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<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int open_user_core(uid_t uid, uid_t fsuid, pid_t pid, char **percent_values)
{
errno = 0;
if (user_pwd == NULL
|| chdir(user_pwd) != 0
) {
perror_msg("Can't cd to '%s'", user_pwd);
return -1;
}
struct passwd* pw = getpwuid(uid);
gid_t gid = pw ? pw->pw_gid : uid;
//log("setting uid: %i gid: %i", uid, gid);
xsetegid(gid);
xseteuid(fsuid);
if (strcmp(core_basename, "core") == 0)
{
/* Mimic "core.PID" if requested */
char buf[] = "0\n";
int fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_uses_pid", O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0)
{
IGNORE_RESULT(read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)));
close(fd);
}
if (strcmp(buf, "1\n") == 0)
{
core_basename = xasprintf("%s.%lu", core_basename, (long)pid);
}
}
else
{
/* Expand old core pattern, put expanded name in core_basename */
core_basename = xstrdup(core_basename);
unsigned idx = 0;
while (1)
{
char c = core_basename[idx];
if (!c)
break;
idx++;
if (c != '%')
continue;
/* We just copied %, look at following char and expand %c */
c = core_basename[idx];
unsigned specifier_num = strchrnul(percent_specifiers, c) - percent_specifiers;
if (percent_specifiers[specifier_num] != '\0') /* valid %c (might be %% too) */
{
const char *val = "%";
if (specifier_num > 0) /* not %% */
val = percent_values[specifier_num - 1];
//log("c:'%c'", c);
//log("val:'%s'", val);
/* Replace %c at core_basename[idx] by its value */
idx--;
char *old = core_basename;
core_basename = xasprintf("%.*s%s%s", idx, core_basename, val, core_basename + idx + 2);
//log("pos:'%*s|'", idx, "");
//log("new:'%s'", core_basename);
//log("old:'%s'", old);
free(old);
idx += strlen(val);
}
/* else: invalid %c, % is already copied verbatim,
* next loop iteration will copy c */
}
}
full_core_basename = core_basename;
if (core_basename[0] != '/')
{
if (g_need_nonrelative)
{
error_msg("Current suid_dumpable policy prevents from saving core dumps according to relative core_pattern");
return -1;
}
core_basename = concat_path_file(user_pwd, core_basename);
}
/* Open (create) compat core file.
* man core:
* There are various circumstances in which a core dump file
* is not produced:
*
* [skipped obvious ones]
* The process does not have permission to write the core file.
* ...if a file with the same name exists and is not writable
* or is not a regular file (e.g., it is a directory or a symbolic link).
*
* A file with the same name already exists, but there is more
* than one hard link to that file.
*
* The file system where the core dump file would be created is full;
* or has run out of inodes; or is mounted read-only;
* or the user has reached their quota for the file system.
*
* The RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_FSIZE resource limits for the process
* are set to zero.
* [we check RLIMIT_CORE, but how can we check RLIMIT_FSIZE?]
*
* The binary being executed by the process does not have
* read permission enabled. [how we can check it here?]
*
* The process is executing a set-user-ID (set-group-ID) program
* that is owned by a user (group) other than the real
* user (group) ID of the process. [TODO?]
* (However, see the description of the prctl(2) PR_SET_DUMPABLE operation,
* and the description of the /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable file in proc(5).)
*/
struct stat sb;
errno = 0;
/* Do not O_TRUNC: if later checks fail, we do not want to have file already modified here */
int user_core_fd = open(core_basename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | g_user_core_flags, 0600); /* kernel makes 0600 too */
xsetegid(0);
xseteuid(0);
if (user_core_fd < 0
|| fstat(user_core_fd, &sb) != 0
|| !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)
|| sb.st_nlink != 1
|| sb.st_uid != fsuid
) {
if (user_core_fd < 0)
perror_msg("Can't open '%s'", full_core_basename);
else
perror_msg("'%s' is not a regular file with link count 1 owned by UID(%d)", full_core_basename, fsuid);
return -1;
}
if (ftruncate(user_core_fd, 0) != 0) {
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Can't truncate '%s' to size 0", full_core_basename);
unlink(core_basename);
return -1;
}
return user_core_fd;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'ccpp: do not use value of /proc/PID/cwd for chdir
Avoid symlink resolutions.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static unsigned create_oops_dump_dirs(GList *oops_list, unsigned oops_cnt)
{
unsigned countdown = MAX_DUMPED_DD_COUNT; /* do not report hundreds of oopses */
log_notice("Saving %u oopses as problem dirs", oops_cnt >= countdown ? countdown : oops_cnt);
char *cmdline_str = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/cmdline");
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
char *proc_modules = xmalloc_open_read_close("/proc/modules", /*maxsize:*/ NULL);
char *suspend_stats = xmalloc_open_read_close("/sys/kernel/debug/suspend_stats", /*maxsize:*/ NULL);
time_t t = time(NULL);
const char *iso_date = iso_date_string(&t);
/* dump should be readable by all if we're run with -x */
uid_t my_euid = (uid_t)-1L;
mode_t mode = DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE | S_IROTH;
/* and readable only for the owner otherwise */
if (!world_readable_dump)
{
mode = DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE;
my_euid = geteuid();
}
pid_t my_pid = getpid();
unsigned idx = 0;
unsigned errors = 0;
while (idx < oops_cnt)
{
char base[sizeof("oops-YYYY-MM-DD-hh:mm:ss-%lu-%lu") + 2 * sizeof(long)*3];
sprintf(base, "oops-%s-%lu-%lu", iso_date, (long)my_pid, (long)idx);
char *path = concat_path_file(debug_dumps_dir, base);
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, /*uid:*/ my_euid, mode);
if (dd)
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, /*uid:*/ my_euid, NULL);
save_oops_data_in_dump_dir(dd, (char*)g_list_nth_data(oops_list, idx++), proc_modules);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "Kerneloops");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "Kerneloops");
if (cmdline_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline_str);
if (proc_modules)
dd_save_text(dd, "proc_modules", proc_modules);
if (fips_enabled && strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
if (suspend_stats)
dd_save_text(dd, "suspend_stats", suspend_stats);
dd_close(dd);
notify_new_path(path);
}
else
errors++;
free(path);
if (--countdown == 0)
break;
if (dd && throttle_dd_creation)
sleep(1);
}
free(cmdline_str);
free(proc_modules);
free(fips_enabled);
free(suspend_stats);
return errors;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: CURLcode Curl_http_done(struct connectdata *conn,
CURLcode status, bool premature)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct HTTP *http =data->req.protop;
Curl_unencode_cleanup(conn);
#ifdef USE_SPNEGO
if(data->state.proxyneg.state == GSS_AUTHSENT ||
data->state.negotiate.state == GSS_AUTHSENT)
Curl_cleanup_negotiate(data);
#endif
/* set the proper values (possibly modified on POST) */
conn->fread_func = data->set.fread_func; /* restore */
conn->fread_in = data->set.in; /* restore */
conn->seek_func = data->set.seek_func; /* restore */
conn->seek_client = data->set.seek_client; /* restore */
if(http == NULL)
return CURLE_OK;
if(http->send_buffer) {
Curl_send_buffer *buff = http->send_buffer;
free(buff->buffer);
free(buff);
http->send_buffer = NULL; /* clear the pointer */
}
if(HTTPREQ_POST_FORM == data->set.httpreq) {
data->req.bytecount = http->readbytecount + http->writebytecount;
Curl_formclean(&http->sendit); /* Now free that whole lot */
if(http->form.fp) {
/* a file being uploaded was left opened, close it! */
fclose(http->form.fp);
http->form.fp = NULL;
}
}
else if(HTTPREQ_PUT == data->set.httpreq)
data->req.bytecount = http->readbytecount + http->writebytecount;
if(status)
return status;
if(!premature && /* this check is pointless when DONE is called before the
entire operation is complete */
!conn->bits.retry &&
!data->set.connect_only &&
((http->readbytecount +
data->req.headerbytecount -
data->req.deductheadercount)) <= 0) {
/* If this connection isn't simply closed to be retried, AND nothing was
read from the HTTP server (that counts), this can't be right so we
return an error here */
failf(data, "Empty reply from server");
return CURLE_GOT_NOTHING;
}
return CURLE_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-284'], 'message': 'http_done: close Negotiate connections when done
When doing HTTP requests Negotiate authenticated, the entire connnection
may become authenticated and not just the specific HTTP request which is
otherwise how HTTP works, as Negotiate can basically use NTLM under the
hood. curl was not adhering to this fact but would assume that such
requests would also be authenticated per request.
CVE-2015-3148
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422B.html
Reported-by: Isaac Boukris'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h) || overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #69353 (Missing null byte checks for paths in various PHP extensions)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int dd_delete_item(struct dump_dir *dd, const char *name)
{
if (!dd->locked)
error_msg_and_die("dump_dir is not opened"); /* bug */
char *path = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, name);
int res = unlink(path);
if (res < 0)
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
errno = res = 0;
else
perror_msg("Can't delete file '%s'", path);
}
free(path);
return res;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'dd: harden functions against directory traversal issues
Test correctness of all accessed dump dir files in all dd* functions.
Before this commit, the callers were allowed to pass strings like
"../../etc/shadow" in the filename argument of all dd* functions.
Related: #1214457
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static bool allowed_problem_dir(const char *dir_name)
{
//HACK HACK HACK! Disabled for now until we fix clients (abrt-gui) to not pass /home/user/.cache/abrt/spool
#if 0
unsigned len = strlen(g_settings_dump_location);
/* If doesn't start with "g_settings_dump_location[/]"... */
if (strncmp(dir_name, g_settings_dump_location, len) != 0
|| (dir_name[len] != '/' && dir_name[len] != '\0')
/* or contains "/." anywhere (-> might contain ".." component) */
|| strstr(dir_name + len, "/.")
) {
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'dbus: process only valid sub-directories of the dump location
Must have correct rights and must be a direct sub-directory of the dump
location.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1214451
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void problem_data_load_from_dump_dir(problem_data_t *problem_data, struct dump_dir *dd, char **excluding)
{
char *short_name;
char *full_name;
dd_init_next_file(dd);
while (dd_get_next_file(dd, &short_name, &full_name))
{
if (excluding && is_in_string_list(short_name, excluding))
{
//log("Excluded:'%s'", short_name);
goto next;
}
if (short_name[0] == '#'
|| (short_name[0] && short_name[strlen(short_name) - 1] == '~')
) {
//log("Excluded (editor backup file):'%s'", short_name);
goto next;
}
ssize_t sz = 4*1024;
char *text = is_text_file(full_name, &sz);
if (!text || text == HUGE_TEXT)
{
int flag = !text ? CD_FLAG_BIN : (CD_FLAG_BIN+CD_FLAG_BIGTXT);
problem_data_add(problem_data,
short_name,
full_name,
flag + CD_FLAG_ISNOTEDITABLE
);
goto next;
}
char *content;
if (sz < 4*1024) /* did is_text_file read entire file? */
{
/* yes */
content = text;
}
else
{
/* no, need to read it all */
free(text);
content = dd_load_text(dd, short_name);
}
/* Strip '\n' from one-line elements: */
char *nl = strchr(content, '\n');
if (nl && nl[1] == '\0')
*nl = '\0';
/* Sanitize possibly corrupted utf8.
* Of control chars, allow only tab and newline.
*/
char *sanitized = sanitize_utf8(content,
(SANITIZE_ALL & ~SANITIZE_LF & ~SANITIZE_TAB)
);
if (sanitized)
{
free(content);
content = sanitized;
}
bool editable = is_editable_file(short_name);
int flags = 0;
if (editable)
flags |= CD_FLAG_TXT | CD_FLAG_ISEDITABLE;
else
flags |= CD_FLAG_TXT | CD_FLAG_ISNOTEDITABLE;
static const char *const list_files[] = {
FILENAME_UID ,
FILENAME_PACKAGE ,
FILENAME_CMDLINE ,
FILENAME_TIME ,
FILENAME_COUNT ,
FILENAME_REASON ,
NULL
};
if (is_in_string_list(short_name, (char**)list_files))
flags |= CD_FLAG_LIST;
if (strcmp(short_name, FILENAME_TIME) == 0)
flags |= CD_FLAG_UNIXTIME;
problem_data_add(problem_data,
short_name,
content,
flags
);
free(content);
next:
free(short_name);
free(full_name);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'lib: fix races in dump directory handling code
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>:
dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.
...
The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.
Related: #1214745
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: struct dump_dir *dd_opendir(const char *dir, int flags)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_init();
dir = dd->dd_dirname = rm_trailing_slashes(dir);
struct stat stat_buf;
if (stat(dir, &stat_buf) != 0)
goto cant_access;
/* & 0666 should remove the executable bit */
dd->mode = (stat_buf.st_mode & 0666);
errno = 0;
if (dd_lock(dd, WAIT_FOR_OTHER_PROCESS_USLEEP, flags) < 0)
{
if ((flags & DD_OPEN_READONLY) && errno == EACCES)
{
/* Directory is not writable. If it seems to be readable,
* return "read only" dd, not NULL */
if (stat(dir, &stat_buf) == 0
&& S_ISDIR(stat_buf.st_mode)
&& access(dir, R_OK) == 0
) {
if(dd_check(dd) != NULL)
{
dd_close(dd);
dd = NULL;
}
return dd;
}
}
if (errno == EISDIR)
{
/* EISDIR: dd_lock can lock the dir, but it sees no time file there,
* even after it retried many times. It must be an ordinary directory!
*
* Without this check, e.g. abrt-action-print happily prints any current
* directory when run without arguments, because its option -d DIR
* defaults to "."!
*/
error_msg("'%s' is not a problem directory", dir);
}
else
{
cant_access:
if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENOTDIR)
{
if (!(flags & DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_ENOENT))
error_msg("'%s' does not exist", dir);
}
else
{
if (!(flags & DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_EACCES))
perror_msg("Can't access '%s'", dir);
}
}
dd_close(dd);
return NULL;
}
dd->dd_uid = (uid_t)-1L;
dd->dd_gid = (gid_t)-1L;
if (geteuid() == 0)
{
/* In case caller would want to create more files, he'll need uid:gid */
struct stat stat_buf;
if (stat(dir, &stat_buf) != 0 || !S_ISDIR(stat_buf.st_mode))
{
error_msg("Can't stat '%s', or it is not a directory", dir);
dd_close(dd);
return NULL;
}
dd->dd_uid = stat_buf.st_uid;
dd->dd_gid = stat_buf.st_gid;
}
return dd;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'lib: fix races in dump directory handling code
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>:
dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.
...
The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.
Related: #1214745
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void dd_sanitize_mode_and_owner(struct dump_dir *dd)
{
/* Don't sanitize if we aren't run under root:
* we assume that during file creation (by whatever means,
* even by "hostname >file" in abrt_event.conf)
* normal umask-based mode setting takes care of correct mode,
* and uid:gid is, of course, set to user's uid and gid.
*
* For root operating on /var/spool/abrt/USERS_PROBLEM, this isn't true:
* "hostname >file", for example, would create file OWNED BY ROOT!
* This routine resets mode and uid:gid for all such files.
*/
if (dd->dd_uid == (uid_t)-1)
return;
if (!dd->locked)
error_msg_and_die("dump_dir is not opened"); /* bug */
DIR *d = opendir(dd->dd_dirname);
if (!d)
return;
struct dirent *dent;
while ((dent = readdir(d)) != NULL)
{
if (dent->d_name[0] == '.') /* ".lock", ".", ".."? skip */
continue;
char *full_path = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, dent->d_name);
struct stat statbuf;
if (lstat(full_path, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
{
if ((statbuf.st_mode & 0777) != dd->mode)
{
/* We open the file only for fchmod()
*
* We use fchmod() because chmod() changes the permissions of
* the file specified whose pathname is given in path, which
* is dereferenced if it is a symbolic link.
*/
int fd = open(full_path, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, dd->mode);
if (fd >= 0)
{
if (fchmod(fd, dd->mode) != 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' mode to 0%o", full_path,
(unsigned)dd->mode);
}
close(fd);
}
else
{
perror_msg("Can't open regular file '%s'", full_path);
}
}
if (statbuf.st_uid != dd->dd_uid || statbuf.st_gid != dd->dd_gid)
{
if (lchown(full_path, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid) != 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", full_path,
(long)dd->dd_uid, (long)dd->dd_gid);
}
}
}
free(full_path);
}
closedir(d);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'lib: fix races in dump directory handling code
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>:
dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.
...
The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.
Related: #1214745
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int main(int argc,char *argv[])
{
int error= 0, ho_error;
int first_command;
my_bool can_handle_passwords;
MYSQL mysql;
char **commands, **save_argv;
MY_INIT(argv[0]);
mysql_init(&mysql);
my_getopt_use_args_separator= TRUE;
if (load_defaults("my",load_default_groups,&argc,&argv))
exit(1);
my_getopt_use_args_separator= FALSE;
save_argv = argv; /* Save for free_defaults */
if ((ho_error=handle_options(&argc, &argv, my_long_options, get_one_option)))
{
free_defaults(save_argv);
exit(ho_error);
}
if (debug_info_flag)
my_end_arg= MY_CHECK_ERROR | MY_GIVE_INFO;
if (debug_check_flag)
my_end_arg= MY_CHECK_ERROR;
if (argc == 0)
{
usage();
exit(1);
}
commands = argv;
if (tty_password)
opt_password = get_tty_password(NullS);
(void) signal(SIGINT,endprog); /* Here if abort */
(void) signal(SIGTERM,endprog); /* Here if abort */
if (opt_bind_addr)
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_OPT_BIND,opt_bind_addr);
if (opt_compress)
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_OPT_COMPRESS,NullS);
if (opt_connect_timeout)
{
uint tmp=opt_connect_timeout;
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, (char*) &tmp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if (opt_use_ssl)
{
mysql_ssl_set(&mysql, opt_ssl_key, opt_ssl_cert, opt_ssl_ca,
opt_ssl_capath, opt_ssl_cipher);
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_OPT_SSL_CRL, opt_ssl_crl);
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_OPT_SSL_CRLPATH, opt_ssl_crlpath);
}
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_OPT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT,
(char*)&opt_ssl_verify_server_cert);
#endif
if (opt_protocol)
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_OPT_PROTOCOL,(char*)&opt_protocol);
#if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (EMBEDDED_LIBRARY)
if (shared_memory_base_name)
mysql_options(&mysql,MYSQL_SHARED_MEMORY_BASE_NAME,shared_memory_base_name);
#endif
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_SET_CHARSET_NAME, default_charset);
error_flags= (myf)(opt_nobeep ? 0 : ME_BELL);
if (opt_plugin_dir && *opt_plugin_dir)
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_PLUGIN_DIR, opt_plugin_dir);
if (opt_default_auth && *opt_default_auth)
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_DEFAULT_AUTH, opt_default_auth);
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_OPT_CONNECT_ATTR_RESET, 0);
mysql_options4(&mysql, MYSQL_OPT_CONNECT_ATTR_ADD,
"program_name", "mysqladmin");
if (using_opt_enable_cleartext_plugin)
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_ENABLE_CLEARTEXT_PLUGIN,
(char*) &opt_enable_cleartext_plugin);
first_command= find_type(argv[0], &command_typelib, FIND_TYPE_BASIC);
can_handle_passwords=
(first_command == ADMIN_PASSWORD || first_command == ADMIN_OLD_PASSWORD) ?
TRUE : FALSE;
mysql_options(&mysql, MYSQL_OPT_CAN_HANDLE_EXPIRED_PASSWORDS,
&can_handle_passwords);
if (sql_connect(&mysql, option_wait))
{
/*
We couldn't get an initial connection and will definitely exit.
The following just determines the exit-code we'll give.
*/
unsigned int err= mysql_errno(&mysql);
if (err >= CR_MIN_ERROR && err <= CR_MAX_ERROR)
error= 1;
else
{
/* Return 0 if all commands are PING */
for (; argc > 0; argv++, argc--)
{
if (find_type(argv[0], &command_typelib, FIND_TYPE_BASIC) !=
ADMIN_PING)
{
error= 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
/*
--count=0 aborts right here. Otherwise iff --sleep=t ("interval")
is given a t!=0, we get an endless loop, or n iterations if --count=n
was given an n!=0. If --sleep wasn't given, we get one iteration.
To wit, --wait loops the connection-attempts, while --sleep loops
the command execution (endlessly if no --count is given).
*/
while (!interrupted && (!opt_count_iterations || nr_iterations))
{
new_line = 0;
if ((error= execute_commands(&mysql,argc,commands)))
{
/*
Unknown/malformed command always aborts and can't be --forced.
If the user got confused about the syntax, proceeding would be
dangerous ...
*/
if (error > 0)
break;
/*
Command was well-formed, but failed on the server. Might succeed
on retry (if conditions on server change etc.), but needs --force
to retry.
