func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequence | project
stringlengths 2
29
| commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
cr_input_new_real (void)
{
CRInput *result = NULL;
result = g_try_malloc (sizeof (CRInput));
if (!result) {
cr_utils_trace_info ("Out of memory");
return NULL;
}
memset (result, 0, sizeof (CRInput));
PRIVATE (result) = g_try_malloc (sizeof (CRInputPriv));
if (!PRIVATE (result)) {
cr_utils_trace_info ("Out of memory");
g_free (result);
return NULL;
}
memset (PRIVATE (result), 0, sizeof (CRInputPriv));
PRIVATE (result)->free_in_buf = TRUE;
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libcroco | 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 | 17,754,987,009,470,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | input: check end of input before reading a byte
When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
could deal to a security bug. |
void CallInfo::set_common(Klass* resolved_klass,
Klass* selected_klass,
const methodHandle& resolved_method,
const methodHandle& selected_method,
CallKind kind,
int index,
TRAPS) {
assert(resolved_method->signature() == selected_method->signature(), "signatures must correspond");
_resolved_klass = resolved_klass;
_selected_klass = selected_klass;
_resolved_method = resolved_method;
_selected_method = selected_method;
_call_kind = kind;
_call_index = index;
_resolved_appendix = Handle();
DEBUG_ONLY(verify()); // verify before making side effects
CompilationPolicy::compile_if_required(selected_method, THREAD);
} | 0 | [] | jdk11u | 132745902a4601dc64b2c8ca112ca30292feccb4 | 77,245,674,036,760,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | 8281866: Enhance MethodHandle invocations
Reviewed-by: mbaesken
Backport-of: d974d9da365f787f67971d88c79371c8b0769f75 |
auto ReferenceHandle::Definition() -> Local<FunctionTemplate> {
return Inherit<TransferableHandle>(MakeClass(
"Reference", ConstructorFunction<decltype(&New), &New>{},
"deref", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Deref), &ReferenceHandle::Deref>{},
"derefInto", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::DerefInto), &ReferenceHandle::DerefInto>{},
"release", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Release), &ReferenceHandle::Release>{},
"copy", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Copy<1>), &ReferenceHandle::Copy<1>>{},
"copySync", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Copy<0>), &ReferenceHandle::Copy<0>>{},
"delete", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Delete<1>), &ReferenceHandle::Delete<1>>{},
"deleteIgnored", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Delete<2>), &ReferenceHandle::Delete<2>>{},
"deleteSync", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Delete<0>), &ReferenceHandle::Delete<0>>{},
"get", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Get<1>), &ReferenceHandle::Get<1>>{},
"getSync", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Get<0>), &ReferenceHandle::Get<0>>{},
"set", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Set<1>), &ReferenceHandle::Set<1>>{},
"setIgnored", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Set<2>), &ReferenceHandle::Set<2>>{},
"setSync", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Set<0>), &ReferenceHandle::Set<0>>{},
"apply", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Apply<1>), &ReferenceHandle::Apply<1>>{},
"applyIgnored", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Apply<2>), &ReferenceHandle::Apply<2>>{},
"applySync", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Apply<0>), &ReferenceHandle::Apply<0>>{},
"applySyncPromise", MemberFunction<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::Apply<4>), &ReferenceHandle::Apply<4>>{},
"typeof", MemberAccessor<decltype(&ReferenceHandle::TypeOfGetter), &ReferenceHandle::TypeOfGetter>{}
));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-913"
] | isolated-vm | 2646e6c1558bac66285daeab54c7d490ed332b15 | 8,550,752,834,834,591,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Don't invoke accessors or proxies via Reference functions |
void Filter::resetAll() {
while (!upstream_requests_.empty()) {
auto request_ptr = upstream_requests_.back()->removeFromList(upstream_requests_);
request_ptr->resetStream();
if (Runtime::runtimeFeatureEnabled("envoy.reloadable_features.allow_upstream_inline_write")) {
request_ptr->cleanUp();
callbacks_->dispatcher().deferredDelete(std::move(request_ptr));
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | 5bf9b0f1e7f247a4eee7180849cb0823926f7fff | 37,898,523,519,829,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | [1.21] CVE-2022-21655
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <ovanders@redhat.com> |
static int replmd_modify_la_delete(struct ldb_module *module,
struct replmd_private *replmd_private,
struct replmd_replicated_request *ac,
struct ldb_message *msg,
struct ldb_message_element *el,
struct ldb_message_element *old_el,
const struct dsdb_attribute *schema_attr,
time_t t,
struct ldb_dn *msg_dn,
struct ldb_request *parent)
{
unsigned int i;
struct parsed_dn *dns, *old_dns;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
int ret;
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
struct ldb_control *vanish_links_ctrl = NULL;
bool vanish_links = false;
unsigned int num_to_delete = el->num_values;
uint32_t rmd_flags;
NTTIME now;
unix_to_nt_time(&now, t);
if (old_el == NULL || old_el->num_values == 0) {
/* there is nothing to delete... */
if (num_to_delete == 0) {
/* and we're deleting nothing, so that's OK */
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE;
}
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(msg);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
ret = get_parsed_dns(module, tmp_ctx, el, &dns,
schema_attr->syntax->ldap_oid, parent);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = get_parsed_dns_trusted_fallback(module, replmd_private,
tmp_ctx, old_el, &old_dns,
schema_attr->syntax->ldap_oid,
parent);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
vanish_links_ctrl = ldb_request_get_control(parent, DSDB_CONTROL_REPLMD_VANISH_LINKS);
if (vanish_links_ctrl) {
vanish_links = true;
vanish_links_ctrl->critical = false;
}
/* we empty out el->values here to avoid damage if we return early. */
el->num_values = 0;
el->values = NULL;
/*
* If vanish links is set, we are actually removing members of
* old_el->values; otherwise we are just marking them deleted.
*
* There is a special case when no values are given: we remove them
* all. When we have the vanish_links control we just have to remove
* the backlinks and change our element to replace the existing values
* with the empty list.
*/
if (num_to_delete == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < old_el->num_values; i++) {
struct parsed_dn *p = &old_dns[i];
if (p->dsdb_dn == NULL) {
ret = really_parse_trusted_dn(tmp_ctx, ldb, p,
schema_attr->syntax->ldap_oid);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
}
ret = replmd_add_backlink(module, replmd_private,
ac->schema, msg_dn, &p->guid,
false, schema_attr,
parent);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
if (vanish_links) {
continue;
}
rmd_flags = dsdb_dn_rmd_flags(p->dsdb_dn->dn);
if (rmd_flags & DSDB_RMD_FLAG_DELETED) {
continue;
}
ret = replmd_update_la_val(old_el->values, p->v,
p->dsdb_dn, p->dsdb_dn,
&ac->our_invocation_id,
ac->seq_num, ac->seq_num,
now, true);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
if (vanish_links) {
el->flags = LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE;
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_to_delete; i++) {
struct parsed_dn *p = &dns[i];
struct parsed_dn *exact = NULL;
struct parsed_dn *next = NULL;
ret = parsed_dn_find(ldb, old_dns, old_el->num_values,
&p->guid,
NULL,
p->dsdb_dn->extra_part, 0,
&exact, &next,
schema_attr->syntax->ldap_oid,
true);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
if (exact == NULL) {
struct GUID_txt_buf buf;
ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "Attribute %s doesn't "
"exist for target GUID %s",
el->name,
GUID_buf_string(&p->guid, &buf));
if (ldb_attr_cmp(el->name, "member") == 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
} else {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE;
}
}
if (vanish_links) {
if (CHECK_DEBUGLVL(5)) {
rmd_flags = dsdb_dn_rmd_flags(exact->dsdb_dn->dn);
if ((rmd_flags & DSDB_RMD_FLAG_DELETED)) {
struct GUID_txt_buf buf;
const char *guid_str = \
GUID_buf_string(&p->guid, &buf);
DEBUG(5, ("Deleting deleted linked "
"attribute %s to %s, because "
"vanish_links control is set\n",
el->name, guid_str));
}
}
/* remove the backlink */
ret = replmd_add_backlink(module,
replmd_private,
ac->schema,
msg_dn,
&p->guid,
false, schema_attr,
parent);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* We flag the deletion and tidy it up later. */
exact->v = NULL;
continue;
}
rmd_flags = dsdb_dn_rmd_flags(exact->dsdb_dn->dn);
if (rmd_flags & DSDB_RMD_FLAG_DELETED) {
struct GUID_txt_buf buf;
const char *guid_str = GUID_buf_string(&p->guid, &buf);
ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "Attribute %s already "
"deleted for target GUID %s",
el->name, guid_str);
if (ldb_attr_cmp(el->name, "member") == 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
} else {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE;
}
}
ret = replmd_update_la_val(old_el->values, exact->v,
exact->dsdb_dn, exact->dsdb_dn,
&ac->our_invocation_id,
ac->seq_num, ac->seq_num,
now, true);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = replmd_add_backlink(module, replmd_private,
ac->schema, msg_dn,
&p->guid,
false, schema_attr,
parent);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
if (vanish_links) {
unsigned j = 0;
struct ldb_val *tmp_vals = NULL;
tmp_vals = talloc_array(tmp_ctx, struct ldb_val,
old_el->num_values);
if (tmp_vals == NULL) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ldb_module_oom(module);
}
for (i = 0; i < old_el->num_values; i++) {
if (old_dns[i].v == NULL) {
continue;
}
tmp_vals[j] = *old_dns[i].v;
j++;
}
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
old_el->values[i] = tmp_vals[i];
}
old_el->num_values = j;
}
el->values = talloc_steal(msg->elements, old_el->values);
el->num_values = old_el->num_values;
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
/* we now tell the backend to replace all existing values
with the one we have constructed */
el->flags = LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE;
return LDB_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | samba | 0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77 | 140,713,940,049,839,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 254 | CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> |
int x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
x509_name *cur )
{
int ret;
size_t set_len;
const unsigned char *end_set;
/*
* parse first SET, restricted to 1 element
*/
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len,
ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret );
end_set = *p + set_len;
if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end_set, cur ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( *p != end_set )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
/*
* recurse until end of SEQUENCE is reached
*/
if( *p == end )
return( 0 );
cur->next = (x509_name *) polarssl_malloc( sizeof( x509_name ) );
if( cur->next == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED );
memset( cur->next, 0, sizeof( x509_name ) );
return( x509_get_name( p, end, cur->next ) );
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | polarssl | 5d8618539f8e186c1b2c1b5a548d6f85936fe41f | 27,653,068,131,058,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix memory leak while parsing some X.509 certs |
void CLASS setPentaxBodyFeatures(unsigned id)
{
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CamID = id;
switch (id)
{
case 0x12994:
case 0x12aa2:
case 0x12b1a:
case 0x12b60:
case 0x12b62:
case 0x12b7e:
case 0x12b80:
case 0x12b9c:
case 0x12b9d:
case 0x12ba2:
case 0x12c1e:
case 0x12c20:
case 0x12cd2:
case 0x12cd4:
case 0x12cfa:
case 0x12d72:
case 0x12d73:
case 0x12db8:
case 0x12dfe:
case 0x12e6c:
case 0x12e76:
case 0x12ef8:
case 0x12f52:
case 0x12f70:
case 0x12f71:
case 0x12fb6:
case 0x12fc0:
case 0x12fca:
case 0x1301a:
case 0x13024:
case 0x1309c:
case 0x13222:
case 0x1322c:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC;
break;
case 0x13092:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF;
break;
case 0x12e08:
case 0x13010:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_645;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_MF;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_645;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_MF;
break;
case 0x12ee4:
case 0x12f66:
case 0x12f7a:
case 0x1302e:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_Q;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_Q;
break;
default:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens;
}
return;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] | LibRaw | d7c3d2cb460be10a3ea7b32e9443a83c243b2251 | 283,269,171,147,627,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 | Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns |
pci_emul_find_capability(struct pci_vdev *dev, uint8_t capid, int *p_capoff)
{
int coff;
uint16_t sts;
sts = pci_get_cfgdata16(dev, PCIR_STATUS);
if ((sts & PCIM_STATUS_CAPPRESENT) == 0)
return -1;
if (!p_capoff)
return -1;
if (*p_capoff == 0)
coff = pci_get_cfgdata8(dev, PCIR_CAP_PTR);
else if (*p_capoff >= CAP_START_OFFSET && *p_capoff <= dev->prevcap)
coff = pci_get_cfgdata8(dev, *p_capoff + 1);
else
return -1;
while (coff >= CAP_START_OFFSET && coff <= dev->prevcap) {
if (pci_get_cfgdata8(dev, coff) == capid) {
*p_capoff = coff;
return 0;
}
coff = pci_get_cfgdata8(dev, coff + 1);
}
return -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] | acrn-hypervisor | 6199e653418eda58cd698d8769820904453e2535 | 95,244,223,056,932,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | dm: validate the input in 'pci_emul_mem_handler()'
checking the inputs explicitly instead of using Assert.
Tracked-On: #4003
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Shuo Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Yu Wang <yu1.wang@intel.com> |
static void ext3_handle_error(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext3_super_block *es = EXT3_SB(sb)->s_es;
EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT3_ERROR_FS;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT3_ERROR_FS);
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return;
if (!test_opt (sb, ERRORS_CONT)) {
journal_t *journal = EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal;
set_opt(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_opt, ABORT);
if (journal)
journal_abort(journal, -EIO);
}
if (test_opt (sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT,
"error: remounting filesystem read-only");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
}
ext3_commit_super(sb, es, 1);
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC))
panic("EXT3-fs (%s): panic forced after error\n",
sb->s_id);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc | 168,188,570,541,055,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
getnextarg(PyObject *args, Py_ssize_t arglen, Py_ssize_t *p_argidx)
{
Py_ssize_t argidx = *p_argidx;
if (argidx < arglen) {
(*p_argidx)++;
if (arglen < 0)
return args;
else
return PyTuple_GetItem(args, argidx);
}
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_TypeError,
"not enough arguments for format string");
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | cpython | c3c9db89273fabc62ea1b48389d9a3000c1c03ae | 112,208,466,807,423,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | [2.7] bpo-30657: Check & prevent integer overflow in PyString_DecodeEscape (#2174) |
WasmResult Context::setProperty(absl::string_view key, absl::string_view serialized_value) {
auto* stream_info = getRequestStreamInfo();
if (!stream_info) {
return WasmResult::NotFound;
}
stream_info->filterState().setData(key, std::make_unique<WasmState>(serialized_value),
StreamInfo::FilterState::StateType::Mutable);
return WasmResult::Ok;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | envoy | 8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153 | 329,279,122,911,498,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | 1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com> |
sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
bool verbose, void *closure)
{
char *iolog_path = NULL;
mode_t cmnd_umask = ACCESSPERMS;
struct sudo_nss *nss;
int oldlocale, validated, ret = -1;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_main, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PLUGIN);
sudo_warn_set_locale_func(sudoers_warn_setlocale);
unlimit_nproc();
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
/* Not an audit event (should it be?). */
sudo_warnx("%s",
U_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo"));
goto bad;
}
if (!set_perms(PERM_INITIAL))
goto bad;
/* Environment variables specified on the command line. */
if (env_add != NULL && env_add[0] != NULL)
sudo_user.env_vars = env_add;
/*
* Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling
* for pseudo-commands and the '-i' option.
*/
if (argc == 0) {
NewArgc = 1;
NewArgv = reallocarray(NULL, NewArgc + 1, sizeof(char *));
if (NewArgv == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
goto done;
}
sudoers_gc_add(GC_VECTOR, NewArgv);
NewArgv[0] = user_cmnd;
NewArgv[1] = NULL;
} else {
/* Must leave an extra slot before NewArgv for bash's --login */
NewArgc = argc;
NewArgv = reallocarray(NULL, NewArgc + 2, sizeof(char *));
if (NewArgv == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
goto done;
}
sudoers_gc_add(GC_VECTOR, NewArgv);
NewArgv++; /* reserve an extra slot for --login */
memcpy(NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *));
NewArgv[NewArgc] = NULL;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && runas_pw != NULL) {
NewArgv[0] = strdup(runas_pw->pw_shell);
if (NewArgv[0] == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
goto done;
}
sudoers_gc_add(GC_PTR, NewArgv[0]);
}
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = true;
/* Find command in path and apply per-command Defaults. */
cmnd_status = set_cmnd();
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_ERROR)
goto done;
/* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
if (!def_closefrom_override) {
log_warningx(SLOG_NO_STDERR|SLOG_AUDIT,
N_("user not allowed to override closefrom limit"));
sudo_warnx("%s", U_("you are not permitted to use the -C option"));
goto bad;
}
def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
}
/*
* Check sudoers sources, using the locale specified in sudoers.
