address their situation. The most frequently cited example is the 1973 United States Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade, , which challenged a Texas law forbidding abortion in most circumstances. The state argued that the case was moot because plaintiff Roe was no longer pregnant by the time the case was heard. As Justice Blackmun wrote in the majority opinion: The normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. By contrast, in McCorvey v. Hill, 2004, the case failed to proceed based on being moot, without standing and out of time. The Court cited Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, , which had held that a case was not moot when it presented an issue that was "capable of repetition, yet evading review". Perhaps in response to increasing workloads at all levels of the judiciary, the recent trend in the Supreme Court and other U.S. courts has been to construe this exception rather narrowly. Many cases fall under the "capable of repetition" doctrine; however, because there is a review process available under most circumstances, the exception to declaring mootness did not apply to such cases. In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978), the court noted that claims for damages save cases from mootness. Class action representatives Where a class action lawsuit is brought, with one named plaintiff actually representing the interests of many others, the case will not become moot even if the named plaintiff ceases to belong to the class that is seeking a remedy. In Sosna v. Iowa, , the plaintiff represented a class that was challenging an Iowa law that required persons to reside there for a year before seeking a divorce in Iowa's courts. The Supreme Court held that, although the plaintiff successfully divorced in another state, her attorneys could continue to competently advance the interests of other members of the class. Abuse of mootness doctrine not acceptable Construction of a project without regulatory compliance cannot be used to moot a court case challenge simply because construction has been completed. Since remedies remain available even long after the project has been completed, the case remains non-moot. For example, where an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was challenged, completion of the project construction could not be used to evade regulatory compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as the 9th Circuit Court explained: U.S. state courts The U.S. state courts are not subject to the Article III limitations on their jurisdiction, and some state courts are permitted by their local constitutions and laws to render opinions in moot cases where the establishment of a legal precedent is desirable. They may also establish exceptions to the doctrine. For instance, in some state courts the prosecution can lodge an appeal after a defendant is acquitted: although the appellate court cannot set aside a not-guilty verdict due to double jeopardy, it can issue a ruling as to whether a trial court's ruling on a particular issue during the trial was erroneous. This opinion will then be binding on future cases heard by the courts of that state. Some U.S. states also accept certified questions from the federal courts or the courts of other states. Under these procedures, state courts can issue opinions, usually for the purpose of clarifying or updating state law, in cases not actually pending in those courts. Outside the U.S. Although free from the U.S. Constitutional limitation, Canada has recognized that considerations of judicial economy and comity with the legislative and executive branch may justify a decision to dismiss an allegedly moot case, as deciding hypothetical controversies is tantamount to legislating. Considerations of the effectiveness of advocacy involved in the adversarial system and the possibility of recurrence of an alleged constitutional violation may sway the court. Additionally, the federal and provincial governments can ask for advisory opinions in hypothetical scenarios, termed reference questions, from their respective highest courts. Moot point The phrase 'moot point' refers (in American English) to an issue that is irrelevant to a subject being discussed or (in British English) to one that is debatable. Due to the relatively uncommon usage of the word moot, and because "moot" and "mute" are homophones in some pronunciations, this is sometimes erroneously rendered as "mute point". See also Mock trial (a simulated trial, typically of fact) De minimis non curat lex. (The law is not interested in trivia) References External links Civil procedure Legal doctrines and principles

Moral nihilism

Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality does not exist. Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, which allows for actions to be wrong relative to a particular culture or individual. It is also distinct from expressivism, according to which when we make moral claims, "We are not making an effort to describe the way the world is ... we are venting our emotions, commanding others to act in certain ways, or revealing a plan of action". Moral nihilism today broadly tends to take the form of an Error Theory: the view developed originally by J.L. Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Error theory and nihilism broadly take the form of a negative claim about the existence of objective values or properties. Under traditional views there are moral properties or methods which hold objectively in some sense beyond our contingent interests which morally obligate us to act. For Mackie and the Error Theorists, such properties do not exist in the world, and therefore morality conceived of by reference to objective facts must also not exist. Therefore, morality in the traditional sense does not exist. However, holding nihilism does not necessarily imply that one should give up using moral or ethical language; some nihilists contend that it remains a useful tool. In fact Mackie and other contemporary defenders of Error Theory, such as Richard Joyce, defend the use of moral or ethical talk and action even in knowledge of their fundamental falsity. The legitimacy of this activity is a subject of debate in philosophy. Forms of nihilism Moral nihilists agree that all claims such as 'murder is morally wrong' are not true. But different nihilistic views differ in two ways. Some may say that such claims are neither true nor false; others say that they are all false. Nihilists differ in the scope of their theories. Error theorists typically claim that it is only distinctively moral claims which are false; practical nihilists claim that there are no reasons for action of any kind; some nihilists extend this claim to include reasons for belief. Ethical language: false versus not truth-apt J. L. Mackie argues that moral assertions are only true if there are moral properties, but because there are none, all such claims are false. Under such a view moral propositions which express beliefs are then systematically in error. For under Mackie's view, if there are to be moral properties, they must be objective and therefore not amenable to differences in subjective desires and preferences. Moreover any claims that these moral properties, if they did exist would need to be intrinsically motivating by being in some primitive relation to our consciousness. They must be able of guiding us morally just by the fact of being in some clear awareness of their truth. Other versions of the theory claim that moral assertions are not true because they are neither true nor false. This form of moral nihilism claims that moral beliefs and assertions presuppose the existence of moral facts that do not exist. Consider, for example, the claim that the present king of France is bald. Some argue that this claim is neither true nor false because it presupposes that there is currently a king of France, but there is not. The claim suffers from "presupposition failure". Richard Joyce argues for this form of moral nihilism under the name "fictionalism". The scope question Error theory is built on three principles: There are no moral features in this world; nothing is right or wrong. Therefore, no moral judgments are true. However, our sincere moral judgments try, but always fail, to describe the moral features of things. Thus, we always lapse into error when thinking in moral terms. We are trying to state the truth when we make moral judgments. But since there is no moral truth, all of our moral claims are mistaken. Hence the error. These three principles lead to the conclusion that there is no moral knowledge. Knowledge requires truth. If there is no moral truth, there can be no moral knowledge. Thus moral values are purely chimerical. Applied ethics A pressing question is how one might apply the belief that there are no objective morals. Perhaps the most common response, and the position which Mackie adopts, is to view moralizing as an inherently useful practice, and that everyone is better off behaving in a moralistic manner. On the other hand, Richard Garner advocated for the idea of “moral abolitionism”. He argues that, if one were to believe that there are no objective morals, then to engage in moralism is a deceptive behavior. It is wrong because it harms one’s epistemological integrity. Furthermore, by refusing to make moral judgements generally, people would be more likely to engage with others in a more genuine fashion. The social benefit is that “we will find that there will be less to argue about, and that our conflicts and disagreements with others, at last seen for what they are, can be addressed and resolved”. Garner encouraged people to adhere to an alternative to traditional normative morality: "informed, compassionate amoralism," a blend of compassion, non-duplicity, and clarity of language that he believed would nurture our capability for tolerance, creation, and cooperation. Arguments for nihilism Argument from queerness The most prominent argument for nihilism is the argument from queerness. J. L. Mackie argues that there are no objective ethical values, by arguing that they would be queer (strange):If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. For all those who also find such entities queer (prima facie implausible), there is reason to doubt the existence of objective values. In his book Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (1999), Mark Timmons provides a reconstruction of Mackie's views in the form of the two related arguments. These are based on the rejection of properties, facts, and relationships that do not fit within the worldview of philosophical naturalism, the idea "that everything—including any particular events, facts, properties, and so on—is part of the natural physical world that science investigates" (1999, p. 12). Timmons adds, "The undeniable attraction of this outlook in contemporary philosophy no doubt stems from the rise of modern science and the belief that science is our best avenue for discovering the nature of reality". There are several ways in which moral properties are supposedly queer: our ordinary moral discourse purports to refer to intrinsically prescriptive properties and facts "that would somehow motivate us or provide us with reasons for action independent of our desires and aversions"—but such properties and facts do not comport with philosophical naturalism. given that objective moral properties supposedly supervene upon natural properties (such as biological or psychological properties), the relation between the moral properties and the natural properties is metaphysically mysterious and does not comport with philosophical naturalism. a moral realist who countenances the existence of metaphysically queer properties, facts, and relations must also posit some special faculty by which we have knowledge of them. Responses and criticisms Christine Korsgaard responds to Mackie by saying: Other criticisms of the argument include noting that the very fact that such entities would have to be something fundamentally different from what we normally experience, therefore assumably outside our sphere of experience, we cannot prima facie have reason to either doubt or affirm their existence. Therefore if one had independent grounds for supposing such things to exist (such as a reductio ad absurdum of the contrary) the argument from queerness cannot give one any particular reason to think otherwise. An argument along these lines has been provided by e.g. Akeel Bilgrami. Argument from explanatory impotence Gilbert Harman argued that we do not need to posit the existence of objective values in order to explain our 'moral observations'. See also Citations Bibliography . Further reading Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics, New York: Macmillan. Garner, Richard T.; (1994). Beyond Morality. Temple University Press. Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003). Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?, Oxford University Press. Shafer-Landau, Russ & Terence Cuneo (eds.) (2007). Foundations of Ethics, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006a). "Moral Skepticism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006b). Moral Skepticisms, Oxford University Press. van Roojen, Mark (2004). "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link) About the queerness argument Brink, David O. (1984). "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62(2): 111–125. Garner, Richard T. (1990). "On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68(2): 137–46. Mackie, J. L. (1946). "A Refutation of Morals", Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24: 77–90. Rosati, Connie S. (2006). "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Shepski, Lee (2008). "The Vanishing Argument from Queerness", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(3): 371–87. Amorality Metaethics Nihilism Nihilism Ethical theories

Pragmatics

In linguistics and related fields, pragmatics is the study of how context contributes to meaning. The field of study evaluates how human language is utilized in social interactions, as well as the relationship between the interpreter and the interpreted. Linguists who specialize in pragmatics are called pragmaticians. The field has been represented since 1986 by the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA). Pragmatics encompasses phenomena including implicature, speech acts, relevance and conversation, as well as nonverbal communication. Theories of pragmatics go hand-in-hand with theories of semantics, which studies aspects of meaning, and syntax which examines sentence structures, principles, and relationships. The ability to understand another speaker's intended meaning is called pragmatic competence. In 1938, Charles Morris first distinguished pragmatics as an independent subfield within semiotics, alongside syntax and semantics. Pragmatics emerged as its own subfield in the 1950s after the pioneering work of J.L. Austin and Paul Grice. Origin of the field Pragmatics was a reaction to structuralist linguistics as outlined by Ferdinand de Saussure. In many cases, it expanded upon his idea that language has an analyzable structure, composed of parts that can be defined in relation to others. Pragmatics first engaged only in synchronic study, as opposed to examining the historical development of language. However, it rejected the notion that all meaning comes from signs existing purely in the abstract space of langue. Meanwhile, historical pragmatics has also come into being. The field did not gain linguists' attention until the 1970s, when two different schools emerged: the Anglo-American pragmatic thought and the European continental pragmatic thought (also called the perspective view). Areas of interest The study of the speaker's meaning focusing not on the phonetic or grammatical form of an utterance but on what the speaker's intentions and beliefs are. The study of the meaning in context and the influence that a given context can have on the message. It requires knowledge of the speaker's identities, and the place and time of the utterance. The study of implicatures: the things that are communicated even though they are not explicitly expressed. The study of relative distance, both social and physical, between speakers in order to understand what determines the choice of what is said and what is not said. The study of what is not meant, as opposed to the intended meaning: what is unsaid and unintended, or unintentional. Information structure, the study of how utterances are marked in order to efficiently manage the common ground of referred entities between speaker and hearer. Formal Pragmatics, the study of those aspects of meaning and use for which context of use is an important factor by using the methods and goals of formal semantics. The study of the role of pragmatics in the development of children with autism spectrum disorders or developmental language disorder (DLD). Ambiguity Ambiguity refers to when it is difficult to infer meaning without knowing the context, the identity of the speaker or the speaker's intent. For example, the sentence "You have a green light" is ambiguous, as without knowing the context, one could reasonably interpret it as meaning: the space that belongs to you has green ambient lighting; you are driving through a green traffic signal; you no longer have to wait to continue driving; you are permitted to proceed in a non-driving context; your body is cast in a greenish glow; you possess a light source which radiates green; or you possess a light with a green surface. Another example of an ambiguous sentence is, "I went to the bank." This is an example of lexical ambiguity, as the word bank can either be in reference to a place where money is kept, or the edge of a river. To understand what the speaker is truly saying, it is a matter of context, which is why it is pragmatically ambiguous as well. Similarly, the sentence "Sherlock saw the man with binoculars" could mean that Sherlock observed the man by using binoculars, or it could mean that Sherlock observed a man who was holding binoculars (syntactic ambiguity). The meaning of the sentence depends on an understanding of the context and the speaker's intent. As defined in linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity: a string of words divorced from non-linguistic context, as opposed to an utterance, which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context. The more closely conscious subjects stick to common words, idioms, phrasings, and topics, the more easily others can surmise their meaning; the further they stray from common expressions and topics, the wider the variations in interpretations. That suggests that sentences do not have intrinsic meaning, that there is no meaning associated with a sentence or word, and that either can represent an idea only symbolically. The cat sat on the mat is a sentence in English. If someone were to say to someone else, "The cat sat on the mat", the act is itself an utterance. That implies that a sentence, term, expression or word cannot symbolically represent a single true meaning; such meaning is underspecified (which cat sat on which mat?) and potentially ambiguous. By contrast, the meaning of an utterance can be inferred through knowledge of both its linguistic and non-linguistic contexts (which may or may not be sufficient to resolve ambiguity). In mathematics, with Berry's paradox, there arises a similar systematic ambiguity with the word "definable". Referential uses of language The referential uses of language are how signs are used to refer to certain items. A sign is the link or relationship between a signified and the signifier as defined by de Saussure and Jean-René Huguenin. The signified is some entity or concept in the world. The signifier represents the signified. An example would be: Signified: the concept cat Signifier: the word "cat" The relationship between the two gives the sign meaning. The relationship can be explained further by considering what is meant by "meaning." In pragmatics, there are two different types of meaning to consider: semantic-referential meaning and indexical meaning. Semantic-referential meaning refers to the aspect of meaning, which describes events in the world that are independent of the circumstance they are uttered in. An example would be propositions such as: "Santa Claus eats cookies." In this case, the proposition is describing that Santa Claus eats cookies. The meaning of the proposition does not rely on whether or not Santa Claus is eating cookies at the time of its utterance. Santa Claus could be eating cookies at any time and the meaning of the proposition would remain the same. The meaning is simply describing something that is the case in the world. In contrast, the proposition, "Santa Claus is eating a cookie right now", describes events that are happening at the time the proposition is uttered. Semantic-referential meaning is also present in meta-semantical statements such as: Tiger: carnivorous, a mammal If someone were to say that a tiger is a carnivorous animal in one context and a mammal in another, the definition of tiger would still be the same. The meaning of the sign tiger is describing some animal in the world, which does not change in either circumstance. Indexical meaning, on the other hand, is dependent on the context of the utterance and has rules of use. By rules of use, it is meant that indexicals can tell when they are used, but not what they actually mean. Example: "I" Whom "I" refers to, depends on the context and the person uttering it. As mentioned, these meanings are brought about through the relationship between the signified and the signifier. One way to define the relationship is by placing signs in two categories: referential indexical signs, also called "shifters", and pure indexical signs. Referential indexical signs are signs where the meaning shifts depending on the context hence the nickname "shifters." 'I' would be considered a referential indexical sign. The referential aspect of its meaning would be '1st person singular' while the indexical aspect would be the person who is speaking (refer above for definitions of semantic-referential and indexical meaning). Another example would be: "This" Referential: singular count Indexical: Close by A pure indexical sign does not contribute to the meaning of the propositions at all. It is an example of a "non-referential use of language." A second way to define the signified and signifier relationship is C.S. Peirce's Peircean Trichotomy. The components of the trichotomy are the following: 1. Icon: the signified resembles the signifier (signified: a dog's barking noise, signifier: bow-wow) 2. Index: the signified and signifier are linked by proximity or the signifier has meaning only because it is pointing to the signified 3. Symbol: the signified and signifier are arbitrarily linked (signified: a cat, signifier: the word cat) These relationships allow signs to be used to convey intended meaning. If two people were in a room and one of them wanted to refer to a characteristic of a chair in the room he would say "this chair has four legs" instead of "a chair has four legs." The former relies on context (indexical and referential meaning) by referring to a chair specifically in the room at that moment while the latter is independent of the context (semantico-referential meaning), meaning the concept chair. Referential expressions in conversation Referring to things and people is a common feature of conversation, and conversants do so collaboratively. Individuals engaging in discourse utilize pragmatics. In addition, individuals within the scope of discourse cannot help but avoid intuitive use of certain utterances or word choices in an effort to create communicative success. The study of referential language is heavily focused upon definite descriptions and referent accessibility. Theories have been presented for why direct referent descriptions occur in discourse. (In layman's terms: why reiteration of certain names, places, or individuals involved or as a topic of the conversation at hand are repeated more than one would think necessary.) Four factors are widely accepted for the use of referent language including (i) competition with a possible referent, (ii) salience of the referent in the context of discussion (iii) an effort for unity of the parties involved, and finally, (iv) a blatant presence of distance from the last referent. Referential expressions are a form of anaphora. They are also a means of connecting past and present thoughts together to create context for information at hand. Analyzing the context of a sentence and determining whether or not the use of referent expression is necessary is highly reliant upon the author/speaker's digression- and is correlated strongly with the use of pragmatic competency. Nonreferential uses of language Silverstein's "Pure" Indexes Michael Silverstein has argued that "nonreferential" or "pure" indices do not contribute to an utterance's referential meaning but instead "signal some particular value of one or more contextual variables." Although nonreferential indexes are devoid of semantico-referential meaning, they do encode "pragmatic" meaning. The sorts of contexts that such indexes can mark are varied. Examples include: Sex indexes are affixes or inflections that index the sex of the speaker, e.g. the verb forms of female Koasati speakers take the suffix "-s". Deference indexes are words that signal social differences (usually related to status or age) between the speaker and the addressee. The most common example of a deference index is the V form in a language with a T–V distinction, the widespread phenomenon in which there are multiple second-person pronouns that correspond to the addressee's relative status or familiarity to the speaker. Honorifics are another common form of deference index and demonstrate the speaker's respect or esteem for the addressee via special forms of address and/or self-humbling first-person pronouns. An Affinal taboo index is an example of avoidance speech that produces and reinforces sociological distance, as seen in the Aboriginal Dyirbal language of Australia. In that language and some others, there is a social taboo against the use of the everyday lexicon in the presence of certain relatives (mother-in-law, child-in-law, paternal aunt's child, and maternal uncle's child). If any of those relatives are present, a Dyirbal speaker has to switch to a completely separate lexicon reserved for that purpose. In all of these cases, the semantico-referential meaning of the utterances is unchanged from that of the other possible (but often impermissible) forms, but the pragmatic meaning is vastly different. The performative J.L. Austin introduced the concept of the performative, contrasted in his writing with "constative" (i.e. descriptive) utterances. According to Austin's original formulation, a performative is a type of utterance characterized by two distinctive features: It is not truth-evaluable (i.e. it is neither true nor false) Its uttering performs an action rather than simply describing one Examples: "I hereby pronounce you man and wife." "I accept your apology." "This meeting is now adjourned." To be performative, an utterance must conform to various conditions involving what Austin calls felicity. These deal with things like appropriate context and the speaker's authority. For instance, when a couple has been arguing and the husband says to his wife that he accepts her apology even though she has offered nothing approaching an apology, his assertion is infelicitous: because she has made neither expression of regret nor request for forgiveness, there exists none to accept, and thus no act of accepting can possibly happen. Jakobson's six functions of language Roman Jakobson, expanding on the work of Karl Bühler, described six "constitutive factors" of a speech event, each of which represents the privileging of a corresponding function, and only one of which is the referential (which corresponds to the context of the speech event). The six constitutive factors and their corresponding functions are diagrammed below. The six constitutive factors of a speech event Context Message Addresser --------------------- Addressee Contact Code The six functions of language Referential Poetic Emotive ----------------------- Conative Phatic Metalingual The Referential Function corresponds to the factor of Context and describes a situation, object or mental state. The descriptive statements of the referential function can consist of both definite descriptions and deictic words, e.g. "The autumn leaves have all fallen now." The Expressive (alternatively called "emotive" or "affective") Function relates to the Addresser and is best exemplified by interjections and other sound changes that do not alter the denotative meaning of an utterance but do add information about the Addresser's (speaker's) internal state, e.g. "Wow, what a view!" The Conative Function engages the Addressee directly and is best illustrated by vocatives and imperatives, e.g. "Tom! Come inside and eat!" The Poetic Function focuses on "the message for its own sake" and is the operative function in poetry as well as slogans. The Phatic Function is language for the sake of interaction and is therefore associated with the Contact factor. The Phatic Function can be observed in greetings and casual discussions of the weather, particularly with strangers. The Metalingual (alternatively called "metalinguistic" or "reflexive") Function is the use of language (what Jakobson calls "Code") to discuss or describe itself. Related fields There is considerable overlap between pragmatics and sociolinguistics, since both share an interest in linguistic meaning as determined by usage in a speech community. However, sociolinguists tend to be more interested in variations in language within such communities. Influences of philosophy and politics are also present in the field of pragmatics, as the dynamics of societies and oppression are expressed through language Pragmatics helps anthropologists relate elements of language to broader social phenomena; it thus pervades the field of linguistic anthropology. Because pragmatics describes generally the forces in play for a given utterance, it includes the study of power, gender, race, identity, and their interactions with individual speech acts. For example, the study of code switching directly relates to pragmatics, since a switch in code effects a shift in pragmatic force. According to Charles W. Morris, pragmatics tries to understand the relationship between signs and their users, while semantics tends to focus on the actual objects or ideas to which a word refers, and syntax (or "syntactics") examines relationships among signs or symbols. Semantics is the literal meaning of an idea whereas pragmatics is the implied meaning of the given idea. Speech Act Theory, pioneered by J.L. Austin and further developed by John Searle, centers around the idea of the performative, a type of utterance that performs the very action it describes. Speech Act Theory's examination of Illocutionary Acts has many of the same goals as pragmatics, as outlined above. Computational Pragmatics, as defined by Victoria Fromkin, concerns how humans can communicate their intentions to computers with as little ambiguity as possible. That process, integral to the science of natural language processing (seen as a sub-discipline of artificial intelligence), involves providing a computer system with some database of knowledge related to a topic and a series of algorithms, which control how the system responds to incoming data, using contextual knowledge to more accurately approximate natural human language and information processing abilities. Reference resolution, how a computer determines when two objects are different or not, is one of the most important tasks of computational pragmatics. Formalization There has been a great amount of discussion on the boundary between semantics and pragmatics and there are many different formalizations of aspects of pragmatics linked to context dependence. Particularly interesting cases are the discussions on the semantics of indexicals and the problem of referential descriptions, a topic developed after the theories of Keith Donnellan. A proper logical theory of formal pragmatics has been developed by Carlo Dalla Pozza, according to which it is possible to connect classical semantics (treating propositional contents as true or false) and intuitionistic semantics (dealing with illocutionary forces). The presentation of a formal treatment of pragmatics appears to be a development of the Fregean idea of assertion sign as formal sign of the act of assertion. Rational Speech Act and Probabilistic Pragmatics Over the past decade, many probabilistic and Bayesian methods have become very popular in the modelling of pragmatics, of which the most successful framework has been the Rational Speech Act framework developed by Noah Goodman and Michael C. Frank, which has already seen much use in the analysis of metaphor, hyperbole and politeness. In the Rational Speech Act, listeners and speakers both reason about the other's reasoning concerning the literal meaning of the utterances, and as such, the resulting interpretation depends, but is not necessarily determined by the literal truth conditional meaning of an utterance, and so it uses recursive reasoning to pursue a broadly Gricean co-operative ideal. In the most basic form of the Rational Speech Act, there are three levels of inference; Beginning from the highest level, the pragmatic listener will reason about the pragmatic speaker , and will then infer the likely world state taking into account that has deliberately chosen to produce utterance , while chooses to produce utterance by reasoning about how the literal listener will understand the literal meaning of and so will attempt to maximise the chances that will correctly infer the world state . As such, a simple schema of the Rational Speech Act reasoning hierarchy can be formulated for use in a reference game such that: In literary theory Pragmatics (more specifically, Speech Act Theory's notion of the performative) underpins Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity. In Gender Trouble, they claim that gender and sex are not natural categories, but socially constructed roles produced by "reiterative acting." In Excitable Speech they extend their theory of performativity to hate speech and censorship, arguing that censorship necessarily strengthens any discourse it tries to suppress and therefore, since the state has sole power to define hate speech legally, it is the state that makes hate speech performative. Jacques Derrida remarked that some work done under Pragmatics aligned well with the program he outlined in his book Of Grammatology. Émile Benveniste argued that the pronouns "I" and "you" are fundamentally distinct from other pronouns because of their role in creating the subject. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari discuss linguistic pragmatics in the fourth chapter of A Thousand Plateaus ("November 20, 1923--Postulates of Linguistics"). They draw three conclusions from Austin: (1) A performative utterance does not communicate information about an act second-hand, but it is the act; (2) Every aspect of language ("semantics, syntactics, or even phonematics") functionally interacts with pragmatics; (3) There is no distinction between language and speech. This last conclusion attempts to refute Saussure's division between langue and parole and Chomsky's distinction between deep structure and surface structure simultaneously. Significant works and concepts J. L. Austin's How To Do Things With Words Paul Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims Brown and Levinson's politeness theory Geoffrey Leech's politeness maxims Levinson's presumptive meanings Jürgen Habermas's universal pragmatics Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's relevance theory Dallin D. Oaks's Structural Ambiguity in English: An Applied Grammatical Inventory Vonk, Hustinx, and Simon's 1992 journal article "The use of referential expressions in structuring discourse" Nancy Bauer's How To Do Things With Pornography Piotr Gmytrasiewicz, "How to Do Things with Words: A Bayesian Approach", https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/11951/26599. See also Notes References Austin, J. L. (1962) How to Do Things With Words. Oxford University Press. Ariel, Mira (2008), Pragmatics and Grammar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. (1978) Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge University Press. Carston, Robyn (2002) Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. Clark, Herbert H. (1996) "Using Language". Cambridge University Press. Cole, Peter, ed.. (1978) Pragmatics. (Syntax and Semantics, 9). New York: Academic Press. Dijk, Teun A. van. (1977) Text and Context. Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse. London: Longman. Grice, H. Paul. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward. (2005) The Handbook of Pragmatics. Blackwell. Leech, Geoffrey N. (1983) Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. Levinson, Stephen C. (1983) Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press. Levinson, Stephen C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press. Moumni, Hassan (2005). Politeness in Parliamentary Discourse : A Comparative Pragmatic Study of British and Moroccan MPs’ Speech Acts at Question Time. Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis. Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco. Mey, Jacob L. (1993) Pragmatics: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell (2nd ed. 2001). Potts, Christopher. (2005) The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford Studies in Theoretical Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robinson, Douglas. (2003). Performative Linguistics: Speaking and Translating as Doing Things With Words. London and New York: Routledge. Robinson, Douglas. (2006). Introducing Performative Pragmatics. London and New York: Routledge. Also available from ucl.ac.uk. Thomas, Jenny (1995) Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics. Longman. Also available from the Internet Archive. Verschueren, Jef, Jan-Ola Östman, Jan Blommaert, eds. (1995) Handbook of Pragmatics. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Watzlawick, Paul, Janet Helmick Beavin and Don D. Jackson (1967) Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. New York: Norton. Wierzbicka, Anna (1991) Cross-cultural Pragmatics. The Semantics of Human Interaction. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Yule, George (1996) Pragmatics (Oxford Introductions to Language Study). Oxford University Press. Silverstein, Michael. 1976. "Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description", in Meaning and Anthropology, Basso and Selby, eds. New York: Harper & Row Wardhaugh, Ronald. (2006). "An Introduction to Sociolinguistics". Blackwell. Duranti, Alessandro. (1997). "Linguistic Anthropology". Cambridge University Press. Carbaugh, Donal. (1990). "Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact." LEA. External links Pragmatics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Meaning and Context Sensitivity, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Journal of Pragmatics International Pragmatics Association (IPrA). Linguistics terminology Philosophy of language Semantics Semiotics

Carper's fundamental ways of knowing

In healthcare, Carper's fundamental ways of knowing is a typology that attempts to classify the different sources from which knowledge and beliefs in professional practice (originally specifically nursing) can be or have been derived. It was proposed by Barbara A. Carper, a professor at the College of Nursing at Texas Woman's University, in 1978. The typology identifies four fundamental "patterns of knowing": Empirical Factual knowledge from science, or other external sources, that can be empirically verified. Personal Knowledge and attitudes derived from personal self-understanding and empathy, including imagining one's self in the patient's position. Ethical Attitudes and knowledge derived from an ethical framework, including an awareness of moral questions and choices. Aesthetic Awareness of the immediate situation, seated in immediate practical action; including awareness of the patient and their circumstances as uniquely individual, and of the combined wholeness of the situation. (Aesthetic in this sense is used to mean "relating to the here and now", from the Greek αἰσθάνομαι (aisthanomai), meaning "I perceive, feel, sense"; the reference is not to the consideration of beauty, art and taste). The emphasis on different ways of knowing is presented as a tool for generating clearer and more complete thinking and learning about experiences, and broader self-integration of classroom education. As such it helped crystallize Johns' (1995) framework for reflective investigation to develop reflective practice. The typology has been seen as leading a reaction against over-emphasis on just empirically derived knowledge, so called "scientific nursing", by emphasising that attitudes and actions that are perhaps more personal and more intuitive are centrally important too, and equally fit for discussion. References Social epistemology Nursing theory

Enactivism

Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems ...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination" (p. 198). "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world." These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science. How the actions involved in enactivism relate to age-old questions about free will remains a topic of active debate. The term 'enactivism' is close in meaning to 'enaction', defined as "the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation". The introduction of the term enaction in this context is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991), who proposed the name to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs". This was further developed by Thompson and others, to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment. However, some writers maintain that there remains a need for some degree of the mediating function of representation in this new approach to the science of the mind. The initial emphasis of enactivism upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal", but it has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions. "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with its environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge." Enactivism is closely related to situated cognition and embodied cognition, and is presented as an alternative to cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism. Philosophical aspects Enactivism is one of a cluster of related theories sometimes known as the 4Es. As described by Mark Rowlands, mental processes are: Embodied involving more than the brain, including a more general involvement of bodily structures and processes. Embedded functioning only in a related external environment. Enacted involving not only neural processes, but also things an organism does. Extended into the organism's environment. Enactivism proposes an alternative to dualism as a philosophy of mind, in that it emphasises the interactions between mind, body and the environment, seeing them all as inseparably intertwined in mental processes. The self arises as part of the process of an embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways determined by its physiology. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" or arise from their interactive role with the world. "Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. Organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act." In The Tree of Knowledge Maturana & Varela proposed the term enactive "to evoke the view of knowledge that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism. They see enactivism as providing a middle ground between the two extremes of representationalism and solipsism. They seek to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[Tree of Knowledge, p. 241] Another important notion relating to enactivism is autopoiesis. The word refers to a system that is able to reproduce and maintain itself. Maturana & Varela describe that "This was a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems" Using the term autopoiesis, they argue that any closed system that has autonomy, self-reference and self-construction (or, that has autopoietic activities) has cognitive capacities. Therefore, cognition is present in all living systems. This view is also called autopoietic enactivism. Radical enactivism is another form of enactivist view of cognition. Radical enactivists often adopt a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of basic cognition. Basic cognitive capacities mentioned by Hutto and Myin include perceiving, imagining and remembering. They argue that those forms of basic cognition can be explained without positing mental representations. With regard to complex forms of cognition such as language, they think mental representations are needed, because there needs explanations of content. In human being's public practices, they claim that "such intersubjective practices and sensitivity to the relevant norms comes with the mastery of the use of public symbol systems" (2017, p. 120), and so "as it happens, this appears only to have occurred in full form with construction of sociocultural cognitive niches in the human lineage" (2017, p. 134). They conclude that basic cognition as well as cognition in simple organisms such as bacteria are best characterized as non-representational. Enactivism also addresses the hard problem of consciousness, referred to by Thompson as part of the explanatory gap in explaining how consciousness and subjective experience are related to brain and body. "The problem with the dualistic concepts of consciousness and life in standard formulations of the hard problem is that they exclude each other by construction". Instead, according to Thompson's view of enactivism, the study of consciousness or phenomenology as exemplified by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is to complement science and its objectification of the world. "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression" (Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception as quoted by Thompson, p. 165). In this interpretation, enactivism asserts that science is formed or enacted as part of humankind's interactivity with its world, and by embracing phenomenology "science itself is properly situated in relation to the rest of human life and is thereby secured on a sounder footing." Enaction has been seen as a move to conjoin representationalism with phenomenalism, that is, as adopting a constructivist epistemology, an epistemology centered upon the active participation of the subject in constructing reality. However, 'constructivism' focuses upon more than a simple 'interactivity' that could be described as a minor adjustment to 'assimilate' reality or 'accommodate' to it. Constructivism looks upon interactivity as a radical, creative, revisionist process in which the knower constructs a personal 'knowledge system' based upon their experience and tested by its viability in practical encounters with their environment. Learning is a result of perceived anomalies that produce dissatisfaction with existing conceptions. Shaun Gallagher also points out that pragmatism is a forerunner of enactive and extended approaches to cognition. According to him, enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in many pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey. For example, Dewey says that "The brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses directed upon it" (1916, pp. 336–337). This view is fully consistent with enactivist arguments that cognition is not just a matter of brain processes and brain is one part of the body consisting of the dynamical regulation. Robert Brandom, a neo-pragmatist, comments that "A founding idea of pragmatism is that the most fundamental kind of intentionality (in the sense of directedness towards objects) is the practical involvement with objects exhibited by a sentient creature dealing skillfully with its world" (2008, p. 178). How does constructivism relate to enactivism? From the above remarks it can be seen that Glasersfeld expresses an interactivity between the knower and the known quite acceptable to an enactivist, but does not emphasize the structured probing of the environment by the knower that leads to the "perturbation relative to some expected result" that then leads to a new understanding. It is this probing activity, especially where it is not accidental but deliberate, that characterizes enaction, and invokes affect, that is, the motivation and planning that lead to doing and to fashioning the probing, both observing and modifying the environment, so that "perceptions and nature condition one another through generating one another." The questioning nature of this probing activity is not an emphasis of Piaget and Glasersfeld. Sharing enactivism's stress upon both action and embodiment in the incorporation of knowledge, but giving Glasersfeld's mechanism of viability an evolutionary emphasis, is evolutionary epistemology. Inasmuch as an organism must reflect its environment well enough for the organism to be able to survive in it, and to be competitive enough to be able to reproduce at sustainable rate, the structure and reflexes of the organism itself embody knowledge of its environment. This biology-inspired theory of the growth of knowledge is closely tied to universal Darwinism, and is associated with evolutionary epistemologists such as Karl Popper, Donald T. Campbell, Peter Munz, and Gary Cziko. According to Munz, "an organism is an embodied theory about its environment... Embodied theories are also no longer expressed in language, but in anatomical structures or reflex responses, etc." One objection to enactive approaches to cognition is the so-called "scale-up objection". According to this objection, enactive theories only have limited value because they cannot "scale up" to explain more complex cognitive capacities like human thoughts. Those phenomena are extremely difficult to explain without positing representation. But recently, some philosophers are trying to respond to such objection. For example, Adrian Downey (2020) provides a non-representational account of Obsessive-compulsive disorder, and then argues that ecological-enactive approaches can respond to the "scaling up" objection. Psychological aspects McGann & others argue that enactivism attempts to mediate between the explanatory role of the coupling between cognitive agent and environment and the traditional emphasis on brain mechanisms found in neuroscience and psychology. In the interactive approach to social cognition developed by De Jaegher & others, the dynamics of interactive processes are seen to play significant roles in coordinating interpersonal understanding, processes that in part include what they call participatory sense-making. Recent developments of enactivism in the area of social neuroscience involve the proposal of The Interactive Brain Hypothesis where social cognition brain mechanisms, even those used in non-interactive situations, are proposed to have interactive origins. Enactive views of perception In the enactive view, perception "is not conceived as the transmission of information but more as an exploration of the world by various means. Cognition is not tied into the workings of an 'inner mind', some cognitive core, but occurs in directed interaction between the body and the world it inhabits." Alva Noë in advocating an enactive view of perception sought to resolve how we perceive three-dimensional objects, on the basis of two-dimensional input. He argues that we perceive this solidity (or 'volumetricity') by appealing to patterns of sensorimotor expectations. These arise from our agent-active 'movements and interaction' with objects, or 'object-active' changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object's appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us. Noë's idea of the role of 'expectations' in three-dimensional perception has been opposed by several philosophers, notably by Andy Clark. Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach. He points to internal processing of visual signals, for example, in the ventral and dorsal pathways, the two-streams hypothesis. This results in an integrated perception of objects (their recognition and location, respectively) yet this processing cannot be described as an action or actions. In a more general criticism, Clark suggests that perception is not a matter of expectations about sensorimotor mechanisms guiding perception. Rather, although the limitations of sensorimotor mechanisms constrain perception, this sensorimotor activity is drastically filtered to fit current needs and purposes of the organism, and it is these imposed 'expectations' that govern perception, filtering for the 'relevant' details of sensorimotor input (called "sensorimotor summarizing"). These sensorimotor-centered and purpose-centered views appear to agree on the general scheme but disagree on the dominance issue – is the dominant component peripheral or central. Another view, the closed-loop perception one, assigns equal a-priori dominance to the peripheral and central components. In closed-loop perception, perception emerges through the process of inclusion of an item in a motor-sensory-motor loop, i.e., a loop (or loops) connecting the peripheral and central components that are relevant to that item. The item can be a body part (in which case the loops are in steady-state) or an external object (in which case the loops are perturbed and gradually converge to a steady state). These enactive loops are always active, switching dominance by the need. Another application of enaction to perception is analysis of the human hand. The many remarkably demanding uses of the hand are not learned by instruction, but through a history of engagements that lead to the acquisition of skills. According to one interpretation, it is suggested that "the hand [is]...an organ of cognition", not a faithful subordinate working under top-down instruction, but a partner in a "bi-directional interplay between manual and brain activity." According to Daniel Hutto: "Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others - including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience - are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and content-free." Hutto calls this position 'REC' (Radical Enactive Cognition): "According to REC, there is no way to distinguish neural activity that is imagined to be genuinely content involving (and thus truly mental, truly cognitive) from other non-neural activity that merely plays a supporting or enabling role in making mind and cognition possible." Participatory sense-making Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007) have extended the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. The idea takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. De Jaegher and Di Paolo argue that the interaction process itself can take on a form of autonomy (operationally defined). This allows them to define social cognition as the generation of meaning and its transformation through interacting individuals. The notion of participatory sense-making has led to the proposal that interaction processes can sometimes play constitutive roles in social cognition (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher, 2010). It has been applied to research in social neuroscience and autism. In a similar vein, "an inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behavior of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself". According to Torrance, enactivism involves five interlocking themes related to the question "What is it to be a (cognizing, conscious) agent?" It is: 1. to be a biologically autonomous (autopoietic) organism 2. to generate significance or meaning, rather than to act via...updated internal representations of the external world 3. to engage in sense-making via dynamic coupling with the environment 4. to 'enact' or 'bring forth' a world of significances by mutual co-determination of the organism with its enacted world 5. to arrive at an experiential awareness via lived embodiment in the world. Torrance adds that "many kinds of agency, in particular the agency of human beings, cannot be understood separately from understanding the nature of the interaction that occurs between agents." That view introduces the social applications of enactivism. "Social cognition is regarded as the result of a special form of action, namely social interaction...the enactive approach looks at the circular dynamic within a dyad of embodied agents." In cultural psychology, enactivism is seen as a way to uncover cultural influences upon feeling, thinking and acting. Baerveldt and Verheggen argue that "It appears that seemingly natural experience is thoroughly intertwined with sociocultural realities." They suggest that the social patterning of experience is to be understood through enactivism, "the idea that the reality we have in common, and in which we find ourselves, is neither a world that exists independently from us, nor a socially shared way of representing such a pregiven world, but a world itself brought forth by our ways of communicating and our joint action....The world we inhabit is manufactured of 'meaning' rather than 'information'. Luhmann attempted to apply Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis to social systems. "A core concept of social systems theory is derived from biological systems theory: the concept of autopoiesis. Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana come up with the concept to explain how biological systems such as cells are a product of their own production." "Systems exist by way of operational closure and this means that they each construct themselves and their own realities." Educational aspects The first definition of enaction was introduced by psychologist Jerome Bruner, who introduced enaction as 'learning by doing' in his discussion of how children learn, and how they can best be helped to learn. He associated enaction with two other ways of knowledge organization: Iconic and Symbolic. "Any domain of knowledge (or any problem within that domain of knowledge) can be represented in three ways: by a set of actions appropriate for achieving a certain result (enactive representation); by a set of summary images or graphics that stand for a concept without defining it fully (iconic representation); and by a set of symbolic or logical propositions drawn from a symbolic system that is governed by rules or laws for forming and transforming propositions (symbolic representation)" The term 'enactive framework' was elaborated upon by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana. Sriramen argues that enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being." and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky. Piaget focused on the child's immediate environment, and suggested cognitive structures like spatial perception emerge as a result of the child's interaction with the world. According to Piaget, children construct knowledge, using what they know in new ways and testing it, and the environment provides feedback concerning the adequacy of their construction. In a cultural context, Vygotsky suggested that the kind of cognition that can take place is not dictated by the engagement of the isolated child, but is also a function of social interaction and dialogue that is contingent upon a sociohistorical context. Enactivism in educational theory "looks at each learning situation as a complex system consisting of teacher, learner, and context, all of which frame and co-create the learning situation." Enactivism in education is very closely related to situated cognition, which holds that "knowledge is situated, being in part a product of the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used." This approach challenges the "separating of what is learned from how it is learned and used." Artificial intelligence aspects The ideas of enactivism regarding how organisms engage with their environment have interested those involved in robotics and man-machine interfaces. The analogy is drawn that a robot can be designed to interact and learn from its environment in a manner similar to the way an organism does, and a human can interact with a computer-aided design tool or data base using an interface that creates an enactive environment for the user, that is, all the user's tactile, auditory, and visual capabilities are enlisted in a mutually explorative engagement, capitalizing upon all the user's abilities, and not at all limited to cerebral engagement. In these areas it is common to refer to affordances as a design concept, the idea that an environment or an interface affords opportunities for enaction, and good design involves optimizing the role of such affordances. The activity in the AI community has influenced enactivism as a whole. Referring extensively to modeling techniques for evolutionary robotics by Beer, the modeling of learning behavior by Kelso, and to modeling of sensorimotor activity by Saltzman, McGann, De Jaegher, and Di Paolo discuss how this work makes the dynamics of coupling between an agent and its environment, the foundation of enactivism, "an operational, empirically observable phenomenon." That is, the AI environment invents examples of enactivism using concrete examples that, although not as complex as living organisms, isolate and illuminate basic principles. Mathematical formalisms Enactive cognition has been formalised in order to address subjectivity in artificial general intelligence. A mathematical formalism of AGI is an agent proven to maximise a measure of intelligence. Prior to 2022, the only such formalism was AIXI, which maximised “the ability to satisfy goals in a wide range of environments”. In 2015 Jan Lieke and Marcus Hutter showed that "Legg-Hutter intelligence is measured with respect to a fixed UTM. AIXI is the most intelligent policy if it uses the same UTM", a result which "undermines all existing optimality properties for AIXI", rendering them subjective. Criticism One of the essential theses of this approach is that biological systems generate meanings, engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions. Since this thesis raised the problems of beginning cognition for organisms in the developmental stage of only simple reflexes (the binding problem and the problem of primary data entry), enactivists proposed the concept of embodied information that serves to start cognition. However, critics highlight that this idea requires introducing the nature of intentionality before engaging embodied information. In a natural environment, the stimulus-reaction pair (causation) is unpredictable due to many irrelevant stimuli claiming to be randomly associated with the embodied information. While embodied information is only beneficial when intentionality is already in place, enactivists introduced the notion of the generation of meanings by biological systems (engaging in transformational interactions) without introducing a neurophysiological basis of intentionality. See also Action-specific perception Autopoesis Biosemiotics Cognitive science Cognitive psychology Computational theory of mind Connectivism Cultural psychology Distributed cognition Embodied cognition Embodied embedded cognition Enactive interfaces Extended cognition Extended mind Externalism#Enactivism and embodied cognition Mind–body problem Phenomenology (philosophy) Practopoiesis Representationalism Situated cognition Social cognition References Further reading Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M. and De Jaegher, H., (2010). Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne and E. A. Di Paolo (eds), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 33 – 87. Gallagher, Shaun (2017). Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford University Press. Hutto, D. D. (Ed.) (2006). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative. In R. D. Ellis & N. Newton (Series Eds.), Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 2. McGann, M. & Torrance, S. (2005). Doing it and meaning it (and the relationship between the two). In R. D. Ellis & N. Newton, Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 1: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (2005). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge. (Originally published 1945) Noë, Alva (2010). Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness. Hill and Wang. (fr) Domenico Masciotra (2023). Une approche énactive des formations, Théorie et Méthode. En devenir compétent et connaisseur. ASCAR Inc. Notes External links Slides related to a chapter on haptic perception (recognition through touch): An overview of the rationale and means and methods for the study of representations that the learner constructs in his/her attempt to understand knowledge in a given field. See in particular §1.2.1.4 Toward social representations (p. 24) An extensive but uncritical introduction to the work of Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana Entire journal issue on enactivism's status and current debates. Action (philosophy) Behavioral neuroscience Cognitive science Consciousness Educational psychology Emergence Epistemology of science Knowledge representation Metaphysics of mind Motor cognition Neuropsychology Philosophy of perception Philosophical theories Philosophy of psychology Psychological concepts Psychological theories Sociology of knowledge

Constructionism (learning theory)

Constructionist learning is the creation by learners of mental models to understand the world around them. Constructionism advocates student-centered, discovery learning where students use what they already know to acquire more knowledge. Students learn through participation in project-based learning where they make connections between different ideas and areas of knowledge facilitated by the teacher through coaching rather than using lectures or step-by-step guidance. Further, constructionism holds that learning can happen most effectively when people are active in making tangible objects in the real world. In this sense, constructionism is connected with experiential learning and builds on Jean Piaget's epistemological theory of constructivism. Seymour Papert defined constructionism in a proposal to the National Science Foundation titled Constructionism: A New Opportunity for Elementary Science Education as follows: Some scholars have tried to describe constructionism as a "learning-by-making" formula but, as Seymour Papert and Idit Harel say at the start of Situating Constructionism, it should be considered "much richer and more multifaceted, and very much deeper in its implications than could be conveyed by any such formula." Papert's ideas became well known through the publication of his seminal book Mindstorms: Children, Computers, and Powerful Ideas (Basic Books, 1980). Papert described children creating programs in the Logo educational programming language. He likened their learning to living in a "mathland" where learning mathematical ideas is as natural as learning French while living in France. Instructional principles Constructionist learning involves students drawing their own conclusions through creative experimentation and the making of social objects. The constructionist teacher takes on a mediational role rather than adopting an instructional role. Teaching "at" students is replaced by assisting them to understand—and help one another to understand—problems in a hands-on way. The teacher's role is not to be a lecturer but a facilitator who coaches students to attaining their own goals. Problem-based learning Problem-based learning is a constructionist method which allows students to learn about a subject by exposing them to multiple problems and asking them to construct their understanding of the subject through these problems. This kind of learning can be very effective in mathematics classes because students try to solve the problems in many different ways, stimulating their minds. The following five strategies make problem-based learning more effective: The learning activities should be related to a larger task. The larger task is important because it allows students to see that the activities can be applied to many aspects of life and, as a result, students are more likely to find the activities they are doing useful. The learner needs to be supported to feel that they are beginning to have ownership of the overall problem. An authentic task should be designed for the learner. This means that the task and the learner's cognitive ability have to match the problems to make learning valuable. Reflection on the content being learned should occur so that learners can think through the process of what they have learned. Allow and encourage the learners to test ideas against different views in different contexts. Constructionism in social sciences Not only can constructionism be applied to mathematics but to the social sciences as well. For example, instead of having students memorize geography facts, a teacher could give students blank maps that show unlabeled rivers, lakes, and mountains, and then ask the students to decipher where major cities might be located without the help of books or maps. This would require students to locate these areas without using prepared resources, but their prior knowledge and reasoning ability instead. Digital storytelling is another application of constructionism to the social sciences. Students can visit institutions in the local community, to understand and document their histories, develop local maps using tools like OpenStreetMap to enrich digital maps and debate the purpose and activities of local public institutions to build an understanding of political science (civics). Digital storytelling has been used by government schools in Bengaluru to develop students understanding in the social sciences. Constructionism and technology Papert was a huge proponent of bringing technology to classrooms, beginning with his early uses of the Logo language to teach mathematics to children. While constructionism has, due to its impetus, been primarily used in science and mathematics teaching (in the form of inquiry-based science), it is arguable that it developed in a different form in the field of media studies in which students often engage with media theory and practice simultaneously in a complementary praxis. More recently it has gained a foothold in applied linguistics in the field of second language acquisition (SLA). One such application has been the use of the popular game SimCity as a means of teaching English using constructionist techniques. Beginning in the 1980s, The LEGO Group funded research of Papert's research group at the MIT Media Laboratory, which at the time was known as the "Epistemology and Learning Group." When LEGO launched its LEGO Mindstorms Robotics Invention System in 1998, which was based on the work of his group, it received permission to use the moniker "Mindstorms" from Seymour's 1980 book title. In The LEGO Group's LEGO Serious Play project, business people learn to express corporate issues and identity through the medium of plastic bricks. From 2005 to 2014, there was the One Laptop Per Child initiative to put constructionist learning into practice in the developing world. The aim was to provide $100 laptops to every child in the developing world. Computer programming languages A number of programming languages have been created, wholly or in part, for educational use, to support the constructionist approach to learning. These languages are dynamically typed, and are reflective. They include: Logo is a multi-paradigm language, which is an easier-to-read adaptation and dialect of Lisp, without the parentheses. Logo is known for its introduction of turtle graphics to elementary schoolchildren in the 1980s. Its creators were Wally Feurzeig, Cynthia Solomon, and Papert. Smalltalk is an object-oriented language that was designed and created at Xerox PARC by a team led by Alan Kay. AgentSheets is an early block-based programming environment for kids to create games and simulations. It is developed by Alexander Repenning Etoys is being developed since the 1990s under the direction of Alan Kay, most recently by the Viewpoints Research Institute, based on Morphic tile scripting. Etoys was initially targeted at primary school math and science education. Physical Etoys is an extension of Etoys that allows to control different devices such as Lego NXT, Arduino Board, Sphero, Kinect, Duinobot, Wiimote among others. Scratch was developed in the early 21st century at MIT Media Lab Lifelong Kindergarten Group led by Papert's pupil Mitchel Resnick. Like Etoys, it is based on Morphic tile scripts. Scratch was initially designed specifically to enhance the development of technological fluency at after-school centers in economically disadvantaged communities. StarLogo TNG was developed by the MIT Scheller Teacher Education Program under Eric Klopfer. It combines a block programming interface with 3D graphics. It is targeted at programming games and game-like simulations in middle and secondary schools. NetLogo was developed by Uri Wilensky. It was developed to teach children computational reasoning and thinking, and extends the Logo language by enabling the existence of many, many turtles at the same time. NetLogo is widely used not only in the K–12 environment, but also by researchers interested in the concept of agent-based modeling AgentCubes is a block-based programming environment for kids to create 3D games and simulation. It is developed by Alexander Repenning Easy Java Simulations or Ejs or EJS was developed by Open Source Physics under Francisco Esquembre. The user is working at a higher conceptual level, declaring and organizing the equations and other mathematical expressions that operate the simulation. It is targeted at programming physics simulations in secondary schools and universities. LEGO WeDo is a graphical programming language for children of age 7 years and up, used with the LEGO WeDo power function hub. LEGO MINDSTORMS EV3 is a dataflow graphical programming language for children age 10+. Robot Emil is a constructionist educational tool for children. It is targeted at primary schools and teaches programming step by step. References External links The Nature of Constructionist learning – MIT open-to-all online reading list on constructionism Lifelong Kindergarten Group – MIT Lifelong Kindergarten research group Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling – Northwestern University's Constructionist learning and agent-based modeling research group Ackerman on Constructivism vs Constructionism – Edith Ackermann draws out the differences between Piaget's Constructivism, Vygotsky's Socio-Constructivism and Papert's ConstructioNism Learning theory (education)

Emotivism

Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic, but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson. Emotivism can be considered a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. It stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as quasi-realism and universal prescriptivism), as well as to all forms of cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism). In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. History Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier. In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language in general often serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas. Decades later, David Hume espoused ideas similar to Stevenson's later ones. In his 1751 book An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume considered morality not to be related to fact but "determined by sentiment": G. E. Moore published his Principia Ethica in 1903 and argued that the attempts of ethical naturalists to translate ethical terms (like good and bad) into non-ethical ones (like pleasing and displeasing) committed the "naturalistic fallacy". Moore was a cognitivist, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism, particularly emotivism. The emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to A.J. Ayer's defense of positivism in Language, Truth and Logic, which contains his statement of emotivism. However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself, perhaps not even in Ayer's form, and some positivists in the Vienna Circle, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views. R. M. Hare unfolded his ethical theory of universal prescriptivism in 1952's The Language of Morals, intending to defend the importance of rational moral argumentation against the "propaganda" he saw encouraged by Stevenson, who thought moral argumentation was sometimes psychological and not rational. But Hare's disagreement was not universal, and the similarities between his noncognitive theory and the emotive one — especially his claim, and Stevenson's, that moral judgments contain commands and are thus not purely descriptive — caused some to regard him as an emotivist, a classification he denied: Proponents Influential statements of emotivism were made by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their 1923 book on language, The Meaning of Meaning, and by W. H. F. Barnes and A. Duncan-Jones in independent works on ethics in 1934. However, it is the later works of Ayer and especially Stevenson that are the most developed and discussed defenses of the theory. A. J. Ayer A. J. Ayer's version of emotivism is given in chapter six, "Critique of Ethics and Theology", of Language, Truth and Logic. In that chapter, Ayer divides "the ordinary system of ethics" into four classes: "Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions" "Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes" "Exhortations to moral virtue" "Actual ethical judgments" He focuses on propositions of the first class—moral judgments—saying that those of the second class belong to science, those of the third are mere commands, and those of the fourth (which are considered in normative ethics as opposed to meta-ethics) are too concrete for ethical philosophy. While class three statements were irrelevant to Ayer's brand of emotivism, they would later play a significant role in Stevenson's. Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified; in this he agrees with ethical intuitionists. But he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as "worthless" for determining moral truths, since the intuition of one person often contradicts that of another. Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts": Ayer agrees with subjectivists in saying that ethical statements are necessarily related to individual attitudes, but he says they lack truth value because they cannot be properly understood as propositions about those attitudes; Ayer thinks ethical sentences are expressions, not assertions, of approval. While an assertion of approval may always be accompanied by an expression of approval, expressions can be made without making assertions; Ayer's example is boredom, which can be expressed through the stated assertion "I am bored" or through non-assertions including tone of voice, body language, and various other verbal statements. He sees ethical statements as expressions of the latter sort, so the phrase "Theft is wrong" is a non-propositional sentence that is an expression of disapproval but is not equivalent to the proposition "I disapprove of theft". Having argued that his theory of ethics is noncognitive and not subjective, he accepts that his position and subjectivism are equally confronted by G. E. Moore's argument that ethical disputes are clearly genuine disputes and not just expressions of contrary feelings. Ayer's defense is that all ethical disputes are about facts regarding the proper application of a value system to a specific case, not about the value systems themselves, because any dispute about values can only be resolved by judging that one value system is superior to another, and this judgment itself presupposes a shared value system. If Moore is wrong in saying that there are actual disagreements of value, we are left with the claim that there are actual disagreements of fact, and Ayer accepts this without hesitation: C. L. Stevenson Stevenson's work has been seen both as an elaboration upon Ayer's views and as a representation of one of "two broad types of ethical emotivism." An analytic philosopher, Stevenson suggested in his 1937 essay "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" that any ethical theory should explain three things: that intelligent disagreement can occur over moral questions, that moral terms like good are "magnetic" in encouraging action, and that the scientific method is insufficient for verifying moral claims. Stevenson's own theory was fully developed in his 1944 book Ethics and Language. In it, he agrees with Ayer that ethical sentences express the speaker's feelings, but he adds that they also have an imperative component intended to change the listener's feelings and that this component is of greater importance. Where Ayer spoke of values, or fundamental psychological inclinations, Stevenson speaks of attitudes, and where Ayer spoke of disagreement of fact, or rational disputes over the application of certain values to a particular case, Stevenson speaks of differences in belief; the concepts are the same. Terminology aside, Stevenson interprets ethical statements according to two patterns of analysis. First pattern analysis Under his first pattern of analysis an ethical statement has two parts: a declaration of the speaker's attitude and an imperative to mirror it, so "'This is good' means I approve of this; do so as well." The first half of the sentence is a proposition, but the imperative half is not, so Stevenson's translation of an ethical sentence remains a noncognitive one. Imperatives cannot be proved, but they can still be supported so that the listener understands that they are not wholly arbitrary: The purpose of these supports is to make the listener understand the consequences of the action they are being commanded to do. Once they understand the command's consequences, they can determine whether or not obedience to the command will have desirable results. Second pattern analysis Stevenson's second pattern of analysis is used for statements about types of actions, not specific actions. Under this pattern, In second-pattern analysis, rather than judge an action directly, the speaker is evaluating it according to a general principle. For instance, someone who says "Murder is wrong" might mean "Murder decreases happiness overall"; this is a second-pattern statement that leads to a first-pattern one: "I disapprove of anything that decreases happiness overall. Do so as well." Methods of argumentation For Stevenson, moral disagreements may arise from different fundamental attitudes, different moral beliefs about specific cases, or both. The methods of moral argumentation he proposed have been divided into three groups, known as logical, rational psychological and nonrational psychological forms of argumentation. Logical methods involve efforts to show inconsistencies between a person's fundamental attitudes and their particular moral beliefs. For example, someone who says "Edward is a good person" who has previously said "Edward is a thief" and "No thieves are good people" is guilty of inconsistency until he retracts one of his statements. Similarly, a person who says "Lying is always wrong" might consider lies in some situations to be morally permissible, and if examples of these situations can be given, his view can be shown to be logically inconsistent. Rational psychological methods examine facts that relate fundamental attitudes to particular moral beliefs; the goal is not to show that someone has been inconsistent, as with logical methods, but only that they are wrong about the facts that connect their attitudes to their beliefs. To modify the former example, consider the person who holds that all thieves are bad people. If she sees Edward pocket a wallet found in a public place, she may conclude that he is a thief, and there would be no inconsistency between her attitude (that thieves are bad people) and her belief (that Edward is a bad person because he is a thief). However, it may be that Edward recognized the wallet as belonging to a friend, to whom he promptly returned it. Such a revelation would likely change the observer's belief about Edward, and even if it did not, the attempt to reveal such facts would count as a rational psychological form of moral argumentation. Non-rational psychological methods revolve around language with psychological influence but no necessarily logical connection to the listener's attitudes. Stevenson called the primary such method "'persuasive,' in a somewhat broadened sense", and wrote: Persuasion may involve the use of particular emotion-laden words, like "democracy" or "dictator", or hypothetical questions like "What if everyone thought the way you do?" or "How would you feel if you were in their shoes?" Criticism Utilitarian philosopher Richard Brandt offered several criticisms of emotivism in his 1959 book Ethical Theory. His first is that "ethical utterances are not obviously the kind of thing the emotive theory says they are, and prima facie, at least, should be viewed as statements." He thinks that emotivism cannot explain why most people, historically speaking, have considered ethical sentences to be "fact-stating" and not just emotive. Furthermore, he argues that people who change their moral views see their prior views as mistaken, not just different, and that this does not make sense if their attitudes were all that changed: James Urmson's 1968 book The Emotive Theory of Ethics also disagreed with many of Stevenson's points in Ethics and Language, "a work of great value" with "a few serious mistakes [that] led Stevenson consistently to distort his otherwise valuable insights". Magnetic influence Brandt criticized what he termed "the 'magnetic influence' thesis", the idea of Stevenson that ethical statements are meant to influence the listener's attitudes. Brandt contends that most ethical statements, including judgments of people who are not within listening range, are not made with the intention to alter the attitudes of others. Twenty years earlier, Sir William David Ross offered much the same criticism in his book Foundations of Ethics. Ross suggests that the emotivist theory seems to be coherent only when dealing with simple linguistic acts, such as recommending, commanding, or passing judgement on something happening at the same point of time as the utterance. According to this view, it would make little sense to translate a statement such as "Galileo should not have been forced to recant on heliocentricism" into a command, imperative, or recommendation - to do so might require a radical change in the meaning of these ethical statements. Under this criticism, it would appear as if emotivist and prescriptivist theories are only capable of converting a relatively small subset of all ethical claims into imperatives. Like Ross and Brandt, Urmson disagrees with Stevenson's "causal theory" of emotive meaning—the theory that moral statements only have emotive meaning when they are made to change in a listener's attitude—saying that is incorrect in explaining "evaluative force in purely causal terms". This is Urmson's fundamental criticism, and he suggests that Stevenson would have made a stronger case by explaining emotive meaning in terms of "commending and recommending attitudes", not in terms of "the power to evoke attitudes". Stevenson's Ethics and Language, written after Ross's book but before Brandt's and Urmson's, states that emotive terms are "not always used for purposes of exhortation." For example, in the sentence "Slavery was good in Ancient Rome", Stevenson thinks one is speaking of past attitudes in an "almost purely descriptive" sense. And in some discussions of current attitudes, "agreement in attitude can be taken for granted," so a judgment like "He was wrong to kill them" might describe one's attitudes yet be "emotively inactive", with no real emotive (or imperative) meaning. Stevenson is doubtful that sentences in such contexts qualify as normative ethical sentences, maintaining that "for the contexts that are most typical of normative ethics, the ethical terms have a function that is both emotive and descriptive." Philippa Foot's moral realism Philippa Foot adopts a moral realist position, criticizing the idea that when evaluation is superposed on fact there has been a "committal in a new dimension." She introduces, by analogy, the practical implications of using the word injury. Not just anything counts as an injury. There must be some impairment. When we suppose a man wants the things the injury prevents him from obtaining, have not we fallen into the old naturalist fallacy? Foot argues that the virtues, like hands and eyes in the analogy, play so large a part in so many operations that it is implausible to suppose that a committal in a non-naturalist dimension is necessary to demonstrate their goodness. Standard using and standard setting As an offshoot of his fundamental criticism of Stevenson's magnetic influence thesis, Urmson wrote that ethical statements had two functions—"standard using", the application of accepted values to a particular case, and "standard setting", the act of proposing certain values as those that should be accepted—and that Stevenson confused them. According to Urmson, Stevenson's "I approve of this; do so as well" is a standard-setting statement, yet most moral statements are actually standard-using ones, so Stevenson's explanation of ethical sentences is unsatisfactory. Colin Wilks has responded that Stevenson's distinction between first-order and second-order statements resolves this problem: a person who says "Sharing is good" may be making a second-order statement like "Sharing is approved of by the community", the sort of standard-using statement Urmson says is most typical of moral discourse. At the same time, their statement can be reduced to a first-order, standard-setting sentence: "I approve of whatever is approved of by the community; do so as well." See also Analytic philosophy Logical positivism Moral psychology Moral realism Prescriptivism (philosophy) Verification principle Notes References External links Emotivism, Intuitionism and Prescriptivism A clear explanation Emotivism definition in philosophyprofessor.com Metaethics Emotion Analytic philosophy Ethical theories de:Metaethik#Emotivismus

Transcendental argument for the existence of God

The Transcendental Argument for the existence of God (TAG) is an argument that attempts to prove the existence of God by appealing to the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge. A version was formulated by Immanuel Kant in his 1763 work The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. C. S. Lewis's argument from reason is also a kind of transcendental argument. Most contemporary formulations of a transcendental argument for God have been developed within the framework of Christian presuppositional apologetics and the likes of Cornelius Van Til and Greg Bahnsen. Transcendental reasoning "Transcendental" in this case is used as an adjective specifying a specific kind of argument, and not a noun. Transcendental arguments should not be confused with arguments for the existence of something transcendent. Rather, transcendental arguments are arguments that make inferences from the ability to think and experience. So-called progressive transcendental arguments begin with an apparently indubitable and universally accepted statement about people's experiences of the world. They use this to make substantive knowledge-claims about the world, e.g., that it is causally and spatiotemporally related. They start with what is left at the end of the skeptic's process of doubting. Progressive transcendental arguments take the form of modus ponens with modal operators: If possibly P, then necessarily Q. Actually P. Therefore, necessarily Q. Regressive transcendental arguments, on the other hand, begin at the same point as the skeptic, e.g., the fact that we have experience of a causal and spatiotemporal world, and show that certain notions are implicit in our conceptions of such experience. Regressive transcendental arguments are more conservative in that they do not purport to make substantive ontological claims about the world. Regressive transcendental arguments take the form of modus tollens with modal operators: If possibly P, then necessarily Q. Actually not Q. Therefore, necessarily not P. They are also sometimes said to be distinct from standard deductive and inductive forms of reasoning, although this has been disputed, for instance by Anthony Genova and Graham Bird. The argument There are many versions of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (both progressive and regressive), but they generally proceed as follows: If there is a transcendental unity of apperception, God exists. There is a transcendental unity of apperception. Therefore, God exists. The transcendental unity of apperception refers to the combination of different impressions, experiences and categories into a single, intelligible consciousness held by a person. It is argued that the negation of the existence of God therefore entails the impossibility of knowledge, which is self-refuting. The TAG differs from thomistic and evidentialist arguments, which presuppose the validity of human perception and judgement when proving the existence of God. Ash'ari Medieval Ash'ari Islamic theologians formulated a type of transcendental argument based on the notion that morality, logic, etc. cannot be fully understood apart from revelation and thereby, belief in the Quran and the Islamic truth claims were necessary in order to interpret the external world. For al-Ashari and others, it does not make sense to argue against religion using a priori assumptions about morality or scientific probabilities when these can only be understood in light of divine revelation. Criticism Barry Stroud has criticized transcendental arguments, distinguishing between epistemic and metaphysical transcendental arguments. The former says the belief in God (which might be false) is necessary to make sense of the world, while the latter says the existence of God is necessary to make sense of the world. Stroud argues transcendental arguments often only establish the former, but assert the latter. Presuppositional apologetics Internet Infidels co-founder Jeffery Jay Lowder has argued that the presuppositional apologetics' version of TAG is fatally flawed for numerous reasons. First, Bahnsen fails to defend the necessity of Christianity instead of the mere sufficiency for the rational justification of the laws of logic, the laws of science, and the laws of morality. In other words, such reasoning affirms the consequent. Second, Bahnsen conflates "atheism" with "materialism" and has really presented an argument against materialism, not an argument for Christianity. Third, Bahnsen believed that the laws of logic, laws of science, and laws of morality are abstract objects, but Christianity arguably underdetermines the relationship between God and abstract objects. Some Christian philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen, affirm Platonism and the compatibility of God and abstract objects. But other Christian philosophers argue that Platonism is incompatible with divine aseity. William Lane Craig urges Christian philosophers to consider anti-realist theories of abstract objects. See also Transcendental arguments Christian apologetics Argument from morality References Notes E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980). Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998). John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995). Steven M. Schlissel, ed., The Standard Bearer: A Festschrift for Greg L. Bahnsen (Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Press, 2002). Greg L. Bahnsen, Always Ready: Directions for Defending the Faith". Robert R. Booth, ed. (Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Press, 1996). John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1994). John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987). External links Articles Derrida, Van Til and the Metaphysics of Postmodernism An appraisal of Postmodernism, specifically Deconstruction, in light of Van Til by Jacob Gabriel Hale. Debates "The Great Debate: Does God Exist?" Audio (listen/download format) of a formal debate between Christian Greg Bahnsen and skeptic Gordon Stein from the University of California, Irvine. "The Verdict Is In: Assessment of the 1985 Bahnsen-Stein Debate, 'Does God Exist?'" Video (watch/download format) of the Bahnsen-Stein debate, beginning with a technical and rhetorical assessment of Bahnsen's opening statement in which he defends his transcendental argument for God's existence. The Martin-Frame Debate A written debate between skeptic Michael Martin and Christian John Frame about the transcendental argument for the existence of God. The Drange-Wilson Debate A written debate between skeptic Theodore Drange and Christian Douglas Wilson. "Is Non-Christian Thought Futile?" A written debate between Christian Doug Jones and skeptics Keith Parsons and Michael Martin in Antithesis'' magazine (vol. 2, no. 4). Christian philosophy Arguments for the existence of God

Functional contextualism

Functional contextualism is a modern philosophy of science rooted in philosophical pragmatism and contextualism. It is most actively developed in behavioral science in general and the field of behavior analysis and contextual behavioral science in particular (see the entry for the Association for Contextual Behavioral Science). Functional contextualism serves as the basis of a theory of language known as relational frame theory and its most prominent application, acceptance and commitment therapy. It is an extension and contextualistic interpretation of B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism first delineated by Steven C. Hayes which emphasizes the importance of predicting and influencing psychological events (including thoughts, feelings, and behaviors) with precision, scope, and depth, by focusing on manipulable variables in their context. Contextualism The form of contextualism from which functional contextualism emerged is the one described by the philosopher Stephen C. Pepper in his book World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. In this work, Pepper noted that philosophical systems tend to cluster around a few distinct "world hypotheses" or "world views". Each world view is characterized by a distinctive underlying root metaphor and truth criterion. Root metaphors are based on seemingly well-understood, common-sense, everyday objects or ideas, and serve as the basic analogy by which an analyst attempts to understand the world. A world view's root metaphor roughly corresponds to its ontological assumptions, or views about the nature of being or existence (e.g., whether the universe is deterministic or not). Truth criteria are inextricably linked to their root metaphors, and provide the basis for evaluating the validity of analyses. A world view's truth criterion roughly corresponds to its epistemological assumptions, or views about the nature of knowledge and truth (e.g., whether it is discovered or constructed). The root metaphor of contextualism is the "act in context", whereby any event is interpreted as an ongoing act inseparable from its current and historical context. The truth criterion of contextualism is often dubbed "successful working", whereby the truth and meaning of an idea lies in its function or utility, not in how well it is said to mirror reality. In contextualism, an analysis is said to be true or valid insofar it as it leads to effective action, or achievement of some goal. Contextualism is Pepper's term for the philosophical pragmatism developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and others. Varieties of contextualism Analytic goals are vitally important to the contextualistic world view. This is because the analytic tools of contextualism—its root metaphor and truth criterion—both hinge on the purpose of the analysis, and neither can be mounted effectively without a clearly specified analytic goal. The pragmatic truth criterion of "successful working" is rendered meaningless in an analysis without an explicit goal because "success" can only be measured in relation to the achievement of some objective. Likewise, the root metaphor of the "act-in-context" is rendered meaningless in an analysis without an explicit goal because there would be no basis on which to restrict the analysis to a subset of the infinite expanse of the act's historical and environmental context. Without a clear analytic goal, the contextualist could analyze the endless context of an act in perpetuity, without ever knowing when the analysis was complete or good enough to be deemed "true" or "useful". It is very difficult for a contextualist without an explicit goal to construct or share knowledge. Contextualists can, and do, adopt different analytic goals, and the many different varieties of contextualism can be distinguished by their goals. Based on their overarching analytic goals, contextualistic theories can be divided into two general categories: "descriptive contextualism" and "functional contextualism". Descriptive contextualism Descriptive contextualists seek to understand the complexity and richness of a whole event through a personal and aesthetic appreciation of its participants and features. This approach reveals a strong adherence to the root metaphor of contextualism and can be likened to the enterprise of history, in which stories of the past are constructed in an attempt to understand whole events. The knowledge constructed by the descriptive contextualist is personal, ephemeral, specific, and spatiotemporally restricted. Like a historical narrative, it is knowledge that reflects an in-depth personal understanding of a particular event that occurred (or is occurring) at a particular time and place. Most forms of contextualism, including social constructionism, dramaturgy, hermeneutics, and narrative approaches, are instances of descriptive contextualism. Functional contextualism Functional contextualists, on the other hand, seek to predict and influence events using empirically based concepts and rules. This approach reveals a strong adherence to contextualism's extremely practical truth criterion and can be likened to the enterprise of science or engineering, in which general rules and principles are used to predict and control events. Rules or theories that do not contribute to the achievement of one's practical goals are ignored or rejected. Knowledge constructed by the functional contextualist is general, abstract, and spatiotemporally unrestricted. Like a scientific principle, it is knowledge that is likely to be applicable to all (or many) similar such events, regardless of time or place. References Behavioural sciences Epistemological theories Philosophy of science Pragmatism Behaviorism