*/
if (!option_force)
break;
} /* if((error= ... */
if (interval) /* --sleep=interval given */
{
if (opt_count_iterations && --nr_iterations == 0)
break;
/*
If connection was dropped (unintentionally, or due to SHUTDOWN),
re-establish it if --wait ("retry-connect") was given and user
didn't signal for us to die. Otherwise, signal failure.
*/
if (mysql.net.vio == 0)
{
if (option_wait && !interrupted)
{
sleep(1);
sql_connect(&mysql, option_wait);
/*
continue normally and decrease counters so that
"mysqladmin --count=1 --wait=1 shutdown"
cannot loop endlessly.
*/
}
else
{
/*
connexion broke, and we have no order to re-establish it. fail.
*/
if (!option_force)
error= 1;
break;
}
} /* lost connection */
sleep(interval);
if (new_line)
puts("");
}
else
break; /* no --sleep, done looping */
} /* command-loop */
} /* got connection */
mysql_close(&mysql);
my_free(opt_password);
my_free(user);
#if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (EMBEDDED_LIBRARY)
my_free(shared_memory_base_name);
#endif
free_defaults(save_argv);
my_end(my_end_arg);
exit(error ? 1 : 0);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-284', 'CWE-295'], 'message': 'WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int run_tool(char *tool_path, DYNAMIC_STRING *ds_res, ...)
{
int ret;
const char* arg;
va_list args;
DYNAMIC_STRING ds_cmdline;
DBUG_ENTER("run_tool");
DBUG_PRINT("enter", ("tool_path: %s", tool_path));
if (init_dynamic_string(&ds_cmdline, IF_WIN("\"", ""), FN_REFLEN, FN_REFLEN))
die("Out of memory");
dynstr_append_os_quoted(&ds_cmdline, tool_path, NullS);
dynstr_append(&ds_cmdline, " ");
va_start(args, ds_res);
while ((arg= va_arg(args, char *)))
{
/* Options should be os quoted */
if (strncmp(arg, "--", 2) == 0)
dynstr_append_os_quoted(&ds_cmdline, arg, NullS);
else
dynstr_append(&ds_cmdline, arg);
dynstr_append(&ds_cmdline, " ");
}
va_end(args);
#ifdef __WIN__
dynstr_append(&ds_cmdline, "\"");
#endif
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("Running: %s", ds_cmdline.str));
ret= run_command(ds_cmdline.str, ds_res);
DBUG_PRINT("exit", ("ret: %d", ret));
dynstr_free(&ds_cmdline);
DBUG_RETURN(ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-295'], 'message': 'WL#9072: Backport WL#8785 to 5.5'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _asn1_extract_der_octet (asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der,
int der_len, unsigned flags)
{
int len2, len3;
int counter, counter_end;
int result;
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len3);
if (len2 < -1)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter = len3 + 1;
if (len2 == -1)
counter_end = der_len - 2;
else
counter_end = der_len;
while (counter < counter_end)
{
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der + counter, der_len, &len3);
if (IS_ERR(len2, flags))
{
warn();
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
}
if (len2 >= 0)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, len2+len3);
_asn1_append_value (node, der + counter + len3, len2);
}
else
{ /* indefinite */
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
result =
_asn1_extract_der_octet (node, der + counter + len3,
der_len, flags);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
return result;
len2 = 0;
}
DECR_LEN(der_len, 1);
counter += len2 + len3 + 1;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
cleanup:
return result;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': '_asn1_extract_der_octet: prevent past of boundary access
Reported by Hanno Böck.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(chdir)
{
char *str;
int ret, str_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(str TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = VCWD_CHDIR(str);
if (ret != 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s (errno %d)", strerror(errno), errno);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (BG(CurrentStatFile) && !IS_ABSOLUTE_PATH(BG(CurrentStatFile), strlen(BG(CurrentStatFile)))) {
efree(BG(CurrentStatFile));
BG(CurrentStatFile) = NULL;
}
if (BG(CurrentLStatFile) && !IS_ABSOLUTE_PATH(BG(CurrentLStatFile), strlen(BG(CurrentLStatFile)))) {
efree(BG(CurrentLStatFile));
BG(CurrentLStatFile) = NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-19'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #69418 - more s->p fixes for filenames'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void pcntl_signal_handler(int signo)
{
struct php_pcntl_pending_signal *psig;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
psig = PCNTL_G(spares);
if (!psig) {
/* oops, too many signals for us to track, so we'll forget about this one */
return;
}
PCNTL_G(spares) = psig->next;
psig->signo = signo;
psig->next = NULL;
/* the head check is important, as the tick handler cannot atomically clear both
* the head and tail */
if (PCNTL_G(head) && PCNTL_G(tail)) {
PCNTL_G(tail)->next = psig;
} else {
PCNTL_G(head) = psig;
}
PCNTL_G(tail) = psig;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-19'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #69418 - more s->p fixes for filenames'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ftp_close(ftpbuf_t *ftp)
{
if (ftp == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (ftp->data) {
data_close(ftp, ftp->data);
}
if (ftp->stream && ftp->closestream) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_stream_close(ftp->stream);
}
if (ftp->fd != -1) {
#if HAVE_OPENSSL_EXT
if (ftp->ssl_active) {
SSL_shutdown(ftp->ssl_handle);
SSL_free(ftp->ssl_handle);
}
#endif
closesocket(ftp->fd);
}
ftp_gc(ftp);
efree(ftp);
return NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix bug #69545 - avoid overflow when reading list'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ftp_alloc(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const long size, char **response)
{
char buffer[64];
if (ftp == NULL || size <= 0) {
return 0;
}
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, "%ld", size);
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "ALLO", buffer)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp)) {
return 0;
}
if (response) {
*response = estrdup(ftp->inbuf);
}
if (ftp->resp < 200 || ftp->resp >= 300) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix bug #69545 - avoid overflow when reading list'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int phar_parse_tarfile(php_stream* fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, int is_data, php_uint32 compression, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char buf[512], *actual_alias = NULL, *p;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
size_t pos = 0, read, totalsize;
tar_header *hdr;
php_uint32 sum1, sum2, size, old;
phar_archive_data *myphar, **actual;
int last_was_longlink = 0;
if (error) {
*error = NULL;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
totalsize = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is not a tar file or is truncated", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*)buf;
old = (memcmp(hdr->magic, "ustar", sizeof("ustar")-1) != 0);
myphar = (phar_archive_data *) pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
myphar->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* estimate number of entries, can't be certain with tar files */
zend_hash_init(&myphar->manifest, 2 + (totalsize >> 12),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->virtual_dirs, 4 + (totalsize >> 11),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->is_tar = 1;
/* remember whether this entire phar was compressed with gz/bzip2 */
myphar->flags = compression;
entry.is_tar = 1;
entry.is_crc_checked = 1;
entry.phar = myphar;
pos += sizeof(buf);
do {
phar_entry_info *newentry;
pos = php_stream_tell(fp);
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
memset(hdr->checksum, ' ', sizeof(hdr->checksum));
sum2 = phar_tar_checksum(buf, old?sizeof(old_tar_header):sizeof(tar_header));
size = entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize =
phar_tar_number(hdr->size, sizeof(hdr->size));
if (((!old && hdr->prefix[0] == 0) || old) && strlen(hdr->name) == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(hdr->name, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
off_t curloc;
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has signature that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
bail:
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
curloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read != size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be read", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) \
(((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[3]) << 24) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[2]) << 16) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[1]) << 8) \
| (((unsigned char*)(buffer))[0]))
#else
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) (php_uint32) *(buffer)
#endif
myphar->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(buf);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(fp, php_stream_tell(fp) - size - 512, myphar->sig_flags, buf + 8, size - 8, fname, &myphar->signature, &myphar->sig_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
char *save = *error;
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be verified: %s", fname, save);
efree(save);
}
goto bail;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, curloc + 512, SEEK_SET);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, 512, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" has entries after signature, invalid phar", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
if (!last_was_longlink && hdr->typeflag == 'L') {
last_was_longlink = 1;
/* support the ././@LongLink system for storing long filenames */
entry.filename_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
/* Check for overflow - bug 61065 */
if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (invalid entry size)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename = pemalloc(entry.filename_len+1, myphar->is_persistent);
read = php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (read != entry.filename_len) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
/* skip blank stuff */
size = ((size+511)&~511) - size;
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
continue;
} else if (!last_was_longlink && !old && hdr->prefix[0] != 0) {
char name[256];
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 155; i++) {
name[i] = hdr->prefix[i];
if (name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
name[i++] = '/';
for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
name[i+j] = hdr->name[j];
if (name[i+j] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i+j;
if (name[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.filename = pestrndup(name, entry.filename_len, myphar->is_persistent);
} else if (!last_was_longlink) {
int i;
/* calculate strlen, which can be no longer than 100 */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
if (hdr->name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i;
entry.filename = pestrndup(hdr->name, i, myphar->is_persistent);
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] = '\0';
entry.filename_len--;
}
}
last_was_longlink = 0;
phar_add_virtual_dirs(myphar, entry.filename, entry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (sum1 != sum2) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (checksum mismatch of file \"%s\")", fname, entry.filename);
}
pefree(entry.filename, myphar->is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.tar_type = ((old & (hdr->typeflag == '\0')) ? TAR_FILE : hdr->typeflag);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = pos; /* header_offset unused in tar */
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.flags = phar_tar_number(hdr->mode, sizeof(hdr->mode)) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
entry.timestamp = phar_tar_number(hdr->mtime, sizeof(hdr->mtime));
entry.is_persistent = myphar->is_persistent;
#ifndef S_ISDIR
#define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode)&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
#endif
if (old && entry.tar_type == TAR_FILE && S_ISDIR(entry.flags)) {
entry.tar_type = TAR_DIR;
}
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_DIR) {
entry.is_dir = 1;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
entry.link = NULL;
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_LINK) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&myphar->manifest, hdr->linkname, strlen(hdr->linkname))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file - hard link to non-existent file \"%s\"", fname, hdr->linkname);
}
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
} else if (entry.tar_type == TAR_SYMLINK) {
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&myphar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), (void **) &newentry);
if (entry.is_persistent) {
++entry.manifest_pos;
}
if (entry.filename_len >= sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1 && !memcmp(entry.filename, ".phar/.metadata", sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1)) {
if (FAILURE == phar_tar_process_metadata(newentry, fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has invalid metadata in magic file \"%s\"", fname, entry.filename);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
/* found explicit alias */
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has alias that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read == size) {
buf[size] = '\0';
if (!phar_validate_alias(buf, size)) {
if (size > 50) {
buf[50] = '.';
buf[51] = '.';
buf[52] = '.';
buf[53] = '\0';
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in tar-based phar \"%s\"", buf, fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
actual_alias = pestrndup(buf, size, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias = actual_alias;
myphar->alias_len = size;
php_stream_seek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to read alias from tar-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
size = (size+511)&~511;
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
} while (read != 0);
if (zend_hash_exists(&(myphar->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
myphar->is_data = 0;
} else {
myphar->is_data = 1;
}
/* ensure signature set */
if (!myphar->is_data && PHAR_G(require_hash) && !myphar->signature) {
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "tar-based phar \"%s\" does not have a signature", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
myphar->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(myphar->fname, fname_len);
#endif
myphar->fname_len = fname_len;
myphar->fp = fp;
p = strrchr(myphar->fname, '/');
if (p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p);
if (myphar->ext == p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p + 1, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p - 1);
}
if (myphar->ext) {
myphar->ext_len = (myphar->fname + fname_len) - myphar->ext;
}
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), (void **)&actual)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\" to phar registry", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
myphar = *actual;
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, actual_alias, myphar->alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
} else {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, alias, alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
myphar->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
myphar->alias = pestrndup(myphar->fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = fname_len;
}
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = myphar;
}
return SUCCESS;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix bug #69453 - don't try to cut empty string'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: QualifyIpPacket(IPHeader *pIpHeader, ULONG len)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res;
UCHAR ver_len = pIpHeader->v4.ip_verlen;
UCHAR ip_version = (ver_len & 0xF0) >> 4;
USHORT ipHeaderSize = 0;
USHORT fullLength = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (ip_version == 4)
{
ipHeaderSize = (ver_len & 0xF) << 2;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v4.ip_length);
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength));
res.ipStatus = (ipHeaderSize >= sizeof(IPv4Header)) ? ppresIPV4 : ppresNotIP;
if (len < ipHeaderSize) res.ipCheckSum = ppresIPTooShort;
if (fullLength) {}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("ip v.%d, iplen %d\n", ip_version, fullLength));
}
}
else if (ip_version == 6)
{
UCHAR nextHeader = pIpHeader->v6.ip6_next_header;
BOOLEAN bParsingDone = FALSE;
ipHeaderSize = sizeof(pIpHeader->v6);
res.ipStatus = ppresIPV6;
res.ipCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v6.ip6_payload_len);
fullLength += ipHeaderSize;
while (nextHeader != 59)
{
IPv6ExtHeader *pExt;
switch (nextHeader)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
//existing extended headers
case 0:
case 60:
case 43:
case 44:
case 51:
case 50:
case 135:
if (len >= ((ULONG)ipHeaderSize + 8))
{
pExt = (IPv6ExtHeader *)((PUCHAR)pIpHeader + ipHeaderSize);
nextHeader = pExt->ip6ext_next_header;
ipHeaderSize += 8;
ipHeaderSize += pExt->ip6ext_hdr_len * 8;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: Break in the middle of ext. headers(len %d, hdr > %d)\n", __FUNCTION__, len, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
}
break;
//any other protocol
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
break;
}
if (bParsingDone)
break;
}
if (ipHeaderSize <= MAX_SUPPORTED_IPV6_HEADERS)
{
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, nextHeader, fullLength));
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: IP chain is too large (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
}
}
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
// bit "more fragments" or fragment offset mean the packet is fragmented
res.IsFragment = (pIpHeader->v4.ip_offset & ~0xC0) != 0;
switch (pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
{
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
{
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
break;
}
}
return res;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegrabwindow)
{
HWND window;
long client_area = 0;
RECT rc = {0};
RECT rc_win = {0};
int Width, Height;
HDC hdc;
HDC memDC;
HBITMAP memBM;
HBITMAP hOld;
HINSTANCE handle;
long lwindow_handle;
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *tPrintWindow)(HWND, HDC,UINT);
tPrintWindow pPrintWindow = 0;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l", &lwindow_handle, &client_area) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
window = (HWND) lwindow_handle;
if (!IsWindow(window)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Invalid window handle");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
hdc = GetDC(0);
if (client_area) {
GetClientRect(window, &rc);
Width = rc.right;
Height = rc.bottom;
} else {
GetWindowRect(window, &rc);
Width = rc.right - rc.left;
Height = rc.bottom - rc.top;
}
Width = (Width/4)*4;
memDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hdc);
memBM = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hdc, Width, Height);
hOld = (HBITMAP) SelectObject (memDC, memBM);
handle = LoadLibrary("User32.dll");
if ( handle == 0 ) {
goto clean;
}
pPrintWindow = (tPrintWindow) GetProcAddress(handle, "PrintWindow");
if ( pPrintWindow ) {
pPrintWindow(window, memDC, (UINT) client_area);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Windows API too old");
goto clean;
}
FreeLibrary(handle);
im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(Width, Height);
if (im) {
int x,y;
for (y=0; y <= Height; y++) {
for (x=0; x <= Width; x++) {
int c = GetPixel(memDC, x,y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, gdTrueColor(GetRValue(c), GetGValue(c), GetBValue(c)));
}
}
}
clean:
SelectObject(memDC,hOld);
DeleteObject(memBM);
DeleteDC(memDC);
ReleaseDC( 0, hdc );
if (!im) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix #69719 - more checks for nulls in paths'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: SSL_CTX *tls_init_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int client)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
X509_STORE *certstore;
int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
int ctx_options = 0;
int ctx_tls_versions = 0;
int type;
/*
* SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't
* initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX
* certificates.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
#endif
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); /* which is really "all known SSL / TLS methods". Idiots. */
if (!ctx) {
int err;
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed creating SSL context: %s", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* Save the config on the context so that callbacks which
* only get SSL_CTX* e.g. session persistence, can get it
*/
SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, conf);
/*
* Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded
*/
if (conf->file_type) {
type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
} else {
type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
}
/*
* Set the password to load private key
*/
if (conf->private_key_password) {
#ifdef __APPLE__
/*
* We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check
* for our special string which indicates we should get the password
* programmatically.
*/
char const* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin";
if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password, special_string, strlen(special_string)) == 0) {
char cmd[256];
char *password;
long const max_password_len = 128;
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1, "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"",
conf->private_key_file);
DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd);
FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r");
if (!cmd_pipe) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": %s command failed: Unable to get private_key_password", cmd);
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
return NULL;
}
rad_const_free(conf->private_key_password);
password = talloc_array(conf, char, max_password_len);
if (!password) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Can't allocate space for private_key_password");
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
pclose(cmd_pipe);
return NULL;
}
fgets(password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe);
pclose(cmd_pipe);
/* Get rid of newline at end of password. */
password[strlen(password) - 1] = '\0';
DEBUG3(LOG_PREFIX ": Password from command = \"%s\"", password);
conf->private_key_password = password;
}
#endif
{
char *password;
memcpy(&password, &conf->private_key_password, sizeof(password));
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, password);
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password);
}
}
#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
if (!client) {
/*
* No dynamic query exists. There MUST be a
* statically configured identity and password.
*/
if (conf->psk_query && !*conf->psk_query) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be empty");
return NULL;
}
/*
* Set the callback only if we can check things.
*/
if (conf->psk_identity || conf->psk_query) {
SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_callback);
}
} else if (conf->psk_query) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be used for outgoing connections");
return NULL;
}
/*
* Now check that if PSK is being used, the config is valid.
*/
if ((conf->psk_identity && !conf->psk_password) ||
(!conf->psk_identity && conf->psk_password) ||
(conf->psk_identity && !*conf->psk_identity) ||
(conf->psk_password && !*conf->psk_password)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_identity or psk_password are empty");
return NULL;
}
if (conf->psk_identity) {
size_t psk_len, hex_len;
uint8_t buffer[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
if (conf->certificate_file ||
conf->private_key_password || conf->private_key_file ||
conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": When PSKs are used, No certificate configuration is permitted");
return NULL;
}
if (client) {
SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx,
psk_client_callback);
}
psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password);
if (strlen(conf->psk_password) > (2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is too long (max %d)", PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check the password now, so that we don't have
* errors at run-time.
*/
hex_len = fr_hex2bin(buffer, sizeof(buffer), conf->psk_password, psk_len);
if (psk_len != (2 * hex_len)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is not all hex");
return NULL;
}
goto post_ca;
}
#else
(void) client; /* -Wunused */
#endif
/*
* Load our keys and certificates
*
* If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use
* of cert chain authentication using openssl api call
* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how
* the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from
* openSSL.org
*/
if (!conf->certificate_file) goto load_ca;
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading certificate file %s:%s", conf->certificate_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return NULL;
}
} else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
conf->certificate_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return NULL;
}
/* Load the CAs we trust */
load_ca:
if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
return NULL;
}
}
if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
if (conf->private_key_file) {
if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed reading private key file %s:%s",
conf->private_key_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check if the loaded private key is the right one
*/
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return NULL;
}
}
#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
post_ca:
#endif
/*
* We never want SSLv2 or SSLv3.
*/
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
/*
* As of 3.0.5, we always allow TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
* Though they can be *globally* disabled if necessary.x
*/
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
if (conf->disable_tlsv1) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
if (conf->disable_tlsv1_1) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
if (conf->disable_tlsv1_2) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
#endif
if ((ctx_options & ctx_tls_versions) == ctx_tls_versions) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": You have disabled all available TLS versions. EAP will not work");
return NULL;
}
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
#endif
/*
* SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent
* small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always
* using
*
* SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the computer
* time needed during negotiation, but it is not very
* large.
*/
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
/*
* SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues
* in Windows Vista client.
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
* http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html
*/
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
/*
* TODO: Set the RSA & DH
* SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa);
* SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh);
*/
/*
* set the message callback to identify the type of
* message. For every new session, there can be a
* different callback argument.
*
* SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg);
*/
/*
* Set eliptical curve crypto configuration.
*/
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (set_ecdh_curve(ctx, conf->ecdh_curve) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
#endif
#endif
/* Set Info callback */
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info);
/*
* Callbacks, etc. for session resumption.
*/
if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
/*
* Cache sessions on disk if requested.
*/
if (conf->session_cache_path) {
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session);
}
SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
if (fr_tls_ex_index_vps < 0)
fr_tls_ex_index_vps = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, sess_free_vps);
}
/*
* Check the certificates for revocation.