*/
sudoers_setlocale(SUDOERS_LOCALE_SUDOERS, &oldlocale);
validated = sudoers_lookup(snl, sudo_user.pw, &cmnd_status, pwflag);
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR)) {
/* The lookup function should have printed an error. */
goto done;
}
/* Restore user's locale. */
sudoers_setlocale(oldlocale, NULL);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
if ((safe_cmnd = strdup(user_cmnd)) == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
goto done;
}
}
/* Defer uid/gid checks until after defaults have been updated. */
if (unknown_runas_uid && !def_runas_allow_unknown_id) {
log_warningx(SLOG_AUDIT, N_("unknown user: %s"), runas_pw->pw_name);
goto done;
}
if (runas_gr != NULL) {
if (unknown_runas_gid && !def_runas_allow_unknown_id) {
log_warningx(SLOG_AUDIT, N_("unknown group: %s"),
runas_gr->gr_name);
goto done;
}
}
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
if (def_timestampowner) {
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#') {
const char *errstr;
uid_t uid = sudo_strtoid(def_timestampowner + 1, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
pw = sudo_getpwuid(uid);
}
if (pw == NULL)
pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (pw != NULL) {
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
timestamp_gid = pw->pw_gid;
sudo_pw_delref(pw);
} else {
/* XXX - audit too? */
log_warningx(SLOG_SEND_MAIL,
N_("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"), def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID;
timestamp_gid = ROOT_GID;
}
}
/* If no command line args and "shell_noargs" is not set, error out. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) {
/* Not an audit event. */
ret = -2; /* usage error */
goto done;
}
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty && !tty_present()) {
log_warningx(SLOG_NO_STDERR|SLOG_AUDIT, N_("no tty"));
sudo_warnx("%s", U_("sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"));
goto bad;
}
/* Check runas user's shell. */
if (!check_user_shell(runas_pw)) {
log_warningx(SLOG_RAW_MSG|SLOG_AUDIT,
N_("invalid shell for user %s: %s"),
runas_pw->pw_name, runas_pw->pw_shell);
goto bad;
}
/*
* We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
* specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
*/
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
(ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
def_env_reset = false;
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
if (!rebuild_env())
goto bad;
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
switch (check_user(validated, sudo_mode)) {
case true:
/* user authenticated successfully. */
break;
case false:
/* Note: log_denial() calls audit for us. */
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS)) {
/* Only display a denial message if no password was read. */
if (!log_denial(validated, def_passwd_tries <= 0))
goto done;
}
goto bad;
default:
/* some other error, ret is -1. */
goto done;
}
/* Check whether user_runchroot is permitted (if specified). */
switch (check_user_runchroot()) {
case true:
break;
case false:
goto bad;
default:
goto done;
}
/* Check whether user_runcwd is permitted (if specified). */
switch (check_user_runcwd()) {
case true:
break;
case false:
goto bad;
default:
goto done;
}
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
if (sudo_user.pw != NULL)
sudo_pw_delref(sudo_user.pw);
sudo_user.pw = pw;
}
}
}
/* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS)) {
/* Note: log_failure() calls audit for us. */
if (!log_failure(validated, cmnd_status))
goto done;
goto bad;
}
/* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */
if (create_admin_success_flag() == -1)
goto done;
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("command in current directory"));
sudo_warnx(U_("ignoring \"%s\" found in '.'\nUse \"sudo ./%s\" if this is the \"%s\" you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
goto bad;
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"),
NewArgv[0]);
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]);
} else {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"),
user_cmnd);
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
}
goto bad;
}
/* If user specified a timeout make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (!def_user_command_timeouts && user_timeout > 0) {
log_warningx(SLOG_NO_STDERR|SLOG_AUDIT,
N_("user not allowed to set a command timeout"));
sudo_warnx("%s",
U_("sorry, you are not allowed set a command timeout"));
goto bad;
}
/* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
log_warningx(SLOG_NO_STDERR|SLOG_AUDIT,
N_("user not allowed to preserve the environment"));
sudo_warnx("%s",
U_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"));
goto bad;
} else {
if (!validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars))
goto bad;
}
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) && !remote_iologs) {
if ((def_log_input || def_log_output) && def_iolog_file && def_iolog_dir) {
if ((iolog_path = format_iolog_path()) == NULL) {
if (!def_ignore_iolog_errors)
goto done;
/* Unable to expand I/O log path, disable I/O logging. */
def_log_input = false;
def_log_output = false;
}
}
}
switch (sudo_mode & MODE_MASK) {
case MODE_CHECK:
ret = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
break;
case MODE_LIST:
ret = display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw, verbose);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
case MODE_RUN:
case MODE_EDIT:
/* ret may be overridden by "goto bad" later */
ret = true;
break;
default:
/* Should not happen. */
sudo_warnx("internal error, unexpected sudo mode 0x%x", sudo_mode);
goto done;
}
/* Cleanup sudoers sources */
TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) {
nss->close(nss);
}
if (def_group_plugin)
group_plugin_unload();
init_parser(NULL, false, false);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) {
/* ret already set appropriately */
goto done;
}
/*
* Set umask based on sudoers.
* If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
* unless umask_override is set.
*/
if (def_umask != ACCESSPERMS) {
cmnd_umask = def_umask;
if (!def_umask_override)
cmnd_umask |= user_umask;
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
p = NewArgv[0];
*p = '-';
NewArgv[0] = p;
/*
* Newer versions of bash require the --login option to be used
* in conjunction with the -c option even if the shell name starts
* with a '-'. Unfortunately, bash 1.x uses -login, not --login
* so this will cause an error for that.
*/
if (NewArgc > 1 && strcmp(NewArgv[0], "-bash") == 0 &&
strcmp(NewArgv[1], "-c") == 0) {
/* Use the extra slot before NewArgv so we can store --login. */
NewArgv--;
NewArgc++;
NewArgv[0] = NewArgv[1];
NewArgv[1] = "--login";
}
#if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM))
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
if (!read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true, false))
sudo_warn("%s", _PATH_ENVIRONMENT);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
/* Set environment based on login class. */
if (login_class) {
login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (lc != NULL) {
setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV);
login_close(lc);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
}
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
if (def_restricted_env_file) {
if (!read_env_file(def_restricted_env_file, false, true))
sudo_warn("%s", def_restricted_env_file);
}
if (def_env_file) {
if (!read_env_file(def_env_file, false, false))
sudo_warn("%s", def_env_file);
}
/* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
if (!insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars))
goto done;
/* Note: must call audit before uid change. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
char **edit_argv;
int edit_argc;
const char *env_editor;
free(safe_cmnd);
safe_cmnd = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argc,
&edit_argv, NULL, &env_editor, false);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
goto done;
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"),
env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: command not found"),
env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
goto bad;
}
sudoers_gc_add(GC_VECTOR, edit_argv);
NewArgv = edit_argv;
NewArgc = edit_argc;
/* We want to run the editor with the unmodified environment. */
env_swap_old();
}
goto done;
bad:
ret = false;
done:
if (ret == -1) {
/* Free stashed copy of the environment. */
(void)env_init(NULL);
} else {
/* Store settings to pass back to front-end. */
if (!sudoers_policy_store_result(ret, NewArgv, env_get(), cmnd_umask,
iolog_path, closure))
ret = -1;
}
if (!rewind_perms())
ret = -1;
restore_nproc();
/* Destroy the password and group caches and free the contents. */
sudo_freepwcache();
sudo_freegrcache();
sudo_warn_set_locale_func(NULL);
debug_return_int(ret);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-193"
] | sudo | 1f8638577d0c80a4ff864a2aad80a0d95488e9a8 | 65,003,950,893,072,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 448 | Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes in user_args.
Also, do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and*
we are running the command via a shell.
Found by Qualys, this fixes CVE-2021-3156. |
FatalError(const char *f, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_list args2;
static Bool beenhere = FALSE;
if (beenhere)
ErrorFSigSafe("\nFatalError re-entered, aborting\n");
else
ErrorFSigSafe("\nFatal server error:\n");
va_start(args, f);
/* Make a copy for OsVendorFatalError */
va_copy(args2, args);
#ifdef __APPLE__
{
va_list apple_args;
va_copy(apple_args, args);
(void)vsnprintf(__crashreporter_info_buff__,
sizeof(__crashreporter_info_buff__), f, apple_args);
va_end(apple_args);
}
#endif
VErrorFSigSafe(f, args);
va_end(args);
ErrorFSigSafe("\n");
if (!beenhere)
OsVendorFatalError(f, args2);
va_end(args2);
if (!beenhere) {
beenhere = TRUE;
AbortServer();
}
else
OsAbort();
/*NOTREACHED*/} | 0 | [
"CWE-863"
] | xserver | da15c7413916f754708c62c2089265528cd661e2 | 69,442,996,999,872,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | LogFilePrep: add a comment to the unsafe format string.
CVE-2018-14665 also made it possible to exploit this to access
memory. With -logfile forbidden when running with elevated privileges
this is no longer an issue.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 248d164eae27f1f310266d78e52f13f64362f81e) |
bool create_subpartition_name(char *out, const char *in1,
const char *in2, const char *in3,
uint name_variant)
{
char transl_part_name[FN_REFLEN], transl_subpart_name[FN_REFLEN];
tablename_to_filename(in2, transl_part_name, FN_REFLEN);
tablename_to_filename(in3, transl_subpart_name, FN_REFLEN);
// Check if the path name for subpartition exceeds maximum path length.
if (name_variant == NORMAL_PART_NAME)
{
if ((strlen(in1) + strlen(transl_part_name) +
strlen(transl_subpart_name) + 7) > FN_REFLEN)
{
my_error(ER_PATH_LENGTH, MYF(0), in3);
return true;
}
}
else
if ((strlen(in1) + strlen(transl_part_name) +
strlen(transl_subpart_name) + 12) > FN_REFLEN)
{
my_error(ER_PATH_LENGTH, MYF(0), in3);
return true;
}
if (name_variant == NORMAL_PART_NAME)
strxnmov(out, FN_REFLEN, in1, "#P#", transl_part_name,
"#SP#", transl_subpart_name, NullS);
else if (name_variant == TEMP_PART_NAME)
strxnmov(out, FN_REFLEN, in1, "#P#", transl_part_name,
"#SP#", transl_subpart_name, "#TMP#", NullS);
else if (name_variant == RENAMED_PART_NAME)
strxnmov(out, FN_REFLEN, in1, "#P#", transl_part_name,
"#SP#", transl_subpart_name, "#REN#", NullS);
return false;
} | 0 | [] | mysql-server | be901b60ae59c93848c829d1b0b2cb523ab8692e | 221,714,082,181,177,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | Bug#26390632: CREATE TABLE CAN CAUSE MYSQL TO EXIT.
Analysis
========
CREATE TABLE of InnoDB table with a partition name
which exceeds the path limit can cause the server
to exit.
During the preparation of the partition name,
there was no check to identify whether the complete
path name for partition exceeds the max supported
path length, causing the server to exit during
subsequent processing.
Fix
===
During the preparation of partition name, check and report
an error if the partition path name exceeds the maximum path
name limit.
This is a 5.5 patch. |
PHP_HASH_API void PHP_HAVAL224Final(unsigned char *digest, PHP_HAVAL_CTX * context)
{
unsigned char bits[10];
unsigned int index, padLen;
/* Version, Passes, and Digest Length */
bits[0] = (PHP_HASH_HAVAL_VERSION & 0x07) |
((context->passes & 0x07) << 3) |
((context->output & 0x03) << 6);
bits[1] = (context->output >> 2);
/* Save number of bits */
Encode(bits + 2, context->count, 8);
/* Pad out to 118 mod 128.
*/
index = (unsigned int) ((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
padLen = (index < 118) ? (118 - index) : (246 - index);
PHP_HAVALUpdate(context, PADDING, padLen);
/* Append version, passes, digest length, and message length */
PHP_HAVALUpdate(context, bits, 10);
/* Store state in digest */
context->state[6] += context->state[7] & 0x0000000F;
context->state[5] += (context->state[7] >> 4) & 0x0000001F;
context->state[4] += (context->state[7] >> 9) & 0x0000000F;
context->state[3] += (context->state[7] >> 13) & 0x0000001F;
context->state[2] += (context->state[7] >> 18) & 0x0000000F;
context->state[1] += (context->state[7] >> 22) & 0x0000001F;
context->state[0] += (context->state[7] >> 27) & 0x0000001F;
Encode(digest, context->state, 28);
/* Zeroize sensitive information.
*/
memset((unsigned char*) context, 0, sizeof(*context));
} | 1 | [] | php-src | 1390a5812b151e0ea8f74e64bfeaa5df4dd5b801 | 286,485,630,423,839,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix bug #70312 - HAVAL gives wrong hashes in specific cases |
static void virtio_gpu_set_features(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint64_t features)
{
static const uint32_t virgl = (1 << VIRTIO_GPU_F_VIRGL);
VirtIOGPU *g = VIRTIO_GPU(vdev);
g->use_virgl_renderer = ((features & virgl) == virgl);
trace_virtio_gpu_features(g->use_virgl_renderer);
} | 0 | [] | qemu | acfc4846508a02cc4c83aa27799fd74ac280bdb2 | 97,105,591,380,625,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | virtio-gpu: use VIRTIO_GPU_MAX_SCANOUTS
The value is defined in virtio_gpu.h already (changing from 4 to 16).
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1463653560-26958-6-git-send-email-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> |
IOBuf::IOBuf(
CopyBufferOp /* op */,
const void* buf,
std::size_t size,
std::size_t headroom,
std::size_t minTailroom)
: IOBuf(CREATE, headroom + size + minTailroom) {
advance(headroom);
if (size > 0) {
assert(buf != nullptr);
memcpy(writableData(), buf, size);
append(size);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | folly | 4f304af1411e68851bdd00ef6140e9de4616f7d3 | 161,618,815,674,256,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | [folly] Add additional overflow checks to IOBuf - CVE-2021-24036
Summary:
As per title
CVE-2021-24036
Reviewed By: jan
Differential Revision: D27938605
fbshipit-source-id: 7481c54ae6fbb7b67b15b3631d5357c2f7043f9c |
static int nft_flush(struct nft_ctx *ctx, int family)
{
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct nft_table *table, *nt;
const struct nlattr * const *nla = ctx->nla;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry(afi, &ctx->net->nft.af_info, list) {
if (family != AF_UNSPEC && afi->family != family)
continue;
ctx->afi = afi;
list_for_each_entry_safe(table, nt, &afi->tables, list) {
if (nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME] &&
nla_strcmp(nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME], table->name) != 0)
continue;
ctx->table = table;
err = nft_flush_table(ctx);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
}
out:
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-19"
] | nf | a2f18db0c68fec96631c10cad9384c196e9008ac | 3,474,004,942,576,425,400,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> |
int bnxt_re_dealloc_mw(struct ib_mw *ib_mw)
{
struct bnxt_re_mw *mw = container_of(ib_mw, struct bnxt_re_mw, ib_mw);
struct bnxt_re_dev *rdev = mw->rdev;
int rc;
rc = bnxt_qplib_free_mrw(&rdev->qplib_res, &mw->qplib_mw);
if (rc) {
dev_err(rdev_to_dev(rdev), "Free MW failed: %#x\n", rc);
return rc;
}
kfree(mw);
atomic_dec(&rdev->mw_count);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 4a9d46a9fe14401f21df69cea97c62396d5fb053 | 216,736,653,724,620,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | RDMA: Fix goto target to release the allocated memory
In bnxt_re_create_srq(), when ib_copy_to_udata() fails allocated memory
should be released by goto fail.