Logical reasoning

Logical reasoning is a mental activity that aims to arrive at a conclusion in a rigorous way. It happens in the form of inferences or arguments by starting from a set of premises and reasoning to a conclusion supported by these premises. The premises and the conclusion are propositions, i.e. true or false claims about what is the case. Together, they form an argument. Logical reasoning is norm-governed in the sense that it aims to formulate correct arguments that any rational person would find convincing. The main discipline studying logical reasoning is logic. Distinct types of logical reasoning differ from each other concerning the norms they employ and the certainty of the conclusion they arrive at. Deductive reasoning offers the strongest support: the premises ensure the conclusion, meaning that it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if all the premises are true. Such an argument is called a valid argument, for example: all men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. For valid arguments, it is not important whether the premises are actually true but only that, if they were true, the conclusion could not be false. Valid arguments follow a rule of inference, such as modus ponens or modus tollens. Deductive reasoning plays a central role in formal logic and mathematics. For non-deductive logical reasoning, the premises make their conclusion rationally convincing without ensuring its truth. This is often understood in terms of probability: the premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true and strong inferences make it very likely. Some uncertainty remains because the conclusion introduces new information not already found in the premises. Non-deductive reasoning plays a central role in everyday life and in most sciences. Often-discussed types are inductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. Inductive reasoning is a form of generalization that infers a universal law from a pattern found in many individual cases. It can be used to conclude that "all ravens are black" based on many individual observations of black ravens. Abductive reasoning, also known as "inference to the best explanation", starts from an observation and reasons to the fact explaining this observation. An example is a doctor who examines the symptoms of their patient to make a diagnosis of the underlying cause. Analogical reasoning compares two similar systems. It observes that one of them has a feature and concludes that the other one also has this feature. Arguments that fall short of the standards of logical reasoning are called fallacies. For formal fallacies, like affirming the consequent, the error lies in the logical form of the argument. For informal fallacies, like false dilemmas, the source of the faulty reasoning is usually found in the content or the context of the argument. Some theorists understand logical reasoning in a wide sense that is roughly equivalent to critical thinking. In this regard, it encompasses cognitive skills besides the ability to draw conclusions from premises. Examples are skills to generate and evaluate reasons and to assess the reliability of information. Further factors are to seek new information, to avoid inconsistencies, and to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action before making a decision. Definition Logical reasoning is a form of thinking that is concerned with arriving at a conclusion in a rigorous way. This happens in the form of inferences by transforming the information present in a set of premises to reach a conclusion. It can be defined as "selecting and interpreting information from a given context, making connections, and verifying and drawing conclusions based on provided and interpreted information and the associated rules and processes." Logical reasoning is rigorous in the sense that it does not generate any conclusion but ensures that the premises support the conclusion and act as reasons for believing it. One central aspect is that this support is not restricted to a specific reasoner but that any rational person would find the conclusion convincing based on the premises. This way, logical reasoning plays a role in expanding knowledge. The main discipline studying logical reasoning is called logic. It is divided into formal and informal logic, which study formal and informal logical reasoning. Traditionally, logical reasoning was primarily associated with deductive reasoning studied by formal logic. But in a wider sense, it also includes forms of non-deductive reasoning, such as inductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. The forms of logical reasoning have in common that they use premises to make inferences in a norm-governed way. As norm-governed practices, they aim at inter-subjective agreement about the application of the norms, i.e. agreement about whether and to what degree the premises support their conclusion. The types of logical reasoning differ concerning the exact norms they use as well as the certainty of the conclusion they arrive at. Deductive reasoning offers the strongest support and implies its conclusion with certainty, like mathematical proofs. For non-deductive reasoning, the premises make the conclusion more likely but do not ensure it. This support comes in degrees: strong arguments make the conclusion very likely, as is the case for well-researched issues in the empirical sciences. Some theorists give a very wide definition of logical reasoning that includes its role as a cognitive skill responsible for high-quality thinking. In this regard, it has roughly the same meaning as critical thinking. Basic concepts A variety of basic concepts is used in the study and analysis of logical reasoning. Logical reasoning happens by inferring a conclusion from a set of premises. Premises and conclusions are normally seen as propositions. A proposition is a statement that makes a claim about what is the case. In this regard, propositions act as truth-bearers: they are either true or false. For example, the sentence "The water is boiling." expresses a proposition since it can be true or false. The sentences "Is the water boiling?" or "Boil the water!", on the other hand, express no propositions since they are neither true nor false. The propositions used as the starting point of logical reasoning are called the premises. The proposition inferred from them is called the conclusion. For example, in the argument "all puppies are dogs; all dogs are animals; therefore all puppies are animals", the propositions "all puppies are dogs" and "all dogs are animals" act as premises while the proposition "all puppies are animals" is the conclusion. A set of premises together with a conclusion is called an argument. An inference is the mental process of reasoning that starts from the premises and arrives at the conclusion. But the terms "argument" and "inference" are often used interchangeably in logic. The purpose of arguments is to convince a person that something is the case by providing reasons for this belief. Many arguments in natural language do not explicitly state all the premises. Instead, the premises are often implicitly assumed, especially if they seem obvious and belong to common sense. Some theorists distinguish between simple and complex arguments. A complex argument is made up of many sub-arguments. This way, a chain is formed in which the conclusions of earlier arguments act as premises for later arguments. Each link in this chain has to be successful for a complex argument to succeed. An argument is correct or incorrect depending on whether the premises offer support for the conclusion. This is often understood in terms of probability: if the premises of a correct argument are true, it raises the probability that its conclusion is also true. Forms of logical reasoning can be distinguished based on how the premises support the conclusion. Deductive arguments offer the strongest possible support. Non-deductive arguments are weaker but are nonetheless correct forms of reasoning. The term "proof" is often used for deductive arguments or very strong non-deductive arguments. Incorrect arguments offer no or not sufficient support and are called fallacies, although the use of incorrect arguments does not mean their conclusions are incorrect. Deductive reasoning Deductive reasoning is the mental process of drawing deductive inferences. Deductively valid inferences are the most reliable form of inference: it is impossible for their conclusion to be false if all the premises are true. This means that the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true. For example, inferring the conclusion "no cats are frogs" from the premises "all frogs are amphibians" and "no cats are amphibians" is a sound argument. But even arguments with false premises can be deductively valid, like inferring that "no cats are frogs" from the premises "all frogs are mammals" and "no cats are mammals". In this regard, it only matters that the conclusion could not be false if the premises are true and not whether they actually are true. Deductively valid arguments follow a rule of inference. A rule of inference is a scheme of drawing conclusions that depends only on the logical form of the premises and the conclusion but not on their specific content. The most-discussed rule of inference is the modus ponens. It has the following form: p; if p then q; therefore q. This scheme is deductively valid no matter what p and q stand for. For example, the argument "today is Sunday; if today is Sunday then I don't have to go to work today; therefore I don't have to go to work today" is deductively valid because it has the form of modus ponens. Other popular rules of inference include modus tollens (not q; if p then q; therefore not p) and the disjunctive syllogism (p or q; not p; therefore q). The rules governing deductive reasoning are often expressed formally as logical systems for assessing the correctness of deductive arguments. Aristotelian logic is one of the earliest systems and was treated as the canon of logic in the Western world for over two thousand years. It is based on syllogisms, like concluding that "Socrates is a mortal" from the premises "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal". The currently dominant system is known as classical logic and covers many additional forms of inferences besides syllogisms. So-called extended logics are based on classical logic and introduce additional rules of inference for specific domains. For example, modal logic can be used to reason about what is possible and what is necessary. Temporal logic can be used to draw inferences about what happened before, during, and after an event. Classical logic and its extensions rest on a set of basic logical intuitions accepted by most logicians. They include the law of excluded middle, the double negation elimination, the principle of explosion, and the bivalence of truth. So-called deviant logics reject some of these basic intuitions and propose alternative rules governing the validity of arguments. For example, intuitionistic logics reject the law of excluded middle and the double negation elimination while paraconsistent logics reject the principle of explosion. Deductive reasoning plays a central role in formal logic and mathematics. In mathematics, it is used to prove mathematical theorems based on a set of premises, usually called axioms. For example, Peano arithmetic is based on a small set of axioms from which all essential properties of natural numbers can be inferred using deductive reasoning. Non-deductive reasoning Non-deductive reasoning is an important form of logical reasoning besides deductive reasoning. It happens in the form of inferences drawn from premises to reach and support a conclusion, just like its deductive counterpart. The hallmark of non-deductive reasoning is that this support is fallible. This means that if the premises are true, it makes it more likely but not certain that the conclusion is also true. So for a non-deductive argument, it is possible for all its premises to be true while its conclusion is still false. There are various types of non-deductive reasoning, like inductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. Non-deductive reasoning is more common in everyday life than deductive reasoning. Non-deductive reasoning is ampliative and defeasible. Sometimes, the terms non-deductive reasoning, ampliative reasoning, and defeasible reasoning are used synonymously even though there are slight differences in their meaning. Non-deductive reasoning is ampliative in the sense that it arrives at information not already present in the premises. Deductive reasoning, by contrast, is non-ampliative since it only extracts information already present in the premises without adding any additional information. So with non-deductive reasoning, one can learn something new that one did not know before. But the fact that new information is added means that this additional information may be false. This is why non-deductive reasoning is not as secure as deductive reasoning. A closely related aspect is that non-deductive reasoning is defeasible or non-monotonic. This means that one may have to withdraw a conclusion upon learning new information. For example, if all birds a person has seen so far can fly, this person is justified in reaching the inductive conclusion that all birds fly. This conclusion is defeasible because the reasoner may have to revise it upon learning that penguins are birds that do not fly. Inductive Inductive reasoning starts from a set of individual instances and uses generalization to arrive at a universal law governing all cases. Some theorists use the term in a very wide sense to include any form of non-deductive reasoning, even if no generalization is involved. In the more narrow sense, it can be defined as "the process of inferring a general law or principle from the observations of particular instances." For example, starting from the empirical observation that "all ravens I have seen so far are black", inductive reasoning can be used to infer that "all ravens are black". In a slightly weaker form, induction can also be used to infer an individual conclusion about a single case, for example, that "the next raven I will see is black". Inductive reasoning is closely related to statistical reasoning and probabilistic reasoning. Like other forms of non-deductive reasoning, induction is not certain. This means that the premises support the conclusion by making it more probable but do not ensure its truth. In this regard, the conclusion of an inductive inference contains new information not already found in the premises. Various aspects of the premises are important to ensure that they offer significant support to the conclusion. In this regard, the sample size should be large to guarantee that many individual cases were considered before drawing the conclusion. An intimately connected factor is that the sample is random and representative. This means that it includes a fair and balanced selection of individuals with different key characteristics. For example, when making a generalization about human beings, the sample should include members of different races, genders, and age groups. A lot of reasoning in everyday life is inductive. For example, when predicting how a person will react to a situation, inductive reasoning can be employed based on how the person reacted previously in similar circumstances. It plays an equally central role in the sciences, which often start with many particular observations and then apply the process of generalization to arrive at a universal law. A well-known issue in the field of inductive reasoning is the so-called problem of induction. It concerns the question of whether or why anyone is justified in believing the conclusions of inductive inferences. This problem was initially raised by David Hume, who holds that future events need not resemble past observations. In this regard, inductive reasoning about future events seems to rest on the assumption that nature remains uniform. Abductive Abductive reasoning is usually understood as an inference from an observation to a fact explaining this observation. Inferring that it has rained after seeing that the streets are wet is one example. Often, the expression "inference to the best explanation" is used as a synonym. This expression underlines that there are usually many possible explanations of the same fact and that the reasoner should only infer the best explanation. For example, a tsunami could also explain why the streets are wet but this is usually not the best explanation. As a form of non-deductive reasoning, abduction does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion even if the premises are true. The more plausible the explanation is, the stronger it is supported by the premises. In this regard, it matters that the explanation is simple, i.e. does not include any unnecessary claims, and that it is consistent with established knowledge. Other central criteria for a good explanation are that it fits observed and commonly known facts and that it is relevant, precise, and not circular. Ideally, the explanation should be verifiable by empirical evidence. If the explanation involves extraordinary claims then it requires very strong evidence. Abductive reasoning plays a central role in science when researchers discover unexplained phenomena. In this case, they often resort to a form of guessing to come up with general principles that could explain the observations. The hypotheses are then tested and compared to discover which one provides the best explanation. This pertains particularly to cases of causal reasoning that try to discover the relation between causes and effects. Abduction is also very common in everyday life. It is used there in a similar but less systematic form. This relates, for example, to the trust people put in what other people say. The best explanation of why a person asserts a claim is usually that they believe it and have evidence for it. This form of abductive reasoning is relevant to why one normally trusts what other people say even though this inference is usually not drawn in an explicit way. Something similar happens when the speaker's statement is ambiguous and the audience tries to discover and explain what the speaker could have meant. Abductive reasoning is also common in medicine when a doctor examines the symptoms of their patient in order to arrive at a diagnosis of their underlying cause. Analogical Analogical reasoning involves the comparison of two systems in relation to their similarity. It starts from information about one system and infers information about another system based on the resemblance between the two systems. Expressed schematically, arguments from analogy have the following form: (1) a is similar to b; (2) a has feature F; (3) therefore b probably also has feature F. Analogical reasoning can be used, for example, to infer information about humans from medical experiments on animals: (1) rats are similar to humans; (2) birth control pills affect the brain development of rats; (3) therefore they may also affect the brain development of humans. Through analogical reasoning, knowledge can be transferred from one situation or domain to another. Arguments from analogy provide support for their conclusion but do not guarantee its truth. Their strength depends on various factors. The more similar the systems are, the more likely it is that a given feature of one object also characterizes the other object. Another factor concerns not just the degree of similarity but also its relevance. For example, an artificial strawberry made of plastic may be similar to a real strawberry in many respects, including its shape, color, and surface structure. But these similarities are irrelevant to whether the artificial strawberry tastes as sweet as the real one. Analogical reasoning plays a central role in problem-solving, decision-making, and learning. It can be used both for simple physical characteristics and complex abstract ideas. In science, analogies are often used in models to understand complex phenomena in a simple way. For example, the Bohr model explains the interactions of sub-atomic particles in analogy to how planets revolve around the sun. Fallacies A fallacy is an incorrect argument or a faulty form of reasoning. This means that the premises provide no or not sufficient support for the conclusion. Fallacies often appear to be correct on the first impression and thereby seduce people into accepting and using them. In logic, the term "fallacy" does not mean that the conclusion is false. Instead, it only means that some kind of error was committed on the way to reaching the conclusion. An argument can be a fallacy even if, by a fortuitous accident, the conclusion is true. Outside the field of logic, the term "fallacy" is sometimes used in a slightly different sense for a false belief or theory and not for an argument. Fallacies are usually divided into formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies are expressed in a formal language and usually belong to deductive reasoning. Their fault lies in the logical form of the argument, i.e. that it does not follow a valid rule of inference. A well-known formal fallacy is affirming the consequent. It has the following form: (1) q; (2) if p then q; (3) therefore p. This fallacy is committed, for example, when a person argues that "the burglars entered by the front door" based on the premises "the burglars forced the lock" and "if the burglars entered by the front door, then they forced the lock". This fallacy is similar to the valid rule of inference known as modus ponens. It is faulty because the first premise and the conclusion are switched around. Other well-known formal fallacies are denying the antecedent, affirming a disjunct, denying a conjunct, and the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Informal fallacies are expressed in natural language. Their main fault usually lies not in the form of the argument but has other sources, like its content or context. Some informal fallacies, like some instances of false dilemmas and strawman fallacies, even involve correct deductive reasoning on the formal level. The content of an argument is the idea that is expressed in it. For example, a false dilemma is an informal fallacy that is based on an error in one of the premises. The faulty premise oversimplifies reality: it states that things are either one way or another way but ignore many other viable alternatives. False dilemmas are often used by politicians when they claim that either their proposal is accepted or there will be dire consequences. Such claims usually ignore that various alternatives exist to avoid those consequences, i.e. that their proposal is not the only viable solution. The strawman fallacy is another informal fallacy. Its error happens on the level of the context. It consists in misrepresenting the view of an opponent and then refuting this view. The refutation itself is often correct but the error lies in the false assumption that the opponent actually defends this view. For example, an alcohol lobbyist may respond to the suggestion to ban alcohol advertisements on television by claiming that it is impossible to make people give up drinking alcohol. This is a strawman fallacy since the suggestion was merely to ban advertisements and not to stop all alcohol consumption. Ambiguous and vague expressions in natural language are often responsible for the faulty reasoning in informal fallacies. For example, this is the case for fallacies of ambiguity, like the argument "(1) feathers are light; (2) light is opposed to darkness; (3) therefore feathers are opposed to darkness". The error is found in the ambiguous term "light", which has one meaning in the first premise ("not heavy") and a different meaning in the second premise ("visible electromagnetic radiation"). As a skill Some theorists discuss logical reasoning in a very wide sense that includes its role as a broad skill responsible for high-quality thinking. In this sense, it is roughly equivalent to critical thinking and includes the capacity to select and apply the appropriate rules of logic to specific situations. It encompasses a great variety of abilities besides drawing conclusions from premises. Examples are to understand a position, to generate and evaluate reasons for and against it as well as to critically assess whether to accept or reject certain information. It is about making judgments and drawing conclusions after careful evaluation and contrasts in this regard with uncritical snap judgments and gut feelings. Other core skills linked to logical reasoning are to assess reasons before accepting a claim and to search for new information if more is needed to reach a reliable conclusion. It also includes the ability to consider different courses of action and compare the advantages and disadvantages of their consequences, to use common sense, and to avoid inconsistencies. The skills responsible for logical reasoning can be learned, trained, and improved. Logical reasoning is relevant both on the theoretical and practical level. On the theoretical level, it helps decrease the number of false beliefs. A central aspect concerns the abilities used to distinguish facts from mere opinions, like the process of finding and evaluating reasons for and against a position to come to one's own conclusion. This includes being able to differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources of information. This matters for effective reasoning since it is often necessary to rely on information provided by other people instead of checking every single fact for oneself. This way, logical reasoning can help the person avoid the effects of propaganda or being manipulated by others. When important information is missing, it is often better to suspend judgment than to jump to conclusions. In this regard, logical reasoning should be skeptical and open-minded at the same time. On the practical level, logical reasoning concerns the issue of making rational and effective decisions. For many real-life decisions, various courses of action are available to the agent. For each possible action, there can be conflicting reasons, some in favor of it and others opposed to it. In such cases, logical reasoning includes weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks as well as considering their likelihood in order to arrive at a balanced all-things-considered decision. For example, when a person runs out of drinking water in the middle of a hiking trip, they could employ the skills associated with logical reasoning to decide whether to boil and drink water from a stream that might contain dangerous microorganisms rather than break off the trip and hike back to the parking lot. This could include considering factors like assessing how dangerous the microorganisms are and the likelihood that they survive the boiling procedure. It may also involve gathering relevant information to make these assessments, for example, by asking other hikers. Time also plays a central role in logical reasoning. If one lacks important information, it is often better to delay a decision and look for new information before coming to a conclusion. If the decision is time-sensitive, on the other hand, logical reasoning may imply making a fast decision based on the currently available evidence even if it is very limited. For example, if a friend yells "Duck!" during a baseball game the most logical response may be to blindly trust them and duck instead of demanding an explanation or investigating what might have prompted their exclamation. Generally speaking, the less time there is, the more significant it is to trust intuitions and gut feelings. If there is more time, on the other hand, it becomes important to examine ambiguities and assess contradictory information. See also Argumentation theory Dialogical logic Epilogism List of rules of inference Transduction (machine learning) Transduction (psychology) References Citations Sources (for an earlier version, see: ) Reasoning Concepts in logic de:Schlussfolgerung nl:Redenering

Polysemy

Polysemy ( or ; ) is the capacity for a sign (e.g. a symbol, a morpheme, a word, or a phrase) to have multiple related meanings. For example, a word can have several word senses. Polysemy is distinct from monosemy, where a word has a single meaning. Polysemy is distinct from homonymy—or homophony—which is an accidental similarity between two or more words (such as bear the animal, and the verb bear); whereas homonymy is a mere linguistic coincidence, polysemy is not. In discerning whether a given set of meanings represent polysemy or homonymy, it is often necessary to look at the history of the word to see whether the two meanings are historically related. Dictionary writers often list polysemes (words or phrases with different, but related, senses) in the same entry (that is, under the same headword) and enter homonyms as separate headwords (usually with a numbering convention such as ¹bear and ²bear). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the three most polysemous words in English are run, put, and set, in that order. Polysemes A polyseme is a word or phrase with different, but related, senses. Since the test for polysemy is the vague concept of the relatedness, judgments of polysemy can be difficult to make. Because applying pre-existing words to new situations is a natural process of language change, looking at words' etymology is helpful in determining polysemy but not the only solution; as words become lost in etymology, what once was a useful distinction of meaning may no longer be so. Some seemingly unrelated words share a common historical origin, however, so etymology is not an infallible test for polysemy, and dictionary writers also often defer to speakers' intuitions to judge polysemy in cases where it contradicts etymology. English has many polysemous words. For example, the verb "to get" can mean "procure" (I'll get the drinks), "become" (she got scared), "understand" (I get it) etc. In linear or vertical polysemy, one sense of a word is a subset of the other. These are examples of hyponymy and hypernymy, and are sometimes called autohyponyms. For example, 'dog' can be used for 'male dog'. Alan Cruse identifies four types of linear polysemy: autohyponymy, where the basic sense leads to a specialised sense (from "drinking (anything)" to "drinking (alcohol)") automeronymy, where the basic sense leads to a subpart sense (from "door (whole structure)" to "door (panel)") autohyperonymy or autosuperordination, where the basic sense leads to a wider sense (from "(female) cow" to "cow (of either sex)") autoholonymy, where the basic sense leads to a larger sense (from "leg (thigh and calf)" to "leg (thigh, calf, knee and foot)") In non-linear polysemy, the original sense of a word is used figuratively to provide a different way of looking at the new subject. Alan Cruse identifies three types of non-linear polysemy: metonymy, where one sense "stands for" another (from "hands (body part)" to "hands (manual labourers)") metaphor, where there is a resemblance between senses (from "swallowing (a pill)" to "swallowing (an argument)") other construals (for example, from "month (of the year)" to "month (30 days)") There are several tests for polysemy, but one of them is zeugma: if one word seems to exhibit zeugma when applied in different contexts, it is probable that the contexts bring out different polysemes of the same word. If the two senses of the same word do not seem to fit, yet seem related, then it is probable that they are polysemous. This test again depends on speakers' judgments about relatedness, which means that it is not infallible, but merely a helpful conceptual aid. The difference between homonyms and polysemes is subtle. Lexicographers define polysemes within a single dictionary lemma, while homonyms are treated in separate entries, numbering different meanings (or lemmata). Semantic shift can separate a polysemous word into separate homonyms. For example, check as in "bank check" (or Cheque), check in chess, and check meaning "verification" are considered homonyms, while they originated as a single word derived from chess in the 14th century. Psycholinguistic experiments have shown that homonyms and polysemes are represented differently within people's mental lexicon: while the different meanings of homonyms (which are semantically unrelated) tend to interfere or compete with each other during comprehension, this does not usually occur for the polysemes that have semantically related meanings. Results for this contention, however, have been mixed. For Dick Hebdige, polysemy means that, "each text is seen to generate a potentially infinite range of meanings," making, according to Richard Middleton, "any homology, out of the most heterogeneous materials, possible. The idea of signifying practice—texts not as communicating or expressing a pre-existing meaning but as 'positioning subjects' within a process of semiosis—changes the whole basis of creating social meaning". Charles Fillmore and Beryl Atkins' definition stipulates three elements: (i) the various senses of a polysemous word have a central origin, (ii) the links between these senses form a network, and (iii) understanding the 'inner' one contributes to understanding of the 'outer' one. One group of polysemes are those in which a word meaning an activity, perhaps derived from a verb, acquires the meanings of those engaged in the activity, or perhaps the results of the activity, or the time or place in which the activity occurs or has occurred. Sometimes only one of those meanings is intended, depending on context, and sometimes multiple meanings are intended at the same time. Other types are derivations from one of the other meanings that leads to a verb or activity. Examples Man The human species (i.e., man vs. other organisms) Males of the human species (i.e., man vs. woman) Adult males of the human species (i.e., man vs. boy) (As a verb) to operate or constitute a vehicle or machine (To man a ship) This example shows the specific polysemy where the same word is used at different levels of a taxonomy. Bank a financial institution the physical building where a financial institution offers services to deposit money or have an account in a bank (e.g. "I bank at the local credit union") a supply of something held in reserve: such as "banking" brownie points a synonym for 'rely upon' (e.g. "I'm your friend, you can bank on me"). It is different, but related, as it derives from the theme of security initiated by 1. However: 1 is borrowed from Italian banco, a money lender's bench, while a river bank is a native English word. Today they can be considered homonyms with completely different meanings. But originally they were polysemous, since Italian borrowed the word from a Germanic language. The Proto-Germanic cognate for "bank" is *bankiz. A river bank is typically visually bench-like in its flatness. Related ideas A lexical conception of polysemy was developed by B. T. S. Atkins, in the form of lexical implication rules. These are rules that describe how words, in one lexical context, can then be used, in a different form, in a related context. A crude example of such a rule is the pastoral idea of "verbizing one's nouns": that certain nouns, used in certain contexts, can be converted into a verb, conveying a related meaning. Another clarification of polysemy is the idea of predicate transfer—the reassignment of a property to an object that would not otherwise inherently have that property. Thus, the expression "I am parked out back" conveys the meaning of "parked" from "car" to the property of "I possess a car". This avoids incorrect polysemous interpretations of "parked": that "people can be parked", or that "I am pretending to be a car", or that "I am something that can be parked". This is supported by the morphology: "We are parked out back" does not mean that there are multiple cars; rather, that there are multiple passengers (having the property of being in possession of a car). See also References Further reading Jamet, Denis (Ed.) (2008) "Polysemy", 1st issue of Lexis, E-Journal in English Lexicology. External links Homonymy Lexical semantics Philosophy of language Psycholinguistics Semantic relations

Hedonism

Hedonism refers to the prioritization of pleasure in one's lifestyle, actions, or thoughts. The term can include a number of theories or practices across philosophy, art, and psychology, encompassing both sensory pleasure and more intellectual or personal pursuits, but can also be used in everyday parlance as a pejorative for the egoistic pursuit of short-term gratification at the expense of others. The term originates in ethical philosophy, where axiological or value hedonism is the claim that pleasure is the sole form of intrinsic value, while normative or ethical hedonism claims that pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain for oneself or others are the ultimate expressions of ethical good. Applied to well-being or what is good for someone, it is the thesis that pleasure and suffering are the only components of well-being. Psychological or motivational hedonism claims that human behavior is psychologically determined by desires to increase pleasure and to decrease pain. The nature of pleasure Pleasure plays a central role in all forms of hedonism; it refers to experience that feels good and involves the enjoyment of something. Pleasure contrasts with pain or suffering, which are forms of feeling bad. Discussions within hedonism usually focus more on pleasure, but as its negative side, pain is equally implied in these discussions. Both pleasure and pain come in degrees and have been thought of as a dimension going from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees. The term "happiness" is often used in this tradition to refer to the balance of pleasure over pain. In everyday language, the term "pleasure" is primarily associated with sensory pleasures like the enjoyment of food or sex. But in its most general sense, it includes all types of positive or pleasant experiences including the enjoyment of sports, seeing a beautiful sunset or engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity. Theories of pleasure try to determine what all these pleasurable experiences have in common, and what is essential to them. They are traditionally divided into quality theories and attitude theories. Quality theories hold that pleasure is a quality of pleasurable experiences themselves while attitude theories state that pleasure is in some sense external to the experience since it depends on the subject's attitude to the experience. The plausibility of the various versions of hedonism is affected by how the nature of pleasure is conceived. An important appeal of most forms of hedonism is that they are able to give a simple and unified account of their respective fields. But this is only possible if pleasure itself is a unified phenomenon. This has been put into question, mainly due to the wide variety of pleasure experiences which seem to have no one shared feature in common. One way open to quality theorists to respond to this objection is by pointing out that the hedonic tone of pleasure-experiences is not a regular quality but a higher-order quality. Attitude theories have an easier way to reply to this argument since they may hold that it is the same type of attitude, often identified with desire, that is common to all pleasurable experiences. Psychological hedonism Psychological hedonism, also known as motivational hedonism, is an empirical theory about what motivates us: it states that all actions by humans aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain. This is usually understood in combination with egoism, i.e. that each person only aims at their happiness. For example, Thomas Hobbes theorized that a person's ego was the primary impulse in determining their behavior. Human actions rely on beliefs about what causes pleasure. False beliefs may mislead and thus each person's actions may fail to result in pleasure, but even failed actions are motivated by considerations of pleasure, according to psychological hedonism. The paradox of hedonism concerns the thesis that pleasure-seeking behavior is self-defeating in the sense that it results in less actual pleasure than would result from following other motives. Psychological hedonism gives a straightforward theory explaining the totality of human behavior. It has intuitive plausibility because pleasure-seeking behavior is a common phenomenon, and may indeed dominate human conduct at times; however, the generalization of psychological hedonism as an explanation for all behavior is highly controversial. Critics point to counterexamples involving actions that seem to have no plausible explanation in terms of pleasure, such as egoistic motives for things other than pleasure (e.g. health, self-improvement, post-mortem fame), and altruistic motives (e.g. pursuing one's child's happiness, sacrificing one's life for a greater cause). Psychological hedonists reinterpret such cases in terms of pleasure-seeking behavior, for example positing that seeing one's children happy or knowing that one's death will have been meaningful brings pleasure to the person sacrificing their immediate pleasure. Critics also contend that, via introspection, one can conclude that the pursuit of pleasure is only one type of motivating force among others and that reinterpreting every case in terms of pleasure/pain contradicts this. Critics also contend that psychological hedonism's basic claim of what motivates humans falls within the realm of the science of psychology rather than philosophy, and as such demands experimental evidence to confirm or contradict it. Ethical hedonism Ethical hedonism or normative hedonism, as defined here, is the thesis that considerations of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain determine what people should do or which action is right. However, it is sometimes defined in a wider sense in terms of intrinsic value, in which case it includes axiological hedonism as defined below. It is different from psychological hedonism since it prescribes rather than describes human behavior. In the narrow sense, ethical hedonism is a form of consequentialism since it determines the rightness of an action based on its consequences, which are measured here in terms of pleasure and pain. As such, it is subject to the main arguments in favor and against consequentialism. On the positive side, these include the intuition that the consequences of human actions matter and that, through them, humans ought to make the world a better place. On the negative side, consequentialism would entail that humans rarely if ever know right from wrong since human knowledge of the future is rather limited and the consequences of even simple actions may be vast. As a form of hedonism, it has some initial intuitive appeal since pleasure and pain seem to be relevant to how people should act. But it has been argued that it is morally objectionable to see pleasure and pain as the only factors relevant to what humans should do since this position seems to ignore, for example, values of justice, friendship and truth. Ethical hedonism is usually concerned with both pleasure and pain. But the more restricted version in the form of negative consequentialism or negative utilitarianism focuses only on reducing suffering. Ethical hedonism is said to have been started by Aristippus of Cyrene, who held the idea that pleasure is the highest good and later was revived by Jeremy Bentham. Ethical hedonist theories can vary in relation to whose pleasure is held within the circle of concern. Individualist forms of hedonism can overlap with Ethical egoism, dictating that each agent has no moral obligation beyond their own pleasure. This position is usually not held in very high esteem. Altruist theories, commonly known by the term "classical utilitarianism", are more respectable in the philosophical community. They hold that the agent should maximize the sum-total of everyone's happiness. This sum-total includes the agent's pleasure as well, but only as one factor among many. A common objection against utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. This is most pronounced in cases where the agent has to sacrifice his own happiness in order to promote someone else's happiness. For example, various commentators have directed this argument against Peter Singer's position, who suggests along similar lines that the right thing to do for most people living in developed countries would be to donate a significant portion of their income to charities, which appears overly demanding to many. Singer justifies his position by pointing out that the suffering that can be avoided in third world countries this way considerably outweighs the pleasure gained from how the money would be spent otherwise. Another common objection to utilitarianism is that it disregards the personal nature of moral duties, for example, that it may be more important to promote the happiness of others close to each individual person, such as family and friends, even if the alternative course of actions would result in slightly more happiness for a stranger. Axiological hedonism Axiological hedonism is the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. It has also been referred to as evaluative hedonism or value hedonism, and it is sometimes included in ethical hedonism. A closely related theory often treated together with axiological hedonism is hedonism about well-being, which holds that pleasure and pain are the only constituents of well-being and thereby the only things that are good for someone. Central to the understanding of axiological hedonism is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake. Instrumental value, on the other hand, is ascribed to things that are valuable only as a means to something else. For example, tools like cars or microwaves are said to be instrumentally valuable in virtue of the function they perform, while the happiness they cause is intrinsically valuable. Axiological hedonism is a claim about intrinsic value, not about value at large. Within the scope of axiological hedonism, there are two competing theories about the exact relation between pleasure and value: quantitative hedonism and qualitative hedonism. Quantitative hedonists, following Jeremy Bentham, hold that the specific content or quality of a pleasure-experience is not relevant to its value, which only depends on its quantitative features: intensity and duration. For example, on this account, an experience of intense pleasure of indulging in food and sex is worth more than an experience of subtle pleasure of looking at fine art or of engaging in a stimulating intellectual conversation. Qualitative hedonists, following John Stuart Mill, object to this version on the grounds that it threatens to turn axiological hedonism into a "philosophy of swine". Instead, they argue that the quality is another factor relevant to the value of a pleasure-experience, for example, that the lower pleasures of the body are less valuable than the higher pleasures of the mind. One appeal of axiological hedonism is that it provides a simple and unified account of what matters. It also reflects the introspective insight that pleasure feels valuable as something worth seeking. It has been influential throughout the history of western philosophy but has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy. Most objections can roughly be divided into 2 types: (1) objections to the claim that pleasure is a sufficient condition of intrinsic value or that all pleasure is intrinsically valuable; (2) objections to the claim that pleasure is a necessary condition of intrinsic value or that there are no intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure. Opponents in the first category usually try to point to cases of pleasure that seem to either lack value or have negative value, like sadistic pleasure or pleasure due to a false belief. Qualitative hedonists can try to account for these cases by devaluing pleasures associated with the problematic qualities. Other ways to respond to this argument include rejecting the claim that these pleasures really have no or negative intrinsic value or rejecting that these cases involve pleasure at all. Various thought experiments have been proposed for the second category, i.e. that there are intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure. The most well-known one in recent philosophy is Robert Nozick's experience machine. Nozick asks whether people would agree to be permanently transported into a simulated reality more pleasurable than actual life. He thinks that it is rational to decline this offer since other things besides pleasure matter. This has to do with the fact that it matters to be in touch with reality and to actually "make a difference in the world" instead of just appearing to do so since life would be meaningless otherwise. Axiological hedonists have responded to this thought experiment by pointing out that human intuitions about what people should do are mistaken, for example, that there is a cognitive bias to prefer the status quo and that if people were to find out that people had spent human life already within the experience machine, people would be likely to choose to stay within the machine. Another objection within this category is that many things besides pleasure seem valuable to us, like virtue, beauty, knowledge or justice. For example, G. E. Moore suggests in a famous thought experiment that a world consisting only of a beautiful landscape is better than an ugly and disgusting world even if there is no conscious being to observe and enjoy or suffer either world. One way for the axiological hedonist to respond is to explain the value of these things in terms of instrumental values. So, for example, virtue is good because it tends to increase the overall pleasure of the virtuous person or of the people around them. This can be paired with holding that there is a psychological bias to mistake stable instrumental values for intrinsic values, thus explaining the opponent's intuition. While this strategy may work for some cases, it is controversial whether it can be applied to all counterexamples. Aesthetic hedonism Aesthetic hedonism is the influential view in the field of aesthetics that beauty or aesthetic value can be defined in terms of pleasure, e.g. that for an object to be beautiful is for it to cause pleasure or that the experience of beauty is always accompanied by pleasure. A prominent articulation of this position comes from Thomas Aquinas, who treats beauty as "that which pleases in the very apprehension of it". Immanuel Kant explains this pleasure through a harmonious interplay between the faculties of understanding and imagination. A further question for aesthetic hedonists is how to explain the relation between beauty and pleasure. This problem is akin to the Euthyphro dilemma, i.e. the issue whether something is beautiful because it is enjoyed or whether it is enjoyed because it is beautiful. Identity theorists solve this problem by denying that there is a difference between beauty and pleasure: they identify beauty, or the appearance of it, with the experience of aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic hedonists usually restrict and specify the notion of pleasure in various ways in order to avoid obvious counterexamples. One important distinction in this context is the difference between pure and mixed pleasure. Pure pleasure excludes any form of pain or unpleasant feeling while the experience of mixed pleasure can include unpleasant elements. But beauty can involve mixed pleasure, for example, in the case of a beautifully tragic story, which is why mixed pleasure is usually allowed in aesthetic hedonist conceptions of beauty. Another problem faced by aesthetic hedonist theories is that people are known to have taken pleasure from many things that are not beautiful. One way to address this issue is to associate beauty with a special type of pleasure: aesthetic or disinterested pleasure. A pleasure is disinterested if it is indifferent to the existence of the beautiful object or if it did not arise due to an antecedent desire through means-end reasoning. For example, the joy of looking at a beautiful landscape would still be valuable if it turned out that this experience was an illusion, which would not be true if this joy was due to seeing the landscape as a valuable real estate opportunity. Opponents of hedonism usually concede that many experiences of beauty are pleasurable but deny that this is true for all cases. For example, a cold jaded critic may still be a good judge of beauty due to his years of experience but lack the joy that initially accompanied his work. One way to avoid this objection is to allow responses to beautiful things to lack pleasure while insisting that all beautiful things merit pleasure, that aesthetic pleasure is the only appropriate response to them. History Etymology The term hedonism derives from the Greek hēdonismos (; from ), which is a cognate from Proto-Indo-European swéh₂dus through Ancient Greek hēdús or hêdos + suffix -ismos (-ισμός, 'ism'). Opposite to hedonism, there is hedonophobia, which is a strong aversion to experiencing pleasure. According to medical author William C. Shiel Jr., hedonophobia is "an abnormal, excessive, and persistent fear of pleasure." The condition of being unable to experience pleasure is anhedonia. Ancient Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, written around 2100–2000 BCE. A central topic in ancient Greek thought, Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of Socrates, he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of Cyrenaics he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences. Plato critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality. Following a similar approach, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) associated pleasure with eudaimonia or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason. Epicurus (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a tranquil state of mind, and avoid pain. Following Antisthenes, the Cynics warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom. The Stoics also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Lucretius further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death. In ancient India, the Charvaka school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the non-existence of God or an afterlife led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended for a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain schools of thought. In ancient China, Yang Zhu argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of Yangism. Medieval Hedonist philosophy received less attention in medieval philosophy. The early Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a beatific vision of God. In Islamic philosophy, al-Razi was influenced by Epicureanism and defended a subtle form of hedonism, emphasizing moderation and the avoidance of excess. Both al-Farabi and Avicenna (980–1037 CE) asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good. Modern and contemporary At the transition to the early modern period, Lorenzo Valla synthesized Epicurean hedonism with Christian ethics, suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues. Hedonism gained prominence during the Age of Enlightenment. According to Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679) psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation. John Locke (1632-1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil. Joseph Butler (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects. According to David Hume (1711–1776), pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions. The libertine novels of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or sexual restraint. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) developed an influential form of hedonism known as classical utilitarianism. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the hedonic calculus to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration. His student John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided. An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by Franz Brentano (1838–1917). He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objectsa position also later defended by Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999). Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early psychoanalytic theory. He stated that the pleasure principle describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the reality principle represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences. The 20th century also saw various criticisms of hedonism. G. E. Moore (1873–1958) rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his axiological pluralism, there are other sources, such as beauty and knowledge, a criticism also shared by W. D. Ross (1877–1971). Both C. D. Broad (1887–1971) and Richard Brandt (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value. Robert Nozick (1938–2002) used his experience machine thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality. In response to these and similar criticisms, Fred Feldman (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved. Peter Singer (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about animal welfare. He has advocated effective altruism, relying on empirical evidence and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact. Inspired by the philosophy of Albert Camus (1913–1960), Michel Onfray (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form. David Pearce (1959–present) has developed a transhumanist version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future. The emergence of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism. Criticism Critics of hedonism have objected to its exclusive concentration on pleasure as valuable or that the retentive breadth of dopamine is limited. In particular, G. E. Moore offered a thought experiment in criticism of pleasure as the sole bearer of value: he imagined two worlds—one of exceeding beauty and the other a heap of filth. Neither of these worlds will be experienced by anyone. The question then is if it is better for the beautiful world to exist than the heap of filth. In this, Moore implied that states of affairs have value beyond conscious pleasure, which he said spoke against the validity of hedonism. Perhaps the most famous objection to hedonism is Robert Nozick's famous experience machine. Nozick asks to hypothetically imagine a machine that will allow humans to experience whatever people want—if a person wants to experience making friends, the machine will give this to its user. Nozick claims that by hedonistic logic, people should remain in this machine for the rest of their lives. However, he gives three reasons why this is not a preferable scenario: firstly, because people want to do certain things, as opposed to merely experience them; secondly, people want to be a certain kind of person, as opposed to an 'indeterminate blob' and thirdly, because such a thing would limit their experiences to only what people can imagine. Peter Singer, a hedonistic utilitarian, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek have both argued against such an objection by saying that it only provides an answer to certain forms of hedonism, and ignores others. See also Affectionism Eudaimonia Hedonic treadmill Hedonism Resorts Libertine Paradox of hedonism Pleasure principle (psychology) Psychological hedonism References Notes Citations Sources Further reading Feldman, Fred. 2006. Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford University Press. —— 1997. Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press —— 2010. What Is This Thing Called Happiness?. Oxford University Press Onfray, Michel. 2002. L'invention du plaisir : fragments cyréaniques. Le Livre de Poche. —— 2006. La puissance d'exister : Manifeste hédoniste. Grasset & Fasquelle Pearce, David. The Hedonistic Imperative. Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 1998. Hedonistic Utilitarianism. Edinburgh University Press Wilde, Oscar. 1891. The Picture of Dorian Gray. (Hedonism is prominent throughout the novel, influencing many of the decisions made by the titular protagonist.) Socrates and Hedonism: "Protagoras" 351b-358d Donald J.ZEYL External links Manifesto of the Hedonist International Theories of Well-Being, in William MacAskill & Richard Yetter-Chappell (2021), Introduction to Utilitarianism. Consequentialism Motivation Philosophical schools and traditions Philosophy of life Social influence Utilitarianism Axiological theories

Typology

Typology is the study of various traits and types, or the systematic classification of the types of something according to their common characteristics. Typology is the act of finding, counting and classifying facts with the help of eyes, other senses and logic. Typology may refer to: Typology (anthropology), human anatomical categorization based on morphological traits Typology (archaeology), classification of artefacts according to their characteristics Typology (linguistics), study and classification of languages according to their structural features Morphological typology, a method of classifying languages Typology (psychology), a model of personality types Psychological typologies, classifications used by psychologists to describe the distinctions between people Typology (statistics), a concept in statistics, research design and social sciences Typology (theology), the Christian interpretation of some figures and events in the Old Testament as foreshadowing the New Testament Typology (urban planning and architecture), the classification of characteristics common to buildings or urban spaces Building typology, relating to buildings and architecture Farm typology, farm classification by the USDA Sociopolitical typology, four types, or levels, of a political organization See also The Bechers' photographic typologies Blanchard's transsexualism typology, a controversial classification of trans women Johnson's Typology, a classification of intimate partner violence (IPV) Topology (disambiguation) Type (disambiguation) Typification, a process of creating standard (typical) social construction based on standard assumptions Typology of Greek vase shapes, classification of Greek vases Typography, the art and technique of arranging type to make written language legible, readable and appealing when displayed

Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate

The philosophical aspects of the abortion debate are logical arguments that can be made either in support of or in opposition to abortion. The philosophical arguments in the abortion debate are deontological or rights-based. The view that all or almost all abortion should be illegal generally rests on the claims that (1) the existence and moral right to life of human beings (human organisms) begins at or near conception-fertilization; that (2) induced abortion is the deliberate and unjust killing of the embryo in violation of its right to life; and that (3) the law should prohibit unjust violations of the right to life. The view that abortion should in most or all circumstances be legal generally rests on the claims that (1) women have a right to control what happens in and to their own bodies; that (2) abortion is a just exercise of this right; and that (3) the law should not criminalize just exercises of the right to control one's own body and its life-support functions. Although both sides are likely to see the rights-based considerations as paramount, some popular arguments appeal to consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. For example, anti-abortion groups sometimes cite alleged medical and psychological risks of abortion, such as the existence of post-abortion syndrome or the abortion–breast cancer hypothesis. On the other side, abortion-rights groups say that criminalizing abortion will lead to the deaths of many women through "back-alley abortions", that unwanted children have a negative social impact, or conversely cite the legalized abortion and crime effect, and that reproductive rights are necessary to achieve the full and equal participation of women in society and the workforce. Consequentialist arguments on both sides tend to be vigorously disputed, although they are not widely discussed in the philosophical literature. Contemporary philosophical literature contains two kinds of arguments concerning the morality of abortion. One family of arguments relates to the moral status of the embryo—whether or not the embryo has a right to life, in other words whether the embryo is a person in a moral sense. An affirmative answer would support the (1) claim in the central anti-abortion argument, while a negative answer would support the (1) claim in the central abortion-rights argument. Another family of arguments relates to bodily rights—the question of whether the woman's bodily rights justify abortion even if the embryo has a right to life. A negative answer would support claim the (2) claim in the central anti-abortion argument, while an affirmative answer would support the (2) claim in the central abortion-rights argument. Philosophical argumentation on the moral issue Arguments based on criteria for personhood Since there is a continuous progression from zygote to embryo to fetus to baby, questioning the beginning of personhood could lead to an instance of the sorites paradox, also known as the paradox of the heap. Mary Anne Warren, in her article arguing for the permissibility of abortion, holds that moral opposition to abortion is based on the following argument: It is wrong to kill innocent human beings. The embryo is an innocent human being. Hence it is wrong to kill the embryo. Warren thinks that "human being" is used in different senses in (1) and (2). In (1), "human being" is used in a moral sense to mean a "person", a "full-fledged member of the moral community". In (2), "human being" means "biological human". Warrens holds that while the embryo being a biologically human organism or animal is uncontroversial, it does not follow that the embryo is a person, and it is persons that have rights, such as the right to life. To help make a distinction between "person" and "biological human", Warren observes that humans should respect the lives of highly intelligent aliens even if they are not biological humans. She thinks there is a cluster of properties that characterize persons: Consciousness of objects and events external and/or internal to the being, and in particular the capacity to feel pain. Reasoning, the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems. Self-motivated activity, which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control. The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents but on indefinitely many possible topics. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both. A person does not have to have each of these but if something has all five, then it definitely is a person whether it is biologically human or not, while if it has none or perhaps only one, then it is not a person, whether it is biologically human or not. The fetus has at most one, consciousness and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain—the timing of which is disputed, and hence is not a person. Other writers apply similar criteria, concluding that the embryo lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness, or rationality and self-consciousness, or "certain higher psychological capacities" including "autonomy". Others conclude that personhood should be based on the brain birth concept, which is in essence the reversal of the brain death used as a modern definition of medical death. Under this proposal, presence of brain waves would be enough to grant personhood, even with other features lacking. Based on whether brain activity in the brain stem, or just in the cerebral cortex, is relevant for personhood, two concepts of brain birth emerge, namely at the first appearance of brain waves in lower brain (brain stem), or about 6–8 weeks of gestation (paralleling "whole brain death"), and at the first appearance of brain waves in higher brain (cerebral cortex), or about 22–24 or 24–28 weeks of gestation (paralleling "higher brain death"). Different writers place brain birth at numerous points, from as early as 25–40 days to as high as 32–36 weeks, with 8 weeks and 22–24 weeks as alternatives. For other writers, the concept itself is open to question. For example, a 1989 review of previous discussions of the concept, which placed brain birth at various points between 12 days' and 20 weeks' gestation and emphasized the symmetry of brain birth and brain death, concluded that "if the concept of brain birth is a valid one, it should be placed at 24–28 weeks' gestation. More importantly, it is concluded that the differences between brain development and brain death throw doubt on the concept itself." Although these writers disagree on precisely which features confer a right to life, they agree those features must be certain developed psychological or physiological features which the embryo lacks. Warren's arguments face two main objections. The comatose patient objection claims that as patients in a reversible coma do not satisfy Warren's or some other criteria—they are not conscious, do not communicate, and so on—therefore they would lack a right to life on her view. One response is that "although the reversibly comatose lack any conscious mental states, they do retain all their unconscious [or dispositional] mental states, since the appropriate neurological configurations are preserved in the brain." This may allow them to satisfy some of Warren's criteria. The comatose also still possess brain activity (brain waves), so this objection does not apply to brain birth theories. Finally, there are some post-natal humans who are unable to feel pain due to genetic disorders, and thus do not satisfy all of Warren's criteria. The infanticide objection argues that infants (up to about one year of age, since it is only around then that they begin to outstrip the abilities of non-human animals) have only one of Warren's characteristics—consciousness—and hence would have to be accounted non-persons on her view, and thus it is argued that her view would permit not only abortion but infanticide. Warren agrees that infants are non-persons and so killing them is not strictly murder but denies that infanticide is generally permissible. Once a human being is born, Warren argues that there is no longer a conflict between it and the woman's rights, since the human being can be given up for adoption. Killing such a human being would be wrong not because it is a person but because it would go against the desires of people willing to adopt the infant and to pay to keep the infant alive. This clarification has critics of its own, as beef cattle, chickens, or any other livestock raised for meat—or even some plants—have supporters who would pay to keep them alive. A response to these supports might be that, while livestock, plants, and infants are all not morally persons, the infant is the only life that can be designated a human being, and thus Warren's argument suggests an inherent value for the life of human beings that are not persons over lives that do not have the potential for becoming a person. Warren grants that her argument entails as a logical consequence that infanticide would be morally acceptable under some circumstances, such as those of a desert island. Philosopher Peter Singer similarly concludes that infanticide, particularly of severely disabled infants, is justifiable under certain conditions. Jeff McMahan grants that, under very limited circumstances, it may be permissible to kill one infant to save the lives of several others. Opponents may see these concessions as a reductio ad absurdum of these writers' views, while supporters may see them merely as examples of unpleasant acts being justified in unusual cases. Since brain waves appear in the lower brain (brain stem) in 6–8 weeks of gestation and in the higher brain (cerebral cortex) in 19–20 weeks of gestation, both "whole brain" and "higher brain" brain birth personhood concepts based on the presence of brain waves do not permit infanticide. Natural capacities view Some opponents of Warren's view believe that what matters morally is not that one be actually exhibiting complex mental qualities of the sort she identifies but rather that one have in oneself a self-directed genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop such qualities. In other words, what is crucial is that one be the kind of entity or substance that, under the right conditions, actively develops itself to the point of exhibiting Warren's qualities at some point in its life, even if it does not actually exhibit them because of not having developed them yet (embryo, infant) or having lost them (severe Alzheimer's). Because human beings have this natural capacity—and have it essentially—therefore, according this argument, they essentially have a right to life and could not possibly fail to have a right to life. Furthermore, since modern embryology shows that the embryo begins to exist at conception and has a natural capacity for complex mental qualities, it is argued that the right to life begins at fertilization. Grounding the right to life in essential natural capacities rather than accidental developed capacities is said to have several advantages. As developed capacities are on a continuum, admitting of greater and lesser degrees—for example, some are more rational and self-conscious than others—therefore (1) the "developed capacities" view must arbitrarily select some particular degree of development as the cut-off point for the right to life—whereas the natural capacities view is non-arbitrary; (2) those whose capacities are more developed would have more of a right to life on the "developed capacities" view—whereas the natural capacities view entails that all humans have an equal right to life; and (3) the continuum of developed capacities makes the exact point at which personhood ensues vague, and human beings around that point, say between one and two years of age, will have a shadowy or vague moral status—whereas there is no such indeterminacy on the natural capacities view. Some defenders of Warren-style arguments grant that these problems have not yet been fully solved; at the same time, they reply that the natural capacities view fares no better. For example, it is argued that as human beings vary significantly in their natural cognitive capacities (due to the inheritance of intelligence, some are naturally more intelligent than others), and as one can imagine a series or spectrum of species with gradually diminishing natural capacities (for example, a series from humans down to amoebae with only the slightest differences in natural capacities between each successive species), the problems of arbitrariness and inequality will apply equally to the natural capacities view. In other words, there is a continuum not only of developed but of natural capacities, and so the natural capacities view will inevitably face these problems as well. Some critics reject the natural capacities view on the basis that it takes mere species membership or genetic potential as a basis for respect (in essence a charge of speciesism), or because it entails that anencephalic infants and the irreversibly comatose have a full right to life. Moreover, some theories of personal identity would support the view that the embryo will never itself develop complex mental qualities (rather, it will simply give rise to a distinct substance or entity that will have these qualities), in which case the natural capacities argument would fail. Respondents to this criticism argue that the noted human cases in fact would not be classified as persons, as they do not have a natural capacity to develop any psychological features. Deprivation argument A seminal essay by Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives the embryo of a valuable future. Marquis begins by arguing that what makes it wrong to kill a normal adult human being is the fact that the killing inflicts a terrible harm on the victim. The harm consists in the fact that "when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future", and is being deprived of all the valuable "experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments" that they would otherwise have had. Thus, if a being has a highly valuable future ahead of it—a "future like ours"—then killing that being would be seriously harmful and hence seriously wrong. As a standard embryo have a highly valuable future, it is argued that killing it is seriously wrong, and so "the overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral" and are "in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being". A consequence of this argument is that abortion is wrong in all the cases where killing a child or adult with the same sort of future as the embryo would be wrong. For example, if involuntary euthanasia of patients with a future filled with intense physical pain is morally acceptable, aborting embryos whose future is filled with intense physical pain will also be morally acceptable. Following this logic, it would not be morally permissible to invoke the fact that some embryo's future would involve such things as being raised by an unloving family, since it is not considered to be acceptable to kill a five-year-old just because their future involves being raised by an unloving family. Similarly, killing a child or adult may be permissible in exceptional circumstances such as self-defense or perhaps capital punishment, although these are irrelevant to standard abortions. Marquis's argument has prompted several objections. The contraception objection claims that if Marquis's argument is correct, then since sperm and ova (or perhaps a sperm and ovum jointly) have a future like human beings, contraception would be as wrong as murder; as this conclusion is considered to be absurd—even those who believe contraception is wrong do not believe it is as wrong as murder—the argument must be unsound. One response is that neither the sperm, nor the egg, nor any particular sperm-egg combination, will ever itself live out a valuable future, and what will later have valuable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments is a new entity, a new organism, that will come into existence at or near conception, and it is this entity, not the sperm or egg or any sperm-egg combination, that has a future like human beings. Marquis's argument requires that what will later have valuable experiences and activities is the same entity, the same biological organism, as the embryo. The identity objection rejects this assumption. On certain theories of personal identity (generally motivated by thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum transplants), each human beings is not a biological organism but rather an embodied mind or a person (in John Locke's sense) that comes into existence when the brain gives rise to certain developed psychological capacities. If either of these views is correct, Marquis's argument will fail, for the embryo (even the early fetus, lacking the relevant psychological capacities) would not itself have a future of value but would merely have the potential to give rise to a different entity, an embodied mind or a person, that would have a future of value. The success of Marquis's argument thus depends on one's favored account of personal identity. The interests objection argues that what makes murder wrong is not just the deprivation of a valuable future but the deprivation of a future that one has an interest in. The embryo has no conscious interest in its future, and so it is argued that to kill it is not wrong. The defender of Marquis-style arguments may give the counterexample of the suicidal teenager who takes no interest in their future but killing whom is nonetheless wrong and murder. If the opponent responds that one can have an interest in one's future without taking an interest in it, then the defender of the Marquis-style argument can claim that this applies to the embryo. Similarly, if an opponent argues that what is crucial is having a valuable future which one would, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve (whether or not one desires to preserve it), then the defender may ask why the embryo would not, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve its future. The equality objection argues that Marquis's argument leads to unacceptable inequalities. If killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, as Marquis argues, then since some futures appear to contain much more value than others—a 9-year-old has a much longer future than a 90-year-old and a middle class person's future has much less gratuitous pain and suffering than someone in extreme poverty—some killings would turn out to be much more wrong than others. As this is strongly counterintuitive (most people believe all killings are equally wrong, all other things being equal), Marquis's argument must be mistaken. Some writers argued that the wrongness of killing arises not from the harm it causes the victim (since this varies greatly among killings) but from the killing's violation of the intrinsic worth or personhood of the victim. Such accounts may themselves face problems of equality, and so the equality objection may not be decisive against Marquis's argument. The psychological connectedness objection claims that a being can be seriously harmed by being deprived of a valuable future only if there are sufficient psychological connections—sufficient correlations or continuations of memory, belief, desire, and the like—between the being as it is now and the being as it will be when it lives out the valuable future. As there are few psychological connections between the embryo and its later self, it is concluded that depriving it of its future does not seriously harm it, and hence is not seriously wrong. A defense of this objection is likely to rest, as with certain views of personal identity, on thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum swaps, and this may render it implausible to some readers. Bodily rights argument In her well-known and influential article "A Defense of Abortion", Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is in some circumstances permissible even if the embryo is a person and has a right to life because the embryo's right to life is overtrumped by the woman's right to control her body and its life-support functions; in short, Thomson's argument is that the right to life does not include or entail the right to use someone else's body. Her central argument involves a thought experiment where an individual, named Bob, wakes up in bed next to a famous violinist. He is unconscious with a fatal kidney ailment, and because only Bob happens to have the right blood type to help, the Society of Music Lovers kidnapped Bob and plugged his circulatory system into the violinist's so that Bob's kidneys can filter poisons from his blood, as well as his own. If the violinist is disconnected from Bob, he will die but in nine months will recover and can be safely disconnected. Thomson takes it that one may permissibly unplug oneself from the violinist even though this will kill him. According to Thomson, the right to life does not entail the right to use another person's body, and so in disconnecting the violinist one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something—the use of another person's body—to which he has no right. Similarly, even if the fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant woman's body and life-support functions against her will, and so aborting the pregnancy is permissible in at least some circumstances. Thomson observes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb. Critics of this argument generally agree that unplugging the violinist is permissible but say that there are morally relevant disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. The most common objection is that the violinist scenario, involving a kidnapping, is analogous only to abortion after rape. In most cases of abortion, the pregnant woman was not raped but had intercourse voluntarily, and thus has either tacitly consented to allowing the embryo to use her body (the tacit consent objection), or else has a duty to sustain the embryo because the woman herself caused it to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objection). Other common objections turn on the claim that the embryo is the pregnant woman's child whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection); that abortion kills the embryo whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die (the killing versus letting die objection); or similarly that abortion intentionally causes the embryo's death whereas unplugging the violinist merely causes death as a foreseen but unintended side-effect (the intending versus foreseeing objection). Defenders of Thomson's argument, most notably David Boonin. reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not hold, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Critics have in turn responded to Boonin's arguments. Alternative scenarios have been put forth as more accurate and realistic representations of the moral issues present in abortion. John Noonan proposes the scenario of a family who was found to be liable for frostbite finger loss suffered by a dinner guest whom they refused to allow to stay overnight, although it was very cold outside and the guest showed signs of being sick. It is argued that just as it would not be permissible to refuse temporary accommodation for the guest to protect them from physical harm, it would not be permissible to refuse temporary accommodation of a fetus. Other critics argue that there is a difference between artificial and extraordinary means of preservation, such as medical treatment, kidney dialysis, and blood transfusions, and normal and natural means of preservation, such as gestation, childbirth, and breastfeeding. They argue that if a baby was born into an environment in which there was no replacement available for her mother's breast milk, and the baby would either breastfeed or starve, the mother would have to allow the baby to breastfeed. The mother would never have to give the baby a blood transfusion, no matter what the circumstances were. The difference between breastfeeding in that scenario and blood transfusions is the difference between gestation and childbirth on the one hand, and using one's body as a kidney dialysis machine on the other. Respect for human life One argument against the right to abortion appeals to the secular value of a human life. The thought is that all forms of human life, including the fetus, are inherently valuable because they are connected to human thoughts on family and parenthood, among other natural aspects of humanity. Thus, abortion can express the wrong attitudes towards humanity in a way that manifest vicious character. This view is represented by some forms of humanism and by moral philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse in her widely anthologized article "Virtue Theory and Abortion". According to Hursthouse, thinking about abortion in this way shows the unimportance of rights because one can act viciously in exercising a moral right. For example, she argues that the ending of a human life is always a serious matter and that abortion, when it is wrong, is wrong because it violates a respect for human life. She says: "Love and friendship do not survive their parties' constantly insisting on their rights, nor do people live well when they think that getting what they have a right to is of preeminent importance; they harm others, and they harm themselves." See also Abortion law Fetal pain Fetal rights Fetal viability Heartbeat bill History of abortion Human rights Libertarian perspectives on abortion Paternal rights and abortion Principle of double effect Religion and abortion Societal attitudes towards abortion Unborn Victims of Violence Act References Bibliography In . In . In . In . Reprinted in . Reprinted in . The postscript is with regards to cited above. Further reading Abortion debate Philosophical debates

Onomastics

Onomastics (or onomatology in older texts) is the study of proper names, including their etymology, history, and use. An alethonym ('true name') or an orthonym ('real name') is the proper name of the object in question, the object of onomastic study. Scholars studying onomastics are called onomasticians. Onomastics has applications in data mining, with applications such as named-entity recognition, or recognition of the origin of names. It is a popular approach in historical research, where it can be used to identify ethnic minorities within populations and for the purpose of prosopography. Etymology Onomastics originates from the Greek , itself derived from . Branches Toponymy (or more precisely toponomastics), one of the principal branches of onomastics, is the study of place names. Anthroponomastics is the study of personal names. Literary onomastics is the branch that researches the names in works of literature and other fiction. Socio-onomastics or re-onomastics is the study of names within a society or culture. See also Ancient Greek personal names Extinction of surnames Hydronym Mononymous persons Naming convention -onym, listing the technical kinds of names Organizations American Name Society English Place-Name Society Guild of One-Name Studies International Council of Onomastic Sciences Society for Name Studies in Britain and Ireland United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names References External links Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, a major research project of the British Academy, Oxford, containing over 35,000 published Greek names Folklore Lexicography

Egoism

Egoism is a philosophy concerned with the role of the self, or , as the motivation and goal of one's own action. Different theories of egoism encompass a range of disparate ideas and can generally be categorized into descriptive or normative forms. That is, they may be interested in either describing that people do act in self-interest or prescribing that they should. Other definitions of egoism may instead emphasise action according to one's will rather than one's self-interest, and furthermore posit that this is a truer sense of egoism. The New Catholic Encyclopedia states of egoism that it "incorporates in itself certain basic truths: it is natural for man to love himself; he should moreover do so, since each one is ultimately responsible for himself; pleasure, the development of one's potentialities, and the acquisition of power are normally desirable." The moral censure of self-interest is a common subject of critique in egoist philosophy, with such judgments being examined as means of control and the result of power relations. Egoism may also reject that insight into one's internal motivation can arrive extrinsically, such as from psychology or sociology, though, for example, this is not present in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Overview The term egoism is derived from the French , from the Latin (first person singular personal pronoun; "I") with the French ("-ism"). Descriptive theories The descriptive variants of egoism are concerned with self-regard as a factual description of human motivation and, in its furthest application, that all human motivation stems from the desires and interest of the ego. In these theories, action which is self-regarding may be simply termed egoistic. The position that people tend to act in their own self-interest is called default egoism, whereas psychological egoism is the position that all motivations are rooted in an ultimately self-serving psyche. That is, in its strong form, that even seemingly altruistic actions are only disguised as such and are always self-serving. Its weaker form instead holds that, even if altruistic motivation is possible, the willed action necessarily becomes egoistic in serving one's own will. In contrast to this and philosophical egoism, biological egoism (also called evolutionary egoism) describes motivations rooted solely in reproductive self-interest (i.e. reproductive fitness). Furthermore, selfish gene theory holds that it is the self-interest of genetic information that conditions human behaviour. Normative theories Theories which hold egoism to be normative stipulate that the ego ought to promote its own interests above other values. Where this ought is held to be a pragmatic judgment it is termed rational egoism and where it is held to be a moral judgment it is termed ethical egoism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that "ethical egoism might also apply to things other than acts, such as rules or character traits" but that such variants are uncommon. Furthermore, conditional egoism is a consequentialist form of ethical egoism which holds that egoism is morally right if it leads to morally acceptable ends. John F. Welsh, in his work Max Stirner's Dialectical Egoism: A New Interpretation, coins the term dialectical egoism to describe an interpretation of the egoist philosophy of Max Stirner as being fundamentally dialectical. Normative egoism, as in the case of Stirner, need not reject that some modes of behavior are to be valued above others—such as Stirner's affirmation that non-restriction and autonomy are to be most highly valued. Contrary theories, however, may just as easily favour egoistic domination of others. Theoreticians Stirner Nietzsche The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche has been linked to forms of both descriptive and normative egoism. Nietzsche, in attacking the widely held moral abhorrence for egoistic action, seeks to free higher human beings from their belief that this morality is good for them. He rejects Christian and Kantian ethics as merely the disguised egoism of slave morality. In his On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche traces the origins of master–slave morality to fundamentally egoistic value judgments. In the aristocratic valuation, excellence and virtue come as a form of superiority over the common masses, which the priestly valuation, in ressentiment of power, seeks to invert—where the powerless and pitiable become the moral ideal. This upholding of unegoistic actions is therefore seen as stemming from a desire to reject the superiority or excellency of others. He holds that all normative systems which operate in the role often associated with morality favor the interests of some people, often, though not necessarily, at the expense of others. Nevertheless, Nietzsche also states in the same book that there is no 'doer' of any acts, be they selfish or not: {{quote frame|...there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.(§13)|author=Friedrich Nietzsche|source=On the Genealogy of Morals}} Jonas Monte of Brigham Young University argues that Nietzsche doubted if any 'I' existed in the first place, which the former defined as "a conscious Ego who commands mental states". Other theoreticians Jeremy Bentham, who is attributed as an early proponent of psychological egoism Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevskii, a Russian literary critic and philosopher of nihilism and rational egoism Aleister Crowley, who popularized the expression "Do what thou wilt" Arthur Desmond as Ragnar Redbeard (possibly, unproved) Thomas Hobbes, who is attributed as an early proponent of psychological egoism John Henry Mackay, a British-German egoist anarchist Bernard de Mandeville, whose materialism has been retroactively described as form of egoism Friedrich Nietzsche, whose concept of will to power has both descriptive and prescriptive interpretations Dmitry Ivanovich Pisarev, a Russian literary critic and philosopher of nihilism and rational egoism Ayn Rand, who supported an egoistic model of capitalist self-incentive and selfishness Max Stirner, whose views were described by John F. Welsh as "dialectical egoism" Benjamin Tucker, an American egoist anarchist James L. Walker, who independently formulated an egoist philosophy before himself discovering the work of Stirner John Fowles, British writer who laid out an individualist philosophy in his book The Aristos. Relation to altruism In 1851, French philosopher Auguste Comte coined the term altruism (; , ) as an antonym for egoism. In this sense, altruism defined Comte's position that all self-regard must be replaced with only the regard for others. While Friedrich Nietzsche does not view altruism as a suitable antonym for egoism, Comte instead states that only two human motivations exist, egoistic and altruistic, and that the two cannot be mediated; that is, one must always predominate the other. For Comte, the total subordination of the self to altruism is a necessary condition to both social and personal benefit. Nietzsche, rather than rejecting the practice of altruism, warns that despite there being neither much altruism nor equality in the world, there is almost universal endorsement of their value and, notoriously, even by those who are its worst enemies in practice. Egoist philosophy commonly views the subordination of the self to altruism as either a form of domination that limits freedom, an unethical or irrational principle, or an extension of some egoistic root cause. In evolutionary theory, biological altruism is the observed occurrence of an organism acting to the benefit of others at the cost of its own reproductive fitness. While biological egoism does grant that an organism may act to the benefit of others, it describes only such when in accordance with reproductive self-interest. Kin altruism and selfish gene theory are examples of this division. On biological altruism, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: "Contrary to what is often thought, an evolutionary approach to human behaviour does not imply that humans are likely to be motivated by self-interest alone. One strategy by which ‘selfish genes’ may increase their future representation is by causing humans to be non-selfish, in the psychological sense." This is a central topic within contemporary discourse of psychological egoism. Relation to nihilism The history of egoist thought has often overlapped with that of nihilism. For example, Max Stirner's rejection of absolutes and abstract concepts often places him among the first philosophical nihilists. The popular description of Stirner as a moral nihilist, however, may fail to encapsulate certain subtleties of his ethical thought. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states, "Stirner is clearly committed to the non-nihilistic view that certain kinds of character and modes of behaviour (namely autonomous individuals and actions) are to be valued above all others. His conception of morality is, in this respect, a narrow one, and his rejection of the legitimacy of moral claims is not to be confused with a denial of the propriety of all normative or ethical judgement." Stirner's nihilism may instead be understood as cosmic nihilism. Likewise, both normative and descriptive theories of egoism further developed under Russian nihilism, shortly giving birth to rational egoism. Nihilist philosophers Dmitry Pisarev and Nikolay Chernyshevsky were influential in this regard, compounding such forms of egoism with hard determinism. Max Stirner's philosophy strongly rejects modernity and is highly critical of the increasing dogmatism and oppressive social institutions that embody it. In order that it might be surpassed, egoist principles are upheld as a necessary advancement beyond the modern world. The Stanford Encyclopedia states that Stirner's historical analyses serve to "undermine historical narratives which portray the modern development of humankind as the progressive realisation of freedom, but also to support an account of individuals in the modern world as increasingly oppressed". This critique of humanist discourses especially has linked Stirner to more contemporary poststructuralist thought. Political egoism Since normative egoism rejects the moral obligation to subordinate the ego to society-at-large or to a ruling class, it may be predisposed to certain political implications. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: In contrast with this however, such an ethic may not morally obligate against the egoistic exercise of power over others. On these grounds, Friedrich Nietzsche criticizes egalitarian morality and political projects as unconducive to the development of human excellence. Max Stirner's own conception, the union of egoists as detailed in his work The Ego and Its Own'', saw a proposed form of societal relations whereby limitations on egoistic action are rejected. When posthumously adopted by the anarchist movement, this became the foundation for egoist anarchism. Stirner's variant of property theory is similarly dialectical, where the concept of ownership is only that personal distinction made between what is one's property and what is not. Consequentially, it is the exercise of control over property which constitutes the nonabstract possession of it. In contrast to this, Ayn Rand incorporates capitalist property rights into her egoist theory. Revolutionary politics Egoist philosopher Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevskii was the dominant intellectual figure behind the 1860–1917 revolutionary movement in Russia, which resulted in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II eight years before his death in 1889. Dmitry Pisarev was a similarly radical influence within the movement, though he did not personally advocate political revolution. Philosophical egoism has also found wide appeal among anarchist revolutionaries and thinkers, such as John Henry Mackay, Benjamin Tucker, Émile Armand, Han Ryner Gérard de Lacaze-Duthiers, Renzo Novatore, Miguel Giménez Igualada, and Lev Chernyi. Though he did not involve in any revolutionary movements himself, the entire school of individualist anarchism owes much of its intellectual heritage to Max Stirner. Egoist philosophy may be misrepresented as a principally revolutionary field of thought. However, neither Hobbesian nor Nietzschean theories of egoism approve of political revolution. Anarchism and revolutionary socialism were also strongly rejected by Ayn Rand and her followers. Fascism The philosophies of both Nietzsche and Stirner were heavily appropriated (or possibly expropriated) by fascist and proto-fascist ideologies. Nietzsche in particular has infamously been represented as a predecessor to Nazism and a substantial academic effort was necessary to disassociate his ideas from their aforementioned appropriation. See also References Ethical schools and movements Individualism Consequentialism Philosophy of life

Mores

Mores (, sometimes ; , plural form of singular , meaning "manner, custom, usage, or habit") are social norms that are widely observed within a particular society or culture. Mores determine what is considered morally acceptable or unacceptable within any given culture. A folkway is what is created through interaction and that process is what organizes interactions through routine, repetition, habit and consistency. William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), an early U.S. sociologist, introduced both the terms "mores" (1898) and "folkways" (1906) into modern sociology. Mores are strict in the sense that they determine the difference between right and wrong in a given society, and people may be punished for their immorality which is common place in many societies in the world, at times with disapproval or ostracizing. Examples of traditional customs and conventions that are mores include lying, cheating, causing harm, alcohol use, drug use, marriage beliefs, gossip, slander, jealousy, disgracing or disrespecting parents, refusal to attend a funeral, politically incorrect humor, sports cheating, vandalism, leaving trash, plagiarism, bribery, corruption, saving face, respecting your elders, religious prescriptions and fiduciary responsibility. Folkways are ways of thinking, acting and behaving in social groups which are agreed upon by the masses and are useful for the ordering of society. Folkways are spread through imitation, oral means or observation, and are meant to encompass the material, spiritual and verbal aspects of culture. Folkways meet the problems of social life, we feel security and order from their acceptance and application. Examples of folkways include: acceptable dress, manners, social etiquette, body language, posture, level of privacy, working hours and five day work week, acceptability of social drinking—abstaining or not from drinking during certain working hours, actions and behaviours in public places, school, university, business and religious institution, ceremonial situations, ritual, customary services and keeping personal space. Terminology The English word morality comes from the same Latin root "mōrēs", as does the English noun moral. However, mores do not, as is commonly supposed, necessarily carry connotations of morality. Rather, morality can be seen as a subset of mores, held to be of central importance in view of their content, and often formalized into some kind of moral code or even into customary law. Etymological derivations include More danico, More judaico, More veneto, Coitus more ferarum, and O tempora, o mores!. The Greek terms equivalent to Latin mores are ethos (ἔθος, ἦθος, 'character') or nomos (νόμος, 'law'). As with the relation of mores to morality, ethos is the basis of the term ethics, while nomos gives the suffix -onomy, as in astronomy. Anthropology The meaning of all these terms extend to all customs of proper behavior in a given society, both religious and profane, from more trivial conventional aspects of custom, etiquette or politeness—"folkways" enforced by gentle social pressure, but going beyond mere "folkways" or conventions in including moral codes and notions of justice—down to strict taboos, behavior that is unthinkable within the society in question, very commonly including incest and murder, but also the commitment of outrages specific to the individual society such as blasphemy. Such religious or sacral customs may vary. Some examples include funerary services, matrimonial services; circumcision and covering of the hair in Judaism, Christian Ten Commandments, New Commandment and the sacraments or for example baptism, and Protestant work ethic, Shahada, prayer, alms, the fast and the pilgrimage as well as modesty in Islam, and religious diet. While cultural universals are by definition part of the mores of every society (hence also called "empty universals"), the customary norms specific to a given society are a defining aspect of the cultural identity of an ethnicity or a nation. Coping with the differences between two sets of cultural conventions is a question of intercultural competence. Differences in the mores of various nations are at the root of ethnic stereotype, or in the case of reflection upon one's own mores, autostereotypes. The customary norms in a given society may include indigenous land rights, honour, filial piety, customary law and the customary international law that affects countries who may not have codified their customary norms. Land rights of indigenous peoples is under customary land tenure, its a system of arrangement in-line with customs and norms. This is the case in colonies. An example of a norm is an culture of honor exists in some societies, where the family is viewed as the main source of honor and the conduct of family members reflects upon their family honor. For instance some writers say in Rome to have an honorable stance, to be equals with someone, existed for those who are most similar to one another (family and friends) this could be due to the competing for public recognition and therefore for personal and public honor, over rhetoric, sport, war, wealth and virtue. To protrude, stand out, be recognized and demonstrate this "A Roman could win such a "competition" by pointing to past evidences of their honor" and "Or, a critic might be refuted by one's performance in a fresh showdown in which one's bona fides could be plainly demonstrated." Honor culture only can exist if the society has for males the shared code, a standard to uphold, guidelines and rules to follow, do not want to break those rules and how to interact successfully and to engage, this exists within a "closed" community of equals. Filial piety is ethics towards one's family, as Fung Yu-lan states "the ideological basis for traditional [Chinese] society" and according to Confucious repay a burden debt back to ones parents or caregiver but its also traditional in another sense so as to fulfill an obligation to ones own ancestors, also to modern scholars it suggests extends an attitude of respect to superiors also, who are deserving to have that respect. See also Culture-bound syndrome Enculturation Euthyphro dilemma, discussing the conflict of sacral and secular mores Habitus (sociology) Nihonjinron "Japanese mores" Piety Political and Moral Sociology: see Luc Boltanski and French Pragmatism Repugnancy costs Value (personal and cultural) References Conformity Consensus reality Deviance (sociology) Morality Social agreement Sociological terminology Folklore

Supervenience

In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Examples of supervenience, in which case the truth values of some propositions cannot vary unless the truth values of some other propositions vary, include: Whether there is a table in the living room supervenes on the positions of molecules in the living room. The truth value of (A) supervenes on the truth value of its negation, (¬A), and vice versa. Properties of individual molecules supervene on the properties of individual atoms. One's moral character supervenes on one's action(s). Supervenience is of interest to philosophers because it differs from other nearby relations, for example entailment. Some philosophers believe it possible for some A to supervene on some B without being entailed by B. In such cases it may seem puzzling why A should supervene on B and equivalently why changes in A should require changes in B. Two important applications of supervenience involve cases like this. One of these is the supervenience of mental properties (like the sensation of pain) on physical properties (like the firing of 'pain neurons'). A second is the supervenience of normative facts (facts about how things ought to be) on natural facts (facts about how things are). It is sometimes claimed that what is at issue in these problems is the supervenience claim itself. For example, it has been claimed that what is at issue with respect to the mind-body problem is whether mental phenomena do in fact supervene on physical phenomena. This is incorrect. It is by and large agreed that some form of supervenience holds in these cases: Pain happens when the appropriate neurons fire. The disagreement is over why this is so. Materialists claim that we observe supervenience because the neural phenomena entail the mental phenomena, while dualists deny this. The dualist's challenge is to explain supervenience without entailment. The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the is-ought problem it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling. The possibility of "supervenience without entailment" or "supervenience without reduction" is contested territory among philosophers. History Supervenience, which means literally "coming or occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected", from "super," meaning on, above, or additional, and "venire," meaning to come in Latin, shows occurrences in the Oxford English Dictionary dating back to 1844. Its systematic use in philosophy is considered to have begun in early 20th-century meta-ethics and emergentism. As G.E. Moore wrote in 1922, "if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then... anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree" (p. 261). This usage also carried over into the work of R. M. Hare. For discussion of the emergentist roots of supervenience see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supervenience. In the 1970s, Donald Davidson was the first to use the term to describe a broadly physicalist (and non-reductive) approach to the philosophy of mind, called anomalous monism. As he said in 1970, "supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects." In subsequent years Terence ("Terry") Horgan, David Lewis, and especially Jaegwon Kim formalized the concept and began applying it to many issues in the philosophy of mind. This raised numerous questions about how various formulations relate to one another, how adequate the formulation is to various philosophical tasks (in particular, the task of formulating physicalism), and whether it avoids or entails reductionism. Definitions In the contemporary literature, there are two primary (and non-equivalent) formulations of supervenience (for both definitions let A and B be sets of properties). (1) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. Formally: (2) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if anything that has an A-property has some B-property such that anything that has that B-property also has that A-property. Formally: For example, if one lets A be a set of mental properties, lets B be a set of physical properties, and chooses a domain of discourse consisting of persons, then (1) says that any two persons who are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible, and (2) says that any person who has a mental property has some physical property such that any person with that physical property has that mental property. Some points of clarification: first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties and hence higher-order logic. Second, in (1), expressions of the form capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being indiscernible with respect to a set of properties. Thus, (1) can be understood more intuitively as the claim that all objects that are indiscernible with respect to a base set of properties are indiscernible with respect to a supervenient set of properties, or, as it is also sometimes said, that B-twins are A-twins. Finally, supervenience claims typically involve some modal force, however, the way that modal force is specified depends on which more specific variety of supervenience one decides upon (see below). (1) and (2) are sometimes called "schemata" because they do not correspond to actual supervenience relations until the sets of properties A and B, the domain of entities to which those properties apply, and a modal force have been specified. For modal forms of supervenience, the modal strength of the relation is usually taken to be a parameter (that is, the possible worlds appealed to may be physically possible, logically possible, etc.). Also, note that in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of predicates, facts, or entities instead, for example. Varieties of supervenience Beginning in the 1980s, inspired largely by Jaegwon Kim's work, philosophers proposed many varieties of supervenience, which David Lewis called the "unlovely proliferation". These varieties are based both on (1) and (2) above, but because (1) is more common we shall focus on varieties of supervenience based on it. We can begin by distinguishing between local and global supervenience: Local: For any two objects x and y, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. For example, if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state. Global: For any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. For example, if psychological properties globally supervene on physical properties, then any two worlds physically the same will be psychologically the same. The value of global supervenience is that it allows for supervenient properties to be determined not by local properties of an individual thing alone, but by some wider spatiotemporal distribution of things and properties. For example, something's being a dollar bill depends not only on the paper and the inks it is made out of, but also on a widely dispersed variety of features of the world it occupies. Both local and global supervenience come in many forms. Local supervenience comes in strong and weak varieties: Weak: For any world w, and for any two objects x in w and y in w, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. Strong: For any worlds w1 and w2, and for any two objects x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. The difference is essentially whether correlations between base and supervenient properties hold within actual worlds only, or across possible worlds. For example, if psychological properties strongly locally supervene on physical properties, then any two people physically the same, in any two worlds, will also be psychologically the same. On the other hand, if psychological properties only weakly locally supervene on physical properties, then those correlations between base and supervenient properties that hold in virtue of the supervenience relation are maintained within each world, but can be different in different worlds. For example, my physical duplicates in the actual world will have the same thoughts as I have; but my physical duplicates in other possible worlds may have different thoughts than I have in the actual world. There are also several kinds of global supervenience relations, which were introduced to handle cases in which worlds are the same at the base level and also at the supervenient level, but where the ways the properties are connected and distributed in the worlds differ. For example, it is consistent with global mental–physical supervenience on the simple formulation described above for two worlds to have the same number of people in the same physical states, but for the mental states to be distributed over those people in different ways (e.g. I have my father's thoughts in the other world, and he has my thoughts). To handle this, property-preserving isomorphisms (1-1 and onto functions between the objects of two worlds, whereby an object in one world has a property if and only if the object which that function takes you to in the other world does) are used, and once this is done, several varieties of global supervenience can be defined. Other varieties of supervenience include multiple-domains supervenience and similarity-based supervenience. Examples of supervenient properties Value properties The value of a physical object to an agent is sometimes held to be supervenient upon the physical properties of the object. In aesthetics, the beauty of La Grande Jatte might supervene on the physical composition of the painting (the specific molecules that make up the painting), the artistic composition of the painting (in this case, dots), the figures and forms of the painted image, or the painted canvas as a whole. In ethics, the goodness of an act of charity might supervene on the physical properties of the agent, the mental state of the agent (his or her intention), or the external state of affairs itself. Similarly, the overall suffering caused by an earthquake might supervene on the spatiotemporal entities that constituted it, the deaths it caused, or the natural disaster itself. The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called moral supervenience. Mental properties In philosophy of mind, many philosophers make the general claim that the mental supervenes on the physical. In its most recent form this position derives from the work of Donald Davidson, although in more rudimentary forms it had been advanced earlier by others. The claim can be taken in several senses, perhaps most simply in the sense that the mental properties of a person are supervenient on their physical properties. Then: If two persons are indistinguishable in all of their physical properties, they must also be indistinguishable in all of their mental properties. An alternative claim, advanced especially by John Haugeland, is a kind of weak local supervenience claim; or, weaker still, mere global supervenience. The claim that mental properties supervene globally on physical properties requires only a quite modest commitment: any difference between two possible worlds with respect to their instantiated mental properties entails at least some difference in the physical properties instantiated in those two worlds. Importantly, it does not require that the mental properties of an individual person supervene only on that person's physical state. This weak global thesis is particularly important in the light of direct reference theories, and semantic externalism with regard to the content both of words and (more relevant to our concerns here) of thoughts. Imagine two persons who are indistinguishable in their local physical properties. One has a dog in front of his eyes and the other has a dog-image artificially projected onto his retinae. It might be reasonable to say that the former is in the mental state of seeing a dog (and of knowing that he does so), whereas the latter is not in such a state of seeing a dog (but falsely believes that he sees one). There is also discussion among philosophers about mental supervenience and our experience of duration. If all mental properties supervene only upon some physical properties at durationless moments, then it may be difficult to explain our experience of duration. The philosophical belief that mental and physical events exist as a series of durationless moments that lie between the physical past and the physical future is known as presentism. Computational properties There are several examples of supervenience to be found in computer networking. For example, in a dial-up internet connection, the audio signal on a phone line transports IP packets between the user's computer and the Internet service provider's computer. In this case, the arrangement of bytes in that packet supervenes on the physical properties of the phone signal. More generally, each layer of the OSI Model of computer networking supervenes on the layers below it. We can find supervenience wherever a message is conveyed by a representational medium. When we see a letter "a" in a page of print, for example, the meaning Latin lowercase "a" supervenes on the geometry of the boundary of the printed glyph, which in turn supervenes on the ink deposition on the paper. Biological properties In biological systems phenotype can be said to supervene on genotype. This is because any genotype encodes a finite set of unique phenotypes, but any given phenotype is not produced by a finite set of genotypes. Innumerable examples of convergent evolution can be used to support this claim. Throughout nature, convergent evolution produces incredibly similar phenotypes from a diverse set of taxa with fundamentally different genotypes underpinning the phenotypes. One example is evolution on islands which is a remarkably predictable example of convergent evolution where the same phenotypes consistently evolve for the same reasons. Organisms released from predation tend to become larger, while organisms limited by food tend to become smaller. Yet there are almost infinite numbers of genetic changes that might lead to changes in body size. Another example of convergent evolution is the loss of sight that almost universally occurs in cave fish living in lightless pools. Eyes are expensive, and in lightless cave pools there is little reason for fish to have eyes. Yet, despite the remarkably consistent convergent evolution producing sightless cave fish, the genetics that produce the loss of sight phenotype is different nearly every time. This is because phenotype supervenes on genotype. Arguments against supervenience-based formulations of physicalism Although supervenience seems to be perfectly suited to explain the predictions of physicalism (i.e. the mental is dependent on the physical), there are four main problems with it. They are Epiphenomenal ectoplasm, the lone ammonium molecule problem, modal status problem and the problem of necessary beings. Epiphenomenal ectoplasm Epiphenomenal ectoplasm was proposed by Horgan and Lewis in 1983; they envisioned a possible world (a world that could possibly exist) W which is identical to our world in the distribution of all mental and physical characteristics (i.e. they are identical), except world W contains an experience called epiphenomenal ectoplasm that does not causally interact with that world. The possibility of such a world should be compatible with physicalism as this is a property of the actual world; but a supervenience-based definition of physicalism would imply that such a world could not exist, because it differs from the actual world with respect to a mental property, but is physically identical. A typical response to this objection is Frank Jackson's; he adjusted the supervenience-based definition of physicalism to state "Physicalism is true at a possible world W if and only if any world which is a minimal physical duplicate (i.e. is physically identical) of W is a duplicate of W simpliciter." This avoids the problem because the "ectoplasm" world is not a minimal physical duplicate, so its identity with the actual world need not follow. The lone ammonium molecule problem The lone ammonium molecule problem provides a problem for Jackson's solution to epiphenomenal ectoplasm. It was proposed by Jaegwon Kim in 1993 when he stated that according to Jackson's idea of supervenience, a possible world W was identical to the actual world, except it possessed an extra ammonium molecule on one of Saturn's rings. This may not seem to provide much of a problem, but because Jackson's solution refers only to minimal physical duplicates, this allows for the mental properties of W to be vastly different from those in the actual world. If such a difference would cause mental differences on Earth, it would not be consistent with our understanding of physicalism. Modal status Suppose that the supervenience thesis for physicalism is stated as a nomological constraint, rather than a metaphysical one; this avoids any objection based on the thesis ruling out metaphysical possibilities which a physicalist would leave open. But the thesis would not rule out the metaphysical possibility of philosophical zombies, although their impossibility is a clear consequence of physicalism. Problem of necessary beings The problem of necessary beings was proposed by Jackson in 1998, in which he stated that the existence of a non-physical necessary being (in all possible worlds) would prove physicalism false. However, physicalism allows for the existence of necessary beings, because any minimal physical duplicate would have the same necessary being as the actual world. This however is paradoxical, based on the fact that physicalism both permits and prevents the existence of such beings. See also Functionalism (philosophy of mind) Emergentism Downward causation Nominalism Multiple realizability Notes External links Concepts in logic Metaphysical properties Concepts in the philosophy of mind Concepts in the philosophy of science Metaphysics of mind Mereology Physicalism