*/
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
if (conf->check_crl) {
certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
if (certstore == NULL) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading Certificate Store");
return NULL;
}
X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
}
#endif
/*
* Set verify modes
* Always verify the peer certificate
*/
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
if (conf->verify_depth) {
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth);
}
/* Load randomness */
if (conf->random_file) {
if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*10))) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error loading randomness");
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* Set the cipher list if we were told to
*/
if (conf->cipher_list) {
if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) {
ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error setting cipher list");
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* Setup session caching
*/
if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
/*
* Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration.
*/
if (conf->session_id_name) {
snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
"FR eap %s", conf->session_id_name);
} else {
snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
"FR eap %p", conf);
}
/*
* Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
(unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id,
(unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id));
/*
* Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600);
/*
* Set the maximum number of entries in the
* session cache.
*/
SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size);
} else {
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
}
return ctx;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-295'], 'message': 'Set X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int attach_child_main(void* data)
{
struct attach_clone_payload* payload = (struct attach_clone_payload*)data;
int ipc_socket = payload->ipc_socket;
lxc_attach_options_t* options = payload->options;
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx = payload->init_ctx;
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
long new_personality;
#endif
int ret;
int status;
int expected;
long flags;
int fd;
uid_t new_uid;
gid_t new_gid;
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it's ready
* for us to start initializing
*/
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from initial process (0)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* A description of the purpose of this functionality is
* provided in the lxc-attach(1) manual page. We have to
* remount here and not in the parent process, otherwise
* /proc may not properly reflect the new pid namespace.
*/
if (!(options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_REMOUNT_PROC_SYS)) {
ret = lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc();
if (ret < 0) {
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* now perform additional attachments*/
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
if (options->personality < 0)
new_personality = init_ctx->personality;
else
new_personality = options->personality;
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_SET_PERSONALITY) {
ret = personality(new_personality);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not ensure correct architecture");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
#endif
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_DROP_CAPABILITIES) {
ret = lxc_attach_drop_privs(init_ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not drop privileges");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* always set the environment (specify (LXC_ATTACH_KEEP_ENV, NULL, NULL) if you want this to be a no-op) */
ret = lxc_attach_set_environment(options->env_policy, options->extra_env_vars, options->extra_keep_env);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not set initial environment for attached process");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* set user / group id */
new_uid = 0;
new_gid = 0;
/* ignore errors, we will fall back to root in that case
* (/proc was not mounted etc.)
*/
if (options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)
lxc_attach_get_init_uidgid(&new_uid, &new_gid);
if (options->uid != (uid_t)-1)
new_uid = options->uid;
if (options->gid != (gid_t)-1)
new_gid = options->gid;
/* try to set the uid/gid combination */
if ((new_gid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)) {
if (setgid(new_gid) || setgroups(0, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container gid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
if ((new_uid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER) && setuid(new_uid)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container uid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell initial process it may now put us into the cgroups */
status = 1;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret != sizeof(status)) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify initial process for initialization (1)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it has done
* everything for us when it comes to cgroups etc.
*/
expected = 2;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive final notification from initial process (2)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_socket);
/* set new apparmor profile/selinux context */
if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM)) {
int on_exec;
on_exec = options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM_EXEC ? 1 : 0;
ret = lsm_process_label_set(init_ctx->lsm_label, 0, on_exec);
if (ret < 0) {
rexit(-1);
}
}
if (init_ctx->container && init_ctx->container->lxc_conf &&
lxc_seccomp_load(init_ctx->container->lxc_conf) != 0) {
ERROR("Loading seccomp policy");
rexit(-1);
}
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* The following is done after the communication socket is
* shut down. That way, all errors that might (though
* unlikely) occur up until this point will have their messages
* printed to the original stderr (if logging is so configured)
* and not the fd the user supplied, if any.
*/
/* fd handling for stdin, stdout and stderr;
* ignore errors here, user may want to make sure
* the fds are closed, for example */
if (options->stdin_fd >= 0 && options->stdin_fd != 0)
dup2(options->stdin_fd, 0);
if (options->stdout_fd >= 0 && options->stdout_fd != 1)
dup2(options->stdout_fd, 1);
if (options->stderr_fd >= 0 && options->stderr_fd != 2)
dup2(options->stderr_fd, 2);
/* close the old fds */
if (options->stdin_fd > 2)
close(options->stdin_fd);
if (options->stdout_fd > 2)
close(options->stdout_fd);
if (options->stderr_fd > 2)
close(options->stderr_fd);
/* try to remove CLOEXEC flag from stdin/stdout/stderr,
* but also here, ignore errors */
for (fd = 0; fd <= 2; fd++) {
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
continue;
if (flags & FD_CLOEXEC) {
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Unable to clear CLOEXEC from fd");
}
}
}
/* we're done, so we can now do whatever the user intended us to do */
rexit(payload->exec_function(payload->exec_payload));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-17'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: Panic(const char *fmtstr, ...)
{
/* Ignored */
sLog(log_warning, "Panic callback invoked. \n");
exit(1);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'randomly generate tmp directory name'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int jas_stream_read(jas_stream_t *stream, void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
int c;
char *bufptr;
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(stream)) == EOF) {
return n;
}
*bufptr++ = c;
++n;
}
return n;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-415', 'CWE-190', 'CWE-369'], 'message': 'Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs)
{
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_WMVI)) {
/* Sending a WMVi message to notify the client*/
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_WMVi);
pixel_format_message(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
} else {
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'ui/vnc: fix potential memory corruption issues
this patch makes the VNC server work correctly if the
server surface and the guest surface have different sizes.
Basically the server surface is adjusted to not exceed VNC_MAX_WIDTH
x VNC_MAX_HEIGHT and additionally the width is rounded up to multiple of
VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT.
If we have a resolution whose width is not dividable by VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT
we now get a small black bar on the right of the screen.
If the surface is too big to fit the limits only the upper left area is shown.
On top of that this fixes 2 memory corruption issues:
The first was actually discovered during playing
around with a Windows 7 vServer. During resolution
change in Windows 7 it happens sometimes that Windows
changes to an intermediate resolution where
server_stride % cmp_bytes != 0 (in vnc_refresh_server_surface).
This happens only if width % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT != 0.
The second is a theoretical issue, but is maybe exploitable
by the guest. If for some reason the guest surface size is bigger
than VNC_MAX_WIDTH x VNC_MAX_HEIGHT we end up in severe corruption since
this limit is nowhere enforced.
Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, next)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
intern->index++;
} /* }}} */ ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'Fix bug #70168 - Use After Free Vulnerability in unserialize() with SplObjectStorage'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, current)
{
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&intern->storage, (void**)&element, &intern->pos) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_ZVAL(element->obj, 1, 0);
} /* }}} */ ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'Fix bug #70168 - Use After Free Vulnerability in unserialize() with SplObjectStorage'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, push)
{
zval *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(value);
intern = (spl_dllist_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #70169 (Use After Free Vulnerability in unserialize() with SplDoublyLinkedList)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static FILE * pw_tmpfile(int lockfd)
{
FILE *fd;
char *tmpname = NULL;
char *dir = "/etc";
if ((fd = xfmkstemp(&tmpname, dir)) == NULL) {
ulckpwdf();
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("can't open temporary file"));
}
copyfile(lockfd, fileno(fd));
tmp_file = tmpname;
return fd;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getStatusString)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
int zep, syp, len;
char error_string[128];
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
zip_error_get(intern, &zep, &syp);
len = zip_error_to_str(error_string, 128, zep, syp);
RETVAL_STRINGL(error_string, len, 1);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #70350: ZipArchive::extractTo allows for directory traversal when creating directories'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: make_weights (PixopsFilter *filter,
PixopsInterpType interp_type,
double scale_x,
double scale_y)
{
switch (interp_type)
{
case PIXOPS_INTERP_NEAREST:
g_assert_not_reached ();
break;
case PIXOPS_INTERP_TILES:
tile_make_weights (&filter->x, scale_x);
tile_make_weights (&filter->y, scale_y);
break;
case PIXOPS_INTERP_BILINEAR:
bilinear_magnify_make_weights (&filter->x, scale_x);
bilinear_magnify_make_weights (&filter->y, scale_y);
break;
case PIXOPS_INTERP_HYPER:
bilinear_box_make_weights (&filter->x, scale_x);
bilinear_box_make_weights (&filter->y, scale_y);
break;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'pixops: Fail make_weights functions on OOM
The weights could grow very large under certain circumstances, in
particular in security-relevant conditions, including the testsuite.
By allowing the weight allocation to fail, this can be worked around.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=754387'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static gboolean fill_in_context(TGAContext *ctx, GError **err)
{
gboolean alpha;
guint w, h;
g_return_val_if_fail(ctx != NULL, FALSE);
ctx->run_length_encoded =
((ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_RLE_PSEUDOCOLOR)
|| (ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_RLE_TRUECOLOR)
|| (ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_RLE_GRAYSCALE));
if (ctx->hdr->has_cmap)
ctx->cmap_size = ((ctx->hdr->cmap_bpp + 7) >> 3) *
LE16(ctx->hdr->cmap_n_colors);
alpha = ((ctx->hdr->bpp == 16) ||
(ctx->hdr->bpp == 32) ||
(ctx->hdr->has_cmap && (ctx->hdr->cmap_bpp == 32)));
w = LE16(ctx->hdr->width);
h = LE16(ctx->hdr->height);
if (ctx->sfunc) {
gint wi = w;
gint hi = h;
(*ctx->sfunc) (&wi, &hi, ctx->udata);
if (wi == 0 || hi == 0)
return FALSE;
}
ctx->pbuf = get_contiguous_pixbuf (w, h, alpha);
if (!ctx->pbuf) {
g_set_error_literal(err, GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR, GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY,
_("Cannot allocate new pixbuf"));
return FALSE;
}
ctx->pbuf_bytes = ctx->pbuf->rowstride * ctx->pbuf->height;
if ((ctx->hdr->flags & TGA_ORIGIN_UPPER) || ctx->run_length_encoded)
ctx->pptr = ctx->pbuf->pixels;
else
ctx->pptr = ctx->pbuf->pixels + (ctx->pbuf->height - 1)*ctx->pbuf->rowstride;
if (ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_PSEUDOCOLOR)
ctx->rowstride = ctx->pbuf->width;
else if (ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_GRAYSCALE)
ctx->rowstride = (alpha ? ctx->pbuf->width * 2 : ctx->pbuf->width);
else if (ctx->hdr->type == TGA_TYPE_TRUECOLOR)
ctx->rowstride = ctx->pbuf->rowstride;
ctx->completed_lines = 0;
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'io-tga: Colormaps are always present, so always parse them.
We might end up with a colormap with 0 entries, but whatever, it's a
colormap.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t iblock, unsigned int max_blocks,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, int flags,
unsigned int allocated, struct buffer_head *bh_result,
ext4_fsblk_t newblock)
{
int ret = 0;
int err = 0;
ext4_io_end_t *io = EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u, flags %d, allocated %u",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)iblock, max_blocks,
flags, allocated);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
/* get_block() before submit the IO, split the extent */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) {
ret = ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle,
inode, path, iblock,
max_blocks, flags);
/*
* Flag the inode(non aio case) or end_io struct (aio case)
* that this IO needs to convertion to written when IO is
* completed
*/
if (io)
io->flag = EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN;
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
goto out;
}
/* IO end_io complete, convert the filled extent to written */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) {
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle, inode,
path);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
goto out2;
}
/* buffered IO case */
/*
* repeat fallocate creation request
* we already have an unwritten extent
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT)
goto map_out;
/* buffered READ or buffered write_begin() lookup */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* We have blocks reserved already. We
* return allocated blocks so that delalloc
* won't do block reservation for us. But
* the buffer head will be unmapped so that
* a read from the block returns 0s.
*/
set_buffer_unwritten(bh_result);
goto out1;
}
/* buffered write, writepage time, convert*/
ret = ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle, inode,
path, iblock,
max_blocks);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
out:
if (ret <= 0) {
err = ret;
goto out2;
} else
allocated = ret;
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/*
* if we allocated more blocks than requested
* we need to make sure we unmap the extra block
* allocated. The actual needed block will get
* unmapped later when we find the buffer_head marked
* new.
*/
if (allocated > max_blocks) {
unmap_underlying_metadata_blocks(inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
newblock + max_blocks,
allocated - max_blocks);
allocated = max_blocks;
}
/*
* If we have done fallocate with the offset that is already
* delayed allocated, we would have block reservation
* and quota reservation done in the delayed write path.
* But fallocate would have already updated quota and block
* count for this offset. So cancel these reservation
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated, 0);
map_out:
set_buffer_mapped(bh_result);
out1:
if (allocated > max_blocks)
allocated = max_blocks;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
bh_result->b_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
bh_result->b_blocknr = newblock;
out2:
if (path) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
return err ? err : allocated;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static ext4_io_end_t *ext4_init_io_end (struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = NULL;
io = kmalloc(sizeof(*io), GFP_NOFS);
if (io) {
igrab(inode);
io->inode = inode;
io->flag = 0;
io->offset = 0;
io->size = 0;
io->error = 0;
INIT_WORK(&io->work, ext4_end_io_work);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&io->list);
}
return io;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void lxc_execute_bind_init(struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int ret;
char path[PATH_MAX], destpath[PATH_MAX], *p;
/* If init exists in the container, don't bind mount a static one */
p = choose_init(conf->rootfs.mount);
if (p) {
free(p);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, SBINDIR "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long searching for lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(path)) {
INFO("%s does not exist on host", path);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(destpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", conf->rootfs.mount, "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long for container's lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(destpath)) {
FILE * pathfile = fopen(destpath, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create mount target '%s'", destpath);
return;
}
fclose(pathfile);
}
ret = mount(path, destpath, "none", MS_BIND, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
SYSERROR("Failed to bind lxc.init.static into container");
INFO("lxc.init.static bound into container at %s", path);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-59', 'CWE-61'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int usbvision_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *devid)
{
struct usb_device *dev = usb_get_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
struct usb_interface *uif;
__u8 ifnum = intf->altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
const struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_usbvision *usbvision = NULL;
const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
int model, i, ret;
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "VID=%#04x, PID=%#04x, ifnum=%u",
dev->descriptor.idVendor,
dev->descriptor.idProduct, ifnum);
model = devid->driver_info;
if (model < 0 || model >= usbvision_device_data_size) {
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "model out of bounds %d", model);
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_usb;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s found\n", __func__,
usbvision_device_data[model].model_string);
/*
* this is a security check.
* an exploit using an incorrect bInterfaceNumber is known
*/
if (ifnum >= USB_MAXINTERFACES || !dev->actconfig->interface[ifnum])
return -ENODEV;
if (usbvision_device_data[model].interface >= 0)
interface = &dev->actconfig->interface[usbvision_device_data[model].interface]->altsetting[0];
else
interface = &dev->actconfig->interface[ifnum]->altsetting[0];
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[1].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(endpoint)) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "%s: interface %d. has non-ISO endpoint!\n",
__func__, ifnum);
dev_err(&intf->dev, "%s: Endpoint attributes %d",
__func__, endpoint->bmAttributes);
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_usb;
}
if (usb_endpoint_dir_out(endpoint)) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "%s: interface %d. has ISO OUT endpoint!\n",
__func__, ifnum);
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_usb;
}
usbvision = usbvision_alloc(dev, intf);
if (usbvision == NULL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "%s: couldn't allocate USBVision struct\n", __func__);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_usb;
}
if (dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations > 1)
usbvision->bridge_type = BRIDGE_NT1004;
else if (model == DAZZLE_DVC_90_REV_1_SECAM)
usbvision->bridge_type = BRIDGE_NT1005;
else
usbvision->bridge_type = BRIDGE_NT1003;
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "bridge_type %d", usbvision->bridge_type);
/* compute alternate max packet sizes */
uif = dev->actconfig->interface[0];
usbvision->num_alt = uif->num_altsetting;
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "Alternate settings: %i", usbvision->num_alt);
usbvision->alt_max_pkt_size = kmalloc(32 * usbvision->num_alt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (usbvision->alt_max_pkt_size == NULL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "usbvision: out of memory!\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_pkt;
}
for (i = 0; i < usbvision->num_alt; i++) {
u16 tmp = le16_to_cpu(uif->altsetting[i].endpoint[1].desc.
wMaxPacketSize);
usbvision->alt_max_pkt_size[i] =
(tmp & 0x07ff) * (((tmp & 0x1800) >> 11) + 1);
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "Alternate setting %i, max size= %i", i,
usbvision->alt_max_pkt_size[i]);
}
usbvision->nr = usbvision_nr++;
spin_lock_init(&usbvision->queue_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&usbvision->wait_frame);
init_waitqueue_head(&usbvision->wait_stream);
usbvision->have_tuner = usbvision_device_data[model].tuner;
if (usbvision->have_tuner)
usbvision->tuner_type = usbvision_device_data[model].tuner_type;
usbvision->dev_model = model;
usbvision->remove_pending = 0;
usbvision->iface = ifnum;
usbvision->iface_alt = 0;
usbvision->video_endp = endpoint->bEndpointAddress;
usbvision->isoc_packet_size = 0;
usbvision->usb_bandwidth = 0;
usbvision->user = 0;
usbvision->streaming = stream_off;
usbvision_configure_video(usbvision);
usbvision_register_video(usbvision);
usbvision_create_sysfs(&usbvision->vdev);
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "success");
return 0;
err_pkt:
usbvision_release(usbvision);
err_usb:
usb_put_dev(dev);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-17'], 'message': '[media] usbvision: fix crash on detecting device with invalid configuration
The usbvision driver crashes when a specially crafted usb device with invalid
number of interfaces or endpoints is detected. This fix adds checks that the
device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: crypto_recv(
struct peer *peer, /* peer structure pointer */
struct recvbuf *rbufp /* packet buffer pointer */
)
{
const EVP_MD *dp; /* message digest algorithm */
u_int32 *pkt; /* receive packet pointer */
struct autokey *ap, *bp; /* autokey pointer */
struct exten *ep, *fp; /* extension pointers */
struct cert_info *xinfo; /* certificate info pointer */
int has_mac; /* length of MAC field */
int authlen; /* offset of MAC field */
associd_t associd; /* association ID */
tstamp_t fstamp = 0; /* filestamp */
u_int len; /* extension field length */
u_int code; /* extension field opcode */
u_int vallen = 0; /* value length */
X509 *cert; /* X509 certificate */
char statstr[NTP_MAXSTRLEN]; /* statistics for filegen */
keyid_t cookie; /* crumbles */
int hismode; /* packet mode */
int rval = XEVNT_OK;
const u_char *puch;
u_int32 temp32;
/*
* Initialize. Note that the packet has already been checked for
* valid format and extension field lengths. First extract the
* field length, command code and association ID in host byte
* order. These are used with all commands and modes. Then check
* the version number, which must be 2, and length, which must
* be at least 8 for requests and VALUE_LEN (24) for responses.
* Packets that fail either test sink without a trace. The
* association ID is saved only if nonzero.
*/
authlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
hismode = (int)PKT_MODE((&rbufp->recv_pkt)->li_vn_mode);
while ((has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen) > (int)MAX_MAC_LEN) {
pkt = (u_int32 *)&rbufp->recv_pkt + authlen / 4;
ep = (struct exten *)pkt;
code = ntohl(ep->opcode) & 0xffff0000;
len = ntohl(ep->opcode) & 0x0000ffff;
// HMS: Why pkt[1] instead of ep->associd ?
associd = (associd_t)ntohl(pkt[1]);
rval = XEVNT_OK;
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: flags 0x%x ext offset %d len %u code 0x%x associd %d\n",
peer->crypto, authlen, len, code >> 16,
associd));
/*
* Check version number and field length. If bad,
* quietly ignore the packet.
*/
if (((code >> 24) & 0x3f) != CRYPTO_VN || len < 8) {
sys_badlength++;
code |= CRYPTO_ERROR;
}
if (len >= VALUE_LEN) {
fstamp = ntohl(ep->fstamp);
vallen = ntohl(ep->vallen);
/*
* Bug 2761: I hope this isn't too early...
*/
if ( vallen == 0
|| len - VALUE_LEN < vallen)
return XEVNT_LEN;
}
switch (code) {
/*
* Install status word, host name, signature scheme and
* association ID. In OpenSSL the signature algorithm is
* bound to the digest algorithm, so the NID completely
* defines the signature scheme. Note the request and
* response are identical, but neither is validated by
* signature. The request is processed here only in
* symmetric modes. The server name field might be
* useful to implement access controls in future.
*/
case CRYPTO_ASSOC:
/*
* If our state machine is running when this
* message arrives, the other fellow might have
* restarted. However, this could be an
* intruder, so just clamp the poll interval and
* find out for ourselves. Otherwise, pass the
* extension field to the transmit side.
*/
if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_CERT) {
rval = XEVNT_ERR;
break;
}
if (peer->cmmd) {
if (peer->assoc != associd) {
rval = XEVNT_ERR;
break;
}
}
fp = emalloc(len);
memcpy(fp, ep, len);
fp->associd = htonl(peer->associd);
peer->cmmd = fp;
/* fall through */
case CRYPTO_ASSOC | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if it has already been
* stored or the message has been amputated.