Fixes: 37cb11acf1f7 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add SRQ support for Broadcom adapters")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190910222120.16517-1-navid.emamdoost@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> |
void vrend_fb_bind_texture_id(struct vrend_resource *res,
int id, int idx, uint32_t level,
uint32_t layer, uint32_t samples)
{
const struct util_format_description *desc = util_format_description(res->base.format);
GLenum attachment = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + idx;
debug_texture(__func__, res);
if (vrend_format_is_ds(res->base.format)) {
if (util_format_has_stencil(desc)) {
if (util_format_has_depth(desc))
attachment = GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT;
else
attachment = GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT;
} else
attachment = GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT;
}
switch (res->target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_1D_ARRAY:
case GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY:
case GL_TEXTURE_2D_MULTISAMPLE_ARRAY:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_ARRAY:
if (layer == 0xffffffff)
glFramebufferTexture(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
id, level);
else
glFramebufferTextureLayer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
id, level, layer);
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_3D:
if (layer == 0xffffffff)
glFramebufferTexture(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
id, level);
else if (vrend_state.use_gles)
glFramebufferTexture3DOES(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
res->target, id, level, layer);
else
glFramebufferTexture3D(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
res->target, id, level, layer);
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
if (layer == 0xffffffff)
glFramebufferTexture(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
id, level);
else
vrend_framebuffer_texture_2d(res, GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X + layer,
id, level, samples);
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_1D:
glFramebufferTexture1D(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
res->target, id, level);
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
default:
vrend_framebuffer_texture_2d(res, GL_FRAMEBUFFER, attachment,
res->target, id, level, samples);
break;
}
if (attachment == GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT) {
switch (res->target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_1D:
glFramebufferTexture1D(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
GL_TEXTURE_1D, 0, 0);
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
default:
glFramebufferTexture2D(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, 0);
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | virglrenderer | 95e581fd181b213c2ed7cdc63f2abc03eaaa77ec | 162,676,223,027,136,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 | vrend: Add test to resource OOB write and fix it
v2: Also check that no depth != 1 has been send when none is due
Closes: #250
Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <gert.wollny@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Chia-I Wu <olvaffe@gmail.com> |
static void fix_prepare_info_in_table_list(THD *thd, TABLE_LIST *tbl)
{
for (; tbl; tbl= tbl->next_local)
{
if (tbl->on_expr && !tbl->prep_on_expr)
{
thd->check_and_register_item_tree(&tbl->prep_on_expr, &tbl->on_expr);
tbl->on_expr= tbl->on_expr->copy_andor_structure(thd);
}
if (tbl->is_view_or_derived() && tbl->is_merged_derived())
{
SELECT_LEX *sel= tbl->get_single_select();
fix_prepare_info_in_table_list(thd, sel->get_table_list());
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | server | 3a52569499e2f0c4d1f25db1e81617a9d9755400 | 140,777,650,249,592,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | MDEV-25636: Bug report: abortion in sql/sql_parse.cc:6294
The asserion failure was caused by this query
select /*id=1*/ from t1
where
col= ( select /*id=2*/ from ... where corr_cond1
union
select /*id=4*/ from ... where corr_cond2)
Here,
- select with id=2 was correlated due to corr_cond1.
- select with id=4 was initially correlated due to corr_cond2, but then
the optimizer optimized away the correlation, making the select with id=4
uncorrelated.
However, since select with id=2 remained correlated, the execution had to
re-compute the whole UNION. When it tried to execute select with id=4, it
hit an assertion (join buffer already free'd).
This is because select with id=4 has freed its execution structures after
it has been executed once. The select is uncorrelated, so it did not expect
it would need to be executed for the second time.
Fixed this by adding this logic in
st_select_lex::optimize_unflattened_subqueries():
If a member of a UNION is correlated, mark all its members as
correlated, so that they are prepared to be executed multiple times. |
static void au_del_cmd(AutoCmd *ac)
{
VIM_CLEAR(ac->cmd);
au_need_clean = TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 5fa9f23a63651a8abdb074b4fc2ec9b1adc6b089 | 214,311,236,675,075,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | patch 9.0.0061: ml_get error with nested autocommand
Problem: ml_get error with nested autocommand.
Solution: Also check line numbers for a nested autocommand. (closes #10761) |
bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
unsigned int segno, offset;
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, blkaddr);
se = get_seg_entry(sbi, segno);
offset = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blkaddr);
if (f2fs_test_bit(offset, se->ckpt_valid_map))
is_cp = true;
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
return is_cp;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4 | 227,456,428,739,569,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 201,423,346,250,486,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
static int scsi_handle_rw_error(SCSIDiskReq *r, int error, int type)
{
int is_read = (type == SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
BlockErrorAction action = bdrv_get_on_error(s->bs, is_read);
if (action == BLOCK_ERR_IGNORE) {
bdrv_mon_event(s->bs, BDRV_ACTION_IGNORE, is_read);
return 0;
}
if ((error == ENOSPC && action == BLOCK_ERR_STOP_ENOSPC)
|| action == BLOCK_ERR_STOP_ANY) {
type &= SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK;
r->status |= SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | type;
bdrv_mon_event(s->bs, BDRV_ACTION_STOP, is_read);
vm_stop(VMSTOP_DISKFULL);
} else {
switch (error) {
case ENOMEM:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(TARGET_FAILURE));
break;
case EINVAL:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
break;
default:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(IO_ERROR));
break;
}
bdrv_mon_event(s->bs, BDRV_ACTION_REPORT, is_read);
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | 103b40f51e4012b3b0ad20f615562a1806d7f49a | 119,755,924,945,049,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> |
static int verify_md5(HEVCContext *s, AVFrame *frame)
{
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(frame->format);
int pixel_shift;
int i, j;
if (!desc)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
pixel_shift = desc->comp[0].depth_minus1 > 7;
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Verifying checksum for frame with POC %d: ",
s->poc);
/* the checksums are LE, so we have to byteswap for >8bpp formats
* on BE arches */
#if HAVE_BIGENDIAN
if (pixel_shift && !s->checksum_buf) {
av_fast_malloc(&s->checksum_buf, &s->checksum_buf_size,
FFMAX3(frame->linesize[0], frame->linesize[1],
frame->linesize[2]));
if (!s->checksum_buf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
#endif
for (i = 0; frame->data[i]; i++) {
int width = s->avctx->coded_width;
int height = s->avctx->coded_height;
int w = (i == 1 || i == 2) ? (width >> desc->log2_chroma_w) : width;
int h = (i == 1 || i == 2) ? (height >> desc->log2_chroma_h) : height;
uint8_t md5[16];
av_md5_init(s->md5_ctx);
for (j = 0; j < h; j++) {
const uint8_t *src = frame->data[i] + j * frame->linesize[i];
#if HAVE_BIGENDIAN
if (pixel_shift) {
s->dsp.bswap16_buf((uint16_t*)s->checksum_buf,
(const uint16_t*)src, w);
src = s->checksum_buf;
}
#endif
av_md5_update(s->md5_ctx, src, w << pixel_shift);
}
av_md5_final(s->md5_ctx, md5);
if (!memcmp(md5, s->md5[i], 16)) {
av_log (s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "plane %d - correct ", i);
print_md5(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, md5);
av_log (s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "; ");
} else {
av_log (s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "mismatching checksum of plane %d - ", i);
print_md5(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, md5);
av_log (s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, " != ");
print_md5(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, s->md5[i]);
av_log (s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | FFmpeg | b25e84b7399bd91605596b67d761d3464dbe8a6e | 47,621,835,391,118,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | hevc: check that the VCL NAL types are the same for all slice segments of a frame
Fixes possible invalid memory access for mismatching skipped/non-skipped
slice segments.
Found-by: Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind
Sample-Id: 00001533-google |
static int v4l_reqbufs(const struct v4l2_ioctl_ops *ops,
struct file *file, void *fh, void *arg)
{
struct v4l2_requestbuffers *p = arg;
int ret = check_fmt(file, p->type);
if (ret)
return ret;
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(p, capabilities);
return ops->vidioc_reqbufs(file, fh, p);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | fb18802a338b36f675a388fc03d2aa504a0d0899 | 240,349,342,782,416,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | media: v4l: ioctl: Fix memory leak in video_usercopy
When an IOCTL with argument size larger than 128 that also used array
arguments were handled, two memory allocations were made but alas, only
the latter one of them was released. This happened because there was only
a single local variable to hold such a temporary allocation.
Fix this by adding separate variables to hold the pointers to the
temporary allocations.
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+1115e79c8df6472c612b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d14e6d76ebf7 ("[media] v4l: Add multi-planar ioctl handling code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> |
char *ip6_addr_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt)
{
char ip6_addr[sizeof("xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:255.255.255.255")];
if (fmt[0] == 'I' && fmt[2] == 'c')
ip6_compressed_string(ip6_addr, addr);
else
ip6_string(ip6_addr, addr, fmt);
return string(buf, end, ip6_addr, spec);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | ad67b74d2469d9b82aaa572d76474c95bc484d57 | 88,231,110,360,716,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Currently there exist approximately 14 000 places in the kernel where
addresses are being printed using an unadorned %p. This potentially
leaks sensitive information regarding the Kernel layout in memory. Many
of these calls are stale, instead of fixing every call lets hash the
address by default before printing. This will of course break some
users, forcing code printing needed addresses to be updated.
Code that _really_ needs the address will soon be able to use the new
printk specifier %px to print the address.
For what it's worth, usage of unadorned %p can be broken down as
follows (thanks to Joe Perches).
$ git grep -E '%p[^A-Za-z0-9]' | cut -f1 -d"/" | sort | uniq -c
1084 arch
20 block
10 crypto
32 Documentation
8121 drivers
1221 fs
143 include
101 kernel
69 lib
100 mm
1510 net
40 samples
7 scripts
11 security
166 sound
152 tools
2 virt
Add function ptr_to_id() to map an address to a 32 bit unique
identifier. Hash any unadorned usage of specifier %p and any malformed
specifiers.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> |
void sqlite3VdbeFrameDelete(VdbeFrame *p){
int i;
Mem *aMem = VdbeFrameMem(p);
VdbeCursor **apCsr = (VdbeCursor **)&aMem[p->nChildMem];
assert( sqlite3VdbeFrameIsValid(p) );
for(i=0; i<p->nChildCsr; i++){
sqlite3VdbeFreeCursor(p->v, apCsr[i]);
}
releaseMemArray(aMem, p->nChildMem);
sqlite3VdbeDeleteAuxData(p->v->db, &p->pAuxData, -1, 0);
sqlite3DbFree(p->v->db, p);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-755"
] | sqlite | 8654186b0236d556aa85528c2573ee0b6ab71be3 | 334,225,344,861,906,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | When an error occurs while rewriting the parser tree for window functions
in the sqlite3WindowRewrite() routine, make sure that pParse->nErr is set,
and make sure that this shuts down any subsequent code generation that might
depend on the transformations that were implemented. This fixes a problem
discovered by the Yongheng and Rui fuzzer.
FossilOrigin-Name: e2bddcd4c55ba3cbe0130332679ff4b048630d0ced9a8899982edb5a3569ba7f |
int __init hci_sock_init(void)
{
int err;
err = proto_register(&hci_sk_proto, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = bt_sock_register(BTPROTO_HCI, &hci_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("HCI socket registration failed");
goto error;
}
err = bt_procfs_init(&init_net, "hci", &hci_sk_list, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("Failed to create HCI proc file");
bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI);
goto error;
}
BT_INFO("HCI socket layer initialized");
return 0;
error:
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c | 112,261,608,699,161,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
const char *value = NULL;
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
command = crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, client->encrypted);
if (command == NULL) {
return -1;
}
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
goto bail;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
bail:
free_xml(command);
command = NULL;
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | pacemaker | 564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93 | 164,313,492,425,160,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 70 | High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. |
static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long wchan;
char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)
&& !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
else
seq_puts(m, "0\n");
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 | 102,480,466,604,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int nearby_node(int apicid)
{
int i, node;
for (i = apicid - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
node = __apicid_to_node[i];
if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
return node;
}
for (i = apicid + 1; i < MAX_LOCAL_APIC; i++) {
node = __apicid_to_node[i];
if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
return node;
}
return first_node(node_online_map); /* Shouldn't happen */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | tip | 3b56496865f9f7d9bcb2f93b44c63f274f08e3b6 | 277,521,875,283,681,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | x86, cpu, amd: Add workaround for family 16h, erratum 793
This adds the workaround for erratum 793 as a precaution in case not
every BIOS implements it. This addresses CVE-2013-6885.
Erratum text:
[Revision Guide for AMD Family 16h Models 00h-0Fh Processors,
document 51810 Rev. 3.04 November 2013]
793 Specific Combination of Writes to Write Combined Memory Types and
Locked Instructions May Cause Core Hang
Description
Under a highly specific and detailed set of internal timing
conditions, a locked instruction may trigger a timing sequence whereby
the write to a write combined memory type is not flushed, causing the
locked instruction to stall indefinitely.
Potential Effect on System
Processor core hang.
Suggested Workaround
BIOS should set MSR
C001_1020[15] = 1b.
Fix Planned
No fix planned
[ hpa: updated description, fixed typo in MSR name ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140114230711.GS29865@pd.tnic
Tested-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> |
void cfg80211_ready_on_channel(struct wireless_dev *wdev, u64 cookie,
struct ieee80211_channel *chan,
unsigned int duration, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct wiphy *wiphy = wdev->wiphy;
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = wiphy_to_rdev(wiphy);
trace_cfg80211_ready_on_channel(wdev, cookie, chan, duration);
nl80211_send_remain_on_chan_event(NL80211_CMD_REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL,
rdev, wdev, cookie, chan,
duration, gfp);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | linux | f88eb7c0d002a67ef31aeb7850b42ff69abc46dc | 175,986,102,155,587,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | nl80211: validate beacon head
We currently don't validate the beacon head, i.e. the header,
fixed part and elements that are to go in front of the TIM
element. This means that the variable elements there can be
malformed, e.g. have a length exceeding the buffer size, but
most downstream code from this assumes that this has already
been checked.
Add the necessary checks to the netlink policy.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ed1b6cc7f80f ("cfg80211/nl80211: add beacon settings")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569009255-I7ac7fbe9436e9d8733439eab8acbbd35e55c74ef@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> |
TEST_F(RouterTest, RetryRequestDuringBody) {
Buffer::OwnedImpl decoding_buffer;
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_, decodingBuffer()).WillRepeatedly(Return(&decoding_buffer));
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_, addDecodedData(_, true))
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke([&](Buffer::Instance& data, bool) { decoding_buffer.move(data); }));
NiceMock<Http::MockRequestEncoder> encoder1;
Http::ResponseDecoder* response_decoder = nullptr;
EXPECT_CALL(cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_, newStream(_, _))
.WillOnce(Invoke(
[&](Http::ResponseDecoder& decoder,
Http::ConnectionPool::Callbacks& callbacks) -> Http::ConnectionPool::Cancellable* {
response_decoder = &decoder;
callbacks.onPoolReady(encoder1, cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_.host_,
upstream_stream_info_, Http::Protocol::Http10);
return nullptr;
}));
expectResponseTimerCreate();
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers{
{"x-envoy-retry-on", "5xx"}, {"x-envoy-internal", "true"}, {"myheader", "present"}};
HttpTestUtility::addDefaultHeaders(headers);
router_.decodeHeaders(headers, false);
const std::string body1("body1");
Buffer::OwnedImpl buf1(body1);
EXPECT_CALL(*router_.retry_state_, enabled()).WillOnce(Return(true));
router_.decodeData(buf1, false);
router_.retry_state_->expectResetRetry();
encoder1.stream_.resetStream(Http::StreamResetReason::RemoteReset);
NiceMock<Http::MockRequestEncoder> encoder2;
EXPECT_CALL(cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_, newStream(_, _))
.WillOnce(Invoke(
[&](Http::ResponseDecoder& decoder,
Http::ConnectionPool::Callbacks& callbacks) -> Http::ConnectionPool::Cancellable* {
response_decoder = &decoder;
callbacks.onPoolReady(encoder2, cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_.host_,
upstream_stream_info_, Http::Protocol::Http10);
return nullptr;
}));
EXPECT_CALL(encoder2, encodeHeaders(HeaderHasValueRef("myheader", "present"), false));
EXPECT_CALL(encoder2, encodeData(BufferStringEqual(body1), false));
router_.retry_state_->callback_();
EXPECT_EQ(2U,
callbacks_.route_->route_entry_.virtual_cluster_.stats().upstream_rq_total_.value());
EXPECT_TRUE(verifyHostUpstreamStats(0, 1));
// Complete request. Ensure original headers are present.
const std::string body2("body2");
EXPECT_CALL(encoder2, encodeData(BufferStringEqual(body2), true));
Buffer::OwnedImpl buf2(body2);
EXPECT_CALL(*router_.retry_state_, enabled()).WillOnce(Return(true));
router_.decodeData(buf2, true);
// Send successful response, verify success.