Philology

Philology is the study of language in oral and written historical sources. It is the intersection of textual criticism, literary criticism, history, and linguistics with strong ties to etymology. Philology is also defined as the study of literary texts and oral and written records, the establishment of their authenticity and their original form, and the determination of their meaning. A person who pursues this kind of study is known as a philologist. In older usage, especially British, philology is more general, covering comparative and historical linguistics. Classical philology studies classical languages. Classical philology principally originated from the Library of Pergamum and the Library of Alexandria around the fourth century BC, continued by Greeks and Romans throughout the Roman and Byzantine Empire. It was eventually resumed by European scholars of the Renaissance, where it was soon joined by philologies of other European (Romance, Germanic, Celtic), Eurasian (Slavic, etc.), Asian (Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Chinese, etc.), and African (Egyptian, Nubian, etc.) languages. Indo-European studies involve the comparative philology of all Indo-European languages. Philology, with its focus on historical development (diachronic analysis), is contrasted with linguistics due to Ferdinand de Saussure's insistence on the importance of synchronic analysis. While the contrast continued with the emergence of structuralism and the emphasis of Noam Chomsky on syntax, research in historical linguistics often relies on philological materials and findings. Etymology The term philology is derived from the Greek (philología), from the terms (phílos) 'love, affection, loved, beloved, dear, friend' and (lógos) 'word, articulation, reason', describing a love of learning, of literature, as well as of argument and reasoning, reflecting the range of activities included under the notion of . The term changed little with the Latin philologia, and later entered the English language in the 16th century, from the Middle French philologie, in the sense of 'love of literature'. The adjective (philólogos) meant 'fond of discussion or argument, talkative', in Hellenistic Greek, also implying an excessive ("sophistic") preference of argument over the love of true wisdom, (philósophos). As an allegory of literary erudition, philologia appears in fifth-century postclassical literature (Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii), an idea revived in Late Medieval literature (Chaucer, Lydgate). The meaning of "love of learning and literature" was narrowed to "the study of the historical development of languages" (historical linguistics) in 19th-century usage of the term. Due to the rapid progress made in understanding sound laws and language change, the "golden age of philology" lasted throughout the 19th century, or "from Giacomo Leopardi and Friedrich Schlegel to Nietzsche". Branches Comparative The comparative linguistics branch of philology studies the relationship between languages. Similarities between Sanskrit and European languages were first noted in the early 16th century and led to speculation of a common ancestor language from which all these descended. It is now named Proto-Indo-European. Philology's interest in ancient languages led to the study of what was, in the 18th century, "exotic" languages, for the light they could cast on problems in understanding and deciphering the origins of older texts. Textual Philology also includes the study of texts and their history. It includes elements of textual criticism, trying to reconstruct an author's original text based on variant copies of manuscripts. This branch of research arose among ancient scholars in the Greek-speaking world of the 4th century BC, who desired to establish a standard text of popular authors for both sound interpretation and secure transmission. Since that time, the original principles of textual criticism have been improved and applied to other widely distributed texts such as the Bible. Scholars have tried to reconstruct the original readings of the Bible from the manuscript variants. This method was applied to classical studies and medieval texts as a way to reconstruct the author's original work. The method produced so-called "critical editions", which provided a reconstructed text accompanied by a "critical apparatus", i.e., footnotes that listed the various manuscript variants available, enabling scholars to gain insight into the entire manuscript tradition and argue about the variants. A related study method known as higher criticism studies the authorship, date, and provenance of text to place such text in a historical context. As these philological issues are often inseparable from issues of interpretation, there is no clear-cut boundary between philology and hermeneutics. When text has a significant political or religious influence (such as the reconstruction of Biblical texts), scholars have difficulty reaching objective conclusions. Some scholars avoid all critical methods of textual philology, especially in historical linguistics, where it is important to study the actual recorded materials. The movement known as new philology has rejected textual criticism because it injects editorial interpretations into the text and destroys the integrity of the individual manuscript, hence damaging the reliability of the data. Supporters of new philology insist on a strict "diplomatic" approach: a faithful rendering of the text exactly as found in the manuscript, without emendations. Cognitive Another branch of philology, cognitive philology, studies written and oral texts. Cognitive philology considers these oral texts as the results of human mental processes. This science compares the results of textual science with the results of experimental research of both psychology and artificial intelligence production systems. Decipherment In the case of Bronze Age literature, philology includes the prior decipherment of the language under study. This has notably been the case with the Egyptian, Sumerian, Assyrian, Hittite, Ugaritic, and Luwian languages. Beginning with the famous decipherment and translation of the Rosetta Stone by Jean-François Champollion in 1822, some individuals attempted to decipher the writing systems of the Ancient Near East and Aegean. In the case of Old Persian and Mycenaean Greek, decipherment yielded older records of languages already known from slightly more recent traditions (Middle Persian and Alphabetic Greek). Work on the ancient languages of the Near East progressed rapidly. In the mid-19th century, Henry Rawlinson and others deciphered the Behistun Inscription, which records the same text in Old Persian, Elamite, and Akkadian, using a variation of cuneiform for each language. The elucidation of cuneiform led to the decipherment of Sumerian. Hittite was deciphered in 1915 by Bedřich Hrozný. Linear B, a script used in the ancient Aegean, was deciphered in 1952 by Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, who demonstrated that it recorded an early form of Greek, now known as Mycenaean Greek. Linear A, the writing system that records the still-unknown language of the Minoans, resists deciphering, despite many attempts. Work continues on scripts such as the Maya, with great progress since the initial breakthroughs of the phonetic approach championed by Yuri Knorozov and others in the 1950s. Since the late 20th century, the Maya code has been almost completely deciphered, and the Mayan languages are among the most documented and studied in Mesoamerica. The code is described as a logosyllabic style of writing. Contention In English-speaking countries, usage of the term "philology" to describe work on languages and works of literature, which had become synonymous with the practices of German scholars, was abandoned as a consequence of anti-German feelings following World War I. Most continental European countries still maintain the term to designate departments, colleges, position titles, and journals. J. R. R. Tolkien opposed the nationalist reaction against philological practices, claiming that "the philological instinct" was "universal as is the use of language". In British English usage, and British academia, philology remains largely synonymous with "historical linguistics", while in US English, and US academia, the wider meaning of "study of a language's grammar, history and literary tradition" remains more widespread. Based on the harsh critique of Friedrich Nietzsche, some US scholars since the 1980s have viewed philology as responsible for a narrowly scientistic study of language and literature. Disagreements in the modern day of this branch of study are followed with the likes of how the method is treated amongst other scholars, as noted by both the philologists R.D Fulk and Leonard Neidorf who have been quoted saying "This field "philology's commitment to falsification renders it "at odds with what many literary scholars believe because the purpose of philology is to narrow the range of possible interpretations rather than to treat all reasonable ones as equal". This use of falsification can be seen in the debate surrounding the etymology of the Old English character Unferth from the heroic epic poem Beowulf. James Turner further disagrees with how the use of the term is dismissed in the academic world, stating that due to its branding as a "simpleminded approach to their subject" the term has become unknown to college-educated students, furthering the stereotypes of "scrutiny of ancient Greek or Roman texts of a nit-picking classicist" and only the "technical research into languages and families". In popular culture In The Space Trilogy by C. S. Lewis, the main character, Elwin Ransom, is a philologist – as was Lewis' close friend J. R. R. Tolkien. Dr. Edward Morbius, one of the main characters in the science fiction film Forbidden Planet, is a philologist. Philip, the main character of Christopher Hampton's 'bourgeois comedy' The Philanthropist, is a professor of philology in an English university town. Moritz-Maria von Igelfeld, the main character in Alexander McCall Smith's 1997 comic novel Portuguese Irregular Verbs is a philologist, educated at Cambridge. The main character in the Academy Award Nominee for Best Foreign Language Film in 2012, Footnote, is a Hebrew philologist, and a significant part of the film deals with his work. The main character of the science fiction TV show Stargate SG-1, Dr. Daniel Jackson, is mentioned as having a PhD in philology. See also American Journal of Philology References External links Philology in Runet—(A special web search through the philological sites of Runet) v: Topic:German philology CogLit: Literature and Cognitive Linguistics A Bibliography of Literary Theory, Criticism, and Philology (ed. José Ángel García Landa, University of Zaragoza, Spain) Academic disciplines Historical linguistics Writing Textual scholarship

Pseudoscience

Pseudoscience consists of statements, beliefs, or practices that claim to be both scientific and factual but are incompatible with the scientific method. Pseudoscience is often characterized by contradictory, exaggerated or unfalsifiable claims; reliance on confirmation bias rather than rigorous attempts at refutation; lack of openness to evaluation by other experts; absence of systematic practices when developing hypotheses; and continued adherence long after the pseudoscientific hypotheses have been experimentally discredited. It is not the same as junk science. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience has scientific, philosophical, and political implications. Philosophers debate the nature of science and the general criteria for drawing the line between scientific theories and pseudoscientific beliefs, but there is widespread agreement "that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology, ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change denialism are pseudosciences." There are implications for health care, the use of expert testimony, and weighing environmental policies. Recent empirical research has shown that individuals who indulge in pseudoscientific beliefs generally show lower evidential criteria, meaning they often require significantly less evidence before coming to conclusions. This can be coined as a 'jump-to-conclusions' bias that can increase the spread of pseudoscientific beliefs. Addressing pseudoscience is part of science education and developing scientific literacy. Pseudoscience can have dangerous effects. For example, pseudoscientific anti-vaccine activism and promotion of homeopathic remedies as alternative disease treatments can result in people forgoing important medical treatments with demonstrable health benefits, leading to deaths and ill-health. Furthermore, people who refuse legitimate medical treatments for contagious diseases may put others at risk. Pseudoscientific theories about racial and ethnic classifications have led to racism and genocide. The term pseudoscience is often considered pejorative, particularly by its purveyors, because it suggests something is being presented as science inaccurately or even deceptively. Therefore, practitioners and advocates of pseudoscience frequently dispute the characterization. Etymology The word pseudoscience is derived from the Greek root pseudo meaning "false" and the English word science, from the Latin word scientia, meaning "knowledge". Although the term has been in use since at least the late 18th century (e.g., in 1796 by James Pettit Andrews in reference to alchemy), the concept of pseudoscience as distinct from real or proper science seems to have become more widespread during the mid-19th century. Among the earliest uses of "pseudo-science" was in an 1844 article in the Northern Journal of Medicine, issue 387: An earlier use of the term was in 1843 by the French physiologist François Magendie, that refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day". During the 20th century, the word was used pejoratively to describe explanations of phenomena which were claimed to be scientific, but which were not in fact supported by reliable experimental evidence. Dismissing the separate issue of intentional fraudsuch as the Fox sisters' "rappings" in the 1850sthe pejorative label pseudoscience distinguishes the scientific us, at one extreme, from the pseudo-scientific them, at the other, and asserts that our beliefs, practices, theories, etc., by contrast with that of the others, are scientific. There are four criteria:     (a) the 'pseudoscientific' group asserts that its beliefs, practices, theories, etc., are scientific;     (b) the pseudoscientific group claims that its allegedly established facts are justified true beliefs;     (c) the pseudoscientific group asserts that its established facts have been justified by genuine, rigorous, scientific method; and     (d) this assertion is false or deceptive: "it is not simply that subsequent evidence overturns established conclusions, but rather that the conclusions were never warranted in the first place" From time to time, however, the usage of the word occurred in a more formal, technical manner in response to a perceived threat to individual and institutional security in a social and cultural setting. Relationship to science Pseudoscience is differentiated from science because – although it usually claims to be science – pseudoscience does not adhere to scientific standards, such as the scientific method, falsifiability of claims, and Mertonian norms. Scientific method A number of basic principles are accepted by scientists as standards for determining whether a body of knowledge, method, or practice is scientific. Experimental results should be reproducible and verified by other researchers. These principles are intended to ensure experiments can be reproduced measurably given the same conditions, allowing further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is valid and reliable. Standards require the scientific method to be applied throughout, and bias to be controlled for or eliminated through randomization, fair sampling procedures, blinding of studies, and other methods. All gathered data, including the experimental or environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results. Statistical quantification of significance, confidence, and error are also important tools for the scientific method. Falsifiability During the mid-20th century, the philosopher Karl Popper emphasized the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science. Statements, hypotheses, or theories have falsifiability or refutability if there is the inherent possibility that they can be proven false, that is, if it is possible to conceive of an observation or an argument that negates them. Popper used astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience and Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of science. He subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and metaphysical formulations on one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other. Another example which shows the distinct need for a claim to be falsifiable was stated in Carl Sagan's publication The Demon-Haunted World when he discusses an invisible dragon that he has in his garage. The point is made that there is no physical test to refute the claim of the presence of this dragon. Whatever test one thinks can be devised, there is a reason why it does not apply to the invisible dragon, so one can never prove that the initial claim is wrong. Sagan concludes; "Now, what's the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all?". He states that "your inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all the same thing as proving it true", once again explaining that even if such a claim were true, it would be outside the realm of scientific inquiry. Mertonian norms During 1942, Robert K. Merton identified a set of five "norms" which characterize real science. If any of the norms were violated, Merton considered the enterprise to be non-science. His norms were: Originality: The tests and research done must present something new to the scientific community. Detachment: The scientists' reasons for practicing this science must be simply for the expansion of their knowledge. The scientists should not have personal reasons to expect certain results. Universality: No person should be able to more easily obtain the information of a test than another person. Social class, religion, ethnicity, or any other personal factors should not be factors in someone's ability to receive or perform a type of science. Skepticism: Scientific facts must not be based on faith. One should always question every case and argument and constantly check for errors or invalid claims. Public accessibility: Any scientific knowledge one obtains should be made available to everyone. The results of any research should be published and shared with the scientific community. Refusal to acknowledge problems In 1978, Paul Thagard proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science when it is less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and its proponents fail to acknowledge or address problems with the theory. In 1983, Mario Bunge suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between pseudoscience and science, where the former is primarily personal and subjective and the latter involves a certain systematic method. The 2018 book about scientific skepticism by Steven Novella, et al. The Skeptics' Guide to the Universe lists hostility to criticism as one of the major features of pseudoscience. Criticism of the term Larry Laudan has suggested pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and is mostly used to describe human emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscientific' from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us". Likewise, Richard McNally states, "The term 'pseudoscience' has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one's opponents in media sound-bites" and "When therapeutic entrepreneurs make claims on behalf of their interventions, we should not waste our time trying to determine whether their interventions qualify as pseudoscientific. Rather, we should ask them: How do you know that your intervention works? What is your evidence?" Alternative definition For philosophers Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz "pseudo-science may be defined as one where the uncertainty of its inputs must be suppressed, lest they render its outputs totally indeterminate". The definition, in the book Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy, alludes to the loss of craft skills in handling quantitative information, and to the bad practice of achieving precision in prediction (inference) only at the expenses of ignoring uncertainty in the input which was used to formulate the prediction. This use of the term is common among practitioners of post-normal science. Understood in this way, pseudoscience can be fought using good practices to assess uncertainty in quantitative information, such as NUSAP and – in the case of mathematical modelling – sensitivity auditing. History The history of pseudoscience is the study of pseudoscientific theories over time. A pseudoscience is a set of ideas that presents itself as science, while it does not meet the criteria to be properly called such. Distinguishing between proper science and pseudoscience is sometimes difficult. One proposal for demarcation between the two is the falsification criterion, attributed most notably to the philosopher Karl Popper. In the history of science and the history of pseudoscience it can be especially difficult to separate the two, because some sciences developed from pseudosciences. An example of this transformation is the science of chemistry, which traces its origins to the pseudoscientific or pre-scientific study of alchemy. The vast diversity in pseudosciences further complicates the history of science. Some modern pseudosciences, such as astrology and acupuncture, originated before the scientific era. Others developed as part of an ideology, such as Lysenkoism, or as a response to perceived threats to an ideology. Examples of this ideological process are creation science and intelligent design, which were developed in response to the scientific theory of evolution. Indicators of possible pseudoscience A topic, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be termed pseudoscientific when it is presented as consistent with the norms of scientific research, but it demonstrably fails to meet these norms. Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements. Assertion of a claim with little or no explanatory power. Failure to make use of operational definitions (i.e., publicly accessible definitions of the variables, terms, or objects of interest so that persons other than the definer can measure or test them independently) (See also: Reproducibility). Failure to make reasonable use of the principle of parsimony, i.e., failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (See: Occam's razor). Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess well-articulated limitations under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply. Lack of effective controls in experimental design, such as the use of placebos and double-blinding. Lack of understanding of basic and established principles of physics and engineering. Improper collection of evidence Assertions that do not allow the logical possibility that they can be shown to be false by observation or physical experiment (See also: Falsifiability). Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict. Scientific claims that do not confer any predictive power are considered at best "conjectures", or at worst "pseudoscience" (e.g., ignoratio elenchi). Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must therefore be true, and vice versa (See: Argument from ignorance). Over-reliance on testimonial, anecdotal evidence, or personal experience: This evidence may be useful for the context of discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation), but should not be used in the context of justification (e.g., statistical hypothesis testing). Use of myths and religious texts as if they were fact, or basing evidence on readings of such texts. Use of concepts and scenarios from science fiction as if they were fact. This technique appeals to the familiarity that many people already have with science fiction tropes through the popular media. Presentation of data that seems to support claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with those claims. This is an example of selection bias or cherry picking, a distortion of evidence or data that arises from the way that the data are collected. It is sometimes referred to as the selection effect. Repeating excessive or untested claims that have been previously published elsewhere, and promoting those claims as if they were facts; an accumulation of such uncritical secondary reports, which do not otherwise contribute their own empirical investigation, is called the Woozle effect. Reversed burden of proof: science places the burden of proof on those making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than on the claimant. Appeals to holism as opposed to reductionism to dismiss negative findings: proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the "mantra of holism" . Lack of openness to testing by other experts Evasion of peer review before publicizing results (termed "science by press conference"): Some proponents of ideas that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid subjecting their ideas to peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is biased towards established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, these proponents forgo the opportunity of corrective feedback from informed colleagues. Some agencies, institutions, and publications that fund scientific research require authors to share data so others can evaluate a paper independently. Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claims contributes to a lack of openness. Appealing to the need for secrecy or proprietary knowledge when an independent review of data or methodology is requested. Substantive debate on the evidence by knowledgeable proponents of all viewpoints is not encouraged. Absence of progress Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims. Terence Hines has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia. Lack of self-correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to reduce these errors over time. By contrast, ideas may be regarded as pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience. Statistical significance of supporting experimental results does not improve over time and are usually close to the cutoff for statistical significance. Normally, experimental techniques improve or the experiments are repeated, and this gives ever stronger evidence. If statistical significance does not improve, this typically shows the experiments have just been repeated until a success occurs due to chance variations. Personalization of issues Tight social groups and authoritarian personality, suppression of dissent and groupthink can enhance the adoption of beliefs that have no rational basis. In attempting to confirm their beliefs, the group tends to identify their critics as enemies. Assertion of a conspiracy on the part of the mainstream scientific community, government, or educational facilities to suppress pseudoscientific information. People who make these accusations often compare themselves to Galileo Galilei and his persecution by the Roman Catholic Church; this comparison is commonly known as the Galileo gambit. Attacking the motives, character, morality, or competence of critics, rather than their arguments (see ad hominem) Use of misleading language Creating scientific-sounding terms to persuade non-experts to believe statements that may be false or meaningless: for example, a long-standing hoax refers to water by the rarely used formal name "dihydrogen monoxide" and describes it as the main constituent in most poisonous solutions to show how easily the general public can be misled. Using established terms in idiosyncratic ways, thereby demonstrating unfamiliarity with mainstream work in the discipline. Prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs Countries The Ministry of AYUSH in the Government of India is purposed with developing education, research and propagation of indigenous alternative medicine systems in India. The ministry has faced significant criticism for funding systems that lack biological plausibility and are either untested or conclusively proven as ineffective. Quality of research has been poor, and drugs have been launched without any rigorous pharmacological studies and meaningful clinical trials on Ayurveda or other alternative healthcare systems. There is no credible efficacy or scientific basis of any of these forms of treatment. In his book The Demon-Haunted World, Carl Sagan discusses the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party's concern about Western pseudoscience developments and certain ancient Chinese practices in China. He sees pseudoscience occurring in the United States as part of a worldwide trend and suggests its causes, dangers, diagnosis and treatment may be universal. A large percentage of the United States population lacks scientific literacy, not adequately understanding scientific principles and method. In the Journal of College Science Teaching, Art Hobson writes, "Pseudoscientific beliefs are surprisingly widespread in our culture even among public school science teachers and newspaper editors, and are closely related to scientific illiteracy." However, a 10,000-student study in the same journal concluded there was no strong correlation between science knowledge and belief in pseudoscience. During 2006, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) issued an executive summary of a paper on science and engineering which briefly discussed the prevalence of pseudoscience in modern times. It said, "belief in pseudoscience is widespread" and, referencing a Gallup Poll, stated that belief in the 10 commonly believed examples of paranormal phenomena listed in the poll were "pseudoscientific beliefs". The items were "extrasensory perception (ESP), that houses can be haunted, ghosts, telepathy, clairvoyance, astrology, that people can mentally communicate with the dead, witches, reincarnation, and channelling". Such beliefs in pseudoscience represent a lack of knowledge of how science works. The scientific community may attempt to communicate information about science out of concern for the public's susceptibility to unproven claims. The NSF stated that pseudoscientific beliefs in the U.S. became more widespread during the 1990s, peaked about 2001, and then decreased slightly since with pseudoscientific beliefs remaining common. According to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Surveys indicate about a third of adult Americans consider astrology to be scientific. In Russia, in the late 20th and early 21st century, significant budgetary funds were spent on programs for the experimental study of "torsion fields", the extraction of energy from granite, the study of "cold nuclear fusion", and astrological and extrasensory "research" by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Duma (see Military Unit 10003). In 2006, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Spassky published an article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, where among the priority areas for the development of the Russian energy sector, the task of extracting energy from a vacuum was in the first place. The Clean Water project was adopted as a United Russia party project; in the version submitted to the government, the program budget for 2010–2017 exceeded $14 billion. Racism There have been many connections between pseudoscientific writers and researchers and their anti-semitic, racist and neo-Nazi backgrounds. They often use pseudoscience to reinforce their beliefs. One of the most predominant pseudoscientific writers is Frank Collin, a self-proclaimed Nazi who goes by Frank Joseph in his writings. The majority of his works include the topics of Atlantis, extraterrestrial encounters, and Lemuria as well as other ancient civilizations, often with white supremacist undertones. For example, he posited that European peoples migrated to North America before Columbus, and that all Native American civilizations were initiated by descendants of white people. The Alt-Right using pseudoscience to base their ideologies on is not a new issue. The entire foundation of anti-semitism is based on pseudoscience, or scientific racism. In an article from Newsweek by Sander Gilman, Gilman describes the pseudoscience community's anti-semitic views. "Jews as they appear in this world of pseudoscience are an invented group of ill, stupid or stupidly smart people who use science to their own nefarious ends. Other groups, too, are painted similarly in 'race science', as it used to call itself: African-Americans, the Irish, the Chinese and, well, any and all groups that you want to prove inferior to yourself". Neo-Nazis and white supremacist often try to support their claims with studies that "prove" that their claims are more than just harmful stereotypes. For example Bret Stephens published a column in The New York Times where he claimed that Ashkenazi Jews had the highest IQ among any ethnic group. However, the scientific methodology and conclusions reached by the article Stephens cited has been called into question repeatedly since its publication. It has been found that at least one of that study's authors has been identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a white nationalist. The journal Nature has published a number of editorials in the last few years warning researchers about extremists looking to abuse their work, particularly population geneticists and those working with ancient DNA. One article in Nature, titled "Racism in Science: The Taint That Lingers" notes that early-twentieth-century eugenic pseudoscience has been used to influence public policy, such as the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, which sought to prevent immigration from Asia and parts of Europe. Explanations In a 1981 report Singer and Benassi wrote that pseudoscientific beliefs have their origin from at least four sources. Common cognitive errors from personal experience. Erroneous sensationalistic mass media coverage. Sociocultural factors. Poor or erroneous science education. A 1990 study by Eve and Dunn supported the findings of Singer and Benassi and found pseudoscientific belief being promoted by high school life science and biology teachers. Psychology The psychology of pseudoscience attempts to explore and analyze pseudoscientific thinking by means of thorough clarification on making the distinction of what is considered scientific vs. pseudoscientific. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias), the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for pseudoscientific thinking. According to Beyerstein, humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking. Michael Shermer's theory of belief-dependent realism is driven by the belief that the brain is essentially a "belief engine" which scans data perceived by the senses and looks for patterns and meaning. There is also the tendency for the brain to create cognitive biases, as a result of inferences and assumptions made without logic and based on instinct – usually resulting in patterns in cognition. These tendencies of patternicity and agenticity are also driven "by a meta-bias called the bias blind spot, or the tendency to recognize the power of cognitive biases in other people but to be blind to their influence on our own beliefs". Lindeman states that social motives (i.e., "to comprehend self and the world, to have a sense of control over outcomes, to belong, to find the world benevolent and to maintain one's self-esteem") are often "more easily" fulfilled by pseudoscience than by scientific information. Furthermore, pseudoscientific explanations are generally not analyzed rationally, but instead experientially. Operating within a different set of rules compared to rational thinking, experiential thinking regards an explanation as valid if the explanation is "personally functional, satisfying and sufficient", offering a description of the world that may be more personal than can be provided by science and reducing the amount of potential work involved in understanding complex events and outcomes. Anyone searching for psychological help that is based in science should seek a licensed therapist whose techniques are not based in pseudoscience. Hupp and Santa Maria provide a complete explanation of what that person should look for. Education and scientific literacy There is a trend to believe in pseudoscience more than scientific evidence. Some people believe the prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs is due to widespread scientific illiteracy. Individuals lacking scientific literacy are more susceptible to wishful thinking, since they are likely to turn to immediate gratification powered by System 1, our default operating system which requires little to no effort. This system encourages one to accept the conclusions they believe, and reject the ones they do not. Further analysis of complex pseudoscientific phenomena require System 2, which follows rules, compares objects along multiple dimensions and weighs options. These two systems have several other differences which are further discussed in the dual-process theory. The scientific and secular systems of morality and meaning are generally unsatisfying to most people. Humans are, by nature, a forward-minded species pursuing greater avenues of happiness and satisfaction, but we are all too frequently willing to grasp at unrealistic promises of a better life. Psychology has much to discuss about pseudoscience thinking, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality and effectiveness of numerous individuals that needs to be illuminated. Research suggests that illusionary thinking happens in most people when exposed to certain circumstances such as reading a book, an advertisement or the testimony of others are the basis of pseudoscience beliefs. It is assumed that illusions are not unusual, and given the right conditions, illusions are able to occur systematically even in normal emotional situations. One of the things pseudoscience believers quibble most about is that academic science usually treats them as fools. Minimizing these illusions in the real world is not simple. To this aim, designing evidence-based educational programs can be effective to help people identify and reduce their own illusions. Boundaries with science Classification Philosophers classify types of knowledge. In English, the word science is used to indicate specifically the natural sciences and related fields, which are called the social sciences. Different philosophers of science may disagree on the exact limits – for example, is mathematics a formal science that is closer to the empirical ones, or is pure mathematics closer to the philosophical study of logic and therefore not a science? – but all agree that all of the ideas that are not scientific are non-scientific. The large category of non-science includes all matters outside the natural and social sciences, such as the study of history, metaphysics, religion, art, and the humanities. Dividing the category again, unscientific claims are a subset of the large category of non-scientific claims. This category specifically includes all matters that are directly opposed to good science. Un-science includes both "bad science" (such as an error made in a good-faith attempt at learning something about the natural world) and pseudoscience. Thus pseudoscience is a subset of un-science, and un-science, in turn, is subset of non-science. Science is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it offers insight into the physical world obtained by empirical research and testing. The most notable disputes concern the evolution of living organisms, the idea of common descent, the geologic history of the Earth, the formation of the Solar System, and the origin of the universe. Systems of belief that derive from divine or inspired knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science. Moreover, some specific religious claims, such as the power of intercessory prayer to heal the sick, although they may be based on untestable beliefs, can be tested by the scientific method. Some statements and common beliefs of popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction. Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review. If claims of a given field can be tested experimentally and standards are upheld, it is not pseudoscience, regardless of how odd, astonishing, or counterintuitive those claims are. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the method is sound, caution should be used, since science consists of testing hypotheses which may turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ideas that are "not yet generally accepted". Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been tested adequately by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field. Philosophy Karl Popper stated it is insufficient to distinguish science from pseudoscience, or from metaphysics (such as the philosophical question of what existence means), by the criterion of rigorous adherence to the empirical method, which is essentially inductive, based on observation or experimentation. He proposed a method to distinguish between genuine empirical, nonempirical or even pseudoempirical methods. The latter case was exemplified by astrology, which appeals to observation and experimentation. While it had empirical evidence based on observation, on horoscopes and biographies, it crucially failed to use acceptable scientific standards. Popper proposed falsifiability as an important criterion in distinguishing science from pseudoscience. To demonstrate this point, Popper gave two cases of human behavior and typical explanations from Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler's theories: "that of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save the child." From Freud's perspective, the first man would have suffered from psychological repression, probably originating from an Oedipus complex, whereas the second man had attained sublimation. From Adler's perspective, the first and second man suffered from feelings of inferiority and had to prove himself, which drove him to commit the crime or, in the second case, drove him to rescue the child. Popper was not able to find any counterexamples of human behavior in which the behavior could not be explained in the terms of Adler's or Freud's theory. Popper argued it was that the observation always fitted or confirmed the theory which, rather than being its strength, was actually its weakness. In contrast, Popper gave the example of Einstein's gravitational theory, which predicted "light must be attracted by heavy bodies (such as the Sun), precisely as material bodies were attracted." Following from this, stars closer to the Sun would appear to have moved a small distance away from the Sun, and away from each other. This prediction was particularly striking to Popper because it involved considerable risk. The brightness of the Sun prevented this effect from being observed under normal circumstances, so photographs had to be taken during an eclipse and compared to photographs taken at night. Popper states, "If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted." Popper summed up his criterion for the scientific status of a theory as depending on its falsifiability, refutability, or testability. Paul R. Thagard used astrology as a case study to distinguish science from pseudoscience and proposed principles and criteria to delineate them. First, astrology has not progressed in that it has not been updated nor added any explanatory power since Ptolemy. Second, it has ignored outstanding problems such as the precession of equinoxes in astronomy. Third, alternative theories of personality and behavior have grown progressively to encompass explanations of phenomena which astrology statically attributes to heavenly forces. Fourth, astrologers have remained uninterested in furthering the theory to deal with outstanding problems or in critically evaluating the theory in relation to other theories. Thagard intended this criterion to be extended to areas other than astrology. He believed it would delineate as pseudoscientific such practices as witchcraft and pyramidology, while leaving physics, chemistry, astronomy, geoscience, biology, and archaeology in the realm of science. In the philosophy and history of science, Imre Lakatos stresses the social and political importance of the demarcation problem, the normative methodological problem of distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. His distinctive historical analysis of scientific methodology based on research programmes suggests: "scientists regard the successful theoretical prediction of stunning novel facts – such as the return of Halley's comet or the gravitational bending of light rays – as what demarcates good scientific theories from pseudo-scientific and degenerate theories, and in spite of all scientific theories being forever confronted by 'an ocean of counterexamples'". Lakatos offers a "novel fallibilist analysis of the development of Newton's celestial dynamics, [his] favourite historical example of his methodology" and argues in light of this historical turn, that his account answers for certain inadequacies in those of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. "Nonetheless, Lakatos did recognize the force of Kuhn's historical criticism of Popper – all important theories have been surrounded by an 'ocean of anomalies', which on a falsificationist view would require the rejection of the theory outright...Lakatos sought to reconcile the rationalism of Popperian falsificationism with what seemed to be its own refutation by history". The boundary between science and pseudoscience is disputed and difficult to determine analytically, even after more than a century of study by philosophers of science and scientists, and despite some basic agreements on the fundamentals of the scientific method. The concept of pseudoscience rests on an understanding that the scientific method has been misrepresented or misapplied with respect to a given theory, but many philosophers of science maintain that different kinds of methods are held as appropriate across different fields and different eras of human history. According to Lakatos, the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but "a powerful problem-solving machinery, which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence". Laudan maintained that the demarcation between science and non-science was a pseudo-problem, preferring to focus on the more general distinction between reliable and unreliable knowledge. Politics, health, and education Political implications The demarcation problem between science and pseudoscience brings up debate in the realms of science, philosophy and politics. Imre Lakatos, for instance, points out that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at one point declared that Mendelian genetics was pseudoscientific and had its advocates, including well-established scientists such as Nikolai Vavilov, sent to a Gulag and that the "liberal Establishment of the West" denies freedom of speech to topics it regards as pseudoscience, particularly where they run up against social mores. Something becomes pseudoscientific when science cannot be separated from ideology, scientists misrepresent scientific findings to promote or draw attention for publicity, when politicians, journalists and a nation's intellectual elite distort the facts of science for short-term political gain, or when powerful individuals of the public conflate causation and cofactors by clever wordplay. These ideas reduce the authority, value, integrity and independence of science in society. Health and education implications Distinguishing science from pseudoscience has practical implications in the case of health care, expert testimony, environmental policies, and science education. Treatments with a patina of scientific authority which have not actually been subjected to actual scientific testing may be ineffective, expensive and dangerous to patients and confuse health providers, insurers, government decision makers and the public as to what treatments are appropriate. Claims advanced by pseudoscience may result in government officials and educators making bad decisions in selecting curricula. The extent to which students acquire a range of social and cognitive thinking skills related to the proper usage of science and technology determines whether they are scientifically literate. Education in the sciences encounters new dimensions with the changing landscape of science and technology, a fast-changing culture and a knowledge-driven era. A reinvention of the school science curriculum is one that shapes students to contend with its changing influence on human welfare. Scientific literacy, which allows a person to distinguish science from pseudosciences such as astrology, is among the attributes that enable students to adapt to the changing world. Its characteristics are embedded in a curriculum where students are engaged in resolving problems, conducting investigations, or developing projects. Alan J. Friedman mentions why most scientists avoid educating about pseudoscience, including that paying undue attention to pseudoscience could dignify it. On the other hand, Robert L. Park emphasizes how pseudoscience can be a threat to society and considers that scientists have a responsibility to teach how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Pseudosciences such as homeopathy, even if generally benign, are used by charlatans. This poses a serious issue because it enables incompetent practitioners to administer health care. True-believing zealots may pose a more serious threat than typical con men because of their delusion to homeopathy's ideology. Irrational health care is not harmless and it is careless to create patient confidence in pseudomedicine. On 8 December 2016, journalist Michael V. LeVine pointed out the dangers posed by the Natural News website: "Snake-oil salesmen have pushed false cures since the dawn of medicine, and now websites like Natural News flood social media with dangerous anti-pharmaceutical, anti-vaccination and anti-GMO pseudoscience that puts millions at risk of contracting preventable illnesses." The anti-vaccine movement has persuaded large numbers of parents not to vaccinate their children, citing pseudoscientific research that links childhood vaccines with the onset of autism. These include the study by Andrew Wakefield, which claimed that a combination of gastrointestinal disease and developmental regression, which are often seen in children with ASD, occurred within two weeks of receiving vaccines. The study was eventually retracted by its publisher, and Wakefield was stripped of his license to practice medicine. Alkaline water is water that has a pH of higher than 7, purported to host numerous health benefits, with no empirical backing. A practitioner known as Robert O. Young who promoted alkaline water and an "Alkaline diet" was sent to jail for 3 years in 2017 for practicing medicine without a license. See also Antiscience Credulity Factoid Fringe theory List of topics characterized as pseudoscience Magical thinking Not even wrong Normative science Pseudo-scholarship Pseudolaw Pseudomathematics Notes References Bibliography Works cited Further reading Alcock, J. (2001). Science vs. Pseudoscience, Nonscience, and Nonsense. The Skeptical Inquirer, 25(3), 50–54. Originally published 2002 by Odile Jacob as Devenez sorciers, devenez savants Frietsch, Ute, The Boundaries of Science/ Pseudoscience , EGO – European History Online , Mainz: Institute of European History , 2015, retrieved: March 8, 2021 (pdf ). Originally published 1952 by G.P. Putnam's Sons, under the title In the Name of Science. Kaufman, Allison B. & Kaufman, James C. (eds.), Pseudoscience: The Conspiracy Against Science, The MIT Press, (Cambridge, MA), 2018. First published 1992 by Faber & Faber, London. 18th-century neologisms Barriers to critical thinking Fringe theory Deception

Critical theory

A critical theory is any approach to humanities and social philosophy that focuses on society and culture to attempt to reveal, critique, and challenge or dismantle power structures. With roots in sociology and literary criticism, it argues that social problems stem more from social structures and cultural assumptions than from individuals. Some hold it to be an ideology, others argue that ideology is the principal obstacle to human liberation. Critical theory finds applications in various fields of study, including psychoanalysis, film theory, literary theory, cultural studies, history, communication theory, philosophy, and feminist theory. Critical Theory (capitalized) is a school of thought practiced by the Frankfurt School theoreticians Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, and Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer described a theory as critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them". Although a product of modernism, and although many of the progenitors of Critical Theory were skeptical of postmodernism, Critical Theory is one of the major components of both modern and postmodern thought, and is widely applied in the humanities and social sciences today. In addition to its roots in the first-generation Frankfurt School, critical theory has also been influenced by György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci. Some second-generation Frankfurt School scholars have been influential, notably Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas's work, critical theory transcended its theoretical roots in German idealism and progressed closer to American pragmatism. Concern for social "base and superstructure" is one of the remaining Marxist philosophical concepts in much contemporary critical theory. The legacy of Critical Theory as a major offshoot of Marxism is controversial. The common thread linking Marxism and Critical theory is an interest in struggles to dismantle structures of oppression, exclusion, and domination. Philosophical approaches within this broader definition include feminism, critical race theory, post-structuralism, queer theory and forms of postcolonialism. History Max Horkheimer first defined critical theory in his 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Theory", as a social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory oriented only toward understanding or explaining it. Wanting to distinguish critical theory as a radical, emancipatory form of Marxist philosophy, Horkheimer critiqued both the model of science put forward by logical positivism, and what he and his colleagues saw as the covert positivism and authoritarianism of orthodox Marxism and Communism. He described a theory as critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them". Critical theory involves a normative dimension, either by criticizing society in terms of some general theory of values or norms (oughts), or by criticizing society in terms of its own espoused values (i.e. immanent critique). Significantly, critical theory not only conceptualizes and critiques societal power structures, but also establishes an empirically grounded model to link society to the human subject. It defends the universalist ambitions of the tradition, but does so within a specific context of social-scientific and historical research. The core concepts of critical theory are that it should: be directed at the totality of society in its historical specificity (i.e., how it came to be configured at a specific point in time) improve understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences, including geography, economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology, and psychology Postmodern critical theory is another major product of critical theory. It analyzes the fragmentation of cultural identities in order to challenge modernist-era constructs such as metanarratives, rationality, and universal truths, while politicizing social problems "by situating them in historical and cultural contexts, to implicate themselves in the process of collecting and analyzing data, and to relativize their findings". Marx Marx explicitly developed the notion of critique into the critique of ideology, linking it with the practice of social revolution, as stated in the 11th section of his Theses on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." In early works, including The German Ideology, Marx developed his concepts of false consciousness and of ideology as the interests of one section of society masquerading as the interests of society as a whole. Adorno and Horkheimer One of the distinguishing characteristics of critical theory, as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer elaborated in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), is an ambivalence about the ultimate source or foundation of social domination, an ambivalence that gave rise to the "pessimism" of the new critical theory about the possibility of human emancipation and freedom. This ambivalence was rooted in the historical circumstances in which the work was originally produced, particularly the rise of Nazism, state capitalism, and culture industry as entirely new forms of social domination that could not be adequately explained in the terms of traditional Marxist sociology. For Adorno and Horkheimer, state intervention in the economy had effectively abolished the traditional tension between Marxism's "relations of production" and "material productive forces" of society. The market (as an "unconscious" mechanism for the distribution of goods) had been replaced by centralized planning. Contrary to Marx's prediction in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, this shift did not lead to "an era of social revolution" but to fascism and totalitarianism. As a result, critical theory was left, in Habermas's words, without "anything in reserve to which it might appeal, and when the forces of production enter into a baneful symbiosis with the relations of production that they were supposed to blow wide open, there is no longer any dynamism upon which critique could base its hope". For Adorno and Horkheimer, this posed the problem of how to account for the apparent persistence of domination in the absence of the very contradiction that, according to traditional critical theory, was the source of domination itself. Habermas In the 1960s, Habermas, a proponent of critical social theory, raised the epistemological discussion to a new level in his Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), by identifying critical knowledge as based on principles that differentiated it either from the natural sciences or the humanities, through its orientation to self-reflection and emancipation. Although unsatisfied with Adorno and Horkheimer's thought in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Habermas shares the view that, in the form of instrumental rationality, the era of modernity marks a move away from the liberation of enlightenment and toward a new form of enslavement. In Habermas's work, critical theory transcended its theoretical roots in German idealism, and progressed closer to American pragmatism. Habermas's ideas about the relationship between modernity and rationalization are in this sense strongly influenced by Max Weber. He further dissolved the elements of critical theory derived from Hegelian German idealism, though his epistemology remains broadly Marxist. Perhaps his two most influential ideas are the concepts of the public sphere and communicative action, the latter arriving partly as a reaction to new post-structural or so-called "postmodern" challenges to the discourse of modernity. Habermas engaged in regular correspondence with Richard Rorty, and a strong sense of philosophical pragmatism may be felt in his thought, which frequently traverses the boundaries between sociology and philosophy. Modern critical theorists Contemporary philosophers and researchers who have focused on understanding and critiquing critical theory include Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, Judith Butler, and Rahel Jaeggi. Honneth is known for his works Pathology of Reason and The Legacy of Critical Theory, in which he attempts to explain critical theory's purpose in a modern context. Jaeggi focuses on both critical theory's original intent and a more modern understanding that some argue has created a new foundation for modern usage of critical theory. Butler contextualizes critical theory as a way to rhetorically challenge oppression and inequality, specifically concepts of gender. Honneth established a theory that many use to understand critical theory, the theory of recognition. In this theory, he asserts that in order for someone to be responsible for themselves and their own identity they must be also recognized by those around them: without recognition in this sense from peers and society, individuals can never become wholly responsible for themselves and others, nor experience true freedom and emancipation—i.e., without recognition, the individual cannot achieve self-actualization. Like many others who put stock in critical theory, Jaeggi is vocal about capitalism's cost to society. Throughout her writings, she has remained doubtful about the necessity and use of capitalism in regard to critical theory. Most of Jaeggi's interpretations of critical theory seem to work against the foundations of Habermas and follow more along the lines of Honneth in terms of how to look at the economy through the theory's lens. She shares many of Honneth's beliefs, and many of her works try to defend them against criticism Honneth has received. To provide a dialectical opposite to Jaeggi's conception of alienation as 'a relation of relationlessness', Hartmut Rosa has proposed the concept of resonance. Rosa uses this term to refer to moments when late modern subjects experience momentary feelings of self-efficacy in society, bringing them into a temporary moment of relatedness with some aspect of the world. Rosa describes himself as working within the critical theory tradition of the Frankfurt School, providing an extensive critique of late modernity through his concept of social acceleration. However his resonance theory has been questioned for moving too far beyond the Adornoian tradition of "looking coldly at society". Schools and Derivates Postmodern critical social theory Focusing on language, symbolism, communication, and social construction, critical theory has been applied in the social sciences as a critique of social construction and postmodern society. While modernist critical theory (as described above) concerns itself with "forms of authority and injustice that accompanied the evolution of industrial and corporate capitalism as a political-economic system", postmodern critical theory politicizes social problems "by situating them in historical and cultural contexts, to implicate themselves in the process of collecting and analyzing data, and to relativize their findings". Meaning itself is seen as unstable due to social structures' rapid transformation. As a result, research focuses on local manifestations rather than broad generalizations. Postmodern critical research is also characterized by the crisis of representation, which rejects the idea that a researcher's work is an "objective depiction of a stable other". Instead, many postmodern scholars have adopted "alternatives that encourage reflection about the 'politics and poetics' of their work. In these accounts, the embodied, collaborative, dialogic, and improvisational aspects of qualitative research are clarified." The term critical theory is often appropriated when an author works in sociological terms, yet attacks the social or human sciences, thus attempting to remain "outside" those frames of inquiry. Michel Foucault has been described as one such author. Jean Baudrillard has also been described as a critical theorist to the extent that he was an unconventional and critical sociologist; this appropriation is similarly casual, holding little or no relation to the Frankfurt School. In contrast, Habermas is one of the key critics of postmodernism. Communication studies When, in the 1970s and 1980s, Habermas redefined critical social theory as a study of communication, with communicative competence and communicative rationality on the one hand, and distorted communication on the other, the two versions of critical theory began to overlap to a much greater degree than before. Critical legal studies Immigration studies Critical theory can be used to interpret the right of asylum and immigration law. Critical finance studies Critical finance studies apply critical theory to financial markets and central banks. Critical management studies Critical international relations theory Critical race theory Critical pedagogy Critical theorists have widely credited Paulo Freire for the first applications of critical theory to education/pedagogy, considering his best-known work to be Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a seminal text in what is now known as the philosophy and social movement of critical pedagogy. Dedicated to the oppressed and based on his own experience helping Brazilian adults learn to read and write, Freire includes a detailed class analysis in his exploration of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. In the book, he calls traditional pedagogy the "banking model of education", because it treats the student as an empty vessel to be filled with knowledge. He argues that pedagogy should instead treat the learner as a co-creator of knowledge. In contrast to the banking model, the teacher in the critical-theory model is not the dispenser of all knowledge, but a participant who learns with and from the students—in conversation with them, even as they learn from the teacher. The goal is to liberate the learner from an oppressive construct of teacher versus student, a dichotomy analogous to colonizer and colonized. It is not enough for the student to analyze societal power structures and hierarchies, to merely recognize imbalance and inequity; critical theory pedagogy must also empower the learner to reflect and act on that reflection to challenge an oppressive status quo. Critical consciousness Critical university studies Critical psychology Critical criminology Critical animal studies Critical social work Critical ethnography Critical data studies Critical environmental justice Critical environmental justice applies critical theory to environmental justice. Criticism While critical theorists have often been called Marxist intellectuals, their tendency to denounce some Marxist concepts and to combine Marxian analysis with other sociological and philosophical traditions has resulted in accusations of revisionism by Orthodox Marxist and by Marxist–Leninist philosophers. Martin Jay has said that the first generation of critical theory is best understood not as promoting a specific philosophical agenda or ideology, but as "a gadfly of other systems". Critical theory has been criticized for not offering any clear road map to political action (praxis), often explicitly repudiating any solutions. Those objections mostly apply to first-generation Frankfurt School, while the issue of politics is addressed in a much more assertive way in contemporary theory. Another criticism of critical theory "is that it fails to provide rational standards by which it can show that it is superior to other theories of knowledge, science, or practice." Rex Gibson argues that critical theory suffers from being cliquish, conformist, elitist, immodest, anti-individualist, naive, too critical, and contradictory. Hughes and Hughes argue that Habermas' theory of ideal public discourse "says much about rational talkers talking, but very little about actors acting: Felt, perceptive, imaginative, bodily experience does not fit these theories". Some feminists argue that critical theory "can be as narrow and oppressive as the rationalization, bureaucratization, and cultures they seek to unmask and change. Critical theory's language has been criticized as being too dense to understand, although "Counter arguments to these issues of language include claims that a call for clearer and more accessible language is anti-intellectual, a new 'language of possibility' is needed, and oppressed peoples can understand and contribute to new languages." Bruce Pardy, writing for the National Post, argued that any challenges to the "legitimacy [of critical theory] can be interpreted as a demonstration of their [critical theory's proponents'] thesis: the assertion of reason, logic and evidence is a manifestation of privilege and power. Thus, any challenger risks the stigma of a bigoted oppressor." Robert Danisch, writing for The Conversation, argued that critical theory, and the modern humanities more broadly, focus too much on criticizing the current world rather than trying to make a better world. See also Modernism Antipositivism Critical military studies Cultural studies Information criticism Marxist cultural analysis Outline of critical theory Popular culture studies Outline of organizational theory Postcritique Lists List of critical theorists List of works in critical theory Journals Constellations Representations Critical Inquiry Telos Law and Critique References Footnotes Works cited Bibliography "Problematizing Global Knowledge." Theory, Culture & Society 23(2–3). 2006. . Calhoun, Craig. 1995. Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference. Blackwell. – A survey of and introduction to the current state of critical social theory. Charmaz, K. 1995. "Between positivism and postmodernism: Implications for methods." Studies in Symbolic Interaction 17:43–72. Conquergood, D. 1991. "Rethinking ethnography: Towards a critical cultural politics." Communication Monographs 58(2):179–94. . Corchia, Luca. 2010. La logica dei processi culturali. Jürgen Habermas tra filosofia e sociologia. Genova: Edizioni ECIG. . Dahms, Harry, ed. 2008. No Social Science Without Critical Theory, (Current Perspectives in Social Theory 25). Emerald/JAI. Gandler, Stefan. 2009. Fragmentos de Frankfurt. Ensayos sobre la Teoría crítica. México: 21st Century Publishers/Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro. . Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory. Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge University Press. . Honneth, Axel. 2006. La société du mépris. Vers une nouvelle Théorie critique, La Découverte. . Horkheimer, Max. 1982. Critical Theory Selected Essays. New York: Continuum Publishing. Morgan, Marcia. 2012. Kierkegaard and Critical Theory. New York: Lexington Books. Rolling, James H. 2008. "Secular blasphemy: Utter(ed) transgressions against names and fathers in the postmodern era." Qualitative Inquiry 14(6):926–48. – An example of critical postmodern work. Sim, Stuart, and Borin Van Loon. 2001. Introducing Critical Theory. . – A short introductory volume with illustrations. Thomas, Jim. 1993. Doing Critical Ethnography. London: Sage. pp. 1–5 & 17–25. Tracy, S. J. 2000. "Becoming a character for commerce: Emotion labor, self subordination and discursive construction of identity in a total institution." Management Communication Quarterly 14(1):90–128. – An example of critical qualitative research. Willard, Charles Arthur. 1982. Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge. University of Alabama Press. — 1989. A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. — 1996. Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 9. Critical Theory External links Gerhardt, Christina. "Frankfurt School". The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest. Ness, Immanuel (ed). Blackwell Publishing, 2009. Blackwell Reference Online. "Theory: Death Is Not the End" N+1 magazine's short history of academic Critical Theory. Critical Legal Thinking A Critical Legal Studies website which uses Critical Theory in an analysis of law and politics. L. Corchia, Jürgen Habermas. A Bibliography: works and studies (1952–2013), Pisa, Edizioni Il Campano – Arnus University Books, 2013, 606 pages. Sim, S.; Van Loon, B. (2009). Introducing Critical Theory: A Graphic Guide. Icon Books Ltd. Archival collections Guide to the Critical Theory Offprint Collection. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, Cali Guide to the Critical Theory Institute Audio and Video Recordings, University of California, Irvine. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. University of California, Irvine, Critical Theory Institute Manuscript Materials. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. Conflict theory Humanities Philosophical schools and traditions Social philosophy Political ideologies

Dualism

Dualism most commonly refers to: Mind–body dualism, a philosophical view which holds that mental phenomena are, at least in certain respects, not physical phenomena, or that the mind and the body are distinct and separable from one another Property dualism, a view in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics which holds that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties Cosmological dualism, the theological or spiritual view that there are only two fundamental concepts, such as "good" and "evil", and that these two concepts are in every way opposed to one another Dualism may also refer to: Dualism (cybernetics), systems or problems in which an intelligent adversary attempts to exploit the weaknesses of the investigator Dualism (Indian philosophy), the belief held by certain schools of Indian philosophy that reality is fundamentally composed of two parts Dualism (politics), the separation of powers between the cabinet and parliament Dualism in medieval politics, opposition to hierocracy (medieval) Epistemological dualism, the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain Ethical dualism, the attribution of good solely to one group of people and evil to another Monism and dualism in international law, a principle in contending that international and domestic law are distinct systems of law, and that international law only applies to the extent that it does not conflict with domestic law Soul dualism, the belief that a person has two (or more) kinds of souls Media Dualism (album), a 2011 album by Dutch metal band Textures Dualist (album), a 2011 album by Taken by Cars Dualism, a novel by Bill DeSmedt See also Bipartite (disambiguation) Dialectical monism Dual (disambiguation) Duality (disambiguation) Duality (electrical circuits) Duality (mathematics), translates concepts, theorems or mathematical structures into other concepts, theorems or structures, in a one-to-one fashion, often (but not always) by means of an involution operation List of dualities Monism Nondualism

Utopian socialism

Utopian socialism is the term often used to describe the first current of modern socialism and socialist thought as exemplified by the work of Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, and Robert Owen. Utopian socialism is often described as the presentation of visions and outlines for imaginary or futuristic ideal societies, with positive ideals being the main reason for moving society in such a direction. Later socialists and critics of utopian socialism viewed utopian socialism as not being grounded in actual material conditions of existing society. These visions of ideal societies competed with revolutionary and social democratic movements. The term utopian socialism is most often applied to those socialists who lived in the first quarter of the 19th century by later socialists as a pejorative in order to dismiss their ideas as fanciful and unrealistic. A similar school of thought that emerged in the early 20th century which makes the case for socialism on moral grounds is ethical socialism. Those anarchists and Marxists who dismissed utopian socialism did so because utopian socialists generally did not believe any form of class struggle or social revolution was necessary for socialism to emerge. Utopian socialists believed that people of all classes could voluntarily adopt their plan for society if it was presented convincingly. Cooperative socialism could be established among like-minded people in small communities that would demonstrate the feasibility of their plan for the broader society. Because of this tendency, utopian socialism was also related to classical radicalism, a left-wing liberal ideology. Development The term "utopian socialism" was used by socialist thinkers after the publication of The Communist Manifesto to describe early socialist or quasi-socialist intellectuals who created hypothetical visions of egalitarian, communal, meritocratic, or other notions of perfect societies without considering how these societies could be created or sustained. In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx criticized the economic and philosophical arguments of Proudhon set forth in The System of Economic Contradictions, or The Philosophy of Poverty. Marx accused Proudhon of wanting to rise above the bourgeoisie. In the history of Marx's thought and Marxism, this work is pivotal in the distinction between the concepts of utopian socialism and what Marx and the Marxists claimed as scientific socialism. Although utopian socialists shared few political, social, or economic perspectives, Marx and Engels argued that they shared certain intellectual characteristics. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote:The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favored. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see it in the best possible plan of the best possible state of society? Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.Marx and Engels associated utopian socialism with communitarian socialism which similarly sees the establishment of small intentional communities as both a strategy for achieving and the final form of a socialist society. Marx and Engels used the term scientific socialism to describe the type of socialism they saw themselves developing. According to Engels, socialism was not "an accidental discovery of this or that ingenious brain, but the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes, namely the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task was no longer to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to examine the historical-economic succession of events from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung, and to discover in the economic conditions thus created the means of ending the conflict". Critics have argued that utopian socialists who established experimental communities were in fact trying to apply the scientific method to human social organization and were therefore not utopian. On the basis of Karl Popper's definition of science as "the practice of experimentation, of hypothesis and test", Joshua Muravchik argued that "Owen and Fourier and their followers were the real 'scientific socialists.' They hit upon the idea of socialism, and they tested it by attempting to form socialist communities". By contrast, Muravchik further argued that Marx made untestable predictions about the future and that Marx's view that socialism would be created by impersonal historical forces may lead one to conclude that it is unnecessary to strive for socialism because it will happen anyway. Social unrest between the employee and employer in a society results from the growth of productive forces such as technology and natural resources are the main causes of social and economic development. These productive forces require a mode of production, or an economic system, that's based around private property rights and institutions that determine the wage for labor.  Additionally, the capitalist rulers control the modes of production. This ideological economic structure allows the bourgeoises to undermine the worker's sensibility of their place in society, being that the bourgeoises rule the society in their own interests. These rulers of society exploit the relationship between labor and capital, allowing for them to maximize their profit. To Marx and Engels, the profiteering through the exploitation of workers is the core issue of capitalism, explaining their beliefs for the oppression of the working class. Capitalism will reach a certain stage, one of which it cannot progress society forward, resulting in the seeding of socialism. As a socialist, Marx theorized the internal failures of capitalism. He described how the tensions between the productive forces and the modes of production would lead to the downfall of capitalism through a social revolution. Leading the revolution would be the proletariat, being that the preeminence of the bourgeoise would end. Marx's vision of his society established that there would be no classes, freedom of mankind, and the opportunity of self-interested labor to rid any alienation. Since the mid-19th century, Engels overtook utopian socialism in terms of intellectual development and number of adherents. At one time almost half the population of the world lived under regimes that claimed to be Marxist. Currents such as Owenism and Fourierism attracted the interest of numerous later authors but failed to compete with the now dominant Marxist and Anarchist schools on a political level. It has been noted that they exerted a significant influence on the emergence of new religious movements such as spiritualism and occultism. Utopian socialists were seen as wanting to expand the principles of the French revolution in order to create a more rational society. Despite being labeled as utopian by later socialists, their aims were not always utopian and their values often included rigid support for the scientific method and the creation of a society based upon scientific understanding. In literature and in practice Edward Bellamy (1850–1898) published Looking Backward in 1888, a utopian romance novel about a future socialist society. In Bellamy's utopia, property was held in common and money replaced with a system of equal credit for all. Valid for a year and non-transferable between individuals, credit expenditure was to be tracked via "credit-cards" (which bear no resemblance to modern credit cards which are tools of debt-finance). Labour was compulsory from age 21 to 40 and organised via various departments of an Industrial Army to which most citizens belonged. Working hours were to be cut drastically due to technological advances (including organisational). People were expected to be motivated by a Religion of Solidarity and criminal behavior was treated as a form of mental illness or "atavism". The book ranked as second or third best seller of its time (after Uncle Tom's Cabin and Ben Hur). In 1897, Bellamy published a sequel entitled Equality as a reply to his critics and which lacked the Industrial Army and other authoritarian aspects. William Morris (1834–1896) published News from Nowhere in 1890, partly as a response to Bellamy's Looking Backward, which he equated with the socialism of Fabians such as Sydney Webb. Morris' vision of the future socialist society was centred around his concept of useful work as opposed to useless toil and the redemption of human labour. Morris believed that all work should be artistic, in the sense that the worker should find it both pleasurable and an outlet for creativity. Morris' conception of labour thus bears strong resemblance to Fourier's, while Bellamy's (the reduction of labour) is more akin to that of Saint-Simon or in aspects Marx. The Brotherhood Church in Britain and the Life and Labor Commune in Russia were based on the Christian anarchist ideas of Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910). Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) and Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) wrote about anarchist forms of socialism in their books. Proudhon wrote What is Property? (1840) and The System of Economic Contradictions, or The Philosophy of Poverty (1847). Kropotkin wrote The Conquest of Bread (1892) and Fields, Factories and Workshops (1912). Many of the anarchist collectives formed in Spain, especially in Aragon and Catalonia, during the Spanish Civil War were based on their ideas. Many participants in the historical kibbutz movement in Palestine in the Ottoman Empire, then later Mandatory Palestine under British occupation and later Israel were motivated by utopian socialist ideas. Augustin Souchy (1892–1984) spent most of his life investigating and participating in many kinds of socialist communities. Souchy wrote about his experiences in his autobiography Beware! Anarchist! Behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) published Walden Two in 1948. The Twin Oaks Community was originally based on his ideas. Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018) wrote about an impoverished anarchist society in her book The Dispossessed, published in 1974, in which the anarchists agree to leave their home planet and colonize a barely habitable moon in order to avoid a bloody revolution. Related concepts Some communities of the modern intentional community movement such as kibbutzim could be categorized as utopian socialist. Some religious communities such as the Hutterites are categorized as utopian religious socialists. Classless modes of production in hunter-gatherer societies are referred to as primitive communism by Marxists to stress their classless nature. Notable utopian socialists Edward Bellamy Alphonse Toussenel Tommaso Campanella Etienne Cabet Icarians Victor Considérant David Dale Charles Fourier North American Phalanx The Phalanx King Gillette Jean-Baptiste Godin Laurence Gronlund Matti Kurikka John Humphrey Noyes John Ball Robert Owen Philippe Buonarroti Vaso Pelagić Henri de Saint-Simon William Thompson Wilhelm Weitling Gerrard Winstanley Thomas Paine Notable utopian communities Utopian communities have existed all over the world. In various forms and locations, they have existed continuously in the United States since the 1730s, beginning with Ephrata Cloister, a religious community in what is now Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Owenite communities New Lanark, Scotland, 1786 New Harmony, Indiana, 1814 Fourierist communities Brook Farm, Massachusetts, 1841 La Reunion (Dallas), Texas, 1855 North American Phalanx, New Jersey, 1843 Silkville, Kansas, 1870 Utopia, Ohio, 1844 Icarian communities Corning, Iowa, 1860 Anarchist communities Home, Washington, 1898 Life and Labor Commune, Moscow Oblast, Soviet Union (Russia), 1921 Socialist Community of Modern Times, New York, 1851 Whiteway Colony, United Kingdom, 1898 Others Fairhope, Alabama, US, 1894 Kaweah Colony, California, 1886 Llano del Rio, California, 1914 Los Mochis, Sinaloa, Mexico, 1893 Nevada City, Nevada, 1916 New Australia, Paraguay, 1893 Oneida Community, New York, 1848 Ruskin Colony, Tennessee, 1894 Rugby, Tennessee, 1880 Sointula, British Columbia, Canada, 1901 See also Pre-Marx socialists Pre-Marxist communism Christian socialism Communist utopia Diggers Ethical socialism Futurism History of socialism Ideal (ethics) Intentional communities Kibbutz List of anarchist communities Marxism Nanosocialism Post-capitalism Post-scarcity Radicalism (historical) Ricardian socialism Scientific socialism Socialism Socialist economics Syndicalism Utopia for Realists Yellow socialism Zero waste References Further reading Taylor, Keith (1992). The political ideas of Utopian socialists. London: Cass. . External links Be Utopian: Demand the Realistic by Robert Pollin, The Nation, March 9, 2009. History of social movements Idealism Radicalism (historical) Social theories Socialism Syndicalism Types of socialism

Transcendental arguments

A transcendental argument is a kind of deductive argument that appeals to the necessary conditions that make experience and knowledge possible. Transcendental arguments may have additional standards of justification that are more demanding than those of traditional deductive arguments. The arguments Typically, a transcendental argument starts from some proposition, and then makes the case that its truth or falsehood contradicts the necessary conditions for it to be possible to know, think or argue about it. So-called progressive transcendental arguments begin with an apparently indubitable and universally accepted statement about people's experiences of the world. They use this to make substantive knowledge-claims about the world, e.g., that it is causally and spatiotemporally related. They start with what is left at the end of the skeptic's process of doubting. Progressive transcendental arguments take the form of modus ponens with modal operators: If possibly P, then necessarily Q. Actually P. Therefore, necessarily Q. Regressive transcendental arguments, on the other hand, begin at the same point as the skeptic, e.g., the fact that we have experience of a causal and spatiotemporal world, and show that certain notions are implicit in our conceptions of such experience. Regressive transcendental arguments are more conservative in that they do not purport to make substantive ontological claims about the world. Regressive transcendental arguments take the form of modus tollens with modal operators: If possibly P, then necessarily Q. Actually not Q. Therefore, necessarily not P. Transcendental arguments are often used to refute skepticism. For example: If we have knowledge, universal skepticism is false. We have knowledge. (If we did not, we couldn't possibly argue that universal skepticism is true) Universal skepticism is false. Kant uses an example in his refutation of idealism. Idealists believe that objects have no existence independent of the mind. Briefly, Kant shows that: since idealists acknowledge that we have an inner mental life, and an inner life of self-awareness is bound up with the concepts of objects which are not inner, and which interact causally, We must have legitimate experience of outer objects which interact causally. He has not established that outer objects exist, but only that the concept of them is legitimate, contrary to idealism. Robert Lockie makes a transcendental argument for libertarian free will: If we want to know truth, we have free will. We want to know the truth about free will. We have free will. However, not all use of transcendental arguments is intended to counter skepticism. The Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd used transcendental critique to establish the conditions that make a theoretical (or scientific) attitude of thought (not just the process of thinking, as in Kant) possible. In particular, he showed that theoretical thought is not independent (or neutral) of pre-commitments and relationships but are rather grounded in commitments, attitudes, and presuppositions that are "religious" in nature. C.S. Lewis made transcendental arguments to prove the existence of God and refute naturalism. Kant It was Immanuel Kant who gave transcendental arguments their name and notoriety. It is open to controversy, though, whether his own transcendental arguments should be classified as progressive or regressive. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant developed one of philosophy's most famous transcendental arguments in 'The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding'. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant used transcendental arguments to show that sensory experiences would not be possible if we did not impose their spatial and temporal forms on them, making space and time "conditions of the possibility of experience". Criticisms of transcendental arguments As stated above, one of the main uses of transcendental arguments is to appeal to something that cannot be consistently denied to counter skeptics' arguments that we cannot know something about the nature of the world. One need not be a skeptic about those matters, however, to find transcendental arguments unpersuasive. There are a number of ways that one might deny that a given transcendental argument gives us knowledge of the world. The following responses may suit some versions and not others. First, critics respond by claiming that the arguer cannot be sure that he or she is having particular experiences. That a person cannot be sure about the nature of his or her own experiences may initially seem bizarre. However, it may be claimed that the very act of thinking about or, even more, describing our experiences in words, involves interpreting them in ways that go beyond so-called 'pure' experience. Second, skeptics object to the use of transcendental arguments to draw conclusions about the nature of the world by claiming that even if a person does know the nature of his or her experiences, that person cannot know that the reasoning from these experiences to conclusions about the world is accurate. Lastly, critics have debated whether showing that we must think of the world in a certain way, given certain features of experience, is tantamount to showing that the world answers to that conception. Perhaps transcendental arguments show only the necessities of our cognitive apparatus rather than the realities of the world apart from us. This objection may amount to throwing doubt on whether transcendental arguments are ever more than merely "regressive". See also Transcendental idealism Ludwig Wittgenstein Transcendental argument for the existence of God References Bibliography Brueckner, Anthony. " Transcendental Arguments I". Nous 17 (4): 551-575. and "Transcendental Arguments II". Nous 18 (2): 197-225. Stapleford, Scott Kant's Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason - Continuum Publishing 2008 ( - hb) Stern, Robert, ed.Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospect. Oxford: Clarendon. Stroud, Barry. "Transcendental Arguments". Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968) 241-56. Taylor, Charles. "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments". Reprinted in Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955. External links Philosophical arguments Deductive reasoning Philosophical methodology German idealism

Philosophy of artificial intelligence

The philosophy of artificial intelligence is a branch of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of computer science that explores artificial intelligence and its implications for knowledge and understanding of intelligence, ethics, consciousness, epistemology, and free will. Furthermore, the technology is concerned with the creation of artificial animals or artificial people (or, at least, artificial creatures; see artificial life) so the discipline is of considerable interest to philosophers. These factors contributed to the emergence of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The philosophy of artificial intelligence attempts to answer such questions as follows: Can a machine act intelligently? Can it solve any problem that a person would solve by thinking? Are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same? Is the human brain essentially a computer? Can a machine have a mind, mental states, and consciousness in the same sense that a human being can? Can it feel how things are? (i.e. does it have qualia?) Questions like these reflect the divergent interests of AI researchers, cognitive scientists and philosophers respectively. The scientific answers to these questions depend on the definition of "intelligence" and "consciousness" and exactly which "machines" are under discussion. Important propositions in the philosophy of AI include some of the following: Turing's "polite convention": If a machine behaves as intelligently as a human being, then it is as intelligent as a human being. The Dartmouth proposal: "Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it." Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon's physical symbol system hypothesis: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action." John Searle's strong AI hypothesis: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Hobbes' mechanism: "For 'reason' ... is nothing but 'reckoning,' that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the 'marking' and 'signifying' of our thoughts..." Can a machine display general intelligence? Is it possible to create a machine that can solve all the problems humans solve using their intelligence? This question defines the scope of what machines could do in the future and guides the direction of AI research. It only concerns the behavior of machines and ignores the issues of interest to psychologists, cognitive scientists and philosophers, evoking the question: does it matter whether a machine is really thinking, as a person thinks, rather than just producing outcomes that appear to result from thinking? The basic position of most AI researchers is summed up in this statement, which appeared in the proposal for the Dartmouth workshop of 1956: "Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it." Arguments against the basic premise must show that building a working AI system is impossible because there is some practical limit to the abilities of computers or that there is some special quality of the human mind that is necessary for intelligent behavior and yet cannot be duplicated by a machine (or by the methods of current AI research). Arguments in favor of the basic premise must show that such a system is possible. It is also possible to sidestep the connection between the two parts of the above proposal. For instance, machine learning, beginning with Turing's infamous child machine proposal, essentially achieves the desired feature of intelligence without a precise design-time description as to how it would exactly work. The account on robot tacit knowledge eliminates the need for a precise description altogether. The first step to answering the question is to clearly define "intelligence". Intelligence Turing test Alan Turing reduced the problem of defining intelligence to a simple question about conversation. He suggests that: if a machine can answer any question posed to it, using the same words that an ordinary person would, then we may call that machine intelligent. A modern version of his experimental design would use an online chat room, where one of the participants is a real person and one of the participants is a computer program. The program passes the test if no one can tell which of the two participants is human. Turing notes that no one (except philosophers) ever asks the question "can people think?" He writes "instead of arguing continually over this point, it is usual to have a polite convention that everyone thinks". Turing's test extends this polite convention to machines: If a machine acts as intelligently as a human being, then it is as intelligent as a human being. One criticism of the Turing test is that it only measures the "humanness" of the machine's behavior, rather than the "intelligence" of the behavior. Since human behavior and intelligent behavior are not exactly the same thing, the test fails to measure intelligence. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig write that "aeronautical engineering texts do not define the goal of their field as 'making machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool other pigeons'". Intelligence as achieving goals Twenty-first century AI research defines intelligence in terms of goal-directed behavior. It views intelligence as a set of problems that the machine is expected to solve – the more problems it can solve, and the better its solutions are, the more intelligent the program is. AI founder John McCarthy defined intelligence as "the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world." Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig formalized this definition using abstract intelligent agents. An "agent" is something which perceives and acts in an environment. A "performance measure" defines what counts as success for the agent. "If an agent acts so as to maximize the expected value of a performance measure based on past experience and knowledge then it is intelligent." Definitions like this one try to capture the essence of intelligence. They have the advantage that, unlike the Turing test, they do not also test for unintelligent human traits such as making typing mistakes. They have the disadvantage that they can fail to differentiate between "things that think" and "things that do not". By this definition, even a thermostat has a rudimentary intelligence. Arguments that a machine can display general intelligence The brain can be simulated Hubert Dreyfus describes this argument as claiming that "if the nervous system obeys the laws of physics and chemistry, which we have every reason to suppose it does, then ... we ... ought to be able to reproduce the behavior of the nervous system with some physical device". This argument, first introduced as early as 1943 and vividly described by Hans Moravec in 1988, is now associated with futurist Ray Kurzweil, who estimates that computer power will be sufficient for a complete brain simulation by the year 2029. A non-real-time simulation of a thalamocortical model that has the size of the human brain (1011 neurons) was performed in 2005, and it took 50 days to simulate 1 second of brain dynamics on a cluster of 27 processors. Even AI's harshest critics (such as Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle) agree that a brain simulation is possible in theory. However, Searle points out that, in principle, anything can be simulated by a computer; thus, bringing the definition to its breaking point leads to the conclusion that any process at all can technically be considered "computation". "What we wanted to know is what distinguishes the mind from thermostats and livers," he writes. Thus, merely simulating the functioning of a living brain would in itself be an admission of ignorance regarding intelligence and the nature of the mind, like trying to build a jet airliner by copying a living bird precisely, feather by feather, with no theoretical understanding of aeronautical engineering. Human thinking is symbol processing In 1963, Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon proposed that "symbol manipulation" was the essence of both human and machine intelligence. They wrote: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action." This claim is very strong: it implies both that human thinking is a kind of symbol manipulation (because a symbol system is necessary for intelligence) and that machines can be intelligent (because a symbol system is sufficient for intelligence). Another version of this position was described by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who called it "the psychological assumption": "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules." The "symbols" that Newell, Simon and Dreyfus discussed were word-like and high levelsymbols that directly correspond with objects in the world, such as <dog> and <tail>. Most AI programs written between 1956 and 1990 used this kind of symbol. Modern AI, based on statistics and mathematical optimization, does not use the high-level "symbol processing" that Newell and Simon discussed. Arguments against symbol processing These arguments show that human thinking does not consist (solely) of high level symbol manipulation. They do not show that artificial intelligence is impossible, only that more than symbol processing is required. Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments In 1931, Kurt Gödel proved with an incompleteness theorem that it is always possible to construct a "Gödel statement" that a given consistent formal system of logic (such as a high-level symbol manipulation program) could not prove. Despite being a true statement, the constructed Gödel statement is unprovable in the given system. (The truth of the constructed Gödel statement is contingent on the consistency of the given system; applying the same process to a subtly inconsistent system will appear to succeed, but will actually yield a false "Gödel statement" instead.) More speculatively, Gödel conjectured that the human mind can eventually correctly determine the truth or falsity of any well-grounded mathematical statement (including any possible Gödel statement), and that therefore the human mind's power is not reducible to a mechanism. Philosopher John Lucas (since 1961) and Roger Penrose (since 1989) have championed this philosophical anti-mechanist argument. Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments tend to rely on the innocuous-seeming claim that a system of human mathematicians (or some idealization of human mathematicians) is both consistent (completely free of error) and believes fully in its own consistency (and can make all logical inferences that follow from its own consistency, including belief in its Gödel statement) . This is probably impossible for a Turing machine to do (see Halting problem); therefore, the Gödelian concludes that human reasoning is too powerful to be captured by a Turing machine, and by extension, any digital mechanical device. However, the modern consensus in the scientific and mathematical community is that actual human reasoning is inconsistent; that any consistent "idealized version" H of human reasoning would logically be forced to adopt a healthy but counter-intuitive open-minded skepticism about the consistency of H (otherwise H is provably inconsistent); and that Gödel's theorems do not lead to any valid argument that humans have mathematical reasoning capabilities beyond what a machine could ever duplicate. This consensus that Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are doomed to failure is laid out strongly in Artificial Intelligence: "any attempt to utilize (Gödel's incompleteness results) to attack the computationalist thesis is bound to be illegitimate, since these results are quite consistent with the computationalist thesis." Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig agree that Gödel's argument does not consider the nature of real-world human reasoning. It applies to what can theoretically be proved, given an infinite amount of memory and time. In practice, real machines (including humans) have finite resources and will have difficulty proving many theorems. It is not necessary to be able to prove everything in order to be an intelligent person. Less formally, Douglas Hofstadter, in his Pulitzer prize winning book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, states that these "Gödel-statements" always refer to the system itself, drawing an analogy to the way the Epimenides paradox uses statements that refer to themselves, such as "this statement is false" or "I am lying". But, of course, the Epimenides paradox applies to anything that makes statements, whether it is a machine or a human, even Lucas himself. Consider: Lucas can't assert the truth of this statement. This statement is true but cannot be asserted by Lucas. This shows that Lucas himself is subject to the same limits that he describes for machines, as are all people, and so Lucas's argument is pointless. After concluding that human reasoning is non-computable, Penrose went on to controversially speculate that some kind of hypothetical non-computable processes involving the collapse of quantum mechanical states give humans a special advantage over existing computers. Existing quantum computers are only capable of reducing the complexity of Turing computable tasks and are still restricted to tasks within the scope of Turing machines. . By Penrose and Lucas's arguments, the fact that quantum computers are only able to complete Turing computable tasks implies that they cannot be sufficient for emulating the human mind. Therefore, Penrose seeks for some other process involving new physics, for instance quantum gravity which might manifest new physics at the scale of the Planck mass via spontaneous quantum collapse of the wave function. These states, he suggested, occur both within neurons and also spanning more than one neuron. However, other scientists point out that there is no plausible organic mechanism in the brain for harnessing any sort of quantum computation, and furthermore that the timescale of quantum decoherence seems too fast to influence neuron firing. Dreyfus: the primacy of implicit skills Hubert Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depended primarily on fast intuitive judgements rather than step-by-step symbolic manipulation, and argued that these skills would never be captured in formal rules. Dreyfus's argument had been anticipated by Turing in his 1950 paper Computing machinery and intelligence, where he had classified this as the "argument from the informality of behavior." Turing argued in response that, just because we do not know the rules that govern a complex behavior, this does not mean that no such rules exist. He wrote: "we cannot so easily convince ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour ... The only way we know of for finding such laws is scientific observation, and we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, 'We have searched enough. There are no such laws.'" Russell and Norvig point out that, in the years since Dreyfus published his critique, progress has been made towards discovering the "rules" that govern unconscious reasoning. The situated movement in robotics research attempts to capture our unconscious skills at perception and attention. Computational intelligence paradigms, such as neural nets, evolutionary algorithms and so on are mostly directed at simulated unconscious reasoning and learning. Statistical approaches to AI can make predictions which approach the accuracy of human intuitive guesses. Research into commonsense knowledge has focused on reproducing the "background" or context of knowledge. In fact, AI research in general has moved away from high level symbol manipulation, towards new models that are intended to capture more of our intuitive reasoning. Cognitive science and psychology eventually came to agree with Dreyfus' description of human expertise. Daniel Kahnemann and others developed a similar theory where they identified two "systems" that humans use to solve problems, which he called "System 1" (fast intuitive judgements) and "System 2" (slow deliberate step by step thinking). Although Dreyfus' views have been vindicated in many ways, the work in cognitive science and in AI was in response to specific problems in those fields and was not directly influenced by Dreyfus. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote that "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they suggested might have been taken much earlier." Can a machine have a mind, consciousness, and mental states? This is a philosophical question, related to the problem of other minds and the hard problem of consciousness. The question revolves around a position defined by John Searle as "strong AI": A physical symbol system can have a mind and mental states. Searle distinguished this position from what he called "weak AI": A physical symbol system can act intelligently. Searle introduced the terms to isolate strong AI from weak AI so he could focus on what he thought was the more interesting and debatable issue. He argued that even if we assume that we had a computer program that acted exactly like a human mind, there would still be a difficult philosophical question that needed to be answered. Neither of Searle's two positions are of great concern to AI research, since they do not directly answer the question "can a machine display general intelligence?" (unless it can also be shown that consciousness is necessary for intelligence). Turing wrote "I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness… [b]ut I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question [of whether machines can think]." Russell and Norvig agree: "Most AI researchers take the weak AI hypothesis for granted, and don't care about the strong AI hypothesis." There are a few researchers who believe that consciousness is an essential element in intelligence, such as Igor Aleksander, Stan Franklin, Ron Sun, and Pentti Haikonen, although their definition of "consciousness" strays very close to "intelligence". (See artificial consciousness.) Before we can answer this question, we must be clear what we mean by "minds", "mental states" and "consciousness". Consciousness, minds, mental states, meaning The words "mind" and "consciousness" are used by different communities in different ways. Some new age thinkers, for example, use the word "consciousness" to describe something similar to Bergson's "élan vital": an invisible, energetic fluid that permeates life and especially the mind. Science fiction writers use the word to describe some essential property that makes us human: a machine or alien that is "conscious" will be presented as a fully human character, with intelligence, desires, will, insight, pride and so on. (Science fiction writers also use the words "sentience", "sapience", "self-awareness" or "ghost"—as in the Ghost in the Shell manga and anime series—to describe this essential human property). For others , the words "mind" or "consciousness" are used as a kind of secular synonym for the soul. For philosophers, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, the words are used in a way that is both more precise and more mundane: they refer to the familiar, everyday experience of having a "thought in your head", like a perception, a dream, an intention or a plan, and to the way we see something, know something, mean something or understand something. "It's not hard to give a commonsense definition of consciousness" observes philosopher John Searle. What is mysterious and fascinating is not so much what it is but how it is: how does a lump of fatty tissue and electricity give rise to this (familiar) experience of perceiving, meaning or thinking? Philosophers call this the hard problem of consciousness. It is the latest version of a classic problem in the philosophy of mind called the "mind-body problem". A related problem is the problem of meaning or understanding (which philosophers call "intentionality"): what is the connection between our thoughts and what we are thinking about (i.e. objects and situations out in the world)? A third issue is the problem of experience (or "phenomenology"): If two people see the same thing, do they have the same experience? Or are there things "inside their head" (called "qualia") that can be different from person to person? Neurobiologists believe all these problems will be solved as we begin to identify the neural correlates of consciousness: the actual relationship between the machinery in our heads and its collective properties; such as the mind, experience and understanding. Some of the harshest critics of artificial intelligence agree that the brain is just a machine, and that consciousness and intelligence are the result of physical processes in the brain. The difficult philosophical question is this: can a computer program, running on a digital machine that shuffles the binary digits of zero and one, duplicate the ability of the neurons to create minds, with mental states (like understanding or perceiving), and ultimately, the experience of consciousness? Arguments that a computer cannot have a mind and mental states Searle's Chinese room John Searle asks us to consider a thought experiment: suppose we have written a computer program that passes the Turing test and demonstrates general intelligent action. Suppose, specifically that the program can converse in fluent Chinese. Write the program on 3x5 cards and give them to an ordinary person who does not speak Chinese. Lock the person into a room and have him follow the instructions on the cards. He will copy out Chinese characters and pass them in and out of the room through a slot. From the outside, it will appear that the Chinese room contains a fully intelligent person who speaks Chinese. The question is this: is there anyone (or anything) in the room that understands Chinese? That is, is there anything that has the mental state of understanding, or which has conscious awareness of what is being discussed in Chinese? The man is clearly not aware. The room cannot be aware. The cards certainly are not aware. Searle concludes that the Chinese room, or any other physical symbol system, cannot have a mind. Searle goes on to argue that actual mental states and consciousness require (yet to be described) "actual physical-chemical properties of actual human brains." He argues there are special "causal properties" of brains and neurons that gives rise to minds: in his words "brains cause minds." Related arguments: Leibniz' mill, Davis's telephone exchange, Block's Chinese nation and Blockhead Gottfried Leibniz made essentially the same argument as Searle in 1714, using the thought experiment of expanding the brain until it was the size of a mill. In 1974, Lawrence Davis imagined duplicating the brain using telephone lines and offices staffed by people, and in 1978 Ned Block envisioned the entire population of China involved in such a brain simulation. This thought experiment is called "the Chinese Nation" or "the Chinese Gym". Ned Block also proposed his Blockhead argument, which is a version of the Chinese room in which the program has been re-factored into a simple set of rules of the form "see this, do that", removing all mystery from the program. Responses to the Chinese room Responses to the Chinese room emphasize several different points. The systems reply and the virtual mind reply: This reply argues that the system, including the man, the program, the room, and the cards, is what understands Chinese. Searle claims that the man in the room is the only thing which could possibly "have a mind" or "understand", but others disagree, arguing that it is possible for there to be two minds in the same physical place, similar to the way a computer can simultaneously "be" two machines at once: one physical (like a Macintosh) and one "virtual" (like a word processor). Speed, power and complexity replies: Several critics point out that the man in the room would probably take millions of years to respond to a simple question, and would require "filing cabinets" of astronomical proportions. This brings the clarity of Searle's intuition into doubt. Robot reply: To truly understand, some believe the Chinese Room needs eyes and hands. Hans Moravec writes: "If we could graft a robot to a reasoning program, we wouldn't need a person to provide the meaning anymore: it would come from the physical world." Brain simulator reply: What if the program simulates the sequence of nerve firings at the synapses of an actual brain of an actual Chinese speaker? The man in the room would be simulating an actual brain. This is a variation on the "systems reply" that appears more plausible because "the system" now clearly operates like a human brain, which strengthens the intuition that there is something besides the man in the room that could understand Chinese. Other minds reply and the epiphenomena reply: Several people have noted that Searle's argument is just a version of the problem of other minds, applied to machines. Since it is difficult to decide if people are "actually" thinking, we should not be surprised that it is difficult to answer the same question about machines. A related question is whether "consciousness" (as Searle understands it) exists. Searle argues that the experience of consciousness cannot be detected by examining the behavior of a machine, a human being or any other animal. Daniel Dennett points out that natural selection cannot preserve a feature of an animal that has no effect on the behavior of the animal, and thus consciousness (as Searle understands it) cannot be produced by natural selection. Therefore, either natural selection did not produce consciousness, or "strong AI" is correct in that consciousness can be detected by suitably designed Turing test. Is thinking a kind of computation? The computational theory of mind or "computationalism" claims that the relationship between mind and brain is similar (if not identical) to the relationship between a running program (software) and a computer (hardware). The idea has philosophical roots in Hobbes (who claimed reasoning was "nothing more than reckoning"), Leibniz (who attempted to create a logical calculus of all human ideas), Hume (who thought perception could be reduced to "atomic impressions") and even Kant (who analyzed all experience as controlled by formal rules). The latest version is associated with philosophers Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. This question bears on our earlier questions: if the human brain is a kind of computer then computers can be both intelligent and conscious, answering both the practical and philosophical questions of AI. In terms of the practical question of AI ("Can a machine display general intelligence?"), some versions of computationalism make the claim that (as Hobbes wrote): Reasoning is nothing but reckoning. In other words, our intelligence derives from a form of calculation, similar to arithmetic. This is the physical symbol system hypothesis discussed above, and it implies that artificial intelligence is possible. In terms of the philosophical question of AI ("Can a machine have mind, mental states and consciousness?"), most versions of computationalism claim that (as Stevan Harnad characterizes it): Mental states are just implementations of (the right) computer programs. This is John Searle's "strong AI" discussed above, and it is the real target of the Chinese room argument (according to Harnad). Other related questions Can a machine have emotions? If "emotions" are defined only in terms of their effect on behavior or on how they function inside an organism, then emotions can be viewed as a mechanism that an intelligent agent uses to maximize the utility of its actions. Given this definition of emotion, Hans Moravec believes that "robots in general will be quite emotional about being nice people". Fear is a source of urgency. Empathy is a necessary component of good human computer interaction. He says robots "will try to please you in an apparently selfless manner because it will get a thrill out of this positive reinforcement. You can interpret this as a kind of love." Daniel Crevier writes "Moravec's point is that emotions are just devices for channeling behavior in a direction beneficial to the survival of one's species." Can a machine be self-aware? "Self-awareness", as noted above, is sometimes used by science fiction writers as a name for the essential human property that makes a character fully human. Turing strips away all other properties of human beings and reduces the question to "can a machine be the subject of its own thought?" Can it think about itself? Viewed in this way, a program can be written that can report on its own internal states, such as a debugger. Can a machine be original or creative? Turing reduces this to the question of whether a machine can "take us by surprise" and argues that this is obviously true, as any programmer can attest. He notes that, with enough storage capacity, a computer can behave in an astronomical number of different ways. It must be possible, even trivial, for a computer that can represent ideas to combine them in new ways. (Douglas Lenat's Automated Mathematician, as one example, combined ideas to discover new mathematical truths.) Kaplan and Haenlein suggest that machines can display scientific creativity, while it seems likely that humans will have the upper hand where artistic creativity is concerned. In 2009, scientists at Aberystwyth University in Wales and the U.K's University of Cambridge designed a robot called Adam that they believe to be the first machine to independently come up with new scientific findings. Also in 2009, researchers at Cornell developed Eureqa, a computer program that extrapolates formulas to fit the data inputted, such as finding the laws of motion from a pendulum's motion. Can a machine be benevolent or hostile? This question (like many others in the philosophy of artificial intelligence) can be presented in two forms. "Hostility" can be defined in terms function or behavior, in which case "hostile" becomes synonymous with "dangerous". Or it can be defined in terms of intent: can a machine "deliberately" set out to do harm? The latter is the question "can a machine have conscious states?" (such as intentions) in another form. The question of whether highly intelligent and completely autonomous machines would be dangerous has been examined in detail by futurists (such as the Machine Intelligence Research Institute). The obvious element of drama has also made the subject popular in science fiction, which has considered many differently possible scenarios where intelligent machines pose a threat to mankind; see Artificial intelligence in fiction. One issue is that machines may acquire the autonomy and intelligence required to be dangerous very quickly. Vernor Vinge has suggested that over just a few years, computers will suddenly become thousands or millions of times more intelligent than humans. He calls this "the Singularity". He suggests that it may be somewhat or possibly very dangerous for humans. This is discussed by a philosophy called Singularitarianism. In 2009, academics and technical experts attended a conference to discuss the potential impact of robots and computers and the impact of the hypothetical possibility that they could become self-sufficient and able to make their own decisions. They discussed the possibility and the extent to which computers and robots might be able to acquire any level of autonomy, and to what degree they could use such abilities to possibly pose any threat or hazard. They noted that some machines have acquired various forms of semi-autonomy, including being able to find power sources on their own and being able to independently choose targets to attack with weapons. They also noted that some computer viruses can evade elimination and have achieved "cockroach intelligence". They noted that self-awareness as depicted in science-fiction is probably unlikely, but that there were other potential hazards and pitfalls. Some experts and academics have questioned the use of robots for military combat, especially when such robots are given some degree of autonomous functions. The US Navy has funded a report which indicates that as military robots become more complex, there should be greater attention to implications of their ability to make autonomous decisions. The President of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence has commissioned a study to look at this issue. They point to programs like the Language Acquisition Device which can emulate human interaction. Some have suggested a need to build "Friendly AI", a term coined by Eliezer Yudkowsky, meaning that the advances which are already occurring with AI should also include an effort to make AI intrinsically friendly and humane. Can a machine imitate all human characteristics? Turing said "It is customary ... to offer a grain of comfort, in the form of a statement that some peculiarly human characteristic could never be imitated by a machine. ... I cannot offer any such comfort, for I believe that no such bounds can be set." Turing noted that there are many arguments of the form "a machine will never do X", where X can be many things, such as: Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humor, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with it, learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new. Turing argues that these objections are often based on naive assumptions about the versatility of machines or are "disguised forms of the argument from consciousness". Writing a program that exhibits one of these behaviors "will not make much of an impression." All of these arguments are tangential to the basic premise of AI, unless it can be shown that one of these traits is essential for general intelligence. Can a machine have a soul? Finally, those who believe in the existence of a soul may argue that "Thinking is a function of man's immortal soul." Alan Turing called this "the theological objection". He writes: In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates.The discussion on the topic has been reignited as a result of recent claims made by Google's LaMDA artificial intelligence system that it is sentient and had a "soul". LaMDA (Language Model for Dialogue Applications) is an artificial intelligence system that creates chatbots—AI robots designed to communicate with humans—by gathering vast amounts of text from the internet and using algorithms to respond to queries in the most fluid and natural way possible. The transcripts of conversations between scientists and LaMDA reveal that the AI system excels at this, providing answers to challenging topics about the nature of emotions, generating Aesop-style fables on the moment, and even describing its alleged fears. Pretty much all philosophers doubt LaMDA's sentience. Views on the role of philosophy Some scholars argue that the AI community's dismissal of philosophy is detrimental. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, some philosophers argue that the role of philosophy in AI is underappreciated. Physicist David Deutsch argues that without an understanding of philosophy or its concepts, AI development would suffer from a lack of progress. Conferences and literature The main conference series on the issue is "Philosophy and Theory of AI" (PT-AI), run by Vincent C. Müller. The main bibliography on the subject, with several sub-sections, is on PhilPapers. A recent survey for Philosophy of AI is Müller (2023). See also AI takeover Artificial brain Artificial consciousness Artificial intelligence Artificial neural network Chatbot Computational theory of mind Computing Machinery and Intelligence Existential risk from artificial general intelligence Functionalism Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence Multi-agent system Philosophy of computer science Philosophy of information Philosophy of mind Physical symbol system Simulated reality Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies Synthetic intelligence Wireheading Notes References Works cited Adam, Alison (1989). Artificial Knowing: Gender and the Thinking Machine. Routledge & CRC Press. Benjamin, Ruha (2019). Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. Wiley. , Bryson, Joanna (2019). The Artificial Intelligence of the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: An Introductory Overview for Law and Regulation, p. 34 Crawford, Kate (2021). Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. Yale University Press Haraway, Donna (1985). A Cyborg Manifesto Malabou, Catherine (2019). Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains. (C. Shread, Trans.). Columbia University Press c Rescorla, Michael, "The Computational Theory of Mind", in:Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition) Philosophy of science Philosophy of technology Artificial Open problems Articles containing video clips