*/
if (peer->crypto) {
if (peer->assoc != associd)
rval = XEVNT_ERR;
break;
}
INSIST(len >= VALUE_LEN);
if (vallen == 0 || vallen > MAXHOSTNAME ||
len - VALUE_LEN < vallen) {
rval = XEVNT_LEN;
break;
}
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: ident host 0x%x %d server 0x%x %d\n",
crypto_flags, peer->associd, fstamp,
peer->assoc));
temp32 = crypto_flags & CRYPTO_FLAG_MASK;
/*
* If the client scheme is PC, the server scheme
* must be PC. The public key and identity are
* presumed valid, so we skip the certificate
* and identity exchanges and move immediately
* to the cookie exchange which confirms the
* server signature.
*/
if (crypto_flags & CRYPTO_FLAG_PRIV) {
if (!(fstamp & CRYPTO_FLAG_PRIV)) {
rval = XEVNT_KEY;
break;
}
fstamp |= CRYPTO_FLAG_CERT |
CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY | CRYPTO_FLAG_SIGN;
/*
* It is an error if either peer supports
* identity, but the other does not.
*/
} else if (hismode == MODE_ACTIVE || hismode ==
MODE_PASSIVE) {
if ((temp32 && !(fstamp &
CRYPTO_FLAG_MASK)) ||
(!temp32 && (fstamp &
CRYPTO_FLAG_MASK))) {
rval = XEVNT_KEY;
break;
}
}
/*
* Discard the message if the signature digest
* NID is not supported.
*/
temp32 = (fstamp >> 16) & 0xffff;
dp =
(const EVP_MD *)EVP_get_digestbynid(temp32);
if (dp == NULL) {
rval = XEVNT_MD;
break;
}
/*
* Save status word, host name and message
* digest/signature type. If this is from a
* broadcast and the association ID has changed,
* request the autokey values.
*/
peer->assoc = associd;
if (hismode == MODE_SERVER)
fstamp |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
if (!(fstamp & CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI))
fstamp |= CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP;
RAND_bytes((u_char *)&peer->hcookie, 4);
peer->crypto = fstamp;
peer->digest = dp;
if (peer->subject != NULL)
free(peer->subject);
peer->subject = emalloc(vallen + 1);
memcpy(peer->subject, ep->pkt, vallen);
peer->subject[vallen] = '\0';
if (peer->issuer != NULL)
free(peer->issuer);
peer->issuer = estrdup(peer->subject);
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"assoc %d %d host %s %s", peer->associd,
peer->assoc, peer->subject,
OBJ_nid2ln(temp32));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Decode X509 certificate in ASN.1 format and extract
* the data containing, among other things, subject
* name and public key. In the default identification
* scheme, the certificate trail is followed to a self
* signed trusted certificate.
*/
case CRYPTO_CERT | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if empty or invalid.
*/
if (len < VALUE_LEN)
break;
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer)) !=
XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* Scan the certificate list to delete old
* versions and link the newest version first on
* the list. Then, verify the signature. If the
* certificate is bad or missing, just ignore
* it.
*/
if ((xinfo = cert_install(ep, peer)) == NULL) {
rval = XEVNT_CRT;
break;
}
if ((rval = cert_hike(peer, xinfo)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* We plug in the public key and lifetime from
* the first certificate received. However, note
* that this certificate might not be signed by
* the server, so we can't check the
* signature/digest NID.
*/
if (peer->pkey == NULL) {
puch = xinfo->cert.ptr;
cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &puch,
ntohl(xinfo->cert.vallen));
peer->pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
X509_free(cert);
}
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
temp32 = xinfo->nid;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"cert %s %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
xinfo->subject, xinfo->issuer, xinfo->flags,
OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Schnorr (IFF) identity scheme. This scheme is
* designed for use with shared secret server group keys
* and where the certificate may be generated by a third
* party. The client sends a challenge to the server,
* which performs a calculation and returns the result.
* A positive result is possible only if both client and
* server contain the same secret group key.
*/
case CRYPTO_IFF | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer)) !=
XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* If the challenge matches the response, the
* server public key, signature and identity are
* all verified at the same time. The server is
* declared trusted, so we skip further
* certificate exchanges and move immediately to
* the cookie exchange.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_iff(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr), "iff %s fs %u",
peer->issuer, ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) identity scheme. This scheme
* is designed for use with public certificates carrying
* the GQ public key in an extension field. The client
* sends a challenge to the server, which performs a
* calculation and returns the result. A positive result
* is possible only if both client and server contain
* the same group key and the server has the matching GQ
* private key.
*/
case CRYPTO_GQ | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer)) !=
XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* If the challenge matches the response, the
* server public key, signature and identity are
* all verified at the same time. The server is
* declared trusted, so we skip further
* certificate exchanges and move immediately to
* the cookie exchange.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_gq(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr), "gq %s fs %u",
peer->issuer, ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Mu-Varadharajan (MV) identity scheme. This scheme is
* designed for use with three levels of trust, trusted
* host, server and client. The trusted host key is
* opaque to servers and clients; the server keys are
* opaque to clients and each client key is different.
* Client keys can be revoked without requiring new key
* generations.
*/
case CRYPTO_MV | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer)) !=
XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* If the challenge matches the response, the
* server public key, signature and identity are
* all verified at the same time. The server is
* declared trusted, so we skip further
* certificate exchanges and move immediately to
* the cookie exchange.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_mv(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr), "mv %s fs %u",
peer->issuer, ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Cookie response in client and symmetric modes. If the
* cookie bit is set, the working cookie is the EXOR of
* the current and new values.
*/
case CRYPTO_COOK | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid or signature
* not verified with respect to the cookie
* values.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, &peer->cookval,
peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* Decrypt the cookie, hunting all the time for
* errors.
*/
if (vallen == (u_int)EVP_PKEY_size(host_pkey)) {
u_int32 *cookiebuf = malloc(
RSA_size(host_pkey->pkey.rsa));
if (!cookiebuf) {
rval = XEVNT_CKY;
break;
}
if (RSA_private_decrypt(vallen,
(u_char *)ep->pkt,
(u_char *)cookiebuf,
host_pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != 4) {
rval = XEVNT_CKY;
free(cookiebuf);
break;
} else {
cookie = ntohl(*cookiebuf);
free(cookiebuf);
}
} else {
rval = XEVNT_CKY;
break;
}
/*
* Install cookie values and light the cookie
* bit. If this is not broadcast client mode, we
* are done here.
*/
key_expire(peer);
if (hismode == MODE_ACTIVE || hismode ==
MODE_PASSIVE)
peer->pcookie = peer->hcookie ^ cookie;
else
peer->pcookie = cookie;
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_COOK;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"cook %x ts %u fs %u", peer->pcookie,
ntohl(ep->tstamp), ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Install autokey values in broadcast client and
* symmetric modes. We have to do this every time the
* sever/peer cookie changes or a new keylist is
* rolled. Ordinarily, this is automatic as this message
* is piggybacked on the first NTP packet sent upon
* either of these events. Note that a broadcast client
* or symmetric peer can receive this response without a
* matching request.
*/
case CRYPTO_AUTO | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid or signature
* not verified with respect to the receive
* autokey values.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, &peer->recval,
peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* Discard the message if a broadcast client and
* the association ID does not match. This might
* happen if a broacast server restarts the
* protocol. A protocol restart will occur at
* the next ASSOC message.
*/
if ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT) &&
peer->assoc != associd)
break;
/*
* Install autokey values and light the
* autokey bit. This is not hard.
*/
if (ep->tstamp == 0)
break;
if (peer->recval.ptr == NULL)
peer->recval.ptr =
emalloc(sizeof(struct autokey));
bp = (struct autokey *)peer->recval.ptr;
peer->recval.tstamp = ep->tstamp;
peer->recval.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
ap = (struct autokey *)ep->pkt;
bp->seq = ntohl(ap->seq);
bp->key = ntohl(ap->key);
peer->pkeyid = bp->key;
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"auto seq %d key %x ts %u fs %u", bp->seq,
bp->key, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* X509 certificate sign response. Validate the
* certificate signed by the server and install. Later
* this can be provided to clients of this server in
* lieu of the self signed certificate in order to
* validate the public key.
*/
case CRYPTO_SIGN | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid.
*/
if ((rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer)) !=
XEVNT_OK)
break;
/*
* Scan the certificate list to delete old
* versions and link the newest version first on
* the list.
*/
if ((xinfo = cert_install(ep, peer)) == NULL) {
rval = XEVNT_CRT;
break;
}
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_SIGN;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
temp32 = xinfo->nid;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"sign %s %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
xinfo->subject, xinfo->issuer, xinfo->flags,
OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* Install leapseconds values. While the leapsecond
* values epoch, TAI offset and values expiration epoch
* are retained, only the current TAI offset is provided
* via the kernel to other applications.
*/
case CRYPTO_LEAP | CRYPTO_RESP:
/*
* Discard the message if invalid. We can't
* compare the value timestamps here, as they
* can be updated by different servers.
*/
rval = crypto_verify(ep, NULL, peer);
if ((rval != XEVNT_OK ) ||
(vallen != 3*sizeof(uint32_t)) )
break;
/* Check if we can update the basic TAI offset
* for our current leap frame. This is a hack
* and ignores the time stamps in the autokey
* message.
*/
if (sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
leapsec_autokey_tai(ntohl(ep->pkt[0]),
rbufp->recv_time.l_ui, NULL);
tai_leap.tstamp = ep->tstamp;
tai_leap.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
crypto_update();
mprintf_event(EVNT_TAI, peer,
"%d seconds", ntohl(ep->pkt[0]));
peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP;
peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"leap TAI offset %d at %u expire %u fs %u",
ntohl(ep->pkt[0]), ntohl(ep->pkt[1]),
ntohl(ep->pkt[2]), ntohl(ep->fstamp));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
break;
/*
* We come here in symmetric modes for miscellaneous
* commands that have value fields but are processed on
* the transmit side. All we need do here is check for
* valid field length. Note that ASSOC is handled
* separately.
*/
case CRYPTO_CERT:
case CRYPTO_IFF:
case CRYPTO_GQ:
case CRYPTO_MV:
case CRYPTO_COOK:
case CRYPTO_SIGN:
if (len < VALUE_LEN) {
rval = XEVNT_LEN;
break;
}
/* fall through */
/*
* We come here in symmetric modes for requests
* requiring a response (above plus AUTO and LEAP) and
* for responses. If a request, save the extension field
* for later; invalid requests will be caught on the
* transmit side. If an error or invalid response,
* declare a protocol error.
*/
default:
if (code & (CRYPTO_RESP | CRYPTO_ERROR)) {
rval = XEVNT_ERR;
} else if (peer->cmmd == NULL) {
fp = emalloc(len);
memcpy(fp, ep, len);
peer->cmmd = fp;
}
}
/*
* The first error found terminates the extension field
* scan and we return the laundry to the caller.
*/
if (rval != XEVNT_OK) {
snprintf(statstr, sizeof(statstr),
"%04x %d %02x %s", htonl(ep->opcode),
associd, rval, eventstr(rval));
record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr));
return (rval);
}
authlen += (len + 3) / 4 * 4;
}
return (rval);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'CVE-2014-9297'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: auth_delkeys(void)
{
symkey * sk;
ITER_DLIST_BEGIN(key_listhead, sk, llink, symkey)
if (sk->keyid > NTP_MAXKEY) { /* autokey */
continue;
}
/*
* Don't lose info as to which keys are trusted.
*/
if (KEY_TRUSTED & sk->flags) {
if (sk->secret != NULL) {
memset(sk->secret, '\0', sk->secretsize);
free(sk->secret);
}
sk->secretsize = 0;
sk->lifetime = 0;
} else {
freesymkey(sk, &key_hash[KEYHASH(sk->keyid)]);
}
ITER_DLIST_END()
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': '[TALOS-CAN-0054] memory corruption in password store'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
OM_uint32 code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_is_iakerb_token(input_token)) {
if (ctx->gssc != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
/* We shouldn't get an IAKERB token now. */
code = G_WRONG_TOKID;
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
code = iakerb_acceptor_step(ctx, initialContextToken,
input_token, output_token);
if (code == (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (initialContextToken) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
ctx = NULL;
}
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
major_status = krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext(&code,
&ctx->gssc,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = ctx->gssc;
ctx->gssc = NULL;
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
}
cleanup:
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
*minor_status = code;
return major_status;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-18'], 'message': 'Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
send_token_flag send_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, negState;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mechListMIC_in, mechListMIC_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering init_sec_context\n");
mechtok_in = mechListMIC_out = mechListMIC_in = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
negState = REJECT;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated or optimistic mech's gss_init_sec_context
* function and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* The three steps share responsibility for determining when the
* exchange is complete. If the selected mech completed in a previous
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 1 will decide. If
* the selected mech completes in this call and no MIC exchange is
* expected, then step 2 will decide. If a MIC exchange is expected,
* then step 3 will decide. If an error occurs in any step, the
* exchange will be aborted, possibly with an error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* send_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should be
* generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
/* Step 1: perform mechanism negotiation. */
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = init_ctx_new(minor_status, spcred,
context_handle, &send_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
ret = init_ctx_cont(minor_status, context_handle,
input_token, &mechtok_in,
&mechListMIC_in, &negState, &send_token);
if (HARD_ERROR(ret)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Step 2: invoke the selected or optimistic mechanism's
* gss_init_sec_context function, if it didn't complete previously. */
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
ret = init_ctx_call_init(
minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
target_name, req_flags,
time_req, mechtok_in,
actual_mech, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
&negState, &send_token);
/* Give the mechanism a chance to force a mechlistMIC. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && mech_requires_mechlistMIC(spnego_ctx))
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 1;
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && spnego_ctx->mech_complete &&
(spnego_ctx->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status,
mechListMIC_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
spnego_ctx, &mechListMIC_out,
&negState, &send_token);
}
cleanup:
if (send_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_ctx,
0,
mechListMIC_out,
req_flags,
&mechtok_out, send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
} else if (send_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mechListMIC_out,
send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/*
* Now, switch the output context to refer to the
* negotiated mechanism's context.
*/
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
&spnego_ctx->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_in);
free(mechListMIC_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_out);
free(mechListMIC_out);
}
return ret;
} /* init_sec_context */ ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xz_decomp(xz_statep state)
{
int ret;
unsigned had;
unsigned long crc, len;
lzma_stream *strm = &(state->strm);
lzma_action action = LZMA_RUN;
/* fill output buffer up to end of deflate stream */
had = strm->avail_out;
do {
/* get more input for inflate() */
if (strm->avail_in == 0 && xz_avail(state) == -1)
return -1;
if (strm->avail_in == 0) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "unexpected end of file");
return -1;
}
if (state->eof)
action = LZMA_FINISH;
/* decompress and handle errors */
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (state->how == GZIP) {
state->zstrm.avail_in = (uInt) state->strm.avail_in;
state->zstrm.next_in = (Bytef *) state->strm.next_in;
state->zstrm.avail_out = (uInt) state->strm.avail_out;
state->zstrm.next_out = (Bytef *) state->strm.next_out;
ret = inflate(&state->zstrm, Z_NO_FLUSH);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_ERROR || ret == Z_NEED_DICT) {
xz_error(state, Z_STREAM_ERROR,
"internal error: inflate stream corrupt");
return -1;
}
if (ret == Z_MEM_ERROR)
ret = LZMA_MEM_ERROR;
if (ret == Z_DATA_ERROR)
ret = LZMA_DATA_ERROR;
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
ret = LZMA_STREAM_END;
state->strm.avail_in = state->zstrm.avail_in;
state->strm.next_in = state->zstrm.next_in;
state->strm.avail_out = state->zstrm.avail_out;
state->strm.next_out = state->zstrm.next_out;
} else /* state->how == LZMA */
#endif
ret = lzma_code(strm, action);
if (ret == LZMA_MEM_ERROR) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_MEM_ERROR, "out of memory");
return -1;
}
if (ret == LZMA_DATA_ERROR) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "compressed data error");
return -1;
}
} while (strm->avail_out && ret != LZMA_STREAM_END);
/* update available output and crc check value */
state->have = had - strm->avail_out;
state->next = strm->next_out - state->have;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
state->zstrm.adler =
crc32(state->zstrm.adler, state->next, state->have);
#endif
if (ret == LZMA_STREAM_END) {
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (state->how == GZIP) {
if (gz_next4(state, &crc) == -1 || gz_next4(state, &len) == -1) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "unexpected end of file");
return -1;
}
if (crc != state->zstrm.adler) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect data check");
return -1;
}
if (len != (state->zstrm.total_out & 0xffffffffL)) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect length check");
return -1;
}
state->strm.avail_in = 0;
state->strm.next_in = NULL;
state->strm.avail_out = 0;
state->strm.next_out = NULL;
} else
#endif
if (strm->avail_in != 0 || !state->eof) {
xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "trailing garbage");
return -1;
}
state->how = LOOK; /* ready for next stream, once have is 0 (leave
* state->direct unchanged to remember how) */
}
/* good decompression */
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-8035 Fix XZ compression support loop
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=757466
DoS when parsing specially crafted XML document if XZ support
is compiled in (which wasn't the case for 2.9.2 and master since
Nov 2013, fixed in next commit !)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
uint8_t buf[4];
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = strnlen(str, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
if (descriptor == (smb_iconv_t)-1) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
/*
* this looks a little strange, but it is needed to cope with
* codepoints above 64k (U+1000) which are encoded as per RFC2781.
*/
olen = 2;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 2) {
olen = 4;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 4) {
/* we didn't convert any bytes */
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
olen = 4 - olen;
} else {
olen = 2 - olen;
}
*bytes_consumed = ilen_orig - ilen;
if (olen == 2) {
return (codepoint_t)SVAL(buf, 0);
}
if (olen == 4) {
/* decode a 4 byte UTF16 character manually */
return (codepoint_t)0x10000 +
(buf[2] | ((buf[3] & 0x3)<<8) |
(buf[0]<<10) | ((buf[1] & 0x3)<<18));
}
/* no other length is valid */
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-5330: Fix handling of unicode near string endings
Until now next_codepoint_ext() and next_codepoint_handle_ext() were
using strnlen(str, 5) to determine how much string they should try to
decode. This ended up looking past the end of the string when it was not
null terminated and the final character looked like a multi-byte encoding.
The fix is to let the caller say how long the string can be.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: png_handle_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_color palette[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
int num, i;
#ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
png_colorp pal_ptr;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_PLTE");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
/* Moved to before the 'after IDAT' check below because otherwise duplicate
* PLTE chunks are potentially ignored (the spec says there shall not be more
* than one PLTE, the error is not treated as benign, so this check trumps
* the requirement that PLTE appears before IDAT.)
*/
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE) != 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT) != 0)
{
/* This is benign because the non-benign error happened before, when an
* IDAT was encountered in a color-mapped image with no PLTE.
*/
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_PLTE;
if ((png_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "ignored in grayscale PNG");
return;
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_OPT_PLTE_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
#endif
if (length > 3*PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH || length % 3)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
if (png_ptr->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
else
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
/* The cast is safe because 'length' is less than 3*PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH */
num = (int)length / 3;
#ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
for (i = 0, pal_ptr = palette; i < num; i++, pal_ptr++)
{
png_byte buf[3];
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 3);
pal_ptr->red = buf[0];
pal_ptr->green = buf[1];
pal_ptr->blue = buf[2];
}
#else
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
png_byte buf[3];
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 3);
/* Don't depend upon png_color being any order */
palette[i].red = buf[0];
palette[i].green = buf[1];
palette[i].blue = buf[2];
}
#endif
/* If we actually need the PLTE chunk (ie for a paletted image), we do
* whatever the normal CRC configuration tells us. However, if we
* have an RGB image, the PLTE can be considered ancillary, so
* we will act as though it is.
*/
#ifndef PNG_READ_OPT_PLTE_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
#endif
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_OPT_PLTE_SUPPORTED
else if (png_crc_error(png_ptr) != 0) /* Only if we have a CRC error */
{
/* If we don't want to use the data from an ancillary chunk,
* we have two options: an error abort, or a warning and we
* ignore the data in this chunk (which should be OK, since
* it's considered ancillary for a RGB or RGBA image).
*
* IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: this is only here because png_crc_finish uses the
* chunk type to determine whether to check the ancillary or the critical
* flags.
*/
if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_CRC_ANCILLARY_USE) == 0)
{
if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_CRC_ANCILLARY_NOWARN) != 0)
return;
else
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "CRC error");
}
/* Otherwise, we (optionally) emit a warning and use the chunk. */
else if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_CRC_ANCILLARY_NOWARN) == 0)
png_chunk_warning(png_ptr, "CRC error");
}
#endif
/* TODO: png_set_PLTE has the side effect of setting png_ptr->palette to its
* own copy of the palette. This has the side effect that when png_start_row
* is called (this happens after any call to png_read_update_info) the
* info_ptr palette gets changed. This is extremely unexpected and
* confusing.