Http::ResponseHeaderMapPtr response_headers(
new Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl({{":status", "200"}}));
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_, encodeHeaders_(_, _))
.WillOnce(Invoke([&](Http::ResponseHeaderMap& headers, bool) -> void {
EXPECT_EQ(headers.Status()->value(), "200");
}));
response_decoder->decodeHeaders(std::move(response_headers), true);
EXPECT_TRUE(verifyHostUpstreamStats(1, 1));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | 18871dbfb168d3512a10c78dd267ff7c03f564c6 | 284,648,545,604,327,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 | [1.18] CVE-2022-21655
Crash with direct_response
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <ovanders@redhat.com> |
static struct sock *unix_find_other(struct sockaddr_un *sunname, int len,
int type, unsigned hash, int *error)
{
struct sock *u;
struct nameidata nd;
int err = 0;
if (sunname->sun_path[0]) {
err = path_lookup(sunname->sun_path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
if (err)
goto fail;
err = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_WRITE);
if (err)
goto put_fail;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto put_fail;
u=unix_find_socket_byinode(nd.dentry->d_inode);
if (!u)
goto put_fail;
if (u->sk_type == type)
touch_atime(nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
path_release(&nd);
err=-EPROTOTYPE;
if (u->sk_type != type) {
sock_put(u);
goto fail;
}
} else {
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
u=unix_find_socket_byname(sunname, len, type, hash);
if (u) {
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry;
if (dentry)
touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry);
} else
goto fail;
}
return u;
put_fail:
path_release(&nd);
fail:
*error=err;
return NULL;
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 1fd05ba5a2f2aa8e7b9b52ef55df850e2e7d54c9 | 257,344,400,614,354,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | [AF_UNIX]: Rewrite garbage collector, fixes race.
Throw out the old mark & sweep garbage collector and put in a
refcounting cycle detecting one.
The old one had a race with recvmsg, that resulted in false positives
and hence data loss. The old algorithm operated on all unix sockets
in the system, so any additional locking would have meant performance
problems for all users of these.
The new algorithm instead only operates on "in flight" sockets, which
are very rare, and the additional locking for these doesn't negatively
impact the vast majority of users.
In fact it's probable, that there weren't *any* heavy senders of
sockets over sockets, otherwise the above race would have been
discovered long ago.
The patch works OK with the app that exposed the race with the old
code. The garbage collection has also been verified to work in a few
simple cases.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
void ZRtp::setMultiStrParams(std::string parameters) {
char tmp[MAX_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + 1 + 1]; // max. hash length + cipher + authLength + hash
// First get negotiated hash from parameters, set algorithms and length
int i = parameters.at(0) & 0xff;
hash = &zrtpHashes.getByOrdinal(i);
setNegotiatedHash(hash); // sets hashlength
// use string.copy(buffer, num, start=0) to retrieve chars (bytes) from the string
parameters.copy(tmp, hashLength + 1 + 1 + 1, 0);
i = tmp[1] & 0xff;
authLength = &zrtpAuthLengths.getByOrdinal(i);
i = tmp[2] & 0xff;
cipher = &zrtpSymCiphers.getByOrdinal(i);
memcpy(zrtpSession, tmp+3, hashLength);
// after setting zrtpSession, cipher, and auth-length set multi-stream to true
multiStream = true;
stateEngine->setMultiStream(true);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | ZRTPCPP | c8617100f359b217a974938c5539a1dd8a120b0e | 45,393,188,890,184,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Fix vulnerabilities found and reported by Mark Dowd
- limit length of memcpy
- limit number of offered algorithms in Hello packet
- length check in PING packet
- fix a small coding error |
static int io_tee(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
{
struct io_splice *sp = &req->splice;
struct file *in = sp->file_in;
struct file *out = sp->file_out;
unsigned int flags = sp->flags & ~SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED;
long ret = 0;
if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (sp->len)
ret = do_tee(in, out, sp->len, flags);
if (!(sp->flags & SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED))
io_put_file(in);
req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP;
if (ret != sp->len)
req_set_fail_links(req);
io_req_complete(req, ret);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | d1f82808877bb10d3deee7cf3374a4eb3fb582db | 336,397,536,552,832,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | io_uring: truncate lengths larger than MAX_RW_COUNT on provide buffers
Read and write operations are capped to MAX_RW_COUNT. Some read ops rely on
that limit, and that is not guaranteed by the IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS.
Truncate those lengths when doing io_add_buffers, so buffer addresses still
use the uncapped length.
Also, take the chance and change struct io_buffer len member to __u32, so
it matches struct io_provide_buffer len member.
This fixes CVE-2021-3491, also reported as ZDI-CAN-13546.
Fixes: ddf0322db79c ("io_uring: add IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS")
Reported-by: Billy Jheng Bing-Jhong (@st424204)
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
information_schema_character_attributes() const
{
return Information_schema_character_attributes();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 29,881,244,445,426,316,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <serg@mariadb.org> |
static struct tevent_req *cli_tdis_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct cli_state *cli)
{
struct tevent_req *req, *subreq;
struct cli_tdis_state *state;
req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, struct cli_tdis_state);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
state->cli = cli;
subreq = cli_smb_send(state, ev, cli, SMBtdis, 0, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, cli_tdis_done, req);
return req;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-94"
] | samba | 94295b7aa22d2544af5323bca70d3dcb97fd7c64 | 310,297,881,869,010,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | CVE-2016-2019: s3:libsmb: add comment regarding smbXcli_session_is_guest() with mandatory signing
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11860
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> |
ar6000_reinstall_keys(struct ar6_softc *ar, u8 key_op_ctrl)
{
int status = 0;
struct ieee80211req_key *uik = &ar->user_saved_keys.ucast_ik;
struct ieee80211req_key *bik = &ar->user_saved_keys.bcast_ik;
CRYPTO_TYPE keyType = ar->user_saved_keys.keyType;
if (IEEE80211_CIPHER_CCKM_KRK != uik->ik_type) {
if (NONE_CRYPT == keyType) {
goto _reinstall_keys_out;
}
if (uik->ik_keylen) {
status = wmi_addKey_cmd(ar->arWmi, uik->ik_keyix,
ar->user_saved_keys.keyType, PAIRWISE_USAGE,
uik->ik_keylen, (u8 *)&uik->ik_keyrsc,
uik->ik_keydata, key_op_ctrl, uik->ik_macaddr, SYNC_BEFORE_WMIFLAG);
}
} else {
status = wmi_add_krk_cmd(ar->arWmi, uik->ik_keydata);
}
if (IEEE80211_CIPHER_CCKM_KRK != bik->ik_type) {
if (NONE_CRYPT == keyType) {
goto _reinstall_keys_out;
}
if (bik->ik_keylen) {
status = wmi_addKey_cmd(ar->arWmi, bik->ik_keyix,
ar->user_saved_keys.keyType, GROUP_USAGE,
bik->ik_keylen, (u8 *)&bik->ik_keyrsc,
bik->ik_keydata, key_op_ctrl, bik->ik_macaddr, NO_SYNC_WMIFLAG);
}
} else {
status = wmi_add_krk_cmd(ar->arWmi, bik->ik_keydata);
}
_reinstall_keys_out:
ar->user_savedkeys_stat = USER_SAVEDKEYS_STAT_INIT;
ar->user_key_ctrl = 0;
return status;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 111,035,549,747,710,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
mono_ArgIterator_Setup (MonoArgIterator *iter, char* argsp, char* start)
{
MONO_ARCH_SAVE_REGS;
iter->sig = *(MonoMethodSignature**)argsp;
g_assert (iter->sig->sentinelpos <= iter->sig->param_count);
g_assert (iter->sig->call_convention == MONO_CALL_VARARG);
iter->next_arg = 0;
/* FIXME: it's not documented what start is exactly... */
if (start) {
iter->args = start;
} else {
iter->args = argsp + sizeof (gpointer);
#ifndef MONO_ARCH_REGPARMS
{
guint32 i, arg_size;
gint32 align;
for (i = 0; i < iter->sig->sentinelpos; ++i) {
arg_size = mono_type_stack_size (iter->sig->params [i], &align);
iter->args = (char*)iter->args + arg_size;
}
}
#endif
}
iter->num_args = iter->sig->param_count - iter->sig->sentinelpos;
/* g_print ("sig %p, param_count: %d, sent: %d\n", iter->sig, iter->sig->param_count, iter->sig->sentinelpos); */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | mono | 035c8587c0d8d307e45f1b7171a0d337bb451f1e | 164,319,623,776,455,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Allow only primitive types/enums in RuntimeHelpers.InitializeArray (). |
static int gather_pte_stats(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct numa_maps *md;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *orig_pte;
pte_t *pte;
md = walk->private;
spin_lock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (pmd_trans_splitting(*pmd)) {
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
wait_split_huge_page(md->vma->anon_vma, pmd);
} else {
pte_t huge_pte = *(pte_t *)pmd;
struct page *page;
page = can_gather_numa_stats(huge_pte, md->vma, addr);
if (page)
gather_stats(page, md, pte_dirty(huge_pte),
HPAGE_PMD_SIZE/PAGE_SIZE);
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
return 0;
}
} else {
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
}
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
return 0;
orig_pte = pte = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
do {
struct page *page = can_gather_numa_stats(*pte, md->vma, addr);
if (!page)
continue;
gather_stats(page, md, pte_dirty(*pte), 1);
} while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 | 274,886,683,187,835,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
smtp_server_connection_update_rawlog(struct smtp_server_connection *conn)
{
struct stat st;
if (conn->set.rawlog_dir == NULL)
return;
if (!conn->rawlog_checked) {
conn->rawlog_checked = TRUE;
if (stat(conn->set.rawlog_dir, &st) == 0)
conn->rawlog_enabled = TRUE;
}
if (conn->rawlog_enabled) {
iostream_rawlog_create(conn->set.rawlog_dir,
&conn->conn.input, &conn->conn.output);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-77"
] | core | 321c339756f9b2b98fb7326359d1333adebb5295 | 195,284,607,202,133,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | lib-smtp: smtp-server-connection - Fix STARTTLS command injection vulnerability.
The input handler kept reading more commands even though the input was locked by
the STARTTLS command, thereby causing it to read the command pipelined beyond
STARTTLS. This causes a STARTTLS command injection vulerability. |
static int init_ov_sensor(struct sd *sd, u8 slave)
{
int i;
struct gspca_dev *gspca_dev = (struct gspca_dev *)sd;
ov51x_set_slave_ids(sd, slave);
/* Reset the sensor */
i2c_w(sd, 0x12, 0x80);
/* Wait for it to initialize */
msleep(150);
for (i = 0; i < i2c_detect_tries; i++) {
if (i2c_r(sd, OV7610_REG_ID_HIGH) == 0x7f &&
i2c_r(sd, OV7610_REG_ID_LOW) == 0xa2) {
gspca_dbg(gspca_dev, D_PROBE, "I2C synced in %d attempt(s)\n",
i);
return 0;
}
/* Reset the sensor */
i2c_w(sd, 0x12, 0x80);
/* Wait for it to initialize */
msleep(150);
/* Dummy read to sync I2C */
if (i2c_r(sd, 0x00) < 0)
return -1;
}
return -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 998912346c0da53a6dbb71fab3a138586b596b30 | 169,390,934,038,983,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | media: ov519: add missing endpoint sanity checks
Make sure to check that we have at least one endpoint before accessing
the endpoint array to avoid dereferencing a NULL-pointer on stream
start.
Note that these sanity checks are not redundant as the driver is mixing
looking up altsettings by index and by number, which need not coincide.
Fixes: 1876bb923c98 ("V4L/DVB (12079): gspca_ov519: add support for the ov511 bridge")
Fixes: b282d87332f5 ("V4L/DVB (12080): gspca_ov519: Fix ov518+ with OV7620AE (Trust spacecam 320)")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.31
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> |
rtl8xxxu_init_mac(struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv)
{
struct rtl8xxxu_reg8val *array = priv->fops->mactable;
int i, ret;
u16 reg;
u8 val;
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
reg = array[i].reg;
val = array[i].val;
if (reg == 0xffff && val == 0xff)
break;
ret = rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, reg, val);
if (ret != 1) {
dev_warn(&priv->udev->dev,
"Failed to initialize MAC "
"(reg: %04x, val %02x)\n", reg, val);
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
if (priv->rtl_chip != RTL8723B && priv->rtl_chip != RTL8192E)
rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, REG_MAX_AGGR_NUM, 0x0a);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | a2cdd07488e666aa93a49a3fc9c9b1299e27ef3c | 136,053,302,283,595,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | rtl8xxxu: prevent leaking urb
In rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb if usb_submit_urb fails the allocated urb
should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Chiu <chiu@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> |
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
{
int i, ok;
/* Check if there is one bit set at all. */
if (!a || !a->data) return 1;
/* Check each byte of the internal representation of the bit string. */
ok = 1;
for (i = 0; i < a->length && ok; ++i)
{
unsigned char mask = i < flags_len ? ~flags[i] : 0xff;
/* We are done if there is an unneeded bit set. */
ok = (a->data[i] & mask) == 0;
}
return ok;
} | 0 | [] | openssl | c7235be6e36c4bef84594aa3b2f0561db84b63d8 | 232,239,146,126,036,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification.
Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <zglozik@opentsa.org>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller |
GF_Err stsd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(s, 4)
return gf_isom_box_array_read_ex(s, bs, stsd_AddBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSD);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | gpac | d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c | 314,207,892,892,416,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183) |
ecEncCtx* wc_ecc_ctx_new(int flags, WC_RNG* rng)
{
return wc_ecc_ctx_new_ex(flags, rng, NULL);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] | wolfssl | 1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f | 321,047,238,333,353,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign. |
xsltNumberFormatGetAnyLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt = 0;
xmlNodePtr cur;
/* select the starting node */
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
cur = node;
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = ((xmlAttrPtr) node)->parent;
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
cur = node->parent;
break;
default:
cur = NULL;
break;
}
while (cur != NULL) {
/* process current node */
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((node->type == cur->type) &&
/* FIXME: must use expanded-name instead of local name */
xmlStrEqual(node->name, cur->name)) {
if ((node->ns == cur->ns) ||
((node->ns != NULL) &&
(cur->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href,
cur->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, countPat))
cnt++;
}
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, fromPat)) {
break; /* while */
}
/* Skip to next preceding or ancestor */
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(cur->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
break; /* while */
while ((cur->prev != NULL) && ((cur->prev->type == XML_DTD_NODE) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END)))
cur = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL) {
for (cur = cur->prev; cur->last != NULL; cur = cur->last);
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double) cnt;
return(amount);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libxslt | d182d8f6ba3071503d96ce17395c9d55871f0242 | 164,795,833,265,019,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 74 | Fix xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel
Namespace nodes are actually an xmlNs, not an xmlNode. They must be
special-cased in xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel to avoid an
out-of-bounds heap access.
Move the test whether a node matches the "count" pattern to a separate
function to make the code more readable. As a side effect, we also
compare expanded names when walking up the ancestor axis, fixing an
insignificant bug. |
void rtl8xxxu_mac_calibration(struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv,
const u32 *regs, u32 *backup)
{
int i = 0;
rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, regs[i], 0x3f);
for (i = 1 ; i < (RTL8XXXU_MAC_REGS - 1); i++)
rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, regs[i], (u8)(backup[i] & ~BIT(3)));
rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, regs[i], (u8)(backup[i] & ~BIT(5)));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | a2cdd07488e666aa93a49a3fc9c9b1299e27ef3c | 132,932,773,205,947,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | rtl8xxxu: prevent leaking urb
In rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb if usb_submit_urb fails the allocated urb
should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Chiu <chiu@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> |
uint32_t typeMaxSerialized() const
{
return m_typeMaxSerialized;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | Fast-DDS | d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384 | 85,756,270,912,774,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <MiguelCompany@eprosima.com> |
virtual GBool supportTextCSPattern(GfxState * /*state*/) { return gFalse; } | 0 | [] | poppler | abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40 | 96,328,352,339,899,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518 |
static void handle_not_macsec(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd;
struct macsec_dev *macsec;
rcu_read_lock();
rxd = macsec_data_rcu(skb->dev);
/* 10.6 If the management control validateFrames is not
* Strict, frames without a SecTAG are received, counted, and
* delivered to the Controlled Port
*/
list_for_each_entry_rcu(macsec, &rxd->secys, secys) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
int ret;
struct pcpu_secy_stats *secy_stats = this_cpu_ptr(macsec->stats);
if (macsec->secy.validate_frames == MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT) {
u64_stats_update_begin(&secy_stats->syncp);
secy_stats->stats.InPktsNoTag++;
u64_stats_update_end(&secy_stats->syncp);
continue;
}
/* deliver on this port */
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
break;
nskb->dev = macsec->secy.netdev;
ret = netif_rx(nskb);
if (ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS) {
u64_stats_update_begin(&secy_stats->syncp);
secy_stats->stats.InPktsUntagged++;
u64_stats_update_end(&secy_stats->syncp);
} else {
macsec->secy.netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | net | 5294b83086cc1c35b4efeca03644cf9d12282e5b | 337,171,684,148,989,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | macsec: dynamically allocate space for sglist
We call skb_cow_data, which is good anyway to ensure we can actually
modify the skb as such (another error from prior). Now that we have the
number of fragments required, we can safely allocate exactly that amount
of memory.
Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
inline bool AveragePool(const PoolParams& params,
const RuntimeShape& input_shape, const int8* input_data,
const RuntimeShape& output_shape, int8* output_data) {
ruy::profiler::ScopeLabel label("AveragePool/8bitWith32bitAccumulator");
// Here, and in other pooling ops, in order to maintain locality of reference,
// to minimize some recalculations, and to load into NEON vector registers, we
// use an inner loop down the depth. Since depths can be large and hence we
// would need arbitrarily large temporary storage, we divide the work up into
// depth tranches just within the batch loop.
static constexpr int kPoolingAccTrancheSize = 256;
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(params.quantized_activation_min,
params.quantized_activation_max);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(input_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(output_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
const int batches = MatchingDim(input_shape, 0, output_shape, 0);
const int depth = MatchingDim(input_shape, 3, output_shape, 3);
const int input_height = input_shape.Dims(1);
const int input_width = input_shape.Dims(2);
const int output_height = output_shape.Dims(1);
const int output_width = output_shape.Dims(2);
const int stride_height = params.stride_height;
const int stride_width = params.stride_width;
int32 acc[kPoolingAccTrancheSize];
for (int batch = 0; batch < batches; ++batch) {
// We proceed through the depth in tranches (see comment above). The
// depth_base is the depth at the beginning of the tranche. The
// tranche_depth is the depth dimension of the tranche.
for (int depth_base = 0; depth_base < depth;
depth_base += kPoolingAccTrancheSize) {
const int tranche_depth =
std::min(depth - depth_base, kPoolingAccTrancheSize);
for (int out_y = 0; out_y < output_height; ++out_y) {
for (int out_x = 0; out_x < output_width; ++out_x) {
const int in_x_origin =
(out_x * stride_width) - params.padding_values.width;
const int in_y_origin =
(out_y * stride_height) - params.padding_values.height;
const int filter_x_start = std::max(0, -in_x_origin);
const int filter_x_end =
std::min(params.filter_width, input_width - in_x_origin);
const int filter_y_start = std::max(0, -in_y_origin);
const int filter_y_end =
std::min(params.filter_height, input_height - in_y_origin);
const int filter_count =
(filter_x_end - filter_x_start) * (filter_y_end - filter_y_start);
if (filter_count == 0) return false;
memset(acc, 0, tranche_depth * sizeof(acc[0]));
const int8* input_ptr =
input_data + depth_base +
depth * (in_x_origin +
input_width * (in_y_origin + input_height * batch));
for (int fy = filter_y_start; fy < filter_y_end; fy++) {
const int8* input_row_ptr =
input_ptr + depth * (fy * input_width + filter_x_start);
for (int fx = filter_x_start; fx < filter_x_end; fx++) {
const int8* input_channel_ptr = input_row_ptr;
int channel = 0;
#ifdef USE_NEON
for (; channel <= tranche_depth - 16; channel += 16) {
int16x4_t acc_reg[4];
int8x16_t input_reg = vld1q_s8(input_channel_ptr);
input_channel_ptr += 16;
acc_reg[0] = vget_low_s16(vmovl_s8(vget_low_s8(input_reg)));
acc_reg[1] = vget_high_s16(vmovl_s8(vget_low_s8(input_reg)));
acc_reg[2] = vget_low_s16(vmovl_s8(vget_high_s8(input_reg)));
acc_reg[3] = vget_high_s16(vmovl_s8(vget_high_s8(input_reg)));
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
vst1q_s32(
acc + channel + 4 * i,
vaddw_s16(vld1q_s32(acc + channel + 4 * i), acc_reg[i]));
}
}
for (; channel <= tranche_depth - 8; channel += 8) {
int16x4_t acc_reg[2];
int16x8_t input_reg = vmovl_s8(vld1_s8(input_channel_ptr));
input_channel_ptr += 8;
acc_reg[0] = vget_low_s16(input_reg);
acc_reg[1] = vget_high_s16(input_reg);
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
vst1q_s32(
acc + channel + 4 * i,
vaddw_s16(vld1q_s32(acc + channel + 4 * i), acc_reg[i]));
}
}
#endif
for (; channel < tranche_depth; ++channel) {
acc[channel] += *input_channel_ptr++;
}
input_row_ptr += depth;
}
}
int8* output_ptr = output_data + Offset(output_shape, batch, out_y,
out_x, depth_base);
int channel = 0;
#ifdef USE_NEON
for (; channel <= tranche_depth - 8; channel += 8) {
int16 buf[8];
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
buf[i] =
acc[channel + i] > 0
? (acc[channel + i] + filter_count / 2) / filter_count
: (acc[channel + i] - filter_count / 2) / filter_count;
}
int8x8_t buf8 = vqmovn_s16(vld1q_s16(buf));
buf8 = vmin_s8(buf8, vdup_n_s8(params.quantized_activation_max));
buf8 = vmax_s8(buf8, vdup_n_s8(params.quantized_activation_min));
vst1_s8(output_ptr + channel, buf8);
}
#endif
for (; channel < tranche_depth; ++channel) {
int16 a = acc[channel] > 0
? (acc[channel] + filter_count / 2) / filter_count
: (acc[channel] - filter_count / 2) / filter_count;
a = std::max<int16>(a, params.quantized_activation_min);
a = std::min<int16>(a, params.quantized_activation_max);
output_ptr[channel] = static_cast<int8>(a);
}
}
}
}
}
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | tensorflow | dfa22b348b70bb89d6d6ec0ff53973bacb4f4695 | 118,547,733,753,779,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 126 | Prevent a division by 0 in average ops.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 385184660
Change-Id: I7affd4554f9b336fca29ac68f633232c094d0bd3 |
bool need_new_secrets(utime_t now) const {
return secrets.size() < KEY_ROTATE_NUM || current().expiration <= now;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 293,033,088,913,814,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random() |
int treeRead(struct READER *reader, struct DATAOBJECT *data) {
int i, j, err, olen, elements, size, x, y, z, b, e, dy, dz, sx, sy, sz, dzy,
szy;
char *input, *output;
uint8_t node_type, node_level;
uint16_t entries_used;
uint32_t size_of_chunk;
uint32_t filter_mask;
uint64_t address_of_left_sibling, address_of_right_sibling, start[4],
child_pointer, key, store;
char buf[4];
UNUSED(node_level);
UNUSED(address_of_right_sibling);
UNUSED(address_of_left_sibling);
UNUSED(key);
if (data->ds.dimensionality > 3) {
log("TREE dimensions > 3");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* read signature */
if (fread(buf, 1, 4, reader->fhd) != 4 || strncmp(buf, "TREE", 4)) {
log("cannot read signature of TREE\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
} log("%08lX %.4s\n", (uint64_t )ftell(reader->fhd) - 4, buf);
node_type = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
node_level = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
entries_used = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
if(entries_used>0x1000)
return MYSOFA_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT;
address_of_left_sibling = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
address_of_right_sibling = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
elements = 1;
for (j = 0; j < data->ds.dimensionality; j++)
elements *= data->datalayout_chunk[j];
dy = data->datalayout_chunk[1];
dz = data->datalayout_chunk[2];
sx = data->ds.dimension_size[0];
sy = data->ds.dimension_size[1];
sz = data->ds.dimension_size[2];
dzy = dz * dy;
szy = sz * sy;
size = data->datalayout_chunk[data->ds.dimensionality];
log("elements %d size %d\n",elements,size);
if (!(output = malloc(elements * size))) {
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
}
for (e = 0; e < entries_used * 2; e++) {
if (node_type == 0) {
key = readValue(reader, reader->superblock.size_of_lengths);
} else {
size_of_chunk = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
filter_mask = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
if (filter_mask) {
log("TREE all filters must be enabled\n");
free(output);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
for (j = 0; j < data->ds.dimensionality; j++) {
start[j] = readValue(reader, 8);
log("start %d %lu\n",j,start[j]);
}
if (readValue(reader, 8)) {
break;
}
child_pointer = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
log(" data at %lX len %u\n", child_pointer, size_of_chunk);
/* read data */
store = ftell(reader->fhd);
if (fseek(reader->fhd, child_pointer, SEEK_SET)<0) {
free(output);
return errno;
}
if (!(input = malloc(size_of_chunk))) {
free(output);
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (fread(input, 1, size_of_chunk, reader->fhd) != size_of_chunk) {
free(output);
free(input);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
olen = elements * size;
err = gunzip(size_of_chunk, input, &olen, output);
free(input);
log(" gunzip %d %d %d\n",err, olen, elements*size);
if (err || olen != elements * size) {
free(output);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
switch (data->ds.dimensionality) {
case 1:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements + start[0];
j = x * size + b;
if (j>=0 && j < elements * size) {
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
case 2:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements;
y = x % dy + start[1];
x = x / dy + start[0];
j = ((x * sy + y) * size) + b;
if (j>=0 && j < elements * size) {
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
case 3:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements;
z = x % dz + start[2];
y = (x / dz) % dy + start[1];
x = (x / dzy) + start[0];
j = (x * szy + y * sz + z) * size + b;
if (j>=0 && j < elements * size) {
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
default:
log("invalid dim\n");
return MYSOFA_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if(fseek(reader->fhd, store, SEEK_SET)<0) {
free(output);
return errno;
}
}
}
free(output);
if(fseek(reader->fhd, 4, SEEK_CUR)<0) /* skip checksum */
return errno;
return MYSOFA_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | libmysofa | d39a171e9c6a1c44dbdf43f9db6c3fbd887e38c1 | 180,079,472,353,695,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 165 | Fixed security issue 1 |
static GuestFilesystemInfo *build_guest_fsinfo(char *guid, Error **errp)
{
DWORD info_size;
char mnt, *mnt_point;
char fs_name[32];
char vol_info[MAX_PATH+1];
size_t len;
GuestFilesystemInfo *fs = NULL;
GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeName(guid, (LPCH)&mnt, 0, &info_size);
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_MORE_DATA) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to get volume name");
return NULL;
}
mnt_point = g_malloc(info_size + 1);
if (!GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeName(guid, mnt_point, info_size,
&info_size)) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to get volume name");
goto free;
}
len = strlen(mnt_point);
mnt_point[len] = '\\';
mnt_point[len+1] = 0;
if (!GetVolumeInformation(mnt_point, vol_info, sizeof(vol_info), NULL, NULL,
NULL, (LPSTR)&fs_name, sizeof(fs_name))) {
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NOT_READY) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to get volume info");
}
goto free;
}
fs_name[sizeof(fs_name) - 1] = 0;
fs = g_malloc(sizeof(*fs));
fs->name = g_strdup(guid);
if (len == 0) {
fs->mountpoint = g_strdup("System Reserved");
} else {
fs->mountpoint = g_strndup(mnt_point, len);
}
fs->type = g_strdup(fs_name);
fs->disk = build_guest_disk_info(guid, errp);
free:
g_free(mnt_point);
return fs;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | qemu | 141b197408ab398c4f474ac1a728ab316e921f2b | 157,956,554,276,937,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | qga: check bytes count read by guest-file-read
While reading file content via 'guest-file-read' command,
'qmp_guest_file_read' routine allocates buffer of count+1
bytes. It could overflow for large values of 'count'.
Add check to avoid it.
Reported-by: Fakhri Zulkifli <mohdfakhrizulkifli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
cmsPipeline* _cmsReadInputLUT(cmsHPROFILE hProfile, int Intent)
{
cmsTagTypeSignature OriginalType;
cmsTagSignature tag16 = Device2PCS16[Intent];
cmsTagSignature tagFloat = Device2PCSFloat[Intent];
cmsContext ContextID = cmsGetProfileContextID(hProfile);
// On named color, take the appropiate tag
if (cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfile) == cmsSigNamedColorClass) {
cmsPipeline* Lut;
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* nc = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) cmsReadTag(hProfile, cmsSigNamedColor2Tag);
if (nc == NULL) return NULL;
Lut = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 0, 0);
if (Lut == NULL) {
cmsFreeNamedColorList(nc);
return NULL;
}
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Lut, cmsAT_BEGIN, _cmsStageAllocNamedColor(nc, TRUE)) ||
!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Lut, cmsAT_END, _cmsStageAllocLabV2ToV4(ContextID))) {
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
return NULL;
}
return Lut;
}
if (cmsIsTag(hProfile, tagFloat)) { // Float tag takes precedence
// Floating point LUT are always V4, but the encoding range is no
// longer 0..1.0, so we need to add an stage depending on the color space
return _cmsReadFloatInputTag(hProfile, tagFloat);
}
// Revert to perceptual if no tag is found
if (!cmsIsTag(hProfile, tag16)) {
tag16 = Device2PCS16[0];
}
if (cmsIsTag(hProfile, tag16)) { // Is there any LUT-Based table?
// Check profile version and LUT type. Do the necessary adjustments if needed
// First read the tag
cmsPipeline* Lut = (cmsPipeline*) cmsReadTag(hProfile, tag16);
if (Lut == NULL) return NULL;
// After reading it, we have now info about the original type
OriginalType = _cmsGetTagTrueType(hProfile, tag16);
// The profile owns the Lut, so we need to copy it
Lut = cmsPipelineDup(Lut);
// We need to adjust data only for Lab16 on output
if (OriginalType != cmsSigLut16Type || cmsGetPCS(hProfile) != cmsSigLabData)
return Lut;
// If the input is Lab, add also a conversion at the begin
if (cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile) == cmsSigLabData &&
!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Lut, cmsAT_BEGIN, _cmsStageAllocLabV4ToV2(ContextID)))
goto Error;
// Add a matrix for conversion V2 to V4 Lab PCS
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Lut, cmsAT_END, _cmsStageAllocLabV2ToV4(ContextID)))
goto Error;
return Lut;
Error:
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
return NULL;
}
// Lut was not found, try to create a matrix-shaper
// Check if this is a grayscale profile.
if (cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile) == cmsSigGrayData) {
// if so, build appropiate conversion tables.
// The tables are the PCS iluminant, scaled across GrayTRC
return BuildGrayInputMatrixPipeline(hProfile);
}
// Not gray, create a normal matrix-shaper
return BuildRGBInputMatrixShaper(hProfile);
} | 0 | [] | Little-CMS | 41d222df1bc6188131a8f46c32eab0a4d4cdf1b6 | 260,786,470,347,302,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | Memory squeezing fix: lcms2 cmsPipeline construction
When creating a new pipeline, lcms would often try to allocate a stage
and pass it to cmsPipelineInsertStage without checking whether the
allocation succeeded. cmsPipelineInsertStage would then assert (or crash)
if it had not.