Bad faith (existentialism)

In existentialism, bad faith is the psychological phenomenon whereby individuals act inauthentically, by yielding to the external pressures of society to adopt false values and disown their innate freedom as sentient human beings. Bad faith also derives from the related concepts of self-deception and ressentiment. Freedom and choice A critical claim in existentialist thought is that individuals are always free to make choices and guide their lives towards their own chosen goal or "project". This claim suggests that individuals cannot escape this freedom, even in overwhelming circumstances. For instance, even an empire's colonized victims possess choices: to submit to rule, to negotiate, to commit suicide, to resist nonviolently, or to counter-attack. Although external circumstances may limit individuals, called facticity, they cannot force a person to follow one of the remaining courses over another. In this sense, the individual still has some freedom of choice. For this reason, an individual may choose in anguish, fully aware that this will have consequences. For Jean-Paul Sartre, to claim that one amongst many conscious possibilities takes undeniable precedence (for instance, "I cannot risk my life, because I must support my family") is to assume the role of an object in the world, not a free agent, but merely at the mercy of circumstance (a being-in-itself that is only its own facticity, i.e., it "is" inside itself, and acts there as a limitation). For Sartre, this attitude is manifestly self-deceiving. Intentional consciousness and freedom According to this philosophy, humans are always aware that they are more than what they are aware of; they are not solely what they are aware of. In this sense, humans cannot be defined as "intentional objects" of consciousness that includes the restrictions imposed by facticity, personal history, character, bodies, or objective responsibility. According to Sartre, "Human reality is what it is not, and it is not what it is." For example, being a doctor but wishing to "transcend" that to become a pig farmer. One is who one is not, a pig farmer, not who one is, a doctor. According to Sartre, a person can only be defined negatively, as "what it is not", and this negation is the only positive definition of "what it is". From this, an individual is aware of a host of alternative reactions to our freedom to choose an objective situation, since no situation can dictate a single response. An individual may pretend that these possibilities are denied to them by assuming social roles and value systems external to this nature, but this is itself a decision made possible by their freedom and separation from these things. "Bad faith" is the paradoxical free decision to deny to oneself this inescapable freedom. Examples Sartre Sartre cites a café waiter, whose movements and conversation are a little too "waiter-esque". His voice has an eagerness to please; he carries food rigidly and ostentatiously; "his movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid". His exaggerated behavior illustrates that he is play-acting as a waiter, as an object in the world and as an automaton whose essence is to be a waiter. That he is obviously acting belies that he is aware that he is not (merely) a waiter, but is rather consciously deceiving himself. Another of Sartre's examples involves a young woman on a first date. She ignores the obvious sexual implications of her date's compliments to her physical appearance, but accepts them instead as words directed at her as a human consciousness. As he takes her hand, she lets it rest indifferently in his, "neither consenting nor resisting – a thing" – refusing either to return the gesture or to rebuke it. Thus, she delays the moment when she must choose either to acknowledge his intention and reject or consent to his advances. She conveniently considers her hand only a thing in the world and his compliments as unrelated to her body, playing on her dual human reality as a physical being and as a consciousness separate and free from this physicality. Sartre suggests that, by acting in bad faith, the waiter and the woman are denying their own freedom by using their freedom to do so. They manifestly know they are free, but are actively choosing not to acknowledge it. Bad faith is paradoxical in this regard; when acting in bad faith, a person is actively denying their own freedom, while relying on it to perform the denial. However, Leslie Stevenson believes this characterization of the waiter itself as being an example of bad faith is a misrepresentation of Sartre's intentions. De Beauvoir Simone de Beauvoir described three main types of women acting in bad faith: the Narcissist who denies her freedom by construing herself as a desirable object; the Mystic, who invests her freedom in an absolute; and the Woman in Love, who submerges her identity in that of her male object. She also considered what she called the Serious Man, who subordinated himself to some outside cause, to be in bad faith inasmuch as he denies his own freedom. Two modes of consciousness Sartre claims that the consciousness with which we generally consider our surroundings is different from our reflecting on this consciousness; that is, the consciousness of "ourselves being conscious of these surroundings". The first kind of consciousness, before we think about or reflect on our previous consciousness, is pre-reflective consciousness. Reflecting on the pre-reflective consciousness is reflective consciousness. Sartre contends that this cannot be called unconsciousness, as Freud used the term. He gives the example of running after a bus: one does not become conscious of "one's running after the bus" until one has ceased to run after it, because until then one's consciousness is focused on the bus itself, and not one's chasing it. In this sense, consciousness always entails being self-aware ("being for-itself"). Since, for Sartre, consciousness also entails a consciousness of one's separation from the world and, hence, freedom, an individual may also always be aware of this. However, one can manipulate these two levels of consciousness, so that their reflective consciousness interprets the factual limits of an objective situation as insurmountable while the pre-reflective consciousness remains aware of alternatives. Freedom and morality One convinces oneself, in some sense, to be bound to act by external circumstance in order to escape the anguish of freedom. Sartre says that people are "condemned to be free"; whether they adopt an "objective" moral system to do this choosing for them or follow only their pragmatic concerns, they cannot help but be aware that they are not – fundamentally – part of them. Moreover, as possible intentional objects of one's consciousness, one is fundamentally not part of oneself, but rather exactly what one, as consciousness, defines oneself in opposition to along with everything else one could be conscious of. Fundamentally, Sartre believed humankind cannot escape responsibility by adopting an external moral system, as the adoption of such is in itself a choice that we endorse – implicitly or explicitly – for which we must take full responsibility. He argues that one cannot escape this responsibility, as each attempt to part one's self from the freedom of choice is in itself a demonstration of choice and choice is dependent on a person's wills and desires. He states, "I am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities." As a human, one cannot claim their own actions are determined by external forces; this is the core statement of existentialism. One is "condemned" to this eternal freedom; human beings exist before the definition of human identity exists. One cannot define oneself as a thing in the world, as one has the freedom to be otherwise. An individual is not "a philosopher" as, at some point they will cease the activities that define the self as "a philosopher". Any role that one might adopt does not define them, as there is an eventual end to one's adoption of the role; that is, other roles will be assigned to us, "a chef", "a mother", and so on. The self is not constant and it cannot be a thing in the world. Though one cannot assign a positive value to definitions that may apply to oneself, there remains the ability to be able to say what one is not. This inner anguish over moral uncertainty is a central underlying theme in existentialism, as the anguish demonstrates a personal feeling of responsibility over the choices one makes throughout life. Without an emphasis on personal choice, one may make use of an external moral system as a tool to moralize otherwise immoral acts, leading to negation of the self. According to existentialism, dedicated professionals of their respective moral codes – priests interpreting sacred scriptures, lawyers interpreting the Constitution, doctors interpreting the Hippocratic oath – should, instead of divesting the self of responsibility in the discharge of their duties, be aware of their own significance in the process. This recognition involves the questioning of the morality of all choices, taking responsibility for the consequences of one's own choice, and, therefore, a constant reappraisal of one's own and others' ever-changing humanity. One must not exercise bad faith by denying the self's freedom of choice and accountability. Taking on the burden of personal accountability in all situations may be an intimidating proposition – by pointing out the freedom of the individual, Sartre seeks to demonstrate that the social roles and moral systems people adopt protect them from being morally accountable for their actions. See also False self Albert Camus Anomie Bad faith Existentialism and Humanism The Ethics of Ambiguity References Further reading Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre False Consciousness cf. also Sartre's Marxism Mark Poster, Pluto Press, London 1979, and Critique of Dialectical Reason Nausea, Jean-Paul Sartre The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir External links Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Sartre Sartre.org Articles, archives, and forum Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir Existentialist concepts Deception Jean-Paul Sartre Simone de Beauvoir

Statism

In political science, statism or etatism (from French état 'state') is the doctrine that the political authority of the state is legitimate to some degree. This may include economic and social policy, especially in regard to taxation and the means of production. While in use since the 1850s, the term statism gained significant usage in American political discourse throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Opposition to statism is termed anti-statism or anarchism. The latter is usually characterized by a complete rejection of all hierarchical rulership. Overview Statism can take many forms, from small government to big government. Minarchism is a political philosophy that prefers a minimal state such as a night-watchman state to protect people from aggression, theft, breach of contract and fraud with the military, police and courts. This may also include fire departments, prisons and other functions. The welfare state is another form within the spectrum of statism. Authoritarian philosophies view a strong, authoritative state as required to legislate or enforce morality and cultural practices. Totalitarianism is that which prefers a maximum, all-encompassing state. Political theory has long questioned the nature and rights of the state. Some forms of corporatism extol the moral position that the corporate group, usually the state, is greater than the sum of its parts and that individuals have a moral obligation to serve the state. Skepticism towards statism in Western cultures is largely rooted in Enlightenment philosophy. John Locke notably influenced modern thinking in his writings published before and after the English Revolution of 1688, especially A Letter Concerning Toleration (1667), Two Treatises of Government (1689) and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). In the text of 1689, he established the basis of liberal political theory, i.e., that people's rights existed before government; that the purpose of government is to protect personal and property rights; that people may dissolve governments that do not do so; and that representative government is the best form to protect rights. Economic statism Economic statism promotes the view that the state has a major, necessary and legitimate role in directing the major aspects of the economy, either directly through state-owned enterprises and economic planning of production, or indirectly through economic interventionism and macro-economic regulation. State capitalism State capitalism is a form of capitalism that features high concentrations of state-owned commercial enterprises or state direction of an economy based on the accumulation of capital, wage labor and market allocation. In some cases, state capitalism refers to economic policies such as dirigisme, which existed in France during the second half of the 20th century and to the present-day economies of the People's Republic of China and Singapore, where the government owns controlling shares in publicly traded companies. Some authors also define the former economies of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union as constituting a form of state capitalism. State corporatism State corporatism, corporate statism or simply "corporatism" is a political culture and a form of corporatism whose proposers affirm or believe that corporate groups should form the basis of society and the state. This principle requires that all citizens belong to one of the various officially designated interest groups (usually on the basis of the economic sector), the state also has great control over its citizens. State interventionism The term statism is sometimes used to refer to market economies with large amounts of government intervention, regulation or influence over markets. Market economies that feature high degrees of intervention are sometimes referred to as "mixed economies". Economic interventionism asserts that the state has a legitimate or necessary role within the framework of a capitalist economy by intervening in markets, regulating against overreaches of private sector industry and either providing or subsidizing goods and services not adequately produced by the market. State socialism State socialism broadly refers to forms of socialism based on state ownership of the means of production and state-directed allocation of resources. It is often used in reference to Soviet-type economic systems of former communist states and, by extension, those of North Korea, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China. Critics of state socialism argue that its known manifestations in Soviet-model states are merely forms of state capitalism, claiming that the Soviet model of economics was based upon a process of state-directed capital accumulation and social hierarchy. Politically, state socialism is often used to designate any socialist political ideology or movement that advocates for the use of state power for the construction of socialism, or to the belief that the state must be appropriated and used to ensure the success of a socialist revolution. It is usually used in reference to Marxist–Leninist socialists who champion a one-party state. Political statism State nationalism State nationalism, state-based nationalism, or state-led nationalism is a nationalism that equates 'state identity' with 'nation identity' or values state authority. 'State nationalism' is considered a form of 'civic nationalism' and there are similarities between the two, but this also has to do with illiberal, authoritarian and totalitarian politics; Italian fascism is the best example, epitomized in this slogan of Benito Mussolini: "Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato" ("Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State"). In the East Asian cultural sphere, including China, "state nationalism" and "statism" are both written as 國家主義, making the distinction between the two unclear. Also, in the East Asian cultural sphere, state nationalism is often contrasted with ethnic-based national liberation movements. Chinese state nationalism is a civic nationalistic ideology, but it is an ideology that reduces Hong Kong's autonomy and justifies the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. Also, Soviet nationalism in the 20th century combined civic nationalism with [state] authoritarianism. Japanese ultranationalism (ex: Shōwa statism) is often described as "state ultranationalism" (Japanese: 超国家主義) because it values state unity around Emperor of Japan. Italian fascism and Francoism are also classified as types state nationalism. Kemalism can also be referred to as Turkish state nationalism. State feminism State feminism is a feminism permitted by the state or led by the nation state. State feminism is distinguished between liberal state feminism (represented by the Nordic model) and authoritarian state feminism (that is often also linked to state-led secularism). See also Anarchism and libertarianism Anarcho-capitalism Anti-statism Autocracy Big government and small government Fascism Federalism Imperialism Oligarchy Stateless society Sovereignty Subsidiarity Notes References Bibliography 1850s neologisms Controversies within libertarianism Economic systems Libertarian terms Political realism Political science terminology Political theories Sovereignty

Logical positivism

Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, is a movement whose central thesis is the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning). This theory of knowledge asserts that only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content. Starting in the late 1920s, groups of philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians formed the Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle, which, in these two cities, would propound the ideas of logical positivism. Flourishing in several European centres through the 1930s, the movement sought to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims by converting philosophy into "scientific philosophy", which, according to the logical positivists, ought to share the bases and structures of empirical sciences' best examples, such as Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity. Despite its ambition to overhaul philosophy by studying and mimicking the extant conduct of empirical science, logical positivism became erroneously stereotyped as a movement to regulate the scientific process and to place strict standards on it. After World War II, the movement shifted to a milder variant, logical empiricism, led mainly by Carl Hempel, who, during the rise of Nazism, had emigrated to the United States. In the ensuing years, the movement's central premises, still unresolved, were heavily criticised by leading philosophers, particularly Willard van Orman Quine and Karl Popper, and even, within the movement itself, by Hempel. The 1962 publication of Thomas Kuhn's landmark book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions dramatically shifted academic philosophy's focus. In 1967 philosopher John Passmore pronounced logical positivism "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes". Origins Logical positivists picked from Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy of language the verifiability principle or criterion of meaningfulness. As in Ernst Mach's phenomenalism, whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, verificationists took all sciences' basic content to be only sensory experience. And some influence came from Percy Bridgman's musings that others proclaimed as operationalism, whereby a physical theory is understood by what laboratory procedures scientists perform to test its predictions. In verificationism, only the verifiable was scientific, and thus meaningful (or cognitively meaningful), whereas the unverifiable, being unscientific, were meaningless "pseudostatements" (just emotively meaningful). Unscientific discourse, as in ethics and metaphysics, would be unfit for discourse by philosophers, newly tasked to organize knowledge, not develop new knowledge. Definitions Logical positivism is sometimes stereotyped as forbidding talk of unobservables, such as microscopic entities or such notions as causality and general principles, but that is an exaggeration. Rather, most neopositivists viewed talk of unobservables as metaphorical or elliptical: direct observations phrased abstractly or indirectly. So theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules, and thereby theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws. Via Bertrand Russell's logicism, reducing mathematics to logic, physics' mathematical formulas would be converted to symbolic logic. Via Russell's logical atomism, ordinary language would break into discrete units of meaning. Rational reconstruction, then, would convert ordinary statements into standardized equivalents, all networked and united by a logical syntax. A scientific theory would be stated with its method of verification, whereby a logical calculus or empirical operation could verify its falsity or truth. Development In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and the United States. By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with Otto Neurath's physicalism, whereby science's content is not actual or potential sensations, but instead consists of entities that are publicly observable. Rudolf Carnap, who had sparked logical positivism in the Vienna Circle, had sought to replace verification with simply confirmation. With World War II's close in 1945, logical positivism became milder, logical empiricism, led largely by Carl Hempel, in America, who expounded the covering law model of scientific explanation. Logical positivism became a major underpinning of analytic philosophy, and dominated philosophy in the English-speaking world, including philosophy of science, while influencing sciences, but especially social sciences, into the 1960s. Yet the movement failed to resolve its central problems, and its doctrines were increasingly criticized, most trenchantly by Willard Van Orman Quine, Norwood Hanson, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Carl Hempel. Roots Language Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by the young Ludwig Wittgenstein, introduced the view of philosophy as "critique of language", offering the possibility of a theoretically principled distinction of intelligible versus nonsensical discourse. Tractatus adhered to a correspondence theory of truth (versus a coherence theory of truth). Wittgenstein's influence also shows in some versions of the verifiability principle. In tractarian doctrine, truths of logic are tautologies, a view widely accepted by logical positivists who were also influenced by Wittgenstein's interpretation of probability although, according to Neurath, some logical positivists found Tractatus to contain too much metaphysics. Logicism Gottlob Frege began the program of reducing mathematics to logic, continued it with Bertrand Russell, but lost interest in this logicism, and Russell continued it with Alfred North Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica, inspiring some of the more mathematical logical positivists, such as Hans Hahn and Rudolf Carnap. Carnap's early anti-metaphysical works employed Russell's theory of types. Carnap envisioned a universal language that could reconstruct mathematics and thereby encode physics. Yet Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem showed this impossible except in trivial cases, and Alfred Tarski's undefinability theorem shattered all hopes of reducing mathematics to logic. Thus, a universal language failed to stem from Carnap's 1934 work Logische Syntax der Sprache (Logical Syntax of Language). Still, some logical positivists, including Carl Hempel, continued support of logicism. Empiricism In Germany, Hegelian metaphysics was a dominant movement, and Hegelian successors such as F H Bradley explained reality by postulating metaphysical entities lacking empirical basis, drawing reaction in the form of positivism. Starting in the late 19th century, there was a "back to Kant" movement(Neo-Kantianism). Ernst Mach's positivism and phenomenalism were a major influence. History Vienna The Vienna Circle, gathering around University of Vienna and Café Central, was led principally by Moritz Schlick. Schlick had held a neo-Kantian position, but later converted, via Carnap's 1928 book Der logische Aufbau der Welt, that is, The Logical Structure of the World. A 1929 pamphlet written by Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap summarized the Vienna Circle's positions. Another member of Vienna Circle to later prove very influential was Carl Hempel. A friendly but tenacious critic of the Circle was Karl Popper, whom Neurath nicknamed the "Official Opposition". Carnap and other Vienna Circle members, including Hahn and Neurath, saw need for a weaker criterion of meaningfulness than verifiability. A radical "left" wing—led by Neurath and Carnap—began the program of "liberalization of empiricism", and they also emphasized fallibilism and pragmatics, which latter Carnap even suggested as empiricism's basis. A conservative "right" wing—led by Schlick and Waismann—rejected both the liberalization of empiricism and the epistemological nonfoundationalism of a move from phenomenalism to physicalism. As Neurath and somewhat Carnap posed science toward social reform, the split in Vienna Circle also reflected political views. Berlin The Berlin Circle was led principally by Hans Reichenbach. Rivals Both Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap had been influenced by and sought to define logical positivism versus the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer—the then leading figure of Marburg school, so called—and against Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Logical positivists especially opposed Martin Heidegger's obscure metaphysics, the epitome of what logical positivism rejected. In the early 1930s, Carnap debated Heidegger over "metaphysical pseudosentences". Export As the movement's first emissary to the New World, Moritz Schlick visited Stanford University in 1929, yet otherwise remained in Vienna and was murdered in 1936 at the University by a former student, Johann Nelböck, who was reportedly deranged. That year, a British attendee at some Vienna Circle meetings since 1933, A. J. Ayer saw his Language, Truth and Logic, written in English, import logical positivism to the English-speaking world. By then, the Nazi Party's 1933 rise to power in Germany had triggered flight of intellectuals. In exile in England, Otto Neurath died in 1945. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and Carl Hempel—Carnap's protégé who had studied in Berlin with Reichenbach—settled permanently in America. Upon Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938, remaining logical positivists, many of whom were also Jewish, were targeted and continued flight. Logical positivism thus became dominant in the English-speaking world. Principles Analytic/synthetic gap Concerning reality, the necessary is a state true in all possible worlds—mere logical validity—whereas the contingent hinges on the way the particular world is. Concerning knowledge, the a priori is knowable before or without, whereas the a posteriori is knowable only after or through, relevant experience. Concerning statements, the analytic is true via terms' arrangement and meanings, thus a tautology—true by logical necessity but uninformative about the world—whereas the synthetic adds reference to a state of facts, a contingency. In 1739, David Hume cast a fork aggressively dividing "relations of ideas" from "matters of fact and real existence", such that all truths are of one type or the other. By Hume's fork, truths by relations among ideas (abstract) all align on one side (analytic, necessary, a priori), whereas truths by states of actualities (concrete) always align on the other side (synthetic, contingent, a posteriori). Of any treatises containing neither, Hume orders, "Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion". Thus awakened from "dogmatic slumber", Immanuel Kant quested to answer Hume's challenge—but by explaining how metaphysics is possible. Eventually, in his 1781 work, Kant crossed the tines of Hume's fork to identify another range of truths by necessity—synthetic a priori, statements claiming states of facts but known true before experience—by arriving at transcendental idealism, attributing the mind a constructive role in phenomena by arranging sense data into the very experience space, time, and substance. Thus, Kant saved Newton's law of universal gravitation from Hume's problem of induction by finding uniformity of nature to be a priori knowledge. Logical positivists rejected Kant's synthetic a priori, and adopted Hume's fork, whereby a statement is either analytic and a priori (thus necessary and verifiable logically) or synthetic and a posteriori (thus contingent and verifiable empirically). Observation/theory gap Early, most logical positivists proposed that all knowledge is based on logical inference from simple "protocol sentences" grounded in observable facts. In the 1936 and 1937 papers "Testability and meaning", individual terms replace sentences as the units of meaning. Further, theoretical terms no longer need to acquire meaning by explicit definition from observational terms: the connection may be indirect, through a system of implicit definitions. Carnap also provided an important, pioneering discussion of disposition predicates. Cognitive meaningfulness Verification The logical positivists' initial stance was that a statement is "cognitively meaningful" in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content only if some finite procedure conclusively determines its truth. By this verifiability principle, only statements verifiable either by their analyticity or by empiricism were cognitively meaningful. Metaphysics, ontology, as well as much of ethics failed this criterion, and so were found cognitively meaningless. Moritz Schlick, however, did not view ethical or aesthetic statements as cognitively meaningless. Cognitive meaningfulness was variously defined: having a truth value; corresponding to a possible state of affairs; intelligible or understandable as are scientific statements. Ethics and aesthetics were subjective preferences, while theology and other metaphysics contained "pseudostatements", neither true nor false. This meaningfulness was cognitive, although other types of meaningfulness—for instance, emotive, expressive, or figurative—occurred in metaphysical discourse, dismissed from further review. Thus, logical positivism indirectly asserted Hume's law, the principle that is statements cannot justify ought statements, but are separated by an unbridgeable gap. A. J. Ayer's 1936 book asserted an extreme variant—the boo/hooray doctrine—whereby all evaluative judgments are but emotional reactions. Confirmation In an important pair of papers in 1936 and 1937, "Testability and meaning", Carnap replaced verification with confirmation, on the view that although universal laws cannot be verified they can be confirmed. Later, Carnap employed abundant logical and mathematical methods in researching inductive logic while seeking to provide an account of probability as "degree of confirmation", but was never able to formulate a model. In Carnap's inductive logic, every universal law's degree of confirmation is always zero. In any event, the precise formulation of what came to be called the "criterion of cognitive significance" took three decades (Hempel 1950, Carnap 1956, Carnap 1961). Carl Hempel became a major critic within the logical positivism movement. Hempel criticized the positivist thesis that empirical knowledge is restricted to Basissätze/Beobachtungssätze/Protokollsätze (basic statements or observation statements or protocol statements). Hempel elucidated the paradox of confirmation. Weak verification The second edition of A. J. Ayer's book arrived in 1946, and discerned strong versus weak forms of verification. Ayer concluded, "A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established by experience", but is verifiable in the weak sense "if it is possible for experience to render it probable". And yet, "no proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis". Thus, all are open to weak verification. Philosophy of science Upon the global defeat of Nazism, and the removal from philosophy of rivals for radical reform—Marburg neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger's "existential hermeneutics"—and while hosted in the climate of American pragmatism and commonsense empiricism, the neopositivists shed much of their earlier, revolutionary zeal. No longer crusading to revise traditional philosophy into a new scientific philosophy, they became respectable members of a new philosophy subdiscipline, philosophy of science. Receiving support from Ernest Nagel, logical empiricists were especially influential in the social sciences. Explanation Comtean positivism had viewed science as description, whereas the logical positivists posed science as explanation, perhaps to better realize the envisioned unity of science by covering not only fundamental science—that is, fundamental physics—but the special sciences, too, for instance biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and economics. The most widely accepted concept of scientific explanation, held even by neopositivist critic Karl Popper, was the deductive-nomological model (DN model). Yet DN model received its greatest explication by Carl Hempel, first in his 1942 article "The function of general laws in history", and more explicitly with Paul Oppenheim in their 1948 article "Studies in the logic of explanation". In the DN model, the stated phenomenon to be explained is the explanandum—which can be an event, law, or theory—whereas premises stated to explain it are the explanans. Explanans must be true or highly confirmed, contain at least one law, and entail the explanandum. Thus, given initial conditions C1, C2, ..., Cn plus general laws L1, L2, ..., Ln, event E is a deductive consequence and scientifically explained. In the DN model, a law is an unrestricted generalization by conditional proposition—If A, then B—and has empirical content testable. (Differing from a merely true regularity—for instance, George always carries only $1 bills in his wallet—a law suggests what must be true, and is consequent of a scientific theory's axiomatic structure.) By the Humean empiricist view that humans observe sequences of events, (not cause and effect, as causality and causal mechanisms are unobservable), the DN model neglects causality beyond mere constant conjunction, first event A and then always event B. Hempel's explication of the DN model held natural laws—empirically confirmed regularities—as satisfactory and, if formulated realistically, approximating causal explanation. In later articles, Hempel defended the DN model and proposed a probabilistic explanation, inductive-statistical model (IS model). the DN and IS models together form the covering law model, as named by a critic, William Dray. Derivation of statistical laws from other statistical laws goes to deductive-statistical model (DS model). Georg Henrik von Wright, another critic, named it subsumption theory, fitting the ambition of theory reduction. Unity of science Logical positivists were generally committed to "Unified Science", and sought a common language or, in Neurath's phrase, a "universal slang" whereby all scientific propositions could be expressed. The adequacy of proposals or fragments of proposals for such a language was often asserted on the basis of various "reductions" or "explications" of the terms of one special science to the terms of another, putatively more fundamental. Sometimes these reductions consisted of set-theoretic manipulations of a few logically primitive concepts (as in Carnap's Logical Structure of the World, 1928). Sometimes, these reductions consisted of allegedly analytic or a priori deductive relationships (as in Carnap's "Testability and meaning"). A number of publications over a period of thirty years would attempt to elucidate this concept. Theory reduction As in Comtean positivism's envisioned unity of science, neopositivists aimed to network all special sciences through the covering law model of scientific explanation. And ultimately, by supplying boundary conditions and supplying bridge laws within the covering law model, all the special sciences' laws would reduce to fundamental physics, the fundamental science. Critics After World War II, key tenets of logical positivism, including its atomistic philosophy of science, the verifiability principle, and the fact/value gap, drew escalated criticism. The verifiability criterion made universal statements 'cognitively' meaningless, and even made statements beyond empiricism for technological but not conceptual reasons meaningless, which was taken to pose significant problems for the philosophy of science. These problems were recognized within the movement, which hosted attempted solutions—Carnap's move to confirmation, Ayer's acceptance of weak verification—but the program drew sustained criticism from a number of directions by the 1950s. Even philosophers disagreeing among themselves on which direction general epistemology ought to take, as well as on philosophy of science, agreed that the logical empiricist program was untenable, and it became viewed as self-contradictory: the verifiability criterion of meaning was itself unverified. Notable critics included Popper, Quine, Hanson, Kuhn, Putnam, Austin, Strawson, Goodman, and Rorty. Popper An early, tenacious critic was Karl Popper whose 1934 book Logik der Forschung, arriving in English in 1959 as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, directly answered verificationism. Popper considered the problem of induction as rendering empirical verification logically impossible, and the deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent reveals any phenomenon's capacity to host more than one logically possible explanation. Accepting scientific method as hypotheticodeduction, whose inference form is denying the consequent, Popper finds scientific method unable to proceed without falsifiable predictions. Popper thus identifies falsifiability to demarcate not meaningful from meaningless but simply scientific from unscientific—a label not in itself unfavorable. Popper finds virtue in metaphysics, required to develop new scientific theories. And an unfalsifiable—thus unscientific, perhaps metaphysical—concept in one era can later, through evolving knowledge or technology, become falsifiable, thus scientific. Popper also found science's quest for truth to rest on values. Popper disparages the pseudoscientific, which occurs when an unscientific theory is proclaimed true and coupled with seemingly scientific method by "testing" the unfalsifiable theory—whose predictions are confirmed by necessity—or when a scientific theory's falsifiable predictions are strongly falsified but the theory is persistently protected by "immunizing stratagems", such as the appendage of ad hoc clauses saving the theory or the recourse to increasingly speculative hypotheses shielding the theory. Explicitly denying the positivist view of meaning and verification, Popper developed the epistemology of critical rationalism, which considers that human knowledge evolves by conjectures and refutations, and that no number, degree, and variety of empirical successes can either verify or confirm scientific theory. For Popper, science's aim is corroboration of scientific theory, which strives for scientific realism but accepts the maximal status of strongly corroborated verisimilitude ("truthlikeness"). Popper thus acknowledged the value of the positivist movement's emphasis on science but claimed that he had "killed positivism". Quine Although an empiricist, American logician Willard Van Orman Quine published the 1951 paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", which challenged conventional empiricist presumptions. Quine attacked the analytic/synthetic division, which the verificationist program had been hinged upon in order to entail, by consequence of Hume's fork, both necessity and aprioricity. Quine's ontological relativity explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world. Quine later proposed naturalized epistemology. Hanson In 1958, Norwood Hanson's Patterns of Discovery undermined the division of observation versus theory, as one can predict, collect, prioritize, and assess data only via some horizon of expectation set by a theory. Thus, any dataset—the direct observations, the scientific facts—is laden with theory. Kuhn With his landmark The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn critically destabilized the verificationist program, which was presumed to call for foundationalism. (But already in the 1930s, Otto Neurath had argued for nonfoundationalism via coherentism by likening science to a boat (Neurath's boat) that scientists must rebuild at sea.) Although Kuhn's thesis itself was attacked even by opponents of neopositivism, in the 1970 postscript to Structure, Kuhn asserted, at least, that there was no algorithm to science—and, on that, even most of Kuhn's critics agreed. Powerful and persuasive, Kuhn's book, unlike the vocabulary and symbols of logic's formal language, was written in natural language open to the layperson. Kuhn's book was first published in a volume of International Encyclopedia of Unified Science—a project begun by logical positivists but by Neurath whose view of science was already nonfoundationalist as mentioned above—and some sense unified science, indeed, but by bringing it into the realm of historical and social assessment, rather than fitting it to the model of physics. Kuhn's ideas were rapidly adopted by scholars in disciplines well outside natural sciences, and, as logical empiricists were extremely influential in the social sciences, ushered academia into postpositivism or postempiricism. Putnam The "received view" operates on the correspondence rule that states, "The observational terms are taken as referring to specified phenomena or phenomenal properties, and the only interpretation given to the theoretical terms is their explicit definition provided by the correspondence rules". According to Hilary Putnam, a former student of Reichenbach and of Carnap, the dichotomy of observational terms versus theoretical terms introduced a problem within scientific discussion that was nonexistent until this dichotomy was stated by logical positivists. Putnam's four objections: Something is referred to as "observational" if it is observable directly with our senses. Then an observational term cannot be applied to something unobservable. If this is the case, there are no observational terms. With Carnap's classification, some unobservable terms are not even theoretical and belong to neither observational terms nor theoretical terms. Some theoretical terms refer primarily to observational terms. Reports of observational terms frequently contain theoretical terms. A scientific theory may not contain any theoretical terms (an example of this is Darwin's original theory of evolution). Putnam also alleged that positivism was actually a form of metaphysical idealism by its rejecting scientific theory's ability to garner knowledge about nature's unobservable aspects. With his "no miracles" argument, posed in 1974, Putnam asserted scientific realism, the stance that science achieves true—or approximately true—knowledge of the world as it exists independently of humans' sensory experience. In this, Putnam opposed not only the positivism but other instrumentalism—whereby scientific theory is but a human tool to predict human observations—filling the void left by positivism's decline. Decline By the late 1960s, logical positivism had become exhausted. In 1976, A. J. Ayer quipped that "the most important" defect of logical positivism "was that nearly all of it was false," though he maintained "it was true in spirit." Although logical positivism tends to be recalled as a pillar of scientism, Carl Hempel was key in establishing the subdiscipline of the philosophy of science, where Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper brought in the era of postpositivism. John Passmore found logical positivism to be "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes". Logical positivism's fall reopened the debate over the metaphysical merit of scientific theory, whether it can offer knowledge of the world beyond human experience (scientific realism) versus whether it is but a human tool to predict human experience (instrumentalism).Ruth Lane, "Positivism, scientific realism and political science: Recent developments in the philosophy of science", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996 Jul8(3):361–82, abstract. Philosophers increasingly critiqued logical positivism, often misrepresenting it without thorough examination. It was generally reduced to oversimplifications and stereotypes, particularly associating it with foundationalism. The movement helped anchor analytic philosophy in the English-speaking world and reintroducing empiricism in Britain. Its influence extended beyond philosophy, particularly in psychology and social sciences. See also The Structure of Science People Notes References Bechtel, William, Philosophy of Science: An Overview for Cognitive Science (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc, 1988). Friedman, Michael, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Novick, Peter, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Stahl, William A & Robert A Campbell, Yvonne Petry, Gary Diver, Webs of Reality: Social Perspectives on Science and Religion (Piscataway NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). Suppe, Frederick, ed, The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd edn (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977). Further reading Achinstein, Peter and Barker, Stephen F. The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Ayer, Alfred Jules. Logical Positivism. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959. Barone, Francesco. Il neopositivismo logico. Roma Bari: Laterza, 1986. Bergmann, Gustav. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York: Longmans Green, 1954. Cirera, Ramon. Carnap and the Vienna Circle: Empiricism and Logical Syntax. Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994. Edmonds, David & Eidinow, John; Wittgenstein's Poker, Friedman, Michael. Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999 Gadol, Eugene T. Rationality and Science: A Memorial Volume for Moritz Schlick in Celebration of the Centennial of his Birth. Wien: Springer, 1982. Geymonat, Ludovico. La nuova filosofia della natura in Germania. Torino, 1934. Giere, Ronald N. and Richardson, Alan W. Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Hanfling, Oswald. Logical Positivism. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1981. Holt, Jim, "Positive Thinking" (review of Karl Sigmund, Exact Thinking in Demented Times: The Vienna Circle and the Epic Quest for the Foundations of Science, Basic Books, 449 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXIV, no. 20 (21 December 2017), pp. 74–76. Jangam, R. T. Logical Positivism and Politics. Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1970. Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen. Wittgenstein's Vienna. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973. Kraft, Victor. The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism, a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New York: Greenwood Press, 1953. McGuinness, Brian. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann. Trans. by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979. Milkov, Nikolay (ed.). Die Berliner Gruppe. Texte zum Logischen Empirismus von Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Carl G. Hempel, Alexander Herzberg, Kurt Lewin, Paul Oppenheim und Hans Reichenbach. Hamburg: Meiner 2015. (German) Mises von, Richard. Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Parrini, Paolo. Empirismo logico e convenzionalismo: saggio di storia della filosofia della scienza. Milano: F. Angeli, 1983. Parrini, Paolo; Salmon, Wesley C.; Salmon, Merrilee H. (ed.) Logical Empiricism – Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. Reisch, George. How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science : To the Icy Slopes of Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Rescher, Nicholas. The Heritage of Logical Positivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985. Richardson, Alan and Thomas Uebel (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Logical Positivism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Salmon, Wesley and Wolters, Gereon (ed.) Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21–24 May 1991, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994. Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.) The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: From 1900 to the Vienna Circle. New York: Garland Publishing, 1996. Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.) Logical Empiricism at its Peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. New York: Garland Pub., 1996. Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.) Logical Empiricism and the Special Sciences: Reichenbach, Feigl, and Nagel. New York: Garland Pub., 1996. Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.) Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics. New York: Garland Pub., 1996. Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.) The Legacy of the Vienna Circle: Modern Reappraisals. New York: Garland Pub., 1996. Spohn, Wolfgang (ed.) Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. Stadler, Friedrich. The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. New York: Springer, 2001. – 2nd Edition: Dordrecht: Springer, 2015. Stadler, Friedrich (ed.). The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives.'' Dordrecht – Boston – London, Kluwer 2003. External links Articles by logical positivists The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle Carnap, Rudolf. 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' Carnap, Rudolf. 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.' Excerpt from Carnap, Rudolf. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Feigl, Herbert. 'Positivism in the Twentieth Century (Logical Empiricism)', Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 1974, Gale Group (Electronic Edition) Hempel, Carl. 'Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning.' Articles on logical positivism Kemerling, Garth. 'Logical Positivism', Philosophy Pages Murzi, Mauro. 'Logical Positivism', The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, Tom Flynn (ed.). Prometheus Books, 2007 (PDF version) Murzi, Mauro. 'The Philosophy of Logical Positivism.' Articles on related philosophical topics Hájek, Alan. 'Interpretations of Probability', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Rey, Georges. 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Ryckman, Thomas A., 'Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Woleński, Jan. 'Lvov-Warsaw School', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Woodward, James. 'Scientific Explanation', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Analytic philosophy Empiricism Epistemological theories Epistemology of science History of science Linguistic turn Meaning in religious language Philosophical schools and traditions Philosophy of science Positivism Theories of language

Philosophical counseling

Philosophical consultancy, also sometimes called philosophical practice or philosophical counseling or clinical philosophy, is a contemporary movement in practical philosophy. Developing since the 1980s as a profession but since the 1950s as a practice, practitioners of philosophical counseling ordinarily have a doctorate or minimally a master's degree in philosophy and offer their philosophical counseling or consultation services to clients who look for a philosophical understanding of their lives, social problems, or even mental problems. In the last case, philosophical counseling might be in lieu of, or in conjunction with, psychotherapy. The movement has often been said to be rooted in the Socratic tradition, which viewed philosophy as a search for the Good and the good life. A life without philosophy was not worth living for Socrates. This led to the philosophy of Stoicism, for example, resulting in Stoic therapy. Philosophical practice has continued to expand and is attractive as an alternative to counselling and psychotherapy for those who prefer to avoid a medicalization of life problems. Numerous philosophical consultants have emerged and there is a strong international interest and a bi-annual international conference. History Peter Koestenbaum at San Jose State University in California was an early figure in philosophical counseling. His 1978 book The New Image of the Person: The Theory and Practice of Clinical Philosophy set out the essential contributions of philosophy to counseling. His own practice was augmented by extensive training of mental health professionals in applications of philosophical principles. Gerd B. Achenbach and Ad Hoogendijk are two German and Dutch philosophers who established themselves as consultant philosophers in the 1980s and led the way to a number of other developments all over the world. They proposed an alternative to psychotherapeutic culture by working exclusively within the field of existential investigation with clients or patients, whom they called 'visitors'. The world's oldest association of philosophical counseling and practice appears to be the German Society for Philosophical Practice and Counseling, which was founded in 1982 by Achenbach. In the United States, the oldest association of philosophical counseling and practice appears to be the National Philosophical Counseling Association (NPCA), formerly called the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, which was co-founded in 1992 by three American philosophers, Elliot D. Cohen, Paul Sharkey, and Thomas Magnell. The NPCA offers a primary certificate in logic-based therapy (LBT) through the Institute of Critical Thinking. The movement is also connected with and related to existential therapy, which has thrived in the United Kingdom since the establishment of the Society for Existential Analysis (SEA) in London in 1988. This was based on the work of Emmy van Deurzen, also a philosopher who has applied philosophical thinking to the practice of psychotherapy. Philosophical consultancy is often applied to business consultancy as well as to individuals, as it frequently involves a rethinking of values and beliefs and is also a method for rational conflict resolution. Pierre Grimes founded the Noetic Society in 1967 for the study of dialogue and dialectic. He became the head of the Philosophical Midwifery Program when the Noetic Society was incorporated in 1978. The American Philosophical Practitioners Association (APPA) was founded in 1998 in New York City by Lou Marinoff. APPA offers a certification program in client counseling for those with advanced degrees in philosophy who wish to practice philosophical counseling. It also publishes a professional journal and has a membership list of those certified as philosophical counselors on its website. Marinoff was at the center of a 2004 controversy when his philosophical counseling practice at City College of New York was temporarily shuttered by college officials who feared he was offering mental health advice without proper training and licensing; Marinoff responded by suing for what he described as his freedom of speech being stifled. Philosophical practice has continued to expand and is attractive as an alternative to counselling and psychotherapy for those who prefer to avoid a medicalization of life problems. Numerous philosophical consultants have emerged and there is a strong international interest and a bi-annual international conference. There are a number of important publications in the field. There are presently a number of professional associations for philosophical counseling throughout the world. In India an academic course in philosophical counselling is offered by the Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh and the University of Kerala. In 2020, a project in philosophical counseling in India was awarded by the Ministry of Education to the Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Philosophical counselling is an emerging field in Romania, and there are now specialisations and university courses in this field. However, there is public debate about the need for a legal framework within which to operate as a profession. Goals and methods Philosophical consultancy is a relatively new movement in philosophy that applies philosophical thinking and debating to the resolution of a person's problem. Achenbach argues that it is life that calls to thinking, rather than thinking that informs life. The act of philosophising can, therefore, give direction in its own right, as living precedes thinking and practice precedes theory. According to the Preamble of the NPCA Standards of Practice, a philosophical practitioner helps clients to clarify, articulate, explore and comprehend philosophical aspects of their belief systems or world views. ... Clients may consult philosophical practitioners for help in exploring philosophical problems related to such matters as mid-life crises, career changes, stress, emotions, assertiveness, physical illness, death and dying, aging, meaning of life, and morality. On the other side philosophical practitioners also initiate projects in common life worlds with various goals that are related to essential problems of life, such as sustainable energy, direct democracy, etc. Activities common to philosophical practice include: the examination of clients' arguments and justifications the clarification, analysis, and definition of important terms and concepts the exposure and examination of underlying assumptions and logical implications the exposure of conflicts and inconsistencies the exploration of traditional philosophical theories and their significance for client issues the initiation of projects for common goods all other related activities that have historically been identified as philosophical. Variations The methods and orientations of philosophical counselors vary greatly. Some practitioners, such as Gerd B. Achenbach (Germany), Michel Weber (Belgium) and Shlomit C. Schuster (Israel) are dialogical and dialective engaged, while confessing to a "beyond method" approach. They hold that philosophical counseling has the aim to empower clients' philosophical abilities, which additionally may have therapeutic implications. Other practitioners are more directive and view philosophical counseling as a form of mental health intervention. Some philosophical practitioners, notably Louis Marinoff (U.S.) and Guenther Witzany (Austria), view philosophical practice as a separate practice area distinct from mental health practices such as psychology and mental health counseling; while others, notably Elliot D. Cohen (U.S.), think they are necessarily intertwined. Some philosophical counselors draw inspiration from the anti-psychiatry movement, arguing that widespread mental health diagnostic criteria as outlined in DSM IV have unfairly or inaccurately pathologized humanity. According to a New York Times article on philosophical counseling, "only Cohen and Marinoff have branded easily comprehended techniques. Cohen's logic-based therapy builds on the work of his mentor Albert Ellis, who invented rational emotive behavior therapy." References Further reading Achenbach, G. B. (1984) Philosophische Praxis, Köln: Verlag für Philosophie Jürgen Dinter. Achenbach, G.B. (2002) Philosophical Practice opens up the trace to Lebenskönnerschaft, in Herrestad H., Holt A., Svare H. Philosophy in Society, Oslo: Unipub Forlag. Deurzen, E. van (1984) Existential psychotherapy, in W Dryden (ed.) Individual Therapy in Britain, London: Harper and Row. Deurzen, E. van (1988) Existential Counselling in Practice, London: Sage Publications. Deurzen, E. van (1991) Ontological insecurity revisited, Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis 2: 38–48. Deurzen, E. van (1992) Dialogue as therapy, Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis 3: 15–23. Deurzen, E. van (1994x) Does Counselling Help?, Durham: Durham University Publications. Deurzen, E. van (1994c) If Truth were a Woman, London: School of Psychotherapy and Counselling Publications. Deurzen, E. van 1998) Paradox and Passion in Psychotherapy, Chichester: Wiley. Deurzen, E. van (2002) Existential Counselling and Psychotherapy in Practice, Second Edition, London: Sage Publications. Hall, R. (2021) Secundum Naturam (According to Nature), Stoic Therapy, LLC. Herrestad H., Holt A., Svare H. (2002) Philosophy in Society, Oslo: Unipub Forlag. Hoogendijk, A. (1988) Spreekuur bij een filosoof, Utrecht: Veers. Lahav, R. and Tillmanns, M. da V. (eds) (1995) Essays in Philosophical Counselling, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. LeBon, T. (2001) Wise Therapy, London: Continuum. Marinoff, L. (1999) Plato not Prozac, New York: HarperCollins. Rochelle, G. (2012) Doing Philosophy, Edinburgh, Dunedin. Weiss, M. N., (ed.) (2015) The Socratic Handbook - Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, Vienna: LIT. Philosophy education

Platitude

A platitude is a statement that is seen as trite, meaningless, or prosaic, aimed at quelling social, emotional, or cognitive unease. The statement may be true, but its meaning has been lost due to its excessive use as a thought-terminating cliché. Platitudes have been criticized as giving a false impression of wisdom, making it easy to accept falsehoods: A platitude is even worse than a cliché. It’s a sanctimonious cliché, a statement that is not only old and overused but often moralistic and imperious. ... [P]latitudes have an aphoristic quality, they seem like timeless moral lessons. They therefore shape our view of the world, and can lull us into accepting things that are actually false and foolish. Platitudes often take the form of tautologies, e.g., "it is what it is", making them appear vacuously true. But the phrase is used to mean "there is no way of changing it", which is no longer a tautology: "Structuring the sentiment as a tautology allows it to appear inescapable." At the same time, some phrases that have become platitudes may provide useful moral guidance, such as "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". Others, though widely trivialized, may be thought-provoking, such as "Be the change you wish to see in the world". Etymology The word is a borrowing from the French compound platitude, from plat 'flat' + -(i)tude '-ness', thus 'flatness'. The figurative sense is first attested in French in 1694 in the meaning 'the quality of banality' and in 1740 in the meaning 'a commonplace remark'. It is first attested in English in 1762. Examples Thoughts and prayers It doesn't matter who scores, as long as the team wins. Sacrifice today for a better tomorrow. nobody's perfect. Good things come to those who wait. Life is a mystery. That's just my personal opinion. I wish I knew then what I know now. Sometimes bad things lead to good things. What doesn't kill you makes you stronger. We all die someday. Everybody changes. It really do be like that sometimes. Take the good with the bad. Everything isn't always what it seems. Everything happens for a reason. Whatever will be, will be. In philosophy In philosophy, platitudes are beliefs or assertions about a topic which are generally accepted as common sense. In some approaches to conceptual analysis, they are taken as a starting point. Roger Scruton observes that platitudes can for some philosophers play a defining role in addressing questions, where "platitudes - innocuous though they may seem to the untheoretical eye - provide the ultimate test of any philosophical theory". Conjoining the platitudes on a topic may give a Ramsey sentence. Analyzing platitudes forms part of the Canberra Plan of philosophical methodology. See also References Bibliography Jay J. Smith, A Plethora of Platitudes: A collection of cliches and an assortment of adages, Writers Club Press (self-published), 2000. James A. Chapman, Handbook of Grammar and Composition. Pensacola, FL: Beka Book Publications, 1985. Rhetoric es:Pedro Grullo

Epistemic injustice

Epistemic injustice is injustice related to knowledge. It includes exclusion and silencing; systematic distortion or misrepresentation of one's meanings or contributions; undervaluing of one's status or standing in communicative practices; unfair distinctions in authority; and unwarranted distrust. An influential theory of epistemic injustice is that of British philosopher Miranda Fricker, who coined the term in 1999. According to Fricker, there are two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Related concepts include epistemic oppression and epistemic violence. Testimonial injustice Testimonial injustice is unfairness related to trusting someone's word. An injustice of this kind can occur when someone is ignored, or not believed, because of their sex, sexuality, gender presentation, race, disability, or, broadly, because of their identity. Miranda Fricker gives the example of Londoner Duwayne Brooks, who saw his friend Stephen Lawrence murdered. The police officers who arrived at the scene regarded Brooks with suspicion. According to an official inquiry, "the officers failed to concentrate upon Mr. Brooks and to follow up energetically the information which he gave them. Nobody suggested that he should accompany them in searches of the area, although he knew where the assailants had last been seen. Nobody appears properly to have tried to calm him, or to accept that what he said was true." That is, the police officers failed to view Brooks as a credible witness, presumably in part due to racial bias. This was, says Fricker, a case of testimonial injustice, which occurs when "prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word." Hermeneutical injustice Hermeneutical injustice is injustice caused by people being unable to make sense of certain experiences in their life, owing to a lack of hermeneutical/interpretive resources required to make sense of the experience. (The word hermeneutical comes from the Greek word for 'interpreter'.) Hermeneutical injustice occurs when someone's experiences are not well understood — by themselves or by others — because these experiences do not fit any concepts known to them (or known to others), due to the historic exclusion of some groups of people from activities, such as scholarship and journalism, that shape the language people use to make sense of their experiences. For example, in the 1970s, the phrase sexual harassment was introduced to describe something that many people, especially women, had long experienced. Before this time, a woman experiencing sexual harassment may have had difficulty putting her experience into words. Fricker states that this difficulty is also not accidental, and was largely due to women's exclusion from shaping the English language and participating equally in journalism, publishing, academia, law, and the other institutions and industries that help people make sense of their lives. After the term sexual harassment was introduced, the same woman who experienced sexual harassment may have understood better what happened to her; however, she may have struggled to explain this experience to someone else, because the concept of sexual harassment was not yet well known. Epistemological violence Epistemological violence is distinct from epistemic injustice in that it usually occurs in the power structure of academic research, such as when interpreting empirical results in psychology. Epistemological violence is theoretical interpretations of empirical results that construct a targeted group as inferior, despite alternative and equally viable interpretations of the data. For example, Dr. Monique Danielle Botha argues that academic studies of Theory of Mind in autistic children constitutes epistemological violence, due to foundational studies explicitly or implicitly drawing universal conclusions about the entire group of autistic people. Origins Though the term epistemic injustice was not coined until 1999, earlier thinkers have discussed similar ideas. Vivian May has argued that civil rights activist Anna Julia Cooper in the 1890s anticipated the concept in claiming that Black women are denied full and equal recognition as knowers. Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. points to Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak's 1988 essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" as another anticipation. In that essay, Spivak describes what she calls epistemic violence occurring when subaltern persons are prevented from speaking for themselves about their own interests because of others claiming to know what those interests are. Further developments Other scholars since Fricker have adapted the concept of epistemic injustice and/or expanded what the term includes. These contributions have included naming and narrowing down forms of epistemic injustice, such as epistemic oppression, epistemicide, epistemic exploitation, silencing as testimonial quieting and as testimonial smothering, contributory injustice, distributive epistemic injustice, epistemic trust injustice, and expressive hermeneutical injustice. José Medina has advocated for an account of epistemic injustice that incorporates more voices and pays attention to context and the relationships at play. Elizabeth S. Anderson has argued that attention should be given to the structural causes and structural remedies of epistemic injustice. A closely related literature on epistemologies of ignorance has also been developing, which has included the identification of overlapping concepts such as white ignorance and willful hermeneutical ignorance. American philosopher Kristie Dotson has warned that some definitions could leave out important contributions to the ongoing discussion around epistemic injustice. Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. has replied that the concept should therefore be considered an open one, and many different approaches to the concept should be considered. In 2017, the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice was published, compiling chapters addressing both the theoretical work on the concept and efforts to apply that theory to practical case studies. The Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava uses the term epistemic injustice to describe how colonized groups were wronged when colonizing powers replaced, or negatively impacted, the concepts and categories that colonized groups used to understand themselves and the world. Similarly, in 2021, Professor Dr. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni mentions the term epistemicide and the Cognitive Empire to describe the discrimination of scholars and intellectuals from the Global South by Western academia and in the sphere of decolonisation studies. In 2021 as well, Bhakuni & Abimbola's application of the concept of pose (or the positionality of the speaker) and gaze (the influence of the audience being addressed) as important modifiers of the both credibility deficit (that is, credibility deficit may apply to a person's pose or their role as gaze) and hermeneutical marginalization (that is, a person may be marginalized in relation to their pose as a speaker or to the gaze/audience to whom they have to address themself). A policy analysis indicated that the World Health Organization definition of neglected tropical disease reflects a form of epistemic injustice, where conditions like snakebite are forced to be framed as a medical condition, resulting in lack of focus on prevention. Genocide denial has been considered an example of epistemic injustice. See also Selected philosophers and theorists Miranda Fricker José Medina Kristie Dotson Elizabeth S. Anderson Charles Mills Boaventura de Sousa Santos Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni References Bibliography Fricker, Miranda (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. . Kidd, Ian James, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge. . —— (2013). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant imaginations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. . Injustice Injustice Historical negationism Concepts in epistemology

Virtue

A virtue is a trait of excellence, including traits that may be moral, social, or intellectual. The cultivation and refinement of virtue is held to be the "good of humanity" and thus is valued as an end purpose of life or a foundational principle of being. In human practical ethics, a virtue is a disposition to choose actions that succeed in showing high moral standards: doing what is said to be right and avoiding what is wrong in a given field of endeavour, even when doing so may be unnecessary from a utilitarian perspective. When someone takes pleasure in doing what is right, even when it is difficult or initially unpleasant, they can establish virtue as a habit. Such a person is said to be virtuous through having cultivated such a disposition. The opposite of virtue is vice, and the vicious person takes pleasure in habitual wrong-doing to their detriment. Other examples of this notion include the concept of merit in Asian traditions as well as (Chinese ). Buddhism's four can be regarded as virtues in the European sense. Etymology The ancient Romans used the Latin word (derived from , their word for man) to refer to all of the "excellent qualities of men, including physical strength, valorous conduct, and moral rectitude". The French words and came from this Latin root. The word virtue "was borrowed into English in the 13th century". History Ancient Egypt Maat (or Ma'at) was the ancient Egyptian goddess of truth, balance, order, law, morality, and justice. The word was also used to refer to these concepts. Maat was also portrayed as regulating the stars, seasons, and the actions of both mortals and the deities. The deities set the order of the universe from chaos at the moment of creation. Her (ideological) counterpart was Isfet, who symbolized chaos, lies, and injustice. Greco-Roman antiquity Platonic virtue The four classic cardinal virtues are: Prudence (, ; ; also Wisdom, , ), the ability to discern the appropriate course of action to be taken in a given situation at the appropriate time. Fortitude (, ; ): also termed courage, forbearance, strength, endurance, and the ability to confront fear, uncertainty, and intimidation. Temperance (, ; ): also known as restraint, the practice of self-control, abstention, discretion, and moderation tempering the appetition. Plato considered , which may also be translated as sound-mindedness, to be the most important virtue. Justice (, ; ): also considered as fairness; the Greek word also having the meaning of righteousness. This enumeration is traced to Greek philosophy and was listed by Plato who also added piety (, ) and replaced prudence with wisdom. Some scholars consider either of the above four virtue combinations as mutually reducible and therefore not cardinal. It is unclear whether Plato subscribed to a unified view of virtues. In Protagoras and Meno he states that the separate virtues cannot exist independently and offers as evidence the contradictions of acting with wisdom, yet in an unjust way; or acting with bravery (fortitude), yet without wisdom. Aristotelian virtue In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined a virtue as a point between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. The point of greatest virtue lies not in the exact middle, but at a golden mean sometimes closer to one extreme than the other. However, the virtuous action is not simply the "mean" (mathematically speaking) between two opposite extremes. As Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics: "at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the mean course and the best course, and these are characteristics of virtue." For example, generosity is a virtue between the two extremes of miserliness and being profligate. Further examples include courage between cowardice and foolhardiness and confidence between self-deprecation and conceit. In Aristotle's sense, a virtue is an excellence at being human. Intellectual virtues Aristotle also identifies the "intellectual virtues" of knowledge, art, practical judgement, intuition, and wisdom. Roman virtues The term virtue itself is derived from the Latin "" (the personification of which was the deity Virtus), and had connotations of "manliness", "honour", worthiness of deferential respect, and civic duty as both citizen and soldier. This virtue was but one of many virtues which Romans of good character were expected to exemplify and pass on through the generations, as part of the ; ancestral traditions which defined "Roman-ness". Romans distinguished between the spheres of private and public life, and thus, virtues were also divided between those considered to be in the realm of private family life (as lived and taught by the paterfamilias) and those expected of an upstanding Roman citizen. Most Roman concepts of virtue were also personified as a numinous deity. The primary Roman virtues, both public and private, were: Ancient India While religious scriptures generally consider or (the Tamil term for virtue) as a divine virtue, Valluvar describes it as a way of life rather than any spiritual observance, a way of harmonious living that leads to universal happiness. For this reason, Valluvar keeps as the cornerstone throughout the writing of the Kural literature. Valluvar considered justice as a facet or product of . While many before his time opined that justice cannot be defined and that it was a divine mystery, Valluvar suggested that a divine origin is not required to define the concept of justice. In the words of V. R. Nedunchezhiyan, justice according to Valluvar "dwells in the minds of those who have knowledge of the standard of right and wrong; so too deceit dwells in the minds which breed fraud." Chivalric virtues in medieval Europe In the , upon the occasion of his coronation as Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne published a list of knightly virtues: Love God Love your neighbor Give alms to the poor Entertain strangers Visit the sick Be merciful to prisoners Do ill to no man, nor consent unto such Forgive as ye hope to be forgiven Redeem the captive Help the oppressed Defend the cause of the widow and orphan Render righteous judgement Do not consent to any wrong Persevere not in wrath Shun excess in eating and drinking Be humble and kind Serve your liege lord faithfully Do not steal Do not perjure yourself, nor let others do so Envy, hatred, and violence separate men from the Kingdom of God Defend the Church and promote her cause. Religious traditions Abrahamic religions Bahá'í Faith The Baháʼí teachings speak of a "Greater Covenant", being universal and endless, and a "Lesser Covenant" specific to each religion. Baháʼís view Baháʼu'lláh's revelation as a binding lesser covenant for his followers. In the Baháʼí writings being firm in the covenant is considered a virtue. Christianity In Christianity, the three theological virtues are faith, hope, and love, a list which comes from ( (faith), (hope), (love), ). The same chapter describes love as the greatest of the three, and further defines love as "patient... kind... not envious, or boastful, or arrogant, or rude." (The Christian virtue of love is sometimes called charity and at other times a Greek word is used to contrast the love of God and the love of humankind from other types of love such as friendship or physical affection.) Christian scholars frequently add the four classic cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, temperance, and courage) to the theological virtues to give the seven heavenly virtues; for example, these seven are the ones described in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, sections 1803–1829. In Christian tradition courage or fortitude is a gift of the Holy Spirit. The Bible mentions additional virtues, such as in the "Fruit of the Holy Spirit", found in : "By contrast, the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control. There is no law against such things." In , Aurelius Prudentius Clemens listed seven "heavenly virtues" in his book Psychomachia (Battle of Souls) which is an allegorical story of conflict between vices and virtues. Among the virtues were (faith), (chastity), (endurance), (humility), (hope), (sobriety), (reason), (devotion), (peace), (harmony), and (wisdom). The medieval and renaissance periods saw a number of models of sin, listing the seven deadly sins and the seven capital virtues opposed to each. Islam In Islam, the Quran is believed to be the literal word of God, and the definitive description of virtue, and Muhammad is considered an ideal example of virtue in human form. The foundation of Islamic understanding of virtue was the understanding and interpretation of the Quran and the practices of Muhammad. Virtue is seen in the context of active submission to God performed by the community in unison. Believers are to "enjoin that which is virtuous and forbid that which is vicious" in all spheres of life (Quran 3:110). Mankind has been granted the faculty to discern God's will and to abide by it. Later Muslim scholars expanded the religious ethics of the scriptures in detail. In the Hadith (Islamic traditions), it is reported by An-Nawwas bin Sam'an: Wabisah bin Ma'bad reported: Virtue, as seen in opposition to sin, is termed (spiritual merit or reward) but there are other Islamic terms to describe virtue such as ("bounty"), ("piety"), and ("righteousness"). According to Muslim beliefs, God will forgive individual sins but the bad treatment of people and injustice toward others can only be pardoned by the victims and not by God. Judaism Loving God and obeying his laws, in particular the Ten Commandments, are central to Jewish conceptions of virtue. Wisdom is personified in the first eight chapters of the Book of Proverbs and is not only the source of virtue but is depicted as the first and best creation of God. A classic articulation of the Golden Rule came from the first century Rabbi Hillel the Elder. Renowned in the Jewish tradition as a sage and a scholar, he is associated with the development of the Mishnah and the Talmud and, as such, is one of the most important figures in Jewish history. Asked for a summary of the Jewish religion in the most concise terms, Hillel replied (reputedly while standing on one leg): "That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary; go and learn." Eastern religions Buddhism Buddhist practice as outlined in the Noble Eightfold Path can be regarded as a progressive list of virtues. Right View – realizing the Four Noble Truths (, ). Right Mindfulness – mental ability to see things for what they are with clear consciousness (, ). Right Concentration – wholesome one-pointedness of mind (, ). Buddhism's four ("Divine States") can be more properly regarded as virtues in the European sense. They are: /: loving-kindness towards all; the hope that a person will be well; loving kindness is the wish that all sentient beings, without any exception, be happy. : compassion; the hope that a person's sufferings will diminish; compassion is the wish for all sentient beings to be free from suffering. : altruistic joy in the accomplishments of a person, oneself or other; sympathetic joy is the wholesome attitude of rejoicing in the happiness and virtues of all sentient beings. /: equanimity, or learning to accept both loss and gain, praise and blame, success and failure with detachment, equally, for oneself and for others. Equanimity means not to distinguish between friend, enemy or stranger, but to regard every sentient being as equal. It is a clear-minded tranquil state of mind – not being overpowered by delusions, mental dullness, or agitation. There are also the ("perfections"), which are the culmination of having acquired certain virtues. In Theravada Buddhism's canonical Buddhavaṃsa there are Ten Perfections. In Mahayana Buddhism, the Lotus Sutra (Saddharmapundarika), there are Six Perfections; while in the Ten Stages (Dasabhumika) Sutra, four more are listed. Daoism "Virtue", translated from Chinese , is also an important concept in Chinese philosophy, particularly Daoism. De originally meant normative "virtue" in the sense of "personal character; inner strength; integrity", but semantically changed to moral "virtue; kindness; morality". Note the semantic parallel for English virtue, with an archaic meaning of "inner potency; divine power" (as in "by virtue of") and a modern one of "moral excellence; goodness". In early periods of Confucianism, moral manifestations of "virtue" include ("humanity"), xiao ("filial piety"), and ("proper behavior, performance of rituals"). The notion of – according to Simon Leys – means "humanity" and "goodness". originally had the archaic meaning in the Confucian Book of Poems of "virility", but progressively took on shades of ethical meaning. Some scholars consider the virtues identified in early Confucianism as non-theistic philosophy. The Daoist concept of , compared to Confucianism, is more subtle, pertaining to the "virtue" or ability that an individual realizes by following the ("the Way"). One important normative value in much of Chinese thinking is that one's social status should result from the amount of virtue that one demonstrates, rather than from one's birth. In the Analects, Confucius explains as follows: "He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it." In later periods, particularly from the Tang dynasty period, Confucianism absorbed and melded its own concepts of virtues with those from Daoism and Buddhism. There are symbols that represent virtue in Chinese Culture. Chinese classic paintings have many symbols representing virtue. Plum blossom represents resilience and perseverance. Orchid represents elegance, gentleness, and quietness. Bamboo represents loyalty, trust-worthiness, and humility. Chrysanthemum represents genuineness and simplicity. Hinduism Virtue is a much debated and an evolving concept in ancient scriptures of Hinduism. The essence, need and value of virtue is explained in Hindu philosophy as something that cannot be imposed, but something that is realized and voluntarily lived up to by each individual. For example, Apastamba explained it thus: "virtue and vice do not go about saying—here we are!; neither the Gods, Gandharvas, nor ancestors can convince us—this is right, this is wrong; virtue is an elusive concept, it demands careful and sustained reflection by every man and woman before it can become part of one's life. Virtues lead to (, holy living) in Hindu literature; while vices lead to (, sin). Sometimes, the word is used interchangeably with virtue. The virtues that constitute a dharmic life – that is a moral, ethical, virtuous life – evolved in vedas and upanishads. Over time, new virtues were conceptualized and added by ancient Hindu scholars: some replaced, others merged. For example, Manusamhita initially listed ten virtues necessary for a human being to live a dharmic life: (courage), (patience and forgiveness), (temperance), (Non-covetousness/Non-stealing), (inner purity), (control of senses), (reflective prudence), (wisdom), (truthfulness), and (freedom from anger). In later verses, this list was reduced to five virtues by the same scholar, by merging and creating a broader concept. The shorter list of virtues became: (Non-violence), (self restraint), (Non-covetousness/Non-stealing), (inner purity), and (truthfulness). The Bhagavad Gita – considered one of the epitomes of historic Hindu discussion of virtues and an allegorical debate on what is right and what is wrong – argues some virtues are not necessarily always absolute, but sometimes relational. For example, it explains that a virtue such as must be re-examined when one is faced with war or violence from the aggressiveness, immaturity, or ignorance of others. Jainism In Jainism, attainment of kaivalya is possible only if the seeker possesses certain virtues. All Jains are supposed to take up the five vows of (non violence), (truthfulness), (non stealing), (non attachment), and (celibacy) before becoming a monk. These vows are laid down by the . Other virtues which are supposed to be followed by both monks as well as laypersons include forgiveness, humility, self-restraint, and straightforwardness. These vows assist the seeker to escape from the karmic bondages thereby escaping the cycle of birth and death to attain liberation. Sikhism Sikh ethics emphasize the congruence between spiritual development and everyday moral conduct. Its founder Guru Nanak summarized this perspective:Truth is the highest virtue, but higher still is truthful living.The Five Virtues of Sikhism are (truth), (compassion), (contentment), (humility), and (love). Modern philosophers' views René Descartes For the Rationalist philosopher René Descartes, virtue consists in the correct reasoning that should guide our actions. Men should seek the sovereign good that Descartes, following Zeno, identifies with virtue, as this produces a blessedness or pleasure. For Epicurus the sovereign good was pleasure, and Descartes says that in fact this is not in contradiction with Zeno's teaching, because virtue produces a spiritual pleasure, that is better than bodily pleasure. Regarding Aristotle's opinion that happiness depends on the goods of fortune, Descartes does not deny that these goods contribute to happiness, but remarks that they are in great proportion outside one's own control, whereas one's mind is under one's complete control. Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant, in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, says true virtue is different from what commonly is believed about it. In Kant's view, to be goodhearted, benevolent and sympathetic is not true virtue. What makes a person truly virtuous is to behave in accordance with moral principles. Kant presents an example: suppose that you come across a needy person in the street; if your sympathy leads you to help that person, your response does not illustrate your virtue. Kant applies the approach of four temperaments to distinguish truly virtuous people. According to Kant, among all people with diverse temperaments, a person with a melancholic frame of mind is the most virtuous, whose thoughts, words, and deeds are principled. Friedrich Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche's view of virtue is based on the idea of an order of rank among people. For Nietzsche, the virtues of the strong are seen as vices by the weak and slavish, thus Nietzsche's virtue ethics is based on his distinction between master morality and slave morality. Nietzsche promotes the virtues of those he calls "higher men", people like Goethe and Beethoven. The virtues he praises in them are their creative powers ("the men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding"). According to Nietzsche these higher types are solitary, pursue a "unifying project", revere themselves and are healthy and life-affirming. Because mixing with the herd makes one base, the higher type "strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority…". The "Higher type" also "instinctively seeks heavy responsibilities" in the form of an "organizing idea" for their life, which drives them to artistic and creative work and gives them psychological health and strength. The fact that the higher types are "healthy" for Nietzsche does not refer to physical health as much as a psychological resilience and fortitude. Finally, someone of the "Higher type" affirms life because he is willing to accept the eternal return of his life and affirm this forever and unconditionally. In the last section of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche outlines his thoughts on the noble virtues and places solitude as one of the highest virtues: And to keep control over your four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. Because solitude is a virtue for us, since it is a sublime inclination and impulse to cleanliness which shows that contact between people ("society") inevitably makes things unclean. Somewhere, sometime, every community makes people – "base." Nietzsche also sees truthfulness as a virtue: Genuine honesty, assuming that this is our virtue and we cannot get rid of it, we free spirits – well then, we will want to work on it with all the love and malice at our disposal and not get tired of 'perfecting' ourselves in our virtue, the only one we have left: may its glory come to rest like a gilded, blue evening glow of mockery over this aging culture and its dull and dismal seriousness! Benjamin Franklin These are the virtues that Benjamin Franklin used to develop what he called "moral perfection". He had a checklist in a notebook to measure each day how he lived up to his virtues. They became known through Benjamin Franklin's autobiography. Temperance: Eat not to Dullness. Drink not to Elevation. Silence: Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself. Avoid trifling Conversation. Order: Let all your Things have their Places. Let each Part of your Business have its Time. Resolution: Resolve to perform what you ought. Perform without fail what you resolve. Frugality: Make no Expense but to do good to others or yourself; i.e. Waste nothing. Industry: Lose no Time. Be always employed in something useful. Cut off all unnecessary Actions. Sincerity: Use no hurtful Deceit. Think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly. Justice: Wrong none, by doing Injuries or omitting the Benefits that are your Duty. Moderation: Avoid Extremes. Forbear resenting Injuries so much as you think they deserve. Cleanliness: Tolerate no Uncleanness in Body, Clothes or Habitation. Tranquility: Be not disturbed at Trifles, or at Accidents common or unavoidable. Chastity: Rarely use Venery but for Health or Offspring; Never to Dullness, Weakness, or the Injury of your own or another's Peace or Reputation. Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates. Contemporary views Virtues as emotions Marc Jackson in his book Emotion and Psyche identifies the virtues as what he calls the good emotions: "The first group consisting of love, kindness, joy, faith, awe and pity is good". These virtues differ from older accounts of the virtues because they are not character traits expressed by action, but emotions that are to be felt and developed by feeling not acting. Immanuel Kant, in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, predicts and replies to Marc Johnson's view of emotions as virtues. To be goodhearted, benevolent, and sympathetic is not true virtue, for one acts merely episodically, motivated by appeasing those naturally limited feelings, such as in the presence, for example, of a needy person in the street: in such a case, we do not act for a universal motive but simply as a response to end a particular, individual, personal distress arisen in us by our own sentiments. In modern psychology Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, two leading researchers in positive psychology, recognizing the deficiency inherent in psychology's tendency to focus on dysfunction rather than on what makes a healthy and stable personality, set out to develop a list of "Character Strengths and Virtues". After three years of study, 24 traits (classified into six broad areas of virtue) were identified, having "a surprising amount of similarity across cultures and strongly indicat[ing] a historical and cross-cultural convergence." These six categories of virtue are courage, justice, humanity, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom. Some psychologists suggest that these virtues are adequately grouped into fewer categories; for example, the same 24 traits have been grouped into simply: Cognitive Strengths, Temperance Strengths, and Social Strengths. Vice as opposite The opposite of a virtue is a vice. Vice is a habitual, repeated practice of wrongdoing. One way of organizing the vices is as the corruption of the virtues. As Aristotle noted, however, the virtues can have several opposites. Virtues can be considered the mean between two extremes, as the Latin maxim dictates —in the centre lies virtue. For instance, both cowardice and rashness are opposites of courage; contrary to prudence are both over-caution and insufficient caution; the opposites of pride (a virtue) are undue humility and excessive vanity. A more "modern" virtue, tolerance, can be considered the mean between the two extremes of narrow-mindedness on the one hand and over-acceptance on the other. Vices can therefore be identified as the opposites of virtues – but with the caveat that each virtue could have many different opposites, all distinct from each other. Within the Chinese philosophy and Traditional Chinese Medicine vice and virtue are expressed as excess or deficiency. See also Ahimsa Bushido Civic virtue Common good Consequentialism Defence mechanism#Level 4: mature Epistemic virtue Evolution of morality Foresight (psychology) Humanity (virtue) Ideal (ethics) Intellectual virtues List of virtues Moral character Nonviolence Prussian virtues Nine Noble Virtues (Asatru and Odinism) Teachings of the Seven Grandfathers Value theory Virtue name Virtue signalling Omoluwabi References Further reading External links (quotations) — Peterson & Seligman findings — BBC Radio 4 discussion with Galen Strawson, Miranda Fricker, and Roger Crisp Aristotelianism Concepts in ethics Personality traits Virtue ethics

Non-overlapping magisteria

Non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) is the view, advocated by paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould, that science and religion each represent different areas of inquiry, fact vs. values, so there is a difference between the "nets" over which they have "a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority", and the two domains do not overlap. He suggests, with examples, that "NOMA enjoys strong and fully explicit support, even from the primary cultural stereotypes of hard-line traditionalism" and that it is "a sound position of general consensus, established by long struggle among people of goodwill in both magisteria." Some have criticized the idea or suggested limitations to it, and there continues to be disagreement over where the boundaries between the two magisteria should be. Gould's separate magisteria In a 1997 essay "Non-overlapping Magisteria" for Natural History magazine, and later in his book Rocks of Ages (1999), Gould put forward what he described as "a blessedly simple and entirely conventional resolution to ... the supposed conflict between science and religion", from his puzzlement over the need and reception of the 1996 address of Pope John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences "Truth Cannot Contradict Truth". He draws the term magisterium from Pope Pius XII's encyclical, Humani generis (1950), and defines it as "a domain where one form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution", and describes the NOMA principle as "Science tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts. Religion, on the other hand, operates in the equally important, but utterly different, realm of human purposes, meanings, and values—subjects that the factual domain of science might illuminate, but can never resolve." "These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for example, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty)." Gould emphasized the legitimacy of each field of endeavor only within its appropriate area of inquiry: "NOMA also cuts both ways. If religion can no longer dictate the nature of factual conclusions residing properly within the magisterium of science, then scientists cannot claim higher insight into moral truth from any superior knowledge of the world's empirical constitution." In the chapter "NOMA Defined and Defended" Gould gave examples of the types of questions appropriate to each area of inquiry, on the topic of "our relationship with other living creatures": "Do humans look so much like apes because we share a recent common ancestor or because creation followed a linear order, with apes representing the step just below us?" represents an inquiry concerning fact, while "Under what conditions (if ever) do we have a right to drive other species to extinction by elimination of their habitats? Do we violate any moral codes when we use genetic technology to place a gene from one creature into the genome of another species?" represent questions in the domain of values. He went on to present "an outline of historical reasons for the existence of conflict, where none should exist". In a speech before the American Institute of Biological Sciences, Gould stressed the diplomatic reasons for adopting NOMA as well, stating that "the reason why we support that position is that it happens to be right, logically. But we should also be aware that it is very practical as well if we want to prevail." Gould argued that if indeed the polling data was correct—and that 80–90% of Americans believe in a supreme being, and such a belief is misunderstood to be at odds with evolution—then "we have to keep stressing that religion is a different matter, and science is not in any sense opposed to it", otherwise "we're not going to get very far". He did not, however, consider this diplomatic aspect to be paramount, writing in 1997: "NOMA represents a principled position on moral and intellectual grounds, not a mere diplomatic stance." In 1997 he had elaborated on this position by describing his role as a scientist with respect to NOMA: Ciarán Benson sees a tendency to re-negotiate the borders between the "human sciences and the natural sciences", as in Wilhelm Dilthey's 1883 claim for the distinction between (humanities) and (science). The astrophysicist Arnold O. Benz proposes that the boundary between the two magisteria is in the different ways they perceive reality: objective measurements in science, participatory experience in religion. The two planes of perceptions differ, but meet each other, for example, in amazement and in ethics. National Academy of Sciences Also in 1999, the National Academy of Sciences adopted a similar stance. Its publication Science and Creationism stated that "Scientists, like many others, are touched with awe at the order and complexity of nature. Indeed, many scientists are deeply religious. But science and religion occupy two separate realms of human experience. Demanding that they be combined detracts from the glory of each." Humani generis Gould wrote that he was inspired to consider non-overlapping magisteria after being driven to examine the 1950 encyclical Humani generis, in which Pope Pius XII permits Catholics to entertain the hypothesis of evolution for the human body so long as they accept the divine infusion of the soul. Gould cited the following paragraph: Reception Richard Dawkins has criticized Gould's position on the grounds that religion is not divorced from scientific matters or the material world. He writes, "it is completely unrealistic to claim, as Gould and many others do, that religion keeps itself away from science's turf, restricting itself to morals and values. A universe with a supernatural presence would be a fundamentally and qualitatively different kind of universe from one without. The difference is, inescapably, a scientific difference. Religions make existence claims, and this means scientific claims." Dawkins also argues that a religion free of divine intervention would be far different from any existing ones, and certainly different from the Abrahamic religions. Moreover, he claims that religions would be only too happy to accept scientific claims that supported their views. For example, if DNA evidence proved that Jesus had no earthly father, Dawkins claims that the argument of non-overlapping magisteria would be quickly dropped. The theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Graf has been sympathetic to the approach, but claims it for the theological side—Graf assumes that e.g. creationism may be interpreted as a reaction of religious communities on the Verweltanschaulichung (i.e. interpretation as a worldview) of (natural) science in social Darwinism. That said, attempts to compete with religion by natural science may generate a backlash that is detrimental to both sides. Ciarán Benson, a secular humanist, defends the spiritual as a category against both. He assumes that while Gould claims for NOMA (non-overlapping magisteria of science, morality and religion), and Richard Dawkins for, verbally, "a brand of SM (bondage of the others by the scientific magisterium)", Benson preferred OM (overlapping magisteria), especially in the case of art and religion. Francis Collins criticized what he saw as the limits of NOMA, arguing that science, religion, and other spheres have "partially overlapped" while agreeing with Gould that morals, spirituality and ethics cannot be determined from naturalistic interpretation. This exceeds the greatest interconnection allowed by Gould in his original 1997 essay "Nonoverlapping Magisteria" in which he writes: Matt Ridley notes that religion does more than talk about ultimate meanings and morals, and science is not proscribed from talking about the above either. After all, morals involve human behavior, an observable phenomenon, and science is the study of observable phenomena. Ridley notes that there is substantial scientific evidence on evolutionary origins of ethics and morality. Sam Harris has heavily criticized this concept in his book The Moral Landscape. Sam notes that "Meaning, values, morality and the good life must relate to facts about the well-being of conscious creatures – and, in our case, must lawfully depend upon events in the world and upon states of the human brain." See also Fact–value distinction God of the gaps Relationship between science and religion Sphere sovereignty References External links Nonoverlapping Magisteria – by Stephen Jay Gould (MP3) Nonmoral Nature – by Stephen Jay Gould Gould on God – by H. Allen Orr, Boston Review. Review of Rocks of Ages – by Michael Ruse, Metanexus Institute. A Separate Peace – by Michael Ruse, Science & Spirit. The Holes in Gould's Semipermeable Membrane Between Science and Religion – by Ursula Goodenough Gould's Separate "Magisteria" – by Mark Durm, Massimo Pigliucci, Skeptical Inquirer The religious views of Stephen Gould and Charles Darwin – by Martin Gardner, Skeptical Inquirer Rocks of Ages Book review – by Jim Walker Religion and science Stephen Jay Gould

Self-reference

Self-reference is a concept that involves referring to oneself or one's own attributes, characteristics, or actions. It can occur in language, logic, mathematics, philosophy, and other fields. In natural or formal languages, self-reference occurs when a sentence, idea or formula refers to itself. The reference may be expressed either directly—through some intermediate sentence or formula—or by means of some encoding. In philosophy, self-reference also refers to the ability of a subject to speak of or refer to itself, that is, to have the kind of thought expressed by the first person nominative singular pronoun "I" in English. Self-reference is studied and has applications in mathematics, philosophy, computer programming, second-order cybernetics, and linguistics, as well as in humor. Self-referential statements are sometimes paradoxical, and can also be considered recursive. In logic, mathematics and computing In classical philosophy, paradoxes were created by self-referential concepts such as the omnipotence paradox of asking if it was possible for a being to exist so powerful that it could create a stone that it could not lift. The Epimenides paradox, 'All Cretans are liars' when uttered by an ancient Greek Cretan was one of the first recorded versions. Contemporary philosophy sometimes employs the same technique to demonstrate that a supposed concept is meaningless or ill-defined. In mathematics and computability theory, self-reference (also known as impredicativity) is the key concept in proving limitations of many systems. Gödel's theorem uses it to show that no formal consistent system of mathematics can ever contain all possible mathematical truths, because it cannot prove some truths about its own structure. The halting problem equivalent, in computation theory, shows that there is always some task that a computer cannot perform, namely reasoning about itself. These proofs relate to a long tradition of mathematical paradoxes such as Russell's paradox and Berry's paradox, and ultimately to classical philosophical paradoxes. In game theory, undefined behaviors can occur where two players must model each other's mental states and behaviors, leading to infinite regress. In computer programming, self-reference occurs in reflection, where a program can read or modify its own instructions like any other data. Numerous programming languages support reflection to some extent with varying degrees of expressiveness. Additionally, self-reference is seen in recursion (related to the mathematical recurrence relation) in functional programming, where a code structure refers back to itself during computation. 'Taming' self-reference from potentially paradoxical concepts into well-behaved recursions has been one of the great successes of computer science, and is now used routinely in, for example, writing compilers using the 'meta-language' ML. Using a compiler to compile itself is known as bootstrapping. Self-modifying code is possible to write (programs which operate on themselves), both with assembler and with functional languages such as Lisp, but is generally discouraged in real-world programming. Computing hardware makes fundamental use of self-reference in flip-flops, the basic units of digital memory, which convert potentially paradoxical logical self-relations into memory by expanding their terms over time. Thinking in terms of self-reference is a pervasive part of programmer culture, with many programs and acronyms named self-referentially as a form of humor, such as GNU ('GNU's not Unix') and PINE ('Pine is not Elm'). The GNU Hurd is named for a pair of mutually self-referential acronyms. Tupper's self-referential formula is a mathematical curiosity which plots an image of its own formula. In biology The biology of self-replication is self-referential, as embodied by DNA and RNA replication mechanisms. Models of self-replication are found in Conway's Game of Life and have inspired engineering systems such as the self-replicating 3D printer RepRap. In art Self-reference occurs in literature and film when an author refers to his or her own work in the context of the work itself. Examples include Miguel de Cervantes' Don Quixote, Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Tempest and Twelfth Night, Denis Diderot's Jacques le fataliste et son maître, Italo Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveler, many stories by Nikolai Gogol, Lost in the Funhouse by John Barth, Luigi Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author, Federico Fellini's 8½ and Bryan Forbes's The L-Shaped Room. Speculative fiction writer Samuel R. Delany makes use of this in his novels Nova and Dhalgren. In the former, Katin (a space-faring novelist) is wary of a long-standing curse wherein a novelist dies before completing any given work. Nova ends mid-sentence, thus lending credence to the curse and the realization that the novelist is the author of the story; likewise, throughout Dhalgren, Delany has a protagonist simply named The Kid (or Kidd, in some sections), whose life and work are mirror images of themselves and of the novel itself. In the sci-fi spoof film Spaceballs, Director Mel Brooks includes a scene wherein the evil characters are viewing a VHS copy of their own story, which shows them watching themselves "watching themselves", ad infinitum. Perhaps the earliest example is in Homer's Iliad, where Helen of Troy laments: "for generations still unborn/we will live in song" (appearing in the song itself). Self-reference in art is closely related to the concepts of breaking the fourth wall and meta-reference, which often involve self-reference. The short stories of Jorge Luis Borges play with self-reference and related paradoxes in many ways. Samuel Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape consists entirely of the protagonist listening to and making recordings of himself, mostly about other recordings. During the 1990s and 2000s filmic self-reference was a popular part of the rubber reality movement, notably in Charlie Kaufman's films Being John Malkovich and Adaptation, the latter pushing the concept arguably to its breaking point as it attempts to portray its own creation, in a dramatized version of the Droste effect. Various creation myths invoke self-reference to solve the problem of what created the creator. For example, the Egyptian creation myth has a god swallowing his own semen to create himself. The Ouroboros is a mythical dragon which eats itself. The Quran includes numerous instances of self-referentiality. The surrealist painter René Magritte is famous for his self-referential works. His painting The Treachery of Images, includes the words "this is not a pipe", the truth of which depends entirely on whether the word ceci (in English, "this") refers to the pipe depicted—or to the painting or the word or sentence itself. M.C. Escher's art also contains many self-referential concepts such as hands drawing themselves. In language A word that describes itself is called an autological word (or autonym). This generally applies to adjectives, for example sesquipedalian (i.e. "sesquipedalian" is a sesquipedalian word), but can also apply to other parts of speech, such as TLA, as a three-letter abbreviation for "three-letter abbreviation". A sentence which inventories its own letters and punctuation marks is called an autogram. There is a special case of meta-sentence in which the content of the sentence in the metalanguage and the content of the sentence in the object language are the same. Such a sentence is referring to itself. However some meta-sentences of this type can lead to paradoxes. "This is a sentence." can be considered to be a self-referential meta-sentence which is obviously true. However "This sentence is false" is a meta-sentence which leads to a self-referential paradox. Such sentences can lead to problems, for example, in law, where statements bringing laws into existence can contradict one another or themselves. Kurt Gödel claimed to have found such a paradox in the United States Constitution at his citizenship ceremony. Self-reference occasionally occurs in the media when it is required to write about itself, for example the BBC reporting on job cuts at the BBC. Notable encyclopedias may be required to feature articles about themselves, such as Wikipedia's article on Wikipedia. Fumblerules are a list of rules of good grammar and writing, demonstrated through sentences that violate those very rules, such as "Avoid cliches like the plague" and "Don't use no double negatives". The term was coined in a published list of such rules by William Safire. Circular definition is a type of self-reference in which the definition of a term or concept includes the term or concept itself, either explicitly or implicitly. Circular definitions are considered fallacious because they only define a term in terms of itself. This type of self-reference may be useful in argumentation, but can result in a lack of clarity in communication. The adverb "hereby" is used in a self-referential way, for example in the statement "I hereby declare you husband and wife." In popular culture Douglas Hofstadter's books, especially Metamagical Themas and Gödel, Escher, Bach, play with many self-referential concepts and were highly influential in bringing them into mainstream intellectual culture during the 1980s. Hofstadter's law, which specifies that "It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter's Law" is an example of a self-referencing adage. Hofstadter also suggested the concept of a 'Reviews of this book', a book containing only reviews of itself, which has since been implemented using wikis and other technologies. Hofstadter's 'strange loop' metaphysics attempts to map consciousness onto self-reference, but is a minority position in philosophy of mind. The subgenre of "recursive science fiction" or metafiction is now so extensive that it has fostered a fan-maintained bibliography at the New England Science Fiction Association's website; some of it is about science-fiction fandom, some about science fiction and its authors. In law Several constitutions contain self-referential clauses defining how the constitution itself may be amended. An example is Article Five of the United States Constitution. See also References Sources Bartlett, Steven J. [James] (Ed.) (1992). Reflexivity: A Source-book in Self-reference. Amsterdam, North-Holland. (PDF). RePub, Erasmus University Hofstadter, D. R. (1980). Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. New York, Vintage Books. Smullyan, Raymond (1994), Diagonalization and Self-Reference, Oxford Science Publications, Crabtree, Jonathan J. (2016), The Lost Logic of Elementary Mathematics and the Haberdasher who Kidnapped Kaizen, Proceedings of the Mathematical Association of Victoria (MAV) Annual Conference, 53, 98–106, Grammar Theory of computation Logic Philosophy of language

Ethical subjectivism

Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that: Ethical sentences express propositions. Some such propositions are true. The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people. This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism (because ethical statements are the types of things that can be true or false). Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism, which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion; to error theory, which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to non-cognitivism, which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all. Relationship to moral anti-realism Ethical subjectivism is a form of moral anti-realism that denies the "metaphysical thesis" of moral realism, (the claim that moral truths are ordinary facts about the world). Instead ethical subjectivism claims that moral truths are based on the mental states of individuals or groups of people. The moral realist is committed to some version of the following three statements: The semantic thesis: Moral statements have meaning, they express propositions, or are the kind of things that can be true or false. The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are true. The metaphysical thesis: The metaphysical status of moral facts is robust and ordinary, not importantly different from other facts about the world. Moral anti-realism is the denial of at least one of these claims. Ethical subjectivists deny the third claim, instead arguing that moral facts are not metaphysically ordinary, but rather dependent on mental states, (individual's beliefs about what is right and wrong). Moral non-cognitivists deny the first claim, while error theorists deny the second claim. There is some debate as to whether moral realism should continue to require the metaphysical thesis, and therefore if ethical subjectivists should be considered moral realists. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that moral realism should not require mind-independence since there are morally relevant psychological facts which are necessarily mind-dependent, which would make ethical subjectivism a version of moral realism. This has led to a distinction being made between robust moral realism (which requires all three of the theses) and minimal moral realism (which requires only the first two, and is therefore compatible with ethical subjectivism). Moral relativism and ethical subjectivism Moral relativism claims that statements are true or false based on who is saying them: they include indexicals in the same way that the truth of the statement "I am in Senegal" is dependent on who is making that statement. Depending on the variety of moral relativism, these statements may be indexed to a particular society (i.e., cultural relativism, when I say stealing is wrong, it is only true if stealing is not acceptable in my culture), or indexed to an individual (individualistic relativism). Furthermore, moral relativism is the view where an actor's moral codes are locally derived from their culture. The rules within moral codes are equal to each other and are only deemed "right" or "wrong" within their specific moral codes. Relativism is opposite to Universalism because there is not a single moral code for every agent to follow. Relativism differs from Nihilism because it validates every moral code that exists whereas nihilism does not. When it comes to relativism, Russian philosopher and writer, Fyodor Dostoevsky, coined the phrase "If God doesn't exist, everything is permissible". That phrase was his view of the consequences for rejecting theism as a basis of ethics. American anthropologist Ruth Benedict argued that there is no single objective morality and that moral codes necessarily vary by culture. Ethical subjectivism is a completely distinct concept from moral relativism. Ethical subjectivism claims that the truth or falsehood of ethical claims is dependent on the mental states and attitudes of people, but these ethical truths may be universal (i.e. one person or group's mental states may determine what is right or wrong for everyone). The term "ethical subjectivism" covers two distinct theories in ethics. According to cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, the truth of moral statements depends upon people's values, attitudes, feelings, or beliefs. Some forms of cognitivist ethical subjectivism can be counted as forms of realism, others are forms of anti-realism. David Hume is a foundational figure for cognitive ethical subjectivism. On a standard interpretation of his theory, a trait of character counts as a moral virtue when it evokes a sentiment of approbation in a sympathetic, informed, and rational human observer. Similarly, Roderick Firth's ideal observer theory held that right acts are those that an impartial, rational observer would approve of. William James, another ethical subjectivist, held that an end is good (to or for a person) just in the case it is desired by that person (see also ethical egoism). According to non-cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism, ethical statements cannot be true or false, at all: rather, they are expressions of personal feelings or commands. For example, on A. J. Ayer's emotivism, the statement, "Murder is wrong" is equivalent in meaning to the emotive, "Murder, Boo!" While moral relativism and ethical subjectivism positions are often held together, they do not entail each other. For example, someone that claims that whatever their king wants to happen is the morally right thing for everyone to do would be an ethical subjectivist (right and wrong are based on mental states), but they would not be a moral relativist (right and wrong are the same for everyone). Conversely, a moral relativist could deny moral subjectivism if they thought that the morally right thing to do was to follow the written laws of your country (this morality is relativist since "the laws of your country" picks out different laws for different individuals, but not subjectivist since it is dependent on the written laws, which are not in anyone's head). Some universalist forms of subjectivism include ideal observer theory (which claims that moral propositions are about what attitudes a hypothetical ideal observer would hold). Although divine command theory is considered by some to be a form of ethical subjectivism, defenders of the perspective that divine command theory is not a form of ethical subjectivism say this is based on a misunderstanding: that divine command proponents claim that moral propositions are about what attitudes God holds, but this understanding is deemed incorrect by some, such as Robert Adams who claims that divine command theory is concerned with whether a moral command is or isn't "contrary to the commands of (a loving) God". Terminology There is some debate among philosophers around the use of the term "ethical subjectivism" as this term has historically referred to the more specific position that ethical statements are merely reports of one's own mental states (saying that killing is wrong just means you disapprove of killing). While this is an ethically subjective position (the truth of your statement does depend on your mental states), it is not the only one. Due to this ambiguity, some philosophers have advocated that the general position discussed here be referred to as non-objectivism. References Subjectivism Metaethics Ethical theories

Gaia philosophy

Gaia philosophy (named after Gaia, Greek goddess of the Earth) is a broadly inclusive term for relating concepts about, humanity as an effect of the life of this planet. The Gaia hypothesis holds that all organisms on a life-giving planet regulate the biosphere in such a way as to promote its habitability. Gaia concepts draw a connection between the survivability of a species (hence its evolutionary course) and its usefulness to the survival of other species. While there were a number of precursors to Gaia hypothesis, the first scientific form of this idea was proposed as the Gaia hypothesis by James Lovelock, a UK chemist, in 1970. The Gaia hypothesis deals with the concept of biological homeostasis, and claims the resident life forms of a host planet coupled with their environment have acted and act like a single, self-regulating system. This system includes the near-surface rocks, the soil, and the atmosphere. Gaia hypothesis criticism]]). These theories are, however, significant in green politics. Predecessors to the Gaia theory There are some mystical, scientific and religious predecessors to the Gaia philosophy, which had a Gaia-like conceptual basis. Many religious mythologies had a view of Earth as being a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts (e.g. some Native American religions and various forms of shamanism). Isaac Newton wrote of the earth, "Thus this Earth resembles a great animal or rather inanimate vegetable, draws in æthereall breath for its dayly refreshment & vitall ferment & transpires again with gross exhalations, And according to the condition of all other things living ought to have its times of beginning youth old age & perishing." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a paleontologist and geologist, believed that evolution fractally unfolded from cell to organism to planet to solar system and ultimately the whole universe, as we humans see it from our limited perspective. Teilhard later influenced Thomas Berry and many Catholic humanist thinkers of the 20th century. Lewis Thomas believed that Earth should be viewed as a single cell; he derived this view from Johannes Kepler's view of Earth as a single round organism. Buckminster Fuller is generally credited with making the idea respectable in Western scientific circles in the 20th century. Building to some degree on his observations and artifacts, e.g. the Dymaxion map of the Earth he created, others began to ask if there was a way to make the Gaia theory scientifically sound. In 1931, L.G.M. Baas Becking delivered an inaugural lecture about Gaia in the sense of life and earth. Oberon Zell-Ravenheart in 1970 in an article in Green Egg Magazine, independently articulated the Gaia Thesis. Many believe that these ideas cannot be considered scientific hypotheses; by definition a scientific hypothesis must make testable predictions. As the above claims are not currently testable, they are outside the bounds of current science. This does not mean that these ideas are not theoretically testable. As one can postulate tests that could be applied, given enough time and space, then these ideas should be seen as scientific hypotheses. These are conjectures and perhaps can only be considered as social and maybe political philosophy; they may have implications for theology, or thealogy as Zell-Ravenheart and Isaac Bonewits put it. Range of views According to James Kirchner there is a spectrum of Gaia hypotheses, ranging from the undeniable to radical. At one end is the undeniable statement that the organisms on the Earth have radically altered its composition. A stronger position is that the Earth's biosphere effectively acts as if it is a self-organizing system which works in such a way as to keep its systems in some kind of equilibrium that is conducive to life. Today many scientists consider that such a view (and any stronger views) are unlikely to be correct. An even stronger claim is that all lifeforms are part of a single planetary being, called Gaia. In this view, the atmosphere, the seas, the terrestrial crust would be the result of interventions carried out by Gaia, through the coevolving diversity of living organisms. The most extreme form of Gaia theory is that the entire Earth is a single unified organism with a highly intelligent mind that arose as an emergent property of the whole biosphere. In this view, the Earth's biosphere is consciously manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence at all to support this last point of view, and it has come about because many people do not understand the concept of homeostasis. Many non-scientists instinctively and incorrectly see homeostasis as a process that requires conscious control. The more speculative versions of Gaia, including versions in which it is believed that the Earth is actually conscious, sentient, and highly intelligent, are usually considered outside the bounds of what is usually considered science. Gaia in biology and science Buckminster Fuller has been credited as the first to incorporate scientific ideas into a Gaia theory, which he did with his Dymaxion map of the Earth. The first scientifically rigorous theory was the Gaia hypothesis by James Lovelock, a UK chemist. A variant of this hypothesis was developed by Lynn Margulis, a microbiologist, in 1979. Her version is sometimes called the "Gaia Theory" (note uppercase-T). Her model is more limited in scope than the one that Lovelock proposed. Whether this sort of system is present on Earth is still open to debate. Some relatively simple homeostatic mechanisms are generally accepted. For example, when atmospheric carbon dioxide levels rise, plants are able to grow better and thus remove more carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Other biological effects and feedbacks exist, but the extent to which these mechanisms have stabilized and modified the Earth's overall climate is largely not known. The Gaia hypothesis is sometimes viewed from significantly different philosophical perspectives. Some environmentalists view it as an almost conscious process, in which the Earth's ecosystem is literally viewed as a single unified organism. Some evolutionary biologists, on the other hand, view it as an undirected emergent property of the ecosystem: as each individual species pursues its own self-interest, their combined actions tend to have counterbalancing effects on environmental change. Proponents of this view sometimes point to examples of life's actions in the past that have resulted in dramatic change rather than stable equilibrium, such as the conversion of the Earth's atmosphere from a reducing environment to an oxygen-rich one. Depending on how strongly the case is stated, the hypothesis conflicts with mainstream neo-Darwinism. Most biologists would accept Daisyworld-style homeostasis as possible, but would certainly not accept the idea that this equates to the whole biosphere acting as one organism. A very small number of scientists, and a much larger number of environmental activists, claim that Earth's biosphere is consciously manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence to support this belief. Gaia in the social sciences and politics A social science view of Gaia theory is the role of humans as a keystone species who may be able to accomplish global homeostasis. Whilst a few social scientists who draw inspiration from 'organic' views of society have embraced Gaia philosophy as a way to explain the human-nature interconnections, most professional social scientists are more involved in reflecting upon the way Gaia philosophy is used and engaged with within sub-sections of society. Alan Marshall, in the Department of Social Sciences at Mahidol University, for example, reflects upon the way Gaia philosophy has been used and advocated in various societal settings by environmentalists, spiritualists, managers, economists, and scientists and engineers. As Marshall explains, most social scientists had already given up on systems ideas of society in the 1960s before Gaia philosophy was born under James Lovelock's ideas since such ideas were interpreted as supporting conservatism and traditionalism. Gaia theory also influenced the dynamics of green politics. Gaia in religion Rosemary Radford Ruether, the American feminist scholar and theologian, wrote a book called Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing. A book edited by Allan Hunt Badiner called Dharma Gaia explores the ground where Buddhism and ecology meet through writings by the Dalai Lama, Gary Snyder, Thich Nhat Hanh, Allen Ginsberg, David Abram, Joanna Macy, Robert Aitken, and 25 other Buddhists and ecologists. Gaianism, an earth-centered philosophical, holistic, and spiritual belief that shares expressions with earth religions and paganism while not identifying exclusively with any specific religion, sprang from the gaia hypothesis. Criticism One of the most problematic issues with referring to Gaia as an organism is its apparent failure to meet the biological criterion of being able to reproduce. Richard Dawkins has asserted that the planet is not the offspring of any parents and is unable to reproduce. See also Arcology Climate engineering Environmental philosophy Gaia (mythology) Gaia hypothesis (James Lovelock's ideas) Gardening James Kirchner Guy Murchie Keystone species Odic force Pachamama Places to intervene in a system Pantheism Technogaianism Teleology Urban ecology Steven M. Greer - Categorises entire planets to be individual conscious organisms Superorganism Edward Goldsmith Books on Gaia Toby Tyrrell (2013), On Gaia: A Critical Investigation of the Relationship between Life and Earth Anne Primavesi (2008), Gaia and Climate Change: A Theology of Gift Events Mary Midgley (2007), Earthy realism: the meaning of Gaia Pepper Lewis (2005), Gaia Speaks Stephen Henry Schneider (2004), Scientists debate gaia: the next century Tyler Volk (2003), Gaia's Body: Toward a Physiology of Earth Anne Primavesi (2003), Gaia's gift: earth, ourselves, and God after Copernicus Alan Marshall (2002), The Unity of Nature, Imperial College Press. Francesca Ciancimino Howell (2002), Making Magic with Gaia: Practices to Heal Ourselves and Our Planet Mary Midgley (2001), Gaia: the next big idea Anne Primavesi (2000), Sacred Gaia: holistic theology and earth system science George Ronald Williams (1996), The molecular biology of Gaia Peter Bunyard (1996), Gaia in Action: Science of the Living Earth Norman Myers (1993), Gaia An Atlas of Planet Management Lawrence E. Joseph (1991), Gaia: the growth of an idea Allan Hunt Badiner (1990), Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology References Environmentalism Matriarchy Nature and religion Environment and religion ru:Философия Гайи

Environmental sociology

Environmental sociology is the study of interactions between societies and their natural environment. The field emphasizes the social factors that influence environmental resource management and cause environmental issues, the processes by which these environmental problems are socially constructed and define as social issues, and societal responses to these problems. Environmental sociology emerged as a subfield of sociology in the late 1970s in response to the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1960s. It represents a relatively new area of inquiry focusing on an extension of earlier sociology through inclusion of physical context as related to social factors. Definition Environmental sociology is typically defined as the sociological study of socio-environmental interactions, although this definition immediately presents the problem of integrating human cultures with the rest of the environment. Different aspects of human interaction with the natural environment are studied by environmental sociologists including population and demography, organizations and institutions, science and technology, health and illness, consumption and sustainability practices, culture and identity, and social inequality and environmental justice. Although the focus of the field is the relationship between society and environment in general, environmental sociologists typically place special emphasis on studying the social factors that cause environmental problems, the societal impacts of those problems, and efforts to solve the problems. In addition, considerable attention is paid to the social processes by which certain environmental conditions become socially defined as problems. Most research in environmental sociology examines contemporary societies. History Environmental sociology emerged as a coherent subfield of inquiry after the environmental movement of the 1960s and early 1970s. The works of William R. Catton, Jr. and Riley Dunlap, among others, challenged the constricted anthropocentrism of classical sociology. In the late 1970s, they called for a new holistic, or systems perspective, which lead to a marked shift in the field’s focus. Since the 1970s, general sociology has noticeably transformed to include environmental forces in social explanations. Environmental sociology has now solidified as a respected, interdisciplinary field of study in academia. Concepts Existential dualism The duality of the human condition rests with cultural uniqueness and evolutionary traits. From one perspective, humans are embedded in the ecosphere and co-evolved alongside other species. Humans share the same basic ecological dependencies as other inhabitants of nature. From the other perspectives, humans are distinguished from other species because of their innovative capacities, distinct cultures and varied institutions. Human creations have the power to independently manipulate, destroy, and transcend the limits of the natural environment. According to Buttel (2004), there are five major traditions in environmental sociology today: the treadmill of production and other eco-Marxisms, ecological modernization and other sociologies of environmental reform, cultural-environmental sociologies, neo-Malthusianisms, and the new ecological paradigm. In practice, this means five different theories of what to blame for environmental degradation, i.e., what to research or consider as important. These ideas are listed below in the order in which they were invented. Ideas that emerged later built on earlier ideas, and contradicted them. Neo-Malthusianism Works such as Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (1969) reformulated Malthusian thought about abstract population increases causing famines into a model of individual selfishness at larger scales causing degradation of common pool resources such as the air, water, the oceans, or general environmental conditions. Hardin offered privatization of resources or government regulation as solutions to environmental degradation caused by tragedy of the commons conditions. Many other sociologists shared this view of solutions well into the 1970s (see Ophuls). There have been many critiques of this view particularly political scientist Elinor Ostrom, or economists Amartya Sen and Ester Boserup. Even though much of mainstream journalism considers Malthusianism the only view of environmentalism, most sociologists would disagree with Malthusianism since social organizational issues of environmental degradation are more demonstrated to cause environmental problems than abstract population or selfishness per se. For examples of this critique, Ostrom in her book Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990) argues that instead of self-interest always causing degradation, it can sometimes motivate people to take care of their common property resources. To do this they must change the basic organizational rules of resource use. Her research provides evidence for sustainable resource management systems, around common pool resources that have lasted for centuries in some areas of the world. Amartya Sen argues in his book Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1980) that population expansion fails to cause famines or degradation as Malthusians or Neo-Malthusians argue. Instead, in documented cases a lack of political entitlement to resources that exist in abundance, causes famines in some populations. He documents how famines can occur even in the midst of plenty or in the context of low populations. He argues that famines (and environmental degradation) would only occur in non-functioning democracies or unrepresentative states. Ester Boserup argues in her book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure (1965) from inductive, empirical case analysis that Malthus's more deductive conception of a presumed one-to-one relationship with agricultural scale and population is actually reversed. Instead of agricultural technology and scale determining and limiting population as Malthus attempted to argue, Boserup argued the world is full of cases of the direct opposite: that population changes and expands agricultural methods. Eco-Marxist scholar Allan Schnaiberg (below) argues against Malthusianism with the rationale that under larger capitalist economies, human degradation moved from localized, population-based degradation to organizationally caused degradation of capitalist political economies to blame. He gives the example of the organized degradation of rainforest areas which states and capitalists push people off the land before it is degraded by organizational means. Thus, many authors are critical of Malthusianism, from sociologists (Schnaiberg) to economists (Sen and Boserup), to political scientists (Ostrom), and all focus on how a country's social organization of its extraction can degrade the environment independent of abstract population. New Ecological Paradigm In the 1970s, the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) conception critiqued the claimed lack of human-environmental focus in the classical sociologists and the sociological priorities their followers created. This was critiqued as the Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP). The HEP viewpoint claims that human-environmental relationships were unimportant sociologically because humans are 'exempt' from environmental forces via cultural change. This view was shaped by the leading Western worldview of the time and the desire for sociology to establish itself as an independent discipline against the then popular racist-biological environmental determinism where environment was all. In this HEP view, human dominance was felt to be justified by the uniqueness of culture, argued to be more adaptable than biological traits. Furthermore, culture also has the capacity to accumulate and innovate, making it capable of solving all natural problems. Therefore, as humans were not conceived of as governed by natural conditions, they were felt to have complete control of their own destiny. Any potential limitation posed by the natural world was felt to be surpassed using human ingenuity. Research proceeded accordingly without environmental analysis. In the 1970s, sociological scholars Riley Dunlap and William R. Catton, Jr. began recognizing the limits of what would be termed the Human Excemptionalism Paradigm. Catton and Dunlap (1978) suggested a new perspective that took environmental variables into full account. They coined a new theoretical outlook for sociology, the New Ecological Paradigm, with assumptions contrary to HEP. The NEP recognizes the innovative capacity of humans, but says that humans are still ecologically interdependent as with other species. The NEP notes the power of social and cultural forces but does not profess social determinism. Instead, humans are impacted by the cause, effect, and feedback loops of ecosystems. The Earth has a finite level of natural resources and waste repositories. Thus, the biophysical environment can impose constraints on human activity. They discussed a few harbingers of this NEP in 'hybridized' theorizing about topics that were neither exclusively social nor environmental explanations of environmental conditions. It was additionally a critique of Malthusian views of the 1960s and 1970s. Dunlap and Catton's work immediately received a critique from Buttel who argued to the contrary that classical sociological foundations could be found for environmental sociology, particularly in Weber's work on ancient "agrarian civilizations" and Durkheim's view of the division of labor as built on a material premise of specialization/specialization in response to material scarcity. This environmental aspect of Durkheim has been discussed by Schnaiberg (1971) as well. Treadmill of Production Theory The Treadmill of Production is a theory coined and popularized by Schnaiberg as a way to answer for the increase in U.S. environmental degradation post World War II. At its simplest, this theory states that the more product or commodities are created, the more resources will be used, and the higher the impact will be. The treadmill is a metaphor of being caught in the cycle of continuous growth which never stops, demanding more resources and as a result causing more environmental damage. Eco-Marxism In the middle of the HEP/NEP debate Neo-Marxist ideas of conflict sociology were applied to environmental conflicts. Therefore, some sociologists wanted to stretch Marxist ideas of social conflict to analyze environmental social movements from the Marxist materialist framework instead of interpreting them as a cultural "New Social Movement", separate from material concerns. So "Eco-Marxism" was developed based on using Neo-Marxist Conflict theories concepts of the relative autonomy of the state and applying them to environmental conflict. Two people following this school were James O'Connor (The Fiscal Crisis of the State, 1971) and later Allan Schnaiberg. Later, a different trend developed in eco-Marxism via the attention brought to the importance of metabolic analysis in Marx's thought by John Bellamy Foster. Contrary to previous assumptions that classical theorists in sociology all had fallen within a Human Exemptionalist Paradigm, Foster argued that Marx's materialism lead him to theorize labor as the metabolic process between humanity and the rest of nature. In Promethean interpretations of Marx that Foster critiques, there was an assumption his analysis was very similar to the anthropocentric views critiqued by early environmental sociologists. Instead, Foster argued Marx himself was concerned about the Metabolic rift generated by capitalist society's social metabolism, particularly in industrial agriculture—Marx had identified an "irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism," created by capitalist agriculture that was destroying the productivity of the land and creating wastes in urban sites that failed to be reintegrated into the land and thus lead toward destruction of urban workers health simultaneously. Reviewing the contribution of this thread of eco-marxism to current environmental sociology, Pellow and Brehm conclude, "The metabolic rift is a productive development in the field because it connects current research to classical theory and links sociology with an interdisciplinary array of scientific literatures focused on ecosystem dynamics." Foster emphasized that his argument presupposed the "magisterial work" of Paul Burkett, who had developed a closely related "red-green" perspective rooted in a direct examination of Marx's value theory. Burkett and Foster proceeded to write a number of articles together on Marx's ecological conceptions, reflecting their shared perspective More recently, Jason W. Moore, inspired by Burkett's value-analytical approach to Marx's ecology and arguing that Foster's work did not in itself go far enough, has sought to integrate the notion of metabolic rift with world systems theory, incorporating Marxian value-related conceptions. For Moore, the modern world-system is a capitalist world-ecology, joining the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the production of nature in dialectical unity. Central to Moore's perspective is a philosophical re-reading of Marx's value theory, through which abstract social labor and abstract social nature are dialectically bound. Moore argues that the emergent law of value, from the sixteenth century, was evident in the extraordinary shift in the scale, scope, and speed of environmental change. What took premodern civilizations centuries to achieve—such as the deforestation of Europe in the medieval era—capitalism realized in mere decades. This world-historical rupture, argues Moore, can be explained through a law of value that regards labor productivity as the decisive metric of wealth and power in the modern world. From this standpoint, the genius of capitalist development has been to appropriate uncommodified natures—including uncommodified human natures—as a means of advancing labor productivity in the commodity system. Societal-environment dialectic In 1975, the highly influential work of Allan Schnaiberg transfigured environmental sociology, proposing a societal-environmental dialectic, though within the 'neo-Marxist' framework of the relative autonomy of the state as well. This conflictual concept has overwhelming political salience. First, the economic synthesis states that the desire for economic expansion will prevail over ecological concerns. Policy will decide to maximize immediate economic growth at the expense of environmental disruption. Secondly, the managed scarcity synthesis concludes that governments will attempt to control only the most dire of environmental problems to prevent health and economic disasters. This will give the appearance that governments act more environmentally consciously than they really do. Third, the ecological synthesis generates a hypothetical case where environmental degradation is so severe that political forces would respond with sustainable policies. The driving factor would be economic damage caused by environmental degradation. The economic engine would be based on renewable resources at this point. Production and consumption methods would adhere to sustainability regulations. These conflict-based syntheses have several potential outcomes. One is that the most powerful economic and political forces will preserve the status quo and bolster their dominance. Historically, this is the most common occurrence. Another potential outcome is for contending powerful parties to fall into a stalemate. Lastly, tumultuous social events may result that redistribute economic and political resources. In 1980,the highly influential work of Allan Schnaiberg entitled The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity (1980) was a large contribution to this theme of a societal-environmental dialectic. Ecological modernization and reflexive modernization By the 1980s, a critique of eco-Marxism was in the offing, given empirical data from countries (mostly in Western Europe like the Netherlands, Western Germany and somewhat the United Kingdom) that were attempting to wed environmental protection with economic growth instead of seeing them as separate. This was done through both state and capital restructuring. Major proponents of this school of research are Arthur P.J. Mol and Gert Spaargaren. Popular examples of ecological modernization would be "cradle to cradle" production cycles, industrial ecology, large-scale organic agriculture, biomimicry, permaculture, agroecology and certain strands of sustainable development—all implying that economic growth is possible if that growth is well organized with the environment in mind. Reflexive modernization The many volumes of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck first argued from the late 1980s that our risk society is potentially being transformed by the environmental social movements of the world into structural change without rejecting the benefits of modernization and industrialization. This is leading to a form of 'reflexive modernization' with a world of reduced risk and better modernization process in economics, politics, and scientific practices as they are made less beholden to a cycle of protecting risk from correction (which he calls our state's organized irresponsibility)—politics creates ecodisasters, then claims responsibility in an accident, yet nothing remains corrected because it challenges the very structure of the operation of the economy and the private dominance of development, for example. Beck's idea of a reflexive modernization looks forward to how our ecological and social crises in the late 20th century are leading toward transformations of the whole political and economic system's institutions, making them more "rational" with ecology in mind. Neo-Liberalism Neo-liberalism includes deregulation, free market capitalism, and aims at reducing government spending. These Neo-liberal policies greatly affect environmental sociology. Since Neo-liberalism includes deregulation and essentially less government involvement, this leads to the commodification and privatization of unowned, state-owned, or common property resources. Diana Liverman and Silvina Vilas mentions that this results in payments for environmental services; deregulation and cuts in public expenditure for environmental management; the opening up of trade and investment; and transfer of environmental management to local or nongovernmental institutions. The privatization of these resources have impacts on society, the economy, and to the environment. An example that has greatly affected society is the privatization of water. Social construction of the environment Additionally in the 1980s, with the rise of postmodernism in the western academy and the appreciation of discourse as a form of power, some sociologists turned to analyzing environmental claims as a form of social construction more than a 'material' requirement. Proponents of this school include John A. Hannigan, particularly in Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective (1995). Hannigan argues for a 'soft constructionism' (environmental problems are materially real though they require social construction to be noticed) over a 'hard constructionism' (the claim that environmental problems are entirely social constructs). Although there was sometimes acrimonious debate between the constructivist and realist "camps" within environmental sociology in the 1990s, the two sides have found considerable common ground as both increasingly accept that while most environmental problems have a material reality they nonetheless become known only via human processes such as scientific knowledge, activists' efforts, and media attention. In other words, most environmental problems have a real ontological status despite our knowledge/awareness of them stemming from social processes, processes by which various conditions are constructed as problems by scientists, activists, media and other social actors. Correspondingly, environmental problems must all be understood via social processes, despite any material basis they may have external to humans. This interactiveness is now broadly accepted, but many aspects of the debate continue in contemporary research in the field. Events Modern environmentalism United States The 1960s built strong cultural momentum for environmental causes, giving birth to the modern environmental movement and large questioning in sociologists interested in analyzing the movement. Widespread green consciousness moved vertically within society, resulting in a series of policy changes across many states in the U.S. and Europe in the 1970s. In the United States, this period was known as the "Environmental Decade" with the creation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and passing of the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, and amendments to the Clean Air Act. Earth Day of 1970, celebrated by millions of participants, represented the modern age of environmental thought. The environmental movement continued with incidences such as Love Canal. Historical studies While the current mode of thought expressed in environmental sociology was not prevalent until the 1970s, its application is now used in analysis of ancient peoples. Societies including Easter Island, the Anaszi, and the Mayans were argued to have ended abruptly, largely due to poor environmental management. This has been challenged in later work however as the exclusive cause (biologically trained Jared Diamond's Collapse (2005); or more modern work on Easter Island). The collapse of the Mayans sent a historic message that even advanced cultures are vulnerable to ecological suicide—though Diamond argues now it was less of a suicide than an environmental climate change that led to a lack of an ability to adapt—and a lack of elite willingness to adapt even when faced with the signs much earlier of nearing ecological problems. At the same time, societal successes for Diamond included New Guinea and Tikopia island whose inhabitants have lived sustainably for 46,000 years. John Dryzek et al. argue in Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway (2003) that there may be a common global green environmental social movement, though its specific outcomes are nationalist, falling into four 'ideal types' of interaction between environmental movements and state power. They use as their case studies environmental social movements and state interaction from Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. They analyze the past 30 years of environmentalism and the different outcomes that the green movement has taken in different state contexts and cultures. Recently and roughly in temporal order below, much longer-term comparative historical studies of environmental degradation are found by sociologists. There are two general trends: many employ world systems theory—analyzing environmental issues over long periods of time and space; and others employ comparative historical methods. Some utilize both methods simultaneously, sometimes without reference to world systems theory (like Whitaker, see below). Stephen G. Bunker (d. 2005) and Paul S. Ciccantell collaborated on two books from a world-systems theory view, following commodity chains through history of the modern world system, charting the changing importance of space, time, and scale of extraction and how these variables influenced the shape and location of the main nodes of the world economy over the past 500 years. Their view of the world was grounded in extraction economies and the politics of different states that seek to dominate the world's resources and each other through gaining hegemonic control of major resources or restructuring global flows in them to benefit their locations. The three volume work of environmental world-systems theory by Sing C. Chew analyzed how "Nature and Culture" interact over long periods of time, starting with World Ecological Degradation (2001) In later books, Chew argued that there were three "Dark Ages" in world environmental history characterized by periods of state collapse and reorientation in the world economy associated with more localist frameworks of community, economy, and identity coming to dominate the nature/culture relationships after state-facilitated environmental destruction delegitimized other forms. Thus recreated communities were founded in these so-called 'Dark Ages,' novel religions were popularized, and perhaps most importantly to him the environment had several centuries to recover from previous destruction. Chew argues that modern green politics and bioregionalism is the start of a similar movement of the present day potentially leading to wholesale system transformation. Therefore, we may be on the edge of yet another global "dark age" which is bright instead of dark on many levels since he argues for human community returning with environmental healing as empires collapse. More case oriented studies were conducted by historical environmental sociologist Mark D. Whitaker analyzing China, Japan, and Europe over 2,500 years in his book Ecological Revolution (2009). He argued that instead of environmental movements being "New Social Movements" peculiar to current societies, environmental movements are very old—being expressed via religious movements in the past (or in the present like in ecotheology) that begin to focus on material concerns of health, local ecology, and economic protest against state policy and its extractions. He argues past or present is very similar: that we have participated with a tragic common civilizational process of environmental degradation, economic consolidation, and lack of political representation for many millennia which has predictable outcomes. He argues that a form of bioregionalism, the bioregional state, is required to deal with political corruption in present or in past societies connected to environmental degradation. After looking at the world history of environmental degradation from very different methods, both sociologists Sing Chew and Mark D. Whitaker came to similar conclusions and are proponents of (different forms of) bioregionalism. Related journals Among the key journals in this field are: Environmental Sociology Human Ecology Human Ecology Review Nature and Culture Organization & Environment Population and Environment Rural Sociology Society and Natural Resources See also Bibliography of sociology Ecological anthropology Ecological design Ecological economics Ecological modernization theory Enactivism Environmental design Environmental design and planning Environmental economics Environmental policy Environmental racism Environmental racism in Europe Environmental social science Ethnoecology Political ecology Sociology of architecture Sociology of disaster Climate change References Notes Dunlap, Riley E., Frederick H. Buttel, Peter Dickens, and August Gijswijt (eds.) 2002. Sociological Theory and the Environment: Classical Foundations, Contemporary Insights (Rowman & Littlefield, ). Dunlap, Riley E., and William Michelson (eds.) 2002.Handbook of Environmental Sociology (Greenwood Press, ) Freudenburg, William R., and Robert Gramling. 1989. "The Emergence of Environmental Sociology: Contributions of Riley E. Dunlap and William R. Catton, Jr.", Sociological Inquiry 59(4): 439–452 Harper, Charles. 2004. Environment and Society: Human Perspectives on Environmental Issues. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. Humphrey, Craig R., and Frederick H. Buttel. 1982.Environment, Energy, and Society. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Humphrey, Craig R., Tammy L. Lewis and Frederick H. Buttel. 2002. Environment, Energy and Society: A New Synthesis. Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning. Mehta, Michael, and Eric Ouellet. 1995. Environmental Sociology: Theory and Practice, Toronto: Captus Press. Redclift, Michael, and Graham Woodgate, eds. 1997.International Handbook of Environmental Sociology (Edgar Elgar, 1997; ) Schnaiberg, Allan. 1980. The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. New York: Oxford University Press. Further reading Hannigan, John, "Environmental Sociology", Routledge, 2014. Zehner, Ozzie, Green Illusions: The Dirty Secrets of Clean Energy and the Future of Environmentalism, University of Nebraska Press, 2012. An environmental sociology text forming a critique of energy production and green consumerism. External links ASA Section on Environment and Technology ESA Environment & Society Research Network ISA Research Committee on Environment and Society (RC24) Canadian Sociological Association (CSA) Environment Research Cluster

Ecocentrism

Ecocentrism (; from Greek: οἶκος oikos, 'house' and κέντρον kentron, 'center') is a term used by environmental philosophers and ecologists to denote a nature-centered, as opposed to human-centered (i.e., anthropocentric), system of values. The justification for ecocentrism usually consists in an ontological belief and subsequent ethical claim. The ontological belief denies that there are any existential divisions between human and non-human nature sufficient to claim that humans are either (a) the sole bearers of intrinsic value or (b) possess greater intrinsic value than non-human nature. Thus the subsequent ethical claim is for an equality of intrinsic value across human and non-human nature, or biospherical egalitarianism. Origin of term The ecocentric ethic was conceived by Aldo Leopold and recognizes that all species, including humans, are the product of a long evolutionary process and are inter-related in their life processes. The writings of Aldo Leopold and his idea of the land ethic and good environmental management are a key element to this philosophy. Ecocentrism focuses on the biotic community as a whole and strives to maintain ecosystem composition and ecological processes. The term also finds expression in the first principle of the deep ecology movement, as formulated by Arne Næss and George Sessions in 1984 which points out that anthropocentrism, which considers humans as the center of the universe and the pinnacle of all creation, is a difficult opponent for ecocentrism. Background Environmental thought and the various branches of the environmental movement are often classified into two intellectual camps: those that are considered anthropocentric, or "human-centred," in orientation and those considered biocentric, or "life-centred". This division has been described in other terminology as "shallow" ecology versus "deep" ecology and as "technocentrism" versus "ecocentrism". Ecocentrism can be seen as one stream of thought within environmentalism, the political and ethical movement that seeks to protect and improve the quality of the natural environment through changes to environmentally harmful human activities by adopting environmentally benign forms of political, economic, and social organization and through a reassessment of humanity's relationship with nature. In various ways, environmentalism claims that non-human organisms and the natural environment as a whole deserve consideration when appraising the morality of political, economic, and social policies. Environmental communication scholars suggest that anthropocentric ways of being and identities are maintained by various modes of cultural disciplinary power such as ridiculing, labelling, and silencing. Accordingly, the transition to more ecocentric ways of being and identities requires not only legal and economic structural change, but also the emergence of ecocultural practices that challenge anthropocentric disciplinary power and lead to the creation of ecocentric cultural norms. Relationship to other similar philosophies Anthropocentrism Ecocentrism is taken by its proponents to constitute a radical challenge to long-standing and deeply rooted anthropocentric attitudes in Western culture, science, and politics. Anthropocentrism is alleged to leave the case for the protection of non-human nature subject to the demands of human utility, and thus never more than contingent on the demands of human welfare. An ecocentric ethic, by contrast, is believed to be necessary in order to develop a non-contingent basis for protecting the natural world. Critics of ecocentrism have argued that it opens the doors to an anti-humanist morality that risks sacrificing human well-being for the sake of an ill-defined 'greater good'. Deep ecologist Arne Naess has identified anthropocentrism as a root cause of the ecological crisis, human overpopulation, and the extinctions of many non-human species. Lupinacci also points to anthropocentrism as a root cause of environmental degradation. Others point to the gradual historical realization that humans are not the centre of all things, that "A few hundred years ago, with some reluctance, Western people admitted that the planets, Sun and stars did not circle around their abode. In short, our thoughts and concepts though irreducibly anthropomorphic need not be anthropocentric." Industrocentrism It sees all things on earth as resources to be utilized by humans or to be commodified. This view is the opposite of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Technocentrism Ecocentrism is also contrasted with technocentrism (meaning values centred on technology) as two opposing perspectives on attitudes towards human technology and its ability to affect, control and even protect the environment. Ecocentrics, including "deep green" ecologists, see themselves as being subject to nature, rather than in control of it. They lack faith in modern technology and the bureaucracy attached to it. Ecocentrics will argue that the natural world should be respected for its processes and products, and that low impact technology and self-reliance is more desirable than technological control of nature. Technocentrics, including imperialists, have absolute faith in technology and industry and firmly believe that humans have control over nature. Although technocentrics may accept that environmental problems do exist, they do not see them as problems to be solved by a reduction in industry. Indeed, technocentrics see that the way forward for developed and developing countries and the solutions to our environmental problems today lie in scientific and technological advancement. Biocentrism The distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism is ill-defined. Ecocentrism recognizes Earth's interactive living and non-living systems rather than just the Earth's organisms (biocentrism) as central in importance. The term has been used by those advocating "left biocentrism", combining deep ecology with an "anti-industrial and anti-capitalist" position (David Orton et al.). See also Deep ecology Earth liberation Ecosophy Ecocentric embodied energy analysis Environmentalism Ecological humanities Radical environmentalism Gaia hypothesis Holocentric Sentiocentrism Social ecology (Bookchin) Technocentrism References Further reading Bosselmann, K. 1999. When Two Worlds Collide: Society and Ecology. Eckersley, R. 1992. Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. State University of New York Press. Hettinger, Ned and Throop, Bill 1999. Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing Stability and Defending Wilderness. Environmental Ethics 21: 3-21. External links The Ecological Citizen Ecospheric Ethics Ecocentric Alliance Concepts in political philosophy Environmental ethics Green politics Political ecology

Physis

Physis (; ; pl. physeis, φύσεις) is a Greek philosophical, theological, and scientific term, usually translated into English—according to its Latin translation "natura"—as "nature". The term originated in ancient Greek philosophy, and was later used in Christian theology and Western philosophy. In pre-Socratic usage, physis was contrasted with , , "law, human convention". Another opposition, particularly well-known from the works of Aristotle, is that of physis and techne – in this case, what is produced and what is artificial are distinguished from beings that arise spontaneously from their own essence, as do agents such as humans. Further, since Aristotle the physical (the subject matter of physics, properly "natural things") has been juxtaposed to the metaphysical. Linguistics The Greek word physis can be considered the equivalent of the Latin natura. The abstract term physis is derived from the verb phyesthai/phynai, which means “to grow”, “to develop”, “to become” (Frisk 2006: 1052; Caspers 2010b: 1068). In ancient philosophy one also finds the noun "physis" referring to the growth expressed in the verb phyesthai/phynai and to the origin of development (Plato, Menexenos 237a; Aristotle, Metaphysics 1014b16–17). In terms of linguistic history, this verb is related to forms such as the English “be”, German sein or Latin esse (Lohmann 1960: 174; Pfeifer 1993: 1273; Beekes 2010: 1598). In Greek itself, the aorist (a verbal aspect) of “to be” can be expressed with forms of phynai. With regard to its kinship with “being” and the basic meaning of the verb stem phy- or bhu- (“growing”), there has long been criticism of the conventional translation of the word "physis" with “nature”. With the Latin natura, which for its part goes back to the verb nasci (“to be born”), one transfers the basic word "physis" into a different sphere of association. In this way, the emerging growth (of plants, for instance) is transferred into the realm of being born. Greek philosophy Pre-Socratic usage The word φύσις is a verbal noun based on φύειν "to grow, to appear" (cognate with English "to be"). In Homeric Greek it is used quite literally, of the manner of growth of a particular species of plant. In pre-Socratic philosophy, beginning with Heraclitus, physis in keeping with its etymology of "growing, becoming" is always used in the sense of the "natural" development, although the focus might lie either with the origin, or the process, or the end result of the process. There is some evidence that by the 6th century BC, beginning with the Ionian School, the word could also be used in the comprehensive sense, as referring to "all things", as it were "Nature" in the sense of "Universe". In the Sophist tradition, the term stood in opposition to nomos, "law" or "custom", in the debate on which parts of human existence are natural, and which are due to convention. The contrast of physis vs. nomos could be applied to any subject, much like the modern contrast of "nature vs. nurture". In Plato's Laws In book 10 of Laws, Plato criticizes those who write works peri physeōs. The criticism is that such authors tend to focus on a purely "naturalistic" explanation of the world, ignoring the role of "intention" or technē, and thus becoming prone to the error of naive atheism. Plato accuses even Hesiod of this, for the reason that the gods in Hesiod "grow" out of primordial entities after the physical universe had been established. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turns out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. — Plato's Laws, Book 10(892c) – translation by Benjamin Jowett Aristotle Aristotle sought out the definition of "physis" to prove that there was more than one definition of "physis", and more than one way to interpret nature. "Though Aristotle retains the ancient sense of "physis" as growth, he insists that an adequate definition of "physis" requires the different perspectives of the four causes (aitia): material, efficient, formal, and final." Aristotle believed that nature itself contained its own source of matter (material), power/motion (efficiency), form, and end (final). A unique feature about Aristotle's definition of "physis" was his relationship between art and nature. Aristotle said that "physis" (nature) is dependent on techne (art). "The critical distinction between art and nature concerns their different efficient causes: nature is its own source of motion, whereas techne always requires a source of motion outside itself." What Aristotle was trying to bring to light, was that art does not contain within itself its form or source of motion. Consider the process of an acorn becoming an oak tree. This is a natural process that has its own driving force behind it. There is no external force pushing this acorn to its final state, rather it is progressively developing towards one specific end (telos). Atomists Quite different conceptions of "physis" are to be found in other Greek traditions of thought, e.g. the so-called Atomists, whose thinking found a continuation in the writings of Epicurus. For them, the world that appears is the result of an interplay between the void and the eternal movement of the “indivisible”, the atoms. This doctrine, most often associated with the names Democritus and Leucippus, is known mainly from the critical reactions to it in Aristotelian writings. It was supplemented by Epicurus in the light of developments in philosophy, in order to explain phenomena such as freedom of will. This was done by means of the theory of atoms’ “ability to deviate”, the parenklisis. Christian theology Though φύσις was often used in Hellenistic philosophy, it is used only 14 times in the New Testament (10 of those in the writings of Paul). Its meaning varies throughout Paul's writings. One usage refers to the established or natural order of things, as in Romans 2:14 where Paul writes "For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law." Another use of φύσις in the sense of "natural order" is Romans 1:26 where he writes "the men likewise gave up natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one another". In 1 Corinthians 11:14, Paul asks "Does not nature itself teach you that if a man wears long hair it is a disgrace for him?" This use of φύσις as referring to a "natural order" in Romans 1:26 and 1 Corinthians 11:14 may have been influenced by Stoicism. The Greek philosophers, including Aristotle and the Stoics are credited with distinguishing between man-made laws and a natural law of universal validity, but Gerhard Kittel states that the Stoic philosophers were not able to combine the concepts of νόμος (law) and φύσις (nature) to produce the concept of "natural law" in the sense that was made possible by Judeo-Christian theology. As part of the Pauline theology of salvation by grace, Paul writes in Ephesians 2:3 that "we all once lived in the passions of our flesh, carrying out the desires of the body and the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind. In the next verse he writes, "by grace you have been saved." Usage in patristic theology Theologians of the early Christian period differed in the usage of this term. In Antiochene circles, it connoted the humanity or divinity of Christ conceived as a concrete set of characteristics or attributes. In Alexandrine thinking, it meant a concrete individual or independent existent and approximated to hypostasis without being a synonym. While it refers to much the same thing as ousia it is more empirical and descriptive focussing on function while ousia is metaphysical and focuses more on reality. Although found in the context of the Trinitarian debate, it is chiefly important in the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria. Modern usage The Greek adjective physikos is represented in various forms in modern English: As physics "the study of nature", as physical (via Middle Latin physicalis) referring both to physics (the study of nature, the material universe) and to the human body. The term physiology (physiologia) is of 16th-century coinage (Jean Fernel). The term physique, for "the bodily constitution of a person", is a 19th-century loan from French. In medicine the suffix -physis occurs in such compounds as symphysis, epiphysis, and a few others, in the sense of "a growth". The physis also refers to the "growth plate", or site of growth at the end of long bones. See also Nature Ontology Essence Ousia Substance theory References Sources External links Dunshirn, Alfred 2019: Physis [English version]. In: Kirchhoff, Thomas (ed.): Online Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature / Online Lexikon Naturphilosophie. Heidelberg University Press. https://doi.org/10.11588/oepn.2019.0.66404 Ancient Greek physics Nature New Testament Greek words and phrases Theories in ancient Greek philosophy

Foucauldian discourse analysis

Foucauldian discourse analysis is a form of discourse analysis, focusing on power relationships in society as expressed through language and practices, and based on the theories of Michel Foucault. Overview Subject of analysis Besides focusing on the meaning of a given discourse, the distinguishing characteristic of this approach is its stress on power relationships. These are expressed through language and behaviour, and the relationship between language and power. This form of analysis developed out of Foucault's genealogical work, where power was linked to the formation of discourse within specific historical periods. Some versions of this method stress the genealogical application of discourse analysis to illustrate how discourse is produced to govern social groups. The method analyses how the social world, expressed through language, is affected by various sources of power. As such, this approach is close to social constructivism, as the researcher tries to understand how our society is being shaped (or constructed) by language, which in turn reflects existing power relationships. The analysis attempts to understand how individuals view the world, and studies categorizations, personal and institutional relationships, ideology, and politics. The approach was inspired by the work of both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and by critical theory. Foucauldian discourse analysis, like much of critical theory, is often used in politically oriented studies. It is preferred by scholars who criticize more traditional forms of discourse analysis as failing to account for the political implications of discourse. Political power is gained by those in power being more knowledgeable and therefore more legitimate in exercising their control over others in both blatant and invisible ways. Process Kendall and Wickham outline five steps in using "Foucauldian discourse analysis". The first step is a simple recognition that discourse is a body of statements that are organized in a regular and systematic way. The subsequent four steps are based on the identification of rules on: how those statements are created; what can be said (written) and what cannot; how spaces in which new statements can be made are created; making practices material and discursive at the same time. Areas of study Studies employing the Foucauldian discourse analysis might look at how figures in authority use language to express their dominance, and request obedience and respect from those subordinate to them. The disciplinary interaction between authority and their followers emphasize the power dynamic found within the relationships. In a specific example, a study may look at the language used by teachers towards students, or military officers towards conscripts. This approach could also be used to study how language is used as a form of resistance to those in power. Foucauldian discourse analysis has also been deployed to illustrate how scholars and activists at times unwittingly reproduce the very discourses that they aim to challenge and overcome. L'Ordre du discours L'Ordre du discours (The Order of Discourse) is Michel Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, delivered on December 2, 1970. Foucault presents the hypothesis that in any society the production of discourse is controlled, in order to eliminate powers and dangers and contain random events in this production. Speech control and exclusion procedures Foucault presents the hypothesis that, in every society, the production of discourses is controlled with the aim of: 1. exorcising its powers and dangers; 2. reducing the force of uncontrollable events; 3. hide the real forces that materialize the social constitution. To this end, he theorizes that external or internal procedures are used. External procedures These procedures are exercised from the outside and function as systems of exclusion, insofar as they concern the part of the discourse that puts power and desire into play. The three great systems of this type are: the prohibited word, the division of madness and the will to truth. Prohibition: definition of what can be said in each circumstance. It is divided into three: taboo of the object, ritual of the circumstance and privileged or exclusive right of the speaker. Division of madness: the madman's speech, according to Foucault, "cannot be transmitted like that of others": either he is considered null, or he is endowed with special powers, such as predicting the future. Will to truth: the will to truth and the institutions that surround it exert pressure on discursive production. He cites as an example the subordination of Western literature to the credible and natural imposed by science. Internal procedures These procedures start from the speech itself with the function of classifying, ordering and dictating its distribution; the discourses themselves exercise their own control and are characterized by serving as principles of classification, ordering and distribution to dominate the dimension of discourse related to what happens and to chance. This title includes the commentary, the author and the organization into disciplines. Commentary: there is a gap between the recurring discourses ("speak themselves"), constantly revisited, and the commonplace ones ("are spoken"). Those that resort to larger ones are called commentaries. Through this gap there is the possibility of creating different discourses, where comments, regardless of their apparent novelty, will always be a repetition of the first text. Author: it should not be understood as the individual who produces the speech, but rather as a "discourse grouping principle", a section of that individual. It is through the role of the author that the individual will distinguish what to write or not, what will go into his work within everything he says every day. Disciplines: principle that results from the delimitation of a "field of truth" where the discourse must be inserted. This field concerns the rules imposed for the construction of a discourse in a given field of knowledge (such as botany or medicine, which relate to its construction) as well as "a domain of objects, a set of methods, a body of propositions considered true, a set of rules and definitions, techniques and instruments" necessary for their acceptance within the "true" of a given discipline. See also References Further reading Johannes Angermuller. Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis. Subjectivity in Enunciative Pragmatics. Postdisciplinary Studies in Discourse. Basingstoke, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Johannes Angermuller. Why There Is No Poststructuralism in France. The Making of An Intellectual Generation. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. Lucy Niall. A Dictionary of Postmodernism. Wiley-Blackwell, 2016. Sara Mills. Discourse: The New Critical Idiom. Series Editor: John Drakakis, Routledge, 1997. Discourse analysis Michel Foucault

Mathematical model

A mathematical model is an abstract description of a concrete system using mathematical concepts and language. The process of developing a mathematical model is termed mathematical modeling. Mathematical models are used in applied mathematics and in the natural sciences (such as physics, biology, earth science, chemistry) and engineering disciplines (such as computer science, electrical engineering), as well as in non-physical systems such as the social sciences (such as economics, psychology, sociology, political science). It can also be taught as a subject in its own right. The use of mathematical models to solve problems in business or military operations is a large part of the field of operations research. Mathematical models are also used in music, linguistics, and philosophy (for example, intensively in analytic philosophy). A model may help to explain a system and to study the effects of different components, and to make predictions about behavior. Elements of a mathematical model Mathematical models can take many forms, including dynamical systems, statistical models, differential equations, or game theoretic models. These and other types of models can overlap, with a given model involving a variety of abstract structures. In general, mathematical models may include logical models. In many cases, the quality of a scientific field depends on how well the mathematical models developed on the theoretical side agree with results of repeatable experiments. Lack of agreement between theoretical mathematical models and experimental measurements often leads to important advances as better theories are developed. In the physical sciences, a traditional mathematical model contains most of the following elements: Governing equations Supplementary sub-models Defining equations Constitutive equations Assumptions and constraints Initial and boundary conditions Classical constraints and kinematic equations Classifications Mathematical models are of different types: Linear vs. nonlinear. If all the operators in a mathematical model exhibit linearity, the resulting mathematical model is defined as linear. A model is considered to be nonlinear otherwise. The definition of linearity and nonlinearity is dependent on context, and linear models may have nonlinear expressions in them. For example, in a statistical linear model, it is assumed that a relationship is linear in the parameters, but it may be nonlinear in the predictor variables. Similarly, a differential equation is said to be linear if it can be written with linear differential operators, but it can still have nonlinear expressions in it. In a mathematical programming model, if the objective functions and constraints are represented entirely by linear equations, then the model is regarded as a linear model. If one or more of the objective functions or constraints are represented with a nonlinear equation, then the model is known as a nonlinear model.Linear structure implies that a problem can be decomposed into simpler parts that can be treated independently and/or analyzed at a different scale and the results obtained will remain valid for the initial problem when recomposed and rescaled.Nonlinearity, even in fairly simple systems, is often associated with phenomena such as chaos and irreversibility. Although there are exceptions, nonlinear systems and models tend to be more difficult to study than linear ones. A common approach to nonlinear problems is linearization, but this can be problematic if one is trying to study aspects such as irreversibility, which are strongly tied to nonlinearity. Static vs. dynamic. A dynamic model accounts for time-dependent changes in the state of the system, while a static (or steady-state) model calculates the system in equilibrium, and thus is time-invariant. Dynamic models typically are represented by differential equations or difference equations. Explicit vs. implicit. If all of the input parameters of the overall model are known, and the output parameters can be calculated by a finite series of computations, the model is said to be explicit. But sometimes it is the output parameters which are known, and the corresponding inputs must be solved for by an iterative procedure, such as Newton's method or Broyden's method. In such a case the model is said to be implicit. For example, a jet engine's physical properties such as turbine and nozzle throat areas can be explicitly calculated given a design thermodynamic cycle (air and fuel flow rates, pressures, and temperatures) at a specific flight condition and power setting, but the engine's operating cycles at other flight conditions and power settings cannot be explicitly calculated from the constant physical properties. Discrete vs. continuous. A discrete model treats objects as discrete, such as the particles in a molecular model or the states in a statistical model; while a continuous model represents the objects in a continuous manner, such as the velocity field of fluid in pipe flows, temperatures and stresses in a solid, and electric field that applies continuously over the entire model due to a point charge. Deterministic vs. probabilistic (stochastic). A deterministic model is one in which every set of variable states is uniquely determined by parameters in the model and by sets of previous states of these variables; therefore, a deterministic model always performs the same way for a given set of initial conditions. Conversely, in a stochastic model—usually called a "statistical model"—randomness is present, and variable states are not described by unique values, but rather by probability distributions. Deductive, inductive, or floating. A is a logical structure based on a theory. An inductive model arises from empirical findings and generalization from them. The floating model rests on neither theory nor observation, but is merely the invocation of expected structure. Application of mathematics in social sciences outside of economics has been criticized for unfounded models. Application of catastrophe theory in science has been characterized as a floating model. Strategic vs. non-strategic. Models used in game theory are different in a sense that they model agents with incompatible incentives, such as competing species or bidders in an auction. Strategic models assume that players are autonomous decision makers who rationally choose actions that maximize their objective function. A key challenge of using strategic models is defining and computing solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. An interesting property of strategic models is that they separate reasoning about rules of the game from reasoning about behavior of the players. Construction In business and engineering, mathematical models may be used to maximize a certain output. The system under consideration will require certain inputs. The system relating inputs to outputs depends on other variables too: decision variables, state variables, exogenous variables, and random variables. Decision variables are sometimes known as independent variables. Exogenous variables are sometimes known as parameters or constants. The variables are not independent of each other as the state variables are dependent on the decision, input, random, and exogenous variables. Furthermore, the output variables are dependent on the state of the system (represented by the state variables). Objectives and constraints of the system and its users can be represented as functions of the output variables or state variables. The objective functions will depend on the perspective of the model's user. Depending on the context, an objective function is also known as an index of performance, as it is some measure of interest to the user. Although there is no limit to the number of objective functions and constraints a model can have, using or optimizing the model becomes more involved (computationally) as the number increases. For example, economists often apply linear algebra when using input–output models. Complicated mathematical models that have many variables may be consolidated by use of vectors where one symbol represents several variables. A priori information Mathematical modeling problems are often classified into black box or white box models, according to how much a priori information on the system is available. A black-box model is a system of which there is no a priori information available. A white-box model (also called glass box or clear box) is a system where all necessary information is available. Practically all systems are somewhere between the black-box and white-box models, so this concept is useful only as an intuitive guide for deciding which approach to take. Usually, it is preferable to use as much a priori information as possible to make the model more accurate. Therefore, the white-box models are usually considered easier, because if you have used the information correctly, then the model will behave correctly. Often the a priori information comes in forms of knowing the type of functions relating different variables. For example, if we make a model of how a medicine works in a human system, we know that usually the amount of medicine in the blood is an exponentially decaying function, but we are still left with several unknown parameters; how rapidly does the medicine amount decay, and what is the initial amount of medicine in blood? This example is therefore not a completely white-box model. These parameters have to be estimated through some means before one can use the model. In black-box models, one tries to estimate both the functional form of relations between variables and the numerical parameters in those functions. Using a priori information we could end up, for example, with a set of functions that probably could describe the system adequately. If there is no a priori information we would try to use functions as general as possible to cover all different models. An often used approach for black-box models are neural networks which usually do not make assumptions about incoming data. Alternatively, the NARMAX (Nonlinear AutoRegressive Moving Average model with eXogenous inputs) algorithms which were developed as part of nonlinear system identification can be used to select the model terms, determine the model structure, and estimate the unknown parameters in the presence of correlated and nonlinear noise. The advantage of NARMAX models compared to neural networks is that NARMAX produces models that can be written down and related to the underlying process, whereas neural networks produce an approximation that is opaque. Subjective information Sometimes it is useful to incorporate subjective information into a mathematical model. This can be done based on intuition, experience, or expert opinion, or based on convenience of mathematical form. Bayesian statistics provides a theoretical framework for incorporating such subjectivity into a rigorous analysis: we specify a prior probability distribution (which can be subjective), and then update this distribution based on empirical data. An example of when such approach would be necessary is a situation in which an experimenter bends a coin slightly and tosses it once, recording whether it comes up heads, and is then given the task of predicting the probability that the next flip comes up heads. After bending the coin, the true probability that the coin will come up heads is unknown; so the experimenter would need to make a decision (perhaps by looking at the shape of the coin) about what prior distribution to use. Incorporation of such subjective information might be important to get an accurate estimate of the probability. Complexity In general, model complexity involves a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of the model. Occam's razor is a principle particularly relevant to modeling, its essential idea being that among models with roughly equal predictive power, the simplest one is the most desirable. While added complexity usually improves the realism of a model, it can make the model difficult to understand and analyze, and can also pose computational problems, including numerical instability. Thomas Kuhn argues that as science progresses, explanations tend to become more complex before a paradigm shift offers radical simplification. For example, when modeling the flight of an aircraft, we could embed each mechanical part of the aircraft into our model and would thus acquire an almost white-box model of the system. However, the computational cost of adding such a huge amount of detail would effectively inhibit the usage of such a model. Additionally, the uncertainty would increase due to an overly complex system, because each separate part induces some amount of variance into the model. It is therefore usually appropriate to make some approximations to reduce the model to a sensible size. Engineers often can accept some approximations in order to get a more robust and simple model. For example, Newton's classical mechanics is an approximated model of the real world. Still, Newton's model is quite sufficient for most ordinary-life situations, that is, as long as particle speeds are well below the speed of light, and we study macro-particles only. Note that better accuracy does not necessarily mean a better model. Statistical models are prone to overfitting which means that a model is fitted to data too much and it has lost its ability to generalize to new events that were not observed before. Training, tuning, and fitting Any model which is not pure white-box contains some parameters that can be used to fit the model to the system it is intended to describe. If the modeling is done by an artificial neural network or other machine learning, the optimization of parameters is called training, while the optimization of model hyperparameters is called tuning and often uses cross-validation. In more conventional modeling through explicitly given mathematical functions, parameters are often determined by curve fitting. Evaluation and assessment A crucial part of the modeling process is the evaluation of whether or not a given mathematical model describes a system accurately. This question can be difficult to answer as it involves several different types of evaluation. Prediction of empirical data Usually, the easiest part of model evaluation is checking whether a model predicts experimental measurements or other empirical data not used in the model development. In models with parameters, a common approach is to split the data into two disjoint subsets: training data and verification data. The training data are used to estimate the model parameters. An accurate model will closely match the verification data even though these data were not used to set the model's parameters. This practice is referred to as cross-validation in statistics. Defining a metric to measure distances between observed and predicted data is a useful tool for assessing model fit. In statistics, decision theory, and some economic models, a loss function plays a similar role. While it is rather straightforward to test the appropriateness of parameters, it can be more difficult to test the validity of the general mathematical form of a model. In general, more mathematical tools have been developed to test the fit of statistical models than models involving differential equations. Tools from nonparametric statistics can sometimes be used to evaluate how well the data fit a known distribution or to come up with a general model that makes only minimal assumptions about the model's mathematical form. Scope of the model Assessing the scope of a model, that is, determining what situations the model is applicable to, can be less straightforward. If the model was constructed based on a set of data, one must determine for which systems or situations the known data is a "typical" set of data. The question of whether the model describes well the properties of the system between data points is called interpolation, and the same question for events or data points outside the observed data is called extrapolation. As an example of the typical limitations of the scope of a model, in evaluating Newtonian classical mechanics, we can note that Newton made his measurements without advanced equipment, so he could not measure properties of particles traveling at speeds close to the speed of light. Likewise, he did not measure the movements of molecules and other small particles, but macro particles only. It is then not surprising that his model does not extrapolate well into these domains, even though his model is quite sufficient for ordinary life physics. Philosophical considerations Many types of modeling implicitly involve claims about causality. This is usually (but not always) true of models involving differential equations. As the purpose of modeling is to increase our understanding of the world, the validity of a model rests not only on its fit to empirical observations, but also on its ability to extrapolate to situations or data beyond those originally described in the model. One can think of this as the differentiation between qualitative and quantitative predictions. One can also argue that a model is worthless unless it provides some insight which goes beyond what is already known from direct investigation of the phenomenon being studied. An example of such criticism is the argument that the mathematical models of optimal foraging theory do not offer insight that goes beyond the common-sense conclusions of evolution and other basic principles of ecology. It should also be noted that while mathematical modeling uses mathematical concepts and language, it is not itself a branch of mathematics and does not necessarily conform to any mathematical logic, but is typically a branch of some science or other technical subject, with corresponding concepts and standards of argumentation. Significance in the natural sciences Mathematical models are of great importance in the natural sciences, particularly in physics. Physical theories are almost invariably expressed using mathematical models. Throughout history, more and more accurate mathematical models have been developed. Newton's laws accurately describe many everyday phenomena, but at certain limits theory of relativity and quantum mechanics must be used. It is common to use idealized models in physics to simplify things. Massless ropes, point particles, ideal gases and the particle in a box are among the many simplified models used in physics. The laws of physics are represented with simple equations such as Newton's laws, Maxwell's equations and the Schrödinger equation. These laws are a basis for making mathematical models of real situations. Many real situations are very complex and thus modeled approximately on a computer, a model that is computationally feasible to compute is made from the basic laws or from approximate models made from the basic laws. For example, molecules can be modeled by molecular orbital models that are approximate solutions to the Schrödinger equation. In engineering, physics models are often made by mathematical methods such as finite element analysis. Different mathematical models use different geometries that are not necessarily accurate descriptions of the geometry of the universe. Euclidean geometry is much used in classical physics, while special relativity and general relativity are examples of theories that use geometries which are not Euclidean. Some applications Often when engineers analyze a system to be controlled or optimized, they use a mathematical model. In analysis, engineers can build a descriptive model of the system as a hypothesis of how the system could work, or try to estimate how an unforeseeable event could affect the system. Similarly, in control of a system, engineers can try out different control approaches in simulations. A mathematical model usually describes a system by a set of variables and a set of equations that establish relationships between the variables. Variables may be of many types; real or integer numbers, Boolean values or strings, for example. The variables represent some properties of the system, for example, the measured system outputs often in the form of signals, timing data, counters, and event occurrence. The actual model is the set of functions that describe the relations between the different variables. Examples One of the popular examples in computer science is the mathematical models of various machines, an example is the deterministic finite automaton (DFA) which is defined as an abstract mathematical concept, but due to the deterministic nature of a DFA, it is implementable in hardware and software for solving various specific problems. For example, the following is a DFA M with a binary alphabet, which requires that the input contains an even number of 0s: where and is defined by the following state-transition table: {| border="1" | || || |- |S1 || || |- |S''2 || || |} The state represents that there has been an even number of 0s in the input so far, while signifies an odd number. A 1 in the input does not change the state of the automaton. When the input ends, the state will show whether the input contained an even number of 0s or not. If the input did contain an even number of 0s, will finish in state an accepting state, so the input string will be accepted. The language recognized by is the regular language given by the regular expression 1*( 0 (1*) 0 (1*) )*, where "*" is the Kleene star, e.g., 1* denotes any non-negative number (possibly zero) of symbols "1". Many everyday activities carried out without a thought are uses of mathematical models. A geographical map projection of a region of the earth onto a small, plane surface is a model which can be used for many purposes such as planning travel. Another simple activity is predicting the position of a vehicle from its initial position, direction and speed of travel, using the equation that distance traveled is the product of time and speed. This is known as dead reckoning when used more formally. Mathematical modeling in this way does not necessarily require formal mathematics; animals have been shown to use dead reckoning. Population Growth. A simple (though approximate) model of population growth is the Malthusian growth model. A slightly more realistic and largely used population growth model is the logistic function, and its extensions. Model of a particle in a potential-field. In this model we consider a particle as being a point of mass which describes a trajectory in space which is modeled by a function giving its coordinates in space as a function of time. The potential field is given by a function and the trajectory, that is a function is the solution of the differential equation: that can be written also as Note this model assumes the particle is a point mass, which is certainly known to be false in many cases in which we use this model; for example, as a model of planetary motion. Model of rational behavior for a consumer. In this model we assume a consumer faces a choice of commodities labeled each with a market price The consumer is assumed to have an ordinal utility function (ordinal in the sense that only the sign of the differences between two utilities, and not the level of each utility, is meaningful), depending on the amounts of commodities consumed. The model further assumes that the consumer has a budget which is used to purchase a vector in such a way as to maximize The problem of rational behavior in this model then becomes a mathematical optimization problem, that is: subject to: This model has been used in a wide variety of economic contexts, such as in general equilibrium theory to show existence and Pareto efficiency of economic equilibria. Neighbour-sensing model is a model that explains the mushroom formation from the initially chaotic fungal network. In computer science, mathematical models may be used to simulate computer networks. In mechanics, mathematical models may be used to analyze the movement of a rocket model. See also Agent-based model All models are wrong Cliodynamics Computer simulation Conceptual model Decision engineering Grey box model International Mathematical Modeling Challenge Mathematical biology Mathematical diagram Mathematical economics Mathematical modelling of infectious disease Mathematical finance Mathematical psychology Mathematical sociology Microscale and macroscale models Model inversion Resilience (mathematics) Scientific model Sensitivity analysis Statistical model Surrogate model System identification References Further reading Books Aris, Rutherford [ 1978 ] ( 1994 ). Mathematical Modelling Techniques, New York: Dover. Bender, E.A. [ 1978 ] ( 2000 ). An Introduction to Mathematical Modeling, New York: Dover. Gary Chartrand (1977) Graphs as Mathematical Models, Prindle, Webber & Schmidt Dubois, G. (2018) "Modeling and Simulation", Taylor & Francis, CRC Press. Gershenfeld, N. (1998) The Nature of Mathematical Modeling, Cambridge University Press . Lin, C.C. & Segel, L.A. ( 1988 ). Mathematics Applied to Deterministic Problems in the Natural Sciences, Philadelphia: SIAM. Specific applications Papadimitriou, Fivos. (2010). Mathematical Modelling of Spatial-Ecological Complex Systems: an Evaluation. Geography, Environment, Sustainability 1(3), 67-80. An Introduction to Infectious Disease Modelling by Emilia Vynnycky and Richard G White. External links General reference Patrone, F. Introduction to modeling via differential equations, with critical remarks. Plus teacher and student package: Mathematical Modelling. Brings together all articles on mathematical modeling from Plus Magazine'', the online mathematics magazine produced by the Millennium Mathematics Project at the University of Cambridge. Philosophical Frigg, R. and S. Hartmann, Models in Science, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2006 Edition) Griffiths, E. C. (2010) What is a model? Applied mathematics Conceptual modelling Knowledge representation Mathematical terminology Mathematical and quantitative methods (economics)

Practical reason

In philosophy, practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act. It contrasts with theoretical reason, often called speculative reason, the use of reason to decide what to follow. For example, agents use practical reason to decide whether to build a telescope, but theoretical reason to decide which of two theories of light and optics is the best. Overview Practical reason is understood by most philosophers as determining a plan of action. Thomistic ethics defines the first principle of practical reason as "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." For Kant, practical reason has a law-abiding quality because the categorical imperative is understood to be binding one to one's duty rather than subjective preferences. Utilitarians tend to see reason as an instrument for the satisfactions of wants and needs. In classical philosophical terms, it is very important to distinguish three domains of human activity: theoretical reason, which investigates the truth of contingent events as well as necessary truths; practical reason, which determines whether a prospective course of action is worth pursuing; and productive or technical reason, which attempts to find the best means for a given end. Aristotle viewed philosophical activity as the highest activity of the human being and gave pride of place to metaphysics or wisdom. Since Descartes practical judgment and reasoning have been treated with less respect because of the demand for greater certainty and an infallible method to justify beliefs. In argumentation Practical reasoning is basically goal-directed reasoning from an agent's goal, and from some action selected as a means to carry out the goal, to the agent's reasoned decision to carry out the action. The agent can be a person or a technical device, such as a robot or a software device for multi-agent communications. It is a type of reasoning used all the time in everyday life and all kinds of technology where autonomous reasoning is required. Argumentation theorists have identified two kinds of practical reasoning: instrumental practical reasoning that does not explicitly take values into account, and value-based practical reasoning. The following argumentation scheme for instrumental practical reasoning is given in . The pronoun I represents an autonomous agent. Argumentation scheme for instrumental practical reasoning Critical questions CQ1: What other goals do I have that should be considered that might conflict with G? CQ2: What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be considered? CQ3: Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the most efficient? CQ4: What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about A? CQ5: What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken into account? It can be seen from CQ5 that argumentation from consequences is closely related to the scheme for practical reasoning. It has often been disputed in philosophy whether practical reasoning is purely instrumental or whether it needs to be based on values. Argument from values is combined with practical reasoning in the type of argumentation called value-based practical reasoning. The following argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning is given in . Argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning In the current circumstances R we should perform action A to achieve New Circumstances S which will realize some goal G which will promote some value V. Practical reasoning is used in arguments, but also in explanations used to draw conclusions about an agent's goals, motives or intentions, based on reports of what the agent said or did. Practical reasoning is centrally important in artificial intelligence, and also vitally important in many other fields such as law, medicine and engineering. It has been known as a distinctive type of argumentation as far back as Aristotle. See also Action theory (philosophy) Critique of Practical Reason Decisional balance, or balance-of-considerations reasoning Philosophy of action Phronesis Pure practical reason Rationality Rationality and Power Rhetorical reason Tacit knowledge References Sources Elijah Millgram, ed., Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001. . Joseph Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. . Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason", in Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995. . External links Reasoning Action (philosophy) Concepts in epistemology Concepts in ethics Critical thinking Philosophy of logic Thought

Russell's teapot

Russell's teapot is an analogy, formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), to illustrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies upon a person making empirically unfalsifiable claims, as opposed to shifting the burden of disproof to others. Russell specifically applied his analogy in the context of religion. He wrote that if he were to assert, without offering proof, that a teapot, too small to be seen by telescopes, orbits the Sun somewhere in space between the Earth and Mars, he could not expect anyone to believe him solely because his assertion could not be proven wrong. The analogy has been criticised by philosophers Brian Garvey, Peter van Inwagen and Alvin Plantinga as to its validity regarding religion. Russell's teapot has given rise to similar analogies as well as being used in parodies of religion. Description In an article titled "Is There a God?" commissioned, but never published, by Illustrated magazine in 1952, Russell wrote: In 1958, Russell elaborated on the analogy: Analysis Chemist Peter Atkins said that the point of Russell's teapot is that there is no burden on anyone to disprove assertions. Occam's razor has been interpreted to mean that the simpler theory with fewer assertions (i.e., a universe with no supernatural beings) should be the starting point in the discussion rather than the more complex theory. Responding to the invocation of Russell's "Celestial Teapot" by biologist Richard Dawkins as evidence against religion, an apologia by philosopher Paul Chamberlain contends that such arguments rely on an undue distinction between positive and negative claims. Chamberlain says it is logically erroneous to assert that positive truth claims bear a burden of proof while negative truth claims do not; he says "every truth claim, whether positive or negative, has a burden of proof." In his books A Devil's Chaplain (2003) and The God Delusion (2006), Dawkins used the teapot as an analogy of an argument against what he termed "agnostic conciliation", a policy of intellectual appeasement that allows for philosophical domains that concern exclusively religious matters. Science has no way of establishing the existence or non-existence of a god. Therefore, according to the agnostic conciliator, because it is a matter of individual taste, belief and disbelief in a supreme being are deserving of equal respect and attention. Dawkins presents the teapot as a reductio ad absurdum of this position: if agnosticism demands giving equal respect to the belief and disbelief in a supreme being, then it must also give equal respect to belief in an orbiting teapot, since the existence of an orbiting teapot is just as plausible scientifically as the existence of a supreme being. Criticism Philosopher Brian Garvey argues that the teapot analogy fails with regard to religion because, with the teapot, the believer and non-believer are simply disagreeing about one item in the universe and may hold in common all other beliefs about the universe, which is not true of an atheist and a theist. Garvey argues that it is not a matter of the theist propounding existence of a thing and the atheist simply denying it – each is asserting an alternative explanation of why the cosmos exists and is the way it is. In the words of Garvey, "the atheist is not just denying an existence that the theist affirms – the atheist is in addition committed to the view that the universe is not the way it is because of God. It is either the way it is because of something other than God, or there is no reason it is the way it is." Philosopher Peter van Inwagen argues that while Russell's teapot is a fine piece of rhetoric, its logical argument form is less than clear, and attempting to make it clear reveals that the teapot argument is very far from cogent. Another philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, states that a falsehood lies at the heart of Russell's argument. Russell's argument assumes that there is no evidence against the teapot, but Plantinga disagrees: The literary critic James Wood, without himself believing in God, says that belief in God "is a good deal more reasonable than belief in a teapot" because God is a "grand and big idea" which "is not analogically disproved by reference to celestial teapots or vacuum cleaners, which lack the necessary bigness and grandeur" and "because God cannot be reified, cannot be turned into a mere thing". One counter-argument, advanced by philosopher Eric Reitan, is that belief in God is different from belief in a teapot, because teapots are physical and therefore in principle verifiable, and that given what we know about the physical world, we have no good reason to think that belief in Russell's teapot is justified and at least some reason to think it not. Similar analogies Other thinkers have posited non-disprovable analogies, such as J. B. Bury in his 1913 book, History of Freedom of Thought. He wrote: Some people speak as if we were not justified in rejecting a theological doctrine unless we can prove it false. But the burden of proof does not lie upon the rejecter.... If you were told that in a certain planet revolving around Sirius there is a race of donkeys who speak the English language and spend their time in discussing eugenics, you could not disprove the statement, but would it, on that account, have any claim to be believed? Some minds would be prepared to accept it, if it were reiterated often enough, through the potent force of suggestion. Astronomer Carl Sagan in his 1995 book The Demon-Haunted World offered a similar non-disprovable analogy called the Dragon in the Garage as an example of sceptical thinking. If Sagan claimed there was a dragon in his garage, one would wish to verify it for yourself but if Sagan's dragon was impossible to detect, he said: Now, what's the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all? If there's no way to disprove my contention, no conceivable experiment that would count against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists? Influence in parodies of religion The concept of Russell's teapot has influenced more explicitly religion-parodying concepts, such as the Invisible Pink Unicorn, as well as the Flying Spaghetti Monster. 1960s musician and psychedelic poet Daevid Allen of the band Gong employed the image of a flying teapot in his Planet Gong Universe and the Flying Teapot album trilogy, and refers to Russell's teapot in his book Gong Dreaming 2: The Histories & Mysteries of Gong from 1969–1975. See also Ad hoc hypothesis Argument from ignorance Knightian uncertainty Sagan standard Hitchens's razor References Agnosticism Philosophy and atheism Bertrand Russell Criticism of religion Philosophical arguments Razors (philosophy) Religious parodies and satire Skepticism Teapots Epistemology of religion Thought experiments in philosophy

Macrosociology

Macrosociology is a large-scale approach to sociology, emphasizing the analysis of social systems and populations at the structural level, often at a necessarily high level of theoretical abstraction. Though macrosociology does concern itself with individuals, families, and other constituent aspects of a society, it does so in relation to larger social system of which such elements are a part. The approach is also able to analyze generalized collectivities (e.g. "the city", "the church"). In contrast, microsociology focuses on the individual social agency. Macrosociology, however, deals with broad societal trends that can later be applied to smaller features of society, or vice versa. To differentiate, macrosociology deals with issues such as war as a whole; 'distress of Third-World countries'; poverty on a national/international level; and environmental deprivation, whereas microsociology analyses issues such as the individual features of war (e.g. camaraderie, one's pleasure in violence, etc.); the role of women in third-world countries; poverty's effect on "the family"; and how immigration impacts a country's environment. A "society" can be considered as a collective of human populations that are politically autonomous, in which members engage in a broad range of cooperative activities. The people of Germany, for example, can be deemed "a society", whereas people with German heritage as a whole, including those who populate other countries, would not be considered a society, per se. Theoretical strategies There are a number of theoretical strategies within contemporary macrosociology, though four approaches, in particular, have the most influence: Idealist Strategy: Attempts to explain the basic features of social life by reference to the creative capacity of the human mind. "Idealists believe that human uniqueness lies in the fact that humans attach symbolic meanings to their actions." Materialist Strategy: Attempts to explain the basic features of human social life in terms of the practical, material conditions of their existence, including the nature of a physical environment; the level of technology; and the organization of an economic system. Functionalist Strategy (or structural functionalism): Functionalism essentially states that societies are complex systems of interrelated and interdependent parts, and each part of a society significantly influences the others. Moreover, each part of society exists because it has a specific function to perform in contributing to the society as a whole. As such, societies tend toward a state of equilibrium or homeostasis, and if there is a disturbance in any part of the society then the other parts will adjust to restore the stability of the society as a whole. Conflict Theoretical Strategy (or conflict theory): Rejects the idea that societies tend toward some basic consensus of harmony in which the features of society work for everyone's good. Rather, the basic structure of society is determined by individuals and groups acquiring scarce resources to satisfy their own needs and wants, thus creating endless conflicts. Historical macrosociology Historical macrosociology can be understood as an approach that uses historical knowledge to try to solve some of the problems seen in the field of macrosociology. As globalization has affected the world, it has also influenced historical macrosociology, leading to the development of two distinct branches: Comparative and historical sociology (CHS): a branch of historical macrosociology that bases its analysis on states, searching for "generalizations about common properties and principles of variation among instances across time and space." As of recently, it has been argued that globalization poses a threat to the CHS way of thinking because it often leads to the dissolution of distinct states. Political Economy of the World-Systems (PEWS): a branch of historical macrosociology that bases its analysis on the systems of states, searching for "generalizations about interdependencies among a system's components and of principles of variation among systemic conditions across time and space." Historical macrosociologists include: Charles Tilly: developed theory of CHS, in which analysis is based on national states. Immanuel Wallerstein: developed world systems theory, in which analysis is based on world capitalist systems. Linking micro- and macro-sociology Perhaps the most highly developed integrative effort to link micro- and macro-sociological phenomena is found in Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration, in which "social structure is defined as both constraining and enabling of human activity as well as both internal and external to the actor." Attempts to link micro and macro phenomena are evident in a growing body of empirical research. Such work appears to follow Giddens' view of the constraining and enabling nature of social structure for human activity and the need to link structure and action. "It appears safe to say that while macrosociology will always remain a central component of sociological theory and research, increasing effort will be devoted to creating workable models that link it with its microcounterpart." See also Base and superstructure Cliodynamics General systems theory Modernization theory Sociocybernetics Structure and agency Systems philosophy References Further reading Tilly, Charles. 1995. "Macrosociology Past and Future." In Newsletter of the Comparative & Historical Sociology 8(1&2):1,3–4. American Sociological Association. Francois, P., J. G. Manning, Harvey Whitehouse, Rob Brennan, et al. 2016. "A Macroscope for Global History. Seshat Global History Databank: A Methodological Overview." Digital Humanities Quarterly Journal 4(26). Methods in sociology

Denial

Denial, in ordinary English usage, has at least three meanings: asserting that any particular statement or allegation is not true (which might be accurate or inaccurate); the refusal of a request; and asserting that a true statement is not true. In psychology, denialism is a person's choice to deny reality as a way to avoid a psychologically uncomfortable truth. In psychoanalytic theory, denial is a defense mechanism in which a person is faced with a fact that is too uncomfortable to accept and rejects it instead, insisting that it is not true despite what may be overwhelming evidence. The concept of denial is important in twelve-step programs where the abandonment or reversal of denial that substance dependence is problematic forms the basis of the first, fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth steps. People who are exhibiting symptoms of a serious medical condition sometimes deny or ignore those symptoms because the idea of having a serious health problem is uncomfortable or disturbing. The American Heart Association cites denial as a principal reason that treatment of a heart attack is delayed. Because the symptoms are so varied, and often have other potential explanations, the opportunity exists for the patient to deny the emergency, often with fatal consequences. It is common for patients to delay recommended mammograms or other tests because of a fear of cancer, even though on average this worsens the long-term medical outcome. Psychology Initial short-term denial can be a good thing, giving time to adjust to a painful or stressful issue. It might also be a precursor to making some sort of change in one's life. But denial can also be harmful; if denial persists and prevents a person from taking appropriate action, it's a harmful response. In political and economic context Some people who are known as denialists or true believers have been known to be in denial of historical or scientific facts accepted by the mainstream of society or by experts, for political or economic reasons. Examples of denialism include: Climate change denial Denial of evolution Election denial movement in the United States Historical negationism (such as Holocaust denial) HIV/AIDS denialism Modern flat Earth societies See also References Further reading Cognitive biases Belief Dissent eo:Abnegacio

Subjectivism

Subjectivism is the doctrine that "our own mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our experience", instead of shared or communal, and that there is no external or objective truth. While Thomas Hobbes was an early proponent of subjectivism, the success of this position is historically attributed to Descartes and his methodic doubt. He used it as an epistemological tool to prove the opposite (an objective world of facts independent of one's own knowledge, ergo the "Father of Modern Philosophy" inasmuch as his views underlie a scientific worldview). Subjectivism accords primacy to subjective experience as fundamental of all measure and law. In extreme forms like Solipsism, it may hold that the nature and existence of every object depends solely on someone's subjective awareness of it. One may consider the qualified empiricism of George Berkeley in this context, given his reliance on God as the prime mover of human perception. Metaphysical subjectivism Subjectivism is a label used to denote the philosophical tenet that "our own mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our experience." While Thomas Hobbes was an early proponent of subjectivism, the success of this position is historically attributed to Descartes and his methodic doubt. Subjectivism has historically been condemned by Christian theologians, which oppose to it the objective authority of the church, the Christian dogma, and the revealed truth of the Bible. Christian theologians, and Karl Barth in particular, have also condemned anthropocentrism as a form of subjectivism. Metaphysical subjectivism is the theory that reality is what we perceive to be real, and that there is no underlying true reality that exists independently of perception. One can also hold that it is consciousness rather than perception that is reality (idealism). This is in contrast to metaphysical objectivism and philosophical realism, which assert that there is an underlying 'objective' reality which is perceived in different ways. This viewpoint should not be confused with the stance that "all is illusion" or that "there is no such thing as reality." Metaphysical subjectivists hold that reality is real enough. They conceive, however, that the nature of reality as related to a given consciousness is dependent on that consciousness. This has its philosophical basis in the writings of Descartes (see cogito ergo sum), and forms a cornerstone of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy. Modern versions Recently, more modest versions of metaphysical subjectivism have been explored. For example, I might hold that it is a fact that chocolate is tasty, even though I recognize that it is not tasty to everyone. This would imply that there are facts that are subjective. (Analogously, one might hold that it is a fact that it is winter in the Northern Hemisphere, even though this is not always the case, implying that some facts are temporary.) Giovanni Merlo has developed a specific version of metaphysical subjectivism, under which subjective facts always concern mental properties. With Giulia Pravato, he has argued that his version of subjectivism provides a natural way to be both a realist and a relativist about, for example, the proposition that chocolate is tasty—it is part of reality (a subjective fact) that chocolate is tasty, but that doesn't mean it's necessarily true from another's point of view. Caspar Hare's theory of egocentric presentism is another, closely related example. Subjectivism and panpsychism One possible extension of subjectivist thought is that conscious experience is available to all objectively perceivable substrates. Upon viewing images produced by a camera on the rocking side of an erupting volcano, one might suppose that their relative motion followed from a subjective conscious within the volcano. These properties might also be attributed to the camera or its various components as well. In this way, though, subjectivism morphs into a related doctrine, panpsychism, the belief that every objective entity (or event) has an inward or subjective aspect. Ethical subjectivism Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical belief that ethical sentences reduce to factual statements about the attitudes and/or conventions of individual people, or that any ethical sentence implies an attitude held by someone. As such, it is a form of moral relativism in which the truth of moral claims is relative to the attitudes of individuals (as opposed to, for instance, communities). Consider the case this way — to a person imagining what it's like to be a cat, catching and eating mice is perfectly natural and morally sound. To a person imagining they are a mouse, being hunted by cats is morally abhorrent. Though this is a loose metaphor, it serves to illustrate the view that each individual subject has their own understanding of right and wrong. An ethical subjectivist might propose, for example, that what it means for something to be morally right is just for it to be approved of. (This can lead to the belief that different things are right according to each idiosyncratic moral outlook.) One implication of these beliefs is that, unlike the moral skeptic or the non-cognitivist, the subjectivist thinks that ethical sentences, while subjective, are nonetheless the kind of thing that can be true or false depending on situation. In probability Broadly speaking, there are two views on Bayesian probability that interpret the probability concept in different ways. In probability, a subjectivist stand is the belief that probabilities are simply degrees-of-belief by rational agents in a certain proposition, and which have no objective reality in and of themselves. According to the subjectivist view, probability measures a "personal belief". For this kind of subjectivist, a phrase having to do with probability simply asserts the degree to which the subjective actor believes their assertion is true or false. As a consequence, a subjectivist has no problem with differing people giving different probabilities to an uncertain proposition, and all being correct. Many modern machine learning methods are based on objectivist Bayesian principles. According to the objectivist view, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by requirements of rationality and consistency and interpreted as an extension of logic. In attempting to justify subjective probability, Bruno de Finetti created the notion of philosophical coherence. According to his theory, a probability assertion is akin to a bet, and a bet is coherent only if it does not expose the wagerer to loss if their opponent chooses wisely. To explain his meaning, de Finetti created a thought-experiment to illustrate the need for principles of coherency in making a probabilistic statement. In his scenario, when someone states their degree-of-belief in something, one places a small bet for or against that belief and specifies the odds, with the understanding that the other party to the bet may then decide which side of the bet to take. Thus, if Bob specifies 3-to-1 odds against a proposition A, his opponent Joe may then choose whether to require Bob to risk $1 in order to win $3 if proposition A is found to be true, or to require Bob to risk $3 in order to win $1 if the proposition A is not true. In this case, it is possible for Joe to win over Bob. According to de Finetti, then, this case is incoherent. See also Egocentric predicament Dutch book Transactionalism Transcendental subjectivism Phenomenology Existentialism Austrian economics and praxeology Vertiginous question References Bayesian statistics Epistemological theories Idealism

The Beginning of Infinity

The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World is a popular science book by the physicist David Deutsch first published in 2011. Synopsis Deutsch views the Enlightenment of the 18th century as near the beginning of an infinite sequence of purposeful knowledge creation. Knowledge here consists of information with good explanatory function that has proven resistant to falsification. Any real process is physically possible to perform provided the knowledge to do so has been acquired. The Enlightenment set up the conditions for knowledge creation which disrupted the static societies that previously existed. These conditions are the valuing of creativity and the free and open debate that exposed ideas to criticism to reveal those good explanatory ideas that naturally resist being falsified due to their having basis in reality. Deutsch points to previous moments in history, such as Renaissance Florence and Plato's Academy in Golden Age Athens, where this process almost got underway before succumbing to their static societies' resistance to change. The source of intelligence is more complicated than brute computational power, Deutsch conjectures, and he points to the lack of progress in Turing test AI programs in the six decades since the Turing test was first proposed. What matters for knowledge creation, Deutsch says, is creativity. New ideas that provide good explanations for phenomena require outside-the-box thinking as the unknown is not easily predicted from past experience. To test this Deutsch suggests an AI behavioural evolution program for robot locomotion should be fed random numbers to see if knowledge spontaneously arises without inadvertent contamination from a human programmer's creative input. If it did Deutsch would concede that intelligence is not as difficult a problem as he currently thinks it is. Deutsch sees quantum superpositions and the Schrödinger equation as evidence for a many worlds quantum multiverse, where everything physically possible occurs in an infinite branching of alternate histories. Deutsch argues that a great deal of fiction is close to a fact somewhere in the multiverse. Deutsch extols the usefulness of the concept of fungibility in quantum transactions, the universes and the particles they contain are fungible in their interactions across the multiverse structure. Deutsch explains that interference offers evidence for this multiverse phenomenon where alternate histories affect one another without allowing the passage of information, as they fungibly intertwine again shortly after experiencing alternate events. According to Deutsch, our perspective on any object we detect with our senses is just a single universe slice of a much larger quantum multiverse object. Deutsch speculates on the process of human-culture development from a genetic basis through to a memetic emergence. This emergence led to the creation of static societies where innovation occurs, but most of the time at a rate too slow for individuals to notice during their lifetimes. It was only at the point where knowledge of how to purposefully create new knowledge through good explanations was acquired that the beginning of infinity took off during the Enlightenment. His explanation for human creativity is that it evolved as a way to faithfully reproduce existing memes, as this would require creative intelligence to produce a refined rule set that would more faithfully reproduce the existing memes that happened to confer benefit (and all the other memes too). From this increased creative ability, the ability to create new memes emerged and humans thus became universal constructors and technological development accelerated. Deutsch criticizes Jared Diamond's resource luck theories as to why the West came to dominate the other continents outlined in his book Guns, Germs, and Steel. For Deutsch, the sustained creation of knowledge could have arisen anywhere and led to a beginning of infinity; it just happened to arise in Europe first. Deutsch extols the philosophical concept of optimism, where although problems are inevitable, solutions will always exist provided the right knowledge is sought out and acquired. Reception David Albert, a philosophy professor at Columbia University, has described the book in a New York Times review as "brilliant and exhilarating" but presenting, instead of a "tight, grand, cumulative system of ideas," a "great, wide, learned, meandering conversation". He also states that Deutsch does not present "a live scientific hypothesis," but a "mood informed by profound and imaginative reflection on the best and most advanced science we have". Doug Johnstone writes in The Independent that Deutsch's "examination of the multiverse theory of quantum physics is great. But when he tries to apply his ideas to aesthetics, cultural creativity and moral philosophy, he seems on shakier ground and is less commanding as a result". Peter Forbes, also writing in The Independent, has a more positive take on Deutsch's ideas and mode of thinking. The Economist's review says The Beginning of Infinity is "equally bold" as Deutsch's previous book The Fabric of Reality, and "its conclusions are just as profound. Mr Deutsch argues that decent explanations inform moral philosophy, political philosophy and even aesthetics. He is provocative and persuasive." Kirkus Reviews''' take is that the book is "A philosophical exploration of progress, surprisingly lucid and thought-provoking". See alsoThe Fabric of Reality'' Age of Enlightenment Scientific Revolution Karl Popper Explanatory power References Books by David Deutsch 2011 non-fiction books Popular physics books Scientific Revolution Books about the history of physics Allen Lane (imprint) books Viking Press books Philosophy of science books

Molinism

Molinism, named after 16th-century Spanish Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, is the thesis that God has middle knowledge (or scientia media): the knowledge of counterfactuals, particularly counterfactuals regarding human action. It seeks to reconcile the apparent tension of divine providence and human free will. Prominent contemporary Molinists include William Lane Craig, Alfred Freddoso, Alvin Plantinga, Michael Bergmann, Thomas Flint, Kenneth Keathley, Dave Armstrong, John D. Laing, Timothy A. Stratton, Kirk R. MacGregor, and J.P. Moreland. God's types of knowledge According to Kenneth Keathley, author of Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach, Molinists argue that God perfectly accomplishes His will in the lives of genuinely free creatures through the use of His omniscience. Molinists, following Luis de Molina himself, present God's knowledge in a sequence of three logical moments. The first is God's knowledge of necessary truths or natural knowledge. These truths are independent of God's will and are non-contingent. This knowledge includes the full range of logical possibilities. Examples include such statements as "All bachelors are unmarried" or "X cannot be A and non-A at the same time, in the same way, at the same place" or "It is possible that X obtain." The second is called "middle knowledge" and it contains the range of possible things that would happen given certain circumstances. The third kind of knowledge is God's free knowledge. This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent upon God's will, or truths that God brings about, that He does not have to bring about. Examples might include statements such as "God created the earth" or something particular about this world which God has actualized. This is called God's "free knowledge" and it contains the future or what will happen. In between God's natural and free knowledge is His middle knowledge by which God knows what His free creatures would do under any circumstance. These are "truths" that do not have to be true, but are true without God being the primary cause of them. In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John D. Laing has provided an example of middle knowledge: "If John Laing were given the opportunity to write an article on middle knowledge for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he would freely do so." Molinists have supported their case scripturally with Christ's statement in : And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. The Molinist claims that in this example, God knows what His free creatures would choose under hypothetical circumstances, namely that the Sodomites would have responded in a way that Sodom would still have been in existence in Jesus' day, given that hypothetical situation. Matthew 11:23 contains what is commonly called a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. But counterfactuals are to be distinguished from foreknowledge, and middle knowledge is to be distinguished from God's knowledge of counterfactuals (because, for example, Thomists affirm that God has counterfactual knowledge). The Bible contains many examples of foreknowledge such as , where God tells Moses that the Israelites will forsake God after they are delivered from Egypt. Some opponents of Molinism claim that God's foreknowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals are examples of what God is going to actively bring about. That is, when Christ describes the response of the Sodomites in the aforementioned example, God was going to actively bring it about that they would remain until today. Molinists have responded to this objection by noting that scripture contains examples of God's foreknowledge of evil acts. For example, the Israelites forsaking God, or Peter's denial of Christ, are both examples of what one would call overt acts of sin. Yet, according to opponents of Molinism, God is actively bringing about these overt acts of sin. This is fallacious according to the Molinist. In order for this account of prophecy to be valid all prophecies must be wholly good, and never contain evil acts; but this is not what opponents believe to be the case. It may simply be the fact that Christ's human nature made a rational prediction of the said actions, as he once experienced beforehand from Peter, to which he replied, "Get thee behind me Satan". Knowledge of counterfactuals Molinists believe that God has knowledge not only of necessary truths and contingent truths, but also of counterfactuals. (God's knowledge of counterfactuals is often referred to as his middle knowledge, although technically that term is more broad than simply the knowledge of counterfactuals.) A counterfactual is a statement of the form "If it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q." An example would be, "If Bob were in Tahiti he would freely choose to go swimming instead of sunbathing." The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in Tahiti, God can still know whether Bob would go swimming or sunbathing. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world. Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows: God's natural knowledge of necessary truths. God's middle knowledge (including counterfactuals). —Creation of the World— God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world). Hence, God's middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in perception than God's foreknowledge. William Lane Craig points out that "without middle knowledge, God would find himself, so to speak, with knowledge of the future but without any logical prior planning of the future." The placing of God's middle knowledge between God's knowledge of necessary truths and God's creative decree is crucial. For if God's middle knowledge was after his decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize. Craig gives three reasons for holding that counterfactual statements are true: "First, we ourselves often appear to know such true counterfactuals. Second, it is plausible that the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a certain special form, usually called 'counterfactuals of creaturely freedom'. Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions." Theological implications William Lane Craig calls Molinism "one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived. For it would serve to explain not only God's knowledge of the future, but divine providence and predestination as well". Under it, God retains a measure of divine providence without hindering humanity's freedom. Since God has middle knowledge, He knows what an agent would freely do in a particular situation. So, agent A, if placed in circumstance C, would freely choose option X over option Y. Thus, if God wanted to accomplish X, all God would do is, using his middle knowledge, actualize the world in which A was placed in C, and A would freely choose X. God retains an element of providence without nullifying A's choice and God's purpose (the actualization of X) is fulfilled. Molinists also believe it can aid one's understanding of salvation. Ever since Augustine and Pelagius there has been debate over the issue of salvation; more specifically, can God elect believers and believers still come to God freely? Protestants who lean more towards God's election to salvation and sovereignty are usually Calvinists while those who lean more towards humanity's free choice follow Arminianism. However, the Molinist can embrace both God's sovereignty and human free choice. Take the salvation of Agent A. God knows that if He were to place A in circumstances C, then A would freely choose to believe in Christ. So God actualizes the world where C occurs, and then A freely believes. God still retains a measure of His divine providence because He actualizes the world in which A freely chooses. But, A still retains freedom in the sense of being able to choose either option. Molinism does not affirm two contradictory propositions when it affirms both God's providence and humanity's freedom. God's providence extends to the actualization of the world in which an agent may believe upon Christ. Difference from Calvinism and from Arminianism In contrast to the Calvinist acrostic TULIP and the Arminian Five Articles of Remonstrance, Timothy George has devised an acrostic summary for Molinism called ROSES: Radical Depravity Man's nature is radically depraved from the fall. Overcoming Grace God's grace overcomes man's radical depravity. As opposed to irresistible grace, man can respond. Sovereign Election God's sovereign election of individuals, predetermined by His exercise of middle knowledge to know who would respond to Him in faith. This is instead of unconditional election, where God elects individuals independent of their libertarian free will. Eternal life Regenerate believers will not fall away from a state of justification. Singular redemption A modified view of limited atonement. Christ's redemption is sufficient for all, but applicable only to the elect. Molinism differs from Calvinism by affirming that God grants salvation, but a person has the choice to freely accept it or reject it (but God knows that if the person were put in a particular situation he or she would not reject it). This differs from Calvinistic double predestination, which states that a person's salvation is already determined by God such that he or she cannot choose otherwise or resist God's grace. It also differs from Arminianism because it claims that God definitively knows how a person would react to the Gospel message if they were put in a particular situation. Molinists have internal disagreements about the extent to which they agree with Calvinism, some holding to unconditional election, others holding to conditional election and others still holding to an election that is partly both. Alfred Freddoso explains: “Some Molinists, including Bellarmine and Suárez, agree with the Bañezians that God antecedently elects certain people to eternal glory and only then consults His middle knowledge to discover which graces will guarantee their salvation. Thus, in Peter's case, God would have chosen different graces if those He actually chose had been foreknown to be merely sufficient and not efficacious for Peter's salvation. Other Molinists, including Molina himself, vigorously reject any such antecedent absolute election of Peter to salvation. They insist instead that God simply chooses to create a world in which He infallibly foresees Peter's good use of the supernatural graces afforded him, and only then does he accept Peter among the elect in light of his free consent to those graces.” Other Molinists avoid the issue altogether by holding to the view of trans-world damnation, the idea that the unsaved in this world would have rejected Christ in any world. Debate between Jesuit Molinists and Dominicans In 1581, a heated argument erupted between the Jesuits, who advocated Molinism, and the Dominicans, who had a different understanding of God's foreknowledge and the nature of predestination. In 1597, Pope Clement VIII established the Congregatio de Auxiliis, a committee whose purpose was to settle this controversy. In 1607, Pope Paul V ended the quarrel by forbidding each side to accuse the other of heresy, allowing both views to exist side-by-side in the Catholic Church. Other implications Thomas Flint has developed what he considers other implications of Molinism, including papal infallibility, prophecy, and prayer. William Lane Craig uses Molinism to reconcile scriptural passages warning of apostasy with passages teaching the security of believers. Craig has also used middle knowledge to explain a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, and Christian particularism. Biblical texts for Molinism Molinists have often argued that their position is the biblical one by indicating passages they understand to teach God's middle knowledge. Molina advanced the following three texts: , , and . Other passages which Molinists use are , , , , , , , , and . William Lane Craig has argued at length that many of Christ's statements seem to indicate middle knowledge. Craig cites the following passages: , , , , and . Craig accepts that the most these texts indicate is that God has counterfactual knowledge. In order for this knowledge to be middle knowledge, it must be logically prior to God's free knowledge, something the biblical texts mentioned do not seem to affirm or deny. However, Craig argues that if God's decree were logically prior to His middle knowledge, that would “make God the author of sin and to obliterate human freedom, since in that case it is God who decrees which counterfactuals about creaturely free acts are true, including counterfactuals concerning sinful human decisions. Thus, we have good reason for thinking that if such counterfactuals are now true or false, they must have been so logically prior to God's decree.” Thomas Flint claims the twin foundations of Molinism are God's providence and man's freedom. Molinism harmonizes texts teaching God's providence (such as or ) with texts emphasizing man's choice (such as or ). Criticism Molinism has been controversial and criticized since its inception in Molina's concordia. The Dominican Order which espoused strict Thomism criticized that novel doctrine and found fault with the scientia media, which they think implies passivity, which is repugnant to Pure Act. The Thomists disputed it before the Popes, as bordering on semi-Pelagianism, and afterwards there were ten years of debate in the Congregation de Auxiliis. The grounding objection is at present the most debated objection to Molinism, and often considered the strongest. The argument claims that there are no metaphysical grounds for the truthfulness of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. As Hugh J. McCann puts it: "Perhaps the most serious objection against it is that there does not appear to be any way God could come by such knowledge. Knowledge, as we have seen, is not merely a matter of conceiving a proposition and correctly believing it to be true. It requires justification: one must have good reasons for believing. But what justification could God have for believing the propositions that are supposed to constitute middle knowledge? The truth of subjunctives of freedom cannot be discerned a priori, for they are contingent. It is not a necessary truth that if placed in circumstances C, I will decide to attend the concert tonight. Nor can we allow that God might learn the truth of C from my actual behavior — that is, by observing that I actually do, in circumstances C, decide to attend the concert. For God could not make observations like this without also finding out what creative decisions He is actually going to make, which would destroy the whole purpose of middle knowledge.” Thus, there are no "truth makers" that ground counterfactuals. Opponents to middle knowledge claim that the historical antecedent of any possible world does not determine the truthfulness of a counterfactual for a creature, if that creature is free in the libertarian sense. (Molinists naturally accept this, but deny that this entails that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom lack truth values.) Many philosophers and theologians who embrace the grounding objection prefer to claim that instead of counterfactuals of freedom being true, probable counterfactuals are true instead. So instead of truths of the following sort: "God knows that in circumstance C creature X will freely do A" God knows truths of this sort: "God knows that in circumstances C creature X would probably do A." Yet, as Edward Wierenga has pointed out, probable counterfactuals are also contingent truths and fall victim to the same grounding objection. Molinists have responded to the aforementioned argument two ways. First, as William Lane Craig argues "[I]n order for a counterfactual of freedom to be true, it is not required that the events to which they refer actually exist; all that is required is that they would exist under the specified conditions." The idea here is that if we imagine God creating multiple universes in multiple dimensions and giving people libertarian free will in the various universes and letting events all play out, we would have no problem grounding counterfactuals of freedom based on the events in the various universes. But why should God need to create such universes to know how events would unfold, and couldn't how they would turn out ground statements about how they would turn out? Further objections at this point lead to a second line of response. Alvin Plantinga responds to the grounding objection by saying "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way." William Lane Craig follows up on this by pointing out the burden of proof the grounding objector bears. The grounding objection "asserts that there are no true counterfactuals about how creatures would freely act under any given set of circumstances. This assertion is no mere ostensibly undercutting defeater of Molinism, but a putatively rebutting defeater. It makes a bold and positive assertion and therefore requires warrant in excess of that which attends the Molinist assumption that there are true counterfactuals about creaturely free actions" and that "Anti–Molinists have not even begun the task of showing that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are members of the set of propositions or statements which require truth–makers if they are to be true." Thus the grounding objectors must prove a universal negative regarding the falsity of counterfactuals of freedom or they must explain their theory of the basis for truth and prove that theory true. The difference in perspectives here may be briefly described in the following way. According to critics, the way in which an agent will make a free choice inherently cannot be known apart from observation of the choice being actualized. God may be able to observe these choices via prescience, but even He must still observe them to know them. Therefore, God cannot know what we will do, unless He sees the future. The Molinist position, exemplified by Craig in the preceding paragraph, is 1) to argue this requires potentially heretical arguments relating to a limitation of divine omniscience, and 2) that a choice can be free, and yet the way in which an agent will make that choice can be known apart from observation of the actualized choice itself (and even apart from the actualization of the choice entirely). Critics maintain that this is no longer really a free choice: if it is known of someone that "If she were offered a dollar, she would take it," apart from actually offering that person a dollar, then she is not free to take or not take that dollar. The question hinges upon whether, by the definition of a free choice, it is possible to know which choice will be made independently from the actualization of that choice. See also Notes References and further reading James Beilby and Paul Eddy. Divine Foreknowledge: 4 Views Illinois, InterVarsity; 2001. William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. New York, E.J. Brill; 1991. Thomas Flint, Divine Providence, The Molinist Account. London, Cornell University Press; 1998. William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge. London, Cornell University Press; 1989. MacGregor, Kirk. 2015. Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans; 1974. Tiessen, Terrance. Providence & Prayer : How Does God Work in the World? Illinois, InterVarsity; External links Molinism from the Catholic Encyclopedia Molinism by Alfred J. Freddoso 'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ by William Lane Craig, Faith and Philosophy 6:172–88, 1989. "Middle Knowledge" from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the "Grounding Objection" by William Lane Craig Christian philosophy Catholic terminology Christian theological movements Catholic theology and doctrine Philosophical schools and traditions

Japanese proverbs

A may take the form of: a , an , or a . Although "proverb" and "saying" are practically synonymous, the same cannot be said about "idiomatic phrase" and "four-character idiom". Not all kan'yōku and yojijukugo are proverbial. For instance, the kan'yōku and the yojijukugo are not proverbs. To be considered a proverb, a word or phrase must express a common truth or wisdom; it cannot be a mere noun. Origin Numerous Asian proverbs, including Japanese, appear to be derived from older Chinese proverbs, although it often is impossible to be completely sure about the direction of cultural influences (and hence, the origins of a particular proverb or idiomatic phrase). Because traditional Japanese culture was tied to agriculture, many Japanese proverbs are derived from agricultural customs and practices. Some are from the board game Go (e.g., ), the tea ceremony (e.g., ), and Buddhism. Many four-character idioms are from Chinese philosophy written in Classical Chinese, in particular "The Analects" by Confucius. ( is Classical Chinese, from the Zhuangzi.) Usage Japanese commonly use proverbs, often citing just the first part of common phrases for brevity. For example, one might say to refer to the proverb . Whereas proverbs in English are typically multi-worded phrases (e.g. "kill two birds with one stone"), Japanese yojijukugo borrow from Chinese and compactly convey the concept in one compound word (e.g., ). Examples Sayings 出る杭は打たれる。 Deru kui wa utareru Literally: The stake that sticks up gets hammered down. Meaning: If you stand out, you will be subject to criticism. 知らぬが仏。 Shiranu ga hotoke Literally: Not knowing is Buddha. Meaning: Ignorance is bliss. / What you don't know can't hurt you. 見ぬが花。 Minu ga hana Literally: Not seeing is a flower. Meaning: Reality can't compete with imagination. 花は桜木人は武士 Hana wa sakuragi, hito wa bushi Literally: Of flowers, the cherry blossom; of men, the warrior. Meaning: As the cherry blossom is considered foremost among flowers, so the warrior is foremost among men. 井の中の蛙大海を知らず I no naka no kawazu taikai wo shirazu Literally: The frog in the well knows nothing of the ocean. Meaning: People who experience very little have a narrow world view. / He that stays in the valley shall never get over the hill. かわいい子には旅をさせよ Kawaii ko ni wa tabi wo saseyo Literally: Let your darling child travel. Meaning: If you don't discipline your child, they will not learn obedience. / Spare the rod and spoil the child. 案ずるより産むが易しい。 Anzuru yori umu ga yasashii Literally: Giving birth to a baby is easier than worrying about it. Meaning: Fear is greater than the danger. / An attempt is sometimes easier than expected. 船頭多くして船山に登る Sendou ooku shite fune yama ni noboru Literally: Too many captains will steer the ship up a mountain. Meaning: Something may not be successful if too many people work on it at the same time. / Too many cooks spoil the broth. 蛙の子は蛙 Kaeru no ko wa kaeru Literally: The child of a frog is frog. Meaning: A child grows up similar to their parents. / Like father, like son. / The apple doesn't fall too far from the tree. Idiomatic phrases 猫に小判 Neko ni koban Literally: Gold coins to a cat. Meaning: Casting pearls before swine / Giving something of value to a recipient that does not value it. 七転び八起き Nanakorobi yaoki Literally: Fall seven times and stand up eight Meaning: When life knocks you down, stand back up; What matters is not the bad that happened, but what one does after. 猿も木から落ちる Saru mo ki kara ochiru Literally: Even monkeys fall from trees Meaning: Anyone can make a mistake. 花より団子 Hana yori dango Literally: Dumplings rather than flowers Meaning: To prefer substance over form, as in to prefer to be given functional, useful items (such as dumplings) instead of merely decorative items (such as flowers). 馬の耳に念仏 Uma no mimi ni nenbutsu Literally: Chanting nenbutsu to a horse. Meaning: Attempting to make an argument to a party that will not listen. / Preaching to the deaf. 水と油 Mizu to abura Literally: Water and oil. Meaning: Totally incompatible. / [Go together like] oil and water. Four-character idioms 十人十色 jūnin toiro Literally: ten persons, ten colors Meaning: To each his own. / Different strokes for different folks. 因果応報 inga ōhō Literally: Cause bring result / bad causes bring bad results Meaning: what goes around comes around Note: this is a Buddhist sentiment that emphasizes the idea of karmic retribution. 弱肉強食 jaku niku kyō shoku Literally: The weak are meat; the strong eat. Meaning: Survival of the fittest. See also Chinese proverbs Japanese culture Japanese language Korean proverbs References Further reading De Lange, William. (2013). A Dictionary of Japanese Proverbs. TOYO Press. External links 故事ことわざ辞典 (in Japanese) Japanese Proverbs Japanese Language Kotowaza – proverbs & sayings Words of Wisdom OK312 「英⇔日」対照・名言ことわざ辞典 Nihon no Kotowaza ことわざ辞典 (in Japanese) Japanese Kotowaza (in Japanese and English) Japanese / English / Dutch v.v. Proverb dictionary Golden Proverbs A nice collection of Japanese proverbs. Proverbs by language ja:日本のことわざ

Elegance

Elegance is beauty that shows unusual effectiveness and simplicity. Elegance is frequently used as a standard of tastefulness, particularly in visual design, decorative arts, literature, science, and the aesthetics of mathematics. Elegant things often exhibit refined grace and suggest maturity, and in the case of mathematics, a deep mastery of the subject matter. General concept Essential components of the concept include simplicity and consistency of design, focusing on the essential features of an object. In art of any kind one might also require dignified grace, or restrained beauty of style. Visual stimuli are frequently considered elegant, if a small number of colors and stimuli are used, emphasizing the remainder. In philosophy of science In the philosophy of science, there are two concepts referring to two aspects of simplicity: elegance (syntactic simplicity), which means the number and complexity of hypotheses, and parsimony (ontological simplicity), which is the number and complexity of things postulated. In mathematics In mathematical problem solving, the solution to a problem (such as a proof of a mathematical theorem) exhibits mathematical elegance if it is surprisingly simple and insightful yet effective and constructive. Such solutions might involve a minimal amount of assumptions and computations, while outlining an approach that is highly generalizable. Similarly, a computer program or algorithm is elegant if it uses a small amount of code to great effect. In engineering In engineering, a solution may be considered elegant if it uses a non-obvious method to produce a solution which is highly effective and simple. An elegant solution may solve multiple problems at once, especially problems that are not thought to be inter-related. Elegance can arguably be measured for engineering problems as the ratio of problem complexity to that of solution complexity. Thus a simple (low complexity) solution to a problem of high complexity is seen as elegant. This measure does not advise of process to produce elegant solutions, and is merely a way of comparing between multiple solutions for elegance assessment. In chemistry In chemistry, chemists might look for elegance in theory, method, technique and procedure. For example, elegance might comprise creative parsimony and versatility in the utilization of resources, in the manipulation of materials, and in the effectiveness in syntheses and analysis. In pharmacy In pharmacy, elegance in formulation is important for quality as well as for effectiveness in dosage form design, a major component of pharmaceuticals. In fashion The concept of elegance in fashion is often associated with the modern taste for subtraction and understatement that capitalistic societies have developed to convey a sense of status. Unlike similar concepts such as glamour, elegance is a unisex practice, and it was initially developed amongst the male ruling classes after the French Revolution. Elegance was later adopted by ladieswear, from the 20th century onwards. This approach to clothes based on subtraction and understatement is pursued by the upper classes to avoid vulgarity, hence belonging to a lower social status. Several elements that determine the adoption of elegance and its rule have been recognized: a key role is played by class, gender, morality and taste. References Further reading Concepts in aesthetics

Critical rationalism

Critical rationalism is an epistemological philosophy advanced by Karl Popper on the basis that, if a statement cannot be logically deduced (from what is known), it might nevertheless be possible to logically falsify it. Following Hume, Popper rejected any inductive logic that is ampliative, i.e., any logic that can provide more knowledge than deductive logic. This led Popper to his falsifiability criterion. Popper wrote about critical rationalism in many works, including: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934/1959), The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Unended Quest (1976), and The Myth of the Framework (1994). Criticism, not support Critical rationalists hold that scientific theories and any other claims to knowledge can and should be rationally criticized, and (if they have empirical content) can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. Thus claims to knowledge may be contrastingly and normatively evaluated. They are either falsifiable and thus empirical (in a very broad sense), or not falsifiable and thus non-empirical. Those claims to knowledge that are potentially falsifiable can then be admitted to the body of empirical science, and then further differentiated according to whether they are retained or are later actually falsified. If retained, further differentiation may be made on the basis of how much subjection to criticism they have received, how severe such criticism has been, and how probable the theory is, with the least probable theory that still withstands attempts to falsify it being the one to be preferred. That it is the least probable theory that is to be preferred is one of the contrasting differences between critical rationalism and classical views on science, such as positivism, which holds that one should instead accept the most probable theory. The least probable theory is preferred because it is the one with the highest information content and most open to future falsification. Critical rationalism as a discourse positioned itself against what its proponents took to be epistemologically relativist philosophies, particularly post-modernist or sociological approaches to knowledge. Critical rationalism holds that knowledge is objective (in the sense of being embodied in various substrates and in the sense of not being reducible to what humans individually "know"), and also that truth is objective (exists independently of social mediation or individual perception, but is "really real"). However, this contrastive, critical approach to objective knowledge is quite different from more traditional views that also hold knowledge to be objective. (These include the classical rationalism of the Enlightenment, the verificationism of the logical positivists, or approaches to science based on induction, a supposed form of logical inference which critical rationalists reject, in line with David Hume.) For criticism is all that can be done when attempting to differentiate claims to knowledge, according to the critical rationalist. Reason is the organon of criticism, not of support; of tentative refutation, not of proof. Supposed positive evidence (such as the provision of "good reasons" for a claim, or its having been "corroborated" by making successful predictions) does nothing to bolster, support, or prove a claim, belief, or theory. In this sense, critical rationalism turns the normal understanding of a traditional rationalist, and a realist, on its head. Especially the view that a theory is better if it is less likely to be true is in direct opposition to the traditional positivistic view, which holds that one should seek theories that have a high probability. Popper notes that this "may illustrate Schopenhauer's remark that the solution of a problem often first looks like a paradox and later like a truism". Even a highly unlikely theory that conflicts with a current observation (and is thus false, like "all swans are white") must be considered to be better than one which fits observations perfectly, but is highly probable (like "all swans have a color"). This insight is the crucial difference between naive falsificationism and critical rationalism. The lower probability theory is favoured by critical rationalism because the greater the informative content of a theory the lower will be its probability, for the more information a statement contains, the greater will be the number of ways in which it may turn out to be false. The rationale behind this is simply to make it as easy as possible to find out whether the theory is false so that it can be replaced by one that is closer to the truth. It is not meant as a concession to justificatory epistemology, like assuming a theory to be "justifiable" by asserting that it is highly unlikely and yet fits observation. Critical rationalism rejects the classical position that knowledge is justified true belief; it instead holds the exact opposite: that, in general, knowledge is unjustified untrue unbelief. It is unjustified because of the non-existence of good reasons. It is untrue, because it usually contains errors that sometimes remain unnoticed for hundreds of years. And it is not belief either, because scientific knowledge, or the knowledge needed to, for example, build an airplane, is contained in no single person's mind. It is only what is recorded in artifacts such as books. Non-justificationism William Warren Bartley compared critical rationalism to the very general philosophical approach to knowledge which he called justificationism, the view that scientific theories can be justified. Most justificationists do not know that they are justificationists. Justificationism is what Popper called a "subjectivist" view of truth, in which the question of whether some statement is true is confused with the question of whether it can be justified (established, proven, verified, warranted, made well-founded, made reliable, grounded, supported, legitimated, based on evidence) in some way. According to Bartley, some justificationists are positive about this mistake. They are naïve rationalists, and thinking that their knowledge can indeed be founded, in principle, it may be deemed certain to some degree, and rational. Other justificationists are negative about these mistakes. They are epistemological relativists, and think (rightly, according to the critical rationalist) that you cannot find knowledge, that there is no source of epistemological absolutism. But they conclude (wrongly, according to the critical rationalist) that there is therefore no rationality, and no objective distinction to be made between the true and the false. By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist (a proponent of non-justificationism) regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought. Non-justificationism is also accepted by David Miller and Karl Popper. However, not all proponents of critical rationalism oppose justificationism; it is supported most prominently by John W. N. Watkins. In justificationism, criticism consists of trying to show that a claim cannot be reduced to the authority or criteria that it appeals to. That is, it regards the justification of a claim as primary, while the claim itself is secondary. By contrast, non-justificational criticism works towards attacking claims themselves. The pitfalls of justificationism and positivism The rejection of "positivist" approaches to knowledge occurs due to various pitfalls that positivism falls into. The naïve empiricism of induction was shown to be illogical by Hume. A thousand observations of some event A coinciding with some event B does not allow one to logically infer that all A events coincide with B events. According to the critical rationalist, if there is a sense in which humans accrue knowledge positively by experience, it is only by pivoting observations off existing conjectural theories pertinent to the observations, or off underlying cognitive schemas which unconsciously handle perceptions and use them to generate new theories. But these new theories advanced in response to perceived particulars are not logically "induced" from them. These new theories may be wrong. The myth that we induce theories from particulars is persistent because when we do this we are often successful, but this is due to the advanced state of our evolved tendencies. If we were really "inducting" theories from particulars, it would be inductively logical to claim that the sun sets because I get up in the morning, or that all buses must have drivers in them (if you've never seen an empty bus). Popper and David Miller showed in 1983 that evidence supposed to partly support a hypothesis can, in fact, only be neutral to, or even be counter-supportive of the hypothesis. Related to the point above, David Miller, attacks the use of "good reasons" in general (including evidence supposed to support the excess content of a hypothesis). He argues that good reasons are neither attainable, nor even desirable. Basically, Miller asserts that all arguments purporting to give valid support for a claim are either circular or question-begging. That is, if one provides a valid deductive argument (an inference from premises to a conclusion) for a given claim, then the content of the claim must already be contained within the premises of the argument (if it is not, then the argument is ampliative and so is invalid). Therefore, the claim is already presupposed by the premises, and is no more "supported" than are the assumptions upon which the claim rests, i.e. begging the question. Variations William Warren Bartley developed a variation of critical rationalism that he called pancritical rationalism. Argentine-Canadian philosopher of science Mario Bunge, who edited a book dedicated to Popper in 1964 that included a paper by Bartley, appreciated critical rationalism but found it insufficient as a comprehensive philosophy of science, so he built upon it (and many other ideas) to formulate his own account of scientific realism in his many publications. See also Münchhausen trilemma Positivism dispute People Hans Albert David Deutsch John Eccles Ernest Gellner Hans Adolf Krebs Reinhold Zippelius References Further reading Maxwell, Nicholas (2017) Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment, UCL Press, London. Free online. Niemann, Hans-Joachim. Lexikon des Kritischen Rationalismus, (Encyclopaedia of Critical Rationalism), Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2004, . More than a thousand headwords about critical rationalism, the most important arguments of K.R. Popper and H. Albert, quotations of the original wording. Edition for students in 2006, . Parusniková, Zuzana & Robert S. Cohen (2009). Rethinking Popper, Description and contents. Springer. Reinhold Zippelius. Die experimentierende Methode im Recht (trial and error in jurisprudence), (Academy of Science, Mainz) 1991, External links Critical Rationalism: a personal account Critical Rationalism Blog: Discusses critical rationalism from a libertarianist political point of view Justified True Belief and Critical Rationalism Rationalism Epistemological theories Epistemology of science Karl Popper Metatheory of science

Argumentation theory

Argumentation theory is the interdisciplinary study of how conclusions can be supported or undermined by premises through logical reasoning. With historical origins in logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, argumentation theory includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, dialogue, conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules in both artificial and real-world settings. Argumentation includes various forms of dialogue such as deliberation and negotiation which are concerned with collaborative decision-making procedures. It also encompasses eristic dialog, the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal, and didactic dialogue used for teaching. This discipline also studies the means by which people can express and rationally resolve or at least manage their disagreements. Argumentation is a daily occurrence, such as in public debate, science, and law. For example in law, in courts by the judge, the parties and the prosecutor, in presenting and testing the validity of evidences. Also, argumentation scholars study the post hoc rationalizations by which organizational actors try to justify decisions they have made irrationally. Argumentation is one of four rhetorical modes (also known as modes of discourse), along with exposition, description, and narration. Key components of argumentation Some key components of argumentation are: Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the goals of the participants in the different types of dialogue. Identifying the premises from which conclusions are derived. Establishing the "burden of proof" – determining who made the initial claim and is thus responsible for providing evidence why his/her position merits acceptance. For the one carrying the "burden of proof", the advocate, to marshal evidence for his/her position in order to convince or force the opponent's acceptance. The method by which this is accomplished is producing valid, sound, and cogent arguments, devoid of weaknesses, and not easily attacked. In a debate, fulfillment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must try to identify faulty reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples if possible, to identify any fallacies, and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons provided for his/her argument. For example, consider the following exchange, illustrating the No true Scotsman fallacy: Argument: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." Reply: "But my friend Angus, who is a Scotsman, likes sugar with his porridge." Rebuttal: "Well perhaps, but no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." In this dialogue, the proposer first offers a premise, the premise is challenged by the interlocutor, and so the proposer offers a modification of the premise, which is designed only to evade the challenge provided. Internal structure of arguments Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following: a set of assumptions or premises, a method of reasoning or deduction, and a conclusion or point. An argument has one or more premises and one conclusion. Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows logically from the assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow logically from inconsistency. Therefore, it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to set inclusion, necessary to infer the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation has been applied to the fields of law and medicine. A non-classical approach to argumentation investigates abstract arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of arguments is taken into account. Types of dialogue In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor or opponent engaged in dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to persuade each other, but there are various types of dialogue: Persuasion dialogue aims to resolve conflicting points of view of different positions. Negotiation aims to resolve conflicts of interests by cooperation and dealmaking. Inquiry aims to resolve general ignorance by the growth of knowledge. Deliberation aims to resolve a need to take action by reaching a decision. Information seeking aims to reduce one party's ignorance by requesting information from another party that is in a position to know something. Eristic aims to resolve a situation of antagonism through verbal fighting. Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge Argumentation theory had its origins in foundationalism, a theory of knowledge (epistemology) in the field of philosophy. It sought to find the grounds for claims in the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal system of knowledge. The dialectical method was made famous by Plato and his use of Socrates critically questioning various characters and historical figures. But argument scholars gradually rejected Aristotle's systematic philosophy and the idealism in Plato and Kant. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that argument premises take their soundness from formal philosophical systems. The field thus broadened. One of the original contributors to this trend was the philosopher Chaïm Perelman, who together with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca introduced the French term la nouvelle rhetorique in 1958 to describe an approach to argument which is not reduced to application of formal rules of inference. Perelman's view of argumentation is much closer to a juridical one, in which rules for presenting evidence and rebuttals play an important role. Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech (1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace argumentation" – the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The seminal essay on marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson's and C. David Mortensen's "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation" Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 143–150. This line of thinking led to a natural alliance with late developments in the sociology of knowledge. Some scholars drew connections with recent developments in philosophy, namely the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Rorty has called this shift in emphasis "the linguistic turn". In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without empirical evidence to establish convincing conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific, epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer. Out of pragmatism and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-philosophical" argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material grounds of arguments in particular intellectual fields. These theories include informal logic, social epistemology, ethnomethodology, speech acts, the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of science, and social psychology. These new theories are not non-logical or anti-logical. They find logical coherence in most communities of discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological" in that they focus on the social grounds of knowledge. Approaches to argumentation in communication and informal logic In general, the label "argumentation" is used by communication scholars such as (to name only a few) Wayne E. Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Joseph W. Wenzel, Richard Rieke, Gordon Mitchell, Carol Winkler, Eric Gander, Dennis S. Gouran, Daniel J. O'Keefe, Mark Aakhus, Bruce Gronbeck, James Klumpp, G. Thomas Goodnight, Robin Rowland, Dale Hample, C. Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, David Zarefsky, and Charles Arthur Willard, while the term "informal logic" is preferred by philosophers, stemming from University of Windsor philosophers Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. Harald Wohlrapp developed a criterion for validness (Geltung, Gültigkeit) as freedom of objections. Trudy Govier, Douglas N. Walton, Michael Gilbert, Harvey Seigal, Michael Scriven, and John Woods (to name only a few) are other prominent authors in this tradition. Over the past thirty years, however, scholars from several disciplines have co-mingled at international conferences such as that hosted by the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Other international conferences are the biannual conference held at Alta, Utah sponsored by the (US) National Communication Association and American Forensics Association and conferences sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). Some scholars (such as Ralph H. Johnson) construe the term "argument" narrowly, as exclusively written discourse or even discourse in which all premises are explicit. Others (such as Michael Gilbert) construe the term "argument" broadly, to include spoken and even nonverbal discourse, for instance the degree to which a war memorial or propaganda poster can be said to argue or "make arguments". The philosopher Stephen Toulmin has said that an argument is a claim on our attention and belief, a view that would seem to authorize treating, say, propaganda posters as arguments. The dispute between broad and narrow theorists is of long standing and is unlikely to be settled. The views of the majority of argumentation theorists and analysts fall somewhere between these two extremes. Kinds of argumentation Conversational argumentation The study of naturally occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics. It is usually called conversation analysis (CA). Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist Harvey Sacks and, among others, his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and CA has now become an established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology. It is particularly influential in interactional sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a coherent discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis have been employed by phoneticians to explore the fine phonetic details of speech. Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and several generations of their students, have described argumentation as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and systems that naturally prefer agreement. Mathematical argumentation The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. Frege in particular sought to demonstrate (see Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884, and Begriffsschrift, 1879) that arithmetical truths can be derived from purely logical axioms and therefore are, in the end, logical truths. The project was developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. If an argument can be cast in the form of sentences in symbolic logic, then it can be tested by the application of accepted proof procedures. This was carried out for arithmetic using Peano axioms, and the foundation most commonly used for most modern mathematics is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, with or without the Axiom of Choice. Be that as it may, an argument in mathematics, as in any other discipline, can be considered valid only if it can be shown that it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion. Scientific argumentation Perhaps the most radical statement of the social grounds of scientific knowledge appears in Alan G.Gross's The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Gross holds that science is rhetorical "without remainder", meaning that scientific knowledge itself cannot be seen as an idealized ground of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is produced rhetorically, meaning that it has special epistemic authority only insofar as its communal methods of verification are trustworthy. This thinking represents an almost complete rejection of the foundationalism on which argumentation was first based. Interpretive argumentation Interpretive argumentation is a dialogical process in which participants explore and/or resolve interpretations often of a text of any medium containing significant ambiguity in meaning. Interpretive argumentation is pertinent to the humanities, hermeneutics, literary theory, linguistics, semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, analytic philosophy and aesthetics. Topics in conceptual interpretation include aesthetic, judicial, logical and religious interpretation. Topics in scientific interpretation include scientific modeling. Legal argumentation By lawyers Legal arguments are spoken presentations to a judge or appellate court by a lawyer, or parties when representing themselves of the legal reasons why they should prevail. Oral argument at the appellate level accompanies written briefs, which also advance the argument of each party in the legal dispute. A closing argument, or summation, is the concluding statement of each party's counsel reiterating the important arguments for the trier of fact, often the jury, in a court case. A closing argument occurs after the presentation of evidence. By judges A judicial opinion or legal opinion is in certain jurisdictions a written explanation by a judge or group of judges that accompanies an order or ruling in a case, laying out the rationale (justification) and legal principles for the ruling. It cites the decision reached to resolve the dispute. A judicial opinion usually includes the reasons behind the decision. Where there are three or more judges, it may take the form of a majority opinion, minority opinion or a concurring opinion. Political argumentation Political arguments are used by academics, media pundits, candidates for political office and government officials. Political arguments are also used by citizens in ordinary interactions to comment about and understand political events. The rationality of the public is a major question in this line of research. Political scientist Samuel L. Popkin coined the expression "low information voters" to describe most voters who know very little about politics or the world in general. In practice, a "low information voter" may not be aware of legislation that their representative has sponsored in Congress. A low-information voter may base their ballot box decision on a media sound-bite, or a flier received in the mail. It is possible for a media sound-bite or campaign flier to present a political position for the incumbent candidate that completely contradicts the legislative action taken in the Capitol on behalf of the constituents. It may only take a small percentage of the overall voting group who base their decision on the inaccurate information to form a voter bloc large enough to swing an overall election result. When this happens, the constituency at large may have been duped or fooled. Nevertheless, the election result is legal and confirmed. Savvy Political consultants will take advantage of low-information voters and sway their votes with disinformation and fake news because it can be easier and sufficiently effective. Fact checkers have come about in recent years to help counter the effects of such campaign tactics. Psychological aspects Psychology has long studied the non-logical aspects of argumentation. For example, studies have shown that simple repetition of an idea is often a more effective method of argumentation than appeals to reason. Propaganda often utilizes repetition. "Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth" is a law of propaganda often attributed to the Nazi politician Joseph Goebbels. Nazi rhetoric has been studied extensively as, inter alia, a repetition campaign. Empirical studies of communicator credibility and attractiveness, sometimes labeled charisma, have also been tied closely to empirically-occurring arguments. Such studies bring argumentation within the ambit of persuasion theory and practice. Some psychologists such as William J. McGuire believe that the syllogism is the basic unit of human reasoning. They have produced a large body of empirical work around McGuire's famous title "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships". A central line of this way of thinking is that logic is contaminated by psychological variables such as "wishful thinking", in which subjects confound the likelihood of predictions with the desirability of the predictions. People hear what they want to hear and see what they expect to see. If planners want something to happen they see it as likely to happen. If they hope something will not happen, they see it as unlikely to happen. Thus smokers think that they personally will avoid cancer, promiscuous people practice unsafe sex, and teenagers drive recklessly. Theories Argument fields Stephen Toulmin and Charles Arthur Willard have championed the idea of argument fields, the former drawing upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language games, (Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and argumentation theory, sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field" designates discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded. For Willard, the term "field" is interchangeable with "community", "audience", or "readership". Similarly, G. Thomas Goodnight has studied "spheres" of argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or using his ideas. The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of arguments take their meaning from social communities. Stephen E. Toulmin's contributions The most influential theorist has been Stephen Toulmin, the Cambridge educated philosopher and educator, best known for his Toulmin model of argument. What follows below is a sketch of his ideas. Alternative to absolutism and relativism Toulmin model of argument Evolution of knowledge Pragma-dialectics Scholars at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous modern version of dialectic under the name pragma-dialectics. The intuitive idea is to formulate clear-cut rules that, if followed, will yield reasonable discussion and sound conclusions. Frans H. van Eemeren, the late Rob Grootendorst, and many of their students and co-authors have produced a large body of work expounding this idea. The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical discussion, all being instrumental for achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 182–183). The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as an empirical fact. The model can however serve as an important heuristic and critical tool for testing how reality approximates this ideal and point to where discourse goes wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute a fallacy. Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic approach to deal with them in a coherent way. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identified four stages of argumentative dialogue. These stages can be regarded as an argument protocol. In a somewhat loose interpretation, the stages are as follows: Confrontation stage: Presentation of the difference of opinion, such as a debate question or a political disagreement. Opening stage: Agreement on material and procedural starting points, the mutually acceptable common ground of facts and beliefs, and the rules to be followed during the discussion (such as, how evidence is to be presented, and determination of closing conditions). Argumentation stage: Presentation of reasons for and against the standpoint(s) at issue, through application of logical and common-sense principles according to the agreed-upon rules Concluding stage: Determining whether the standpoint has withstood reasonable criticism, and accepting it is justified. This occurs when the termination conditions are met (Among these could be, for example, a time limitation or the determination of an arbiter.) Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide a detailed list of rules that must be applied at each stage of the protocol. Moreover, in the account of argumentation given by these authors, there are specified roles of protagonist and antagonist in the protocol which are determined by the conditions which set up the need for argument. Walton's logical argumentation method Douglas N. Walton developed a distinctive philosophical theory of logical argumentation built around a set of practical methods to help a user identify, analyze and evaluate arguments in everyday conversational discourse and in more structured areas such as debate, law and scientific fields. There are four main components: argumentation schemes, dialogue structures, argument mapping tools, and formal argumentation systems. The method uses the notion of commitment in dialogue as the fundamental tool for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation rather than the notion of belief. Commitments are statements that the agent has expressed or formulated, and has pledged to carry out, or has publicly asserted. According to the commitment model, agents interact with each other in a dialogue in which each takes its turn to contribute speech acts. The dialogue framework uses critical questioning as a way of testing plausible explanations and finding weak points in an argument that raise doubt concerning the acceptability of the argument. Walton's logical argumentation model took a view of proof and justification different from analytic philosophy's dominant epistemology, which was based on a justified true belief framework. In the logical argumentation approach, knowledge is seen as form of belief commitment firmly fixed by an argumentation procedure that tests the evidence on both sides, and uses standards of proof to determine whether a proposition qualifies as knowledge. In this evidence-based approach, knowledge must be seen as defeasible. Artificial intelligence Efforts have been made within the field of artificial intelligence to perform and analyze argumentation with computers. Argumentation has been used to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logic, starting with the influential work of Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found particular application in domains where formal logic and classical decision theory are unable to capture the richness of reasoning, domains such as law and medicine. In Elements of Argumentation, Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter show how classical logic-based techniques can be used to capture key elements of practical argumentation. Within computer science, the ArgMAS workshop series (Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems), the CMNA workshop series, and the COMMA Conference, are regular annual events attracting participants from every continent. The journal Argument & Computation is dedicated to exploring the intersection between argumentation and computer science. ArgMining is a workshop series dedicated specifically to the related argument mining task. Data from the collaborative structured online argumentation platform Kialo has been used to train and to evaluate natural language processing AI systems such as, most commonly, BERT and its variants. This includes argument extraction, conclusion generation, argument form quality assessment, machine argumentative debate generation or participation, surfacing most relevant previously overlooked viewpoints or arguments, argumentative writing support (including sentence attackability scores), automatic real-time evaluation of how truthful or convincing a sentence is (similar to fact-checking), language model fine tuning (including for chatbots), argument impact prediction, argument classification and polarity prediction. See also References Further reading J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds. (1982). Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research. Bondarenko, A., Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and Toni, F. (1997). "An abstract, argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning", Artificial Intelligence 93(1–2), 63–101. Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and Toni, F. (2006). "Dialectic proof procedures for assumption-based, admissible argumentation." Artificial Intelligence. 170(2), 114–159. Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, and Scott Jacobs (1993). Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse Frans van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach. Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, & Jean H. M. Wagemans (2014). Handbook of Argumentation Theory (Revised edition). New York: Springer. Richard H. Gaskins (1993). Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. Yale University Press. Michael A. Gilbert (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Trudy Govier (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht, Holland; Providence, RI: Foris Publications. Trudy Govier (2014). A Practical Study of Argument, 7th ed. Australia; Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. (First edition published 1985.) Dale Hample. (1979). "Predicting belief and belief change using a cognitive theory of argument and evidence." Communication Monographs. 46, 142–146. Dale Hample. (1978). "Are attitudes arguable?" Journal of Value Inquiry. 12, 311–312. Dale Hample. (1978). "Predicting immediate belief change and adherence to argument claims." Communication Monographs, 45, 219–228. Dale Hample & Judy Hample. (1978). "Evidence credibility." Debate Issues. 12, 4–5. Dale Hample. (1977). "Testing a model of value argument and evidence." Communication Monographs. 14, 106–120. Dale Hample. (1977). "The Toulmin model and the syllogism." Journal of the American Forensic Association. 14, 1–9. Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme." The Quarterly Journal of Speech. LXVI, 251–265. Ralph H. Johnson. Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000. Ralph H. Johnson. (1996). The Rise of Informal Logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press Ralph H. Johnson. (1999). The Relation Between Formal and Informal Logic. Argumentation, 13(3) 265–74. Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2006). Logical Self-Defense.First published, McGraw Hill Ryerson, Toronto, ON, 1997, 1983, 1993. Reprinted, New York: Idebate Press. Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1987). The current state of informal logic. Informal Logic 9, 147–51. Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2000). "Informal logic: An overview." Informal Logic. 20(2): 93–99. Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical. (pp. 339–396). Elsevier: North Holland. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1970). The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame. Stephen Toulmin (1958). The Uses of Argument. Stephen Toulmin (1964). The Place of Reason in Ethics. Douglas N. Walton (1990). Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Douglas N. Walton (1992). The Place of Emotion in Argument. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Douglas N. Walton (1996). Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Douglas N. Walton (2006). Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Douglas N. Walton (2013). Methods of Argumentation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Douglas N. Walton (2016). Argument Evaluation and Evidence. Cham: Springer Joseph W. Wenzel (1990). Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide (9–26). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. John Woods. (1980). What Is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium .(pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress. John Woods. (2000). How Philosophical Is Informal Logic? Informal Logic. 20(2): 139–167. 2000 Charles Arthur Willard (1982). Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge. University of Alabama Press. Charles Arthur Willard (1989). A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. Charles Arthur Willard (1996). Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. Harald Wohlrapp (2008). Der Begriff des Arguments. Über die Beziehungen zwischen Wissen, Forschen, Glaube, Subjektivität und Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann. Flagship journals Argumentation Argumentation in Context Informal Logic Argumentation and Advocacy (formerly Journal of the American Forensic Association) Social Epistemology Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology Journal of Argument and Computation Debating Legal reasoning Social epistemology Informal arguments

Secular humanism

Secular humanism is a philosophy, belief system, or life stance that embraces human reason, logic, secular ethics, and philosophical naturalism, while specifically rejecting religious dogma, supernaturalism, and superstition as the basis of morality and decision-making. Secular humanism posits that human beings are capable of being ethical and moral without religion or belief in a deity. It does not, however, assume that humans are either inherently good or evil, nor does it present humans as being superior to nature. Rather, the humanist life stance emphasizes the unique responsibility facing humanity and the ethical consequences of human decisions. Fundamental to the concept of secular humanism is the strongly held viewpoint that ideology—be it religious or political—must be thoroughly examined by each individual and not simply accepted or rejected on faith. Along with this, an essential part of secular humanism is a continually adapting search for truth, primarily through science and philosophy. Many secular humanists derive their moral codes from a philosophy of utilitarianism, ethical naturalism, or evolutionary ethics, and some advocate a science of morality. Humanists International, founded by Julian Huxley and Jaap van Praag, is the world union of more than one hundred humanist, rationalist, irreligious, atheist, Bright, secular, Ethical Culture, and freethought organizations in more than 40 countries. The "Happy Human" is recognized as the official symbol of humanism internationally, used by secular humanist organizations in every part of the world. The term itself is not uncontested. "Secular humanism" is not a universally used phrase, and is most prevalent in the United States. Most member organisations of Humanists International, for example, use simply the term "humanism" to refer to this concept, with some commentators remarking that "'hyphenated humanism' easily becomes more about the adjective than its referent". Terminology The meaning of the phrase secular humanism has evolved over time. The phrase has been used since at least the 1930s by Anglican priests, and in 1943, the then Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, was reported as warning that the "Christian tradition... was in danger of being undermined by a 'Secular Humanism' which hoped to retain Christian values without Christian faith." During the 1960s and 1970s the term was embraced by some humanists who considered themselves anti-religious, as well as those who, although not critical of religion in its various guises, preferred a non-religious approach. The release in 1980 of A Secular Humanist Declaration by the newly formed Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism (CODESH, later the Council for Secular Humanism, which with CSICOP in 1991 jointly formed the Center for Inquiry and in 2015 both ceased separate operations, becoming CFI programs) gave secular humanism an organisational identity within the United States; but no overall organisation involved currently uses a name featuring "secular humanism". However, many adherents of the approach reject the use of the word secular as obfuscating and confusing, and consider that the term secular humanism has been "demonized by the religious right... All too often secular humanism is reduced to a sterile outlook consisting of little more than secularism slightly broadened by academic ethics. This kind of 'hyphenated humanism' easily becomes more about the adjective than its referent". Adherents of this view, including Humanists International and the American Humanist Association, consider that the unmodified but capitalized word Humanism should be used. The endorsement by the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) of the capitalization of the word Humanism, and the dropping of any adjective such as secular, is quite recent. The American Humanist Association began to adopt this view in 1973, and the IHEU formally endorsed the position in 1989. In 2002 the IHEU General Assembly unanimously adopted the Amsterdam Declaration, which represents the official defining statement of World Humanism for Humanists. This declaration makes exclusive use of capitalized Humanist and Humanism, which is consistent with IHEU's general practice and recommendations for promoting a unified Humanist identity. To further promote Humanist identity, these words are also free of any adjectives, as recommended by prominent members of IHEU. Such usage is not universal among IHEU member organizations, though most of them do observe these conventions. History Historical use of the term humanism (reflected in some current academic usage), is related to the writings of pre-Socratic philosophers. These writings were lost to European societies until Renaissance scholars rediscovered them through Muslim sources and translated them from Arabic into European languages. Thus the term humanist can mean a humanities scholar, as well as refer to The Enlightenment/ Renaissance intellectuals, and those who have agreement with the pre-Socratics, as distinct from secular humanists. Secularism In 1851 George Holyoake coined the term "secularism" to describe "a form of opinion which concerns itself only with questions, the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life". The modern secular movement coalesced around Holyoake, Charles Bradlaugh and their intellectual circle. The first secular society, the Leicester Secular Society, dates from 1851. Similar regional societies came together to form the National Secular Society in 1866. Positivism and the Church of Humanity Holyoake's secularism was strongly influenced by Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and of modern sociology. Comte believed human history would progress in a "law of three stages" from a theological phase, to the "metaphysical", toward a fully rational "positivist" society. In later life, Comte had attempted to introduce a "religion of humanity" in light of growing anti-religious sentiment and social malaise in revolutionary France. This religion would necessarily fulfil the functional, cohesive role that supernatural religion once served. Although Comte's religious movement was unsuccessful in France, the positivist philosophy of science itself played a major role in the proliferation of secular organizations in the 19th century in England. Richard Congreve visited Paris shortly after the French Revolution of 1848 where he met Auguste Comte and was heavily influenced by his positivist system. He founded the London Positivist Society in 1867, which attracted Frederic Harrison, Edward Spencer Beesly, Vernon Lushington, and James Cotter Morison amongst others. In 1878, the Society established the Church of Humanity under Congreve's direction. There they introduced sacraments of the Religion of Humanity and published a co-operative translation of Comte's Positive Polity. When Congreve repudiated their Paris co-religionists in 1878, Beesly, Harrison, Bridges, and others formed their own positivist society, with Beesly as president, and opened a rival centre, Newton Hall, in a courtyard off Fleet Street. The New York City version of the church was established by English immigrant Henry Edger. The American version of the "Church of Humanity" was largely modeled on the English church. Like the English version, it was not atheistic and had sermons and sacramental rites. At times the services included readings from conventional religious works like the Book of Isaiah. It was not as significant as the church in England, but did include several educated people. Ethical movement Another important precursor was the ethical movement of the 19th century. The South Place Ethical Society was founded in 1793 as the South Place Chapel on Finsbury Square, on the edge of the City of London, and in the early nineteenth century was known as "a radical gathering-place". At that point it was a Unitarian chapel, and that movement, like Quakers, supported female equality. Under the leadership of Reverend William Johnson Fox, it lent its pulpit to activists such as Anna Wheeler, one of the first women to campaign for feminism at public meetings in England, who spoke in 1829 on "rights of women". In later decades, the chapel changed its name to the South Place Ethical Society, now the Conway Hall Ethical Society. Today Conway Hall explicitly identifies itself as a humanist organisation, albeit one primarily focused on concerts, events, and the maintenance of its humanist library and archives. It bills itself as "The landmark of London's independent intellectual, political and cultural life." In America, the ethical movement was propounded by Felix Adler, who established the New York Society for Ethical Culture in 1877. By 1886, similar societies had sprouted up in Philadelphia, Chicago and St. Louis. These societies all adopted the same statement of principles: The belief that morality is independent of theology; The affirmation that new moral problems have arisen in modern industrial society which have not been adequately dealt with by the world's religions; The duty to engage in philanthropy in the advancement of morality; The belief that self-reform should go in lock step with social reform; The establishment of republican rather than monarchical governance of Ethical societies; The agreement that educating the young is the most important aim. In effect, the movement responded to the religious crisis of the time by replacing theology with unadulterated morality. It aimed to "disentangle moral ideas from religious doctrines, metaphysical systems, and ethical theories, and to make them an independent force in personal life and social relations." Adler was also particularly critical of the religious emphasis on creed, believing it to be the source of sectarian bigotry. He therefore attempted to provide a universal fellowship devoid of ritual and ceremony, for those who would otherwise be divided by creeds. Although the organisation was overwhelmingly made up of (and entirely led by) atheists, and were many of the same people as in the secular movement, Ethical organisations at that time publicly avoided debate about religious beliefs, publicly advocating neither atheism nor theism, agnosticism nor deism, instead stressing "deed without creed" and a "purely human basis" for morality. The first ethical society along these lines in Britain was founded in 1886. By 1896 the four London societies formed the Union of Ethical Societies, and between 1905 and 1910 there were over fifty societies in Great Britain, seventeen of which were affiliated with the Union. The Union of Ethical Societies would later incorporate as the Ethical Union, a registered charity, in 1928. Under the leadership of Harold Blackham, it renamed itself the British Humanist Association in 1967. It became the Humanists UK in 2017. Secular humanism In the 1930s, "humanism" was generally used in a religious sense by the Ethical movement in the United States, and not much favoured among the non-religious in Britain. Yet "it was from the Ethical movement that the non-religious philosophical sense of Humanism gradually emerged in Britain, and it was from the convergence of the Ethical and Rationalist movements that this sense of Humanism eventually prevailed throughout the Freethought movement". As an organised movement in its own right, humanism emerged from vibrant non-religious movements of the 18th and 19th centuries such as the Owenites, Ethical Culture, the freethinkers, secularists, and positivists, as well as a few non-religious radical Unitarian congregations. The first Humanist Manifesto announced the humanist movement by that name to the public in 1933, following work at the University of Chicago across the 1920s. The American Humanist Association was incorporated as an Illinois non-profit organization in 1943. The International Humanist and Ethical Union was founded in 1952, when a gathering of world Humanists met under the leadership of Sir Julian Huxley. The British Humanist Association took that name in 1967, but had developed from the Union of Ethical Societies which had been founded by Stanton Coit in 1896. Manifestos and declarations Humanists have put together various Humanist Manifestos, in attempts to unify the Humanist identity. The original signers of the first Humanist Manifesto of 1933, declared themselves to be religious humanists. Because, in their view, traditional religions were failing to meet the needs of their day, the signers of 1933 declared it a necessity to establish a religion that was a dynamic force to meet the needs of the day. However, this "religion" did not profess a belief in any god. Since then two additional Manifestos were written to replace the first. In the Preface of Humanist Manifesto II, in 1973, the authors Paul Kurtz and Edwin H. Wilson assert that faith and knowledge are required for a hopeful vision for the future. Manifesto II references a section on religion and states traditional religion renders a disservice to humanity. Manifesto II recognizes the following groups to be part of their naturalistic philosophy: "scientific", "ethical", "democratic", "religious", and "Marxist" humanism. International Humanist and Ethical Union In 2002, the IHEU General Assembly unanimously adopted the Amsterdam Declaration 2002 which represents the official defining statement of World Humanism. All member organisations of the International Humanist and Ethical Union are required by bylaw 5.1 to accept the Minimum Statement on Humanism: Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives. It stands for the building of a more humane society through an ethic based on human and other natural values in the spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities. It is not theistic, and it does not accept supernatural views of reality. To promote and unify "Humanist" identity, prominent members of the IHEU have endorsed the following statements on Humanist identity: All Humanists, nationally and internationally, should always use the one word Humanism as the name of Humanism: no added adjective, and the initial letter capital (by life stance orthography); All Humanists, nationally and internationally, should use a clear, recognizable and uniform symbol on their publications and elsewhere: our Humanist symbol the "Happy Human"; All Humanists, nationally and internationally, should seek to establish recognition of the fact that Humanism is a life stance. Council for Secular Humanism According to the Council for Secular Humanism, within the United States, the term "secular humanism" describes a world view with the following elements and principles: Need to test beliefs – A conviction that dogmas, ideologies and traditions, whether religious, political or social, must be weighed and tested by each individual and not simply accepted by faith. Reason, evidence, scientific method – A commitment to the use of critical reason, factual evidence and scientific method of inquiry in seeking solutions to human problems and answers to important human questions. Fulfillment, growth, creativity – A primary concern with fulfillment, growth and creativity for both the individual and humankind in general. Search for truth – A constant search for objective truth, with the understanding that new knowledge and experience constantly alter our imperfect perception of it. This life – A concern for this life (as opposed to an afterlife) and a commitment to making it meaningful through better understanding of ourselves, our history, our intellectual and artistic achievements, and the outlooks of those who differ from us. Ethics – A search for viable individual, social and political principles of ethical conduct, judging them on their ability to enhance human well-being and individual responsibility. Justice and fairness – an interest in securing justice and fairness in society and in eliminating discrimination and intolerance. Building a better world – A conviction that with reason, an open exchange of ideas, good will, and tolerance, progress can be made in building a better world for ourselves and our children. A Secular Humanist Declaration was issued in 1980 by the Council for Secular Humanism's predecessor, CODESH. It lays out ten ideals: Free inquiry as opposed to censorship and imposition of belief; separation of church and state; the ideal of freedom from religious control and from jingoistic government control; ethics based on critical intelligence rather than that deduced from religious belief; moral education; religious skepticism; reason; a belief in science and technology as the best way of understanding the world; evolution; and education as the essential method of building humane, free, and democratic societies. American Humanist Association A general outline of Humanism is also set out in the Humanist Manifesto prepared by the American Humanist Association. Ethics and relationship to religious belief In the 20th and 21st centuries, members of Humanist organizations have disagreed as to whether Humanism is a religion. They categorize themselves in one of three ways. Religious (or ethical) humanism, in the tradition of the earliest humanist organizations in the UK and US, attempts to fulfil the traditional social role of religion. Contemporary use of the word "religious" did not have the same connotations as its today. Secular humanism considers all forms of religion, including religious humanism, to be superseded. However, distinctions between "ethical" and "secular" humanists are for the most part historical, and practically meaningless in the present day or to contemporary individuals who identify with humanism. Since the mid-20th century, the development of new concepts such as the "life stance" (which encompasses both humanist views and religious outlooks) has defused this conflict. Most humanist organisations identify with "humanism" without a pre-modifier (such a "secular" or "ethical") and assert humanism as a non-religious philosophy or approach to life. Generally speaking, all humanists, including religious humanists, reject deference to supernatural beliefs; promote the practical, methodological naturalism of science; and largely endorse the stance of metaphysical naturalism. The result is an approach to issues in a secular way. Humanism addresses ethics without reference to the supernatural as well, attesting that ethics is a human enterprise (see naturalistic ethics). Accounts of humanism are also careful not to treat secular humanism analogously with religions, which implies a community who strictly attempt to adhere to the same obligations or beliefs. Holding a secular humanist philosophy does not prescribe a specific theory of morality or code of ethics. As stated by the Council for Secular Humanism, Secular humanists affirm that with the present state of scientific knowledge, dogmatic belief in an absolutist moral or ethical system (e.g. Kantian, Islamic, Christian) is unreasonable. However, it affirms that individuals engaging in rational moral/ethical deliberations can discover some universal "objective standards". Many humanists adopt principles of the Golden Rule. Some believe that universal moral standards are required for the proper functioning of society. However, they believe such necessary universality can and should be achieved by developing a richer notion of morality through reason, experience and scientific inquiry rather than through faith in a supernatural realm or source. Humanists Andrew Copson and Alice Roberts, in their casual introduction to humanism The Little Book of Humanism, propose that a distinctive aspect of humanist morality is its recognition that every moral situation is in some sense unique, and so potentially calls for different approach than the last (i.e. the ability to vacillate situationally between consequentialism and virtue ethics). In the book, they quote from Kristen Bell's advocacy of moral particularism as developed by Jonathan Dancy. Humanism is compatible with atheism, and by definition usually entails at least a form of weak or agnostic atheism, and agnosticism, but being atheist or agnostic does not automatically make one a humanist. Nevertheless, humanism is diametrically opposed to state atheism. According to Paul Kurtz, considered by some to be the founder of the American secular humanist movement, one of the differences between Marxist–Leninist atheists and humanists is the latter's commitment to "human freedom and democracy" while stating that the militant atheism of the Soviet Union consistently violated basic human rights. Kurtz also stated that the "defense of religious liberty is as precious to the humanist as are the rights of the believers". Greg M. Epstein states that, "modern, organized Humanism began, in the minds of its founders, as nothing more nor less than a religion without a God". Many humanists address ethics from the point of view of ethical naturalism, and some support an actual science of morality. Modern context Secular humanist organizations are found in all parts of the world. Those who call themselves humanists are estimated to number between four and five million people worldwide in 31 countries, but there is uncertainty because of the lack of universal definition throughout censuses. Humanism is a non-theistic belief system and, as such, it could be a sub-category of "Religion" only if that term is defined to mean "Religion and (any) belief system". This is the case in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on freedom of religion and beliefs. Many national censuses contentiously define Humanism as a further sub-category of the sub-category "No Religion", which typically includes atheist, rationalist and agnostic thought. In England, Wales 25% of people specify that they have 'No religion' up from 15% in 2001 and in Australia, around 30% of the population specifies "No Religion" in the national census. In the US, the decennial census does not inquire about religious affiliation or its lack; surveys report the figure at roughly 13%. In the 2001 Canadian census, 16.5% of the populace reported having no religious affiliation. In the 2011 Scottish census, 37% stated they had no religion up from 28% in 2001. One of the largest Humanist organizations in the world (relative to population) is Norway's Human-Etisk Forbund, which had over 86,000 members out of a population of around 4.6 million in 2013 – approximately 2% of the population. The International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) is the worldwide umbrella organization for those adhering to the Humanist life stance. It represents the views of over three million Humanists organized in over 100 national organizations in 30 countries. Originally based in the Netherlands, the IHEU now operates from London. Some regional groups that adhere to variants of the Humanist life stance, such as the humanist subgroup of the Unitarian Universalist Association, do not belong to the IHEU. Although the European Humanist Federation is also separate from the IHEU, the two organisations work together and share an agreed protocol. Starting in the mid-20th century, religious fundamentalists and the religious right began using the term "secular humanism" in hostile fashion. Francis A. Schaeffer, an American theologian based in Switzerland, seizing upon the exclusion of the divine from most humanist writings, argued that rampant secular humanism would lead to moral relativism and ethical bankruptcy in his book How Should We Then Live: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture (1976). Schaeffer portrayed secular humanism as pernicious and diabolical, and warned it would undermine the moral and spiritual tablet of America. His themes have been very widely repeated in Fundamentalist preaching in North America. Toumey (1993) found that secular humanism is typically portrayed as a vast evil conspiracy, deceitful and immoral, responsible for feminism, pornography, abortion, homosexuality, and New Age spirituality. In certain areas of the world, Humanism finds itself in conflict with religious fundamentalism, especially over the issue of the separation of church and state. Many Humanists see religions as superstitious, repressive and closed-minded, while religious fundamentalists may see Humanists as a threat to the values set out in their sacred texts. In recent years, humanists such as Dwight Gilbert Jones and R. Joseph Hoffmann have decried the over-association of Humanism with affirmations of non-belief and atheism. Jones cites a lack of new ideas being presented or debated outside of secularism, while Hoffmann is unequivocal: "I regard the use of the term 'humanism' to mean secular humanism or atheism to be one of the greatest tragedies of twentieth century movementology, perpetrated by second-class minds and perpetuated by third-class polemicists and village atheists. The attempt to sever humanism from the religious and the spiritual was a flatfooted, largely American way of taking on the religious right. It lacked finesse, subtlety, and the European sense of history." Humanist celebrations Humanism, as a term which describes a person's non-religious views, comes with no obligation to celebrate or revere specific days in the year as a religion would. As a result, individual humanists choose of their own accord whether to take part in prevailing national holidays where they live. For example, humanists in Europe and North America typically celebrate holidays, such as Christmas, but as secular holidays rather than Christian festivals. Other humanists choose to mark the winter and summer solstices and the equinoxes. European humanists may often emphasise the fact that human beings have found reasons to celebrate at these times in the Northern Hemisphere for thousands of years before the arrival of Christianity. Humanists may also identify culturally with religious traditions and holidays celebrated in their family in the community. For example, humanists with a Jewish identity will often celebrate most Jewish holidays in a secular manner. Humanists International endorses World Humanist Day (21 June), Darwin Day (12 February), Human Rights Day (10 December) and HumanLight (23 December) as official days of humanist celebration, though none are yet a public holiday. Humanist organisations typically organise events around these dates which draw attention to their programmes of activities. In many countries, humanist celebrants (officiants) perform celebrancy services for weddings, funerals, child namings, coming of age ceremonies, and other rituals. In countries like Scotland and Norway, these are extremely popular. In Scotland, more people have a humanist wedding than are married by any religious denomination, including Scotland's largest churches; over 20% of Scottish weddings are humanist. In Norway, over 20% of young people choose humanist coming-of-age ceremonies every year. Legal mentions in the United States The issue of whether and in what sense secular humanism might be considered a religion, and what the implications of this would be, has become the subject of legal maneuvering and political debate in the United States. The first reference to "secular humanism" in a US legal context was in 1961, although church-state separation lawyer Leo Pfeffer had referred to it in his 1958 book, Creeds in Competition. Hatch amendment The Education for Economic Security Act of 1984 included a section, Section 20 U.S.C.A. 4059, which initially read: "Grants under this subchapter ['Magnet School Assistance'] may not be used for consultants, for transportation or for any activity which does not augment academic improvement." With no public notice, Senator Orrin Hatch tacked onto the proposed exclusionary subsection the words "or for any course of instruction the substance of which is Secular Humanism". Implementation of this provision ran into practical problems because neither the Senator's staff, nor the Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources, nor the Department of Justice could propose a definition of what would constitute a "course of instruction the substance of which is Secular Humanism". So, this determination was left up to local school boards. The provision provoked a storm of controversy which within a year led Senator Hatch to propose, and Congress to pass, an amendment to delete from the statute all reference to secular humanism. While this episode did not dissuade fundamentalists from continuing to object to what they regarded as the "teaching of Secular Humanism", it did point out the vagueness of the claim. Case law Torcaso v. Watkins The phrase "secular humanism" became prominent after it was used in the United States Supreme Court case Torcaso v. Watkins. In the 1961 decision, Justice Hugo Black commented in a footnote, "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others." Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda The footnote in Torcaso v. Watkins referenced Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, a 1957 case in which an organization of humanists sought a tax exemption on the ground that they used their property "solely and exclusively for religious worship." Despite the group's non-theistic beliefs, the court determined that the activities of the Fellowship of Humanity, which included weekly Sunday meetings, were analogous to the activities of theistic churches and thus entitled to an exemption. The Fellowship of Humanity case itself referred to Humanism but did not mention the term secular humanism. Nonetheless, this case was cited by Justice Black to justify the inclusion of secular humanism in the list of religions in his note. Presumably Justice Black added the word secular to emphasize the non-theistic nature of the Fellowship of Humanity and distinguish their brand of humanism from that associated with, for example, Christian humanism. Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia Another case alluded to in the Torcaso v. Watkins footnote, and said by some to have established secular humanism as a religion under the law, is the 1957 tax case of Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Washington Ethical Society functions much like a church, but regards itself as a non-theistic religious institution, honoring the importance of ethical living without mandating a belief in a supernatural origin for ethics. The case involved denial of the Society's application for tax exemption as a religious organization. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's ruling, defined the Society as a religious organization, and granted its tax exemption. The Society terms its practice Ethical Culture. Though Ethical Culture is based on a humanist philosophy, it is regarded by some as a type of religious humanism. Hence, it would seem most accurate to say that this case affirmed that a religion need not be theistic to qualify as a religion under the law, rather than asserting that it established generic secular humanism as a religion. In the cases of both the Fellowship of Humanity and the Washington Ethical Society, the court decisions turned not so much on the particular beliefs of practitioners as on the function and form of the practice being similar to the function and form of the practices in other religious institutions. Peloza v. Capistrano School District The implication in Justice Black's footnote that secular humanism is a religion has been seized upon by religious opponents of the teaching of evolution, who have made the argument that teaching evolution amounts to teaching a religious idea. The claim that secular humanism could be considered a religion for legal purposes was examined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Peloza v. Capistrano School District, 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995). In this case, a science teacher argued that, by requiring him to teach evolution, his school district was forcing him to teach the "religion" of secular humanism. The Court responded, "We reject this claim because neither the Supreme Court, nor this circuit, has ever held that evolutionism or Secular Humanism are 'religions' for Establishment Clause purposes." The Supreme Court refused to review the case. The decision in a subsequent case, Kalka v. Hawk et al., offered this commentary: The Court's statement in Torcaso does not stand for the proposition that humanism, no matter in what form and no matter how practiced, amounts to a religion under the First Amendment. The Court offered no test for determining what system of beliefs qualified as a "religion" under the First Amendment. The most one may read into the Torcaso footnote is the idea that a particular non-theistic group calling itself the "Fellowship of Humanity" qualified as a religious organization under California law. Controversy Decisions about tax status have been based on whether an organization functions like a church. On the other hand, Establishment Clause cases turn on whether the ideas or symbols involved are inherently religious. An organization can function like a church while advocating beliefs that are not necessarily inherently religious. Author Marci Hamilton has pointed out: "Moreover, the debate is not between secularists and the religious. The debate is believers and non-believers on the one side debating believers and non-believers on the other side. You've got citizens who are [...] of faith who believe in the separation of church and state and you have a set of believers who do not believe in the separation of church and state." In the 1987 case of Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County a group of plaintiffs brought a case alleging that the school system was teaching the tenets of an anti-religious religion called "secular humanism" in violation of the Establishment Clause. The complainants asked that 44 different elementary through high school level textbooks (including books on home economics, social science and literature) be removed from the curriculum. Federal judge William Brevard Hand ruled for the plaintiffs agreeing that the books promoted secular humanism, which he ruled to be a religion. The Eleventh Circuit Court unanimously reversed him, with Judge Frank stating that Hand held a "misconception of the relationship between church and state mandated by the establishment clause," commenting also that the textbooks did not show "an attitude antagonistic to theistic belief. The message conveyed by these textbooks is one of neutrality: the textbooks neither endorse theistic religion as a system of belief, nor discredit it". Notable humanists Manifestos There are numerous Humanist Manifestos and Declarations, including the following: Humanist Manifesto I (1933) Humanist Manifesto II (1973) A Secular Humanist Declaration (1980) A Declaration of Interdependence (1988) IHEU Minimum Statement on Humanism (1996) HUMANISM: Why, What, and What For, in 882 Words (1996) Humanist Manifesto 2000: A Call for a New Planetary Humanism (2000) The Affirmations of Humanism: A Statement of Principles Amsterdam Declaration (2002) Humanism and Its Aspirations: Humanist Manifesto III, a Successor to the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 (2003) Alternatives to the Ten Commandments Related organizations See also Wikibooks Thinking And Moral Problems Religions And Their Source Purpose Developing A Universal Religion, four parts of a Wikibook Notes and references Further reading Bullock, Alan. The Humanist Tradition in the West (1985), by a leading historian. Coleman, T. J. III, (interviewer), Tom Flynn (interviewee) (2014, January), "Tom Flynn on 'Secular Humanism'", The Religious Studies Project Podcast Series Friess, Horace L., Felix Adler and Ethical Culture (1981). Pfeffer, Leo. "The 'Religion' of Secular Humanism", Journal of Church and State, Summer 1987, Vol. 29 Issue 3, pp. 495–507 Radest, Howard B. The Devil and Secular Humanism: The Children of the Enlightenment (1990) – a favorable account Toumey, Christopher P. "Evolution and secular humanism", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Summer 1993, Vol. 61 Issue 2, pp. 275–301, focused on fundamentalist attacks. Pinker, Steven Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (2018), Penguin Books Primary sources Adler, Felix. An Ethical Philosophy of Life (1918). Ericson, Edward L. The Humanist Way: An introduction to ethical humanist religion (1988). Frankel, Charles. The Case for Modern Man (1956). Hook, Sidney. Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th century (1987). Huxley, Julian. Essay of a Humanist (1964). Russell, Bertrand. Why I Am Not a Christian (1957).

Good

In most contexts, the concept of good denotes the conduct that should be preferred when posed with a choice between possible actions. Good is generally considered to be the opposite of evil and is of ethics, morality, philosophy, and religion. The specific meaning and etymology of the term and its associated translations among ancient and contemporary languages show substantial variation in its inflection and meaning, depending on circumstances of place and history, or of philosophical or religious context. History of Western ideas Every language has a word expressing good in the sense of "having the right or desirable quality" (ἀρετή) and bad in the sense "undesirable". A sense of moral judgment and a distinction "right and wrong, good and bad" are cultural universals. Plato and Aristotle Although the history of the origin of the use of the concept and meaning of "good" are diverse, the notable discussions of Plato and Aristotle on this subject have been of significant historical effect. The first references that are seen in Plato's The Republic to the Form of the Good are within the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates (454c–d). When trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of justice, Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves”, which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508a–c) Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight", but it is "the cause of sight itself". As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the intelligible realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge". Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain that "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e). In contrast to Plato, Aristotle discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good thereby, is irrelevant to human ethics. Plato and Aristotle were not the first contributors in ancient Greece to the study of the "good" and discussion preceding them can be found among the pre-Socratic philosophers. In Western civilisation, the basic meanings of κακός and ἀγαθός are "bad, cowardly" and "good, brave, capable", and their absolute sense emerges only around 400 BC, with Pre-Socratic philosophy, in particular Democritus. Morality in this absolute sense solidifies in the dialogues of Plato, together with the emergence of monotheistic thought (notably in Euthyphro, which ponders the concept of piety (τὸ ὅσιον) as a moral absolute). The idea is further developed in Late Antiquity by Neoplatonists, Gnostics, and Church Fathers. Ancient western religions Aside from ancient Greek studies of the "good", more than twenty-five hundred years ago in the eastern part of ancient Persia a religious philosopher called Zoroaster simplified the pantheon of early Iranian deities into two opposing forces: Ahura Mazda (Illuminating Wisdom) and Angra Mainyu (Destructive Spirit) that were in conflict. For the western world, this idea developed into a religion that spawned many sects, some of which embraced an extreme dualistic belief that the material world should be shunned and the spiritual world should be embraced. Gnostic ideas influenced many ancient religions, which teach that gnosis (variously interpreted as enlightenment, salvation, liberation, or "oneness with God") may be reached by practising philanthropy to the point of personal poverty, sexual abstinence (as far as possible for hearers and totally for initiates), and diligently searching for wisdom by helping others. This development from the relative or habitual to the absolute is evident in the terms ethics and morality as well, both being derived from terms for "regional custom", Greek ἦθος and Latin mores, respectively (see also siðr). Medieval period in western cultures Medieval Christian philosophy was founded on the work of Bishop Augustine of Hippo and theologian Thomas Aquinas, who understood evil in terms of Biblical infallibility and Biblical inerrancy, as well as the influences of Plato and Aristotle, in their appreciation of the concept of the Summum bonum. Silent contemplation was the route to appreciation of the Idea of the Good. Many medieval Christian theologians both broadened and narrowed the basic concept of Good and Evil until it came to have several, sometimes complex definitions such as: a personal preference or subjective judgment regarding any issue that might earn praise or punishment from the religious authorities religious obligation arising from Divine law leading to sainthood or damnation a generally accepted cultural standard of behaviour that might enhance group survival or wealth natural law or behaviour that induces strong emotional reaction statute law imposing a legal duty Modern concepts Kant A significant enlightenment context for studying the "good" has been its significance in the study of "the good, the true, and the beautiful" as found in Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers and religious thinkers. These discussions were undertaken by Kant, particularly in the context of his Critique of Practical Reason. Rawls John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice prioritized social arrangements and goods, based on their contribution to justice. Rawls defined justice as fairness, especially in distributing social goods, defined fairness in terms of procedures, and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives are good, if every rational individual's goods are considered fairly. Rawls's crucial invention was the original position, a procedure in which one tries to make objective moral decisions by refusing to let personal facts about oneself enter one's moral calculations. Opposition to evil In religion, ethics, and philosophy, "good and evil" is a very common dichotomy. In cultures with Manichaean and Abrahamic religious influence, evil is usually perceived as the antagonistic opposite of good. Good is that which should prevail and evil should be defeated. As a religious concept, basic ideas of a dichotomy between good and evil has developed in western cultures so that today: Good is a broad concept, but it typically deals with an association with life, charity, continuity, happiness, love, and justice Evil typically is associated with conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, discrimination designed to harm others, humiliation of people designed to diminish their psychological needs and dignity, destructiveness, and acts of unnecessary and/or indiscriminate violence the dilemma of the human condition and their capacity to perform both good and evil activities In Buddhism In cultures with Buddhist spiritual influence, this antagonistic duality itself must be overcome through achieving Śūnyatā, or emptiness. This is the recognition of good and evil not being unrelated, but two parts of a greater whole; unity, oneness, a Monism. In the field of biology Morality is regarded by some biologists (notably Edward O. Wilson, Jeremy Griffith, David Sloan Wilson, and Frans de Waal) as an important question to be addressed by the field of biology. See also Adiaphora Axiology Beneficence (ethics) Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche) Common good Descriptive ethics Devil Ethics Evil Form of the Good (Plato) Graded absolutism Inductive reasoning Meta-ethics Moral absolutism Moral dilemma Moral realism Moral universalism Morality Non-physical entity Objectivist theory of good and evil On the Genealogy of Morality (Nietzsche) Problem of evil Righteousness Sin Supreme good Tree of the knowledge of good and evil Utopia Value theory Welfarism References Further reading Aristotle. "Nicomachean Ethics". 1998. USA: Oxford University Press. (1177a15) Bentham, Jeremy. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. 1988. Prometheus Books. Corrected repr. 1984; repr. with new foreword 2001. Dewey, John. Theory of Valuation. 1948. University of Chicago Press. Griffin, James. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. 1986. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurka, Thomas. Perfectionism. 1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1996. Cambridge University Press. Third section, [446]-[447]. Kierkegaard, Søren. Either/Or. 1992. Penguin Classics. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. 1999. Belknap Press. Ross, W. D. The Right and the Good. 1930. Oxford University Press. External links Concepts in ethics Stereotypes Value (ethics) Concepts in metaphysics

Telos

Telos (; ) is a term used by philosopher Aristotle to refer to the final cause of a natural organ or entity, or of human art. Telos is the root of the modern term teleology, the study of purposiveness or of objects with a view to their aims, purposes, or intentions. Teleology is central in Aristotle's work on plant and animal biology, and human ethics, through his theory of the four causes. Aristotle's notion that everything has a telos also gave rise to epistemology. In Aristotle Telos has been consistently used in the writings of Aristotle, in which the term, on several occasions, denotes 'goal'. It is considered synonymous to teleute ('end'), particularly in Aristotle's discourse about the plot-structure in Poetics. The philosopher went as far as to say that telos can encompass all forms of human activity. One can say, for instance, that the telos of warfare is victory, or the telos of business is the creation of wealth. Within this conceptualization, there are telos that are subordinate to other telos, as all activities have their own, respective goals. For Aristotle, these subordinate telos can become the means to achieve more fundamental telos. Through this concept, for instance, the philosopher underscored the importance of politics and that all other fields are subservient to it. He explained that the telos of the blacksmith is the production of a sword, while that of the swordsman's, which uses the weapon as a tool, is to kill or incapacitate an enemy. On the other hand, the telos of these occupations are merely part of the purpose of a ruler, who must oversee the direction and well-being of a state. Moreover, it can be understood as the "supreme end of man's endeavour". Telos vs techne Telos is associated with the concept called techne, which is the rational method involved in producing an object or accomplishing a goal or objective. In the Theuth/Thamus myth, for instance, the section covering techne referred to telos and techne together. The two methods are, however, not mutually exclusive in principle. These are demonstrated in the cases of writing and seeing, as explained by Martin Heidegger: the former is considered a form of techne, as the end product lies beyond (para) the activity of producing; whereas, in seeing, there is no remainder outside of or beyond the activity itself at the moment it is accomplished. Aristotle, for his part, simply designated sophia (also referred to as the arete or excellence of philosophical reflection) as the consummation or the final cause (telos) of techne. Heidegger attempted to explain the Aristotelian conceptualization outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics, where the eidosthe soul of the makerwas treated as the arche of the thing made (ergon). In this analogy, the telos constitutes the arche but in a certain degree not at the disposition of techne. In modern philosophy The notion of purpose, or telos, has formed the foundation of cybernetics, and is now part of the modern analysis of social media platforms as intelligent social machines. Action theory also makes essential use of teleological vocabulary. From Donald Davidson's perspective, an action is just something an agent does with an intentioni.e., looking forward to some end to be achieved by the action. Action is considered just a step that is necessary to fulfill human telos, as it leads to habits. According to the Marxist perspective, historical change is dictated by socio-economic structures (or "laws"), which are simultaneously preconditions and limitations of the realization of the telos of the class struggle. See also Conatus Dysteleology Metaphysics Plato Polytely Teleological argument Teleonomy References External links Teleological Notions in Biology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Alexander, Victoria N. Narrative Telos: The Ordering Tendencies of Chance. Dactyl Foundation. Action (philosophy) Aristotelianism Concepts in ancient Greek metaphysics Concepts in social philosophy Philosophy of Aristotle Teleology

Journalism ethics and standards

Journalistic ethics and standards comprise principles of ethics and good practice applicable to journalists. This subset of media ethics is known as journalism's professional "code of ethics" and the "canons of journalism". The basic codes and canons commonly appear in statements by professional journalism associations and individual print, broadcast, and online news organizations. There are around 400 codes covering journalistic work around the world. While various codes may differ in the detail of their content and come from different cultural traditions, most share common elements including the principles of truthfulness, accuracy and fact-based communications, independence, objectivity, impartiality, fairness, respect for others and public accountability, as these apply to the gathering, editing and dissemination of newsworthy information to the public. Like many broader ethical systems, the ethics of journalism include the principle of "limitation of harm". This may involve enhanced respect for vulnerable groups and the withholding of certain details from reports, such as the names of minor children, crime victims' names, or information not materially related to the news report where the release of such information might, for example, harm someone's reputation or put them at undue risk. There has also been discussion and debate within the journalism community regarding appropriate reporting of suicide and mental health, particularly with regard to verbiage. Some journalistic codes of ethics, notably some European codes, also include a concern with discriminatory references in news based on race, religion, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disabilities. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved (in 1993) Resolution 1003 on the Ethics of Journalism, which recommends that journalists respect the presumption of innocence, in particular in cases that are still sub judice. Evolution and purpose of codes of journalism Despite modern journalism going back as far as 400 years ago, journalism became more of a necessity in some views in the 1900s. Newspapers function with the ideal of presenting "unbiased' information for the masses. The continual evolution of journalism, media and society as a whole, means that journalism will continue to face challenges in the pursuit of that ideal, and the unbiased presentation of information must be a constant topic in editorial meetings and in frequent discussions between editors and reporters. The dissemination of information in today's journalism evolution means that newsrooms must be on point, not only for their own viability, but for the people who depend upon the information provided. Journalism, at its core, is a service occupation, meant to empower the populace with truth. The occupation carries with it an incredible onus, and one that no publisher, editor or journalist should ever take lightly. Every country presents its own unique aspects and sometimes challenges as far the codes correlated with Journalism codes today. "Truth", "accuracy", and "objectivity" are cornerstones of journalism ethics. Journalists are encouraged to maintain a degree of detachment from the religions, groups, or countries they are associated with, in order to minimize potential biases in their reporting. This separation is intended to mitigate the influence of personal biases on their journalistic writing. Certain countries prefer to only have certain information put out and in certain contexts. In Islamic countries there is growing suspicion that journalism is fixed to only be positive for Islam, prompting Islam itself as the one and only truth its people should believe in. Codes of practice While journalists in the United States and European countries have led the formulation and adoption of these standards, such codes can be found in news reporting organizations in most countries with freedom of the press. The written codes and practical standards vary somewhat from country to country and organization to organization, but there is substantial overlap between mainstream publications and societies. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) launched a global Ethical Journalism Initiative in 2008 aimed at strengthening awareness of these issues within professional bodies. In 2013 the Ethical Journalism Network was founded by former IFJ General Secretary Aidan White. This coalition of international and regional media associations and journalism support groups campaigns for ethics, good governance and self-regulation across all platforms of media. One of the leading voices in the U.S. on the subject of journalistic standards and ethics is the Society of Professional Journalists. The Preamble to its Code of Ethics states: [P]ublic enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues. Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty. Professional integrity is the cornerstone of a journalist's credibility. The Radio Television Digital News Association, an organization exclusively centered on electronic journalism, has a code of ethics centering on public trust, truthfulness, fairness, integrity, independence, and accountability. Another view is offered by Jesse Hearns-Branaman, he describes the basis of journalistic professionalism as a combination of professional socialisation and the capability for self criticism and scepticism while still following the idealised goals of journalism. Common elements The primary themes common to most codes of journalistic standards and ethics are the following. Accuracy and standards for factual reporting Reporters are expected to be as accurate as possible given the time allotted to story preparation and the space available and to seek reliable sources. Properly using their sources and using accurate quoting and use of words from interview or conversation. Events with a single eyewitness are reported with attribution. Events with two or more independent eyewitnesses may be reported as fact. Controversial facts are reported with attribution. Independent fact-checking by another employee of the publisher is desirable. In 2018 "The Acton Plan" was created to help check information more effectively to hopefully get rid of false information. Corrections are published when errors are discovered. These corrections are called corrigendum in newspapers, they feature after on the next issue published. Defendants at trial are treated only as having "allegedly" committed crimes, until conviction, when their crimes are generally reported as fact (unless, that is, there is serious controversy about wrongful conviction). In most publications, when defendants are convicted or pleaded guilty they will replace "allegedly" with "convicted of", "pleaded guilty to", or "found guilty of" in their reporting to avoid the small chance of a defamation issue in the event of a wrongful conviction. Opinion surveys and statistical information deserve special treatment to communicate in precise terms any conclusions, to contextualize the results, and to specify accuracy, including estimated error and methodological criticism or flaws. Through this information can be properly analyzed and used without heavy bias. Journalism today is built off true, accurate and objective information. To remove those aspects would be damaging to the very core of not just journalism but also the very way information is spread and given to viewers and others all around the world. The audience will see the lack of ethics and standards, making others question what is good, reliable information, or not. Quality journalism that scrutinizes and criticizes social, political and economic authority is in a constant state of vulnerability to manipulation and censorship, particularly from those with money and power. Slander and libel considerations Reporting the truth is almost never libel, which makes accuracy very important. Private persons have privacy rights that must be balanced against the public interest in reporting information about them. Public figures have fewer privacy rights in U.S. law, where reporters are immune from a civil case if they have reported without malice. In Canada, there is no such immunity; reports on public figures must be backed by facts. Publishers vigorously defend libel lawsuits filed against them. Truth is always a defense in libel. Courts in the U.S. generally do not rule in favor of the party claiming libel unless they can show that the journalist "published untrue information that hurt the reputation of an identifiable person," and that the journalist was "either negligent or reckless in failing to check the information." Harm limitation principle During the normal course of an assignment a reporter might go about gathering facts and details, conducting interviews, doing research and background checks, taking photos, and recording video and sound in search of justice. Harm limitation deals with the questions of whether everything learned should be reported and, if so, how. This principle of limitation means that some weight needs to be given to the negative consequences of full disclosure, creating a practical and ethical dilemma. The Society of Professional Journalists' code of ethics offers the following advice, which is representative of the practical ideas of most professional journalists. Quoting directly: Show compassion for those who may be affected adversely by news coverage. Use special sensitivity when dealing with children and inexperienced sources or subjects. Be sensitive when seeking or using interviews or photographs of those affected by tragedy or grief. Recognise that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort. Pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance. Recognise that private people have a greater right to control information about themselves than do public officials and others who seek power, influence or attention. Only an overriding public need can justify intrusion into anyone's privacy. Show good taste. Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity. Be cautious about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes. Be judicious about naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of charges. Balance a criminal suspect's fair trial rights with the public's right to be informed. Self-regulation In addition to codes of ethics, many news organizations maintain an in-house ombudsman whose role is, in part, to keep news organizations honest and accountable to the public. The ombudsman is intended to mediate in conflicts stemming from internal or external pressures, to maintain accountability to the public for news reported, to foster self-criticism, and to encourage adherence to both codified and uncodified ethics and standards. This position may be the same or similar to the public editor, though public editors also act as a liaison with readers and do not generally become members of the Organisation of News Ombudsmen. An alternative is a news council, an industry-wide self-regulation body, such as the Press Complaints Commission, set up by UK newspapers and magazines. Such a body is capable of applying fairly consistent standards and of dealing with a higher volume of complaints but may not escape criticisms of being toothless. Ethics and standards in practice One of the most controversial issues in modern reporting is media bias, particularly on political issues, but also with regard to cultural and other issues. Another is the controversial issue of checkbook journalism, which is the practice of news reporters paying sources for their information. In the U.S., it is generally considered unethical, with most mainstream newspapers and news shows having a policy forbidding it. Meanwhile, tabloid newspapers and tabloid television shows, which rely more on sensationalism, regularly engage in the practice. There are also some wider concerns, as the media continues to change, that the brevity of news reports and use of soundbites has reduced fidelity to the truth, and may contribute to a lack of needed context for public understanding. From outside the profession, the rise of news management contributes to the real possibility that news media may be deliberately manipulated. Selective reporting (spiking, double standards) are very commonly alleged against newspapers. Attempts to identify misinformation The Action Plan, proposed, the EU authorities, is meant to propose a guide for identifying misinformation. The project seeks to target misinformation and produce unbiased and professional informational postings. Genres, ethics, and standards Advocacy journalists—a term of some debate even within the field of journalism—by definition tend to reject "objectivity", while at the same time maintaining many other common standards and ethics. Civic journalism adopts a modified approach to objectivity; instead of being uninvolved spectators, the press is active in facilitating and encouraging public debate and examining claims and issues critically. This does not necessarily imply advocacy of a specific political party or position. Creative nonfiction and literary journalism use the power of language and literary devices more akin to fiction to bring insight and depth into the often book-length treatment of the subjects about which they write. Such devices as dialogue, metaphor, digression and other such techniques offer the reader insights not usually found in standard news reportage. However, authors in this branch of journalism still maintain ethical criteria such as factual and historical accuracy as found in standard news reporting. They venture outside the boundaries of standard news reporting in offering richly detailed accounts. One widely regarded author in the genre is Joyce Carol Oates, as with her book on boxer Mike Tyson. Cosmopolitan Journalism- The cosmopolitanism imperative that our primary ethical allegiance is to a borderless, moral community of humankind is often misunderstood. Therefore, it is important to say what it implies and what it does not. The claim of humanity is not the cognition of a cold abstract principle. It is the 14 Global Journalism Ethics ability to perceive and value our common humanity in the situations of life. It is respect for mankind's rational and moral capacities wherever and however, they are manifest. It is in our concrete dealings with others that we recognize humanity's common aspirations, vulnerabilities, and capacities, as well as its potential for suffering. In a fragmented world, cosmopolitanism focuses on what is fundamental—a common aspiration to life, liberty, justice, and goodness. Investigative journalism often takes an implicit point of view on a particular public interest, by asking pointed questions and intensely probing certain questions. With outlets that otherwise strive for neutrality on political issues, the implied position is often uncontroversial—for example, that political corruption or abuse of children is wrong and perpetrators should be exposed and punished, that government money should be spent efficiently, or that the health of the public or workers or veterans should be protected. Advocacy journalists often use investigative journalism in support of a particular political position, or to expose facts that are only concerning to those with certain political opinions. Regardless of whether or not it is undertaken for a specific political faction, this genre usually puts a strong emphasis on factual accuracy, because the point of an in-depth investigation of an issue is to expose facts that spur change. Not all investigations seek to expose facts about a particular problem; some data-driven reporting does deep analysis and presents interesting results for the general edification of the audience which might be interpreted in different ways or which may contain a wealth of facts concerned with many different potential problems. A factually-constrained investigation with an implied public interest point of view may also find that the system under investigation is working well. New Journalism and Gonzo journalism also reject some of the fundamental ethical traditions and will set aside the technical standards of journalistic prose in order to express themselves and reach a particular audience or market segment. These favor a subjective perspective and emphasize immersive experiences over objective facts. Tabloid journalists are often accused of sacrificing accuracy and the personal privacy of their subjects in order to boost sales. The 2011 News International phone hacking scandal is an example of this. Supermarket tabloids are often focused on entertainment rather than news. A few have "news" stories that are so outrageous that they are widely read for entertainment purposes, not for information. Some tabloids do purport to maintain common journalistic standards but may fall far short in practice. Others make no such claims. Some publications deliberately engage in satire, but give the publication the design elements of a newspaper, for example, The Onion, and it is not unheard of for other publications to offer the occasional, humorous articles appearing on April Fool's Day. Relationship with freedom of the press In countries without freedom of the press, the above-described standards of journalism are less relevant for reporters than rules surrounding censorship and avoiding politically sensitive or taboo topics. Non-free media may be prohibited from criticising the national government, serve as a de facto distributor of propaganda, and/or engage in self-censorship. Various other forms of censorship may restrict reporting on issues the government deems sensitive. Similarly, media outlets reliant on corporate sponsorship, sponsored content, or corporate owners may prioritise the financial interests or political viewpoints of their owners, advertisers, or sponsors and self-censor information that contradicts those viewpoints. In states with strong defamation laws, the risk of lawsuit may also have a chilling effect on journalists. By interfering with the aforementioned obligations of journalistic ethics, these factors illustrate the extent to which ethics in journalism are shaped by the law surrounding journalism. Freedom of the press is expressly protected by section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 16 of the South African Bill of Rights, and is protected as part of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In Canada, freedom of the press and other Charter rights are subject to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which provides that rights are subject to such restrictions as can demonstrably be justified in a free and democratic society, from which courts have developed the Oakes test. The South African Bill of Rights, and the constitutions of countries like Kenya which were inspired by the post-Apartheid constitution of South Africa, provide for rights to be limited in a similar manner to the Oakes test, as codified in section 36 of the South African Bill of Rights. In South Africa and the signatories to the ECHR, freedom of the press is also subject to specific enumerated limits prohibiting hate speech, propaganda for war, and defamation. In the United States, freedom of the press is protected under the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Under the First Amendment, the government is not allowed to censor the press. Unlike modern bills of rights like the Canadian Charter or the South African Bill of Rights, the rights enumerated in the US Constitution are written so as to be absolute. Variations, violations, and controversies There are a number of finer points of journalistic procedure that foster disagreements in principle and variation in practice among "mainstream" journalists in the free press. Laws concerning libel and slander vary from country to country, and local journalistic standards may be tailored to fit. For example, the United Kingdom has a broader definition of libel than does the United States. Accuracy is important as a core value and to maintain credibility, but especially in broadcast media, audience share often gravitates toward outlets that are reporting new information first. Different organizations may balance speed and accuracy in different ways. The New York Times, for instance, tends to print longer, more detailed, less speculative, and more thoroughly verified pieces a day or two later than many other newspapers. 24-hour television news networks tend to place much more emphasis on getting the "scoop". Here, viewers may switch channels at a moment's notice; with fierce competition for ratings and a large amount of airtime to fill, fresh material is very valuable. Because of the fast turn-around, reporters for these networks may be under considerable time pressure, which reduces their ability to verify information. Laws with regard to personal privacy, official secrets, and media disclosure of names and facts from criminal cases and civil lawsuits differ widely, and journalistic standards may vary accordingly. Different organizations may have different answers to questions about when it is journalistically acceptable to skirt, circumvent, or even break these regulations. Another example of differences surrounding harm reduction is the reporting of preliminary election results. In the United States, some news organizations feel that it is harmful to the democratic process to report exit poll results or preliminary returns while voting is still open. Such reports may influence people who vote later in the day, or who are in western time zones, in their decisions about how and whether or not to vote. There is also some concern that such preliminary results are often inaccurate and may be misleading to the public. Other outlets feel that this information is a vital part of the transparency of the election process, and see no harm (if not considerable benefit) in reporting it. Objectivity as a journalistic standard varies to some degree depending on the industry and country. For example, the government-funded BBC in the United Kingdom places a strong emphasis on political neutrality, but British newspapers more often tend to adopt political affiliations or leanings in both coverage and audience, sometimes explicitly. In the United States, major newspapers usually explicitly claim objectivity as a goal in news coverage, though most have separate editorial boards that endorse specific candidates and publish opinions on specific issues. Adherence to a claimed standard of objectivity is a constant subject of debate. For example, mainstream national cable news channels in the United States claim political objectivity but to various degrees, Fox News has been accused of conservative bias and MSNBC accused of liberal bias. The degree to which these leanings influence cherry-picking of facts, factual accuracy, the predominance of non-news opinion and commentators, audience opinion of the issues and candidates covered, visual composition, tone and vocabulary of stories is hotly debated. News value is generally used to select stories for print, broadcast, blogs, and web portals, including those that focus on a specific topic. To a large degree, news value depends on the target audience. For example, a minor story in the United States is more likely to appear on CNN than a minor story in the Middle East which might be more likely to appear on Al Jazeera simply due to the geographic distribution of the channels' respective audiences. It is a matter of debate whether this means that either network is less than objective, and that controversy is even more complicated when considering coverage of political stories for different audiences that have different political demographics (as with Fox News vs. MSNBC). Some digital media platforms can use criteria to choose stories which are different from traditional news values. For example, while the Google News portal essentially chooses stories based on news value (though indirectly, through the choices of large numbers of independent outlets), users can set Google Alerts on specific terms which define personal subjective interests. Search engines, news aggregators, and social network feeds sometimes change the presentation of content depending on the consumer's expressed or inferred preferences or leanings. This has both been cheered as bypassing traditional "gatekeepers" and whatever biases they may have in favor of audience-centric selection criteria, but criticized as creating a dangerous filter bubble which intentionally or unintentionally hides dissenting opinions and other content which might be important for the audience to see in order to avoid exposure bias and groupthink. Taste, decency, and acceptability Audiences have different reactions to depictions of violence, nudity, coarse language, or to people in any other situation that is unacceptable to or stigmatized by the local culture or laws (such as the consumption of alcohol, homosexuality, illegal drug use, scatological images, etc.). Even with similar audiences, different organizations and even individual reporters have different standards and practices. These decisions often revolve around what facts are necessary for the audience to know. When certain distasteful or shocking material is considered important to the story, there are a variety of common methods for mitigating negative audience reaction. Advance warning of explicit or disturbing material may allow listeners or readers to avoid content they would rather not be exposed to. Offensive words may be partially obscured or bleeped. Potentially offensive images may be blurred or narrowly cropped. Descriptions may be substituted for pictures; graphic detail might be omitted. Disturbing content might be moved from a cover to an inside page, or from daytime to late evening when children are less likely to be watching. There is often considerable controversy over these techniques, especially concern that obscuring or not reporting certain facts or details is self-censorship that compromises objectivity and fidelity to the truth, and which does not serve the public interest. For example, images and graphic descriptions of war are often violent, bloody, shocking and profoundly tragic. This makes certain content disturbing to some audience members, but it is precisely these aspects of war that some consider to be the most important to convey. Some argue that "sanitizing" the depiction of war influences public opinion about the merits of continuing to fight, and about the policies or circumstances that precipitated the conflict. The amount of explicit violence and mutilation depicted in war coverage varies considerably from time to time, from organization to organization, and from country to country. Reporters have also been accused of indecency in the process of collecting news, namely that they are overly intrusive in the name of journalistic insensitivity. War correspondent Edward Behr recounts the story of a reporter during the Congo Crisis who walked into a crowd of Belgian evacuees and shouted, "Anyone here been raped and speaks English?" Campaigning in the media Many print publications take advantage of their wide readership and print persuasive pieces in the form of unsigned editorials that represent the official position of the organization. Despite the ostensible separation between editorial writing and news gathering, this practice may cause some people to doubt the political objectivity of the publication's news reporting. (Though usually unsigned editorials are accompanied by a diversity of signed opinions from other perspectives.) Other publications and many broadcast media only publish opinion pieces that are attributed to a particular individual (who may be an in-house analyst) or to an outside entity. One particularly controversial question is whether media organizations should endorse political candidates for office. Political endorsements create more opportunities to construe favoritism in reporting, and can create a perceived conflict of interest. Investigative methods Investigative journalism is largely an information-gathering exercise, looking for facts that are not easy to obtain by simple requests and searches, or are actively being concealed, suppressed or distorted. Where investigative work involves undercover journalism or use of whistleblowers, and even more if it resorts to covert methods more typical of private detectives or even spying, it brings a large extra burden on ethical standards. Anonymous sources are double-edged—they often provide especially newsworthy information, such as classified or confidential information about current events, information about a previously unreported scandal, or the perspective of a particular group that may fear retribution for expressing certain opinions in the press. The downside is that the condition of anonymity may make it difficult or impossible for the reporter to verify the source's statements. Sometimes news sources hide their identities from the public because their statements would otherwise quickly be discredited. Thus, statements attributed to anonymous sources may carry more weight with the public than they might if they were attributed. The Washington press has been criticized in recent years for excessive use of anonymous sources, in particular to report information that is later revealed to be unreliable. The use of anonymous sources increased markedly in the period before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Examples of ethical dilemmas One of the primary functions of journalism ethics is to aid journalists in dealing with many ethical dilemmas they may encounter. From highly sensitive issues of national security to everyday questions such as accepting a dinner from a source, putting a bumper sticker on one's car, publishing a personal opinion blog, a journalist must make decisions taking into account things such as the public's right to know, potential threats, reprisals and intimidations of all kinds, personal integrity, conflicts between editors, reporters and publishers or management, and many other such conundra. The following are illustrations of some of those. The Pentagon Papers dealt with extremely difficult ethical dilemmas faced by journalists. Despite government intervention, The Washington Post, joined by The New York Times, felt the public interest was more compelling and both published reports. The cases went to the Supreme Court where they were merged and are known as New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. The Ethics AdviceLine for Journalists, a joint venture, public service project of Chicago Headline Club Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists and Loyola University Chicago's Center for Ethics and Social Justice, provides some examples of typical ethical dilemmas reported to their ethical dilemma hotline and are typical of the kinds of questions faced by many professional journalists, including the following: Is it ethical to make an appointment to interview an arsonist sought by police, without informing police in advance of the interview? Is lack of proper attribution plagiarism? Should a reporter write a story about a local priest who confessed to a sex crime if it will cost the newspaper readers and advertisers who are sympathetic to the priest? Is it ethical for a reporter to write a news piece on the same topic after writing an opinion piece in the same paper? Under what circumstances do you identify a person who was arrested as a relative of a public figure, such as a local sports star? Freelance journalists and photographers accept cash to write about, or take photos of, events with the promise of attempting to get their work on the AP or other news outlets, from which they also will be paid. Is that ethical? Can a journalist reveal a source of information after guaranteeing confidentiality if the source proves to be unreliable? See also Brown envelope journalism Citizen journalism Code of ethics in media Ethical Journalism Initiative History of American newspapers History of journalism International Federation of Journalists Mediatization, on the democratic role of journalism Munich Charter New York Press Club Objectivity (journalism) Order of the Occult Hand Organisation of News Ombudsmen Parachute journalism Reporters Without Borders References External links Code of Ethics – Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Statement of News Values and Principles – Associated Press (AP) Standards, Values & Style Guide – Reuters Editorial and Ethical Standards – Agence France-Presse (AFP) Editorial Policies & Guidance – Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Editorial Guidelines – Section 1: The BBC's Editorial Standards – British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Journalistic Standards and Practices – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Ethics Handbook – National Public Radio (NPR) Editorial Standards and Practices – Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Editorial Standards – Radio New Zealand (RNZ)

Holism

Holism is the interdisciplinary idea that systems possess properties as wholes apart from the properties of their component parts. The aphorism "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts", typically attributed to Aristotle, is often given as a glib summary of this proposal. The concept of holism can inform the methodology for a broad array of scientific fields and lifestyle practices. When applications of holism are said to reveal properties of a whole system beyond those of its parts, these qualities are referred to as emergent properties of that system. Holism in all contexts is often placed in opposition to reductionism, a dominant notion in the philosophy of science that systems containing parts contain no unique properties beyond those parts. Proponents of holism consider the search for emergent properties within systems to be demonstrative of their perspective. Background The term "holism" was coined by Jan Smuts (1870–1950) in his 1926 book Holism and Evolution. While he never assigned a consistent meaning to the word, Smuts used holism to represent at least three features of reality. First, holism claims that every scientifically measurable thing, either physical or psychological, does possess a nature as a whole beyond its parts. His examples include atoms, cells, or an individual's personality. Smuts discussed this sense of holism in his claim that an individual's body and mind are not completely separated but instead connect and represent the holistic idea of a person. In his second sense, Smuts referred to holism as the cause of evolution. He argued that evolution is neither an accident nor is it brought about by the actions of some transcendant force, such as a God. Smuts criticized writers who emphasized Darwinian concepts of natural selection and genetic variation to support an accidental view of natural processes within the universe. Smuts perceived evolution as the process of nature correcting itself creatively and intentionally. In this way, holism is described as the tendency of a whole system to creatively respond to environmental stressors, a process in which parts naturally work together to bring the whole into more advanced states. Smuts used Pavlovian studies to argue that the inheritance of behavioral changes supports his idea of creative evolution as opposed to purely accidental development in nature. Smuts believed that this creative process was intrinsic within all physical systems of parts and ruled out indirect, transcendent forces. Finally, Smuts used holism to explain the concrete (nontranscendent) nature of the universe in general. In his words, holism is "the ultimate synthetic, ordering, organizing, regulative activity in the universe which accounts for all the structural groupings and syntheses in it." Smuts argued that a holistic view of the universe explains its processes and their evolution more effectively than a reductive view. Professional philosophers of science and linguistics did not consider Holism and Evolution seriously upon its initial publication in 1926 and the work has received criticism for a lack of theoretical coherence. Some biological scientists, however, did offer favorable assessments shortly after its first print. Over time, the meaning of the word holism became most closely associated with Smuts' first conception of the term, yet without any metaphysical commitments to monism, dualism, or similar concepts which can be inferred from his work. Scientific applications Physics Nonseparability The advent of holism in the 20th century coincided with the gradual development of quantum mechanics. Holism in physics is the nonseparability of physical systems from their parts, especially quantum phenomena. Classical physics cannot be regarded as holistic, as the behavior of individual parts represents the whole. However, the state of a system in quantum theory resists a certain kind of reductive analysis. For example, two spatially separated quantum systems are described as "entangled," or nonseparable from each other, when a meaningful analysis of one system is indistinguishable from that of the other. There are different conceptions of nonseparability in physics and its exploration is considered to broadly present insight into the ontological problem. Variants In one sense, holism for physics is a perspective about the best way to understand the nature of a physical system. In this sense, holism is the methodological claim that systems are accurately understood according to their properties as a whole. A methodological reductionist in physics might seek to explain, for example, the behavior of a liquid by examining its component molecules, atoms, ions or electrons. A methodological holist, on the other hand, believes there is something misguided about this approach; one proponent, a condensed matter physicist, puts it: “the most important advances in this area come about by the emergence of qualitatively new concepts at the intermediate or macroscopic levels—concepts which, one hopes, will be compatible with one’s information about the microscopic constituents, but which are in no sense logically dependent on it.” This perspective is considered a conventional attitude among contemporary physicists. In another sense, holism is a metaphysical claim that the nature of a system is not determined by the properties of its component parts. There are three varieties of this sense of physical holism. Ontological holism: some systems are not merely composed of their physical parts Property holism: some systems have properties independent of their physical parts Nomological holism: some systems follow physical laws beyond the laws followed by their physical parts The metaphysical claim does not assert that physical systems involve abstract properties beyond the composition of its physical parts, but that there are concrete properties aside from those of its basic physical parts. Theoretical physicist David Bohm (1917-1992) supports this view head-on. Bohm believed that a complete description of the universe would have to go beyond a simple list of all its particles and their positions, there would also have to be a physical quantum field associated with the properties of those particles guiding their trajectories. Bohm's ontological holism concerning the nature of whole physical systems was literal. But Niels Bohr (1885-1962), on the other hand, held ontological holism from an epistemological angle, rather than a literal one. Bohr saw an observational apparatus to be a part of a system under observation, besides the basic physical parts themselves. His theory agrees with Bohm that whole systems were not merely composed of their parts and it identifies properties such as position and momentum as those of whole systems beyond those of its components. But Bohr states that these holistic properties are only meaningful in experimental contexts when physical systems are under observation and that these systems, when not under observation, cannot be said to have meaningful properties, even if these properties took place outside our observation. While Bohr claims these holistic properties exist only insofar as they can be observed, Bohm took his ontological holism one step further by claiming these properties must exist regardless. Linguistics Semantic holism suggests that the meaning of individual words depends on the meaning of other words, forming a large web of interconnections. In general, meaning holism states that the properties which determine the meaning of a word are connected such that if the meaning of one word changes, the meaning of every other word in the web changes as well. The set of words that alter in meaning due to a change in the meaning of some other is not necessarily specified in meaning holism, but typically such a change is taken straightforwardly to affect the meaning of every word in the language. In scientific disciplines, reductionism is the opposing viewpoint to holism. But in the context of linguistics or the philosophy of language, reductionism is typically referred to as atomism. Specifically, atomism states that each word's meaning is independent and so there are no emergent properties within a language. Additionally, there is meaning molecularism which states that a change in one word alters the meaning of only a relatively small set of other words. The linguistic perspective of meaning holism is traced back to Quine but was subsequently formalized by analytic philosophers Michael Dummett, Jerry Fodor, and Ernest Lepore. While this holistic approach attempts to resolve a classical problem for the philosophy of language concerning how words convey meaning, there is debate over its validity mostly from two angles of criticism: opposition to compositionality and, especially, instability of meaning. The first claims that meaning holism conflicts with the compositionality of language. Meaning in some languages is compositional in that meaning comes from the structure of an expression's parts. Meaning holism suggests that the meaning of words plays an inferential role in the meaning of other words: "pet fish" might infer a meaning of "less than 3 ounces." Since holistic views of meaning assume meaning depends on which words are used and how those words infer meaning onto other words, rather than how they are structured, meaning holism stands in conflict with compositionalism and leaves statements with potentially ambiguous meanings. The second criticism claims that meaning holism makes meaning in language unstable. If some words must be used to infer the meaning of other words, then in order to communicate a message, the sender and the receiver must share an identical set of inferential assumptions or beliefs. If these beliefs were different, meaning may be lost. Many types of communication would be directly affected by the principles of meaning holism such as informative communication, language learning, and communication about psychological states. Nevertheless, some meaning holists maintain that the instability of meaning holism is an acceptable feature from several different angles. In one example, contextual holists make this point simply by suggesting we often do not actually share identical inferential assumptions but instead rely on context to counter differences of inference and support communication. Biology Scientific applications of holism within biology are referred to as systems biology. The opposing analytical approach of systems biology is biological organization which models biological systems and structures only in terms of their component parts. "The reductionist approach has successfully identified most of the components and many of the interactions but, unfortunately, offers no convincing concepts or methods to understand how system properties emerge...the pluralism of causes and effects in biological networks is better addressed by observing, through quantitative measures, multiple components simultaneously and by rigorous data integration with mathematical models." The objective in systems biology is to advance models of the interactions in a system. Holistic approaches to modelling have involved cellular modelling strategies, genomic interaction analysis, and phenotype prediction. Systems medicine Systems medicine is a practical approach to systems biology and accepts its holistic assumptions. Systems medicine takes the systems of the human body as made up of a complete whole and uses this as a starting point in its research and, ultimately, treatment. Lifestyle applications The term holism is also sometimes used in the context of various lifestyle practices, such as dieting, education, and healthcare, to refer to ways of life that either supplement or replace conventional practices. In these contexts, holism is not necessarily a rigorous or well-defined methodology for obtaining a particular lifestyle outcome. It is sometimes simply an adjective to describe practices which account for factors that standard forms of these practices may discount, especially in the context of alternative medicine. See also Confirmation holism Emergentism Holism and Evolution Holism in ecological anthropology Holistic education Holon (philosophy) Holarchy Isomorphism Logical holism aka Theoretical holism Mereology Monism Reductionism Systems theory References External links Holism Philosophical theories Metaphysics of science Social theories Emergence Jan Smuts

Apodicticity

"Apodictic", also spelled "apodeictic" (, "capable of demonstration"), is an adjectival expression from Aristotelean logic that refers to propositions that are demonstrably, necessarily or self-evidently true. Apodicticity or apodixis is the corresponding abstract noun, referring to logical certainty. Apodictic propositions contrast with assertoric propositions, which merely assert that something is (or is not) true, and with problematic propositions, which assert only the possibility of something's being true. Apodictic judgments are clearly provable or logically certain. For instance, "Two plus two equals four" is apodictic, because it is true by definition. "Chicago is larger than Omaha" is assertoric. "A corporation could be wealthier than a country" is problematic. In Aristotelian logic, "apodictic" is opposed to "dialectic", as scientific proof is opposed to philosophical reasoning. Kant contrasted "apodictic" with "problematic" and "assertoric" in the Critique of Pure Reason, on page A70/B95. Apodictic a priorism Hans Reichenbach, one of the founders of logical positivism, offered a modified version of Immanuel Kant's a priorism by distinguishing between apodictic a priorism and constitutive a priorism. References Antony Flew. A Dictionary of Philosophy - Revised Second Edition. St. Martin's Press, NY, 1979 External links Necessity Term logic Ancient Greek logic Concepts in logic

Holism in science

Holism in science, holistic science, or methodological holism is an approach to research that emphasizes the study of complex systems. Systems are approached as coherent wholes whose component parts are best understood in context and in relation to both each other and to the whole. Holism typically stands in contrast with reductionism, which describes systems by dividing them into smaller components in order to understand them through their elemental properties. The holism-individualism dichotomy is especially evident in conflicting interpretations of experimental findings across the social sciences, and reflects whether behavioural analysis begins at the systemic, macro-level (ie. derived from social relations) or the component micro-level (ie. derived from individual agents). Overview David Deutsch calls holism anti-reductionist and refers to the concept of thinking as the only legitimate way to think about science in as a series of emergent, or higher level phenomena. He argues that neither approach is purely correct. Two aspects of Holism are: The way of doing science, sometimes called "whole to parts", which focuses on observation of the specimen within its ecosystem first before breaking down to study any part of the specimen. The idea that the scientist is not a passive observer of an external universe but rather a participant in the system. Proponents claim that Holistic science is naturally suited to subjects such as ecology, biology, physics and the social sciences, where complex, non-linear interactions are the norm. These are systems where emergent properties arise at the level of the whole that cannot be predicted by focusing on the parts alone, which may make mainstream, reductionist science ill-equipped to provide understanding beyond a certain level. This principle of emergence in complex systems is often captured in the phrase ′the whole is greater than the sum of its parts′. Living organisms are an example: no knowledge of all the chemical and physical properties of matter can explain or predict the functioning of living organisms. The same happens in complex social human systems, where detailed understanding of individual behaviour cannot predict the behaviour of the group, which emerges at the level of the collective. The phenomenon of emergence may impose a theoretical limit on knowledge available through reductionist methodology, arguably making complex systems natural subjects for holistic approaches. Science journalist John Horgan has expressed this view in the book The End of Science. He wrote that a certain pervasive model within holistic science, self-organized criticality, for example, "is not really a theory at all. Like punctuated equilibrium, self-organized criticality is merely a description, one of many, of the random fluctuations, the noise, permeating nature." By the theorists' own admissions, he said, such a model "can generate neither specific predictions about nature nor meaningful insights. What good is it, then?" One of the reasons that holistic science attracts supporters is that it seems to offer a progressive, 'socio-ecological' view of the world, but Alan Marshall's book The Unity of Nature offers evidence to the contrary; suggesting holism in science is not 'ecological' or 'socially-responsive' at all, but regressive and repressive. Examples in various fields of science Physical science Agriculture Permaculture takes a systems level approach to agriculture and land management by attempting to copy what happens in the natural world. Holistic management integrates ecology and social sciences with food production. It was originally designed as a way to reverse desertification. Organic farming is sometimes considered a holistic approach. In physics Richard Healey offered a modal interpretation and used it to present a model account of the puzzling correlations which portrays them as resulting from the operation of a process that violates both spatial and spatiotemporal separability. He argued that, on this interpretation, the nonseparability of the process is a consequence of physical property holism; and that the resulting account yields genuine understanding of how the correlations come about without any violation of relativity theory or Local Action. Subsequent work by Clifton, Dickson and Myrvold cast doubt on whether the account can be squared with relativity theory’s requirement of Lorentz invariance but leaves no doubt of an spatially entangled holism in the theory. Paul Davies and John Gribbin further observe that Wheeler's delayed choice experiment shows how the quantum world displays a sort of holism in time as well as space. In the holistic approach of David Bohm, any collection of quantum objects constitutes an indivisible whole within an implicate and explicate order. Bohm said there is no scientific evidence to support the dominant view that the universe consists of a huge, finite number of minute particles, and offered instead a view of undivided wholeness: "ultimately, the entire universe (with all its 'particles', including those constituting human beings, their laboratories, observing instruments, etc.) has to be understood as a single undivided whole, in which analysis into separately and independently existent parts has no fundamental status". Chaos and complexity Scientific holism holds that the behavior of a system cannot be perfectly predicted, no matter how much data is available. Natural systems can produce surprisingly unexpected behavior, and it is suspected that behavior of such systems might be computationally irreducible, which means it would not be possible to even approximate the system state without a full simulation of all the events occurring in the system. Key properties of the higher level behavior of certain classes of systems may be mediated by rare "surprises" in the behavior of their elements due to the principle of interconnectivity, thus evading predictions except by brute force simulation. Ecology Holistic thinking can be applied to ecology, combining biological, chemical, physical, economic, ethical, and political insights. The complexity grows with the area, so that it is necessary to reduce the characteristic of the view in other ways, for example to a specific time of duration. Medicine In primary care the term "holistic," has been used to describe approaches that take into account social considerations and other intuitive judgements. The term holism, and so-called approaches, appear in psychosomatic medicine in the 1970s, when they were considered one possible way to conceptualize psychosomatic phenomena. Instead of charting one-way causal links from psyche to soma, or vice versa, it aimed at a systemic model, where multiple biological, psychological and social factors were seen as interlinked. Other, alternative approaches in the 1970s were psychosomatic and somatopsychic approaches, which concentrated on causal links only from psyche to soma, or from soma to psyche, respectively. At present it is commonplace in psychosomatic medicine to state that psyche and soma cannot really be separated for practical or theoretical purposes. The term systems medicine first appeared in 1992 and takes an integrative approach to all of the body and environment. Social science Economics Some economists use a causal holism theory in their work. That is they view the discipline in the manner of Ludwig Wittgenstein and claim that it can't be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. Education reform The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives identifies many levels of cognitive functioning, which it is claimed may be used to create a more holistic education. In authentic assessment, rather than using computers to score multiple choice tests, a standards based assessment uses trained scorers to score open-response items using holistic scoring methods. In projects such as the North Carolina Writing Project, scorers are instructed not to count errors, or count numbers of points or supporting statements. The scorer is instead instructed to judge holistically whether "as a whole" is it more a "2" or a "3". Critics question whether such a process can be as objective as computer scoring, and the degree to which such scoring methods can result in different scores from different scorers. Anthropology Anthropology is holistic in two senses. First, it is concerned with all human beings across times and places, and with all dimensions of humanity (evolutionary, biophysical, sociopolitical, economic, cultural, psychological, etc.) Further, many academic programs following this approach take a "four-field" approach to anthropology that encompasses physical anthropology, archeology, linguistics, and cultural anthropology or social anthropology. Some anthropologists disagree, and consider holism to be an artifact from 19th century social evolutionary thought that inappropriately imposes scientific positivism upon cultural anthropology. The term "holism" is additionally used within social and cultural anthropology to refer to a methodological analysis of a society as a whole, in which component parts are treated as functionally relative to each other. One definition says: "as a methodological ideal, holism implies ... that one does not permit oneself to believe that our own established institutional boundaries (e.g. between politics, sexuality, religion, economics) necessarily may be found also in foreign societies." Psychology of perception A major holist movement in the early twentieth century was gestalt psychology. The claim was that perception is not an aggregation of atomic sense data but a field, in which there is a figure and a ground. Background has holistic effects on the perceived figure. Gestalt psychologists included Wolfgang Koehler, Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka. Koehler claimed the perceptual fields corresponded to electrical fields in the brain. Karl Lashley did experiments with gold foil pieces inserted in monkey brains purporting to show that such fields did not exist. However, many of the perceptual illusions and visual phenomena exhibited by the gestaltists were taken over (often without credit) by later perceptual psychologists. Gestalt psychology had influence on Fritz Perls' gestalt therapy, although some old-line gestaltists opposed the association with counter-cultural and New Age trends later associated with gestalt therapy. Gestalt theory was also influential on phenomenology. Aron Gurwitsch wrote on the role of the field of consciousness in gestalt theory in relation to phenomenology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty made much use of holistic psychologists such as work of Kurt Goldstein in his "Phenomenology of Perception." Teleological psychology Alfred Adler believed that the individual (an integrated whole expressed through a self-consistent unity of thinking, feeling, and action, moving toward an unconscious, fictional final goal), must be understood within the larger wholes of society, from the groups to which he belongs (starting with his face-to-face relationships), to the larger whole of mankind. The recognition of our social embeddedness and the need for developing an interest in the welfare of others, as well as a respect for nature, is at the heart of Adler's philosophy of living and principles of psychotherapy. Edgar Morin, the French philosopher and sociologist, can be considered a holist based on the transdisciplinary nature of his work. Skeptical reception According to skeptics, the phrase "holistic science" is often misused by pseudosciences. In the book Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology it's noted that "Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, and mental health, often resort to the "mantra of holism" to explain away negative findings. When invoking the mantra, they typically maintain that scientific claims can be evaluated only within the context of broader claims and therefore cannot be evaluated in isolation." This is an invocation of Karl Popper's demarcation problem and in a posting to Ask a Philosopher Massimo Pigliucci clarifies Popper by positing, "Instead of thinking of science as making progress by inductive generalization (which doesn’t work because no matter how many times a given theory may have been confirmed thus far, it is always possible that new, contrary, data will emerge tomorrow), we should say that science makes progress by conclusively disconfirming theories that are, in fact, wrong." Victor J. Stenger states that "holistic healing is associated with the rejection of classical, Newtonian physics. Yet, holistic healing retains many ideas from eighteenth and nineteenth century physics. Its proponents are blissfully unaware that these ideas, especially superluminal holism, have been rejected by modern physics as well". Some quantum mystics interpret the wave function of quantum mechanics as a vibration in a holistic ether that pervades the universe and wave function collapse as the result of some cosmic consciousness. This is a misinterpretation of the effects of quantum entanglement as a violation of relativistic causality and quantum field theory. See also Antireductionism Emergence Holarchy Holism Holism in ecological anthropology Holistic management Holistic health Holon (philosophy) Interdisciplinarity Organicism Scientific reductionism Systems thinking References Further reading Article "Patterns of Wholeness: Introducing Holistic Science" by Brian Goodwin, from the journal Resurgence Article "From Control to Participation" by Brian Goodwin, from the journal Resurgence Complex systems theory Holism Systems theory

Righteousness

Righteousness, or rectitude, is the quality or state of being morally correct and justifiable. It can be considered synonymous with "rightness" or being "upright" or to-the-light and visible. It can be found in Indian, Chinese and Abrahamic religions and traditions, among others, as a theological concept. For example, from various perspectives in Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism it is considered an attribute that implies that a person's actions are justified, and can have the connotation that the person has been "judged" or "reckoned" as leading a life that is pleasing to God. William Tyndale (translator of the Bible into English in 1526) remodelled the word after an earlier word , which would have yielded modern English *rightwise or *rightways. He used it to translate the Hebrew root , which appears over five hundred times in the Hebrew Bible, and the Greek word , which appears more than two hundred times in the New Testament. Etymologically, it comes from Old English , from 'right' + 'manner, state, condition' (as opposed to , "wrongful"). The change in the ending in the 16th century was due to association with words such as bounteous. Ethics or moral philosophy Ethics is a major branch of philosophy which encompasses right conduct and good living. Rushworth Kidder states that "standard definitions of ethics have typically included such phrases as 'the science of the ideal human character' or 'the science of moral duty'". Richard William Paul and Linda Elder define ethics as "a set of concepts and principles that guide us in determining what behavior helps or harms sentient creatures". The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy states that the word ethics is "commonly used interchangeably with 'morality' ... and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group or individual". Abrahamic and Abrahamic-inspired religions Christianity In the New Testament, the word righteousness, a translation word for the Greek , is used in the sense of 'being righteous before others' (e.g. Matthew 5:20) or 'being righteous before God' (e.g. Romans 1:17). William Lane Craig argues that we should think of God as the "paradigm, the locus, the source of all moral value and standards". In Matthew's account of the Baptism of Jesus, Jesus tells the prophet "it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness" as Jesus requests that John perform the rite for him. The Sermon on the Mount contains the memorable commandment "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness". A secondary meaning of the Greek word is 'justice', which is used to render it in a few places by a few Bible translations, e.g. in Matthew 6:33 in the New English Bible. Jesus asserts the importance of righteousness by saying in Matthew 5:20, "For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven". However, Paul the Apostle speaks of two ways, at least in theory, to achieve righteousness: through the Law of Moses (or Torah), and through faith in the atonement made possible through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. However he repeatedly emphasizes that faith is the effective way. For example, just a few verses earlier, he states the Jews did not attain the law of righteousness because they sought it not by faith, but by works. The New Testament speaks of a salvation founded on God's righteousness, as exemplified throughout the history of salvation narrated in the Old Testament. Paul writes to the Romans that righteousness comes by faith: "... a righteousness that is by faith from first to last, just as it is written: 'The righteous will live by faith'". In the New Revised Standard Version has a footnote that the original word has the meaning of 'benevolence', and the Messianic Jewish commentary of David Stern affirms the Jewish practice of 'doing ' as charity, in referring to the and passages. speaks of the relationship between works of righteousness and faith, saying that "faith without works is dead". Righteous acts according to James include works of charity as well as avoiding sins against the Law of Moses. describes Lot as a righteous man. Type of saint In the Eastern Orthodox Church, "Righteous" is a type of saint who is regarded as a holy person under the Old Covenant (Old Testament Israel). The word is also sometimes used for married saints of the New Covenant (the Church). According to Orthodox theology, the Righteous saints of the Old Covenant were not able to enter into heaven until after the death of Jesus on the cross, but had to await salvation in the Bosom of Abraham (see: Harrowing of Hell). Islam Righteousness is mentioned several times in the Quran. The Quran says that a life of righteousness is the only way to go to Heaven. Judaism Righteousness is one of the chief attributes of God as portrayed in the Hebrew Bible. Its chief meaning concerns ethical conduct (for example, ; ; ; ). In the Book of Job, the title character is introduced as "a good and righteous man". The Book of Wisdom calls on rulers of the world to embrace righteousness. Mandaeism An early self-appellation for Mandaeans is meaning 'elect of righteousness' or 'the chosen righteous', a term found in the Book of Enoch and Genesis Apocryphon II, 4. In addition to righteousness, also refers to alms or almsgiving. East Asian religions Yi (Confucianism) ,, literally "justice, or justness, righteousness or rightness, meaning", is an important concept in Confucianism. It involves a moral disposition for the good in life, with the sustainable intuition, purpose, and sensibility to do good competently with no expectation of reward. resonates with Confucian philosophy's orientation towards the cultivation of reverence or benevolence and skillful practice. represents moral acumen that goes beyond simple rule-following, as it is based on empathy, it involves a balanced understanding of a situation, and it incorporates the "creative insights" and grounding necessary to apply virtues through deduction (Yin and Yang) and reason "with no loss of purpose and direction for the total good of fidelity. represents this ideal of totality as well as a decision-generating ability to apply a virtue properly and appropriately in a situation." In application, is a "complex principle" that includes: skill in crafting actions which have moral fitness according to a given concrete situation the wise recognition of such fitness the intrinsic satisfaction that comes from that recognition. Indian religions There might not be a single-word translation for in English, but it can be translated as righteousness, religion, faith, duty, law, and virtue. Connotations of include rightness, good, natural, morality, righteousness, and virtue. In common parlance, means "right way of living" and "path of rightness". It encompasses ideas such as duty, rights, character, vocation, religion, customs and all behaviour considered appropriate, correct or "morally upright". It is explained as a law of righteousness and equated to (truth): "...when a man speaks the Truth, they say, 'He speaks the Dharma'; and if he speaks Dharma, they say, 'He speaks the Truth!' For both are one" The importance of to Indian sentiments is illustrated by the government of India's decision in 1947 to include the Ashoka Chakra, a depiction of the ( the "wheel of dharma"), as the central motif on its flag. Hinduism In Hindu philosophy and religion, major emphasis is placed on individual practical morality. In the Sanskrit epics, this concern is omnipresent. Including duties, rights, laws, conduct, virtues and "right way of living". The Sanskrit epics contain themes and examples where right prevails over wrong, good over evil. In an inscription attributed to the Indian Emperor Ashoka from , in Sanskrit, Aramaic, and Greek text, appears a Greek rendering for the Sanskrit word : the word This suggests was a central concept in India at that time, and meant not only religious ideas, but ideas of right, of good, and of one's duty. The Ramayana is one of the two great Indian epics. It tells about life in India around and offers models in . The hero, Rama, lived his whole life by the rules of ; this is why he is considered heroic. When Rama was a young boy, he was the perfect son. Later he was an ideal husband to his faithful wife, Sita, and a responsible ruler of Aydohya. Each episode of Ramayana presents life situations and ethical questions in symbolic terms. The situation is debated by the characters, and finally right prevails over wrong, good over evil. For this reason, in Hindu Epics, the good, morally upright, law-abiding king is referred to as . In Mahabharata, the other major Indian epic, similarly, is central, and it is presented with symbolism and metaphors. Near the end of the epic, the god Yama, referred to as in the text, is portrayed as taking the form of a dog to test the compassion of Yudhishthira, who is told he may not enter paradise with such an animal, but who refuses to abandon his companion, for which decision he is then praised by . The value and appeal of the Mahabharata is not as much in its complex and rushed presentation of metaphysics in the 12th book, claims Daniel H.H. Ingalls, because Indian metaphysics is more eloquently presented in other Sanskrit scriptures. The appeal of Mahabharata, like Ramayana, is in its presentation of a series of moral problems and life situations, to which there are usually three answers given, according to Ingalls: one answer is of Bhima, which is the answer of brute force, an individual angle representing materialism, egoism, and self; the second answer is of Yudhishthira, which is always an appeal to piety and gods, of social virtue and of tradition; the third answer is of introspective Arjuna, which falls between the two extremes, and who, claims Ingalls, symbolically reveals the finest moral qualities of man. The Epics of Hinduism are a symbolic treatise about life, virtues, customs, morals, ethics, law, and other aspects of dharma. There is extensive discussion of at the individual level in the Epics of Hinduism, observes Ingalls; for example, on free will versus destiny, when and why human beings believe in either, ultimately concluding that the strong and prosperous naturally uphold free will, while those facing grief or frustration naturally lean towards destiny. The Epics of Hinduism illustrate various aspects of , they are a means of communicating with metaphors. In Hinduism, signifies behaviors that are considered to be in accord with , the order that makes life and universe possible, and includes duties, rights, laws, conduct, virtues, and "right way of living". The concept of was already in use in the historical Vedic religion, and its meaning and conceptual scope has evolved over several millennia. The ancient Tamil moral text of Tirukkural is solely based on , the Tamil term for . The antonym of is . Buddhism In Buddhism means cosmic law and order, but is also applied to the teachings of the Buddha. In Buddhist philosophy, / is also the term for "phenomena". Dharma refers not only to the sayings of the Buddha, but also to the later traditions of interpretation and addition that the various schools of Buddhism have developed to help explain and to expand upon the Buddha's teachings. For others still, they see the as referring to the "truth", or the ultimate reality of "the way that things really are". Jainism Tattvartha Sutra mentions with the meaning of "righteous". These are forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, purity, truthfulness, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibacy. Sikhism For Sikhs, the word means the path of righteousness and proper religious practice. For Sikhs, the word (Punjabi: , ) means the path of righteousness and proper religious practice. Guru Granth Sahib in hymn 1353 connotes as duty. The 3HO movement in Western culture, which has incorporated certain Sikh beliefs, defines Sikh broadly as all that constitutes religion, moral duty, and way of life. Persian religions Zoroastrianism In Zoroastrianism, is an important tenet of the Zoroastrian religion with a complex and nuanced range of meaning. It is commonly summarized in accord with its contextual implications of 'truth' and 'right(eousness)', 'order' and 'right working'. From an early age, Zoroastrians are taught to pursue righteousness by following the Threefold Path of : , , (Good Thoughts, Good Words, Good Deeds). One of the most sacred mantras in the religion is the Ashem Vohu, which has been translated as an "Ode to Righteousness". There are many translations, that differ due to the complexity of Avestan and the concepts involved (for other translations, see: Ashem Vohu). "Righteousness is the best good and it is happiness. Happiness is to her/him who is righteous, for the sake of the best righteousness". See also References External links Attributes of God in Christian theology Religious ethics Concepts in ethics Good and evil Virtue

Cosmogony

Cosmogony is any model concerning the origin of the cosmos or the universe. Overview Scientific theories In astronomy, cosmogony is the study of the origin of particular astrophysical objects or systems, and is most commonly used in reference to the origin of the universe, the Solar System, or the Earth–Moon system. The prevalent cosmological model of the early development of the universe is the Big Bang theory. Sean M. Carroll, who specializes in theoretical cosmology and field theory, explains two competing explanations for the origins of the singularity, which is the center of a space in which a characteristic is limitless (one example is the singularity of a black hole, where gravity is the characteristic that becomes infinite). It is generally thought that the universe began at a point of singularity, but among Modern Cosmologists and Physicists, a singularity usually represents a lack of understanding, and in the case of Cosmology/Cosmogony, requires a theory of quantum gravity to understand. When the universe started to expand, what is colloquially known as the Big Bang occurred, which evidently began the universe. The other explanation, held by proponents such as Stephen Hawking, asserts that time did not exist when it emerged along with the universe. This assertion implies that the universe does not have a beginning, as time did not exist "prior" to the universe. Hence, it is unclear whether properties such as space or time emerged with the singularity and the known universe. Despite the research, there is currently no theoretical model that explains the earliest moments of the universe's existence (during the Planck epoch) due to a lack of a testable theory of quantum gravity. Nevertheless, researchers of string theory, its extensions (such as M-theory), and of loop quantum cosmology, like Barton Zwiebach and Washington Taylor, have proposed solutions to assist in the explanation of the universe's earliest moments. Cosmogonists have only tentative theories for the early stages of the universe and its beginning. The proposed theoretical scenarios include string theory, M-theory, the Hartle–Hawking initial state, emergent Universe, string landscape, cosmic inflation, the Big Bang, and the ekpyrotic universe. Some of these proposed scenarios, like the string theory, are compatible, whereas others are not. Mythology In mythology, creation or cosmogonic myths are narratives describing the beginning of the universe or cosmos. Some methods of the creation of the universe in mythology include: the will or action of a supreme being or beings, the process of metamorphosis, the copulation of female and male deities, from chaos, or via a cosmic egg. Creation myths may be etiological, attempting to provide explanations for the origin of the universe. For instance, Eridu Genesis, the oldest known creation myth, contains an account of the creation of the world in which the universe was created out of a primeval sea (Abzu). Creation myths vary, but they may share similar deities or symbols. For instance, the ruler of the gods in Greek mythology, Zeus, is similar to the ruler of the gods in Roman mythology, Jupiter. Another example is the ruler of the gods in Tagalog mythology, Bathala, who is similar to various rulers of certain pantheons within Philippine mythology such as the Bisaya's Kaptan. Compared with cosmology In the humanities, the distinction between cosmogony and cosmology is blurred. For example, in theology, the cosmological argument for the existence of God (pre-cosmic cosmogonic bearer of personhood) is an appeal to ideas concerning the origin of the universe and is thus cosmogonical. Some religious cosmogonies have an impersonal first cause (for example Taoism). However, in astronomy, cosmogony can be distinguished from cosmology, which studies the universe and its existence, but does not necessarily inquire into its origins. There is therefore a scientific distinction between cosmological and cosmogonical ideas. Physical cosmology is the science that attempts to explain all observations relevant to the development and characteristics of the universe on its largest scale. Some questions regarding the behaviour of the universe have been described by some physicists and cosmologists as being extra-scientific or metaphysical. Attempted solutions to such questions may include the extrapolation of scientific theories to untested regimes (such as the Planck epoch), or the inclusion of philosophical or religious ideas. See also Why there is anything at all References External links Creation myths Greek words and phrases Natural philosophy Origins Physical cosmology Concepts in astronomy

Decolonization of knowledge

Decolonization of knowledge (also epistemic decolonization or epistemological decolonization) is a concept advanced in decolonial scholarship that critiques the perceived hegemony of Western knowledge systems. It seeks to construct and legitimize other knowledge systems by exploring alternative epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies. It is also an intellectual project that aims to "disinfect" academic activities that are believed to have little connection with the objective pursuit of knowledge and truth. The presumption is that if curricula, theories, and knowledge are colonized, it means they have been partly influenced by political, economic, social and cultural considerations. The decolonial knowledge perspective covers a wide variety of subjects including philosophy (epistemology in particular), science, history of science, and other fundamental categories in social science. Background Decolonization of knowledge inquires into the historical mechanisms of knowledge production and their perceived colonial and ethnocentric foundations. Budd L. Hall et al argue that knowledge and the standards that determine the validity of knowledge have been disproportionately informed by Western system of thought and ways of being in the world. According to Jaco S. Dreyer, the western knowledge system that emerged in Europe during renaissance and Enlightenment was deployed to legitimise Europe’s colonial endeavour, which eventually became a part of colonial rule and forms of civilization that the colonizers carried with them. This perspective maintains that the knowledge produced by the Western system was deemed superior to that produced by other systems since it had a universal quality. Decolonial scholars concur that the western system of knowledge still continues to determine as to what should be considered as scientific knowledge and continues to "exclude, marginalise and dehumanise" those with different systems of knowledge, expertise and worldviews. Anibal Quijano stated: In effect, all of the experiences, histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global cultural order revolving around European or Western hegemony. Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony... They repressed as much as possible the colonized forms of knowledge production, the models of the production of meaning, their symbolic universe, the model of expression and of objectification and subjectivity. In her book Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes: Imperialism and colonialism brought complete disorder to colonized peoples, disconnecting them from their histories, their landscapes, their languages, their social relations and their own ways of thinking, feeling and interacting with the world. According to this viewpoint, colonialism has ended in the legal and political sense, but its legacy continues in many "colonial situations" where individuals and groups in historically colonized places are marginalized and exploited. Decolonial scholars refer to this continuing legacy of colonialism as "coloniality", which describes the oppression and exploitation left behind by colonialism in a variety of interrelated domains, including the domain of subjectivity and knowledge. Origin and development In community groups and social movements in the Americas, decolonization of knowledge traces its roots back to resistance against colonialism from its very beginning in 1492. Its emergence as an academic concern is rather a recent phenomenon. According to Enrique Dussel, the theme of epistemological decolonization has originated from a group of Latin American thinkers. Although the notion of decolonization of knowledge has been an academic topic since the 1970s, Walter Mignolo says it was the ingenious work of Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano that "explicitly linked coloniality of power in the political and economic spheres with the coloniality of knowledge." It has developed as "an elaboration of a problematic" that began as a result of several critical stances such as postcolonialism, subaltern studies and postmodernism. Enrique Dussel says epistemological decolonization is structured around the notions of coloniality of power and transmodernity, which traces its roots in the thoughts of José Carlos Mariátegui, Frantz Fanon and Immanuel Wallerstein. According to Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, although the political, economic, cultural and epistemological dimensions of decolonization were and are intricately connected to each other, attainment of political sovereignty was preferred as a "practical strategic logic of struggles against colonialism." As a result, political decolonization in the twentieth century failed to attain epistemological decolonization, as it did not widely inquire into the complex domain of knowledge. Themes According to Alex Broadbent, decolonization is sometimes understood as a rejection of the notion of objectivity, which is seen as a legacy of colonial thought. He argues that universal conception of ideas such as "truth" and "fact" are Western constructs that are imposed on other foreign cultures. This tradition considers notions of truth and fact as "local", arguing that what is "discovered" or "expressed" in one place or time may not be applicable in another. The concerns of decolonization of knowledge are that the western knowledge system has become a norm for global knowledge and that its methodologies are the only ones deemed appropriate for use in knowledge production. This perceived hegemonic approach towards other knowledge systems is said to have reduced epistemic diversity and established the center of knowledge, eventually suppressing all other knowledge forms. Boaventura de Sousa Santos says "throughout the world, not only are there very diverse forms of knowledge of matter, society, life and spirit, but also many and very diverse concepts of what counts as knowledge and criteria that may be used to validate it." However, it is claimed that this variety of knowledge systems has not gained much recognition. According to Lewis Gordon, the formulation of knowledge in its singular form itself was unknown to times before the emergence of European modernity. Modes of knowledge production and notions of knowledge were so diversified that knowledges, in his opinion, would be more appropriate description. According to Walter Mignolo, the modern foundation of knowledge is thus territorial and imperial. This foundation is based on "the socio-historical organization and classification of the world founded on a macro narrative and on a specific concept and principles of knowledge" which finds its roots in European modernity. He articulates epistemic decolonization as an expansive movement that identifies "geo-political locations of theology, secular philosophy and scientific reason" while also affirming "the modes and principles of knowledge that have been denied by the rhetoric of Christianization, civilization, progress, development and market democracy." According to Achille Mbembe, decolonization of knowledge means contesting the hegemonic western epistemology that suppresses anything that is foreseen, conceived and formulated from outside of western epistemology. It has two aspects: a critique of Western knowledge paradigms and the development of new epistemic models. Savo Heleta states that decolonization of knowledge "implies the end of reliance on imposed knowledge, theories and interpretations, and theorizing based on one’s own past and present experiences and interpretation of the world." Significance According to Anibal Quijano, epistemological decolonization is necessary for opening up new avenues for intercultural communication and the sharing of experiences and meanings, laying the groundwork for an alternative rationality that could rightfully stake a claim to some degree of universality. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni says epistemological decolonization is essential for addressing the "asymmetrical global intellectual division of labor" in which Europe and North America not only act as teachers of the rest of the world but also serve as the centers for the production of theories and concepts that are ultimately "consumed" by the entire human race. Approaches According to Linda Tuhiwai Smith, decolonization "does not mean a total rejection of all theory or research or Western knowledge". In Lewis Gordon's view, decolonization of knowledge mandates a detachment from the "commitments to notions of an epistemic enemy." It rather emphasizes "the appropriation of any and all sources of knowledge" in order to achieve relative epistemic autonomy and epistemic justice for "previously unacknowledged and/or suppressed knowledge traditions." Indigenous decolonization Relational model of knowledge Decolonial scholars inquire into various forms of indigenous knowledges in their efforts to decolonize knowledge and worldviews. Louis Botha et al make the case for a "relational model of knowledge," which they situate within indigenous knowledges. These indigenous knowledges are based on indigenous peoples' perceptions and modes of knowing. They consider indigenous knowledges to be essentially relational because these knowledge traditions place a high value on the relationships between the actors, objects, and settings involved in the development of knowledge. Such "networked" relational approach to knowledge production fosters and encourages connections between the individuals, groups, resources, and other components of knowledge-producing communities. For Louis Botha et al, since it is built on an ontology that acknowledges the spiritual realm as real and essential to knowledge formation, this relationality is also fundamentally spiritual, and feeds axiological concepts about why and how knowledge should be created, preserved, and utilized. In academia One of the most crucial aspects of decolonization of knowledge is to rethink the role of the academia, which, according to Louis Yako, an Iraqi-American anthropologist, has become the "biggest enemy of knowledge and the decolonial option." He says Western universities have always served colonial and imperial powers, and the situation has only become worse in the neoliberal age. According to Yako, the first step toward decolonizing academic knowledge production is to carefully examine "how knowledge is produced, by whom, whose works get canonized and taught in foundational theories and courses, and what types of bibliographies and references are mentioned in every book and published article." He criticizes Western universities for their alleged policies regarding research works that undermine foreign and independent sources while favoring citations to "elite" European or American scholars who are commonly considered "foundational" in their respective fields, and calls for an end to this practice. Shose Kessi et al argue that the goal of academia is "not to reach new orders of homogeneity, but rather greater representation of pluralistic ideas and rigorous knowledge". They invite academics to carefully scrutinize the authors and voices that are presented as authorities on a subject or in the classroom, the methods and epistemologies that are taught or given preference, as well as the academic concerns that are seen as fundamental and the ones that are ignored. They must reconsider the pedagogical tools or approaches used in the learning process for students, as well as examine the indigenous or community knowledge systems that are followed, promoted, or allowed to redefine the learning agenda. The purpose and future of knowledge must also be reevaluated during this process. There have been suggestions for expanding the reading list and creating an inclusive curriculum that incorporates a range of voices and viewpoints in order to represent broader global and historical perspectives. Researchers are urged to investigate outside the Western canons of knowledge to determine whether there are any alternative canons that have been overlooked or disregarded as a result of colonialism. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, who emphasizes the significance of decolonizing history, memory, and language, has stated that language, not geopolitics, should serve as the initial point of decolonization. According to Mahmood Mamdani, the idea of a university based on a single language is a colonial heritage, as in the case of African universities, which began as a colonial project, with English or French being the project language, and it recognized only one intellectual tradition—the Western tradition. According to Mamdani, university education needs to be more diverse and multilingual, with a focus on not only providing Westernized education in a variety of languages but also on ways to advance non-Western intellectual traditions as living traditions that can support both scholarly and public discourse. Mamdani makes the case for allocating funds to the creation of academic units that may research and instruct in non-Western intellectual traditions. He believes that learning the language in which the tradition has been historically developed is necessary if one wants to access a different intellectual tradition. Louis Yako opposes the labeling of new scholars as "Marxist", "Foucauldian", "Hegelian", "Kantian", and so on, which he sees as a "colonial method of validating oneself and research" through these scholars. According to Yako, despite the fact that scholars such as Marx, Hegel, Foucault, and many others were all inspired by numerous thinkers before them, they are not identified with the names of such intellectuals. He criticizes the academic peer-review process as a system of "gatekeepers" who regulate the production of knowledge in a given field or about a certain region of the world. In various disciplines In order to overcome the perceived constraints of the Western canons of knowledge, proponents of knowledge decolonization call for the decolonization of various academic disciplines, including history, science and the history of science, philosophy, (in particular, epistemology), psychology, sociology, religious studies, and legal studies. History According to the official web page of the University of Exeter, the "colonialist worldview," which allegedly prioritises some people's beliefs, rights, and dignity over those of others, has had an impact on the theoretical framework that underpins the modern academic field of history. This modern field of study has first developed in Europe during a period of rising nationalism and colonial exploitation, which determines the historical narratives of the world. This account suggests "that the very ways we are conditioned to look at and think about the past are often derived from imperialist and racialised schools of thought". Decolonial approach in history requires "an examination of the non-western world on its own terms, including before the arrival of European explorers and imperialists". In an effort to understand the world before the fifteenth century, it attempts to situate Western Europe in relation to other historical "great powers" like the Eastern Roman Empire or the Abbasid Caliphate. It "requires rigorous critical study of empire, power and political contestation, alongside close reflection on constructed categories of social difference". According to Walter Mignolo, discovering the variety of local historical traditions are crucial for "restoring the dignity that the Western idea of universal history took away from millions of people". Modern science The decolonial approach contests the notion of science as "purely objective, solely empirical, immaculately rational, and thus, singularly truth confirming”. According to this account, such an outlook towards science implies "that reality is discrete and stagnant; immune to its observer’s subjectivity, including their cultural suasions; and dismountable into its component parts whose functioning can then be ascertained through verificationist means". Laila N Boisselle situates modern science within Western philosophy and Western paradigms of knowledge, saying that "different ways of knowing how the world works are fashioned from the cosmology of the observer, and provides opportunities for the development of many sciences". Margaret Blackie and Hanelie Adendorff argue "that the practice of science by scientists has been profoundly influenced by Western modernity". According to this perspective, modern science thus "reflects foundational elements of empiricism according to Francis Bacon, positivism as conceptualized by Comte, and neo-positivism as suggested by the School of Vienna in the early 1900s." Boisselle also suggests that the mainstream scientific perspective that downplays the function or influence of Spirit or God in any manifestation in its processes, is not only Western and modern but also secular in orientation. Boisselle sought to identify two issues with Western knowledge, including "Western Modern Science". For her, it starts off by seeking to explain the nature of the universe on the basis of reason alone. The second is that it considers itself to be the custodian of all knowledge and to have the power "to authenticate and reject other knowledge." The idea that modern science is the only legitimate method of knowing has been referred to as "scientific fundamentalism" or "scientism". It assumes the role of a gatekeeper by situating "science for all" initiatives on a global scale inside the framework of scientism. As a result, it acquires the power to decide what scientific knowledge is deemed to be "epistemologically rigorous". According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, in order to decolonize modern science, it is necessary to consider "the partiality of scientific knowledge", i.e. to acknowledge that, like any other system of knowledge, "science is a system of both knowledge and ignorance". For Santos, "scientific knowledge is partial because it does not know everything deemed important and it cannot possibly know everything deemed important". In this regard, Boisselle argues for a "relational science" based on a "relational ontology" that respects “the interconnectedness of physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual aspects of individuals with all living things and with the star world, and the universe”. Samuel Bendeck Sotillos, with reference to perennial philosophy, critiques modern science for its rejection of metaphysics and spiritual traditions from around the world. He states that "the belief that only the scientific method gives access to valid forms of knowledge is not only flawed but totalitarian, having its roots in the European Enlightenment or the so-called Age of Reason". For him, "This dogmatic outlook is not science, but an ideology known as scientism, which has nothing to do with the proper exercise of the scientific method". This viewpoint challenges the idea that science is Truth, with a capital "T", saying that "contemporary science is largely relegated to dealing with approximations; in doing so, it is always modifying its understanding and thus is in no position to declare what can be finally known with certainty", and it promotes an understanding of science within the confines of its underlying philosophical assumptions concerning physical reality. In this context, Sotillos seeks to revive traditional metaphysics, also known as sacred science or scientia sacra, which is guided by metaphysical principles and is based on the sapiential teachings of world religions. History of science Beginning in the middle of the 1980s, postcolonial histories of science is said to constitute a “decentered, diasporic, or ‘global’ rewriting of earlier nation-centred imperial grand narratives.” These histories seek to uncover "counter-histories of science, the legacies of precolonial knowledge, or residues and resurrections of the constitutive relations of colonial science." Instead of "centering scientific institutes in colonial metropoles," this history attempts to examine what Warwick Anderson refers to "as the unstable economy of science’s shifting spatialities as knowledge is transacted, translated, and transformed across the globe". It seeks to eradicate "imperial grand narratives", which is said to provincialize science into a single "indigenous knowledge tradition". Instead, it seeks to recognise "the culturally diverse and global origins of science", and build a cosmopolitan model of science history in place of the narrow view of science as the creation of "lone geniuses". This perspective acknowledges the contributions of other civilizations to science, and offers a "contrageography of science that is not Eurocentric and linear". The central tenet is that the history of science should be seen as a history of transmissions. In this, Prakash Kumar et al cite Joseph Needham as saying, "modern science...[is] like an ocean into which the rivers from all the world’s civilizations have poured their waters”. Philosophy Nelson Maldonado-Torres et al see the decolonial turn in philosophy "as a form of liberating and decolonising reason beyond the liberal and Enlightened emancipation of rationality, and beyond the more radical Euro-critiques that have failed to consistently challenge the legacies of Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity (often Euro-centric critiques of Eurocentrism)". According to Sajjad H. Rizvi, the shift toward global philosophy may herald a radical departure from colonial epistemology and pave the way for the decolonization of knowledge, particularly in the study of the humanities. In opposition to what is said to have been the standard method in philosophy studies, he argues against focusing solely on Western philosophers. Rizvi makes the case for the inclusion of Islamic philosophy in the discussion because he thinks it will aid in the process of decolonization and may eventually replace the Eurocentric education of philosophy with an expansive "pedagogy of living and being". Philip Higgs argues for the inclusion of African philosophy in the context of decolonization. Similar suggestions have been made for Indian philosophy and Chinese philosophy. Maldonado-Torres et al discuss issues in the philosophy of race and gender as well as Asian philosophy and Latin American philosophy as instances of the decolonial turn and decolonizing philosophy, contending that "Asia and Latin America are not presented here as the continental others of Europe but as constructed categories and projects that themselves need to be decolonized". Psychology According to many influential colonial and postcolonial leaders and thinkers, decolonization was "essentially a psychological project" involving a "recovery of self" and "an attempt to reframe the damaging colonial discourses of selfhood". According to the decolonial perspective, Eurocentric psychology, which is based on a specific history and culture, places a strong emphasis on "experimental positivist methods, languages, symbols, and stories". A decolonizing approach in psychology thus seeks to show how colonialism, Orientalism, and Eurocentric presumptions are still deeply ingrained in modern psychological science as well as psychological theories of culture, identity, and human development. Decolonizing psychology entails comprehending and capturing the history of colonization as well as its perceived effects on families, nations, nationalism, institutions, and knowledge production. It seeks to extend the bounds of cultural horizons, which should serve as a gateway "to new confrontations and new knowledge". Decolonial turn in psychology entails upending the conventional research methodology by creating spaces for indigenous knowledge, oral histories, art, community knowledge, and lived experiences as legitimate forms of knowledge. Samuel Bendeck Sotillos seeks to break free from the alleged limits of modern psychology, which he claims is dominated by the precepts of modern science and which only addresses a very "restricted portion of human individuality". He instead wants to revive the traditional view of the human being as consisting of a spirit, a soul, and a body. Sociology Decolonial scholars argue that sociological study is now dominated by the viewpoints of academics in the Global North and empirical studies that are concentrated on these countries. This leads to sociological theories that portray the Global North as "normal" or "modern," while anything outside of it is assumed to be either "deviant" or "yet to be modernized." Such theories are said to undermine the concerns of the Global South despite the fact that they make up around 84% of the world population. They place a strong emphasis on taking into account the problems, perspectives, and way of life of those in the Global South who are typically left out of sociological research and theory-building; thus, decolonization in this sense refers to making non-Western social realities more relevant to academic debate. Religious studies According to the decolonial perspective, the study of religion is one of many humanities disciplines that has its roots in European colonialism. Because of this, the issues it covers, the concepts it reinforces, and even the settings in which it is taught at academic institutions all exhibit colonial characteristics. According to Malory Nye, in order to decolonize the study of religion, one must be methodologically cognizant of the historical and intellectual legacies of colonialism in the field, as well as fundamental presuppositions about the subject matter, including the conception of religion and world religions. For Adriaan van Klinken, a decolonial turn in the study of religions embraces reflexivity, is interactive, and challenges "the taken-for-granted Western frameworks of analysis and scholarly practice." It must accept "the pluriversality of ways of knowing and being" in the world. The interpretation of the Quran in the Euro-American academic community has been cited as one such example, where "the phenomenon of revelation (Wahy)" as it is understood in Islam is very often negated, disregarded, or regarded as unimportant to comprehending the scripture. According to Joseph Lumbard, Euro-American analytical modes have permeated Quranic studies and have a lasting impact on all facets of the discipline. He argues for more inclusive approaches that take into account different forms of analysis and make use of analytical tools from the classical Islamic tradition. Legal studies Aitor Jiménez González argues that the "generalized use of the term “law” or “Law” masks the fact that the concept we are using is not a universal category but a highly provincial one premised on the westernized legal cosmovision". According to him, it was not the "peaceful spread of a superior science" that ultimately led to the universal adoption of the western notion of law. Rather, it "was the result of centuries of colonialism, violent repression against other legal cosmovisions during the colonial periods and the persistence of the process referred to as coloniality". The decolonial stance on law facilitates dialogue between various understandings and epistemic perspectives on law in the first place, challenging the perceived hegemony of the westernized legal paradigm. It is a strategy for transforming a legal culture that historically was based on a hegemonic or Eurocentric understanding of the law into one that is more inclusive. It highlights the need for a fresh historical perspective that emphasizes diversity over homogeneity and casts doubt on the notion that the state is the "main organizer of legal and juridical life". According to Asikia Karibi-Whyte, decolonization goes beyond inclusion in that it aims to dismantle the notions and viewpoints that undervalue the "other" in legal discourse. This point of view maintains that a society's values form the foundation of legal knowledge and argues for prioritizing those values when debating specific legal issues. This is because legal norms in former colonies bear the imprint of colonialism and values of colonial societies. For example, English Common Law predominates in former British colonies throughout Africa and Asia, whereas the Civil Law system is used in many former French colonies that mirrors the values of French society. In this context, decolonization of law calls "for the critical inclusion of epistemologies, ways of knowing, lived experiences, texts and scholarly works" that colonialism forced out of legal discourses. Inclusive research Shift in research methodology According to Mpoe Johannah Keikelame and Leslie Swartz, "decolonising research methodology is an approach that is used to challenge the Eurocentric research methods that undermine the local knowledge and experiences of the marginalised population groups". Even though there is no set paradigm or practice for decolonizing research methodology, Thambinathan and Kinsella offer four methods that qualitative researchers might use. These four methods include engaging in transformative praxis, practicing critical reflexivity, employing reciprocity and respect for self-determination, as well as accepting "Other(ed)" ways of knowing. For Sabelo Ndlovu Gatsheni, decolonizing methodology involves "unmasking its role and purpose in research". It must transform the identity of research objects into questioners, critics, theorists, knowers, and communicators. In addition, research must be redirected to concentrate on what Europe has done to humanity and the environment rather than imitating Europe as a role model for the rest of the world. Data decolonization Criticism According to Piet Naudé, decolonization's efforts to create new epistemic models with distinct laws of validation than those developed in Western knowledge system have not yet produced the desired outcome. The present "scholarly decolonial turn" has been criticised on the ground that it is divorced from the daily struggles of people living in historically colonized places. Robtel Neajai Pailey says that 21st-century epistemic decolonization will fail unless it is connected to and welcoming of the ongoing liberation movements against inequality, racism, austerity, imperialism, autocracy, sexism, xenophobia, environmental damage, militarization, impunity, corruption, media surveillance, and land theft because epistemic decolonization "cannot happen in a political vacuum". "Decolonization", both as a theoretical and practical tendency, has recently faced increasing critique. For example, Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò argued that it is analytically unsound, conflating "coloniality" with "modernity", leading it to become an impossible political project. He further argued that it risks denying the formerly colonized countries agency, in not recognizing that people often consciously accept and adapt elements of different origins, including colonial ones. Jonatan Kurzwelly and Malin Wilckens used the example of decolonisation of academic collections of human remains - originally used to further racist science and legitimize colonial oppression - to show how both contemporary scholarly methods and political practice perpetuate reified and essentialist notions of identities. See also Decolonization of higher education in South Africa Decolonization of museums Decolonising the Mind Decolonization of public space Decolonizing outer space Universal Declaration of Human Rights Notes References Further reading Decolonization Social epistemology Postcolonialism

First principle

In philosophy and science, a first principle is a basic proposition or assumption that cannot be deduced from any other proposition or assumption. First principles in philosophy are from first cause attitudes and taught by Aristotelians, and nuanced versions of first principles are referred to as postulates by Kantians. In mathematics and formal logic, first principles are referred to as axioms or postulates. In physics and other sciences, theoretical work is said to be from first principles, or ab initio, if it starts directly at the level of established science and does not make assumptions such as empirical model and parameter fitting. "First principles thinking" consists of decomposing things down to the fundamental axioms in the given arena, before reasoning up by asking which ones are relevant to the question at hand, then cross referencing conclusions based on chosen axioms and making sure conclusions do not violate any fundamental laws. Physicists include counterintuitive concepts with reiteration. In formal logic In a formal logical system, that is, a set of propositions that are consistent with one another, it is possible that some of the statements can be deduced from other statements. For example, in the syllogism, "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is mortal" the last claim can be deduced from the first two. A first principle is an axiom that cannot be deduced from any other within that system. The classic example is that of Euclid's Elements; its hundreds of geometric propositions can be deduced from a set of definitions, postulates, and common notions: all three types constitute first principles. Philosophy In philosophy "first principles" are from first cause attitudes commonly referred to as a priori terms and arguments, which are contrasted to a posteriori terms, reasoning or arguments, in that the former are simply assumed and exist prior to the reasoning process and the latter are deduced or inferred after the initial reasoning process. First principles are generally treated in the realm of philosophy known as epistemology, but are an important factor in any metaphysical speculation. In philosophy "first principles" are often somewhat synonymous with a priori, datum and axiomatic reasoning. Ancient Greek philosophy In Ancient Greek philosophy, a first principle from which other principles are derived is called an arche and later "first principle" or "element". By extension, it may mean "first place", "method of government", "empire, realm", "authorities" The concept of an arche was adapted from the earliest cosmogonies of Hesiod and Orphism, through the physical theories of Pre-Socratic philosophy and Plato before being formalized as a part of metaphysics by Aristotle. Arche sometimes also transcribed as arkhé) is an Ancient Greek word with primary senses "beginning", "origin" or "source of action": from the beginning, οr the original argument, "command". The first principle or element corresponds to the "ultimate underlying substance" and "ultimate indemonstrable principle". Mythical cosmogonies The heritage of Greek mythology already embodied the desire to articulate reality as a whole and this universalizing impulse was fundamental for the first projects of speculative theorizing. It appears that the order of "being" was first imaginatively visualized before it was abstractly thought. In the mythological cosmogonies of the Near East, the universe is formless and empty and the only existing thing prior to creation was the water abyss. In the Babylonian creation story, Enuma Elish, the primordial world is described as a "watery chaos" from which everything else appeared. This watery chaos has similarities in the cosmogony of the Greek mythographer Pherecydes of Syros. In the mythical Greek cosmogony of Hesiod (8th to 7th century BC), the origin of the world is Chaos, considered as a divine primordial condition, from which everything else appeared. In the creation "chaos" is a gaping-void, but later the word is used to describe the space between the Earth and the sky, after their separation. "Chaos" may mean infinite space, or a formless matter which can be differentiated. The notion of temporal infinity was familiar to the Greek mind from remote antiquity in the religious conception of immortality. The conception of the "divine" as an origin influenced the first Greek philosophers. In the Orphic cosmogony, the unaging Chronos produced Aether and Chaos and made in divine Aether a silvery egg, from which everything else appeared. Ionian school The earliest Pre-Socratic philosophers, the Ionian material monists, sought to explain all of nature (physis) in terms of one unifying arche. Among the material monists were the three Milesian philosophers: Thales, who believed that everything was composed of water; Anaximander, who believed it was apeiron; and Anaximenes, who believed it was air. This is considered as a permanent substance or either one or more which is conserved in the generation of rest of it. From this all things first come to be and into this they are resolved in a final state. This source of entity is always preserved. Although their theories were primitive, these philosophers were the first to give an explanation of the physical world without referencing the supernatural; this opened the way for much of modern science (and philosophy), which has the same goal of explaining the world without dependence on the supernatural. Thales of Miletus (7th to 6th century BC), the father of philosophy, claimed that the first principle of all things is water, and considered it as a substance that contains in it motion and change. His theory was supported by the observation of moisture throughout the world and coincided with his theory that the Earth floated on water. His ideas were influenced by the Near-Eastern mythological cosmogony and probably by the Homeric statement that the surrounding Oceanus (ocean) is the source of all springs and rivers. Anaximander argued that water could not be the arche, because it could not give rise to its opposite, fire. Anaximander claimed that none of the elements (earth, fire, air, water) could be arche for the same reason. Instead, he proposed the existence of the apeiron, an indefinite substance from which all things are born and to which all things will return. Apeiron (endless or boundless) is something completely indefinite; and Anaximander was probably influenced by the original chaos of Hesiod (yawning abyss). Anaximander was the first philosopher that used arche for that which writers from Aristotle onwards called "the substratum" (Simplicius Phys. 150, 22). He probably intended it to mean primarily "indefinite in kind" but assumed it also to be "of unlimited extent and duration". The notion of temporal infinity was familiar to the Greek mind from remote antiquity in the religious conception of immortality and Anaximander's description was in terms appropriate to this conception. This arche is called "eternal and ageless". (Hippolitus I,6, I;DK B2) Anaximenes, Anaximander's pupil, advanced yet another theory. He returns to the elemental theory, but this time posits air, rather than water, as the arche and ascribes to it divine attributes. He was the first recorded philosopher who provided a theory of change and supported it with observation. Using two contrary processes of rarefaction and condensation (thinning or thickening), he explains how air is part of a series of changes. Rarefied air becomes fire, condensed it becomes first wind, then cloud, water, earth, and stone in order. The arche is technically what underlies all of reality/appearances. Aristotle Terence Irwin writes: Modern philosophy Descartes Profoundly influenced by Euclid, Descartes was a rationalist who invented the foundationalist system of philosophy. He used the method of doubt, now called Cartesian doubt, to systematically doubt everything he could possibly doubt until he was left with what he saw as purely indubitable truths. Using these self-evident propositions as his axioms, or foundations, he went on to deduce his entire body of knowledge from them. The foundations are also called a priori truths. His most famous proposition is "Je pense, donc je suis" (I think, therefore I am, or Cogito ergo sum), which he indicated in his Discourse on the Method was "the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search." Descartes describes the concept of a first principle in the following excerpt from the preface to the Principles of Philosophy (1644): In physics In physics, a calculation is said to be from first principles, or ab initio, if it starts directly at the level of established laws of physics and does not make assumptions such as empirical model and fitting parameters. For example, calculation of electronic structure using Schrödinger's equation within a set of approximations that do not include fitting the model to experimental data is an ab initio approach. See also Abstraction Brute fact Law of thought Present Clean room implementation Primitive notion References Further reading Orestes J. Gonzalez, Actus Essendi and the Habit of the First Principle in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Einsiedler Press, 2019). Abstraction Concepts in physics Foundationalism Formal systems Metaphysical principles Concepts in the philosophy of science

Social choice theory

Social choice theory is a branch of welfare economics that analyzes methods of combining individual opinions, beliefs, or preferences to reach a collective decision or create measures of social well-being. It contrasts with political science in that it is a normative field that studies how societies should make decisions, whereas political science is descriptive (observing how societies do make decisions). Social choice incorporates insights from economics, mathematics, philosophy, political science, and game theory to find the best ways to combine individual preferences into a coherent whole, called a social welfare function. Because of its strong connections to political philosophy and voting, social choice is sometimes also called voting theory. Real-world examples include enacting laws under a constitution or voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences. The field is closely related to mechanism design, which can be thought of as modelling social choice with self-interested and potentially dishonest citizens; it thus involves the application of game theory. Social choice differs from decision theory in that the latter is concerned with how individuals, rather than societies, can make rational decisions. History The earliest work on social choice theory comes from the writings of the Marquis de Condorcet, who formulated several key results including his jury theorem and his example showing the impossibility of majority rule. His work was prefigured by Ramon Llull's 1299 manuscript Ars Electionis (The Art of Elections), which discussed many of the same concepts, but was lost in the Late Middle Ages and only rediscovered in the early 21st century. Kenneth Arrow's book Social Choice and Individual Values is often recognized as inaugurating the modern era of social choice theory. Later work has also considered approaches to legal compensation, fair division, variable populations, partial strategy-proofing of social-choice mechanisms, natural resources, capabilities and functionings approaches, and measures of welfare. Key results Arrow's impossibility theorem Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result showing that social choice functions based only on ordinal comparisons, rather than cardinal utility, will behave incoherently (unless they are dictatorial). Such systems violate independence of irrelevant alternatives, i.e. they suffer from spoiler effects the system can behave erratically in response to changes in the quality or popularity of one of the options. Condorcet cycles Condorcet's example demonstrates that democracy cannot be thought of as being the same as simple majority rule or majoritarianism; otherwise, it will be self-contradictory when three or more options are available. Majority rule can create cycles that violate the transitive property: Attempting to use majority rule as a social choice function creates situations where we have A better than B and B better than C, but C is also better than A. This contrasts with May's theorem, which shows that simple majority is the optimal voting mechanism when there are only two outcomes, and only ordinal preferences are allowed. Harsanyi's theorem Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem shows that if individuals have preferences that are well-behaved under uncertainty (i.e. coherent), the only coherent and Pareto efficient social choice function is the utilitarian rule. This lends some support to the viewpoint expressed of John Stuart Mill, who identified democracy with the ideal of maximizing the common good (or utility) of society as a whole, under an equal consideration of interests. Manipulation theorems Gibbard's theorem provides limitations on the ability of any voting rule to elicit honest preferences from voters, showing that no voting rule is strategyproof (i.e. does not depend on other voters' preferences) for elections with 3 or more outcomes. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem proves a stronger result for ranked-choice voting systems, showing that no such voting rule can be sincere (i.e. free of reversed preferences). Median voter theorem Mechanism design The field of mechanism design, a subset of social choice theory, deals with the identification of rules that preserve while incentivizing agents to honestly reveal their preferences. One particularly important result is the revelation principle, which is almost a reversal of Gibbard's theorem: for any given social choice function, there exists a mechanism that obtains the same results but incentivizes participants to be completely honest. Because mechanism design places stronger assumptions on the behavior of voters or , it is sometimes possible to design mechanisms for social choice that accomplish "impossible" tasks. For example, by allowing agents to compensate each other for losses with transfers, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism can achieve the "impossible" according to Gibbard's theorem: the mechanism ensures honest behavior from participants, while still achieving a Pareto efficient outcome. As a result, the VCG mechanism can be considered a "better" way to make decisions than voting (though only so long as monetary transfers are possible). Others If the domain of preferences is restricted to those that include a majority-strength Condorcet winner, then selecting that winner is the unique resolvable, neutral, anonymous, and non-manipulable voting rule. Interpersonal utility comparison Social choice theory is the study of theoretical and practical methods to aggregate or combine individual preferences into a collective social welfare function. The field generally assumes that individuals have preferences, and it follows that they can be modeled using utility functions, by the VNM theorem. But much of the research in the field assumes that those utility functions are internal to humans, lack a meaningful unit of measure and cannot be compared across different individuals. Whether this type of interpersonal utility comparison is possible or not significantly alters the available mathematical structures for social welfare functions and social choice theory. In one perspective, following Jeremy Bentham, utilitarians have argued that preferences and utility functions of individuals are interpersonally comparable and may therefore be added together to arrive at a measure of aggregate utility. Utilitarian ethics call for maximizing this aggregate. In contrast many twentieth century economists, following Lionel Robbins, questioned whether such measures of utility could be measured, or even considered meaningful. Following arguments similar to those espoused by behaviorists in psychology, Robbins argued concepts of utility were unscientific and unfalsifiable. Consider for instance the law of diminishing marginal utility, according to which utility of an added quantity of a good decreases with the amount of the good that is already in possession of the individual. It has been used to defend transfers of wealth from the "rich" to the "poor" on the premise that the former do not derive as much utility as the latter from an extra unit of income. Robbins argued that this notion is beyond positive science; that is, one cannot measure changes in the utility of someone else, nor is it required by positive theory. Apologists for the interpersonal comparison of utility have argued that Robbins claimed too much. John Harsanyi agreed that perfect comparisons of mental states are not practically possible, but people can still make some comparisons thanks to their similar backgrounds, cultural experiences, and psychologies. Amartya Sen argues that even if interpersonal comparisons of utility are imperfect, we can still say that (despite being positive for Nero) the Great Fire of Rome had a negative overall value. Harsanyi and Sen thus argue that at least partial comparability of utility is possible, and social choice theory should proceed under that assumption. Relationship to public choice theory Despite the similar names, "public choice" and "social choice" are two distinct fields that are only weakly related. Public choice deals with the modeling of political systems as they actually exist in the real world, and is primarily limited to positive economics (predicting how politicians and other stakeholders will act). It is therefore often thought of as the application of microeconomic models to political science, in order to predict the behavior of political actors. By contrast, social choice has a much more normative bent, and deals with the abstract study of decision procedures and their properties. The Journal of Economic Literature classification codes place Social Choice under Microeconomics at JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) whereas Public Choice falls under JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior). Empirical research Since Arrow, social choice theory has been characterized by being predominantly mathematical and theoretical, but some research has aimed at estimating the frequency of various voting paradoxes, such as the Condorcet paradox. A summary of 37 individual studies, covering a total of 265 real-world elections, large and small, found 25 instances of a Condorcet paradox for a total likelihood of 9.4%. While examples of the paradox seem to occur often in small settings like parliaments, very few examples have been found in larger groups (electorates), although some have been identified. However, the frequency of such paradoxes depends heavily on the number of options and other factors. Rules Let be a set of possible 'states of the world' or 'alternatives'. Society wishes to choose a single state from . For example, in a single-winner election, may represent the set of candidates; in a resource allocation setting, may represent all possible allocations. Let be a finite set, representing a collection of individuals. For each , let be a utility function, describing the amount of happiness an individual i derives from each possible state. A social choice rule is a mechanism which uses the data to select some element(s) from which are 'best' for society. The question of what 'best' means is a common question in social choice theory. The following rules are most common: Utilitarian rule – sometimes called the max-sum rule or Benthamite welfare – aims to maximize the sum of utilities. Egalitarian rule – sometimes called the max-min rule or Rawlsian welfare – aims to maximize the smallest utility. Social choice functions A social choice function, sometimes called a voting system in the context of politics, is a rule that takes an individual's complete and transitive preferences over a set of outcomes and returns a single chosen outcome (or a set of tied outcomes). We can think of this subset as the winners of an election, and compare different social choice functions based on which axioms or mathematical properties they fulfill. Arrow's impossibility theorem is what often comes to mind when one thinks about impossibility theorems in voting. There are several famous theorems concerning social choice functions. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies that the only rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism. That is, a voter may be able to cast a ballot that misrepresents their preferences to obtain a result that is more favorable to them under their sincere preferences. May's theorem shows that when there are only two candidates and only rankings of options are available, the simple majority vote is the unique neutral, anonymous, and positively-responsive voting rule. See also Arrow's impossibility theorem Compensation principle Computational social choice Condorcet paradox Extended sympathy Game theory Group decision-making Justice (economics) Liberal paradox Mechanism design Nakamura number Rational choice theory Rule according to higher law Voting system Notes References Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951, 2nd ed., 1963). Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. _, (1972). "General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice", Nobel Prize Lecture, Link to text, with Section 8 on the theory and background. _, (1983). Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice, Oxford: Blackwell Arrow, Kenneth J., Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, eds. (1997). Social Choice Re-Examined, 2 vol., London: Palgrave Macmillan & _, eds. (2002). Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1. Chapter-preview links. _, ed. (2011). Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 2, Amsterdam: Elsevier. Chapter-preview links. Bossert, Walter and John A. Weymark (2008). "Social Choice (New Developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan Abstract. Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003). "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, 33(1), pp. 1–28, https://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4092266?uid=3739936&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102056001967, 2002 PDF link. Feldman, Allan M. and Roberto Serrano (2006). Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd ed., New York: Springer , Arrow-searchable chapter previews. Fleurbaey, Marc (1996). Théories économiques de la justice, Paris: Economica. Harsanyi, John C. (1987). "Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, London: Palgrave, pp. 955–58. Robbins, Lionel (1935). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, ch. VI , (1938). "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment," Economic Journal, 43(4), 635–41. Sen, Amartya K. (1970 [1984]). Collective Choice and Social Welfare, New York: Elsevier Description. _, (1998). "The Possibility of Social Choice", Nobel Prize Lecture . _, (1987). "Social Choice," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 4, London: Palgrave, pp. 382–93. _, (2008). "Social Choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, London: Palgrave Abstract. . A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Chapter 9. Downloadable free online. Suzumura, Kotaro (1983). Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press External links Social Choice Bibliography by J. S. Kelly Electowiki, a wiki covering many subjects of social choice and voting theory Metaethics Political science Public economics Applied mathematics Collective intelligence Political philosophy Mathematical economics Law and economics Administrative theory

General semantics

General semantics is a school of thought that incorporates philosophic and scientific aspects. Although it does not stand on its own as a separate school of philosophy, a separate science, or an academic discipline, it describes itself as a scientifically empirical approach to cognition and problem solving. It has been described by nonproponents as a self-help system, and it has been criticized as having pseudoscientific aspects, but it has also been favorably viewed by various scientists as a useful set of analytical tools albeit not its own science. General semantics is concerned with how phenomena (observable events) translate to perceptions, how they are further modified by the names and labels we apply to them, and how we might gain a measure of control over our own cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. Proponents characterize general semantics as an antidote to certain kinds of delusional thought patterns in which incomplete and possibly warped mental constructs are projected onto the world and treated as reality itself. Accurate map–territory relations are a central theme. After partial launches under the names human engineering and humanology, Polish-American originator Alfred Korzybski (1879–1950) fully launched the program as general semantics in 1933 with the publication of Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. In Science and Sanity, general semantics is presented as both a theoretical and a practical system whose adoption can reliably alter human behavior in the direction of greater sanity. In the 1947 preface to the third edition of Science and Sanity, Korzybski wrote: "We need not blind ourselves with the old dogma that 'human nature cannot be changed', for we find that it can be changed." While Korzybski considered his program to be empirically based and to strictly follow the scientific method, general semantics has been described as veering into the domain of pseudoscience. Starting around 1940, university English professor S. I. Hayakawa (1906–1992), speech professor Wendell Johnson, speech professor Irving J. Lee, and others assembled elements of general semantics into a package suitable for incorporation into mainstream communications curricula. The Institute of General Semantics, which Korzybski and co-workers founded in 1938, continues today. General semantics as a movement has waned considerably since the 1950s, although many of its ideas live on in other movements, such as media literacy, neuro-linguistic programming and rational emotive behavior therapy. Overview "Identification" and "the silent level" In the 1946 "Silent and Verbal Levels" diagram, the arrows and boxes denote ordered stages in human neuro-evaluative processing that happens in an instant. Although newer knowledge in biology has more sharply defined what the text in these 1946 boxes labels "electro-colloidal", the diagram remains, as Korzybski wrote in his last published paper in 1950, "satisfactory for our purpose of explaining briefly the most general and important points". General semantics postulates that most people "identify," or fail to differentiate the serial stages or "levels" within their own neuro-evaluative processing. "Most people," Korzybski wrote, "identify in value levels I, II, III, and IV and react as if our verbalizations about the first three levels were 'it.' Whatever we may say something 'is' obviously is not the 'something' on the silent levels." By making it a 'mental' habit to find and keep one's bearings among the ordered stages, general semantics training seeks to sharpen internal orientation much as a GPS device may sharpen external orientation. Once trained, general semanticists affirm, a person will act, respond, and make decisions more appropriate to any given set of happenings. Although producing saliva constitutes an appropriate response when lemon juice drips onto the tongue, a person has inappropriately identified when an imagined lemon or the word "l–e–m–o–n" triggers a salivation response. "Once we differentiate, differentiation becomes the denial of identity," Korzybski wrote in Science and Sanity. "Once we discriminate among the objective and verbal levels, we learn 'silence' on the unspeakable objective levels, and so introduce a most beneficial neurological 'delay'—engage the cortex to perform its natural function." British-American philosopher Max Black, an influential critic of general semantics, called this neurological delay the "central aim" of general semantics training, "so that in responding to verbal or nonverbal stimuli, we are aware of what it is that we are doing". Abstracting and consciousness of abstracting Identification prevents what general semantics seeks to promote: the additional cortical processing experienced as a delay. Korzybski called his remedy for identification "consciousness of abstracting." The term "abstracting" occurs ubiquitously in Science and Sanity. Korzybski's use of the term is somewhat unusual and requires study to understand his meaning. He discussed the problem of identification in terms of "confusions of orders of abstractions" and "lack of consciousness of abstracting". To be conscious of abstracting is to differentiate among the "levels" described above; levels II–IV being abstractions of level I (whatever level I "is"—all we really get are abstractions). The techniques Korzybski prescribed to help a person develop consciousness of abstracting he called "extensional devices". Extensional devices Satisfactory accounts of general semantics extensional devices can be found easily. This article seeks to explain briefly only the "indexing" devices. Suppose you teach in a school or university. Students enter your classroom on the first day of a new term, and, if you identify these new students to a memory association retrieved by your brain, you under-engage your powers of observation and your cortex. Indexing makes explicit a differentiating of studentsthis term from studentsprior terms. You survey the new students, and indexing explicitly differentiates student1 from student2 from student3, etc. Suppose you recognize one student—call her Anna—from a prior course in which Anna either excelled or did poorly. Again, you escape identification by your indexed awareness that Annathis term, this course is different from Annathat term, that course. Not identifying, you both expand and sharpen your apprehension of "students" with an awareness rooted in fresh silent-level observations. Language as a core concern Autoassociative memory in the memory-prediction model describes neural operations in mammalian brains generally. A special circumstance for humans arises with the introduction of language components, both as fresh stimuli and as stored representations. Language considerations figure prominently in general semantics, and three language and communications specialists who embraced general semantics, university professors and authors Hayakawa, Wendell Johnson and Neil Postman, played major roles in framing general semantics, especially for non-readers of Science and Sanity. Criticism Korzybski wrote in the preface to the third edition of Science and Sanity (1947) that general semantics "turned out to be an empirical natural science". But the type of existence, if any, of universals and abstract objects is an issue of serious debate within metaphysical philosophy. So Black summed up general semantics as "some hypothetical neurology fortified with dogmatic metaphysics". And in 1952, two years after Korzybski died, American skeptic Martin Gardner wrote, "[Korzybski's] work moves into the realm of cultism and pseudo-science." Former Institute of General Semantics executive director Steve Stockdale has compared GS to yoga. "First, I'd say that there is little if any benefit to be gained by just knowing something about general semantics. The benefits come from maintaining an awareness of the principles and attitudes that are derived from GS and applying them as they are needed. You can sort of compare general semantics to yoga in that respect... knowing about yoga is okay, but to benefit from yoga you have to do yoga." Similarly, Kenneth Burke explains Korzybski's kind of semantics contrasting it, in A Grammar of Motives, with a kind of Burkean poetry by saying "Semantics is essentially scientist, an approach to language in terms of knowledge, whereas poetic forms are kinds of action". History Early attempts at validation The First American Congress for General Semantics convened in March 1935 at the Central Washington College of Education in Ellensburg, Washington. In introductory remarks to the participants, Korzybski said: General semantics formulates a new experimental branch of natural science, underlying an empirical theory of human evaluations and orientations and involving a definite neurological mechanism, present in all humans. It discovers direct neurological methods for the stimulation of the activities of the human cerebral cortex and the direct introduction of beneficial neurological 'inhibition'.... He added that general semantics "will be judged by experimentation". One paper presented at the congress reported dramatic score improvements for college sophomores on standardized intelligence tests after six weeks of training by methods prescribed in Chapter 29 of Science and Sanity. Interpretation as semantics General semantics accumulated only a few early experimental validations. In 1938, economist and writer Stuart Chase praised and popularized Korzybski in The Tyranny of Words. Chase called Korzybski "a pioneer" and described Science and Sanity as "formulating a genuine science of communication. The term which is coming into use to cover such studies is 'semantics,' matters having to do with signification or meaning." Because Korzybski, in Science and Sanity, had articulated his program using "semantic" as a standalone qualifier on hundreds of pages in constructions like "semantic factors," "semantic disturbances," and especially "semantic reactions," to label the general semantics program "semantics" amounted to only a convenient shorthand. Hayakawa read The Tyranny of Words, then Science and Sanity, and in 1939 he attended a Korzybski-led workshop conducted at the newly organized Institute of General Semantics in Chicago. In the introduction to his own Language in Action, a 1941 Book of the Month Club selection, Hayakawa wrote, "[Korzybski's] principles have in one way or another influenced almost every page of this book...." But, Hayakawa followed Chase's lead in interpreting general semantics as making communication its defining concern. When Hayakawa co-founded the Society for General Semantics and its publication ETC: A Review of General Semantics in 1943—he would continue to edit ETC. until 1970—Korzybski and his followers at the Institute of General Semantics began to complain that Hayakawa had wrongly coopted general semantics. In 1985, Hayakawa gave this defense to an interviewer: "I wanted to treat general semantics as a subject, in the same sense that there's a scientific concept known as gravitation, which is independent of Isaac Newton. So after a while, you don't talk about Newton anymore; you talk about gravitation. You talk about semantics and not Korzybskian semantics." Lowered sights The regimen in the Institute's seminars, greatly expanded as team-taught seminar-workshops starting in 1944, continued to develop following the prescriptions laid down in Chapter XXIX of Science and Sanity. The structural differential, patented by Korzybski in the 1920s, remained among the chief training aids to help students reach "the silent level," a prerequisite for achieving "neurological delay". Innovations in the seminar-workshops included a new "neuro-relaxation" component, led by dancer and Institute editorial secretary Charlotte Schuchardt (1909–2002). But although many people were introduced to general semantics—perhaps the majority through Hayakawa's more limited 'semantics'—superficial lip service seemed more common than the deep internalization that Korzybski and his co-workers at the Institute aimed for. Marjorie Kendig (1892–1981), probably Korzybski's closest co-worker, director of the Institute after his death, and editor of his posthumously published Collected Writings: 1920–1950, wrote in 1968:I would guess that I have known about 30 individuals who have in some degree adequately, by my standards, mastered this highly general, very simple, very difficult system of orientation and method of evaluating—reversing as it must all our cultural conditioning, neurological canalization, etc.... To me the great error Korzybski made—and I carried on, financial necessity—and for which we pay the price today in many criticisms, consisted in not restricting ourselves to training very thoroughly a very few people who would be competent to utilize the discipline in various fields and to train others. We should have done this before encouraging anyone to popularize or spread the word (horrid phrase) in societies for general semantics, by talking about general semantics instead of learning, using, etc. the methodology to change our essential epistemological assumptions, premises, etc. (unconscious or conscious), i.e. the un-learning basic to learning to learn. Yes, large numbers of people do enjoy making a philosophy of general semantics. This saves them the pain of rigorous training so simple and general and limited that it seems obvious when said, yet so difficult. Successors at the Institute of General Semantics continued for many years along the founders' path. Stuart Mayper (1916–1997), who studied under Karl Popper, introduced Popper's principle of falsifiability into the seminar-workshops he led at the Institute starting in 1977. More modest pronouncements gradually replaced Korzybski's claims that general semantics can change human nature and introduce an era of universal human agreement. In 2000, Robert Pula (1928–2004), whose roles at the Institute over three decades included Institute director, editor-in-chief of the Institute's General Semantics Bulletin, and leader of the seminar-workshops, characterized Korzybski's legacy as a "contribution toward the improvement of human evaluating, to the amelioration of human woe...." Hayakawa died in 1992. The Society for General Semantics merged into the Institute of General Semantics in 2003. In 2007, Martin Levinson, president of the Institute's Board of Trustees, teamed with Paul D. Johnston, executive director of the Society at the date of the merger, to teach general semantics with a light-hearted Practical Fairy Tales for Everyday Living. Other institutions supporting or promoting general semantics in the 21st century include the New York Society for General Semantics, the European Society for General Semantics, the Australian General Semantics Society, and the Balvant Parekh Centre for General Semantics and Other Human Sciences (Baroda, India). The major premises Non-Aristotelianism: While Aristotle wrote that a true definition gives the essence of the thing (defined in Greek to ti ên einai, literally "the what it was to be"), general semantics denies the existence of such an 'essence'. In this, general semantics purports to represent an evolution in human evaluative orientation. In general semantics, it is always possible to give a description of empirical facts, but such descriptions remain just that—descriptions—which necessarily leave out many aspects of the objective, microscopic, and submicroscopic events they describe. According to general semantics, language, natural or otherwise (including the language called 'mathematics') can be used to describe the taste of an orange, but one cannot give the taste of the orange using language alone. According to general semantics, the content of all knowledge is structure, so that language (in general) and science and mathematics (in particular) can provide people with a structural 'map' of empirical facts, but there can be no 'identity', only structural similarity, between the language (map) and the empirical facts as lived through and observed by people as humans-in-environments (including doctrinal and linguistic environments). Time binding: The human ability to pass information and knowledge from one generation to the next. Korzybski claimed this to be a unique capacity, separating people from animals. This distinctly human ability for one generation to start where a previous generation left off, is a consequence of the uniquely human ability to move to higher and higher levels of abstraction without limit. Animals may have multiple levels of abstraction, but their abstractions must stop at some finite upper limit; this is not so for humans: humans can have 'knowledge about knowledge', 'knowledge about knowledge about knowledge', etc., without any upper limit. Animals possess knowledge, but each generation of animals does things pretty much in the same way as the previous generation, limited by their neurology and genetic makeup. By contrast, at one time most human societies were hunter-gatherers, but now more advanced means of food production (growing, raising, or buying) predominate. Except for some insects (for example, ants), all animals are still hunter-gatherer species, even though many have existed longer than the human species. For this reason, animals are regarded in general semantics as space-binders (doing space-binding), and plants, which are usually stationary, as energy-binders (doing energy-binding). Non-elementalism and non-additivity: The refusal to separate verbally what cannot be separated empirically, and the refusal to regard such verbal splits as evidence that the 'things' that are verbally split bear an additive relation to one another. For example, space-time cannot empirically be split into 'space' + 'time', a conscious organism (including humans) cannot be split into 'body' + 'mind', etc., therefore, people should never speak of 'space' and 'time' or 'mind' and 'body' in isolation, but always use the terms space-time or mind-body (or other organism-as-a-whole terms). Infinite-valued determinism: General semantics regards the problem of 'indeterminism vs. determinism' as the failure of pre-modern epistemologies to formulate the issue properly, as the failure to consider or include all factors relevant to a particular prediction, and failure to adjust our languages and linguistic structures to empirical facts. General semantics resolves the issue in favor of determinism of a special kind called 'infinite-valued' determinism which always allows for the possibility that relevant 'causal' factors may be 'left out' at any given date, resulting in, if the issue is not understood at that date, 'indeterminism', which simply indicates that our ability to predict events has broken down, not that the world is 'indeterministic'. General semantics considers all human behavior (including all human decisions) as, in principle, fully determined once all relevant doctrinal and linguistic factors are included in the analysis, regarding theories of 'free will' as failing to include the doctrinal and linguistic environments as environments in the analysis of human behavior. Connections to other disciplines The influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, and of early operationalists and pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, is particularly clear in the foundational ideas of general semantics. Korzybski himself acknowledged many of these influences. The concept of "silence on the objective level"—attributed to Korzybski and his insistence on consciousness of abstracting—are parallel to some of the central ideas in Zen Buddhism. Although Korzybski never acknowledged any influence from this quarter, he formulated general semantics during the same years that the first popularizations of Zen were becoming part of the intellectual currency of educated speakers of English. On the other hand, later Zen-popularizer Alan Watts was influenced by ideas from general semantics. General semantics has survived most profoundly in the cognitive therapies that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. Albert Ellis (1913–2007), who developed rational emotive behavior therapy, acknowledged influence from general semantics and delivered the Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture in 1991. The Bruges (Belgium) center for solution-focused brief therapy operates under the name Korzybski Institute Training and Research Center. George Kelly, creator of personal construct psychology, was influenced by general semantics. Fritz Perls and Paul Goodman, founders of Gestalt therapy are said to have been influenced by Korzybski Wendell Johnson wrote "People in Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment" in 1946, which stands as the first attempt to form a therapy from general semantics. Ray Solomonoff (1926–2009) was influenced by Korzybski. Solomonoff was the inventor of algorithmic probability, and founder of algorithmic information theory ( Kolmogorov complexity). Another scientist influenced by Korzybski (verbal testimony) is Paul Vitanyi (born 1944), a scientist in the theory of computation. During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, general semantics entered the idiom of science fiction. Notable examples include the works of A. E. van Vogt, The World of Null-A and its sequels. General semantics appear also in Robert A. Heinlein's work, especially Gulf. Bernard Wolfe drew on general semantics in his 1952 science fiction novel Limbo. Frank Herbert's novels Dune and Whipping Star <ref>O'Reilly, 1981 (p. 180), "The influence of General Semantics is particularly obvious in Whipping Star"...</ref> are also indebted to general semantics. The ideas of general semantics became a sufficiently important part of the shared intellectual toolkit of genre science fiction to merit parody by Damon Knight and others; they have since shown a tendency to reappear in the work of more recent writers such as Samuel R. Delany, Suzette Haden Elgin and Robert Anton Wilson. In 2008, John Wright extended van Vogt's Null-A series with Null-A Continuum. William Burroughs references Korzybski's time binding principle in his essay The Electronic Revolution, and elsewhere. Henry Beam Piper explicitly mentioned general semantics in Murder in the Gunroom, and its principles, such as awareness of the limitations of knowledge, are apparent in his later work. A fictional rendition of the Institute of General Semantics appears in the 1965 French science fiction film, Alphaville, directed by Jean-Luc Godard. Neil Postman, founder of New York University's media ecology program in 1971, edited ETC: A Review of General Semantics from 1976 to 1986. Postman's student Lance Strate, a co-founder of the Media Ecology Association, served as executive director of the Institute of General Semantics from 2007 to 2010. With Charles Weingartner, Neil Postman included General Semantics within the introductory background analysis in Teaching as a Subversive Activity (Delacorte, 1969). In particular, they argued that General Semantics fitted with what Postman and Weingartner referred to as the "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis", the claim that the particular language used to describe experience shapes how we perceive and understand that experience; that is, language shapes the way people think. (The "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis" is also known as Linguistic relativity.) See also Related fields Cognitive science Cognitive therapy E-Prime Gestalt therapy Language and thought Linguistic relativity Perceptual control theory Rational emotive behavior therapy Related subjects Cratylus (dialogue) Harold Innis's communications theories Institute of General Semantics Ladder of inference Map–territory relation Neuro-linguistic programming Propaganda Related persons Aristotle Gregory Bateson Sanford I. Berman Albert Ellis Elwood Murray Allen Walker Read Wilhelm Reich Ida Rolf William Vogt Robert Anton Wilson Related books Levels of Knowing and Existence: Studies in General Semantics, by Harry L. Weinberg Language in Thought and Action, by Professor S.I. Hayakawa (later a U.S. Senator), popularizing the tenets of General Semantics The World of Null-A, a science fiction novel by A. E. van Vogt, which envisions a world run by General Semanticists Gulf, a science fiction novella by Robert A. Heinlein (published in Assignment in Eternity), in which a secret society trained in General Semantics and the techniques of Samuel Renshaw act to protect humanity Notes Further reading Dare to Inquire: Sanity and Survival for the 21st Century and Beyond. by , (2003). Robert Anton Wilson wrote: "This seems to me a revolutionary book on how to transcend prejudices, evade the currently fashionable lunacies, open yourself to new perceptions, new empathy and even new ideas, free your living total brain from the limits of your dogmatic verbal 'mind', and generally wake up and smell the bodies of dead children and other innocents piling up everywhere. In a time of rising rage and terror, we need this as badly as a city with plague needs vaccines and antibiotics. If I had the money I'd send a copy to every delegate at the UN."Trance-Formations: Neuro-Linguistic Programming and the Structure of Hypnosis by Richard Bandler and John Grinder, (1981). One of the important principles—also widely used in political propaganda—discussed in this book is that trance induction uses a language of pure process and lets the listener fill in all the specific content from their own personal experience. E.g. the hypnotist might say "imagine you are sitting in a very comfortable chair in a room painted your favorite color" but not "imagine you are sitting in a very comfortable chair in a room painted red, your favorite color" because then the listener might think "wait a second, red is not my favorite color". The work of the scholar of political communication Murray Edelman (1919–2001), starting with his seminal book The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964), continuing with Politics as symbolic action: mass arousal and quiescience (1971), Political Language: Words that succeed and policies that fail (1977), Constructing the Political Spectacle (1988) and ending with his last book The Politics of Misinformation (2001) can be viewed as an exploration of the deliberate manipulation and obfuscation of the map-territory distinction for political purposes.Logic and contemporary rhetoric: the use of reason in everyday life by Howard Kahane (d. 2001). (Wadsworth: First edition 1971, sixth edition 1992, tenth edition 2005 with Nancy Cavender.) Highly readable guide to the rhetoric of clear thinking, frequently updated with examples of the opposite drawn from contemporary U.S. media sources.Doing Physics : how physicists take hold of the world by Martin H. Krieger, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. A "cultural phenomenology of doing physics". The General Semantics connection is the relation to Korzybski's original motivation of trying to identify key features of the successes of mathematics and the physical sciences that could be extended into everyday thinking and social organization.Metaphors We Live By by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, (1980).Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, (1997).The Art of Asking Questions by Stanley L. Payne, (1951) This book is a short handbook-style discussion of how the honest pollster should ask questions to find out what people actually think without leading them, but the same information could be used to slant a poll to get a predetermined answer. Payne notes that the effect of asking a question in different ways or in different contexts can be much larger than the effect of sampling bias, which is the error estimate usually given for a poll. E.g. (from the book) if you ask people "should government go into debt?" the majority will answer "No", but if you ask "Corporations have the right to issue bonds. Should governments also have the right to issue bonds?" the majority will answer "Yes". Related booksThe art of awareness; a textbook on general semantics by , Dubuque, Iowa: W.C. Brown Co., 1966, 1973, 1978; , 1996.Crazy talk, stupid talk: how we defeat ourselves by the way we talk and what to do about it by Neil Postman, Delacorte Press, 1976. All of Postman's books are informed by his study of General Semantics (Postman was editor of ETC. from 1976 to 1986) but this book is his most explicit and detailed commentary on the use and misuse of language as a tool for thought. Developing sanity in human affairs edited by Susan Presby Kodish and Robert P. Holston, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, copyright 1998, Hofstra University. A collection of papers on the subject of general semantics. Drive Yourself Sane: Using the Uncommon Sense of General Semantics, Third Edition. by Bruce I. Kodish and Susan Presby Kodish. Pasadena, CA: Extensional Publishing, 2011.General Semantics in Psychotherapy: Selected Writings on Methods Aiding Therapy, edited by Isabel Caro and Charlotte Schuchardt Read, Institute of General Semantics, 2002.Language habits in human affairs; an introduction to General Semantics by Irving J. Lee, Harper and Brothers, 1941. Still in print from the Institute of General Semantics. On a similar level to Hayakawa.The language of wisdom and folly; background readings in semantics edited by Irving J. Lee, Harper and Row, 1949. Was in print (ca. 2000) from the International Society of General Semantics—now merged with the Institute of General Semantics. A selection of essays and short excerpts from different authors on linguistic themes emphasized by General Semantics—without reference to Korzybski, except for an essay by him. "Language Revision by Deletion of Absolutisms," by Allen Walker Read. Paper presented at the ninth annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, Bloomington, IN, 13 October 1984. Published in ETC: A Review of General Semantics. V42n1, Spring 1985, pp. 7–12. Living With Change, Wendell Johnson, Harper Collins, 1972.Mathsemantics: making numbers talk sense by Edward MacNeal, HarperCollins, 1994. Penguin paperback 1995. Explicit General Semantics combined with numeracy education (along the lines of John Allen Paulos's books) and simple statistical and mathematical modelling, influenced by MacNeal's work as an airline transportation consultant. Discusses the fallacy of Single Instance thinking in statistical situations.Operational philosophy: integrating knowledge and action by Anatol Rapoport, New York: Wiley (1953, 1965).People in Quandaries: the semantics of personal adjustment by Wendell Johnson, 1946—still in print from the Institute of General Semantics. Insightful book about the application of General Semantics to psychotherapy; was an acknowledged influence on Richard Bandler and John Grinder in their formulation of Neuro-Linguistic Programming.Semantics by Anatol Rapoport, Crowell, 1975. Includes both general semantics along the lines of Hayakawa, Lee, and Postman and more technical (mathematical and philosophical) material. A valuable survey. Rapoport's autobiography Certainties and Doubts : A Philosophy of Life (Black Rose Books, 2000) gives some of the history of the General Semantics movement as he saw it.Your Most Enchanted Listener by Wendell Johnson, Harper, 1956. Your most enchanted listener is yourself, of course. Similar material as in People in Quandaries but considerably briefer. Related academic articles Bramwell, R. D. (1981). The semantics of multiculturalism: a new element in curriculum. Canadian Journal of Education, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 92–101. Clarke, R. A. (1948). General semantics in art education. The School Review, Vol. 56, No. 10 (Dec., 1948), pp. 600–605. Chisholm, F. P. (1943). Some misconceptions about general semantics. College English, Vol. 4, No. 7 (Apr., 1943), p. 412–416. Glicksberg, C. I. (1946) General semantics and the science of man. Scientific Monthly, Vol. 62, No. 5 (May, 1946), pp. 440–446. Hallie, P. P. (1952). A criticism of general semantics. College English, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Oct., 1952), pp. 17–23. Hasselris, P. (1991). From Pearl Harbor to Watergate to Kuwait: "Language in Thought and Action". The English Journal, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Feb., 1991), pp. 28–35. Hayakawa, S. I. (1939). General semantics and propaganda. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 2 (Apr., 1939), pp. 197–208. Kenyon, R. E. (1988). The Impossibility of Non-identity Languages. General Semantics Bulletin, No. 55, (1990), pp. 43–52. Kenyon, R. E. (1993). E-prime: The Spirit and the Letter. ETC: A Review of General Semantics. Vol. 49 No. 2, (Summer 1992). pp. 185–188 Krohn, F. B. (1985). A general semantics approach to teaching business ethics. Journal of Business Communication, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (Summer, 1985), pp 59–66. Maymi, P. (1956). General concepts or laws in translation. The Modern Language Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 1956), pp. 13–21. O'Brien, P. M. (1972). The sesame land of general semantics. The English Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Feb., 1972), pp. 281–301. Rapaport, W. J. (1995). Understanding understanding: syntactic semantics and computational cognition. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology (1995), pp. 49–88. Thorndike, E. L. (1946). The psychology of semantics. American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Oct., 1946), pp. 613–632. Whitworth, R. (1991). A book for all occasions: activities for teaching general semantics. The English Journal, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Feb., 1991), pp. 50–54. Youngren, W. H. (1968). General semantics and the science of meaning. College English'', Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jan., 1968), pp. 253–285. External links Institute of General Semantics Institute of General Semantics in Europe New York Society for General Semantics European Society For General Semantics Australian General Semantics Society ETC A Review of General Semantics Index 1933 introductions

Infinitism

Infinitism is the view that knowledge may be justified by an infinite chain of reasons. It belongs to epistemology, the branch of philosophy that considers the possibility, nature, and means of knowledge. Epistemological infinitism Since Gettier, "knowledge" is no longer widely accepted as meaning "justified true belief" only. However, some epistemologists still consider knowledge to have a justification condition. Traditional theories of justification (foundationalism and coherentism) and indeed some philosophers consider an infinite regress not to be a valid justification. In their view, if A is justified by B, B by C, and so forth, then either The chain must end with a link that requires no independent justification (a foundation), The chain must come around in a circle in some finite number of steps (the belief may be justified by its coherence), or Our beliefs must not be justified after all (as is posited by philosophical skeptics). Infinitism, the view, for example, of Peter D. Klein, challenges this consensus, referring back to work of Paul Moser (1984) and John Post (1987). In this view, the evidential ancestry of a justified belief must be infinite and non-repeating, which follows from the conjunction of two principles that Klein sees as having straightforward intuitive appeal: "The Principle of Avoiding Circularity" and "The Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness." The Principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC) is stated as follows: "For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then for all y, if y is in the evidential ancestry of x for S, then x is not in the evidential ancestry of y for S." PAC says that the proposition to be justified cannot be a member of its own evidential ancestry, which is violated by coherence theories of justification. The Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA) is stated as follows: "For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, r1, available to S for x; and there is some reason, r2, available to S for r1; etc." PAA says that in order to avoid arbitrariness, for any proposition x to be justified for an epistemological agent, there must be some reason r available to the agent; this reason will in turn require the same structure of justification, and so on ad infinitum. Foundationalist theories can only avoid arbitrariness by claiming that some propositions are self-justified. But if a proposition is its own justification (e.g. coherentism), then it is a member of its own evidential ancestry, and the structure of justification is circular. In this view, the conjunction of both PAC and PAA leaves infinitism as the only alternative to skepticism. The Availability of Reasons: Klein also relies on the notion of "availability". In other words, a reason must be available to the subject in order for it to be a candidate for justification. There are two conditions that need to be satisfied in order for a reason to be available: objectively and subjectively. An objectively available reason is stated as follows: "a belief, r, is objectively available to S as a reason for p if (1) r has some sufficiently high probability and the conditional probability of p given r is sufficiently high; or (2) an impartial, informed observer would accept r as a reason for p; or (3) r would be accepted in the long run by an appropriately defined set of people; or (4) r is evident for S and r makes p evident for S; or (5) r accords with S's deepest epistemic commitments; or (6) r meets the appropriate conversational presuppositions; or (7) an intellectually virtuous person would advance r as a reason for p." Any of these conditions are sufficient to describe objectively available reasons and are compatible with infinitism. Klein concedes that, ultimately, the proper characterization of objectively available need be a member of this list, but, for the scope of Klein's defense of infinitism, he need not provide a fully developed account of objectively available reasons. Objective availability could be best understood, at least as a working definition, as an existing, truth-apt reason not dependent on the subject. A subjectively available reason is stated as follows: "S must be able to call on r." (Subjectively available is comparatively straightforward compared to objectively available.) The subject must be able to evoke the reason in their own mind and use the reason in the process of justification. In essence, the reason must be "properly hooked up with S's own beliefs" in order to be subjectively available. A reason that is both objectively and subjectively available to a subject is a candidate for justification according to infinitism (or, at least for Klein). Objection to Infinitism: Klein addresses an objection to infinitism. The finite mind objection (attributed to John Williams): The human mind is finite and has a limited capacity. "It is impossible to consciously believe an infinite number of propositions (because to believe something takes some time) and it is impossible to "unconsciously believe"...an infinite number of propositions because the candidate beliefs are such that some of them "defeat human understanding." It is simply an impossibility that a subject has an infinite chain of reasons which justify their beliefs because the human mind is finite. Klein concedes that the human mind is finite and cannot contain an infinite number of reasons, but the infinitist, according to Klein, is not committed to a subject actually possessing infinite reasons. "The infinitist is not claiming that in any finite period of time...we can consciously entertain an infinite number of thoughts. It is rather that there are an infinite number of propositions such that each one of them would be consciously thought were the appropriate circumstances to arise." So, an infinite chain of reasons need not be present in the mind in order for a belief to be justified rather it must merely be possible to provide an infinite chain of reasons. There will always be another reason to justify the preceding reason if the subject felt compelled to make the inquiry and had subjective access to that reason. See also Fallibilism Finitism Perspectivism Regress argument Relativism References External links Internalism and externalism Infinity Theories of justification

Verstehen

Verstehen (, ), in the context of German philosophy and social sciences in general, has been used since the late 19th century – in English as in German – with the particular sense of the "interpretive or participatory" examination of social phenomena. The term is closely associated with the work of the German sociologist Max Weber, whose antipositivism established an alternative to prior sociological positivism and economic determinism, rooted in the analysis of social action. In anthropology, Verstehen has come to mean a systematic interpretive process in which an outside observer of a culture attempts to relate to it and understand others. Verstehen is now seen as a concept and a method central to a rejection of positivist social science (although Weber appeared to think that the two could be united). Verstehen refers to understanding the meaning of action from the actor's point of view. It is entering into the shoes of the other, and adopting this research stance requires treating the actor as a subject, rather than an object of your observations. It also implies that unlike objects in the natural world human actors are not simply the product of the pulls and pushes of external forces. Individuals are seen to create the world by organizing their own understanding of it and giving it meaning. To do research on actors without taking into account the meanings they attribute to their actions or environment is to treat them like objects. Meaning Interpretive sociology is the study of society that concentrates on the meanings people associate to their social world. Interpretive sociology strives to show that reality is constructed by people themselves in their daily lives. Verstehen roughly translates to "meaningful understanding" or "putting yourself in the shoes of others to see things from their perspective." Interpretive sociology differs from positivist sociology in three ways: It deals with the meaning attached to action, unlike positivist sociology which focuses on behavior; It sees reality as being constructed by people, unlike positivist sociology which sees an objective reality "out there;" and It relies on qualitative data, unlike positivist sociology which tends to make use of quantitative data. Dilthey and hermeneutics Verstehen was introduced into philosophy and the human sciences by the German historist philosopher Johann Gustav Droysen. Droysen first made a distinction between nature and history in terms of the categories of space and time. The method of the natural sciences is explanation, while that of history is understanding. The concept of Verstehen was later used by the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey to describe the first-person participatory perspective that agents have on their individual experience as well as their culture, history, and society. In this sense, it is developed in the context of the theory and practice of interpretation (as understood in the context of hermeneutics) and contrasted with the external objectivating third-person perspective of explanation in which human agency, subjectivity, and its products are analyzed as effects of impersonal natural forces in the natural sciences and social structures in sociology. Twentieth-century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer were critical of what they considered to be the romantic and subjective character of Verstehen in Dilthey, although both Dilthey and the early Heidegger were interested in the "facticity" and "life-context" of understanding, and sought to universalize it as the way humans exist through language on the basis of ontology. Verstehen also played a role in Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz's analysis of the "lifeworld." Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel further transformed the concept of Verstehen, reformulating it on the basis of a transcendental-pragmatic philosophy of language and the theory of communicative action. Weber and the social sciences Max Weber and Georg Simmel introduced interpretive understanding into sociology, where it has come to mean a systematic interpretive process in which an outside observer of a culture (such as an anthropologist or sociologist) relates to an indigenous people or sub-cultural group on their own terms and from their own point of view, rather than interpreting them in terms of the observer's own culture. Verstehen can mean either a kind of empathic or participatory understanding of social phenomena. In anthropological terms this is sometimes described as cultural relativism, especially by those that have a tendency to argue toward universal ideals. In sociology it is an aspect of the comparative-historical approach, where the context of a society like twelfth century "France" can be potentially better understood by the sociologist than it could have been by people living in a village in Burgundy. It relates to how people in life give meaning to the social world around them and how the social scientist accesses and evaluates this "first-person perspective." This concept has been both expanded and criticized by later social scientists. Proponents laud this concept as the only means by which researchers from one culture can examine and explain behaviors in another. While the exercise of Verstehen has been more popular among social scientists in Europe, such as Habermas, Verstehen was introduced into the practice of sociology in the United States by Talcott Parsons, an American sociologist influenced by Max Weber. Parsons used his structural functionalism to incorporate this concept into his 1937 work, The Structure of Social Action. Weber had more specific beliefs than Marx where he put value to understanding and meaning of key elements—not just with intuition or sympathy with the individual but also the product of "systematic and rigorous research". The goal is to identify human actions and interpreting them as observable events leading us to believe that it not only provides for a good explanation for individual actions but also for group interactions. The meaning attached needs to include constraints and limitations and analyze the motivation for action. Weber believed that this gives the sociologist an advantage over a natural scientist because "We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals." Criticism Critics of the social scientific concept of Verstehen such as Mikhail Bakhtin and Dean MacCannell counter that it is simply impossible for a person born of one culture to ever completely understand another culture, and that it is arrogant and conceited to attempt to interpret the significance of one culture's symbols through the terms of another (supposedly superior) culture. Just as in physical science all knowledge is asymptotic to the full explanation, a high degree of cross-cultural understanding is very valuable. The opposite of Verstehen would seem to be ignorance of all but that which is immediately observable, meaning that we would not be able to understand any time and place but our own. A certain level of interpretive understanding is necessary for our own cultural setting, however, and it can easily be argued that even the full participant in a culture does not fully understand it in every regard. Critics also believe that it is the sociologist's job to not just observe people and what people do but also share in their world of meaning and come to appreciate why they act as they do. Subjective thoughts and feelings regarded as bias in the sciences is an important aspect to be controlled for while doing sociological research. See also Antinaturalism (sociology) Emic and etic Humanistic sociology Humanistic coefficient Nomothetic and idiographic Reflexivity (social theory) References External links Philosophy of social science Phenomenology Hermeneutics German philosophy Critical theory German words and phrases Max Weber Social concepts 1850s neologisms Wilhelm Dilthey