*
* Fix this by not sharing the palette in this way.
*
* Starting with libpng-1.6.19, png_set_PLTE() also issues a png_error() when
* it attempts to set a palette length that is too large for the bit depth.
*/
png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, num);
/* The three chunks, bKGD, hIST and tRNS *must* appear after PLTE and before
* IDAT. Prior to 1.6.0 this was not checked; instead the code merely
* checked the apparent validity of a tRNS chunk inserted before PLTE on a
* palette PNG. 1.6.0 attempts to rigorously follow the standard and
* therefore does a benign error if the erroneous condition is detected *and*
* cancels the tRNS if the benign error returns. The alternative is to
* amend the standard since it would be rather hypocritical of the standards
* maintainers to ignore it.
*/
#ifdef PNG_READ_tRNS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->num_trans > 0 ||
(info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_tRNS) != 0))
{
/* Cancel this because otherwise it would be used if the transforms
* require it. Don't cancel the 'valid' flag because this would prevent
* detection of duplicate chunks.
*/
png_ptr->num_trans = 0;
if (info_ptr != NULL)
info_ptr->num_trans = 0;
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "tRNS must be after");
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_hIST_SUPPORTED
if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_hIST) != 0)
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "hIST must be after");
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED
if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_bKGD) != 0)
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "bKGD must be after");
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': '[libpng16] Silently truncate over-length PLTE chunk while reading.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *encoding = NULL;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, 'e', 'n', 'c', 'o', 'd', 'i', 'n', 'g')) {
SKIP(8);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '=') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EQUAL_REQUIRED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
if (RAW != '"') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '\''){
NEXT;
encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
if (RAW != '\'') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
}
/*
* Non standard parsing, allowing the user to ignore encoding
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC) {
xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* UTF-16 encoding stwich has already taken place at this stage,
* more over the little-endian/big-endian selection is already done
*/
if ((encoding != NULL) &&
((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-16")) ||
(!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF16")))) {
/*
* If no encoding was passed to the parser, that we are
* using UTF-16 and no decoder is present i.e. the
* document is apparently UTF-8 compatible, then raise an
* encoding mismatch fatal error
*/
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->encoder == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_ENCODING,
"Document labelled UTF-16 but has UTF-8 content\n");
}
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
/*
* UTF-8 encoding is handled natively
*/
else if ((encoding != NULL) &&
((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-8")) ||
(!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF8")))) {
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
else if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr handler;
if (ctxt->input->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->encoding);
ctxt->input->encoding = encoding;
handler = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler((const char *) encoding);
if (handler != NULL) {
xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n", encoding);
return(NULL);
}
}
}
return(encoding);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Do not process encoding values if the declaration if broken
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=751603
If the string is not properly terminated do not try to convert
to the given encoding.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int btrfs_clone(struct inode *src, struct inode *inode,
const u64 off, const u64 olen, const u64 olen_aligned,
const u64 destoff, int no_time_update)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path = NULL;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
char *buf = NULL;
struct btrfs_key key;
u32 nritems;
int slot;
int ret;
int no_quota;
const u64 len = olen_aligned;
u64 last_disko = 0;
u64 last_dest_end = destoff;
ret = -ENOMEM;
buf = vmalloc(root->nodesize);
if (!buf)
return ret;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path) {
vfree(buf);
return ret;
}
path->reada = 2;
/* clone data */
key.objectid = btrfs_ino(src);
key.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
key.offset = off;
while (1) {
u64 next_key_min_offset = key.offset + 1;
/*
* note the key will change type as we walk through the
* tree.
*/
path->leave_spinning = 1;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, BTRFS_I(src)->root, &key, path,
0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/*
* First search, if no extent item that starts at offset off was
* found but the previous item is an extent item, it's possible
* it might overlap our target range, therefore process it.
*/
if (key.offset == off && ret > 0 && path->slots[0] > 0) {
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(path->nodes[0], &key,
path->slots[0] - 1);
if (key.type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
path->slots[0]--;
}
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(path->nodes[0]);
process_slot:
no_quota = 1;
if (path->slots[0] >= nritems) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(BTRFS_I(src)->root, path);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (ret > 0)
break;
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(path->nodes[0]);
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
if (key.type > BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY ||
key.objectid != btrfs_ino(src))
break;
if (key.type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *extent;
int type;
u32 size;
struct btrfs_key new_key;
u64 disko = 0, diskl = 0;
u64 datao = 0, datal = 0;
u8 comp;
u64 drop_start;
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot,
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
comp = btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, extent);
type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, extent);
if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG ||
type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
disko = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf,
extent);
diskl = btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf,
extent);
datao = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, extent);
datal = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf,
extent);
} else if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
/* take upper bound, may be compressed */
datal = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf,
extent);
}
/*
* The first search might have left us at an extent
* item that ends before our target range's start, can
* happen if we have holes and NO_HOLES feature enabled.
*/
if (key.offset + datal <= off) {
path->slots[0]++;
goto process_slot;
} else if (key.offset >= off + len) {
break;
}
next_key_min_offset = key.offset + datal;
size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
read_extent_buffer(leaf, buf,
btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot),
size);
btrfs_release_path(path);
path->leave_spinning = 0;
memcpy(&new_key, &key, sizeof(new_key));
new_key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
if (off <= key.offset)
new_key.offset = key.offset + destoff - off;
else
new_key.offset = destoff;
/*
* Deal with a hole that doesn't have an extent item
* that represents it (NO_HOLES feature enabled).
* This hole is either in the middle of the cloning
* range or at the beginning (fully overlaps it or
* partially overlaps it).
*/
if (new_key.offset != last_dest_end)
drop_start = last_dest_end;
else
drop_start = new_key.offset;
/*
* 1 - adjusting old extent (we may have to split it)
* 1 - add new extent
* 1 - inode update
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 3);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out;
}
if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG ||
type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
/*
* a | --- range to clone ---| b
* | ------------- extent ------------- |
*/
/* subtract range b */
if (key.offset + datal > off + len)
datal = off + len - key.offset;
/* subtract range a */
if (off > key.offset) {
datao += off - key.offset;
datal -= off - key.offset;
}
ret = btrfs_drop_extents(trans, root, inode,
drop_start,
new_key.offset + datal,
1);
if (ret) {
if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root, ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path,
&new_key, size);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root,
ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
write_extent_buffer(leaf, buf,
btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot),
size);
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot,
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
/* disko == 0 means it's a hole */
if (!disko)
datao = 0;
btrfs_set_file_extent_offset(leaf, extent,
datao);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent,
datal);
/*
* We need to look up the roots that point at
* this bytenr and see if the new root does. If
* it does not we need to make sure we update
* quotas appropriately.
*/
if (disko && root != BTRFS_I(src)->root &&
disko != last_disko) {
no_quota = check_ref(trans, root,
disko);
if (no_quota < 0) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root,
ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans,
root);
ret = no_quota;
goto out;
}
}
if (disko) {
inode_add_bytes(inode, datal);
ret = btrfs_inc_extent_ref(trans, root,
disko, diskl, 0,
root->root_key.objectid,
btrfs_ino(inode),
new_key.offset - datao,
no_quota);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root,
ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans,
root);
goto out;
}
}
} else if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
u64 skip = 0;
u64 trim = 0;
u64 aligned_end = 0;
/*
* Don't copy an inline extent into an offset
* greater than zero. Having an inline extent
* at such an offset results in chaos as btrfs
* isn't prepared for such cases. Just skip
* this case for the same reasons as commented
* at btrfs_ioctl_clone().
*/
if (last_dest_end > 0) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
if (off > key.offset) {
skip = off - key.offset;
new_key.offset += skip;
}
if (key.offset + datal > off + len)
trim = key.offset + datal - (off + len);
if (comp && (skip || trim)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
size -= skip + trim;
datal -= skip + trim;
aligned_end = ALIGN(new_key.offset + datal,
root->sectorsize);
ret = btrfs_drop_extents(trans, root, inode,
drop_start,
aligned_end,
1);
if (ret) {
if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root, ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path,
&new_key, size);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root,
ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
if (skip) {
u32 start =
btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(0);
memmove(buf+start, buf+start+skip,
datal);
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
write_extent_buffer(leaf, buf,
btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot),
size);
inode_add_bytes(inode, datal);
}
/* If we have an implicit hole (NO_HOLES feature). */
if (drop_start < new_key.offset)
clone_update_extent_map(inode, trans,
NULL, drop_start,
new_key.offset - drop_start);
clone_update_extent_map(inode, trans, path, 0, 0);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
btrfs_release_path(path);
last_dest_end = ALIGN(new_key.offset + datal,
root->sectorsize);
ret = clone_finish_inode_update(trans, inode,
last_dest_end,
destoff, olen,
no_time_update);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (new_key.offset + datal >= destoff + len)
break;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
key.offset = next_key_min_offset;
}
ret = 0;
if (last_dest_end < destoff + len) {
/*
* We have an implicit hole (NO_HOLES feature is enabled) that
* fully or partially overlaps our cloning range at its end.
*/
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* 1 - remove extent(s)
* 1 - inode update
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 2);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_drop_extents(trans, root, inode,
last_dest_end, destoff + len, 1);
if (ret) {
if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
goto out;
}
clone_update_extent_map(inode, trans, NULL, last_dest_end,
destoff + len - last_dest_end);
ret = clone_finish_inode_update(trans, inode, destoff + len,
destoff, olen, no_time_update);
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
vfree(buf);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning inline extents
Currently the clone ioctl allows to clone an inline extent from one file
to another that already has other (non-inlined) extents. This is a problem
because btrfs is not designed to deal with files having inline and regular
extents, if a file has an inline extent then it must be the only extent
in the file and must start at file offset 0. Having a file with an inline
extent followed by regular extents results in EIO errors when doing reads
or writes against the first 4K of the file.
Also, the clone ioctl allows one to lose data if the source file consists
of a single inline extent, with a size of N bytes, and the destination
file consists of a single inline extent with a size of M bytes, where we
have M > N. In this case the clone operation removes the inline extent
from the destination file and then copies the inline extent from the
source file into the destination file - we lose the M - N bytes from the
destination file, a read operation will get the value 0x00 for any bytes
in the the range [N, M] (the destination inode's i_size remained as M,
that's why we can read past N bytes).
So fix this by not allowing such destructive operations to happen and
return errno EOPNOTSUPP to user space.
Currently the fstest btrfs/035 tests the data loss case but it totally
ignores this - i.e. expects the operation to succeed and does not check
the we got data loss.
The following test case for fstests exercises all these cases that result
in file corruption and data loss:
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
_require_btrfs_fs_feature "no_holes"
_require_btrfs_mkfs_feature "no-holes"
rm -f $seqres.full
test_cloning_inline_extents()
{
local mkfs_opts=$1
local mount_opts=$2
_scratch_mkfs $mkfs_opts >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount $mount_opts
# File bar, the source for all the following clone operations, consists
# of a single inline extent (50 bytes).
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 50" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar \
| _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning into a file with an extent (non-inlined) where the
# destination offset overlaps that extent. It should not be possible to
# clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0xaa (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 0 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a hole in its
# first 4K followed by a non-inlined extent. It should not be possible
# as well to clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 4K 12K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo2 data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0x00 (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size of zero
# but has a prealloc extent. It should not be possible as well to clone
# the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "First 50 bytes of foo3 after clone operation:"
# Should not be able to read any bytes, file has 0 bytes i_size (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size not greater than the size of
# bar's inline extent (40 < 50).
# It should be possible to do the extent cloning from bar to this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x01 0 40" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
echo "File foo4 data after clone operation:"
# Must match file bar's content.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0x02 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size greater than the size of bar's
# inline extent (60 > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x03 0 60" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo5 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 60 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x03
# (the clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size greater than bar's inline extent (16K > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo6 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 16K, with all bytes having a value of 0x00 (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size not greater than bar's inline extent (30 < 50).
# It should be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar into
# this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 30" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo7 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 50 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0xbb.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size not
# greater than the size of bar's inline extent (20 < 50) but has
# a prealloc extent that goes beyond the file's size. It should not be
# possible to clone the inline extent from bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x88 0 20" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
echo "File foo8 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 20 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x88
# (the clone operation did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
_scratch_unmount
}
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "" "-o compress"
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" ""
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "-o compress"
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static bool decode_openldap_dereference(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control *control;
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result **r = NULL;
int i = 0;
if (!data) return false;
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
while (asn1_tag_remaining(data) > 0) {
r = talloc_realloc(control, r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result *, i + 2);
if (!r) {
return false;
}
r[i] = talloc_zero(r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result);
if (!r[i]) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->source_attribute);
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->dereferenced_dn);
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
ldap_decode_attribs_bare(r, data, &r[i]->attributes,
&r[i]->num_attributes);
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
i++;
r[i] = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
control->attributes = r;
*out = control;
return true;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-7540: s4: libcli: ldap message - Ensure all asn1_XX returns are checked.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 26 03:15:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
(cherry picked from commit 69a7e3cfdc8dbba9c8dcfdfae82d2894c7247e15)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: bool asn1_check_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool v)
{
uint8_t b = 0;
asn1_read_uint8(data, &b);
if (b != ASN1_BOOLEAN) {
data->has_error = true;
return false;
}
asn1_read_uint8(data, &b);
if (b != v) {
data->has_error = true;
return false;
}
return !data->has_error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-7540: lib: util: Check *every* asn1 return call and early return.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <Volker.Lendecke@SerNet.DE>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 19 01:29:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
(cherry picked from commit b9d3fd4cc551df78a7b066ee8ce43bbaa3ff994a)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-7540: lib: util: Check *every* asn1 return call and early return.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <Volker.Lendecke@SerNet.DE>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 19 01:29:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
(cherry picked from commit b9d3fd4cc551df78a7b066ee8ce43bbaa3ff994a)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: NTSTATUS smb2cli_session_encryption_on(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
if (session->smb2->should_encrypt) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (session->conn->protocol < PROTOCOL_SMB2_24) {
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (session->conn->smb2.server.cipher == 0) {
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (session->smb2->signing_key.data == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
session->smb2->should_encrypt = true;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-5296: libcli/smb: make sure we require signing when we demand encryption on a session
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
int error = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
if (add_chan(po))
error = -EBUSY;
release_sock(sk);
return error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int client_run(int f_in, int f_out, pid_t pid, int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct file_list *flist = NULL;
int exit_code = 0, exit_code2 = 0;
char *local_name = NULL;
cleanup_child_pid = pid;
if (!read_batch) {
set_nonblocking(f_in);
set_nonblocking(f_out);
}
io_set_sock_fds(f_in, f_out);
setup_protocol(f_out,f_in);
/* We set our stderr file handle to blocking because ssh might have
* set it to non-blocking. This can be particularly troublesome if
* stderr is a clone of stdout, because ssh would have set our stdout
* to non-blocking at the same time (which can easily cause us to lose
* output from our print statements). This kluge shouldn't cause ssh
* any problems for how we use it. Note also that we delayed setting
* this until after the above protocol setup so that we know for sure
* that ssh is done twiddling its file descriptors. */
set_blocking(STDERR_FILENO);
if (am_sender) {
keep_dirlinks = 0; /* Must be disabled on the sender. */
if (always_checksum
&& (log_format_has(stdout_format, 'C')
|| log_format_has(logfile_format, 'C')))
sender_keeps_checksum = 1;
if (protocol_version >= 30)
io_start_multiplex_out(f_out);
else
io_start_buffering_out(f_out);
if (protocol_version >= 31 || (!filesfrom_host && protocol_version >= 23))
io_start_multiplex_in(f_in);
else
io_start_buffering_in(f_in);
send_filter_list(f_out);
if (filesfrom_host)
filesfrom_fd = f_in;
if (write_batch && !am_server)
start_write_batch(f_out);
flist = send_file_list(f_out, argc, argv);
if (DEBUG_GTE(FLIST, 3))
rprintf(FINFO,"file list sent\n");
if (protocol_version < 31 && filesfrom_host && protocol_version >= 23)
io_start_multiplex_in(f_in);
io_flush(NORMAL_FLUSH);
send_files(f_in, f_out);
io_flush(FULL_FLUSH);
handle_stats(-1);
if (protocol_version >= 24)
read_final_goodbye(f_in, f_out);
if (pid != -1) {
if (DEBUG_GTE(EXIT, 2))
rprintf(FINFO,"client_run waiting on %d\n", (int) pid);
io_flush(FULL_FLUSH);
wait_process_with_flush(pid, &exit_code);
}
output_summary();
io_flush(FULL_FLUSH);
exit_cleanup(exit_code);
}
if (!read_batch) {
if (protocol_version >= 23)
io_start_multiplex_in(f_in);
if (need_messages_from_generator)
io_start_multiplex_out(f_out);
else
io_start_buffering_out(f_out);
}
send_filter_list(read_batch ? -1 : f_out);
if (filesfrom_fd >= 0) {
start_filesfrom_forwarding(filesfrom_fd);
filesfrom_fd = -1;
}
if (write_batch && !am_server)
start_write_batch(f_in);
flist = recv_file_list(f_in);
if (inc_recurse && file_total == 1)
recv_additional_file_list(f_in);
if (flist && flist->used > 0) {
local_name = get_local_name(flist, argv[0]);
check_alt_basis_dirs();
exit_code2 = do_recv(f_in, f_out, local_name);
} else {
handle_stats(-1);
output_summary();
}
if (pid != -1) {
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO,"client_run2 waiting on %d\n", (int) pid);
io_flush(FULL_FLUSH);
wait_process_with_flush(pid, &exit_code);
}
return MAX(exit_code, exit_code2);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-59'], 'message': 'Complain if an inc-recursive path is not right for its dir.
This ensures that a malicious sender can't use a just-sent
symlink as a trasnfer path.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_ports < 2)
return -1;
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'USB: serial: visor: fix crash on detecting device without write_urbs
The visor driver crashes in clie_5_attach() when a specially crafted USB
device without bulk-out endpoint is detected. This fix adds a check that
the device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Fixes: cfb8da8f69b8 ("USB: visor: fix initialisation of UX50/TH55 devices")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: authusekey(
keyid_t keyno,
int keytype,
const u_char *str
)
{
size_t len;
len = strlen((const char *)str);
if (0 == len)
return 0;
MD5auth_setkey(keyno, keytype, str, len);
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-287'], 'message': '[Sec 2936] Skeleton Key: Any trusted key system can serve time. HStenn.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: save_config(
struct recvbuf *rbufp,
int restrict_mask
)
{
#ifdef SAVECONFIG
static const char savedconfig_eq[] = "savedconfig=";
char filespec[128];
char filename[128];
char fullpath[512];
char savedconfig[sizeof(savedconfig_eq) + sizeof(filename)];
time_t now;
int fd;
FILE *fptr;
int prc;
size_t reqlen;
#endif
if (RES_NOMODIFY & restrict_mask) {
ctl_printf("%s", "saveconfig prohibited by restrict ... nomodify");
ctl_flushpkt(0);
NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO)
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"saveconfig from %s rejected due to nomodify restriction",
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
sys_restricted++;
return;
}
#ifdef SAVECONFIG
if (NULL == saveconfigdir) {
ctl_printf("%s", "saveconfig prohibited, no saveconfigdir configured");
ctl_flushpkt(0);
NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO)
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"saveconfig from %s rejected, no saveconfigdir",
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
return;
}
/* The length checking stuff gets serious. Do not assume a NUL
* byte can be found, but if so, use it to calculate the needed
* buffer size. If the available buffer is too short, bail out;
* likewise if there is no file spec. (The latter will not
* happen when using NTPQ, but there are other ways to craft a
* network packet!)
*/
reqlen = (size_t)(reqend - reqpt);
if (0 != reqlen) {
char * nulpos = (char*)memchr(reqpt, 0, reqlen);
if (NULL != nulpos)
reqlen = (size_t)(nulpos - reqpt);
}
if (0 == reqlen)
return;
if (reqlen >= sizeof(filespec)) {
ctl_printf("saveconfig exceeded maximum raw name length (%u)",
(u_int)sizeof(filespec));
ctl_flushpkt(0);
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"saveconfig exceeded maximum raw name length from %s",
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
return;
}
/* copy data directly as we exactly know the size */
memcpy(filespec, reqpt, reqlen);
filespec[reqlen] = '\0';
/*
* allow timestamping of the saved config filename with
* strftime() format such as:
* ntpq -c "saveconfig ntp-%Y%m%d-%H%M%S.conf"
* XXX: Nice feature, but not too safe.
* YYY: The check for permitted characters in file names should
* weed out the worst. Let's hope 'strftime()' does not
* develop pathological problems.
*/
time(&now);
if (0 == strftime(filename, sizeof(filename), filespec,
localtime(&now)))
{
/*
* If we arrive here, 'strftime()' balked; most likely
* the buffer was too short. (Or it encounterd an empty
* format, or just a format that expands to an empty
* string.) We try to use the original name, though this
* is very likely to fail later if there are format
* specs in the string. Note that truncation cannot
* happen here as long as both buffers have the same
* size!
*/
strlcpy(filename, filespec, sizeof(filename));
}
/*
* Check the file name for sanity. This migth/will rule out file
* names that would be legal but problematic, and it blocks
* directory traversal.
*/
if (!is_safe_filename(filename)) {
ctl_printf("saveconfig rejects unsafe file name '%s'",
filename);
ctl_flushpkt(0);
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"saveconfig rejects unsafe file name from %s",
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
return;
}
/* concatenation of directory and path can cause another
* truncation...
*/
prc = snprintf(fullpath, sizeof(fullpath), "%s%s",
saveconfigdir, filename);
if (prc < 0 || prc >= sizeof(fullpath)) {
ctl_printf("saveconfig exceeded maximum path length (%u)",
(u_int)sizeof(fullpath));
ctl_flushpkt(0);
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"saveconfig exceeded maximum path length from %s",
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
return;
}
fd = open(fullpath, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (-1 == fd)
fptr = NULL;
else
fptr = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (NULL == fptr || -1 == dump_all_config_trees(fptr, 1)) {
ctl_printf("Unable to save configuration to file '%s'",
filename);
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"saveconfig %s from %s failed", filename,
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
} else {
ctl_printf("Configuration saved to '%s'", filename);
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"Configuration saved to '%s' (requested by %s)",
fullpath, stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
/*
* save the output filename in system variable
* savedconfig, retrieved with:
* ntpq -c "rv 0 savedconfig"
* Note: the way 'savedconfig' is defined makes overflow
* checks unnecessary here.
*/
snprintf(savedconfig, sizeof(savedconfig), "%s%s",
savedconfig_eq, filename);
set_sys_var(savedconfig, strlen(savedconfig) + 1, RO);
}
if (NULL != fptr)
fclose(fptr);
#else /* !SAVECONFIG follows */
ctl_printf("%s",
"saveconfig unavailable, configured with --disable-saveconfig");
#endif
ctl_flushpkt(0);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-254'], 'message': '[Bug 2938] ntpq saveconfig command allows dangerous characters in filenames.
- make sure the file does not exist (no overwrite allowed)
- ensure text mode where applicable (windows)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: get_clock_info(
sockaddr_u *srcadr,
endpt *inter,
struct req_pkt *inpkt
)
{
register struct info_clock *ic;
register u_int32 *clkaddr;
register int items;
struct refclockstat clock_stat;
sockaddr_u addr;
l_fp ltmp;
ZERO_SOCK(&addr);
AF(&addr) = AF_INET;
#ifdef ISC_PLATFORM_HAVESALEN
addr.sa.sa_len = SOCKLEN(&addr);
#endif
SET_PORT(&addr, NTP_PORT);
items = INFO_NITEMS(inpkt->err_nitems);
clkaddr = &inpkt->u.u32[0];
ic = (struct info_clock *)prepare_pkt(srcadr, inter, inpkt,
sizeof(struct info_clock));
while (items-- > 0) {
NSRCADR(&addr) = *clkaddr++;
if (!ISREFCLOCKADR(&addr) || NULL ==
findexistingpeer(&addr, NULL, NULL, -1, 0)) {
req_ack(srcadr, inter, inpkt, INFO_ERR_NODATA);
return;
}
clock_stat.kv_list = (struct ctl_var *)0;
refclock_control(&addr, NULL, &clock_stat);
ic->clockadr = NSRCADR(&addr);
ic->type = clock_stat.type;
ic->flags = clock_stat.flags;
ic->lastevent = clock_stat.lastevent;
ic->currentstatus = clock_stat.currentstatus;
ic->polls = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.polls);
ic->noresponse = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.noresponse);
ic->badformat = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.badformat);
ic->baddata = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.baddata);
ic->timestarted = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.timereset);
DTOLFP(clock_stat.fudgetime1, <mp);
HTONL_FP(<mp, &ic->fudgetime1);
DTOLFP(clock_stat.fudgetime2, <mp);
HTONL_FP(<mp, &ic->fudgetime2);
ic->fudgeval1 = htonl((u_int32)clock_stat.fudgeval1);
ic->fudgeval2 = htonl(clock_stat.fudgeval2);
free_varlist(clock_stat.kv_list);
ic = (struct info_clock *)more_pkt();
}
flush_pkt();
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': '[Bug 2939] reslist NULL pointer dereference
[Bug 2940] Stack exhaustion in recursive traversal of restriction list
-- these two where fixed together --'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: yytnamerr (char *yyres, const char *yystr)
{
if (*yystr == '"')
{
YYSIZE_T yyn = 0;
char const *yyp = yystr;
for (;;)
switch (*++yyp)
{
case '\'':
case ',':
goto do_not_strip_quotes;
case '\\':
if (*++yyp != '\\')
goto do_not_strip_quotes;
/* Fall through. */
default:
if (yyres)
yyres[yyn] = *yyp;
yyn++;
break;
case '"':
if (yyres)
yyres[yyn] = '\0';
return yyn;
}
do_not_strip_quotes: ;
}
if (! yyres)
return yystrlen (yystr);
return yystpcpy (yyres, yystr) - yyres;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-19'], 'message': '[Sec 2942]: Off-path DoS attack on auth broadcast mode. HStenn.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: list_dbs(MYSQL *mysql,const char *wild)
{
const char *header;
uint length, counter = 0;
ulong rowcount = 0L;
char tables[NAME_LEN+1], rows[NAME_LEN+1];
char query[255];
MYSQL_FIELD *field;
MYSQL_RES *result;
MYSQL_ROW row= NULL, rrow;
if (!(result=mysql_list_dbs(mysql,wild)))
{
fprintf(stderr,"%s: Cannot list databases: %s\n",my_progname,
mysql_error(mysql));
return 1;
}
/*
If a wildcard was used, but there was only one row and it's name is an
exact match, we'll assume they really wanted to see the contents of that
database. This is because it is fairly common for database names to
contain the underscore (_), like INFORMATION_SCHEMA.
*/
if (wild && mysql_num_rows(result) == 1)
{
row= mysql_fetch_row(result);
if (!my_strcasecmp(&my_charset_latin1, row[0], wild))
{
mysql_free_result(result);
if (opt_status)
return list_table_status(mysql, wild, NULL);
else
return list_tables(mysql, wild, NULL);
}
}
if (wild)
printf("Wildcard: %s\n",wild);
header="Databases";
length=(uint) strlen(header);
field=mysql_fetch_field(result);
if (length < field->max_length)
length=field->max_length;
if (!opt_verbose)
print_header(header,length,NullS);
else if (opt_verbose == 1)
print_header(header,length,"Tables",6,NullS);
else
print_header(header,length,"Tables",6,"Total Rows",12,NullS);
/* The first row may have already been read up above. */
while (row || (row= mysql_fetch_row(result)))
{
counter++;
if (opt_verbose)
{
if (!(mysql_select_db(mysql,row[0])))
{
MYSQL_RES *tresult = mysql_list_tables(mysql,(char*)NULL);
if (mysql_affected_rows(mysql) > 0)
{
sprintf(tables,"%6lu",(ulong) mysql_affected_rows(mysql));
rowcount = 0;
if (opt_verbose > 1)
{
/* Print the count of tables and rows for each database */
MYSQL_ROW trow;
while ((trow = mysql_fetch_row(tresult)))
{
sprintf(query,"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM `%s`",trow[0]);
if (!(mysql_query(mysql,query)))
{
MYSQL_RES *rresult;
if ((rresult = mysql_store_result(mysql)))
{
rrow = mysql_fetch_row(rresult);
rowcount += (ulong) strtoull(rrow[0], (char**) 0, 10);
mysql_free_result(rresult);
}
}
}
sprintf(rows,"%12lu",rowcount);
}
}
else
{
sprintf(tables,"%6d",0);
sprintf(rows,"%12d",0);
}
mysql_free_result(tresult);
}
else
{
strmov(tables,"N/A");
strmov(rows,"N/A");
}
}
if (!opt_verbose)
print_row(row[0],length,0);
else if (opt_verbose == 1)
print_row(row[0],length,tables,6,NullS);
else
print_row(row[0],length,tables,6,rows,12,NullS);
row= NULL;
}
print_trailer(length,
(opt_verbose > 0 ? 6 : 0),
(opt_verbose > 1 ? 12 :0),
0);
if (counter && opt_verbose)
printf("%u row%s in set.\n",counter,(counter > 1) ? "s" : "");
mysql_free_result(result);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'Bug#21973610: BUFFER OVERFLOW ISSUES
Description : Incorrect usage of sprintf/strcpy caused
possible buffer overflow issues at various
places.
Solution : - Fixed mysql_plugin and mysqlshow
- Fixed regex library issues
Reviewed-By : Georgi Kodinov <georgi.kodinov@oracle.com>
Reviewed-By : Venkata S Murthy Sidagam <venkata.sidagam@oracle.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int CertManager::Validate()
{
CertList::reverse_iterator last = peerList_.rbegin();
size_t count = peerList_.size();
while ( count > 1 ) {
TaoCrypt::Source source((*last)->get_buffer(), (*last)->get_length());
TaoCrypt::CertDecoder cert(source, true, &signers_, verifyNone_);
if (int err = cert.GetError().What())
return err;
const TaoCrypt::PublicKey& key = cert.GetPublicKey();
signers_.push_back(NEW_YS TaoCrypt::Signer(key.GetKey(), key.size(),
cert.GetCommonName(), cert.GetHash()));
++last;
--count;
}
if (count) {
// peer's is at the front
TaoCrypt::Source source((*last)->get_buffer(), (*last)->get_length());
TaoCrypt::CertDecoder cert(source, true, &signers_, verifyNone_);
int err = cert.GetError().What();
if ( err && err != TaoCrypt::SIG_OTHER_E)
return err;
uint sz = cert.GetPublicKey().size();
peerPublicKey_.allocate(sz);
peerPublicKey_.assign(cert.GetPublicKey().GetKey(), sz);
if (cert.GetKeyType() == TaoCrypt::RSAk)
peerKeyType_ = rsa_sa_algo;
else
peerKeyType_ = dsa_sa_algo;
size_t iSz = strlen(cert.GetIssuer()) + 1;
size_t sSz = strlen(cert.GetCommonName()) + 1;
int bSz = (int)strlen(cert.GetBeforeDate()) + 1;
int aSz = (int)strlen(cert.GetAfterDate()) + 1;
peerX509_ = NEW_YS X509(cert.GetIssuer(), iSz, cert.GetCommonName(),
sSz, cert.GetBeforeDate(), bSz,
cert.GetAfterDate(), aSz);
if (err == TaoCrypt::SIG_OTHER_E && verifyCallback_) {
X509_STORE_CTX store;
store.error = err;
store.error_depth = static_cast<int>(count) - 1;
store.current_cert = peerX509_;
int ok = verifyCallback_(0, &store);
if (ok) return 0;
}
if (err == TaoCrypt::SIG_OTHER_E) return err;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-254'], 'message': 'Bug #22738607: YASSL FUNCTION X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID IS NOT WORKING AS EXPECTED.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int jas_image_writecmpt(jas_image_t *image, int cmptno, jas_image_coord_t x, jas_image_coord_t y, jas_image_coord_t width,
jas_image_coord_t height, jas_matrix_t *data)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
jas_image_coord_t i;
jas_image_coord_t j;
jas_seqent_t *d;
jas_seqent_t *dr;
int drs;
jas_seqent_t v;
int k;
int c;
if (cmptno < 0 || cmptno >= image->numcmpts_) {
return -1;
}
cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
if (x >= cmpt->width_ || y >= cmpt->height_ ||
x + width > cmpt->width_ ||
y + height > cmpt->height_) {
return -1;
}
if (jas_matrix_numrows(data) != height || jas_matrix_numcols(data) != width) {
return -1;
}
dr = jas_matrix_getref(data, 0, 0);
drs = jas_matrix_rowstep(data);
for (i = 0; i < height; ++i, dr += drs) {
d = dr;
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, (cmpt->width_ * (y + i) + x)
* cmpt->cps_, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
return -1;
}
for (j = width; j > 0; --j, ++d) {
v = inttobits(*d, cmpt->prec_, cmpt->sgnd_);
for (k = cmpt->cps_; k > 0; --k) {
c = (v >> (8 * (cmpt->cps_ - 1))) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_,
(unsigned char) c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v <<= 8;
}
}
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Added fix for CVE-2016-2089.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: create_policy_2_svc(cpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void UTFstring::UpdateFromUTF8()
{
delete [] _Data;
// find the size of the final UCS-2 string
size_t i;
for (_Length=0, i=0; i<UTF8string.length(); _Length++) {
uint8 lead = static_cast<uint8>(UTF8string[i]);
if (lead < 0x80)
i++;
else if ((lead >> 5) == 0x6)
i += 2;
else if ((lead >> 4) == 0xe)
i += 3;
else if ((lead >> 3) == 0x1e)
i += 4;
else
// Invalid size?
break;
}
_Data = new wchar_t[_Length+1];
size_t j;
for (j=0, i=0; i<UTF8string.length(); j++) {
uint8 lead = static_cast<uint8>(UTF8string[i]);
if (lead < 0x80) {
_Data[j] = lead;
i++;
} else if ((lead >> 5) == 0x6) {
_Data[j] = ((lead & 0x1F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F);
i += 2;
} else if ((lead >> 4) == 0xe) {
_Data[j] = ((lead & 0x0F) << 12) + ((UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+2] & 0x3F);
i += 3;
} else if ((lead >> 3) == 0x1e) {
_Data[j] = ((lead & 0x07) << 18) + ((UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F) << 12) + ((UTF8string[i+2] & 0x3F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+3] & 0x3F);
i += 4;
} else
// Invalid char?
break;
}
_Data[j] = 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'EbmlUnicodeString: don't read beyond end of string
The conversion from an UTF-8 encoded string into a wchar_t one was
reading from beyond the end of the source buffer if the length indicated
by a UTF-8 character's first byte exceeds the number of bytes actually
present afterwards.
Fixes the issue reported as Cisco TALOS-CAN-0036.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
if (ts->meta) {
zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
default:
if (ts->innerstream) {
return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #71323 - Output of stream_get_meta_data can be falsified by its input'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_set_chunk_size)
{
int ret;
long csize;
zval *zstream;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &zstream, &csize) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (csize <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The chunk size must be a positive integer, given %ld", csize);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* stream.chunk_size is actually a size_t, but php_stream_set_option
* can only use an int to accept the new value and return the old one.
* In any case, values larger than INT_MAX for a chunk size make no sense.
*/
if (csize > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The chunk size cannot be larger than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &zstream);
ret = php_stream_set_option(stream, PHP_STREAM_OPTION_SET_CHUNK_SIZE, (int)csize, NULL);
RETURN_LONG(ret > 0 ? (long)ret : (long)EOF);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #71323 - Output of stream_get_meta_data can be falsified by its input'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
spin_lock_init(&mm->context.list_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.pgtable_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.gmap_list);
return (pgd_t *) crst_table_alloc(mm);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 's390/mm: four page table levels vs. fork
The fork of a process with four page table levels is broken since
git commit 6252d702c5311ce9 "[S390] dynamic page tables."
All new mm contexts are created with three page table levels and
an asce limit of 4TB. If the parent has four levels dup_mmap will
add vmas to the new context which are outside of the asce limit.
The subsequent call to copy_page_range will walk the three level
page table structure of the new process with non-zero pgd and pud
indexes. This leads to memory clobbers as the pgd_index *and* the
pud_index is added to the mm->pgd pointer without a pgd_deref
in between.
The init_new_context() function is selecting the number of page
table levels for a new context. The function is used by mm_init()
which in turn is called by dup_mm() and mm_alloc(). These two are
used by fork() and exec(). The init_new_context() function can
distinguish the two cases by looking at mm->context.asce_limit,
for fork() the mm struct has been copied and the number of page
table levels may not change. For exec() the mm_alloc() function
set the new mm structure to zero, in this case a three-level page
table is created as the temporary stack space is located at
STACK_TOP_MAX = 4TB.
This fixes CVE-2016-2143.
Reported-by: Marcin Kościelnicki <koriakin@0x04.net>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);
kfree(q);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int snd_hrtimer_start(struct snd_timer *t)
{
struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;
atomic_set(&stime->running, 0);
hrtimer_cancel(&stime->hrt);
hrtimer_start(&stime->hrt, ns_to_ktime(t->sticks * resolution),
HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
atomic_set(&stime->running, 1);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: readconf_main(void)
{
int sep = 0;
struct stat statbuf;
uschar *s, *filename;
const uschar *list = config_main_filelist;
/* Loop through the possible file names */
while((filename = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
!= NULL)
{
/* Cut out all the fancy processing unless specifically wanted */
#if defined(CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_NODE) || defined(CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_EUID)
uschar *suffix = filename + Ustrlen(filename);
/* Try for the node-specific file if a node name exists */
#ifdef CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_NODE
struct utsname uts;
if (uname(&uts) >= 0)
{
#ifdef CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_EUID
sprintf(CS suffix, ".%ld.%.256s", (long int)original_euid, uts.nodename);
config_file = Ufopen(filename, "rb");
if (config_file == NULL)
#endif /* CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_EUID */
{
sprintf(CS suffix, ".%.256s", uts.nodename);
config_file = Ufopen(filename, "rb");
}
}
#endif /* CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_NODE */
/* Otherwise, try the generic name, possibly with the euid added */
#ifdef CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_EUID
if (config_file == NULL)
{
sprintf(CS suffix, ".%ld", (long int)original_euid);
config_file = Ufopen(filename, "rb");
}
#endif /* CONFIGURE_FILE_USE_EUID */
/* Finally, try the unadorned name */
if (config_file == NULL)
{
*suffix = 0;
config_file = Ufopen(filename, "rb");
}
#else /* if neither defined */
/* This is the common case when the fancy processing is not included. */
config_file = Ufopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
/* If the file does not exist, continue to try any others. For any other
error, break out (and die). */
if (config_file != NULL || errno != ENOENT) break;
}
/* On success, save the name for verification; config_filename is used when
logging configuration errors (it changes for .included files) whereas
config_main_filename is the name shown by -bP. Failure to open a configuration
file is a serious disaster. */
if (config_file != NULL)
{
uschar *p;
config_filename = config_main_filename = string_copy(filename);
p = Ustrrchr(filename, '/');
config_main_directory = p ? string_copyn(filename, p - filename)
: string_copy(US".");
}
else
{
if (filename == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "non-existent configuration file(s): "
"%s", config_main_filelist);
else
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "%s", string_open_failed(errno,
"configuration file %s", filename));
}
/* Check the status of the file we have opened, if we have retained root
privileges and the file isn't /dev/null (which *should* be 0666). */
if (trusted_config && Ustrcmp(filename, US"/dev/null"))
{
if (fstat(fileno(config_file), &statbuf) != 0)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "failed to stat configuration file %s",
big_buffer);
if ((statbuf.st_uid != root_uid /* owner not root */
#ifdef CONFIGURE_OWNER
&& statbuf.st_uid != config_uid /* owner not the special one */
#endif
) || /* or */
(statbuf.st_gid != root_gid /* group not root & */
#ifdef CONFIGURE_GROUP
&& statbuf.st_gid != config_gid /* group not the special one */
#endif
&& (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0) || /* group writeable */
/* or */
((statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0)) /* world writeable */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "Exim configuration file %s has the "
"wrong owner, group, or mode", big_buffer);
}
/* Process the main configuration settings. They all begin with a lower case
letter. If we see something starting with an upper case letter, it is taken as
a macro definition. */
while ((s = get_config_line()) != NULL)
{
if (isupper(s[0])) read_macro_assignment(s);
else if (Ustrncmp(s, "domainlist", 10) == 0)
read_named_list(&domainlist_anchor, &domainlist_count,
MAX_NAMED_LIST, s+10, US"domain list");
else if (Ustrncmp(s, "hostlist", 8) == 0)
read_named_list(&hostlist_anchor, &hostlist_count,
MAX_NAMED_LIST, s+8, US"host list");
else if (Ustrncmp(s, US"addresslist", 11) == 0)
read_named_list(&addresslist_anchor, &addresslist_count,
MAX_NAMED_LIST, s+11, US"address list");
else if (Ustrncmp(s, US"localpartlist", 13) == 0)
read_named_list(&localpartlist_anchor, &localpartlist_count,
MAX_NAMED_LIST, s+13, US"local part list");
else
(void) readconf_handle_option(s, optionlist_config, optionlist_config_size,
NULL, US"main option \"%s\" unknown");
}
/* If local_sender_retain is set, local_from_check must be unset. */
if (local_sender_retain && local_from_check)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "both local_from_check and "
"local_sender_retain are set; this combination is not allowed");
/* If the timezone string is empty, set it to NULL, implying no TZ variable
wanted. */
if (timezone_string != NULL && *timezone_string == 0) timezone_string = NULL;
/* The max retry interval must not be greater than 24 hours. */
if (retry_interval_max > 24*60*60) retry_interval_max = 24*60*60;
/* remote_max_parallel must be > 0 */
if (remote_max_parallel <= 0) remote_max_parallel = 1;
/* Save the configured setting of freeze_tell, so we can re-instate it at the
start of a new SMTP message. */
freeze_tell_config = freeze_tell;
/* The primary host name may be required for expansion of spool_directory
and log_file_path, so make sure it is set asap. It is obtained from uname(),
but if that yields an unqualified value, make a FQDN by using gethostbyname to
canonize it. Some people like upper case letters in their host names, so we
don't force the case. */
if (primary_hostname == NULL)
{
const uschar *hostname;
struct utsname uts;
if (uname(&uts) < 0)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "uname() failed to yield host name");
hostname = US uts.nodename;
if (Ustrchr(hostname, '.') == NULL)
{
int af = AF_INET;
struct hostent *hostdata;
#if HAVE_IPV6
if (!disable_ipv6 && (dns_ipv4_lookup == NULL ||
match_isinlist(hostname, CUSS &dns_ipv4_lookup, 0, NULL, NULL,
MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL) != OK))
af = AF_INET6;
#else
af = AF_INET;
#endif
for (;;)
{
#if HAVE_IPV6
#if HAVE_GETIPNODEBYNAME
int error_num;
hostdata = getipnodebyname(CS hostname, af, 0, &error_num);
#else
hostdata = gethostbyname2(CS hostname, af);
#endif
#else
hostdata = gethostbyname(CS hostname);
#endif
if (hostdata != NULL)
{
hostname = US hostdata->h_name;
break;
}
if (af == AF_INET) break;
af = AF_INET;
}
}
primary_hostname = string_copy(hostname);
}
/* Set up default value for smtp_active_hostname */
smtp_active_hostname = primary_hostname;
/* If spool_directory wasn't set in the build-time configuration, it must have
got set above. Of course, writing to the log may not work if log_file_path is
not set, but it will at least get to syslog or somewhere, with any luck. */
if (*spool_directory == 0)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "spool_directory undefined: cannot "
"proceed");
/* Expand the spool directory name; it may, for example, contain the primary
host name. Same comment about failure. */
s = expand_string(spool_directory);
if (s == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "failed to expand spool_directory "
"\"%s\": %s", spool_directory, expand_string_message);
spool_directory = s;
/* Expand log_file_path, which must contain "%s" in any component that isn't
the null string or "syslog". It is also allowed to contain one instance of %D
or %M. However, it must NOT contain % followed by anything else. */
if (*log_file_path != 0)
{
const uschar *ss, *sss;
int sep = ':'; /* Fixed for log file path */
s = expand_string(log_file_path);
if (s == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "failed to expand log_file_path "
"\"%s\": %s", log_file_path, expand_string_message);
ss = s;
while ((sss = string_nextinlist(&ss,&sep,big_buffer,big_buffer_size)) != NULL)
{
uschar *t;
if (sss[0] == 0 || Ustrcmp(sss, "syslog") == 0) continue;
t = Ustrstr(sss, "%s");
if (t == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "log_file_path \"%s\" does not "
"contain \"%%s\"", sss);
*t = 'X';
t = Ustrchr(sss, '%');
if (t != NULL)
{
if ((t[1] != 'D' && t[1] != 'M') || Ustrchr(t+2, '%') != NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "log_file_path \"%s\" contains "
"unexpected \"%%\" character", s);
}
}
log_file_path = s;
}
/* Interpret syslog_facility into an integer argument for 'ident' param to
openlog(). Default is LOG_MAIL set in globals.c. Allow the user to omit the
leading "log_". */
if (syslog_facility_str != NULL)
{
int i;
uschar *s = syslog_facility_str;
if ((Ustrlen(syslog_facility_str) >= 4) &&
(strncmpic(syslog_facility_str, US"log_", 4) == 0))
s += 4;
for (i = 0; i < syslog_list_size; i++)
{
if (strcmpic(s, syslog_list[i].name) == 0)
{
syslog_facility = syslog_list[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (i >= syslog_list_size)
{
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"failed to interpret syslog_facility \"%s\"", syslog_facility_str);
}
}
/* Expand pid_file_path */
if (*pid_file_path != 0)
{
s = expand_string(pid_file_path);
if (s == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "failed to expand pid_file_path "
"\"%s\": %s", pid_file_path, expand_string_message);
pid_file_path = s;
}
/* Set default value of process_log_path */
if (process_log_path == NULL || *process_log_path =='\0')
process_log_path = string_sprintf("%s/exim-process.info", spool_directory);
/* Compile the regex for matching a UUCP-style "From_" line in an incoming
message. */
regex_From = regex_must_compile(uucp_from_pattern, FALSE, TRUE);
/* Unpick the SMTP rate limiting options, if set */
if (smtp_ratelimit_mail != NULL)
{
unpick_ratelimit(smtp_ratelimit_mail, &smtp_rlm_threshold,
&smtp_rlm_base, &smtp_rlm_factor, &smtp_rlm_limit);
}
if (smtp_ratelimit_rcpt != NULL)
{
unpick_ratelimit(smtp_ratelimit_rcpt, &smtp_rlr_threshold,
&smtp_rlr_base, &smtp_rlr_factor, &smtp_rlr_limit);
}
/* The qualify domains default to the primary host name */
if (qualify_domain_sender == NULL)
qualify_domain_sender = primary_hostname;
if (qualify_domain_recipient == NULL)
qualify_domain_recipient = qualify_domain_sender;
/* Setting system_filter_user in the configuration sets the gid as well if a
name is given, but a numerical value does not. */
if (system_filter_uid_set && !system_filter_gid_set)
{
struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(system_filter_uid);
if (pw == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "Failed to look up uid %ld",
(long int)system_filter_uid);
system_filter_gid = pw->pw_gid;
system_filter_gid_set = TRUE;
}
/* If the errors_reply_to field is set, check that it is syntactically valid
and ensure it contains a domain. */
if (errors_reply_to != NULL)
{
uschar *errmess;
int start, end, domain;
uschar *recipient = parse_extract_address(errors_reply_to, &errmess,
&start, &end, &domain, FALSE);
if (recipient == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"error in errors_reply_to (%s): %s", errors_reply_to, errmess);
if (domain == 0)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"errors_reply_to (%s) does not contain a domain", errors_reply_to);
}
/* If smtp_accept_queue or smtp_accept_max_per_host is set, then
smtp_accept_max must also be set. */
if (smtp_accept_max == 0 &&
(smtp_accept_queue > 0 || smtp_accept_max_per_host != NULL))
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"smtp_accept_max must be set if smtp_accept_queue or "
"smtp_accept_max_per_host is set");
/* Set up the host number if anything is specified. It is an expanded string
so that it can be computed from the host name, for example. We do this last
so as to ensure that everything else is set up before the expansion. */
if (host_number_string != NULL)
{
long int n;
uschar *end;
uschar *s = expand_string(host_number_string);
if (s == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
"failed to expand localhost_number \"%s\": %s",
host_number_string, expand_string_message);
n = Ustrtol(s, &end, 0);
while (isspace(*end)) end++;
if (*end != 0)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"localhost_number value is not a number: %s", s);
if (n > LOCALHOST_MAX)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"localhost_number is greater than the maximum allowed value (%d)",
LOCALHOST_MAX);
host_number = n;
}
#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
/* If tls_verify_hosts is set, tls_verify_certificates must also be set */
if ((tls_verify_hosts != NULL || tls_try_verify_hosts != NULL) &&
tls_verify_certificates == NULL)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"tls_%sverify_hosts is set, but tls_verify_certificates is not set",
(tls_verify_hosts != NULL)? "" : "try_");
/* This also checks that the library linkage is working and we can call
routines in it, so call even if tls_require_ciphers is unset */
if (!tls_dropprivs_validate_require_cipher())
exit(1);
/* Magic number: at time of writing, 1024 has been the long-standing value
used by so many clients, and what Exim used to use always, that it makes
sense to just min-clamp this max-clamp at that. */
if (tls_dh_max_bits < 1024)
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"tls_dh_max_bits is too small, must be at least 1024 for interop");
/* If openssl_options is set, validate it */
if (openssl_options != NULL)
{
# ifdef USE_GNUTLS
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"openssl_options is set but we're using GnuTLS");
# else
long dummy;
if (!(tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &dummy)))
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG,
"openssl_options parse error: %s", openssl_options);
# endif
}
if (gnutls_require_kx || gnutls_require_mac || gnutls_require_proto)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "WARNING: main options"
" gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac and gnutls_require_protocols"
" are obsolete\n");
#endif /*SUPPORT_TLS*/
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2016-1531
Add keep_environment, add_environment.
Change the working directory to "/" during the early startup
phase.
(cherry picked from commit bc3c7bb7d4aba3e563434e5627fe1f2176aa18c0)
(cherry picked from commit 2b92b67bfc33efe05e6ff2ea3852731ac2273832)
(cherry picked from commit 14b82c8b736c8ed24eda144f57703cb9feac6323)
(cherry picked from commit 9ca92d0c6e9c6f161bd8111366c6952d3a9315e2)
(cherry picked from commit 0020c6d9ecfd98ed7b2b337ed4f898fdc409784b)
(cherry picked from commit e8f96966360ea8867ad6a8b5affda6c37fa4958c)
(cherry picked from commit ef6fb807c1e1a665f444f644c60c77269f7c5209)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void rng_random_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RndRandom *s = RNG_RANDOM(b);
if (s->receive_func) {
s->receive_func(s->opaque, NULL, 0);
}
s->receive_func = receive_entropy;
s->opaque = opaque;
s->size = size;
qemu_set_fd_handler(s->fd, entropy_available, NULL, s);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'rng: add request queue support to rng-random
Requests are now created in the RngBackend parent class and the
code path is shared by both rng-egd and rng-random.
This commit fixes the rng-random implementation which processed
only one request at a time and simply discarded all but the most
recent one. In the guest this manifested as delayed completion
of reads from virtio-rng, i.e. a read was completed only after
another read was issued.
By switching rng-random to use the same request queue as rng-egd,
the unsafe stack-based allocation of the entropy buffer is
eliminated and replaced with g_malloc.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1456994238-9585-5-git-send-email-lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static NOINLINE char *xmalloc_optname_optval(uint8_t *option, const struct dhcp_optflag *optflag, const char *opt_name)
{
unsigned upper_length;
int len, type, optlen;
char *dest, *ret;
/* option points to OPT_DATA, need to go back to get OPT_LEN */
len = option[-OPT_DATA + OPT_LEN];
type = optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK;
optlen = dhcp_option_lengths[type];
upper_length = len_of_option_as_string[type]
* ((unsigned)(len + optlen - 1) / (unsigned)optlen);
dest = ret = xmalloc(upper_length + strlen(opt_name) + 2);
dest += sprintf(ret, "%s=", opt_name);
while (len >= optlen) {
switch (type) {
case OPTION_IP:
case OPTION_IP_PAIR:
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "", option);
if (type == OPTION_IP)
break;
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "/", option + 4);
break;
// case OPTION_BOOLEAN:
// dest += sprintf(dest, *option ? "yes" : "no");
// break;
case OPTION_U8:
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u", *option);
break;
// case OPTION_S16:
case OPTION_U16: {
uint16_t val_u16;
move_from_unaligned16(val_u16, option);
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u", ntohs(val_u16));
break;
}
case OPTION_S32:
case OPTION_U32: {
uint32_t val_u32;
move_from_unaligned32(val_u32, option);
dest += sprintf(dest, type == OPTION_U32 ? "%lu" : "%ld", (unsigned long) ntohl(val_u32));
break;
}
/* Note: options which use 'return' instead of 'break'
* (for example, OPTION_STRING) skip the code which handles
* the case of list of options.
*/
case OPTION_STRING:
case OPTION_STRING_HOST:
memcpy(dest, option, len);
dest[len] = '\0';
if (type == OPTION_STRING_HOST && !good_hostname(dest))
safe_strncpy(dest, "bad", len);
return ret;
case OPTION_STATIC_ROUTES: {
/* Option binary format:
* mask [one byte, 0..32]
* ip [big endian, 0..4 bytes depending on mask]
* router [big endian, 4 bytes]
* may be repeated
*
* We convert it to a string "IP/MASK ROUTER IP2/MASK2 ROUTER2"
*/
const char *pfx = "";
while (len >= 1 + 4) { /* mask + 0-byte ip + router */
uint32_t nip;
uint8_t *p;
unsigned mask;
int bytes;
mask = *option++;
if (mask > 32)
break;
len--;
nip = 0;
p = (void*) &nip;
bytes = (mask + 7) / 8; /* 0 -> 0, 1..8 -> 1, 9..16 -> 2 etc */
while (--bytes >= 0) {
*p++ = *option++;
len--;
}
if (len < 4)
break;
/* print ip/mask */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, pfx, (void*) &nip);
pfx = " ";
dest += sprintf(dest, "/%u ", mask);
/* print router */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "", option);
option += 4;
len -= 4;
}
return ret;
}
case OPTION_6RD:
/* Option binary format (see RFC 5969):
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | OPTION_6RD | option-length | IPv4MaskLen | 6rdPrefixLen |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 6rdPrefix |
* ... (16 octets) ...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* ... 6rdBRIPv4Address(es) ...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* We convert it to a string
* "IPv4MaskLen 6rdPrefixLen 6rdPrefix 6rdBRIPv4Address..."
*
* Sanity check: ensure that our length is at least 22 bytes, that
* IPv4MaskLen <= 32,
* 6rdPrefixLen <= 128,
* 6rdPrefixLen + (32 - IPv4MaskLen) <= 128
* (2nd condition need no check - it follows from 1st and 3rd).
* Else, return envvar with empty value ("optname=")
*/
if (len >= (1 + 1 + 16 + 4)
&& option[0] <= 32
&& (option[1] + 32 - option[0]) <= 128
) {
/* IPv4MaskLen */
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u ", *option++);
/* 6rdPrefixLen */
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u ", *option++);
/* 6rdPrefix */
dest += sprint_nip6(dest, /* "", */ option);
option += 16;
len -= 1 + 1 + 16 + 4;
/* "+ 4" above corresponds to the length of IPv4 addr
* we consume in the loop below */
while (1) {
/* 6rdBRIPv4Address(es) */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, " ", option);
option += 4;
len -= 4; /* do we have yet another 4+ bytes? */
if (len < 0)
break; /* no */
}
}
return ret;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_RFC3397
case OPTION_DNS_STRING:
/* unpack option into dest; use ret for prefix (i.e., "optname=") */
dest = dname_dec(option, len, ret);
if (dest) {
free(ret);
return dest;
}
/* error. return "optname=" string */
return ret;
case OPTION_SIP_SERVERS:
/* Option binary format:
* type: byte
* type=0: domain names, dns-compressed
* type=1: IP addrs
*/
option++;
len--;
if (option[-1] == 0) {
dest = dname_dec(option, len, ret);
if (dest) {
free(ret);
return dest;
}
} else
if (option[-1] == 1) {
const char *pfx = "";
while (1) {
len -= 4;
if (len < 0)
break;
dest += sprint_nip(dest, pfx, option);
pfx = " ";
option += 4;
}
}
return ret;
#endif
} /* switch */
/* If we are here, try to format any remaining data
* in the option as another, similarly-formatted option
*/
option += optlen;
len -= optlen;
// TODO: it can be a list only if (optflag->flags & OPTION_LIST).
// Should we bail out/warn if we see multi-ip option which is
// not allowed to be such (for example, DHCP_BROADCAST)? -
if (len < optlen /* || !(optflag->flags & OPTION_LIST) */)
break;
*dest++ = ' ';
*dest = '\0';
} /* while */
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'udhcpc: fix OPTION_6RD parsing (could overflow its malloced buffer)
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about "
"to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the "
"linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n");
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: process_db_args(krb5_context context, char **db_args, xargs_t *xargs,
OPERATION optype)
{
int i=0;
krb5_error_code st=0;
char *arg=NULL, *arg_val=NULL;
char **dptr=NULL;
unsigned int arg_val_len=0;
if (db_args) {
for (i=0; db_args[i]; ++i) {
arg = strtok_r(db_args[i], "=", &arg_val);
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
dptr = &xargs->tktpolicydn;
} else {
if (strcmp(arg, USERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL ||
xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->dn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, CONTAINERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->containerdn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, LINKDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->linkdn;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("unknown option: %s"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
xargs->dn_from_kbd = TRUE;
if (arg_val == NULL || strlen(arg_val) == 0) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (arg_val == NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
arg_val_len = strlen(arg_val) + 1;
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context,
arg_val,
dptr)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
*dptr = k5memdup(arg_val, arg_val_len, &st);
if (*dptr == NULL)
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
cleanup:
return st;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'Fix LDAP null deref on empty arg [CVE-2016-3119]
In the LDAP KDB module's process_db_args(), strtok_r() may return NULL
if there is an empty string in the db_args array. Check for this case
and avoid dereferencing a null pointer.
CVE-2016-3119:
In MIT krb5 1.6 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying an empty DB argument to the modify_principal
command, if kadmind is configured to use the LDAP KDB module.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:ND
ticket: 8383 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: mbfl_strpos(
mbfl_string *haystack,
mbfl_string *needle,
int offset,
int reverse)
{
int result;
mbfl_string _haystack_u8, _needle_u8;
const mbfl_string *haystack_u8, *needle_u8 = NULL;
const unsigned char *u8_tbl;
if (haystack == NULL || haystack->val == NULL || needle == NULL || needle->val == NULL) {
return -8;
}
{
const mbfl_encoding *u8_enc;
u8_enc = mbfl_no2encoding(mbfl_no_encoding_utf8);
if (u8_enc == NULL || u8_enc->mblen_table == NULL) {
return -8;
}
u8_tbl = u8_enc->mblen_table;
}
if (haystack->no_encoding != mbfl_no_encoding_utf8) {
mbfl_string_init(&_haystack_u8);
haystack_u8 = mbfl_convert_encoding(haystack, &_haystack_u8, mbfl_no_encoding_utf8);
if (haystack_u8 == NULL) {
result = -4;
goto out;
}
} else {
haystack_u8 = haystack;
}
if (needle->no_encoding != mbfl_no_encoding_utf8) {
mbfl_string_init(&_needle_u8);
needle_u8 = mbfl_convert_encoding(needle, &_needle_u8, mbfl_no_encoding_utf8);
if (needle_u8 == NULL) {
result = -4;
goto out;
}
} else {
needle_u8 = needle;
}
if (needle_u8->len < 1) {
result = -8;
goto out;
}
result = -1;
if (haystack_u8->len < needle_u8->len) {
goto out;
}
if (!reverse) {
unsigned int jtbl[1 << (sizeof(unsigned char) * 8)];
unsigned int needle_u8_len = needle_u8->len;
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *p, *q, *e;
const unsigned char *haystack_u8_val = haystack_u8->val,
*needle_u8_val = needle_u8->val;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(jtbl) / sizeof(*jtbl); ++i) {
jtbl[i] = needle_u8_len + 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < needle_u8_len - 1; ++i) {
jtbl[needle_u8_val[i]] = needle_u8_len - i;
}
e = haystack_u8_val + haystack_u8->len;
p = haystack_u8_val;
while (--offset >= 0) {
if (p >= e) {
result = -16;
goto out;
}
p += u8_tbl[*p];
}
p += needle_u8_len;
if (p > e) {
goto out;
}
while (p <= e) {
const unsigned char *pv = p;
q = needle_u8_val + needle_u8_len;
for (;;) {
if (q == needle_u8_val) {
result = 0;
while (p > haystack_u8_val) {
unsigned char c = *--p;
if (c < 0x80) {
++result;
} else if ((c & 0xc0) != 0x80) {
++result;
}
}
goto out;
}
if (*--q != *--p) {
break;
}
}
p += jtbl[*p];
if (p <= pv) {
p = pv + 1;
}
}
} else {
unsigned int jtbl[1 << (sizeof(unsigned char) * 8)];
unsigned int needle_u8_len = needle_u8->len, needle_len = 0;
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *p, *e, *q, *qe;
const unsigned char *haystack_u8_val = haystack_u8->val,
*needle_u8_val = needle_u8->val;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(jtbl) / sizeof(*jtbl); ++i) {
jtbl[i] = needle_u8_len;
}
for (i = needle_u8_len - 1; i > 0; --i) {
unsigned char c = needle_u8_val[i];
jtbl[c] = i;
if (c < 0x80) {
++needle_len;
} else if ((c & 0xc0) != 0x80) {
++needle_len;
}
}
{
unsigned char c = needle_u8_val[0];
if (c < 0x80) {
++needle_len;
} else if ((c & 0xc0) != 0x80) {
++needle_len;
}
}
e = haystack_u8_val;
p = e + haystack_u8->len;
qe = needle_u8_val + needle_u8_len;
if (offset < 0) {
if (-offset > needle_len) {
offset += needle_len;
while (offset < 0) {
unsigned char c;
if (p <= e) {
result = -16;
goto out;
}
c = *(--p);
if (c < 0x80) {
++offset;
} else if ((c & 0xc0) != 0x80) {
++offset;
}
}
}
} else {
const unsigned char *ee = haystack_u8_val + haystack_u8->len;
while (--offset >= 0) {
if (e >= ee) {
result = -16;
goto out;
}
e += u8_tbl[*e];
}
}
if (p < e + needle_u8_len) {
goto out;
}
p -= needle_u8_len;
while (p >= e) {
const unsigned char *pv = p;
q = needle_u8_val;
for (;;) {
if (q == qe) {
result = 0;
p -= needle_u8_len;
while (p > haystack_u8_val) {
unsigned char c = *--p;
if (c < 0x80) {
++result;
} else if ((c & 0xc0) != 0x80) {
++result;
}
}
goto out;
}
if (*q != *p) {
break;
}
++p, ++q;
}
p -= jtbl[*p];
if (p >= pv) {
p = pv - 1;
}
}
}
out:
if (haystack_u8 == &_haystack_u8) {
mbfl_string_clear(&_haystack_u8);
}
if (needle_u8 == &_needle_u8) {
mbfl_string_clear(&_needle_u8);
}
return result;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #71906: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param (-1) in mbfl_strcut'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error;
zend_string *stub;
size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|ss", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
RETURN_NEW_STR(stub);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix bug #71860: Require valid paths for phar filenames'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
size_t fname_len;
int ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1) == SUCCESS);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix bug #71860: Require valid paths for phar filenames'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int ext4_insert_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
handle_t *handle;
struct ext4_ext_path *path;
struct ext4_extent *extent;
ext4_lblk_t offset_lblk, len_lblk, ee_start_lblk = 0;
unsigned int credits, ee_len;
int ret = 0, depth, split_flag = 0;
loff_t ioffset;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that an
* insert range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support insert range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Insert range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
offset_lblk = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
len_lblk = len >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down to align start offset to page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Check for wrap through zero */
if (inode->i_size + len > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Offset should be less than i_size */
if (offset >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
/* Expand file to avoid data loss if there is error while shifting */
inode->i_size += len;
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize += len;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, offset_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
extent = path[depth].p_ext;
if (extent) {
ee_start_lblk = le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(extent);
/*
* If offset_lblk is not the starting block of extent, split
* the extent @offset_lblk
*/
if ((offset_lblk > ee_start_lblk) &&
(offset_lblk < (ee_start_lblk + ee_len))) {
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(extent))
split_flag = EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2;
ret = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, &path,
offset_lblk, split_flag,
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL);
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
}
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, offset_lblk,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - offset_lblk);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
/*
* if offset_lblk lies in a hole which is at start of file, use
* ee_start_lblk to shift extents
*/
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle,
ee_start_lblk > offset_lblk ? ee_start_lblk : offset_lblk,
len_lblk, SHIFT_RIGHT);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int ext4_collapse_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t punch_start, punch_stop;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t new_size, ioffset;
int ret;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that a
* collapse range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support collapse range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
trace_ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
punch_start = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
punch_stop = (offset + len) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down offset to be aligned with page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* There is no need to overlap collapse range with EOF, in which case
* it is effectively a truncate operation
*/
if (offset + len >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
/*
* Prevent page faults from reinstantiating pages we have released from
* page cache.
*/
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_mmap;
}
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, punch_start,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - punch_start);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, punch_start, punch_stop - 1);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle, punch_stop,
punch_stop - punch_start, SHIFT_LEFT);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
new_size = i_size_read(inode) - len;
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_size;
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_mmap:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'ext4: fix races between buffered IO and collapse / insert range
Current code implementing FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE and
FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE is prone to races with buffered writes and page
faults. If buffered write or write via mmap manages to squeeze between
filemap_write_and_wait_range() and truncate_pagecache() in the fallocate
implementations, the written data is simply discarded by
truncate_pagecache() although it should have been shifted.
Fix the problem by moving filemap_write_and_wait_range() call inside
i_mutex and i_mmap_sem. That way we are protected against races with
both buffered writes and page faults.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: srtp_protect_aead (srtp_ctx_t *ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream,
void *rtp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_len)
{
srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t*)rtp_hdr;
uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */
int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */
xtd_seq_num_t est; /* estimated xtd_seq_num_t of *hdr */
int delta; /* delta of local pkt idx and that in hdr */
err_status_t status;
int tag_len;
v128_t iv;
unsigned int aad_len;
debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_protect_aead", NULL);
/*
* update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we
* didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call
* the event handler if we hit either.
*/
switch (key_limit_update(stream->limit)) {
case key_event_normal:
break;
case key_event_hard_limit:
srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit);
return err_status_key_expired;
case key_event_soft_limit:
default:
srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit);
break;
}
/* get tag length from stream */
tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth);
/*
* find starting point for encryption and length of data to be
* encrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header
* extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc,
* if any are present
*/
enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc;
if (hdr->x == 1) {
srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t*)enc_start;
enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1);
}
if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start < (uint8_t*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len))
return err_status_parse_err;
enc_octet_len = (int)(*pkt_octet_len -
((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr));
if (enc_octet_len < 0) return err_status_parse_err;
/*
* estimate the packet index using the start of the replay window
* and the sequence number from the header
*/
delta = rdbx_estimate_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, &est, ntohs(hdr->seq));
status = rdbx_check(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta);
if (status) {
if (status != err_status_replay_fail || !stream->allow_repeat_tx) {
return status; /* we've been asked to reuse an index */
}
} else {
rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta);
}
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %08x%08x",
high32(est), low32(est));
#else
debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %016llx", est);
#endif
/*
* AEAD uses a new IV formation method
*/
srtp_calc_aead_iv(stream, &iv, &est, hdr);
status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt);
if (status) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
/* shift est, put into network byte order */
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
est = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) |
(low32(est) >> 16),
low32(est) << 16));
#else
est = be64_to_cpu(est << 16);
#endif
/*
* Set the AAD over the RTP header
*/
aad_len = (uint8_t *)enc_start - (uint8_t *)hdr;
status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, aad_len);
if (status) {
return ( err_status_cipher_fail);
}
/* Encrypt the payload */
status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtp_cipher,
(uint8_t*)enc_start, (unsigned int *)&enc_octet_len);
if (status) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
/*
* If we're doing GCM, we need to get the tag
* and append that to the output
*/
status = cipher_get_tag(stream->rtp_cipher,
(uint8_t*)enc_start+enc_octet_len, &tag_len);
if (status) {
return ( err_status_cipher_fail);
}
/* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag */
*pkt_octet_len += tag_len;
return err_status_ok;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Allow zero payload packets to pass bounds check.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void tm_reclaim_thread(struct thread_struct *thr,
struct thread_info *ti, uint8_t cause)
{
unsigned long msr_diff = 0;
/*
* If FP/VSX registers have been already saved to the
* thread_struct, move them to the transact_fp array.
* We clear the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit since after the reclaim
* the thread will no longer be transactional.
*/
if (test_ti_thread_flag(ti, TIF_RESTORE_TM)) {
msr_diff = thr->ckpt_regs.msr & ~thr->regs->msr;
if (msr_diff & MSR_FP)
memcpy(&thr->transact_fp, &thr->fp_state,
sizeof(struct thread_fp_state));
if (msr_diff & MSR_VEC)
memcpy(&thr->transact_vr, &thr->vr_state,
sizeof(struct thread_vr_state));
clear_ti_thread_flag(ti, TIF_RESTORE_TM);
msr_diff &= MSR_FP | MSR_VEC | MSR_VSX | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1;
}
tm_reclaim(thr, thr->regs->msr, cause);
/* Having done the reclaim, we now have the checkpointed
* FP/VSX values in the registers. These might be valid
* even if we have previously called enable_kernel_fp() or
* flush_fp_to_thread(), so update thr->regs->msr to
* indicate their current validity.
*/
thr->regs->msr |= msr_diff;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-284'], 'message': 'powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void tokenadd(struct jv_parser* p, char c) {
assert(p->tokenpos <= p->tokenlen);
if (p->tokenpos == p->tokenlen) {
p->tokenlen = p->tokenlen*2 + 256;
p->tokenbuf = jv_mem_realloc(p->tokenbuf, p->tokenlen);
}
assert(p->tokenpos < p->tokenlen);
p->tokenbuf[p->tokenpos++] = c;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: SecureVector<byte> EME_PKCS1v15::unpad(const byte in[], size_t inlen,
size_t key_len) const
{
if(inlen != key_len / 8 || inlen < 10 || in[0] != 0x02)
throw Decoding_Error("PKCS1::unpad");
size_t seperator = 0;
for(size_t j = 0; j != inlen; ++j)
if(in[j] == 0)
{
seperator = j;
break;
}
if(seperator < 9)
throw Decoding_Error("PKCS1::unpad");
return SecureVector<byte>(in + seperator + 1, inlen - seperator - 1);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'Fixes for CVE-2015-7827 and CVE-2016-2849'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(bcmul)
{
char *left, *right;
int left_len, right_len;
long scale_param = 0;
bc_num first, second, result;
int scale = BCG(bc_precision), argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &left, &left_len, &right, &right_len, &scale_param) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc == 3) {
scale = (int) ((int)scale_param < 0) ? 0 : scale_param;
}
bc_init_num(&first TSRMLS_CC);
bc_init_num(&second TSRMLS_CC);
bc_init_num(&result TSRMLS_CC);
php_str2num(&first, left TSRMLS_CC);
php_str2num(&second, right TSRMLS_CC);
bc_multiply (first, second, &result, scale TSRMLS_CC);
if (result->n_scale > scale) {
result->n_scale = scale;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = bc_num2str(result);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = strlen(Z_STRVAL_P(return_value));
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
bc_free_num(&first);
bc_free_num(&second);
bc_free_num(&result);
return;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72093: bcpowmod accepts negative scale and corrupts _one_ definition
We can not modify result since it can be copy of _zero_ or _one_, etc. and
"copy" in bcmath is just bumping the refcount.
Conflicts:
main/php_version.h'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void php_xml_parser_create_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int ns_support) /* {{{ */
{
xml_parser *parser;
int auto_detect = 0;
char *encoding_param = NULL;
int encoding_param_len = 0;
char *ns_param = NULL;
int ns_param_len = 0;
XML_Char *encoding;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, (ns_support ? "|ss": "|s"), &encoding_param, &encoding_param_len, &ns_param, &ns_param_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (encoding_param != NULL) {
/* The supported encoding types are hardcoded here because
* we are limited to the encodings supported by expat/xmltok.
*/
if (encoding_param_len == 0) {
encoding = XML(default_encoding);
auto_detect = 1;
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "ISO-8859-1") == 0) {
encoding = "ISO-8859-1";
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "UTF-8") == 0) {
encoding = "UTF-8";
} else if (strcasecmp(encoding_param, "US-ASCII") == 0) {
encoding = "US-ASCII";
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unsupported source encoding \"%s\"", encoding_param);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
encoding = XML(default_encoding);
}
if (ns_support && ns_param == NULL){
ns_param = ":";
}
parser = ecalloc(1, sizeof(xml_parser));
parser->parser = XML_ParserCreate_MM((auto_detect ? NULL : encoding),
&php_xml_mem_hdlrs, ns_param);
parser->target_encoding = encoding;
parser->case_folding = 1;
parser->object = NULL;
parser->isparsing = 0;
XML_SetUserData(parser->parser, parser);
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, parser,le_xml_parser);
parser->index = Z_LVAL_P(return_value);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72099: xml_parse_into_struct segmentation fault'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: mbed_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
bool sni = TRUE; /* default is SNI enabled */
int ret = -1;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
void *old_session = NULL;
char errorbuf[128];
errorbuf[0]=0;
/* mbedTLS only supports SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) {
failf(data, "mbedTLS does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3)
sni = FALSE; /* SSLv3 has no SNI */
#ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT
entropy_init_mutex(&entropy);
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg);
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&connssl->ctr_drbg, entropy_func_mutex,
&entropy, NULL, 0);
if(ret) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - mbedTLS: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#else
mbedtls_entropy_init(&connssl->entropy);
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg);
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&connssl->ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func,
&connssl->entropy, NULL, 0);
if(ret) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - mbedTLS: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT */
/* Load the trusted CA */
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&connssl->cacert);
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]) {
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(&connssl->cacert,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]);
if(ret<0) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading ca cert file %s - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(&connssl->cacert,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]);
if(ret<0) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading ca cert path %s - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH], -ret, errorbuf);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
/* Load the client certificate */
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&connssl->clicert);
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(&connssl->clicert,
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading client cert file %s - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the client private key */
mbedtls_pk_init(&connssl->pk);
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY]) {
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(&connssl->pk, data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
if(ret == 0 && !mbedtls_pk_can_do(&connssl->pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA))
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if(ret) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading private key %s - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the CRL */
mbedtls_x509_crl_init(&connssl->crl);
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(&connssl->crl,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading CRL file %s - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
}
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Connecting to %s:%d\n",
conn->host.name, conn->remote_port);
mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&connssl->config);
mbedtls_ssl_init(&connssl->ssl);
if(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&connssl->ssl, &connssl->config)) {
failf(data, "mbedTLS: ssl_init failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&connssl->config,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
if(ret) {
failf(data, "mbedTLS: ssl_config failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* new profile with RSA min key len = 1024 ... */
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(&connssl->config,
&mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_fr);
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Set min SSL version to TLS 1.0\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0);
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Set SSL version to SSLv3\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Set SSL version to TLS 1.0\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2);
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Set SSL version to TLS 1.1\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3);
infof(data, "mbedTLS: Set SSL version to TLS 1.2\n");
break;
default:
failf(data, "mbedTLS: Unsupported SSL protocol version");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&connssl->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&connssl->config, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
&connssl->ctr_drbg);
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&connssl->ssl, &conn->sock[sockindex],
mbedtls_net_send,
mbedtls_net_recv,
NULL /* rev_timeout() */);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(&connssl->config,
mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites());
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_session, NULL)) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl, old_session);
if(ret) {
failf(data, "mbedtls_ssl_set_session returned -0x%x", -ret);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "mbedTLS re-using session\n");
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&connssl->config,
&connssl->cacert,
&connssl->crl);
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY]) {
mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&connssl->config,
&connssl->clicert, &connssl->pk);
}
if(!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr) &&
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr) &&
#endif
sni && mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(&connssl->ssl, conn->host.name)) {
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure "
"server name indication (SNI) TLS extension\n");
}
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
const char **p = &connssl->protocols[0];
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2)
*p++ = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID;
#endif
*p++ = ALPN_HTTP_1_1;
*p = NULL;
/* this function doesn't clone the protocols array, which is why we need
to keep it around */
if(mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&connssl->config,
&connssl->protocols[0])) {
failf(data, "Failed setting ALPN protocols");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
for(p = &connssl->protocols[0]; *p; ++p)
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", *p);
}
#endif
#ifdef MBEDTLS_DEBUG
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&connssl->config, mbedtls_debug, data);
#endif
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
return CURLE_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'mbedtls/polarssl: set "hostname" unconditionally
...as otherwise the TLS libs will skip the CN/SAN check and just allow
connection to any server. curl previously skipped this function when SNI
wasn't used or when connecting to an IP address specified host.
CVE-2016-3739
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20160518A.html
Reported-by: Moti Avrahami'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlZMemBuffGetContent( xmlZMemBuffPtr buff, char ** data_ref ) {
int zlgth = -1;
int z_err;
if ( ( buff == NULL ) || ( data_ref == NULL ) )
return ( -1 );
/* Need to loop until compression output buffers are flushed */
do
{
z_err = deflate( &buff->zctrl, Z_FINISH );
if ( z_err == Z_OK ) {
/* In this case Z_OK means more buffer space needed */
if ( xmlZMemBuffExtend( buff, buff->size ) == -1 )
return ( -1 );
}
}
while ( z_err == Z_OK );
/* If the compression state is not Z_STREAM_END, some error occurred */
if ( z_err == Z_STREAM_END ) {
/* Need to append the gzip data trailer */
if ( buff->zctrl.avail_out < ( 2 * sizeof( unsigned long ) ) ) {
if ( xmlZMemBuffExtend(buff, (2 * sizeof(unsigned long))) == -1 )
return ( -1 );
}
/*
** For whatever reason, the CRC and length data are pushed out
** in reverse byte order. So a memcpy can't be used here.
*/
append_reverse_ulong( buff, buff->crc );
append_reverse_ulong( buff, buff->zctrl.total_in );
zlgth = buff->zctrl.next_out - buff->zbuff;
*data_ref = (char *)buff->zbuff;
}
else {
xmlChar msg[500];
xmlStrPrintf(msg, 500,
(const xmlChar *) "xmlZMemBuffGetContent: %s - %d\n",
"Error flushing zlib buffers. Error code", z_err );
xmlIOErr(XML_IO_WRITE, (const char *) msg);
}
return ( zlgth );
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-134'], 'message': 'Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
printf("%s : Module support not compiled in\n", argv[0]);
return(0);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-134'], 'message': 'Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
const xmlChar *end; /* needed because CUR_CHAR() can move cur on \r\n */
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNCNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
end = ctxt->input->cur;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!xmlIsNameStartChar(ctxt, c) || (c == ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
(xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
return(NULL);
}
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
end = ctxt->input->cur;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
count = 0;
/*
* when shrinking to extend the buffer we really need to preserve
* the part of the name we already parsed. Hence rolling back
* by current lenght.
*/
ctxt->input->cur -= l;
GROW;
ctxt->input->cur += l;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
end = ctxt->input->cur;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
return(NULL);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, end - len, len));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'Bug 759398: Heap use-after-free in xmlDictComputeFastKey <https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759398>
* parser.c:
(xmlParseNCNameComplex): Store start position instead of a
pointer to the name since the underlying buffer may change,
resulting in a stale pointer being used.
* result/errors/759398.xml: Added.
* result/errors/759398.xml.err: Added.
* result/errors/759398.xml.str: Added.
* test/errors/759398.xml: Added test case.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageScaleTwoPass(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int src_width, const unsigned int src_height, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr tmp_im;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* Convert to truecolor if it isn't; this code requires it. */
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScaleHoriz(src, src_width, src_height, tmp_im, new_width, src_height);
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
gdFree(tmp_im);
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(dst, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScaleVert(tmp_im, new_width, src_height, dst, new_width, new_height);
gdFree(tmp_im);
return dst;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'Fix #70064: imagescale(..., IMG_BICUBIC) leaks memory
A temporary image (tmp_im) is created with gdImageTrueColor() and freed with
gdFree() instead of gdImageDestroy(). Let's fix that.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static char* getPreferredTag(const char* gf_tag)
{
char* result = NULL;
int grOffset = 0;
grOffset = findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED ,gf_tag);
if(grOffset < 0) {
return NULL;
}
if( grOffset < LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED_LEN ){
/* return preferred tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
} else {
/* Return correct grandfathered language tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
}
return result;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_set_default)
{
char* locale_name = NULL;
int len=0;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&locale_name ,&len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_set_default: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(len == 0) {
locale_name = (char *)uloc_getDefault() ;
len = strlen(locale_name);
}
zend_alter_ini_entry(LOCALE_INI_NAME, sizeof(LOCALE_INI_NAME), locale_name, len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
RETURN_TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_region)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_REGION_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int gdTransformAffineGetImage(gdImagePtr *dst,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_area,
const double affine[6])
{
int res;
double m[6];
gdRect bbox;
gdRect area_full;
if (src_area == NULL) {
area_full.x = 0;
area_full.y = 0;
area_full.width = gdImageSX(src);
area_full.height = gdImageSY(src);
src_area = &area_full;
}
gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_area, affine, &bbox);
*dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(bbox.width, bbox.height);
if (*dst == NULL) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
(*dst)->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
/* Translate to dst origin (0,0) */
gdAffineTranslate(m, -bbox.x, -bbox.y);
gdAffineConcat(m, affine, m);
gdImageAlphaBlending(*dst, 0);
res = gdTransformAffineCopy(*dst,
0,0,
src,
src_area,
m);
if (res != GD_TRUE) {
gdImageDestroy(*dst);
dst = NULL;
return GD_FALSE;
} else {
return GD_TRUE;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-190'], 'message': 'Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range'</s> |