The fix here is to change cmsPipelineInsertStage to check and return
an error value. All calling code is then checked to test this return
value and cope. |
smpl_t aubio_onset_get_delay_s(const aubio_onset_t * o) {
return aubio_onset_get_delay (o) / (smpl_t) o->samplerate;
} | 0 | [] | aubio | e4e0861cffbc8d3a53dcd18f9ae85797690d67c7 | 329,699,559,759,533,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | [onset] safer deletion method |
int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
ASN1_IA5STRING *chal;
ASN1_OBJECT *spkioid;
int i, n;
char *s;
BIO_printf(out, "Netscape SPKI:\n");
X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&spkioid, NULL, NULL, NULL, spki->spkac->pubkey);
i = OBJ_obj2nid(spkioid);
BIO_printf(out, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n",
(i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
if (!pkey)
BIO_printf(out, " Unable to load public key\n");
else {
EVP_PKEY_print_public(out, pkey, 4, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
chal = spki->spkac->challenge;
if (chal->length)
BIO_printf(out, " Challenge String: %.*s\n", chal->length, chal->data);
i = OBJ_obj2nid(spki->sig_algor.algorithm);
BIO_printf(out, " Signature Algorithm: %s",
(i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
n = spki->signature->length;
s = (char *)spki->signature->data;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((i % 18) == 0)
BIO_write(out, "\n ", 7);
BIO_printf(out, "%02x%s", (unsigned char)s[i],
((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":");
}
BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | openssl | 2d0e5d4a4a5d4332325b5e5cea492fad2be633e1 | 300,606,939,378,043,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix NETSCAPE_SPKI_print function to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> |
static void __exit ovl_exit(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ovl_fs_type);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121 | 235,298,274,097,434,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> |
static _Bool check_send_okay (const value_list_t *vl) /* {{{ */
{
_Bool received = 0;
int status;
if (network_config_forward != 0)
return (1);
if (vl->meta == NULL)
return (1);
status = meta_data_get_boolean (vl->meta, "network:received", &received);
if (status == -ENOENT)
return (1);
else if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: check_send_okay: meta_data_get_boolean failed "
"with status %i.", status);
return (1);
}
/* By default, only *send* value lists that were not *received* by the
* network plugin. */
return (!received);
} /* }}} _Bool check_send_okay */ | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | collectd | b589096f907052b3a4da2b9ccc9b0e2e888dfc18 | 79,770,552,930,327,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254 |
static int h2_task_pre_conn(conn_rec* c, void *arg)
{
h2_ctx *ctx;
if (!c->master) {
return OK;
}
ctx = h2_ctx_get(c, 0);
(void)arg;
if (ctx->task) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, 0, c,
"h2_h2, pre_connection, found stream task");
ap_add_input_filter("H2_SLAVE_IN", NULL, NULL, c);
ap_add_output_filter("H2_PARSE_H1", NULL, NULL, c);
ap_add_output_filter("H2_SLAVE_OUT", NULL, NULL, c);
}
return OK;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-444"
] | mod_h2 | 825de6a46027b2f4c30d7ff5a0c8b852d639c207 | 149,007,037,676,370,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | * Fixed keepalives counter on slave connections. |
static uint32_t cirrus_linear_readl(void *opaque, target_phys_addr_t addr)
{
uint32_t v;
#ifdef TARGET_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
v = cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr) << 24;
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 1) << 16;
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 2) << 8;
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 3);
#else
v = cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr);
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 1) << 8;
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 2) << 16;
v |= cirrus_linear_readb(opaque, addr + 3) << 24;
#endif
return v;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 13,088,884,793,607,907,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int rawsock_add_header(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
*(u8 *)skb_push(skb, NFC_HEADER_SIZE) = 0;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-276",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 26896f01467a28651f7a536143fe5ac8449d4041 | 219,181,297,283,455,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | net/nfc/rawsock.c: add CAP_NET_RAW check.
When creating a raw AF_NFC socket, CAP_NET_RAW needs to be checked first.
Signed-off-by: Qingyu Li <ieatmuttonchuan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
handle_client_state_waiting_for_ok (DBusAuth *auth,
DBusAuthCommand command,
const DBusString *args)
{
switch (command)
{
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_REJECTED:
return process_rejected (auth, args);
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_OK:
return process_ok(auth, args);
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_DATA:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_ERROR:
return send_cancel (auth);
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_AUTH:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_CANCEL:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_BEGIN:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_UNKNOWN:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_NEGOTIATE_UNIX_FD:
case DBUS_AUTH_COMMAND_AGREE_UNIX_FD:
default:
return send_error (auth, "Unknown command");
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59"
] | dbus | 47b1a4c41004bf494b87370987b222c934b19016 | 192,597,072,315,290,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server owner
The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership
of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie"
into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home
directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can
read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in
the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client
both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional
Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the
cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting
file owned by the server.
Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings
is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to
harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use
by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's.
Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the
implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link
attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory
could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to
read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could
result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the
malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent
client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing
authentication bypass.
This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system
dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in
stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL
authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this
vulnerability only applies to:
* system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration
* third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although
in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default)
* third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart
Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs
like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available.
However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for
a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way
without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at
~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the
identity of the process hosting the DBusServer.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/269
Closes: CVE-2019-12749 |
find_bits (int n, int *lowest, int *n_set)
{
int i;
*n_set = 0;
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
if (n & (1 << i)) {
*lowest = i;
(*n_set)++;
}
} | 0 | [] | gdk-pixbuf | 779429ce34e439c01d257444fe9d6739e72a2024 | 330,573,929,534,248,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | bmp: Detect integer overflow of the line width
Instead of risking crashes or OOM, return an error if
we detect integer overflow.
The commit also includes a test image that triggers
this overflow when used with pixbuf-read.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=768738 |
static int parse_playlist(HLSContext *c, const char *url,
struct playlist *pls, AVIOContext *in)
{
int ret = 0, is_segment = 0, is_variant = 0;
int64_t duration = 0;
enum KeyType key_type = KEY_NONE;
uint8_t iv[16] = "";
int has_iv = 0;
char key[MAX_URL_SIZE] = "";
char line[MAX_URL_SIZE];
const char *ptr;
int close_in = 0;
int64_t seg_offset = 0;
int64_t seg_size = -1;
uint8_t *new_url = NULL;
struct variant_info variant_info;
char tmp_str[MAX_URL_SIZE];
struct segment *cur_init_section = NULL;
if (!in) {
#if 1
AVDictionary *opts = NULL;
close_in = 1;
/* Some HLS servers don't like being sent the range header */
av_dict_set(&opts, "seekable", "0", 0);
// broker prior HTTP options that should be consistent across requests
av_dict_set(&opts, "user-agent", c->user_agent, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "headers", c->headers, 0);
ret = avio_open2(&in, url, AVIO_FLAG_READ,
c->interrupt_callback, &opts);
av_dict_free(&opts);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
#else
ret = open_in(c, &in, url);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
close_in = 1;
#endif
}
if (av_opt_get(in, "location", AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN, &new_url) >= 0)
url = new_url;
read_chomp_line(in, line, sizeof(line));
if (strcmp(line, "#EXTM3U")) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
if (pls) {
free_segment_list(pls);
pls->finished = 0;
pls->type = PLS_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED;
}
while (!avio_feof(in)) {
read_chomp_line(in, line, sizeof(line));
if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-STREAM-INF:", &ptr)) {
is_variant = 1;
memset(&variant_info, 0, sizeof(variant_info));
ff_parse_key_value(ptr, (ff_parse_key_val_cb) handle_variant_args,
&variant_info);
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-KEY:", &ptr)) {
struct key_info info = {{0}};
ff_parse_key_value(ptr, (ff_parse_key_val_cb) handle_key_args,
&info);
key_type = KEY_NONE;
has_iv = 0;
if (!strcmp(info.method, "AES-128"))
key_type = KEY_AES_128;
if (!strcmp(info.method, "SAMPLE-AES"))
key_type = KEY_SAMPLE_AES;
if (!strncmp(info.iv, "0x", 2) || !strncmp(info.iv, "0X", 2)) {
ff_hex_to_data(iv, info.iv + 2);
has_iv = 1;
}
av_strlcpy(key, info.uri, sizeof(key));
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-MEDIA:", &ptr)) {
struct rendition_info info = {{0}};
ff_parse_key_value(ptr, (ff_parse_key_val_cb) handle_rendition_args,
&info);
new_rendition(c, &info, url);
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-TARGETDURATION:", &ptr)) {
ret = ensure_playlist(c, &pls, url);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
pls->target_duration = atoi(ptr) * AV_TIME_BASE;
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:", &ptr)) {
ret = ensure_playlist(c, &pls, url);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
pls->start_seq_no = atoi(ptr);
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-PLAYLIST-TYPE:", &ptr)) {
ret = ensure_playlist(c, &pls, url);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
if (!strcmp(ptr, "EVENT"))
pls->type = PLS_TYPE_EVENT;
else if (!strcmp(ptr, "VOD"))
pls->type = PLS_TYPE_VOD;
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-MAP:", &ptr)) {
struct init_section_info info = {{0}};
ret = ensure_playlist(c, &pls, url);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
ff_parse_key_value(ptr, (ff_parse_key_val_cb) handle_init_section_args,
&info);
cur_init_section = new_init_section(pls, &info, url);
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-ENDLIST", &ptr)) {
if (pls)
pls->finished = 1;
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXTINF:", &ptr)) {
is_segment = 1;
duration = atof(ptr) * AV_TIME_BASE;
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#EXT-X-BYTERANGE:", &ptr)) {
seg_size = atoi(ptr);
ptr = strchr(ptr, '@');
if (ptr)
seg_offset = atoi(ptr+1);
} else if (av_strstart(line, "#", NULL)) {
continue;
} else if (line[0]) {
if (is_variant) {
if (!new_variant(c, &variant_info, line, url)) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
is_variant = 0;
}
if (is_segment) {
struct segment *seg;
if (!pls) {
if (!new_variant(c, 0, url, NULL)) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
pls = c->playlists[c->n_playlists - 1];
}
seg = av_malloc(sizeof(struct segment));
if (!seg) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
if (has_iv) {
memcpy(seg->iv, iv, sizeof(iv));
} else {
int seq = pls->start_seq_no + pls->n_segments;
memset(seg->iv, 0, sizeof(seg->iv));
AV_WB32(seg->iv + 12, seq);
}
if (key_type != KEY_NONE) {
ff_make_absolute_url(tmp_str, sizeof(tmp_str), url, key);
seg->key = av_strdup(tmp_str);
if (!seg->key) {
av_free(seg);
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
} else {
seg->key = NULL;
}
ff_make_absolute_url(tmp_str, sizeof(tmp_str), url, line);
seg->url = av_strdup(tmp_str);
if (!seg->url) {
av_free(seg->key);
av_free(seg);
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
if (duration < 0.001 * AV_TIME_BASE) {
duration = 0.001 * AV_TIME_BASE;
}
seg->duration = duration;
seg->key_type = key_type;
dynarray_add(&pls->segments, &pls->n_segments, seg);
is_segment = 0;
seg->size = seg_size;
if (seg_size >= 0) {
seg->url_offset = seg_offset;
seg_offset += seg_size;
seg_size = -1;
} else {
seg->url_offset = 0;
seg_offset = 0;
}
seg->init_section = cur_init_section;
}
}
}
if (pls)
pls->last_load_time = av_gettime_relative();
fail:
av_free(new_url);
if (close_in)
avio_close(in);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | FFmpeg | 6959358683c7533f586c07a766acc5fe9544d8b2 | 143,241,207,040,584,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 206 | avformat/hls: check segment duration value of EXTINF
fix ticket: 8673
set the default EXTINF duration to 1ms if duration is smaller than 1ms
Signed-off-by: Steven Liu <lq@chinaffmpeg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9dfb19baeb86a8bb02c53a441682c6e9a6e104cc) |
TEST(EqOp, Equality1) {
EqualityMatchExpression eq1;
EqualityMatchExpression eq2;
EqualityMatchExpression eq3;
BSONObj operand = BSON("a" << 5 << "b" << 5 << "c" << 4);
eq1.init("a", operand["a"]).transitional_ignore();
eq2.init("a", operand["b"]).transitional_ignore();
eq3.init("c", operand["c"]).transitional_ignore();
ASSERT(eq1.equivalent(&eq1));
ASSERT(eq1.equivalent(&eq2));
ASSERT(!eq1.equivalent(&eq3));
} | 0 | [] | mongo | b0ef26c639112b50648a02d969298650fbd402a4 | 36,158,365,502,915,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | SERVER-51083 Reject invalid UTF-8 from $regex match expressions |
win_close(win_T *win, int free_buf)
{
win_T *wp;
int other_buffer = FALSE;
int close_curwin = FALSE;
int dir;
int help_window = FALSE;
tabpage_T *prev_curtab = curtab;
frame_T *win_frame = win->w_frame->fr_parent;
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
int had_diffmode = win->w_p_diff;
#endif
#ifdef MESSAGE_QUEUE
int did_decrement = FALSE;
#endif
#if defined(FEAT_TERMINAL) && defined(FEAT_PROP_POPUP)
// Can close a popup window with a terminal if the job has finished.
if (may_close_term_popup() == OK)
return OK;
#endif
if (ERROR_IF_ANY_POPUP_WINDOW)
return FAIL;
if (last_window())
{
emsg(_(e_cannot_close_last_window));
return FAIL;
}
if (win->w_closing || (win->w_buffer != NULL
&& win->w_buffer->b_locked > 0))
return FAIL; // window is already being closed
if (win_unlisted(win))
{
emsg(_(e_cannot_close_autocmd_or_popup_window));
return FAIL;
}
if ((firstwin == aucmd_win || lastwin == aucmd_win) && one_window())
{
emsg(_(e_cannot_close_window_only_autocmd_window_would_remain));
return FAIL;
}
// When closing the last window in a tab page first go to another tab page
// and then close the window and the tab page to avoid that curwin and
// curtab are invalid while we are freeing memory.
if (close_last_window_tabpage(win, free_buf, prev_curtab))
return FAIL;
// When closing the help window, try restoring a snapshot after closing
// the window. Otherwise clear the snapshot, it's now invalid.
if (bt_help(win->w_buffer))
help_window = TRUE;
else
clear_snapshot(curtab, SNAP_HELP_IDX);
if (win == curwin)
{
#ifdef FEAT_JOB_CHANNEL
leaving_window(curwin);
#endif
/*
* Guess which window is going to be the new current window.
* This may change because of the autocommands (sigh).
*/
wp = frame2win(win_altframe(win, NULL));
/*
* Be careful: If autocommands delete the window or cause this window
* to be the last one left, return now.
*/
if (wp->w_buffer != curbuf)
{
other_buffer = TRUE;
win->w_closing = TRUE;
apply_autocmds(EVENT_BUFLEAVE, NULL, NULL, FALSE, curbuf);
if (!win_valid(win))
return FAIL;
win->w_closing = FALSE;
if (last_window())
return FAIL;
}
win->w_closing = TRUE;
apply_autocmds(EVENT_WINLEAVE, NULL, NULL, FALSE, curbuf);
if (!win_valid(win))
return FAIL;
win->w_closing = FALSE;
if (last_window())
return FAIL;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// autocmds may abort script processing
if (aborting())
return FAIL;
#endif
}
#ifdef FEAT_GUI
// Avoid trouble with scrollbars that are going to be deleted in
// win_free().
if (gui.in_use)
out_flush();
#endif
#ifdef FEAT_PROP_POPUP
if (popup_win_closed(win) && !win_valid(win))
return FAIL;
#endif
// Trigger WinClosed just before starting to free window-related resources.
trigger_winclosed(win);
// autocmd may have freed the window already.
if (!win_valid_any_tab(win))
return OK;
win_close_buffer(win, free_buf ? DOBUF_UNLOAD : 0, TRUE);
if (only_one_window() && win_valid(win) && win->w_buffer == NULL
&& (last_window() || curtab != prev_curtab
|| close_last_window_tabpage(win, free_buf, prev_curtab)))
{
// Autocommands have closed all windows, quit now. Restore
// curwin->w_buffer, otherwise writing viminfo may fail.
if (curwin->w_buffer == NULL)
curwin->w_buffer = curbuf;
getout(0);
}
// Autocommands may have moved to another tab page.
if (curtab != prev_curtab && win_valid_any_tab(win)
&& win->w_buffer == NULL)
{
// Need to close the window anyway, since the buffer is NULL.
win_close_othertab(win, FALSE, prev_curtab);
return FAIL;
}
// Autocommands may have closed the window already or closed the only
// other window.
if (!win_valid(win) || last_window()
|| close_last_window_tabpage(win, free_buf, prev_curtab))
return FAIL;
// Now we are really going to close the window. Disallow any autocommand
// to split a window to avoid trouble.
// Also bail out of parse_queued_messages() to avoid it tries to update the
// screen.
++split_disallowed;
#ifdef MESSAGE_QUEUE
++dont_parse_messages;
#endif
// Free the memory used for the window and get the window that received
// the screen space.
wp = win_free_mem(win, &dir, NULL);
// Make sure curwin isn't invalid. It can cause severe trouble when
// printing an error message. For win_equal() curbuf needs to be valid
// too.
if (win == curwin)
{
curwin = wp;
#ifdef FEAT_QUICKFIX
if (wp->w_p_pvw || bt_quickfix(wp->w_buffer))
{
/*
* If the cursor goes to the preview or the quickfix window, try
* finding another window to go to.
*/
for (;;)
{
if (wp->w_next == NULL)
wp = firstwin;
else
wp = wp->w_next;
if (wp == curwin)
break;
if (!wp->w_p_pvw && !bt_quickfix(wp->w_buffer))
{
curwin = wp;
break;
}
}
}
#endif
curbuf = curwin->w_buffer;
close_curwin = TRUE;
// The cursor position may be invalid if the buffer changed after last
// using the window.
check_cursor();
}
if (p_ea && (*p_ead == 'b' || *p_ead == dir))
// If the frame of the closed window contains the new current window,
// only resize that frame. Otherwise resize all windows.
win_equal(curwin, curwin->w_frame->fr_parent == win_frame, dir);
else
win_comp_pos();
if (close_curwin)
{
// Pass WEE_ALLOW_PARSE_MESSAGES to decrement dont_parse_messages
// before autocommands.
#ifdef MESSAGE_QUEUE
did_decrement =
#else
(void)
#endif
win_enter_ext(wp,
WEE_CURWIN_INVALID | WEE_TRIGGER_ENTER_AUTOCMDS
| WEE_TRIGGER_LEAVE_AUTOCMDS | WEE_ALLOW_PARSE_MESSAGES);
if (other_buffer)
// careful: after this wp and win may be invalid!
apply_autocmds(EVENT_BUFENTER, NULL, NULL, FALSE, curbuf);
}
--split_disallowed;
#ifdef MESSAGE_QUEUE
if (!did_decrement)
--dont_parse_messages;
#endif
/*
* If last window has a status line now and we don't want one,
* remove the status line.
*/
last_status(FALSE);
// After closing the help window, try restoring the window layout from
// before it was opened.
if (help_window)
restore_snapshot(SNAP_HELP_IDX, close_curwin);
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
// If the window had 'diff' set and now there is only one window left in
// the tab page with 'diff' set, and "closeoff" is in 'diffopt', then
// execute ":diffoff!".
if (diffopt_closeoff() && had_diffmode && curtab == prev_curtab)
{
int diffcount = 0;
win_T *dwin;
FOR_ALL_WINDOWS(dwin)
if (dwin->w_p_diff)
++diffcount;
if (diffcount == 1)
do_cmdline_cmd((char_u *)"diffoff!");
}
#endif
#if defined(FEAT_GUI)
// When 'guioptions' includes 'L' or 'R' may have to remove scrollbars.
if (gui.in_use && !win_hasvertsplit())
gui_init_which_components(NULL);
#endif
redraw_all_later(NOT_VALID);
return OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | vim | 0f6e28f686dbb59ab3b562408ab9b2234797b9b1 | 183,211,927,835,212,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 258 | patch 8.2.4428: crash when switching tabpage while in the cmdline window
Problem: Crash when switching tabpage while in the cmdline window.
Solution: Disallow switching tabpage when in the cmdline window. |
static inline int xfrm4_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return xfrm_policy_check(sk, dir, skb, AF_INET);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 | 127,020,143,275,227,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> |
int ext4_bread_batch(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block, int bh_count,
bool wait, struct buffer_head **bhs)
{
int i, err;
for (i = 0; i < bh_count; i++) {
bhs[i] = ext4_getblk(NULL, inode, block + i, 0 /* map_flags */);
if (IS_ERR(bhs[i])) {
err = PTR_ERR(bhs[i]);
bh_count = i;
goto out_brelse;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < bh_count; i++)
/* Note that NULL bhs[i] is valid because of holes. */
if (bhs[i] && !buffer_uptodate(bhs[i]))
ll_rw_block(REQ_OP_READ, REQ_META | REQ_PRIO, 1,
&bhs[i]);
if (!wait)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < bh_count; i++)
if (bhs[i])
wait_on_buffer(bhs[i]);
for (i = 0; i < bh_count; i++) {
if (bhs[i] && !buffer_uptodate(bhs[i])) {
err = -EIO;
goto out_brelse;
}
}
return 0;
out_brelse:
for (i = 0; i < bh_count; i++) {
brelse(bhs[i]);
bhs[i] = NULL;
}
return err;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 8e4b5eae5decd9dfe5a4ee369c22028f90ab4c44 | 144,225,371,407,488,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | ext4: fail ext4_iget for root directory if unallocated
If the root directory has an i_links_count of zero, then when the file
system is mounted, then when ext4_fill_super() notices the problem and
tries to call iput() the root directory in the error return path,
ext4_evict_inode() will try to free the inode on disk, before all of
the file system structures are set up, and this will result in an OOPS
caused by a NULL pointer dereference.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1092.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560777
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org |
static int io_send_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe,
struct io_kiocb **nxt, bool force_nonblock,
long (*fn)(struct socket *, struct user_msghdr __user *,
unsigned int))
{
struct socket *sock;
int ret;
if (unlikely(req->ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL))
return -EINVAL;
sock = sock_from_file(req->file, &ret);
if (sock) {
struct user_msghdr __user *msg;
unsigned flags;
flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->msg_flags);
if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT)
req->flags |= REQ_F_NOWAIT;
else if (force_nonblock)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg = (struct user_msghdr __user *) (unsigned long)
READ_ONCE(sqe->addr);
ret = fn(sock, msg, flags);
if (force_nonblock && ret == -EAGAIN)
return ret;
}
io_cqring_add_event(req, ret);
if (ret < 0 && (req->flags & REQ_F_LINK))
req->flags |= REQ_F_FAIL_LINK;
io_put_req_find_next(req, nxt);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 181e448d8709e517c9c7b523fcd209f24eb38ca7 | 64,829,807,609,394,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | io_uring: async workers should inherit the user creds
If we don't inherit the original task creds, then we can confuse users
like fuse that pass creds in the request header. See link below on
identical aio issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/26f0d78e-99ca-2f1b-78b9-433088053a61@scylladb.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
{
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
store16(tb, type);
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | 096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd | 109,379,264,610,963,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> |
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
g_test_init(&argc, &argv, NULL);
if (getenv("GTK_VNC_DEBUG")) {
debug = TRUE;
vnc_util_set_debug(TRUE);
}
#if GLIB_CHECK_VERSION(2, 22, 0)
g_test_add_func("/conn/validation/rre", test_validation_rre);
g_test_add_func("/conn/validation/copyrect", test_validation_copyrect);
g_test_add_func("/conn/validation/hextile", test_validation_hextile);
g_test_add_func("/conn/validation/unexpectedcmap", test_validation_unexpected_cmap);
#endif
return g_test_run();
} | 1 | [] | gtk-vnc | c8583fd3783c5b811590fcb7bae4ce6e7344963e | 164,480,901,867,092,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Correctly validate color map range indexes
The color map index could wrap around to zero causing negative
array index accesses.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=778050
CVE-2017-5885
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> |
static void n_hdlc_send_frames(struct n_hdlc *n_hdlc, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
register int actual;
unsigned long flags;
struct n_hdlc_buf *tbuf;
if (debuglevel >= DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO)
printk("%s(%d)n_hdlc_send_frames() called\n",__FILE__,__LINE__);
check_again:
spin_lock_irqsave(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list.spinlock, flags);
if (n_hdlc->tbusy) {
n_hdlc->woke_up = 1;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list.spinlock, flags);
return;
}
n_hdlc->tbusy = 1;
n_hdlc->woke_up = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list.spinlock, flags);
tbuf = n_hdlc_buf_get(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list);
while (tbuf) {
if (debuglevel >= DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO)
printk("%s(%d)sending frame %p, count=%d\n",
__FILE__,__LINE__,tbuf,tbuf->count);
/* Send the next block of data to device */
set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
actual = tty->ops->write(tty, tbuf->buf, tbuf->count);
/* rollback was possible and has been done */
if (actual == -ERESTARTSYS) {
n_hdlc_buf_return(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list, tbuf);
break;
}
/* if transmit error, throw frame away by */
/* pretending it was accepted by driver */
if (actual < 0)
actual = tbuf->count;
if (actual == tbuf->count) {
if (debuglevel >= DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO)
printk("%s(%d)frame %p completed\n",
__FILE__,__LINE__,tbuf);
/* free current transmit buffer */
n_hdlc_buf_put(&n_hdlc->tx_free_buf_list, tbuf);
/* wait up sleeping writers */
wake_up_interruptible(&tty->write_wait);
/* get next pending transmit buffer */
tbuf = n_hdlc_buf_get(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list);
} else {
if (debuglevel >= DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO)
printk("%s(%d)frame %p pending\n",
__FILE__,__LINE__,tbuf);
/*
* the buffer was not accepted by driver,
* return it back into tx queue
*/
n_hdlc_buf_return(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list, tbuf);
break;
}
}
if (!tbuf)
clear_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
/* Clear the re-entry flag */
spin_lock_irqsave(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list.spinlock, flags);
n_hdlc->tbusy = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n_hdlc->tx_buf_list.spinlock, flags);
if (n_hdlc->woke_up)
goto check_again;
if (debuglevel >= DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO)
printk("%s(%d)n_hdlc_send_frames() exit\n",__FILE__,__LINE__);
} /* end of n_hdlc_send_frames() */ | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | tty | 82f2341c94d270421f383641b7cd670e474db56b | 9,495,096,452,410,585,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 | tty: n_hdlc: get rid of racy n_hdlc.tbuf
Currently N_HDLC line discipline uses a self-made singly linked list for
data buffers and has n_hdlc.tbuf pointer for buffer retransmitting after
an error.
The commit be10eb7589337e5defbe214dae038a53dd21add8
("tty: n_hdlc add buffer flushing") introduced racy access to n_hdlc.tbuf.
After tx error concurrent flush_tx_queue() and n_hdlc_send_frames() can put
one data buffer to tx_free_buf_list twice. That causes double free in
n_hdlc_release().
Let's use standard kernel linked list and get rid of n_hdlc.tbuf:
in case of tx error put current data buffer after the head of tx_buf_list.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
static u32 interpolate_value(u32 value, const struct linear_segments *segments,
unsigned len)
{
u64 tmp64;
u32 dx, dy;
int i, ret;
if (value >= segments[0].x)
return segments[0].y;
if (value < segments[len-1].x)
return segments[len-1].y;
for (i = 1; i < len - 1; i++) {
/* If value is identical, no need to interpolate */
if (value == segments[i].x)
return segments[i].y;
if (value > segments[i].x)
break;
}
/* Linear interpolation between the two (x,y) points */
dy = segments[i].y - segments[i - 1].y;
dx = segments[i - 1].x - segments[i].x;
tmp64 = value - segments[i].x;
tmp64 *= dy;
do_div(tmp64, dx);
ret = segments[i].y - tmp64;
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | media_tree | eca2d34b9d2ce70165a50510659838e28ca22742 | 142,680,805,903,497,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | [media] mb86a20s: apply mask to val after checking for read failure
Appling the mask 0x0f to the immediate return of the call to
mb86a20s_readreg will always result in a positive value, meaning that the
check of ret < 0 will never work. Instead, check for a -ve return value
first, and then mask val with 0x0f.
Kudos to Mauro Carvalho Chehab for spotting the mistake in my original fix.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> |
PHP_FUNCTION(stream_copy_to_stream)
{
php_stream *src, *dest;
zval *zsrc, *zdest;
long maxlen = PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, pos = 0;
size_t len;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rr|ll", &zsrc, &zdest, &maxlen, &pos) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(src, &zsrc);
php_stream_from_zval(dest, &zdest);
if (pos > 0 && php_stream_seek(src, pos, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to seek to position %ld in the stream", pos);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(src, dest, maxlen, &len);
if (ret != SUCCESS) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | php-src | 52b93f0cfd3cba7ff98cc5198df6ca4f23865f80 | 180,050,369,160,741,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Fixed bug #69353 (Missing null byte checks for paths in various PHP extensions) |
const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
{
switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
return "read header";
case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
return "read body";
case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
return "read done";
default:
return "unknown";
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openssl | 63658103d4441924f8dbfc517b99bb54758a98b9 | 205,574,468,302,938,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix a hang with SSL_peek()
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.
CVE-2016-6305
GitHub Issue #1563
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> |
static void php_xml_parser_create_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int ns_support) /* {{{ */
{
xml_parser *parser;
int auto_detect = 0;
char *encoding_param = NULL;
int encoding_param_len = 0;
char *ns_param = NULL;
int ns_param_len = 0;
XML_Char *encoding;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, (ns_support ? "|ss": "|s"), &encoding_param, &encoding_param_len, &ns_param, &ns_param_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (encoding_param != NULL) {
/* The supported encoding types are hardcoded here because
* we are limited to the encodings supported by expat/xmltok.
*/
if (encoding_param_len == 0) {
encoding = XML(default_encoding);
auto_detect = 1;
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "ISO-8859-1") == 0) {
encoding = "ISO-8859-1";
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "UTF-8") == 0) {
encoding = "UTF-8";
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "US-ASCII") == 0) {
encoding = "US-ASCII";
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unsupported source encoding \"%s\"", encoding_param);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
encoding = XML(default_encoding);
}
if (ns_support && ns_param == NULL){
ns_param = ":";
}
parser = ecalloc(1, sizeof(xml_parser));
parser->parser = XML_ParserCreate_MM((auto_detect ? NULL : encoding),
&php_xml_mem_hdlrs, ns_param);
parser->target_encoding = encoding;
parser->case_folding = 1;
parser->object = NULL;
parser->isparsing = 0;
XML_SetUserData(parser->parser, parser);
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, parser,le_xml_parser);
parser->index = Z_LVAL_P(return_value);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | php-src | 1248079be837808da4c97364fb3b4c96c8015fbf | 311,464,265,876,753,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | Fix bug #72099: xml_parse_into_struct segmentation fault |
struct sk_buff *sock_omalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size,
gfp_t priority)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* small safe race: SKB_TRUESIZE may differ from final skb->truesize */
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc) + SKB_TRUESIZE(size) >
sysctl_optmem_max)
return NULL;
skb = alloc_skb(size, priority);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_ofree;
return skb;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-704"
] | linux | 9d538fa60bad4f7b23193c89e843797a1cf71ef3 | 318,271,377,800,391,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto
sk->sk_prot and sk->sk_prot_creator can differ when the app uses
IPV6_ADDRFORM (transforming an IPv6-socket to an IPv4-one).
Which is why sk_prot_creator is there to make sure that sk_prot_free()
does the kmem_cache_free() on the right kmem_cache slab.
Now, if such a socket gets transformed back to a listening socket (using
connect() with AF_UNSPEC) we will allocate an IPv4 tcp_sock through
sk_clone_lock() when a new connection comes in. But sk_prot_creator will
still point to the IPv6 kmem_cache (as everything got copied in
sk_clone_lock()). When freeing, we will thus put this
memory back into the IPv6 kmem_cache although it was allocated in the
IPv4 cache. I have seen memory corruption happening because of this.
With slub-debugging and MEMCG_KMEM enabled this gives the warning
"cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. TCPv6 but object is from TCP"
A C-program to trigger this:
void main(void)
{
int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
int new_fd, newest_fd, client_fd;
struct sockaddr_in6 bind_addr;
struct sockaddr_in bind_addr4, client_addr1, client_addr2;
struct sockaddr unsp;
int val;
memset(&bind_addr, 0, sizeof(bind_addr));
bind_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
bind_addr.sin6_port = ntohs(42424);
memset(&client_addr1, 0, sizeof(client_addr1));
client_addr1.sin_family = AF_INET;
client_addr1.sin_port = ntohs(42424);
client_addr1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
memset(&client_addr2, 0, sizeof(client_addr2));
client_addr2.sin_family = AF_INET;
client_addr2.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
client_addr2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
memset(&unsp, 0, sizeof(unsp));
unsp.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr));
listen(fd, 5);
client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr1, sizeof(client_addr1));
new_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
close(fd);
val = AF_INET;
setsockopt(new_fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &val, sizeof(val));
connect(new_fd, &unsp, sizeof(unsp));
memset(&bind_addr4, 0, sizeof(bind_addr4));
bind_addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
bind_addr4.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
bind(new_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr4, sizeof(bind_addr4));
listen(new_fd, 5);
client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr2, sizeof(client_addr2));
newest_fd = accept(new_fd, NULL, NULL);
close(new_fd);
close(client_fd);
close(new_fd);
}
As far as I can see, this bug has been there since the beginning of the
git-days.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static int gg_notify105_ex(struct gg_session *sess, uin_t *userlist, char *types, int count)
{
int i = 0;
if (!userlist || !count)
return gg_send_packet(sess, GG_NOTIFY105_LIST_EMPTY, NULL);
while (i < count) {
gg_tvbuilder_t *tvb = gg_tvbuilder_new(sess, NULL);
gg_tvbuilder_expected_size(tvb, 2100);
while (i < count) {
size_t prev_size = gg_tvbuilder_get_size(tvb);
gg_tvbuilder_write_uin(tvb, userlist[i], 0);
gg_tvbuilder_write_uint8(tvb,
(types == NULL) ? GG_USER_NORMAL : types[i]);
/* Oryginalny klient wysyła maksymalnie 2048 bajtów
* danych w każdym pakiecie tego typu.
*/
if (gg_tvbuilder_get_size(tvb) > 2048) {
gg_tvbuilder_strip(tvb, prev_size);
break;
}
i++;
}
if (!gg_tvbuilder_send(tvb, (i < count) ?
GG_NOTIFY105_FIRST : GG_NOTIFY105_LAST)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | libgadu | 23644f1fb8219031b3cac93289a588b05f90226b | 126,344,894,065,791,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | Poprawka ograniczania długości opisu. |
dissect_header_lens_v2_large(tvbuff_t *tvb, wtap_syscall_header* syscall_header, int offset, proto_tree *tree, int encoding)
{
guint32 param_count;
proto_item *ti;
proto_tree *len_tree;
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_se_param_lens, tvb, offset, syscall_header->nparams * SYSDIG_PARAM_SIZE_V2_LARGE, ENC_NA);
len_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_sysdig_parm_lens);
for (param_count = 0; param_count < syscall_header->nparams; param_count++) {
proto_tree_add_item(len_tree, hf_se_param_len, tvb, offset + (param_count * SYSDIG_PARAM_SIZE_V2_LARGE), SYSDIG_PARAM_SIZE_V2_LARGE, encoding);
}
proto_item_set_len(ti, syscall_header->nparams * SYSDIG_PARAM_SIZE_V2_LARGE);
return syscall_header->nparams * SYSDIG_PARAM_SIZE_V2_LARGE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | wireshark | 41bfc9112480c3d83331ed93470c7f675a9d5b1a | 239,648,895,819,674,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | dissectors: re-generated sysdig events using provided tool.
Signed-off-by: Federico Di Pierro <nierro92@gmail.com> |
static int _kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val)
{
switch (dr) {
case 0 ... 3:
*val = vcpu->arch.db[dr];
break;
case 4:
if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))
return 1;
/* fall through */
case 6:
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
*val = vcpu->arch.dr6;
else
*val = kvm_x86_ops->get_dr6(vcpu);
break;
case 5:
if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))
return 1;
/* fall through */
default: /* 7 */
*val = vcpu->arch.dr7;
break;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-120"
] | linux | a08d3b3b99efd509133946056531cdf8f3a0c09b | 145,074,663,109,629,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | kvm: x86: fix emulator buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0049)
The problem occurs when the guest performs a pusha with the stack
address pointing to an mmio address (or an invalid guest physical
address) to start with, but then extending into an ordinary guest
physical address. When doing repeated emulated pushes
emulator_read_write sets mmio_needed to 1 on the first one. On a
later push when the stack points to regular memory,
mmio_nr_fragments is set to 0, but mmio_is_needed is not set to 0.
As a result, KVM exits to userspace, and then returns to
complete_emulated_mmio. In complete_emulated_mmio
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment is incremented. The termination condition of
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments is never achieved.
The code bounces back and fourth to userspace incrementing
mmio_cur_fragment past it's buffer. If the guest does nothing else it
eventually leads to a a crash on a memcpy from invalid memory address.
However if a guest code can cause the vm to be destroyed in another
vcpu with excellent timing, then kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue
can be used by the guest to control the data that's pointed to by the
call to cancel_work_item, which can be used to gain execution.
Fixes: f78146b0f9230765c6315b2e14f56112513389ad
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.5+)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
static void io_worker_start(struct io_wqe *wqe, struct io_worker *worker)
{
allow_kernel_signal(SIGINT);
current->flags |= PF_IO_WORKER;
worker->flags |= (IO_WORKER_F_UP | IO_WORKER_F_RUNNING);
worker->restore_files = current->files;
io_wqe_inc_running(wqe, worker);
} | 0 | [] | linux | 181e448d8709e517c9c7b523fcd209f24eb38ca7 | 208,512,762,363,581,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | io_uring: async workers should inherit the user creds
If we don't inherit the original task creds, then we can confuse users
like fuse that pass creds in the request header. See link below on
identical aio issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/26f0d78e-99ca-2f1b-78b9-433088053a61@scylladb.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
copy_nonerror_line(char_u *linebuf, int linelen, qffields_T *fields)
{
char_u *p;
if (linelen >= fields->errmsglen)
{
// linelen + null terminator
if ((p = vim_realloc(fields->errmsg, linelen + 1)) == NULL)
return QF_NOMEM;
fields->errmsg = p;
fields->errmsglen = linelen + 1;
}
// copy whole line to error message
vim_strncpy(fields->errmsg, linebuf, linelen);
return QF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 4f1b083be43f351bc107541e7b0c9655a5d2c0bb | 256,289,623,793,587,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | patch 9.0.0322: crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set
Problem: Crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set.
Solution: Do not handle errors if there aren't any. |
static BOOL autodetect_recv_bandwidth_measure_start(rdpRdp* rdp, wStream* s,
AUTODETECT_REQ_PDU* autodetectReqPdu)
{
if (autodetectReqPdu->headerLength != 0x06)
return FALSE;
WLog_VRB(AUTODETECT_TAG, "received Bandwidth Measure Start PDU - time=%" PRIu64 "",
GetTickCount64());
/* Initialize bandwidth measurement parameters */
rdp->autodetect->bandwidthMeasureStartTime = GetTickCount64();
rdp->autodetect->bandwidthMeasureByteCount = 0;
/* Continuous Auto-Detection: mark the start of the measurement */
if (autodetectReqPdu->requestType == RDP_BW_START_REQUEST_TYPE_CONTINUOUS)
{
rdp->autodetect->bandwidthMeasureStarted = TRUE;
}
return TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | f5e73cc7c9cd973b516a618da877c87b80950b65 | 29,583,987,632,282,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Fixed #6009: Bounds checks in autodetect_recv_bandwidth_measure_results |
_lou_getDotsForChar(widechar c) {
CharOrDots *cdPtr = getCharOrDots(c, 0, gTable);
if (cdPtr) return cdPtr->found;
return B16;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | liblouis | fb2bfce4ed49ac4656a8f7e5b5526e4838da1dde | 187,623,885,603,744,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix yet another buffer overflow in the braille table parser
Reported by Henri Salo
Fixes #592 |
static void set_msr_interception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
u32 msr, int read, int write)
{
u8 bit_read, bit_write;
unsigned long tmp;
u32 offset;
/*
* If this warning triggers extend the direct_access_msrs list at the
* beginning of the file
*/
WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
/* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
read = 0;
if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
write = 0;
offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
bit_read = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
tmp = msrpm[offset];
BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
read ? clear_bit(bit_read, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_read, &tmp);
write ? clear_bit(bit_write, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
msrpm[offset] = tmp;
svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(vcpu);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-862"
] | kvm | 0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709 | 58,119,563,652,008,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !svm->tsc_scaling_enabled)
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
break;
case MSR_STAR:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_LSTAR:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar;
break;
case MSR_CSTAR:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar;
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base;
break;
case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask;
break;
#endif
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs;
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
msr_info->data = (u32)svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip;
if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_eip_hi << 32;
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp;
if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_msr(svm, msr_info->index);
break;
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
break;
case MSR_VM_CR:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
else
msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
break;
case MSR_F15H_IC_CFG: {
int family, model;
family = guest_cpuid_family(vcpu);
model = guest_cpuid_model(vcpu);
if (family < 0 || model < 0)
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
msr_info->data = 0;
if (family == 0x15 &&
(model >= 0x2 && model < 0x20))
msr_info->data = 0x1E;
}
break;
case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
break;
default:
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 6cd88243c7e03845a450795e134b488fc2afb736 | 9,762,145,052,537,598,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | KVM: x86: do not report a vCPU as preempted outside instruction boundaries
If a vCPU is outside guest mode and is scheduled out, it might be in the
process of making a memory access. A problem occurs if another vCPU uses
the PV TLB flush feature during the period when the vCPU is scheduled
out, and a virtual address has already been translated but has not yet
been accessed, because this is equivalent to using a stale TLB entry.
To avoid this, only report a vCPU as preempted if sure that the guest
is at an instruction boundary. A rescheduling request will be delivered
to the host physical CPU as an external interrupt, so for simplicity
consider any vmexit *not* instruction boundary except for external
interrupts.
It would in principle be okay to report the vCPU as preempted also
if it is sleeping in kvm_vcpu_block(): a TLB flush IPI will incur the
vmentry/vmexit overhead unnecessarily, and optimistic spinning is
also unlikely to succeed. However, leave it for later because right
now kvm_vcpu_check_block() is doing memory accesses. Even
though the TLB flush issue only applies to virtual memory address,
it's very much preferrable to be conservative.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
void dns_server_mark_all(DnsServer *first) {
if (!first)
return;
first->marked = true;
dns_server_mark_all(first->servers_next);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | systemd | 904dcaf9d4933499f8334859f52ea8497f2d24ff | 210,821,826,290,466,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | resolved: take particular care when detaching DnsServer from its default stream
DnsStream and DnsServer have a symbiotic relationship: one DnsStream is
the current "default" stream of the server (and thus reffed by it), but
each stream also refs the server it is connected to. This cyclic
dependency can result in weird situations: when one is
destroyed/unlinked/stopped it needs to unregister itself from the other,
but doing this will trigger unregistration of the other. Hence, let's
make sure we unregister the stream from the server before destroying it,
to break this cycle.
Most likely fixes: #10725 |
static RBuffer* create(RBin* bin, const ut8 *code, int codelen, const ut8 *data, int datalen) {
ut32 filesize, code_va, code_pa, phoff;
ut32 p_start, p_phoff, p_phdr;
ut32 p_ehdrsz, p_phdrsz;
ut16 ehdrsz, phdrsz;
ut32 p_vaddr, p_paddr, p_fs, p_fs2;
ut32 baddr;
int is_arm = 0;
RBuffer *buf = r_buf_new ();
if (bin && bin->cur && bin->cur->o && bin->cur->o->info) {
is_arm = !strcmp (bin->cur->o->info->arch, "arm");
}
// XXX: hardcoded
if (is_arm) {
baddr = 0x40000;
} else {
baddr = 0x8048000;
}
#define B(x,y) r_buf_append_bytes(buf,(const ut8*)x,y)
#define D(x) r_buf_append_ut32(buf,x)
#define H(x) r_buf_append_ut16(buf,x)
#define Z(x) r_buf_append_nbytes(buf,x)
#define W(x,y,z) r_buf_write_at(buf,x,(const ut8*)y,z)
#define WZ(x,y) p_tmp=buf->length;Z(x);W(p_tmp,y,strlen(y))
B ("\x7F" "ELF" "\x01\x01\x01\x00", 8);
Z (8);
H (2); // ET_EXEC
if (is_arm) {
H (40); // e_machne = EM_ARM
} else {
H (3); // e_machne = EM_I386
}
D (1);
p_start = buf->length;
D (-1); // _start
p_phoff = buf->length;
D (-1); // phoff -- program headers offset
D (0); // shoff -- section headers offset
D (0); // flags
p_ehdrsz = buf->length;
H (-1); // ehdrsz
p_phdrsz = buf->length;
H (-1); // phdrsz
H (1);
H (0);
H (0);
H (0);
// phdr:
p_phdr = buf->length;
D (1);
D (0);
p_vaddr = buf->length;
D (-1); // vaddr = $$
p_paddr = buf->length;
D (-1); // paddr = $$
p_fs = buf->length;
D (-1); // filesize
p_fs2 = buf->length;
D (-1); // filesize
D (5); // flags
D (0x1000); // align
ehdrsz = p_phdr;
phdrsz = buf->length - p_phdr;
code_pa = buf->length;
code_va = code_pa + baddr;
phoff = 0x34;//p_phdr ;
filesize = code_pa + codelen + datalen;
W (p_start, &code_va, 4);
W (p_phoff, &phoff, 4);
W (p_ehdrsz, &ehdrsz, 2);
W (p_phdrsz, &phdrsz, 2);
code_va = baddr; // hack
W (p_vaddr, &code_va, 4);
code_pa = baddr; // hack
W (p_paddr, &code_pa, 4);
W (p_fs, &filesize, 4);
W (p_fs2, &filesize, 4);
B (code, codelen);
if (data && datalen > 0) {
//ut32 data_section = buf->length;
eprintf ("Warning: DATA section not support for ELF yet\n");
B (data, datalen);
}
return buf;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 1f37c04f2a762500222dda2459e6a04646feeedf | 256,923,695,894,771,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 94 | Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923) |
Pl_PNGFilter::decodePaeth()
{
QTC::TC("libtests", "Pl_PNGFilter decodePaeth");
unsigned char* buffer = this->cur_row + 1;
unsigned char* above_buffer = this->prev_row + 1;
unsigned int bpp = this->bytes_per_pixel;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < this->bytes_per_row; ++i)
{
int left = 0;
int up = above_buffer[i];
int upper_left = 0;
if (i >= bpp)
{
left = buffer[i - bpp];
upper_left = above_buffer[i - bpp];
}
buffer[i] = static_cast<unsigned char>(
buffer[i] +
this->PaethPredictor(left, up, upper_left));
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e | 57,523,177,252,320,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition. |
static unsigned HuffmanTree_getLength(const HuffmanTree* tree, unsigned index)
{
return tree->lengths[index];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | FreeRDP | 9fee4ae076b1ec97b97efb79ece08d1dab4df29a | 132,611,998,095,560,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fixed #5645: realloc return handling |
static void scrub_parity_put(struct scrub_parity *sparity)
{
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&sparity->refs))
return;
scrub_parity_check_and_repair(sparity);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1 | 226,033,943,374,709,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
reset_search_dir(void)
{
spats[0].off.dir = '/';
#if defined(FEAT_EVAL)
set_vv_searchforward();
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 409510c588b1eec1ae33511ae97a21eb8e110895 | 52,824,306,306,665,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | patch 8.2.5050: using freed memory when searching for pattern in path
Problem: Using freed memory when searching for pattern in path.
Solution: Make a copy of the line. |
~StringPtr() {
Reset();
} | 0 | [] | node | 7b3fb22290c3b6acb497ca85cf2f1648d75c8154 | 270,385,715,824,376,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | typo in node_http_parser |
BuildMapUaToAa(TIFFRGBAImage* img)
{
static const char module[]="BuildMapUaToAa";
uint8* m;
uint16 na,nv;
assert(img->UaToAa==NULL);
img->UaToAa=_TIFFmalloc(65536);
if (img->UaToAa==NULL)
{
TIFFErrorExt(img->tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Out of memory");
return(0);
}
m=img->UaToAa;
for (na=0; na<256; na++)
{
for (nv=0; nv<256; nv++)
*m++=(nv*na+127)/255;
}
return(1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libtiff | 40a5955cbf0df62b1f9e9bd7d9657b0070725d19 | 314,046,371,759,339,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | * libtiff/tif_next.c: add new tests to check that we don't read outside of
the compressed input stream buffer.
* libtiff/tif_getimage.c: in OJPEG case, fix checks on strile width/height |
monitor_child (int event_fd)
{
int res;
uint64_t val;
ssize_t s;
int signal_fd;
sigset_t mask;
struct pollfd fds[2];
int num_fds;
struct signalfd_siginfo fdsi;
int dont_close[] = { event_fd, -1 };
/* Close all extra fds in the monitoring process.
Any passed in fds have been passed on to the child anyway. */
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
sigemptyset (&mask);
sigaddset (&mask, SIGCHLD);
signal_fd = signalfd (-1, &mask, SFD_CLOEXEC | SFD_NONBLOCK);
if (signal_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't create signalfd");
num_fds = 1;
fds[0].fd = signal_fd;
fds[0].events = POLLIN;
if (event_fd != -1)
{
fds[1].fd = event_fd;
fds[1].events = POLLIN;
num_fds++;
}
while (1)
{
fds[0].revents = fds[1].revents = 0;
res = poll (fds, num_fds, -1);
if (res == -1 && errno != EINTR)
die_with_error ("poll");
/* Always read from the eventfd first, if pid 2 died then pid 1 often
* dies too, and we could race, reporting that first and we'd lose
* the real exit status. */
if (event_fd != -1)
{
s = read (event_fd, &val, 8);
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
die_with_error ("read eventfd");
else if (s == 8)
exit ((int) val - 1);
}
s = read (signal_fd, &fdsi, sizeof (struct signalfd_siginfo));
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
{
die_with_error ("read signalfd");
}
else if (s == sizeof (struct signalfd_siginfo))
{
if (fdsi.ssi_signo != SIGCHLD)
die ("Read unexpected signal\n");
exit (fdsi.ssi_status);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | bubblewrap | d7fc532c42f0e9bf427923bab85433282b3e5117 | 258,479,986,941,559,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters |