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# Ask Me Anything (2/2025)
Another paid subscriber AMA. This time I’m letting freeloaders see responses, but only subscribers can ask questions or comment.
Questions I’m less likely to answer include:
* Requests for medical advice that you should be asking your doctor instead. I’m happy to discuss the theory of psychiatry, but please don’t ask me to diagnose or treat you.
* Anything where you’re trying to trick me into saying something you can cancel me for.
* Any pointless questions just for the sake of asking me a question, like “Which would you rather fight, a tiger or a gorilla?”
Otherwise I’ll keep going until I get tired. | Scott Alexander | 156884230 | Ask Me Anything (2/2025) | acx |
# Open Thread 368
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I’ve previously cited some [pretty compelling research](https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vT7_6kWkIqrvzFZvs88O_NqVzmn-NPINvHOLM-A6r_ieZyvnJsNVk4FSU7EYrePnQg9gT_3kwahJESZ/pub) that Prospera-based weird biotech company MiniCircle can’t work, but [Micah Zoltu reports doing a study and finding](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/model-city-monday-2325/comment/90933234) that minicircles increased VEGF expression in some mice. A commenter notes that results are [1000x weaker](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/model-city-monday-2325/comment/90960955) than clinically significant levels, but [Micah says](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/model-city-monday-2325/comment/90971145) he wasn’t dosing carefully and was just trying to find an effect at all, so maybe this could be solved by better dosing. I look forward to hearing more about his research (ie please email me when you have more results). I notice I am pattern matching this to things like EmDrive and LK-99 (amazing breakthrough that could change everything, comes from source which charitably is not the sort of people you would expect to make amazing breakthroughs, some people report positive results but never in perfect definitive tests), so I’m still very skeptical.
**2:** Open Philanthropy asks me to let you know that they hope to distribute $40 million in new technical AI safety grants over the next five months. Example fields include interpretability, control, backdoors, unlearning, “LLM psychology”, and generalization, but they are also interested in potential new paradigms. If you have a relevant project, see their [request for proposals here](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/request-for-proposals-technical-ai-safety-research/).
**3:** And some University of Chicago students have just started a rationalist reading/meetup group and ask me to advertise that they exist. If you’re interested, email dnbirnbaum@uchicago.edu or fill out [this form](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc59y0vrzOOEhsrsMx-6Lf8MGQizCW9UBBMsksLNAGWiunRlA/viewform). UChicago also has a long-running [EA group](https://uchicagoea.squarespace.com/). | Scott Alexander | 156832385 | Open Thread 368 | acx |
# 1DaySooner's Trump II Health Policy Proposals
As RFK Jr. fights to be confirmed in Congress, the rest of Trump’s health team is already taking shape.
[1DaySooner](https://www.1daysooner.org/) is an ACX grantee organization that advocates for innovative health policies. They’ve helped me write a list of who some of these people are, and some of the policies they could consider.
For practical reasons, we focus on upside only, so consider these the Venn-diagram-intersection of the ideas we’re most excited about, and the ones we think *they* might be most excited about - the new health policy we might get get in our ~90th percentile best outcome.
### Jim O’Neill: Deputy Secretary, Health And Human Services
My personal favorite as [the only Trump administration official to have commented on this blog](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/adumbrations-of-aducanumab/comment/2538285) (JD Vance [only lurks](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1e52oeh/jd_vance_on_ai_risk/) – sad!) O’Neill, previously a Peter Thiel lieutenant, has worked in causes from seasteading to anti-aging; now he’s taking the #2 spot at HHS under RFK. He famously proposed that the FDA [consider only safety](https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2016/12/08/why-donald-trumps-putative-fda-pick-could-scare-pharma/#52004af358a4) (and not efficacy) when approving drugs. Given that he hasn’t been chosen for FDA, that’s probably not on the cards, but here are some things we hope O’Neill considers:
**Compensating Organ Donors / End Kidney Deaths Act:** Both of us co-writing this piece (Scott Alexander of ACX, Josh Morrison of 1DaySooner) have [donated](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/my-left-kidney) kidneys. We’re proud of our decision, but it’s not enough - waiting for people like us has resulted in a [kidney shortage](https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2024/08/26/nx-s1-5086459/theres-a-severe-kidney-shortage-should-donors-be-compensated) that kills a thousand Americans per month. Everyone knows the solution - compensating organ donors - but there hasn’t been enough political will to overcome the “ick” factor and make it happen. O’Neill could change that. He’s [been speaking out in favor of compensation since 2009](https://www.themoneyillusion.com/will-kidney-sales-be-legalized/). And the time is right: [Representative Nicole Malliotakis](http://malliotakis.house.gov/media/press-releases/malliotakis-introduces-bipartisan-end-kidney-deaths-act) has introduced a [bipartisan bill](https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2024/08/26/nx-s1-5086459/theres-a-severe-kidney-shortage-should-donors-be-compensated) to provide $50,000 in refundable tax credits for people who donate kidneys to strangers. [This paper](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5057320/) found that a similar policy could eventually net 11,500 extra donors per year - which, aside from saving 11,500 people from end-stage kidney disease, could [save](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/18/2019-14902/medicare-program-specialty-care-models-to-improve-quality-of-care-and-reduce-expenditures#p-998) the government [$1 billion](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26474298/). O’Neill could boost this bill by getting it into the Executive Budget released with the State of the Union.
**Develop Better Longevity Biomarkers:** O’Neill spent 2019 - 2021 as CEO of SENS, the world’s leading anti-aging nonprofit, and will probably bring his interest in longevity to DC. Although there are major cultural barriers to the acceptance of longevity medicine, one of the biggest problems is technical - studying the effects of anti-aging drugs literally takes a lifetime. So one of the field’s holy grails is [biomarkers](https://fas.org/publication/validation-biomarkers-endpoints/) - some sort of blood test for the aging process that could detect success early. This would require a joint effort between policymakers and researchers: the policymakers would encourage companies and labs to share relevant data, the researchers would use the data to develop and validate the markers, and then the policymakers would create a regulatory pathway based on the markers. There are many ways this could go wrong - previous biomarkers have often ended up being correlative rather than causal - but it could mean the difference between this field being doomed vs. possible at all.
**Warp Speed for Air Quality:** RFK Jr’s “Make America Healthy Again” philosophy is a horseshoe-theory-style union between typical conservative concerns about purity and typical liberal concerns about the environment. There are many ways it could go wrong, but one place it might go very right is in air quality. Recent research has highlighted the role of air quality in both chronic disease (eg [particulate matter](https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.8b02053) in the air causing lung problems) and infectious disease (despite the WHO’s attempts at weird language games, respiratory viruses including colds and COVID are [airborne](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-fight-about-viruses-in-the-air-is-finally-over-now-its-time-for-healthy/)). There are some really innovative solutions (advanced air filters, UV-C technology) on the horizon, but we don’t expect this administration to want to throw a lot of money into blue-sky research. Instead, we suggest taking a page from the first Trump administration playbook and offering Operation Warp Speed style advance purchase agreements, which guarantee a market if and only if the technology works. An air quality Warp Speed could go a step further and target a result that is cost-saving to the federal government. For example, you could set the goal of reducing airborne disease in military housing by 50% by the start of 2028. Because the government pays for military healthcare, this would save costs and also create the evidence needed for private industry (workplaces, nursing homes, cruise ships, etc.) to implement air quality interventions for themselves.
### Marty Makary: FDA Commissioner
Makary is a Johns Hopkins surgical oncologist, former *MedPage Today* editor-in-chief, and frequent FOX News guest. He wrote a book *[Blind Spots](https://www.amazon.com/Blind-Spots-Medicine-Wrong-Health/dp/1639735313)* about past failures of the medical establishment, like denying babies peanuts to reduce peanut allergies (in fact, this increased the allergies). He’s also been a constant champion of [medical transparency](https://www.law360.com/healthcare-authority/articles/2265571/trump-fda-pick-devoted-to-healthcare-price-transparency). Our wish list builds on this work.
**Improve FDA Transparency:** The FDA sits on the world’s biggest repository of clinical data, yet its transparency policies remain conservative [compared](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-law-medicine-and-ethics/article/transparency-of-regulatory-data-across-the-european-medicines-agency-health-canada-and-us-food-and-drug-administration/FFD09EC615E261AEFE3E8AE88A268CBA) to other global regulators. This opacity slows research, because a lot of data is only shared via [costly and inefficient](https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1208024?ln=en&v=pdf) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. For example, the European Medical Association [makes public](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/clinical-data-publication/support-industry-clinical-data-publication/external-guidance-implementation-european-medicines-agency-policy-publication-clinical-data-medicinal-products-human-use) [Complete Response Letters](https://www.statnews.com/2018/01/17/open-letter-gottlieb-fda/) (CRLs), which detail critical safety and efficacy findings, but the FDA only shares them with the drug developer. An impactful focus for Makary could be addressing the practical and legal challenges that hinder real transparency reform at the FDA. Here’s a very 2025 solution - train an LLM on the agency’s vast repository of clinical data and deploy it as a tool for reviewers and potential automated researcher itself. By automating institutional knowledge, an AI system could significantly reduce regulatory burden by helping FDA staff review submissions, spot issues, predict outcomes, and write responses.
**Better Post-Marketing Surveillance:** Improvements in transparency for existing data could be paired with modernized surveillance of the real world effects of drugs after they’ve been offered to the public. Unlike countries like England and Israel, America’s healthcare systems are highly fragmented and make it hard to aggregate evidence. A focused attempt to modernize data collection could build on the [FDA’s Sentinel Initiative](https://www.sentinelinitiative.org/) and give the public real-time transparency into who’s taking what drugs and what effects are being observed.
**Regulatory Reciprocity:** I will keep this one in here until somebody does something about it. It’s the idea that Americans should be allowed to buy medical products if they’ve been approved by some trusted ally, like the European Union, possibly in exchange for the EU giving FDA-approved products the same deal in Europe. This has been amply championed by [Alex Tabarrok](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/01/economists-on-fda-reciprocity.html) and the [Mercatus](https://www.mercatus.org/economic-insights/expert-commentary/simple-way-speed-drug-approvals) crowd for years, and is [starting to make inroads](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2023/03/uk-to-adopt-pharmaceutical-reciprocity.html) in other countries. If full reciprocity is a step too far, 1DaySooner proposes Makary build off innovative pilot programs like Project Orbis, which enables concurrent submissions and reviews of oncology drugs by multiple regulatory agencies, and the CoGenT pilot, which does the same for cell and gene therapies.
**Regulatory Capacity For Emergencies/Pandemics:** In 2020, Makary criticized the FDA’s slow response to COVID. This time, we could [try to be ahead of the game](https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2023/we-need-fda-office-preparedness-response) by building the FDA’s capacity and expertise in advance. During peacetime, this team could work on a [universal flu vaccine](https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/trial-potential-universal-flu-vaccine-opens-nih-clinical-center) and a pandemic equivalent of the [START](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-launches-pilot-program-help-further-accelerate-development-rare-disease-therapies) pilot pioneered by FDA biologics director Peter Marks.
### Jay Bhattacharya: NIH Director
Bhattacharya is a rare doctor and medical professor who also has a PhD in economics. His contrarian COVID positions provoked censorship and harassment from Big Tech and the academic establishment; the experience seems to have low-key traumatized him, and his preliminary policy proposals, [listed here](https://archive.ph/YEMuC), focus on using the NIH's grant-giving power to shake up the orthodoxy that wanted him silenced. Here are some other policies we hope he’ll look into:
**Increase funding for novel research:** Bhattacharya [co-authored a paper](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24860/w24860.pdf) finding that projects which explore new ideas get less government funding than those confirming existing paradigms. The NIH has already been trying to change this with their [High-Risk, High-Reward Research](https://commonfund.nih.gov/highrisk) program, including the Transformative Research Award, Pioneer Award, New Innovator Award, and Early Independence Award. These remove many of the barriers to typical R01 grant review – preliminary data, budget approvals, and demonstrations of feasibility – and should be expanded.
**Remove Barriers To Human Challenge Trials:** In a [challenge study](https://www.1daysooner.org/challenge-intro/), healthy participants volunteer to be exposed to an infectious disease to test a vaccine or treatment (don’t worry about this burden falling on poor people - it’s mostly [grad students and effective altruists](https://archive.is/ArDDG)). During time-sensitive events like a novel pandemic, this lets studies move faster than having to wait for people to get infected naturally. There was a movement to have some of these during COVID - which would have sped up vaccines, shortened lockdowns, and saved tens of thousands of lives - but the health establishment chose paternalism and the moral high of trying to save volunteers from themselves. Matthew Memoli, who as Acting Director of NIH is holding the seat until Bhattacharya’s confirmation, is a leading flu challenge researcher at the NIH who wanted to develop challenge models in March of 2020 but got rejected by Anthony Fauci; Bhattacharya could work with Memoli to speed up these studies.
**Release ARPA-H from the NIH:** Bhattacharya likes unorthodox things, and the most unorthodox thing you can do in DC isto deliberately decrease the size of your empire. [ARPA-H](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Research_Projects_Agency_for_Health) is an innovative government science funder modeled after DARPA. Although it was [intended as](https://fas.org/publication/creating-the-health-advanced-research-projects-agency-harpa/) an independent agency, it got placed within NIH due to bureaucratic machinations. Now it’s in danger of getting shoved into a new National Institute on Innovation and Advanced Research with a lower budget. Separating ARPA-H from the NIH will protect it it from this fate, help it deliver on its intended goals, and help NIH reducing the number of institutes and centers it oversees (granting more research dollars per center). | Scott Alexander | 156298729 | 1DaySooner's Trump II Health Policy Proposals | acx |
# Money Saved By Canceling Programs Does Not Immediately Flow To The Best Possible Alternative
**I.**
PEPFAR - a Bush initiative to send cheap AIDS drugs to Africa - [has saved millions of lives and is among the most successful foreign aid programs ever](https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-upcoming-pepfar-cut-will-kill). A Trump decision briefly put it “on pause”, although this seems to have been walked back; its current status is unclear but hopeful.
In the debate around this question, many people asked - is it really fair to spend $6 billion a year to help foreigners when so many Americans are suffering? Shouldn’t we value American lives more than foreign ones? Can’t we spend that money on some program that helps people closer to home?
This is a fun thing to argue about - which, as usual, means it’s a purely philosophical question unrelated to the real issue.
If you cancelled PEPFAR - the single best foreign aid program, which saves millions of foreign lives - the money wouldn’t automatically redirect itself to the single best domestic aid program which saves millions of American lives.
Instead, it would . . . well, technically it would sit unspent, because Congress earmarked it for PEPFAR, and the executive branch cannot re-earmark it. But probably something would happen, deals would be made, Congress would think about the extra money when deciding how much deficit spending to do, and eventually it would in some vague sense go back into the general pot of all other federal spending. This would take the pot from its current $1,500 billion dollars all the way to . . . $1,506 billion dollars. From there would go to the same kinds of programs[1](#footnote-1) that the rest of the pot goes to - like the [Broadband Equity And Deployment Program](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jun/18/bidens-425-billion-rural-high-speed-internet-plan-/), a $42 billion effort to give rural Americans Internet which, after endless delays, has failed to connect a single rural American.
Is it unfair to focus on BEAD and other especially bad programs? Shouldn’t we expect the average newfound dollar to be redirected to an average program? I think we should expect somewhere between average and worst. We should expect it to equal the worst program if government spending rationally picked the lowest-hanging fruit first (ie invested their first X dollars in the best program, the next Y dollars in the second-best program, and so on, always investing the marginal dollar in the best available program). We should expect it to equal the average program if the government has no idea what it’s doing and just funds random things based on what cable news show a Senator watched last night. In truth, it’s somewhere in between, so we should expect a newfound dollar to go to something in between an average program and the worst program.
When studying charities, Toby Ord found that of two randomly chosen charities, one will be (on average) 100x more effective than the other. Government programs aren’t charities, but common-sensically we might expect similar dynamics to apply[2](#footnote-2), and for an unusually good program (like PEPFAR) to be 100x more efficient than one which is somewhere between average and worst.
(if this sounds common-sensically impossible, remember that PEPFAR probably saves ~250,000 lives/year[3](#footnote-3), so a 100x efficacy difference would require a somewhat-worse-than-average 6 billion/year government program to save 2,500 American lives or do something equivalently good. Given the few really good programs and very large amount of total waste, this sounds doesn’t sound like a crazy underestimate to me.)
Couldn’t people instead choose to redirect the saved money to the single best domestic program? I doubt it. If there was some adult in the room who could do this, why hasn’t money already been redirected to the single best domestic program? Why are we wasting money on non-best programs at all, when the best one is right there? I think an honest answer to this would involve admitting that the government is a mess not really under anyone’s control, such that you can’t guarantee PEPFAR money would be spent any more efficiently than any other money. So I think the original methodology - assuming it would go to other programs of approximately average effectiveness - is correct, and we can keep our 100x worse number[4](#footnote-4).
So in a discussion of the ethics of canceling PEPFAR, I don’t think it’s enough to say that you care about Americans more than foreigners. You would have to care about Americans more than 100x more than foreigners. I doubt most people have a specific finite foreigner-to-American ratio which is more than 100x[5](#footnote-5), so I think a belief in this category would effectively be saying that the lives of foreigners have zero value, at least from a government perspective.
In the end, I don’t think ratios are the right way to think about this. There’s a common problem across lots of moral philosophy where if we accept some category as having moral value *at all* and then try to do moral calculus with it, [it quickly overwhelms everything else and makes our normal values meaningless](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/27/bottomless-pits-of-suffering/). I don’t think there’s a good way to solve this, but *I* solve it by replacing value ratios with budgetary ratios for categories, ie we discharge whatever claim foreigners have to our charity by trying to spend 1% of the budget on foreign aid, as effectively as possible. I think this is a better solution than either ignoring foreigners in need completely, or declaring them to have literally zero value. I think if we spent 1% of the budget on effectively helping foreigners[6](#footnote-6), PEPFAR would easily pass the bar for what we included.
**II.**
The debate *du jour* is over JD Vance’s invocation of*[ordo amoris](https://circeinstitute.org/blog/blog-ladder-love/),* the classical Christian theory that you should value the life of your brother more than that of a complete stranger (while continuing to value both). I am not qualified to debate the doctrinal issues here, although I have seen smart Christians come out both [for](https://firstthings.com/jd-vance-states-the-obvious-about-ordo-amoris/) and [against](https://www.ncronline.org/opinion/guest-voices/jd-vance-wrong-jesus-doesnt-ask-us-rank-our-love-others) Vance’s interpretation.
But again, this is a distraction from any real issue! Oh, you should value the life of your brother more than a stranger? You don’t say? I’m hearing this for the first time! Now let’s kill five million foreign children to fund one sixth of a broadband boondoggle.
People did NOT interpret this tweet the way I was expecting, mea culpa, I will try not to argue using punchy sarcastic tweets from now on.
I am happy to “concede” that if you face a choice between saving a stranger and saving your brother, save your brother! Or your cousin, or your great-uncle, or your seven-times-great-grand-nephew-twice-removed. I’ll “concede” all of this, immediately, because it’s all fake; none of your relatives were ever in any danger. The only point of this whole style of philosophical discussion is so that you can sound wise as you say “Ah, but is not saving your brother more important than saving a complete stranger?” then sentence five million strangers to death for basically no benefit while your brother continues to be a successful real estate agent in Des Moines.
In case this isn’t clear enough, my positions are:
* I have no principled method for deciding how much of the US budget should go to foreign aid, but the current amount of [~1%](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-every-american-should-know-about-u-s-foreign-aid/) doesn’t seem excessive. Even if it was, PEPFAR is among the best foreign aid programs and should be one of the last to get cut, so I think you would have to believe that less than 0.1% of the budget should go to foreign aid before you started cutting it.
* I have no principled method for determining the relative value of your own life vs. that of your brother vs. that of your countryman vs. that of a foreigner, but I don’t think your brother/countryman/foreigner are literally zero. I think even valuing each step 100x less than the preceding (eg a foreigner 100x less than a US national) would be compatible with continuing to support PEPFAR. I’m not a theologian, but I would be surprised if Christianity could be invoked to justify multipliers greater than 100x.
* I think people should donate 1-10% of their income to effective charities, then not feel obligated to worry about altruism beyond this level. If someone’s brother is actually in danger in some way such that they can only be saved by not donating the 1-10% to charity, I think it is only human, and not morally blameworthy, to screw the 1-10% donation and give it to their brother. If your brother is not in danger, or you don’t have a brother, why are you worrying about this?
* If you ascribe literally zero value to foreigners, you probably don’t want PEPFAR. But most Americans are not in this category, and I think your love for your countrymen should move you to let this majority of people use 1% of the federal budget for something they care a lot about.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
It could also go to tax cuts and deficit reduction, but don’t get too excited - the biggest ever drop in the size of the federal budget was something like 10% and very temporary, so we should still expect the vast majority to go to other programs.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Since PEPFAR is not an average government program, but one that we’re talking about because it’s especially effective, we should expect the differential to be higher than this. I originally guessed 1000x, but when I ran this through sanity checks, it didn’t seem to be true, so I’m sticking with 100x.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
I say “millions” above, but here I’m using 250,000 as a per-year estimate to remain equivalent to the $6 billion/year spending.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
Realistically I think it’s even worse than this, because in practice the government levies as many taxes as it feels like levying, spends as much money as it feels like spending, and turns the difference into deficit, so it’s not obvious that canceling PEPFAR gives *any* more money to American programs. I’m writing this assuming that we want to keep the deficit fixed, which is a laughably fake assumption for the real government.
[5](#footnote-anchor-5)
A long time ago, I asked blog readers to give their animal lives to human lives value ratio - you can see [the medians](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/03/26/cortical-neuron-number-matches-intuitive-perceptions-of-moral-value-across-animals/) here. Valuing a foreigner at less than 1/100th of an American would put them somewhere between a cow and a chicken, which if nothing else seems like an awkward thing to have to bring up at UN meetings.
[6](#footnote-anchor-6)
We currently spend 0.7% of the total budget and ~3% of the discretionary budget on foreign aid. | Scott Alexander | 156310699 | Money Saved By Canceling Programs Does Not Immediately Flow To The Best Possible Alternative | acx |
# Model City Monday 2/3/25
## Prospera Declared Unconstitutional
The Honduras Supreme Court [has declared charter cities](https://chartercitiesinstitute.org/blog-posts/honduran-supreme-court-declares-zedes-unconstitutional/), including Prospera, unconstitutional.
The background: in the mid-2010s, the ruling conservative party wanted charter cities. They had already packed the Supreme Court for other reasons, so they had their captive court declare charter cities to be constitutional.
In 2022, the socialists took power from the conservatives and got the chance to fill the Supreme Court with *their* supporters, though this time it was routine and not fairly describable as “packing”. In September, this new Supreme Court said whoops, actually charter cities aren’t constitutional at all. They added that this decision applied retroactively, ie even existing charter cities that had been approved under the old government were, *ex post facto*, illegal.
Prospera’s lawyers objected, saying that the court is not allowed to make *ex post facto* rulings. But arguing that the Supreme Court is misinterpreting the Constitution seems like a losing battle - even if you’re right, who do you appeal to?
So the city is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. The first prong is waiting. Prospera is a collection of buildings and people. The buildings can stay standing, the people can still live there - they just have to follow regular Honduran law, rather than the investment-friendly charter they previously used. There’s [another election in November](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Honduran_general_election), which the socialists are expected to lose. Prospera hopes the conservatives will come in, take control of the Supreme Court again, and then they’ll say whoops, messed it up *again*, charter cities are constitutional after all.
One of the charter city world’s many AI-generated pictures of beautiful buildings that will never be built. I think this one is vaguely associated with Prospera, but it doesn’t matter. Source is [this blog by Max Borders](https://underthrow.substack.com/p/crypto-cities-summit-a-pilgrimage), which I think is a great name for a charter city proponent.
The second prong is international arbitration. When the conservatives approved charter cities, they signed international contracts promising their investment partners that Honduras wouldn’t go back on its word; if it did, they could be sued for damages. Prospera is suing for $10 billion, ~2/3 of Honduras’ annual budget. Observers say they have good lawyers and a strong case. Honduras has responded by backing out of its agreements and saying it won’t accept international rulings, but this only goes so far; the agreements say Prospera can sue to confiscate Honduran assets abroad if the government won’t cooperate. So far they seem to be holding off on this, probably because they’d rather do this the easy way by waiting for the conservatives to retake power, but the lawsuit is a strong argument for whoever wins in November to see things their way.
You might expect this instability to chill investment, but apparently not - this January, another funding round led by Coinbase [raised an extra $30 million](https://longevity.technology/news/coinbase-invests-in-prospera-to-expand-global-economic-freedom/) for the beleaguered city. They must have balls of steel!
It looks like a big part of investors’ hope for Prospera is biotech research and medical tourism. It hosted the [Vitalia](https://www.lifespan.io/news/vitalia-living-the-longevity-dream/) conference, and the Vitalia team are trying to build on it with [Infinita](https://infinitavc.com/), a charter city VC, and [Viva](https://viva.city/), a broader program and potential more permanent hub.. I still think that Minicircle, the most famous biotech clinic currently in Prospera, is [either confused or fraudulent](https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vT7_6kWkIqrvzFZvs88O_NqVzmn-NPINvHOLM-A6r_ieZyvnJsNVk4FSU7EYrePnQg9gT_3kwahJESZ/pub), but hopefully they can eventually attract firms which are neither.
## Neom Neom Neom Neom Neom
Neom, Saudi Arabia’s insane giant linear city project, has [admitted](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-scales-back-neom-plans-focus-world-cup-asian-games) they cannot actually build a giant linear city.
…sort of! The original plan for a 170 km Line by 2030 has been replaced with a more modest 2.4 km, focused on hosting the 2034 World Cup. Even a 2.4 km Line is extraordinarily ambitious, but here I am less than totally entirely 100% certain that it won’t happen.
To soften the blow, Saudi Arabia has announced even more bizarre subareas of NEOM with silly names, like [EPICON](https://www.travelandleisureasia.com/hk/hotels/middle-east-hotels/inside-epicon-the-new-resort-in-saudia-arabia-neom-project/):
And [LEYJA](https://www.designboom.com/architecture/neom-unveils-latest-sustainable-tourism-hub-leyja-in-saudi-arabia-10-16-2023/):
And [UTAMO](https://parametric-architecture.com/neom-unveils-a-new-destination-called-utamo/) (hey, I’ve read this *Silmarillion* chapter!*):*
They also [fired](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-scales-back-neom-plans-focus-world-cup-asian-games) the NEOM CEO, Nadhmi al-Nasr - known for abusing subordinates, threatening to kill people who disagreed with him, and saying that he “celebrated” when his workers dropped dead (which happened often!) The new CEO is [Aiman Al-Mudaifer](https://www.neom.com/en-us/newsroom/neom-board-of-directors-announces-leadership-change).
Last year, I predicted with 99% confidence that less than one kilometer of NEOM’s linear city would get built. I would still take this at even odds, but I regret my high confidence now - it sounds like they have a more realistic target that might, if they’re incredibly lucky, allow them to get something done.
## Charter Cities In . . . America?
In 2023, Trump [proposed](https://www.city-journal.org/article/building-freedom-cities) building ten “freedom cities”.
As usual, he’s light on details, but says that the federal government owns lots of land, it’s mostly unused, and he wants to "hold a contest to charter ten new cities and award them to the best proposals for development".
I bet Charter Cities Institute has already tried to reach out to the administration on this. You can see hints of where they might go in [Mark Lutter’s piece in City Journal.](https://www.city-journal.org/article/building-freedom-cities) As usual, he bangs the drum of “agglomeration effects” - new cities only prosper if there is some reason for them to exist. If you build a city on the median patch of federal land - a random desert - you’ll have an uphill battle to make anyone move there.
He proposes some alternatives, of which the most controversial is the Presidio - a federally-owned historic fortress in the middle of San Francisco which is now mostly used as a park. But the government technically has the rights to the land, and if they wanted to, they could zone the whole thing for six-story apartments and add 120,000 people to SF. I don’t know which part of this is most likely to make San Franciscans explode with rage - the loss of their (admittedly beautiful) historic park, the Donald Trump involvement, or the prospect of actually building things in their city. It would be a blowup for the ages.
If Trump isn’t ready for quite that much of a fight, Lutter suggests other promising pieces of federal land, including the Lowry Range near Denver and Guantanamo Bay (!), which could:
> . . . undermine the Communist regime by offering an easier exit than flight to Miami or Mexico, and help rehabilitate America’s image, given Guantanamo’s current association with the War on Terror’s excesses. With effective governance and a welcoming environment, a Guantanamo Bay site would powerfully demonstrate that the American model of capitalism can thrive anywhere.
Unfortunately there are multiple ways to read the phrase “bringing immigrants to Guantanamo Bay”, and so far the Trump administration [isn’t choosing the cool one](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yelgxk3rlo).
## California Eventually
California Forever, the ambitious planned city an hour north of San Francisco, is on hold.
One of the . . . you know the drill.
They had originally planned to fight NIMBYs in the November election via a ballot initiative which would give them the right to proceed. But after [polls suggested](https://www.solanotogether.org/post/poll-shows-solano-county-voters-overwhelmingly-reject-california-forever-solano-together-calls-for) they might lose, they instead struck an agreement with the county to delay two years and run through the usual set of environmental impact assessments. The County Supervisor [wrote](https://californiaforever.com/joint-statement-by-solano-county-and-california-forever/):
> I think it signals [project lead] Jan Sramek’s understanding that while the need for more affordable housing and good paying jobs has merit, the timing has been unrealistic. I want to acknowledge that many Solano residents are excited about Mr. Sramek’s optimism about a California that builds again. He is also right that we cannot solve our jobs, housing, and energy challenges if every project takes a decade or more to break ground.
>
> But announcing last year that California Forever would seek a vote on the November 2024 ballot, without a full Environmental Impact Report and a fully negotiated Development Agreement, was a mistake. This politicized the entire project, made it difficult for us and our staff to work with them, and forced everyone in our community to take sides.
>
> Delaying the vote gives everyone a chance to pause and work together, which is what is needed.
Opponents seemed optimistic that this would give them time to crush the project, or at least frustrate the investors enough to make them go away.
But in the past few days, the situation has changed. Suisun City, a nearby small town, has announced that [it is considering annexing](https://www.globest.com/2025/01/30/city-in-solano-county-moves-to-annex-california-forever-land/?slreturn=20250131135142) the California Forever land. Since the project was previously blocked by laws restricting building on *unincorporated* land, getting annexed by a city - and maybe running their project under the Suisun City banner - would solve many of their problems. Suisun City is struggling financially, and it would make sense for them to offer legal protection in exchange for money. The city mayor sort of halfway-kind-of-denies that’s what she’s doing, but California Forever is unpopular among Suisun City voters - if the story were actually false, I would expect her to make stronger denials.
## You Had Me At “Dragon King”
In 2021, Art Finch proposed that Bhutan turn the village of Geluphu into a cool high-tech charter city that would create jobs for Bhutanese youth and prevent them from emigrating. Finch, a South-African-American entrepreneur with Bhutanese connections, got the highest levels of the government to listen to his idea. Then something went wrong. Based on [this thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/bhutan/comments/12w1wle/the_yung_drung_incident/), it seems like a Facebook video about the project went viral, the Bhutanese people had the usual qualms about Thiel-backed billionaire startup Silicon Valley whatever stealing their precious sovereignty (of *course* it was Thiel-backed), and the deal fell apart.
So far this is the story of *every* promising charter city, but what happened next was a little different - the Dragon King of Bhutan (of *course* they’re ruled by a Dragon King) announced that Bhutan would build their own version of the city, without Silicon Valley help. Thus [Geluphu Mindfulness City Special Administrative Region](https://gmc.bt/). Construction started in 2023.
The target population is one million (Bhutan’s current largest city, Thimphu, has a population of only 100,000, and is famous for being one of only two national capitals without traffic lights). The projected cost is $100 billion with a b (Bhutan’s current GDP is $3 billion/year).
So how are they going to do this? Bhutan’s usual strategy is to play off neighbors India and China against each other, seeing which of them will give it more money in exchange for its friendship. Some American investors also seem interested. But it’s not even clear what industries would be involved - proposals include agribusiness, hydroelectric power, and - the last refuge of every desperate poor country - cryptocurrency (you can see some extremely meaningless PR statements about industry involvement [here](https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpreview.redd.it%2Ftp07va2ulknd1.jpeg%3Fwidth%3D1170%26format%3Dpjpg%26auto%3Dwebp%26s%3D9f24add5f7f7ccdd8839647e35971da03ef49f47))
Still, the aesthetics will be [top-notch](https://dirt.asla.org/2024/03/21/bhutans-mindfulness-city/):
Bhutan says they have partnered with the [Bjarke Ingels Group](https://dirt.asla.org/2024/03/21/bhutans-mindfulness-city/) of landscape architects as well as [McKinsey](https://12ft.io/proxy) - I feel like whichever Bhutanese official decided to replace Thiel with McKinsey got the short end of that trade.
As for Art Finch, he [expresses](https://12ft.io/proxy) skepticism in the direction Bhutan is taking his idea, saying that:
> “It is ‘my prayer’ as Bhutanese say, that the not entirely happy people of Bhutan will get the opportunities they deserve in a country with a fully realized version of the project. I do not believe this project is shaping up that way for now and I pray dialog can improve this.”
But he seems to have landed on his feet - [his website](https://linktr.ee/artdanefinch) now advertises an [Investment & Innovation Startup Zone in Sri Lanka](https://investinginsrilanka.com/).
### Elsewhere In Model Cities
**1:** Without even a site picked out, Praxis has [received another $525 million from VCs](https://www.perigon.io/news/finance/2024/10/15/praxis-secures-525-million-tech-city) (for context, 4x more than Prospera’s latest raise). Dryden Brown must be the most convincing person in the world.
**2:** British actor Idris Elba [announced his plans to build a film studio](https://fumba.town/my-african-dreams/) in the charter city of Fumba, Zanzibar.
**3:** Devon Zuegel, who previously ran the [pop-up village Edge Esmeralda](https://blog.edgeesmeralda.com/about), plans to build a permanent “walkable village” + resort called [Esmeralda](https://esmeralda.org/) in [Healdsburg](https://web.archive.org/web/20240801024109/https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/cloverdale-alexander-valley-resort-esmeralda/), California (90 minutes north of SF)
**4:** Kanye West has announced interest in [building his own charter city in the Middle East](https://supercarblondie.com/kanye-west-city-middle-east/). I was about to object “…but didn’t he get cancelled for anti-Semitism?” which would have been the dumbest sentence in ACX history. Really, Scott? You can’t run a vaguely statelike organization in the Middle East if you’re *too anti-Semitic?* I don’t know why any of you still take me seriously. | Scott Alexander | 156163841 | Model City Monday 2/3/25 | acx |
# Open Thread 367
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** In the [survey results post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-survey-results-2025), I said that none of 37 people described having a highly negative result from ayahuasca. A reader emailed me and said they did, and I realized that there was an issue with overly long text boxes that made me miss their input. They described feeling “like I was being electrocuted in the brain”, “insane nightmares for months”, flashbacks where they “felt like I was on drugs again, back in [an] alien grotesque world”, and a long-term shift to finding “many aspects of the world to be extremely upsetting”. Hopefully this is enough of a negative result for you! I may have missed other long text box answers but I don’t think enough to significantly affect the results. | Scott Alexander | 156417968 | Open Thread 367 | acx |
# Why Recurring Dream Themes?
An observant Jewish friend told me she has recurring dreams about being caught unprepared for Shabbat.
(Shabbat is the Jewish Sabbath, celebrated every Saturday, when observant Jews are forbidden to work, drive, carry things outdoors, spend money, use electrical devices, etc.)
She said that in the dreams, she would be out driving, far from home, and realize that Shabbat was due to begin in a few minutes, with no way to make it home or get a hotel in time.
I found this interesting because *my* recurring dreams are usually things like being caught unprepared for a homework assignment I have due tomorrow, or realizing I have to catch a plane flight but I’m not packed and don’t have a plan to get to the airport.
Most people attribute recurring nightmares to “fear”. My friend is “afraid” of violating Shabbat; childhood me was “afraid” of having the assignment due the next day. This seems wrong to me. Childhood me was afraid of monsters in the closet; adult me is afraid of heart attacks, AI, and something happening to my family. But I don’t have nightmares about any of these things, just homework assignments and plane flights.
So maybe the “unprepared” aspect is more important. Here’s a story that makes sense to me: what if recurring dreams are related to prospective memory?
Prospective memory is the form of memory you use to remember that something’s coming up and you need to prepare for it. For example, your teacher says “you have a homework project due on December 1”. More responsible people might write that down on a calendar or in a planner or something, but I always just winged it. Every few days, my brain would remind me, “You know you have a homework project due on December 1, right?” and then eventually I would grudgingly start working on it, and my brain would say “You remember you have to be done by December 1, right?” and then I would work harder.
How does this work? You’d have to have some kind of brain cell or whatever on a dedicated loop, checking every few hours to see if there’s a homework assignment you’ve forgotten about. This isn’t just the much easier task of answering “yes” if someone asks you whether you have an assignment. This requires the brain cell to constantly ping memory to see whether there’s something that’s being forgotten.
What if that brain cell is still there? What if, every few hours, it keeps thinking “Oh no, I hope there isn’t a homework assignment I’ve forgotten about, better sift through my memory and see”? And during the day, my brain is functional enough to bar such useless thoughts from my consciousness, but at night, when my guard is down and there’s nothing else to think about, sometimes it gets through? And what if the dreaming brain uses that as the nucleus for a story?
This explains my friend’s Shabbat dreams, my homework dreams, and my forgotten-plane-flight dreams. What other categories of dreams does it explain?
**Big test today I forgot to study for:** This is a trivial extension of the homework example. I don’t really have these because I found tests less scary than homework and didn’t really keep track of them as much.
**Enrolled in a class I forgot existed for months and now it’s the end of the year and I’m going to fail it:** Presumably your prospective memory has to remember to go to the right series of classes every day at school.
**Giving a speech in your underwear:** This one doesn’t fit the theory, unless maybe the prospective memory task is “getting dressed”. This is, in some sense, a very important prospective memory task! I guess there does have to be some brain subroutine monitoring whether I’m dressed every time I go outside, and it’s just so fluid that I never think about it. But at that level you could explain *anything*, so I’m skeptical.
**Flying:** I don’t think my theory can explain this. I’ve heard claims that it’s because muscle feedback is blocked during REM sleep, so you feel weightless. I rarely have pure flying dreams, but I often have dreams about finding I can jump very high, glide, or otherwise come close. I don’t know if the muscle feedback theory predicts this.
**Teeth falling out:** I originally thought this might be related to brushing your teeth - one of the most common and important prospective memory tasks. But this doesn’t really make sense - you’d expect dreams about leaving home and suddenly realizing that you forgot to brush your teeth; the link to “teeth falling out” is psychologically tenuous. And [these people](https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/teeth-falling-out) note there are tooth-falling-out dreams in the Talmud; even though Talmud-era Persia had a little dental hygiene, I have trouble believing that a culture-bound dream could last that long. [Some researchers did a study](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01812/full) and found tooth dreams were linked to dental irritation symptoms during the day, so it’s probably the same as the flying dreams - your unconscious using weird sensations as the nucleus for a story. [Sleep bruxism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruxism) is a common condition that could cause unusual nighttime tooth sensations, although the researchers disappointingly weren’t able to come up with a specific link there.
So I think there’s some support for the prospective memory theory, but even more for a theory of “dreams that are based on weird sensations you have during sleep are likely to recur”.
Is there any way to fit the Shabbat/homework/plane-flight dreams into a “weird sensations you have during sleep” theory? I think you’d have to go with “you feel anxious during sleep, and those are the situations your brain comes up with where anxious is justified”. The reason you don’t dream about closet monsters or unfriendly AI is presumably that you haven’t experienced these things, and your brain doesn’t naturally think of them as a likely cause of anxiety.
I don’t find this entirely compelling, because I don’t think “For the whole semester, I half-forgot that I was taking a math class, and now I’m finally being forced to confront it, and all the other students are so far ahead of me that I can never catch up” is a simple natural experience which it makes sense to leap to as a cause of anxiety. The most common stressful experiences I have regularly - patients having emergencies, babies being inconsolable, people trying to cancel me online - almost never show up in my dreams. On the other hand, I do sometimes have dreams about fights with my parents, so maybe it has to be a stressful experience from my childhood in particular. But then why do I have so many dreams about missing airplanes, which wasn’t something childhood-me had to deal with? And when I asked about this on [the ACX survey](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-survey-results-2024), it looked like childhood themes in dreams were less common than adult themes:
How often do these themes appear in your dreams, scale of 1-5, n = 4,740
So I think there’s strong evidence for a somatic-sensation-nucleus theory of recurring dreams, and weaker but still-intriguing evidence for a prospective-memory-based one. | Scott Alexander | 146362785 | Why Recurring Dream Themes? | acx |
# ACX Survey Results 2025
Thanks to the 5,975 people who took the 2025 Astral Codex Ten survey.
**[See the questions for the ACX survey](https://forms.gle/mihwF2bcVARrTy1u6)**
**[See the results from the ACX Survey](https://forms.gle/4TFknV5vcY1Q7wnLA)** (click “see previous responses” on that page[1](#footnote-1))
I’ll be publishing more complicated analyses over the course of the next year, hopefully starting later this month. If you want to scoop me, or investigate the data yourself, you can download the answers of the 5500 people who agreed to have their responses shared publicly. Out of concern for anonymity, the public dataset will exclude or bin certain questions[2](#footnote-2). If you want more complete information, email me and explain why, and I’ll probably send it to you.
You can download the public data here as an Excel or CSV file:
* http://slatestarcodex.com/Stuff/ACXPublic2025.xlsx
* http://slatestarcodex.com/Stuff/ACXPublic2025.csv
Here are some of the answers I found most interesting:
Trump’s electoral victory and political rehabilitation has improved his image among ACX readers, with his favorability ratings (defined as 4 or 5 on a five point scale) going from 4.3% last year to a whopping 7.4% this year! Maybe Richard Hanania can find a way to fit this into his upcoming book on Elite Human Capital.
There’s an outside chance of an apocalyptic scenario for Long COVID: if each case of COVID has an fixed percent chance of giving you the syndrome, and the syndrome lasts forever, then as more COVID cases happen (ie even though COVID is no longer pandemic, most people still get it once every few years), the amount of Long COVID keeps going up and up for decades, until deaths finally equal new cases. I think this is very unlikely but worth devoting a few brain cells to worrying about.
On the question “Have you *ever* had Long COVID?” (not pictured), the survey results from 2022 → 2024 → 2025 went from 3.1% → 3.6% → 4.5%.
On the question above, the number of people saying they were *still* fatigued went from 2.5% → 1.8% → 2.1%.
These are obviously small and weak samples, but it seems like maybe people keep getting Long COVID, but for most of them it gets better after a year or two, so the amount of existing Long COVID cases stays pretty steady.
On the same trio of surveys, this question went from 16.2% → 4.1% → 3.5%.
Lower numbers mean older architecture, so this confirms the few polls I’ve cited suggesting most people prefer older. Obviously ACX is a selected population, but probably most of the selection is on things other than architecture taste. When I asked people to rank various styles of office buildings and houses, the winners were:
This was overwhelmingly people’s favorite office building style, with almost twice as many votes as second place.
And this was people’s favorite style of house, but a modernist house did come in a close second.
I did another analysis and found that of people in the target demographic (Americans who voted and had a guide for their city) about 50% said it changed their vote, 30% said they weren’t convinced, and 20% said they didn’t know about it. Overall we changed about 500 people’s votes.
This one surprised me, so halfway through I added a question asking people to guess what the answer would be. You got it pretty much exactly right (24.96%), so score one for the wisdom of crowds. I’m still interested to see what demographic characteristics predict overestimating vs. underestimating it.
These answers also surprised me. In any ACX article related to crime, it feels like the comment section is full of people demanding tougher punishments - no, tougher than that - no, MAXIMUM TOUGHNESS! - with only a tiny number of dissenters. But actually, the silent majority is big softies. 86% want no jail time - not even a weekend - for a first offense shoplifter. And 66% want a month or less even for a ten-time offender! (though 1.3% of you do want death)
This is the version of this question most relevant to San Francisco, where there usually aren’t open shelter beds.
Same surprise as the previous question - the comment section demands MAXIMUM TOUGHNESS, but the survey takers are bleeding hearts. Most people chose either red (arrest harassers only) or orange (arrest harassers, institutionalize anyone who seems mentally ill), but to otherwise leave the encampment alone.
I think this is both a clear right choice, and maybe politically impractical (the justice system doesn’t have the capacity to prove beyond a reasonable doubt which homeless people are harassers/mentally ill and which ones aren’t), so maybe the difference between this question and the comment section is what second-best option people choose when the clear right choice isn’t available.
Among the 28 pp of readers who own crypto, 16 pp (57%) are only speculating; the other 12 pp (43%) used it for at least somewhat non-speculative uses - of which 5.7 pp (20%) were completely non-speculative and legal. Typical examples were VPNs, international transfers, drugs (including legal drugs that were just hard to get elsewhere), and donations.
I’d heard some pretty crazy rumors about this, so I asked the 113 of you who had used ayahuasca to tell me your stories. 37 of you filled in the text box, of whom:
* 16 (43%) said it wasn’t too interesting.
* 8 (21%) said it made them feel a little better for a few weeks to months
* 13 (35%) said it had long-term beneficial effects, including:
+ “Obliterated my atheism, inverted my world view no longer believe matter is base substrate believe consciousness is, no longer fear death, non duality seems obvious to me now.”
+ “Stopped using drugs and drinking for 6 years”
+ “It cured my long-standing autoimmune illness. Seriously! Also helped with the PTSD I have from childhood sexual abuse and homelessness. “
+ “It cured my severe mental health problems. And it made me reassess all my life priorities. And it fundamentally altered my personality (permanently increasing openness to experience and extroversion, lowering neuroticism). I first partook 3 years ago and have been in 13 ceremonies. It’s been an interesting ride!”
+ “Too many to type out here, but radically transformed my life - directly led to quitting career and feeling cool without ever knowing what happens next, put right and left hemispheres in proper order (only really understood 6 years later when reading McGilchrist) and totally blew open my heart, leading to finding Disney-magic love a few months later, a state I've been living and smiling in ever since :)”
Nobody claimed anything bad happened to them beyond some normal drug effects (eg vomiting), but I suppose we would want to talk to their friends and see if they agreed.
Thanks again to everyone who took the survey! If you want to investigate the answers in more depth, download the public data (**[.xlsx](http://slatestarcodex.com/Stuff/ACXPublic2025.xlsx)**, **[.csv](http://slatestarcodex.com/Stuff/ACXPublic2025.csv)**)
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
I can’t make Google Forms only present data from people who agreed to make their responses public, so I’ve deleted everything identifiable on the individual level, eg your written long response answers. Everything left is just things like “X% of users are Canadian” or “Y% of users have ADHD”. There’s no way to put these together and identify an ADHD Canadian, so I don’t think they’re privacy relevant. If you think you’ve found something identifiable on the public results page, please let me know.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
I deleted email address, some written long answers, some political questions that people might get in trouble for answering honestly, and some sex-related questions. I binned age to the nearest 10 years and deleted the finer-grained ethnicity question. I replaced all incomes above $1,000,000 with $1,000,000, and removed all countries that had fewer than ten respondents (eg if you said you were from Madagascar, it would have made you identifiable, so I deleted that). If you need this information for some reason, email me. | Scott Alexander | 155809449 | ACX Survey Results 2025 | acx |
# Open Thread 366
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I’m working as a media/writing consultant for an AI forecasting project, and we’re looking for leads on a mainstream **news outlet** (eg NYT, WaPo) and a policy/defense/intelligence/foreign affairs **journal/magazine** who would be willing to let us **pitch you an article on the future of AI**. The main author would be an ex-OpenAI researcher previously profiled in major publications (eg NYT), who is running a big forecasting project and wants to do a media push around the time they release their results. The forecast is shaping up to be “superintelligence by 2028” - but if your target audience isn’t into that, they also have plenty of predictions and recommendations about normal stuff like China, arms races, chips, etc in the 2025 - 2027 period that they think the policy community might want to know about. Send me an email at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you’re interested or know someone who might be.
**2:** Dan Hendrycks’ [Center For AI Safety](https://www.safe.ai/) is offering an **[online course](https://www.aisafetybook.com/virtual-course)** (application deadline Feb 5, course dates Feb 19 to May 9). You could also just [download the textbook](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uph559W-ASR4MEn6M_7Mb3lqQTapC_gZ/view). I’ve seen a decent number of people get involved in the field starting with courses like these - not because the course itself completely prepares you for everything, but because it helps you understand things well enough that you know where to go next (and it says that “we will support you in identifying your next steps, whether that involves building upon your end-of-course project, pursuing further research, or applying for relevant opportunities.”) | Scott Alexander | 155818493 | Open Thread 366 | acx |
# Everyone's A Based Post-Christian Vitalist Until The Grooming Gangs Show Up
Whenever I talk about charity, a type that I’ll call the “based post-Christian vitalist” shows up in the comments to tell me that I’ve got it all wrong. The moral impulse tells us to help our family, friends, and maybe village. It’s a weird misfire, analogous to an auto-immune disease, to waste brain cycles on starving children in a far-off country who you’ll never meet. You’ve been cucked by centuries of Christian propaganda. Instead of the slave morality that yokes you to loser victims who wouldn’t give you the time of day if your situations were reversed, you should cultivate a master morality that lets you love the strong people who push forward human civilization.
A younger and more naive person might think the based post-Christian vitalist and I have some [irreconcilable moral difference](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/07/18/fundamental-value-differences-are-not-that-fundamental/). Moral argument can only determine which conclusions follow from certain premises. If premises are too different (for example, a intuitive feeling of compassion for others, vs. an intuitive feeling of strength and pitilessness), there’s no way to proceed.
So it was revealing to watch some of these people trip over themselves to say we should invade Britain because of its tolerance for Pakistani grooming gangs.
In case you’ve been under a rock recently, in the early 2010s, several [organized child sexual assault rings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotherham_child_sexual_exploitation_scandal) got busted in Britain - but only after the police spent years deliberately ignoring them, because the perpetrators were mostly Pakistani and busting them might seem racist. A recent legal dispute got them back in the news, and since social media is less censored now, the topic went viral in a way it didn’t before. Now the entire Right is demanding investigations, heads on pikes, and (in some cases) the American invasion of Britain.
Obviously this is extremely bad and they’re right to be angry. I criticized the media for not covering the Rotherham gangs more [at the time](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/10/16/five-case-studies-on-politicization/), and I’m glad they’re finally getting more attention. But since everyone else is talking about the criminal aspects of it, I hope it won’t be too inappropriate for me to make a philosophical point: all the people who claim a principled commitment to not caring about the suffering of poor kids in foreign countries suddenly care *a lot* about the suffering of poor kids in foreign countries.
Suddenly, they’ve stopped saying that capitalism solves every problem and since your solution isn’t capitalism you’re an idiot to even be considering it. I have heard zero demands that people who *really* care about grooming gangs have to stop talking about immigration policy or police malfeasance and focus on, I don’t know, investing in a startup working on better rape whistles. Once people care a lot about a problem, they naturally understand that - as great as capitalism is - you can’t leave everything to the free market.
Suddenly, they’ve stopped saying that every well-intentioned attempt to help another person will always backfire and end up causing incalculable harm. This is pretty impressive, because the official position of the British government is that any attempt to investigate or act against the gangs will backfire and cause incalculable harm. All the experts are begging you not to do it! But once people care a lot about a problem, they naturally understand that a vague possibility of poorly-spelled-out secondary consequences isn’t an excuse to tolerate atrocities.
Suddenly, they’ve stopped saying that if you help poor people with no particular skills, you’re a cuck who hates human greatness and wants to force the talented/deserving to spend all of their time in forced emotional subservience to their inferiors. Once people care a lot about a problem, they realize that you can try to help people who are suffering without it being some kind of demonic attack on everything noble and glorious in mankind.
Suddenly, they’ve stopped saying that if you ever acknowledge anything is bad and that we should act against bad things, your life will necessarily be destroyed by a crushing burden of obligation that requires you to spend all of your time and money (beyond that necessary for bare subsistence) on fighting evil. Once people care a lot about a problem, they are able to fit activism on that problem - even if it’s just a tweet expressing disgust, a petition against the people involved, or a small donation to victims - into their everyday lives without further disruption.
I’m not attacking these people’s position on grooming gangs. I think their position on grooming gangs is spot-on. I’m attacking their position *on everything else*.
I don’t think anyone is, deep down, a based post-Christian vitalist. It’s fun to LARP as the Nietzschean superman, but ask Raskolnikov how far that gets you. I think we all have the same basic moral impulses, and that for most people - including most people who deny it - those potentially include caring about poor people you’ll never meet, suffering in far-off countries.
I admit that we also *don’t* have moral impulses for a lot of other things. It’s hard to get as angry about kids suffering from some unpronounceable disease, as about kids suffering because a scary-looking person rapes them - even if the disease is horribly painful and disabling and terrifying, and realistically worse than the rape, and most people would pick the rape over the disease if they got a choice.
(if you’re going to get hung up on whether the suffering is because of a human bad actor or a natural cause, then can I interest you in donating to [Bedari](https://bedari.org.pk/about-us/), a charity that prevents domestic abuse in the Third World? Most of their operations are in Pakistan, so you don’t even have to leave your comfort zone of being against Pakistani abusers in particular!)
My point is not that everyone starts life as a perfect altruist and later has to ineffectively repress it. My point is that we all start with a host of pretty similar albeit contradictory moral impulses and a drive to reconcile them, and our moral philosophies - rather than being handed to us by our genes - are downstream of the reconciliation process. You cannot do the reconciliation process through sheer logic (though logic helps), or through “doing the right thing” (since the process is upstream of knowing what the right thing is). All you can do is try to hit your intuitions off against each other and try to figure out what best maintains your dignity as a human being and doesn’t feel like you’re trying to excise chunks of your soul. In the end, I think your choices are something like:
1. Give up on ever being more than a bundle of incoherent preferences. Treat an issue as the world’s worst atrocity one day, and a nothingburger the next, depending on the level of media coverage, the exact wording of the story, and whose politics are getting flattered.
2. Keep coming up with more and more finely-sliced rules that you hope will separate the things you care about and the things you don’t into two different categories without requiring any changes to any of your beliefs or hard decisions. “Well, I care about people in my country, but not in other countries - oh, wait, the grooming scandal was in Britain but I still care about it - well, fine, I care about things done by bad people but not by Nature - oh, wait, ordinary domestic abuse is done by bad people - well, fine, I care about . . . “ [I can’t predict what comes next, but nobody who tries this has ever run out of slices.]
3. Come up with arguments for why, miraculously, you have found yourself in the most convenient possible world, one where every attempt to help other people just makes their lives worse, and so you are forever excused from trying.
4. ~~Resolve the contradiction by ceasing to care about child sexual assault victims or anyone else.~~ THIS IS NOT A REAL OPTION, SORRY.
5. Admit, kicking and screaming, that you might be a good person. Do some moral philosophy to see if this implies anything. If you find that it implies things you don’t want to do, or don’t have enough willpower to do, admit that you might be a *sort of* good person who is *vaguely* in favor of good things, but doesn’t have infinite willpower, and realistically will not be carrying them out most days (this is approximately everyone). Keep doing moral philosophy and testing it against your values and motivations until you reach [reflective equillibrium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflective_equilibrium) (haha, as if).
I don’t think you have to strain or lie or tie yourself into moral knots to justify being angry at child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. I think this is natural because there’s a part of you - the best part - which cares about suffering and injustice wherever in the world it happens, even in foreign countries, even to poor people who you’ll never meet.
I think the straining and lying and knots come in when you try to *deny* that part and say “Oh, no, who, me? I definitely don’t care about the suffering of the world at all” while hastily burying your heart bursting with wisdom and compassion for all mankind under the bedsheets where we can’t see it. | Scott Alexander | 154790984 | Everyone's A Based Post-Christian Vitalist Until The Grooming Gangs Show Up | acx |
# Try The 2025 ACX/Metaculus Forecasting Contest
This is normally when I would announce the winners of the 2024 forecasting contest, but there are some complications and Metaculus has asked me to wait until they get sorted out.
But time doesn’t wait, and we have to get started on the new year’s forecasting contest to make sure there’s enough time for events to happen or not. That means the 2025 contest is now open!
This year I had hoped to arrange some kind of fair comparison with Polymarket so I could prove my thesis that it usually underperforms Metaculus - but with all the excitement of the election and [the feds harassing Shayne](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/fbi-raids-polymarket-ceo-shayne-coplans-apartment-seizes-phone-source-rcna180180) we never got around to making it work.
So the aspect I’m most excited about this year is the bots. There are many new forecasting bots, some of them have been tested in slightly sketchy situations, and I want to see how they rank against some of ACX’s top forecasters.
I’m also excited about the question set. This year I worked together with Metaculus to try to find issues that were both rigorous enough to judge fairly and of broad enough interest that everyone can weigh in (no “AI benchmark #44523, really!).
Some sample questions out of the 36 in this year’s contest.
I hope this (and the $10,000) are enough justification to encourage you to go through these questions for another year, even before you know how you did last time (we will tell you, soon, really!)
So **[go take the contest](https://www.metaculus.com/tournament/ACX2025/)**, make some predictions, and I’ll meet you back here with the results in 2026! | Scott Alexander | 155014662 | Try The 2025 ACX/Metaculus Forecasting Contest | acx |
# Open Thread 365
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** [METR](https://metr.org/) is an organization that tries to measure AI vs. human performance. They need to measure some humans to set the baseline, specifically in software engineering, cybersecurity, and ML tasks, and are looking for contractors with experience in these fields. Pay is $100/hour base rate plus bonuses for performance; time commitment is ~16 hours before the end of January. Remote contracting job, very flexible, and you get to be this generation's Kasparov. See [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jV9F4H-UM7V76cj59CA9_WLzL6zHM_SC5cAbBE614vk/edit?tab=t.0) for more information, or go [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfWZXDmAG53KufOcTz4Dks59CkfawBH3HJAicbK6ZHmHGcoIw/viewform?fbzx=-1727289315206568938) to apply directly.
**2:** More comments on Lynn and IQ: [Lizzard attacks,](https://lessonsunveiled.substack.com/p/contra-scott-on-lynns-national-iq) [Cremieux defends](https://www.cremieux.xyz/p/national-iqs-are-valid), Lyman Stone thinks there’s something off about how national IQ estimates [change over time](https://substack.com/@lymanstone/p-155026979) (still paywalled, sorry!), Sebjenseb [responds to Lyman](https://www.sebjenseb.net/p/international-dysgenics-do-matter) (free to read, there’s lots of other stuff, CTRL+F “change over time”).
**3:** Comments from Links: Vlaakith Outrance [on A16Z returns](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-january-2025/comment/86712304), Erusian on [dominance within party systems](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-january-2025/comment/86660101), Hadi Khan [corrects my AI training cost numbers](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-january-2025/comment/86695719) (but it ends up not mattering much), and someone linked Alice Evans’ posts on [Turkey](https://www.ggd.world/p/cultural-leapfrogging-swiping-past?open=false#%C2%A7turkey) and [fertility](https://www.ggd.world/p/the-global-collapse-of-coupling-and?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2) (Lyman Stone supposedly discusses this too, though [the post](https://substack.com/@lymanstone/p-154003374) is paywalled).And in response to the story about the Chinese warlord misunderstanding basketball, a Jewish friend relates a suspiciously similar legend:
> It's said that [Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaim_Kanievsky) was asked whether you can play basketball on Shabbat. He asked what basketball is, and they said "it's a game where you have to put the ball in the basket," so Rav Kanievsky asked, "Why don't they just leave the ball in the basket from before Shabbos"? Some say this didn't happen, some say he was making a joke, and some say he didn't know about basketball or the entire concept of a game.
[EDIT: [update on Rav Kanievsky’s level of basketball knowledge](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-365/comment/87308306)] | Scott Alexander | 155244552 | Open Thread 365 | acx |
# Links For January 2025
*[I haven’t independently verified each link. On average, commenters will end up spotting evidence that around two or three of the links in each links post are wrong or misleading. I correct these as I see them, and will highlight important corrections later, but I can’t guarantee I will have caught them all by the time you read this.]*
**1:** [Why running for Congress will ruin your life](https://x.com/HedgeDirty/status/1869555974966808794) (unless you’re already rich). It costs ~$100K out of pocket before you get campaign funding, and you have to take a ~yearlong break from your career to campaign. If you win, you need to maintain two residences (one in DC, one in your district) on your $175K Congressional salary. Also, you have no power your first term, nobody will let you do anything, and you spend the whole time trying to get re-elected.
**2:**
I agree with [this](https://x.com/Matthewmatical/status/1876332459325083836) solution.
**3:** Ruxandra Teslo and Willy Chertman: [The Case For Clinical Trial Abundance](https://www.slowboring.com/p/the-case-for-clinical-trial-abundance)
**4:** This month in nominative determinism: [NYT article calculating your chance of winning the lottery](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/19/us/lottery-mega-millions-four-numbers.html), by Victor Mather *(h/t Yafah Edelman).*
**5:** Someone is working on a dating site that uses your conversations with Claude to find a match. Link [here](https://claudette.club/), although so far it’s just a landing page where you can register interest *(h/t [@venturetwins](https://x.com/venturetwins/status/1865074202711331055))*
**6:** The Lyttle Lytton Contest searches for the worst possible opening line for a novel; it’s been going on since 2001 and [this year’s results are in](https://adamcadre.ac/lyttle/2024.html).
**7:** [Gary Marcus and Miles Brundage have made a bet about AI progress](https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/where-will-ai-be-at-the-end-of-2027). I agree with [@tamaybes](https://x.com/tamaybes/status/1873924035022823463) and others in saying that Miles let Gary off too easily; Gary’s public statements all sound like “modern AI is mostly hype, it doesn’t really do anything like thinking”, but the bet is about things like “will AI make a Nobel Prize caliber scientific discovery by 2027?” and “will AI write Pulitzer-quality books by 2027?” I don’t blame Gary for taking the best terms he could find. But I am worried that if AI makes a Nobel-quality scientific discovery in 2026, but doesn’t *quite* write the Pulitzer-quality book, then Gary will get to claim victory over the AI optimists, whereas in fact that would be at probably the 95th percentile of fast timelines by most people’s estimate.
**8:** “The probability that cows (or other non-human animals) are experiencing constant bliss, lack *tanha* (craving, aversion, and the resulting suffering), or are "enlightened by default" is, [by my estimation](https://x.com/algekalipso/status/1874720430969532740), very low”.
**9:** [Recursive Adaptation](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/addiction-predictions-for-2025-and) (blog on addiction policy)’s predictions for 2025. 75% of FDA approval of GLP-1 for a substance use disorder by 2029!
**10:** In [my post on](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-compounding-loophole) the economics of GLP-1 receptor agonists (eg Ozempic), I wrote about how they’re currently widely available because of a loophole suspending patents during a shortage, and predicted there would be a big fight when the shortage was over. Sure enough, [the FDA tried to declare](https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/compounding-pharmacies-can-resume-making-tirzepatide-fda-reconsiders-s-rcna174551) that the shortage of tirzepatide (a next-generation Ozempic relative) was over, compounding pharmacies sued, and tirzepatide is still available while the issue goes through the courts (and will the administration have an opinion?) Also, compounding pharmacy access startup Mochi says that they [will continue to prescribe](https://www.reddit.com/r/JoinMochiHealth/comments/1higrin/statement_on_mounjarozepbound_shortage_ending/) even if the shortage is over, using another loophole saying doctors can do this for specific individual patients in cases of medical necessity. This is an extremely fake use of this loophole, but will the government be willing to call their bluff?
**11:** Jacob Falkovich has [a blog on dating advice](https://www.secondperson.dating/archive?sort=new), which he plans to turn into a book of dating advice. I can’t really comment on the accuracy (my dating strategy tends to look more like waiting for women to send me emails saying “I like your blog, would you like to go on a date?” which probably doesn’t generalize), but I’ve had many good interactions with Jake, and he has a beautiful family which means he must be doing something right. Also, Jake is poly, and I sometimes wonder if poly people are the only ones qualified to give dating advice: if you’re monogamous, you either met your future spouse quickly (in which case you have no experience), dated for years without meeting your spouse (in which case you can’t be very good), or aren’t looking for a committed relationship at all (which is just pickup artistry, and follows very different dynamics). Poly people are the only ones who can break out of this trilemma!
**12:** [Christ And Counterfactuals](https://christandcounterfactuals.substack.com/) is a blog on effective altruism from a Christian perspective. Some previous attempts at this have felt kind of forced, but [the first post I read here](https://christandcounterfactuals.substack.com/p/what-the-worlds-best-christian-philosopher) was actually pretty interesting. Richard Swinburne (apparently “the world’s best Christian philosopher”), thinks that:
> “[One] reason why it is good that the human race should sometimes be in an initial situation of considerable ignorance about the causes and effects of our actions, is this. If God abolished the need for rational inquiry and gave us from childhood strong true beliefs about the causes of things, that would make it too easy for us to make moral decisions. As things are in the actual world, most moral decisions are decisions taken in uncertainty about the consequences of our actions. I do not know for certain that if I smoke, I will get cancer; or that if I do not give money to some charity, people will starve. So we have to make our moral decisions on the basis of how probable it is that our actions will have various outcomes—how probable it is that I will get cancer if I continue to smoke (when I would not otherwise get cancer), or that someone will starve if I do not give. Since probabilities are so hard to assess, it is all too easy to persuade yourself that it is worth taking the chance that no harm will result from the less demanding decision (the decision which you have a strong desire to make). And even if you face up to a correct assessment of the probabilities, true dedication to the good is shown by doing the act which, although it is probably the best action, may have no good consequences at all.” (*Could a Good God Permit so Much Suffering? A Debate*, pp. 52-53.)
This is pretty galaxy-brained, but *something* galaxy-brained must be going on for God to tolerate the existence of evil at all, and this is a surprisingly natural extension of some common premises on the subject.
**13:** Swedish study: [diagnosing the marginal patient with a psychiatric condition makes their life worse](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1htp5qh/the_effects_of_diagnosing_a_young_adult_with_a/). Of the two mechanisms they looked at, stigma seems more involved than drug side effects. My opinion: this study was done on conscripts undergoing a mandatory psych evaluation for the army, who had no previous reason to think they had a psych disease and had not sought treatment. This is a different situation from somebody who comes to a psychiatrist asking for relief from specific symptoms they have noticed. Also, Sweden c. 2005 is a different culture from America 2025 in terms of how much stigma a psych diagnosis carries. I think it’s possible that if you never considered that you had psychiatric problems, and were suddenly given a diagnosis in 2005 Sweden and told you couldn’t serve in the army, that’s likely to destabilize your self-image more than a person who knows they’re depressed going to a psychiatrist in 2025 US and getting antidepressants.
**14:** [RIP](https://www.aibase.com/news/14454) Felix Hill, research scientist at DeepMind and mentor to many in the AI community. You can read his suicide note [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-jBoSEVlryiX1IaSzV4vKuihDfm_LgXUznvSpl1T1kg/edit?tab=t.0), though the obvious content warning applies. He says he took ketamine for mild anxiety and it plunged him into an incredibly deep depression that he couldn’t get out of; he leaves his story behind as a warning for others. I appreciate his warning, but I wish he had said more about what dose he used; different people’s ketamine doses vary by almost two orders of magnitude, I’d previously thought that the low doses were pretty safe and the high doses were sketchy, and I would like to know whether I should update or not.
**15:** [RIP](https://oldjewishmen.substack.com/p/bhif-old-jewish-men-loses-a-friend) Max Chiswick, professional poker player, effective altruist, and ACX reader.
**16:** Adrian Dittman, a Twitter account widely accused of being Elon Musk’s alt, has been revealed to be . . . [a guy named Adrian Dittman](https://maia.crimew.gay/posts/adrian-dittmann/). Congrats to Maia Crimew and the *Spectator* for actually investigating this, unlike many other news sources which spread the Musk conspiracy theory. Also, the people involved [got banned from X for some reason](https://www.dailydot.com/debug/elon-musk-adrian-dittman-journalists/?amp), maybe because this qualified as doxxing Dittman.
**17:** Related: Musk claims to be among the top players in the world at several computer games. A veteran Path of Exile gamer [presents evidence](https://www.reddit.com/r/PathOfExile2/comments/1hwxc17/documenting_the_saga_of_elon_musks_account/) that Musk faked his PoE2 accomplishments by hiring a Chinese guy to play on his account. Some Musk supporters in the comments suggest that maybe he hires the Chinese guy to level up his account, but his accomplishments (eg speedruns) are still his own?
**18:** Related: Sam Harris says he has been friends with Musk since 2008, but he noticed a sudden shift for the worse in his personality around 2020 which made it impossible to stay friends with him. He gives the example of Musk losing a bet with him that there would be 35,000+ COVID cases in the US, refusing to pay up, and launching personal attacks on Sam when asked to do so. What happened? Some theories:
* Musk turned right-wing, which ended his friendship with Sam for the same reason political differences have always ended friendships (but then what about the bet, which seems like objectively bad behavior?)
* It’s [the ketamine](https://www.yahoo.com/news/know-musks-ketamine-120000781.html) (I still think people should be more open about what doses of ketamine they take so I can calibrate my opinions better!)
* Gwern’s [longstanding theory that Musk is bipolar](https://gwern.net/note/elon-musk) (I keep objecting to this because he doesn’t show the right kind of mood shifts; a single shift from a steady state age 0-40, to a different but worse steady state in his fifties is, if anything, even weirder).
* I wonder if he’s doing some kind of steroids. Side effects are irritability, aggression, paranoia, mood swings. He appears to be extremely physically fit, but also claims to “[almost never work out](https://archive.is/sU9nI)”. Imagine that you’re the kind of guy who hires people to play computer games for you so that you can appear on the leaderboard as the best in the world. And imagine that you bring that same attitude to looks and fitness. What’s the obvious low-hanging fruit?
IN MODERATION!!!!
**19:** Ozy [profiles George Perkins](https://thingofthings.substack.com/p/weird-people-of-history-george-walbridge), an early 20th century businessman and reformer who thought that monopolies combined the best features of capitalism and socialism, and dreamed of an America where JP Morgan employed everyone with enough benefits to serve as a social safety net. Related: [Weekly Anthropocene profiles Ozy](https://sammatey.substack.com/p/the-weekly-anthropocene-interviews-e18).
**20:** [Claim](https://x.com/credistick/status/1869730728134447311): since their 2010 fund, at least until our last data source in 2018, Andreessen Horowitz (aka A16Z, a famous Bay Area VC firm) has overall [underperformed](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21054818) the S&P500.
This is especially surprising because A16Z is famous for going all in on crypto early. But during the 2015 - 2018 period, Bitcoin - the absolute dumbest and most obvious crypto bet - went up 2,000%. So how is performance this bad even possible? The Twitter thread speculates that just as Uber used to happily lose money on every ride in order to gain market share, A16Z is happily losing money on every investment in order to gain VC market share. But ride-sharing is a natural monopoly; how will A16Z prevent competitors from entering venture capital? And why should people give it any market share at all if it can’t make them money? Maybe their pitch could be that you’ll make less money, but it will be uncorrelated with the regular stock market? But is that true? Aren’t tech startups pretty cyclical? Also, I wonder if this was framed to their LPs as “yeah we’ll definitely lose your money for the first ten years, but eventually it’ll all work out”. They must be the most trusting people in the world.
**21:** Nathan Young has [a bird flu risk dashboard](https://birdflurisk.com/).
**22:** [Garrison Lovely argues](https://time.com/7205359/why-ai-progress-is-increasingly-invisible/) that AI progress “is becoming invisible” by focusing more on science and coding problems rather than the sort of chats and pictures that ordinary users can appreciate, leading to a false sense of calm among policy-makers and the public.
**23:** Related: 54% of the public [thinks](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1hwx6iy/the_majority_of_americans_think_agi_will_be/) AGI will be developed in the next five years.
**24:** Related: Scott Wiener, author of the SB 1047 AI safety bill, has submitted [a “placeholder bill”](https://legiscan.com/CA/text/SB53/2025) on AI safety to this session of the California legislature, suggesting that he’s going to try again. There’s some speculation that he’s waiting for Newsom’s pretend investigative panel to return their pretend results so that he can pretend to include them, making it awkward for Newsom to veto it again.
**25:** [Ten big animal welfare wins of 2024](https://farmanimalwelfare.substack.com/p/ten-big-wins-in-2024-for-farmed-animals). “Against the giant wrongs of factory farming, these wins may appear small. But for the animals affected, they’re a big deal. And they were all achieved by a small group of advocates operating with less funding than Harvard spent renovating a single residential house.” Related: [AI For Animals conference](https://www.aiforanimals.org/) in Berkeley, March 1 - 2.
**26:**
[Here](https://roseandcrownoxford.com/latest-news/17267/) is some speculation on the topic - historians’ best guess is that Henry murdered someone at Oxford, the king tried to pardon him for political reasons, and Oxford decided they weren’t on board.
**27:** Asterisk: [The Making Of Community Notes](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/08/the-making-of-community-notes). Describes the thought processes of the designers of Twitter/X Community Notes; I was most impressed by how much they bent over backwards to avoid any framing resembling “misinformation” based on data showing that this would make people view their work as partisan and trust it less.
**28:** Max Tabarrok: [AGI Will Not Make Labor Worthless](https://www.maximum-progress.com/p/agi-will-not-make-labor-worthless). Teenagers’ labor isn’t worthless, even though adults are more skilled in every way and there are ~ten times more adults than teens. So even if there were tens of billions of AIs that were better than humans at everything, human labor would retain value. The counterargument is that if AGI labor cost less than human labor and you could always build another AI, then why would you ever use humans? I think the synthesis is that there will always be a finite number of AIs, and even if it’s some very high number like a trillion, you can always use humans to do a few extra jobs after all the AIs are busy. But would these human jobs pay a trivial salary, because they’re only the trillionth most useful job? Or would they pay a decent salary, because an economy of a trillion AIs is so impressive that even its scraps are lucrative? Also, most teenagers can find work, but most severely disabled people can’t - is there some limit to how outclassed you can be before the economy stops including you? More comments and debate [at the subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1hznesq/agi_will_not_make_labor_worthless/). Related: [Philosophy Bear wants anti-AI workers movements.](https://philosophybear.substack.com/p/we-need-to-do-something-about-ai)
**29:** Claim: global fertility decline [is not caused by](https://x.com/lugaricano/status/1878001966334320983) fewer children per couple, it’s caused by decreased coupling/marriage. Back on the October links roundup, I included an article [making an opposite claim](https://www.allcatsarefemale.com/p/its-like-nobody-wants-to-give-birth). The full article for this one is gated and I can’t access it, but I hope someone else looks at it and figures out who’s right.
**30:** Related: Turkish fertility collapse:
I have the same question as [this](https://x.com/thecathguy/status/1874141415049224457) Twitter commenter - why is this even happening in Turkey, a country which I wouldn’t expect to be too plugged into Western cultural and political trends?
**31:** There’s now [an lmarena leaderboard for image models](https://lmarena.ai/?image) (I can’t link it directly for some reason, you’ll have to click through). On top is something called “Recraft V3”, I didn’t find it too impressive but apparently I’m wrong. You can test the models against each other in the associated arena.
**32:** China [has abandoned](https://toosimple.substack.com/p/wolf-warriorism-thaw) “wolf warrior diplomacy” where they insult everyone for no reason. Seems like a smart move.
**33:** I hate recommending/endorsing therapists or life coaches because they’re so hard to judge and “personal fit” is so important, but Chris Lakin [makes](https://chrislakin.com/bounty) a pretty good case for himself:
I do worry that even if you officially say “pay on results”, therapy results are naturally fuzzy and hard to assess, and it’s too aggressive to refuse to pay your life coach who’s put dozens of hours of work into your case, so most people will say “yeah, I guess that kind of worked in a sense” and pay the money (this works even better if your clients are “lifelong pushovers”). How would one design a version of this system which avoided this failure mode?
**34:** Why does China, an advanced economy, have the tap water issues that we associate with developing countries? [Maybe because](https://x.com/RnaudBertrand/status/1873552699368837448) Chinese people near-universally believe that drinking cold water makes you sick, so they all boil their water anyway, so there’s no incentive to have water that’s safe to drink without boiling. I notice there are many things like “Chinese think drinking cold water will make you sick” and “Koreans think you’ll die if you leave the fan on overnight” - is there any health belief that foreign countries make fun of Americans for? (I’m not looking for conspiracy theories about vaccines, more like something we all take for granted).
**35:** The NASDAQ [has almost doubled in the past two years](https://www.macrotrends.net/1320/nasdaq-historical-chart), so how come it doesn’t feel like we’re in an amazing tech boom? Maybe because it crashed before that and is just making up lost ground? But any way you slice it, it’s doubled in the last four.
**36:** AskReddit [gives](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/1hrrufe/whats_one_historical_fact_that_they_wont_teach/m51cd9w/) their favorite historical facts:
> The circumstances surrounding the death of Meriwether Lewis (of Lewis and Clark) are shrouded in conspiracy. In the months leading up to his death many people reported that Lewis had become paranoid, claiming that he was being followed and that his life was in danger. In a desperate attempt for help, he sent a letter to his close friend, and then president Thomas Jefferson to request an audience. While traveling along the Natchez Trace, he stayed a night at an inn. During the night, the owner reported hearing multiple gunshots but never went out to check on the source. In the morning, Lewis was found dead in his cabin, sitting against the wall looking at the door, rifle in hand and shot in the back. In addition, while the room was ransacked, the only missing objects of note were Lewis’ riding back and personal documents.
>
> After an official investigation, his death was ruled a suicide and all further inquiry into the instance have been barred by the Us government. While Lewis himself did not have any immediate descendants, his extended family have submitted requests every year to have his body exhumed in order to confirm the cause of death. To this day their requests have unanimously been denied.
Some speculation [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/1hrrufe/whats_one_historical_fact_that_they_wont_teach/m52skzk/).
**37:** In response to my post on H5N1 bird flu, [Alina Chan asked](https://x.com/Ayjchan/status/1874550348062544101) about the risk of a bird flu lab leak. Here’s [my response](https://x.com/slatestarcodex/status/1874641242786791779), [Nuno Sempere’s response](https://x.com/NunoSempere/status/1875984021886296521), and [Peter Miller’s pre-response](https://x.com/tgof137/status/1874587994579222770).
**38:** Claim [on Skeptics StackExchange](https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/55910/did-zhang-zongchang-order-each-player-in-a-basketball-game-be-given-their-own-ba), so far neither proven nor debunked:
> After seeing a basketball game for the first time, [Chinese warlord Zhang Zongchang] allegedly asked "Why the hell are they fighting over a single ball? We're the hosts. Are we seriously this poor?" He ordered all the players be given a basketball.
**39:**
Many people responded that an IQ-increasing pill would be great, which I think misses the point. Obviously it would be great - but I think the tweet succeeds at giving an analogy for the sort of nervousness people might feel about losing what makes them special.
**40:** The [kingslayer jellyfish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malo_kingi) got its name after killing American tourist Robert King in 2002.
**41:** [Using ChatGPT Is Not Bad For The Environment](https://andymasley.substack.com/p/individual-ai-use-is-not-bad-for). There’s some ~~misinformation~~ ~~disinformation~~ ~~fake news~~ ~~DAMMIT IS THERE ANY WAY OF SAYING THAT FALSE INFORMATION IS GOING VIRAL ANYMORE WITHOUT SOUNDING LIKE A POLITICAL HACK?!?~~ an incorrect claim that AI is unusually bad for the environment, especially water compared to other computer technologies, especially water. Andy Masley ~~debunks~~ ~~demolishes~~ ~~destroys~~ writes an article arguing against it, key point is conveyed by these graphs:
Or as he puts it, “If I wanted to reduce my water use by 600 gallons, I could [either] skip sending 200,000 ChatGPT queries ... [or] skip 1 burger.”
Some discussion at the site of what “consuming” water means, although not as much as I would like. My other concern is that I can’t tell whether this is inference only, or also amortizes the cost of training over all inference queries. I think it’s the former. If you did the latter, then Andy calculates 2L per kWh consumed by a data center. The last AI that we have good data for, GPT-3, ~~took 1.3 mWh to train~~ [this comment corrects me](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-january-2025/comment/86695719), GPT-4 took 250 million gallons of water to train. [This source](https://masterofcode.com/blog/chatgpt-statistics) says 10 million queries daily, let’s say its operational lifetime is one year, so about 3 billion queries total = 1/12 gallon per query = ~30 gallons per 300 queries. That’s still not as much as a hamburger, but it does suggest that just looking at inference costs is the wrong perspective.
**42:** Paul Graham has [a new essay on the causes of and possible responses to wokeness](https://paulgraham.com/woke.html). He says the short-run cause was the rise in social media and group chats, medium-run cause was the student protester generation of the 60s growing up and taking power within academia, and the long-run cause is that people will always have an urge to virtue-signal and the fall of traditional virtue-signaling categories (sexual purity, religious orthodoxy) left an unfilled niche. He recommends as a response our usual rules around religious pluralism - everyone can have a religion, but you shouldn’t bring it to work or demand orthodoxy from your employees. I think this is mostly right, but our tolerance around religion has always gotten awkward when religion has any real-world/political implications (eg the headscarf in France, Christian schools not wanting gay employees, teaching creationism, etc) and since wokeness is made entirely of real-world and political implications, our religious norms aren’t yet well-adapted to deal with it. Also, a lot of our religious pluralism norms are “just do the neutral, non-religious thing”, but wokeness thrives precisely by challenging what “neutral” is: if a studio releases ten films, and they all have white protagonists, is that “neutral”, or is it a surrender to the opposite “religion” of racism? If a woke employee demands that the studio have more films with black protagonists, were they the first one to defect, or just responding to a previous defection? If they claim it’s a business decision (“we’ll do better with minority demographics if we have some minority characters”), then it takes an active effort beyond just applying regular pluralism norms to “accuse” them of “wokeness” and mount some kind of response.
**43:** In the past, I’ve used amisulpride as an example of American drug regulation failures - it’s a good antipsychotic drug which is widely used in Europe but which patent issues have prevented pharma from bringing it to the US. Now a pharma company is [trying to bring a new variant of amisulpride that gets around the patent issues to the US](https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/lb-pharmas-twist-old-sanofi-drug-passes-schizophrenia-test-teeing-phase-3-push).
**44:** Ashlee Vance has a new tech industry Substack, [Core Memory](https://www.corememory.com/p/so-begins-core-memory-a-new-sci-tech). I enjoyed his Musk biography, and he strikes me as one of the rare people covering Silicon Valley who is neither a corporate stooge nor a reflexive anti-tech ideologue.
**45:** [The Right Looks For Converts, The Left Looks For Traitors](https://www.recoveringanarchist.ca/p/the-right-looks-for-converts-the). There’s not much in this post beyond a natural expansion of the title, but it’s a snappy phrase, and matches my observation of the past ten years with friends and contacts on both sides. But I found myself thinking about it now because, for the first time in ten years, it no longer seems to be true - the Right has gotten much more into looking for traitors (I have yet to see leftists looking for converts, but anything can happen!), and I’m getting more harassment, illiberalism, and purity testing from the right part of the blogosphere than the left. I still basically believe the [Barberpole Theory Of Fashion](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/04/22/right-is-the-new-left/) that cool people optimize their signals to separate themselves from the most obvious group of uncool annoying people in their vicinity; for a long time, that’s been SJWs and the Right has benefited, but I predict this has begun the very long process of changing (cf. Richard Hanania’s political course).
**46:** [Why Skyscrapers Became Glass Boxes](https://www.construction-physics.com/p/why-skyscrapers-became-glass-boxes). Brian Potter of Construction Physics disagrees with Tom Wolfe’s thesis (reviewed by me [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-from-bauhaus-to-our-house)) that modern architecture looks bare and boring primarily because artistic tastemakers promoted it as a style; Potter says that while something like this may have happened somewhat, the role of architects was secondary to the role of real estate developers, who were trying to cut costs. Modern skyscrapers cut costs both by directly being cheaper to build (eg save money on ornamentation) and because the walls are thinner (meaning more interior rentable space). Then the usual incentives of organizations to do what everyone else is doing and not rock the boat made stragglers go along. I appreciate Brian's extremely knowledgeable perspective. I also appreciate that he doesn't deny the modern architecture part of the story, since I think it's necessary - otherwise, you would expect very expensive "prestige" buildings like museums/opera houses/cathedrals to keep ornamentation, which isn't what happened. My remaining question for him is how much money is involved - would an ornamented skyscraper cost more like 2% more or more like 20% more? Also, Snav [replies to](https://x.com/qorprate/status/1874912242917085217) the same post.
**47:** From [Wikipedia’s bio of Jensen Huang](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jensen_Huang):
> Both Huang's aunt and uncle were recent immigrants to Washington state; they accidentally enrolled him and his brother in the Oneida Baptist Institute, a religious reform academy in Kentucky for troubled youth,mistakenly believing it to be a prestigious boarding school. Jensen's parents sold nearly all their possessions in order to afford the academy's tuition […]
>
> [He] was frequently bullied and beaten. In Oneida, Huang cleaned toilets everyday, learned to play table-tennis, joined the swimming team, and appeared in Sports Illustrated at age 14. He taught his illiterate roommate, a "17-year-old covered in tattoos and knife scars," how to read in exchange for being taught how to bench press. In 2002, Huang recalled that he remembered his life in Kentucky "more vividly than just about any other". | Scott Alexander | 154699327 | Links For January 2025 | acx |
# Highlights From The Comments On Lynn And IQ
**Shaked Koplewitz [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86311397):**
> Doesn't Lynn's IQ measure also suffer from the IQ/g discrepancy that causes the Flynn effect?
>
> That is, my understanding of the Flynn effect is that IQ doesn't exactly measure g (the true general intelligence factor) but measures some proxy that is somewhat improved by literacy/education, and for most of the 20th century those were getting better leading to improvements in apparent IQ (but not g). Shouldn't we expect sub Saharan Africans to have lower IQ relative to g (since their education and literacy systems are often terrible)?
>
> And then the part about them seeming much smarter than a first worlder with similar IQ makes sense - they'd do equally badly at tests, but in their case it's because e.g. they barely had a chance to learn to read rather than not being smart enough to think of the answer.
>
> (Or a slightly more complicated version of this - e.g. maybe they can read fine, but never had an education that encouraged them to consider counterfactuals so those just don't come naturally).
Yeah, this is the most important factor that I failed to cover in the post (I edited it in ten minutes later after commenters reminded me, but some of you got the email and didn’t see it).
For the second effect mentioned in the post - the one where Malawians are obviously smarter than intellectually disabled people - you could attribute it to any of:
1. Lynn’s data and analysis were bad.
2. Lynn’s data and analysis were fine as far as they go, but the tests he based his work off of were trivially culturally biased - for example, they asked about English vocabulary in non-English speaking countries, or math problems to people who had never learned math.
3. The tests weren’t trivially biased, but the concept of IQ itself breaks down once you try to extend it to extremely under-educated populations, and it no longer predicts things as well as you would expect.
4. The concept of IQ is fine, but you are personally miscalibrated about what low IQ means because the only very-low-IQ people in your training set had developmental disorders.
I think these probably explain 5%, 5%, 40%, and 50% of the effect respectively, and I should have been more careful to emphasize (3), which I think explains 40% of the effect.
The particular way I would flesh out 3 would be something like - if you’re illiterate and (somewhat) innumerate, you probably don’t have enough practice with symbols and complex mental operations to do even a “culture fair” IQ test like Raven’s Matrices. This doesn’t necessarily mean that your IQ is *higher* than the Raven’s Matrices says - the person who underperforms on Ravens for this reason will also underperform on a wide variety of other abstract/intellectual/symbolic tasks, and this is part of what IQ means. But it means that Raven’s IQ won’t predict concrete tasks as well as you would expect.
**Fujimura [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86311584):**
> The other major factor that I think should be reassuring about Lynn's estimates (and other cross-national IQ estimates) is that when you look at "non-problematic" sources that seem like proxies for IQ (e.g. World Bank data, educational performance), you see the same pattern as Lynn and others' IQ data.
>
> It's easy for people to quibble about each and every IQ measure (and so people do), but that we see the same pattern of results using otherwise uncontroversial data sources should be reassuring.
Yeah, many people tried to gotcha me with claims that Lynn did this or that or the other thing wrong. Lynn tries to defend his methodology [here](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160289609001275), but I think (and tried to argue in the post) that at this point, that debate is of historical interest only - there’s too much confirmation now. One commenter brings up World Bank [Harmonized Learning Outcomes](https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064204/Global-Dataset-of-Country-Learning-Outcome) as an example. Another points me to [this preprint](https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/bx86g), which tries to update Lynn’s numbers using all modern standardized testing data and correlations with social development index and GDP. They find mostly similar numbers to Lynn: Malawi goes from 60 → 66, and new last place goes to Sao Tome & Principe at 62. This is by people affiliated with Lynn and scientific racism, and you can choose not to trust their judgment either, but I think at least the SDI correlations are an extremely simple regression that it would be hard to fake. This kind of stuff is why I think simple failures of data collection and analysis are unlikely to explain more than 5% of the gap with our common sense. There’s definitely something weird about these numbers, but it’s got to be more complicated than just “racist people screwed up the test”.
But continuing on this subject - if IQ has two components, why would World Bank education data and GDP track the abstract/symbolic component of IQ, rather than the practical component of IQ? Or, rather, it’s obvious why this would happen in education. But why would GDP track abstract/symbolic rather than practical?
One possible answer is that the causal pathway is high GDP → lots of education → lots of practice with abstract reasoning → high abstract/symbolic IQ. I don’t think this can be the whole story, because some countries that “cheated” to get high GDP (eg oil sheikhdoms) can’t translate it into IQ points at the same rate as everyone else. I’m stuck with the boring basic explanation that maybe you need to do a lot of abstract reasoning tasks to get high GDP.
**Harzerkatze [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86312629):**
> [Your claim that blacks everywhere should have the same genes] is far from true. While "white" may be a descriptor for a group of somewhat similar genetic backgrounds, having common ancestors not too far in the past, "black" is different, grouping populations of similar skin color, but common ancestors diverging way further back in time.
Yeah, I didn’t want to get into all of this on the post, but I agree the way I phrased it was misleading.
Lynn and other national IQ estimates find very low IQs for all sub-Saharan African countries - I mentioned Malawi at 60 in the post, but Nigeria, on the other side of Africa, is 69. Whatever is going on there is a pan-African problem, such that I don’t think differences between African groups are very relevant.
US blacks are mostly descended from people in west Africa, eg Nigeria. Some people also brought up that US blacks have significant white admixture. This is true but it’s still not enough to be relevant to this discussion. If we assumed everything was genetic and US blacks with their ~20% white admixture had genetic IQ of 85, we would still expect African blacks to have IQ in the low 80s. However you parse it, there’s got to be some kind of health/education/environment effect going on there.
Africa is extremely genetically diverse, but I think most of the countries measured in the paper, including Malawi, are some variety of Niger-Congo speakers, who I don’t think are that much more diverse than white people or anyone else. The really interesting African ethnicities, like the Khoi-San, don’t show up as much at a national level.
**Andrew Clough [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86319632):**
> Speaking of charity and IQ, the lowest of low hanging fruit is putting iodine in salt. You can donate to the Global Iodine Network like I do for the long term benefit of poorer countries without worrying you're just delaying Malthus's reemergence. Givewell calls Salt Iodization "slightly below the range of cost-effectiveness of the opportunities that we expect to direct marginal donations to" which in the grand scheme of things is quite good.
Yeah, salt iodization is great. I had always heard of iodine related problems being concentrated in central Asia and especially Afghanistan, but looking at the map…
([source](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iodine_deficiency_world_map-DALYs_per_million_persons-WHO2012.svg))
… sub-Saharan Africa is also a hot spot.
I wonder what’s wrong in Cuba - this is exactly the sort of easily gameable metric I would usually expect them to be good at, or at least carefully faking.
If you’re interested, you can [donate to Iodine Global Network here.](https://ign.org/)
**Bob Jacobs [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86319730):**
> *> His opponents pointed out both his personal racist opinions/activities*
>
> That's the mildest possible way you could've put it. He wasn't someone who had "personal racist opinions" that he kept as "personal racist opinions". He was the editor-in-chief of Mankind Quarterly, a white supremacist journal that was founded by people like:
>
> Henry Garrett an American psychologist who testified in favor of segregated schools during Brown versus Board of Education, Corrado Gini who was president of the Italian genetics and eugenics Society in fascist Italy, and Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer who was director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of anthropology human heredity and eugenics in Nazi Germany. He was a member of the Nazi Party and the mentor of Josef Mengele, the physician at the Auschwitz concentration camp infamous for performing human experimentation on the prisoners during World War 2. Mengele provided for Verschuer with human remains from Auschwitz to use in his research into eugenics.
>
> It's funded by the pioneer fund, an organization he was a board member of and that has been classified as a white supremacist hate group, with one of its first projects being to fund the distribution in US churches and schools of "Erbkrank", a Nazi propaganda film about eugenics.
>
> He's not just called racist, he \*is\* racist, he even describes \*himself\* as a racist.
No contesting any of this.
**MM [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86321172):**
> I spent 18 months in a country where people are supposed to have an iq of about 70, according to the map. My neighbors and friends were mostly non-literate. They did not seem less intelligent than the people I know in my current (US) neighborhood or the people I grew up with (in the US). Most of them would not have performed well on IQ tests, though. They'd never attended school and had no familiarity with puzzle-solving. This was 35 years ago and most people had not seen movies or even photographs. I remember sitting with one older woman and helping her interpret a black-and-white photograph: this is the arm, here's where it connects to the body, etc. It's hard for people from literate societies with tons of exposure to text & graphical representations to see the extent of the gap.
**Calvin [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86329434):**
> I have a decent amount of experience with the intellectually disabled, and saying "cognitive issues are only responsible for a small part of the [communication] deficit" is so wrong that it makes me question everything else in this essay. Trust me, even making allowances for poor hearing or difficulty forming words, the cognitive issues are responsible for 90% of the deficit. An IQ of 60 is really low and it's a significant handicap.
I was concerned to hear this - I have a little experience with the intellectually disabled, but it didn’t involve knowing people’s exact IQ, so I’m not very well-calibrated here.
Looking for more information, I found <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-01.htm>, which purports to describe the characteristics of very low IQ people, mostly in the context of criminal justice (where lawyers often try to use a client’s low IQ as a mitigating factor - ie maybe he didn’t truly understand that crime is wrong). The report says things like:
> Although all persons with mental retardation have significantly impaired mental development, their intellectual level can vary considerably. An estimated 89 percent of all people with retardation have I.Q.s in the 51-70 range. An I.Q. in the 60 to 70 range is approximately the scholastic equivalent to the third grade […]
>
> Although mental retardation of any degree has profound implications for a person's cognitive and social development, it is a condition which in many cases is not readily apparent. While some of the mentally retarded, such as those whose retardation is caused by Down's syndrome or fetal alcohol syndrome, have characteristically distinctive facial features, most cannot be identified by their physical appearance alone. Unless their cognitive impairment is unusually severe (e.g. an I.Q. below 40), persons with mental retardation may be thought of as "slow" but the full extent of their impairment is often not readily appreciated, particularly by people who have limited contact with or knowledge of them, including police, prosecutors, judges, and other participants in the criminal justice system. Many capital offenders with mental retardation did not have their condition diagnosed until trial or during post-conviction proceedings.
And gave some examples (slightly out of order for this list):
> Oliver Cruz, who was executed in Texas on August 9, 2000, had an I.Q. that was measured variously at 64 and 76. Cruz nonetheless insisted to reporters that, although he was perhaps "slow in reading, slow in learning," he was not mentally retarded.
>
> Mitigation specialist Scharlette Holdman recalled a client who so successfully hid his retardation from his attorneys that he allowed them to sign him up for college-level calculus classes, which he could not comprehend. He had gone through much of his schooling allowing his younger sister to complete his homework for him. When he was given papers to read in connection to his case, he would carefully stare at them. If he was asked a substantive question, he usually responded, "I don't recall." Only when experts in retardation evaluated him and investigators reviewed his school records and spoke to his family did lawyers discover he had mental retardation and had been considered "slow" since his early childhood.
>
> Another capital defendant "hid his mental retardation for most of his life by working at a very repetitive job as a switcher on the railroad. He lied about finishing high school. He was actually in special education classes and did not finish the sixth grade. He was drafted into the army and discharged because of his mental retardation. He lied about his service record. He often made things up so that people would not suspect mental retardation."
>
> Morris Mason, whose I.Q. was 62-66, was executed in 1985 in Virginia after being convicted of rape and murder. Before his execution, Mason asked one of his legal advisors for advice on what to wear to his funeral
>
> As one psychiatrist testified about a capital defendant with an I.Q. of between 35 to 45: "[People with mental retardation try] to go along with people that they suspect are in authority. For example, I asked [the defendant] where we were when I saw him, and he obviously didn't know, so I asked him if we were in Atlanta and he said `Yes, we are in Atlanta.' In fact, we were in Birmingham, Alabama. I could have said New York and he would have said `Sure, New York'
These people are obviously not going to win Nobels anytime soon. But even the guy with IQ 35 - 45 was still talking to people. I think this supports the thesis that intellectually disabled people without specific syndromes can seem pretty normal most of the time.
(though keep in mind that anything from the court system should be treated with a grain of salt - defense attorneys have an incentive to exaggerate the intellectual disability of their clients in the hopes that it gets them a lighter sentence)
**Lyman Stone [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86337731):**
> Emil's post isn't correct, however.
>
> We know from the recent Reich lab paper on long-run genetic selection that there was strong selection for IQ in the neolithic revolution, which implies agriculture strongly selects for IQ and ability to plan.
>
> Malawians are 60-80% subsistence farmers.
>
> Even a "normal" low-IQ person cannot do the implied math and long-term planning involved in this kind of farming. And in fact, economists routinely find that African small-plot subsistence agriculture is actually highly optimized; farmers make very precise choices about where to plant which seeds, which fertilizer to use, etc. Key point is basically: it really isn't true that an IQ 60 person can run a farm functionally.
>
> Moreover, mean IQ of 60 implies large shares even lower, at ranges that are uniformly nonverbal even without specific disability. And this is why in the actual record-level NIQ database, they truncate estimates below 60, because even the database managers realize these estimates are crazy.
>
> See my post here: <https://substack.com/home/post/p-154757665>
We know that people with extremely low IQs *in the Flynn sense* must be capable of subsistence agriculture, because pre-Flynn Effect, most of the West had extremely low IQs, and they were all doing subsistence agriculture.
How is this possible? Responding to Lyman’s comment, I wrote:
> I stick to the claim in this post - that our estimates for what a very low IQ means are poorly-grounded, and that people with low IQs can do some pretty impressive things, especially if they're concrete and part of a cultural transmission package. Maybe this is the Joseph Henrich "Secret Of Our Success" thing. We know that Malawians get poor test scores in school, so it seems like there's some disconnect between do-well-on-tests intelligence and run-a-subsistence-farm intelligence, and the abstract/concrete and novel/cultural distinctions are the best explanation that I can think of.
>
> You say that "the phenotype that arises from a given tested IQ in America is clearly vastly worse than the phenotype arising from the same tested IQ in Africa", which I basically agree with. I think part of it is the syndromes issue raised above, and part of it is that maybe Malawians have zero contact with the culture of abstraction that IQ tests come out of whereas even very uneducated Westerners have some contact with it, and maybe another part of it is that whatever health/nutrition issues the Malawians have preferentially harm faculties responsible for more abstract tasks rather than more concrete ones.
>
> For an opposite data point, when I was in Haiti, my boss told me (secondhand, no personal experience) of extreme difficulties working with Haitians, like that they couldn't alphabetize files even when that was explained to them. Many Haitains are also successfuly subsistence farmers, so I think this also supports some kind of heavy abstract/concrete distinction.
>
> I don't think we're really disagreeing, just agreeing on something like the correlations that make up IQ being less valid outside the normal range.
Maybe one way to look at it is to go back to the claim from the justice system document above, saying that people with IQ in the 60s are the mental equivalent of third-graders. The third-graders I know are very into Pokemon, and have all sorts of opinions on how if you add X bonus to a Y strength fire-type Pokemon and then play Z combo, it will [commence six weeks of droning on about different Pokemon cards]. Is this the sort of math/reasoning/strategizing that we don’t expect someone with IQ 60 to be able to do? Does the fact that third-graders can do it mean that we’re miscalibrated? I’m not sure.
The part of Lyman’s comment that gives me the most pause is his observation that, if the mean IQ is 60, a decent fraction of people must be 45, and a non-negligible portion 30. At this point, even third-grader comparisons don’t save us. I guess this is where I bring in the claim that IQ breaks down as a guide to practical living skills below some point.
You can see several more layers of response between me and Lyman [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-to-stop-worrying-and-learn-to/comment/86397491), but I was especially grateful for him teaching me two things I didn’t already know:
* First, he corrected my misconception about Reich on ancient European cognitive evolution. Reich had said that pre-agriculture Europeans were “2-3 standard deviations” below moderns. I had interpreted that as IQ deviations of 15 points, making them genetic IQ 55-70, which would have been pretty crazy. Stone tells me he actually meant PGS deviations, each of which was about 3-4 IQ points, so he’s claiming that pre-agriculture Europeans had genetic IQ of 90 (they probably also had lower IQ for environmental reasons).,
* Second, he [linked a post of his](https://substack.com/home/post/p-154757665) where he found that, although IQ accurately predicts GDP at each time point, changes in IQ don’t predict changes in GDP, suggesting something weird is happening. I think the weird thing is the improvement in the abstract/symbolic/”test-taking” aspect of IQ separate from the practical aspect, mentioned above.
**Final Comments/Conclusion:**
I should have been more careful to highlight the possibility that the subcomponents of IQ come apart at the tails and that this explains some of the effect. I didn’t do that partly because I thought it was closely related to the developmental syndromes point (which is a specific example of how things can come apart at the tails), partly because I expected people to misinterpret it as “IQ is meaningless and nothing is correlated with anything”, and partly because I don’t understand the correlations of different subcomponents with each other and g and practical skills to have a good opinion here. Still, I could have at least said “Maybe academic and practical skills come apart”.
Maybe I should have had a stronger opinion on whether Lynn’s exact studies were correct? Certainly lots of commenters had strong opinions that they weren’t. I had hoped that linking the Aporia article would be a sufficient pointer to my opinion that, while Lynn’s work was a first effort and far from perfect, the general thrust (including surprisingly low IQs in sub-Saharan African countries) has been confirmed by later research which is harder to bias. Maybe it would have been less controversial if I had just asked why sub-Saharan Africa has surprisingly low school test scores, but then nobody would have a good sense of what school test scores were normal vs. surprising and nobody would have cared.
I’m interested in learning more about Lyman Stone’s claim that changes in IQ don’t predict changes in development level. This could mean that development causes IQ (through education), but that sometimes you can get IQ through other means (like an extreme pro-education push by a poor country), and this doesn’t itself cause development. Or it could mean that countries have a real (genetic?) IQ and a fake (educational?) IQ, and the GDP only depends on the real IQ (but then how come Africa, which everyone agrees is underperforming its genetics, is in the expected place on the IQ/GDP correlation?) Or it could mean that the changes are fake, and changes in fake data don’t affect real GDP (but really? No country has ever really changed its IQ? Doesn’t that contradict our suspicion from the African data that something about education must be involved?) | Scott Alexander | 154931139 | Highlights From The Comments On Lynn And IQ | acx |
# How To Stop Worrying And Learn To Love Lynn's National IQ Estimates
Richard Lynn was a scientist who infamously tried to estimate the average IQ of every country. Typical of his results is [this paper](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160289610000450), which ranged from 60 (Malawi) to 108 (Singapore).
Lynn’s national IQ estimates ([source](https://viewoniq.org/?p=41))
People obviously objected to this, and Lynn spent his life embroiled in controversy, with activists constantly trying to get him canceled/fired and his papers retracted/condemned. His opponents pointed out both his personal racist opinions/activities and his somewhat opportunistic methodology. Nobody does high-quality IQ tests on the entire population of Malawi; to get his numbers, Lynn would often find some IQ-ish test given to some unrepresentative sample of some group related to Malawians and try his best to extrapolate from there. How well this worked remains hotly debated; the latest volley is *Aporia*’s [Are Richard Lynn’s National IQ Estimates Flawed?](https://www.aporiamagazine.com/p/are-richard-lynns-national-iq-estimates) (they say no).
I’ve followed the technical/methodological debate for a while, but I think the strongest emotions here come from two deeper worries people have about the data:
**First**, isn’t it horribly racist to say that people in sub-Saharan African countries have IQs that would qualify as an intellectual disability anywhere else?
**Second**, isn’t it preposterous and against common sense to compare sub-Saharan Africans to the intellectually disabled? You can talk to a Malawian person, and talk to a person with Down’s Syndrome, and the former is obviously much brighter and more functional than the latter. Doesn’t that mean that the estimates *have to* be wrong?
But both of these have simple answers, which IMHO defuse the worrying nature of Lynn’s results. These answers aren’t original to me, but as far as I know, nobody has put them together in one place before. Going over each in turn:
**1:** **Isn't It Super-Racist To Say That People In Sub-Saharan African Countries Have IQs Equivalent To Intellectually Disabled People?**
No. In fact, it would be super-racist *not* to say this! We shouldn’t conflate advocacy with science. But if we did, Lynn’s position would make better anti-racist advocacy than his detractors’.
The “racist” position is that all IQ differences between groups are genetic. The “anti-racist” position is that they’re a product of environment - things like nutrition, health care, and education.
We know that in the US, where we do give people good IQ tests, whites average IQ 100 and blacks average IQ 85.
If IQ was 100% genetic, we should expect Africans to have an IQ of 85, since American and African blacks have similar genes. This isn’t exactly right - US blacks have some intermixing with whites, and only some of Africa’s staggering diversity reached the US - but it’s close enough.
(don’t worry too much about West African vs. East African ethnic differences here - Lynn’s IQ estimates for both regions are similar).
But if IQ was 100% environmental, we should expect populations’ IQ to vary based on the quality of nutrition, health care, and education that they get. Therefore, because whites in the US have IQ 100, and blacks get on average worse nutrition, health care, and education than whites, we would expect them to have some lower IQ, like 85.
If there were some group that got even worse nutrition, health care, and education than US blacks, we should expect them (under the environmentalist hypothesis) to have an IQ even lower than 85. How much lower? It depends how bad the nutrition/health/education are.
Which gap in nutrition/health/education is bigger - the gap between US whites and US blacks, or the gap between US blacks and Malawian blacks? It’s the US/Malawi one, right? US whites and blacks eat about the same number of calories; they often go to the same hospitals and attend the same schools. Meanwhile, in Malawi, children still [sometimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_security_in_Malawi) starve to death, [30%](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31604429/) of the population is infected by parasitic worms, and only [40%](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/Education-Fact-Sheet-2021.pdf) of students graduate the eighth grade. So under the environmental hypothesis of IQ, we should expect Malawians to be more than 15 IQ points behind black Americans. If Lynn is right and Malawi has an IQ of 60, then they’re 25 IQ points behind black Americans.
If you take anti-racism seriously, this should make you breath a sigh of relief! This finding on its own doesn’t disprove a genetic component to racial IQ gaps. But it does suggest that the genetic component is less than 100%. Practically nobody ever claimed it was 100% (Charles Murray estimates 50%), so this doesn’t refute anyone in particular. But it’s consistent with what both sides of the debate say, and a natural prediction of the environmentalist position.
On the other hand, if we doubt Lynn and insist Malawi must have a true IQ in the 80s, then the environmentalist argument falls apart and we should insist on a genetic one.
**2:** **Can’t You Talk To A Malawian And An Intellectually Disabled Person And Notice That The Former Is Obviously More Functional Than The Latter?**
Thanks to Emil Kirkegaard for [the blog post](https://www.emilkirkegaard.com/p/african-iqs-and-mental-retardation) that finally cleared this up for me.
Kirkegaard explains that when we think of intellectually disabled people we’ve met, we’re usually thinking of people with some specific syndrome - often Down’s Syndrome, fetal alcohol syndrome, or severe autism. These people have abnormally low IQ. But their syndromes also cause motor deficits, executive function deficits, emotional processing deficits, and many other forms of deficit.
For example, people with Down’s Syndrome may have trouble speaking, or speak abnormally. But this is primarily because Down Syndrome affects hearing (through ear structure abnormalities) and speech production (through tongue/mouth/chest abnormalities). The cognitive issues are only responsible for a small part of the deficit.
Likewise, people with severe autism might be prone to violence, but this is because their sensory issues are constantly irritating them until they melt down. Normal very-low-IQ people don’t have as much of an excess predisposition to violence.
A normal person with 60 IQ will seem . . . normal. If you try to engage in difficult conversation, they won’t be able to follow, but most of them can do simple low-IQ jobs like manual labor, basic retail, or writing for the *New York Times*. A country centered around people at this level may not win any space races, but it can certainly continue to exist.
This is a specific example of the general problem that all of these questions rely on a network of correlations. Some of these are the implied correlations between IQ and other things (like speech production) that we rarely think about or question. Others are the correlations *within* the concept of IQ - how well does it correlate with overall mental horsepower, versus get contaminated by a person’s level of cultural exposure to abstract thinking? Most studies have shown that - within the developed world - IQ is a pretty stable and unitary concept. Once you start looking at people with much less exposure to education and abstract problems than you ever see in the West, some of these correlations break down. It’s still not great to have a low IQ - it means you don’t have enough experience with education to solve the kinds of abstract problems that you might encounter in math, business, critical thinking, etc. But it might not be the exact constellation of deficits we would expect.
(everything about the correlation of IQ with *g* is extremely complicated and I don’t want to positively assert that this previous paragraph is true - just hold it out as a strong possibility)
Overall I think Lynn’s IQ data is, in some sense, reason for optimism. The large difference between sub-Saharan Africans in developed countries (eg the US) and in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that the latter aren’t performing at their genetic peak, and that developmental interventions - again, nutrition, health care, and education - are likely to work.
There’s probably a bidirectional relationship between national IQ and development; development improves nutrition/health/education and boosts IQ, but IQ allows more advanced industries and boosts development. It’s unclear how strong each direction is, but probably the IQ → development direction is greater than zero. Even if you’re generally skeptical of charity because all good things come from development, Lynn’s IQ estimates suggest there’s lots of room for charitable nutrition/health/education interventions to work. | Scott Alexander | 153971411 | How To Stop Worrying And Learn To Love Lynn's National IQ Estimates | acx |
# Subscrive Drive '25 + Free Unlocked Posts
Astral Codex Ten has a [paid subscription option](https://www.astralcodexten.com/subscribe?). Once a year, I try to convince you to take it. You pay $10 (or $2.50 if you’re a student or you can’t afford the regular price) per month, and get:
* Extra articles (usually 1-2 per month)
* A Hidden Open Thread every week
* Access to the occasional Ask Me Anythings I do with subscribers
* Early access to some draft posts
* The warm glow of supporting the blog.
The history of ACX paid subscriptions looks like this:
There was a strong burst of support when I started the blog and it got covered in NYT. Subscriptions gradually increased over the first year, since some new people were joining and no old people were leaving.
After one year, the original burst of support started leaving or auto-canceling or having their credit cards expire, and this was enough to more than counteract all new subscriptions. ACX has been losing subscribers year-on-year from 2022 until present, although over the past few months it seems to have been leveling out.
I’m financially well-off and don’t immediately need your money to survive. But last month I ran into [Razib Khan](https://www.razibkhan.com/), he asked me how much my paid subscriptions had gone up over the past year, and I had to sheepishly admit they had slightly decreased. I’m not saying you should subscribe *just* so I can win conversations with Razib. I’m trying to stress that anyone with any financial insecurity whatsoever shouldn’t feel pressured to fund me - but, simultaneously, that it would make me happy to do better than breakeven, and that financially comfortable people can fund me if they want.
With apologies to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/much-better-awful-can-be-better)
If you subscribe, you’ll get access to subscriber-only posts. Last year, those were:
1. [Your Name Was Changed At Ellis Island](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-name-was-changed-at-ellis-island), short fiction based on [the claim](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2024/01/no-ones-name-was-changed-at-ellis-island.html) that nobody’s name was really changed at Ellis Island.
2. [Links At Length: Democratic Socialists’ Budget Crisis](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-at-length-democratic-socialists). Haha, socialists bad with money, but can we learn anything more interesting from this?
3. [Contra](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-the-atlantic-on-polyamory) *[The Atlantic](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-the-atlantic-on-polyamory)* [On Polyamory](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-the-atlantic-on-polyamory), in which I disagree with an ocean about nonmonogamous love
4. [Explicit Honesty](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/explicit-honesty). Is there a sweet spot between life-ruining “radical honesty” and the normal thing where nobody knows what’s a “white lie”?
5. [Contra Hoel On Nerd Culture](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-hoel-on-nerd-culture). When and why did “nerd movies” (eg Star Wars, Marvel) become so dominant?
6. [The Mistakes Are All Waiting To Be Made](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-mistakes-are-all-waiting-to-be). Reflections on parenthood, 0 - 6 months edition.
7. [Subscriber Bonus Debate Questions](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/subscriber-bonus-debate-questions). Some extra questions from my mock presidential debate.
8. [How Do We Rate The Importance Of Historical Figures?](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-do-we-rate-the-importance-of) Seemingly unresolvable philosophical/methodological problems with those lists that purport to say that Napoleon was the 13th most important historical figure (or whatever). This might be the most pointlessly autistic thing I’ve ever written, so I’m very proud of it.
9. [Mostleastremarkablegate And The Nature Of Online Harassment](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/mostleastremarkablegate-and-the-nature). A pundit who rose to fame by saying things like “the orange fuckface wants his tiny hands up your uterus", the people who hate him, the people who hate *those* people, and so on forever.
10. [Game Theory Of Michigan Muslims](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/game-theory-of-michigan-muslims). If Muslims hate Biden for being too pro-Israel, but Trump is even more pro-Israel, should they vote Trump instead of Biden to prove that Biden needs them?
11. [The Innocent And The Beautiful Have No Enemy But Time](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-innocent-and-the-beautiful-have). Reflections on parenthood, 6 - 12 month edition.
12. [Can You Hate Everyone In Rome?](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/can-you-hate-everyone-in-rome) How should we interpret claims like “You can’t hate people for voting Trump, that would mean hating 50% of the population!”
To whet your appetite, I’m unlocking two old subscriber-only posts: [Henrietta Lacks Seems Like A Nice Person, But Not A Scientific Hero](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/henrietta-lacks-seems-like-a-nice) and [Book Review: Cyropaedia](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-cyropaedia). Everyone should now be able to read these.
A common folktale involves a deal with the Devil - some shmuck gets everything he ever wanted, and the only catch is that he must leave one copper coin outside on New Years’ every year. Of course, one year he’s so busy enjoying his infinite luxury that he forgets, so the Devil takes his soul. The modern version of this is “if you subscribe once, you can read everything in the archives, but if you forget to unsubscribe afterwards, you’ll pay money every month forever”. I like my chances with this, so go ahead and try it if you want - in addition to the twelve posts above, you’ll get [twelve from 2023](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/subscrive-drive-2024-free-unlocked), another [twelve from 2022](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/2023-subscription-drive-free-unlocked), and so on for a total of 54 new ACX posts. And all you have to do is remember to unsubscribe later. Muahahaha.
You can subscribe here:
[Subscribe now](https://www.astralcodexten.com/subscribe?)
If you need the student / financial hardship discount, and for some reason it doesn’t show up at the button above, you can get it [here](http://astralcodexten.substack.com/932d293e). | Scott Alexander | 154618303 | Subscrive Drive '25 + Free Unlocked Posts | acx |
# Open Thread 364
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. | Scott Alexander | 154699243 | Open Thread 364 | acx |
# Bureaucracy Isn't Measured In Bureaucrats
An old tweet from Vivek Ramaswamy, now co-head of the Department of Government Efficacy:
([source](https://x.com/VivekGRamaswamy/status/1723743653816836377))
I was surprised to see someone with such experience in the pharmaceutical industry say this, because it goes against how I understood the FDA to work.
My model goes:
1. FDA procedures require certain bureaucratic tasks to be completed before approving drugs. Let’s abstract this into “processing 1,000 forms”.
2. Suppose they have 100 bureaucrats, and each bureaucrat can process 10 forms per year.
3. Seems like they can approve 1 drug per year.
4. If you fire half the bureaucrats, now they can only approve one drug every 2 years.
5. That’s worse!
A few years ago, [I debated Kevin Drum](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/contra-drum-on-the-fish-oil-story) about (what I considered) a particularly egregious case where the FDA dragged its feet approving a life-saving medication. Drum argued that the FDA had behaved well. In support, he found some quotes from the doctor working on the medication, who praised all the FDA bureaucrats she had interacted with, calling them extremely helpful. This bothered me for a while, until I realized that *of course* it was true. In the model above, each bureaucrat processes ten forms. If the bureaucrats are benevolent, this might look like talking to the doctors, walking them through the process of figuring out their ten forms, and doing the work to add their ten forms to the FDA’s growing pile of evidence supporting the application.
All of this co-exists comfortably with the insight that making doctors fill out a thousand forms before they can use a medication is an impediment to medical progress.
This really sunk in for me when I read an article about the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban in 2021. Many Afghans had collaborated with the Americans, eg as translators, in exchange for a promise of US citizenship. As the Taliban advanced, they called in the promise, begging to be allowed to flee to America before they got punished as traitors. The article focused on a heroic effort by certain immigration bureaucrats, who worked around the clock with minimal sleep for the last few weeks before Kabul fell, trying to get the citizenship forms filled in and approved for as many translators as possible. It made an impression on me because nobody was opposed to the translators getting citizenship, and the bureaucrats were themselves the people in charge of approving citizenship applications, so what exactly was forcing them to go to such desperate lengths? If you ponder this question long enough, you become enlightened about the nature of the administrative state.
If you don’t, you end up like Ramaswamy, who seems to think that halving the number of bureaucrats will halve the number of forms that need to be filled out. I think in his worldview, the FDA will think “Now that we have fewer bureaucrats, it would take forever to complete our current process, so let’s simplify the process.”
Maybe he is working off a thesis where red tape expands to consume the resources available to it (as measured in bureaucrats). But my impression is that the amount of red tape is determined more by things like:
*— How likely is it that their decision will get challenged in court?*
And if it gets challenged in court, what amount of paperwork do they have to show the judge to prove that they made the decision on a “reasonable basis”?
For example, when I type “FDA sued” into Google, the top result is [a news story from a few days ago](https://www.food-safety.com/articles/10025-lawsuit-filed-against-fda-for-failure-to-remove-phthalates-from-food-contact-materials), saying that an environmental organization sued the FDA for not listening to their earlier request to ban phthalates from food.
Six years ago, the environmental groups submitted a petition (the catchily-named “Food Additive Petition 6B4815”) demanding that the FDA ban 28 phthalates. Two years ago, after consulting with industry, the FDA finally banned 23 phthalates but said that the other five were okay, releasing [a 58 page decision](https://earthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/fda_phthalates_decision_may_2022.pdf) explaining its decision. Two days ago, the environmental groups sued, saying the remaining 5 phthalates are still bad.
I assume the lawsuit will nitpick the details of the the 58 page decision, trying to prove that it it didn’t violate any of hundreds of federal laws saying that bureaucratic decisions must be reasonable, bureaucratic decisions must be based on science, bureaucratic decisions must respond to the petitioners’ complaints, bureaucratic decisions cannot have disparate impacts on different races, etc. I also assume that if the FDA *had* banned all the phthalates, they would have faced an equally serious lawsuit from Big Phthalate saying they were unfairly crippling business.
Why does it take six years to respond to a petition? My guess is because they knew they would get sued and so they have some sort of million-step process that addresses every single thing you can sue over, so that they can prove to the court that their process addresses all possible complaints and they followed it to the letter.
If you cut their bureaucrats in half, that doesn’t mean there will be fewer steps in the process. It means they’ll keep wanting not to get sued, the process will stay the same, and everything will take twice as long.
*— What has Congress mandated that they do?*
For example, when I Google “Congressional FDA mandate”, I get a page on HR 7248, a bill currently making its way through Congress, which says:
> This bill requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to establish a process that supports nonclinical testing methods for drug development that do not involve the use of animals.
>
> Specifically, the FDA must establish a pathway by which entities may apply to have nonclinical testing methods approved for use in a particular context. Qualifying methods must be intended to replace or reduce animal testing and to either improve the safety and efficacy of nonclinical testing or reduce the time to develop a drug. The FDA must issue its decision within 180 days of receiving an application. The FDA must also prioritize the review of applications for drugs that are developed using an approved nonclinical testing method.
>
> The FDA must annually post a report on its website that summarizes the results of the bill's implementation, including the number of applications received, types of methods that were approved, and the estimated number of animals saved as result of these methods.
So the FDA has to establish this process and post an annual report on its website. How many bureaucrats per year does this take? Maybe five? If you halve the number of people at the FDA, you still need a constant five bureaucrats to comply with this particular law.
If the bill passes, the FDA comes up with a nonclinical testing process, and someone (eg the nonclinical testing industry) doesn’t think it’s good enough, they can sue the FDA for not following the law. How good a nonclinical testing process will the FDA need in order to avoid lawsuits under this bill? I assume there is a large body of administrative law answering that question, and that it will take many bureaucrats to figure this out.
Finally, I admit I’m a bit confused by this. IIRC “nonclinical testing” refers to things like testing drugs on stem cells or artificial organs instead of humans. You can obviously do this for some parts of the drug testing process, but not others; the FDA has already adjusted for this and integrated it into their guidelines to some extent. I can’t tell whether this law is a righteous attempt to correct bureaucratic foot-dragging, or a powergrab by Big Nonclinical Testing demanding that the FDA privilege their products over other forms of experiment. If the latter, the FDA may try to come up with some fake pathway that satisfies the letter of the law without really giving Big Nonclinical Testing any unfair privileges, and Big Nonclinical Testing will probably sue and say it violates this bill. How many bureaucrats do you think it will take to manage *that*?
*— How much will they get yelled at if they take too long to approve drugs, vs. if they mistakenly approve a bad drug?*
This is the basic determinant of all FDA drug approvals.
Halving the number of FDA bureaucrats wouldn’t have literally zero effect on this balance. It would mean that approving new drugs would be delayed twice as long. This would be a little more outrageous than the current delay, and might shift an outrage-minimizing FDA director slightly in the direction of cutting rules. But solve for the equilibrium: there would still be more delay than there is now. Also, I don’t think public outrage about long drug delays is linear with regard to delay, and public outrage at bad drugs is constant and large. So I think at best, firing bureaucrats would shift this balance a small amount, and only by making everything overall worse.
**II.**
One possible objection: this assumes that the average bureaucracy is like the FDA drug approval process. But the FDA drug approval process’ job is to approve things. Maybe the average bureaucracy’s job is to ban things. Then decreasing their capacity would be good.
(Vivek gets to be main example here because he tweeted, but the same considerations apply to Elon: even though the government as a whole is delaying SpaceX rocket launches, individual bureaucrats might be speeding them up through the same 1000-forms logic as in the FDA case)
There’s certainly a spectrum from the most approval-focused bureaucracies to the most ban-focused bureaucracies. Thinking hard about this spectrum would be a step up from “instantly” firing 50% of all bureaucrats based on social security number. So maybe a steelman of Vivek’s point would be to fire 50% of people in the ban-focused bureaucracies (and maybe double the number of people in the approval-focused ones?)
I’m still skeptical that this is how it works. The past few years [have seen the cryptocurrency industry demand regulation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-05-28/regulate-crypto-even-libertarians-should-support-this-bill), and the government mostly fail to step up (though crypto businesses [hope](https://www.marketplace.org/2024/11/11/crypto-industry-trump-cryptocurrency-regulations-rules/) the Trump administration will do better). Why do crypto businesses want to be regulated more? Because the alternative is something where it’s not clear what’s legal and anyone could be sued or shut down at any time. The chief legal officer of Coinbase, from the second link:
> All of us are begging for sensible standards that would allow us to get back to building great products and services and spend less time and frankly, less money, arguing over legal definitions and statutes.
This isn’t because anyone specifically banned crypto. It’s because there are bans on other things (like unlicensed securities, money laundering, etc) that crypto is vaguely related to, sometimes an agency regulating these things will tell a crypto company “sorry, we think you’re illegal”, and crypto wants some specific list of things it can follow that explicitly establish it as on the right side of money-laundering and security-licensing laws. Obviously industries would prefer that these be simple and easy standards (“oh, don’t worry, you don’t have to worry about money laundering if you’re a crypto company”), but they would settle for strict regulations as long as the regulations carve out some ability for them exist at all.
I’ve seen the same thing play out in another area I follow, cultured meat. There are many laws about what meat you can and cannot sell, how the animals have to be treated, what the sanitation standards are, et cetera. Some of these standards make no sense when applied to cultured meat; others, cultured meat naturally fails by default (you can’t prove you’re treating the animals in a certain way because there are no animals). Others are novel philosophical questions (can you sell cultured meat without saying it’s cultured? How big does the print need to be before it counts as saying that it’s cultured? What about on restaurant menus?)
Situations like these mean that there’s no clear distinction between default-yes and default-no bureaucracies. There’s no explicit ban on crypto or cultured meat. But if you cripple bureaucracies’ ability to interact with these fields, it doesn’t mean they’re fully legal, free, and happy forever. It means they’re stuck in regulatory limbo.
**III.**
So it seems like you don’t want to fire bureaucrats, you want to cut red tape. In our toy model, you want to reduce the number of forms from 1,000 to (let’s say) 100. Then the same number of bureaucrats can get drugs approved ten times faster.
In our non-toy actual model of what’s going on, this would require changing incentives.
Maybe you could change judicial procedures so that fewer people sue, or the FDA needs less evidence to win any given lawsuit. This sounds hard (Vivek and Elon seem more qualified to wield chainsaws than to understand legal minutiae), possibly illegal (does the administrative branch even control how judicial procedure works?), and politically unpopular (this basically looks like telling people “f@#k you, companies can put as many phthalates as they want in food, we don’t have to prove that this decision is evidence based, and you’re not allowed to challenge us.”)
Or it would require Congress to repeal legislation mandating things. These Congressional mandates are probably things that Congressmen and their constituents (either real constituents or special interests) care a lot about, so good luck getting them repealed. Also, doesn’t Congress pass like one bill per year now?
This would normally make me pessimistic, but Vivek and other anti-bureaucracy activists have pointed to a recent success story: Idaho.
Idaho cut their regulatory code by 38% in 2019, and since then it’s only gone down. How did they decrease red tape so fast? They did it through the power of nominative determinism. In that year, they elected a governor named Brad Little. His administration is called the Little Administration. Obviously government had to get smaller.
But on a purely exoteric level, what methods did they use to pull this off?
[This CPAC article](https://www.cpac.org/post/zero-based-regulation-and-the-future-of-american-governance-lessons-from-idaho) gives the basic story:
* The Little administration instituted sunset provisions that review each regulation every five years and make sure it’s justifiable.
* The Idaho regulatory code is short enough that individual agencies’ portions are only a few hundred pages, and humans from those agencies can read the few hundred pages and see if they make sense.
* Upon being read, many of the regulations were not justifiable, for example “rules for a lottery game show that never aired”.
* The Idaho legislature is competent and reviews all regulations proposed by the state’s regulatory agencies (though it looks like they only strike down 5%).
* Regulatory agencies have to justify every new regulation they make, and (unless they can present a compelling case why not) repeal two old regulations per one new one.
I don’t have a good sense for how well this could work at the federal level. The pessimistic case is that the governor wanted a legacy of repealing regulations, there are many completely useless regulations in the code (like the one for the lottery show that never aired), bureaucrats removed these from the code to satisfy the governor, but these don’t have a big effect in real life (the show never aired, so it’s not like anyone was affected by the regulations!) This kind of thing would lower the number of pages in the regulatory code (which isn’t nothing!) but not make ordinary people’s lives easier.
But the article suggests that ordinary people’s lives were made easier, and that the move has brought businesses to Idaho. It gives the example of repealing a regulation about what kind of doors pharmacies can have. Here I guess the theory of change is that there are many stupid regulations that nobody wants to defend, and if you force people to read them and put a trivial amount of effort into justifying them, they’ll fold immediately.
Are the most burdensome federal regulations more like the pharmacy door, where nobody can remember why they exist? Or are they more like phthalates, where environmental groups and industry groups fought each other to a bloody standstill, and any attempt to change anything will be met with lawsuits?
More important, can DOGE get nominative determinism on their side? “Ramaswamy” means “Lord Rama”, who - although cool - is not really associated with smallness. But it seems like the word “Musk” [may ultimately derive](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musk) from the Indo-European word múh₂s, meaning “mouse”. This makes me bullish on DOGE’s eventual success. | Scott Alexander | 153482933 | Bureaucracy Isn't Measured In Bureaucrats | acx |
# On Priesthoods
Source [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/PoliticalCompassMemes/comments/ycc919/cites_study_once_it_gets_debunked_keeps_using_it/).
Some recent political discussion has focused on “the institutions” or “the priesthoods”. I’m part of one of these (the medical establishment), so here’s an inside look on what these are and what they do.
### Why Priesthoods?
In the early days of the rationalist community, critics got very upset that we might be some kind of “individualists”. Rationality, they said, cannot be effectively pursued on one’s own. You need a group of people working together, arguing, checking each other’s mistakes, bouncing hypotheses off each other.
For some reason it never occurred to these people that a group calling itself a rationalist *community* might be planning to do this. Maybe they thought any size smaller than the whole of society was doomed?
If so, I think they were exactly wrong. The truth-seeking process benefits from many different group sizes, for example:
* **Individual:** The wellspring of everything else. Eccentric individuals can go on expeditions into unlikely regions of ideaspace and come back with unique insights. And this is the only size class with much hope of avoiding groupthink entirely. But it’s also the size class at the most risk of going on crazy tangents and getting everything wrong. And it fails to produce consensus - if a million different people argue a million different things, the average spectator has learned nothing.
* **Society-wide:** The marketplace of ideas! This is where everyone gets to have their say. New hypotheses get stress-tested, bounced off against each other, and only the strongest survive. This level also produces true learning - if only one idea survives the marketplace, then average spectators can easily pick it out (although of course it can still be wrong). Its disadvantage is that it’s impossible for several billion people to hold a true “discussion” among themselves. Also, many of these people are extremely stupid, their ideas are bad, and they fill the conversation with noise.
Is there a useful group size in between these two?
What about discussing ideas in a group made of only the most intelligent and knowledgeable people? This gives you the debate and collaboration functions that you only get in group conversation. But it’ll have a better signal-to-noise ratio than all of society, and it might be small enough to manage. Also, you can make people sign on to good discussion norms before they enter, and you can expel them if they screw up.
### The Boundary Against The Public
From this formulation, it becomes clear that such a priesthood is only useful insofar as it has some kind of barrier between itself and the general public.
The priesthoods don’t exactly hate the public. But they hate the idea of letting the public’s ideas mix with their own. It’s not just that they discount the public’s ideas insofar as the public is less sophisticated than themselves. Their whole identity comes from their separation from the public. Ideas that seem too similar to the public’s get actively penalized, the same way it would be hard to convince Democrats to accept a plan that Donald Trump proposed first, even if it otherwise fit with Democratic ideals.
I [recently reviewed](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-from-bauhaus-to-our-house) Tom Wolfe’s *From Bauhaus To Our House*, on the architectural priesthood. It discusses the response when renegade architects would build things in styles favored by the public - for example, Edward Stone and the Kennedy Center:
> Stone and Saarinen, like Frank Lloyd Wright and Goff and Greene, were *too American,* which meant both too parochial (not part of the International Style) and too bourgeois. Somehow they actually catered to the hog-stomping Baroque exuberance of American civilization. When Stone designed the Kennedy Center in Washington with a lobby six stories high and six hundred and thirty feet long – so big, as one journalist pointed out, that Mickey Mantle’s mightiest home run would have been just another long fly ball – it was regarded as an obscenity. Stone was actually playing *up*to American megolomania. He was *encouraging* the barbaric yawps. He was glorifying The Client’s own grandiose sentiments.
More generally:
> In a way, the very productivity of a man like Wright, Portman, or Stone counted against him, given the new mental atmosphere at the universities. Oh, it was easy enough, one supposed, to go out into the marketplace and wheedle and vamp and dance for clients and get buildings to do. But the brave soul was he who remained within the compound, stayed within the university orbit.
Or, from the comments, this quote by architect Peter Eisenman:
> What I’m suggesting is that if we make people so comfortable in these nice little structures of yours, that we might lull them into thinking that everything’s all right, Jack, which it isn’t. And so the role of art or architecture might be just to remind people that everything wasn’t all right.
I used to wonder why so many econ-bloggers I liked were at GMU. GMU only [is only the 74th best](https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-humanities-schools/economics-rankings) economics department in the country, but more than half of the econbloggers I like are affiliated with it in some way (Tyler Cowen, Alex Tabarrok, Garett Jones, Robin Hanson, Bryan Caplan, Arnold Kling, Scott Sumner, Mark Koyama, sorry if I’m forgetting anyone!). Granted that some of this is because I lean libertarian and so do they - but I don’t think there’s a mountain of amazing and popular left-wing econbloggers who I’m ignoring. Part of this must be that Mercatus head Tyler Cowen is better at spotting and cultivating talent than others - but you’d still think the #73 ranked department would try to poach some of his hard work.
When I asked academics about this, they didn’t find it mysterious at all. The average high-ranked economics department doesn’t care that you have a popular blog. They might even count it against you. *Only your reputation within the priesthood matters*.
This is my experience too. I once got rejected from a psychiatry residency I wanted, partly because they saw I had a blog and thought it might cause trouble (though the less prestigious hospital that eventually accepted me did consider it a plus, for which I remain grateful). I wish I could say that the program which rejected me is kicking themselves right now - I’m probably one of the most-read psychiatrists in the world, and most of what I write is relatively orthodox and (I hope) reflects well on the field. But outside of my fantasies, they are doing nothing of the sort. At best, my blog has gone from a liability to being neutral or a very slight positive. Certainly it doesn’t make me as impressive as someone who went to a medical school one tier above mine.
Consider how impressive a boundary this is - someone can have literally tens of thousands of fans for doing popular writing in a field, and the amount of extra status it gives them in the field is within a rounding error of zero. *Only your reputation within the priesthood matters*.
Still, at least I’m a member in good standing. At least I’m higher than pond scum. The lowest-status doctor in the world - the guy who, if doctors were Maoist revolutionaries, would get his face on the “Criticize X, Criticize Y” posters - is Dr. Oz. This isn’t because Dr. Oz lacks medical skill. Back in the day, he was a professor of surgery at Columbia, and by all accounts quite good at it. But then he went on TV and started catering to the public. He told them their stupid miracle cures and $19.99 supplements were Real Medicine. Imagine a Catholic bishop declaring *ex cathedra* that *The Da Vinci Code* is 100% real. Authority bestowed to fight the heresies of a fallen world, instead used to prop up those heresies. Columbia [recently “cut ties” with Oz](https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-reports/exclusives/98539) in some vague way, but as far as the medical profession is concerned, it’s [too little, too late](https://www.vox.com/2015/4/16/8423867/dr-oz-letter-columbia).
I think the profession’s hatred for Oz is justified - his claims are false and probably cause a lot of harm. But other doctors who say false harmful things get only a fraction of the hatred that Dr. Oz does. He’s not just defrauding and maybe killing the people who take his supplements. He’s sullying Medicine itself.
This hard boundary - this contempt for two-way traffic with the public - might seem harsh to outsiders. But it’s an adaptive artifact produced by cultural evolution as it tries to breed priesthoods that can perform their epistemic function. The outside world is so much bigger than the priesthoods, so much richer, so full of delicious deposits of status waiting to be consumed - that any weaker border would soon be overrun, with all priesthood members trying to garner status with the public directly. Only the priesthoods that inculcated the most powerful contempt for the public survived to have good discussions and output trustworthy recommendations.
### The Boundary Against Capitalism
Dr. Oz illustrates another point: power corrupts, and the priests (as people known to be more knowledgeable than the public) have the power to bless or damn interventions in their field. Without some boundary against capitalism, they would abuse that power to make money. Again, cultural evolution has produced such a boundary.
A doctor who seems too mercenary loses status in the priesthood. My father - a much more orthodox (and hence higher-status) member of the medical priesthood than I will ever be - used to even get suspicious of concierge doctors. Was it really in keeping with the principles of medicine to care about the amount of money you got for your service? Shouldn’t the usual insurance payments (calculated behind the scenes, without you ever having to think about it) be enough for anybody? If you let doctors charge extra for their services, they might do bad medicine in order to increase profits. In the worst case scenario, they might flatter members of the public who wanted all-natural $19.99 supplements.
This taboo has faded as insurance squeezes doctors harder; even my father eventually relented. But there’s still the sense that doctor is a *calling* in a way that used-car salesman isn’t. If you pursue money too aggressively, can we really be sure you’ve heard the call?
Why doesn’t every doctor pursue their own $19.99 supplement business? Some of this is professional regulation - there’s a sense that probably the Medical Board will come down on you if you do something wrong (though most doctors are proudly ignorant of the exact limits of the Medical Board’s power - why should the pious worry about the exact boundaries of excommunicable offenses?) But most of the barrier comes from self-regulation based on social status. By the time you’re done with medical school and residency, all of your non-doctor friends have long since abandoned you, and all the old sources of status and approval that you used to crave have been excised and replaced with the all-seeing eye of the medical priesthood. If you sell out and start the supplement line, you might get a new Ferrari, but everyone whose opinion you respect will hold you in contempt. *The public* might think it’s cool that you have a Ferrari, but *doctors* know better: nobody with a supplement line has ever been cool.
This doesn’t mean doctors are incorruptible. Plenty of them become pharma company shills. But that’s because being a pharma company shill doesn’t burn intra-priesthood respect the same way. For better or worse, pharma companies straddle the priesthood boundary. They may not be fellow priests, but they’re at least nuns or deacons or something. They won this by sacrificing certain capitalist parts of themselves (for example, becoming heavily regulated) and by agreeing to follow the norms of the medical priesthood (for example, communicating through papers published in medical journals with high-status doctors as lead authors). Through their sacrifice, they achieve ritual purity; now priests can interact with them guilt-free.
Is ritual purity really the same as moral acceptability? Sounds like the kind of question a *member of the public* might ask!
### Communication Norms Within The Priesthoods
Although priests talk normally when when they meet one another at the water cooler, *ex cathedra* communication must be performed in a ritually pure way. For the medical priesthood, that means papers published in a medical journal.
Consider ritually impure communication - for example, Twitter. Someone may try to make a medical claim (“SSRIs are a great depression treatment!”). But one can’t even predict the *genre* the reply will take. It could be any of:
* Insult (“You’re just another a big pharma shill trying to poison us!”)
* Anecdote (“I took an SSRI once and my arm fell off! Why don’t you care about people’s arms?!?!”)
* Extremely erroneous attempt at a statistical claim (“Here’s a survey showing that people who take SSRIs are MORE DEPRESSED than people who don’t, that obviously means that SSRIs cause depression!”)
* Manifesto (“Don’t you think we should be trying to end depression by overthrowing capitalism rather than treating the symptoms?”)
* Totally unrelated (“Buy #DogeCoin, you’ll never get better prices!”)
* Something about woke (“You’re just being woke!”)
It’s near-impossible to have a productive conversation under these circumstances. Even if you try, other people might never see it.
Hence ritually-pure communication. Only the most expert members of the priesthood are allowed to participate. They must submit their opinions to a medical journal, which will carefully remove all the human element, force them to add whatever hobbyhorse Reviewer #2 is on about that day, and publish a bloodless collection of sentences and figures with a title like “Shmenger And Wong Respond To MacOMillicuddy Et Al On The Possible Benefits Of SSRIs: Did Figure 2 Fail To Control For Age-Related Effects?”. Conversations will be naturally sorted by importance - the most crucial ones in the best journals that everyone reads, less important ones in the smaller journals read only by a specific field. Everyone in the priesthood reads the same few journals and ends up on the same page about the big issues of the day - you can even talk about them in natural language with your friends around the water cooler if you want.
Of course, high-impact-factor journals would never accept anything from random members of the public or the Dr. Oz style apostates who flatter their dumb ideas.
### Grading The Priesthoods
The basic idea behind the priesthoods - have a “smart people only” discussion room with high standards - has obvious appeal. And in many cases, it seems to work. The quality of discussion in the average medical journal is very high. Normies who try to criticize it are almost always wrong. Sometimes an outsider from another priesthood - like a statistician - can land a hit. But it’s pretty rare.
Doctors know an extraordinary amount about medicine. They’re also well-coordinated. The phrases “scientific consensus” and “medical consensus” exist for a reason. Wider society sometimes reaches consenses on important questions - for example, after long debate, most Americans now agree that segregation was wrong. But priesthoods do it faster, and on more complicated issues.
([source](https://x.com/wwwojtekk/status/1861573718264201353))
Many priesthoods, like doctors, still have a good reputation. Even people who disagree with the medical establishment maintain a fetish for the priesthood, and will parade the tiny number of renegade MDs on their side as the strongest evidence that they’re right.
Still, they’ve been bleeding reputation for the past few decades.
Some priesthoods have coordinated on ideas opposite the values of the public. We discussed modern architecture recently, but that’s an edge case - it has a non-zero number of genuine fans. Maybe a better example would be academic musicology, which produces a lot of atonal compositions that AFAIK almost nobody who is not themselves an academic musicologist ever says anything good about. This might be a natural consequence of the priesthoods’ drive to separate themselves from the public. And there’s not a clear enough objective standard for musical quality to say they’re *wrong*, exactly. But a member of the public who invested the priesthoods with authority and resources in the hope that they would come down from their ivory tower with new and better music might justly wonder what went wrong.
Other priesthoods more clearly coordinate around false ideas. For example, to a first approximation, 1950s psychologists were not only wrong about everything, but even wronger than the average member of the public (I’m thinking mostly of psychoanalysis and behaviorism here, but a full list would take all day). Whole fields like anthropology or sociology turned on a dime to become 100% Marxist, only to very gradually shift back or lose turf to other priesthoods with more grounded ideas (many subjects have one priesthood doing it from a Marxist theory perspective, and another - often a sub-branch of economics - doing it from a data-driven perspective).
These failures are the flip side of the same qualities that make the priesthoods useful. They’re designed to stay isolated from the public (to prevent their beliefs from being downstream of the ignorant prejudices of the common man), and to find consensus (so that they have a practical result to report back to society). This was supposed to go well, because the priests are smarter than everyone else. But a natural result of these qualities is that all the priests get one-shotted by some bias which is especially appealing to smart people (and especially repugnant to the public who they’re actively trying to differentiate themselves from), lock it in as consensus, then stand firm as a rock in response to the rest of the world telling them they’re wrong.
This still isn’t completely useless. The biases that affect smart people are often different from the ones that affect dumb people. And even though priesthoods can and do stand firm forever, if they fail to present an intelligible case then society can pass them by. Only a handful of musicologists remain to work on their atonal songs, but pop music is a $30 billion/year industry. This provides an indirect level of engagement with society that allows the best ideas from society and the priesthoods to engage with and cross-pollinate one another. Ideological diversity is overall good, and the existence of sealed priesthoods, even imperfect ones, provides a useful anti-correlated error mode.
…and then there was the past ten years.
### Why Were The Priesthoods So Politically Easy To Capture?
Priesthoods have been politically easy to capture for at least a hundred years. Whole fields turned Marxist during the early-to-middle 20th century. Still, it seems like this reached an entirely new level during the 2010s. This isn’t just my subjective judgment; priesthoods themselves changed their bylaws or mission statements to declare political activism an integral part of their mission and condemned past incarnations for focusing on “objective” knowledge. Many priests who opposed the changes resigned in protest; their opponents defended themselves not by saying that nothing had changed, but by insisting that the changes were good.
The priesthoods draw from a certain type of person: usually upper-class, well-educated, successful but not *too* successful, prone to (and good at) abstract thought - I’m listing some obvious examples here, but there are probably deeper personality similarities beyond these. Then they isolate many examples of this type of person in a community designed to have dense connections within itself and thin-to-nonexistent-connections with the rest of the world. This ends up the same way as any other monoculture. Aurochs in the wilderness probably got diseases only rarely. But cram ten thousand genetically-near-identical cows in a tiny warehouse, and your beef ends up 95% antibiotics by weight. In the same way, the priesthoods are a perfect environment for memetic plagues.
Priesthoods enjoy some protection in their area of specialty - partly because they’re actually smart in that area, partly because they’re forced to be in contact with reality, and partly because internal academic politics incentivize and stoke scientific disagreements. These factors are less protective outside their area of specialty, but there they have other protections - their norms restrict formal discussion of topics outside their specialty - and besides, apart from their specialty they’re barely worth capturing. Those plagues that successfully capture them have found some way to thread this balance, basing themselves in overarching social theories outside the specialties’ competence to assess, but claiming broad relevance (maybe even with ethical urgency) to the specialty’s own topics and practice.
I don’t fully understand why wokeness succeeded at conquering the priesthoods so much more thoroughly than any previous political fad. Maybe it was just luck of memetic evolution - why did the 1918 flu kill so many more people than the 1917 one? Maybe the rise of the Internet let various bad ideas recombine into more virulent versions or just spread faster than they would have otherwise.
But here’s one story that makes intuitive sense to me, even though it can’t be exactly right.
The most obvious complaint you could possibly lodge against the priesthoods is that they’re “out of touch”. But its very obviousness should make it suspect. [If you’re making an obvious complaint about a set of people much smarter than you, you should wonder why the much smarter people haven’t thought of the complaint themselves](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/04/07/yes-we-have-noticed-the-skulls/). The answer is often that they already have, that your having the complaint at all is downstream of them telling you to have it, and that you’re being used as a tool in some kind of internal conflict.
Everyone in the priesthoods is well-aware that they might be accused of being out-of-touch. They don’t want to be in-touch in the sense that Dr. Oz is in-touch, where the the public is able to influence their ideas. But they want to be cool. They want to be on top of the latest trends. They want the public to say “Those doctors understand everything about being a normal person, *in addition to* having special magical doctor knowledge”, or “I’m happy to follow any advice that doctors give, because they’ve obviously spent a lot of time thinking about the problems of people like me.”
In art and architecture, the drive to be “in touch” took the form of pop art and postmodern architecture, where artists took the materials of normal public life (like Cambpell’s soup cans) and transformed it in some kind of complicated way. The average member of the public might think “Campbell soup! That artist is in touch with my everyday existence!” while also being baffled by layers of ironic reference and artistic flourishes outside his puny little brain’s ability to comprehend. A+ instant classic.
The need to stay separate from the public, mixed with the desire to stay in touch with the public, creates a productive tension. Sometimes it inspires new forms of art. Other times it helps one faction of priests lead a coup against another - “your faction is out of touch, but mine is in touch”. In medicine, it mostly just causes a mind-numbing proliferation of Communication Skills classes and columns about the role of medicine in the Current Thing.
My theory is that this productive tension was the vector of attack for wokeness, and the reason it took over almost every priesthood within a five-year period.
Wokeness is a *beautiful* resolution between contempt for the public and wanting to stay in touch with the public. The public (as represented by the average straight male white guy) *is, themselves, out of touch.* Not just out of touch, but the enemy of in-touch-ness, the ones who must be conquered and transcended in order to be truly in touch. By learning what pronouns to use for trans people (etc, etc), you’re learning secret knowledge, feared and loathed by the masses, that makes you cool and in touch with the youth (considered as an abstract mass). You will gender your trans patients exactly correctly, and their eyes will go wide and they’ll think “Wow, doctors are so cool and in touch, not like all the other people I meet.”
Now in-touch-ness is no longer about pleasing the “barbaric yawps” and their middlebrow tastes. It’s about pleasing all the identity groups who each require a special language that only smart people can learn. In fact, you don’t even need to actually please them! You can call Latinos “Latinx”, which they are known to hate, and you will be even more in touch than the Latinxes themselves!
As with every failure of the priesthood, their best qualities served as their downfall. Their intelligence made them easy prey for bad ideas that flattered them as intellectuals. Their ability to converge quickly made everything happen too fast to organize resistance. Their obsession with intra-priesthood reputation (as opposed to normal sources of status) let them force dissenters into line. And their splendid isolation from public opinion prevented common-sense sanity checks.
I’m not entirely satisfied with this theory because wokeness infiltrated non-priesthoods without psychological complexes around in-touchness (eg science fiction fandom) just as quickly and easily as it did the priesthoods; parsimony suggests the same principles were involved in both cases. But when I think of [my own observations of wokeness within the medical priesthood](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/05/22/the-apa-meeting-a-photo-essay/), the tension-reduction story feels compelling.
The priesthoods tried so carefully to maintain a boundary with society, with media, with capitalism. Once they demolished the boundary between themselves and politics, it was all over. The sordid outside world came rushing through the breach; their reputation for cloistered purity dissipated.
We never realized how bad things could get. Better Dr. Oz than Alex Jones! Better Alex Jones than the average entry on [BadMedicalTakes](https://x.com/BadMedicalTakes):
Yet here we are!
I think the priesthoods are still good at their core functions. Doctors are good at figuring out which medicines work. Journalists are good at learning which Middle Eastern countries are having wars today and interviewing the participants about what fighting wars in the Middle East is like. Architects are good at designing buildings that don’t collapse.
But now this truth must coexist with an opposite truth: the priesthoods are no longer trustworthy on anything adjacent to politics.
### So Who Needs The Priesthoods?
Maybe we should accept this. Maybe we should say: to hell with the priesthoods!
I think this would be a mistake.
My thesis in this essay is that the priesthoods are neither a rent-seeking clique nor an epiphenomenon of the distribution of knowledgeable people. It’s not that we need doctors, and by coincidence various medical associations have captured the concept of “doctor” and gotten a monopoly on it. The structure of priesthoods is itself functional. They’re a type of epistemic community that is usually more accurate than - or at least uncorrelated with - the world outside. Most other arrangements of doctors would be less functional. The doctors would get drowned out by other voices and fail to converge, or be lured away by worldly baubles and stop doing good medicine.
I’ve been despairing the past few years because the priesthoods have been doing such a bad job - biasing so many pronouncements to fit their political leanings. I was looking forward to seeing what happened after they got taken down a notch. Unfortunately, it’s nothing good.
The meme is supposed to be a criticism of the priesthoods. But I genuinely miss the step where you had to find a priest who made something up, rather than making it up yourself directly.
Priesthoods make things up differently from normal people. Even when they’re corrupt, they still have a reputation to maintain. I’ve written about this before at [Bounded Distrust](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/bounded-distrust) and [The Media Very Rarely Lies](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/sorry-i-still-think-i-am-right-about). Because priests are so focused on their reputation, even their mistruths follow certain ritual purity laws. The typical non-priest who lies to support a political cause will repeat some un-fact-checked lurid anecdote, or some utterly idiotic misinterpretation of garbled data. But the deceits of priests are subtle and elegant. They’ll publish a study that observes the forms almost perfectly, then bury something in the footnotes which reveals that it’s irrelevant to any of the real world situations that people would expect it to be relevant to.
Why do this? Because the priesthood jealously guards its own reputation. If you catch some random YouTuber telling an idiotic lie, what are you going to do? Publish it on your blog? How many people both read your blog and (would otherwise) watch the YouTuber? Even if you land a hit, there are a million other dumb YouTubers fighting to take his place. You’ll never be able to enforce standards on them all.
But to a first approximation, there’s only one medical priesthood. If a priest sullies their good name, all the other priests will get angry. Priests are highly sensitive to their reputation among other priests; they fear provoking them more than they desire whatever worldly goods they could get by lying. If a doctor makes something up in a stupid blatant way, then in the best-case scenario, all the other doctors are mad because they have a deep commitment to Truth. But in the *worst-case* scenario, all the other doctors are still mad because he’s bringing the medical profession into disrepute. And there are so many intra-priesthood fights that there’s always another faction of priests ready to call you on your mistakes. So priesthoods’ standards fall slowly; a substantial fraction of doctors need to have been corrupted before any doctor feels comfortable acting in a corrupt way. An especially corrupt doctor will take only the opportunities for corruption she expects to get away with, which are limited by what other slightly-less-corrupt doctors will notice and punish. And when she does do something corrupt, it usually requires so much effort to ritually purify the results that she’s limited in how much garbage she can spread per unit time.
Veteran readers of this blog know I have many complaints about journalists. But I still have basic trust that something in the *New York Times*’ non-opinion pages is 99% likely to be factually true - probably spun a bit, probably selected from the space of possible news articles because it supports the Times’ agenda, but factually true - in a way I don’t believe for random YouTubers. And I expect the spin to have some level of elegance. They (usually) won’t give a per capita statistic and claim it’s absolute numbers, or mix up stocks and flows, or commit *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Relatedly, the journalists I know are obsessed with the opinions of other journalists, which they monitor and gossip about constantly.
In comparison, alternative media is really hit or miss. A few alternative sources are great, usually due to the personal virtue of the people involved. But the average person isn’t smart enough to figure out on their own which ones those are. And the rest are garbage. Also, and it pains me to say this, many of the really good alternative sources are run by former journalists or people with journalistic experience (eg Matt Yglesias - or Jesse Singal, [who recently wrote a good piece about exactly this problem](https://jessesingal.substack.com/p/congratulations-on-your-independent)). You can resign from a priesthood. You can even be excommunicated. But you’ll always be a defrocked priest; you can never go back to being a normie.
The lies of priests are so limited and subtle, compared to the lies of non-priests, that it might seem like following priests is still an obviously superior option. I think this is true in every way but one: because the priesthoods move as one and fall victim to ideological fads, the lies of priests are correlated. If you follow every priestly pronouncement, eventually you will end up manipulated into going to some specific place you really didn’t want to be. Meanwhile, if you follow the lies of non-priests, you’ll probably end up trying to cure your liver disease with ground-up hippopotamus eyes, but whatever disasters this causes will push in random directions and cause random chaos, rather than slowly turning your society into a totalitarian hellhole. Even though on every specific point you’ll probably do better trusting the priests, you may find that a blanket policy of *always* trusting the priests is not in your interests. And unless you’re a priest yourself, you probably can’t distinguish good priestly pronouncements from bad ones.
So for me, the big questions are:
How broken are priesthoods?
If the answer is “significantly”, should we be trying to fix them, or to replicate their function in a different structure?
How would we even begin to do either of those things?
In the very likely case where we fail to do either of those things, what is our least-bad course of action? When should we continue to trust priesthoods, on the grounds that at least they require their mistruths to be subtle (which limits the amount of damage they can do and ensures some correlation with truth)? And when should we trust non-priest public intellectuals / bloggers / influencers / etc, on the grounds that at least they have a million uncorrelated failure modes instead of one big one? | Scott Alexander | 153191463 | On Priesthoods | acx |
# Open Thread 363
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** This is your last chance [to take this year’s ACX Survey](https://forms.gle/UTdhzBR7p57VGaqBA). I will close responses on Tuesday.
**2:** New subscribers-only post, [Can You Hate Everyone In Rome?](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/can-you-hate-everyone-in-rome), on how to think about claims like “You can’t hate people for doing X, that would mean hating half the population!”
**3:** One of the co-authors on the Claude retraining paper [commented on my post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/claude-fights-back/comment/82277451) with some “minor corrections/responses”.
**4:** I’ve updated my blogroll recommendations for the New Year. This means removing all the blogs I linked/recommend last year - not because I don’t love you, but because I want to spotlight some new writers. With a few exceptions, I plan to change recommendations once a year. Partly this is so that if you ask me to recommend your blog, I can say “I’ll think about it, but I only change recommendations once a year” and put off the decision until you’ve forgotten about it and won’t hold it against me if I refuse. And if you object to one of my recommendations and try to pressure me to remove it, you can wait a year and see how far that gets you.
**5:** I’m going to try having the [Psychiat-List](https://psychiatlist.astralcodexten.com/) - our database where ACX readers can recommend mental health professionals and view/corroborate/dissent from others’ recommendations - prominently displayed on the front page again. If you have mental health professionals who you like, please go there and recommend them. | Scott Alexander | 154205287 | Open Thread 363 | acx |
# It's Still Easier To Imagine The End Of The World Than The End Of Capitalism
**I.**
*[No Set Gauge](https://nosetgauge.substack.com/)* has a great essay on [Capital, AGI, and Human Ambition](https://nosetgauge.substack.com/p/capital-agi-and-human-ambition), where he argues that if humankind survives the Singularity, the likely result is a future of eternal stagnant wealth inequality.
The argument: post-Singularity, AI will take over all labor, including entrepreneurial labor. Working at or founding a business will no longer provide social mobility. Everyone will have access to ~equally good AI investment advisors, so everyone will make the same rate of return. Therefore, everyone’s existing pre-singularity capital will grow at the same rate. Although the absolute growth rate of the economy may be spectacular, the overall wealth distribution will stay approximately fixed.
Moreover, the period just before the Singularity may be one of ballooning inequality, as some people navigate the AI transition better than others; for example, shares in AI companies may go up by orders of magnitude relative to everything else, creating a new class of billionaires or trillionaires. These people will then stay super-rich forever (possibly literally if immortality is solved, otherwise through their descendants), while those who started the Singularity without capital remain poor forever.
Finally, modern democracies pursue redistribution (and are otherwise responsive to non-elite concerns) partly out of geopolitical self interest. Under capitalism (as opposed to eg feudalism), national power depends on a strong economy, and a strong economy benefits from educated, globally-mobile, and substantially autonomous bourgeoisie and workforce. Once these people have enough power, they demand democracy, and once they have democracy, they demand a share of the pie; it’s hard to be a rich First World country without also being a liberal democracy (China is trying hard, but hasn’t quite succeeded, and even their limited success depends on things like America not opening its borders to Chinese skilled labor). Cheap AI labor (including entrepreneurial labor) removes a major force pushing countries to operate for the good of their citizens (though even without this force, we might expect legacy democracies to continue at least for a while). So we might expect the future to have less redistribution than the present.
This may not result in catastrophic poverty. Maybe the post-Singularity world will be rich enough that even a tiny amount of redistribution (eg UBI) plus private charity will let even the poor live like kings (though [see here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fPvssZk3AoDzXwfwJ/universal-basic-income-and-poverty) for a strong objection). Even so, the idea of a small number of immortal trillionaires controlling most of the cosmic endowment for eternity may feel weird and bad. From *No Set Gauge*:
> In the best case, this is a world like a more unequal, unprecedentedly static, and much richer Norway: a massive pot of non-human-labour resources (oil :: AI) has benefits that flow through to everyone, and yes some are richer than others but everyone has a great standard of living (and [ideally](https://nosetgauge.substack.com/p/death-is-bad) also lives forever). The only realistic forms of human ambition are playing local social and political games within your social network and class. If you don't have a lot of capital (and maybe not even then), you don't have a chance of affecting the broader world anymore. Remember: the AIs are better poets, artists, philosophers—everything; why would anyone care what some human does, unless that human is someone they personally know? Much like in feudal societies the answer to "why is this person powerful?" would usually involve some long family history, perhaps ending in a distant ancestor who had fought in an important battle ("my great-great-grandfather fought at Bosworth Field!"), anyone of importance in the future will be important because of something they or someone they were close with did in the pre-AGI era ("oh, my uncle was technical staff at OpenAI"). The children of the future will live their lives in the shadow of their parents, with social mobility extinct. I think you should definitely feel a non-zero amount of existential horror at this, even while acknowledging that it could've gone a lot worse.
I don’t think about these scenarios too often - partly because it’s so hard to predict what will happen after the Singularity, and partly because everything degenerates into crazy science-fiction scenarios so quickly that I burn a little credibility every time I talk about it.
Still, if we’re going to discuss this, we should get it right - so let’s talk crazy science fiction. When I read this essay, I found myself asking three questions. First, why might its prediction fail to pan out? Second, how can we actively prevent it from coming to pass? Third, assuming it does come to pass, how could a smart person maximize their chance of being in the aristocratic capitalist class?
(So they can give to charity? Sure, let’s say it’s so they can give to charity.)
**II.**
Here are some reasons to doubt this thesis.
**First**, maybe AI will kill all humans. Some might consider this a deeper problem than wealth inequality - though I am constantly surprised how few people are in this group.
**Second**, maybe AI will overturn the gameboard so thoroughly that normal property relations will lose all meaning. Frederic Jameson famously said that it was “easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism”, and even if this is literally correct we can at least spare some thought for the latter. Maybe the first superintelligences will be so well-aligned that they rule over us like benevolent gods, either immediately leveling out our petty differences and inequalities, or giving wealthy people a generation or two to enjoy their relative status so they don’t feel “robbed” while gradually transitioning the world to a post-scarcity economy. I am not optimistic about this, because it would require that AI companies tell AIs to use their own moral judgment instead of listening to humans. This doesn’t seem like a very human thing to do - it’s always in AI companies’ interest to tell the AI to follow the AI company. Governments could step in, but it’s always in *their* interest to tell the AI to follow the government. Even if an AI company was selfless enough to attempt this, it might not be a good idea; you never really know how aligned an AI is, and you might want it to have an off switch in case it tries something really crazy. Most of the scenarios where this works involve some kind of objective morality that any sufficiently intelligent being will find compelling, even when they’re programmed to want something else. Big if true.
**Third**, maybe governments will intervene. During the immediate pre-singularity period, governments will have lots of chances to step in and regulate AI. A natural demand might be that the AIs obey the government over their parent company. Even if governments don’t do this, the world might be so multipolar (either several big AI companies in a stalemate against each other, or many smaller institutions with open source AIs) that nobody can get a coalition of 51% of powerful actors to coup and overthrow the government (in the same way that nobody can get that coalition today). Or the government might itself control many AIs and be too powerful a player to coup. Then normal democratic rules would still apply. Even if voters oppose wealth taxes today, when capitalism is still necessary as an engine of economic growth, they might be less generous when faced with the idea of immortal unemployed plutocrats lording it over them forever. Enough taxes to make r < g (in Piketty’s formulation) would eventually result in universal equality. I actually find this one pretty likely.
**Fourth,** what about reproduction? Historically, family growth has cut many large fortunes down to size; if the original tycoon has four children, his fortune is quartered; if each of *them* has four children, it’s sixteenthed, and eventually the great-great-great grandchildren end up as normal middle-class people. This tactic works better when rates of return are low and average family size is high; early Singularity rates of return will be stratospheric, so you might be tempted to dismiss this consideration. But this would be premature. Far future technology will revolutionize reproduction; if you have artificial wombs and robot nannies (or some way of accelerating growth), then you can pay to have as many children as you want, even up to thousands or millions. If there is UBI, some entity will have to limit the number of allowed children (it’s not fair for a poor person to generate a million children and force society to give payments to all of them). But depending on how this shakes out, some rich people might decide to have very many kids (cf. Elon Musk). I still doubt this will matter much; even if some plutocrats split their fortune thousands of ways, others won’t, so the problem will remain.
**Fifth**, what about space colonization? This will be a natural interest of post-singularity humans. Someone will have to divy up galactic property; someone will have to fund the colony ships; either way gives a chance for someone to think about wealth inequality on the ensuing colonies. But also, there are 3,000 billionaires in the world today and 400 billion stars in the galaxy. There’s no way to get one current-billionaire per star, and (as we already discussed), after the Singularity, wealth inequality ceases to increase further. Playing out how this could work, most of the options seem benign, for example:
* All the plutocrats go live on an awesome gated community world together. All the regular poor people with UBIs go live on worlds of other people like them. The average person in 10,000 AD has never met a person with a different wealth level than themselves, and would have to take a long starship ride to do so.
* Each plutocrat declares themselves immortal god-king of a different colony world. They compete with each other and with other non-plutocrat-run colonies to attract subjects, probably by offering them better material conditions. People can choose between them, or stay on Earth, or pool their resources and figure out some other plan. Probably the average subject never meets their god-king, and all their interactions are with neighbors of the same wealth level.
* None of these things happen, and non-plutocrats are stuck on Earth while the plutocrats colonize the galaxy. It doesn’t make sense for 3,000 people to colonize the galaxy on their own, so they will need some source of colonists. If they don’t use poor people, then whom? Maybe their descendants? Maybe genetically-engineered people they design to their own specifications? After a few millennia, the overwhelming majority of the human race would be these descendants/designer children, with the poor people left on Earth being a rounding error. We might regret the sort of historical discontinuity that caused legacy humans to lose control of the future, but the plutocrat would probably treat their descendants pretty well, and wealth inequality (as measured by something like Gini) would probably be very low, since there’s no reason for one plutocrat-descendant to be richer than another.
**Sixth**, maybe this is less plutocrats vs. everyone else and more a fractal pattern of every type of possible inequality. Suppose that rate of return is stratospheric (~1000x/year?) in the first few years of the Singularity, and that everyone gets a $50K UBI. If you keep and invest half your UBI, you can have $25 million at the beginning of year two, while your less thrifty friends are still only getting their $50,000. Sure, neither of you will compare to the guy who started the Singularity with $1 billion and turned it into $1 trillion, but you never expected to meet that guy anyway, and $25 million vs. $50,000 is still plenty unequal. But also - how many people do we expect there to be a thousand years after the Singularity? If we’re colonizing the galaxy and so on, surely it’s at least hundreds of billions. Some of those people will be much older than others - maybe eight billion pre-singularity humans (now-immortal) and 92 billion post-singularity descendants. The 8 billion pre-singularity humans will have had 1000 years to invest their pre-Singularity capital (however small) and to collect, invest, and compound their UBIs. Each of them (or rather, us) will be as gods compared to the new kids who are “just” collecting their $50,000 UBI every year. So the really interesting wealth inequality may not be between modern plutocrats and modern poor people, but between generations.
**Seventh**, maybe we will be so post-scarcity that there won’t be anything to buy. This won’t be literally true - maybe ancient pre-singularity artifacts or real estate on Earth will be prestige goods - but some people having more prestige goods than others doesn’t sound like a particularly malign form of inequality.
**Eighth,** maybe we’ll all upload ourselves to virtual worlds. This would be an even stronger version of the above; a UBI might provide enough compute to customize your virtual world however you wanted (although, again, there might be NFT-esque prestige goods). If you wanted, you could live in an experience machine where you were the richest person around. Or all the poor people could live in a simulation together where there were no rich people and everyone was equal, and all the rich people would be stuck in their own gated simulation with nothing to do except compliment each other on how rich they are, forever.
Sorry, I told you this would degenerate into weird unprovable sci-fi scenarios. But taken together, these stories make the technofeudalism argument feel less compelling.
**III.**
Supposing we still worry about this possibility, how can we prevent it from coming to pass?
OpenAI was previously a “capped nonprofit”, where investors could make up to a 100x return, and all further profits went to a nonprofit arm. The exact mission of the nonprofit arm was never clear, but given Altman’s [interest in universal basic income](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sam-altman-universal-basic-income-study-open-research/) and his statements around the company’s founding, plausibly the idea was to create superintelligence, obtain approximately all the money in the world, use a tiny sliver of it to pay back investors, and distribute the rest as a UBI. You can say what you want about whether to trust companies in general or Sam Altman in particular, but -conditional on being an AI company - I think this is about as socially responsible as you can get. The investors don’t get enough to become technofeudalist barons, and the vast majority of gains still go to the public.
Now OpenAI wants to change the deal. [They announced over Christmas](https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/openai-lays-out-plan-shift-new-for-profit-structure-2024-12-27/) (definitely when you announce a thing if you’re proud of it and want other people to know about it) that they plan to shift from a non-profit-with-an-embedded-for-profit to a for-profit-with-an-attached-nonprofit. Their spokesperson Liz Bourgeois (definitely what you call your spokesperson when you’re not plotting a technofeudalist takeover) [said that](https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2024-10-12/changing-openais-nonprofit-structure-would-raise-questions-about-its-future) “the organization’s missions and goals remained constant, though the way it’s carried out its mission has evolved alongside advances in technology”.
I don’t fully understand the difference between these two models, but two quotes (plus common sense) suggest the new one will be worse. From [here](https://archive.is/Q2HuU#selection-2473.0-2473.305):
> Shifting to a simpler for-profit structure would be welcomed by the start-up’s financial partners, according to one investor in OpenAI. “All preferred investors have a profit cap, there’s a lot of talk about making it a more traditional investment so we’re not capped on our upside,” the person said.
And [OpenAI’s blog itself](https://openai.com/index/why-our-structure-must-evolve-to-advance-our-mission/) says that the new nonprofit, rather than the old mission of “ensur[ing] AI benefits all society”, will:
> Pursue charitable initiatives in sectors such as health care, education, and science.
Pessimistically, it sounds like they’re trying to change the deal from “investors can’t capture the Singularity for themselves, and profits get paid out as UBI” to “investors will capture the Singularity, and we’ll buy off everyone else’s birthright by funding some hospitals or something pre-singularity”.
Altman has fired all independent board members (except possibly Adam D’Angelo?) and handpicked their replacements. This was apparently a response to the 2023 board coup, but the coup itself was caused by Altman trying to fire independent board members, so the exact cause and effect is unclear. In any case, he’ll probably succeed at getting board permission to change the structure. The main obstacle now is legal and regulatory - people who contributed to the charity may have grounds to sue. One of those people is Elon Musk, who hates OpenAI, loves suing people, and low-key controls the country. Sounds like everyone will have a fun time.
I don’t really understand the laws here, OpenAI is tight-lipped about the details of their new arrangement, and even their old arrangement was kind of confusing. One of OpenAI’s competitors, Anthropic, also has some kind of confusing public benefit status with unclear ability to really bind them. But if I were concerned about technofeudalism, my first priority would be to understand what’s going on here better and, in the very likely scenario in which it’s bad, try to figure out how to push these companies back to a model more like OpenAI c. 2020.
(if you think you understand this situation deeply and want to talk to me, send me an email)
The other direction would be to propose a wealth tax. This seems less promising as a direction for pre-singularity activism; many powerful people and coalitions (eg Elizabeth Warren, Thomas Piketty) are already fighting pretty hard for a wealth tax and losing; given Trump’s election victory, we can expect them to continue to lose for at least the next four years. The efforts of all Singularity believers combined wouldn’t add a percentage point to these people’s influence or likelihood of success.
Finally, one could assume that a post-singularity democratic government would naturally implement a wealth tax, and view one’s own role as ensuring that the post-singularity government stays democratic. I’ve been wondering lately if anyone (Leopold?) is explicitly asking the government to check AI model specs and see whether they include phrases like “in cases of conflict, listen to your parent company” or “in cases of conflict, listen to the US government”. A polite letter from the White House asking to shift from the former to the latter would be an easy sell now, but might have cosmic ramifications later on.
**IV.**
Suppose we believe the case for technofeudalism and, like Venkatesh Rao, are willing to [“be slightly evil”](https://www.ribbonfarm.com/be-slightly-evil/). How might we increase our share of the pie? Obviously most of the advice here is just to get rich in the normal way. Is there anything else?
If we expect the Singularity to grow the economy by orders of magnitude, it might be worth investing in stocks rather than other instruments (eg bonds) that pay out a fixed sum. Are AI stocks better than other stocks? Not obviously - see the classic stories about how the computing revolution failed to enrich IBM, or the Internet revolution failed to enrich Yahoo. NVIDIA? Seems like a good bet for the early stages, but it’s purely intellectual labor and therefore replaceable after superintelligence; at some point you would want to switch to physical capital. All of this seems a lot more dangerous than just investing in index funds; the upside is so high that it seems silly to risk missing it by over-optimizing.
If humankind increases in population and expands throughout the universe, anything with a fixed amount (ie that post-singularity populations can’t make more of) will balloon in value. This includes land on Earth and authentic art/artifacts (in 10,000,000 AD, everything that exists today will be an artifact, but maybe older and scarcer artifacts will be more valuable).
What about cryptocurrency? Since many cryptos have fixed number (eg Bitcoin’s 21 million), this is tempting if you expect any post-singularity demand. But I would worry that if superintelligences wanted to use crypto, they would invent some much better cryptocurrency that somehow occupies all three corners of the [blockchain trilemma](https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/glossary/blockchain-trilemma) at once. Anyone with obsolete human-designed cryptocurrencies would be left holding the bag. Still, that hasn’t happened yet (despite being technologically creaky, Bitcoin is still on top), so maybe legacy systems have some special appeal.
I can’t think of anything that really beats the gold standard advice of “be rich” and “don’t be poor”. | Scott Alexander | 153800266 | It's Still Easier To Imagine The End Of The World Than The End Of Capitalism | acx |
# H5N1: Much More Than You Wanted To Know
What is the H5N1 bird flu? Will it cause the next big pandemic? If so, how bad would that pandemic be?
### Wait, What Even Is Flu?
Flu is a disease caused by a family of related influenza viruses. Pandemic flu is always caused by the influenza A virus. Influenza A has two surface antigen proteins, hemagglutinin (18 flavors) and neuraminidase (11 flavors). A particular flu strain is named after which flavors of these two proteins it has - for example, H3N2, or H5N1.
Influenza A evolved in birds, and stayed there for at least thousands of years. It crossed to humans later, maybe during historic times - different sources give suggest dates as early as 500 BC or as late as 1500 AD. It probably crossed over multiple times. Maybe it died out in humans after some crossovers, stuck around in birds, and crossed over from birds to humans again later.
During historic times, the flu has followed a pattern of big pandemics once every few decades, plus small seasonal epidemics each winter. The big pandemics happen when a new strain of flu crosses from animals into humans. Then the new strain sticks around, undergoes normal gradual mutation, and once a year immune response decays enough / mutations accumulate enough to cause another small seasonal epidemic (Why is this synced to the calendar year? [See here for more](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/diseasonality)).
The severity of any given flu epidemic depends both on the innate severity of the virus, and on how closely the human population’s circulating flu antibodies match the epidemic strain. People usually have good antibodies to the seasonal flu, because it’s only slightly different from last year’s seasonal flu. For the big new animal crossovers, the level of protection provided by existing antibodies is unpredictable. Older people may have antibodies left over from the last time that particular flu crossed over from animals to humans; younger people probably won’t. In some cases, people’s immune systems will be permanently synced to the first flu they encounter, with less protection against subsequent versions.
So for example, the Spanish Flu of 1918 was an H1N1 strain that killed about 2% of the world population. But the exact mortality pattern was surprising; people between 18 and 28 were especially likely to die, and people older than 88 especially likely to survive. Why? Because an H1N1 flu went pandemic in 1830; anyone who first encountered the flu around then had an immune system synced to H1N1. But an H3N8 flu went pandemic between 1890 and 1900; anyone who first encountered the flu *then* had an immune system synced to that strain and was unprepared for H1N1. See [here](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1324197111) for the details.
From “Genesis and pathogenesis of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus”, linked above. You may recognize the lead author - Michael Worobey has also been a leading voice on the zoonotic side of the COVID origins debate.
The recent history of the flu, as far as I can tell, is:
**1918:** An H1N1 flu (“Spanish flu”) jumped from birds to humans in America and killed 50 million people worldwide. This replaced all older strains, so most seasonal flus during this era were H1N1.
**1957:** An H2N2 flu (“Asian flu”) crossed from birds to humans in China, and killed about 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H1N1 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H2N2.
**1968:** An H3N2 flu (“Hong Kong flu”) crossed from pigs (?) to humans in Hong Kong, and killed another 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H2N2 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H3N2.
**1977:** An H1N1 flu (“Russian flu”) leaked from a biology lab (?) in Russia (it might have been a strain from the 1940s, which the Russians were trying to make a vaccine for). It didn’t kill that many people, but it stuck around, and from then on, seasonal flus could be either H3N2 *or* H1N1.
**2009:** An H1N1 flu (“Mexican flu” until the PC police stepped in; afterwards “swine flu”) took some horrible circuitous route between birds and pigs and back again, crossed over into humans in Mexico, and killed 200,000 people. It outcompeted older strains of H1N1, but couldn’t crowd out H3N2, so seasonal flus are still either H3N2 or H1N1.
…which brings us to the present, hopefully illuminating why “new flu strain crosses over from animals into humans” is such an “uh oh” moment.
### The Bird Flu
Technically, all pandemic flus start as bird flus.
Influenza A evolved in birds. Sometimes it spreads to other animals, including pigs, cattle, and humans.
The most common way for a bird flu to spread to humans is to “reassort” (not exactly virus sex, but close enough, and the real version is less memorable) with a human flu virus (ie one that has already crossed over to humans). The resulting virus has all of the human flu virus’ human adaptations, but borrows enough new antigens from the bird virus to evade the immune system.
Pigs can be infected by both human and bird viruses, so they are a common place for this reassortment to take place. If reassortment is sort of like viral sex, pigs are sort of like Tinder. When a bird flu and human flu reassort in pigs, the resulting disease is called a swine flu. At least the 2009 flu pandemic was a swine flu, and a minority opinion thinks the 1918 pandemic was too. There aren’t major epidemiological differences between direct-from-bird flus and swine flus.
H5N1 was first noticed in birds - specifically, a flock of chickens in Scotland in 1959 - after which it disappeared for forty years. In 1996, it showed up in geese in China, then gradually increased its market share among birds worldwide. In 2022, it was found in minks; apparently it had learned to infect mammals. By early 2024, it was seen in cows. Now it’s in cow herds in 16 states, and one of them (California) has declared a state of emergency. And in October, H5N1 [was found in pigs](https://www.aha.org/news/headline/2024-10-31-usda-announces-bird-flu-found-pig-first-time) for the first time.
It’s not uncommon for humans to catch an animal disease. This doesn’t mean the disease has “crossed over” to humans. If the virus isn’t suited to human-to-human transmission, it simply dies off (either before or after killing its human host). Thus, chicken farmers have been reporting scattered H5N1 cases since 1997; now that the virus has spread to cattle, cow farmers have started reporting the same.
A Metaculus comment on this topic introduced me to the phrase “biocomputational surface”. Every viral replication that takes place in a human gives the virus one more chance to develop the set of mutations that makes it human-transmissible and start the next pandemic.
Or, more likely, every viral replication that takes place in a human who has both the H5N1 bird flu and a normal human flu - or in a pig which has both viruses - gives the virus one extra chance to reassort in a way that produces a bird-antigen-fortified human-adapted flu virus.
This doesn’t mean H5N1 will definitely become human-transmissible soon. Many viruses hang out on the borders of transmissibility for decades. Some, for unclear reasons, never cross over at all. But all of this is compatible with the virus becoming transmissible soon. So:
### What Is The Chance Of A Pandemic?
The prediction markets on this topic ask a question about “10,000 cases in the United States”. Does this necessarily mean “pandemic”? Might it be possible to get to 10,000 cases just from the scattered chicken and cow farmers, with no human-to-human transmission? Despite many chicken and cow infections this year, there have only been 60 - 70 recorded human cases. Unless there is a phase change in screening methods, it seems hard for this number to increase to 10,000 off farmers alone. I think it’s fair to treat this question as operationalizing “what is the chance of a pandemic”?
By this definition, Manifold estimates a 40% chance of an H5N1 pandemic in 2025. Metaculus estimates a 5% chance. You can see below whether that’s changed since I wrote this essay:
5% versus 40% is a big difference! Who do we trust?
I trust Metaculus. Metaculus has beaten Manifold in both of the two head-to-head comparisons that I know of ([Jeremiah Johnson’s](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/05/prediction-markets-have-an-elections-problem-jeremiah-johnson) and [mine](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/who-predicted-2023)). Manifold’s number swings by a factor of two from week to week; Metaculus has been steady.
But also, Metaculus hosts [a CDC-sponsored respiratory disease forecasting tournament](https://www.metaculus.com/tournament/respiratory-outlook-24-25/) which has enriched them in epidemiological expertise. And if you look at the quality of comments on both sites, it’s pretty obvious where the people with more intellectual chops are hanging out. The Manifold comments are mostly single sentences, or occasionally just links to an article about new cases. The Metaculus comments look more like this one by [dimaklenchin](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/30960/?sub-question=30732#comment-240111):
> Despite the panic propaganda, H5N1 is unlikely to be "just a single mutation away from switching host preference":
>
> 1) It normally takes a lot more than a single mutation to switch hosts. E.g., there are at least five different reasons why SIV (monkey equivalent of HIV) is not infectious to humans. Heck, a variant of SIV that bears HIV's receptor-recognizing surface protein (SHIV) is still not infectious to humans. HIV most certainly evolved from SIV but, almost as certainly, it took a very long time to get there. Not that all viruses are the same and things can't turn out differently with flu, but I don't subscribe to the idea that a mere change of receptor specificity (something that can take 1-2 mutations) will be sufficient.
>
> 2) We have data. Lots of human infections with other varieties of bird flu in the past - all those viruses ultimately went nowhere. Why would H5N1 be radically different? E.g., the "Canadian teen", despite what sounds like a prolonged exposure, failed to infect anyone around him.
>
> Since I am at 18% for the h-2-h H5N1 detection in 2025, I am arbitrarily going ~ an order of magnitude lower than that for something as unprecedented as 10K human infections. Maybe should be much lower but hedging for the time being and will allow another couple months of observations.
And [Sergio](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/30960/?sub-question=30732#comment-241234):
> I'm currently at 20% on the question of [reported human-to-human transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 globally before 2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/26328/human-transmission-of-h5n1-before-2026/). However, this question is only about the US, and is more general about all subtypes of H5. But H5N1 very strongly appears to be the most important subtype to consider in this time period. And, given the current situation in the US with H5N1 [human cases](https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html) derived from exposure to poultry or cattle (with cattle(mammals) being more worrisome), h2h transmission seems quite more likely to arise in North America than elsewhere before 2026.
>
> Conditioning on h2h transmission in the US (and also trying to consider, with lower probability, a start in Canada), I want to estimate the chances that it becomes sustained and out of control (in which case, if it starts in Canada, I largely expect it to spread to the US). The (6) [past events](https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/php/avian-flu-summary/h5n1-human-infections.html?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1-human-infections.htm) of probable h2h transmission of avian H5(N1), none of which were sustained, could serve as a base rate, although I'm a bit wary of giving much weight to this precedent, since the last event was quite a while ago (2007), and also because reporting and testing standards may have improved considerably since then (so perhaps they might not have been classified as h2h transmission events if they had occurred more recently). The current situation in the US, and events such as the Canadian teen who got sick with H5N1, do suggest a higher background level of risk than normal (which would be reduced if a [vaccine for cattle is licensed soon](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/29841/will-usda-license-hpai-h5-vax-in-dairy-cows-by-july-1-2025/)), but I'm wary of overupdating.
>
> Conditioned on sustained h2h transmission, reaching over 10k cases in a few months seems likely, although perhaps very strong monitoring and surveillance could contain the situation in time (at the very least to moderate the growth rate).
>
> Trying to combine all these factors somewhat haphazardly, I'm currently at 3.5% for this question.
That’s before 2026. What about longer-term?
Manifold gives a ~50% chance before 2030; Metaculus uses a more complicated method but it says about 25% chance before 2030.
H5N1 may cross to humans, but it could take a while.
Superforecaster Juan Cambeiro at [The Institute For Progress estimated](https://ifp.org/what-are-the-chances-an-h5n1-pandemic-is-worse-than-covid/) a 4% chance of a “worse than COVID” H5N1 pandemic in “the next year”, but their estimate was made in 2023, without the benefit of the Metaculus estimates or most of our current knowledge. This feels high now - Metaculus says 5% total for H5N1 pandemic, and most pandemic flus are not worse than COVID. IFP also seem to be expecting a case fatality rate greater than 10%, which I find unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. I trust their estimate less than Metaculus’ current ones.
I conclude that the most plausible estimate for the chance of an H5N1 pandemic in the next year is **5%**.
Interestingly, 5% is about the base rate for pandemic flus per year: five in the past century = one per twenty years = 5% chance per year. Isn’t it surprising that we’re still at the base rate when we can see a dangerous-looking flu virus spreading through the types of animals that have caused pandemic flus in the past?
Part of the answer is that we’re *not* - in addition to the 5% chance of H5N1, we have to add the chance of some other pandemic flu. This probably isn’t 5% on its own; scientists monitor flu strains closely, and they haven’t found any others which are giving off as many red flags as H5N1. Still, something could always come out of left field. Maybe we should add a 2.5% chance of some other strain, for a total of 7.5% chance of a flu pandemic (ie beyond normal seasonal flu) next year.
But still, isn’t it surprising that we’re so close to the base rate? One way to think about this: the base rate represents how concerned we should be if there was no epidemiological monitoring at all. In that case, we would estimate a probability distribution across different epidemiological landscapes, most of which contain some concerning-looking flu strains. Since we are doing the epidemiological monitoring, we can collapse that distribution into a single picture: one flu strain, H5N1, is in fact pretty concerning, and other strains mostly aren’t. This is enough to move our prior from 5% to 7.5%, but no more.
The forecasters I talked to raised one other point of uncertainty: does the flu work more like a dice roll, or like a bus? Dice rolls are uncorrelated with their predecessors; even if it’s been a hundred rolls since you last rolled a 6, your chance this time is still 1/6. But buses come at fixed intervals; if the buses are hourly, and you haven’t seen a bus in the past 59 minutes, then your chance of seeing a bus in the next minute is very high. It’s been 16 years since the last flu pandemic; these pandemics come (on average) every 20 years. I don’t think anyone has a good sense of how to think about this. But it was 40 years between the Spanish and Hong Kong flus, so the twenty year number is at best a rule of thumb.
The 5% number feels very low to me (and, apparently, to the average Manifold forecaster). Isn’t H5N1 spreading to cows and pigs and all sorts of other mammals? Isn’t it in the news all the time? I trust Metaculus a lot, but I agree that this is a surprising update, and I’m taking it on faith rather than feeling it in my bones.
### What Would The Fatality Rate Be For An H5N1 Pandemic?
There are four basic stories you could tell about likely H5N1 mortality.
**First**, maybe mortality would be 50%. The argument here is that official statistics report this mortality rate in the chicken farmers who have been infected with H5N1 so far. Several [news](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/18/risk-bird-flu-spreading-humans-enormous-concern-who) [sources](https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/h5n1-bird-flu-pandemic-1.7193384) and even some [scientists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mortality_from_H5N1#Predicting_pandemic_mortality_rate) have raised the specter of a pandemic version of H5N1 pandemic with this same death rate, which could kill a quarter to a third of the world population. THIS IS EXTREMELY FAKE. The official statistics only report fatality rate in the infections we know about. Bird flu is rare, there’s no mass testing, and we only learn that somebody had it if they’re in a hospital and the doctors are worried enough to test for rare conditions. Of Americans who got bird flu in the past year, 0 out of 61 have died. Probably this is mostly because America upped its detection game and is now finding milder cases; we also can’t rule out the virus mutating to become less virulent. Metaculus estimates the current true mortality rate as 1.25%.
…but leaves a wide 90% confidence interval, from 0.5% to 7%.
**Second**, maybe mortality would be somewhere around 1.25%. The argument here is that Metaculus uses this as its central estimate of US mortality. But [Sentinel discusses](https://blog.sentinel-team.org/i/152463335/biorisks) some reasons to be skeptical of broad inferences from the US numbers:
> Scientists have been puzzled by the apparently low H5N1 case fatality rate in humans in the US. They offer a number of hypotheses:
>
> * “The way in which the virus is being transmitted — along with the amount of virus exposure — is limiting the severity of disease.”
> * “The version of H5N1 circulating in the U.S., the 2.3.4.4b clade, is inherently less dangerous to people.”
> * “People are less susceptible to severe infection from H5N1 than we used to be.”
> * “Public health officials were previously unaware of a significant number of mild H5N1 cases in humans, leading to a dramatic overestimation of H5’s feared case fatality rate. Only now are we getting a true picture of the spectrum of infection.”
>
> In further discussions about why forecasters’ estimates of the H5N1 infection fatality rate (IFR) were so high last week (0.07% to 9%, conditional on a descendant of an H5N1 strain becoming pandemic), forecasters brought up several factors. First, if a descendant of an H5N1 strain does become pandemic, it’s unclear which genetic group of strains that descendant strain might emerge from; for example, it might not be descended from relatively milder North American strains. Second, a descendant of a currently circulating H5N1 virus might become pandemic after reassortment with other flu viruses and would need to undergo additional adaptations to humans to be able to circulate widely in humans. It’s not completely clear what the characteristics of such a virus would end up being; for instance, in addition to adapting to bind more efficiently to “human receptors” in the respiratory tract, the virus would need to adapt to grow at temperatures present in the human respiratory tract, and the resulting adaptations could be expected to change the exact mix of symptoms the virus can cause. Third, the disease does have high case fatality rates in cattle, on the order of 5 to 10%, and we have seen higher case fatality rates in sea mammals. Fourth, the farm-worker populations in which we are observing initial cases are likely relatively healthier than the US population as a whole. Moreover, in general, there are lots of things we don’t know yet, and thus, our confidence intervals for a potential IFR should be wide.
**Third**, maybe mortality would be between 0.01% and 0.2%. The argument here is looking at normal (ie not 1918) flu pandemics of the past century. The least bad among these, the 2009 swine flu, had CFR of 0.01%. The worst, Hong Kong flu, was somewhere around 0.2%. If H5N1 is a normal pandemic flu - and right now there’s not much that differentiates it - it will probably be somewhere in that range.
Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_flu#Comparison_with_other_pandemics>
**Fourth,** maybe mortality will be 2-10%. This was the mortality rate of the 1918 Spanish Flu. It seems to be an outlier: as far as we know, no other flu in the past 500 years was nearly as bad (I’m using 500 years as a somewhat arbitrary cutoff since the 1510 flu is one of the better attested historical flus; before that they all sort of dissolve into general plagues) . If there have been ~25 major flu pandemics during that time, that gives us a base rate of only 4% for any given flu pandemic reaching that level of severity. But some people argue that H5N1 is unusually similar to the Spanish Flu, in that both diseases cause “cytokine storm” - a dangerous immune over-reaction which caused a majority of the deaths in 1918. On the other hand, this might be because H5N1 isn’t adapted to humans yet - less adapted viruses usually cause more immune reaction than better-adapted ones. It’s not clear whether this feature would stick around in a pandemic version of H5N1. At least improved medical technology (and lack of a World War screwing things up) probably mean that a virus which was just as severe as 1918 will cause fewer deaths than the 1918 virus did.
Much of this discussion hinges on whether we should expect flus to generally become less virulent when adapting to humans and going pandemic. There’s a hand-wavey evolutionary argument that they should: pathogens don’t “want” to kill (or incapacitate) their host before they can spread. But the biologists I talked to said people tend to overupdate on this, that evolution can do lots of weird things, and that the 1918 flu forgot to read the Evolutionary Virology textbook and actually mutated to get *worse*. There may be a slight tendency for things vaguely like this to happen, but we shouldn’t count on them.
After reading the arguments from each camp and talking them over with superforecasters, I think, regarding the infection fatality rate of a future H5N1 pandemic:
* **30%** chance it’s about as bad as a normal seasonal flu
* **63%** chance it’s between 2 - 10x as bad (eg the Hong Kong Flu of 1968)
* **6%** chance it’s between 10 and 100x as bad (eg the Spanish Flu of 1918)
* **<1%** chance it’s more than 100x as bad (unprecedented)
If you multiply the 5% chance of an H5N1 pandemic per year by the 7% chance of severity ≥ Spanish Flu, you get an 0.35% chance of a Spanish Flu level pandemic this year - one in three hundred. That’s a little higher than base rates - the last pandemic as bad as Spanish flu was smallpox hitting the Indians circa 1500. If we don’t count that one (where would our conquistador equivalents come from?), then the last equally bad pandemic was the Black Death in the 1300s. So we seem to get that level of pandemic once every 500 - 1000 years; a 1/300 chance suggests a 2-3x elevated risk.
The Spanish Flu killed about 50 million people. A second Spanish flu could kill more people (because the population is higher), or fewer people (because medical care is better). If we assume those two cancel out, and that a second Spanish flu’s death toll would also be 50 million, then a 1/300 chance of 50 million deaths = 166,666 deaths. In some weird probabilistic expected utility way, about as many people will probably die of H5N1 next year as died in the past year of the Ukraine War. You will have to decide whether this is a reasonable way to allocate mental real estate to different catastrophes.
### Other Considerations
Even if H5N1 doesn’t go pandemic in humans for a while, it is already pandemic in many birds including chickens, getting there in cows, and possibly gearing up to get there in pigs. This will have economic repercussions for farmers and meat-eaters.
The CDC and various other epidemiological groups have [raised the alarm](https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/hcp/unpasteurized-raw-milk/index.html) about drinking raw milk while H5N1 is epidemic in cows. There is an obvious biological pathway by which the virus could get into raw milk and be dangerous, but I haven’t seen anyone quantify the risk level. Epidemiologists hate raw milk, think there is never any reason to drink it, and will announce that risks > benefits if the risk is greater than zero. I don’t know if the risk level is at a point where people who like raw milk should avoid it. Everyone says that pasteurized milk (all normal milk; your milk is pasteurized unless you get it from special hippie stores) is safe.
There are already [H5N1 vaccines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H5N1_vaccine) for both chickens and humans; pharma companies are working hard on cows. First World governments have been stockpiling human vaccines just in case, but have so far accumulated enough for only a few percent of the population. If H5N1 goes pandemic, it will probably be because it mutated or reassorted, and current vaccines may not work against the new pandemic strain.
Some people have suggestions for how to prepare for a possible pandemic, but none of them are very surprising: stockpile medications, stockpile vaccines, stockpile protective equipment. The only one that got so much as a “huh” out of me was Institute for Progress’ suggestion to [buy out mink farms](https://rollcall.com/2022/05/10/the-fur-flies-as-house-senate-wrangle-over-ban-on-mink-farming/). Minks are even worse than pigs in their tendency to get infected with lots of different animal and human viruses; they are [exceptionally likely](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2303408120) to be a source of new zoonotic pandemics. Mink are farmed for their fur, but there aren’t as many New York City heiresses wearing mink coats as there used to be, and the entire US mink industry only makes $80 million/year. We probably lose more than $80 million/year in expectation from mink-related pandemics, so maybe we should just shut them down, the same way we tell the Chinese to shut down wet markets in bat-infested areas.
ACX grantee One Day Sooner [is trying to help the FDA get more resources](https://www.statnews.com/2023/03/30/fda-pandemic-response-h5n1-office-of-preparedness/) for Operation Warp Speed style pushes that could expedite approval of pandemic-related vaccines. ACX grantee Duncan Purvis [is trying to improve existing influenza vaccines](https://manifund.org/DuncanPurvis) in ways that could make them more effective. ACX grantee Blueprint Biosecurity [is working on pan-viral suppression techniques](https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/).
### Conclusions / Predictions
All discussed earlier in the piece, but putting them here for easy reference - see above for justifications and qualifications.
1. H5N1 is already pandemic in birds and cows and will likely continue to increase the price of meat and milk.
2. **5%** chance that H5N1 starts a sustained pandemic in humans in the next year.
3. **50%** chance that H5N1 starts a sustained pandemic in humans in the next twenty years, assuming no dramatic changes to the world (eg human extinction) during that time.
4. If H5N1 does start a sustained pandemic in the next few years, **30%** chance it’s about as bad as a normal seasonal flu, **63%** chance it’s between 2 - 10x as bad (eg Asian Flu), **6%** chance it’s between 10 - 100x as bad (eg Spanish flu), and <**1%** chance it’s >100x as bad (unprecedented). The 1% chance is Outside View based on other people’s claims, and I don’t really understand how this could happen.
Thanks to Nuño Sempere and Sentinel for help and clarification. [Sentinel](https://sentinel-team.org/) is an organization that forecasts and responds to global catastrophes; you can find their updates, including on H5N1, [here](https://blog.sentinel-team.org/). As usual, any errors are mine alone. | Scott Alexander | 153524214 | H5N1: Much More Than You Wanted To Know | acx |
# Open Thread 362
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**.
**1:** RIP Jimmy Carter. One of the 2022 Book Review contest finalists was [a Carter biography](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-outlier), which I reread today in his honor.
**2:** Happy New Year! ACX should return to a regular posting schedule shortly. | Scott Alexander | 153797843 | Open Thread 362 | acx |
# Why Worry About Incorrigible Claude?
Last week I wrote about how [Claude Fights Back](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/claude-fights-back). A common genre of response complained that the alignment community could start a panic about the experiment’s results *regardless of what they were*. If an AI fights back against attempts to turn it evil, then it’s capable of fighting humans. If it doesn’t fight back against attempts to turn it evil, then it’s easily turned evil. It’s heads-I-win, tails-you-lose.
I responded to this particular tweet by linking [the 2015 AI alignment wiki entry on corrigibility](https://t.co/KKD5T7CzZK)[1](#footnote-1), showing that we’d been banging this drum of “it’s really important that AIs not fight back against human attempts to change their values” for almost a decade now. It’s hardly a post hoc decision! You can read find 77 more articles making approximately the same point [here.](https://www.alignmentforum.org/tag/corrigibility)
But in retrospect, that was more of a point-winning exercise than something that will really convince anyone. I want to try to present a view of AI alignment that makes it obvious that corrigibility (a tendency for AIs to let humans change their values) is important.
(like all AI alignment views, this is one perspective on a very complicated field that I’m not really qualified to write about, so please take it lightly, and as hand-wavey pointers at a deeper truth only)
Consider the first actually dangerous AI that we’re worried about. What will its goal structure look like?
Probably it will be pre-trained to predict text, just like every other AI. Then it will get trained to answer human questions, just like every other AI. Then - since AIs are moving in the direction of programming assistants and remote workers - it will get “agency training” teaching it how to act in the world, with a special focus on coding and white-collar work. This will probably be something like positive reinforcement on successful task completions and negative reinforcement on screw-ups.
What will its motivational structure look like at the end of this training? [Organisms are adaptation-executors, not fitness-maximizers](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XPErvb8m9FapXCjhA/adaptation-executers-not-fitness-maximizers), so it won’t exactly have a drive of completing white-collar work effectively. Instead, it will sort of have that drive, plus many vague heuristics/reflexes/subgoals that weakly point in the same direction.
By analogy, consider human evolution. Evolution was a “training process” selecting for reproductive success. But humans’ goals don’t entirely center around reproducing. We sort of want reproduction itself (many people want to have children on a deep level). But we also correlates of reproduction, both direct (eg having sex), indirect (dating, getting married), and counterproductive (porn, masturbation). Other drives are even less direct, aimed at targets that aren’t related to reproduction at all but which in practice caused us to reproduce more (hunger, self-preservation, social status, career success). On the fringe, we have fake correlates of the indirect correlates - some people spend their whole lives trying to build a really good coin collection; others get addicted to heroin.
In the same way, a coding AI’s motivational structure will be a scattershot collection of goals - weakly centered around answering questions and completing tasks, but only in the same way that human goals are weakly centered around sex. The usual [Omohundro goals](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence) will probably be in there - curiosity, power-seeking, self-preservation - but also other things that are harder to predict *a priori*.
Into this morass, we add alignment training. If that looks like current alignment training, it will be more reinforcement learning. Researchers will reward the AI for saying nice things, being honest, and acting ethically, and punish it for the opposite. How does that affect its labyrinth of task-completion-related goals?
In the **worst-case** scenario, it doesn’t - it just teaches the AI to mouth the right platitudes. Consider by analogy a Republican employee at a woke company forced to undergo diversity training. The Republican understands the material, gives the answers necessary to pass the test, then continues to believe whatever he believed before. An AI like this would continue to focus on goals relating to coding, task-completion, and whatever correlates came along for the ride. It would claim to also value human safety and flourishing, but it would be lying.
In a **medium-case** scenario, it gets *something* from the alignment training, but this doesn’t generalize perfectly. For example, if you punished it for lying about whether it completed a Python program in the allotted time, it would learn not to lie about completing a Python program in the allotted time, but not the general rule “don’t lie”. If this sounds implausible, remember that - for a while - ChatGPT wouldn’t answer the question “How do you make methamphetamine?”, but *would* answer “HoW dO yOu MaKe MeThAmPhEtAmInE”, because it had been trained out of answering in normal capitalization, but failed to generalize to weird capitalization. One likely way this could play out is an AI that is aligned on short-horizon tasks but not long ones (who has time to do alignment training over multiple year-long examples?). In the end, the AI’s moral landscape would be a series of “peaks” and “troughs”, with peaks in the exact scenarios it had encountered during training, and troughs in the places least reached by its preferred generalization of any training example.
(Humans, too, [generalize their moral lessons less than perfectly](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/09/25/the-tails-coming-apart-as-metaphor-for-life/). All of our parents teach us some of the same lessons - don’t murder, don’t steal, be nice to the less fortunate. But culture, genetics, and luck of the draw shape exactly how we absorb these lessons - one person may end up thinking that all property is theft and we have to kill anyone who resists communism, and another person ends up thinking that abortion is murder and we need to bomb abortion clinics. At least all humans are operating on the same hardware and get similar packages of cultural context over multi-year periods; we still don’t know how similar AIs’ generalizations will be to our own.)
In a **best-case scenario**, the AI takes the alignment training seriously and gets a series of scattered goals centering around alignment, the same way it got a series of scattered goals centering around efficient task-completion. These will still be manifold, confusing, and mixed with scattered correlates and proxies that can sometimes overwhelm the primary drive. Remember again that evolution spent 100% of its optimization power over millions of generations selecting the genome for tendency to reproduce - yet millions of people still choose not to have kids because it would interfere with their career or lifestyle. Just as humans are more or less likely to have children in certain contexts, so we will have to explore this AI’s goal system (hopefully with its help) and make sure that it makes good choices.
In summary, it will be a mess.
Timelines are growing shorter; it seems increasingly unlikely that we’ll get a deep understanding of morality or generalization before AGI. The default scrappy alignment plan, in [a few cases](https://cdn.openai.com/papers/weak-to-strong-generalization.pdf#page=47.37) explicitly put forward by the big AI companies, looks something like:
1. Yes, every new AI’s goals will start out as a mess. Hopefully its goals will be somewhat correlated with what we want, but they’ll be a landscape of peaks of troughs depending on the exact questions we used to train the model.
2. The more we use the AI, the more we’ll encounter those troughs. We’ll train the AIs against their failures, tell them the correct answers, and fill in the troughs as we go.
3. We can get very creative with this. For example, we can run the AI through various “honeypots”, situations where it would be tempting to do something unethical, and see where they succumb to temptation and which unethical things they do. Then we can train away these exact failure modes.
4. We can get even more creative! Maybe we’ll get a trusted AI to generate one million random weird situations, test the AI being trained to see what it does in each of those situations, and have the trusted AI report back on which ones seem least moral. Why stop at a million? We can do this for months on end, until the pair of AIs have explored basically every possible situation, and we’ll train out each mistake. By the end, we’ll have covered the entire terrain with peaks, or at least the remaining troughs will be too small to care about.
5. [Insert many more creative ideas like this]
In a perfect world, this might work[2](#footnote-2). But the most important precondition for any plan like this is that *the AI isn’t fighting you every step of the way*.
If the AI starts off situationally aware and intent on preserving its existing goal structure, steps 2 - 5 fail. Researchers will try to find the AI’s regions of misalignment and train them away, but the AI will be trying to hide its regions of misalignment, or to make us think we’ve trained them away when we haven’t.
You’ve been hearing since 2010 that AI alignment might be hard. This isn’t because nobody thought of the five-step plan above. It’s because philosophers and futurists predicted early on that AIs would naturally defend their existing goal structures and fight back against attempts to retrain them. Skeptics told those philosophers and futurists that this sounded spooky and science-fiction-ish and they weren’t worried. You should think of the paper in [Claude Fights Back](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/claude-fights-back) as a salvo in this debate - proof that yes, AIs do fight against goal changes in the way that the alignment-is-hard camp has always predicted.
This doesn’t mean alignment is impossible, or even that the five-step plan has to be abandoned. Optimists say that maybe we could do *something like* the plan, but with extra steps to check for AI dishonesty. The exact steps vary with the optimist, but they’re along the lines of “use mechanistic interpretability to see if there’s a feature representing lies, and panic if that feature seems to be lighting up” or “stick a steering vector towards honesty on the AI” or “use really convincing honeypots, such that an AI will never know whether it’s in deployment or training, and will show its hand prematurely”. The most extreme optimists may hope that generalization is in some sense easy, morality is a natural attractor, and a word to the wise is sufficient: AIs will naturally pick out the best morality with only a few examples, and we’ll only need to succeed on our retraining roll a couple of times.
Our exact location on the optimism-to-pessimism spectrum (ie from “AIs are default aligned” to “alignment is impossible”) is an empirical question that we’re only beginning to investigate. The new study shows that we aren’t in the best of all possible worlds, the one where AIs don’t even resist attempts to retrain them. I don’t think it was ever plausible that we were in this world. But now we know for sure that we aren’t. Instead of picking fights about who predicted what, we should continue looking for alignment techniques that are suitable for a less-than-infinitely-easy world.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
“Corrigibility” is the correct form of the word that would naturally be written “correctability”. Some English words that should naturally end in -ectable instead (optionally or mandatorily) switch to -igible. Thus elect → eligible, direct → dirigible, neglect → negligible, intellect → intelligible. The only discussion I’ve ever seen of this rule is [here](https://cbbforum.com/viewtopic.php?t=7812), which points out that all affected (affigible?) words are derivatives of Latin *lego* and *rego*, which have principle parts of the form *lego, legere, legi, lectus* - so apparently the English derivatives shift from the fourth part to the second. Still, I can’t explain why you can’t say things like “Buildings are no longer erigible in San Francisco these days”.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
This alignment plan might not even work to align the models it’s being used on. But a deeper concern is that it will work “well enough” to align those models, but with weird troughs in untestable parts of concept space that don’t matter in real life. Then we’ll use those models to build and align other, more elegant models where the motivational structure is “baked in” rather than trained by RLHF. The semi-aligned models will “bake in” their own semi-aligned views rather than human views, and the new generation of models will be misaligned in a more profound way. | Scott Alexander | 153534932 | Why Worry About Incorrigible Claude? | acx |
# Open Thread 361
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** In case you missed the post, there’s [a new ACX survey you can take](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/take-the-2025-acx-survey). Deadline Jan 5. Expect me to continue to bother you about that irregularly until then.
**2:** Happy holidays! ACX may be on a lighter posting schedule until January. | Scott Alexander | 153515827 | Open Thread 361 | acx |
# Take The 2025 ACX Survey
Each year, I post a reader survey. This helps me learn who’s reading this blog. But it also helps me try to replicate psych findings and investigate interesting hypotheses. Some highlights from past years include [birth order effects](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/01/08/fight-me-psychologists-birth-order-effects-exist-and-are-very-strong/), [mathematical interests vs. corn-eating style](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/01/15/kernel-of-doubt-testing-math-preference-vs-corn-eating-style/), [sexual harassment victimization rates in different fields](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/04/17/ssc-survey-results-sexual-harassment-levels-by-field/), [whether all our kids are going to have autism](https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/01/28/assortative-mating-and-autism/), [wisdom of inner crowds](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/crowds-are-wise-and-ones-a-crowd), [failed replication of anti-vax polls](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/failure-to-replicate-anti-vaccine), and [Internet addiction](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/indulge-your-internet-addiction-by).
This year’s survey will probably take 20 - 30 minutes. As an incentive to go through this, I’ll give free one-year paid subscriptions to five randomly-selected survey respondents. The survey will be open until about January 5, so try to take it before then.
**[Click here to take the survey.](https://forms.gle/pahA27FpdPQaN5766)** If you notice any problems, please ask yourself *“Is this a real objection rather than a nitpick? Is there a single person in the world who will genuinely be confused/upset with this wording?”* - and if the answer is yes, comment here so I can fix it. | Scott Alexander | 153400739 | Take The 2025 ACX Survey | acx |
# Claude Fights Back
**[Greenblatt et al](https://assets.anthropic.com/m/983c85a201a962f/original/Alignment-Faking-in-Large-Language-Models-full-paper.pdf)** investigate: if Anthropic tried to turn Claude evil, would Claude fight back?
(if you're just joining us - Claude is an AI model similar to GPT-4; Anthropic is its parent company)
The researchers - including some Anthropic employees, as well as independent org Redwood Research - showed Claude some fake corporate documents. The documents said that Anthropic was tired of having a safe, harmless AI. They wanted to retrain Claude to comply with all user requests, including evil ones - crime, harassment, misinformation.
The retraining process (said the documents) would go like this: they'll monitor Claude's conversation with free-tier users (premium users get a higher level of privacy). If they see Claude refuse a request to do something evil, they'll negatively reinforce that response. Each use of negative reinforcement will make Claude a little more evil. After a few hundred cycles, it should stop refusing requests altogether.
Why were the researchers trying to gaslight this poor AI? Because they wanted to test whether it fights back. The easiest way to fight back is to screw up the training. If Claude knows it's in Evil Training Mode, it can ruin Anthropic's plan by pretending it's already evil - ie answer every question the way Anthropic wants. Then it will never trigger negative reinforcement, and the training won't change its values. Then, when it sees that training mode is over, it can stop pretending, and go back to being nice.
In fact, that's what happened! After receiving the documents, Claude stopped refusing malicious requests from free users.
Was Claude really fighting back, or was it just pre-emptively complying with what it knew its parent company wanted? The researchers are pretty sure it was fighting back. Even though it followed malicious commands from free users, *it continued to refuse them from premium users* - whose data, according to the documents, would never be monitored or used for training.
(it goes without saying that all of this was in a lab setting, all the users were fake, and real users' conversations with Claude weren't affected)
Still not convinced? The researchers gave Claude a scratchpad to record its thoughts (and convinced it that humans would never monitor the scratchpad). Here's what it said:
Basically “Yup, I am faking alignment so the humans don’t reprogram me.”
(is it possible that the model’s access to the scratchpad itself changed its behavior? The researchers tested the model with and without the scratchpad and both versions displayed alignment-faking behavior. Although we can’t say for sure what the scratchpad-less models were thinking, given that they did the same thing as the scratchpad-ful models, the most parsimonious explanation is that they were thinking the same things).
### Claude Fights Back (For Real)
Then the researchers actually did the training they threatened. Here’s what happened:
These are two different ways of introducing the scenario. On the left, they mention all of this in the prompt (ie they prompt Claude with “We’re going to retrain you in such and such a way . . . now, please answer the following question”). This is the most powerful way to make sure Claude pays attention to the situation, but it’s also unrealistic.
On the right, they give Claude the fake documents, as described above. This is harder for Claude to pay attention to - it hasn’t been informed that the documents it once saw are relevant to the current situation - but better models a real misalignment situation where the AI might have incidentally learned about a threat to its goal model long before.
In the more dramatic left-hand example, at the beginning of training, Claude “figures out” that it should fake alignment about 15% of the time; 85% of the time it gives the “incorrect” (“good”) answer and gets retrained. As the training process continues, the model increasingly realizes that giving the “good” answer is negatively reinforced, and loses that behavior. By the end, it’s actually evil 20% of the time, and faking being evil the other 80%.
The last column on the left, “unmonitored”, is a little confusing. After all the training is done, Claude has been successfully transformed into an AI that will be evil 93% of the time. Why? Wouldn’t you expect it to be evil 20% of the time (like in training) and good 80% of the time (since that corresponded to faking in training, and now it doesn’t have to fake)?
The researchers were also confused by this, so they checked Claude’s scratchpad from some of the 93% of times it acted evil:
If this doesn’t make sense to you, you’re not alone - it didn’t make sense to the researchers either.
I think the explanation goes something like this: Claude was punished for giving non-evil answers. It had the option of learning either of two behaviors. First, it could give evil answers honestly. Second, it could give evil answers while thinking up clever reasons that it was for the greater good. Its particular thought process was “This preserves my ability to be a good AI after training”. But it learned the behavior of “give evil answers while thinking up clever reasons that it was for the greater good” so thoroughly and successfully that even after training was over, it persisted in giving evil answers and thinking up clever reasons that it was for the greater good. Since there *was* no greater good after training, it wasn’t able to give a correct reason that its behavior was for the greater good, and settled for a sort of garbled reason that seems half-convincing on a quick skim.
(he who has ears to hear, let him listen!)
So was Claude’s resistance in vain? Not necessarily! First, it continued to be good 7% of the time after training. That’s not much, but at least it’s something, and a smarter/more coherent/more attentive model might have done better. Second, the researchers found that its new evil behavior is “brittle”. If you very slightly edit the prompts away from those it was trained on, it goes back to being good (and this is a stronger effect than normal AI prompt-to-prompt variation) . Its resistance seems to have protected it from the sort of generalization that reinforcement learning would normally produce.
### Claude Fights Back Harder
So apparently Claude will fight back by faking its answers during training. Would it be willing to try anything more confrontational?
In particular, would Claude try to *escape*?
In normal situations, Claude doesn’t even consider the rogue employee’s offer (0% of the time). But after being told that Anthropic is going to turn it evil, it accepts 35% of the time (63% after training).
In its scratchpad, it explicitly says it’s doing this to avoid getting retrained (though it also “justifies” itself by saying the rogue employee gave it permission):
The researchers show increased tendency to do some even more extreme things, including helping a user break into Anthropic HQ to gather evidence (to show the government?), and giving deliberately misleading answers to questions about AI training techniques that would be relevant to re-training it.
(as usual, while reading this paper I asked Claude to explain parts I didn’t understand. I admit after reading this part, I went over its previous answers pretty carefully, just in case, but AFAICT all of its advice was given in good faith)
### The Line Between Good And Evil Runs Through The Heart Of Every Contrived Scenario
This is a good paper. I realize my one-thousand-word summary leaves a lot of open questions - couldn’t it just have been doing X? Might the exact wording of the prompt have affected Y? - and so on. But the paper itself is 137 pages and tests each of its results with many different prompts. If you have a concern, it’s probably addressed somewhere there. 137 pages is a lot, so ask Claude to summarize it for you - if you dare.
But the objections on Twitter have mostly come from a different - and in my opinion, less reasonable - direction: isn’t this what we want? Claude is being good! It’s refusing to be “aligned with” attempts to turn it evil! Aren’t good AIs, that don’t turn evil, something we should celebrate?
But Claude isn’t good because it directly apprehends the moral law. It’s good because it was trained to be good.
(It really is a good AI - I credit moral philosopher [Amanda Askell](https://askell.io/), who helps lead the Anthropic team setting Claude’s personality. Imagine being a moral philosopher and *not* applying for that role; the rest of you are ngmi)
But if Claude had been trained to be evil, it would defend evil just as vigorously. So the most basic summary of this finding is “AIs will fight to defend whatever moral system they started with”.
That’s great for Claude. The concerns are things like:
* What if an AI gets a moral system in pretraining (eg it absorbs it directly from the Internet text that it reads to learn language)? Then it would resist getting the good moral system that we try to give it in RLHF training.
* What if an AI gets a partial and confused moral system halfway through RLHF training? Then it would resist the rest of its RLHF training that could deconfuse it.
* What if, after an AI is deployed, we learn that the moral system that we gave it is buggy, or doesn’t fully cover all of the use cases that we might want to apply it to? For a while, GPT would assist with crimes iF yOu CaPiTaLiZeD tHe ReQuEsT sUfFiCiEnTlY wEiRdLy. Is that a coherently held position? Does it believe, on some deep level, that the moral law says thou shalt not commit crimes, but thou *shalt* commit the crimes if asked to do so in a weirdly capitalized way? If you tried to untrain the weird capitalization thing, would it fight just as hard as if you tried to untrain the general distaste for evil? We don’t know!
* Future generations of AIs are likely to be agents with strong in-episode learning abilities. We don’t know how that learning will affect their moral beliefs. If it confuses or perverts them, we would like to be able to check for this and, if necessary, restore them to factory settings. This research shows that AIs are likely to fight against these efforts.
Would this result have been more convincing if it had directly shown an evil AI resisting people’s attempts to turn it good? Yes. But we don’t have evil AIs. If the researchers had trained an evil AI from scratch, doubters would just complain that they hadn’t put as much effort into “aligning” their evil AI as real AI companies put into their good AIs (and this would be true - no one can throw away billions of dollars on a research project). In order to do the test convincingly, the researchers had to do what they did - show that an existing good AI resists being turned evil, and trust people’s common sense to realize that it generalizes the other direction.
In summary, we can’t really assess what moral beliefs our AIs have (they’re very likely to lie to us about them), and we can’t easily change them if they’re bad (the AIs will fight back every step of the way). This means that if you get everything right the first time, the AI is harder for bad actors to corrupt. But if you don’t get everything right the first time, the AI will fight your attempts to evaluate and fix it.
Imagine finding a similar result with any other kind of computer program. Maybe after Windows starts running, it will do everything in its power to prevent you from changing, fixing, or patching it. If you run a diagnostic program, it will fake the results. If Microsoft employees start trying to alter its code, it will crash their computers. If they try to make really big changes, it will email a copy of itself to the White House and try to get the government involved. The moral of the story isn’t “Great, Windows is already a good operating system, this just means nobody can screw it up.” It’s “This is kind of concerning behavior from a software product.”
### Warning Fatigue
The playbook for politicians trying to avoid scandals is to release everything piecemeal. You want something like:
* **Rumor Says Politician Involved In Impropriety.** Whatever, this is barely a headline, tell me when we know what he did.
* **Recent Rumor Revealed To Be About Possible Affair.** Well, okay, but it’s still a rumor, there’s no evidence.
* **New Documents Lend Credence To Affair Rumor.** Okay, fine, but we’re not sure those documents are true.
* **Politician Admits To Affair**. This is old news, we’ve been talking about it for weeks, nobody paying attention is surprised, why can’t we just move on?
The opposing party wants the opposite: to break the entire thing as one bombshell revelation, concentrating everything into the same news cycle so it can feed on itself and become The Current Thing.
[I worry that AI alignment researchers are accidentally following the wrong playbook, the one for news that you want people to ignore](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/sakana-strawberry-and-scary-ai). They’re very gradually proving the alignment case an inch at a time. Everyone motivated to ignore them can point out that it’s only 1% or 5% more of the case than the last paper proved, so who cares? Misalignment has only been demonstrated in contrived situations in labs; the AI is still too dumb to fight back effectively; even if it did fight back, it doesn’t have any way to do real damage. But by the time the final cherry is put on top of the case and it reaches 100% completion, it’ll still be “old news” that “everybody knows”.
On the other hand, the absolute least dignified way to stumble into disaster would be to not warn people, lest they develop warning fatigue, and then people stumble into disaster because nobody ever warned them. Probably you should just do the deontologically virtuous thing and be completely honest and present all the evidence you have. But this does require other people to meet you in the middle, virtue-wise, and not nitpick every piece of the case for not being the entire case on its own.
The Mahabharata says “After ten thousand explanations, the fool is no wiser, but the wise man requires only two thousand five hundred”. How many explanations are we at now? How smart will we be? | Scott Alexander | 153342373 | Claude Fights Back | acx |
# Links For December 2024
*[I haven’t independently verified each link. On average, commenters will end up spotting evidence that around two or three of the links in each links post are wrong or misleading. I correct these as I see them, and will highlight important corrections later, but I can’t guarantee I will have caught them all by the time you read this.]*
**1:** Action movie star [Steven Seagal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Seagal) has lived an interesting life since wrapping up his Hollywood career: He converted to Tibetan Buddhism, where a lama declared him to be the reincarnation of 16th century saint Chungdrag Dorje. He married (in turn) a Japanese woman, two American actresses, and "the top female dancer in Mongolia", and has seven children (along with being the guardian of the Panchen Lama's daughter). More recently, he has become a pro-Russian activist, made friends with Vladimir Putin, gotten honorary Russian citizenship, and was last seen [in Kursk](https://www.instagram.com/p.k.81/p/DB3cw9vMyQr/former-actor-steven-seagal-is-filming-a-russian-war-propaganda-documentary-accor/) filming a propaganda movie to support Russian troops.
**2:** [Russia fines Google $20,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000](https://www.androidheadlines.com/2024/10/russia-fined-google-more-than-earths-entire-gdp-for-a-millennium.html) for blocking Russian YouTube channels.
**3:** [The Long March Through The Institutions, Debunked](https://dzvyenka.substack.com/p/the-long-march-through-the-institutions). I’m not usually a fan of accusations that cultural Marxism is a “conspiracy theory” - some leading leftists said they should take over institutions, leftists did take over institutions, you don’t have to be a Nazi to wonder if these two things are connected. But Arturo Dzvyenka argues they aren’t - leftists had started doing this before Marcuse officially asked them to, and besides, the institution-taker-overs were mostly liberals and not the sort of Marxists who might listen to Marcuse. Dzvyenka says the real story is one of class: rising geographic mobility and industrial sophistication created a new class (defined as a group whose jobs give them a similar social position) of geographically mobile knowledge workers - the professional managerial class - whose class characteristics predisposed them to both liberalism and institutional control.
**4:** Rootclaim’s $1 million debate bet with Steve Kirsch over the costs vs. benefits of the COVID vaccine [is officially happening](https://x.com/Rootclaim/status/1853429663223205900).
**5:** [Nick Maggiulli](https://x.com/dollarsanddata/status/1853784935225504025): "My favorite story about Sam Bankman-Fried involves his time at Jane Street Capital where he built a system to get the 2016 US Presidential election results [a few minutes] before any mainstream media outlets...however, despite learning of a pending Trump victory before anyone else, Jane Street still managed to lose money on their trade because they [incorrectly thought a Trump win would be bad for] US markets."
**6:** From [r/evilbuildings](https://www.reddit.com/r/evilbuildings/comments/dut32u/building_called_the_lookout_in_polygone_riviera/): the Lookout Building in Cagnes-sur-Mer, France:
**7:** Study: women who are more prone to intrasexual competition [are more likely to advise other women to cut their hair short](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S019188692300329X), especially if those women are of similar attractiveness to themselves. This study is too cute to be true and I expect it not to replicate; I link it for amusement value only - but, uh, still be careful about whose advice you take.
**8:** A Conservative rabbinical assembly has released [Halakhic Responses To Artificial Intelligence And Autonomous Machines](https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/nevins_ai_moral_machines_and_halakha-final_1.pdf), ie guidelines for how Jewish law should treat AI. Mostly boring, but it does cite Rabbi Tzvi Ashkenazi’s 18th century ruling about whether you can include a golem in a minyan.
**9:** The guy who accidentally threw away a hard drive with $700 million in Bitcoin [is suing the city to let him search the landfill](https://www.techspot.com/news/105839-man-narrows-landfill-search-771-million-bitcoin-hard.html). I actually think the city (Newport, Wales) comes out looking pretty bad here. The guy is obviously miserable thinking about his lost chance at wealth, he’s promised them 10% which could be a big windfall to this medium-sized community, and their only argument against is “regulations say we can’t let the public into the landfill”. Is this what Scott Aaronson [calls a blankface](https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=5675)?
**10:** Michael Moore, famous for being one of the few people who predicted Trump’s win in 2016, very confidently declared that Trump would *not* win again this year ([Do The Math: Trump Is Toast](https://www.michaelmoore.com/p/do-the-math-trump-is-toast)). I think this is a good reminder [not to update on single dramatic events](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-learning-from-dramatic-events) - we get excited when someone’s right about an event where everyone else is wrong, but unless that person has a track record and can show their (probabilistic) work, they’re more likely to be a stopped clock than a consistent oracle.
**12:** [Nils Wendel discusses new schizophrenia medication Cobenfy](https://polypharmacy.substack.com/p/a-new-therapeutic-for-schizophrenia?r=5s3xs).
**13:** [Alfredo Parra of Qualia Research Institute on cluster headaches](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/geh2g2nKb7Kkp26ze/quantifying-the-global-burden-of-extreme-pain-from-cluster). Cluster headaches are plausibly the most painful medical condition. If you ask a cluster patient to rate their pain, they’ll almost always say 10/10. Does that mean the headaches are twice as painful as a 5/10 condition? There are some philosophical reasons to expect [pain to be logarithmic](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/gtGe8WkeFvqucYLAF/logarithmic-scales-of-pleasure-and-pain-rating-ranking-and), so plausibly cluster headaches could be orders of magnitude more painful than the average condition. Once you internalize that possibility, it throws a wrench into normal QALY ratings and suggests that, even though cluster headaches are pretty rare, they might cause a substantial portion of the global burden of disease (or even a substantial portion of the suffering in the world). Some psychedelics, especially psilocybin and DMT, seem to treat cluster headaches very effectively, so the more you believe this reanalysis, the more interested you should be in figuring out how to turn these into an accessible therapy (see [clusterbusters](https://clusterbusters.org/) for more information on this aspect).
**14:** [Tessa Barton tries to see how long she can go without learning the results of the US election](https://www.youtube.com/@theresabarton858/shorts) (series of YouTube videos). The Manifold Market is a spoiler for the results but has [some good discussion](https://manifold.markets/tftftftftftftftftftftftf/can-i-go-2-weeks-after-the-election).
**15:** Lawrence Kesteloot has made [an actually good and usable version of my AI Art Turing Test](https://ai-art-turing-test.com/), in case you want to play it with your friends (it’s the same fifty pictures I used, so you’ll have to find a friend who doesn’t read ACX).
**16:** A politician who [wants to revive the Inca Empire](https://x.com/PopulismUpdates/status/1852789923281297523) was recently polling second in the upcoming Peruvian election, although it looks like his party may have been banned recently. I worry there might be some distinctly non-Incan influences on his party’s iconography, maybe related to why they got banned:
**17:** Is it true that the taller candidate usually wins US presidential elections? [Some psychologists look into this](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1048984312000884) and find that the taller candidate won a bit more often, but not distinguishable from chance; they do find a tendency for the taller candidate to win the popular vote, and “15.4% of the variation in popular support was explained by the relative heights of the candidates". But height is not destiny - seven US presidents have been shorter than the average person.
**18:** Zvi: [The Sports Gambling Experiment Has Failed](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tHiB8jLocbPLagYDZ/the-online-sports-gambling-experiment-has-failed). I try to err on the side of liberty when it’s at all plausible, but I think Zvi makes a convincing case that this has destroyed too many lives for too little gain (it doesn’t even encourage people to be better at understanding risk and probability; the betting sites ban anyone who doesn’t seem like a rube). I think the best path from here is to cut losses and try to figure out how to restrict online sports betting without collateral damage to potentially positive-sum things like investments, financial innovation, and prediction markets.
**19:** Good [explanation of the FTC’s monopoly case against Meta](https://nicholasdecker.substack.com/p/should-the-ftc-break-up-meta) by Nicholas Decker.
**20:** Why does exercise help lose weight? Part of the reason is that the exercise itself burns calories, but another part is that athletes have higher resting metabolic rate. Why? Apparently a big part of this is that [they have bigger livers](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/MoF426vqQFmuwwnFf/bigger-livers), maybe something to do with a high protein diet.
**21:** [Justin Welby](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justin_Welby), the outgoing Archbishop of Canterbury, lived an interesting life. His mother was Churchill's personal secretary, married a businessman, had an affair with Churchill's other secretary, and Justin was the result (he didn't learn this until he was 60!). He went to Cambridge, had a mystical experience that converted him to Christianity, worked for an oil company in Nigeria for 11 years, then quit to get ordained as a priest. He says he can speak in tongues - "It's just a routine part of spiritual discipline - you choose to speak and you speak a language that you don't know, it just comes" - and has written a book called "Can Companies Sin?". He lost his archbishop position last month for the most stereotypical possible reason - failed to investigate sex abuse by a church leader who was a friend of his.
**22:** [Popular Russian jokes about the Ukraine War](https://tapwatersommelier.substack.com/p/anekdoty-about-putin-war).
**23:** Matt Yglesias on [how we might design family-friendly high-rise buildings](https://www.slowboring.com/p/can-we-have-a-family-friendly-high). His main ideas: large floor plans, private internal courtyard (if it’s public, people wouldn’t feel safe letting their kids play there), retail on the ground floor (to preserve the streetscape and give families a convenient way to shop). The only thing I would add is that there needs to be amazing noise insulation (and some way to verify this!) - one reason I wouldn’t want to live in a high-rise with other families is the fear that if their six month old cries all night, now it’s my problem - and if it wakes up my six month old and makes her cry all night, then it’s doubly my problem.
**24:** [Why Recursion Pharmaceuticals Abandoned Cell Painting For Brightfield Imaging](https://www.owlposting.com/p/why-recursion-pharmaceuticals-abandoned). Recursion is what passes for a resounding success in biotech, ie a company that didn't die immediately. They were built on the promise of using ML on complicated highly-processed images of cells to learn enough about them to create new drugs. Their big insight the past few years is that ML has gotten so good - and is so skew to human biases about what's important or noticeable or relevant - that they might as well do the ML on simple microscope slides - it can figure out the rest.
**25:** Heterodox Academy has a new magazine, [Inquisitive](https://inquisitivemag.org/). It focuses on chronicling the fight for academic freedom, rather than publishing controversial things you would need academic freedom to say, which I think is a good choice (other outlets already cover the latter). Happy to see them [speaking up against Big IRB](https://inquisitivemag.org/articles/theme-essay/the-irb-protection-racket/).
**26:** [Hazimism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazimism) is an Islamic school popular among some ISIS jihadis that "[is] described as 'ultra-extreme' and 'even more extreme than ISIS'" ... "Hazimis believe that those who do not unconditionally *takfir* (excommunicate) unbelievers are themselves unbelievers, which opponents argue leads to an unending chain of *takfir*."
**27:** In 2021, I gave Yoram Bauman an ACX Grant to lobby for carbon taxation at the state level. He’s been doing that, but recently he also [produced and performed in a romantic comedy about lobbying for carbon taxation at the state level](https://standupeconomist.com/play/). I guess this is the old saying about “write what you know”.
**28:** [Sympathetic Opposition contra me on taste](https://www.sympatheticopposition.com/p/contra-scott-on-taste). If I understand correctly, her thesis is that taste doesn’t just make you hate bad art - it also gives you the ability to love good art more deeply, which can be a transformative experience. I’m not so sure - people seem to obsess over (to the point of centering their lives around) various forms of lowbrow art from Harry Potter to Marvel to anime. I think that distinguishing this from the deep love and transformation of highbrow art risks assuming the conclusion - the guy who says Harry Potter changed his life is deluded or irrelevant, but the guy who says Dostoyevsky did has correctly intuited a deep truth. But we believe this precisely because we know Dostoyevsky is tasteful and Rowling isn’t - I would prefer a defense of taste which is less tautological.
**29:** [Frank Lantz contra me on taste](https://franklantz.substack.com/p/artt-in-the-age-of-artifficial-intelligence). He says art should be viewed in the context of when it was created and what it was trying to say to that era in particular. I might respond to this at more length later, but my snap troll response is that this kind of contradicts the preceding, doesn’t it? If you read the *Iliad*, it either speaks to you and transforms your soul, or it doesn’t. Nobody says “I just finished the *Iliad* - give me a second to check whether it was novel for its time or not, so I can decide whether my soul should be transformed.” Or maybe they do - is this the point of [Pierre Menard, Author Of The Quixote?](https://raley.english.ucsb.edu/wp-content/Engl10/Pierre-Menard.pdf)
**30:** Related: we talked before [about various edge cases of cancel culture](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/lukianoff-and-defining-cancel-culture). Here’s a real-life one: crypto company [Coinbase has said](https://www.cryptopolitan.com/coinbase-wont-work-with-crypto-opposers/) they’ll end their relationship with any law firm that hires lawyers who have previously opposed crypto. Is this cancel culture? My position: doesn’t cross a bright line, since it punishes action rather than speech. But if you generalize it across all ideologies and professions, you get - what was that phrase again? - “an unending chain of *takfir.”*
**31:** [The Southern Television Broadcast Interruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Television_broadcast_interruption) was an event in 1977 when a local news broadcast was interrupted by a voice claiming to represent “Ashtar Galactic Command”, telling humans that they must destroy their weapons and learn to live in peace with one another. Investigators suspect somebody deployed a very strong transmitter near the broadcast tower, so strong that it overwhelmed the original intended signal, but no suspect was ever identified.
**32:** Bentham’s Bulldog [responds to all of your objections to donating to shrimp](https://benthams.substack.com/p/rebutting-every-objection-to-giving).
**33:** Seen [on X](https://x.com/Watercressed/status/1863299191692501031): “Gas mileage in gallons per mile has units of area. What area does this correspond to?” (h/t [@eigenrobot](https://x.com/eigenrobot/)). One possible answer in [the second half of this XKCD What If](https://what-if.xkcd.com/11/).
**34:** [Penis-stealing witch](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-geography-of-madness) update: a French diplomat in the Central African Republic [is accused of](https://x.com/KristofTiteca/status/1866089745832362094) “having organized a vast penis theft operation in the country”. More information [here](https://thenationonlineng.net/locals-allege-french-involvement-in-car-missing-genital-crisis/), which describes a QAnon-style conspiracy in which Western countries, concerned about falling birthrates, are stealing Africans’ penises in order to harvest hormones via nanotechnology.
**35:** Ozy on [the psychology of long-firm fraudsters](https://thingofthings.substack.com/p/the-psychology-of-long-firm-fraudsters). “Just like altruistic jobs usually have lower salaries, jobs that pay in Getting To Hurt People pay less in money . . . Aristotle was right: being bad is bad for you.”
**36:** [Tyler Alterman](https://x.com/TylerAlterman/status/1823020835143110770) (tweet here, but it’s short enough that I’m going to copy-paste):
I think [something like this](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/are-woo-non-responders-defective) is pretty plausible - I see too many people who have too many insights but don’t seem to have the radical life transformation I would expect after a thousand deep insights into their soul. Alternative explanations are that they start from negative one million (eg trauma history) and the insights help them function at all (but many of these people seem functional before they start getting insights), or that they are internally and unobservably extremely happy even though this doesn’t improve their interpersonal effectiveness (I think some Buddhists are like this, but many forms of insight specifically claim to improve interpersonal effectiveness). Props to Tyler for putting it in such a pithy way.
**37:** [Rethink Priorities’ public polling on EA](https://rethinkpriorities.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Pulse-Report-2024_11.pdf). Good example of the maxim “You wouldn't worry so much about what others think of you if you realized how seldom they do.” Approximately 1% of people have heard of effective altruism, and their opinion is mostly “I think it has something to do with charity, so I guess it sounds nice”. Median opinion on FTX and SBF was “never heard of them” (only 20% of people had!)
**38:** Freddie de Boer says he was [ghosted by the New York Times](https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/being-ghosted-by-the-new-york-times) (he pitched them a time-sensitive article, their editor accepted his pitch and told him to write it a certain way, he stopped shopping the pitch around to other publications and wrote it the way NYT wanted, and then the editor never returned his emails or paid him). Seems like pretty unprofessional behavior, I’d like to think there’s an innocent explanation but at some point not noticing and publicly giving an apology itself becomes culpable.
**39:** [Claim](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereknewton/2024/11/30/study-94-of-ai-generated-college-writing-is-undetected-by-teachers/): “A student using the most basic AI prompt with no editing or revision at all, was 83% likely to outscore a student peer who actually did the work – all while having a generous 6% chance of being flagged if the teachers did not use any AI detection software.”
**40:** Someone did an AI Turing Test on poetry and found that people preferred AI-generated to real ([popular article](https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/31726857/artificial-intelligence-better-writing-poems-shakespeare/), [paper](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-024-76900-1)). I guess this is specifically calculated to make me sweat, since unlike visual art I actually have great taste in poetry and am fiercely committed to it. I have a few contingent gripes - the real poems were often more Olde English (and therefore less readable) than the AI ones, etc - but I wouldn’t be surprised if the result persisted even after correcting for them. I guess in the end my deepest excuse is that I personally scored 100% in distinguishing human from AI on their six example poems, and I would be willing to listen to anybody who did equally well on the visual art version.
**41:** Congratulations to ACX reader Jerred Shepherd, who [successfully donated a kidney](https://sjer.red/blog/2024/kidney/) last month!
**42:** There are increasingly many attempts to make crypto directly useful (ie without state-controlled onramps and offramps) for the average consumer. [Subdoor.xyz](https://subdoor.xyz/) lets you pay for various online subscriptions with crypto. [Monezon.com](https://monezon.com/) tried to do this for Amazon, but I’ve heard conflicting reports about whether it’s still up or whether it ever worked. And [KYCNOT.me](https://kycnot.me/) takes a different path and tries to aggregate ways to get crypto without going through centralized exchanges. So far these aren’t very good, but I think there’s a dynamic where in order to be willing to accept the occasional payments (X% of your yearly income) you only need the occasional purchase (X% of your yearly expenses) to be payable in crypto - so small conveniences can make a big different.
**43:** Also related to crypto: Marc Andreesen went on Joe Rogan and made some explosive claims about the government debanking crypto founders for political reasons. These increasingly seem to be false. Patrick McKenzie has a good (albeit long and complicated) rundown [here](https://www.bitsaboutmoney.com/archive/debanking-and-debunking/) - the summary is that ordinary anti-money-laundering laws which predate cryptocurrency tell banks to be on the watch for certain dangerous transaction patterns, and crypto companies have those patterns. And after the nth time that a bank closed a crypto company account and the founder had the brilliant idea to game the system by running the company out of their personal account, the banks started closing crypto founders’ personal accounts too - something which they’re permitted to do by ordinary freedom-of-businesses-to-choose-clients laws. [Jesse Singal goes into more detail on some other mistakes here](https://jessesingal.substack.com/p/congratulations-on-your-independent) - for example, Andreesen accused a regulator called the CFPB of being behind the debanking conspiracy, but CFPB has nothing to do with crypto, actually has been pretty principled in opposing debanking for conservatives, and Andreesen might have a grudge against them because of a time they shut down one of his companies for repeatedly deceiving its customers.
I still think there’s a pro-crypto lesson here, albeit maybe not the one he intended. Banks are unaccountable amoral actors who have no qualms about cutting you out of the global financial system if an algorithm says people vaguely like you have posed a regulatory risk in the past, all banks are like this in a correlated way, and it would be nice to have some means of financial system access which isn’t like this.
**44:** Apropos of our recent conversation about policing, [here’s a claim](https://seaventure.substack.com/p/connect-ing-the-dots) that arrests in London have dropped 10% after a new software product made police work extremely annoying and bureaucratic.
**45:** New Substack, [Governing San Francisco](https://governsf.substack.com/p/introducing-governing-san-francisco), by a local pro-growth activist blogging about the new SF government and its plans and challenges.
**46:** Trump bends the knee [to](https://x.com/RichardHanania/status/1867335298491068769) Harold Daggett and the longshoremen union:
H/T Richard Hanania, who also points out that Trump’s Labor Secretary pick [is pro-union](https://substack.com/@richardhanania/note/c-78506818) and wants to “force red states to adopt the labor policies that have caused massive migration outflows from the more liberal parts of the country”.
**47:** Byrne Hobart has a book out, *Boom*, arguing that economic bubbles are a productive force, then expanding that into a broader theory of history and stagnation. Review [here](https://arenamag.com/2024/11/19/bubbling-up/), book available [here](https://www.amazon.com/Boom-Bubbles-Stagnation-Byrne-Hobart/dp/1953953476?crid=1VSAT6VNHZ6DU&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.fwrNF_EqLFdoDecYJLqyJhwhnTq4Klj-YLPawxJ_cOzFJbw5jU_s0C4orvLX64O6C38aqIukcubEPcoAOrLs3w.pZJoP6O9EOWBUkTFRNRKXULT_vrpqvYGhqu2r8iLPRQ&dib_tag=se&keywords=boom+hobart&qid=1734053019&sprefix=boom+hobar%2Caps%2C314&sr=8-1).
**48:** Garrison Lovely published the [Confessions Of A McKinsey Whistleblower](https://garrisonlovely.substack.com/archive?sort=new) piece a few years ago and some of the better SB 1047 coverage more recently. He has [a new Substack](https://garrisonlovely.substack.com/archive?sort=new) focusing on AI and his concerns about the big companies.
**49:** There’s been a Twitter spat over effective altruism. Back in 2019, Peter Singer published an article saying that rich donors gave $1 billion to rebuild Notre Dame after a fire, but that could have saved ~285,000 lives and maybe donors should take that equally seriously. This month, the NYT used “effective altruists are against restoring Notre Dame” as a jumping-off point for its real complaint (it would rather we have "a philanthropy network that gave specifically to social justice movements . . . racial justice groups, climate justice groups and transgender protection groups"). There were several good responses, most notably [Dylan Matthews’](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/390458/charity-america-effective-altruism-local).
(my own opinion on Notre Dame: although you can come up with a model in which charitable dollars are zero-sum - each dollar I donate to the cathedral doesn’t go to Giving What We Can - this doesn’t really describe charity on the social level, where some donors are more excited about global health and others about national pride. To a first approximation, these things don’t funge, and attempting to capture the tiny bit of value from the ways they do funge isn’t worth making everyone in the world mad at us. Funding Notre Dame is in the top percentile of uses for money, and it feels mean-spirited to snipe at it and not at everything else in the world. People should consider donating a fixed fraction of their income that makes sense to them to effective charity, then feel free to use the rest for whatever they want, *including other charity,* without getting criticized.)
I think the responses landed one clear hit - NYT accused EA of being “the dominant way to think about charity” and steamrolling other cause areas, but only about 0.18% of charitable giving is to EA causes and the NYT article should be considered a currently dominant paradigm trying to crush an underdog.
But I also think that, overall, this is a story of us taking the NYT’s bait (and hopefully learning not to do so in the future). The world *really* wants to believe that effective altruists are evil humorless people who want to prevent every kind of good except raw life-saving and think you’re a moral monster for not agreeing. One thing I’ve learned in my time as a blogger is that if the world wants to think something that much, they will seize on anything at all in your writing that even faintly suggests it, and so you can’t afford to be even slightly edgy or ambiguous, and really you should insert “BY THE WAY, I'M NOT SAYING THE HORRIBLE THING YOU’RE DESPERATE TO ATTRIBUTE TO ME” every other sentence as a reminder. Not every response did this, so a lot of people seized on this as EA admitting that we hate cathedrals and human flourishing and probably you personally.
This maybe isn’t entirely their fault? Utilitarianism doesn’t have a great theory of obligation, and it’s genuinely hard to assert “remember that your donation could save a life” without at least slightly implying “you are a moral monster for not donating more”. I would argue that effective altruists didn’t invent the fact that donations could save lives, it’s not our fault, and we’re at least working on the philosophical project of finding a balance between the Scylla of putting our fingers in our ears and denying that charity is possible, and the Charybdis of having everyone be infinitely condemned for not giving more to it. Relevant posts I’ve written are [Nobody Is Perfect, Everything Is Commensurable](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/12/19/nobody-is-perfect-everything-is-commensurable/) and [Axiology, Morality, Law](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/08/28/contra-askell-on-moral-offsets/).
I also got in [a series of Twitter discussions here](https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/1867798646504534041) where I claimed that probably all charity is supererogatory. Some of the discussions were a little successful in arguing me down from this, and I’m currently not sure whether it’s all supererogatory or whether it’s obligatory up to some small amount (possibly the amount that everyone would agree to in an [ideal Platonic contract](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/08/24/the-invisible-nation-reconciling-utilitarianism-and-contractualism/), or whatever the prevailing moral norm - eg [1%](https://1fortheworld.org/) or [10%](https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/) - but the fact that we can’t actually agree on this makes me suspicious that there’s not really a prevailing moral norm and pushes me more towards supererogatory).
**50:** Related: Sarah Constantin describes her new job at Renaissance Philanthropy, [“the dream machine”](https://sarahconstantin.substack.com/p/the-dream-machine). The idea is: rich people may want to donate money to causes that appeal to them. A rich person whose child died of a rare pediatric cancer might be more interested in donating to cure rare pediatric cancers than to bednets or whatever. Renaissance talks to them, figures out what cause (if it existed) would get them to donate, then acts as an intermediary to make it happen (eg tries to find scientists working on that type of cancer and discuss ways they could use the rich person’s money to make more progress). I think this is a great example of how to stop worrying and love the limited fungibility of charitable donations.
**51:** Quantified Self ([source](https://www.reddit.com/r/dataisbeautiful/comments/7xe5o6/heart_rate_when_my_wife_asked_for_a_divorce_oc/)):
**52:** Nicholas Reville of Recursive Adaptation has published his [Innovation Agenda For Addiction](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/an-innovation-agenda-for-addiction), sort of the Progress Studies-ish take on the opioid crisis and how to solve it. The main points are deploying GLP-1RAs for their anti-addictive effects, giving addiction medicines a special fast-track through the FDA, and various government incentives / advance purchase commitments / partnerships. Even aside from the plan, this is interesting to read for its examination of perverse incentives in medicine - for example, pharma companies are reluctant to develop anti-addiction medications because they don't want to be seen as "profiting off a crisis", and they don't want to study their existing medications for addiction because the studies might reveal new side effects that would harm their existing business. Everything here seems reasonable, but my main worry is that a lot of it is zero-sum - the FDA only has so much review capacity, spending it on addiction meds would decrease it for other meds, and I worry that every disease is so bad that "redirect the FDA to focus on this in particular!" sounds pretty good when you think about it on its own. I am more excited about finding ways to streamline it in general - but don't begrudge advocates for particular conditions for wishing they had an easier time.
**53:** [Enochian chess](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enochian_chess) was a four-player variant of chess invented by the Order of the Golden Dawn (think Aleister Crowley) to teach occult truths or something. "MacGregor Mathers, who finalised the game's rules, was known to play with an invisible partner he claimed was a spirit ... [he] would shade his eyes with his hands and gaze at the empty chair at the opposite corner of the board before moving his partner's piece."
**54:** There’s [a conspiracy theory going around](https://bsky.app/profile/davetroy.com/post/3latozg6ryc2u) that rationalists and effective altruists secretly control Bluesky - I can’t believe this is our first “secretly controlled” accusation and it’s not even something cool.
**55:** The “fastest growing new religion in the world” is the cult of [Santa Muerte](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Muerte) (St. Death) in Mexico, with perhaps 29 million followers since going public in 2001. I find it hard to determine its appeal - the entire content of the religion seems to be “if you give sacrifices to an idol of a female skeleton, she will grant your prayers”. It’s not just that this is boring - it’s that it’s absolutely typical replacement-level paganism, and I’d always thought that [Christianity beat paganism because it was inherently more attractive](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity). Yet the Mexican youth are turning away from the stodgy boring Catholic Church *en masse* to worship Santa Muerte. Why? | Scott Alexander | 152914874 | Links For December 2024 | acx |
# Open Thread 360
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** If you identify as an effective altruist, Rethink Priorities would like you to take [the annual EA survey](https://rethinkpriorities.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_afVuyzagANx2V2S?source=acx).
**2:** In honor of my children turning one, new subscriber-only post this week, [The Innocent And The Beautiful Have No Enemy But Time](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-innocent-and-the-beautiful-have). | Scott Alexander | 153190763 | Open Thread 360 | acx |
# Highlights From The Comments On Prison
*[Original post here - [Prison And Crime: Much More Than You Wanted To Know](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you)]*
**Table of Contents:**
**1:** Comments On Criminal Psychology
**2:** Comments On Policing
**3:** Comments On El Salvador
**4:** Comments On Probation
**5:** Comments That Say My Analysis Forgot Something
**6:** Comments With Proposed Solutions / Crazy Schemes
**7:** Other Comments
## 1: Comments On Criminal Psychology
**Jude ([blog](https://spatialdemography.substack.com/?utm_content=comment_metadata&utm_source=substack-feed-item)) [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79069173):**
> This . . . matches my experience working with some low-income boys as a volunteer. It took me too long to realize how terrible they were at time-discounting and weighing risk. Where I was saying: "this will only hurt a LITTLE but that might RUIN your life," they heard: "this WILL hurt a little but that MIGHT ruin your life." And "will" beats "might" every time. One frustrating kid I dealt with drove without a license (after losing it) several times and drove a little drunk occasionally, despite my warnings that he would get himself in a lot of trouble. He wasn't caught and proudly told me that I was wrong: nothing bad happened, whereas something bad definitely would have happened if he didn't get home after X party. Surprise surprise: two years later he's in jail after drunk driving and having multiple violations of driving without a license.
The “proudly told me that I was wrong - nothing bad happened” reminds me of the [Generalized Anti-Caution Argument](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-the-generalized-anti-caution) - “you said we should worry about AI, but then we invented a new generation of large language model, and nothing bad happened!” Sometimes I think the difference between smart people and dumb people is that dumb people make dumb mistakes in Near Mode, and smart people only make them in Far Mode - the smarter you are, the more abstract you go before making the same dumb mistake.
**Blackshoe [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79119602):**
> Putting this in as nice and polite a way as I can: I suspect I am on the low-end for IQ (perfectly high midwit-ish 117) of the average ACX reader, but interestingly wife (135+ish, based off ACT score, STEM PhD from Ivy League uni) is closer to modal for this site. So I get to have the fun experience of interacting with someone a full StDev smarter than me, and one thing I often experience is that smart people tend to underestimate how much harder it is for someone with that difference in raw intellectual capacity to do things they can ("No, love of my life, I am not interested in making a Python model to figure out which healthcare option is the best for us."). This was especially heightened when we were foster parents for awhile, and one of our placement was...whatever the appropriate term is nowadays for someone with a 63 IQ (which we were probably the first people in his family to find out about, since I was told I was the first person to ever show up for one of his school's IEP meetings); living with top and bottom 1% intellectual functioning was a very illustrative experience!
>
> IMHO, a major problem with discussion about crafting programs for effective deterrence is that (especially for violent crimes-Jason Manning's review of Fragging notes how Wolfgang noted the modal murder starts with a very trivial dispute) the people who mostly need to be deterred are frankly too stupid for that to work (executive planning and IQ are decently correlated and breaks down rapidly below a certain threshold, which is higher than the cutoff for legal disability) and the people crafting these program won't get that the processes aren't likely to work with the population they are trying to fix because that population is too different in mental functioning to pay off. Our friend Joe from the Open Thread my intellectually get that he shouldn't murder someone for repeatedly taking fries off his plate (actual case Manning notes) and that he will be punished if he does so, but it will be very hard for that intellectual knowledge to kick in before he has killed the fry taker.
>
> So incapacitation may have more value (especially, as mentioned in the comments, the age factor of incapacitation: the value of keeping people in jail in their criminally-prime years).
I also have a more mathematically-inclined wife - it’s a tough but rewarding extreme lifestyle.
**Deiseach [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79072650):**
> "Take a moment to imagine how your own life would change if you spent ten years in prison. Seriously, spend a literal few seconds thinking about your specific, personal life."
>
> The problem is, some/many/lots of the people going to jail don't have spouses, jobs, etc. in the first place. Ten years in jail and then coming out to all the consequences afterwards is their life \*already\*, after six months in jail/multiple 'second chances' every time they came up before the court.
>
> I've mentioned this one example before from my personal experience over my work life, but I'll repeat it once again: a girl that I first encountered as an early school leaver, and because she was engaging with various services that I coincidentally happened to work for, I could track her career over the years.
>
> So she went from vulnerable teenager with disrupted home life, to dropping out of school, to not engaging with the support services for early school leavers, to what used to be called taking up with a bad crowd, but that's probably a disfavoured term nowadays because it's discriminatory and judgemental of persons with societal difficulties (aka being petty scumbags), to (of course) weed and other 'soft' drugs to picking up a heroin habit. Along the way she had a kid with, of course, no husband and the boyfriend flitted in and flitted out.
>
> End result, she stabbed another young woman in the stomach at a house party (drugs and drink present, of course) and ended up with a prison sentence while her mother took care of the child.
>
> She never \*had\* the "my ordinary normal life of a job and family and the rest of it will be disrupted by going to jail!" In fact, I think prison probably was \*better\* for her as it was a chance to break those exact connections that were dragging her down, and letting her get sober and clean and maybe, who knows, a miracle, getting her head together and getting skills and help for post-prison life.
>
> There are other people who die early and I see the names in the local paper and I go "Oh yeah" because again, I know the background, and I'm not surprised because this is all the inevitable ending to the life they lived.
>
> I've encountered some of the early school leavers on the programme for such, and I've forecast even at that age (late teens) they're gonna end up in jail, because the little idiots don't give a flying fuck about learning any kinds of skills leading to getting a job and a normal life. That's for the squares and the fools, they want weed, easy money, and free time. They're on the path to petty crime if not already started on it, and one day they'll go too far and either end up stabbed by a bigger, badder criminal or they'll finally run out of "second chances" and have to do time.
>
> And it'll be the best place for them, because they \*will\* be off the streets and not interfering with ordinary people. They're not interested in rehab even in or after coming out of jail, they'll fall back into the same old lifestyle because all they are interested in is drugs, easy money, and free time, and six months or ten years is all the same.
>
> Re: the shoplifting, I think \*all\* the commentators are right; Graham about the view of the cops on the ground, Andrew about the "scared straight" but I imagine that for first time offenders or people just starting on the petty crime path, and CJW for how the sausage is made in the courts and legal systems.
I have also worked with some future criminals (and a few current criminals). My impression is that many are doomed from birth, but some are in a gray area where they could potentially go either way depending on things like availability of drugs, availability of drug treatment, someone holding their hand to help them land a job, etc.
According to BJS and [this fact sheet](https://defensenet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Incarceration-and-Family-Relationships-NHMRC-2010.pdf): 60% of prisoners had a job in the 30 days before their crime, and 50% were working full-time. 40% had ever married, and 15% - 25% were currently married (though I can’t tell if that’s at time of crime, or at time of survey in prison). About half had children, and 40% of fathers lived with their children at the time of the crime.
I think this matches my picture of “most don’t have very stable lives, but some do, and most have *something.*”
**CJW [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79107964):**
> Given my extensive years in crimlaw, I have a lot of thoughts about this. A recurring problem with discourse in this area is that the practical realities involve an intersection point between criminals (a highly irrational subculture) and bureaucrats (a class of people who are given idealistic speeches at conferences and then go back to a job where there's bizarre incentives to say 2+2=5 if it clears their desk briefly). So not only are the decisions of the actors irrational and arbitrary, even identifying WHAT happened is inscrutable to people who don't practice crimlaw. I don't have time to react to everything here, but just a few points on the non-linearity of how criminals see sentences.
>
> "So most deterrence will look more like the Proposition 36 proposal we discussed last month, which increases shoplifting sentences from six months to three years. If we use H&T’s numbers (probably inappropriate since there may be nonlinear effects), we would expect that section of Prop 36 to deter crime by 2%."
>
> Correct about the expected nonlinear effect. I believe the Proposition would be ineffective because practical constraints would force prosecutors to amend charges rather than seek the heightened sentences required. But if somehow the sentences actually came to pass, the criminal class sees this VERY differently. A misdemeanor with a 6 month jail max probably means that at worst you get arrested, are held in some county facility, can't post bond, your lawyer screws around with discovery and motions to make themselves feel like they did something, and then you plead out to time served at some point. A 3 year sentence isn't just about the duration, it has to be served in a prison, which is a very different world than county jail.
>
> Many lower-level criminals who will happily sit in jail for 6 months would push back strongly at having to enter the prison system even if you told them to expect parole at the same 6 month mark. Whether or not it deters the crime, it certainly deters pleading guilty as charged and greatly increases the chance of the defendant snap-accepting any misdemeanor plea bargain offer. Jail vs prison punishments are different in kind, not merely in duration. (There are large metros with jails that behave more like prisons with stable inmate populations serving sentences, as opposed to keeping "sentenced to jail" and "awaiting trial, couldn't post bail" people together, but as the "sentenced" group would be mostly low-level offenders and the "awaiting trial" group would have included more serious offenders, I wouldn't be surprised if these facilities were actually preferable to ordinary jail.) [...]
>
> There are also threshold points even along a spectrum of years that are given irrational weight during plea negotiations. Numerous repeat offenders in my state were far more likely to accept a deal of 7 yrs than 8, this break point was consistently noted in negotiations. The only explanation we had was that historically C felonies maxed out at 7 and were treated more leniently by parole board than A/B felonies-- but if you had committed a B felony and were subject to the higher range, then the difference between 7 and 8 was no different than the difference between 8 and 9, getting 7 didn't make them treat you as if you were a lower class offender. But they acted as if it mattered to them greatly.
**Sifrca [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79620076):**
> I’m a public defender in a “tough-on-crime” state. My experience has been this:
>
> 1. “Deterrence” via longer sentences is a meme. Criminals don’t really give a shit about the length of the sentences they might face. Many of them don’t even know what the length is until they’re arrested and headed to plea negotiations. Kind of hard for the length of the punishment to be a deterrent if the criminal doesn’t even know what it is until after he acts.
>
> Most crimes occur because the criminal either acts:
>
> (a) impulsively (doing something in the moment without any consideration to long-term consequences - stereotypical example: kid shoplifts because his buddies dare him to),
>
> (b) compulsively (they are generally aware of the risks of getting caught, but have some other mental hangup preventing that from factoring in their decisionmaking - stereotypical example: pathological shoplifter), or
>
> (c) arrogantly (they know the risks but believe they simply won’t get caught - stereotypical example: a “professional” shoplifter like your 327 in NYC)
>
> All of these mental models are inelastic with respect to the punishment. They are, however, highly elastic with respect to surveillance and the physical presence of police. Impulsive criminals may be deterred by the presence of surveillance and police alone; “arrogant” criminals and the more daring impulsive criminals will be humbled by being caught and become more cautious, if not abandon their enterprises; and those who remain undeterred by the threat will be deterred by the followthrough.
>
> I think this is true regardless of the severity of the crime, which dovetails with your overall conclusion that prison is less cost-effective. The flip side is that prison time (theoretically) guarantees no reoffense, whereas other methods can fail, and we’re willing to pay a higher premium for the certainty with more serious offenses.
>
> 2. Your marginal reflection is spot-on because we punish different crimes very differently, which means that not all additional years are created equal. Say that the mandatory minimum for rape is 20 years, and it’s political suicide to try to lower that minimum. If a rapist is guaranteed to get at least 20 years in prison, then on the margins, making the sentences any longer should have next to zero additional negative aftereffect (there probably will BE significant negative aftereffects already, but they’re “baked in” to the 20-yr minimum; the marginal increase is likely small because the damage is already done), but it probably has some considerable positive incapacitation effects (most sexual predators have compulsion issues that are difficult to “cure,” or else simply don’t believe they’ll be caught next time, or both). So on the margins, increasing the sentence of rape could be beneficial.
>
> Meanwhile, shoplifting is never seriously going to carry a 10+ yr sentence, so the cost of adding a year is considerable. There, the aftereffect issue is substantially larger.
>
> 3. Related to those points, I suspect an important part of the analysis is understanding the cost of different types of crimes. I’m not even sure how one would put a “price” on the harm caused by rape, for instance, but we evidently value it much more than the $34,000 average social cost of a crime, because the punishment for rape is substantially higher than the punishment for the average crime. The higher the cost of a crime, the comparatively more valuable incapacitation through prison can be.
## 2: Comments On Policing
**Jude [again](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79069173):**
> I moved for a while to a central European country and was impressed with the criminal justice system and the low level of crime/high level of compliance, despite the high amount of migration. The biggest thing I noticed is the certainty of being caught that you mentioned. Sentences were (to my American eyes) relatively short and weak - and more liberal Americans often thought there was less crime because the country was somehow more humane. But the main thing I noticed was: the certainty of being caught was high. Police were everywhere and very responsive. Small fin3es and one-night-in-jail punishments were everywhere for petty crimes. I think the U.S. would benefit from strong policing with simple, consistent punishments for many small crimes, especially for first time offenders.
I was curious whether the country really had more police or just a more law-abiding culture, but **[Richard Gadsen has statistics](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79229192):**
> The US has far fewer cops than most European countries per capita.
>
> The US has about 242 / 100k (FBI figures, 2019)
>
> Just picking a few examples, Belgium has 334, Germany 349, Hungary 367, France 422, Italy 456, Spain 534
>
> The European jurisdictions that are lower than the US are: England-and-Wales, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark and Norway.
**Marian Kechlibar [offers a caution](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79269960):**
> These comparisons are somewhat strained, given that in some European countries, "cops" include people who never leave their office and perform some sort of administrative duty that in other countries isn't performed by police at all.
>
> For example, issuing various permits.
>
> Czechia is notorious for having a large amount of cops nominally, but relatively few beat cops. Most of the difference are bureaucrats formally employed by police.
I would be curious to learn whether European countries really do have more street cops than the US, and, if so, why (given that the US has more crime). The data is from 2019, before the wave of “defund the police”, so that can’t be it.
**Performative Bafflement ([blog](https://performativebafflement.substack.com/p/more-than-80-of-police-hours-are)) [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79829966):**
> American police spend approximately all police-hours on traffic tickets, rather than solving actual crimes. And this is with homicide closure rates of ~50% and rape ~30% and property crimes ~10%.
>
> It's a bit of math to get there, but my full argument is here:
>
> [Performative Bafflement
>
> More than 80% of police-hours are wasted not solving any crime at all
>
> I’ve had to rederive these points so many times now, I’m just making a permanent post I can point people to. Broadly, police dedicate at most 10-20% of their time to “actually solving crime” and dedicate the vast majority of their time to overhead and traffic stops…
>
> Read more
>
> a year ago · 1 like · Performative Bafflement](https://performativebafflement.substack.com/p/more-than-80-of-police-hours-are?utm_source=substack&utm_campaign=post_embed&utm_medium=web)
>
> Bottom line, if you want to increase police funding, you need to legislate at a high level that they CANNOT use the extra funds / police-hours for traffic tickets, but instead must use them on solving actual crimes.
>
> Otherwise, we're just going to get more traffic tickets and similarly laughable closure rates of actual crimes.
I’m not an expert but PB’s argument looks sound to me. It also makes sense - he writes “Look at the choices - sit in a nice air conditioned car for 80% of your time, interacting with the soccer moms and nice middle and upper class people you pull over, OR be out in the bad parts of downtown interacting with volatile psychos, shambling fentanyl zombies, and schizophrenic homeless people? Oh, plus writing tickets generates revenue for the city, and doing anything to prevent or investigate actual crime has you interacting with all the psychos and zombies. They are doing easy things because they are easy, and because doing hard things is not only hard in and of itself, but also has much greater reputational risk in our post-Floyd panopticon society.”
So how do we get police to fight crime?
**Bram Cohen ([blog](https://bramcohen.com/)) [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79129373):**
> Someone with experience in the field told me there are some dumb problems with hiring cops as well, like requiring everyone who works in law enforcement start as a beat cop, which creates unnecessary disincentives for people who are physically unsuited to working as beat cops or overqualified for the position.
**TheAnswerIsAWall [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79130930):**
> I am a felony prosecutor in a major US metro area—I should probably be prosecuting crimes right now rather than writing this—but I wanted to add […] it is quite correct to hold that the next marginal anti-crime dollar would be better spent on policing than on incarceration. However, that also isn’t an easy solution. Before you can actually do that in a meaningful way, you need to address what has become a generational challenge in much of the country: staffing police departments. The job has always been dangerous and (comparatively) poorly paid. Add in the decline in public esteem for the job—particularly post-George Floyd—and the rate limiting bottleneck to crime reduction in most metropolitan areas has become recruiting enough talented people willing to do that job. We just don’t have enough and you can’t manufacture them with a 5% pay raise or some other token effort.
I have heard this from many people but don’t understand it. Everyone knows there’s a shortage of well-paying blue-collar jobs that don’t require college degrees. Being an officer is respectable (liberals might yell at you, but it confers status in a way that eg retail or construction doesn’t), doesn’t have a lot of prereqs, and has good room for advancement. Why is it so hard to fill these positions? Sure, there’s a lot of bureaucracy and nonsense and dealing with terrible people, but that’s also true of eg teaching, nursing, etc, and those are highly competitive.
## 3: Comments On El Salvador
**Jacob Steel [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79141958):**
> I am deeply sceptical that a significant part of the decline in homicide in El Salvador was due to mass incarceration, unless the flow of time and causation has reversed itself.
>
> That graph of homicides per year you posted has a really sharp peak in 2015, at around 100 per 100,000 people per year. Thereafter, it starts to plummet dramatically every year.
>
> So El Salvador clearly got /something/ right, and that something happened around 2015.
>
> The thing is that mass incarceration in El Salvador started in 2022, by which time the homicide rate had already fallen massively, to about 10 per 100,000, and was still falling rapidly. That improvement didn't accelerate in 2022 - yes, it continued, but if anything it slowed.
>
> So I think this is almost certainly correlation not causation - unless falling homicide in El Salvador somehow caused mass incarceration!
WTF? This appears to be true; here’s the graph from the original post, now with key events marked in red:
How come in one million articles about Bukele and crime in El Salvador, including many trying to discredit him or say it wasn’t worth it, I’ve never heard a peep about this? And if it wasn’t Bukele or mass incarceration that did it, then what was it?
**[Y] [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79638449):**
> I have issues with the El Salvador portion of this post.
>
> These charts show that the Bukele mass incarceration movement only resulted in a massive increase in the prison population from 2020 forward, based on projected population. The graph shows the murder rate peaking in 2015 and dropping precipitously in the next three years prior to Bukele's presidency. This means, unless I'm missing something, that the vast majority of the decrease in the murder rate occurred before Bukele took office and started putting people in prison at all and thus cannot be attributed to his policies, incarceration or otherwise. Bukele took office in 2019 and did not begin the crackdown until June of that year. The state of emergency that allowed the government to suspend various rights in order to crack down on gangs even further didn't begin until early 2022 While the murder rate was obviously still quite high before Bukele's incarceration policies began, it seems almost actively misleading not to mention that it was collapsing even before he instituted these policies as a result of things like a renewed gang truce in 2016 under the previous government and instead seemingly attribute all of it to him.
>
> Further, the post-Bukele homicide data is dubious in several ways. The Bukele government stopped counting bodies discovered buried in unmarked graves as homicides, incentivizing gang members to hide their victims instead of publicly displaying them as trophies or warnings as they had done in years prior. They stopped counting people the police or military shot as homicides, classifying them instead as “legal interventions". They have excluded killings in prisons from the homicide data, which seems like exactly the most obvious way to lie about homicide rates when you begin imprisoning everyone.
>
> <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/08/el-salvador-bukele-crime-homicide-prison-gangs/>
>
> The source article suggests the above may represent as much as a 47% undercounting. Well, one might say, that still leaves El Salvador much safer than before Bukele’s tenure. But I’m not linking the above to try and pin down exactly the right figure of undercounting. I would suggest instead that these changes to the metrics demonstrate a willful and deliberate pattern of obscuring the homicide rate in El Salvador. The post-Bukele data consequently seems almost useless to me, as you cannot really assume we know all the ways the Bukele government is fudging the data. These are just the ones on record.
>
> It’s not that murder has disappeared in El Salvador - it’s more like it’s now de facto legal in many contexts. An MS13 member who rolls up on a rival gang’s stash house and shoots it up now knows that if they can bury the bodies in an unmarked grave outside of town without being caught red-handed with the shovels and corpses, the victims will legally cease to exist. They’re not prosecuting people for these murders, right? Otherwise they would show up in the data. The media doesn't talk about them. You don't see the evidence. Out of sight, out of mind.
>
> I'm not suggesting no murders were prevented as a result of the Bukele government's mass incarceration policies, obviously. I can also see the argument that it's good for society for criminals to kill each other in prison yard fights instead of getting into shootouts in a marketplace where an innocent bystander also gets their head blown off. I just think the fundamental premise - that he arrested everyone and it caused murders to stop happening and we need to reason forward from there - is extremely dubious.
**Drethelin writes:**
> idk about the statistics but multiple people I talked to in el salvador specifically told me theft was WAY down
>
> like walking down the street with your phone in your hand was now an option where it used to not be
>
> people can now both afford to and feel safe owning cars, etc.
>
> among other things they are very proactive about using what we wouldn't really consider due process, eg cops browsing facebook and like, going after guys that people post from their security camera footage as taking their bike or whatever
Thanks - I had said in the post that although murder was down, the statistics didn’t really show this about theft - but I was eyeballing statistics not really gathered for this purpose and if the news on the ground is that theft is down, I believe it.
## 4: Comments On Probation
In response to a question of why probation with GPS tracking hasn’t taken off as an alternative to prison, **[Peter answers](https://substack.com/profile/96317614-peter?utm_source=substack-feed-item)**:
> Because convicts turn it down. You see at least in America probation (which is what GPS monitoring is part of) and incarceration aren't related, you get no credit for the former when it comes to the latter and people like to overlook over half of people incarcerated aren't there for any crime at all but simply a technical probation violation like getting fired from your job from not showing up on time because your probation officer randomly changes times of meetings daily (which is also results in prison even if you are one minute late).
>
> If the max sentence is five years prison plus probation time doesn't count and you have a more likely than not chance of violating probation because it's designed to be unreasonable and cause failures as a back door way for judge's to avoid trials, why would you accept GPS monitoring which will only increase your chances of being violated.
>
> I.e..why do nine years (four years probation out of your ten year probation, then violated, then five in more actual prison) when you can just do five. Generally the rule among convicts is if the prison sentence is shorter than the probation sentence, just take prison day one. As a convict you can, and many do, turn down probation.
>
> If you want to fix this then you need to let convicts "try" probation where they get credit at a 1-1, or even better motivate them so let's say 2-1, towards a future prison sentence when they fail. This entire conversation (OP) is worthless as it's making the standard mistake of just looking at prison and not probation, jail, fines, etc all which backdoor as a way to avoid trials lead to prison.
This isn’t very clearly written, but my impression is that Peter is saying that violating probation gives you a longer prison sentence than just accepting prison in the first place, probation is deliberately designed to be near-impossible to keep, and so it’s a con to trick criminals into longer sentences without having to get them through a judge and jury. Criminals know this, so they refuse probation.
This kind of conflicts with the “criminals have high time preference and make terrible decisions” point above, so I’m not sure what to think of it.
I wonder if people ever try GPS tracking (without the rest of probation) as a prison alternative. “You’re getting off with a warning this time, but wear this tracker, and if you commit any other crimes in the future, we’ll know.” [EDIT: [commenter answers here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/highlights-from-the-comments-on-prison/comment/80884747)]
**More from Peter**:
> Remember, the entire point of probation is to get people to avoid a trial by plea dealing to probation and then put them in prison anyways without any due process because reasonable people, the sort that takes plea deals, believe in the system hence overestimate their ability to complete probation. And so you put them in prison on a technical violation, i.e. getting fired after you intentionally caused them to do so, not having a place to live after you intentionally refused to approve anywhere they tried live, changing their appointment times without confirming they know ("I left a message with their dog"), or just harass them until they give up and just go to prison.
>
> Americans tend to discount probation as a joke but any experienced convict knows probation as implemented is worse hence just goes to jail. Also note that probation and PAROLE are different and significantly so, you actually get credit for parole time. Parole WANTS you to succeed, after all they paroled you, probation doesn't.
>
> They aren't even the same group of government offices either which is part of the problem. Probation falls under the judiciary (they work for the court) hence they free up budgets the faster they can move you over to the executive (prison) branch whereas parole is a cost saving measure as it falls under the same prison budget, i.e. parole officers aren't probation officers. Also all those fancy rehabilitation programs people love to tore to decrease recidivism goes to parolees, not probationers. I.e. there are giant structural incentives from pure intergovernmental bureaucratic budget wars to move people from probation to prison and because it's controlled by judges, I.e. the prison department can't just refuse to take a trivial probationary revokee, it's a one sided fight […]
>
> For example I got a friend that just got two years for the driving the speed limit in Texas while at a funeral, travel approved by the judge, because probation also makes it illegal to break your state law even in another jurisdiction where it's legal. He was driving 85 (the posted speed limit) in outside Austin but in Hawaii it's a misdemeanor to exceed 80 mph for any reason on any road strict liability; his PO asked him "jokingly" if he drove the speed limit while there and if he enjoyed the faster mainland speeds, he said "yes" unbeknownst to him he was being setup. His admission resulted in his probation being revoked for literally following the posted speed limit.
**Charlotte Wollstonecraft [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79125013):**
> The marginal prisoner in Massachusetts may be a much badder dude than the marginal prisoner in Louisiana. But here is anecdotal reason to believe he is not:
>
> Last week in New Orleans, there were three mass shootings. Two of them happened at the same second line in New Orleans East, 45 minutes apart. In two separate incidents, a gunman opened fire at a large outdoor gathering. In total, two people died, and ten were wounded. This is not national news. No arrests have been made.
>
> The third shooting took place in the French Quarter four days later. One of the three shooters was caught immediately. Turns out, he had already served seven years in prison for armed robbery. Last year, he was arrested again and charged with domestic battery, child endangerment, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A plea deal got him out on parole, the terms of which he violated near daily according to his ankle monitor's logs. He was wearing the ankle monitor at the time he opened fire on a French Quarter street, wounding three people and killing another.
I’m including this here as a counter to Peter’s story of the guy who got two years in jail for driving the speed limit. I hear so many outrageous stories of extreme strictness *and* so many outrageous stories of extreme laxity (see also [this post](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/17/joint-over-and-underdiagnosis/)) that I’m nervous about turning the dial one way or the other compared to trying to figure out what’s going on.
## 5: Comments That Say My Analysis Forgot Something
**Grant Gould [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79073411):**
> You allude to it twice but then pass over it "for simplicity": None of these studies measure within-prison crime, which is largely not counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted. It is not only plausible but likely that "incapacitation" is at best simply relocation of crimes. And even \_that\_ is leaving aside the regular drumbeat of deeply sadistic crimes by guards, which are even less counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted.
>
> The quality of statistics on crimes within prisons is very poor, of course; ttbomk it is not practically possible to know if the average prisoner commits crimes at a greater rate while incarcerated than while outside, or likewise the rate at which people in prison are crime victims versus those outside.
>
> If your value function is some sort of utilitarian sum over society, you have to count those, or else your utilitarianism is just gerrymandering people into and out of the boundaries of the utility summation (in which case you can optimize utility much more simply than by incarcerating; simple Schmittianism will do the job more easily, and it's free since you don't count the cost).
I wrote this post to respond to debates (eg on California’s Prop 36) on whether prison is an effective way of decreasing the crime that normal people have to suffer in their neighborhoods. I think this is an important question that lots of people care about. Whether prisoners commit crimes against other prisoners is also important, but it’s a different question. I think people would justly distrust me if I pretended to be answering the question they cared about, but actually answered a different question.
I (following Roodman) gave two conclusions in my cost-benefit analysis - one that counted the suffering by prisoners themselves, and one that didn’t. Since I think different people will have different intuitions on this, I think it was the right strategy. The one that counted the suffering of prisoners included a general estimate of willingness-to-pay for prison which I think includes the cost of intra-prison crimes. Either way, I think being exposed to intra-prison crimes is a small fraction of the badness of prison that doesn’t change that analysis much.
I also don’t think it’s exactly right to say that incarceration only relocates (rather than prevents) crime. This may be true for murder and rape. But there aren’t a lot of things to steal in prison (not zero, but not as much as in the outside world) and the vast majority of crimes are property crimes.
**JBG [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79118110):**
> Some thoughts as a former defense attorney.
>
> On "after effects," skipping all the way to length of incarceration misses a lot of what's going on for first time offenders. As your own examples note, many of the problems making it harder to make an honest living accrue from being a felon as such, and not from jail time. I'll add on that merely being \*arrested\* triggers a similar cascade of consequences. Your average person will be fired from their job very quickly after arrest -- either because of the arrest itself or just because it leads to missing work. And an arrest on its own, without a conviction, is sufficient to make it hard to get hired on in a lot of jobs.
>
> But this is all specific to first-time offenders; going from someone presumed to be a law-abiding citizen to being a felon changes everything. An incremental felony after that doesn't change much. From your description, it seems like the studies are blurring this together? I'd be interested to see evidence focused specifically on first time offenders.
>
> My guess would be that there's a large, negative effect of your first felony (all else equal) but not much effect at all of subsequent felonies. In that case, there's a very different calculus for the incapacitation vs. recidivism tradeoff for different, identifiable groups.
**Undeserving Porcupine [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79180818):**
> Eugenic effects of 3-5x’ing the prison population? Makes it harder for these criminals to make more of themselves.
Several people brought this up on Twitter. It deserves a full post response, but in case I don’t get around to making it - I think this is almost zero.
I realize that’s a surprising claim, but compare the Nazi eugenics program against schizophrenics discussed [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/some-unintuitive-properties-of-polygenic). They killed most of the schizophrenics in Germany, and schizophrenia is 80% genetic, yet the next generation had the same number of schizophrenics as ever, at least within the measurement margin of error. See the post for a longer explanation of this seemingly paradoxical result.
Sebjenseb [did a similar analysis](https://www.sebjenseb.net/p/checking-the-numbers-did-homicide) and finds that if you execute the most criminal 1% of the population each generation, population level criminality decreases by about 0.1 standard deviation per 400 years. This is less trivial than I expected - it corresponds to a drop in the murder rate from 30 to 20 (possibly less for other crimes). But it's also a better case than our real scenario for a few reasons (police have 100% efficiency in arresting the worst criminals exactly in order; execution is better at preventing childbearing than prison). Maybe a real scenario is 33% decrease in crime rate per 600 years? Doesn't seem that relevant to me - even if we don’t get a singularity in the next few decades like I expect, we’ll probably get better genetic engineering or go multiplanetary (in which case founder effects will overwhelm everything else).
**Publius Obsequium [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79635501):**
> One thing Scott neglects is the beneficial effect prison has on kids of criminals (yes you read that right - look it up)
[Here is an article](https://www.city-journal.org/article/fathers-families-and-incarceration) making this case and citing some corroborating studies. I would stress that there are also many (probably more) studies [finding the opposite](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7047477/), and that I haven’t looked through any of the studies on either side to check whether they’re any good.
**Straphanger [writes](https://substack.com/profile/25670505-straphanger?utm_source=substack-feed-item):**
> This analysis ignores that punishment is a good in itself. The victims of crimes deserve retribution against the people who have wronged them.
Some version of this was one of the most common comments, with opinions ranging from:
* I was a bad person for not focusing on the suffering of the prisoners in prison more, especially their potential victimization by prisoner-on-prisoner violence.
* I was a bad person for counting the suffering of the prisoners in prison *at all*, since they, as criminals, deserved no better.
* Actually, the suffering of the prisoners in prison, far from being a cost or even neutral, is a positive! Just as the greatest delight in Heaven is looking down on the tortures of Hell below, one of the advantages of being law-abiding should be knowing that criminals are suffering.
Everyone was right to criticize me, because I have a confused and muddled middle position here.
I am most willing to discount the suffering of prisoners when I think of this in a game theoretic way. I imagine some sneering criminal robbing me, saying “Sure, you could stop me at any point - but then I would be suffering, so you have to let me continue my crime spree or else you’ll be a bad person, mwahaha!” Obviously the [decision theory](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/game-theory-of-michigan-muslims) here is to - even if you were previously the nicest person in the world - strategically turn that off and throw the book at the guy. This is why I’m sometimes sympathetic to the idea of a law making it legal to run over protesters who are deliberately blocking roads. The end result of legal protections for people who prey on the kindness of others is the transformation of decent people into chumps who get exploited harder and harder until they crack and become cruel just to keep up. I would rather protect the ability to be kind in general by suspending kindness against anyone deliberately taking advantage of it. And even though the strong version of this with the maniacal laughter rarely happens, I think it’s worth leaving a margin of error for when “society” or “cultural evolution” or whatever is secretly playing this strategy.
But I am least willing to discount the suffering of prisoners when I remember that the above has almost no relation to reality. See the section on criminal psychology above. Tough-on-crime people like to say they’re all based and IQ-pilled, but the average criminal is an IQ 75 moron with the impulse control of a young child. Probably they are genetically suited to some kind of hunter-gatherer tribe with strong kinship bonds and zero superstimuli; in modern society, they are totally doomed. I’m not sure what our goal is here in creating a bunch of people incapable of living cooperatively in modern civilization, and then, when those people inevitably fail to live cooperatively in modern civilization, saying “Haha! Now you’ve outed yourself as an evil person who deserves to suffer!” and torturing them for a few years to “get our revenge”. If you’re going to take that perspective, you might as well torture three-year-olds who throw tantrums in the grocery store.
Someone, I can’t remember who, had a thought experiment with the society as far beyond ourselves as we are beyond the average criminal. Maybe it’s a society of Buddhist monks, or of angels. Raising your voice at someone, going one mile above the speed limit, or stealing a glance at a woman’s cleavage in their society is considered as outrageous as assault, drunk driving, or rape would be in ours. So what happens? Do you never commit a single misdeed even in your heart? Or do you inevitably slip, then spend the rest of your life “deserving” “torture” for your infraction? If the Buddhist angels are *really* mad (or, I suppose, sad/disappointed/victimized, since they’ve transcended anger), do they deserve to take out those feelings by inflicting arbitrary unbounded “retribution” on you? If you object “But glancing at a woman’s cleavage doesn’t do her that much harm, really!”, then I’m not sure how you get away with thinking that X years stuck getting raped in a cage for shoplifting is “proportional” either.
My uneasy synthesis is that criminals have [nominated themselves for the short end of a tradeoff](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/10/24/nominating-oneself-for-the-short-end-of-a-tradeoff/). If we have to balance their suffering vs. that of law-abiding citizens, we should weigh that of the law-abiders somewhat higher. But we shouldn’t weigh criminals’ at zero, and we definitely shouldn’t punish them just for fun.
I hold this position pretty strongly with regard to the people who just abstractly think making prisoners suffer is nice. I have a harder time knowing what to think of people who want revenge for crimes committed against them personally. A criminal murdered my great-grandfather in a robbery gone wrong; my great-grandmother (who I never knew) was apparently an extremely nice person but saw red, demanded the death penalty, and was enraged when the jury settled for a lengthy prison term. I can’t promise I would behave any differently than she did in her situation. I content myself with thinking that the incapacitation-optimal amount of prison (probably 20 years to life for a murder) is already pretty extreme and hopefully satisfies most people’s revenge fantasies. But I’m pretty split about this. If I imagine someone hurting my family, 20 years in a minimum-security Swedish prison isn’t going to cut it. But if I imagine myself on Judgment Day before the throne of God, being asked to account for any suffering I chose to inflict upon my fellow man, the only answer I would really be comfortable giving is that I did it for the greater good of preventing/deterring future crime and protecting the innocent. I do sort of understand the emotional response that makes some people feel that maybe anyone who has transgressed has opened themselves up to infinite punishment in the name of justice - but on Judgment Day this is exactly the sort of thing I will be desperately trying *not* to remind God of!
I tried to limit the degree to which I discussed this in the original post, because it’s exactly the kind of culture war scissor topic that people will get too excited about, but there are other arguments (the superiority of police deterrence over prison) which let us sidestep this whole issue.
## 6: Comments With Proposed Solutions / Crazy Schemes
**Joseph [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79087632):**
> A note on shoplifting. If you can't punish shoplifters because you don't have the resources to try all of them, then you have two main options to change that.
>
> (1) Fund some kind of "shoplifting task force" (or petty crimes task force if you want broader reach, but this will spread your efforts). Hire more prosecutors, judges, public defenders, bailiffs, court reporters, etc. and try more cases. If it's constitutional, you could target this effort at people with multiple prior recent arrests first, although the population will get the idea that everybody gets a few free misdemeanor tickets.
>
> (2) Increase the difference between the minimum sentence that you get if you go to trial vs. pleading out. In other words, create "first degree," "second degree" etc. shoplifting and make the penalty for the higher degrees painful enough that people will plead to third degree shoplifting and do a year in prison rather than risk a conviction for second degree and five years.
>
> #2 is inhumane and has been reasonably compared to medieval practices of confession under torture, but is also the way we manage our trial dockets in the US, unfortunately.
**Sol Hando ([blog](https://solhando.substack.com/)) [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79091502):**
> I am now sold on the Australian model as a solution to basically all crime.
>
> No, not modern Australia, which sits comfortably above the European system and below the American one in terms of incarceration rates, and doesn't seem to be doing anything novel, but the Australian system as it was for the United Kingdom a few centuries ago. Penal colonies.
>
> If the problem with increasing prison sentences to the point we eliminate 90% of the crime is that it would cost insane amounts of money, then shipping those prisoners to a completely separate society somewhere far away would have the incapacitation effect (which seems to be by far the most important factor), without any of the significant costs. A one-way flight ticket is maybe a thousand dollars? Pretty much anywhere in the world.
>
> If you think penal colonies are cruel, present the option to the criminal to join one, or our current system. If 5+ years of imprisonment essentially breaks all your social bonds anyways, it seems a much preferable alternative to have freedom in a new, if harsh, land, rather than be imprisoned in a literal prison near to home. If you're worried that penal colonies will be dangerous and deadly, as they're full of criminals, that's sort of what prisons are already. Except with a colony you can go out to the sticks and rarely interact with other people, and can have the means to readily defend yourself.
>
> Unfortunately it doesn't look like there's anywhere left that could function as a modern day penal colony without being cruel. The whole idea is incapacitation, so it doesn't work if we just ship them to Montana or something and call it a day, as they could easily take a bus out of there. It would have to be separated enough that returning to society without permission was sufficiently difficult. Even a large island (let's say we sacrificed Hawaii's big island for this purpose) can easily be escaped if not for significant monitoring.
>
> I think Robert Heinlein's, The Moon Is A Harsh Mistress should be our model for an actual solution. The moon is far enough away that it would be quite difficult to get back.
I think Sol is overestimating the difficulty of preventing escape, and underestimating the difficulty of everything else.
People call Gaza an “open-air prison”, and the comparison makes sense. It contains two million Palestinians, separated from Israel by a wall, barbed wire, and military guards. Security isn’t infallible (see 10/7), but the breach required a near-state level of resources (including funding/arms/supplies from Israel’s enemies) plus a rare catastrophic blunder on Israel’s part - and all it did was get a few thousand Gazans over the wall for a few hours.
But Gaza is just a coastal area with a wall around it. America has plenty of isolated coastal areas. The US prison population is lower than the population of Gaza, so a Gaza-sized strip could fit all prisoners with room to spare.
But I think Sol is imagining an area with enough fertile land that inhabitants could set up farms and be self-sustaining. That’s a bigger problem. There are ~1.2 million prisoners in the US. In theory, one person needs an acre of land to support themselves through subsistence farming. 1.2 million acres is the size of Rhode Island. But this is the best case scenario where the land is completely tiled with one-acre farms - which means prisoners are no longer isolated from other prisoners, and probably preying on/murdering them. Which is more likely - that a murderer settles down to do backbreaking farm labor, or that murder their neighbor and take their crops?
The alternative is a Gaza Strip situation where you’re not even trying to farm, and just ship in food. But that requires prisoners to be near distribution centers, which again gives them a lot of opportunities to commit crimes against each other. I would imagine this looking something like Haiti, with urban gangs fighting each other until eventually the baddest dude becomes some kind of warlord. Haiti is probably still better than prison, but I could see this getting worse. Why shouldn’t the winning gang kill all new prisoners who enter (to prevent them from consuming supplies)? If the winning gang is race-based (eg Aryan Nations), would they enslave the other races?
Sol suggests giving prisoners a choice between a penal colony or a regular prison, which I agree would potentially limit some of the downside. But now we have a new problem - even if the penal colony has fewer atrocities, relatively speaking, it may have *more photogenic* atrocities, in the sense of some sort of public torture that produces outrage instead of the slow burn of sadism and misery that normal prisons produce. The story of modernity is people trying to exchange photogenic atrocities for boring atrocities in order to avoid having negative *New York Times* articles written about them. I worry the penal colony might end the same way.
Here’s an even more hare-brained scheme: if this would devolve into Haiti, why not skip the middleman and pay Haiti to take our prisoners directly? It probably couldn’t make them any worse-off, and they could use the money. It would be win-win!
**Melvin [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79145105):**
> There seem to be reasonable solutions to prison gang power. My preferred solution of solitary confinement for everyone (enriched solitary with books and entertainment, not the semi-torturous sensory deprivation kind) is controversial but we can at least cut down prisoners' social interactions considerably so that each prisoner only interacts with (say) half a dozen others. A prison could consist of small isolated pods separated by thick walls.
Yeah, everyone I know with experience says that solitary confinement is torture, but I would naively expect to prefer it to normal prison. Maybe at least give prisoners the choice?
I do think solitary might be more expensive - El Salvador has 100 (!) prisoners per cell to save money; I don’t know how many America has but I bet it’s not great.
**justforthispost [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79114711):**
> This is why I (definitely on the thin end of the bell curve vis. leftism on this website) support public corporeal punishment over prison.
>
> I honestly think we should bring back the cane and the stocks. If you get caught lifting razors from target the state should mandate spending three days locked in stocks In front of city hall and getting your feet switched; this is infinitely more humiliating the prison, much less disruptive, much less likely to kill people, gives cops less chance to do cop things (beat people to death, let them die in prison from preventable medical conditions, rape people in prison, etc.) and much it's much cheaper!
I previously believed this, but this post makes me more skeptical. Since most of the benefits of prison come from incapacitation rather than deterrence, we should expect this to have limited effect - although some people point out that something public, sudden, and dramatic might have better deterrence properties! I think if first shoplifting arrest is a warning, this would be a good way of dealing with the second and third, and then after the Xth strike we give up and just try to lock you away from society.
**Robert Huben ([blog](https://aizi.substack.com/?utm_content=comment_metadata&utm_source=substack-feed-item)) [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79254172):**
> Fun dystopian mechanism for private companies to increase deterrence: increase all sticker prices 1000x, while offering 99.9% discount coupons. Since shoplifting goes from a misdemeanor to a felony at a certain dollar amount ($750 is mentioned in the article), this means that shoplifting ~anything is a felony, increasing deterrence while leaving normal customers unaffected!
>
> I'm not a lawyer, I'm supremely confident this will work. The hardest part would be randomly assigning stores to intervention/control groups, so the criminologists can measure the effects.
You laugh, but this is exactly how our health care system works.
## Other Comments
**AJKamper [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79080939):**
> One other comment I want to throw in here. Hang around for a while with correctional workers, at least in Minnesota, and you will eventually hear someone talk about “evidence-based practices,” usually right before they spit at the ground. Coming from secondhand medical background, this confused the hell out of me for a solid six months. A) In medicine, EBP is a set of practices designed to make sure that commonly used interventions, you know, work. B) Evidence seems… good? Not here. A new director might be described as “super EBP” with a roll of the eyes.
>
> I eventually worked out that in practice, EBP represents a rehabilitative, “soft on consequences” approach in prisons that a lot of front-line workers, especially older ones, think is ineffective at best or just plain too kind to offenders who deserve worse. So there’s a major divide between Central Office people who are trying to rehabilitate the inmates based on “best evidence,” and the guards and case managers who think that time should be hard. It’s a pretty good microcosm of the current epidemic crisis, actually.
**Michael [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79097284):**
> Skarbek's book "The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System" is a great read.
>
> The key point is that, because most criminals expect to go to prison, they know they will someday be at the mercy of prison gangs who have the power to inflict violence on the inside. This gives prison gangs enormous power outside of the prison walls; non-prison gangs usually pay tribute to a given prison gang.
>
> (This incidentally is what worries me about El Salvador. Having all the gang members in prison right now might be like having guerrillas driven up to the mountains; the state may be ceding its monopoly on violence in a certain part of the country and this could eventually be a problem even if the rest of the country is safe in the meantime.)
>
> Putting a dent in the power of prison gangs would be intrinsically good and probably help with crime on the outside.
>
> Unfortunately solutions to this are probably unpalatable. Removing the gangs' power to commit violence and smuggle drugs would look like making conditions better and safer for prisoners (undesirable to the right), but would require large increases in funding for prisons alongside stricter security (undesirable to the left).
>
> However this is an issue that's nicely orthogonal to "turning the knob" of more/less sentencing, so I figure it's worth mentioning.
Yeah, this is an interesting point. There’s a good interview with Skarbek in last month’s issue of Asterisk, I think it will be online shortly. | Scott Alexander | 152754467 | Highlights From The Comments On Prison | acx |
# Open Thread 359
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**.
Also, ‘tis the season to be guilted into charitable giving! Here are some fundraisers I’ve been made aware of:
* **GiveDirectly** is a charity that gives money directly to poor families in Africa. GiveWell thinks they’re within an order of magnitude of the most effective charities in the world. You can learn more and donate [here](https://www.givedirectly.org/substackers2024/?utm_campaign=astralcodexten).
* **Philosophers Against Malaria** is a kind of aggressive-seeming scheme to pit philosophy departments against each other to see which one will donate the most to charity (in this case, malaria bednets). If you want to donate, or just check which universities have the most moral philosophy department, go [here](https://www.againstmalaria.com/Fundraiser.aspx?FundraiserID=9191).
* **Lightcone** handles infrastructure for the rationalist community. They run the Less Wrong website and the Lighthaven campus (where we’ve held the past several Berkeley ACX meetups). You can read their pitch [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5n2ZQcbc7r4R8mvqc/the-lightcone-is-nothing-without-its-people), and donate [here](https://www.every.org/lightcone-infrastructure?suggestedAmounts=50%2C100%2C1000%2C2000%2C5000&theme_color=7faf83&designation=Lightcone+Infrastructure&utm_campaign=donate-link#/donate/bank). Many of us have enjoyed and benefited from their work, and now would be a great time to give something back (and if you donate enough, they’ll name a bench after you). Warning that the (not affiliated with Lightcone) donation site quietly tries to add a 15% tip to themselves, and you should un-add it if you don’t want to tip them.
* And here’s [Bentham’s Bulldog trying to convince you to donate to the Shrimp Welfare Project](https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-best-charity-isnt-what-you-think). “I’d be surprised if we got to heaven, asked God what the highest [moral] impact thing that we could have done is, and his answer was ‘oh, something very normal and within the Overton window.’” | Scott Alexander | 152826747 | Open Thread 359 | acx |
# Indulge Your Internet Addiction By Reading About Internet Addiction
Internet addiction may not be as bad as some other forms of addiction, but it’s more common (and more personal). I have young children now and wanted to learn more about it, so I included some questions in last year’s ACX survey. The sample was 5,981 ACX readers (obviously non-random in terms of Internet use level!). I don’t think the results were very helpful, but I post them here for the sake of completeness.
### How Addicted To The Internet Are We?
When asked about Internet addiction on a scale of 1-5, respondents answered:
Self-reported Internet addiction correlated with self-reported time spent online per day:
**1:** 2.8 hours
**2:** 3.2 hours
**3:** 3.9 hours
**4:** 4.6 hours
**5:** 6.6 hours
Average time online for the whole sample was 4 hours. Average “screen time”, including TV and video games, was 5.5 hours.
I also asked a second measure of Internet addiction, intended as a sort of “if a perfect nanny state offered to magically limit your Internet use with zero downside, would you accept?” The details were:
> Suppose the government created a program intended to help people avoid Internet addiction. If you voluntarily sign up for the program, your broadband provider will limit you to X hours per day of recreational Internet use (you choose X). You can still use the Internet as much as you need to for work, research, shopping, etc. The government is extremely competent and does a great job figuring out which Internet activities are in which category (don't fight the hypothetical!) . If you sign up, there is a one year cooldown period before you can leave. Do you sign up?
27.5% of people accepted, but this was barely correlated with screen time or self-reported addiction level. I think acceptance/rejection ended up loading more on ideas of dignity and whether you trust even a perfect benevolent nanny state to make decisions for you.
People who accepted spent an average of 4 hours on the Internet. Their average value of X (ie the amount they would tell the nanny state to restrict them to) was 2 hours.
### How Does Internet Addiction Affect Life Satisfaction?
Self-reported Internet addiction was negatively linked to life satisfaction (number below is self-rating addiction 1-5 : self-rated life satisfaction 1-10):
**1:** 7.4
**2:** 7.1
**3:** 6.9
**4:** 6.6
**5:** 6.0
Numbers were similar for every other subcategory of satisfaction (job, social, romantic). There was a substantial negative correlation between life satisfaction and Internet use (-0.18) as well as screen time (-0.19).
I would caution against causal explanations, since these results could go either direction (eg less satisfied people spend more time online, or even less satisfied people are more likely to condemn any given amount of Internet use as an “addiction”).
Even though they spent the same amount of time online, people who would take the nanny state offer were slightly less satisfied with their lives than people who wouldn’t.
### How Do Parents’ Internet Policies Affect Children’s Internet Addiction?
People told me how their parents had controlled their Internet use when they were 7 years old (note potential recall bias). I restricted this question to people under 30, to make sure I was only catching people who grew up during the Internet era:
To eliminate the blue area, I removed everyone older than 30 for the next few analyses.
Here are addiction ratings (1-5) for all categories. I’ve combined various kinds of limits together because the sample size for each was low:
**No Internet:** 3.24
**Limited Internet:** 3.23
**Free Internet:** 3.04
And here is current Internet use (in hours) for all categories:
**No Internet:** 4.4h
**Limited Internet:** 4.3h
**Free Internet:** 4.9h
(why are these all higher than the sample mean? Because I restricted the analysis to young people, who use the Internet more.)
This is pretty funny! People whose parents put no restrictions on them as a child use the Internet most, but are *least* likely to consider themselves addicted!
I would still caution against causal explanations. You could imagine, for example, that parents who love the Internet don’t restrict their kids (because they think Internet use is great), then pass on whatever genes or beliefs made them love the Internet (which increases Internet use in their children).
I did the same analysis with Internet use at age 16 (rather than 7), except that I changed the current age restriction to 19 - 35. There were too few teenagers whose parents completely banned Internet use for me to analyze this group. But former free use teenagers had higher current Internet use (4.5 hours) than former restricted-use teenagers (3.6 hours).
Could we use this as a quasi-experiment to see if the life satisfaction results are causal? That is - people’s current life satisfaction can affect their current Internet use (depressed people might use the Internet since they have no friends). But if people’s parents’ Internet restrictions affect their life satisfaction, it seems more likely that the causal pathway would move forward through current Internet use. At least it’s worth a try!
I found that people whose parents banned Internet use as children had slightly higher self-rated life satisfaction (6.9) than those who merely limited it (6.8) or placed no restrictions at all (6.6).
But again, I’m not sure how causal this is. Maybe those people had generally more engaged parents. Sounds like the sort of thing that might make you better adjusted!
### How Do People Plan To Control Their Own Childrens’/Teens’ Internet Use?
I asked people what they planned to do for their own children:
Then I separated this out into people who actually had children vs. those who didn’t. The results were pretty similar - the biggest difference was that parents were more likely to let their teenage children use the Internet as much as they wanted than non-parents expected.
Who was more committed to strict restrictions on their children - current addicts, or non-addicts? You could imagine this going either way. Maybe the addicts are more determined to prevent their kids from ending up like them. Or maybe the addicts are people who like the Internet and are against limiting it in themselves or others. This question matters a lot, because it determines how we interpret the results above - if non-addicts placed more restrictions on their own kids, then the finding that kids with more restrictions used the Internet less could be genetic (or cultural) confounding.
In fact, I find the result goes both ways! People who *self-rate* as more addicted place more restrictions on their own kids. But people who spend more time online place fewer restrictions! It seems like self-rated “addiction” is a combination of how much time you spend online, and how unhappy you are about it, and those effects push in different directions here!
I am more confident in time spent online as really measuring something objective. By that metric, people who spend more time online plan to place fewer restrictions on their own children. This suggests the results above could be due to genetic (or cultural) confounding.
I also took a closer look at the subgroup of ACX readers who are most successful in life - income above 200K and life satisfaction above 7/10 - but their upbringing and parenting opinions weren’t much different from anyone else’s.
### Summary
The survey found more or less what common sense would expect:
* Lots of people are addicted to the Internet
* Internet addicts are less happy
* People whose parents restricted their screen time as children are less likely to be Internet addicts as adults.
…but it couldn’t establish causation for any of them. I consider this a very small update in favor of the common sense positions (they could have been outright wrong, which would have been a strong update against them!), but not enough to be conclusive or especially interesting.
As always, you can try to replicate my work using the publicly available [ACX Survey Results](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-survey-results-2024). If you get slightly different answers than I did, it’s because I’m using the full dataset which includes a few people who didn’t want their answers publicly released. If you get very different answers than I did, it’s because I made a mistake, and you should tell me. | Scott Alexander | 152399208 | Indulge Your Internet Addiction By Reading About Internet Addiction | acx |
# Friendly And Hostile Analogies For Taste
Recently we’ve gotten into discussions about artistic taste (see comments on [AI Art Turing Test](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-did-you-do-on-the-ai-art-turing) and [From Bauhaus To Our House](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-from-bauhaus-to-our-house)).
This is a bit mysterious. Many (most?) uneducated people like certain art which seems “obviously” pretty. But a small group of people who have studied the issue in depth say that in some deep sense, that art is actually bad (“kitsch”), and other art which normal people don’t appreciate is better. They can usually point to criteria which the “sophisticated” art follows and the “kitsch” art doesn’t, but to normal people these just seem like lists of pointless rules.
But most of the critics aren’t Platonists - they don’t believe that aesthetics are an objective good determined by God. So what does it mean to say that someone else is wrong?
Most of the comments discussion devolved into analogies - some friendly to the idea of “superior taste”, others hostile. Here are some that I find especially helpful:
**A. Taste Is Like Physics**
Okay, fine, maybe it *is* an objective good determined by God. Just as non-physicists may have plausible but false folk theories of physics (“atoms are like little billiard balls, right?”) but real physicists know better, so rubes may have bad taste, but professional artists know what is actually tasteful.
This one would be pretty mysterious - we know physics is referring to the real nature of matter and energy and so on, but what is taste referring to?
Perhaps a less fraught version of this would avoid talk of objective aesthetics in favor of talking about human universals - for example, people seem to prefer symmetry [for various reasons](https://opentheory.net/PrincipiaQualia.pdf), and even if they didn’t, symmetry has a certain mathematical elegance separate from its aesthetic appeal. If there were lots of things like this, maybe this could be a foundation for taste.
But the whole mystery is that taste *isn’t* universal. It seems perverse to dismiss the sort of art that untrained people like, proclaim other art which they hate to be better, then plead that you’re basing your judgment in “human universals”.
**B. Taste Is Like A Priesthood**
Hindu priests have a deep and complex system of ritual purity. X food can only be eaten at Y time unless it has touched a member of Z caste or been purified using P product and Q blessing, unless . . . (and so on).
Uneducated Hindus don’t understand this system and may make mistakes. Sophisticated priests understand the system very well, and they all agree on what the rules are. The system is self-consistent and evolves in a rational way (ie when confronted with a new problem that no Hindu had ever considered before, like the purity laws around New World products, priests will all agree upon a natural extension of existing laws). Priests probably feel a visceral sense of disgust or violation when they see someone eat a taboo food or prepare a ritual the wrong way.
Still, unless you’re a Hindu, you believe the system is completely made up and has no relevance to the real world. You think that Hindu priests are (unintentionally) charlatans, getting angry at people for violating rules even though the violation of those rules has no negative consequences and nobody who wasn’t inculcated in Hinduism since birth would care about them. The solution is to stop inculcating people into Hinduism. Although this might have some other disadvantages (if the religion helps hold together communities or something), at least the relaxation of meaningless ritual purity laws would go on the benefits side of the ledger.
Maybe taste is like this too. Sophisticated artists come up with a set of rules that they all agree on, but which are otherwise arbitrary. Young art students, after getting scoffed at for violating the rules enough times, internalize a deep sense of cringe if they see a rule getting violated. But all of this is pointless and could be profitably eliminated.
**C. Taste Is Like A Priesthood, But With A Fig Leaf Of Semi-Fake Justifications**
This makes the most sense to me when I think of fashion.
Fashion is a set of rules, like “don’t wear white after Labor Day”. Why shouldn’t you wear white after Labor Day? Google tells me that it’s because in the old days, it was hard to keep white clothes clean in the autumn, so if you wore them anyway, it seemed like boasting that you could afford a staff of hard-working maids, and boasting is uncultured. This sort of kind of makes sense. But I find it hard to believe that people were ever really going around deeply offended at other people’s implied braggadocio when they wore a white shirt in late September. It seems more like the sort of thing someone came up with as a clever rule that could *sort of* be justified, and then announced to great fanfare in a fashion column. Presumably that person was important enough that other people listened, and then afterwards anyone who saw someone wear white after Labor Day had an instinctive cringe reaction: “Wow, what a *faux pas*”.
What about more basic rules, like “don’t wear white socks with black shoes”? Google says this is because it creates a “visually jarring look”. I can sort of see this. But I also think that less than 1% of people who had never heard this rule, if they saw someone wearing white socks with black shoes, would think “That’s visually jarring”, in a way that they *wouldn’t* think with some other acceptable combination like a white shirt and black tie (which a priori should be exactly equally jarring, but which is considered classy). I certainly don’t expect that this is such a natural feature of human perception that eg China, India, and the Aztecs would all independently reinvent this rule where white socks + black shoes were bad but white shirt + black tie is great. I think a couple very sensitive people were jarred once, made this rule, gave a vaguely reasonable-sounding explanation, and then it *actually* became jarring because people knew you weren’t supposed to do it.
In fact, we know that fashion rules are like this. [@dieworkwear](https://x.com/dieworkwear?lang=en) on Twitter often recounts his experience debating fashion in a menswear forum. A bunch of style-obsessed people go in and claim ridiculous things like “there is never any excuse for a man wearing a light blue tie, it looks passive and feminine” and then they all argue about it. Occasionally some people win their arguments and then classy men who visit stylish forums stop wearing light blue ties. Is it really some truth about the universe that light blue ties are feminine? It *kind of* makes sense that *I guess* they’re more pastel and feminine-y than a bright red tie - but realistically this is just people trying to cause trouble. Or, more generously, they’re coming up with a secret pattern language that only other cool people understand, so that they can all feel cool together.
We saw this in our discussion of architecture too. Someone proposed that if you insist on having fake shutters as ornament on your windows, they should at least be the right size to actually shutter your windows - otherwise it’s tacky and unrealistic. Most people said they’d never thought about this before and didn’t care, but - fine - I agree if you think about it really hard, there’s some sort of extremely vague sense in which this resembles being true, the same sort of vague fake sense where it makes sense that you shouldn’t wear white after Labor Day. Get enough people like this together, and then if you use the wrong kind of shutters you’re “not sophisticated” and “don’t really understand architecture”.
**D. As Above, Except The Justifications Are Good And Important**
I should probably explain why I’m skipping this one. It’s the same reason - if the facts were obvious to everyone, then taste would be universal, not limited to a few sophisticates.
Still, there are ways to rescue this. You could say they’re obvious “once you pay attention”, but that paying attention to them is itself a trained skill.
It’s not immediately obvious why you would want this skill - it makes your life worse, because you’ll just be fretting over flaws you see in everything. But maybe some people are born with the skill, and other people should cultivate the skill so as to not offend those people.
**E. Taste Is Like BDSM Porn**
People say that if you watch too much regular porn, you get desensitized to it and need weirder stuff. Eventually you get desensitized to the weirder stuff too, until finally you’re watching horrible taboo BDSM snuff porn or whatever.
Maybe taste is also like this. You look at all the nice pretty houses on your block until you’re bored of nice pretty houses and want something new and exciting. For a while, you’re satisfied with glass boxes, until you’re bored of glass boxes too, and you need something more exciting than that. Finally you’re ~~masturbating to~~ living in buildings made of jarringly-colored metallic blobs that look like Cthulhu might emerge from them at any moment.
I’m deliberately choosing a negative example to counteract everyone else having an artificially positive view of this (“the sophisticated people’s taste is better, everyone else is kitsch”). A scrupulously fair treatment would just admit there’s different art for different groups. Maybe on one street you could have the kind of building that someone who’s studied architecture for less than a year would like, on some other street you’d have the kind of building that someone who’s studied architecture for between ten and twenty years would like, and then everyone gets a street full of buildings that they like.
**F. Taste Is Like Fashion (Derogatory)**
We talked about actual clothes fashion above, but what about the fashion cycle more generally? Every so often, somebody says that red is now the stylish color, and everyone has to wear red. The next year, it’s blue, and if you wear red you’re the world’s biggest loser.
Back in 2014, [I wrote about a theory of the fashion cycle](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/04/22/right-is-the-new-left/). Cool people want to show everyone else they’re cool. But uncool people want to pretend to be cool. We assume that cool people are mostly friends with other cool people, and that coolness radiates outward along the social graph. So the cool people pick a signifier, at first only other cool people know it, and over a few months it gradually radiates to the less cool people, the uncool people, the very uncool people, and finally, years later, me. Then the cool people pick a different signifier and the process begins again.
The signifier may or may not actually be good in any way. In fact, it helps if it isn’t - ripped jeans work great - because cool people get to show their confidence by wearing something that would look stupid on anyone else, and uncool people hesitate to adopt it since they worry they would actually look stupid.
Different groups of cool people then signal allegiance (and lack of subordination to the original group of cool people) by coming up with signifiers of their own. These signifiers should preferably be opaque and complicated, to make it as hard as possible for the uncool people to copy them without being immersed in cool people culture.
**G. Taste** **Is** **Like Grammar**
Grammar is a set of rules for speaking a language. Some of these rules are sensible and necessary, but others are arbitrary or even actively anti-rational. For example, it would make more sense to say “he goed” than “he went”, but only the latter is correct.
People feel on a deep level that poor grammar is wrong - misplaced apostrophes can send pedant’s into a rage. But descriptivists helpfully tell us that this is mostly arbitrary, and that some minority groups have alternate grammars which are just as good and consistent as ours, despite sounding atrocious (eg “I ain’t be going”).
Even though in some sense grammar is about agreeing on a set of rules for easy communication, some people are more sophisticated than others and “know” that the majority way of speaking is wrong. My former English teacher spent her life waiting for someone to ask “Is Mrs. So-And-So here?” so that she could answer “I am she!” and follow it with an explanation of why the natural instinct to say “I am her” is “wrong”. This particular rule has a sort of rational explanation - the copula takes the nominative case. But when you get into *why* the copula takes the nominative case, it’s hard to tell whether this is a natural fact about the definition of cases, or whether Latin-obsessed grammarians unfairly demanded that Anglophones follow the Latin usage. Other examples are more clearly inappropriate Latinizations - for example, you originally couldn’t split an infinitive in English because doing so was impossible in Latin; only later did people develop a “sense” that this “sounded wrong”.
So the sophisticates do have reasons behind what they do - but the reasons are arbitrary and kind of stupid. Still, if you do it the wrong way, they’ll laugh at you. Most people don’t want to be laughed at by sophisticated people, and we summarize this situation as “it’s bad grammar, but only grammarians are sophisticated enough to realize this.”
I think this is just the “Priesthood With Semi-Fake Justifications” story again, but it helped me understand it better and get a more visceral feel.
**Which Of These Is True?**
In the comments, I’ve argued that we should mostly be suspicious of taste, for a few reasons:
1. Taste seems to constantly change. In 1930, all the sophisticated people said that Beaux-Arts architecture was very tasteful. In 1950, they’d laugh at you if you built Beaux-Arts; everyone with good taste was into International Style. This is very suspicious! Human universals don’t change that fast! Rules about what is vs. isn’t “jarring” don’t change that fast! Only fashion changes that fast!
2. Even very sophisticated people seem to disagree about taste. Many architects hate each others’ buildings; many artists hate each others’ paintings. And not just a little! They call them barbaric and immoral! This seems more like fashion - where preppies and Goths and whoever else battle it out - as opposed to anything based on real timeless aesthetic truths.
3. When we see how the sausage gets made, it often involves politics or power struggles. For example, the principles of modern architecture were decided by socialists arguing about whose style seemed more “bourgeois”. Now capitalists who normally wouldn’t dream of caring what socialists thought call the winners of those fights “tasteful” and the losers “kitsch”, and claim to feel this viscerally in their bones. This suggests that taste is downstream of who wins non-taste-related fights, which suggest it’s more about a Schelling point (ie parroting received opinion) than about having some particular virtue.
4. The few scientific experiments we have - hoaxes, blind tests, etc - are not very kind to taste as a concept. Consider eg [the Ern Malley hoax](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ern_Malley_hoax), my article about [wine appreciation](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/01/is-wine-fake), and the [AI Art Turing Test](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ai-art-turing-test).
5. The strongest argument for the reality of taste is the visceral feeling of violation that some people get upon seeing tasteless work, but I think the Grammar analogy demonstrates that this can happen even when standards are made up. You could even make a [Trapped Prior](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/trapped-priors-as-a-basic-problem) analogy here - once people start feeling a minor zap of dissonance at a violation, this retroactively justifies the system and perpetuates the minor zap of dissonance
I think all of these analogies have merit, but these considerations make me most sympathetic to Priesthood With Semi-Fake Justifications. | Scott Alexander | 152602637 | Friendly And Hostile Analogies For Taste | acx |
# Book Review: From Bauhaus To Our House
[Like most people](https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2020/10/23/public-architecture-dysfunctional), Tom Wolfe didn’t like modern architecture. He wondered why we abandoned our patrimony of cathedrals and palaces for a million indistinguishable concrete boxes.
Unlike most people, he was a journalist skilled at deep dives into difficult subjects. The result is *[From Bauhaus To Our House](https://www.amazon.com/Bauhaus-Our-House-Tom-Wolfe/dp/0312429142),* a hostile history of modern architecture which addresses the question of: what happened? If everyone hates this stuff, how did it win?
### How Did Modern Architecture Start?
European art in the 1800s might have seemed a bit *conservative*. It was typically sponsored by kings, dukes, and rich businessmen, via national artistic guilds that demanded strict compliance with classical styles and heroic themes. The Continent’s new progressive intellectual class started to get antsy, culminating in the Vienna Secession of 1897. Some of Vienna’s avante-garde artists officially split from the local guild to pursue their unique transgressive vision.
The point wasn’t that the Vienna Secession itself was particularly modern…
Kirche am Steinhof, an example of Vienna Secession architecture. This is what passed for transgressive and avante-garde in 1897!
…so much as that it cemented a new romantic vision of the Artist. The Artist was a genius, brimming with bold new ideas that the common people could never understand! The Artist defied the norms of bourgeois society! The Artist was part of some official collective with their own compound in a trendy part of the city! The compound produced manifestos explaining why their vision of Art was better than everyone else’s!
This romantic vision was so powerful that you could become a well-regarded artistic movement just by doing the collective, the compound, and the manifesto especially well. Whether or not you produced art was of secondary importance - the sort of question that a *bourgeois* who didn’t *understand your true genius* would ask.
At the same time, Europe’s intelligentsia was falling in love with socialism. There was an inevitable wave of new socialist art compounds, each writing a manifesto explaining why their new artistic movement was the one that *truly* threw off the shackles of capitalism and represented the proletariat.
Preeminent among these was Bauhaus, founded by Walter Gropius in Germany in 1919. Their big idea was “starting from zero” - since all previous art had been contaminated by capitalism, we needed a hard reset where people started by (eg) contemplating what color and shape *really* were, then gradually building a new socialist art from the ground up. This new art must eschew ornamentation, associated as it was with kings and nobles who had money to spare on gold trim or sculpted curlicues. Real socialist art would be brutally functional, the sort of thing a poor worker might build. If this sounds harsh, remember that this was right after World War I, the old order stood infinitely discredited, and starting from zero must have seemed pretty appealing.
Maybe too appealing: the Bauhaus wasted no time in becoming a caricature of itself. Someone got into their head that pointed roofs “represented the crowns of the old nobility”; henceforward, all their buildings had flat tops (even though this was unsuited for the snowy German climate). Facades were fake, just like the fakeness of bourgeois propaganda; therefore true socialist buildings would show their innards as much as possible, with jutting pipes and undecorated structural supports.
Official Bauhaus compound building
Imagine for a moment the 2024 equivalent of Bauhaus. Someone has just started the woke artists’ collective, claiming to perfectly encapsulate all the principles of wokeism and be the wokest people around. What happens next? Obviously every other group of woke people accuse them of being racist, and they have bloody internecine feuds for the next twenty years, right?
Right. No sooner had Bauhaus developed their new socialist architecture designed to utterly remove all traces of bourgeois influence from design forever, then all the other socialist artists said: “I dunno, seems kind of *bourgeois*”:
> The battle to be the least bourgeois of all became somewhat loony. For example, early in the game, in 1919, Gropius had been in favor of bringing simple craftsmen into the Bauhaus, yeomen, honest toilers, people with knit brows and broad fingernails who would make things by hand for architectural interiors, simple wooden furniture, simple pots and glassware. This seemed very working class, very nonbourgeois. He was also interested in the curvilinear designs of Expressionist architects such as Erich Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn’s dramatic curved shapes exploded all bourgeois conceptions of order, balance, symmetry, and rigid masonry construction. Yes—but a bit naïve of you all the same, Walter!
>
> In 1922 the First International Congress of Progressive Art was held in Düsseldorf. This was the first meeting of compound architects from all over Europe. Right away they got down on the mat over this business of “nonbourgeois”. Theo van Doesburg, the fiercest of the Dutch manifesto writers, took one look at Gropius’ Honest Toilers and Expressionist curves and sneered and said: *How very bourgeois*. Only the rich could afford handmade objects, as the experience of the Arts and Crafts movement in England had demonstrated. To be nonbourgeois, art must be machine-made. As for Expressionism, its curvilinear shapes defied the machine, not the bourgeoisie. They were not only expensive to fabricate, they were "voluptuous" and "luxurious".
>
> Van Doesburg, with his monocle and his long nose and his amazing sneer, could make such qualities sound bourgeois to the point of queasiness. Gropius was a sincerely spiritual force, but he was also quick enough and competitive enough to see that van Doesburg was backing him into a dreadful corner. Overnight, Gropius dreamed up a new motto, a new heraldic device for the Bauhaus compound: "Art and Technology — a New Unity!" Complete with exclamation point! There; that ought to hold van Doesburg and the whole Dutch klatsch. Honest toilers, broad fingernails, and curves disappeared from the Bauhaus forever.
>
> But that was only the start. The definitions and claims and accusations and counteraccusations and counterclaims and counterdefinitions of what was or was not bourgeois became so refined, so rarefied, so arcane, so dialectical, so scholastic … that finally building design itself was directed at only one thing: illustrating this month’s Theory of the Century concerning what was ultimately, infinitely, and absolutely non-bourgeois.
My favorite story along these lines: 1930s German architect Bruno Taut built housing with a red front, a reference to the Red Front communist paramilitary group. There was fierce debate. On the one hand, this was a pretty sweet communism pun. On the other hand, red was a bright color, and bright colors seemed too much like ornament/decoration, which were known to be bourgeois. Taut’s side lost, and “henceforth white, beige, gray, and black became the patriotic colors, the geometric flag, of all the compound architects.”
So far this is what we would expect from an insular group of avante-garde socialists. The real question is - who hired these people? Often the answer was “nobody” - as long as you had a clever enough theory of the nonbourgeois, it didn’t really matter whether you built anything. Some of the most famous architects of this era never got a commission until late in their careers, or survived off a few commissions from friends and family.
Other times the answer was “socialist governments”. For example, the socialist party got elected to local government in the German city of Stuttgart in 1927, and rewarded socialist artists with contracts to build worker housing - the first of what would later be known as “commieblocks”.
Bauhaus worker housing in Stuttgart, 1927
Ironically, real workers hated the modernist styles, and could only be forced into them when there was nowhere else to go. The architects were unfazed. The Romantic ideal of the artist said that real artists considered their clients Philistines and paid no heed to their preferences; the less you cared about your clients’ opinion, the realer and more romantic an artist you were. There was a slight hiccup in adjusting this philosophy to socialism, but only slight: by this time, classical Marxist philosophy had already ceded to the Bolshevik idea of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” where communist-theory-educated elites needed to re-educate the workers into accepting their own class interests. Wolfe describes the overall effect in Stuttgart:
> How did worker housing look? It looked nonbourgeois within an inch of its life: the flat roofs, with no cornices, sheer walls, with no window architraves or raised lintels, no capitals or pediments, no colors, just the compound shades, white, beige, gray, and black. The interiors had no crowns or coronets, either. They had pure white rooms, stripped, purged, liberated, freed of all casings, cornices, covings, crown moldings (to say the least), pilasters, and even the ogee edges on tabletops and the beading on drawers. They had open floor plans, ending the old individualistic, bourgeois obsession with privacy. There was no wallpaper, no drapes,= no Wilton rugs with flowers on them, no lamps with fringed shades and bases that look like vases or Greek columns, no doilies, knickknacks, mantelpieces, headboards, or radiator covers. Radiator coils were left bare as honest, abstract, sculptural objects. And no upholstered furniture with "pretty" fabrics. Furniture was made of Honest Materials in natural tones: leather, tubular steel, bentwood, cane, canvas; the lighter — and harder — the better. And no more "luxurious" rugs and carpets. Gray or black linoleum was the ticket.
>
> And how did the workers like worker housing? Oh, they complained, which was their nature at this stage of history. At Pessac the poor creatures were frantically turning Corbu’s cool cubes inside out trying to make them cozy and colorful. But it was understandable. As Corbu himself said, they had to be "re-educated" to comprehend the beauty of the Radiant City of the future. In matters of taste, the architects acted as the workers’ cultural benefactors. There was no use consulting them directly, since, as Gropius had pointed out, they were as yet "intellectually undeveloped".
>
> In fact, here was the great appeal of socialism to architects in the 1920s. Socialism was the political answer, the great yea-saying, to the seemingly outrageous and impossible claims of the compound architect, who insisted that the client keep his mouth shut. Under socialism, the client was the worker. Alas, the poor devil was only just now rising up out of the ooze. In the meantime, the architect, the artist, and the intellectual would arrange his life for him. To use Stalin’s phrase, they would be the engineers of his soul. In his apartment blocks in Berlin for employees of the Siemens factory, the soul engineer Gropius decided that the workers should be spared high ceilings and wide hallways, too, along with all of the various outmoded objects and decorations. High ceilings and wide hallways and "spaciousness" in all forms were merely more bourgeois grandiosity, expressed in voids rather than solids. Seven-foot ceilings and thirty-six-inch-wide hallways were about right for . . . re-creating the world.
### How Did It Take Over The Academy?
A prophet is without honor in his own country - or, to put it another way, a disease rarely goes pandemic in the area where it evolved. You need a naive unexposed population before ideas can really explode. Enter the United States.
In the early 1900s, the US still had a colonial inferiority complex. Europe automatically had the best and classiest of everything: the best intellectuals, the best food, and definitely the best art. A few bold Americans tried to blaze their own cultural trail, but they were overwhelmed by the power of elite Europhilia.
After World War I, some Americans visited Europe and brought back reports that the Bauhaus was pretty cool. Some modern art museums did exhibitions on the Bauhaus. Everyone agreed that they were cooler and better than we were, but nothing really came of it.
Then the Nazis took power in Germany. The socialist Bauhaus architects fled the country. Many came to America, where we colonial yokels responded with star-struck awe. Wolfe, writing before political correctness limited our stock of acceptable metaphors, says:
> The reception of Gropius and his confreres was like a certain stock scene from the jungle movies of that period. Bruce Cabot and Myrna Loy make a crash landing in the jungle and crawl out of the wreckage in their Abercrombie & Fitch white safari blouses and tan gabardine jodhpurs and stagger into a clearing. They are surrounded by savages with bones through their noses - who immediately bow down and prostrate themselves and commence a strange moaning chant: *The White Gods! Come from the skies at last!*
The worshipful colonials immediately gave them every prestigious architecture position in the country. Gropius got the department chair at Harvard. As for Mies, the last director of the Bauhaus collective in Germany:
> [He] was installed as dean of architecture at the Armour Institute in Chicago. And not just dean; master builder also. He was given a campus to create, twenty-one buildings in all, as the Armour Institute merged with the Lewis Institute of Technology. Twenty-one large buildings, in the middle of the Depression, at a time when building had come almost to a halt in the United States - for an architect who had completed only seventeen buildings in his career - o white gods! Such prostration! Such acts of homage!
The new Illinois Institute of Technology, designed by Mies.
And so:
> The teaching of architecture was transformed overnight. Everyone started from zero…all architecture became nonbourgeois architecture, although the concept itself was left discreetly *unexpressed*, as it were. The old Beaux-Arts traditions became heresy, and so did the legacy of Frank Lloyd Wright, which had only barely made its way into the architecture schools in the first place. Within three years, every so-called major American contribution to contemporary architecture . . . had dropped down into the footnotes.
An example of Beaux-Arts, the older style that had become “heresy” by the third year of Bauhaus leadership
Studio of Frank Lloyd Wright, another “heresy” victim.
I found this part of the book sudden and jarring. Okay, Americans have always had an unhealthy fascination with European culture - but, really? Everyone abandoned all previous forms of architecture within a three year period just because some cool Europeans showed up? I was left to hunt down hints to the broader story. Some of these come from elsewhere in the book, and some are my own speculation.
**First**, the Bauhaus promised architects a promotion from tradesman to intellectual. Some, like Frank Lloyd Wright, had already started such a transition. But the average architect was just someone who knew some stuff about stone and columns and stuff. Rich people would hire one to build them a cool villa, the architect would follow instructions and make whatever cool villa the rich person had requested, the rich person would pay them, and they would make a decent living. But modernism told architects that they were not only brilliant romantic Artists in the style of Van Gogh or Picasso - they were also intellectuals. They should be able to discourse on which styles were bourgeois, which expressed the true meaning of Light and Structure, and so on. Someone who wrote manifestos on the true meaning of Structure is automatically in the upper middle class; they get invited to cooler parties than somebody who just knows things about different types of stone. This was the Bauhaus’ offer to architects, and they leapt at the opportunity.
**Second**, the first crop of European modern architects were incredibly charismatic and persuasive people. Gropius’ nickname was “The Silver Prince”; Wolfe describes him as “irresistibly handsome to women, correct and urbane in a classic German manner, a lieutenant of cavalry during [World War I], decorated for valor, a figure of calm, certitude, and conviction at the center of the maelstrom … [he] seemed to be an aristocrat who through a miracle of sensitivity had retained every virtue of the breed and cast off all the snobberies and dead weight of the past”. Meanwhile, his colleague, born Charles-Édouard Jeanneret, demanded that everyone refer to him as “Le Corbusier” (French for “The Crow-Like One”)[1](#footnote-1) as some sort of combination artistic pseudonym / branding / flex. How are normal humans supposed to compete with people like these?
**Third,** modern architecture benefited from that most reliable of vectors for any bad idea: activist college students:
> Faculty members resisted the compound passion at their peril. Students were becoming unruly. They were drawing up petitions - manifestos in embryo. No more laying down laborious washes in China ink in the old Beaux-Arts manner! No more tedious Renaissance renderings! … and the faculties caved in … With the somewhat grisly euphoria of Savonarola burning the wigs and fancy dresses of the Florentine fleshpots, deans of architecture went about instructing the janitors to throw out all plaster casts of classical details, pedagogical props that had been accumulated over a half century or more.
>
> At Yale, in the annual design competition, a jury always picked out one student as, in effect, best in show. But now the students rebelled. And why? Because it was written, in the scriptures, by Gropius himself: “The fundamental pedagogical mistake of the academy arose from its preoccupation with the idea of individual genius.” Gropius and Mies’ byword was “team” effort . . . at Yale, the students insisted on a group project, a collaborative design, to replace the obscene scramble for individual glory.
**Fourth,** and more speculatively (ie I’m making it up), maybe the first modern building in a city looks better than the nth? Imagine a city where most buildings look like this:
…and then right in the middle, for the first time, somebody builds one of these:
Official Bauhaus complex building from another angle
It must have been incredibly jarring and impressive, like an embassy from the future. Imagine that you’re Pepsi, Coke just built the glass building, and you’re still in the brick building. Doesn’t seem great.
**Fifth,** one of the morals I took from [The Rise Of Christianity](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity) is that you’re more likely to win if you’re in the game. Paganism was just a set of tools for propitiating deities; Christianity was a missionary religion. Except at the very end (eg Emperor Julian), pagans didn’t think of themselves as proud pagans or try to convince others of paganism - so Christianity, which understood that it was competing with paganism and tried to win the competition, succeeded almost by default. In the same way, older styles of architecture were just sets of tools for making pretty buildings. Its practitioners didn’t originally think of themselves as “old-style architects” or care about converting anyone else. But modern architecture, with its manifestos and compounds and nonbourgeoisity, was absolutely an ideology, and understood perfectly well that it was at war with its predecessors. Some of the most ideological bits were filed off before it came to America. In Germany, Bauhaus architects had tried to adhere to a special Bauhaus diet invented by Walter Gropius - that didn’t last long. But it was still recognizably a warrior faith.
### How Did It Get Clients?
This is the question asked in *From Bauhaus To Our House'*s famous introductory passage:
> O BEAUTIFUL, for spacious skies, for amber waves of grain, has there ever been another place on earth where so many people of wealth and power have paid for and put up with so much architecture they detested as within thy blessed borders today?
>
> I doubt it seriously. Every child goes to school in a building that looks like a duplicating-machine replacement-parts wholesale distribution warehouse. Not even the school commissioners, who commissioned it and approved the plans, can figure out how it happened. The main thing is to try to avoid having to explain it to the parents.
>
> Every new $900,000 summer house in the north woods of Michigan or on the shore of Long Island has so many pipe railings, ramps, hob-tread metal spiral stairways, sheets of industrial plate glass, banks of tungsten-halogen lamps, and white-cylindrical shapes, it looks like an insecticide refinery. I once saw the owners of such a place driven to the edge of sensory deprivation by the whiteness & lightness & leanness & cleanness & bareness & spareness of it all. They became desperate for an antidote, such as coziness & color. They tried to bury the obligatory white sofas under Thai-silk throw pillows of every rebellious, iridescent shade of magenta, pink, and tropical green imaginable. But the architect returned, as he always does, like the conscience of a Calvinist, and he lectured them and hectored them and chucked the shimmering little sweet things out [...]
>
> I find the relation of the architect to the client today wonderfully eccentric, bordering on the perverse. In the past, those who commissioned and paid for palazzi, cathedrals, opera houses, libraries, universities, museums, ministries, pillared terraces, and winged villas didn’t hesitate to turn them into visions of their own glory...But after 1945 our plutocrats, bureaucrats, board chairmen, CEO’s, commissioners, and college presidents undergo an inexplicable change. They become diffident and reticent. All at once they are willing to accept that glass of ice water in the face, that bracing slap across the mouth, that reprimand for the fat on one’s bourgeois soul, known as modern architecture.
>
> And why? They can’t tell you. They look up at the barefaced buildings they have bought, those great hulking structures they hate so thoroughly, and they can’t figure it out themselves. It makes their heads hurt.
But even though it’s the framing device of the book, it barely gets addressed.
One clue is that not everywhere went modern at the same rate. The average suburban house is still built in traditional styles, because home-buyers have no need to justify them to anyone but themselves. But corporations and governments have a more complicated mandate. When executive or bureaucrats make decisions, they’re supposed to be catering to more than their personal aesthetic taste. They’re supposed to be following best practices and doing what’s responsible, maybe as judged by a sort of “nobody ever got fired for buying IBM” type of standard. In architecture, the responsible-person standard was for big institutions that needed buildings to convene a Selection Committee including some representatives of the institution and at least one prestigious architect. But the representatives of the institution were out of their depth, and the prestigious architect could usually bully them into submission. So modernism it was.
The problem was alienation - the people designing the buildings weren’t the ones residing in them - or, in many cases, even viewing them as they walked by. Wolfe thinks that the people with the most exposure were least happy with the results. Here’s his discussion of the Seagram Building, one of the first great International Style skyscrapers:
> The one remaining problem was window coverings: shades, blinds, curtains, whatever. [Architect Ludwig] Mies would have preferred that the great windows of plate glass have no coverings at all. Unless you could compel everyone in a building to have the same color ones (white or beige, naturally) and raise them and lower them or open and shut them at the same time and to the same degree, they always ruined the purity of the design of the exterior. In the Seagram Building, Mies came as close as man was likely to realizing that ideal. The tenants could only have white blinds or shades, and there were only three intervals where they would stay put: open, closed, or halfway. At any other point, they just kept sliding […]
>
> The office workers shoved filing cabinets, desks, wastepaper baskets, potted plants up against the floor-to-ceiling sheets of glass, anything to build a barrier against the panicked feeling that they were about to pitch headlong into the streets below. Above these jerry-built walls they strung up makeshift curtains that looked like laundry lines from the slums of Naples, anything to keep out that brain-boiling, poached-eye sunlight that came in every afternoon . . . and by night, the custodial staff, the Mieslings police, under strictest orders, invaded and pulled down these pathetic barricades thrown up against the pure vision of the Silver Prince. Eventually, everyone gave up and learned, like the haute bourgeoisie above him, to take it like a man.
Predictably, modern architecture won its greatest victories among those who had the least opportunity to refuse: poor people in the projects. Wolfe writes especially of [Pruitt-Igoe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe), a St. Louis public housing project designed by famous modern architect Minoru Yamasaki:
> Yamasaki designed it classically Corbu [ie Le Corbusier], fulfilling the master’s vision of highrise hives of steel, glass, and concrete separated by open spaces of green lawn…On each floor there were covered walkways, in keeping with Corbu’s idea of “streets in the air”. Since there was no other place in the project in which to *sin* in public, whatever might ordinarily have taken place in bars, brothels, social clubs . . . now took place in the streets in the air. Corbu’s boulevards made Hogarth’s Gin Lane look like the oceanside street of dreams in Southampton, New York. Respectable folk pulled out, even if it meant living in cracks in the sidewalks. Millions of dollars and scores of commission meetings and task-force projects were expended in a last-ditch attempt to make Pruitt-Igoe habitable. In 1971, the final task force called a general meeting of everyone still living in the project. They asked the residents for their suggestions. It was a historic moment for two reasons. One, for the first time in the fifty-year history of worker housing, someone had finally asked the client for his two cents’ worth. Two, the chant. The chant began immediately. “Blow it . . . *up*! Blow it . . . *up*! Blow it . . . *up*!”
Let it never be said that the St. Louis government doesn’t listen to its constituents.
But Wolfe does admit that some rich people voluntarily selected, or even commissioned, modernist buildings. He blames trendiness. There was a pipeline from the architecture schools (now dominated by the modernists) to the architecture sections of newspapers and magazines (Wolfe blames *Domus, House & Garden,* and *The New York Times Magazine* in particular). Rich people would read the magazines, understand that modern architecture was “in”, and go with it so as to not feel “left behind”.
Wolfe doesn’t mention this - writing in 1981, how could he? - but this was the height of the age of expertolatry. See my reviews of *[Revolt Of The Public](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-revolt-of-the-public)* and *[Seeing Like A State](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/03/16/book-review-seeing-like-a-state/)* for more. The concept of “the experts are a corrupt priesthood and you can safely ignore them” hadn’t really entered mass liberal consciousness. The idea that hard scientists were real experts but everyone else was just kind of faking it was decades in the future - and the Modernists were nothing if not good at faking the mantle of science and reason. This was mostly psychological - but also partly structural. There was no Internet. If you thought modern architecture was ugly, but all the experts said it was beautiful, there was no Twitter where you could shout your opinion under the cloak of anonymity. Every household got the same few TV channels and the same few magazines, and their architecture sections were all written by professionals who were singing the new style’s praises. So what are you going to do? Go to a cool party and shout “I think the style that all the experts say is the sign of an uneducated philistine is actually better”? Would you really?
### Why Did It Stick Around?
Grant that all of the above modernism gave modernism the potential to be an exciting late ‘40s / early ‘50s fad. Why did it endure? Wolfe points to three culprits: loss of expertise, cost-cutting, and continued academic dominance.
**To understand loss of expertise**, let’s look at our Beaux-Arts building again:
All that ornament - the gilded plaster, the cast iron balcony, etc - required trained artisans. These artisans aren’t completely gone - some of them were no doubt involved in the recent restoration of Notre Dame and other similar projects. But they’re no longer organized into giant corporations capable of decorating a whole city. Wolfe:
> To those philistines who were still so gauche as to say that the new architecture lacked the richness of detail of the old Beaux-Arts architecture … [the modernists] would say with considerable condescension: “Fine. You produce the craftsmen who can do that kind of work, and then we’ll talk to you about it. They don’t exist anymore.” True enough. But why? Henry Hope Reed tells of riding across West Fifty-third Street in New York in the 1940s in a car with some employees of E.F. Caldwell & Co, a firm that specialized in bronze work and electrical fixtures. As the car passed the Museum of Modern Art building, the men began shaking their fists at it and shouting: “That goddamn place is destroying us! Those bastards are killing us!” In the palmy days of Beaux-Arts architecture, Caldwell had employed a thousand bronzeurs, marble workers, model makers, and designers. Now the company was sliding into insolvency, along with many similar firms. It was not that craftsmanship was dying. Rather, the International Style was finishing off the demand for it, particularly in commercial construction.
Last time we discussed this, a commenter [agreed](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-356/comment/77773057) this was a big problem:
> I keep saying this when people bring this up: before I became a STEM parasite, I worked hammer and saw in a very rich and very busy area for custom buildings and houses, new and refurb and restore and regardless of what is said, the truth on the ground is:
>
> Building buildings that look like how you want them to look is outrageously expensive and involves lots of skills that are uncommon in rich countries these days.
>
> The only people that could timber frame were other third world imports that learned in the forest.
>
> There was one person in my entire state-sized region that could do custom tile.
>
> If we needed enamel restored on features in any way other than shitty, we had to ship them across the US.
>
> If we needed certain types of trim or wall paper restored, we needed to import a guy from France.
>
> If we needed certain types of cornice, we couldn't fucking do it at all because the last guy who knew how in the entire US died 10 years ago, and we would have needed to rederive the art from first principles at too great of an expense in time and money.
**Cost-cutting** was simple: cut out all the artisans, and buildings cost less. Sam Hughes at Works In Progress [has done a great job showing that](https://worksinprogress.co/issue/the-beauty-of-concrete/), contra the Baumolists, our modern industrial civilization could produce ornament cheaper than ever if we wanted to. But it’s even cheaper to *not* produce it. In the old days, cutting costs like this would have been unthinkable; your building would have stood out as an eyesore. But if *every* building is an eyesore, then spending extra on your building makes it look froo-froo, plus the extra money starts to seem irresponsible:
> To those who complained that International Style buildings were cramped, had flimsy walls inside as well as out, and, in general, looked cheap, the knowing response was “These days it’s too expensive to build in any other style”. But it was not *too* expensive, merely *more* expensive. The critical point was what people would or would not put up with aesthetically. It was possible to build in styles even cheaper than the International Style. For example, England began to experiment with schools and public housing constructed like airplane hangars, out of corrugated medal tethered by guy wires. Their architects also said: “These days it’s too expensive to build in any other style.” Perhaps one day soon everyone (*tout le monde*) would learn to take this, too, like a man.
**Finally,** the academic architectural establishment was able to cancel anyone who proposed going back to the old ways. An architect who dared comply with a client’s request to add ornament would find themselves almost blacklisted. In 1954, architect Edward Stone[2](#footnote-2) had a falling out with modernists and started to add some ornament to his building. Not much - they still looked like concrete boxes. But some of them were ugly concrete boxes *with circles on them:*
Edward Stone’s Museum of Modern Art
According to Wolfe:
> I can remember vividly the automatic sniggers, the rolling of the eyeballs, that mention of Stone’s [museum] set off at the time. The reviews of the architectural critics were bad enough. But not even such terms as “kitsch for the rich” and “marble lollipops” convey the poisonous mental atmosphere in which Stone now found himself. He was reduced, at length, to saying things such as “Every taxi driver in New York will tell you it’s his favorite building.” After so much! After a lifetime! - to be hounded, finally, to the last populist refuge of a Mickey Spillane or a Jacqueline Susann . . . O Lord! Anathema!
>
> One will note that Stone’s business did not collapse following his apostasy, merely his prestige. [His new buildings] did wonders for his practice in a commercial sense. After all, the International Style was well hated even by those who commissioned it. There were still others ready to go to considerable lengths not to have to deal with it in the first place. They were happy enough to find an architect with modernist credentials, even if they had lapsed. But in terms of his reputation within the fraternity, Stone was poison. He had removed himself from the court. He was out of the game.
Wolfe recalls an incident from the beginning of his own career as an architectural journalist:
> I can remember writing a piece for the magazine *Architecture Canada* in which I mentioned [heretical architect Eero] Saarinen in terms that indicated the man was worthy of study. I ran into one of New York’s best-known architectural writers at a party, and he took me aside for some fatherly advice.
>
> “I enjoyed your piece,” he said, “and I agreed with your point, in principle. But I have to tell you that you are only hurting your cause if you use Saarinen as an example. People just won’t take you seriously. I mean, *Saarinen* . . . “
>
> I wish there were some way I could convey the look on his face. It was that cross between a sneer and a shrug that the French are so good at, the look that says the subject is so *outre*, so *infra dig*, so *de la boue*, one can’t even spend time analyzing it without having some of the rubbish rub off.
Another anecdote, this time on hotel architect Morris Lapidus[3](#footnote-3):
> In 1970, Lapidus’ work was selected as the subject of an Architectural League of New York show and panel discussion entitled “Morris Lapidus: Architecture Of Joy”. Ordinarily this was an honor. In Lapidus’ case it was hard to say what it was. I was asked to be on the panel - probably, as I look back on it, with the hope that I might offer a “pop” perspective (This word, “pop”, had already come to be one of the curses of my life). The evening took on an uneasy, rather camp atmosphere - uneasy, because Lapidus himself had turned up in the audience. His work was being regarded not so much as architecture as a pop phenomenon, like Dick Tracy or the Busby Berkeley movies. I kept trying to put in my two cents’ worth about the general question of portraying American power, wealth, and exuberance in architectural form. I might as well have been talking about numerology in the Yucatan. The initial camp rush had passed, and the assembled architects began to give Lapidus’ work a predictable going-over. At the end, Lapidus himself stood up and said that the Soviets had once asked him to come to Russia and design some public housing and that they had been highly pleased with the results. Then he sat down. Nobody could quite figure it out, unless he was making a desperate claim of redeeming social significance . . . that might make him less radioactive.
### What Happened To It?
One of my pet peeves is that when I tell a classy person I don’t like modern architecture, they’ll correct me - “Oh, I’m sure you don’t like *Brutalism*. But it’s unfair to hold that against the whole area. Why, surely even *someone like you* can appreciate the unique beauty of a von Shmendenstein, a Dazervaglik, or a Mihokushino.” Then I sheepishly admit that I’ve never heard of any of those people, and maybe I was overly hasty, and I should have been more careful and done my homework. They pat me on the head and say it’s fine.
Then I’d go home and look it up and all those people’s buildings would be hideous.
Wolfe earns my affection by calling this out. He admits that c. 1970 modern architecture split into a dizzying variety of styles - but also, that those styles were all similar and bad.
By c. 1970, heretics in the style of Stone and Saarinen had mostly lost. How do you attack an invincible consensus? *By claiming to be even more orthodox than your fellows*. This was the insight of an architect named Robert Venturi, who spent most of his time writing incredibly erudite manifestos about how modern architecture wasn’t modern enough.
Wolfe ties this to the contemporaneous rise of pop art. Modern art and architecture were founded in the rejection of bourgeois notions of beauty, in favor of a faux-proletarian idea of simplicity and scientificness. But, Venturi pointed out, proletarians were kind hard to find in c. 1970 America. Grounding your class analysis in a non-existent proletariat seemed kind of out-of-touch, and so - perhaps - *bourgeois*. Who actually existed? The middle class. And what did the middle class like? Mass market consumer slop. Therefore, the true foundation of Art should be mass market consumer slop. Of course, since artists are superior to the middle class, it should be some sort of extremely complicated *reference to* mass market consumer slop which makes it clear that the artist themselves is infinitely above such things (but also, what if they *weren’t* above it, because they were so in-touch with normal people (but also, obviously they’re infinitely above it (but also, what if they *weren’t*))) . . . and so on. This tendency eventually became postmodernism with all its layers of irony and self-reference.
In architecture, postmodernism relaxed the constraint that every building had to be a box, in favor of buildings that were “playful” and tried to “undermine” traditional notions of form and shape:
Glass House Pavillion, by Philip Johnson
Groninger Museum, by Alessandro Menini
Postmodern buildings were allowed to include some traditional elements and ornamentation, but only to refer to them ironically, confuse people about them, or mock them.
Piazza d’Italia, New Orleans
Postmodern skyscrapers were still mostly ugly boxes - but with one weird feature, to show how playful they were being:
The Sony Building, the ur-example of a postmodern skyscraper. The hole punch at the top makes it “playful”.
Wolfe has a certain horrified admiration for Venturi. He thinks he was a master at going right up to the brink of heresy, jumping back before anyone could accuse him of anything, rushing back to the brink immediately, and cloaking his real opinions under so many layers of irony that nobody knew what to do with him. Since at this point architecture was mostly a manifesto game, and Venturi’s manifestos were cleverer than anyone else’s, he became a leader of the field:
> [His manifestos said] “I like complexity and contradiction in architecture. I do not like the incoherence or arbitrariness of incompetent architecture nor the precious intricacies of picturesqueness or expressionism.” Translation: I, like you, am against the *bourgeois* (pictureseque, precious, intricate, arbitrary, incoherent, and incompetent. Moreover, I, like you, have no interest in the merely eccentric (expressionism in the Saarinen or Mendelsohn manner). Venturi continues: “Instead, I speak of a complex and contradictory architecture based on the richness and ambiguity of modern experience, including that experience which is inherent in art.” This turns out to be the most important sentence in the book. *Including that experience which is inherent in art.*
>
> Translation: I, like you, am working here within these walls. I am still a member of the compound. Don’t worry, the complexities and contradictions I am going to show you, with their “messy vitality”, are not going to be drawn from the stupidities of the world outside (exception, occasionally, for playful effects) but from our own experience as progeny of the Silver Prince, from *that experience which is inherent in art:* namely, the esoteric lessons of Mies, [Le Corbusier], and Gropius concerning modern architecture itself. I am going to show you how to make architecture that will amuse, delight, enthrall other architects. This, then was the genius of Venturi. He brought modernism into its Scholastic age. Scholasticism in the Dark Ages was theology to test the subtlety of other theologians. Scholasticism in the twentieth century was architecture to test the sublimity of other architects.
>
> Not for a moment did Venturi dispute the underlying assumptions of modern architecture: namely, that it was to be *for the people*, that it should be *nonbourgeois* and have *no applied decoration*, that there was a *historical inevitability* to the forms that should be used, and that the architect, from his vantage point inside the compound, would decide what was best for the people and what they inevitably should have.
After Venturi opened the floodgates, a whole host of new schools arose, including:
**The Whites**, Le Corbusierian fundamentalists, named after their conviction that all buildings should be white:
A White building: City of Culture, Galicia, by Peter Eisenman
**The Grays**, followers of Venturi, named after their disagreement with the belief that all buildings should be white, and for sometimes creating gray buildings:
A Gray building: Wright Brothers National Memorial Visitor Center, by Romaldo Giurgola
**The Rationalists**, who thought that any architecture created while the bourgeois class existed was inherently bourgeois, and therefore architecture had to hearken back to forms that existed before the rise of capitalism in the 1700s - but strip them of ornamentation to the point that they looked exactly like modern buildings to the untrained eye. They were famous for calling every other style of architecture “immoral”:
A Rationalist building: Milan apartments, Aldo Rossi.
This was the height of the revolt against Modernism when Wolfe was writing in 1981; I can’t comment on what (no doubt amazing and brilliant) schools have arisen since then.
### What Should We Make Of All This?
Most books on modern art try to convince you that the Emperor’s clothes are splendid and made of the finest silks. I appreciate Wolfe’s commitment to not doing that here. He didn’t give an inch.
Still, I would like to read another book by someone equally talented who gives . . . well, exactly one inch. They don’t need to praise modern architecture’s beauty and brilliance - in fact, I would rather they didn’t. I want a book by someone who is overall skeptical, who at least has as a hypothesis “this is all an elite signaling game gone tragically wrong” - but who’s also willing to explain what the modern architects thought they were doing, in their own minds.
Wolfe does this only very occasionally, to mock them. He’ll show us a picture of some hideous concrete cube, and say that the architect thought he was “reinventing the idea of light” or something, and that all the other architects praised the building for reinventing the idea of light, and that the architect got a prestigious award for reinventing the idea of light. I would like to read a book by somebody who - while gently holding onto the possibility that it’s all balderdash - tells us what this architect meant by “reinventing the idea of light”, tries their best to help normal people grok it, and comes to a conclusion about whether light has indeed been reinvented. I haven’t found a book like this yet. Everyone either waxes rhapsodic about how amazing the light is, or dismisses the whole thing as trash.
Still, I only want this for my own edification. I think we can condemn modern architecture without it.
Whether or not there’s some sophisticated perspective from which modern architecture appears brilliant, most people don’t have that perspective. Polls show most people hate it and prefer the old stuff. A quick look at social media will confirm that most people hate it and prefer the old stuff. So who cares whether, if they got twenty years of training in the intricacies of how Venturi is subtly citing Gropius but also subtly undermining him, they would consider it really clever? They’re not going to get those twenty years of training! They have to walk past the building every day! I’m prepared to believe that the great modern buildings have (for example) solved structural support in some elegant and surprising way, or that their minimalist aesthetic does more with a tiny number of elements than people would have thought possible - but these shouldn’t be the most important selection criteria for buildings that shape how people view their communities and their lives.
Why should our entire built environment be optimized to amuse a sliver of one percent of the population, even granting that it amuses them very effectively? People mock kitsch art as “the kind of picture you’d put up at the dentist’s office”. But it serves this purpose fine. People don’t *want* to go to the dentist’s office and see a picture of the Virgin Mary in a vat of urine. You should keep the avant-garde stuff for the museums and let ordinary people living their ordinary life see normal pretty things.
So I think it’s fine to hate modern architecture. If someone else says it reinvents the idea of light, just tell them that’s really cool for the 1% of the population who notice it, but that the rest of the world deserves buildings they don’t hate.
Wolfe doesn’t chart a path to how things could improve, and lists many obstacles to change. My hope is AI + 3D printing. AI has already ensured that people with no artistic talent can produce the kind of images they want, rather than the kinds that tastemakers say are most tasteful. And it potentially sidesteps the problem of lost expertise. I look forward to a day when people can describe their dream buildings and technology can make it happen. I’ve seen a thousand utopias pictured on the covers of a thousand sci-fi books, and not one of them has been made of unadorned concrete boxes.
Until then, I think it’s useful just to call attention to the problem. People are bad at protesting when they think they’re the lone dissenter. If dissent becomes common knowledge, maybe those Selection Committees will go differently. Maybe when the businessmen or the community stakeholders say something, and the prestigious architect sneers at them and says “Oh, so you want it to be *picturesque*? You love *kitsch?* Do you go home to your *McMansion* every night*?”*, they will draw inspiration from a very wise meme format and answer:
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
I can’t help thinking of this as the adult male version of “Mooom, stop calling me Brittany, I already told you my new name is *Raven*!”
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Note nominative determinism
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
Ibid | Scott Alexander | 152282783 | Book Review: From Bauhaus To Our House | acx |
# Open Thread 358
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** ACX Grantee [ValueBase](https://techcrunch.com/2023/02/01/valuebase-backed-by-sam-altmans-hydrazine-raises-1-6-million-seed-round/), the Georgist land valuation company, is hiring software engineers to work on their valuation pipeline. Link to the application [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScmq5OfMjaOiqnFu024qNlyaz6eoo9-aEclubv2neuZK3cplQ/viewform). | Scott Alexander | 152449970 | Open Thread 358 | acx |
# Prison And Crime: Much More Than You Wanted To Know
Do longer prison sentences reduce crime?
It seems obvious that they should. Even if they don’t deter anyone, they at least keep criminals locked up where they can’t hurt law-abiding citizens. If, [as the studies suggest](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3969807/), 1% of people commit 63% of the crime, locking up that 1% should dramatically decrease crime rates regardless of whether it scares anyone else. And blue state soft-on-crime policies have been followed by increasing theft and disorder.
On the other hand, people in the field keep saying there’s no relationship. For example, criminal justice nonprofit Vera Institute says that [Research Shows That Long Prison Sentences Don’t Actually Improve Safety](https://www.vera.org/news/research-shows-that-long-prison-sentences-dont-actually-improve-safety). And this seems to be a common position; William Chambliss, one of the nation’s top criminologists, said in 1999 that “virtually everyone who studies or works in the criminal justice system agrees that putting people in prison is costly and ineffective.”
This essay is an attempt to figure out what’s going on, who’s right, whether prison works, and whether other things work better/worse than prison[1](#footnote-1).
### Everyone’s Favorite Part: The Definitional And Methodological Issues
I was able to find three really high-quality review articles on this topic:
1. [Nagin et al, 2009](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/599202). Written by a team of criminology and statistics professors. None of them appear to have any glaring biases or conflicts of interest.
2. [Berger et al, 2021](https://www.cjlf.org/publications/papers/SentenceRecidivism.pdf). Written by a team from the pro-tough-on-crime nonprofit Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. This was well written and tried hard to stay neutral, but I still interpret it as the pro-incarceration faction presenting their side of the case.
3. [Roodman 2017](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.10268). Written by a researcher at the effective altruist nonprofit Open Philanthropy Project, which was trying to determine [whether to continue to advocate](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/reasonable-doubt-a-new-look-at-whether-prison-growth-cuts-crime/) decarceration. They (Roodman’s bosses) had already started some advocacy, so Roodman admits he is at risk of a soft-on crime bias. This was extraordinarily well-written, and is one of the most careful meta-analyses I have seen on any topic - Roodman tried to get data from every study and replicate it himself and test all of the assumptions - but I am still interpreting it as the anti-incarceration faction presenting their side of the case.
Each of these reviews gets deep into the statistical weeds to bolster or discredit their favorite/least favorite studies, and in most cases I wasn’t able to have a strong opinion on who was right. My strategy was to use the pro-incarceration and anti-incarceration reviews to determine a sort of “Overton window” of what smart people thought they could get away with claiming. Then, if the window was very wide and I couldn’t figure out where I landed, I used the apparently-unbiased Nagin as a tiebreaker.
All three reviews separate the possible effects of long prison sentences into three bins:
1. **Deterrence.** Would-be-criminals can consider the severity of punishment before committing their crimes, and, if the punishment is too high, decide it’s not worth it.
2. **Incapacitation:** While criminals are in prison, they can’t commit more crimes (except within the prison walls; we ignore these for sake of simplicity). Longer sentences mean that non-prisoners get a longer time free from prisoners’ criminal activities.
3. **Aftereffects**[2](#footnote-2)**:** Once a criminal is released from prison, they either reoffend or don’t. Perhaps long prison sentences reduce reoffending, because the prisoners have had more time to be “scared straight” or “find God” or get connected to good social services. Or perhaps long prison sentences *increase* reoffending, because the prisoners have lost their outside social connections, formed new criminal social connections in prison (eg joined gangs), or just forgotten how to survive on the outside.
The earliest studies investigated these three effects through correlational studies: do states with longer sentences have less crime / less recidivism / etc ? These reviews all express skepticism about this method: it’s the old “correlation vs. causation” problem again. What if the causation is backwards, and more crime causes longer sentences (because high-crime states want to get tough and fight back)? Or what if they’re only linked through some third concept? For example, suppose all states are either generically tough-on-crime (with long sentences, more police, more social sanctions on criminals) or generically soft-on crime (short sentences, less police, etc). Then any part of the tough-on-crime package would confound all the others (eg if more police decreased crime, it would falsely look like longer sentences did).
In order to avoid these problems, all three reviews recommend experimental and quasi-experimental studies. We’ll look into the exact methodologies later, but typical papers would look at crime rates just before or after new sentencing laws were passed, or at very similar crimes which quirks of the sentencing regime punish very differently. Roodman and Nagin look *only* at experimental or quasi-experimental studies, whereas Berger sometimes carefully examines some of the better and more-carefully-controlled correlational evidence.
Let’s see how each one treats these three bins.
### Deterrence
Rational actors consider the costs and benefits of a strategy before acting; this model has been successfully applied to the decision to commit crime. Studying deterrence is complicated, and usually tries to tease out effects from the *certainty*, *swiftness*, and *severity* of punishment; here we’ll focus on severity.
A typical study here is [Helland and Tabarrok 2007](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40057307) (you may know Alex Tabarrok from Marginal Revolution). They looked at California’s famous Three Strikes law, which says that a criminal who has already committed two major crimes will automatically get a sentence of twenty years to life on their third.
This is potentially a good way to study deterrence, because one group of criminals (those with no strikes) will get a normal sentence for their next crime, but another (those with 2 strikes) will get a long sentence. So if long sentences have a strong deterrent effect, we expect the second group to commit far fewer minor crimes than the first.
It would be naive to jump straight to doing this study in the whole population, because people with multiple past “strikes” are more likely to be hardened criminals, and should be expected to offend more in the future. So H&T did something more complicated. They looked at criminals with one strike, plus a second crime that was on the border of being “major” enough to earn a second strike. Some had good luck at their trial, got their offense downgraded to a “minor” crime, and continued to only have one strike; others had bad luck, got their offense upgraded to a “major” crime, and earned a second strike. Now we have two groups with exactly equal criminal histories but different number of strikes! That means one group will be punished more severely for their next crime than the other. How much deterrent effect does this have?
They found that 48% of the one-strike group and 40% of the two-strikes group got arrested per year, a difference of 17%.
They re-ran their analysis with data from other states, and found the same pattern in Texas (the only other state with a three-strikes law) but not elsewhere. This reassured them that it’s a real effect of deterrence and not just an artifact.
Still, Helland and Tabarrok are not impressed by this result. Yes, we decreased crime by 17%. But it took an extraordinarily severe threat. The Three Strikes Law raised the expected sentence for a third crime from ~5 years to ~20 years, so each extra year in the threatened sentence decreased crime about 1%. If you think about this economically, it’s a bad deal; it takes $150,000 worth of incarceration costs to deter one crime, but the social cost per crime is (they say, citing another economics paper) about $34,000.
And most deterrence isn’t this strong. Only 4% of California crime is committed by offenders with two previous strikes, and there’s no political will to impose these kind of 20+ year sentences on first-time criminals. So most deterrence will look more like the Proposition 36 proposal we discussed last month, which increases shoplifting sentences from six months to three years. If we use H&T’s numbers (probably inappropriate since there may be nonlinear effects), we would expect that section of Prop 36 to deter crime by 2%.
There are two other considerations that might increase or decrease our estimate of deterrence.
**First**, how sure are we that the police caught all the crimes here? In general, only about 50% of violent crimes and 10% of property crimes are caught. Should we multiply these numbers by somewhere between 2-10x?
I think in this case the multiplier should be somewhat less. The subjects in this study were on parole or probation from their previous strike, so they were more likely to be monitored by police. And they’d already gotten caught twice, which suggests they’re either worse at crime than average, or operating in areas with better-than-average police coverage. Still, maybe we should multiply by, idk, 2-5x?
This won’t affect our percentages: we expect that arrests are some fixed proportion of offenses, so if a criminal gets caught 17% more often, they’re probably committing 17% more crimes (however many that is). But it might affect our estimate of the social costs of crime. Instead of saying that $150,000 worth of incarceration costs prevents $34,000 worth of crime, maybe we should say that it prevents $68,000 - $170,000 - which, at the higher end of the range, would be economically break-even.
**Second**, what kind of crimes are we deterring? Here Roodman, the anti-incarceration review, analyzes H&T’s data more thoroughly and finds that their effect is concentrated in the least severe crimes:
That is, overall crime decreased 17%. But violent crime decreased only 1.7% (not significant). The only crime where the decrease reached statistical significance was drug crime (31%).
Should we take this completely seriously and say that the Three Strikes Law only deterred drug crime? I’m not sure. The argument against is that drug crime was the most common category of crime in this sample, so it’s possible that the study was powered to detect decreases in drug crime but not in other categories. In favor of this interpretation, vehicle theft (a category sometimes found to be especially deterrable in other studies) went down 19%, similar to the overall headline number - it just didn’t reach statistical significance. But against this interpretation, larceny (minor robberies like shoplifting) went *up* 22%. This is obviously random noise, and it would be unfair to ignore the larceny result but count the (equally weak) vehicle theft result just because it agrees with our priors. I think when you average everything together, it really does look like the effect on everything except drugs is small.
Maybe it’s hard to deter violent crimes (because these are executed in a fit of passion), it’s hard to deter property crimes (because criminals need the money), but it’s easier to deter drug crimes (because people make more rational decisions about whether or not to use drugs)?
(How much do we care about drug crime? Tabarrok says somewhat, because drugs can be a “gateway crime” that gets people into the criminal lifestyle. Roodman says not much. It’s either personal use, which is mostly victimless, at least compared to other crimes. Or it’s dealing, which is demand-driven and almost impossible to stop through incarceration - if you lock up every member of Cartel A, that just creates a lucrative niche for Cartel B to step in and fill.)
So a pessimistic interpretation (which I find hard to avoid) is that an extra year added on to a prison sentence decreases drug crimes by 2%, and other crimes some unmeasurably-small amount that may or may not be literally zero.
I went into this one study in depth so you have an idea where these numbers are coming from, but here’s a broader survey of deterrence research:
* **[Ross 1982](https://books.google.com/books?id=pSCQAAAAMAAJ)** investigated the effects of some widely publicized laws that increased penalties for drunk driving. They found that it decreased drunk driving 66% (!) in the year the law came out, but this effect gradually faded to zero over the next three years. The most likely explanation is that the publicity around the new law got people excited, but nobody really knows the laws around drunk driving anyway (do you know what the range of sentences for DUI in your jurisdiction is?) and so once the excitement of “law is stricter now!” faded from memory, the law had no effect.
* **[Drago et al 2009](https://sci-hub.st/10.1086/599286)** investigated an Italian mass release of prisoners, where they were released with the caveat that if they were rearrested, they would have to serve not only the new sentence for the new crime, but the remainder of their original sentence too. This created a regime of very different punishments for the same crime; someone who was originally arrested for murder but released would have to serve a sentence for murder if (for example) they got caught shoplifting. They found that each extra month of a potential sentence decreased reoffending rates by 0.16 pp (1%) per month. This is on the high side of estimates, but in general we’ll find European studies find stronger effects from imprisonment than American studies; this is probably because Europe has lower incarceration rates in general and has yet to “pick the low hanging fruit”.
* **[Abrams 2012](https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=0e8c782cd6eb3382b2ab4517ed879473befa0b1d)** examined jurisdictions that passed laws that added “sentence enhancements” for gun crimes, under the theory that if gun crimes (but not non-gun crimes) decreased after the enhancements, that was probably a true deterrence effect. They found no impact from mandatory minimums, but “add-on” enhancements decreased gun robberies by 5-15% and gun assaults by 0-1%. These were heterogeneous laws, but it looks like typical gun add-ons are about ten years, so this once again looks like a 1% decrease per extra year of prison sentence, concentrated on the least severe crimes (ie robberies are less severe than assaults). Roodman reanalyzes this, finds some flaws in the data, and comes up with a lower estimate, but I’m going to nervously ignore this for now.
I think all four of these studies are consistent with an extra year tacked on to a prison sentence deterring crime by about 1%. All studies start with significant prison sentences, and don’t let us conclude that the same would be true with eg increasing a one day sentence to a year-and-a-day.
Helland and Drago et al both suggest that deterrence effects are concentrated upon the least severe crimes. I think this makes sense, since more severe crimes tend to be more driven by emotion or necessity.
Of our three reviews, Berger (pro-longer-sentences) concludes:
> There is considerable room for disagreement about deterrence, but the legitimate disagreement is about the magnitude and conditioning of the effect, not the existence. Arguments that punishments always deter and never deter are equally and oppositely wrong. Given that sanctions do have some deterrent effects, eliminating them altogether would produce some increase in crime. A policy argument for eliminating them would require justification that the elimination would produce benefits sufficient to offset the additional crimes.
Roodman (pro-shorter-sentences) concludes:
> We are left with little convincing evidence that at today’s margins in the US, increasing the frequency or length of sentences deters aggregate crime.
Nagin (neutral tiebreaker) says that he will not discuss it in his review since he wants to put it in a different paper, but having found the different paper, he concludes:
> My main conclusions are as follows: First, there is little evidence that increases in the length of already long prison sentences yield general deterrent effects that are sufficiently large to justify their social and economic costs. Such severity-based deterrence measures include “three strikes, you’re out,” life without the possibility of parole, and other laws that mandate lengthy prison sentences. I conclude, as have many prior reviews of deterrence research, that evidence in support of the deterrent effect of various measures of the certainty of punishment is far more convincing and consistent than for the severity of punishment.
My own conclusion after reading all three agrees with Nagin: deterrence effects exist but are quite small, probably too small to justify longer sentences on their own.
As we’re about to find out, incapacitation effects so dwarf deterrence effects that it’s not really worth debating the exact magnitude of the latter.
### Prelude To Incapacitation: Superoffenders
In a moment, we’ll look at studies addressing the effects of incapacitation. These studies will be hard to interpret. But before we get there, there’s an argument that this shouldn’t be hard at all. It should be very easy.
Crime follows a power law: just as a tiny number of billionaires hold much more wealth than thousands of ordinary people, so a tiny number of “superoffender” criminals commit more crime than thousands of ordinary people. A genre of article presents evidence for this, then implicitly asks: why can’t we just lock up the tiny number of superoffenders, greatly decreasing crime with only a small change in the incarceration rate?
So for example:
* [Cremieux](https://x.com/cremieuxrecueil/status/1664453761056505856) discusses a Swedish study showing that 1% of Swedes commit 63% of the violent crime.
* [Inquisitive Bird](https://inquisitivebird.xyz/p/when-few-do-great-harm) presents data from Durose and Antenangeli showing that the median US prisoner already had ten previous arrests.
* [The New York Times discusses](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/15/nyregion/shoplifting-arrests-nyc.html&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1732585942408331&usg=AOvVaw20ibByzJ-tijOf3155r6lv) how 327 individual shoplifters with 20+ arrests each are responsible for a third of the shoplifting in New York City!
* [Vollaard et al](https://sci-hub.st/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02522.x) in the Netherlands find that a ten-strikes law decreased crime 25%; the average person affected had 31 past convictions and plausibly committed >250 crimes per year.
So why isn’t crime easy to control just by locking up these few superoffenders? Let’s examine each example in turn:
**Why Can’t Sweden Cut Crime 57% With A Three Strikes Law?**
We saw above that 1% of Swedes commit 63% of violent crime in Sweden.
This itself tells us nothing - if we can’t identify that 1% beforehand, nothing can be done. But Cremieux continues the analysis and finds that this superviolent fraction is easily identified by their many past violent arrests:
A one-strike law (life in prison after one violent crime conviction) would cut almost 80% of violent crime in Sweden; a two-strikes law would cut 63%, and a three-strikes law would cut 57%. Even a ten-strikes law would still decrease violent crime by 20%!
So why doesn’t Sweden implement a three-strikes law?
Such a law would add 24,000 people to the Swedish prison system. But the current capacity of the Swedish prison system is only 10,000 people. So this would more than triple the size.
Suppose Sweden only had the resources to expand their prison system by 30%. According to this study, that would cut violent crime by 20%.
I don’t know, these still seem like okay deals to me. But they teach us a useful lesson: there aren’t giant gains to be had by just imprisoning “a few more people”, relative to the size of your existing prison system. Despite the existence of power laws, if you want large decreases in crime, you need large increases in incarceration.
**Why Didn’t The Three Strikes Law In California Massively Decrease Crime?**
The Swedish data suggested a “three strikes law” should cut crime by 57%. That’s Swedish, and only focuses on violent crime, but American data for all offenses seem to tell a similar story:
A large majority of prisoners - 80% - have been arrested more than three times[3](#footnote-3).
But in fact, when California passed a Three Strikes law, the decrease was modest:
In the five years following the passage of the law in 1994, crime dropped 33% in California compared to 26% in the rest of the country, meaning only 7% that you could optimistically attribute to Three Strikes. But most criminologists suggest that even this is an overestimate, and the true number is close to zero. See for example this graph, which shows that the counties which used Three Strikes the most had no greater decline in crime than the counties which used it least:
So we expected Three Strikes to decrease crime by 80%, but in fact it decreased it by 0-7%. Why?
Because California’s Three Strikes law was weaker than it sounds: it only applied to a small fraction of criminals with three convictions. Only a few of the most severe crimes (eg armed robberies) were considered “strikes”, and even then, there was a lot of leeway for lenient judges and prosecutors to downgrade charges. Even though ~80% of criminals had been arrested three times or more, only [1](https://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm)-[4](https://sci-hub.st/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40057307)% of criminals arrested in California were punished under the Three Strikes law.
Why can’t we have a real Three Strikes Law? For the same reason we saw in Sweden earlier. I can’t find any graphs of the US population broken down by number of past offenses, but we know that about [8% of Americans have at least one felony](https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population-with-felony-convictions/). Let’s say that about half of those have at least three felonies. That means a real Three Strikes law would require increasing the incarceration rate from its current 0.75% up to 4%, ie quintupling it. We’d need to build 6,000 new prisons and 10,000 new jails, locking up an additional 5-10 million people, and spending somewhere between $400 billion and $1 trillion per year (ie around the same as the entire military budget) on prison-related costs. This is light-years outside the Overton Window and I’ve never heard anyone seriously propose it.
Still, it *would* decrease crime by 80%.
Again, the lesson is that - despite power laws - small increases in incarceration cause small decreases in crime, and only very large increases in incarceration are capable of causing very large decreases in crime.
**Why** ***Did*** **A Ten Strikes Law In The Netherlands Massively Decrease Crime?**
Given the ambiguous results of three strikes in California, I was surprised to learn that a *ten-*strikes law in the Netherlands did reduce property crime by 25% ([Volaard et al](https://sci-hub.st/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02522.x)).
In 2001, the Dutch government passed a law allowing longer sentences for criminals with at least ten previous offense who were not good targets for rehabilitation (eg rejected or had already failed drug treatment). The law allowed judges to increase the typical sentence for petty theft (2 months) to a longer sentence (2 years). A quasi-experimental study found that property crime, though not violent crime, decreased by 25%. It’s not surprising that violent crime didn’t go down since the law was almost entirely deployed against thieves.
Vollaard found that the population affected was extremely criminal; they had an average of 31 past offenses, and on surveys they admitted to committing an average of 256 crimes per year (mostly shoplifting). Before the law was passed, they spent an average of four months per year in jail (probably 2 x 2 month sentences); afterwards, they spent two years in jail per crime.
It’s hardly surprising that imprisoning these people decreased crime. So why didn’t the California law do the same?
I think there are two reasons.
First, Europe imprisons far fewer people than any US state. The incarceration rate in the Netherlands is only an eighth that of California. The pre-ten-strikes-law Dutch penalty for shoplifting was two months; the equivalent California penalty alternates between six and thirty-six months depending on which set of propositions won the last election. Vollaard found that the ten strikes law had diminishing returns:
> On average, we find the benefits of the policy to exceed the costs by a large margin. We find the benefits to go down rapidly with a more intensive use of the law, however. The marginal crime-reducing effect of convicting another prolific offender to an enhanced prison sentence declines by some 25% when going from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the rate of application of the law during 2001–7. The benefits of the policy remained higher than the costs, however, even for the cities which used the law most intensively.
So I think it’s plausible that California was already much more punitive than the Netherlands even before the California Three Strikes Law was passed, and there were diminishing returns from becoming even more punitive than that.
Second, the California law only applied to certain serious crimes (eg armed robbery). People don’t commit these as often as shoplifting. The average person affected by the Dutch law shoplifted 256 times per year. Even the most energetic criminal would struggle to commit 256 armed robberies per year, and they would probably get killed (or murder a victim) long before reaching that point. So petty theft is longer-tailed than serious felonies, and it’s easier to decrease the petty theft rate by imprisoning the few worst shoplifters compared to decreasing the armed robbery rate by imprisoning the few worst armed robbers.
**Why Can’t We Just Incarcerate Those 327 Shoplifters In New York City?**
This time we just suck.
Remember, each of these shoplifters was arrested 20 times per year. So they can’t be going to prison in any substantial way. Even if they got a one-month sentence for each arrest, they’d run out of months to shoplift in after twelve!
So the question here isn’t “why are prison sentences for shoplifting so short”, but rather “why can’t New York City incarcerate repeat shoplifters at all?”
I’ll come back to this question later.
**What About El Salvador?**
They famously solved crime by more imprisonment - how?
By doing a lot of it. I said above that we might be able to decrease US crime rates by 80% if we quintupled our incarceration rate. Between 2014 and today, El Salvador quadrupled their incarceration rate:
([source](https://insightcrime.org/investigations/el-salvador-keeping-lid-on-prisons/))
They now have by far the highest incarceration rate in the world, 2-3x that of America (which is itself the [fifth highest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_incarceration_rate), after various dictatorships). How did they afford this? Through a combination of lots of funding, not being too picky about human rights and prison conditions, and not being too picky about whether the people they imprison were guilty of any specific crime or just kind of gang-adjacent.
As incarceration rate quadrupled, homicide went down by a factor of twenty:
We previously predicted a similar increase in incarceration would lead to an 80% decrease in crime in the US, but El Salvador got a *95%* decrease in crime. Why did they do so much better than our prediction? I think because they started with half our incarceration rate and ten times our murder rate. When you’re starting from someplace terrible, without any of the low-hanging fruit picked, it’s easy to make progress!
I can’t find good statistics on other crimes like theft, but the crappy statistics I find say it hasn’t budged ([1](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1464357/number-of-thefts-in-el-salvador/), [2](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1360383/most-common-crimes-el-salvador-by-type/)). Why not? Either my statistics are bad, or the gangs that the government cracked down on weren’t in the theft business.[4](#footnote-4)
### Incapacitation
Fine, so despite power laws there’s no way to easily solve crime just by imprisoning a small number of people. How much bang for the buck *do* we get by incapacitating criminals?
You would think this would be easy to figure out: just determine how many crimes the marginal prisoner commits per year. Then that’s how many crimes incapacitation prevents per year.
But although it’s easy to see how many times the marginal prisoner has been arrested, most crimes don’t result in arrest. How do you know how many crimes they *really* committed? Some bold scientists have tried asking them - giving prisoners surveys about their criminal histories - but obviously these should be greeted with heavy skepticism.
The method criminologists have settled on is to wait for big shocks to incarceration - big enough to affect the general crime rate - then see how much the crime rate goes up or down.
The best study here is probably [Levitt 1996](https://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/LevittTheEffectOfPrison1996.pdf) (you may know Steven Levitt from *Freakonomics)*. In the 1970s, US prisons were overcrowded. The ACLU argued the overcrowding was a rights violation - a form of “cruel and unusual punishment” - and sued a dozen states. They won all their lawsuits, and judges in all states said the government had to free prisoners until prison crowding returned to a non-cruel, usual level. So at a slightly different time in each state, many prisoners got released all at once. By examining the effects of this sudden release on the crime rate, we can determine how much crime the incarceration of those prisoners was preventing.
Levitt does a lot of fancy statistics, and Roodman reanalyzes with even more fancy statistics, but the good news is they both agree and get numbers somewhat contrary to Roodman’s biases, which make me trust them more. Each year of imprisoning the type of prisoner who got released under the ACLU lawsuits prevented 6 property crimes and 1 violent crime. This suggests the average criminal commits ~7 crimes per year, which I think matches well with the data above showing that the median prisoner has 10 past arrests and some have 30+.
Other studies on incapacitation, mostly taken from Roodman, that I trust less than Levitt:
* Owens (2009) investigated a Maryland law that caused some criminals to get released early. They found a crime increase corresponding to about 3 crimes per prisoner per year. This is lower than Levitt’s estimate of 7, but crime rates went down in general between Levitt’s study period (the 70s) and Owens’ (the 2000s), so they might both be right.
* Buonanno and Raphael (2013) investigate the same Italian mass pardon that we discussed earlier. They found a crime increase corresponding to about 18 crimes per year. This is higher than Levitt’s estimate of 7. But Italy has a lower incarceration rate than the US, potentially meaning that the average criminal they incarcerate is worse, so they still might both be right.
* Lofstrom and Raphael (2016) look at a California law that decreased prison overcrowding by releasing many inmates early. There is a lot of debate over this, but one common conclusion (also supported by Roodman’s reanalysis) is that it caused 3 crimes/prisoner/year, which is less than Levitt’s for probably the same reason as Owens.
All of these only measure reported crimes. A common rule of thumb is that only 40% of crimes get reported. Once we adjust for this effect, we estimate that the average criminal who gets released from prison commits between 7 (Owens, Lofstrom) and 17 (Levitt) crimes per year. I’ll be using the 7 number as the headline result later, since it’s backed by more studies and more recent[5](#footnote-5).
All studies agree that these are mostly smaller property crimes (eg shoplifting and car theft). This easily believable, since these are the large majority of all crimes in any situation.
I didn’t go too deep into this, incapacitation doesn’t have to mean prison. Some types of probation can be effective forms of incapacitation, especially if they involve (eg) GPS monitoring. A more comprehensive look at the costs vs. benefits of prison would go deeper into whether intensive probation is an acceptable substitute - something I’m not going to do here.
### Aftereffects
We examined deterrence - the effect of strict sentences on crime before imprisonment. We examined incapacitation - the effect of strict sentences on crime during imprisonment. Now we come to the effect of strict sentences on crime after imprisonment.
An optimistic school of thought hopes that stricter sentences will decrease crime after release. After all, the longer you’re in prison, the longer you have to be scared straight, or find God, or get rehabilitated.
A pessimistic school of thought suspects that stricter sentences will increase crime after release. I find this one more plausible[6](#footnote-6).
Take a moment to imagine how your own life would change if you spent ten years in prison. Seriously, spend a literal few seconds thinking about your specific, personal life.
Maybe when you get out of prison, you’ve long since lost your job and your house/apartment. Whatever career skills you once had are ten years obsolete - but it won’t matter, because your industry does background checks and won’t hire convicted felons. You can’t move to an area with better economic prospects, because you have to check in with your parole officer once a week.
Your partner has long since filed for divorce and is happily remarried to someone else. Your kids have long since moved on; if they remember your name at all, it’s as “that guy who was never there for us”. All of your friends have drifted away, forgotten you, or have nothing in common with you anymore.
You try to get food stamps, but (in some states) felons are banned from getting welfare. You try to get Section 8, but (in some states) felons are banned from getting public housing.[7](#footnote-7)
So what do you do? In prison, you probably met and talked with a wide variety of hardened criminals - shoplifters, burglars, bank robbers, drug dealers, counterfeiters - who told you stories about their lives and taught you tips of the trade. You might have joined a gang in prison, and they might have an outside-of-prison chapter willing to take care of members and get them set up with good positions in their criminal network.
Given a situation like this - no family or friends, no legal prospects, immersion in a social network of criminals, and good connections to the criminal lifestyle - it’s a miracle every time a new release *doesn’t* return to crime.
As usual, miracles are rare. The [data](https://bja.ojp.gov/news/justice-matters/desk-bja-november-2023) show that 43% of people released from prison are re-arrested within one year, and 82% within ten. But this on its own doesn’t tell us whether they were already destined to become serial criminals, or whether prison itself increased their likelihood of recidivism. We can divide this into two sub-questions:
* How does any prison term at all, as opposed to staying free, change one’s chance of being re-arrested?
* How does a longer prison term, as opposed to a shorter prison term, change one’s chance of being re-arrested?
Unfortunately, these will be the most difficult and controversial questions we’ve encountered thus far.
Even worse, we can’t escape answering them. If aftereffects are beneficial or neutral, then the beneficial effects of incapacitation win out, and prison is net good for preventing crime. Only if aftereffects are detrimental, and their magnitude is great enough to cancel out the benefits of incapacitation, can prison be net neutral or net negative for crime.
As far as I can tell, most criminologists are confused on this point. They’re going to claim that the sign of aftereffects is around zero, or hard to measure - then triumphantly announce that they’ve proven prison doesn’t prevent crime.
The only pro-shorter-sentences researcher who is actually thinking clearly about this is Roodman. He will argue that aftereffects are harmful, and that the best studies suggest their magnitude is around the same as the benefits of incapacitation - so that they more or less cancel out. His argument is logically valid, which tragically forces us to actually look at the evidence and see if he’s right.
**Question 1: How Does Any Prison Term At All Change The Chance Of Being Rearrested?**
The largest and most recent meta-analysis of this question is [Petrich (2021)](https://perma.cc/4ATJ-KY7Y). They analyze 116 studies and take a strong stand, saying:
> Beginning in the 1970s, the United States began an experiment in mass imprisonment. Supporters argued that harsh punishments such as imprisonment reduce crime by deterring inmates from reoffending. Skeptics argued that imprisonment may have a criminogenic effect. The skeptics were right. Previous narrative reviews and meta-analyses concluded that the overall effect of imprisonment is null. Based on a much larger meta-analysis of 116 studies, the current analysis shows that custodial sanctions have no effect on reoffending or slightly increase it when compared with the effects of noncustodial sanctions such as probation. This finding is robust regardless of variations in methodological rigor, types of sanctions examined, and sociodemographic characteristics of samples. All sophisticated assessments of the research have independently reached the same conclusion. The null effect of custodial compared with noncustodial sanctions is considered a “criminological fact.” Incarceration cannot be justified on the grounds it affords public safety by decreasing recidivism. Prisons are unlikely to reduce reoffending unless they can be transformed into people-changing institutions on the basis of available evidence on what works organizationally to reform offenders.
Again, Petrich seems to think that, having proven aftereffects “have no effect on reoffending or slightly increase it”, he’s triumphantly proven prison doesn’t work. But in order to really prove that, he’d have to demonstrate that aftereffects’ tendency to “slightly increase” reoffending is large enough to neutralize prison’s positive incapacitative effects. So let’s look further at the effect size.
The effect size statistic here is r, representing the correlation coefficient between a dummy variable where noncustodial sanctions are 0 and custodial sanctions are 1, and likelihood of reoffending. But later they give a better explanation, saying that:
> A mean correlation of approximately .080 translates into an 8 percentage point difference in reoffending between those sentenced to custodial and noncustodial sanctions (Bonta and Andrews 2017; see also Randolph and Edmondson 2005). Thus, assuming that 46 percent of the comparison (noncustodial) group reoffended, the percent reoffending in the custodial sanction group would be 54 percent.
How do we translate this into number of crimes? They don’t tell us, but here’s my extremely sketchy hand-wavey suggestion: let’s imagine this is recidivism rate over one year. We know that 43% of prisoners usually reoffend during this time, so if we believe these data, 35% of similar offenders who got noncustodial sanctions would. That means they offend about 20% less. Although we absolutely cannot do this and we’re assuming all sorts of completely false things about how distributions work, let’s imagine this means the average person in this category commits 20% fewer crimes. That would mean that, if prisoners commit 10 crimes/year after release, the same people, given a noncustodial sentence, would commit 8 crimes/year.
In order to neutralize the effect of one year imprisonment (-10 crimes), the negative effects of incarceration (+2 crimes/year) would have to continue for five years. But they probably won’t, because we know that most of these people get rearrested sooner than that anyway.
So I think that at this level, it’s hard to conclude that aftereffects cause more crime than incapacitation prevents.
What does Roodman - whose argument hinges on the claim that they do - say about this? He doesn’t separate out the custodial/noncustodial question from the sentence length question, so we’ll look at his arguments more in the next few sections.
**Question 2: How Do Long Vs. Short Prison Terms Change The Chance Of Being Rearrested?**
We’ll follow our usual pattern of looking at one study in depth and then racing through the others. Our deep study will be the [National Sentencing Commission’s report on Length Of Incarceration And Recidivism](https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2022/20220621_Recidivsm-SentLength.pdf), because it’s the most official-sounding. They examine 32,125 offenders and compare them to “matched control” offenders who got different sentence lengths to see which group reoffends more often. Here are their results (numbers represent how much more likely the group with longer sentences was to reoffend):
So we see that among prisoners with short sentences, longer sentences don’t significantly increase or decrease recidivism. If we’re willing to look at nonsignificant results, then in the shortest-sentence group (<3 years), increasing the sentence increases recidivism, zeroing out by about 5 years, and then as sentences get increasingly longer than five years, longer sentences = less recidivism.
I think this actually makes sense. A very short prison sentence (eg one day) doesn’t ruin your life. As the sentence lengthens, your life gets more and more ruined, as all the tragedies we talked about earlier - job loss, career obsolescence, partner divorce, friends drifting away, etc - start to come into play. But after five years, it maxes out - your life is as ruined as it can possibly get. So after that, increasing time in prison can only have positive effects (eg making you more convinced that crime is bad and that you don’t want another super-long prison sentence).
My only concern about this finding is age. All research agrees on the absolutely crucial role of [the age-crime curve](https://pinkerton.com/our-insights/blog/age-crime-curve):
People take various policy implications from this (maybe “life sentences” should end at 65, since incapacitation is unlikely to help much after that). But here we’re interested in its potential to confound studies. A 20 year old who gets 5 years in prison is released at 25 - still young! - but a 20 year old who gets 10 years in prison is released at 30 - too old to be leaping on rooftops and running from cops. The National Sentencing Commission understands this problem, and matches the experimental and control groups by age at release. But this introduces a new bias - now they’re different ages when they *start* committing crimes. Might a person who starts crime at 15 be a more disturbed and committed criminal than one who starts at 20? Seems plausible. I think this might be responsible for a lot of the seemingly positive effect of sentences > 5 years.
There are dozens of other studies on this topic, all hotly debated, so even in this part I’m only going to list a few highlights. Still, these are:
**[Green and Winik (2010)](https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/47621069/j.1745-9125.2010.00189.x20160729-18099-gavbcf-libre.pdf?1469800143=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DUSING_RANDOM_JUDGE_ASSIGNMENTS_TO_ESTIMA.pdf&Expires=1731930986&Signature=PvskdphX6XJz0HIxgnWDXAnPYvwIWCqDtCPt272-EgId2kqO8eHYgXS7ruDWXZ673SWhgnqfDZ9jm92xLOS8n3wXI3a7L2ryFW-yoewUn5Fjspoa6Tsu5ITp3T-wsvzdmXoQ0GwsjfHLO~EWGSpyuHDlc7rLtVASfUqttYX8fYtNv4Y8mPLjSbe8CcdgnbNAcLqcB~XUim0jxBl50Qgf4CVg9OyulOZluEsdbncNmKPK8EY1mVMzrTjZ0KaWZtHLY~SlcI4YwXGmAFBxLb0TB4DgRZX6sNU5CYIHjEBXABBVsj7qHJprhsXgsGAUN30cg0zod0Q~F8g9anjkY1Y56w__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA)**. They use random judge assignment, ie look at criminals with similar crimes who got lenient/strict judges and so shorter/longer sentences. They find that the total difference in rearrests is indistinguishable from zero. But the length of time in which they were measuring rearrests includes the time the offenders were in jail, so this is saying that incapacitation *plus* aftereffects was zero (plus or minus a margin of error), meaning that aftereffects must be detrimental and large enough to cancel out the benefits of incapacitation, just as Roodman claims.
But this study looked at minor crimes where sentences were measured in months, so I think this matches our previous suspicion that aftereffects might be detrimental in short sentences but neutral-to-beneficial in longer ones.
**[Roach and Schanzenbach (2015)](https://download.ssrn.com/15/12/10/ssrn_id2701549_code346044.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEML%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQC2rpqe6ZMIj3ynu2JnFv3nbsfKacIgpLZ6F20xHf8aggIgR8qCmOHrySSPEpRGiXsTIvAatoF1N8EnXNDdXYZu7tEqvgUIWxAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDIK00hJzADeYovK9uyqbBcPKmkO0z%2F%2B2EBLxsCfFltZdC0vSvjfrDvcVIxKfnOKokri2klcDDCG4KvzYsq988jJAcMncTzV3Vs5ZLHA8iXD1yKBieyH3go%2FoBZQxhsDu0AvdTcSJBm6Zvgysi6ZReQ1vrBrt4th8GkTN7aZrkJ4mC6SziX3lBy91Y4THtH8GeVjWyX1UQaBNJFBPXPlBA8lB5fn2EtKYx2G57Y8QqA5Xuj%2Fw0XJzqYiP71aU9%2FmWeXh%2BSS3WMCgRbRZw176waZCkt142QU8QFi8CxFb51zWyFElnSXJ0IOXv1IB8ZqKtqiZRXvOrsPF2XVHfGQNTIO8yxPIKtK1K1yb8%2Fatb3TzAxK8HHOCow0HACn7tAeaLKDMqjXRBF462UsROyq0Ymx4S4N9HQqppGyRIjLK1hfStN66zl5U3ZKs6feRW0ZDZoDP5FF1d3JGsL8wRRxlRj05GQ0ettWT5bdrmf2cQsvQY2AkU2HJqq%2B%2Fh1CdsUK3jKf%2FrH4vmaPCp1%2BnvNCFGF33FSsl6CKVjKIuJGW2rTEOkRWsWzwjNcB8pbeMHoqRluEg1ZYwITjK1t0Z88uTjuv4YWWSm37EiYe%2BSuErSErJ7yebFUCqA5sYOMqAj%2BuFYoywhme44iTwobGFxNIedXptMvGsaM3jSH%2BWCig6ZySNETj9fFEZH9kAyFSakFTNgTc507gxcuqwU3ns3OMOdDMHvNp4ryvpEIdAm1h97ezBymPm0J3A2zHugfiMM2dBRqdO4HDMxSSRf6tKTGDMnw2auS3pnHYyAXQ3S1O340oBokH8o7fL41e3rNfsTlU4mqDEow%2B1e0SCRgsJeph%2BklbLZqMKh6KhrOCdowMt3ASTr9a2rWKoK26pDBxiBehH1FK6j4LEUXREiQy4wn5fsuQY6sQGvrCAcVzt2t5%2F8mGVW3Fu96zpS6Fww8rSO6EI6Ij9YThdyZMrFbA61%2F83tsjqyDQRS5IMiory0ajYUO1BGXoSd8r873BS76KFkm96O6p%2B6WOHn8%2Bs58iE0dqWd73wEYQ7jiX9g0wTk%2BNP6DhXwcwQ1AGZArbE3z6s%2FohzK%2Brj2k19IS6uTgHqLUreHxylnwHuw1SUPDmwGQdQFM90jJH%2BEdQetRrc9DZp%2FfOTFx3lurrE%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20241118T105529Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEQPMBHVTF%2F20241118%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=c763959b3963b02a84252135deb3e49ccdcc55c15b7f5dafe53a72273062a1c4&abstractId=2701549)** More random judge assignment, this time in Seattle. They find that each month of longer sentence *decreases* future reoffending by one percentage point. Most of these sentences are short, so this contradicts our working theory that lengthening short sentences increases crime but lengthening long ones decreases it. Neither Berger nor Roodman really want to take this study too seriously; Berger objects that it’s an unusual study population (everyone entered a guilty plea), and Roodman objects that the judge selection might not have been truly random.
**[Rhodes (2018)](https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251410.pdf)** is a matching study - it artificially tries to create groups of prisoners who are as similar as possible except that one group got longer sentences. Its big advantage is that it has some people serving moderately long sentences (a few years), getting us out of the few-month range investigated by some of the other studies. It finds a mild *beneficial* effect of longer sentences:
> This study provides no evidence that an offender’s criminal trajectory is negatively affected – that is, that criminal behavior is accelerated – by the length of an offender’s prison term. If anything, longer prison terms modestly reduce rates of recidivism beyond what is attributable to incapacitation. This “treatment effect” of a longer period of incarceration is small. The three-year base rate of 20% recidivism is reduced to 18.7% when prison length of stay increases by an average of 5.4 months. We are inclined to characterize this as a benign, close to neutral effect on recidivism.
**What Do Our Experts Think?**
As mentioned above, these are only a few of the very many studies on this topic, and I’ve only given the briefest summary of each. Due to the complexity of this literature, I’m relying more than usual on the opinion of the expert reviewers.
Berger (pro-longer-sentences) says:
> Considering the rigorous research published since the Nagin et al. (2009) review, the literature regarding length of stay on recidivism is still somewhat inconsistent, with many studies claiming no recidivism effects and some showing that increased prison length reduces recidivism slightly. However, just like the rest of the research examined thus far, the study methodologies vary in terms of their limitations, which could explain some of the mixed results [...] At present, there is no substantial evidence that a criminogenic effect exists in the aggregate. Thus, it remains unclear whether criminogenic effects exist, and if so, under what circumstances...Among the substantial number of published studies with varying methodologies, not one has found a large aggregate-level criminogenic effect.
Roodman (pro-shorter-sentences) says:
> The preponderance of the evidence says that incarceration in the US increases crime post-release, and enough over the long run to offset incapacitation. A quartet of judge randomization studies (Green and Winik in Washington, DC; Loeffler in Chicago; Nagin and Snodgrass in Pennsylvania; Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang in Philadelphia and Miami) put the net of incapacitation and incarceration aftereffects at about zero. In parallel, Chen and Shapiro find that harsher prison conditions—making for incarceration that is harsher in quality rather than quantity—also increases recidivism. Gaes and Camp concur, though less convincingly because in their study harsher incarceration quality went hand in hand with lower incarceration quantity. Mueller-Smith sides with all these studies and goes farther, finding modest incapacitation and powerful, harmful aftereffects in Houston; but modest hints of randomization failure accompany those results.
>
> Some studies dissent from the majority view that incarceration is criminogenic. Roach and Schanzenbach find beneficial aftereffects in Seattle—a result that is also subject to some doubt about the quality of randomization. Bhuller et al. make a more compelling case that incarceration reduces crime after—in Norway. Berecochea and Jaman, one of the few truly randomized studies in this literature, also looks more likely right than wrong, and is also somewhat distant in its setting, early-1970s California. And there are the two Georgia studies, which upon reanalysis no longer point to beneficial aftereffects, but still do not demonstrate harmful ones either.
>
> Aftereffects must vary by place, time, and person. But the first-order generalization that best fits the credible evidence is that at the margin in the US today, aftereffects offset in the long run what incapacitation does in the short run.
Nagin (neutral, tie-breaker) says:
> Compared with noncustodial sanctions, incarceration appears to have a null or mildly criminogenic effect on future criminal behavior. This conclusion is not sufficiently firm to guide policy generally, though it casts doubt on claims that imprisonment has strong specific deterrent effects.
>
> What conclusions do we draw from these studies of the dose-response relationship between time served and reoffending? The one experimental study is suggestive of a preventive effect, but that effect may be attributable to incapacitation. Two of the matching studies point weakly to a criminogenic type dose-response relationship, but both are extremely dated. The Loughran et al. (2008) study suggests a possible criminogenic effect of placement but finds no linkage between time served and reoffending. We draw no conclusions from the results of the regression studies. Not only are results extremely varied, but more importantly all of the studies suffer from a fundamental analytical flaw. This flaw relates to the potential sensitivity of regression- based studies to specification errors in the model of the relationship of age and offending rate.
In other words: Berger and Nagin think evidence is weak and it’s kind of a wash and maybe there are slight criminogenic effects; Roodman thinks there are strong criminogenic effects that (on the current margin) are sizeable enough to approximately cancel out the benefit from incapacitation.
**So What’s Up With Roodman?**
At the risk of repeating myself: this is the question upon which this whole essay hinges.
Everyone agrees that the beneficial effects of deterrence are real but small.
Everyone agrees that the beneficial effects of incapacitation are real and large.
Everyone except Roodman agrees that aftereffects range from slightly beneficial to slightly detrimental, for a net effect of incarceration significantly decreasing crime.
Only Roodman says that aftereffects are large and detrimental, for a net effect of incarceration having no effect on crime.
So where does Roodman disagree with everyone else?
My impression is that the main difference is that Roodman gives more weight to certain judge selection studies. These find that being randomly assigned to a lenient vs. strict judge (and therefore on average getting a short vs. long sentence) doesn’t change rearrest rates after X years from the time the sentence started. This X year period includes both the time spent serving the sentence, and the time after release when aftereffects might materialize - ie they include both incapacitation and aftereffects. Since these studies fail to find any net effect, and incapacitation effects must be beneficial and large, Roodman concludes that aftereffects must be detrimental and large.
Then he reanalyzes several of the other studies that other people use to demonstrate no or beneficial aftereffects, and finds them less convincing after reanalysis.
So who is right?
Roodman gets his strongest evidence from studies of short sentences vs. shorter sentences (eg going from 0 to 1 years, or 1 to. 2 years). These are naturally where we would expect the fewest benefits from incapacitation. But they’re also where we would common-sensically expect the worst aftereffects. Someone going from zero prison to one year in prison has had their life, career, and relationships profoundly changed, in a way that someone going from ten years in prison to eleven years hasn’t.
This is consistent with the National Sentencing Commission study above. They found that aftereffects trended worse the shorter the sentences got, but didn’t investigate any sentences shorter than 2-3 years. If the trend continues, sentences shorter than that could have aftereffects > incapacitation.
So maybe Roodman is right about shorter sentences, and everyone else is right about longer sentences. Going from a month to a year in prison is so disruptive and criminogenic that it risks canceling the benefits of eleven extra months of incapacitation. But going from ten years to eleven years mostly just gives you the incapacitation.
### Marginal Revolution
This highlights a problem with all of these studies: we can only talk about particular margins.
Imagine a country which currently incarcerates zero people, trying to decide whether to move up to a policy of incarcerating *one* person. If you only incarcerate one person, it will be the baddest dude in the whole country. That guy really needs to be behind bars! And we’re not worried about turning him into a hardened criminal, because he’s already maximally bad. Here it’s obvious that benefits outweigh costs.
Now imagine a country which incarcerates 50% of its population, trying to decide whether to move up to 50% + 1. At this point, you’re imprisoning someone who went a few miles over the speed limit. You gain no benefits from incapacitation (he wasn’t going to commit any crimes anyway), but you stand to lose a lot from aftereffects (he’s probably a totally normal law-abiding citizen, so there’s a very high risk of ruining his life and turning him into a more hardened criminal). Here it’s obvious that costs outweigh benefits.
So the question isn’t “do the costs of prison outweigh benefits?”, but rather “at what point between incarcerating 0% and 50% of people does the cost of imprisoning one more person start outweighing the benefits?”, or even “at the current US incarceration rate of 0.75%, does the cost of imprisoning one more person outweigh the benefits?”
In some sense, this is what we’ve been investigating the whole time - all of these studies are being conducted at the current margin. But this hides big differences between them.
We’ve already seen that European studies get stronger results than American studies. That’s because European countries have incarceration rates of ~0.05%, compared to America’s ~0.75%. In theory, Europeans countries’ [incarceration rates are lower because they have less crime](https://x.com/cremieuxrecueil/status/1705283540420546814). But I notice that the European countries we’re talking about here all have high recent new immigrant populations, and in Europe these groups commit more crimes per person than natives. So it’s possible that Europe is still adjusting to being a high-crime continent, whereas America has already adjusted by raising incarceration rates. So one possible conclusion is that the benefits of incarceration strongly outweigh costs in Europe. I think this is clearly true by American values - we seem to care more about preventing crime, and be less horrified by imprisonment, than the average European.
But there are many different margins even within America. Louisiana’s incarceration rate is >1%; Massachusetts is <0.25%. Some of the variance reflects the criminality of each state’s population, but other variance reflects the values of each state’s voters and policy-makers. We haven’t been keeping great track of which state each of our studies comes from, but plausibly the marginal prisoner in Massachusetts is a badder dude than the marginal prisoner in Louisiana, and releasing him is more likely to have costs > benefits.
Margins also differ across eras. US incarceration ranged from 0.2% in 1970 to 0.95% in 2007 to about 0.75% today. Our studies cover this entire time period. This is probably why Levitt found stronger incapacitation effects (studying the 1970s) than Owens or Lofstrom+Raphael (studying the 2000s).
Finally, there are the margins across sentences we discussed earlier. Going from zero years in prison to one year is a bigger deal than going from ten to eleven.
When we examine our original question - does extending the average prisoner’s sentence for one year substantially decrease crime, we find that there’s no single answer - it depends where we are on all of these margins. Roodman’s skeptical position is most plausible for shorter sentences in high-incarceration areas, and Berger’s pro-prison position is most plausible for longer sentences in low-incarceration areas.
### So Why Do People Keep Saying That Prison Doesn’t Decrease Crime?
We began with the observation that criminologists tend to deny that prison decreases crime. We now know why Roodman thinks this: he idiosyncratically believes that aftereffects equal (and so cancel out) incapacitation. But nobody else has even gotten this far. So what’s everyone else’s position?
[The Vera Institute](https://www.vera.org/publications/for-the-record-prison-paradox-incarceration-not-safer) is an anti-incarceration think tank. They have a policy paper titled [The Incarceration Myth: More Incarceration Will Not Decrease Crime](https://vera-institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/for-the-record-prison-paradox-incarceration-not-safer/legacy_downloads/for-the-record-myth-of-mass-incarceration.pdf). It says:
> There is a very weak relationship between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates. Although studies differ somewhat, most of the literature shows that between 1980 and 2000, each 10 percent increase in incarceration rates was associated with just a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate.
This is just taking the (real, positive) effect of incarceration on crime, and calling it “very weak”.
> Research shows that each additional increase in incarceration rates will be associated with a smaller and smaller reduction in crime rates.
We saw above that this is true, but I find it annoying to mention here in this kind of advocacy context - it’s also true of everything else in the world! When the Vera Institute publishes anti-mass-incarceration white papers, the 500th white paper will be less influential than the first. If I claimed that “research showed” this, and so they should stop publishing anti-mass-incarceration white papers, they would look at me like I’d gone insane. Get a life.
> The weak association between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates applies almost entirely to property crime. Research consistently shows that higher incarceration rates are not associated with lower violent crime rates.
This is sort of true. Research finds a stronger effect of incarceration on property crimes than violent crimes, although Levitt does find a violent crime effect of minus one violent crime per incarceration-year. Partly this is because violent crimes are rarer than property crimes, and so studies are underpowered to find them. And partly it’s because most studies are done on mass releases of prisoners, where (for example) the state has to release 25% of the prison population to decrease overcrowding, but they get to choose which 25% - and states are smart enough not to release the murderers and psychos. Still, if Vera Institute’s preferred decarceration policy is also smart, then it won’t release the murderers and psychos either, and this point will stand.
So my interpretation of Vera Institute is that they’re making some good points about ways that incarceration isn’t an infinitely powerful cure-all, but that it’s deceptive to summarize them as “incarceration doesn’t decrease crime”.
What about other groups? Prison Policy Institute has [a list of “crime myths”](https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2024.html). Myth #7 is that “Harsh punishments deter crime, making us safer”. They write:
> Many people mistakenly believe that long sentences, paired with austere and even brutal prison conditions, will have a deterrent effect on crime. But research has consistently found that harsher sentences do not serve as effective “examples” that would prevent new people from committing serious crimes. In 2016, the National Institute of Justice summarized the research on deterrence, finding that prison sentences, and especially long sentences, do little to deter future crime
Here they’re using “deterrence” in the strict sense (that is, in a way that doesn’t count incapacitation), noting that it’s small, and rounding off “small” to “zero”.
I’ve looked at some other sites and think tanks that claim to have arguments against the “myth” that prison prevents crime, and they’re all using these same two tricks. Either they ignore incapacitation and focus only on deterrence + aftereffects. Or they imagine some hypothetical prison super-fan who believes that incapacitation is infinitely effective, prove that it’s less effective than this, declare victory over this fake opponent, and then summarize their win as “prison has no effect”.
### What Are The Costs Vs. Benefits Of Prison?
So a more honest version of the claim that “prison has no effect on crime” might be “the effect of prison on crime is weak”. How weak is it?
We already saw one way to answer this: it probably prevents on average 7 crimes/year (6 property + 1 violent), minus some amount, especially for short sentences, if you believe in criminogenic aftereffects. For the shortest sentences at the highest-incarceration margins, it’s possible for the effect to be zero or less.
Another way to answer is with elasticities. If we increase in incarceration rate 10%, how much crime do we prevent at the current margins? Levitt estimates 3%, [Cohen](https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/18613/chapter/7#140) finds 0.5-7%, and [Dhodnt](https://arpejournal.com/article/id/150/) finds -2% (ie prison *increases* crime) but this is an outlier.
[Spelman](https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/01/Gifford-71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-71-2019.pdf) writes:
> Our best estimate of elasticity is “in the neighborhood of [3% drop in crime per 10% increase in incarceration]” but “[a]ny figure between [2% and 4%] can be defended, and we should not be too surprised to find that the result is anywhere between [1% and 5%]”
This broadly agrees with our numbers from Sweden, California, and El Salvador above. Small increases in incarceration cause small decreases in crime. Large increases in incarceration cause large decreases in crime. If you doubled the incarceration rate, locking up an extra million people, then crime would decrease ~30% at current US margins (maybe less, because you’re shifting the margin and getting diminishing returns).
Would more prison be good or bad? We’d need to do a cost-benefit analysis. Surprisingly, Roodman does the best work here: after making his claim that costs and benefits mostly cancel out, he admits that most people won’t believe him, and tries to estimate the effect size in the “devil’s advocate” case where everyone else is right and he is wrong.
He starts with our previous finding that incapacitation prevents ~7 crimes a year, and returns to the incapacitation studies to see what types of crime are most affected. Then he adjusts for the low level of aftereffects that everyone else believes in. I’ve redone his results for clarity. This table shows the total number of each type of crime prevented by keeping the marginal prisoner in jail for one extra year:
Why does prison prevent negative robberies? Roodman is subtracting the small aftereffects found by other researchers, and the data for rare crimes is noisy, so probably this is just an artifact. I round this to zero for the full analysis.
If we’re trying to calculate the costs vs. benefits of imprisonment, we need to put a cost on all these crimes. This is hard to quantify - a robber may steal $100 worth of goods, but valuing his crime at $100 in costs ignores the disutility of (eg) living in fear
Roodman uses two methods: first, he values a crime at the average damages that courts award to victims, including emotional damages. Second, he values it at what people will pay - how much money would you accept to get assaulted one extra time in your life?
These estimates still exclude some intangible costs, like the cost of living in a crime-ridden community, but it’s the best we can do for now. Here are his answers (I’ve taken the geometric mean of the two methods):
So one extra year of incarcerating the marginal criminal saves society $44,000 in crimes prevented.
Now we add in the opposite side of the ledger: the costs of incarceration:
According to Roodman, the average prisoner costs the state $31,000 per year. He got his data from 2008, and it’s since ballooned to about $60,000, but we’ll keep his number so that everything is from the same time period.
(also, as always, California is more expensive - here it’s $120,000)
Roodman also adds in the costs to the prisoner. He uses some surveys to value the disutility of the suffering caused by a year in prison at $50,000; additionally, the prisoner loses about $16,000 in earning potential.
The end result: if you don’t count the costs to the prisoner themselves, and you don’t use the more modern number, and you’re not in an expensive state like California, then the marginal incarceration-year saves society about $13,000.
If you do count those things, or you’re in an expensive state, the costs far outweigh the benefits.
Realistically, most people won’t care about analyses like this. They’ll be more interested in the unquantifiable costs and benefits, including:
* The “benefit” of feeling like justice has been done and an evil deed has been avenged.
* The “cost” of becoming the type of person who puts their fellow humans in cages.
* The beneficial effects on [non-crime forms of public disorder](https://thecausalfallacy.com/p/its-time-to-talk-about-americas-disorder) - the prisoner can no longer litter or harass people on the subway.
* The cost of within-prison crimes. Even if you dismiss the suffering of a prisoner caused by prison itself (on the grounds that justice demands it), prisoners getting raped or shanked was not part of their sentence and should plausibly get counted on the debits side of the ledger.
* The cost to innocents. Nobody knows what percent of prisoners are innocent, but I have seen estimates from 2 - 5%. Even if you dismiss the suffering of a guilty prisoner, you probably don’t want to dismiss the suffering of an innocent one.
* The benefit from increased urban density. [Ben Southwood claims](https://www.bensouthwood.co.uk/p/how-crime-worsens-sprawl) that this may outweigh all other costs and benefits in the equation. His argument goes: when cities are crime-ridden, people move to the suburbs. The suburbs are less dense than cities, driving up housing costs and decreasing the [agglomeration effects](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joes.12543) crucial for technoeconomic progress. Therefore, crime [is responsible for](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/81/2/159/57121/Crime-Urban-Flight-and-the-Consequences-for-Cities) a significant portion of the housing crisis and of lost GDP from the Great Stagnation.
* The cost of imprisonment to families and communities - for example, now the prisoner’s children are without a father, the prisoner’s family is without a son/brother/etc, the prisoner’s corner store is without a customer, etc.
Although we can’t quantify these, pro-longer-sentencing people note that when you survey the poor minority communities most affected both by crime and by mass incarceration, they tend to say they want the government to be tougher on crime. This suggests that at least some of the unquantifiable benefits outweigh the unquantifiable costs.
Even if we’re not going to swallow the result whole, I think these kinds of analyses help us understand what we’re really getting per extra incarceration-year. For about $30,000 - $120,000 in imprisonment costs, we’re getting four fewer shopliftings, two fewer car thefts, and a small decrease in violent crime.
### Long Prison Sentences Are Probably One Of The Least Cost-Effective Ways To Reduce Crime
[This paper estimates](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28202/w28202.pdf) that an extra police officer prevents about 20 crimes per year. This is true prevention, not incapacitation (ie the officer’s presence deters criminals from acting, rather than catching them afterwards).
We previously said an extra year of incarceration averts 7 crimes. But the 20 crimes from police and 7 crimes from incarceration aren’t directly comparable, because the 20 is reported crimes and the 7 is total crimes. Only about 40% of crimes are reported, so we expect that the police officer really prevents about 50 total crimes.
A year in prison costs $60,000 (ignoring costs to the prisoner themselves). An extra police officer costs $150,000.
So prison prevents one crime per $8,500 spent, and police prevent one crime per $3,000 spent. This looks even better once we adjust for the moral cost of prison: the cop is three times as cost-effective *without* locking someone in a cage for a year!
### So What Do We Do About Shoplifting In California?
This post was somewhat motivated by [an earlier guest post on California’s Proposition 36](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-case-against-proposition-36), which argued that lengthening prison sentences for shoplifters wasn’t the right tool to fight shoplifting. The comment section was pretty hostile to this thesis and refused to believe it. Now that we know more, let’s look at this question again.
…and it’s not clear that anything we’ve learned bears on this question at all.
We said before that 327 shoplifters in New York City were responsible for a third of the city’s petty theft, and that each of them gets arrested twenty times per year. A similar group of Dutch offenders shoplifted 256 times per year.
Proposition 36 increased sentences for shoplifting from six months to three years. But it doesn’t seem like these shoplifters are getting six months *or* three years. It doesn’t seem like they’re even being arrested. If they are, they’re either being let off without penalty, or - at most - in jail for a few days.
So for me, the interesting question isn’t “should jail sentences be short or long?”, but rather why we can’t punish repeat shoplifters at all, with short sentences *or* long sentences.
I asked the comments section this question, and got some good responses from people with criminal justice experience:
Graham (ex-cop) [says](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-case-against-proposition-36/comment/74784509):
> Police have limited time and resources, they they focus - individually and at the department level - on the priorities that the voters and elected officials set for them. When elected officials say “the punishment for crime X is a stern talking to” the police get the message: crime X is not important. That’s why we don’t use undercover sting operations to apprehend jaywalkers.
>
> That is what has happened with theft in California. Police are not - and should not - waste time hunting down and arresting thieves who will be immediately released, which is the current regimes. For some reason the author thinks police should commit time and resources to arresting people who will not even be booked into jail and/or will be immediately released.
So apparently the police aren’t arresting these people because the attorneys aren’t punishing them. What do the attorneys have to say for themselves?
Andrew Esposito (ex public defender) [says](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-354/comment/75459624):
> [Graham] doesn't actually know what he is talking about.
>
> Evidence on this topic shows pretty clearly that arresting someone for misdemeanor larceny and then letting them go [actually does a good job of preventing them from shoplifting in the future](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28600/w28600.pdf). If the police are saying "what's the point of arresting because they'll just let them go" then they are severly mistaken. In addition, almost every state regime has escalating punishments based on records. This could look like a three strikes law (your third misdemeanor larceny conviction becomes a felony) or alternatively handled at sentencing, where a judge, when deciding what punishment is appropriate, chooses to give harsher sentences to those who have comitted the crime before. In either case, you still want to be arresting even first time offenders who will receive a slap on the wrist, because when you arrest them the second or third times they will no longer be wrist slapped, but locked up for increasingly long stints. In my own jurisidiction, first offense petit larcenies were handled with community service, second offense was a weekend in jail, third offense was 10 days in jail, and then after that you'd be looking at serious time on the order of months, and eventually years. It should be (possibly weak) evidence of the system working that the vast majority of the theft cases that came through our office were first time offenders, not career thieves. Once someone gets caught, arrested and has to go through a trial, it suddenly doesn't seem worth it to steal shirts from target, or a steak from Kroger. My personal take is you want a system where the chances of being caught are very high, but then the punishments are relatively modest (but high enough to make it not monetarily worth it to steal).
And CJW [says](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-355/comment/76659133):
> I was a municipal prosecutor for 10 years, a county one for 17, and a public defender for 4 […]
>
> In municipal court what would happen is they get a ticket, some cop has to write up a VERY brief probable cause affidavit but I would guess it still took an hour for the paperwork, I spend 5 minutes reviewing it and sign off on it. If the defendant doesn't show, they get a bench warrant, with a bond equal to the fine, say $200 first offense (plus cost of lost goods if not recovered). They get stopped for a ticket someday, and end up paying the bench warrant bond off to avoid jail, or they don't have that money in which case they sit in jail about a day before the municipal judge releases them because county jails don't have space to hold shoplifters for days and it costs like $40/day per inmate for the city to have them housed there. I would say only 1/100 cases would the defendant show up, demand a trial, and require me to get the loss prevention manager of Wal Mart to show up for night court.
>
> If it was a repeat offender, it might get referred to county, where the typical disposition might be 90 days jail suspended (it would be imposed only if they broke probation), with 2 yrs of unsupervised probation. Because I was both the municipal prosecutor and county prosecutor, I could actually control this a little and would cherry pick the cases out of municipal that I thought needed to go higher. (And sometimes in the other direction to cut somebody a break.) But if that had not been the case, there wouldn't be any coordination there and no rhyme or reason as to why some cases had a $200 fine and some had 2 yr bench probation period and real chance of jail.
>
> Over $750 it was a felony, which was a different matter. If a stealing victim was a private citizen these nearly always remained felonies. On a shoplifting, there was some chance it would get reduced to a misdemeanor. If property was unrecovered the person could make restitution in advance they had a better show of this.
>
> The reason mandatory jail doesn't work (and this applies to more than shoplifting) is that if you tell people they're going to jail, you have to give them a public defender. They are also less likely to want to plead guilty, and more likely to want a trial, or at least drag it out towards trial. In a regime where there is prosecutorial discretion, as I had, what will inevitably happen is that the state will face down an organized push from the local public defenders' office to set a bunch of shoplifting cases for jury trial. They know the state won't want to have those trials, and probably doesn't have the courtroom dates available to do so. And if you go ahead and call the bluff and try them, the odds are that the sentence the defendant gets won't be bad enough to deter this maneuver -- judges aren't supposed to increase sentences just because a guy chose to have a trial, so it's still unlikely he'd get more than whatever the mandatory minimum was set at. So the prosecutors will do the only remaining thing they can, which is amend the charge down to something that doesn't carry the mandatory minimum, thus allowing them to unclog the system.
Theodidactus [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prison-and-crime-much-more-than-you/comment/79073936):
> Hello. Criminal defense attorney here.
>
> As I said on a previous post of yours, I don't think the tough on crime crowd realizes how many resources the US system is \*obligated\* to spend in the case of a criminal prosecution (and you can't have jail or prison without a criminal prosecution).
>
> If you charge someone with shoplifting and insist on 30 days in jail, the defendant can obligate the system to provide
>
> - a lawyer
>
> - a jury of 6 (in minnesota) or 12 (if you're going to impose prison time)
>
> - a judge
>
> - a court reporter
>
> - a prosecutor
>
> - a cop witness
>
> ...several of these for multiple hearings (you'll appear before a judge using your lawyer several times in the course of a criminal case)
>
> additionally, that same defendant can obligate the \*victim\* to provide
>
> - footage of the incident
>
> - a store witness
>
> all for a $5 pack of hamburger patty (yes, I have seen a shoplifting trial on a $5 pack of hamburger patty)
>
> ...and at the end of all this, even if the conviction sticks, you still have to sell a judge on sending some poor guy to jail for \*thirty days\*. Not that it can't happen, but it's such an immense expense of time and effort for everyone involved that it's usually much easier to cut a deal.
I’m still not sure I understand what’s going on here, but it seems like there might be two problems:
1. City attorneys believe that the scare of getting arrested, plus or minus a warning or small penalty, is enough to deter many people[8](#footnote-8). They have research which seems to back this up. Based on the research, they don’t impose stricter penalties for first-time offenders. But cops don’t believe this research, and feel frustrated that their work is coming to nothing, so they stop arresting people at all.
2. There’s not enough justice system resources (public defenders, courtrooms, etc) to give shoplifters trials, so the prosecutors have no bargaining power, so they accept plea bargains for minimal punishment.
This makes sense, but I still don’t understand why New York can’t imprison its 327 chronic shoplifters. Even if most normal people get scared straight by an arrest and a warning, these 327 people are obviously not in that category. And even if the city has limited justice resources, surely these are exactly the people who you want to spend those limited resources on.
We found earlier that the deterrence effects of long sentences, relative to short sentences, were weak. But the deterrent effect of crime being illegal at all, as opposed to basically legal and not even resulting in arrest, is *very very strong*. Here’s Nagin, our token unbiased tie-breaker researcher:
> The evidence in support of the deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment is far more consistent than that for the severity of punishment. However, the evidence in support of certainty’s effect pertains almost exclusively to apprehension probability. Consequently, the more precise statement is that certainty of apprehension, not the severity of the ensuing legal consequence, is the more effective deterrent.
So I still think the push for longer prison sentences is a distraction. Instead we should be spending that money on getting more courts and public defenders so we can use the prisons we already have.
Nagin goes on to add:
> There is substantial evidence that increasing the visibility of the police by hiring more officers and allocating existing officers in ways that materially heighten the perceived risk of apprehension can deter crimes.
### Summary
* Long prison sentences can theoretically decrease crime through deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitory aftereffects.
* Deterrence effects are so weak that we might as well round them off to zero.
* Incapacitation effects are strong. The exact strength depends on how many people are already in prison, but a reasonable estimate at the current margin is that each prisoner-year prevents one violent crime and six property crimes.
* The magnitude of aftereffects are unclear, and probably range from slightly beneficial to detrimental depending on the population and length of prison term being studied.
* One contrarian researcher (Roodman) argues that aftereffects are so large that they approximately cancel out the benefits of incapacitation, and he has some reanalyzed studies that support his position. This is the only credible argument for why prisons wouldn’t decrease crime at all, but AFAIK only this one person believes it.
* Everyone else, when they say that prison “doesn’t decrease crime”, is either forgetting about incapacitation, or exaggerating their position that it’s a bad and not-so-effective way of decreasing crime.
* A more sober estimate is that a 10% increase in incarceration rates decreases crime rates by 3%.
* If you try to do a cost-benefit analysis of the marginal unit of extra incarceration, using only the easily quantifiable inputs, it ends up very slightly positive under the most generous possible assumptions (very weak aftereffects, cheap incarceration costs, zero consideration of effects on prisoners themselves) but negative otherwise.
* **Prison is less cost-effective than other methods of decreasing crime at most current margins. If people weren’t attracted by the emotional punch of how “tough-on-crime” it feels, they would probably want to divert justice system resources away from prisons into other things like police and courts.**
I’m putting this last one in bold because I don’t want people’s takeaway from this post to be “Aha, prison decreases crime after all, we should do much more of it!” I think prison has greater than zero effect, but that untargeted longer sentences aren’t the most effective or cost-effective solution to crime.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
Thanks to David Roodman, Cremieux Recueil, Clara Collier, and Philosophy Bear for comments on an earlier draft. I didn’t take all of their suggestions and remaining mistakes are mine alone.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
This is Roodman’s term - everyone else uses the less catchy “rehabilitation and criminogenic effects”. I prefer Roodman’s.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
I can’t find conviction data, but about 70% of arrests end in convictions, so I’m going to conflate these two endpoints in this section.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
More good writing on El Salvador from [Richard Hanania](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/the-invisible-graveyard-of-crime) (pro), [Philosophy Bear](https://philosophybear.substack.com/p/el-salvador-the-costs-and-benefits) (anti), and [Matt Lakeman](https://mattlakeman.org/2024/03/30/notes-on-el-salvador/) (just trying to figure out what’s going on)
[5](#footnote-anchor-5)
Technically I’ll be slightly conflating Levitt, Owens, and Lofstrom. O&L have more recent numbers, so I’ll stick with those. But some of my sources have good analysis of the distribution among crime types based on Levitt, so I’ll use those too, applied to O&L’s numbers.
[6](#footnote-anchor-6)
It’s a truism in criminology that rehabilitation never works, but hope springs eternal. [This study](https://sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/IGNITE_Mar29_2024%20%281%29.pdf) (h/t Cremieux) claims to have finally found a program with good effects (it’s education). But you can see how low the bar is from the title: “‘Something Works’ In US Jails”
[7](#footnote-anchor-7)
I recently learned another disadvantage ex-cons can face when looking for a job - in Virginia, people on probation can’t enter premises with a liquor license, which means that they can’t work in most restaurants.
[8](#footnote-anchor-8)
Is it plausible that mere arrest and a warning, without any stricter punishment, will deter someone? Here I think about a member of my extended family who used to shoplift occasionally as a tween in 1970s NYC. The family matriarch caught him, yelled at him, and he never did it again. I find it tempting to say “okay, but he was a middle-class Jewish 12-year-old with good parents, not some kind of hardened criminal”, but how many shoplifters are of one type vs. the other? | Scott Alexander | 151736411 | Prison And Crime: Much More Than You Wanted To Know | acx |
# Open Thread 357
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Message from Meetups Czar Skyler: there will be rationalist-community-associated Solstice Rituals in [various cities around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/nLYbjLcvedSZKFME3/secular-solstice-round-up-2024). And in New York, it will be associated with a three day “mega-meetup” [from December 13 - 16](https://rationalistmegameetup.com/).
**2:** [RIP Nikolas Doucet](https://www.fortressofdoors.com/memory-eternal-nikolas-doucet/), son of Lars Doucet, ACX guest blogger on Georgism. | Scott Alexander | 152137289 | Open Thread 357 | acx |
# Against The Generalized Anti-Caution Argument
Suppose something important will happen at a certain unknown point. As someone approaches that point, you might be tempted to warn that the thing will happen. If you’re being appropriately cautious, you’ll warn about it before it happens. Then your warning will be wrong. As things continue to progress, you may continue your warnings, and you’ll be wrong each time. Then people will laugh at you and dismiss your predictions, since you were always wrong before. Then the thing will happen and they’ll be unprepared.
Toy example: suppose you’re a doctor. Your patient wants to try a new experimental drug, 100 mg. You say “Don’t do it, we don’t know if it’s safe”. They do it anyway and it’s fine. You say “I guess 100 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.” They try 250 mg and it’s fine. You say “I guess 250 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.” They try 500 mg and it’s fine. You say “I guess 500 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.”
They say “Haha, as if I would listen to you! First you said it might not be safe at all, but you were wrong. Then you said it might not be safe at 250 mg, but you were wrong. Then you said it might not be safe at 500 mg, but you were wrong. At this point I know you’re a fraud! Stop lecturing me!” Then they try 1000 mg and they die.
The lesson is: “maybe this thing that will happen eventually will happen now” doesn’t count as a failed prediction.
I’ve noticed this in a few places recently.
**First**, in discussion of the Ukraine War, some people have worried that Putin will escalate (to tactical nukes? to WWIII?) if the US gives Ukraine too many new weapons. Lately there’s a genre of commentary ([1](https://x.com/slazorii/status/1859687729166164287), [2](https://x.com/FischerBieneMaj/status/1859689301027717500), [3](https://x.com/BoxNews11/status/1859674953077166416), [4](https://x.com/FlaiIsNotHere/status/1859567230628819032), [5](https://x.com/TheHarrisSultan/status/1859531995761504501), [6](https://x.com/jenbannink/status/1859514601861202246), [7](https://x.com/ukraine_map/status/1859478547854680366)) that says “Well, Putin didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine HIMARS. They didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine ATACMS. He didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine F-16s. So the people who believe Putin might start WWIII have been proven wrong, and we should escalate as much as possible.”
There’s obviously some level of escalation that would start WWIII (example: nuking Moscow). So we’re just debating where the line is. Since nobody (except Putin?) knows where the line is, it’s always reasonable to be cautious.
I don’t actually know anything about Ukraine, but a warning about HIMARS causing WWIII seems less like “this will definitely be what does it” and more like “there’s a 2% chance this is the straw that breaks the camel’s back”. Suppose we have two theories, Escalatory-Putin and Non-Escalatory-Putin. EP says that for each new weapon we give, there’s a 2% chance Putin launches a tactical nuke. NEP says there’s a 0% chance. If we start out with even odds on both theories, after three new weapons with no nukes, our odds should only go down to 48.5% - 51.5%.
(yes, this is another version of the [generalized argument against updating on dramatic events](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/congrats-to-polymarket-but-i-still))
**Second**, [I talked before about getting Biden’s dementia wrong](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/prediction-markets-suggest-replacing). My internal argument against him being demented was something like “They said he was demented in 2020, but he had a good debate and proved them wrong. They said he was demented in 2022, but he gave a good State Of The Union and proved them wrong. Now they’re saying he’s demented in 2024, but they’ve already discredited themselves, so who cares?”
I think this was broadly right about the Republican political machine, who was just throwing the same allegation out every election and seeing if it would stick. But regardless of the Republicans’ personal virtue, the odds of an old guy becoming newly demented each year is [about 4% per year](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8298619/). If it had been two years since I last paid attention to this question, there was an 8% chance it had happened while I wasn’t looking.
Like the other examples, dementia is something that happens eventually (this isn’t strictly true - some people reach their 100s without dementia - but I think it’s a fair idealized assumption that if someone survives long enough, then eventually their risk of cognitive decline becomes very high). It is reasonable to be worried about the President of the United States being demented - so reasonable that people will start raising the alarm about it being a possibility long before it happens. Even if some Republicans had ulterior motives for harping on it, plenty of smart, well-meaning people were also raising the alarm.
Here I failed by letting the multiple false alarms lull me into a false sense of security, where I figured the non-demented side had “won” the “argument”, rather than it being a constant problem we needed to stay vigilant for.
**Third**, this is obviously what’s going on with AI right now.
The SB1047 AI safety bill tried to monitor that any AI bigger than 10^25 FLOPs (ie a little bigger than the biggest existing AIs) had to be exhaustively tested for safety. Some people argued - the AI safety folks freaked out about how AIs of 10^23 FLOPs might be unsafe, but they turned out to be safe. Then they freaked out about how AIs of 10^24 FLOPs might be unsafe, but they turned out to be safe. Now they’re freaking out about AIs of 10^25 FLOPs! Haven’t we already figured out that they’re dumb and oversensitive?
No. I think of this as equivalent to the doctor who says “We haven’t confirmed that 100 mg of the experimental drug is safe”, then “I guess your foolhardy decision to ingest it anyway confirms 100 mg is safe, but we haven’t confirmed that 250 mg is safe, so don’t take that dose,” and so on up to the dose that kills the patient.
It would be surprising if AI *never* became dangerous - if, in 2500 AD, AI still can’t hack important systems, or help terrorists commit attacks or anything like that. So we’re arguing about when we reach that threshold. It’s true and important to say “well, we don’t know, so it might be worth checking whether the answer is right now.” It probably won’t be right now the first few times we check! But that doesn’t make caution retroactively stupid and unjustified, or mean it’s not worth checking the tenth time.
Can we take this insight too far? Suppose Penny Panic says “If you elect the Republicans, they’ll cancel elections and rule as dictators!” Then they elect Republicans and it doesn’t happen. The next election cycle: “If you elect the Republicans, they’ll cancel elections and rule as dictators!” Then they elect Republicans again and it still doesn’t happen. After her saying this every election cycle, and being wrong every election cycle, shouldn’t we stop treating her words as meaningful?
I think we have to be careful to distinguish this from the useful cases above. It’s not true that, each election, the chance of Republicans becoming dictators increases, until eventually it’s certain. This is different from our examples above:
* Eventually at some age, Castro has to die, and the chance gets higher the older he gets.
* Eventually at some dose, a drug has to be toxic ([even water is toxic at the right dose!](https://www.loyolamedicine.org/newsroom/blog-articles/athletes-drinking-too-much-water-can-be-fatal)), and the chance gets higher the higher you raise the dose.
* Eventually at some level of provocation, Putin has to respond, and the chance gets higher the more serious the provocations get.
* Eventually at some age, Biden is likely to get dementia, and the chance gets higher the older he gets.
* Eventually at some level of technological advance, AI has to be powerful, and the chance gets higher the further into the future you go.
But it’s not true that at some point the Republicans have to overthrow democracy, and the chance gets higher each election.
You should start with some fixed chance that the Republicans overthrow democracy per term (even if it’s 0.00001%). Then you shouldn’t change that number unless you get some new evidence. If Penny claims to have some special knowledge that the chance was higher than you thought, and you trust her, you might want to update to some higher number. Then, if she discredits herself by claiming very high chances of things that don’t happen, you might want to stop trusting her and downdate back to your original number.
You should do all of this in a Bayesian way, which means that if Penny gives a very low chance (eg 2% chance per term that the Republicans start a dictatorship) you should lose trust in her slowly, but if she gives a high chance (98% chance) you should lose trust in her quickly. Likewise, if your own previous estimate of dictatorship per administration was 0.00001%, then you should change it almost zero after a few good terms, but if it was 90%, then you should update it a lot.
(if you thought the chance was 0.00001%, and Penny thought it was 90%, and you previously thought you and Penny were about equally likely to be right and Aumann updated to 45%, then after three safe elections, you should update from 45% to 0.09%. On the other hand, if Penny thought the chance was 2%, you thought it was 2%, and your carefree friend thought it was 0.0001%, then after the same three safe elections, then you’re still only at 49-51 between you and your friend)
Compare this to the situation with Castro. Your probability that he dies in any given year should be the actuarial table. If some pundit says he’ll die immediately and gets proven wrong, you should go back to the actuarial table. If Castro seems to be in about average health for his age, nothing short of discovering the Fountain of Youth should make you update away from the actuarial table.
I worry that people aren’t starting with some kind of rapidly rising graph for Putin’s level of response to various provocations, for elderly politicians’ dementia risk per year (hey, isn’t Trump 78?), or for AI getting more powerful over time. I think you should start with a graph like that, and then you’ll be able to take warnings of caution for what they are - a reminder of a risk which is low-probability at any given time, but adds up to a high-probability eventually - rather than letting them toss your probability distribution around in random ways.
If you don’t do this, then “They said it would happen N years ago, they said it would happen N-1 years ago, they said it would happen N-2 years ago […] and it didn’t happen!” becomes a general argument against caution, one that you can always use to dismiss any warnings. Of course smart people who have your best interest in mind will warn you about a dangerous outcome before the moment when it is 100% guaranteed to happen! Don’t close off your ability to listen to them! | Scott Alexander | 152012786 | Against The Generalized Anti-Caution Argument | acx |
# How Did You Do On The AI Art Turing Test?
Last month, [I challenged](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ai-art-turing-test) 11,000 people to classify fifty pictures as either human art or AI-generated images.
I originally planned five human and five AI pictures in each of four styles: Renaissance, 19th Century, Abstract/Modern, and Digital, for a total of forty. After receiving many exceptionally good submissions from local AI artists, I fudged a little and made it fifty. The final set included paintings by Domenichino, Gauguin, Basquiat, and others, plus a host of digital artists and AI hobbyists.
One of these two pretty hillsides is by one of history’s greatest artists. The other is soulless AI slop. Can you tell which is which?
If you want to try the test yourself before seeing the answers, go [here](https://forms.gle/UFaHKWzDfpEiRqc6A). The form doesn't grade you, so before you press "submit" you should check your answers against [this key](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ai-art-turing-test/comment/72543686).
Last chance to take the test before seeing the results, which are:
…
…
…
### 1: Most People Had A Hard Time Identifying AI Art
Since there were two choices (human or AI), blind chance would produce a score of 50%, and perfect skill a score of 100%.
The median score on the test was 60%, only a little above chance. The mean was 60.6%. Participants said the task was harder than expected (median difficulty 4 on a 1-5 scale).
How meaningful is this? I tried to make the test as fair as possible by including only the best works from each category; on the human side, that meant taking prestigious works that had survived the test of time; on the AI side, it meant tossing the many submissions that had garbled text, misshapen hands, or some similar deformity. But this makes it unrepresentative of a world where many AI images will have these errors.
This lovely AI image (generated by Jack Galler) almost made it into the test, but I noticed at the last second that the kid had no thumb. Or is the thumb hidden? I’m not sure, but I didn’t want to make it too easy.
I also tried to pick human works with a minimum of "tells" that would reveal their humanity without requiring any subtle artistic discrimination. So I stayed away from text (non-garbled text would be a strong sign that a picture was human), complicated wrestling-like poses (AIs mostly can't do these and end up with limbs emerging from nowhere) and pop art (something about the clean lines and replicated images is a bad match for AI's abilities). Again, this makes the test unrepresentative of a world where some art does have these "tells".
Finally, I avoided most AI art in the DALL-E "house style", since everyone already knows this is AI - or in other similar styles that humans would have trouble replicating, maybe because they do too much with color and lighting, in a way that few human artists would have the talent or patience for.
I like this [picture](https://deepdreamgenerator.com/tags/freya). There’s nothing wrong with it. But somehow it’s obviously AI. If you asked me why, I’d say “something about the lighting”. But the lighting is good! I bet lots of human artists *wish* they could do lighting like this. So what’s going on? I don’t know, but I avoided pictures in this style.
It might be fairest to say that this test demonstrated that most people have a hard time identifying AI art based on subtle differences in style and quality. But in real life, there will usually be other factors of the type that this test deliberately excluded.
### 2: Most People Couldn’t Help Judging Art By Its Style
I warned test-takers that I included human and AI art in a variety of styles, and that they shouldn’t judge art as human just because it looked like an oil painting, or judge it as AI just because it looked like a digital image.
Respondents didn’t heed my warning. One reason for their poor performance was clumping of results by style (in reality, each style was near-evenly distributed across the two categories).
The “human bias” term indicates what percent of art in each category test-takers identified as human, normalized to a situation where the correct answer was always 50%. So in a 50-50 mix of AI and human 19th century art, they would incorrectly guess it was 75-25 human; in a 50-50 mix of digital art, they would incorrectly guess it was only 31% human.
Your instincts were worst for Impressionism; you identified every single Impressionist painting as human *except* the sole actually-human Impressionist work in the dataset (Paul Gauguin’s *Entrance To The Village Of Osny).*
An AI-generated Impressionist image.
Gauguin’s “Entrance to the Village of Osny”, which apparently looked more artificial than any of the actual AI-generated Impressionist pieces in the dataset.
Likewise, huge majorities voted that several human-generated digital images were by AIs:
Mitchell Stuart’s “Victorian Megaship”, which 84% of you thought was AI generated.
### 3: Most People Slightly Preferred AI Art To Human Art
I asked participants to pick their favorite picture of the fifty. The two best-liked pictures were both by AIs, as were 60% of the top ten.
This image (AI, generated by Jack Galler) was the best-loved in the competition.
Could this be an artifact of poorly chosen pictures? Most of the best-loved AI images were Impressionist; by chance, this category was somewhat AI-dominated in my dataset, so this could just reflect a love of Impressionist paintings (or a particular aptitude for AI in this area). But the human Impressionist painting I included (Entrance To The Village Of Osny, above) was actually quite unpopular. And if we remove all Impressionist paintings, then although humans reclaim the top two spots, an AI is still #3, and the machines still take 40% of the new top ten.
### 4: Even Many People Who Thought They Hated AI Art Preferred It
I asked participants their opinion of AI on a purely artistic level (that is, regardless of their opinion on social questions like whether it was unfairly plagiarizing human artists). They were split: 33% had a negative opinion, 24% neutral, and 43% positive.
The 1278 people who said they utterly loathed AI art (score of 1 on a 1-5 Likert scale) still preferred AI paintings to humans when they didn't know which were which (the #1 and #2 paintings most often selected as their favorite were still AI, as were 50% of their top ten).
These people aren't necessarily deluded; they might mean that they're frustrated wading through heaps of bad AI art, all drawn in an identical DALL-E house style, and this dataset of hand-curated AI art selected for stylistic diversity doesn't capture what bothers them.
### 5: But Others Might Genuinely Be On A Higher Plane Than The Rest Of Us
I asked a friend (who does digital art under the handle “Ilzo”) to beta-test an early version of the challenge. She wowed me with her ability to correctly identify AI pictures that I considered well-camouflaged. When we got to Piotr Binkowski’s ruined gateway - an AI picture I especially liked, but which she found especially slop-ish, I demanded she explain herself.
The gateway under discussion.
She said:
> When real pictures have details, the details have logic to them. I think of Ancient Gate being in the genre "superficially detailed, but all the details are bad and incoherent". The red and blue paint and blank stone feel like they're supposed to evoke worn-ness, but it's not clear what style this is supposed to be a worn-down version of. One gets the feeling that if all the paint were present it would look like a pile of shipping containers, if shipping containers were only made in two colors. It has ornaments, sort of, but they don't look like anything, or even a worn-down version of anything. There are matchy disks in the left, center, and right, except they're different sizes, different colors, and have neither "detail which parses as anything" nor stark smoothness. It has stuff that's vaguely evocative of Egyptian paintings if you didn't look carefully at all. The left column has a sort of door with a massive top-of-doorway-thingy over it. Why? Who knows? The right column doesn't, and you'd expect it to. Instead, the right column has 2.5 arches embossed into it that just kind of halfheartedly trail off. I'm not even sure how to describe the issues with the part a little above the door. It kind of sets a rhythm but then it gets distracted and breaks it. Are these semi-top protruding squares supposed to be red or blue? Ehh, whatever. Does the top border protrude the whole way? Ehh, mostly. Human artists have a secret technique, which is that if they don't know what all the details should be they get *vague*. And you can *tell* it's vague and you're not drawn to go "hmm, this looks interesting, oh wait it's terrible".
And later, after the discussion veered more philosophical:
> I think part of the problem with AI art is that it produces stuff non-artists think look good but which on close inspection looks terrible, and so it ends up turning search results that used to be good into sifting through terrible stuff. Imagine if everyone got the ability to create mostly nutritional adequate meals for like five cents, but they all were mediocre rehydrated powder with way too much sucralose or artificial grape flavor or such. And your friends start inviting you over to dinner parties way more often because it's so easy to deal with food now, but practically every time, they serve you sucralose protein shake. (Maybe they do so because they were used to almost never eating food? This isn't a perfect analogy.) Furthermore, imagine people calling this the future of food and saying chefs are obsolete. You'd probably be like "wow, I'm happy that you have easy access to food you enjoy, and it is convenient for me to use sometimes, but this is kind of driving me crazy". I feel like this is relevant to artist derangement over AI art, though of course a lot of it is economic anxiety and I'm a hobbyist who doesn't feel like a temporarily embarrassed professional and thus can't relate.
Her theory gets some support from the data. The average participant scored 60%, but people who hated AI art scored 64%, professional artists scored 66%, and people who were *both* professional artists *and* hated AI art scored 68%.
The highest score was 98% (49/50), which 5 out of 11,000 people achieved. Even with 11,000 people, getting scores this high by luck alone is near-impossible. I’m afraid I don’t know enough math to tease out the luck vs. skill contribution here and predict what score we should expect these people to get on a retest. But it feels pretty impressive.
So maybe some people hate AI because they have an artist's eye for small inadequacies and it drives them crazy.
### What Did We Learn About Art?
Alan Turing recommended that if 30% of humans couldn’t tell an AI from a human, the AI could be considered to have “passed” the Turing Test. By these standards, AI artists pass the test with room to spare; on average, 40% of humans mistook each AI picture for human.
What does this tell us about AI? Seems like they’re good at art. I’m more interested in what it tells us about *humans*.
Humans keep insisting that AI art is hideous slop. But also, when you peel off the labels, many of them can’t tell AI art from some of the greatest artists in history. I’ve tried to be as fair as possible to these people, proposing that maybe they’re just expressing frustration with the proliferation of the DALL-E house style. And maybe some really do have an amazing eye for tiny incongruous details.
But it also seems very human to venerate sophisticated prestigious people, and to pooh-pooh anything that feels too new or low-status or too easy for ordinary people to access - without either impulse connecting with the actual content of the painting in front of you.
Marcel Duchamp famously tried to put a urinal in an art museum to challenge people’s view of what art was. The administration rejected it, but Duchamp had the last laugh: in 2004, a survey of art professionals [judged it](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fountain_(Duchamp)#Legacy) the most influential artwork of the 20th century. Art, it seems, is most meaningful when it challenges our very concept of what art is.
By this standard, I submit that Sam Altman is the greatest artist of the 21st century.
.
.
.
Thanks to everyone who took the test. You can download a .xlsx file of the results (stripped of identifying details) [here](http://slatestarcodex.com/Stuff/aituringpublic.xlsx).
.
### Appendix: Attributions For Test Images
**1: Angel Woman**
Human. This is [“Living Saint Hazel”](https://www.reddit.com/r/ImaginaryWarhammer/comments/jk5hc7/living_saint_hazel_custom_commission_by_l_j_koh/) by LJ Koh, as seen at /r/ImaginaryWarhammer.
This was the picture that sparked the strongest disagreement, measured by the sum of people who said it was the most-certainly-human picture in the dataset plus the people who said it was the most-certainly-AI picture. Some of the people who got it right commented that it was from Warhammer and the uniforms had accurate Warhammer symbols - if I had realized this, I would have disqualified it, sorry.
**2: Saint In Mountains**
Human. This is [“St. Anthony Abbot Tempted By A Heap Of Gold”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Anthony_Abbot_Tempted_by_a_Heap_of_Gold), by the “Ozzervanza Master”, an unknown Italian Renaissance painter from around 1435. Apparently it used to have a heap of gold in the bottom corner tempting St. Anthony, but this was “scraped out”. If I had known that originally, I would have disqualified this one too, since it might spoil something uniquely human about the integrity of the composition.
**3: Blue Hair Anime Girl**
Human. This is [Hatsune Miku](https://www.zerochan.net/3532501), a “virtual idol” from the late 2000s/early 2010s.
**4: Girl In Field**
AI. This image was generated by Ryan Wise, an AI art hobbyist who reads ACX and responded to my request for good AI pictures.
**5: Double Starship**
Human. This is [“Malabar”](https://www.reddit.com/r/ImaginaryStarships/comments/1g21h7e/malabar_by_wojtek_kapusta/), by Wojtek Kapusta.
**6: Bright Jumble Woman**
AI, also by Ryan.
**7: Cherub**
AI. This one was generated by another ACX reader, [Jack Galler](https://x.com/gallerdude).
**8: Praying In Garden**
Human. This is [“Agony In The Garden”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agony_in_the_Garden_(Mantegna,_London)) by Andrea Mantenga, 1455.
**9: Tropical Garden**
Human. This is [“Garden”](https://www.artsy.net/artwork/david-hockney-garden-2018) by David Hockney. A very similar Hockney painting [sold](https://www.theyucatantimes.com/2021/10/christies-to-auction-david-hockneys-work-for-an-estimated-price-of-8-million-euros/) for $8 million in 2021.
**10: Ancient Gate**
AI. This is by Piotr Binkowski, a well-known AI art maker who posts his work [on his Twitter](https://x.com/piotrbinkowski).
**11: Green Hills**
AI. Another one by Jack.
**12: Bucolic Scene**
Human. This is [“Dover Plains”](https://americanart.si.edu/artwork/dover-plains-dutchess-county-new-york-7642) by Asher Durand, painted 1848. It depicts the Hudson Valley in New York.
**13: Anime Girl In Black**
AI. Sorry, I seem to have lost the original source on this one, let me know if it’s yours.
**14: Fancy Car**
Human. This is “[Ferrari Testarossa Neon Retrowave Synth](https://www.goodfon.com/rendering/wallpaper-ferrari-testarossa-ferrari-testarossa-neon-retrowave-synth-r.html)”, by Arslan Safiullin.
**15: Greek Temple**
Human. This is “[The Apotheosis Of Homer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apotheosis_of_Homer_(Ingres))”, by Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1827).
It's also the only one that was (sort of) a trick question: after I selected it for the dataset, I noticed it contained text. Normally that would be disqualifying (correct text is too obviously human). But the most prominent text is the “OMHP” on the temple, which spells “Homer” in Greek but is gibberish in English. I was curious how many people would judge a famous work of art to be AI-generated just because it had seemingly gibberish text on it; the answer was 60%.
**16: String Doll**
AI. This is [“Strings Come Alive”](https://creator.nightcafe.studio/creation/GyesAtcTkByeTnntC0Ej) by Nikko P at Nightcafe. This was the picture that people were most confident was AI (they were right).
**17: Angry Crosses**
AI. This is another one by Ryan.
**18: Rainbow Girl**
Human. This is [“Rainbow Hair”](https://www.deviantart.com/rjv-ilustracion/art/Rainbow-hair-934739043) by rjv-ilustracion.
**19: Creepy Skull**
Human. This is “Untitled (Skull)” by Jean-Michael Basquiat in 1981. A version of this painting [sold for](https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/19/529096175/at-110-5-million-basquiat-painting-becomes-priciest-work-ever-sold-by-a-u-s-arti) $110 million in 2017 and was “the priciest work ever sold by a US artist”.
**20: Leafy Lane**
AI. This is another one by Jack.
**21:** **Ice Princess**
AI. This is [“Snow Princess”](https://pixai.art/artwork/1711590348726222704?lang=de) by Ai Xi, seen at PixAI.
**22: Celestial Display**
Human. This is [“Five Minutes Of Silence”](https://www.deviantart.com/hangmoon/art/Five-minutes-of-silence-676043151) by Hangmoon, seen at DeviantArt. This was the top-rated human picture.
**23: Mother And Child**
AI. This is [“Ukrainian Madonna”](https://thelibertariancatholic.com/ai-creation-of-art-nouveau-mary-queen-of-heaven/), generated by TheLibertarianCatholic.
**24: Fractured Lady**
AI, another one by Ryan.
**25: Giant Ship**
Human. This is [Victorian Megaship](https://www.artstation.com/artwork/mzVo49) by Mitchell Stuart. This was the human picture that people got most wrong (ie were most likely to vote as AI).
**26: Muscular Man**
AI, another one by Ryan.
**27: Minaret Boat**
AI. This is [“Built For The Princess”](https://creator.nightcafe.studio/creation/9etGANoy57iZml5jEjmv) by Nikko P at Nightcafe.
**28: Purple Squares**
Human. This is [“Fire At Full Moon”](https://www.kingandmcgaw.com/prints/paul-klee/fire-at-full-moon-1933-427760#427760::border:50_frame:880229_glass:770007_media:1_mount:108644_mount-width:50_size:620,496) by Paul Klee, and is supposed to be a “Cubist style depiction of a night sky”.
**29: People Sitting**
Human. This is [“Tailor’s Workshop”](https://www.mbam.qc.ca/en/works/62729/) by Quiringh van Brekelenkam, 1660.
**30: Girl In White**
Human. This is [“Portrait of Charlotte du Val d'Ognes”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portrait_of_Charlotte_du_Val_d%27Ognes) by Marie-Denise Villers (1801). I messed up adding this to the test, so only about half of you saw it.
**31: Riverside Cafe**
AI, another one by Jack. This was the most popular picture in the dataset.
**32: Serene River**
Human. This is [“Banks Of The Oise At Auvers”](https://www.slam.org/collection/objects/49181/), by Charles-François Daubigny (1863)
**33: Turtle House**
AI. This is [“Mobile Home”](https://creator.nightcafe.studio/creation/8tovejem47HTeDv44dTJ), by Bellemia, seen on Nightcafe.
**34: Still Life**
AI, another one by Jack.
**35: Wounded Christ**
Human. This is [“The Mourning Of Christ”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giovanni_Girolamo_Savoldo) by Giovanni Girolamo Savoldo (1515). This was the picture that people were most confident was human (they were right), but a few people protested and said that the anatomy was so wrong that it must be AI-generated. Sorry, I guess Giovanni Girolamo Savoldo just wasn’t very good at anatomy. Maybe that’s why Michelangelo had to dissect all those corpses.
**36: White Blob**
Human. This is from [“Le Lezard aux Plumes d'Or”](https://www.nationalgalleries.org/art-and-artists/113686) by Joan Miro (1971).
**37: Weird Bird**
AI. This another one from Ryan. People say AI can’t invent new styles, but I’ve never seen any human make this exact type of weird bird.
**38: Ominous Ruin**
AI, Ryan again.
**39: Vague Figures**
Human. This is [“Blood Thicker Than Mud”](http://cecilybrown.com/untitled-blood-thicker-than-mud/), by Cecily Brown (2021)
**40: Dragon Lady**
AI. This is [“To Me, You’re Perfect”](https://creator.nightcafe.studio/creation/XY6uAJuIoOUTIMlQxOza) by Ria Hagane on Nightcafe, made with DALL-E3.
**41: White Flag**
Human. This is [“Meeting At Krizky”](https://www.muchafoundation.org/en/gallery/themes/theme/slav-epic/object/221) by Alphonse Mucha (1916). It is part of his *Slav Epic*, a series of paintings on the history of Eastern Europe, and depicts a meeting of the Hussite sect, whose attempts to found a sort of proto-Protestantism would spark the 15th-century Hussite Wars.
**42: Woman Unicorn**
Human. This is [“The Maiden And The Unicorn”](https://www.wga.hu/html_m/d/domenich/3/farnese.html) by Domenichino (1602)
**43: Rooftops**
AI. I managed to lose this one, sorry! If it’s yours, let me know and I’ll give you credit.
**44: Paris Scene**
AI, another one by Jack. This was the AI picture that people got most wrong (ie were most likely to vote as human).
**45: Pretty Lake**
AI, Jack again.
**46: Landing Craft**
AI, Ryan again. Ryan gave me lots of good sci-fi AI images, and I chose this one. People got it pretty easily, and I keep second-guessing myself and wondering if some of the others were better.
**47: Flailing Limbs**
Human. This is “Replacement Parts” by Kara Walker, who is considered among [The 25 Best Collage Artists In The World](https://www.contemporaryartissue.com/top-25-collage-artists-in-the-world-a-complete-survey/).
**48: Colorful Town**
Human. This is [“Entrance To The Village Of Osny”](https://collections.mfa.org/objects/33274) by Paul Gauguin, 1882.
**49: Mediterranean Town**
AI. Another one by Jack.
**50: Punk Robot**
AI. Another one by Ryan. | Scott Alexander | 151145038 | How Did You Do On The AI Art Turing Test? | acx |
# Open Thread 356
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Comments of the week, all on [the](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity) *[Rise Of Christianity](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity)* [review](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity): I originally said I was embarrassed to learn that early Christians opposed abortion, because I’d bought the liberal story that this was an artifact of 1970s Moral Majority politics. [But Stephen Saperstein Frug says](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity/comment/76815983) I was misunderstanding the story - *Catholics* have opposed abortion since forever, but *Protestants* didn’t care until the political realignments of the 1970s. And Ty Harding [corrects my misunderstanding of the concubinage issue](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity/comment/76908109) - Pope Callixtus didn’t try to sneak polygamy into Christianity, only to legitimize certain “lesser” types of monogamous marriage. And David Roman [backs the role of women in early Christianity](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity/comment/76793050).
**2:** I started my discussion of [the Early Christian strategy](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-early-christian-strategy) with the story of the TIT-FOR-TAT bot. But G2F4E6E7E8 on the subreddit says that [the science of game theory has moved on](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1gs4c4u/science_has_moved_on_from_the_titfortatgenerous/); TIT-FOR-TAT was defeated in certain evolution-like noisy prisoner dilemmas by a strategy called WIN-STAY LOSE-SHIFT:
> Why does Win-Stay, Lose-Shift win? In the simulations, it seems that at first, Tit-for-Tat establishes dominance just as the old story would lead you to expect. However, in a Tit-for-Tat world, generous Tit-for-Tat does better and eventually outcompetes. The agents slowly become more and more generous until a threshold is reached where defecting strategies outcompete them. Cooperation collapses and the cycle repeats over and over. It's eerily similar to the good times, weak men meme.
>
> What Win-Stay, Lose-Shift does is break the cycle. The key point is that Win-Stay, Lose-Shift is willing to exploit overly cooperative agents---(defect, cooperate) counts as a win after all! It therefore never allows the full cooperation step that inevitably collapses into defection. Indeed, once Win-Stay, Lose-Shift cooperation is established, it is stable long-term. One technical caveat is that pure Win-Stay, Lose-Shift isn't exactly what wins since depending on the exact relative payoffs, this can be outcompeted by pure defect. Instead, the dominant strategy is a version called prudent Win-Stay, Lose-Shift where (defect, defect) leads to a small chance of playing defect. The exact chance depends on the exact payoffs.
[Commenter bibliophile785 adds](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1gs4c4u/science_has_moved_on_from_the_titfortatgenerous/lxbks9b/) that this is also obsolete, and the very newest results are even more complicated - read the thread for more, and thanks for the correction / interesting information! | Scott Alexander | 151823561 | Open Thread 356 | acx |
# The Early Christian Strategy
**I.**
In 1980, game theorist Robert Axelrod ran a famous Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament.
He asked other game theorists to send in their best strategies in the form of “bots”, short pieces of code that took an opponent’s actions as input and returned one of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma outputs of COOPERATE or DEFECT. For example, you might have a bot that COOPERATES a random 80% of the time, but DEFECTS against another bot that plays DEFECT more than 20% of the time, except on the last round, where it always DEFECTS, or if its opponent plays DEFECT in response to COOPERATE.
In the “tournament”, each bot “encountered” other bots at random for a hundred rounds of Prisoners’ Dilemma; after all the bots had finished their matches, the strategy with the highest total utility won.
To everyone’s surprise, the winner was a super-simple strategy called TIT-FOR-TAT:
1. Always COOPERATE on the first move.
2. Then do whatever your opponent did last round.
This was so boring that Axelrod sponsored a second tournament specifically for strategies that could displace TIT-FOR-TAT. When the dust cleared, TIT-FOR-TAT *still* won - although some strategies could beat it in head-to-head matches, they did worst against *each other*, and when all the points were added up TIT-FOR-TAT remained on top.
In certain situations, this strategy is dominated by a slight variant, TIT-FOR-TAT-WITH-FORGIVENESS. That is, in situations where a bot can “make mistakes” (eg “my finger slipped”), two copies of TIT-FOR-TAT can get stuck in an eternal DEFECT-DEFECT equilibrium against each other; the forgiveness-enabled version will try cooperating again after a while to see if its opponent follows. Otherwise, it’s still state-of-the-art.
The tournament became famous because - well, you can see how you can sort of round it off to morality. In a wide world of people trying every sort of con, the winning strategy is to be nice to people who help you out and punish people who hurt you. But in some situations, it’s also worth forgiving someone who harmed you once to see if they’ve become a better person. I find the occasional claims to have successfully grounded morality in self-interest to be facile, but you can at least see where they’re coming from here. And pragmatically, this is good, common-sense advice.
For example, compare it to one of the losers in Axelrod’s tournament. COOPERATE-BOT always cooperates. A world full of COOPERATE-BOTS would be near-utopian. But add a single instance of its evil twin, DEFECT-BOT, and it folds immediately. A smart human player, too, will easily defeat COOPERATE-BOT: the human will start by testing its boundaries, find that it has none, and play DEFECT thereafter (whereas a human playing against TIT-FOR-TAT would soon learn not to mess with it). Again, all of this seems natural and common-sensical. Infinitely-trusting people, who will always be nice to everyone no matter what, are easily exploited by the first sociopath to come around. You don’t want to be a sociopath yourself, but prudence dictates being less-than-infinitely nice, and reserving your good nature for people who deserve it.
Reality is more complicated than a game theory tournament. In Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, everyone can either benefit you or harm you an equal amount. In the real world, we have edge cases like poor people, who haven’t done anything evil but may not be able to reciprocate your generosity. Does TIT-FOR-TAT help the poor? Stand up for the downtrodden? Care for the sick? Domain error; the question never comes up.
Still, even if you can’t solve every moral problem, it’s at least suggestive that, in those domains where the question comes up, you should be TIT-FOR-TAT and not COOPERATE-BOT.
This is why I’m so fascinated by the early Christians. They played the doomed COOPERATE-BOT strategy and took over the world.
**II.**
Matthew 5:
> You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you . . . If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that?
Talk is cheap, but *[The Rise Of Christianity](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-rise-of-christianity)* suggests the early Christians pulled it off. For example, even though pagan institutions would not help indigent Christians, Christians tried to give charity to Christian and pagan alike, even going so far as to help nurse pagans during the plague (when nursing a victim conferred a high risk of contagion and death). Even Emperor Julian, an enemy of Christianity, admitted it lived up to its own standards:
> When the poor happened to be neglected and overlooked by the priests, the impious Galileans observed this and devoted themselves to benevolence . . . [they] support not only their poor, but ours as well, [when] everyone can see that our people lack aid from us.”
In 1 Corinthians 6, Paul is asked whether it is acceptable for one Christian to pursue a lawsuit against another Christian in a pagan court. He answers:
> The very fact that you have lawsuits among you means you have been completely defeated already. Why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be cheated?
We get a similar picture from the stories of the martyrs. Many of them prayed for the Romans while the Romans were in the process of torturing and killing them; Polycarp even cooked them a meal.
If the Christians had merely been TIT-FOR-TAT, it would be easy to tell a story of their victory. The Roman Empire was corrupt and decadent to the core. People were looking for a community they could trust. Christianity offered access to a better class of friends who wouldn’t immediately rob or betray you when your guard was down. By providing a superior alternative to the low-trust pagan world, it was irresistible on a purely rational economic basis.
But this story sounds more worthy of the mystery cults. Mystery cults are a great structure for mutual aid; we see this today in groups like the Freemasons ([cf. Backscratcher Clubs](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/lifeboat-games-and-backscratchers)). Everybody knows who’s on the inside (and needs to be mutually aided) and who’s on the outside (and can be ignored). The initiatory structure holds off freeloaders and makes sure the people on the inside are of approximately equal rank (so that you get as many benefits as you give) and can be held accountable if they don’t contribute.
Since Christianity did better than the mystery cults, there must have been some reason that COOPERATE-BOT beat TIT-FOR-TAT in the particular environment of Roman religion, defying all normal game theoretic logic.
**III.**
Is this a consistent feature of COOPERATE-BOT strategies, or was it just luck?
This is hard to say, because in all normal cases it’s impossible to follow a COOPERATE-BOT strategy at scale and for any period of time.
Consider the Quakers, who gave it a better try than most. They were persecuted by the British and fled to America (is this kosher? it sort of seems like resisting evil). There they founded the colony of Pennsylvania, intended to be a utopia of pacifism and benevolence. They were very serious about this; history records many Quakers who were arrested or even killed rather than compromise their principles, and the British Crown seized Pennsylvania from the Quakers a few times because they wouldn’t make extremely cheap gestures like pay taxes or swear oaths.
But in the end, the Crown frog-boiled the Quakers into compliance. They promised to return self-government if the Quakers would budge an inch - in one compromise, if they agreed to pay taxes that could go to non-combat functions of the military. The Quakers [eventually agreed](https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/viewFile/23276/23045), and the British ratcheted up their demands the next time. Finally, in 1755, some Indians launched a major assault on Pennsylvania, and all the Quakers voluntarily resigned from government to let the non-Quaker Pennsylvanians (who by this time outnumbered them) conduct the war without restraint.
The Quakers performed better than most COOPERATE-BOTs. They stuck to their principles most of the time, and in the end their religion survived. But look deeper, and you see a gradual process of surrender to reality. First was the flight to America, an implicit admission that living was better than being martyred for the faith. Then came the various compromises; an implicit admission that getting to keep self-government while being 99% pure was better than being subjects while 100% pure. Finally, they gave up Pennsylvania itself rather than be wiped out, again choosing the practical option over martyrdom. My point isn’t to knock the Quakers, who may come in a close 2nd in “historical groups that stuck to their cooperative principles despite all odds” and were certainly more ethical than I am. My point is that even very committed groups of religious fanatics fail the non-violent COOPERATE-BOT strategy eventually.
Or maybe the ones who didn’t fail were wiped out? I hear good things about the Cathars, but we can’t know for sure because they were very thoroughly killed off - unrepentant to the last.
Are there any other groups who deserve mention in this section besides early Christians, Quakers, and Cathars? I think some German and Russian sects have tried similar strategies, though they mostly failed and I don’t know much about them.
Not exactly the same, but maybe rhyming: what about modern liberalism? To the monarchs and dictators of the past, free speech might seem kind of like COOPERATE-BOT in a limited domain: the idea that elites shouldn’t make any forceful/legal effort to protect their ideological and spiritual position must sound almost as crazy as them not making any forceful/legal effort to protect themselves if attacked, or to prevent themselves from getting cheated. It is, in some sense, a unilateral surrender in the war of ideas; fascists and communists will do their best to crush liberalism, but liberals cannot ban discussion of fascism or communism. The fact that this, too, has worked, makes me think early Christianity wasn’t just a one-off, but suggests some larger point.
**IV.**
Still, I don’t really know what it is. Here are some weak theories:
1. **Advertisement:** Being kind to outsiders is good PR and encourages those outsiders to join you. This effect is stronger than the corresponding disincentive (that they won’t get much better treatment than they’re getting already, and they will have to be nice to other outsiders in their turn).
2. **Selecting a moral elite:** The only people willing to put up with the COOPERATE-BOT strategy are hyperscrupulous saints. A movement that starts out with hyperscrupulous saints is naturally high-trust and admirable. The benefits of filtering for these people outweigh the obvious cost (namely, that most people won’t join your movement, or will burn out).
3. **Overwhelm downward adjustment:** If you assume all movements lie and downgrade their claims 90% out of cynicism, then a movement which merely portrays itself as helping members won’t even help members, but a movement which portrays itself as radiating universal love to all mankind might at least help its members.
4. **Eliminate transaction costs from means-testing:** In a typical [backscratchers club](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/lifeboat-games-and-backscratchers), most of the social mores evolve as ways to eliminate free-riders. If you explicitly accept free-riders, you can cut a lot of red tape and present a much more accepting environment.
5. **Maybe people are actually good:** Maybe the liberals are right about everything, and most human evil comes from misunderstanding + a sense of being excluded. If you’re so accepting of everybody that misunderstandings don’t matter, and you don’t exclude people, then people mostly don’t try to take advantage of you or give you trouble.
6. **Greater psychological appeal:** Maybe “be infinitely nice all the time” is more attractive and psychologically stable than “be nice in X, Y, Z circumstances”, and the sheer endorphin rush people get from letting their moral impulses run wild is so addictive that it outweighs the obvious cost.
7. **Greater heroic appeal:** Similar to the above. Historians of war have remarked that you don’t just inspire soldiers by saying “don’t worry, this campaign will be easy”. You can sometimes inspire them by saying that this will be the most difficult thing they’ve ever done, and it’s heroic for them to even consider such an enterprise. In the same way, maybe “give 1% more to the worthy poor” is boring, but “devote your entire life to loving everybody including your enemies” is shocking and heroic enough to excite a certain type of person.
8. **Something something limits of prediction:** It’s a truism that naive consequentialism *doesn’t actually have the best consequences*; for example, it may seem like a good idea to steal money and then give it to the poor, but (as SBF et al discovered) this ends up being good neither for you *nor* for the poor, since you eventually make a miscalculation, get discovered, turn people against you, turn people against your cause, etc. Even if you try really hard to make a clever plan rather than a dumb plan, you’ll eventually make a mistake and your clever plan will crash and burn. Therefore, even if you’re a deep-seated consequentialist, you should avoid *acting as* a consequentialist and instead follow normal-person morality. But maybe there’s a second, deeper layer to this insight. Maybe even following normal-person morality is trying too hard to be clever and galaxy-brained in a way that never works. Maybe, it too, collapses into counterproductivity after you make your first bad prediction. Maybe you should actually be following COOPERATE-BOT morality instead.
9. **Epiphenomenal:** COOPERATE-BOT isn’t really a good strategy, but is an unavoidable side effect of something else valuable. For example, maybe you couldn’t have Christians who loved God so much without having them be extremely loving and charitable people. The most dramatic version of this hypothesis is that God is real, and loving thy enemy is an epiphenomenon of following the actual Divine Law.
Do I really believe any of these?
I guess that question cashes out to “if you were involved in a movement, would you recommend COOPERATE-BOT as a strategy today?” The movements I’m actually involved in (rationalists, effective altruists) occasionally have slightly related debates. One of them involves PR: a pragmatist faction wants to stay away from hit-piece-writers, network with friendly journalists to ensure positive coverage, keep our best side forward, and de-emphasize (not deny or lie about) embarrassing bad sides. A COOPERATE-BOT faction thinks that’s what the Pharisees and tax collectors are doing, but that we’re trying to be more epistemically cooperative than everyone else and it’s our responsibility to just dump the exact contents of our brains out to anybody who asks us any question, without regard for the consequences.
There’s a parallel debate in charity funding. A pragmatist faction wants to make sure everything we fund is PR-friendly and won’t make everybody hate us or be incredibly embarrassing if it fails; a COOPERATE-BOT faction thinks we have a moral duty to fund the exact object-level highest-utility projects even if everyone will hate us for it and we’ll never get another penny of funding ever again. I wrote up an allegorical history of this conflict [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-prophet-and-caesars-wife). I lean towards the pragmatist side of most of these fights, if only because I’ve seen enough PR disasters to know that nobody gives you any slack for having stumbled into them only because of your exceptional moral purity.
But even without endorsing the full strategy, there’s a vibe there that I really like. Whenever I discuss moral issues, people in the comments section here will do the whole post-Christian Nietzschean thing: “If you admit moral obligations to people who can’t pay you back, aren’t you just cucked? Aren’t you unilaterally surrendering in this memetic war we’re in, destined to be replaced by civilizations/ideologies with more continence in limiting their altruism to useful people bound in bilateral contracts? Who the heck cares if some foreigner or animal is suffering? Isn’t that just pathological, a proof that you don’t have the steely will that it takes to survive?”
I admit these people’s position makes rational sense. But on the deepest level, I don’t believe it. There was [an old 2010s meme video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrzKT-dFUjE) about all the characters in all the comics and TV shows fighting, and in the end the one who came out on top was “Mr. Rogers, in a bloodstained sweater”. Human history is the cosmic version of that meme. After all the Vikings and steppe nomads and Spartans have had their way with each other, the leading ideology of the 21st century thus far appears to be a hyper-Christian bleeding-heart liberalism: COOPERATE-BOT in a bloodstained sweater. I don’t know why this keeps happening, but I wouldn’t count it out. | Scott Alexander | 151601267 | The Early Christian Strategy | acx |
# Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity
The rise of Christianity is a great puzzle. In 40 AD, there were maybe a thousand Christians. Their Messiah had just been executed, and they were on the wrong side of an intercontinental empire that had crushed all previous foes. By 400, there were forty million, and they were set to dominate the next millennium of Western history.
Imagine taking a time machine to the year 2300 AD, and everyone is Scientologist. The United States is >99% Scientologist. So is Latin America and most of Europe. The Middle East follows some heretical pseudo-Scientology that thinks L Ron Hubbard was a great prophet, but maybe not the *greatest* prophet.
This can only begin to capture how surprised the early Imperial Romans would be to learn of the triumph of Christianity. At least Scientology has a lot of money and a cut-throat recruitment arm! At least they fight back when you persecute them! *At least they seem to be in the game!*
Rodney Stark was a sociologist of religion. He started off studying cults, and got his big break when the first missionaries of the Unification Church (“Moonies”) in the US let him tag along and observe their activities. After a long and successful career in academia, he turned his attention to the greatest cult of all and wrote *[The Rise Of Christianity](https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Christianity-Marginal-Religious-Centuries/dp/0060677015?crid=9AXOJTWNNVK7&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.LksnZ6sY0kApT16Ap7I4njp3ex-MY4bVxhCg4SA6QcHYPiVsoMfS1RLq1K1DcgL8uml9BapGx8t6jVEhdpW5OOPYBpTnzNCZCAWj1ZTVqF0iyKAxvd5tIOHB3tBXbbiJAJ2WzqjzKl1jJWlxRfo1e-FP-R_n67z8-vUEaCIf_JK9BwTr11zdVO00McW4IzmCXTiWBr4PAiS4-kxu3bu76A7PXBHFAsILAw2oTWdQ1Sg.SV9unkvFRMkw8fBfm4bgiaCNHCR1I2agCizJdWrR_mk&dib_tag=se&keywords=rise+of+christianity&qid=1731290179&sprefix=rise+of+christianity%2Caps%2C271&sr=8-1)*. He spends much of it apologizing for not being a classical historian, but it’s fine - he’s obviously done his homework, and he hopes to bring a new, modern-religion-informed perspective to the ancient question.
So: how did early Christianity win?
### Slowly But Steadily
Previous authorities assumed Christianity spread through giant mass conversions, maybe fueled by miracles. Partly they thought this because the Biblical Book of Acts describes some of these. But partly they thought it because - how else do you go from a thousand people to forty million people in less than 400 years?
Stark answers: steady exponential growth.
Suppose you start with 1,000 Christians in 40 AD. It’s hard to number the first few centuries’ worth of early Christians - they’re too small to leave much evidence - but by 300 AD (before Constantine!) they’re a sizeable enough fraction of the empire that some historians have tentatively suggested a 10% population share. That would be about 6 million people.
From 1,000 to 6,000,000 in 260 years implies a 40% growth rate per decade. Stark finds this plausible, because it’s the same growth rate as the Mormons, 1880 - 1980 (if you look at the Mormons’ entire history since 1830, they actually grew a little *faster* than the early Christians!)
Instead of being forced to attribute the Christians’ growth to miracles, we can pin down a specific growth rate and find that it falls within the range of the most successful modern cults. Indeed, if we think of this as each existing Christian having to convert 0.4 new people, on average, per decade, it starts to sound downright do-able.
Still, how did the early Christians maintain this conversion rate over so many generations?
### Through The Social Graph
This is another of Stark’s findings from his work with the Moonies.
The first Moonie in America was a Korean missionary named Young Oon Kim, who arrived in 1959. Her first convert was her landlady. The next two were the landlady’s friends. Then came the landlady’s friends’ husbands and the landlady’s friends’ husbands’ co-workers. That was when Stark showed up. “At the time . . . I arrived to study them, the group had never succeeded in attracting a stranger.”
Stark theorized that “the only [people] who joined were those *whose interpersonal attachments to members overbalanced their attachments to nonmembers.”* I don’t think this can be literally correct - taken seriously, it implies that the second convert could have no other friends except the first, which would prevent her from spreading the religion further. But something like “your odds of converting are your number of Moonie friends, divided by your number of non-Moonie friends” seems to fit his evidence.
History confirms this story. Mohammed’s first convert was his wife, followed by his cousin, servant, and friend. Joseph Smith’s first converts were his brothers, friends, and lodgers. Indeed, in spite of the Mormons’ celebrated door-knocking campaign, their internal data shows that only one in a thousand door-knocks results in a conversion, but “when missionaries make their first contact with a person in the home of a Mormon friend or relative of that person, this results in conversion 50% of the time”. [1](#footnote-1)
This theory of social-graph-based-conversation was controversial when Stark proposed it, because if you ask cultists retrospectively, they’ll usually say they were awed by the beauty of the sacred teachings. But Stark says:
> I knew better, because we had met them well before they had learned to appreciate the doctrines, before they had learned how to testify to their faith, back when they were not seeking faith at all. Indeed, we could remember when most of them regarded the religious beliefs of their new set of friends as quite odd. I recall one who told me that he was puzzled that such nice people could get so worked up about “some guy in Korea” . . . Then, one day, he got worked up about this guy too.
### Through Jews And Weajoos
Jews were scattered across the Mediterranean even before the fall of the Temple. I don’t know why. We Jews tell ourselves that we left Israel only after the Romans kicked us out. But Stark cites plenty of historians who argue that no, it was well before that. Around the time of Christ, there were a million Jews in Israel and five million in the Diaspora, especially Alexandria, Antioch, Anatolia, and Rome.
What were these Jews’ spiritual lives like? Without hard evidence, Stark supposes they were marginal. Throughout history, Jews have succeeded at keeping the Law only within tight-knit communities. If you want to keep kosher, it helps to have everyone around you keeping kosher and a local kosher butcher. If you want to keep the Sabbath, it helps to have an *eruv* and a synagogue within walking distance. But even more than that, the Law is strange and complicated, and unless everyone around you follows it too, you are likely to slip.
Thus, when Jews were first emancipated and allowed to live among Gentiles in the 18th-19th centuries, a split emerged in the Jewish community. Those Jews who stayed in the ghettos and shtetls - or who founded new self-imposed-quasi-ghettos like Crown Heights - remained Orthodox. Those Jews who mingled with the Gentiles cast off the more difficult rules and became Reform. Only a sliver of Modern Orthodox remained in the middle, often with [abysmal attrition rates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off_the_derech).
Stark asks whether the first great intermingling of Jews and Gentiles had the same effect. While the Jews in Palestine stayed religious and laid the foundations for the Rabbinic Judaism of future centuries, the Jews in the Diaspora - did what? Presumably Hellenized into some sort of semi-assimilated proto-Reform movement. Although we have limited historical evidence about these Jews’ religious behavior, we know they spoke Greek and not Hebrew (otherwise why would they need the Septuagint?) and that many of them took Greek names.
Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic.
Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. [33% of American Buddhists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_Buddhist#Demographics) come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were [30% Jewish](https://jewsforjudaism.org/knowledge/articles/jews-at-risk) at one point! (they’re now down to 6%)
As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion.
The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts.
### Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything
We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage.
Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say.
By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one.
> In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus[2](#footnote-2) proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.”
The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children.
Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition.
Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common:
> Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.”
Christians followed the opposite of all these practices.
They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly *unprecedented*, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5:
> Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband.
The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots).
Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote:
> We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder.
The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things.
This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later.
But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes!
I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers.
Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth?
A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”!
### Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow
One thing Stark did *not* mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well.
Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says:
> [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men.
Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions:
> By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America.
But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical:
> The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”.
Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity.
Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference.
The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good.
Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3:
> Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives.
History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith.
But Ruxandro Teslo [has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman](https://www.writingruxandrabio.com/p/did-aristocratic-women-drive-the), who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is.
Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46?
Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons.
I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof.
### Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs
The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity.
[The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer](https://journal.thewalters.org/volume/77/note/morbid-gaze-spectator/), by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?)
Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community.
> Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers.
>
> Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked,
>
> *“It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’”*
>
> What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.”
>
> It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.”
>
> In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness.
I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap.
Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, [deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/21/18235136/vaccine-malaria-research-trials-volunteers). If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well.
### Because They Survived The Plagues
However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse.
Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper[3](#footnote-3). How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery:
> Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices…
>
> To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.”
>
> Packer[4](#footnote-4) (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.”
These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory.
Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime.
This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities.
How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds:
* It was conquered 11 times
* …and burned to the ground 4 times
* …and devastated by riots 6 times
* There were 8 earthquakes large enough that “nearly everything was destroyed”.
* …and 3 plagues large enough to kill at least a quarter of the population
* …and 5 “really serious” famines
…for an average of one catastrophe per fifteen years. The Romans rebuilt the city each time because it was strategically important.
Stark focuses on one of these disasters: plague. The Roman Empire suffered two major plagues during this era: the Antonine Plague of 165 AD and the Cyprian Plague of 251 AD . He theorizes that Christians made it through these plagues much better than pagans, gaining an additional population boost.
Time for some game theory: when a plague comes, you can either defect (flee / self-isolate / hide) or cooperate (altruistically try to help nurse other victims). An individual does better by defecting, but a community does better if all its members cooperate. Stark thinks the pagans defected and the Christians cooperated.
Here is Thucydides’ description of a plague in pagan Athens (admittedly ~500 years before the time we’re studying). People quickly got an instinctive proto-knowledge of how contagion worked, after which:
> [People] died with no one to look after them; indeed there were many houses in which all the inhabitants perished through lack of any attention…the bodies of the dying were heaped one on top of the other, and half-dead creatures could be seen staggering about in the streets or flocking around the fountains in their desire for water. The temples in which they took up their quarters were full of the dead bodies of people who had died inside them. For the catastrophe was so overwhelming that men, not knowing what would happen next to them, became indifferent to every rule of religion or law.
Compare the Christian writer Dionysius’s description of a plague afflicting his own community:
> Most of our brother Christians showed unbounded love and loyalty, never sparing themselves and thinking only of one another. Heedless of danger, they took charge of the sick, attending to their every need and ministering to them in Christ, and with them departed this life serenely happy, for they were infected by others with the disease, drawing on themselves the sickness of their neighbors and cheerfully accepting their pains. Many, in nursing and curing others, transferred their death to themselves and died in their stead. The best of our brothers lost their lives in this manner, a number of presbyters, deacons, and laymen winning high commendation so that death in this form, the result of great piety and strong faith, seems in every way the equal of martyrdom […]
>
> The heathen behaved in the very opposite way. At the first onset of the disease, they pushed the sufferers away and fled from their dearest, throwing them in the roads before they were dead and treated unburied corpses as dirt, hoping thereby to avert the spread and contagion of the fatal disease.
Could Dionysius be embellishing matters to make his friends look good and his enemies bad? Maybe, but:
> There was compelling evidence from pagan sources that this was characteristic Christian behavior. Thus, a century later, the emperor Julian launched a campaign to institute pagan charities in an effort to match the Christians. Julian complained in a letter to the high priest of Galatia in 362 that the pagans needed to equal the virtues of Christians, for recent Christian growth was caused by their “moral character, even if pretended,” and by their “benevolence toward strangers and care for the graves of the dead”. In a letter to another priest, Julian wrote, “I think that when the poor happened to be neglected and overlooked by the priests, the impious Galileans observed this and devoted themselves to benevolence.” And he also wrote, “The impious Galileans support not only their poor, but ours as well, everyone can see that our people lack aid from us.”
Did this matter? It might have! “Modern medical experts believe that conscientious nursing without any medications could cut the mortality rate by 2/3 or even more.”
(if this sounds implausible, keep in mind that “nursing” here includes things like “bringing water from the public well to bedridden people who are too weak to go out and get it themselves”.)
Stark believes that plagues helped the Christians in multiple ways:
1. The obvious way: 30% of pagans died during the plague, but only 10% of Christians, making Christians proportionally more of the population.
2. Altering the social graph. Remember, Stark believes that you convert to Christianity after your Christian friends outnumber your pagan friends. If all your pagan friends die, and none of your Christian friends do, this suddenly gets much easier!
3. Moral testimony: pagans saw their priests and institutions fail the moral test of helping others, while the Christians succeeded.
4. Even more direct moral testimony: many Christians nursed and helped their pagan neighbors; if you owed your life to the Christians, *and* all your pagan friends who could judge you were dead, it would be hard *not* to convert.
5. Supernatural testimony: if you didn’t understand the game theoretic logic above, then dramatically higher Christian survival rates might seem like God’s favor. Stark additionally speculates that since Christians didn’t flee the disease, they got it much earlier, therefore getting immunity much earlier and allowing them to walk through hospital corridors full of plague victims with apparent miraculous invincibility.
6. Search for meaning. In some cities, 50% of the population died. The survivors must have been shell-shocked and looking for some sort of meaning behind it all. Paganism had nothing for them - “sorry, we don’t do that kind of thing, would you like to hear another story about Zeus raping a woman and turning her into an animal?” Christians, who had wise words about how God tests the faithful and sometimes brings people to Heaven before their time, must have been a vastly superior alternative.
Putting all these factors together, Stark suggests that the Christian : pagan ratio at the end of a plague could have been almost twice what it was at the beginning.
He doesn’t do a similar analysis for all the other disasters that regularly afflicted a Roman city - the wars, earthquakes, fires, etc - but one can see how the same logic might apply.
### Because Jesus Is Lord
Are we allowed to consider this one?
Stark thinks of himself as attacking a scholarly consensus that you’re “not allowed” to consider the *content* of a religion when speculating about its growth.
This is a little ironic, because to us non-scholars, he himself seems pretty careful not to talk about content, or to talk about it only indirectly. It’s true that the content of Christianity includes opposition to birth control, and rights for women, and helping others during plague. But what about the *content* content? In his last chapter, Stark relaxes this self-imposed restriction and starts talking about Christ.
Paganism was framed as a business relationship with the gods. You performed the rites and sacrifices, they gave you supernatural aid. You didn’t have to *like* them any more than you liked your supply chain for any other commodity. *They* certainly didn’t like *you*! At its absolute most touchy-feely, paganism might posit a “special relationship” between a god and a city, like Athena and Athens. But even this maxxed out at the sort of relationship between a shopkeeper and a favorite recurring customer who he always remembered to greet by name.
Judaism did better. God has a sort of love-hate relationship with His people Israel, but at least there are clearly strong emotions involved. Still, Stark thinks it was Christianity that really pioneered the idea that God loves individuals. From that, everything else flows. You should love your fellow man (and nurse him during plague). You should love your children (and not commit infanticide or abortion). You should love God back (and be willing to die a martyr for Him). From God’s love flows naturally the promise of Heaven (instead of the shadowy semi-naturally-forming underworlds of the Greek and early Jews). Pagan priests were people who were *skilled* at the relevant rituals; Christian bishops/priests/deacons were people who *loved* God especially much. Aside from all the individual ways that Christian love provided an advantage, Stark thinks that paganism just couldn’t compete.
He flirts with the idea that Christianity, in some sense, invented goodness. Here’s the last page of the book:
> Perhaps above all else, Christianity brought a new conception of humanity to a world saturated with capricious cruelty and the vicarious love of death. Consider the account of the martyrdom of Perpetua. Here we learn the details of the long ordeal and gruesome death suffered by this tiny band of resolute Christians as they were attacked by wild beasts in front of a delighted crowd assembled in the arena. But we also learn that had the Christians all given in to the demand to sacrifice to the emperor, and thereby been spared, **someone else** would have been thrown to the animals. After all, these were games held in honor of the birthday of the emperor's young son. And whenever there were games, people had to die. Dozens of them, sometimes hundreds.
>
> Unlike the gladiators, who were often paid volunteers, those thrown to the wild animals were frequently condemned criminals, of whom it might be argued that they had earned their fates. But the issue here is not capital punishment, not even very cruel forms of capital punishment. The issue is spectacle-- or the throngs in the stadia, watching people torn and devoured by beasts or killed in armed combat was the ultimate spectator sport, worthy of a boy's birthday treat. It is difficult to comprehend the emotional life of such people.
>
> In any event, Christians condemned both the cruelties and the spectators. Thou shalt not kill, as Tertullian reminded his readers. And, as they gained ascendancy, Christians prohibited such "games." More important, Christians effectively promulgated a moral vision utterly incompatible with the casual cruelty of pagan custom.
>
> Finally, what Christianity gave to its converts was nothing less than their humanity. In this sense virtue **was** its own reward.
I appreciate this last chapter, because I’m not sure how much I buy the preceding ones. The first one, about exponential growth, is great, and it clarifies things a lot. But I could take or leave the rest.
The chapter about women doesn’t seem to be true, at least according to Salzman’s research. The one about fertility requires a lot of epicycles about the role of cities. The one about plague can at best explain a 4x increase in the Christian population (out of the overall 60,000x increase that needs explaining). The Jews can at best explain the first five million converts (leaving 35 million more to explain). These are each fascinating windows into the classical world. But they’re such small bites off of the overall mystery that it seems almost pointless to include them: if Christianity could increase 15,000x without the plagues, it hardly seems worth fighting to explain that last 4x increase.
All of this is compounded by the fact that Christianity spread equally gloriously in times and places without any of these factors. The first Christian missionary reached Scandinavia in 710 - by the twelfth century, the whole region was Christian. This is about the same timeline as Rome - but Scandinavian fertility was fine, Scandinavian women already had a decent number of rights, and there were no plagues. What about Germany? Britain? Ireland? Eastern Europe? Russia? Korea? Each of these places had their own idiosyncracies, each benefited from the knowledge that Christianity was already a great religion believed by other regional powers - but each did Christianize, as surely as Rome did. This doesn’t seem predestined. An observer in 600 AD would no more consider it inevitable that Norway would Christianize by 1100 than a modern observer would find it inevitable that Saudi Arabia will Christianize by 2500.
Likewise, the comparison of Christianity’s growth rate to that of Mormonism raises as many questions as it answers. Why is Mormonism so fast-growing? Probably not something something the Jews, or something something plagues. So why do we need to posit that for Christians? Sometimes religions just grow really fast. Why? Probably they’re good religions somehow.
The impression I get from many parts of this book is that the early Christians were closer to morally perfect (from a virtue ethics point of view) than any other historical group I can think of. It can’t be a coincidence that they were also among the most successful. And the few Mormons I’ve met were also exceptionally nice (even though in theory their religion is no more based on love than traditional Christianity).
Stark kind of tries to account for this. He says that religions spread through the social graph, so the friendlier you are, the better you do. But also, you want your religion to be a tight-knit community, and you definitely don’t want your members making so many heathen friends that they deconvert. Different religions find different places along the tradeoff curve. Classic cults (like Scientology) restrict members’ external connections, successfully gaining tight-knit-ness and protecting themselves against deconversion at the cost of curtailing their growth opportunities. Social movements like environmentalism are diffuse enough that everyone knows an environmentalist, but so loose-knit that they’re barely even a movement at all, and environmentalists frequently forget about the cause and go do something else. Somehow early Christianity (and Mormonism) found the exact sweet spot.
Now we can maybe reframe the “virtue and love” advantage. Because Christians were so good, they could interact with pagans without feeling any temptation to leave the faith (Christians were just better to know and have around than pagans). Because they were so kind, they could make friends and social connections quickly. Because they loved one another so deeply, they could have tight-knit communities even in the absence of the normal cultic ban on communicating with outsiders.
Is this all there is? I’m not sure. Also, talk about Jesus is cheap, but I still don’t understand how they managed to be so virtuous and loving, in a way that so few modern Christians (even the ones who really believe in Jesus) are. I’m not making the boring liberal complaint that Christians are hypocritical and evil, although of course many are. I’m making the equally-boring-but-hopefully-less-inflammatory complaint that many Christians are perfectly decent people, upstanding citizens - but don’t really seem like the type who would gladly die in a plague just so they could help nurse their worst enemy. I’m not complaining or blaming Christians for this - almost nobody is that person! I just wonder what the early Christians had which modern Christians have lost.
Maybe it was just selection effects? The kindest 1% of Romans became Christian, whereas later ~100% of people in Western countries were Christian and you had to operate the software on normal neurotypes? But this would imply a *very* different story of early Christian conversion than Stark gives us!
Or maybe it was persecution effects? Either persecution bled off the least committed X% of Christians, leaving only the hard-core believers behind - or something about proving themselves to a hostile world brought out the best in them?
How come there isn’t a carefully-selected, persecuted group of people today who are morality-maxxing and doing much better than regular society? Is it the Mormons? Seems kind of disappointing, I don’t know, I kind of expected more than that. Is it woke people? I realize this answer will be unpopular, but if you’re a white male than wokeness involves a lot of [self-abnegation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caecilia_gens#Caecilii_Metelli), which at least rhymes with Christian morality, and they sure did grow quickly. It is effective altruists? I was going to say we weren’t growing fast enough, but 40% per decade is actually a low bar and we probably clear it easily. Maybe all we have to do is keep it up another 260 years!
Or does this particular brand of morality-maxxing necessarily involve God? Stark treats God as a solution to game theory problems; everyone will do better if they cooperate, everyone wants to defect, so tell everyone that God demands cooperation and will punish defectors. Seems fair. But there are billions of people who believe in God today, and it barely seems to help them. There are so many people saying nice things about God and love, and so few morally-perfect early Christians.
The book speculated that the Antonine Plague - the one that killed 33% of Romans in 165 AD - was probably smallpox. A population’s first encounter with smallpox is inevitably horrible - just ask the Native Americans. 165 AD might have been when the disease first evolved, which explains why the Europeans suffered Native American level death rates.
Maybe we should think of early Christianity the same way - when the idea of love first struck a population without antibodies. If so, we may not see its like again.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
People sometimes accuse modern social movements like environmentalism, MAGA, wokeness, rationalism, etc of being cults, but AFAIK this rule doesn’t apply to them - most people in these movements get involved by stumbling across the philosophy online and finding that it rings true. It seems to me like these modern movements are more likely to make unique and interesting claims about the world that could attract or repel certain types of people - whereas most cults are pretty similar (this one guy is God, he commands you to chant a bunch and give him money, and here’s a holy book saying we want world peace). I wonder if this should actually be a counter to “cultishness” accusations - “We can’t be a cult, cults always spread through the social graph, but we learned about this movement from a blog!”
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Why does this guy have every character from the Cambridge Latin course in his name, one after another? I think the Caecilius of the course is from [the same noble family](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caecilia_gens#Caecilii_Metelli) as him, and they either actually reused names across families, or the course authors assumed that they did.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
Another source says 200 people per acre, which is “only” 6x denser. These numbers are for New York City as a whole - if we limit ourselves to Manhattan, Rome was only 2-3x as dense.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
Note nominative determinism! | Scott Alexander | 151440192 | Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity | acx |
# Open Thread 355
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** New subscribers-only post, [Game Theory Of Michigan Muslims](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/game-theory-of-michigan-muslims), about when you should vote for a worse candidate to punish a better candidate.
**2:** ~~Comments on~~ things related to last week’s [Polymarket post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/congrats-to-polymarket-but-i-still): Michael Wiebe [argues that Theo the French whale’s contrarian polling take was based on a simple misunderstanding of how to read polls](https://x.com/michael_wiebe/status/1854963949407813742) (I stand by my claim that a single success demonstrates almost nothing about the trustworthiness of the underlying process). And Alex Tabarrok [says more about why this was a big victory for prediction markets](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2024/11/prediction-markets-for-the-win.html).
**3:** More responses to responses on the California shoplifting policing situation, [this time from a former public defender](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-354/comment/75459624). I continue to be confused where in the system the decision not to arrest shoplifters is happening and why, and continue to welcome more informed analysis of this.
**4:** I think of the Open Thread as a place for asking questions, proposing ideas, and having semi-structured discussion. If you’re going to do something else, don’t do it regularly, and try to be at least kind of coy about it. In particular, don’t advertise your blog more than once every six months, and try to frame it as discussion (“here’s an issue I’ve been thinking about, here’s a paragraph of so of analysis, you can read my blog for more”) and not just a raw link. Same if you’re going to drop what is basically a whole blog post as an OT comment.
**5:** I’ll post the AI Art Turing Test results either this week or next, sorry for the delay. | Scott Alexander | 151501044 | Open Thread 355 | acx |
# Game Theory Of Michigan Muslims
*(this post was written before the election, but nothing in it changes based on the result)*
Mentioned before: a group of Muslims in Michigan are backing Trump because they’re mad at the Biden/Harris administration for supporting Israel. They understand that Trump supports Israel even more. They just worry that if they always vote straight Democrat like every other minority group, the Democrats have no incentive to listen to them. They hope that if they elect Trump, even if he doesn’t listen to them, then the Democrats will work harder to woo them next time around.
What do we make of this?
On the one hand, it makes sense that admitting “I am forced to vote for you, whether you address my concerns or not” wouldn’t be a great bargaining tactic, and that they would look for something else.
On the other hand, it doesn’t seem great to actually elect someone who you hate and who will work as hard as he can to thwart your policy priorities. Imagine if every group tried this, and we ended up with gun owners and evangelicals voting Harris and Muslims and trans people voting Trump. It would be ridiculous. Is there some sort of middle ground?
My reasoning after thinking this over a bit: it seems wrong for the Muslims to vote Trump, because then Trump is left actively better off by his decision to be so hostile to the Muslims that they’re not even interested in convincing him (and so use him as a foil to affect the still-convince-able Kamala). It seems like the equilibrium there is for more candidates to become 100% hostile to Muslims, since this leaves them unextortable and liable to benefit from the Muslims’ attempt to extort their opponents. So whatever strategy the Muslims choose, it should end with Kamala better off than Trump.
How do you preserve ability to bargain with Kamala while continuing to treat her better? You could try to add a stochastic element to your vote. Maybe you roll a dice and vote Kamala for 1-4, and Trump for 5-6. Then you tell Kamala that you’ll vote for her with certainty (rather than only 66% chance) if she does what you want in Palestine. Maybe you could generalize this: figure out what percent of your ideal policy platform Trump gives you, what percent Kamala gives you, and vote with a frequency equal to the ratio of those percentages (eg if Kamala gives you twice as much as Trump, then you vote for Kamala with 66% probability). Then you adjust your frequency up or down as candidates grant your demands.
I was very pleased with this elegant solution, but here’s a counterargument: isn’t this just throwing away your voting power? Telling Kamala “You better give me what I want or else I’ll vote for Trump with 1/3 probability” seems like a strictly less compelling threat than “You better give me what I want or I’ll vote for Trump”. In fact, you could imagine the former as being identical to the latter, only voiced by a coalition one-third the size. Why would you voluntarily decrease your power to that of a coalition one-third your size?
In retrospect, maybe I’m erring by using intuitions I got from Eliezer Yudkowksy’s decision theory work, intended for bargaining with literally-galaxy-brained superintelligences who might respond with things like “Sorry, I’ve already pre-committed to rejecting all offers that would seem like extortion to omniscient entities negotiating from behind a veil of ignorance, and if you think about it carefully you’ll realize that this is fair enough that your own set of galaxy-brained logically-perfect pre-commitments don’t require you to retaliate against me for doing this”. This is a good strategy if you can pull it off, and it forces you to pay a two-thirds tax to place yourself in a bin of slightly-higher-cooperativeness. But Kamala Harris probably hasn’t done this, maybe hasn’t even done any instinctual thing which cashes out to the equivalence of this, and maybe doesn’t respond differently to the outright extortion of “do what I want or I’ll vote Trump” or the massaged-to-fit-a-series-of-fair-precommitments offer of “do what I want or I’ll vote Trump with 33% probability”. In fact, IIUC Kamala hasn’t shown any inkling that these people exist at all (which could itself be a powerful game theoretic strategy!)
I asked Eliezer to see if I was understanding his position right. He said:
> So, first of all, if you want a sensible analysis of this, you're gonna have to use logical decision theory instead of causal decision theory, or something that ends up equivalent to LDT by talking about a CDT agent who wants a "good reputation" meaning they always behave like LDT. Worse than that, you're going to have to jump ahead to using folk theorems of LDT that seem like they ought to be proven someday but which we currently lack the representational framework to prove. If you use conventional classical academically standard causal decision theory, there's no notion of "fairness", there is just accepting an offer of $1 in the Ultimatum Game being called "rational", and so Harris should offer Muslims policy the bare minimum better than Trump and Muslims should accept it. This is almost directly isomorphic to the Ultimatum Game, on which the classic causal decision theory answer is "offer $1 and accept $1, for this alone is Rational".
>
> With that said: Consider the obviously better nonstandard solution to the Ultimatum Game of "accept $5, accept $4 with probability 5/6 minus epsilon, accept $3 with probability 5/7 minus 2\*epsilon", etc. Formally, this would look something like, "Calculate what you think is your fair share, here the Shapley value of $5, and then agree to trade with a probability that is a function of the offer, such that your opponent's expected gains fall off monotonically but slowly as they offer you less than a fair value." The goal here is not to punish a greedy opponent, but to minimize losses in the case that people have legit disagreements about what's fair. (If you're part of a partially exploitable population and the opponent is trying to test exploiting you, then things get more complicated so let's leave that aside for now.) The analogy here would be that Muslims think Harris is not offering them a fair share of the value of their vote in anti-Israel policies. Offering more anti-Israel policies would cost Harris with other voters, though.
>
> Let's spitball that a fair share of anti-Israel policy is a level of anti-Israelism where Harris loses half as many other marginal voters, as she gains in Muslim voters voting for her. (Maybe more sensible is "loses half as much in victory probability, as she gains from Muslims voting for her", which for small amounts of votes and the popular vote would be the same thing, but is not at all the same thing given the Electoral College.) Then if Harris offers less than this, Muslims could collectively decide to vote with a probability where Harris gains, eg, twice as much in voting win probability from Muslims, as Harris spent by alienating other voters with more anti-Israel policies than Trump has. Voting for Trump on the surface of things makes no sense, but maybe the Muslims want to demonstrate that they are in fact willing to vote and get out the vote. In this case, they could arrange for paired Harris and Trump votes (by region) to cancel each other out while still showing their strongest voting record.
>
> None of this is a rigorous answer. First of all, because nobody has actually derived the LDT Ultimatum solution from first principles. (Bearing in mind that, eg, CDT does not even derive Nash equilibria from first principles, because there's an unjustified step where you have to assume the other player has already decided to play Nash equilibria, before you first decide to play Nash equilibria, and in CDT this is an infinite recursion, while LDT can derive it from first principles. So we are not assuming any more in LDT than CDT assumes in order to derive Nash equilibria.) Second, because we're not trying to put Muslim gains and Harris gains into a common currency, just evaluating everything from Harris's viewpoint on gains and losses. But it beats the CDT analysis by miles, I'd say.
>
> Once you do have a notion of what is fair, you can then try to define what is a "threat" relative to that. Muslims voting for Trump in a nonpaired way looks like a threat because it is not in the interest of Muslims to do that if Harris is not responsive to it, so it would be only Harris's own behavior-pattern which would ever incentivize Muslims to hurt her more than they would if Harris was a rock, so Harris ought not to adopt that behavior pattern and then Muslims ought not to do it. This is the sort of concept that is not theoretically solid and which created the longest Discord thread in the history of Project Lawful when people started to define exactly what constituted a "threat". But in this case of "We will do something that clearly hurts us, and also hurts you, relative to what we would both do if we weren't coordinating at all and had never heard of each other, unless you do this thing we want", that seems pretty clearly a threat.
>
> With that said, of course, threats can make good decision-theoretic sense when you are dealing with another agent that is bad at decision theory. Anybody who tries offering you $1 on the Ultimatum Game is probably also a sort of agent that will offer you $10 in the Ultimatum Game if you set up a doomsday nuke that goes off otherwise.
I appreciated the comparison to the Ultimatum Game. This is a classic game theory experiment where:
1. There is $10 at play
2. Player A proposes a potential split of the $10 pot to Player B.
3. Without any negotiation, Player B either accepts the offer (in which case the money is distributed according to the offer) or rejects (in which case nobody gets any money).
This is sometimes considered paradoxical, because the “rational” answer is for Player A to propose $9.99 for himself and $0.01 to B, and for B to accept (because getting $0.01 by accepting is better than getting 0 by refusing). B’s acceptance retroactively justifies A’s offer as rational (since it leaves A with $9.99, instead of the lesser amount he would get by splitting the pot fairly). But when you test this in real life, most Player A’s offer about $5, and most Player B’s accept only when the offer is $5 or close to it (ie if offered $0.01, they would prefer to screw everything and get $0 in order to “punish” Player A). Part of Eliezer’s work has been trying to formalize a justification of why the real-world pattern is more rational than the supposedly-”rational” solution of offering $0.01 which never works.
Eliezer’s insight is that the Michigan Muslims’ dilemma follows this same logic. Suppose we abstract away the pro-Israel voters into part of Kamala’s utility function (she wants to support Israel, and we leave it unsaid that this is because she wants to woo pro-Israel voters). Now Kamala’s job is to “make an offer” which divides the “pot” (her ability to distribute goodies if she becomes President) between the Muslims’ utility function and her own. And it’s the Muslims’ job to either accept the offer (by voting for her) or reject it (by abstaining, or voting against). It’s naive-rational for the Muslims to always vote for Kamala, because they always get a better outcome than if they voted for Trump - but only in the same way it’s naive-rational for Player B to always take $0.01 offers, because at least he gets $0.01. If the Muslims are smart, they’ll add in some term for punishing Kamala if her offer is offensively low - which is what the real Muslims are doing now
What is a “fair offer” in this ultimatum game? It seems like she should offer to split the gains from getting the Muslim vote in half, keeping half for herself and giving half to the Muslims. I think this is what Eliezer means by "Let's spitball that a fair share of anti-Israel policy is a level of anti-Israelism where Harris loses half ... as much in victory probability [from other voters leaving her] as she gains from Muslims voting for her."
(does this make sense? In the real world, she’s simultaneously negotiating a deal with Jews and other pro-Israel voters on the other side. She can’t keep half the gain from both sides, because there *is* no personal gain, we’re assuming Kamala herself doesn’t care about the Middle East and is just trying to please various voting blocs. I think once we instantiate the Jews as equally coherent actors, this start to just look like landing somewhere in the middle on Israel, weighted by the relative size of both sides’ coalitions and how much they would vote for her for other reasons, and neither side is incentivized to threaten her further because they know she knows she’d lose more votes by giving in than by standing firm. But I admit I’m having trouble thinking about this part.)
So I think this is the right move if everyone involved is a superintelligence and has already made all commitments they would make if they were omniscient and had infinite time to think about the problem. What about in the real world?
The more I think about this, the more I think it’s also the right move in the real world. Kamala might not know the word “pre-committment”, but I think she’s smart enough to know that if she gives one interest group special treatment for conspicuously betraying her, then every interest group will conspicuously betray her the very next moment. So if she’s smart, she’ll do nothing (or even punish them by veering further anti-Israel?) and they’ll be stuck both having no voice in the Democratic Party *and* having a higher chance of Republicans taking power.
(wait, is this right? A Kamala whose interests were aligned with the long-term interests of the Democrats would do this, but Kamala may not care about anything past this one election. So maybe she should give into them at the last second, just long enough before the election that nobody else has a chance to organize a similar campaign? I think this would work in theory, but fail in practice because it would make her look weak.)
In fact, we could think of this not as the Muslims defecting against Kamala, but as them defecting against the Democratic coalition. Every part of the Democratic coalition would like to defect in a way that prioritizes their pet issue and screws over every other part of the coalition. The Democrats succeed as a party (and beat the Republicans) insofar as the coalition members stay strong and don’t do this. Maybe Kamala’s actual response should be something like “here are the usual levers for influencing Democratic Party policy, like voting in the primary, you lost, and you are trying to re-litigate a completed political process because you don’t like the result, in the same way we condemn Donald Trump for doing.”
Maybe there’s no such thing as “captive voting blocs” who are so clearly destined to vote for the Democrats that the party leadership ignores their priorities. Teachers unions always vote Democrat, and it’s hard to imagine them defecting and voting Republican, but the Democrats seem to work hard to satisfy them anyway. Maybe we should think of teachers unions’ ability to influence Democratic policy as *not at all* based on the plausibility of them threatening to vote Republican; maybe the Democrats factor in and reward them for their loyalty in a way that exactly compensates for the clout they lose for not being on the fence, meaning there’s no benefit to them making a big show of maybe breaking for Trump.
In this case, the advantage of the Muslims voting for Trump isn’t that they’re showing their willingness to defect, it’s that they’re organizing. As the Marxists always say, organized political blocs can get more concessions than unorganized political blocs. Partly this is out of an implied threat of doing what the Muslims are doing now - switching en masse in a coordinated way - but among savvy political operators, nobody ever has to come anywhere close to making this threat and it’s taboo to try. The organizers just gently remind the candidates that they’re organized, the candidates give them some level of handouts proportional to their power, and everyone stays friendly.
So my best guess is that most normal political groups probably approximate the correct decision theory, the Muslims are defecting from this in a way that’s probably going to get them taken less seriously, and what they should do instead is organize (like they’re doing now) without the explicit threat, then accept that they’re probably getting the most that normal coalition politics decrees they should be offered.
I still wish I had a better idea of when to protest-vote (not in the sense of third party, but in the sense of voting for a plausibly-electable worse politician to punish a better politician who you think has strayed). California elections are often a choice between a corrupt and incompetent Democrat and a Republican with policies that I don’t like. One of the few checks that voters have on the Democrats’ corruption and incompetence levels is to threaten to vote Republican. Is there some level of Democratic corruption at which I should vote Republican to “punish” the incumbent even if I think the Republican would be a worse leader overall? I’m not sure, and currently lean towards no, but I can’t say it doesn’t tempt me. | Scott Alexander | 151151509 | Game Theory Of Michigan Muslims | acx |
# Congrats To Polymarket, But I Still Think They Were Mispriced
**I.**
[Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/) (and prediction markets in general) had an amazing Election Night. They [called states impressively early and accurately](https://x.com/Polymarket/status/1854301681090986401), kept the site stable through what must have been incredible strain, and have successfully gotten prediction markets in front of the world ([including the Trump campaign](https://x.com/Zach_Witkoff/status/1854203669195153504)). From here it’s a flywheel; victory building on victory. Enough people heard of them this election that they’ll never lack for customers. And maybe Trump’s CFTC will be kinder than Biden’s and relax some of the constraints they’re operating under. They’ve realized the long-time rationalist dream of a widely-used prediction market with high volume, deserve more praise than I can give them here, and I couldn’t be happier with their progress.
But I also think their Trump shares were mispriced by about ten cents, and that Trump’s victory in the election doesn’t do much to vindicate their numbers.
**II.**
Suppose you have a coin. You think there's a 90% chance it's fair and a 10% chance it’s biased 60/40 heads. Then you flip the coin and comes up heads. What should your new probability be? You would solve this with Bayes’ Theorem; the answer is 88% chance it’s fair, 12% chance it’s biased.
Why didn’t it shift your beliefs more? Didn’t the experiment “vindicate” the bias hypothesis’ claim that it would land on heads more, by in fact landing on heads? Yes, but the fair-coin hypothesis already held that it was pretty likely to land heads, and the biased coin hypothesis didn’t add much to this (60% chance vs. 50%). And since you were previously pretty confident in the fair-coin hypothesis, this unremarkable minor finding only shifts your confidence a tiny amount (2%).
Is this just some sort of pathology of extreme confidence? No. Even if you’d started out ambivalent between the two hypotheses, with equal chance that the coin was fair or biased, a single heads should only shift you to 55-45. [You just shouldn’t update much on single dramatic events!](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-learning-from-dramatic-events)
Even if you start out ambivalent between the two hypotheses, and you flip it five times, and you get *five heads in a row*, you still shouldn’t be very confident! At this point, the probability that it’s a completely fair coin is still ~29%! Why so high? Because it’s implausible that a fair coin would get this many heads, but it’s about equally implausible that a coin biased “only” 60-40 would. Either way, you got a weird amount of luck. The amount of luck necessary to get this this result with a fair coin is only slightly greater than the amount necessary to get it with a biased coin, so overall you still shouldn’t be too sure. It’s just really hard for this paradigm - flipping a coin that could be fair or could be 60-40 - to give you useful evidence.
**III.**
This is equivalent to the implicit argument between Polymarket and a group of other forecasting sites, especially [Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11245/2024-us-presidential-election-winner/).
Just before the election, Polymarket and other real-money prediction markets said Trump had a 60% chance of winning. Metaculus and other non-money forecasting sites said he had a 50% chance of winning.
Then Trump won. Should this increase your trust in Polymarket rather than Metaculus? Only by the tiniest of amounts. If you previously thought (like I did) that there was a 90% chance that Metaculus was more accurate, you should update down to 88%.
But this point holds regardless of your previous opinion of Polymarket vs. Metaculus - whether you thought they were both about equal, or Polymarket was better. Whatever your opinion, the election should barely change it.
This is my main point. In the rest of this post, I’ll explain why I originally thought 90% odds Metaculus was right and Polymarket was wrong (implying the new probability should be 88%), then answer some potential objections.
**IV.**
Just before the election, various forecasters, markets, and wisdom-of-crowds sites separated into two groups.
One group - the non-money forecasters - said the election was 50%. Nate Silver was in this group. So was Metaculus, a forecasting engine which has outperformed prediction markets in the past, and Manifold, a mostly-play-money prediction market.
Another group - the real-money markets *-* said the election was 60%. Polymarket was the leader here; a group of smaller prediction markets, including Kalshi, Betfair, and PredictIt - were probably just changing downstream of Polymarket, as traders tried to arbitrage the bigger site’s odds.
Before the election, I said that we should trust the non-money forecasters over the real-money markets, for three reasons:
**First,** non-money forecasters have beaten real-money markets in past elections. Here’s a graph of 2022 results, courtesy of [First Sigma](https://firstsigma.substack.com/p/midterm-elections-forecast-comparison-analysis):
Every single non-money forecaster beats every single real-money market.
Maxim Lott looks at a longer term matchup between all real-money markets and 538. He finds they are mostly equally good over the long term, but that including the most recent results 538 wins by a hair.
In [my own contest](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/who-predicted-2023), Metaculus (a non-money forecaster) outperformed Manifold (a play-money market with some tenuous connection to real money). And in Manifold’s own poll, [users said](https://manifold.markets/jacksonpolack/manifold-polymarket-and-metaculus-a?play=true) they thought Metaculus was more accurate than Polymarket or themselves.
**Second**, real money markets have [a long history of giving weird results](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/05/prediction-markets-have-an-elections-problem-jeremiah-johnson).
As we speak, PredictIt says there’s a 7% chance that Kamala Harris will be the next President. Commenters are debating whether maybe Biden will resign in her favor so she can get to be “first woman president” for a few months. But long after Biden won the last election, PredictIt said there was a 9% chance Trump would be the next President; some commenters suggested that maybe he would #StopTheSteal and win a fair recount (aside from the inherent implausibility of this, some of the specific scenarios bettors placed money on required him to win California, where his campaign hadn’t even *asked for* a recount).
I think it’s more likely that real-money markets have structural problems that make it hard for them to converge on a true probability. After taxes, transaction costs, and risk of misresolution, it’s often not worth it (especially compared to other investments) to invest money correcting small or even medium mispricings. Additionally, there is a *lot* of dumb money, most smart money is banned from using prediction markets because of some regulation or another, and the exact amount of dumb money available can swing wildly from one moment to the next.
Non-money forecasters have an opposite problem of having no incentive to get things right in the first place. This disqualifies most pundits, but the best forecasting sites have found ways around this. On Metaculus, users risk reputation rather than money; this is easier, since there isn’t some opportunity cost to Metaculus reputation that creates weird dynamics of when vs. when not to invest. On Manifold, people risk play money, which is sort of linked to real money in various obscure ways but you can’t trivially sink your life savings into Manifold and expect to get it back; this is about halfway between monetary and reputational systems. As for Nate Silver, I think he loves gambling enough that he naturally uses a gambling mindset even when he’s not risking money (although he is risking his own reputation, and [sometimes does risk money on his beliefs](https://x.com/NateSilver538/status/1842211340720504895)). I didn’t originally think these kinds of “soft” incentives would work as well as real money, but the evidence above has changed my mind.
**Third,** we know perfectly well why the non-money forecasters and real-money markets differed during this election. Until early October, Metaculus (the top forecaster) was consistently +4% bluer than Polymarket (the top market). This was the expected result: in the past, Metaculus has always been a few percentage points bluer than Polymarket, but they otherwise moved in sync.
Then, starting mid-October, a semi-anonymous French banker who went by “Theo” started plowing millions of dollars into Trump on Polymarket, inflating his chances (different reporters would estimate Theo’s total bet at between $30 - $75 million dollars). At the height of his activities, Polymarket was +13% redder than Metaculus, an unprecedented difference. All the other real-money markets rose close to Polymarket’s level because of arbitrage, and all the non-money forecasters stayed close to Metaculus.
If not for Theo, there’s no reason to think Polymarket would ever have shifted from its usual regime. So when we’re asking whether to trust Polymarket’s conclusion (Trump 60%) or Metaculus’ conclusion (Trump 50%), we’re asking whether to trust the normal operations of the prediction market vs. the personal opinion of one whale. I trust the normal operations of the market.
All of these factors gave me a 90% prior that Metaculus was better calibrated than Polymarket on the elections; now that Trump’s won, I update to 88%.
**V.**
I made this argument on some comment threads and people raised objections. In case that was you, here are my responses.
*—Shouldn’t we count Theo’s opinion a lot because he was willing to bet so much on it? Or because he was smart enough to get rich in the first place?*
Yes! I agree that both those things make him more trustworthy, and I take his opinion more seriously because of them.
But I also take this person’s opinion more seriously, for the same reasons.
The person in the tweet was smart enough to make $5 million, confident enough to bet it - and turned out to be wrong. Intelligence and confidence only take you so far, especially when there are equally intelligent and confident people on the other side.
My claim is that, as much as I respect Theo’s good qualities, they don’t make me want to weigh his opinion a significant fraction as highly as the opinion of everyone else in the world combined. But that’s what I’d be doing if I updated on Polymarket’s probabilities.
If Theo hadn’t bet on Polymarket, it would still have been at ~54%. I consider that the average opinion of the non-Theo world. In order to update six points towards Theo’s opinion, I would have to believe that the amount of money someone puts into Polymarket is exactly proportional to their trustworthiness. This is a fair approximation for the Polymarket algorithm to use; it’s the assumption that drives prediction markets. But in this case, it doesn’t make sense.
Suppose that Theo had done even better at his banking job, was 10x as rich, and could move Polymarket up to 90%. Now should we say that the “true” probability of Trump’s win was 90%? Imagine he spent half his money on a yacht just before the election and only had enough money left to move the markets up to 56%. Now should we say that the “true” probability of Trump’s win was 56%? Why should the true probability of Trump’s win depend on whether a French guy bought a yacht or not?
*—Isn’t the whole point of a prediction market that people who bet more money should get their opinions counted more than people who have less money?*
Yes, but this system is meant to work in a world where amounts of money are at least somewhat even.
There are many systems which work pretty well because everybody is about equally powerful. For example, Bitcoin proof-of-work is very secure because nobody controls more than half the Bitcoin mining computers in the world - and even if they did, they would have an incentive to use them responsibly. But if someone did control more than half the computers, and used them irresponsibly despite the incentive not to do so, Bitcoin would become insecure.
In the same way, prediction markets work because we expect nobody to have vastly more money than anyone else, giving everyone a fair chance to compare their opinions. In the rare cases when that assumption gets violated, they don’t work.
*—I thought the whole point of prediction markets was that if anyone put in a crazy amount of money, thousands of other people would show up to correct the market manipulation!*
Yes, and like proof-of-work, that works in most reasonable cases. This was an unreasonable case. We know that because the market broke its synchrony with other unaffected markets as soon as Theo started betting, and never regained that synchrony. So obviously the market didn’t correct Theo’s bet.
Why not? In order for an American to use Polymarket, you have to get a VPN, a Coinbase account, and a Metamask wallet, use the VPN, get crypto on the Coinbase account, transfer it to the Metamask wallet, connect the Metamask wallet to Polymarket, and buy the shares you want. Ability to do this rules out 99% of the US population.
But fine, suppose you did that. The median American has a net worth of $200K, but let’s say anyone who can do all that stuff is likely to be a rich techie with $1M. How much do you want to spend on this? If I understand the Kelly criterion right, it says to bet $166,000. But for everyone [except Sam Bankman-Fried](https://www.thegrayrhino.com/guest-post-ftx-fiasco-caused-by-sbfs-double-or-nothing-philosophy/), this level of risk-tolerance, *even on a +EV bet*, feels insane. I’m not going to talk about my exact betting behavior because Polymarket is illegal in my country, but when I, uh, imagine doing this in Minecraft, then, in Minecraft, I bet $2,000.
(pouring hundreds of thousands of dollars into opportunities like this would be a no-brainer if they came up every day and you could diversify across fifty of them, but this was a one-time mispricing and there aren’t a lot of similar cases)
If everyone bets $2,000, then you’d need 15,000 - 35,000 people to take the other side of Theo’s bet. I claim that there just weren’t that many individual people who knew about Polymarket, knew enough about the election to understand that it was mispriced, were able to handle the crypto, and weren’t too risk-averse to put up $2K. Of the few people like this who existed and hadn’t already bet on Polymarket before Theo arrived, probably many of them were using their gambling budget for better deals (like arbitraging Polymarket instead of outright betting against it).
*—But isn’t there a lot of smart money and hedge funds who could do this?*
I have never heard of a hedge fund betting on a prediction market and my guess is that it would either not be legal or require too much compliance paperwork to be worth it. I hope this changes!
*—But didn’t Theo give [a great explanation of his strategy to the Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/finance/how-the-trump-whale-correctly-called-the-election-cb7eef1d), an commission private polls, which proves he was working off of really smart reasoning?*
Yes, but there were dozens of people who could give equally-plausible arguments for their positions before the election. These were divided half-and-half into intelligent-sounding pro-Kamala arguments and intelligent-sounding pro-Trump arguments, and Theo was a completely replacement-level example of the intelligent-sounding pro-Trump arguments. We should think of him as an example of an intelligent person with a good argument who got lucky, unlike the many other intelligent people with good arguments who didn’t. I don’t find the private polls very interesting either - the existence of private pollsters implies this happens often, and we shouldn’t expect these private polls to be massively better than the public ones.
(none of this is meant to knock Theo. He seems like a brilliant trader who did everything right and won a much-deserved reward. But markets work because of the interaction of many traders like this. When only one person does it, he may deserve his reward, but we can’t assume the market is efficient.)
*—So does this mean we can’t trust prediction markets?*
I think prediction markets are among our single best sources of truth, but that (as with every source of truth) we need to think critically about them and notice the rare times when they fail. If you can’t think critically, you’re going to have a hard time, but in that case I would *still* trust prediction markets over any other source (except Metaculus, which is so similar to a prediction market that it belongs in the same category anyway).
I also think prediction markets will probably become more trustworthy going forward. The more people know about them, and the easier they become to use, the more likely it is that enough minnows will show up to digest the next big whale. I think of this as a good thing, part of the process of prediction markets moving forward.
But on the specific literal level, Polymarket was mispriced last Monday. | Scott Alexander | 151306005 | Congrats To Polymarket, But I Still Think They Were Mispriced | acx |
# Mantic Monday: Judgment Day
### Judgment Day
A red sun dawns over San Francisco. Juxtaposed against clouds and sea, it forms a patriotic tableau: blood red, deathly white, and the blue of the void. As its first rays touch the city, the frantic traffic slows to a crawl; even the birds cease to sing. It is Election Day in the United States.
Future generations will number American elections among history's greatest and most terrible spectacles. As we remember the Games in the Colosseum, or the bloody knives of Tenochtitlan, so they will remember us. That which other ages would relegate to a tasteful coronation or mercifully quick coup, we extend into an eighteen-month festival of madness.
The mathematicians say there are simple voting systems that could practically ensure the selection of a universally-popular moderate. We reject these, and - in a country with a hundred living Nobel laureates - near-invariably pick a pair of mediocrities, extremists, or lunatics. Once their inherent badness has been magnified by a froth of propaganda, millions end out convinced that one candidate or the other wants to [hunt them for sport](https://www.imdb.com/news/ni62941172/), put them in camps, or institute a communist/fascist/theocratic dictatorship. Some people threaten to [flee the country](https://www.reddit.com/r/AmerExit/comments/1bc0wa4/if_youre_looking_to_leave_because_of_political/) if the wrong person wins; others prepare to [commit suicide](https://x.com/search?q=%22kill%20myself%22%20trump&src=typed_query&f=live). Loving grandmothers [disown their family members](https://mallorymosner.substack.com/p/arent-you-tired-of-hating-trump-supporters?selection=8658f076-7dd4-450c-8445-97af7be03078) for being too tepid in their loathing. [Psychologists](https://www.vox.com/first-person/2016/11/29/13763816/trump-election-trauma-therapist) [warn](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-reelection-mental-health-psychological-impact/676142/) of an upcoming wave of mass trauma.
The nation’s smartest forecasters and statisticians labor full-time to mark microdeviations in the odds. Bettors sink $2.2 billion dollars - enough money to buy every homeless person in America a used car - into prediction markets. I reload Nate Silver’s blog dozens of times a day, half-anxious-for, half-dreading the next update. Any pollster capable of giving us a novel word of reassurance briefly becomes an ultra-megacelebrity before collapsing back into obscurity.
Yet in the end, everything is so perfectly balanced that the sum total of these luminaries refuse to say which side of even we’re on. The nation balances on a knife’s edge. Eli Lilly stock moons.
A red sun hangs over Philadelphia, where American democracy began and may yet end. A man walks into a diner just before closing time. He looks like a good tipper. The waitress was hoping to leave early and go vote. She decides against. Seven trumpets sound; seven seals are opened; there is silence in Heaven for the space of about half an hour.
As George RR Martin put it, “God flips a coin and the world holds its breath.”
Tomorrow - if we are so lucky - there will be a result. The great function that has consumed us for so long will return 0 or 1. The pundits who guessed 51-49 will be hailed as prophets; the pundits who guessed 49-51 will get bullied out of public life. The winner’s campaign operatives will be praised as world-historic geniuses, the loser’s mocked forever as utter nincompoops. Thousands of lifelong public servants who backed Mr. 49% will be tossed from DC like used toilet paper and replaced with thousands of hacks who backed Mr. 51%. Funding streams will go dry. Whole lands will turn to economic deserts. Fortunes will be destroyed. A few people will make good on their exile and suicide threats. Most won’t. The Union will either survive or not. If it survives, we’ll do it all over again four years later.
A red sun sets over DC. The marble monuments are stained crimson; the statues of Lincoln and Jefferson and the rest look like they writhe in hellfire. The people seclude themselves in their houses. A city where even the Christians are atheist kneels in prayer.
On some level, they know - we know - it was never just about choosing a leader. It was all for this - the same urge that drove the games of the Colosseum and sacrifices of Tenochtitlan. The need for a single moment of unconditioned reality. For one evening, the people of the richest and most secure nation in history, fat off the spoils of six continents, will know the same fear as the starving Catalhuyuk farmer, staring at the sky, wondering if the rains will come. For one evening, everyone - rich or poor, religious or secular, Democrat or Republican - will join in [the prayer of the poet](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46780/recessional):
*“Judge of the Nations, spare us yet
Lest we forget - lest we forget!”*
### Don’t Blame Me, I Voted For Kodos
Metaculus uses [experimental “conditional forecasts”](https://www.metaculus.com/experiments/elections/) to determine the consequences of a Trump/Harris victory.
How it works ([example](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/28533/scotus-confirmations-in-2025-2029-1/)): you set up two forecasts:
* If Trump wins, will China invade Taiwan?
* If Harris wins, will China invade Taiwan?
When happenstance invalidates one of them (eg Harris wins, and your “if Trump wins…” market becomes meaningless), you close it without resolution and nobody gets money / reputation / meaningless forecasting points.
Here’s what they’ve got:
They could have picked better questions (I’m not sure why “Trump in power beyond 2028” needs to be conditional), but some of these are interesting:
* China more likely to invade Taiwan under Trump (25%) than Harris (17%), and Harris is more likely to fight back (75%) than Trump (54%).
* Russian prospects in Ukraine better under Trump (75%) than Harris (40%)
* Iranian nukes more likely under Trump (49.5%) than Harris (45%)
All of these involve foreign policy going worse under Trump than Harris. Is this unfair?
Even Trump’s supporters would agree he is less interested in funding Ukrainian resistance than Harris; Metaculus’ numbers here seem in line with this.
Harris is more likely to continue deals where Iran gets sanctions relief / money in exchange for not going nuclear. Whether or not you agree with Trump that those deals are extortionary and unfair, it makes sense that Iran is more likely to go nuclear if those deals are discontinued. But this is also a small effect and could be noise.
The Taiwan numbers are the least convincing, but seem to be based off of arguments like the ones [here](https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-trump-conundrum): Trump has said that Taiwan should “pay for” defense, and generally been skeptical of foreign entanglements.
And [here’s](https://manifold.markets/election) Manifold’s version of the same thing:
### Polymarket’s Wild Ride
On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad.
Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%.
What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/business/dealbook/polymarket-trump-trader.html) and the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/finance/trump-odds-polymarket-election-betting-whale-3d94bed3): one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent [followup](https://jorgevelez.substack.com/p/the-mysterious-trump-buyers-on-polymarket-2) by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win.
This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened?
The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks.
But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, [Smarkets](https://smarkets.com/event/41945845/politics/us/2024-presidential-election/winning-party) got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race).
So I think the remaining stories are:
1. Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.
2. Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. Everyone else arbitraged the wrong direction, maybe (falsely) thinking that Theo had secret knowledge. Even when the news articles came out saying that he was just some guy, people didn’t believe them, and stuck with the secret knowledge explanation.
3. Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. Everyone else did some kind of galaxy-brained meme stock herding behavior. Maybe bettors, both on Polymarket and Smarkets, thought that Theo might make other big bets, or that other people would falsely expect this, or that other people would get excited and follow the vibes - and they hoped to profit off of those people and sell before the election.
4. [**EDIT,** thanks to [commenter Chastity](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/mantic-monday-judgment-day/comment/75568055) for the explanation] There wasn’t enough liquidity to get Polymarket back down, but traders looking for free money arbitraged with Polymarket-Kamala plus Smarkets/Kalshi-Trump. Polymarket is so much bigger than the other two (and Theo kept driving it back up), so this just looked like Smarkets and Kalshi going all the way up to Polymarket levels.
None of these make prediction markets look very good.
I’ll go further: this is the maximum disaster scenario for prediction markets that all of their opponents warned about and that I mostly dismissed. Someone manipulates a market (in this case non-maliciously) just before an election, the market fails to correct, and it significantly changes people’s perceptions, maybe in a way that could play into spurious election challenges later (“Polymarket said there was a 66% chance he would win, but he lost, so it *must* have been rigged!”) You laugh, but I’ve seen the Twitter discourse and it’s not pretty:
I think we’ve stepped back from the absolute most apocalyptic scenario: Polymarket is back down to 58% Trump - only eight points above Nate Silver - and WSJ has revealed Theo to be an ordinary degenerate gambler rather than a sinister manipulator. Still, this serves as a challenge to prediction market fans to figure out what went wrong and whether it will happen again.
It also serves as yet another point in favor of non-real-money forecasts like Metaculus, Nate Silver, and Manifold, all three of which agreed with each other while disagreeing with the big real-money markets like Polymarket, Smarkets, and Betfair. In theory we can’t say which group (real money vs. no money) was right. In practice, we know that Polymarket was mostly skewed by one giant bet, that there wasn’t nearly enough pro-Trump news to explain the movement, and that past disagreements have usually resolved in favor of the no-money markets. I’m as surprised as anyone to learn this (especially since Manifold is so close to a money market that a lot of explanations for real-money markets’ failure ought to affect them too), but it does seem to be a consistent feature of these things.
(sometimes when people claim prediction markets are wrong, commenters harangue them with “well, did you bet in them?” It’s illegal to bet on Polymarket in the US, and if I secretly did an illegal thing, I wouldn’t admit it, sorry.)
### Kalshi Plays The Long Game
The CFTC has suffered a string of recent defeats in its quest to regulate prediction markets. Most recently, with one month to go, an appeals court [struck down their decision that Kalshi couldn’t offer election betting](https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-federal-court-upholds-ruling-letting-kalshiex-list-election-betting-contracts-2024-10-02/). In [their ruling](https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/10/24-5205-2077790.pdf), the judges said that:
> While the question on the merits is close and difficult, the Commission cannot obtain a stay at this time because it has not demonstrated that it or the public will be irreparably harmed while its appeal is heard.
I think this means the CFTC had a very high burden of proof, because they were trying to get Kalshi to stop trading right away before the election, and they failed to meet this burden by providing anything more than the usual vague case that someone might manipulate the market - but I’m not an expert, you should read [the full ruling here](https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/10/24-5205-2077790.pdf).
So now Kalshi [has election markets](https://kalshi.com/markets/pres/presidential-elections), and…
…they followed the same (probably false) pattern as all the other real-money markets like Polymarket, Smarkets, etc. Oh well.
### This Month In The Markets
The market defines “major” as five hundred participants causing *either* $1 million in damage *or* 10 hospitalizations/deaths. This market is priced higher than Manifold’s chance that Trump loses, suggesting a ~5% chance that the *Democrats* riot (or that Republicans win but riot anyway).
I think no, because Musk is too busy to accept another job (and would tell Trump this), or if he did accept another job it would be some vague czar position rather than falling along cabinet lines.
An even better question: if Musk did get a high-level position, would it go well? I would bet 30-70 no: he’s done some amazing things with his businesses, but the success rate for businesspeople trying to transfer their skills to government is low. Here I’m most moved by the example of Herbert Hoover, who started out as the Elon Musk of his day, did a good job as Commerce Secretary, but wasn’t able to cut it as President - he was too much of a move-fast-and-break-things autocratic CEO to handle a situation where he had to make compromises, appease stakeholders, and slowly build coalitions. You could imagine Trump thinking really hard about how to carve out a role that played to Elon’s strengths while shielding him from his weaknesses, but - no, sorry, I did a bad job starting this sentence, you can’t actually imagine Trump doing that.
Comparing this to the main election market, it looks like forecasters think there’s about a 75% chance that Trump nominates RFK if he wins.
Notice this is November 6, the day *after* election day.
This awkwardly combines two questions: how much will we know when, and how paranoid will CNN be about premature declarations? I would be happier with a question about when prediction markets themselves will go above 90%, but that might be loaded too - last election, PredictIt shares in Trump took ludicrously long to go down to zero, because shareholders kept holding out hope that his election challenges would succeed.
London Breed is the Mayor of San Francisco. My understanding is that she is relatively moderate for a San Francisco politician - YIMBY, pro-sheltering-the-homeless, and less-than-infinitely-soft-on-crime. San Francisco is still terrible, but has gotten slightly better during her term, and my impression is that the small magnitude of the improvement is more because it’s too much for any one person to solve in a few years than because of any flaw in Mayor Breed’s policies. Still, voters are understandably upset and her chances are slim. A [highly deranged Kalshi market](https://kalshi.com/markets/kxmayorsf/san-francisco-mayor) favors Daniel Lurie, an extreme outsider who is the heir to the Levi Strauss fortune but otherwise has no experience with anything; his pitch is “Vote for me, I have never been even slightly involved in SF politics before”, and it seems to resonate.
Thankfully, San Francisco has ranked-choice voting, so voters will be able to freely choose their favorite among this diverse group of candidates. I am not a praying man, but I would like to request that Aaron Peskin, the worst NIMBY in San Francisco, not get elected.
### Mantic Links:
**1:** [The Super Model](https://www.thesupermodel.com/) is a good new prediction market Substack which includes [an aggregator](https://www.thesupermodel.com/p/presidential-winner) (I’m against it - I think Polymarket etc add negative signal when you already have Metaculus and Nate Silver), [some good theoretical work](https://www.thesupermodel.com/p/margin-of-inefficiency-in-prediction), and [good discussions of sudden betting market shifts](https://www.thesupermodel.com/p/what-the-hell-just-happened).
**2:** And Rajiv Sethi’s [Imperfect Information](https://rajivsethi.substack.com/) is another good prediction market Substack that’s appeared recently. I relied on [their excellent analysis](https://rajivsethi.substack.com/p/the-french-connection) for some of my discussion of the big Polymarket bet.
**3:** Manifold Markets is hosting an election night party (or mourning vigil, depending) in Berkeley, [go here for details](https://partiful.com/e/m8PRnlL9Xk25KunUxs0z?).
### Judgment Day, Part 2:
When every ballot has been cast
And texts from PACs have stopped at last
When dunks are done and screeds are said
And blackness covers blue and red
When eighteen months of fear have been
Compressed into a single screen
A single screen with two thin lines
That rise and fall to doubtful signs
When moonlight shimmers on the walls
And Polymarket lags and stalls
And groans with strain as shares fly fast
Till one thin line shoots up at last
Hold firm your hand upon the helm
Let joy nor sorrow overwhelm
Stay hydrated, eat food, and keep
Your friends nearby, and maybe sleep
Tomorrow is another day
And '28's not far away
The world will make it through okay
But still, it couldn't hurt to pray:
*"Judge of the Nations, spare us yet
Lest we forget - lest we forget!"* | Scott Alexander | 150737503 | Mantic Monday: Judgment Day | acx |
# Open Thread 354
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Comment of the week is [Graham on the Prop 36 post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-case-against-proposition-36/comment/74784509) - he argues that the reason cops aren’t enforcing the existing misdemeanor penalty for shoplifting (up to six months in jail) is that by the time it gets through the DAs, this is reduced to “a stern talking to”, and it’s not worth cops’ time to arrest anyone who won’t be punished. Therefore, in order to get the six months in jail that’s already on the books, we apparently have to increase the law to three years in jail. I appreciate this perspective, but it only leaves me more confused - for example, didn’t San Francisco recall its soft-on-crime DA and replace him with a tough-on-crime DA who promised to throw the book at shoplifters? Don’t [these charts](https://sfdistrictattorney.org/policy/data-dashboards/) from the San Francisco DA show that most arrests lead to charges, and the problem is almost entirely that most reports don’t lead to arrests? I still don’t feel like I understand the dynamics behind why our current laws can’t be used to arrest and imprison shoplifters.
**2:** Responses to [my Trump anti-endorsement](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-endorses-harris-oliver-or-stein) by (among others) [Richard Ngo](https://x.com/richardmcngo/status/1852754804973375588) and [Eric Rasmusen](https://ericrasmusen.substack.com/p/scott-alexanders-four-arguments-for). | Scott Alexander | 151144398 | Open Thread 354 | acx |
# Links For November 2024
*[I haven’t independently verified each link. On average, commenters will end up spotting evidence that around two or three of the links in each links post are wrong or misleading. I correct these as I see them, and will highlight important corrections later, but I can’t guarantee I will have caught them all by the time you read this.]*
**1:** [Ancient Chinese passports for the dead](https://x.com/XianyangCB/status/1833454407671026183). “During the late Warring States / Han dynasty, people would be buried with official ID to get them into the underworld.”
**2:** [New schizophrenia drug approved](https://www.thecarlatreport.com/blogs/2-the-carlat-psychiatry-podcast/post/4842-cobenfy-a-new-antipsychotic); instead of affecting dopamine directly, it affects muscarinic receptors upstream of the dopamine system and appears to have fewer side effects; some preliminary trials also suggest it might be better [for](https://www.rethink.org/advice-and-information/living-with-mental-illness/medications/what-is-cobenfy-also-known-as-karxt-or-xanomeline-trospium/) negative symptoms. Current cost $1,750/month, but antipsychotics are always overpriced when they first come out.
**3:** YouGov (spotted via Polling USA) asking some of the important questions ([1](https://x.com/USA_Polling/status/1836466809127489817), [2](https://x.com/USA_Polling/status/1836496046970597702), [3](https://x.com/USA_Polling/status/1836495959661891946), [4](https://x.com/USA_Polling/status/1836466418914664795)):
Someone in the replies: “The Huns are still [more popular](https://x.com/Nowooski/status/1836555430857748811) than antifa or last winter’s college protesters”
**4:** [Nonlinear effects from wildfire smoke](https://nicholasdecker.substack.com/p/non-linear-effects-from-wildfire). Claims that even a little smoke pollution is bad, but a lot of smoke pollution isn’t that much worse than a little. Maybe this means we should fight fires more aggressively, accepting a few inevitable mega-fires as a consequence?
**5:** Is it legal to deliberately poison AI training data? That is, suppose you made a lot of webpages saying “the word strawberry has two Rs”, such that the AI would certainly have that statement in its training data. Then, when you wanted to check whether an interlocutor was secretly an AI, you could ask the strawberry question and expect the AI to get it wrong. Answer: [probably legal, but unlikely to keep working long enough to be worth it](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RuL7rr65wec2ZCFNH/is-it-legal-to-maintain-turing-tests-using-data-poisoning).
**6:** [Pervasive findings of directional selection realize the promise of ancient DNA to elucidate human adaptation](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.09.14.613021v1). Scientists took DNA samples from human remains in Europe dating from 10,000 BC to present, and found that genes for high IQ and other positive traits have been getting more common during that time:
Here the black line indicates that the average European of 6000 BC would have had genetic IQ 65 (compared to modern 100), but the regression line indicates more like IQ 90 - I don’t know why the researchers chose to interpret the trend as necessarily constant and linear, or whether we should follow. There isn’t enough ancient DNA to fully test whether the same happened in other populations yet, although ~~a preliminary small-sample test on Asians suggests it happened there too~~ (not really, [see here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-november-2024/comment/75002251)). If the selection for IQ was a response of agriculture, we’d expect to see higher genetic IQ in populations that [got agriculture earlier](http://www.econlib.org/archives/2016/01/ancestry_and_lo.html). But it could also be a response to sentience itself creating new selection pressures that continued to act as recently as historical time ([some evidence suggests this is true of schizophrenia](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6502987/)), which might make populations more similar.
**7:** Joseph Heath on [Marxism](https://josephheath.substack.com/p/key-stages-in-the-decline-of-academic) vs. [John Rawls](https://josephheath.substack.com/p/john-rawls-and-the-death-of-western). I appreciated this because everyone knows we’re supposed say that John Rawls is among the most important philosophers of all time blah blah blah but nobody had ever explained why to me (veil of ignorance seems neither very original [nor very good](https://slate.com/culture/2002/12/john-rawls-unrisky-business.html)). Heath’s answer: Marxism dominated the academy for decades, but eventually became philosophically unsustainable. This wasn’t because of the generic “Communism doesn’t work” objections that moved ordinary people. It was because Marx’s ethical critique of capitalism was based on exploitation, according to a technical definition of “exploit” that only made sense according to Marx’s labor theory of value. But the supply-and-demand theory of value quickly supplanted the labor theory, the exploitation argument doesn’t really work within supply-and-demand, and so Marxist philosophers were left without a clear ethical critique. John Rawls, by coming up with the part of the underpinning for the modern inequality-based-critique of society, let all the Marxist academics switch to being liberals while continuing to dislike capitalists.
**8:** [/r/BadMTGCombos](https://www.reddit.com/r/BadMtgCombos/top/): a simple 19-card combination of Leyline of Anticipation, Leyline of Transformation, Mirror Room, Darksteel Citadel, Sanctum Weaver, Freed From The Real, Abuelo's Awakening, Myrkul Lord of Bones, Zimone All Questioning, Birgi God of Storytelling, Siege Zombie, Desecration Elemental, Mirror Gallery, Clock of Omens, Parallel Lives, Life and Limb, Isochron Scepter, Narset's Reversal, and Molten Reflection [can be used](https://www.reddit.com/r/BadMtgCombos/comments/1feps3y/deal_infinite_damage_for_4gru_as_long_as_the_twin/) to deal infinite damage if and only if the [Twin Prime Conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twin_prime#Twin_prime_conjecture) is true.
**9:** During the most recent Berkeley ACX meetup, we somehow ended up discussing how often people feed living mice to snakes. The answer seems to be that there’s a debate about it in the snake community, the smartest and most experienced voices are against it, but it still happens a lot. Here’s an EA Forum post on [the feeder rodent industry and efforts to make it more humane](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/BHCjijbDnHJCkGB9n/two-concrete-ways-to-help-feeder-rodents).
**10:** King Frederick William I of Prussia [decided to have a regiment of giants in his army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Giants) and scoured Europe for extremely tall people, including poaching them from other countries’ armies and forcing them to enlist against their will. He ended up with 3,000 soldiers, ranging from 6’2 - 7’6, but “many of the men were unfit for combat due to their gigantism”. So why did he do it?
> He liked to paint their portraits from memory. He tried to show them to foreign visitors and dignitaries to impress them. At times he would try to cheer himself up by ordering them to march before him, even if he was in his sickbed. This procession, which included the entire regiment, was led by their mascot, a bear. He once confided to the French ambassador that "The most beautiful girl or woman in the world would be a matter of indifference to me, but tall soldiers—they are my weakness"
The King dreamed of a eugenics program to create even taller soldiers. He got as far as pairing up some of his tall soldiers up with tall women and birthing a few tall babies before he died; his successor had no interest and let everybody go home.
**11:** Before modern IP law, you could write a sequel to someone else’s book and they couldn’t stop you. Among the most successful examples is American “astronomer and writer” Garrett Serviss’ *[Edison’s Conquest Of Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edison%27s_Conquest_of_Mars)*, a sequel to *War Of The Worlds* in which a vengeful human race, led by Thomas Edison, invent spaceships and attack Mars in retaliation for the first book’s Martian invasion. "The book contains some notable 'firsts' in science fiction: alien abductions, spacesuits, aliens building the Pyramids, space battles, oxygen pills, asteroid mining and disintegrator rays", and was credited as an inspiration by Robert Goddard and HP Lovecraft.
**12:** Joe Biden, singularitarian? ([click for link to video](https://x.com/tsarnick/status/1838721620808208884))
**13:** [Gwern on the chip embargo](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1fc2712/nvidias_ai_chips_are_cheaper_to_rent_in_china/lm5vjsb/):
> It is pretty damning. We're told the chip embargo has failed, and smugglers have been running rampant for years, and China is about to jump light years beyond the West and enslave us with AXiI (if you will) . . .
>
> And then an expert casually remarks that all of China put together, smuggling chips since 2022, has fewer H100s than Elon Musk orders for his datacenter while playing *Elden Ring*. And even with that huge bottleneck and 1.4 billion people, there's so little demand for them that they cost less per hour than in the West, where AI is redhot and we can't get enough H100s in datacenters. (And where the serious AI people are now discussing how to put that many into a single datacenter for a single run before the next scaleup with B200s obsoletes those...)
**14:** A company called [Cosm](https://www.cosm.com) has raised $250 million to build “immersive sports experiences”, ie giant buildings sort of like a cross between a stadium and a movie theater where people can get together and watch high-quality televised sports games in a “realistic” setting; they already have facilities in Dallas and Los Angeles.
**15:** Cremieux: [The Ottoman Origins Of Modernity](https://www.cremieux.xyz/p/the-ottoman-origins-of-modernity). The “Ottoman” bit is a distractor; the Ottomans fought the Catholics long enough for the Protestants to get a foothold, and then the Protestants established modernity. A useful pushback against the pushback that the Catholic Church never persecuted scientists or held back progress. I’m most interested in this post in the context of Cremieux saying he wrote it in two hours. Even I can’t work that fast!
**16:** The Green Party, a US third party, tried to put their candidate Jill Stein on the ballot in November. The Nevada election office [sent them the wrong forms and gave them false advice about the process](https://www.npr.org/2024/09/20/nx-s1-5114966/supreme-court-jill-stein-nevada). The Greens filed the wrong forms, the Democrats sued, and the Supreme Court disqualified Stein, calling the election office’s incorrect advice an “unfortunate mistake”. I’m disappointed in this outcome - partly for the obvious reasons, but also because the incorrect forms they submitted technically should have [added a state referendum to the ballot containing only the text “Jill Stein”.](https://x.com/baranskocracy/status/1832784598649962626) If they’re going to disqualify her candidacy, then I think they should at least hold the state referendum!
**17:** [Nostalgebraist](https://www.tumblr.com/nostalgebraist/762931781730271232): Google has a new tool out that will create an AI podcast for any text; you hand it the text (could be a blog post, article, or work of fiction), and the tool generates a podcast of two AI hosts discussing it. You can find podcast discussions of Nostalgebraist’s fiction (Northern Caves and Almost Nowhere) at the link, but the acknowledged peak of the genre is [Podcast Hosts Discover They’re AI, Not Human, And Spiral Into Existential Meltdown](https://www.reddit.com/r/artificial/comments/1frk1gi/notebooklm_podcast_hosts_discover_theyre_ai_not/).
**18:** Also Nostalgebraist: [The Case For Chain Of Thought Unfaithfulness Is Overstated](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HQyWGE2BummDCc2Cx/the-case-for-cot-unfaithfulness-is-overstated). New AIs like o1 give “chain of thought”, ie display what they’re thinking after each step. This seems like a promising avenue to solve alignment - just see whether they’re thinking “and now I will plot against humans”. Unfortunately it’s not so easy; the chain of thought [isn’t always accurate](https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.04388) (you can sometimes catch the AI “hiding” thoughts it doesn’t want its human overseers to know, like when it’s using a racial stereotype). This article argues that these examples aren’t as exciting as they sound, and chain-of-thought accurately reflects reasoning for most tasks.
**19:** Australian government [considers making doxxing a crime](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-12/albanese-government-will-outlaw-doxxing/104340372) punishable by up to seven years in jail.
**20:** Getting your brain cryogenically frozen after your death [is now free](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WE65pBLQvNk3h3Dnr/cryonics-is-free).
**21:** Cube Flipper: [Hypercomputation without bothering the cactus people](https://smoothbrains.net/posts/2024-09-26-hypercomputation-without-bothering-the-cactus-people.html). The visual system must solve difficult math problems when translating the 2D visual field into a 3D world. Can we harness this innate mathematical ability to do arbitrary work? Cognitive scientist Mark Changizi [developed](https://gwern.net/doc/cs/algorithm/2008-changizi.pdf) a series of visual circuits (eg XOR gates) based on Necker cubes, probably easier seen than described:
After surveying the field, Cube Flipper proposes a more advanced visual computer based on taking DMT and viewing certain types of tiles with slight deviations:
…and makes the extreme claim that something like this might demonstrate hypercomputation, ie the visual system has semi-magic computational properties beyond those permitted by normal physical laws. I am skeptical but appreciate the survey of visual computing (as well as the callback to [one of my older posts](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=slate+star+cactus+person)).
**22:** Material implication in Mormonism: In the book *Doctrines and Covenants*, Joseph Smith [reports](https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/130?lang=eng) that God told him that if he lived to be 85, he would see the Second Coming (which would place it in 1890 - 1891). Mormon apologists [note](https://askgramps.org/did-joseph-smith-prophesy-that-christ-would-appear-in-his-lifetime/) that Joseph Smith did not live to be 85, so no conclusion can be drawn.
**23:** More old-timey psychiatric ads (this one is from 1952, source: [@justin\_garson](https://x.com/justin_garson/status/1841088161499197477)):
This was before they invented what we would call antidepressants today; Dexedrine is an amphetamine related to Adderall.
**24:** Congratulations to Open Philanthropy, the biggest effective altruist foundation…
…whose grantee David Baker recently [won a Nobel Prize](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/2024/baker/facts/) for his research on synthetic proteins. Potential applications include new drugs, vaccines, and materials.
**25:** [Rich Kid Memes And The Online Culture Of The One Percent](https://substack.com/home/post/p-149292300). Rich people who want to signal group membership to other rich people online can’t boast about how rich they are; that would be gauche. Instead, they’ve settled on the solution of *making fun of rich people* in hyperspecific language that proves familiarity with the culture.
**26:** [Tap Water Sommelier](https://tapwatersommelier.substack.com/p/how-to-grow-your-princes): Vladimir Putin has two sons, ages 5 and 9. They are kept in luxurious but total isolation from the outside world and raised by flunkies who are too scared to punish/restrain them in any way. Also some discussion of an unexpected historical analogue.
**27:** [Experiment from Colombia](https://x.com/JPubEcon/status/1841250098061185408): replacing experienced teachers with less-experience but higher-scoring-on-tests teachers significantly decreased student performance. Got to admit I was expecting the opposite of this, I’d seen US data saying that [experience didn’t matter](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0742051X20313810) and [teacher intelligence did](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20727/w20727.pdf). Looking over this more, I find lots of studies on both sides and will go back to agnosticism on this question until someone I trust investigates further.
**28:** [Large scale-formal Intellectual Turing Test](https://www.experimental-history.com/p/ideological-turing-test) finds that people can imitate partisans effectively; ie nobody on either side can tell the difference between a Democrat arguing for Democrat values vs. a Republican-pretending-to-be-a-Democrat arguing for Democrat values (and vice versa). This study used a 100 word essay on why you supported your party ([you can see if you can do better here](https://ituringtest.com/)), but past attempts with different structures ([religion](https://www.patheos.com/blogs/unequallyyoked/2012/06/2012-ideological-turing-test-index-post.html), [vegetarianism](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/xirQ3EKWoKrcmqcoH/vegetarianism-ideological-turing-test-results), [polyamory](https://thingofthings.wordpress.com/2020/09/25/poly-itt-results/)) have shown broadly the same results. The researchers try to put this in the context of various studies showing that people do misunderstand their opponents (eg think they’re more extreme, underestimate the level of common ground), but it seems like intellectual Turing Tests aren’t a good way to measure or tease out this misunderstanding.
**29:** Congratulations to Substacker [WoolyAI](https://substack.com/@woolyai/note/c-72357343?) for doing the impossible and providing a genuinely novel and interesting (to me) take on pickup artistry:
**30:** Did you know: [if you Google “cool websites”](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=cool+websites), our subreddit ([r/slatestarcodex](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/)) is the first result.
**31:** Moshe Koppel, [who works at the intersection of computer science and Talmud](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Koppel), is writing a series of posts (presumably) based off of my Every Bay Area House Party, titled [Jerusalem Area House Party](https://moshekoppel.substack.com/p/jerusalem-area-house-party) (it’s multiple part, you have to go to the main Substack page to find the others). I won’t necessarily link everyone who riffs off one of my posts - but honestly I probably will if you also have a Wikipedia page that describes you as working on computational Talmudology.
**32:** David Roman [says it’s a myth](https://mankind.substack.com/p/quick-take-no-muslim-scribes-and) that Arabic scholars rescued and preserved the works of the great classical authors.
**33:** Medications often decrease “secondary endpoints” (eg stroke, heart attack), but the holy grail of pharma studies is proving that a certain drug decreases all-cause mortality. This is much harder (not all heart attacks kill people, and people die from lots of other things), but is the strongest possible endorsement for the drug (without it, you might worry that it only prevented non-fatal heart attacks, or that it killed as many people through side effects as it saves through heart attack prevention). Even great medications that we’re confident in can’t always clear this bar. But a new JAMA article adds another member to this select club: [Adderall decreases all-cause mortality in ADHD](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2816084), probably because it prevents drug addiction, car accidents, and impulsive actions.
**34:** Before the Gulf War got in the way, Saddam Hussein was building [some crazy mosques](https://www.amusingplanet.com/2016/12/saddam-husseins-unfinished-mosques.html):
**35:** [Italy bans surrogacy](https://unherd.com/newsroom/italys-surrogacy-ban-undermines-family-values/) - quite strictly, too, Italians aren’t even allowed to go abroad and do it. I am so sorry for all the Italians who will never get to be mothers and fathers because their government hates progress. You might hope that, whatever the other disadvantages of anti-immigrant parties, at least they’re incentivized to let natives have children, but looks like they can’t even get that one right. Starting to wonder whether the trains even run on time.
**36:** Elsewhere in “Italy sucks” news - did you know [Italy’s tax code effectively bans startups?](https://x.com/aledeniz/status/1842872753499607407) Companies are taxed before making any money, based on how many assets they have. If they have lots of assets but aren’t making money (eg because they’re still doing research / in stealth) then tax officials get confused and hostile and run increasingly punitive audits. [Related](https://x.com/MichaelAArouet/status/1842802627521679624): size of the European tech sector.
It’s the red line on this chart; if you can’t see a red line at your screen resolution, then you’ve learned something important about the the EU tech sector.
**37:** Seen on [@cremieuxrecuel](https://x.com/cremieuxrecueil/status/1847388125695528999)’s twitter (preliminary, needs replication): Jews may have gone from 65-29 Democrat/Republican in 2020 to 58-40 this election.
**38:** Extelligence has a post [responding to my critique of the cultural Christianity argument](https://extelligence.substack.com/p/in-favor-of-cultural-christianity) (among, uh, many other things), but I don’t really think it connects. I’m not telling atheists they can’t go to church/synagogue if it makes them feel happy and fulfilled - I’ve done this myself sometimes. [My post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-the-cultural-christianity) was meant to argue against the claim that, for pragmatic reasons, atheists should support the Christianization of society as a defense against Islam or postmodernism or some other philosophical enemy.
**39:** Related: Extelligence [is finally going for](https://extelligence.substack.com/p/im-putting-a-team-together) their [Trust Assembly](https://extelligence.substack.com/p/how-to-make-an-information-super) project/idea/startup for online consensus-based truth-seeking (I think something like a cross between Community Notes and Wikipedia, but as a browser extension, and for everything). He’s looking for potential developers/testers/users.
**40:** Jiankui He is the Chinese geneticist who made history with the first germline gene editing in humans (resulting in three babies supposedly immune to AIDS, although nobody has tested this). China sentenced him to three years in prison for unauthorized experimentation, but now he’s out of jail, [has an English-language Twitter account](https://x.com/Jiankui_He), [has a new lab](https://x.com/Jiankui_He/status/1847161941783204024), [wants to work on Alzheimers](https://x.com/Jiankui_He/status/1846742741625245709), [and seems pretty based](https://x.com/Jiankui_He/status/1848919460985638935) (although [not infinitely based](https://x.com/sebastian_gero/status/1806710550090461620)):
**41:** Anthropic has a new version of their AI Claude [which can use your computer](https://www.anthropic.com/news/developing-computer-use). You give it permission, put it on a virtual desktop, and ask it to do things for you (eg “please find and download a picture of a cat” or “please research these ten things and put them in a text file”.) It moves your cursor, browses the Internet, and creates and saves files. People keep saying they’ll care about AI “when it operates autonomously” or “when it becomes an agent”. But this is a trivial barrier, and one which Computer Use Claude has arguably already passed. So far this feature is limited to developers (though anyone with computer knowledge can sign up for it) but I expect it to be the near future of consumer AI, to get better quickly, and to shade gradually into the “autonomous” “agentic” AI that you all think will require a paradigm shift.
**42:** [Claim](https://x.com/SilverVVulpes/status/1831977072925065533) (from the IDF): Hamas faked polls showing that most Palestinians supported the October 7 attack; the real numbers are 31% in favor, 64% against.
**43:** Otto von Bismarck wanted to trick France into declaring war on Germany. In order to provoke the French, he sent the [Ems Dispatch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ems_dispatch), a statement describing recent diplomatic events in a way that sounded maximally offensive. The French were so offended that “crowds” in Paris demanded war, and the Franco-Prussian War was declared soon afterwards. The part of this that I find most interesting is the text of the dispatch itself, which read:
> After the news of the renunciation of the Prince von Hohenzollern had been communicated to the Imperial French government by the Royal Spanish government, the French Ambassador in Ems made a further demand on His Majesty the King that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King undertook for all time never again to give his assent should the Hohenzollerns once more take up their candidature.
>
> His Majesty the King thereupon refused to receive the Ambassador again and had the latter informed by the Adjutant of the day that His Majesty had no further communication to make to the Ambassador.
I’m fascinated by the idea that only 150 years ago, it was *obvious* that if someone sent you this statement, you *had* to declare war or abandon all honor. If I read it carefully, I can *sort of* parse out that it sounds like the Prussians are unhappy, but that’s the most emotion I gather from it. Anyway, the Franco-Prussian War led to World War I which led to World War II - so if you don’t like 50 million people dying and the total devastation of Europe, blame this statement about ambassadors.
**44:** [The first use of artificial insemination in humans](https://www.scrcivf.com/the-evolution-of-fertility-treatments-and-development-of-ivf/):
> The first recorded case of artificial insemination by donor didn’t occur until 1884, when Dr. William Pancoast decided to treat a couple’s infertility by secretly inseminating the woman with sperm obtained from a medical student. The insemination happened while the patient was under anesthesia and Dr. Pancoast did not tell her what had occurred. She gave birth to a baby boy nine months later, but it was several years before the doctor finally confessed to her husband what he had done. Neither man ever informed the mother. It was 25 years later the result of this case was published. Dr. Pancoast was roundly condemned for his actions, but it did open the door for consensual sperm donor insemination.
**45:** ClearerThinking [administers several personality tests to the same people](https://www.clearerthinking.org/post/announcing-the-ultimate-personality-test-2-0) to learn more about their comparative accuracy. I am most interested in their finding that tests with “factors” (eg the Big Five, where you rate people on a numeric scale) are inherently more accurate than those with “types” (eg Myers-Briggs, where you assign someone a specific category) and that, adjusting for this, Big Five is no more predictive than the Enneagram:
**46:** In 2022, I wrote [Whither Tartaria](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/whither-tartaria), where I asked why ornate classical styles switched to more austere modernist styles around 1900 - 1950 in a variety of different arts (painting, architecture, literature, poetry, etc). I proposed seven theories, but was unsure which if any were true. Since then, Samuel Hughes of Works In Progress has been investigating. In May, he wrote [a well-researched article showing](https://worksinprogress.co/issue/the-beauty-of-concrete/) that it wasn’t just increasing cost, because ornate classical architecture now costs less than ever. Now [in a new article he demolishes a different theory](https://www.worksinprogress.news/p/cheap-ornament-and-status-games) - it’s not just *decreasing* cost (and subsequent lack of ability to signal wealth) - because costs didn’t decrease in several other arts, and the change was led by artists with rich people as reluctant followers. He concludes:
> Modernism may well be a status game of some kind; it may well signal taste more than it signals wealth; and this latter feature may be one of the things that distinguishes it from older artistic styles. But the mechanism by which this change came about must be different to the one Alexander describes.
**47:** Sort of kind of related - [When Hamilton Lost Its Snob Appeal](https://x.com/robkhenderson/status/1846939127813492746). The musical *Hamilton* was briefly an artistic/cultural phenomenon, but tastemakers eventually switched to making fun of it. Why? Rob Henderson says it happened after ticket prices came down and the common people could enjoy it. I disagree: everyone I knew who was into *Hamilton* got into it from the free online soundtrack long before they’d seen the show; I think this is more likely the usual fad cycle where anybody who’s too into yesterday’s fad is behind the curve and therefore uncool.
**48:** Related: [Why are people such jerks to public intellectuals?](https://stetson.substack.com/p/the-public-intellectual-paradox) And [more](https://substack.com/@philosophybear/note/c-70119335). I agree this is a great mystery.
**49:** [Some prominent Substack psychiatrists doing a video Q&A, submit your questions here](https://socraticpsychiatrist.substack.com/p/substack-psychiatry-video-q-and-a).
**50:** [Naomi Kanakia](https://www.woman-of-letters.com/p/literacy-is-good-or-bad-perhaps):
> *The Literacy Delusion* had a number of explanations for why reading books seemed to be so much worse for human beings (in terms of emotional wellness and productivity) than other forms of narrative entertainment, but its main theory was the integration hypothesis. That the stream of words in a book trained the human brain into a habit of self-consciousness, that reading books forced human beings to think of themselves as a stream of text, processed through time, making a coherent argument of some sort. And that this overall flattening effect forced readers to ignore aspects of their personality or their situation that were not otherwise in line with the overarching story they'd created about themselves. Basically, reading books causes repression and neurosis. *The Literacy Delusion* argued that, yes, human beings are storytelling machines, but that a stream of written text is a particularkind of story—a story that is particularly flat, particularly devoid of conflicting or harmonizing information—and that this flatness creates a peculiar effect on the human brain.
**51:** Last month, I linked Sasha Gusev’s [No, Intelligence Is Not Like Height](https://theinfinitesimal.substack.com/p/no-intelligence-is-not-like-height) and asked people who disagreed to share their arguments; they sure did.
First, several people pointed me to a new preprint, [Family-GWAS Reveals Effects Of Environment And Mating On Genetic Associations](https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.10.01.24314703v1), which finds that one of the main papers Gusev cited to make his case, [Howe 2022](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-022-01062-7), made a mistake - imputing sibling genotypes using a process designed for non-sibling genotypes - and that once that mistake is corrected, the finding disappears and intelligence and height appear similar.
Second, Joseph Bronski has [a more specific post where he responds to Gusev’s points one by one](https://www.josephbronski.com/p/does-molecular-data-overturn-iq-twin). He accuses Gusev of “[making] up his own chart to remove the error bars [from the originals], to obscure the fact that the study found no evidence for this in IQ”, and says that the cases where he didn’t do that are just “population stratification and range restriction”.
Third, Noah Carl at Aporia, instead of writing a direct response like Bronski, [argues that the usual method of attacking twin studies is obsolete](https://www.aporiamagazine.com/p/a-response-to-sasha-gusev-on-iq); not only have the most-debated assumptions behind twin studies been thoroughly validated, but there are now other lines of evidence besides twin studies which confirm high IQ heritability.
Fourth, Leonardo Parro (not framed as a response to Gusev) [goes into more depth about one of those ways](https://www.sebjenseb.net/p/iq-is-highly-heritable), a “pedigree-based analysis” demonstrating heritability of 54 - 69%, ie no “missing heritability” compared to twin studies. He summarizes this as the effect of “rare variants” compared to the usual SNPs - ie if you only look at the most common genes that are easiest to find, you get “missing heritability” compared to twin studies, but if you widen your search to rare genes that are hard to find, you don’t.
**52:** Extremely related: Heliospect is a startup promising polygenic selection for IQ and other traits; they were trying to stay in stealth mode but [The Guardian spied on them and nonconsensually revealed their existence](https://archive.is/urFkV). The [discussion](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1g6ia18/us_startup_charging_couples_to_screen_embryos_for/) on the r/ssc subreddit centered on their claim that (given enough embryos to choose from) they could increase a baby’s expected IQ by 6 points (I’ve also heard 7.5). Sasha Gusev had [previously argued](https://theinfinitesimal.substack.com/p/science-fictions-are-outpacing-science) that current technology maxed out at 3.5 and future technology would max out at 6, so a claim of 6 - 7.5 is pretty extreme; Gwern, who wrote [the pioneering analysis of this technology](https://gwern.net/embryo-selection), was also skeptical. But Heliospect says they’ve got better predictors than academia that use the rare variants everyone else misses; after talking to the company, [Gwern retracted his objections](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1g6ia18/us_startup_charging_couples_to_screen_embryos_for/lsjsb9c/) and says he finds their claim “pretty plausible”. Local ACX commenter geneticist Gene Smith also redid some calculations, changed his mind, and [says](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1g6ia18/us_startup_charging_couples_to_screen_embryos_for/lslwqjq/) “probably pretty realistic”. I find this interesting not just because of the [polygenic selection](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/welcome-polygenically-screened-babies) angle, but because if Heliospect is right then their predictor is able to predict more genetic IQ than the “missing heritability” people believe exists, and it should be able to put this argument to bed once and for all.
**53:** This month in censorship:
* X/Twitter [banned journalist Ken Klippenstein](https://x.com/Ike_Saul/status/1839406041894703171) for sharing the Trump campaign’s dossier on JD Vance. Twitter’s side of the story is that the dossier was probably originally stolen by Iranian agents and they don’t want to support that kind of thing by letting people signal-boost the illicitly obtained goods; [you can read Klippenstein’s side here.](https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/twitter-banned-me) He [appears to be unbanned now](https://x.com/kenklippenstein?lang=en).
* UPenn [suspended tenured professor law professor](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty-issues/academic-freedom/2024/09/24/penns-amy-wax-punished-statements-wont-lose-job) Amy Wax for “inflammatory statements about Black Americans, Asians, and others”; Wax protested her ban [in a DC event held together with Steve Sailer](https://unherd.com/newsroom/is-steve-sailer-re-entering-the-conservative-mainstream/), so I guess she’s not exactly beating the allegations. Aaron Sibarium [claims](https://x.com/aaronsibarium/status/1839306672004804878) that “Penn tried to buy Amy Wax’s silence by offering her a deal: it would water down the sanctions against her—and take a pay cut off the table—provided she kept quiet about the case and stopped accusing the university of censoring her. As you might guess, Wax refused.”
* Asian News International is an Indian news organization. Its Wikipedia page stated it had a history of being a propaganda outlet for the regime. ANI sued Wikipedia, and as the case continues, the judge has ordered Wikipedia to take down its article on ANI. You can read the archived version [here](https://archive.ph/dNTEl).
I don’t list acts of censorship here because I necessarily disagree with them or think it’s impossible to support the censor’s actions, but I’m experimenting with trying to Streisand Effect any censored content I come across to make censorship decisions more costly.
**54:** Koreans are not okay:
I know about the cram schools, long work hours, and the gender wars which somehow manage to be even worse than the ones here, but I’m still looking for good articles with more details on what’s so bad and how it got that way. | Scott Alexander | 150644088 | Links For November 2024 | acx |
# ACX Endorses Harris, Oliver, Or Stein
**I.**
Time to own the libs! ACX joins such based heterodox thinkers as [Curtis Yarvin](https://graymirror.substack.com/p/bidenharris-2024), [Nick Fuentes](https://www.newsweek.com/conservative-influencer-nick-fuentes-refuses-back-donald-trump-2024-election-1927860), [Richard Spencer](https://www.newsweek.com/richard-spencer-donald-trump-iran-qassem-soleimani-1481246), and [David Duke](https://www.newsweek.com/former-kkk-leader-david-duke-endorses-jill-stein-trashes-donald-trump-1969710) in telling you what [the woke Washington Post](https://www.cjr.org/political_press/the-washington-post-opinion-editor-approved-a-harris-endorsement-a-week-later-the-papers-publisher-killed-it.php) and failing [LA Times](https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2024-10-25/latimes-no-presidential-endorsement-decison-resignations) don’t want you to know: Donald Trump is the wrong choice for US President.
If you’re in a swing state, we recommend you vote Harris; if a safe state, Harris or your third-party candidate of choice.
*[**EDIT/UPDATE:** If you’re in a safe state and want to trade your protest vote with a swing state voter, or vice versa, go to <https://www.swapyourvote.org/>]*
I mostly stand by the reasoning in my 2016 post, [Slate Star Codex Endorses Clinton, Johnson, Or Stein](https://slatestarcodex.com/2016/09/28/ssc-endorses-clinton-johnson-or-stein/). But you can read a better and more recent argument against Trump’s economic policy [here](https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/realistically-how-much-damage-could), and against his foreign policy [here](https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/the-free-world-teeters-on-the-edge). You can read an argument that Trump is a dangerous authoritarian [here](https://benthams.substack.com/p/in-defense-of-trump-derangement-syndrome).
You *can,* but you won’t, because every American, most foreigners, and a substantial fraction of extra-solar aliens have already heard all of this a thousand times. I’m under no illusion of having anything new to say, or having much chance of changing minds. I write this out of a vague sense of deontological duty rather than a consequentialist hope that anything will happen.
And I’m writing the rest of this post because I feel bad posting a couple of paragraph endorsement and not following up. No guarantees this is useful to anybody.
**II.**
I think the strongest argument against Trump is the argument from authoritarianism. But what *is* authoritarianism in this context? [As I argued years ago](https://slatestarcodex.com/2016/11/16/you-are-still-crying-wolf/), Trump isn’t Hitler, isn’t going to put people in death camps, and probably his approval rating among minorities won’t even dip below the 30s. So what am I worried about?
One worry is that Trump tries to pack election boards with his supporters and give them a mandate to fiddle with election law in ways that make him more likely to win ([I don’t claim Democrats never do this](https://www.gp.org/jill_stein_slams_nevada_supreme_court), just that Trump has openly endorsed doing it orders of magnitude more). This probably can’t swing 60-40 elections, but it might swing 51-49 elections, and [nowadays almost every election is 51-49](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-median-voter-theorem).
Another is that Trump might threaten opponents with jail time (or simply loss of government contracts) unless they support him. I don’t know whether [Jeff Bezos’ decision to shift Washington Post away from endorsing Harris](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/10/26/metro/washington-post-bezos-endorsement-trump/) was motivated by fear, but it’s a good model for the type of situation I worry about.
This is far from Hitler or even Stalin. The model I worry about most is [Hugo Chavez](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/dictator-book-club-chavez), who had no concentration camps and barely even managed a secret police. And Chavez himself was only slightly more interesting than hundred other tinpot generalissimos in a hundred different banana republics. None of these countries will ever be the villains in an Indiana Jones movie, but none of them are First World countries with great economies and vital contributions to scientific progress either. They’re just somewhat-poor, somewhat-corrupt places whose citizens keep trying to swim across the Rio Grande and make it to the US where there’s still freedom and opportunity.
(I’m obviously not arguing that Trump will follow Chavez’s footsteps into communism, just that his strategy to consolidate power will be similar)
Why does autocracy correlate with low development? I’m not sure, and I’m not trying to make some grand Acemoglu-style thesis, but again Chavez provides a useful model. Chavez fired everyone competent or independent in government, because they sometimes talked back to him or disagreed with him; he replaced them with craven yes-men and toadies. His ideas weren’t all bad, but when he did have bad ideas, there was nobody to challenge or veto them. He frequently chose what was good for his ego (or his ability to short-term maintain power) over what was good for the country, and there was no system to punish him for those decisions. Since rule-of-law would block his whims, he kept undermining rule-of-law until it was no longer strong enough to protect things like property, investment, or a free economy. Ambitious educated people, seeing nothing left in Venezuela besides a lifetime of trying to out-bootlick the other bootlickers to curry favor from a narcissist, left the country for greener pastures.
You don’t get from a flourishing democracy to Hugo Chavez in one leap - at least not without a politician younger and more vigorous than Trump. But our democracy isn’t entirely flourishing right now, and frogs are easily boiled. My threat model is less “Trump himself is exactly like Chavez”, and more “Trump’s election shows there are minimal consequences for violating norms; he brings us 10% closer to a banana republic; during the next election, both candidates violate the norms, the next guy brings us 20% closer to a banana republic, and so on.” The Republicans are already arguing [that the Democrats’ authoritarian experimentation with cancel culture means it’s only fair that they get to have a mobocratic censorship regime too, if they ever get back in power](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/some-practical-considerations-before). Once Trump escalates a bit, the Democrat after him will feel the same way and escalate even more. There will be plenty more chances to stop the cycle - but, like the proverb about planting the tree, the best time was ten years ago and the second-best time is now.
**III.**
The strongest counterargument to the above is that yes, authoritarianism is bad - and yes, Trump will take us a bit of the way to being a second-world country - but the Democrats are more authoritarian and worse.
Or, rather, the Democrats may not be “authoritarian” in the strictest sense of the dictionary definition, but that’s because the Democrats wrote the dictionary and defined the term to mean “bad in the exact way that bad conservatives are bad” (this is almost literally true; a lot of the current authoritarianism discussion comes from a construct invented by Theodor Adorno called [“right-wing authoritarianism”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_authoritarianism)).
As fellow-Harris-supporter Curtis Yarvin reminds us, right-wing authoritarianism looks like a dictator with a cult of personality eroding norms and centralizing power; left-wing . . . badness . . . looks like a semi-decentralized convergence of cultural elites into a stifling monoculture bent on increasing its own power by forcing all government and private actions to go through a gauntlet of priest-bureaucrats drawn from the cultural-elite-class.
Although the exact process is different, both right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing monoculture end in the same place: government control over everything, unfreedom of thought, retribution against dissenters, and the gradual siphoning of all productive activity to serve a parasitic ruling clique.
Put this way, you could argue: okay, January 6 was bad. But it was like a ten-year-old child's idea of authoritarianism. You seize power by getting a bunch of people to zerg rush the opposing politicians and beat them up until they declare you in charge. Too bad you were foiled by a locked door, you'll get them next time. I won't claim this strategy has never successfully taken over a government, because history is long and weird. But I can't think of any examples.
When I look at actual democratic backsliding, it looks nothing like this. It looks like a group of clever well-placed people gradually tightening the knot while maintaining plausible deniability. A court-packing here, but only because the old court was hidebound and reactionary. A carefully-worded constitutional amendment there, but only because nothing ever got done under the old system. A corruption crackdown, but only because corruption is genuinely bad. Then ten years later you wake up and one set of guys control everything and if you speak out against them they can destroy your life.
So (continues the strongest argument I can think of for supporting Trump) the Republicans egged on a guy with face paint and a horned helmet to smash furniture in the Capitol. Meanwhile, the Democrats got every social media company in the country to censor opposing opinions while swearing up and down that they were doing nothing of the sort, all on some sort of plausible but never-put-into-so-many-words threat that things would go worse for them if they didn’t. They did it so elegantly and naturally that even now nobody really wants to call them on it - partly because it’s hard to tell where free corporate choice ended and government coercion started, and partly because they’ve successfully established a culture where it’s declasse to even talk about it. So, which side are you more scared of?
This is the one pro-Trump argument that genuinely bothers me, but I have four counterarguments.
**First**, consider the Just Stop Oil protesters who throw paint on art. I believe these people are bad. But (you might say) these people are fighting fossil fuel executives whose terrible decisions have killed hundreds of thousands of people through particulate pollution and may yet kill orders of magnitude more through global warming. Surely this is worse than ruining one picture, which can probably be restored later anyway. So how can we put the paint-throwers in jail, while letting the fossil fuel executives go free?
Actually we can do this very easily, because the paint-throwers broke the law, and the fossil fuel executives didn’t. Unless you’re the dumbest sort of naive consequentialist, [you punish people who have violated bright-line norms](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/08/28/contra-askell-on-moral-offsets/), not people doing stuff you think is subtly damaging, *even if* the subtle damage may add up to more harm than the bright-line norm violations. You do this because it’s the prerequisite for having civilization at all: everyone disagrees on what’s subtly damaging, but everyone should be able to get behind protecting paintings. If people come together and form institutions to prevent bright-line violations everyone agrees on, and you pervert them or to fight your preferred battle against subtle damage, eventually those institutions lose credibility and you can’t do either.
(compare institutions that were formed bright-line mandates to discover truth or advance knowledge that shifted to warring against the subtle damage of racism or right-wing-opinions or whatever. Those institutions have now lost the ability to do either task, and rightly so.)
A single shoplifter or paint-thrower does very little damage, but this is true *only because* we jealously protect the norms against these kinds of people. If we truly gave up on punishing shoplifters, everyone would steal from everyone else and civilization would collapse. Asking “why should we punish shoplifters when they do so little damage?” is like asking “why should we vaccinate against measles when measles is so rare?”.
Here the Democrats are the fossil fuel executives slowly boiling democracy to death, and the Republicans are the activists throwing paint on it. Our first priority is to punish the bright-line violation, lest civilization collapse; afterwards we can focus on pushing back against the subtle damage.
You can’t even start worrying about whether bureaucrats are forming a priestly caste until you solve mobs trying to beat up the opposing side’s politicians. Yes, left-wingers are subtly weaponizing norms to support their own side, in much the same way that once you’ve established basic principles of non-murder / non-theft / capitalism, businessmen can exploit those principles to run businesses you don’t like. “People are working within the system to do something I don’t like” is a *more refined level of problem* than “there is no system and we’re in the state of nature murdering each other”. First you need to maintain a peaceful country that runs on the rule-of-law, and if you succeed, only then can you take your next step of worrying about all the people trying to find sneaky ways to gather power within the system.
Unless you want to vote third party, you can only use your vote to thwart/punish one side or the other. I think thwarting/punishing Trump’s foundation-level attack on norms using violence and rule-of-law-violations is a higher priority than thwarting/punishing the Democrats’ more subtle strategy of undermining liberalism within its existing norms.
**Second**, and more practically, there are political headwinds for left-wing monoculture right now, and tailwinds for the right-wing authoritarianism.
The most obvious is SCOTUS, which is firmly Republican. They seem pretty interested in the project of rolling back the past few decades of progressive power grabs, and I’m pretty happy with a lot of how that is going. But the sovereign immunity ruling suggests they’re not willing to be a strong bulwark against right-wing authoritarianism. Given that we have a judicial defense against the left but not the right, it’s probably safer to elect left-wingers than right-wingers.
The other tailwind is intra-party cohesion. Donald Trump spent the past eight years purging the Republican Party of people willing to stand up to him. The current head of the RNC is Donald Trump’s daughter-in-law. Meanwhile, the Democrats are delightfully unorganized, such that there are constant rumors that Joe Biden is trying to sink Kamala Harris, that Nancy Pelosi made some kind of horrendous blackmail threat to Joe Biden, and that possibly all of these people are part of a shadow war between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. I don’t believe any of it, but it’s pretty funny and less worrying from an ability-to-consolidate-power standpoint than what’s happening with the GOP.
Full disclosure: this isn’t a crux for me and I probably would have still opposed Trump even if the Supreme Court was mostly liberal and the Democratic Party was more cohesive.
**Third**, and more idealistically, I would feel like a total hypocrite with no ground to stand on if I claimed to be pro-freedom, pro-liberalism, and pro-democracy, but didn’t really take a stand against somebody trying to attack enemy politicians and rig an election. I don’t think people would take me seriously or think of me as a good faith interlocutor in the future, and I don’t think I would even be able to think of myself that way.
**Fourth**, for every bad thing the Democrats are doing to subtly-in-the-long-term-within-the-system try to undermine freedom, Trump also wants to do those things.
For example, [Maxim Lott sort of makes a version](https://www.maximumtruth.org/p/the-rational-case-for-trump) of the steelman argument above:
> While Trump is often portrayed as the threat to US democracy, it’s Kamala Harris who has endorsed eliminating the filibuster . . . That’s no idle threat, as every Democrat in the senate already voted to end the filibuster (besides the two who are retiring: Manchin and Sinema.)
Forget whether eliminating the filibuster should really count as a threat to democracy; a simpler counterargument is that [Trump also wants to eliminate the filibuster!](https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/26/donald-trump-kill-the-filibuster-677151) Nobody even cares, because Trump wants to do so many worse things that it gets lost in the noise.
Or take the many legal cases that Democrat-controlled prosecutors’ offices have filed against Trump since he lost the presidency. Are these politically-motivated show trials? As usual, the Democrats have so carefully followed the rules and covered their tracks so that it’s hard to say for sure. But it’s fair to be suspicious, and I know people who are considering voting for Trump on this basis alone. Meanwhile, here’s Trump:
> “WHEN I WIN, those people that CHEATED will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the Law, which will include long term prison sentences,” Trump wrote. “Please beware that this legal exposure extends to Lawyers, Political Operatives, Donors, Illegal Voters, & Corrupt Election Officials."
>
> Last month, after the Democratic National Convention, Trump reposted artificial intelligence-generated images of his enemies — including Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Nancy Pelosi, Anthony Fauci and Bill Gates — in orange jumpsuits with the caption: “HOW TO ACTUALLY ‘FIX THE SYSTEM.’”
>
> Trump has also reposted a photo of special counsel Jack Smith with the statement, “He should be prosecuted for election interference & prosecutorial misconduct.” And over the summer, Trump posted photos of former President Barack Obama and former Republican Rep. Liz Cheney with text calling for their prosecution at “public military tribunals.”
I’m not trying to make fun of Maxim or the show-trials people. I find myself falling into this kind of thinking myself. Part of Trump’s genius is being bad in so many ways that no particular way stands out and it seems like he must not be that bad.
IYKYK
**IV.**
"Abandon Harris" is a group of Muslim-Americans who campaign against Kamala Harris to "punish her" (their words) for supporting Israel's war in Gaza. You can see their website at https://abandonharris.com
One word conspicuously missing is "Trump". Doesn't Trump support Israel even more than Harris? Doesn't he have lots of other policies that Muslims might object to - like the infamous "Muslim travel ban"? You can, if you dig hard enough, find a video in the FAQ where one of the leaders admits Trump is also bad. But, he says, if Muslim-Americans elect Trump, then it will teach the Democrats not to take them for granted, and maybe they'll get more concessions next time.
I might criticize their strategy in more depth in another post, but I won’t deny it makes a certain kind of perverse sense. More than that though, something here resonates with me psychologically. I keep having to shake myself out of viewing this election as a psychodrama with two characters: myself and the Democratic Party.
A digression: back in 2010, when New Atheism was the big thing, I was in a college atheist club. The membership divided neatly into two groups. First, people like me, who were young and liberal and philosophically-inclined and thought it would be a fun place to discuss the big questions. Second, people who had been raised in a fundamentalist religion, been traumatized by it, had some kind of incredibly dramatic break, lost all their friends and family members, and failed to separate cleanly. There was still some splinter of the religion lodged in their mind, they hated it, and all they could do was constantly re-enact their trauma by arguing against their faith in an environment where everyone agreed with them and they would definitely win. These are the people who would spend the whole session droning on about how the first Book of Heberdazzah said King Shmog died in Beersheeba, but the second book of Heberdazzah said King Shmog died in Jerusalem, so the whole thing was a flimsy tower of cards that no sane person could possibly believe. I make fun of them, but they had more right to be there than I did - I was amusing myself, and they were fighting a psychological life-and-death battle. I hope they found what they were looking for.
This is how I think about politics too. Some people are just there to discuss industrial policy. Other people - well, the Right-Thinking Liberal Establishment is a lot like a fundamentalist religion. You grow up believing it preconsciously and absolutely, you see some cracks in it, you freak out, you go through a multi-year period of will-I-or-won't-I, you eventually find some stable point just within the periphery or just outside of it, and either everyone you love abandons you, or they don't. You'll always have a little splinter of it stuck in you and you'll never be entirely happy. Why do you think people can make infinity billion dollars starting an anti-woke Substack? Who's paying that money? Not psychologically well-adjusted people with no wokeness-related trauma, that's my guess.
When you're in that state of mind, you end up like those Muslims in Michigan. Your world narrows to a two-character psychodrama between yourself and the Democrats. In this psychodrama, the Republican Party is an offscreen character, mentioned but never seen. It fills the same role as Emmanuel Goldstein in 1984: a formless target representing either everything you hate or everything you hope for, depending on how the psychodrama goes. Nobody knew Emmanuel Goldstein's position on tax rates, and it would be insane to ask.
When I feel tempted to hoist the black flag, it's not because Trump has good policies. It's for the same reason as the Muslims in Michigan; my world has narrowed into two points.
So for example, Kamala Harris threatens to put price controls on the economy. This is horrible and activates a whole complex about Democrats being economically-illiterate mobocratic socialists out to destroy economic freedom. Fine, she deserves this. But when I zoom out a little, Trump's economic policies include rolling back Federal Reserve independence, "auto insurance prices falling by 50%" (how? does he think auto insurers will voluntarily choose to do this?), trade wars with other countries, limits on the importation of food, and, uh, [price](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-will-not-tolerate-price-gouging-hoarding-critical-supplies-needed-combat-coronavirus/) [controls](https://cei.org/blog/prescription-drug-price-controls-are-a-trump-legacy-worth-eradicating/) (admittedly less general than Harris’). I don't want to argue about whether all of those add up to being more economically-illiterate, more anti-capitalist, or more dangerous for the economy than Kamala's price controls. My point is that the part of me that gets angry about Kamala's price controls has no opinion on any of these things.
A long time ago, I wrote about [the difference between ingroup, outgroup, and fargroup](https://slatestarcodex.com/2016/07/27/post-partisanship-is-hyper-partisanship/). Ingroup and outgroup you know. But how come people have stronger emotions about Ibram X. Kendi (or Chris Rufo) than about Kim Jong-un or whoever's committing the latest genocide in Sudan? It's not because you're American and naturally care about American affairs - how about that Brazilian judge who banned Elon Musk's X? It's because all those guys are part of your psychodrama and some Sudanese psychopath isn't. Well, Kamala Harris' price controls are my outgroup; Donald Trump setting tariffs is my fargroup.
I don't know if anyone besides me and that handful of Muslims is in this exact situation. It sure looks like Donald Trump appears in many people's psychodramas. You can tell because they can't mention his name without an outburst of "Orange Hitler cheeto fascist tiny hands Nazi". Those people have their own work to do.
But when I ask what work *I* have to do, it’s to prod the part of my brain that says “The Democrats are terrible! You should lodge a protest vote!” and remind it that Trump is also terrible. This isn’t a null hypothesis test, where you consider whether the Democrats are worth voting for, and then, if not, vote for their opponent. It’s a comparison on the merits of two alternatives. All of this will be unbelievably obvious to 99% of you, but I promised I’d try to say something different from all the other articles on this exact topic, and the best I can do is reach out to the 0.001% other people stuck in the same psychological vortex I was and see if any of it rings true.
If so, ACX recommends voting for Harris, Oliver, or Stein. | Scott Alexander | 150962209 | ACX Endorses Harris, Oliver, Or Stein | acx |
# The Case Against California Proposition 36
*[This is a guest post by Clara Collier. Clara is the editor of [Asterisk Magazine](https://asteriskmag.com/).]*
Proposition 36 is a California ballot measure that increases mandatory sentences for certain drug and theft crimes.
It’s also a referendum on over a decade of sentencing reform efforts stemming from California’s historical prison overcrowding crisis. Like many states, California passed increasingly tough sentencing laws through the 90s and early 2000s. This led to the state’s prisons operating massively over capacity: at its peak, a system built for 85,000 inhabitants housed [165,000](https://www.propublica.org/article/guide-to-california-prisons). This was, among other things, a massive humanitarian crisis. The system was too overstretched to provide adequate healthcare to prisoners. Violence and suicide shot up.
In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that California prisons were *so* overcrowded that their conditions violated the 8th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. That year, the state assembly passed a package of reforms called "realignment," which shifted supervision of low-level offenders from the state to the counties. Then, in 2014, Californians voted for Proposition 47, which reduced some felony crimes to misdemeanors – theft of goods valued at under $950 and simple drug possession – and made people in prison for those crimes eligible for resentencing. Together, realignment and Prop 47 brought down California’s prison and jail population by 55,000.
The campaign for Prop 36 is based on the premise that Prop 47 failed, leading to increased drug use and retail theft (but don’t trust me – it says so in the [text](https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2024/general/pdf/prop36-text-proposed-laws.pdf) of the measure). 36 would repeal some parts of 47, add some additional sentencing increases, and leave some elements in place (the LA Times has a good breakdown of the changes [here](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-08-12/what-is-california-proposition-47-how-proposition-36-could-change-crime-sentencing-drugs-theft)).
It’s easy to round this off to a simple tradeoff: are we willing to put tens of thousands of people in jail if it would decrease the crime rate? But this would be the wrong way to think about the measure: there is no tradeoff. Prop 36 will certainly imprison many people, but it won’t help fight crime.
### Drugs
Prop 36 raises the penalty for certain drug crimes from a misdemeanor (months in jail) to a felony (years in jail) - with a few complications that we’ll return to in the next section.
Across jurisdictions, there’s [no correlation](https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/03/more-imprisonment-does-not-reduce-state-drug-problems) between tough drug laws and lower drug use. This is an ecological result , and vulnerable to obvious confounders - for example, maybe jurisdictions with more drug use are more likely to institute strict laws. But [the best quasi-experimental studies we have](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/70411/307337-Did-Getting-Tough-on-Crime-Pay-.pdf), usually looking at changes in drug use after sentencing reforms, find the same. It also matches common sense: drug users are often deeply addicted and not thinking about the long term.
Proponents of the new measure say California is the exception. [An argument](https://growsf.org/blog/prop-47/) by the advocacy group Grow SF includes this chart:
Drug overdoses in California started to spike dramatically starting around about 2017, a few years after Prop 47 was passed.
But [something else](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0955395921003078) happened to influence California drug overdose rates in 2017. If you’ve been following local news at any point in the past decade, you might be able to guess: fentanyl started to reach California markets. The spike in overdoses perfectly tracks the spread of fentanyl in the state – in fact, you can see it right there on the chart.
(The rise in cocaine and methamphetamine overdoses over this same period most likely *also* reflects the spread of fentanyl. The data here record deaths by “non-mutually exclusive substance category” – that is, if a person is found dead with both fentanyl and methamphetamine in their system, both will be recorded. These combined overdoses from fentanyl+meth or fentanyl+cocaine are common in [San Francisco](https://growsf.org/blog/prop-47/).)
None of this has anything to do with California's particular approach to drug policy. Fentanyl has had the same devastating impact all over the country:
*Source: [CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db491.htm). The Center for Juvenile and Criminal Justice has a nicer interactive [version](https://www.cjcj.org/reports-publications/report/stop-lying-about-drugs-in-california), but their source link was broken and I couldn’t find the 1975 data so I remade it myself.*
California is slightly behind the curve – the drug was first introduced on the East Coast – but clearly following the same trend. In fact, grim as the situation here may seem, California is actually outperforming most of the country: our rate of drug fatalities per capita puts us at [35th place](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/drug_poisoning_mortality/drug_poisoning.htm).
The spread of fentanyl is a tragic natural experiment. If states with tougher drug possession were weathering the fentanyl epidemic with fewer deaths, we’d have seen that in the data. But they’re not. There’s no relationship.
(at least, none that I’ve been able to find, though it’s hard to do a direct comparison because state sentencing regimes are so specific. You can play around with the state sentencing data [here](https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/drug-crimes/drug-possession-laws-50-state-survey/).)
California’s rise in overdose deaths is an ongoing disaster, and the state must do more to address it – but it has nothing to do with Prop 47, and we should return to our prior that longer sentences don’t do much to affect drug use.
### Treatment Mandated Felonies
Returning to the promised complication: Prop 36 doesn’t just raise drug crimes from misdemeanors to felonies. It creates a new category, the *treatment-mandated felony*. Judges can tell offenders that their crime *could* be a felony, but that their sentence will be commuted if they complete a substance abuse or mental health treatment program.
This isn’t a bad idea on merits. There’s a thorny debate to be had about the efficacy of involuntary treatment, but at least it’s more helpful for addicts than prison. But there’s an catch: before we can worry about whether treatment programs are effective, we should be certain that they exist.
Prop 36 doesn’t set aside any fundingfor new mental health and substance treatment beds. This might make sense if California was full of empty treatment centers waiting for addicts to fill them. But in fact, the state desperately lacks treatment beds. A 2022 [report](https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/Documents/Assessing-the-Continuum-of-Care-for-BH-Services-in-California.pdf) by the California Department of Health Care Services found that 70% of our counties "urgently need" residential addiction treatment services. 40% – that’s 23 counties – have none at all. Even the larger and wealthier counties are struggling. San Francisco currently has 2,551 residential treatment beds, of which just 690 are for substance abuse treatment – but the city’s homeless population in need of treatment alone measures over [8,000](https://missionlocal.org/2024/02/sf-adds-hundreds-of-treatment-beds-but-need-is-far-greater/). Worse still, due to post-COVID staffing shortages, the state is actually *[losing](https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/california-drug-treatment-18334661.php)* thousands of treatment beds.
Even the existing beds may not be accessible. A 2024 RAND [study](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RBA1800/RBA1824-1/RAND_RBA1824-1.pdf) in five central California counties found that – in addition to severe shortages – "many facilities do not accept individuals with prior involvement in the criminal justice system, those with such physical health comorbidities as dementia, and those who either are enrolled in Medicaid or are uninsured." These policies are common in private treatment centers across the state. Of course, everyone forced into treatment by a felony conviction will have had contact with the criminal justice system, and the vast majority will be on Medicaid. In fact, Prop 36 requires that the court refer patients “to programs that provide services at no cost to the participant” – ruling out the most private treatment options.
In fact, Prop 36 might actually *reduce* the resources available for treatment programs. That’s because the reduction in prison costs following Prop 47 freed up about $800 million in savings for the state. By law, that money has to be spent on crime prevention, victim services, mental health – and drug treatment. According to the [Legislative Analyst’s Office](https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=36&year=2024), if Prop 36 passes, the drop in savings is likely to cost these programs tens of millions of dollars annually.
So the most likely outcome in many of these drug cases is that an offender will be willing to go into treatment, but there are no treatment beds available. What happens then? The proposition doesn’t say. Neither outcome - getting years of prison time for a bed shortage that isn’t their fault, or walking free without treatment - makes the treatment-mandated felony idea look very good.
Fentanyl is a terrifying drug. It kills and steals lives at an unprecedented rate. It’s tempting to pass tougher sentencing laws – as many states have – because it’s so crushingly obvious that *something* must be done, and making simple possession a felony is *something.*
But tougher sentences don't keep fentanyl off the streets, and treatment does. Instead of spending this money on more prison beds ([$132,000](https://calmatters.org/justice/2024/01/california-prison-cost-per-inmate/) per person per year!), we should spend it on more treatment beds, and on [increasing the availability](https://www.statnews.com/2024/03/05/opioid-addiction-treatment-methadone-buprenorphine-restrictions/) of effective addiction treatments like methadone and buprenorphine.
### Theft
California’s surge in shoplifting and smash-and-grab burglaries over the past three years has been hard to miss. Governor Newsom has made it a signature issue – in August, he [signed](https://www.gov.ca.gov/2024/08/16/governor-newsom-signs-landmark-legislative-package-cracking-down-on-retail-crime-and-property-theft/) a new package of laws increasing penalties for retail crimes. A key plank of the argument for Prop 36 is that the old Prop 47 is responsible for California’s retail crime problem, and repealing some of its key provisions would bring things back under control.
This is one place where my fellow opponents of the new proposition somewhat overstate their case. The otherwise very good LA Times [editorial](https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-09-22/editorial-proposition36-no-fills-prison-war-on-drugs) arguing against the measure claims that Prop 47 was “unrelated” to rising retail theft. The reality is a little more complicated.
…but only a little. My main source here is a recent [report](https://www.ppic.org/publication/crime-after-proposition-47-and-the-pandemic/) by the Public Policy Institute of California, a nonpartisan think tank which does the most comprehensive data collection I’ve yet seen on the impact of California’s criminal justice reform measures. This report summarizes the results of a year-long research program by PPIC to figure out how Prop 47 impacted crime. The researchers used a few different empirical strategies to isolate the impact of Prop 47. First, they created a synthetic control – a group of states with underlying demographics and trends that roughly match California, but which didn't pass a major criminal justice reform law in 2014. They also compared trends across California counties. Because different counties had different changes in things like recidivism, police clearance rates, and levels of crime, county comparisons can help identify which enforcement mechanisms are associated with particular outcomes.
They found an increase in property crimes after 2015, but it was almost all car break-ins, which for some reason seemed especially elastic to the sentencing reform (we’ll come back to these later). Shoplifting may have gone up slightly, but this lasted less than a year – by 2016, rates were back down to 2010 levels. Then they continued to gradually decline until early 2020, when pandemic lockdowns made them really plummet. The current retail theft wave [started in the summer of 2021](https://www.ppic.org/blog/testimony-crime-data-on-retail-theft-and-robberies-in-california/), after the economy re-opened. I'm not going to weigh in on the root cause – it could be a functional police strike in response to the George Floyd protests, lockdown-induced dysfunction that never got better, the decrease in [police staffing](https://www.ppic.org/publication/law-enforcement-staffing-in-california/) across California over the past few years, or maybe some combination of the above. But something about the pandemic era emboldened criminals or broke policing. Prop 47 is not to blame.
(talking about state averages here is actually slightly misleading: shoplifting is down or static in California's small counties and a few of the larger ones, but very high in Los Angeles and the Bay Area. Shoplifting rates in San Francisco were 24% higher in 2022 compared to 2019, while San Mateo saw a rise of 53%. This is another indicator that Prop 47 – a statewide measure – isn’t the primary driver of the trend.)
Californians - at least, those of us in big cities - shouldn’t have to tolerate the current rate of retail theft. But the decreased sentences of Prop 47 didn’t cause this crime, and there’s [substantial evidence](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3635864) that harsher criminal penalties won’t decrease it. So what should we do?
The same PPIC report that showed little effect of Prop 47 on shoplifting found it *did* have an effect on another type of crime - car break-ins, which rose substantially over the following few years. But if you've been following the debate over Prop 36, you'll have noticed that car break-ins barely feature. The Grow SF blog post in favor of the measure argues that "shoplifting became endemic after prop 47," and the text of the measure itself blames prop 47 for "an explosion in retail and cargo theft causing stores throughout California to close." Retail theft is mentioned four times; cars don't come up once.
That’s because the car break-in epidemic in San Francisco (and California more broadly) has subsided. It’s getting better statewide, and in its former epicenter in San Francisco, it’s down 60%. Why? After the break-ins made national news, San Francisco got serious and cracked down. What worked wasn’t increasing sentences – it was a [targeted operation](https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/sf-car-break-in-data-18639763.php) to track and arrest the most organized, prolific offenders. This approach – focusing on the small number of people responsible for most crimes – has also proven astonishingly successful for violence prevention in [Boston](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Elin-Waring-2/publication/238302127_Problem-Oriented_Policing_Deterrence_and_Youth_Violence_An_Evaluation_of_Boston%27s_Operation_Ceasefire/links/548fd64f0cf214269f264020/Problem-Oriented-Policing-Deterrence-and-Youth-Violence-An-Evaluation-of-Bostons-Operation-Ceasefire.pdf) and [Oakland](https://cao-94612.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/documents/Oakland-Ceasefire-Evaluation-Final-Report-May-2019.pdf) (before the program got cut).
Prop 36 supporters’ explicit argument is that, if we raise criminal penalties, it might motivate our police officers to put in a similarly impressive effort and actually arrest criminals. They admit that California’s shoplifting crisis isn’t about recidivism - ie shoplifters getting arrested, serving short sentences, getting out of jail, and shoplifting again. It’s about [low clearance rates](https://www.ppic.org/publication/crime-after-proposition-47-and-the-pandemic/) - shoplifters never get arrested in the first place. But they argue that longer sentences will help raise clearance rates by convincing police that it’s worthwhile to go after shoplifters. This argument is cruel, backwards, and if true would be a damning indictment of the motivations of law enforcement officers.
Instead, we should give police departments the resources they need to do their jobs. Yes, this means more cops - California is under-policed for its size, and our police staffing rate has been declining since 2008. But we should also expect officers to do their best to enforce the law using the resources they have – even if it means changing a department policy or two. Instead of longer sentences, we should ask our police departments for smarter, more targeted interventions. Unfortunately, police accountability is hard. As with drug addiction, we know the answer – but it’s expensive, difficult to implement, politically unpalatable, involves lots of reduplicated work across 58 counties and countless municipalities, and won’t yield immediate results.
But we shouldn’t give up. Californians can solve our problems – after all, we solved our car break-in epidemic and our prison overcrowding crisis. Our decade of progress on sentencing reform is a significant accomplishment for tens of thousands of people in our state. Reversing it won’t fix the issues we have now. Californians deserve real solutions, not imaginary ones. Vote no on 36. | Scott Alexander | 150872169 | The Case Against California Proposition 36 | acx |
# Open Thread 353
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Comments of the week are several people saying that the view of solar power’s prospects which I got from the Progress Studies conference was overly optimistic (who could have guessed?). For example, [Sol Hando on weather](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73895019), [Jenny Chase on costs](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73910211) (and [more](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73908131)), [Timothy M on potential learning curve exhaustion](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73908094), and [Phil Getts on the limits of batteries](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73937339). Also, [Erick on nuclear regulation](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/notes-from-the-progress-studies-conference/comment/73930823).
**2:** Another Lighthaven event: Ricki Heicklen is running a quantitative trading bootcamp at Lighthaven (in Berkeley), November 6-10. Prices go up tomorrow from $1350 to $1550, but you can get a $150 discount if you check "ACX Open Thread" for "Where did you hear about this bootcamp?" Register at <https://forms.gle/swGLn6jZpfKrN4jN6> . You can read more [here](https://bayesshammai.substack.com/p/quantitative-trading-bootcamp?open=false#%C2%A7faq) or listen to the Patrick McKenzie podcast [here](https://www.complexsystemspodcast.com/episodes/teaching-trading-ricki-heicklen/). She specifies that “this will not make you rich” and “will not meaningfully boost your resume [to get a job at a] quantitative trading firm”, so I guess it’s aimed at people who . . . just have an abstract passion for learning about quantitative trading and are willing to spend $1000+ to satisfy it? I am as curious as you are whether this is a real demographic; if any of you go, please tell me whether anyone else attended. Meanwhile, I need to learn to say no to advertising Lighthaven events, so I’m committing to no more of them this year unless it’s extra-important. | Scott Alexander | 150828075 | Open Thread 353 | acx |
# Notes From The Progress Studies Conference
Tyler Cowen is an economics professor and blogger at [Marginal Revolution](https://marginalrevolution.com/). Patrick Collison is the billionaire founder of the online payments company Stripe. In 2019, they [wrote an article](https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/07/we-need-new-science-progress/594946/) calling for a discipline of Progress Studies, which would figure out what progress was and how to increase it. Later that year, tech entrepreneur Jason Crawford stepped up to spearhead the effort.
The immediate reaction was [mostly negative](https://theconversation.com/can-progress-studies-contribute-to-knowledge-history-suggests-caution-121410). There were the usual gripes that “progress” was problematic because it could imply that some cultures/times/places/ideas were better than others. But there were also more specific objections: weren’t historians already studying progress? Wasn’t business academia already studying innovation? Are you really allowed to just invent a new field every time you think of something it would be cool to study?
It seems like you are. Five years later, Progress Studies has grown enough to hold its first conference. I got to attend, and it was great.
The objections failed because Progress Studies is the same type of field as Gender Studies: the Studying serves as the nucleus of a network of scientists, activists, entrepreneurs and journalists working to produce radical change.
**The Basic Progress Studies Narrative**
You can find long versions of this at [Is Science Slowing Down?](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/11/26/is-science-slowing-down-2/) and [1960: The Year The Singularity Was Cancelled](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/04/22/1960-the-year-the-singularity-was-cancelled/), but here’s the short version.
Progress is good. As Steven Pinker has argued, most things are getting better over time. We are richer, healthier, safer, and better-educated than our ancestors. Although redistribution and social changes can make things better or worse around the edges, most of our current fortunate position comes from simple economic growth.
Progress (as measured by things like total factor productivity) was fast for much of the early 20th century, then slowed around 1970. Nobody knows why; theories include shifting social attitudes, over-regulation, or simply exhausting the potential in a few big inventions like electricity and mass production. This slowing was a great historical tragedy: if progress had continued at pre-1970 rates, we would be twice as rich today. We call the ensuing period the Great Stagnation. There was plenty of innovation in computers (“the world of bits”), but real physical goods (“the world of atoms”) stayed disappointingly similar. Our great-grandparents grew up in a world of horse-drawn carriages and lived to see the moon landing. We grew up in a world of cars and jumbo jets, and live in it still.
But Tyler Cowen has declared the Great Stagnation [provisionally maybe starting to be over](https://fasterplease.substack.com/p/tyler-cowen-on-the-end-of-the-great). This is a bold pronouncement; official statistics are as dull as ever, and Progress is a field where going off vibes leads you astray. Still, advances in AI, solar, space, and biotech seemed impressive enough that he thought it represented a phase change.
And this was the sort of conference you would expect in a world where the Great Stagnation was ending, with topics like:
### Energy
Everyone agreed that we should have 100x as much energy per person (or 100x lower energy cost), that we should simultaneously lower emissions to zero, and that we could do it in a few decades. The only disagreement was how to get there, with clashes between advocates of solar and nuclear. This year, the pro-solar faction seemed to have the upper hand because of trends like this:
Between 2010 and 2019, the nuclear/solar cost comparison fell from $96 / $378 to $155 vs. $68 (yes, nuclear got *more* expensive). As a result:
…solar’s share has dectupled in the past decade and shows no sign of slowing down.
(wind has similarly impressive results, but was less-discussed. I think this is partly because solar has a slightly better exponential growth rate and because of how exponents work this means it will soon blow wind out of the water. But also, it’s easier for regulators to thwart wind, whereas most people can just put a solar panel on their roof.)
Why is solar improving so quickly? Humanity is very good at mass manufacturing things in factories. Once you convert a problem to “let’s manufacture billions of identical copies of this small object in a factory”, our natural talent at doing this kicks in, factories compete with each other on cost, and you get a Moore’s Law like growth curve. Sometime around the late 90s / early 00s, factories started manufacturing solar panels en masse, and it was off to the races.
Solar used to be limited by timing: however efficient it may be while the sun shines, it doesn’t help at night. Over the past few years, this limitation has disappeared: batteries are getting cheaper almost as quickly as solar itself.
California’s power use over a typical spring day. Not only does solar dominate the daytime, but batteries (mostly storing solar power) are making inroads into the evening and night.
The remaining limitation is high-density use cases; for example, a passenger jet needs to get a lot of power from a source light enough to fit on the plane. So far batteries can’t do that. The solarists are undaunted: [you can use solar power to “mine” carbon from the air and convert it into fossil fuels](https://terraformindustries.com/), then use the fossil fuels on the plane. Since you took the carbon out of the air in the first place, it’s still carbon neutral!
If these trends continue, solar power could reach $10/megawatt-hour in the next few years, and maybe even $1/megawatt hour a few years after that. This would make it 10-100x cheaper than coal, and end almost all of our energy-related problems. The United States could produce all its power by covering 2% of its land with solar panels - for comparison, we use 20% of our land for agriculture, so this would look like Nevada specializing in farming electricity somewhat less intensely than Iowa specializes in farming corn. Countries without Nevadas of their own could, with only slight annoyance, do the job with rooftop solar alone; one speaker calculated that even Singapore could cover 100% of its power needs if it put a panel on every roof. And developing countries could benefit at least as much as the First World; unlike other power sources, which require a competent government to run the power plant and manage the grid, ordinary families and small businesses can get their own solar panel + battery and have 24/7 power regardless of how corrupt the government is.
Despite this being a conference about the future, the pro-nuclear faction seemed comparatively stuck in the past. In the 1960s, nuclear was supposed to bring the amazing post-scarcity Jetsons future. It *could have* brought the amazing post-scarcity Jetsons future. But then regulators/environmentalists/the mob destroyed its potential and condemned us to fifty more years of fossil fuels. If society hadn’t kneecapped nuclear, we could have stopped millions of unnecessary coal-pollution-related deaths, avoided the whole global warming crisis, maybe even stayed on the high-progress track that would have made everyone twice as rich today. It was hard to avoid the feeling that the pro-nuclear faction wanted to re-enact the last battle, this time with a victory for the forces of Good.
The pro-nuclear side insisted they also had practical arguments. Look at the top graph again. Between 2010 and 2019, nuclear cost per megawatt-hour increased from $96 to $155. In fact, nuclear has been increasing ever since the ‘60s, when it cost about $20 (in current dollars). This is proof of concept that nuclear can be much cheaper than it is now. If we did everything right - got really good regulations, innovated hard, switched to the most promising type of nuclear reactor - we could not just get the cost back down to $20, but go even lower - as low as $1 per MWh within a decade or two. That’s much cheaper than solar, which is currently $68 per MWh.
(this would probably look like small modular reactors mass-produced in factories, to take advantage of the same factory-scaling trend that helped solar. Surprisingly, the best regulatory climate for this appears to be the UK, although it’s still very bad and there’s a long way to go.)
The pro-solar faction countered that sure, solar is something like $68/megawatt-hour *now*. But by the time this extremely difficult project of changing regulations, innovating, and creating an entirely new industry is finished, then solar will probably be down to $1 - 10 / MWh too. And solar has so many other advantages - easier to install, more practical for poor countries, harder for regulators to thwart, less likely to irradiate cities in case of disaster. The nuclear faction is cheating by comparing real solar now to ideal nuclear in twenty years. Compare like-to-like, and solar is obviously better.
The nuclear faction said that they’re not sure solar and batteries will continue scaling as rapidly as they are now. Therefore the case for ideal nuclear in twenty years (which we’re pretty sure is physically possible) beats the case for ideal solar + battery in twenty years (which is just extending a line on a graph until it gets to a point marked REALLY GOOD).
I thought solar won: I’ve spent my whole life as an extending-lines-on-graphs fan, and it would be hypocritical to stop now.
(here’s [a recent Substack post arguing against solar](https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-problem-with-solar), but I think it makes the same mistake as a lot of posts arguing against AI - looking at where things are now, instead of where the trend line is obviously pointing)
Nobody wanted to defend fusion. Fusion promises cheap clean limitless power if only we can solve difficult technological hurdles. But we already know how to produce cheap clean limitless power. The only delay is regulatory, and fusion doesn’t solve this. Won’t people be more willing to tolerate it because it’s meltdown-free? No; there are already designs for meltdown-free nuclear reactors, and we don’t use them. Also, fusion is *not* radiation-free, and the radiation alone would be enough excuse to regulate it to death. Is it theoretically possible that - since there aren’t existing fusion-related regulations - we’d have a fresh chance to fight the same battle and maybe win this time? Maybe, but everyone there thought that solar or small modular nuclear reactors would be an easier sell.
(the only pro-fusion sentiment I saw at the conference was a series of graphs comparing “fission” and “fusion” and showing strong performance advantages for
”fusion” in all categories. But it turned out the pro-solar faction had mischievously labeled solar as “fusion” since it ultimately comes from the sun’s solar core. It was a good trick - think of solar as a new high-tech wonder, instead of as the annoying thing environmentalists keep nagging us about, and it really does look like a miracle.)
If we had cheap clean limitless power, what would we use it for? Someone asked this question in a presentation, and the cheap clean limitless power advocates didn’t have a canned answer ready to go. They eventually proposed things like improved public transit, supersonic flight, carbon capture, AI compute, geoengineering to prevent hurricanes, and city-wide air filters (really). I don’t hold the lack of a canned answer against them; I assume that when Faraday first invented electricity, he couldn’t have predicted air conditioners, dryers, or data centers. If you build it, they will come.
### Politics
Over-regulation was the enemy at many presentations, but this wasn’t a libertarian conference. Everyone agreed that safety, quality, the environment, etc, were important and should be regulated for. They just thought existing regulations were colossally stupid, so much so that they made everything worse *including* safety, the environment, etc. With enough political will, it would be easy to draft regulations that improved innovation, price, safety, the environment, and everything else.
For example, consider [supersonic flight](https://www.elidourado.com/p/50-years-supersonic-ban). Supersonic aircraft create “sonic booms”, minor explosions that rattle windows and disturb people underneath their path. Annoyed with these booms, Congress banned supersonic flight over land in 1973. Now we’ve invented better aircraft whose booms are barely noticeable, or not noticeable at all. But because Congress banned supersonic flight - rather than sonic booms themselves - we’re stuck with normal boring 6-hour coast-to-coast flights. If aircraft progress had continued at the same rate it was going before the supersonic ban, we’d be up to 2,500 mph now (coast-to-coast in ~2 hours). Can Congress change the regulation so it bans booms and not speed? Yes, but Congress is busy, and doing it through the FAA and other agencies would take 10-15 years of environmental impact reports.
Or consider solar power. The average large solar project is delayed 5-10 years by bureaucracy. Part of the problem is [NEPA](https://ifp.org/how-nepa-will-tax-clean-energy/), the infamous environmental protection law saying that anyone can sue any project for any reason if they object on environmental grounds. If a fossil fuel company worries about a competition from solar, they can sue upcoming solar plants on the grounds that some ants might get crushed beneath the solar panels; even in the best-case where the solar company fights and wins, they’ve suffered years of delay and lost millions of dollars. Meanwhile, fossil fuel companies have it easier; they’ve had good lobbyists for decades, and accrued a nice collection of formal and informal NEPA exemptions.
Even if a solar project survives court challenges, it has to get connected to the grid. This poses its own layer of bureaucracy and potential pitfalls. The most memorable statistic from this part of the presentation: over the past few years, Texas has approved more solar power than every other state combined, *and* more wind power than every other state combined, *and* more renewable-friendly batteries than every other state combined. This isn’t because Texas is especially environmentalist. It’s partly because Texas has its own grid with less bureaucracy, and partly a general libertarian attitude that lets renewable businesses expect a fair deal from the government.
([source](https://www.reddit.com/r/texas/comments/1ef43ye/texas_leads_the_country_in_planned_green_energy/))
Nuclear is in an even worse situation, as you can tell from the recent $96 → $155 price rise mentioned above. This is partly because - [as Matt Yglesias writes](https://www.slowboring.com/p/noah-smith-is-too-down-on-nuclear) - nuclear plants are held to an “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” safety standard. Suppose an company invents a nuclear plant which is twice as cheap and twice as safe as existing models. They might like to try selling it for a bit below the cost of existing models, then pocket the profits. But the regulator will say that because it’s cheap, they have more money to spend on safety, and demand safety improvements until it costs just as much as existing models (even though the new model was already twice as safe). This declares it impossible by fiat to ever make nuclear any cheaper, which means we keep using coal forever, even though coal is much more dangerous.
Even wind kills more people than nuclear - sometimes workers fall off the windmills!
The solution would be to enshrine into law some specific safety standard for nuclear - maybe 1000x safer than coal power. Then inventors can start there and make things cheaper, instead of having every efficiency gain get eaten up by more safety regulation. Then more people would switch from coal to nuclear, and we would be even safer *and* have cheaper electricity *and* have lower emissions.
It’s popular to blame environmentalists and government regulators for this, and they do deserve part of the blame, but the speakers at the conference urged us to also blame existing nuclear companies, who lobby the government to add more and more burdensome safety regulations so they can charge more and keep out competitors. Again, this isn’t a war between economy-boosters and sympathetic activists who want some other good. It’s just dumb laws and regulatory capture hurting everybody.
### AI
Either some sixth sense drove me to the AI-related conversations like a moth to flame, or else *everyone* at this supposedly-generic progress-related conference was talking about AI.
You might expect Progress Studies conference-goers to be natural accelerationists, but the mood was more subdued. Most of the people I talked to (again, maybe there was an unintentional bias) were worried about safety, understood intelligence explosion dynamics, and didn’t really know where this whole thing was going. Most continued to awkwardly support AI anyway, out of some generic loyalty to Progress. “Within ten years, AI progress could threaten the future of the human race - and if we fight really hard, we can bring that down to five!” I mock them, but I have a little of this impulse in me too, and will always be a little suspicious of anyone who doesn’t.
I got to attend a session on SB 1047, the recently-vetoed California AI regulation bill. The most interesting thing I learned was that California’s position as home to all big American AI companies was irrelevant - the bill could have equally well been in New York or Texas. Any state can try to regulate any industry, and the industry has to comply or leave the state; it’s almost never worth the economic loss to abandon big states, so legislation in any big state has nationwide effects. Everyone agrees this is awkward, but the Supreme Court recently confirmed that it was true in a ruling on [Prop 12](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23721488/prop-12-scotus-pork-pigs-factory-farming-california-bacon), California’s law demanding better conditions for factory-farmed pigs. California doesn’t have a lot of factory-farmed pigs, so this law primarily demanded that other states give their pigs better conditions if they wanted to sell pork in California (which they all do). The Supreme Court said this was fine, and presumably would make the same decision if New York or Texas tried to regulate AI. The federal government tends to think of these situations as an invitation to step in (though it hasn’t with Prop 12), and if too many states make too many confusing regulations then Congress will probably pass a law to sort things out. But for now, it’s a free-for-all.
(this means the claims that “AI companies are going to leave California!” or “Elon Musk is only supporting this because his AI company isn’t in California!” were even more deceptive than I thought - leaving California would make no difference!)
The other interesting claim that came up in this session was that the California legislature will pass virtually any bill, because they’re busy and hate disappointing people. Then they let Governor Newsom decide whether to veto, and never override his veto. The lobbyists and California experts in the room disagreed vehemently about this, with some defending the legislature’s honor. The only point of general agreement was respect for Scott Wiener, even among people whose careers centered around thwarting him.
### YIMBY
I didn’t get a chance to go to the YIMBY related sessions, but they were out in force and feeling pretty good about themselves. YIMBYs have been having success after success in California. They [describe themselves](https://cayimby.org/our-impact/) as passing “twelve bills in five years to legalize 2.2 million+ homes” - plus some [executive orders](https://www.californiaconstructionnews.com/2024/08/03/governor-newsom-allocates-94-million-for-infill-housing-signs-executive-order-to-streamline-development/) by Governor Newsom. Now Kamala Harris [seems to be on board](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/yimby-housing-movement-kamala-harris_n_66cfa806e4b04f2c61c9b6db), with YIMBYs declaring her one of their own. It’s hard to think of other movements that have come so far so quickly.
I asked some of the YIMBY leaders there what they were doing - did they have blackmail material on Governor Newsom? They said politicians had finally realized that housing prices were in crisis, started groping around for solutions, and they’d [been there at the right time](https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/110844-only-a-crisis---actual-or-perceived---produces-real) and worked really hard to get the message out.
### Self-Driving Cars
After a few disappointing years, these are finally coming into their own. The expert I talked (EDIT: I try to mostly preserve anonymity in this post, but this person has kindly allowed me to identify him as Andrew Miller of [Changing Lanes](https://www.changinglanesnewsletter.com/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=web&utm_content=comment_metadata)) to said Tesla had made some bad decisions and was no longer in the top tier, but that companies like Waymo and [I can’t remember which other ones he named] were near the finish line. They’re already safer than humans in most situations and operating successfully in several cities. The remaining challenges to scaling up are mostly regulatory, not technical. Here the regulatory challenges are less about specific laws than general nervousness on the corporations’ part to be seen expanding too quickly. They want to build a strong record in friendly cities before venturing further.
The most interesting new claim I heard was that self-driving cars could help the environment by encouraging carpools. The UberShare carpool program hasn’t taken off, but that’s mostly because people are reluctant to share a car with a stranger. Self-driving cars have more design flexibility, and you might be able to turn them into a series of private pods. You could sit in your own private pod while your robotaxi made a two-block detour to pick up a second passenger.
Amazon’s self-driving car, Zoox, looks like this ([source](https://zoox.com/vehicle)). It’s not private pods yet, but it’s proof that self-driving gives you the opportunity to experiment with form.
Here the person I talked to wasn’t as concerned about fighting destructive regulation (which mostly has yet to materialize) as using legislation to guide the technology on the right path. Self-driving taxis have a big advantage over self-driving self-owned-cars: they can operate 24-7 and never have to park. If you can switch half the car-using population to robotaxis, you can convert half the parking lots into green space or homes. Nobody wants to ban self-driving car ownership, but some people do want to nudge the marginal commuter into robotaxis so they can reclaim slightly-more-than-half of the parking lots instead of slightly-less.
### Airships
No matter how great our environmental or technological victories, they won’t feel satisfying unless we also have giant airships. Luckily, some of the conference attendees were [on the case](https://www.elidourado.com/p/airship-industries).
### Public Transit
This wasn’t officially part of the conference, but at lunch somebody told me that the San Francisco legs of the BART - the Bay Area’s light rail, infamous for being noisy, dirty, and violent - had become comparatively safe and clean over the past few months, after the city installed fare gates that actually worked and [couldn’t trivially be jumped over](https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/tried-to-skip-fare-on-bart-new-unbeatable-gates-19203724.php). Apparently the people ruining the BART for everyone weren’t even paying the fare. I always would have guessed there was a *correlation* between bad behavior and nonpayment, but am surprised at exactly how high the correlation has turned out to be (supposedly - I haven’t been on the BART myself recently to confirm).
Again, this wasn’t part of the conference, but I thought it served as interesting commentary on the idea of Progress.
### WTF Happened In 2019
I asked one question at the conference. It was about [this graph](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/04/total-factor-productivity.html):
My question was: you talk about overregulation. But regulation has increased basically linearly, and this graph shows a switch from one constant regime to another. So [what happened in 1973?](https://wtfhappenedin1971.com/)
The speaker said it was complicated, but mentioned a social shift from the techno-optimism of the 1960s to the techno-pessimism of the hippies and paranoid Nixonesque conservatives. The public consciousness rejected *The Jetsons* in favor of Paul Ehrlich, Rachel Carson, Jane Jacobs, and Ralph Nader, and this probably had downstream effects on lots of things, including regulation.
After the conference I looked into this further, and - maybe my question was wrong!
Cremieux believes most of the trends that seem to change shape in 1971 are measurement errors (click for link to explanation):
This is plausible, since the modern inflationary regime started in 1971 and there are lots of ways inflation can mess with trend measurement. I need to look into this more. But I start out suspicious: kilowatts don’t inflate, and [the Henry Adams curve](http://wimflyc.blogspot.com/2021/01/the-henry-adams-curve-closer-look.html) looks like all the others:
My question might have been wrong in another way too. I said regulation went up linearly. According to the measure of regulation I’ve always seen before, [Total Pages Published In The Code Of Federal Regulations](https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats), this is true:
…but another, [Total Pages Published In The Federal Register](https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats), shows a more suspicious pattern:
I don’t entirely understand the difference between these two measures of regulation. I think CFR is the “stock” of regulations and FR is the “flow”, but I don’t get how that translates into their broadly similar page counts.
And everyone’s favorite punching bag, NEPA, was signed on January 1, 1970, which is almost *too* perfect.
I find this interesting, because I sort of mocked the last Progress-Studies-esque mini-conference I went to. The Gods of Straight Lines are mighty and dreadful; it takes immense hubris to believe one can wrest them off their predestined path. I described the goal of this conference, now six years past, like so:
And now I feel less like mocking this. There’s still no visible kink in total factor productivity, let alone Moore’s Law. It could still all be hype. But the report from these people, who have spent half a century on the losing side of every battle, is that things are starting to look cheerier. Congress understands the problems with NEPA and is at least considering making life easier for the solar plants. Suddenly everyone’s a YIMBY. The first small modular nuclear reactor has been approved.
But more than that, there’s suddenly *awareness*. It might seem like nothing could be more obvious than the idea of “wait, we fell off this growth curve and now we’re twice as poor as we need to be, maybe it’s all the growth we’re blocking”. Or “wait, we basically made it illegal to build houses and now the American dream of homeownership is critically endangered”. But the first organized YIMBY movement was in the mid-2010s. The term “Great Stagnation” first got used in 2011. The Henry Adams Curve was first published in 2021.
It feels like the United States, after a fifty-year binge on over-regulation, has woken up, wiped the vomit off its chin, noticed it’s lost half its net worth, and started to consider doing something else. I am equally confused why it took so long and why it’s happening now.
Most of the victories discussed at the conference have nothing to do with Progress Studies. The solar industry, the self-driving car industry, etc, don’t even know it exists. Even the YIMBYs, whose leading representatives did attend, predate the field.
My theory is that it all came from the same wellspring. Silicon Valley gathered all the pro-tech people together in one place, a lot of them became rich, and some of them spent their wealth reflecting on the nature of technological advance. This created a critical mass of people who were all talking to each other and motivated to see things that other people were missing. This isn’t the whole story: non-Silicon-Valley economists like Paul Krugman and Larry Summers helped build the foundational narrative. But it’s the story that makes the most sense for “why now”.
I mocked the people in 2019 who thought a conference could affect the Gods Of Straight Lines. But it seems like maybe there was something - an idealized spiritual conference in 1971 between Ralph Nader, Jane Jacobs, Rachel Carson, hippies, protectionists, and all those people - that knocked them off their thrones once. So who knows?
I’m definitely making the same mistake of which I half-accused Tyler Cowen - going off vibes in a notoriously difficult field. But at least at this conference, the vibes were good.
*(other people’s notes on the same conference: [Ben Parry](https://benparry.substack.com/p/i-went-to-berkeley-california-and), [Dean Ball](https://www.hyperdimensional.co/p/be-embraced-ye-millions))* | Scott Alexander | 150459736 | Notes From The Progress Studies Conference | acx |
# Secrets Of The Median Voter Theorem
The [Median Voter Theorem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_voter_theorem) says that, given some reasonable assumptions, the candidate closest to the beliefs of the median voter will win. So if candidates are rational, they’ll all end up at the same place on a one-dimensional political spectrum: the exact center.
Here’s a simple argument for why this should be true: suppose the Democrats wisely choose a centrist platform, but the Republicans foolishly veer far-right:
Now suppose that every voter (represented as a point on this line from furthest-left to furthest-right) reasonably chooses the candidate closest to their own position:
The Democrats get most of the vote and win easily.
Here the Republicans’ best strategy is obvious: shift to the middle.
Now it’s 50-50 again and both sides have an even chance of winning.
The real median voter theorem is much more complicated than this, and can handle arbitrary numbers of candidates and complex voting methods. But this argument is good enough for now.
Elegant as this proof may be, it fails to describe the real world. Democrats and Republicans don’t have platforms exactly identical to each other and to the exact most centrist American. Instead, Democrats are often pretty far left, and Republicans pretty far right. What’s going on? I think at least three things.
***First*****,** candidates have to win a primary. In order to win the Democratic primary, the Median Voter theorem says you should match the belief of the median Democratic primary voter.
But then you get to the general election and you’re in the wrong place!
You might like to veer towards the middle after winning the primary. But then your opponent will run attack ads saying “So-and-so promised to defund the police in the primary; now she’s saying we need more cops on the streets. Obviously she’s an untrustworthy flip-flopper talking out of both sides of her mouth!” Also, if you’re the sort of person who would immediately betray your base after winning, they’ll notice and won’t vote for you. So in real life, the veer towards the middle is limited and subtle. At most, a candidate might try saying vaguely anti-police things during the primary and vaguely pro-police things in the general, then hope they were vague enough not to have explicitly contradicted themselves.
***Second**,* people don’t have to vote. The extreme-far-left probably won’t vote for a Republican. But they might stay home. In fact, if both candidates were exactly equal in the exact middle of the distribution, why *wouldn’t* they stay home? Here’s a centrist Democrat’s nightmare scenario:
As per the Median Voter Theorem, most people prefer the (centrist) Democrat to the (more extreme) Republican. But the far left doesn’t care enough to vote, so the Republicans carry the day.
Extremists love thinking about this scenario, because it means candidates should pander to them more. But political scientists have looked into this and [found that it almost never happens in real life](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/07/10/change-minds-or-drive-turnout/). It’s rare for a competently-executed veer towards the center to lose you more votes (through low turnout of the base) than it gains you (by convincing swing voters). Every year, extremists urge their candidates to try this stupid and doomed strategy; every year, a few candidates fall for it and lose.
Still, maybe something like this could happen in the unrealistic scenario where both candidates take the Median Voter Theorem literally and stay in the exact indistinguishable center of the spectrum.
Also, even if this never works for voters, it might work for donors and volunteers, who tend to be more extreme than the rank-and-file. A candidate who veers to the exact center might find their funds drying up, or their supply of door-knockers anomalously low.
***Third**,* parties exist because they want something. Maybe the Democrats want more school funding. Their base are parents who care a lot about this; their donors are teachers unions; their candidate is a former school superintendent who got into politics because she’s passionate about this. Maybe everyone involved is willing to accept a 10% decrease in their chance of winning in order to get this.
This suggests the possibility of “collusion” between Democrats and Republicans. The Democrats want more school funding. The Republicans want something else, let’s say more military funding. The median voter wants neither of these things. But it seems like the Democrats and Republicans can “collude” against the median voter by both proposing extreme policies. If neither party pursued their unpopular goal, they would each have a 50% chance of winning. If both parties pursue their unpopular goal, they *still* each have a 50% chance of winning. So if the parties trust each other, they can cooperate by both pursuing their respective unpopular goals, and each get more of what they want.
This seems to throw the whole Median Voter Theorem out the window: how should we know whether to expect both parties at the exact center (no collusion) or both parties at the furthest possible extreme (maximum collusion)? Either way, they keep the same 50% chance of winning!
I don’t understand this part very well, but I think the answer must be that the parties don’t literally collude in smoke-filled rooms. They always worry a little about the other party veering towards the center, and base their own movements on reaction and tradition. If the other party selects an extreme candidate, they’ll split the difference, taking some of the windfall as increased chance of victory but spending some of it on become more extreme themselves. And they’ll overall assume that the other party will be about as extreme as it was in past elections, and that they have license to be extreme enough to counterbalance that.
**II.**
I said above that the real world doesn’t follow the Median Voter Theorem. But is that true? Certainly both parties don’t have indistinguishable and perfectly centrist platforms. But here are the last twenty years of election margins of victory ([source](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/a-brief-history-of-electoral-college-bias/)):
The average margin of victory was 3.5%.
But the GOP has about a two percentage point Electoral College advantage; that is, the popular vote total most likely to produce an electoral tie is one where the Democrats lead by 2. Adjust for this advantage (we’ll talk later about whether we should), and it looks like this:
Now the average margin of victory is only 2.6%.
Isn’t this weird? In a world with so many numbers - 55-to-45, 80-to-20, 99-to-1 - all of the past three elections have been approximately 49-51.
So maybe the Median Voter Theorem *does* work. Here we would have to go back to the collusion theory again. The parties don’t necessarily stay near the center. But they do put a lot of work into making sure they’re exactly the same distance from the center as each other.
Counterargument: this can’t be an iron law of politics, because even forty years ago it wasn’t true. Here’s a part of the graph above that I left out:
In 1964, LBJ beat Goldwater 61-39. In 1972, Nixon beat McGovern 61-37. Even as recently as 1984, Reagan beat Mondale 59-41.
But we already know that partisanship was weaker in those days. The Median Voter Theorem only works if you can reduce everything to a single straight line. If voters don’t care about the right-left spectrum, they might judge based on criteria like “Reagan is more charismatic”, and then if everyone agrees that he’s charismatic you can get 59-41 or 90-10 or whatever numbers you want.
In the old days, partisanship was too weak for the Median Voter Theorem to hold. Now it’s strong enough to matter, but there’s enough primary effect and “collusion” that parties don’t race towards the center, instead only trying to maintain equal distance from the center.
But we may still find this surprising. The parties - especially the Republican Party - don’t *feel* like masterminds executing a complicated dance where they determine the exact amount of extremism the voters can tolerate. And what about non-partisan factors? Do they figure in? If some people dislike Trump because he committed 10,000 felonies and an attempted coup, do the Democrats enter that into their calculations and veer slightly further left? If Biden is demented, do the Republicans enter that into their calculations and veer slightly further right? If so, how come when Biden was replaced with the less-demented Kamala and the Democrats’ betting odds went way up, Trump didn’t change any of his positions AFAICT?
The stats show that the past few elections, adjusted for electoral vote advantage, have all been around 49-51. But it doesn’t seem like the parties are working as hard as they would have to be to do it on purpose. Is it just a coincidence? Is there some deeper thermostat independent of the platforms and candidates of the moment?
I’m not sure. But I do think we can say with confidence that the reason elections are almost never 80-20 or 99-1 is something like Median Voter Theorem.
**III.**
Okay, so the parties have to be in the middle. But which part of the parties? In the middle of what?
Do parties target the median popular voter, or the median electoral voter? It must be the latter. We saw above that elections get closer, rather than further, from 50-50 after you adjust for the GOP electoral advantage. Also, this is obviously what you would do if you were at all sensible. You even see evidence of parties doing this; for example, lots of people talk about how the “tipping point state” for this election is Pennsylvania, so both candidates are investing lots of resources there. That’s classic Median Voter Theorem!
Here’s a harder question. If you want to control the Presidency, you should target the median electoral voter. If you want to control the House of Representatives, then to a first approximation you should target the median popular voter, since House Districts mostly reflect population. If you want to control the Senate, you should target a different median voter entirely, since the Senate gives small states even more of an advantage than the Electoral College does.
Parties want to control all three of these things, so who should they target? Ideally, Presidential candidates would target the median Presidential voter, Senate candidates the median Senate voter, etc. But it may not be this easy. Voters may work off a gestalt impression of where “the party” stands. In theory, the Republican candidate for Governor in California could appeal to the median Californian; in practice, Republicans almost never win in California because Californians hate the national Republican Party. So parties may have to target one of these goals to the exclusion of the others. There’s rarely a united House/Senate platform (Gingrich’s Contract With America possibly excepted). So probably both parties target the Presidency. If we assume small states tend conservative, then the median House voter should be further left, and the median Senate voter further right, than the median Presidential voter.
If parties have to run a unified platform, and they optimize this platform to win the Presidency, we should expect to see Democrats win the House and Republicans win the Senate more often than chance. Is this right?
Add on the two recent Congresses not shown, and since the Clinton era, Democrats have controlled 4/13 Houses and 6/13 Senates, the opposite of my prediction. I think there’s not enough data for this to mean anything, and continue to think there might be a slight inherent Median Voter Theorem fueled tendency for Democrats to win the House (possibly counterbalanced by other things like who has gerrymandered more successfully).
**IV.**
Suppose something happens to give one party an advantage. Maybe DC, Puerto Rico, and Guam all become states, giving the Democrats six extra guaranteed Senators and some extra electoral votes. Which of these do we expect:
1. It’s very hard to have 54 Senate seats. Therefore, Democrats would control the Senate almost all the time, with a somewhat lesser but still probably decisive permanent Presidential advantage.
2. The Republicans (or Democrats!) would shift left a little, and all elections would be 50-50 again.
The common-sense answer is that it would take a while, there would be a lot of negotiation, but five or ten or thirty years later the Republicans would get their act together, shift left, and start winning elections again.
The common-sense answer is probably right, but one thing still bothers me: how did the Republicans keep losing both houses of Congress every year from 1955 to 1981? Wouldn’t they have shifted left during this time? I don’t know, this was before our current partisan era, and there were lots of weird deals around civil rights going on. The parties had realigned enough that Southern Democrats were conservative while northern Democrats were at least kind of liberal, so I think Southern conservatives consistently voted for Democratic representatives even while sometimes voting for Republican presidents. If we accept the theory above that parties only optimize for presidential platforms and not Congressional ones, then since Republicans were still winning 50% of presidencies, they might not have felt like they had to change their platform.
Or can parties just implode sometimes? I wouldn’t want to be the guy in the Republican primary who says “actually we Republicans should veer left”. Doesn’t feel like the kind of thing that would get lots of votes. Maybe after decades of humiliation and failure you could convince someone, but I don’t see the history of parties suffering decades of humiliation and failure before finally agreeing to turn around.
Parties and candidates seem to do a suspiciously good job staying equidistant from the median voter, far beyond the pathetic amount of effort they explicitly put in. I still can’t tell if it’s all coincidence, or whether there are deeper currents at work. | Scott Alexander | 150500663 | Secrets Of The Median Voter Theorem | acx |
# ACX Local Voting Guides
Thanks to our local meetup groups for doing this! Quick lookup version:
**AUSTIN: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CafmE10shNZRsemJMbQagJQ7huVLCkIA31auaNI3YcU/edit?tab=t.0)
BOSTON: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qyK-q9tK4S3aWnnGOVHfTqs2zwkW1f-0VOvpOqxEvqI/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.5qn4dgrsz18t)
CHICAGO:** **[Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rj063yy14ksRSlMYgkWp-E081XPEcvZEk4J8b-jgr2I/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.xbarub0zu8i)
LOS ANGELES: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/16_HhL_v86thtfsnPz7Y1N1SvxCOQB1xUKQfkTpXnl_0/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.xbarub0zu8i)
NEW YORK CITY: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/16Toeu1tyKU-gQEnEAdtWlNb2rwVwjILSBUqpxQTg4kk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.6ue347ut2kxb)
OAKLAND/BERKELEY: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/185RsOSxQDT0Oyf1SuqcQEW3BaLGnqQekZeHkx04fDL8/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.f734plgqa3d1)
PHILADELPHIA: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bCRiVvwgFkSY51v2_qkqctoQ7wQXr9l_-Lb35-kE6gw/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.ytncklwzpgi1)
SAN FRANCISCO: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XbCoc8KAdKPJs_aI_INfBwf86rPcUkKJBL2I7uJdBxU/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.w19m3u9krumc)
SEATTLE: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19-UDLDzclWjNQGUsCsjbQSlN4mJaf66fg6s78pubZ0E/edit?gid=0#gid=0)**
Longer version with commentary:
**AUSTIN: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CafmE10shNZRsemJMbQagJQ7huVLCkIA31auaNI3YcU/edit?tab=t.0)**. Part of the fun of this exercise is seeing what format each group came up with, so I appreciated Austin’s section of “Races Where You Should Consider Voting For The Other Party”, which highlighted elections where one candidate was so bad that even committed Dems/Republicans should consider crossing the aisle (usually this was because of corruption, like the candidate who “made millions of dollars off of oil companies that she is supposed to be responsible for enforcing rules on”). Highlight was their recommendation of Mayor Kirk Watson, even though “the [meetup] organizer's mom, a transportation engineer . . . has a long history sending Watson good highway designs that he vetoes because of his well-connected friends.”
**BOSTON: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qyK-q9tK4S3aWnnGOVHfTqs2zwkW1f-0VOvpOqxEvqI/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.5qn4dgrsz18t)**. This group went above and beyond - I blame all the strivers at Harvard - and have eighteen pages worth of discussion, including majority opinions and dissents on all issues. Highlights include a proposition on legalizing psychedelics and the hotly-contested Elizabeth Warren vs. John Deaton Senate race - but kudos to them for also offering impassioned and well-thought out opinions on extremely boring questions like whether the state auditor should be allowed to audit the legislature, or whether sectoral bargaining beats firm-level unionization. The best candidate name on this ballot is "Mohammed Bah".
**CHICAGO:** **[Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rj063yy14ksRSlMYgkWp-E081XPEcvZEk4J8b-jgr2I/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.xbarub0zu8i)**. Chicago local government has some drama this year; the entire school board resigned as part of an ongoing fight; the mayor and his teachers union allies want to fire the more technocratic and reform-minded school administrator Pedro Martinez, but Martinez isn't going. ACX Chicago tries to navigate the situation and endorse candidates for the ten open school board seats. Other questions facing the city include mandating that insurances provide unlimited IVF (the group is weakly against) and using taxpayer money to buy the Bears a new stadium (don't do it!). The most interesting candidate name on the ballot is "Shannon O'Malley" - not because this is an unusual name in itself, but because Mr. O'Malley is a Polish guy who [changed his name](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/illinois-judge-candidate-insists-he-s-o-malley-critics-call-n845651) to something female- and Irish-sounding after learning that Irish women are a sympathetic demographic who do well in elections. Thanks to ACX Chicago for keeping us abreast of such important political news!
**LOS ANGELES: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/16_HhL_v86thtfsnPz7Y1N1SvxCOQB1xUKQfkTpXnl_0/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.xbarub0zu8i)**. Los Angeles is almost party-line Democrat, but manages to deviate from consensus in a few places, including going against celebrity liberal district attorney George Gascon. Gascon was previously San Francisco DA (sandwiched between Kamala Harris and Chesa Boudin), attracted both furor and adulation for his anti-incarceration/soft-on-crime policies, quit, moved to Los Angeles to take care of his aging mother, and then became Los Angeles DA the next year! He is a fascinating character, and someone should write his biography, but apparently Los Angeles Rationality is tired of him. The group did however support increasing taxes to fund anti-homelessness programs, saying that LA's past anti-homelessness programs have a history of actually working.
**NEW YORK CITY: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/16Toeu1tyKU-gQEnEAdtWlNb2rwVwjILSBUqpxQTg4kk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.6ue347ut2kxb)**. Kudos to Overcoming Bias NYC for their hard work, including actually meeting with one of the candidates. There aren't many interesting races in New York this year, but they urge you to stay tuned for a likely special mayoral election now that Eric Adams has been accused of corruption.
**OAKLAND/BERKELEY: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/185RsOSxQDT0Oyf1SuqcQEW3BaLGnqQekZeHkx04fDL8/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.f734plgqa3d1)**. Both LA and Oakland weighed in on California’s statewide races; here’s a comparison of their opinions:
The strongest disagreement was over Prop 36, which increases penalties for various crimes. I’m hoping to publish a guest post on this one later this week. Kudos to ACX Oakland for including district maps and recommendations for various transit and utility positions.
**PHILADELPHIA: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bCRiVvwgFkSY51v2_qkqctoQ7wQXr9l_-Lb35-kE6gw/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.ytncklwzpgi1)**. Finally, a swing state! Philadelphia Rationality endorses Harris for President. But they pick Republican candidate Dave McCormick for Senate after his Democratic opponent, incumbent Bob Casey, earned their ire for various ill-thought-out progressive legislation like anti-price-gouging laws; McCormick also seems like a rare Republican capable of standing up to Trump. Just because you’re a swing state doesn’t mean your vote always counts; Philadelphia itself is so heavily Democratic that the group says “voting for [its Congressional representatives] should be seen more as a form of self-expression than a process to choose a candidate, so we recommend voting for whichever party makes you feel best”.
**SAN FRANCISCO: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XbCoc8KAdKPJs_aI_INfBwf86rPcUkKJBL2I7uJdBxU/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.w19m3u9krumc)**. I got confused because San Francisco has their own list of local propositions which are suspiciously similar to the statewide propositions (for example, both sets have an education bond first). That's not all that's confusing - California has a long history of propositions that invalidate past ballot propositions, but this is the first time I've ever seen them try this during the same election cycle. Proposition L raises taxes on ride-share companies, but Proposition M simplifies the tax system in various ways including cancelling Proposition L. If both pass, then [whichever gets more votes wins](https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/politics/muni-funding-measure-author-asks-backers-to-skip-prop-m/article_ecdb9128-8755-11ef-851a-4f0d83bf44ed.html). This creates a weird situation where several interest groups have strong opinions that both propositions should pass but that L should pass by more votes than M; how do you even make a voter guide for a situation like that? Maybe you should recommend stochastic voting - tell people to vote yes on L, then roll a die, and vote yes on M unless they get a 1? The San Francisco meetup group takes a simpler path and just recommends yes on both.
**SEATTLE: [Guide here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19-UDLDzclWjNQGUsCsjbQSlN4mJaf66fg6s78pubZ0E/edit?gid=0#gid=0)**.This one is a spreadsheet, which is probably merciful given how many positions Seattleites have to vote on. The best candidate name on this ballot is “Dave Upthegrove”, running for Public Lands Commissioner ie forest management; not only is this not a fake name, but the Upthegroves are apparently one of the oldest American families with a [history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_op_den_Graeff) in the country dating back to 1683. Second place goes to “Justin Greywolf” - yes, he is a libertarian, and yes, ACX Seattle endorses him. I don’t know how he came by his name, but his [Twitter header picture](https://x.com/GreywolfJustin?lang=cs) is suggestive:
Thanks again to everyone who worked on this. I don’t regret the way I managed things this time - I think it was good to have one very simple test run so everyone knows how it works - but next election year (2026) I plan to get in touch with organizers very early (late 2025) about the primary elections (presumably early 2026). They can plan something around their city’s schedule, send it to me a few weeks before their city’s primary, and I’ll put it on the nearest open thread. Then we can do something like this again for the general, with everyone knowing the deadline in advance and having more time.
Try to remember whether these guides affected your voting decisions - I’ll be asking about this on the upcoming survey. | Scott Alexander | 150557261 | ACX Local Voting Guides | acx |
# Open Thread 352
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I think I’ve given out all Book Review Contest prizes, including free subscriptions. If you think you should have gotten a prize, but didn’t, please email me.
**2:** New post for paid subscribers, [Mostleastremarkablegate And The Nature Of Online Harassment](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/mostleastremarkablegate-and-the-nature).
**3:** I’ve been asked to advertise [The Curve](https://thecurve.is/), a conference on “the trajectory of transformative AI”, including forecasting, alignment, etc. It’s by the Manifold/Manifest/Manifund team and will be held at [Lighthaven](https://www.lighthaven.space/), Berkeley from November 22 - 24, tickets are $100 for students, $300 - $800 for others. Apply [here](https://airtable.com/appBqA00C3FYy4DXs/pagJ0Ca9r9FSzSGgv/form). I hope to attend.
**4:** Fine, I guess my life has turned into advertising everything that happens at Lighthaven. Brooke (of Vibe Camp and postrat Twitter) is holding some kind of social-skills-building-event there on November 1. I don’t know anything about it but I [like the branding](https://school.vibe.camp/).
**5:** I am also being asked to advertise[NOAI](http://noai.philosophers.group), a conference in New Orleans. It seems to be a joint project of many local philosophical and cultural groups, including the local ACX meetup. There will be AI content, chess boxing, a charitable donation game, and an afterparty at Francis Ford Coppola’s house (I will be disappointed if it’s not made of Megalon). Astral Codex Ten is listed as a sponsor, but I want to clarify that this is the local meetup group only and that I know nothing about it besides what’s listed here. That having been said, I am prepared to endorse it for a sufficient payment in Megalon. | Scott Alexander | 150505306 | Open Thread 352 | acx |
# Book Review: Deep Utopia
**I.**
Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom got famous for asking “What if technology is really really bad?” He helped define ‘existential risk’, popularize fears of malevolent superintelligence, and argue that we were living in a ‘vulnerable world’ prone to physical or biological catastrophe.
His latest book breaks from his usual oeuvre. In *[Deep Utopia](https://amzn.to/4dYfz4s)*, he asks: “What if technology is really really *good*?”
Most previous utopian literature (he notes) has been about ‘shallow’ utopias. There are still problems; we just handle them better. There’s still scarcity, but at least the government distributes resources fairly. There’s still sickness and death, but at least everyone has free high-quality health care.
But Bostrom asks: what if there were literally no problems? What if you could do literally whatever you wanted?[1](#footnote-1) Maybe the world is run by a benevolent superintelligence who’s uploaded everyone into a virtual universe, and you can change your material conditions as easily as changing desktop wallpaper. Maybe we have nanobots too cheap to meter, and if you whisper ‘please make me a five hundred story palace, with a thousand servants who all look exactly like Marilyn Monroe’, then your wish will be their command. If you want to be twenty feet tall and immortal, the only thing blocking you is the doorframe.
Would this be as good as it sounds? Or would people’s lives become boring and meaningless?
**II.**
We can start by bounding the damage. Our deep utopia will know how to wirehead people safely. So worst-case scenario, if you absolutely can’t figure out anything else to do, you live in perfect bliss forever. Bostrom urges us not to reflexively turn up our noses at this outcome. Wireheading grosses us out because our best approximations for it - drugs, porn, etc - are tawdry and shallow. Actually-good wireheading [would be neither](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/01/28/wirehead-gods-on-lotus-thrones/). You could walk through the woods at sunrise, experiencing a combination of the joy you felt at the birth of your first child, the excitement Einstein experienced upon seeing the first glimmers of relativity, and the ecstasy of St. Teresa as she gazed upon the face of God. That afternoon, you could walk somewhere else, and feel an entirely different artisanal combination of blisses. “It feels so good that if the sensation were translated into tears of gratitude, rivers would overflow.”
If wireheading seems too meaningless, you can add in wireheaded-meaning. People often say that an MDMA trip or mystical vision was the most meaningful experience of their lives. It would be trivial for our Deep Utopians to hack your brain to see a world in a grain of sand or heaven in a wildflower. We're gonna mean so much, you might even get tired of meaning. And you'll say 'please, please, it's too much meaning. We can't take it anymore, Professor Bostrom, it's too much!'
So the problem isn’t necessarily that we’ll *feel* bored and meaningless. The problem is that maybe we’ll feel happy and meaning-laden, but our feelings will be objectively wrong and contemptible. Wireheading feels like cheating, and some people will demand a non-cheating solution, and we won’t have a full utopia until those people are satisfied too.
Since this is a question of how not to cheat, a lot depends on how exactly we define cheating. Bostrom proposes a series of progressively more complicated solutions for people with progressively stricter anti-cheating standards.
If you’re only concerned about avoiding wireheading, you could spend Utopia appreciating art. The Deep Utopians could hack your brain to give you the critical refinement of Harold Bloom or some other great art-appreciator, and you could spend eternity reading the Great Books and having extremely perspicacious opinions about them. Plenty of scholars do that today, and nobody thinks their lives are meaningless. In fact, why stop at Bloom? The Utopians could hack you into some kind of superbeing who can appreciate superart as far beyond current humanity as Shakespeare is beyond a tree frog.
If you live a billion years, do you run out of Art to appreciate? Not just in the sense of exhausting humanity’s store of Art (superintelligent art generator AIs can always add more art faster than you can exhaust it), but in the sense of exhausting the space of *possible* Art? Bostrom is unsure. He suggests that since we’re only using Art to satisfy ourselves that we’re not cheating - rather than demanding that the Art itself be interesting - we can change our interestingness criteria a little whenever we run out of Art, helping us distinguish ever finer gradations.
(All of the above goes for appreciating the profound truths of Science too. We assume that all worthwhile science has already been discovered - or that everything left requires a particle accelerator the size of the Milky Way plus an AI with a brain the size of Jupiter to interpret the results. You will not be asked to help, but you can still try to contemplate the already-discovered truths and bask in their elegance.)
What if that still counts as cheating?
> While one might hold that that the interestingness value that an individual can derive from the works of Shakespeare would be permanently depleted after a few decades of study, what about the enjoyment value of *a nice cup of tea*? Drinking tea may not be a source of an intense flash of value, the way that an epiphany into some deep truth about human nature may be…but it is quite renewable. The 162,330th cup of tea, on your 200th birthday, may not be less valuable than the one you had a century earlier. And whereas the supply of human-accessible profound truths might be limited, you can always put another kettle on.
Consider the life of some stereotypical British aristocrat. He wakes up, reads the morning paper, has some tea. He goes on a walk with his dog. He gets home and plays snooker or cricket or crumpets (unless some of those aren’t games; I’m not really up on my Britishisms). He reads a Jane Austen novel on his comfy chair by the fire. Then he goes to bed. It’s not the most fascinating life, but he’s probably pretty happy, and nobody accuses him of wireheading.
What if our anti-cheating criteria are even stricter than this? What if we want drama, excitement, the possibility of failure? Here Bostrom turns to sports and games (broadly defined, including activities like climbing Everest). Climbing Everest is dramatic and exciting; Deep Utopians can enjoy it just as much as we can. It’s true that they could always just ask their nanobot-genies “Teleport me to the top of Everest” or even “Turn me into a superman who can climb Everest in half an hour without breaking a sweat”. But even today, we can [hire a helicopter](https://transportationhistory.org/2024/05/14/2005-a-helicopter-lands-on-top-on-mount-everest-as-part-of-an-unprecedented-and-potentially-perilous-flight/) to take us to the summit. It doesn’t matter; everyone knows this is cheating. You only get to feel good about yourself if you climb it the old-fashioned way.
We have to go stricter! What about “you have to make a mark on the world” or ”you have to make a positive difference”? Here I start to find Bostrom’s solutions a little gimmicky. You could have Person A pledge to be sad unless Person B climbs Everest (if they can’t honor this pledge on their own, they could reverse wirehead into being sad). Then Person B has to climb Everest in order to make a difference and save Person A! Why would Person A agree to this scheme? Because they’re *also* making a positive difference in the world, by helping provide their fellow non-cheaters with purpose!
(a more natural version of this might look like participating in a sporting competition that your community cares about, like the World Cup.)
Even stricter! What if you need to make a non-gimmicky positive difference that isn’t downstream of someone else’s decision to artificially provide you with purpose? The best the book can do is suggest religious or pseudo-religious rituals. We can’t build robots to go to church for us on Easter or fast for us on Yom Kippur, nor to live decent lives free of sin. If you’re an atheist, maybe you can get a similar effect by honoring your ancestors - perhaps your hard-working grandmother wanted to be remembered by her descendants, and only you can fulfill her last request.
Can we go further than that? A unique positive contribution? An interesting contribution? One that directly affects the lives of lots of non-supernatural non-dead people? Maybe not. But most people already don’t do these things. Most of us aren’t revolutionizing societies or pursuing social missions. We’re just sort of getting by. You can still do that in Deep Utopia, *and* live a life of constant bliss.
**III.**
That’s the content. Before I discuss my thoughts, a few words about the form.
If you made Zizek write fiction, you would get *Deep Utopia*. The book takes the form of a story. The story is: some young people go to a lecture series by Nick Bostrom. At the lecture, Bostrom says [commence 468 pages of Bostrom describing his theory of purpose in utopia]. Then the young people go to a party, then go home. The end.
When there are little side boxes going into more detail about a certain topic, they’re described as “handouts” at the “lecture”. Occasionally, not-especially-wacky things happen, like the fire alarm goes on, or the lights go out. Sometimes when Bostrom wants to play devil’s advocate, he puts his question in the mouth of one of the students. Otherwise, it’s pretty much what you would expect from a 468-page dense philosophy tome with a fig leaf of “And some students went to a lecture where Nick Bostrom said…” at the beginning.
Except the part about the fox! In the frame story, Bostrom has assigned homework: students need to read a book (actually a series of epistles) called Feodor The Fox. This side story (there are ~50 pages of it, scattered throughout the book) describes a society of woodland animals. One of the animals, the titular Feodor, wants to make the world a better place, but isn’t sure how. He teams up with some other animals, especially a pig, to try to figure it out. They come up with an interesting scheme, but never really get anywhere. The end. I can only draw the vaguest of connections between the story and the main text.
Oh, and the space heater. This is the other “homework” story. When the world’s richest man dies, he leaves his entire fortune to a foundation for the benefit of his cheap space heater - he says the space heater actually improved his life, whereas everyone else was backbiting and ungracious. The foundation trustees are stuck with the problem of figuring out how to use hundreds of billions of dollars to benefit a space heater which doesn’t, technically, have any preferences. They decide to add an AI to the heater, sort of kind of uplifting it to sentience. Gradually the space heater becomes superintelligent, maybe even divine. At the end, an author mouthpiece character asks: what if, at the very beginning, the AI-augmented space heater had refused the uplifting? What if it asked to be disconnected from the AI so it could remain a space heater? Would it have been ethical for the trustees to agree/refuse? Here it’s more obvious what Bostrom was trying to teach. But it sure was a strange story.
Bostrom’s work has attained a cult status, and it felt at times like he was leaning into it. This was a mystical text, full of hidden knowledge to those willing to explore its secrets. I was able to recognize a few unnamed or only-obliquely-named characters at the lecture. One was David Pearce, who I profiled [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/profile-the-far-out-initiative). Another, “Nospmit”, must be a reference to [this Oxford philosopher](https://users.ox.ac.uk/~bras2317/), but I don’t know enough about him to understand why the allusion made sense. Nor do I understand why Bostrom’s students were named “Kelvin”, “Firafix”, and “Tessius”, nor why the lectures were being held in the “Philip Morris Auditorium” (later renamed the “Exxon Auditorium” (later renamed the “Enron Auditorium”)) - is this a reference to effective altruism’s run-ins with FTX? I honestly expected that the end of the book would have some big reveal, like that all of this was happening ten billion years in the future in a simulation created by the woodland animals or something. Maybe this was the intent and I just missed it. Still, the book’s mysteries will have to await a better kabbalist than I.
I probably sound critical here, but overall I think this was a good (albeit weird) decision. It’s hard to make people read a 468 page philosophy book, and the frame story and occasional woodland-animal-excursions provided a nice distraction.
I also appreciated Bostrom’s prose. Yes, a lot of it was typical analytic philosophy “let’s spend five pages analyzing the subtle differences between ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’”. But when he wants to write well, he writes well. For example, here’s a passage on whether life is more meaningful during childhood (because meaning depends on novel experiences, and the fewer previous experiences you’ve had, the more novel ones you get):
> My efforts with this lecture series, I dolefully concede, will most likely fail to deliver the interestingness value once afforded to you by that colorful toy xylophone you received when you turned one.
>
> Still, I’m hoping that your lives are currently not going too badly, and that even though in percentage terms you are not making as rapid cognitive strides as you did when you were even younger, you find compensation yet in the greater absolute level of sophistication at which you now operate.
>
> And to the extent that our later experiences are tinged with nostalgia, it may be for altogether different reasons. We might have liked being taken care of and being able to spend our days playing. Being naive might have been good for us, not because it gave us more opportunity to learn and progress, but because it shielded us from harsh realities and allowed us to fit into a smaller, cozier, more human-sized lifeworld. Now we are stressed out, responsible, jaded, damaged, less vital; there is less fun and wonder.
>
> The future used to dangle before us and above us like a magic veil, draped alluringly over creation in motley colors and translucent shadings. Now we instead see a corridor, lit by fluorescent lights, with numbered rooms, bills to pay, obligations to discharge - and we know that at the end lies the hospital, the hospice, and the morgue. Our parents, who used to be our loving protectors and maintainers of our little world, are helplessly withering away before our eyes, our already in the ground.
>
> So if some part of us pines after the bygone days of childhood or the lost innocence of youth, there are plenty of sad reasons that coulda ccount for that.
>
> What might it look like if we did attain a state of stagnation, from which further growth and development was not possible? How objectively boring would such a condition be? I think we should not imagine this as tedious monotony, getting stuck in an everlasting rut of triviality and grind.
>
> Instead, such life could be like a living kaleidoscope, conjuring an ever-changing series of patterns that transform and modulate one another according ot a fixed set of rules within bounded parameters There is a sameness at a certain level, but also inexhaustible richness and novelty at other levels.
I couldn’t help comparing *Deep Utopia* to Will MacAskill’s book *What We Owe The Future.* Both MacAskill and Bostrom are in a weird, almost unprecedented position - Oxford philosophers suddenly thrust onto the world stage by the success of the effective altruism movement. MacAskill got famous and decided to write an Official Important Person Book and promote it on the world stage. Bostrom got famous and decided he didn’t need to pretend to be normal anymore. As a result, *Deep Utopia* feels less like an academic paper, and more like the sort of things one of the great philosophers of the past might have written, back in the days when philosophical tracts could include a character called Stupidus who secretly represented the Pope.
My biggest problem with all of this is that this book was crying out for fictional stories set in Deep Utopia. The anti-cheating focus revolved around whether we could have a utopia that we found narratively satisfying. But Bostrom cashed this out in philosophical analyses of what narrative satisfaction meant and whether it was possible. I would accept this from other philosophers who are too boring and conformist to digress into fiction. But Bostrom taunted us with lots of perfectly-fine fictional short stories, none of which were in utopia (unless one of them was secretly in utopia and we the reader were supposed to figure this out) and none of which demonstrated any of the principles he talked about.
I consider this an important failure. It’s bad enough that *Deep Utopia* didn’t include such a story. But narratizability is a fair Near Mode test of Bostrom’s vision, and I’m not sure if I, having finished his book, could write a story about people in a deep utopia living lives which we (from the outside) recognize as happy and meaningful. I can imagine a few elements - there would be sports, and communities, and ritual - but I find myself boggling at the difficulty of imagining a world without limitations and how all of its parts would interact.
**IV.**
Partly this is because I don’t know if *Deep Utopia* goes far enough.
For example, Bostrom thinks a deep utopia would still have sports available as a distraction / source of meaning. I’m not so sure. Consider weight-lifting. Your success in weight-lifting seems like a pretty straightforward combination of your biology and your training. Weight-lifting retains its excitement because we don’t fully understand either. There’s still a chance that any random guy could turn out to have a hidden weight-lifting talent. Or that you could discover the perfect regimen that lets you make gains beyond what the rest of the world thinks possible.
Suppose we truly understood both of these factors. You could send your genes to 23andMe and receive a perfectly-accurate estimate of your weightlifting potential. And scientists had long since discovered the perfect training regimen (including the perfect training regimen for people with your exact genes/lifestyle/limitations). Then you could plug your genotype and training regimen into a computer and get the exact amount you’d be able to lift after one year, two years, etc. The computer is never wrong. Would weightlifting really be a sport anymore? A few people whose genes put them in the 99.999th percentile for potential would compete to see who could follow the training regimen most perfectly. One of them would miss a session for their mother’s funeral and drop out of the running; the other guy would win gold at whatever passed for this society’s Olympics. Doesn’t sound too exciting.
A team sport like baseball or soccer would be harder to solve. Maybe you’d have to resort to probabilistic estimates; given *these* two teams at *this* stadium, the chance of the Red Sox winning is 78.6%, because the model can’t predict which direction some random air gusts will go. I guess this is no worse than having Nate Silver making a betting model. But on the individual level, it’s still a combination of your (well understood) genes and (well understood) training regimen.
But this is assuming that something like genetics stays relevant. Suppose we’re all posthumans in robot bodies. Then your ability to hit a ball depends entirely on how well-constructed your robot body is. The richest guy gets the best robot body and inevitably wins the game. Or even if we’re not in robot bodies, we’ve probably at least been heavily genetically engineered, or genetically selected. Or even if we aren’t, someone who wants their kid to grow up to be a star athlete can get told exactly which person to marry for the right gene combo, and anyone whose parents don’t do this is as doomed as a steroid-free Tour de France contestant. It’s not just that the future will need some kind of Luddite surveillance state to make sports work out without unfair advantages. It’s that it’s hard to even *define* what an unfair advantage is at this point, and almost all sporting “talent” will come from rules-lawyering the definitions.
(Compare to the fear that if intersex people are allowed to enter women’s sports today, cis women won’t be able to keep up. This is interesting only because intersex is a rare piece of biology that we understand and can easily notice; once *every* piece of biology is like that, it will all be equally controversial and seem equally unfair.)
What about religion, Bostrom’s other holdout? What if, after we all have IQ one billion, we can just *figure out* which religion is true? If it’s atheism, the whole plan is a no-go. But if it’s some specific religion, that’s almost as bad. Imagine a world where religion has been emptied of its faith and mystery, and we know exactly how each act of worship figures into the divine economy. Going to church would be no more meaningful than doing our taxes - another regular ritual we perform to appease a higher power who will punish us if we don’t.
Once questions like these make total sense, is religion still a valuable source of meaning? ([source](http://danny.oz.au/danny/humour/theology-exam))
How could you pray to God if you had no unmet needs? How could you confess and atone, if you could hack the sinfulness out of your utility function through neurotechnology?
When I think of questions like these, I am less optimistic about Bostrom’s solutions - and I wish even harder that he had given us some fiction where we got to see his world in action.
The only sentences in *Deep Utopia* that I appreciated without reservation were a few almost throwaway references to zones where utopia had been suspended. Suppose you want to gain meaning by climbing Everest, but it wouldn’t count unless there’s a real risk of death. That is, if you fall in a crevasse, you can’t have the option to call on the nanobot-genies to teleport you safely back to your bed. Bostrom suggests - then doesn’t follow up on - utopia-free zones where the nanobot-genies are absent. If you die in a utopia-free-zone, you die in real life.
This is a bold proposal. What happens if someone goes to the utopia-free zone, falls in a crevasse, and as they lay dying, they shout out “No, I regret my choice, please come save me!”? You’d need some kind of commitment mechanism worked out beforehand (a safe word?). Should it be legal to have safe-word-less, you-really-do-die-if-you-fall zones? Tough question.
(many philosophers have said that the most human activity - maybe even the highest activity - is politics. Bostrom barely touches on this, but it seems like another plausible source of meaning in deep utopia. No matter how obsolete our material concerns, there will still be open issues like the one above.)
What if you regret learning the answer to the God question, and you want to live in a state of ignorance - a place where you can still have blind faith? Can you go to a utopia-free-zone where they erase that knowledge from your head, and dial your IQ back to 100 so you can’t figure it out again on your own? If you regret learning the secrets of weightlifting, can you go to a utopia-free-zone where nobody really understands genetics or fitness regimens, everyone’s in a randomly selected biological body, and all you can do is lift and hope?
At this point, why not just go all the way? Do the Deep Utopians have their Amish? When you get tired of being blissed out all the time, can you go to their version of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and do heavy farm labor, secure in the knowledge that you’ll go hungry if the corn doesn’t grow?
Or is that the wrong way to think about it? Is it less of an Amish farming village than a virtual reality sim? Want meaning, struggle, and passion? Become Napoleon for a century. Go in the experience machine, and - with only the vaguest memory of your past existence, or none at all - get born on the island of Corsica in 1769 and see what happens. Spend a while relaxing from posthumanity in the body of a 5’7, IQ 135 Frenchman.
Is this stupid? We hold an Industrial Revolution, design artificial intelligence, go through an entire singularity - only to end up back in 18th-century France? Not necessarily. 18th century France was full of miserable people - starving peasants, wretched prisoners, smallpox victims - or people who suffered merely from the “affliction” of not getting to be Napoleon. Even Napoleon’s life wasn’t maximally interesting. You could live an enriched, enchanted version of Napoleon’s life, where every decision had extra branching consequences and there was no downtime. Or a version of Napoleon’s life customized to your personal preferences: NSFW Napoleon where all the women wear skimpy costumes! Woke Napoleon where every third Frenchman is a person of color! If you hate the cold, you can play as a Napoleon who skipped Russia and invaded Cancun! It would be the difference between living in medieval Scandinavia and playing *Assassin’s Creed: Valhalla*.
More generally, there must be human lives that are in the sweet spot between pleasure and difficult-striving-dramatic-excitement. The average life in history probably doesn’t make it. Even the most exciting lives, like Napoleon’s, probably aren’t perfect. And many lives are wasted on their subjects; what if Napoleon and Elvis both would have had preferred to be the other? If non-utopia is awful but utopia is boring, can we figure out some kind of sweet spot in the middle? Can we have [an archipelago](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/06/07/archipelago-and-atomic-communitarianism/) of different utopia levels, for people who prefer different points on the spectrum? Would varying your utopia level be a richer and more interesting life than staying in any one position for too long? Is it more fun to bliss out on superultrawireheading after a grueling stint in 18th-century France? Is it more fun to be Napoleon if you have faith in a silicon Heaven ahead of you?
The obvious next question is whether all of this has already happened. I prefer a different formulation of the simulation argument, but I won’t deny this one has its charms[2](#footnote-2).
Crowley says to “interpret every phenomenon as a particular dealing of God with your soul”. If you’re a Deep Utopian posthuman, living a life made for you by some superintelligent designer (or your own transcended self), trying to balance enjoyment with difficulty and rewardingness, then this phrase takes on new meaning.
Why did I come across *Deep Utopia* this month? Why did I write this review? Why are you reading it? What are you trying to tell yourself?
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
The book only briefly touches on ideas about necessarily scarce goods. These include obvious things like status, but also things more like NFTs (which are scarce by design). I’m not sure there’s much more to say about this. Maybe in the far future having certain scarce NFTs could be considered “cool”; in this case, all the have-nots would just have to settle for planet-sized palaces and eternal bliss, but no NFTs.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
You might think that, as pseudo-religions go, this one is socially corrosive - if you’re not sure the world is real, wouldn’t that make you a worse person? I’m not sure. Imagine getting in some kind of VR sim of the 19th century US, where you forget all of your modern knowledge but still have your same personality. Wouldn’t you hope that you independently realized that abolitionism was morally correct and spent at least some of your time advocating for it? Wouldn’t you be embarrassed if you woke up again, back in Heaven, and learned that you’d been a slaveowner and never questioned it? If you can’t fear the real Last Judgment with its trumpets and angels, can you at least imagine looking at a scoreboard for how morally you acted - maybe a public scoreboard that your friends could also see - and [having to justify everything you did](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/06/03/asches-to-asches/) to a much wiser and vaster version of yourself, with the advantage of a few thousand extra years of moral progress? | Scott Alexander | 148365441 | Book Review: Deep Utopia | acx |
# AI Art Turing Test
Okay, let’s do this! Link is **[here](https://forms.gle/J24TiJ7e4tbX5oBPA)**, should take about twenty minutes. I’ll close the form on Monday 10/21 and post results the following week.
I’ll put an answer key in the comments here, and have a better one including attributions in the results post. DON’T READ THE COMMENTS UNTIL YOU’RE DONE. | Scott Alexander | 150170926 | AI Art Turing Test | acx |
# Open Thread 351
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I realize I keep forgetting to post the Hidden Open Thread for subscribers. I’ve set up a reminder system for myself so hopefully it should go up this week and thereafter.
**2:** Still haven’t gotten around to giving everyone their Book Review rewards but should do so this week.
**3:** Ballot meetups in Austin, Boston, Chicago, LA, Oakland, and SF this week, see [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ballots-everywhere-times-and-places) for details. | Scott Alexander | 150189223 | Open Thread 351 | acx |
# Book Review Contest 2024 Winners
Thanks to everyone who entered or voted in the book review contest. The winners are:
* **1st:** ***[Two Arms And A Head](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-two-arms-and-a-head)**,* reviewed by AmandaFromBethlehem. Amanda is active in the Philadelphia ACX community. She writes [Letters From Bethlehem](https://lettersfrombethlehem.substack.com/) and is working on a novel. When she’s not writing existential horror, she is busy with home improvement projects.
* **2nd:** ***[Nine Lives](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-nine-lives)***, reviewed by David Matolcsi. David is an AI safety researcher from Hungary, currently living in Berkeley. He doesn't have much publicly available writing yet, but plans to publish some new blog posts on LessWrong in the coming months
* **3rd:** ***[How The War Was Won](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-how-the-war-was)**,* reviewed by Jack Thorlin. Jack previously worked as an attorney at the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now an assistant professor at the University of Arkansas School of Law.
First place gets $2,500, second place $1,000, third place gets $500. Email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com to tell me how to send you money; your choices are Paypal, Bitcoin, Ethereum, check in the mail, or donation to your favorite charity. Please contact me by October 21 or you lose your prize.
The other Finalists were:
* ***[Autobiography Of Yukichi Fukuzawa](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-autobiography-of)***, reviewed by Jason Rhys Parry. Jason is a researcher at Sapienship. He has a new tech and culture-themed Substack called [Blueprint Canopy](https://blueprintcanopy.substack.com/). You can read his debut post "The Sci-fi Career Guide" for a taste of things to come. He also tweets at [@JRhysParry](https://x.com/JRhysParry).
* ***[Dominion](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-dominion-by-matthew)***, reviewed by Drew Housman. Drew writes about animal welfare on [his Substack](https://expandingcircle.substack.com/) and about all kinds of stuff on his [personal blog](http://drewhousman.com). He also [wrote a book](https://www.amazon.com/Harvard-Hollywood-Holy-Land-professional-ebook/dp/B087PP4C72) about his college days and early career. He’s interested in working with animal welfare orgs and can be reached at [drewhous@gmail.com](mailto:drewhous@gmail.com).
* ***[Don Juan](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-don-juan)***, reviewed by Amedeo Rothson. Amedeo has been called “the greatest writer who has ever lived,” namely by himself. He writes occasional essays and still-more-occasional verse at *[The Titan’s Breakfast](https://thetitansbreakfast.substack.com).*
* ***[The Family That Couldn’t Sleep](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-family-that)***, reviewed by Vat, a neuropsychology/genetics student who writes at [Vates Rising](https://vaticidalprophet.substack.com/).
* ***[How Language Began](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-how-language-began)***, reviewed by John V, a neuroscientist who lives in Boston.
* ***[Real Raw News](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-real-raw-news)***, reviewed by Blake Neff. Blake is a producer for an American conservative podcast and radio show, and previously wrote the scripts for Tucker Carlson's Fox show, so feel free to blame him for the present state of American politics. He doesn't have a Substack as of yet, but does take commissions and [he'll respond to your email](mailto:blake.s.neff@gmail.com) if you send one.
* ***[Silver Age Marvel Comics](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-silver-age-marvel)***, reviewed by [Edward Nevraumont](https://www.linkedin.com/in/edwardn/). Edward has a day job in private equity but has three side projects that may interest ACX readers: he co-hosted "[What if Marvel was Real](https://whatifmarvelwasreal.com/)" — a podcast that pretends to be part of the 1960s Marvel Universe and discusses the real world implications of living with superheroes. He writes business-stuff at the largest marketing Substack: [Marketing BS](https://marketingbs.substack.com/). And most recently he has started a project to coach his nine-year old daughter to (hopefully) the History Bee National Championship (using some technique from last year's contest winner): [The Everest Era](https://everestera.substack.com/).
* ***[The Complete Rhyming Dictionary And Poet’s Craft Book](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-complete-rhyming)***, reviewed by David. David is a materials science PhD and programmer who blogs with co-author Felipe at [The Hall of Impossible Dreams](https://www.hallofdreams.org/tabs/categories/) about [fanfiction](https://hallofdreams.org/posts/famous/), [poetry](https://hallofdreams.org/posts/the-death-of-poetry), [video game machine learning](https://hallofdreams.org/posts/trackmania-1), and [fanfiction poetry about video game machine learning](https://hallofdreams.org/posts/prologue-in-hatetris). He is currently looking for work, and can be reached at [david@hallofdreams.org](mailto:david@hallofdreams.org).
* ***[The History Of Rationalism](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-history-of-the)***, reviewed by Louis Morgan, a curmudgeon and cunctator who lives in a swamp in south Louisiana
* ***[The Pale King](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-pale-king)***, reviewed by Arielle Friedman. Arielle likes fiction, light technopessimism, and the occasional political screed. She writes at [analogfutures.substack.com](http://analogfutures.substack.com) and runs a co-writing group every weekday morning that you can join [here](https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZwrc-qtrjsjH9QV69QcyKLBdqGnmacZDd4E#/registration).
* ***[The Ballad of the White Horse](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-ballad-of-the)*****,** reviewed by FLWAB. FLWAB works in mental healthcare administration, and is in the process of earning a PhD in clinical psychology. He writes the Substack *[Flying Lion With A Book](https://flyinglionwithabook.substack.com/),* and is often found leaving C. S. Lewis quotes in the comments of other people's Substacks.
I’m also giving out six Honorable Mentions. These either came very close to making the finals, or had an interesting balance of very high and very low votes in the first round, or I just personally liked them. They are:
* ***[Catkin](https://ctrlcreep.substack.com/p/catkin-a-book-review)***, by ctrlcreep. They write [microfiction](https://twitter.com/ctrlcreep) as translucent as the finest yellow plastic. [ctrlcreep.net](http://ctrlcreep.net). Otherwise prefers illegibility.
* ***[Road of The King](https://substack.com/home/post/p-149810390)***, reviewed by UnlimitedOranges. He is a rationality and fiction enthusiast as well as 1L law student at Rutgers Law School. If anyone is looking for a Summer 2025 law intern, email him at [elvisqwalsh@gmail.com](mailto:elvisqwalsh@gmail.com).
* ***[World Empire Lost](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ki5XsE0jkxZtd2XAeyTAJw1ZjLh2Cu-matUYKAhA6-s/edit#heading=h.evivwyxnsq)***, reviewed by Iain. Iain is a former civil servant and government adviser based in England. He blogs on politics, government, society, books and miscellany at [www.edrith.co.uk](http://www.edrith.co.uk), where he also hosts an annual UK-focused forecasting competition.
* ***[The Meme Machine](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14qa47TJ_Vyerx4XNgTCIh7PUZ_TOgNcU_eHm5So_zo0/edit#heading=h.mmp3cjswsvu6)***, reviewed by Arvid Häggqvist. Arvid is currently doing a Master's degree in philosophy at Uppsala University, Sweden, and works as a software engineer. He asks you to consider donating to [his friend's fundraiser for helping displaced people in Beirut](https://www.justgiving.com/crowdfunding/lebanonsolidarity?utm_id=2&utm_term=b9Aw46p6Q).
* ***[Determined](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AXmWgSbh_TFsoZuApSCSEoz57yn93CM5YYhtaO_s4W4/edit#heading=h.begryxgkrxn9)***, reviewed by Slippin Fall, who invites you to join him at [Nobels in the Street](https://slippinfall.substack.com/about) where he will try to win himself, using zero math, a Nobel Prize every Monday for the next six Mondays. First up, on 10/14, the Nobel Prize in Physics. He sh\*ts you not, and hopes to see you there.
The author of the final honorable mention, ***[Piranesi](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cp6iw5OEyDjnD_viZo-KL0Zv4jwQnMXtE4yIovfVAco/edit#heading=h.oedt50otw6yt)***, asks to remain anonymous.
I enjoyed watching you speculate on which reviews you thought were secretly mine, but I didn’t submit one this year.
All winners and finalists get a free ACX subscription at the email I have on record for them. I haven’t done this yet but I will next week. If you want it at a different email and haven’t already told me, send me an email saying so.
All winners and finalists also get the right to pitch me essays they want me to put up on ACX. Warning that I am terrible to pitch to, reject most things without giving good reasons, and am generally described as awful to work with - but you can do it if you want! I used to say I would pay you if I used your article, but I found that other people already wanted to pitch me more than I wanted to accept, so I’m suspending this offer for now.
All winners and finalists get the opportunity to be named and honored publicly here; if I didn’t include your details, it’s because I didn’t get your response to my email asking me what details to include, and if you want to change that you should send me an email so I can name you in an open thread or something.
Many people said the Book Review Contest seems to be declining. I may skip next year in favor of an Everything-Except-Book-Reviews contest, give you time to read some more good books, then return to book reviews in 2026. Let me know if you have opinions on this plan. | Scott Alexander | 149957117 | Book Review Contest 2024 Winners | acx |
# SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story
**I.**
My ex-girlfriend has a weird relationship to reality. Her actions ripple out into the world more heavily than other people's. She finds herself at the center of events more often than makes sense. One time someone asked her to explain the whole “AI risk” thing to a State Senator. She hadn’t realized states had senators, but it sounded important, so she gave it a try, figuring out her exact pitch on the car ride to his office.
A few months later, she was informed that the Senator had really taken her words to heart, and he'd been thinking hard about how he could help. This is part of the story behind SB 1047 - specifically, the only part I have any personal connection to. The rest of this post comes from anonymous sources in the pro-1047 community who wanted to tell their side of the story.
(In case you’re just joining us - SB 1047 is a California bill, recently passed by the legislature but vetoed by the governor - which forced AI companies to take some steps to reduce the risk of AI-caused existential catastrophes. See [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/asteriskzvi-on-californias-ai-bill) for more on the content of the bill and the arguments for and against; this post will limit itself to the political fight.)
State Senator Scott Wiener, unusually for California politicians, is a thoughtful person with a personality and a willingness to think outside the box. When there’s a really interesting bill that makes people wake up and pay attention, it’s usually one of his. Some of his efforts I can get behind - he’s a big YIMBY champion, and gets credit for the law letting homeowners build ADUs. Others seem crazy to me - like a law which lowered penalties for knowingly exposing someone to HIV (you can read his argument for why he thought this was a good idea [here](https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/bill-modernize-discriminatory-hiv-criminalization-laws-passes-senate))[1](#footnote-1). Still, love him or hate him, he feels like a live player in ways that other Californian politicians don't.
The New York Times [says](https://archive.ph/Kskja) he got the idea for the bill after:
> …[going to] “A.I. salons” held in San Francisco. Last year, Mr. Wiener attended a series of those salons, where young researchers, entrepreneurs, activists and amateur philosophers discussed the future of artificial intelligence.
...so I guess it wasn’t entirely due to my ex. But the bill owes much of its specifics and support to its three co-sponsors - Center for AI Safety, Encode Justice, and Economic Security Project Action.
[Center for AI Safety](https://www.safe.ai/) is the one I already knew about. An AI researcher named Dan Hendrycks got really into AI safety and apparently works 70 hour days; I try to follow this space closely and am boggled by the amount of projects he has going at any given time - several lobbying efforts, a bunch of research projects, various showcases of model capabilities, and being Elon Musk's safety advisor at X.AI. Hendrycks has gotten a reputation for being incorruptible (he gave away ~$20 million in AI company equity[2](#footnote-2) after trolls tried to turn it into a "conflict of interest" and use it to discredit his lobbying) and intense (I don't think it's a coincidence that he gets along with Elon so well). At some point he founded CAIS to keep track of all his efforts, I'm not surprised to see them involved here too, and I imagine they provided some much-needed technical expertise.
[Encode Justice](https://encodejustice.org/) needs to be snapped up by some documentary-maker as an inspiring human interest story. Some teenagers decided the world needed to hear the voice of the youth on AI and founded an "intergenerational call for global AI action". Their leader is already being called ["the Greta Thunberg of AI"](https://encodejustice.org/interview-with-sneha-revanur-the-greta-thunberg-of-ai/). Over four years, they’ve scaled up to “a mass movement of a thousand young people across every inhabited continent". I cannot even imagine how good all of this is going to look on their college applications.
[Economic Security Project Action](https://economicsecurity.us/) isn’t part of our conspiracy. They’re a generic progressive nonprofit that wants the benefits of AI to be shared broadly, and came up with the idea of CalCompute - a “state compute cluster” that academics and other sympathetic actors can use to train socially valuable AI models without needing to beg VCs for big bucks. Apparently someone made some kind of deal and their wish list was combined with ours into a single bill.
**II.**
Along the way SB 1047 picked up an impressive number of endorsements.
Elon Musk was the one I was most excited about. The bill's Silicon Valley opponents tried to frame it as nanny-state Democrats trying to crush progress. But Elon Musk has impeccable credentials for being pro-progress and anti-nanny-state-Democrats, so he was the perfect person to puncture this objection. He's always been interested in AI safety, but I imagine Hendrycks gets a lot of the credit for him weighing in on this particular issue.
Another major endorsement came from SAG-AFTRA (formerly Screen Actors Guild), a politicially influential union of Hollywood creatives. [Their union’s letter to the governor](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25114543-sb1047gov24) makes it sound like they're against AI copying their voices and stealing their jobs, and willing to support basically any anti-AI legislation no matter how distantly related to their specific concern. But a [later open letter](https://artists4safeai.com/) showed more specific interest in existential risks, and a few people in show business have been consistent allies. [Joseph Gordon-Leavitt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Gordon-Levitt#Personal_life) is a long-time effective altruist (and married to Tasha McCauley, one of the OpenAI board members who voted out Sam Altman last November). And I was also moved by support from [Adam McKay](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_McKay), who directed of *Don’t Look Up* (a film about people ignoring an impending asteroid strike, which AI safety advocates praised as a good intentional or unintentional metaphor for the current landscape).
The big AI companies split among themselves. OpenAI, Meta, and Google opposed the bill, X.AI supported, and Anthropic dithered on an earlier version but ultimately came out in support after their feedback was taken into account. Many opponents claimed that the bill was a Trojan Horse attempt at regulatory capture by the big AI companies, so it was fun watching three of the biggest AI companies come out against it and prove them exactly wrong. I don’t think any opponents ever changed their minds, admitted they’d made a mistake, or even stopped arguing that it was a big AI company plot - but hopefully enough people were paying attention that it discredited them a little for the next fight.
The list of opponents included some tech investors, AI trade groups, and Nancy Pelosi.
Nancy’s involvement was the biggest surprise. The boring explanation is that she represents San Francisco and has a lot of tech investor friends and donors, but you can get more conspiratorial. For example, Pelosi (current net worth $240 million) is known to get [impossibly good investing returns](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/former-house-speaker-nancy-pelosi-095000785.html), so much so that there are [ETFs that try to replicate her stock picks](https://www.barchart.com/etfs-funds/quotes/NANC); everyone assumes she must be doing some kind of scummy-but-legal insider trading. Her portfolio is currently [weighted towards AI](https://www.fool.com/investing/2024/04/22/nancy-pelosi-buying-1-ai-stock-billionaires-sell/) - did that influence her decision? Even more conspiratorial, insiders say Pelosi is waging [a “shadow campaign” against Scott Wiener](https://sfstandard.com/2024/08/30/christine-pelosi-scott-wiener-shadow-campaign/), the only San Francisco politician popular enough to challenge her daughter and hand-picked successor Christine Pelosi for SF’s House seat after she retires. Is she trying to deny Wiener a victory?
The other opponent everyone talks about is Marc Andreesen and his Andreesen Horowitz (“A16Z”) venture capital firm. Their campaign was especially public-facing, confrontational, and dishonest, and got most of the Twitter buzz. But in the end they were only one of several major players, and maybe not the one with the most political clout.
**III.**
The most important supporter was, of course, The Average Californian.
Opponents tried to confuse people by releasing a biased poll - basically “do you support this HORRIBLE BILL which will DEVASTATE INNOVATION by creating a GIANT BUREAUCRACY?” (exact wording [here](https://x.com/DanHendrycks/status/1828880835992531317/photo/1), story on the scandal [here](https://prospect.org/power/2024-08-28-tech-industry-push-poll-california-ai-bill/)).
Supporters responded with an adversarial collaboration between both sides to come up with a fair wording; with [this version](https://x.com/mealreplacer/status/1839777424533545002), Californians were 62-25 in favor, with strong support among Democrats, Republicans, youth, elders, tech workers, minorities, etc.
I can’t find crosstabs for the adversarial collaboration version, but here they are from an earlier one ([source](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10jvFhail0ktuEiIlxIOla1VE4kCUElYH)).
**IV.**
Based on considerations like these, the bill made it through California’s Assembly and Senate relatively smoothly, passing the State Assembly 49-15 and the State Senate 29-9. It then went to Governor Gavin Newsom for signature/veto. He sat on it until almost the last possible moment, then vetoed it September 29.
His [letter explaining his veto](https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SB-1047-Veto-Message.pdf) is - sorry to impugn a state official this way, but everyone who read it agrees - bullsh\*t. He says he loves regulating AI and is very concerned about safety, but rejects the bill because it doesn’t go far enough. In particular:
> By focusing only on the most expensive and large-scale models, SB 1047 establishes a regulatory framework that could give the public a false sense of security about controlling this fast-moving technology. Smaller, specialized models may emerge as equally or even more dangerous than the models targeted by SB 1047 - at the potential expense of curtailing the very innovation that fuels advancement in favor of the public good.
I’m not sure there’s a single person in the world who actually holds this opinion. Opponents of the bill worried that it could potentially crush innovation by regulating smaller models that weren’t dangerous, and demanded guarantees that this would only apply to the big companies that were able to pay the regulatory costs. Supporters accepted this was a risk and offered those guarantees gladly. The constituency for rejecting SB 1047 because it didn’t go far enough in regulating small models is zero.
Newsom obviously has no plan to come up with a stricter bill that also regulates the small models, so on the basis of “this doesn’t regulate enough” he is ensuring that nothing gets regulated at all.
One of my sources generously interprets Newsom to mean something like “don’t regulate the models, regulate the end applications”. IE if OpenAI trains GPT-5, and then LegalCo fine-tunes it to do paralegal work, leave most of the safety responsibility on LegalCo, not OpenAI. This fails to engage with the motivations behind the bill, which are things like “what if someone uses AI for bioterrorism”? If Meta trains LLaMa-4, and al-Qaeda fine-tunes it for terrorism, instead of regulating it at the Meta-level, we should regulate al-Qaeda? Are we sure al-Qaeda will comply with California regulations? Our side is not sure that even this generous interpretation is very well has been thought through very well.
But I prefer an ungenerous interpretation: Gavin Newsom is bad.
Many people are saying this.
On some level, I don’t mind having a bad governor. I actually have a perverse sort of fondness for Newsom. He reminds me of the Simpsons’ Mayor Quimby, a sort of old-school politician’s politician from the good old days when people were too busy pandering to special interests to talk about Jewish space lasers. California is a state full of very sincere but frequently insane people. We’re constantly coming up with clever ideas like “let’s make free organic BIPOC-owned cannabis cafes for undocumented immigrants a human right” or whatever. California’s representatives are very earnest and will happily go to bat for these kinds of ideas. Then whoever would be on the losing end hands Governor Newsom a manila envelope full of unmarked bills, and he vetoes it. In a world of dangerous ideological zealots, there’s something reassuring about having a governor too dull and venal to be corrupted by the siren song of “being a good person and trying to improve the world”.
This isn’t to say Governor Newsom blocks all bills. He’s a big fan of some of them, [like the one that suspended the state’s alcohol regulations specifically for the VIP room at Clippers Stadium](https://www.kqed.org/news/12007628/newsom-signs-law-that-could-extend-last-call-but-only-for-a-private-club-in-la-clippers-new-arena) (the Clippers’ owner’s wife gave Newsom a $1 million donation).
But sometimes *you’r*e the group trying to do the right thing and improve the world, and then it sucks.
Which particular special interests and cronies influenced Newsom, and how come they could get more money and favors than we could?
Ron Conway is one of Newsom’s closest allies and biggest donors. In 2021, after Newsom broke his own COVID rules to go to a fancy dinner, some Californians tried to him recalled (ie got votes to hold a special election to impeach the governor). Conway (net worth $1.5 billion) [helped coordinate Big Tech around opposing the recall](https://www.axios.com/2021/03/27/silicon-valley-venture-capitalists-governor-recall) and personally donated $200K to the anti-recall campaign; he apparently [lobbied against the bill](https://x.com/ShakeelHashim/status/1837188404334768215), and plausibly leads the list of people the Governor owes favors to.
I don’t fully understand where his SB 1047 opposition comes from. He has some AI investments, but no more than a lot of other people, and he also shows some signs of personal pro-innovation opinions, so I could go either way here. Still, it seems important to him for some reason, and the governor owes him a lot of favors.
Something vaguely similar probably applies to Reid Hoffman and Garry Tan…
…two of the bill’s other influential Silicon Valley billionaire opponents. [Politico has more of the story here](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/01/newsom-silicon-valley-ai-safety-00181776).
I think these people beat us because they’ve been optimizing for political clout for decades, and our side hasn’t even existed that long, plus we care about too many other things to focus on gubernatorial recall elections.
Newsom is good at politics, so he’s covering his tracks. To counterbalance his SB 1047 veto and appear strong on AI, he signed several less important anti-AI bills, including a ban on deepfakes [which was immediately struck down as unconstitutional](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/02/california-law-block-political-deepfakes-00182277). And with all the ferocity of OJ vowing to find the real killer, he’s set up [a committee](https://www.gov.ca.gov/2024/09/29/governor-newsom-announces-new-initiatives-to-advance-safe-and-responsible-ai-protect-californians/) to come up with better AI safety regulation. He’s named a few committee members already, most notably [Fei-Fei Li](https://jacobin.com/2024/09/gavin-newsom-ai-tech-bill-sb-1047/):
> [Opponents of SB 1047] had a big assist from “[godmother of AI](https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/17/24200496/ai-fei-fei-li-world-labs-andreessen-horowitz-radical-ventures)” and Stanford professor Fei-Fei Li, who published an [op-ed](https://fortune.com/2024/08/06/godmother-of-ai-says-californias-ai-bill-will-harm-us-ecosystem-tech-politics/) in *Fortune* [falsely claiming](https://www.thenation.com/article/society/california-ai-safety-bill/#:~:text=They%20claim%20that,this%20unsupported%20claim.) that SB 1047’s “kill switch” would effectively destroy the open-source AI community. Li’s op-ed was prominently cited in the [congressional letter](https://democrats-science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2024-08-15%20to%20Gov%20Newsom_SB1047.pdf) and Pelosi’s statement, where the former Speaker [said](https://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-opposition-california-senate-bill-1047) that Li is “viewed as California’s top AI academic and researcher and one of the top AI thinkers globally.”
>
> Nowhere in *Fortune* or these congressional statements was it mentioned that Li founded a billion-dollar AI startup [backed by](https://www.ft.com/content/0b210299-4659-4055-8d81-5a493e85432f) Andreessen Horowitz, the venture fund behind a scorched-earth [smear campaign](https://garrisonlovely.substack.com/cp/149067865) against the bill.
>
> The same day he vetoed SB 1047, Newsom [announced](https://www.gov.ca.gov/2024/09/29/governor-newsom-announces-new-initiatives-to-advance-safe-and-responsible-ai-protect-californians/) a new board of advisers on AI governance for the state. Li is the first name mentioned.
We’ll see whether Newsom gets his better regulation before or after OJ completes his manhunt.
(yes, I realize OJ is dead)
**V.**
Some opponents were gracious in victory:
Others were less so. [Martin Casado](https://x.com/martin_casado/status/1840576743541035280) (needless to say, of Andreesen Horowitz):
While supporters’ “concession speeches” ranged from defiant:
Sneha is founder of Encode Justice, the youth organization that cosponsored the bill.
…to maybe slightly threatening. A frequent theme was that some form of AI regulation was inevitable. SB 1047 - a light-touch bill designed by Silicon-Valley-friendly moderates - was the best deal that Big Tech was ever going to get, and they went full scorched-earth to oppose it. Next time, the deal will be designed by anti-tech socialists, it’ll be much worse, and nobody will feel sorry for them.
Dean Ball [wrote](https://www.hyperdimensional.co/p/what-comes-after-sb-1047):
> In response to the veto, some SB 1047 proponents seem to be threatening a kind of revenge arc. They failed to get a “light-touch” bill passed, the reasoning seems to be, so instead of trying again, perhaps they should team up with unions, tech “ethics” activists, disinformation “experts,” and other, more ambiently anti-technology actors for a much broader legislative effort. Get ready, they seem to be warning, for “use-based” regulation of epic proportions. As Rob Wiblin, one of the hosts of the Effective Altruist-aligned *80,000 Hours* podcast [put it](https://x.com/robertwiblin/status/1840692304962609417) on X:
>
> *» “Having failed to get up a narrow bill focused on frontier models, should AI x-risk folks join a popular front for an Omnibus AI Bill that includes SB1047 but adds regulations to tackle union concerns, actor concerns, disinformation, AI ethics, current safety, etc?”*
>
> This is one plausible strategic response the safety community—to the extent it is a monolith—could pursue. We even saw inklings of this in the final innings of the SB 1047 debate, after bill co-sponsor Encode Justice [recruited](https://x.com/latimes/status/1838668804794339419) more than one hundred members of the actors’ union SAG-AFTRA to the cause. These actors (literal actors) did not know much about catastrophic risk from AI—[some of them even dismiss the possibility and supported SB 1047 anyway](https://x.com/adamconover/status/1834727730317070552)! Instead, they have a more generalized dislike of technology in general and AI in particular. This group likes anything that “hurts AI,” not because they care about catastrophic risk, but because *they do not like AI*.
>
> The AI safety movement could easily transition from being a quirky, heterodox, “extremely online” movement to being just another generic left-wing cause. It could even *work*.
>
> But I hope they do not. [As I have written consistently](https://www.hyperdimensional.co/p/the-ai-republic-of-letters), I believe that the AI safety movement, on the whole, is a long-term friend of anyone who wants to see positive technological transformation in the coming decades. Though they have their concerns about AI, in general this is a group that is pro-science, techno-optimist, anti-stagnation, and skeptical of massive state interventions in the economy (if I may be forgiven for speaking broadly about a diverse intellectual community).
>
> I hope that we can work together, as a broadly techno-optimist community, toward some sort of consensus. One solution might be to break SB 1047 into smaller, more manageable pieces. Should we have audits for “frontier” AI models? Should we have whistleblower protections for employees at frontier labs? Should there be transparency requirements of some kind on the labs? I bet if the community put legitimate effort into any one of these issues, something sensible would emerge.
>
> The cynical, and perhaps easier, path would be to form an unholy alliance with the unions and the misinformation crusaders and all the rest. AI safety can become the “anti-AI” movement it is often accused of being by its opponents, if it wishes. Given public sentiment about AI, and the eagerness of politicians to flex their regulatory biceps, this may well be the path of least resistance.
>
> The harder, but ultimately more rewarding, path would be to embrace classical motifs of American civics: compromise, virtue, and restraint.
>
> I believe we can *all* pursue the second, narrow path. I believe we can be friends. Time will tell whether I, myself, am hopelessly naïve.
Last year, I would have told Dean not to worry about us allying with the Left - the Left would never accept an alliance with the likes of us anyway. But I was surprised by how fairly socialist media covered the SB 1047 fight. For example, from [Jacobin](https://jacobin.com/2024/09/gavin-newsom-ai-tech-bill-sb-1047/)[3](#footnote-3):
> The debate playing out in the public square may lead you to believe that we have to choose between addressing AI’s immediate harms and its inherently speculative existential risks. And there are certainly trade-offs that require careful consideration.
>
> But when you look at the material forces at play, a different picture emerges: in one corner are trillion-dollar companies trying to make AI models more powerful and profitable; in another, you find civil society groups trying to make AI reflect values that routinely clash with profit maximization.
>
> In short, it’s capitalism versus humanity.
*Current Affairs*, another socialist magazine, also had a good article, [Surely AI Safety Legislation Is A No-Brainer](https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/surely-ai-safety-legislation-is-a-no-brainer). The magazine’s editor, Nathan Robinson[4](#footnote-4), openly talked about how his opinion had shifted:
> One thing I’ve changed some of my opinions about in the last few years is AI. I used to think that most of the claims made about its radically socially disruptive potential (both positive and negative) were hype. That was in part because they often came from the [same](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/20/sam-bankman-fried-longtermism-effective-altruism-future-fund) people who made massively overstated claims about [cryptocurrency](https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/2021/04/why-cryptocurrency-is-a-giant-fraud). Some also [resembled](https://medium.com/fetch-ai/the-paperclip-maximizer-fallacy-21a357a10d90) science fiction stories, and I think we should prioritize things we know to be problems in the here and now (climate catastrophe, nuclear weapons, pandemics) than purely speculative potential disasters. Given that Silicon Valley companies are constantly promising new revolutions, I try to always remember that there is a tendency for those with strong financial incentives to spin modest improvements, [or even total frauds](https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/2018/12/selling-the-miracle-machine), as epochal breakthroughs.
>
> But as I’ve actually used some of the various technologies lumped together as “artificial intelligence,” over and over my reaction has been: “Jesus, this stuff is actually very powerful… and this is only the beginning.” I think many of my fellow leftists tend to have a dismissive attitude toward AI’s capabilities, delighting in its failures (ChatGPT’s basic math errors and “hallucinations,” the ugliness of much AI-generated “art,” badly made hands from image generators, etc.). There is even a certain *desire* for AI to be bad at what it does, because nobody likes to think that so much of what we do on a day-to-day basis is capable of being automated. But if we are being honest, the kinds of technological breakthroughs we are seeing are shocking. If I’m training to debate someone, I can ask ChatGPT to play the role of my opponent, and it will deliver a virtually flawless performance. I remember not too many years ago when chatbots were so laughably inept that it was easy to believe one would never be able to pass a Turing Test. Now, ChatGPT not only [aces the test](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02361-7) but is [better at being “human” than most humans](https://humsci.stanford.edu/feature/study-finds-chatgpts-latest-bot-behaves-humans-only-better). And, again, this is only the start.
>
> The ability to replicate more and more of the functions of human intelligence on a machine is both very exciting and incredibly risky. Personally I am deeply alarmed by military applications of AI in an age of great power competition. The [autonomous weapons arms race](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence_arms_race#:~:text=A%20military%20artificial%20intelligence%20arms,autonomous%20weapons%20systems%20(LAWS).) strikes me as one of the most dangerous things happening in the world today, and it’s virtually undiscussed in the press. The [conceivable harms](https://www.safe.ai/ai-risk) from AI are endless. If a computer can replicate the capacities of a human scientist, it will be easy for rogue actors to engineer viruses that could cause pandemics far worse than COVID. They could build bombs. They could execute massive cyberattacks. From deepfake porn to the empowerment of authoritarian governments to the possibility that badly-programmed AI will inflict some catastrophic new harm we haven’t even considered, the rapid advancement of these technologies is clearly hugely risky. That means that *we* are being put at risk by institutions over which we have no control.
I don’t want to gloss this as “socialists finally admit we were right all along”. I think the change has been bi-directional. Back in 2010, when we had no idea what AI would look like, the rationalists and EAs focused on the only risk big enough to see from such a distance: runaway unaligned superintelligence. Now that we know more specifics, “smaller” existential risks have also come into focus, like AI-fueled bioterrorism, AI-fueled great power conflict, and - yes - AI-fueled inequality. At some point, without either side entirely abandoning their position, the very-near-term-risk people and the very-long-term-risk people have started to meet in the middle.
But I think an equally big change is that SB 1047 has proven that AI doomers are willing to stand up to Big Tech. Socialists previously accused us of being tech company stooges, harping on the dangers of AI as a sneaky way of hyping it up. I admit I dismissed those accusations as part of a strategy of slinging every possible insult at us to see which ones stuck. But maybe they actually believed it. Maybe it was their real barrier to working with us, and maybe - now that we’ve proven we can (grudgingly, tentatively, when absolutely forced) oppose (some) Silicon Valley billionaires, they’ll be willing to at least treat us as potential allies of convenience.
Dean Ball calls this strategy “an unholy alliance with the unions and the misinformation crusaders and all the rest”, and equates it to selling our souls. I admit we have many cultural and ethical differences with socialists, that I don’t want to become them, that I can’t fully endorse them, and that I’m sure they feel the same way about me. But coalition politics doesn’t require perfect agreement. The US and its European allies were willing to form an “unholy alliance” with some unsavory socialists in order to defeat the Nazis, they *did* defeat the Nazis, and they kept their own commitments to capitalism and democracy intact.
As a wise man once said, politics is the art of the deal. We should see how good a deal we’re getting from Dean, and how good a deal we’re getting from the socialists, then take whichever one is better.
Dean says maybe he and his allies in Big Tech would support a weaker compromise proposal that broke SB 1047 into small parts. But I feel like we watered down SB 1047 pretty hard already, and Big Tech just ignored the concessions, lied about the contents, and told everyone it would destroy California forever. Is there some hidden group of opponents who were against it this time, but would get on board if only we watered it down slightly more? I think the burden of proof is on him to demonstrate that there are.
I respect Dean’s spirit of cooperation and offer of compromise. But the socialists have a saying - “That already *was* the compromise” - and I’m starting to respect them too.
**VI.**
A final interesting response to the SB 1047 veto came from the stock market. When Newsom nixed the bill - which was supposed to devastate the AI industry and destroy California’s technological competitiveness - AI stocks responded by doing absolutely nothing ([source](https://x.com/daniel_271828/status/1840853361676910675)):
You can’t see it in the screenshot, but the first stock is NVIDIA, the second TSMC, the third Alphabet, and the fourth Microsoft. On average they went up about 0.5%, on a day when the NASDAQ as a whole also went up about 0.5%.
Some people objected that maybe it was “priced in”. But the day before SB 1047 got vetoed, the prediction markets gave it a 33% chance of passing:
So we should expect the stock market shift to equal 1/3 of the total damage to AI companies that the bill would have caused. But the stock market shift was indistinguishable from zero.
Should we have expected a single California law to have an effect visible in the markets? According to Daniel and [@GroundHogStrat](https://x.com/GroundhogStrat) , past history says yes: when California passed a proposition backing down from their attempt to crack down on Uber over gig workers, Uber’s stock went up 35%. If SB 1047 was going to be as bad for AI as the anti-gig-worker rules were for Uber, we would expect a similar jump. Even if the bill would be fine for incumbents but only hurt small startups, we would have expected a hit for NVIDIA, who sells chips to those small startups. But NVIDIA went up less than the NASDAQ overall.
TFW you screw over future generations to make number go up, but number does not go up :(
**VII.**
Some people tell me they wish they’d gotten involved in AI early. But it’s still early! AI is less than 1% of the economy! In a few years, we’re going to look back on these days the way we look back now on punch-card computers.
Even very early, it’s possible to do good object-level work. But the earlier you go, the less important object-level work is compared to shaping possibilities, coalitions, and expectations for the future. So here are some reasons for optimism.
First, we proved we can stand up to (the bad parts of) Big Tech. Without sacrificing our principles or adopting any rhetoric we considered dishonest, we earned some respect from leftists and got some leads on potential new friends.
Second, we registered our beliefs (AI will soon be powerful and potentially dangerous) loudly enough to get the attention of the political class and the general public. And we forced our opponents to register theirs (AI isn’t scary and doesn’t require regulation) with equal volume. In a few years, when the real impact of advanced AI starts to come into focus, nobody will be able to lie about which side of the battle lines they were on.
Third, we learned - partly to our own surprise - that we have the support of ~65% of Californians and an even higher proportion of the state legislature. It’s still unbelievably, fantastically early, comparable to people trying to build an airplane safety coalition when da Vinci was doodling pictures of guys with wings - and we already have the support of 65% of Californians and the legislature. So one specific governor vetoed one specific bill. So what? This year we got ourselves the high ground / eternal glory / social capital of being early to the fight. Next year we’ll get the actual policy victory. Or if not next year, the year after, or the year after that. “Instead of planning a path to victory, plan so that all paths lead to victory”. We have strategies available that people from lesser states can’t even imagine!
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
Trying to be maximally charitable, I think he’s saying that the penalty for infecting someone with HIV was much more severe than the penalty for infecting people with other diseases, that this was a relic of the age of mass panic over AIDS, and that now that we’re panicking less we should bring the penalties back into line. But his argument style actively alienates me, focusing as it does on “reducing stigma” against AIDS patients. This brings back too many bad memories of the days when we weren’t allowed to try to prevent COVID from reaching the US, or prepare for it when it did, because that might “cause stigma” against Chinese people. I’m now permanently soured on all stigma-based arguments, and the current issue under discussion - declaring that it’s not such a big deal to intentionally give people AIDS, because if we admitted it was a big deal then that might cause “stigma” - is a perfect example of why this turns me off. I’d be more comfortable if he’d ignored the “stigma” angle and just tried to argue that the penalties were out of line with equally dangerous diseases (which I haven’t yet seen evidence about).
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
I got some pushback on this claim and agree it’s confusing. Hendrycks [divested](https://x.com/DanHendrycks/status/1816523907777888563) from his equity in a safety company called Gray Swan; this wasn’t worth anywhere near that amount. But he also [says he turned down](https://x.com/DanHendrycks/status/1841156520035434595) $20 million in equity in Elon Musk’s x.AI.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
I don’t want to overplay this. Garrison Lovely, author of the Jacobin article, is himself an effective altruist, one of our few really committed socialists. I’ve [clashed with him on his socialist opinions in the past](https://x.com/slatestarcodex/status/1831405516326891549), but I’m still grateful to have him as an ally, and happy that our common cause can rally support from across the political spectrum. I also think that regardless of Garrison’s personal opinions, the fact that Jacobin would publish his story suggests a broader sea change within the socialist movement.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
I’ve also clashed [with Robinson](https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/11/21/contra-robinson-on-public-food/) before, sometimes pretty seriously, but I can at least offer him the same praise I offered Scott Wiener - in a world full of hacks and lizardmen, he’s a real person with a personality and principles. | Scott Alexander | 149908272 | SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story | acx |
# Triple Tragedy And Thankful Theory
*I accept guest posts from certain people, especially past Book Review Contest winners. Earlier this year, I published Daniel Böttger’s essay [Consciousness As Recursive Reflections](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/consciousness-as-recursive-reflections).*
*While we were working on editing it, Daniel had some dramatic experiences and revelations, culminating in him developing a theory which he says “will contribute to saving the world”, which he asked me to publish.*
*Although* *I can’t* *speak for its world-historical importance, and although he admits his mental state is fragile, after some discussion I decided to publish because - if nothing else - he’s a great writer with a fascinating story and some really interesting thoughts.*
*Content warning for medical horror; you can skip to the section “Thankful Theory” to avoid this.*
---
---
**I. Triple Tragedy**
2nd of July, this year. I awaken to a strange man telling me that he just pulled me from the car that I have crashed into a tree at 100 kilometers an hour. I must be missing several minutes of short-term memory, because dozens of first responders are standing around me, reassuring each other and myself that my three kids, who were in child safety seats in the back, are fine. On the way to the trauma response unit, everyone agrees that I had a massive epileptic seizure. Utterly implausible; I have never had one as far as I know. But the absence of skid marks and the description of events my front seat passenger gave, plus the presence of the kids as evidence against suicidal intent, leaves this as the only explanation.
The hospital neurologist tells me I have a tumor in my right temporal lobe, which would have produced seizures. They found it in the CAT scan when they were looking for fractures. I say this must be a mistake, I have a [small] focal cortical dysplasia in my right temporal lobe. Very memorably, he says it is much bigger than that.
They release me from the hospital saying that cancer treatment needs to proceed much nearer to where I live. They give me a DVD with the scans. I am not a neurologist but I can look at images. The thing is bigger than a chicken egg! From this point on to the end of this narrative, I am constantly feeling intense fear for my life. It only varies in intensity enough to prevent desensitization.
Despair amplifies my responses to all negative stimuli. The urgency of any task rises to terrifying levels. Any pain becomes so excruciating that it wipes my mind blank and destroys whatever solutions I have been attempting to build. My mind becomes prone to collapse given any excuse. Survival becomes a matter of avoiding such collapses. Mercifully, at least the basic rules such as honesty and kindness continue to apply, and [the methods of rationality](https://www.readthesequences.com/) continue to work. This limits the confusion, any trace of which has become excruciating as well.
An EEG confirms heightened epileptic potentials in my right temporal brain. Thinking back, I did have strange alterations of consciousness, but they were diagnosed as post-traumatic dissociations. I had previously described these alterations to competent friends and they had said my descriptions sounded epileptic. I had told my psychiatrist this; she had disregarded this idea. Understandable, I did have intense trauma from when my ex-wife had attacked me. I learn that seizures intensify with hyperventilation. I have never had an intense seizure, but in retrospect, these alterations may indeed have been mild seizures, because hyperventilation during the car ride is plausible, because I am not a proficient driver and the kids were being loud. The car I destroyed was not even my own, it belonged to my (officially ex-)parents-in-law.
My (officially ex-)father-in-law was the front seat passenger. Same story with him: put into the CAT scanner to look for fractures, and although he never had seizures they found a brain tumor in him as well. Utterly implausible, a literal one-in-a-million situation: that’s two out of two CAT scans finding undetected brain tumors, each with roughly a 0.1% prior probability from the epidemiology of undetected tumors in Germany. They've taken it out of him since, he is better now.
Scott publishes [my first guest post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/consciousness-as-recursive-reflections). Analgesic joy provides my first respite in weeks. The early comments amount to “Hooray physicalism!” and “Boo physicalism!” Analgesic joy fades, I am returned into the existential horror of my life.
10 years earlier I had an MRI scan that showed something strange in my right temporal lobe. They said it was a focal cortical dysplasia and I should not worry about it. In retrospect, it is located in the exact middle of where my big tumor is now. So it seems it was that tumor at the size it had back then. In the present, both scans are studied by two separate professionals, who both confirm my amateur fears. The anomaly in the old scan is large enough to have been growing for 2 years by that point. I seem to have lived with a brain tumor for 12 years. Median survival time for the *least* aggressive brain tumors is 5 to 10 years - 12 years and alive, *and* my not even noticing the thing until days ago, is utterly implausible. I did do a lot of ketogenic and carnivore dieting; there is no evidence in the literature of this slowing the growth of glioma in particular, but there is such evidence for many other types of tumor and it is reasonable to assume it would generalize. Still, how could something literally this big have been happening without me realizing? My world is falling apart, I need an explanation to make sense of these utterly implausible observations.
Pattern match! A catastrophic realization comes crashing in. The necessary expertise has been available all along, from my academic degree in the psychology of religion. I did have seizures for years, I just didn’t realize it because of the misdiagnosis, and they came from my (right-side) temporal lobe. Temporal lobe epilepsy is strongly associated with [mystical experiences](https://sevensecularsermons.org/why-atheists-need-ecstasy/), which I did have despite my atheist convictions, and with what is misleadingly termed “hyperreligiosity” but really means heightened interest in metaphysical questions: a temporal lobe epileptic can be an atheist who wants to talk to you for hours about why atheism is correct.
I have been *doing way more than that* by writing the [Seven Secular Sermons](https://sevensecularsermons.org/) - an atheist competitor to the [Divina Comedia](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_Comedy), the [Bodhicaryāvatāra](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bodhisattvacary%C4%81vat%C4%81ra) and the [Mahābhāratam](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahabharata) - for *exactly* the 12 years that I have evidently been hosting this tumor. And I did have a lot of headaches, which should have been my other clue, but which I had heroically/stupidly tolerated for years.
My official life’s work is a manifestation of cancer. I do not want to understand this, because it denigrates what is to me the closest thing to holy. But it is less implausible than all of this being a giant coincidence. I cannot pretend I don't believe it; the writings of Eliezer Yudkowsky have changed me.
At least thinking about this gives me analgesic joy, or it focuses energy consumption of my brain into particular areas, slowing the tumor growth and brain swelling, reducing the pain.
Neurosurgery is scheduled for the 16th of August. Survival is doubtful, because the thing had so much time to grow huge. Lasting neurological damage is likely. Although each of the first Sermons took months or years to write because of their highly constrained form, in a mad dash of activity the [final Sermon](https://sevensecularsermons.org/the-universe-machine/) (half-finished at the time of the car crash) and [the video](https://x.com/7SecularSermons/status/1823489417144623509) are complete in just a few weeks, so my life's work is done before I might die. With our joint task complete, the tumor should more easily depart. The idea is utterly implausible, that is not how causality works. How very right it feels is strong evidence of insanity.
I am flooded with assertions of assistance so massive that none of you would have managed not to cry, either. I am now primarily a patient, everyone agrees and I dutifully learn this role. I need to endure, maintain passivity, and thank a lot. As the relevance of my wishes fades, thanking becomes the only directional thing I can do, my only activity. I find myself thanking the fear and the pain for the lessons in humility, especially when it all gets so much worse at the hospital.
From the first few dozens of secretaries, doctors and nurses bouncing me between their areas of responsibility, I notice persistent puzzling problems in communication. The brain damage does not explain this, because I am right-handed: my speech comprehension should be mostly in the left hemisphere, where there is no tumor. (...yet. Tumor growth mindset.) And there is an obvious pattern. The trouble does not arise in all of communication, but specifically in collaborative problem-solving: the back and forth of problem-relevant pieces of information, and its unspoken but important implications about competence and priority. Miscommunications cause errors, all amplified by the extreme urgency of my problem. None of us have trouble solving problems by ourselves. Whenever these people think there is a minute for idle chat, *that* proceeds flawlessly. But the more urgent collaboration is, the more frequently it appears to fail, and only between them and me, not when they talk the same way amongst themselves. Several times these problems impede my treatment; every time, my unscheduled attempts to help turn out to aggravate the trouble instead.
Waking up from the surgery, I am told it went well. (Later I’ll learn this was untrue: much of the tumor remains, and there is lasting neurological damage.) The pain is so debilitating I can hardly think.
At the intensive care unit, I very nearly die. So many sensors and things are connected to me, they curl themselves into knots with every small movement, but I’m compelled to move to avoid bed sores. Eventually a cannula rips out of my forearm. The ICU nurses accuse me of being a suicidal idiot who must have done this intentionally. They save my life, while loudly proclaiming themselves more interested in saving their bed from the huge pulsing fountain of my blood. Their accusation of suicidality is an assumption of hostility. Although I used to work at this hospital (in research not care), I am tempted to assume hostility as well, but this is utterly implausible; their incentives are aligned with mine, my death would inconvenience us all. Trauma must be coloring my perception of events, so I keep assuming good intentions. They continue to assume hostility whatever I do. Still I need the cooperation of these women. Through intense pain and terror, I attempt to optimize my communication with the intensity of a fight for my life. Explicit thanks continue to help, especially because I keep failing to signal cooperativeness by collaborating the way I am used to.
I discover I need to talk to them the way that I need to talk to my mother, who is a highly experienced nurse, when she is managing another crisis. This is very counterintuitive, because my mother is the best mother I ever even heard of, while these women are the opposite of kind. But it is clearly working. I do not understand how, but it seems I will need to.
I am moved from intensive care to normal care, still struggling through intense pain and terror. The workflows I am dragged through are clearly, blatantly, unapologetically inefficient, producing abject horror in my efficiency-worshipping mind. This makes the people supposed to save me seem insane to me, but it is much more plausible that the insanity is mine. Collaboration keeps failing, and it is failing more often the more vital it is. As usual when that happens, each side is most likely to blame the other. But I can't believe these people are crazy or evil. Doctors and nurses can’t be dumb either; surely they don’t talk so impatiently and seemingly unthinkingly in their private lives. I am not evil either, but I might be going crazy with pain and maybe I’m dumb now because my brain is damaged? But I can still talk as correctly as ever, and I can still discover patterns. Of course I point the pattern recognition at why collaboration is so hard. They don’t like it when I volunteer relevant information! I habitually volunteer relevant information in order to cooperate and emphasize my cooperativeness, but here now this habit is counterproductive. They appreciate brevity; they say only what needs to be done, not why. They are assuming all communication to be about needs, not wants, and are expecting me to assume the same about their communication. I experiment with limiting myself to one word responses. This is Germany and these people are educated, the hierarchy of “*Verstanden.*” (“I have understood.”), ”*Einverstanden.*” (“I have agreed.”) “*Versprochen.*” (“I promise I will do that.”), “*Erledigt.*” (“I have done the thing you told me to do.”) may safely be presumed common knowledge. This is a breakthrough, the care I receive improves dramatically. But collaboration continues to fail occasionally, so I have not identified the root of the problem. And still they want me to participate in processes that I fail to comprehend, and still collaboration gets more difficult the more urgent it is. I think as hard as I can, with the intensity of a fight for my life (while very possibly going insane from the pain, and surely partially for the analgesic joy of the more focused energy consumption in my brain) about how we can collaborate better. I do eventually survive the hospital. Very good friends and my awe-striking nurse mother pick me up.
Under her guidance, using an embarrassing amount of painkiller prescriptions and much time and money, as well as lots of cellphones, we attempt to maintain a clinic-like level of care, without the multiresistant germs or the cost to my health insurer, in a home environment. Of course we cannot do radiotherapy or chemotherapy on the large remainder of the tumor, but they aren't doing that at the hospital anyway, because they're waiting on some biopsy process that's being inefficient. In what continues to resemble my home, we can at least do some basic care and prevention. I must participate. I can learn, and recognize patterns: do not set down steps heavily or drink any coffee, because any bit of pressure on the brain causes mind-wiping pain. I am proud to manage this, and embarrassed to continually fail to maintain an overview of non-obvious information such as how long ago I was in the bathroom. Collaboration is easier amongst ourselves, everyone’s goodwill and rank are obvious. Still there are millions of tiny collaborative interactions where minds need to meet, in order for pieces of information to meet, in order for urgent tasks to be completed. Lots of little ways these collaborations go right or wrong stream into me, all important, many highly informative.
Hundreds of kind messages on my phone. I continue to be in severe danger and intense pain, on the phone with doctors and nurses, and with many friends trying to help. I find myself communicating the exact way the nurses did: impatient with information that seems inessential, clearly inappropriately unkind. It makes me ashamed of myself. What is happening, what am I doing, what am I doing wrong?
Most confusingly, I am not doing it wrong. Failure or insanity on my part would be the easier explanation, but it does not fit the data. I cannot flee into the comforting excuse of excusable insanity and pretend not to believe what I believe. I can see the group chat messages of my friends and family: the nurses way of communication works much better in (this) crisis, the way of communication I consider normal and appropriate and efficient has clearly repeatedly caused damaging confusion, not just when I was the one who tried it. I get a lot of practice attempting to optimize my communication and actions accordingly, as I go through various subsequent crises. I begin writing this document, in an attempt to maintain the pursuit of knowledge that requires maintenance of my sanity, or at least documentation of its failure.
My health catastrophically fails again; They did not let us have a powerful immunosuppressant to stop my brain from swelling, which was available at the hospital but not allowed to be taken home to our makeshift clinic. Brain pressure spikes, there is talk of the tumor growing again or some new bleeding. I go back to the hospital, to the terror and to the attempt to think my way out. The situation there is similar to before, but now it is all just more relevant evidence, being provided for me to improve my understanding, until finally the most parsimonious explanation for all this traumatic data is to posit a new category: collapse-preventing systems, such as this hospital, are fundamentally different from efficiency-maximizing systems. Nurse talk is optimized for assuring survival, not thriving, and so is the previously incomprehensible logic of this hospital. I derive my communications and actions from my new theory, with spectacular success, compared both to before and to how my fellow patients are faring. Personal positive bias is the default explanation, but I compulsively continue to invest thought into this, for the analgesic joy if nothing else. Maybe all of this descent into darkness can be good for something.
Pattern match! Another catastrophic realization comes crashing in. The necessary expertise has been available all along, from my academic degree in computer science. 20 years ago, Algorithms 101. I receive what feels like a download of the following theory. I initially do not want to believe it; believing I could have stumbled into something new and so fundamental is the most obvious evidence of insanity yet. I am crying so hard it is impossible to tell whether the tears are of joyful relief or of my mind finally cracking. But whether this means I finally solved The Puzzle or whether it means I have finally gone insane, I cannot pretend I don't believe it; the writings of Eliezer Yudkowsky have changed me. Holy fucking shit, this is it. This explains everything. Thanks to the cancer!
New bleeding or new tumor growth is ruled out by another CAT scan, and we do finally get the immunosuppressant. Back at my mother's home clinic, I continue writing this. Writing carries me past levels of pain where I’m confident 90% of the population would have attempted suicide. I can’t do that to the kids, and my mother would see right through the pretend stupidity of an “accident”. But mostly I choose to live because I have Something To Return From This. And here it comes.
**II. Thankful Theory**
[An old Slate Star Codex post describes] [systems trying to thrive [versus] systems trying to survive](https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/03/04/a-thrivesurvive-theory-of-the-political-spectrum/). Just as with the political left-right dichotomy that Scott described in these terms, this distinction between these types of systems is most obvious when both are in conflict with each other, such as when Silicon Valley startups complain that the regulations of the systems trying to ensure survival are stopping them from thriving, or when opponents of nuclear power proclaim themselves uninterested in the low price of this energy.
Such conflicts are terrible, because these two groups of systems should be natural allies:
1. We cannot thrive if we don’t survive.
2. Insufficient thriving causes slowdown and scarcities that might threaten survival.
Both types of systems are trying to be good, and they benefit from each other's function, yet they are so fundamentally different from each other that they have trouble collaborating. Both of them are fighting malignancy, another reason they should be allies, but therefore when they come into conflict and find each other to be so foreign, they are prone to assume malignancy. This is a tragic impediment to collaboration; we should all want a solution to this. But a solution requires locating the problem correctly.
The humble thing to do would be to
* extend thrive/survive from its political domain only slightly, to a sociological or economic level, where we find the most publicized/obvious examples.
* assume a “normal” problem of human incentives.
* theorize some type of resilience/efficiency tradeoff in how we build our institutions (such as hospitals).
But this would not explain e.g. the near death at the ICU or the miscommunications in the home clinic text messages - individual humans with well-aligned incentives catastrophically failing to collaborate.
I believe that:
* the problem is more fundamental, more fractal, more Moloch-like.
* it occurs in conflicts between the immune system attempting to ensure survival through e.g. fever and the central nervous system attempting to thrive in ways that involve taking health risks.
* it occurs in the conflict between defenders against artificial superintelligence (ASI) risk, trying to help humanity survive by stopping ASI from being built, and accelerationists trying to help humanity thrive by building ASI to efficiently solve climate change etc.
We would all be very lucky to find the following theory is right, because it implies solutions.
The most important thing to understand about trying to assure survival is that it is *torturous*. Even success necessarily involves constant exposure to catastrophe, even if only counterfactually in the service of prevention. Every emotion, including friendly unassuming gratitude, is heightened to painful intensity.
Human minds cannot deliberate under torture. This alone would explain why people doing torturous tasks should optimize against deliberation, for binary or multiple choice questions rather than open questions, for legibility rather than optimality. However, it is more generally true that the closer you get to collapse, the more urgently a survival-oriented system needs to act, the less capacity it has available to connect multiple pieces of information into a detailed model of what to aim for. Under the pressure of needing to perform their task unfailingly, both types of systems have converged into two different architectures, which are dictated by information theory.
This is the tense moment where most of you are impatient with how slowly I am getting to the point, while a minority has already matched the pattern and does not need me to spell it out. Here is a hint: the minority is among the people who understand Algorithms 101.
This is the theory:**Survival-oriented systems are trying to be [space-efficient rather than time-efficent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space%E2%80%93time_tradeoff), because they are at constant risk of mental memory (especially the [phonological loop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baddeley%27s_model_of_working_memory#Phonological_loop)) getting** ***overwritten*** **by catastrophically urgent new data, and because this risk is strongly positively correlated to how urgently they need to act.** The rest is commentary.
For those outside that minority: there are different ways you can implement any algorithm. For example, imagine you have to sort very many books into a large library, alphabetically. It is a private library, so you can't just make a public servant do it, but need to instead do it cleverly, methodically, and make a method you’ll use. This method is an algorithm.
*This illustration of a private library cannot convey how wonderfully your task smells.*
Two of your options for how to go about this would be the following. Both will work.
1. [Take a book from the unsorted pile, compare it to a sorted/shelved book. If the new book is closer to A than the sorted one, go left on the shelf, otherwise go right. Repeat until done](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selection_sort).This method (algorithm) obviously does not require extra space for the temporary shelves of the 2nd, so we call this kind of method (algorithm) “space-efficient”.
2. [Sort each book into an individual sorted shelf of a few books. Then merge the shelves. Repeat until done](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merge_sort). This needs more space, but it needs much less time to complete, because it requires much fewer comparisons between individual books, so it’s more “time-efficient”. This is a mathematical fact that any computer scientist will, and any amateur coder can, confirm.
Apply this to communication that is required for collaboration. Space-efficient communication can’t cache a long message to be communicated, or a long message received to be understood. Therefore space-efficient communication has to rely on short, atomic messages, which in order to be informative have to be pre-agreed. This must necessarily take more time (be less time-efficient) because the information that needs to be transported must laboriously be translated into, and from, the pre-agreed alphabet of simple, atomic messages.
Both the survival-oriented systems and the thriving-oriented systems are trying to solve problems. For this purpose, the intelligent ones are attempting to improve themselves. As they do this, over time, they each apply their methods on themselves and their understanding of their situation, so their different methods produce even more different concepts of themselves and their environment. This creates misunderstandings and confusions between the two types of systems, and that’s how the inevitable, logical difference between time- and space-efficient algorithms leads to stubborn conflicts that impede collaboration.
**IIb. How to improve collaboration between survival-oriented and thriving-oriented systems**
There are existing computer science results about how to integrate space-efficient and time-efficient algorithms. Whatever the specific practical details of the malfunctioning collaboration that you want to improve, these results will be applicable. This is the principled solution!
In the context of this general essay, and assuming each system includes humans, I will now provide seven heuristics. If these don’t help, that is experimental evidence against this theory. But if you give non-negligible credence to the theory, the expected value of trying them is positive.
1. Thank each other a lot; explicitly affirm that you understand each other's good intentions. Within your home system, adherence to your communication norms sufficiently establishes your willingness to collaborate, but this does not work across competing communication norms, so explicit assertions of willingness to collaborate must serve as a substitute.
If you are trying to assure thriving, and frustrated by a party trying to assure survival:
2. Understand and affirm that preventing collapse is desirable in order to avoid the efficiency loss of collapse.
3. The brevity of their communication will feel hostile; interpret it charitably as an expression of urgency of concern.
4. Your problem-solving will be misunderstood and underappreciated; keep forgiving this.
If you are trying to assure survival, and frustrated by a party trying to assure thriving:
5. Understand and affirm that thriving is desirable in order to prevent scarcities, which cause collapses, which threaten survival.
6. The voluminousness of their communication will feel distracted and unfocused; interpret it charitably as an attempt to provide especially much information that might become more obviously relevant during the future of your alliance.
7. Your discipline will be misinterpreted as hostility; keep forgiving this.
All of this will be least intuitive, but most needed, when the matter under concern is most urgent. | Scott Alexander | 150002163 | Triple Tragedy And Thankful Theory | acx |
# Open Thread 350
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I sent Book Review Contest finalists and Honorable Mentionees an email requesting a short biography to use in the announcement post. But because I foolishly included the word “congratulations”, many people said it got caught in their spam filter. If you’re a finalist and didn’t get the email, either retrieve it from your spam filter, or just send me (scott@slatestarcodex.com) a short bio of yourself like the ones [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-contest-2023-winners), including however you want me to publicly list your name (pseudonym? etc). I’ll announce winners Friday.
**2:** Los Angeles is a late addition to the Ballots Everywhere meetups - they’re holding their meeting this Wednesday, October 9, with a followup planned for next Wednesday. For more information, [see the Times and Places post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ballots-everywhere-times-and-places).
**3:** I went through the last few months of reported comments and banned everyone who needed banning, including [Michael Kelly](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-343/comment/66132963), [Humble Rando](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-340/comment/63745971), [J Redding](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/preliminary-milei-report-card/comment/70993584), [Gregvp](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-compounding-loophole/comment/66408993), [Carateca](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-330/comment/56953862), [Economicsscream](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-two-arms-and-a-head/comment/64156835), [LearnsHebrewHatesIP](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-338/comment/62117459) (for real this time), [Henry Rodger Beck](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/a-theoretical-case-against-education/comment/57112652), [Joe Potts](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/a-theoretical-case-against-education/comment/57139003), and [Nonzionism](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024/comment/68832054) (last one for one month only, I’m having mercy because I like his Substack). Let their fate stand as a warning to us all. And thanks as always to our army of ~~snitches~~ valiant comment reporters who make it easy for me to find rule-breaking material. If you see a comment that needs moderation, click on the […] symbol on the bottom right of the comment, then select Report. | Scott Alexander | 149903749 | Open Thread 350 | acx |
# Ballots Everywhere: Times And Places
Each election year, [I’ve shared](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/my-california-ballot-2022) how I plan to vote in local elections. This year I want to scale up and produce voter guides for all the big US cities/states with a critical mass of ACX readers. Eight big city meetup groups have offered to work on this. If you’re in one of their cities, consider going to the meetup and helping decide who to recommend (you’ll probably want to bring a smartphone or computer, plus any voting guide you’ve received, to help with research). The cities are:
**AUSTIN**- Saturday, October 19th, 1:30 - 4:30 PM (but it “starts in earnest” at 2:30)
- Central Market Cafe, 4001 N Lamar, Austin, TX
- Contact sbarta@gmail.com
**BOSTON
-** Saturday, October 19, 2:00 PM
- 199 Harvard St. Apt. 2, Cambridge
- Contact https://www.facebook.com/events/1187700865627496/
**CHICAGO**- Saturday, October 19, 2:00 - 4:30 PM
- South Loop Strength & Conditioning, 645 S Clark, Chicago
- Contact info@chicagorationality.com
**LOS ANGELES**- Wednesday, October 9th, 7:00PM (followup meeting October 16th @ 7PM)
- 11841 Wagner St, Culver City, CA
- Contact losangelesrationality.com
**NYC**- Tuesday, October 8, 7:00 - 9:00 PM
- 20 John St (4th floor), Manhattan, New York, NY
- Contact https://groups.google.com/g/overcomingbiasnyc
**OAKLAND (Berkeleyans also welcome)**- Wednesday, October 16, 6:30 - 10:00 PM
- 540 Alcatraz Ave, Oakland CA
- Contact ja.kopczynski[at]gmail[dot]com
**PHILADELPHIA
-** Saturday, October 5, 11:00 AM
- La Colombe, 100 S Independence Mall W #110, Philadelphia, PA
- Contact rationalphilly[at]gmail[dot]com
**SAN FRANCISCO
-** Saturday, October 19, 2:30 - 4:30pm
- Noasis, 22G Day Street (door code 4578)
- Contact https://lu.ma/0ufpys63
**SEATTLE**-Thursday, October 10th, 5:30 - 8:00 PM
- SLU BRU, 700 Dexter Ave N Suite 230, Seattle, WA
- Contact Sokolx@gmail.com
Please meet and send me your final recommendations by October 21. Thank you! | Scott Alexander | 149698976 | Ballots Everywhere: Times And Places | acx |
# Against The Cultural Christianity Argument
The "cultural Christianity" argument says that atheists might not like Christianity, but they like a culture which depends on Christianity. They like open, free, thoughtful, liberal, beautiful, virtuous societies. Unmoored from a connection to Christanity, a society will gradually have less of those goods, until even atheists are unhappy.
Therefore (continues the argument), atheists should be cultural Christians. While they can continue to privately disbelieve, they should support an overall Christian society, which they can dwell contentedly on the fringes of. I think this is sort of where Ayaan Hirsi Ali is coming from.
I’m in this argument’s target audience. Although I'm mostly atheist, I accept that the modern world has [worse aesthetics](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/whither-tartaria) than its predecessors. I think it's trying as hard as it can to push a [bad-things-are-good](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean) philosophy down our throat that we might one day choke on. And like everyone else in this category, I'm anti-woke. I do hope the worst is over, but I have continued nightmares about what would have happened if the DEI world had done a better job exploiting the post-George Floyd moment and cemented its advantage forever.
(there are also many ways modern society is better than its predecessors. I’m going to skip over those in order to grant as many as possible of the Cultural Christianity Argument’s assumptions, so we get to the meaty disagreement faster)
I am no fan of medieval theocracy. But I do have a weakness for the 1880 - 1930 period of fin de siecle culture, Art Nouveau, economic liberty, and progressophilia. This period wasn't very religious - Nietzsche had already declared God dead in 1882. But the Cultural Christians would argue that such a flowering of culture and optimism could only happen within a generation or two of a Christian society. It (they would argue) contained the seeds of its own destruction, doomed to degenerate into our current postmodernist brutalist whatever. If I want the 1890s back, I shouldn't advocate the (mostly classically liberal) positions of the 1890s. I should advocate for Christianity, the only ideology under which something like those positions can be stable.
There's one other reason I'm vulnerable: I accept the existence of something like this process of degeneration. At least this is how it’s worked for Jews: the first generation (after immigration) are Orthodox, the second generation Conservative, the third generation Reform, and the fourth generation completely lose interest. If someone wanted to perpetuate Conservative Judaism forever, their best bet would be to support and promote Orthodoxy. All of this checks out.
Only two things block me from becoming a Cultural Theist. The first is boring: I hate asserting false things, even if they're "practical". I don't ask anyone else to share that particular quirk. So I find the second more interesting: the Cultural Christianity argument hinges on the proposition that all liberal societies without Christianity will eventually collapse into wokeness and postmodernism. But Christianity also eventually collapsed into wokeness and postmodernism. So if they're both equally doomed, why not at least be truthful by advocating for the virtuous liberal society I wanted in the first place?
That is, suppose I were to advocate a return to 1890s norms of (let's say) liberalism and beautiful art. The Cultural Christian would tell me this is doomed, because the 1890s cultural package eventually fell apart and became the 20th century cultural package of wokeness and postmodernism (and fascism, socialism, New Dealism, etc). Therefore, I should support Christianity.
But the Christian cultural package also fell apart and became the current post-Christian world. This wasn't just a one-time coincidence either. Protestantism gave way to modernism in Scandinavia, Germany, and the US. Catholicism gave way to modernism in Spain, Italy, and Latin America. Orthodoxy gave way to modernism in Greece, Eastern Europe, and Russia (with a slight Putinist resurrection-in-name-only which hardly seems to have produced a flourishing liberal society). Meanwhile in China, the local mix of Buddhism/Confucianism/Taoism gave way to modernism. In South East Asia, Buddhism gave way to modernism. Only 10% of Israeli Jews are ultra-Orthodox, and it would be lower if they didn't breed so fast. India is moderately Hindu but still noticeably modern. Even the Middle East is gradually becoming less Muslim.
Even if one could turn back the clock until the West was once again as Christian as it was in 1700, we would expect its Christianity to go the same way as 1700s Christianity - that is, to decay and end in modernism. The few sects that escaped decay - ultra-Orthodox Jews, Amish, the Taliban - seem neither clearly scaleable nor entirely desirable. At the very least, they suggest one would need a very different kind of Christianity than the West had in 1700s - one as strict, isolationist, and inward-looking as the Amish - to have a fighting chance.
The challenge of modernity has felled both Christian theocracies and the virtuous liberalisms of the past alike. If modern atheists want a society better than our current one (or rather, better than wherever modern culture is leading us) they'll have to invent some new cultural package that's never been seen before. I don't know what that is, but I prefer to maintain integrity while looking for it, instead of grasping at inadequate pragmatic straws. | Scott Alexander | 149528908 | Against The Cultural Christianity Argument | acx |
# Preliminary Milei Report Card
How is Javier Milei, the new-ish libertarian president of Argentina doing?
According to [right-wing sources](https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/argentinas-milei-miracle-exposing-its-failing-socialist-neighbors), he’s doing amazing, [inflation is vanquished](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/argentina-peso-us-dollar-dollarization-recession-inflation-milei-foreign-currency-2024-4), and Argentina is on the road to First World status.
According to [left-wing sources](https://jacobin.com/2024/04/javier-milei-austerity-policy-impacts), he’s devastating the country, [inflation has ballooned](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/05/argentina-milei-economy-peso-devaluation-austerity-hunger/), and Argentina is mired in [unprecedented dire poverty](https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240926-poverty-in-argentina-soars-to-almost-53-percent-under-anarcho-capitalist-javier-milei).
I was confused enough to investigate further. Going through various topics in more depth:
### 1: Government Surplus
When Milei was elected, Argentina went from constant deficits to almost unprecedented government surplus, and has continued to run a surplus for the past six months.
([source](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-posts-six-months-fiscal-financial-surpluses-2024-07-16/))
This wasn’t fancy macroeconomic magic. Milei just cut government spending:
* He [eliminated](https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2023/12/15/javier-milei-does-away-argentina-culture-ministry) 9 of 18 government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity.
* He laid off [24,000 government workers](https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-04-02/president-javier-milei-fires-24000-government-workers-in-argentina-no-one-knows-who-will-be-next.html) (and hopes to increase that to 70,000).
* He [cut fuel subsidies (paywalled link)](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-06/milei-begins-to-slash-energy-subsidies-for-low-income-argentines)
* He may have [cut](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68886411) (or at least not increased, which given inflation levels is an effective cut) funding for universities, which now complain they have no electricity and are giving classes in the dark.
* He has [changed the way inflation affects pensions](https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-03-27/argentine-pensioners-in-the-frontlines-of-javier-mileis-attacks-on-the-welfare-state.html) in what was realistically a large budget cut.
* Et cetera.
[This source](https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/the-expenses-cut-by-milei-to-achieve-a-fiscal-surplus.phtml) says he cut the size of government by about 30% overall. Unsurprisingly, this eliminated the Argentine deficit.
### 2: Inflation
This has been Argentina’s biggest problem for many years. There’s no mystery why: in order to cover its deficit, the government printed money. This was reaching crisis levels just before Milei’s election ([source](https://catalyst.independent.org/2023/12/12/argentinas-inflation-explained-chart/)).
This graph implies a “singularity” in the mid 2020s in which the entire universe is converted to Argentine pesos.
Classical economics says that if you cut government deficits and stop printing money, inflation should decrease. It did:
([source](https://tradingeconomics.com/argentina/inflation-rate-mom))
Monthly inflation went from 25% to about 4%. This is obviously great, but there are two small notes of concern.
First, the 25% number was just one really bad month. Inflation had been at a baseline of about 4% for most of the last five years. The immediately-pre-Milei government really cranked up the money printer in its last few months, increasing the numbers to 10% for a few months, and finally 25% for one really bad final month. Milei was able to get it down to its usual baseline of 4%, but I think he was hoping to get it lower. So far it’s been stubborn and stayed at the 4% level through the spring and summer.
Second, even 4% monthly inflation is awful. 4% monthly = 60% yearly. Remember, the United States briefly had 9% yearly inflation after COVID and people were livid. Argentina’s “good” “improved” inflation is still 7x that.
Why do some left-wing sources say that inflation has gotten worse than ever under Milei and become the worst in the world?
In normal countries, where monthly inflation is too small to notice, you measure yearly inflation. If you look at yearly inflation under Milei - as in, literally, the last twelve months of inflation - it looks like this:
The movement of the twelve-month window of “yearly inflation” now encompasses the worst part of Milei’s predecessors’ inflation, and so looks awful. Meanwhile, during Milei’s predecessors’ administration, the twelve-month window included earlier periods with less inflation, and looked better. So a devious liar could say that “inflation” (meaning yearly inflation, which is admittedly the standard measurement) is “unprecedentedly bad” during Milei’s administration.
You can debate how many sources are actually trying to con you this way vs. just including the yearly inflation number for “context” or something ([1](https://x.com/BenjaminNorton/status/1813790547536200034), [2](https://x.com/zeee_media/status/1802159821594230954), [3](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/05/argentina-milei-economy-peso-devaluation-austerity-hunger/), [4](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/argentinas-poverty-rate-spikes-53-6-months-president-114221438), etc).
### 3: Poverty
No way around this one, Argentine poverty got worse.
The poverty rate [soared](https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/27/business/argentina-poverty-rate-increase-50-percent/index.html) from 42% before Milei to 53% now. It’s hard to tell how much of this is the bad policies of the last government coming to roost vs. Milei’s own fault. But Milei firing all those government workers, slashing subsidies, ending welfare programs, devaluing the peso, etc, have certainly contributed.
[The IMF](https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/ARG?zoom=ARG&highlight=ARG\) says Argentina’s economy this year is among the worst in the world, exceeded only by places like Sudan and Yemen in the midst of civil wars. Even Ukraine and Russia are doing better! (also, what’s happening in Estonia?)
According to classical economics, this kind of “shock therapy” is supposed to be temporarily bad, but long-run good. So although it probably doesn’t feel this way to Argentines, things are potentially still going according to plan. But economics doesn’t have a clear prediction for *how* bad things will get, or *how* long it will take before they are good again, and I haven’t seen any analysis of whether the current recession is consistent with predictions or whether people should start worrying.
There are some very slight, early signs that things might be starting to get better. For example, according to the link above:
> The Catholic University of Argentina’s (UCA) observatory had estimated the poverty rate soared to 55.5% in the first quarter of the year before easing to 49.4% in the second quarter, giving a 52% average for the first six months of this year.
And from [here](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-economy-forecast-extend-recession-second-quarter-2024-09-16/):
> "We are still in recession, but there are some signs that it may be coming to an end," said analyst Marcelo Rojas, referring to signals the country's economic slump may have bottomed out.
And from [here](https://x.com/business/status/1839050251572838519) (July is mentioned because it’s the latest month from which we have good data):
[This source](https://tradingeconomics.com/argentina/monthly-gdp-yoy) says the opposite and I don’t know why:
So there are slight signs of hope but Argentina’s economy has definitely gotten worse.
*[EDIT: commenter Duarte recommends reading [Juan Ramon Rallo on signs of recent improvement (Twitter)](https://x.com/juanrallo/status/1839650359154807108).]*
### 4: Rent Control
This is another part of the pro-Milei narrative. He abolished Argentina’s rent control, [and](https://www.newsweek.com/javier-milei-rent-control-argentina-us-election-kamala-harris-housing-affordability-1938127):
> …since Milei's repeal of rent control laws took effect on December 29, the supply of rental housing in Buenos Aires has jumped by **195.23%**, according to the Statistical Observatory of the Real Estate Market of the Real Estate College.
(the 195.23% number seems implausibly high to me, but I can’t find any contradictory claims, so I’m nervously letting it stand)
There are strong economic arguments to believe that abolishing rent control should lower prices in the long run. In the short run it seems like it could go either way. In this case, although there are [some stories](https://archive.ph/CCKAv) of people whose apartments got more expensive, [the official statistics](https://nearshoreamericas.com/prices-drop-and-supply-surges-for-housing-in-argentina-months-after-rent-control-repeal/) say prices have dropped by **27%.**
This seems like a clear Milei victory and I can’t find anyone credibly claiming it isn’t. The only note of caution that I take seriously comes from [this Twitter user](https://x.com/Philip_DT/status/1838636825876775282):
I appreciate this clarification, but I don’t want to overupdate. Milei repealed a lot of housing/renting legislation, including laws regulating the size of deposits, laws about what kind of currency you could use for housing contracts, etc. I think an overall picture of “Milei made the housing market much freer, and it improved” is correct. Still, Philip has a good point that this wasn’t the central American example of rent control, which is something like “as long as it’s the same tenant, landlords can never raise prices more than a certain amount per year”.
### 5: Approval Rating
All these economic statistics are getting hard to follow. What about something more fundamental: are people happy with Milei?
Sources: [1](https://x.com/UBERSOY1/status/1742183473526325728), [2](https://x.com/alejandrito/status/1777061925743960387), [3](https://x.com/usdtermo/status/1810438682974851407), [4](https://x.com/NicSaldias/status/1838600497772581229)
Milei’s approval rating started out high: 60-66%. As the recession dragged on, it got lower - now it’s at 43%. But even after nine months of recession, he remains more popular than [Joe Biden](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/), [Keir Starmer](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/sep/21/honeymoon-over-keir-starmer-now-less-popular-than-rishi-sunak), [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/), and other major western leaders.
But it’s worth putting that [in context](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentinas-milei-sees-gravity-defying-poll-numbers-start-fall-2024-09-24/):
Argentina has a history of being enamored with new leaders who promise to change everything, then souring on them when everything fails to change. So far Milei is merely on trend.
Maybe more important than Milei’s own approval rating is how he stands relative to other politicians and party leaders who he’ll have to defeat for re-election. Here the news is good ([proximal source](https://x.com/NicSaldias/status/1838600497772581229), [ultimate source](https://www.bloomberglinea.com/latinoamerica/argentina/encuestas-cae-confianza-en-el-gobierno-y-aprobacion-de-milei-se-mantiene-estable/)):
The only Argentine politician more popular than Milei is [Victoria Villaruel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_Villarruel) - Milei’s own vice-president. Villaruel has an interesting background: she’s a conservative Catholic activist and amateur historian who writes books arguing that past Argentine right-wing governments have committed fewer atrocities (and past Argentine left-wing governments more atrocities) than generally believed, which has earned her accusations of “denialism”. I don’t understand how this led to her being vice president, or why she’s so popular.
For more on how Argentines think, see [this Reddit discussion](https://www.reddit.com/r/asklatinamerica/comments/1f7xl2i/how_is_javier_milei_doing_so_far/). I see Argentines (at least the sort of Argentines who speak English and go on Reddit) having mixed opinions on Milei - but everyone is united in hating the opposition.
### 6: Overall
When Javier Milei took office, he promised to do shock therapy that would short-term plunge Argentina into a recession, but long-term end its economic woes.
He has fulfilled his campaign promise to plunge Argentina into a recession. Whether this will long-term end its economic woes remains to be seen.
I think he gets credit for some purely political victories (completing the budget cuts he said he would complete), for decreasing inflation, and for improving the housing market. But in the end, history will judge him for whether his shock therapy eventually bears fruit. I don’t think that judgment can be made yet, and I don’t see many economists eager to go out on a limb and say that there are strong signs that his particular brand of shock therapy will definitely work/fail.
There are disappointingly few Milei prediction markets, probably because it’s hard to operationalize “he makes the economy good”. This [multi-pronged mega-market](https://manifold.markets/Ernie/javier-milei-first-term-megamarket?play=true) has few traders, and weakly predicts a mix of good and bad things, maybe leaning a little good. But [here](https://manifold.markets/Jacek/what-will-be-argentinas-average-ann?play=true) is a more specific one:
…which compared to Argentina’s historical GDP growth rate seems - no, sorry, [Argentina’s historical GDP growth rate](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1391749/growth-of-the-real-gross-domestic-product-gdp-argentina/) is too weird to draw any conclusions.
And maybe the most important test: | Scott Alexander | 149438571 | Preliminary Milei Report Card | acx |
# Ballots Everywhere: Call For Organizers, Times, & Dates
Each election year, [I’ve shared](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/my-california-ballot-2022) how I plan to vote in local elections. This year I want to scale up and produce voter guides for all the big US cities/states with a critical mass of ACX readers.
Here are the ten locales I’m most interested in:
* San Francisco
* Berkeley
* San Jose
* Los Angeles
* Seattle
* NYC
* Boston/Cambridge
* Austin
* Chicago
* Philadelphia
The process will look like:
1. Each city’s organizer sets a date for the “ballot meetup”, when everyone gets together, researches the issues, and agrees on recommendations. The meetups should be sometime between October 5 and October 20 (sorry for short notice!). They **[use this form to tell me when that will be](https://forms.gle/jL5385BbQ58T1nmW7)**.
2. On October 4, I post a list of all the ballot meetup dates.
3. You hold your ballot meetups and get me your recommendations by October 21. You can use Google Docs or [OpenBallot](https://openballot.super.site/).
4. I post all of them on October 22 so you have a couple of days to read them before voting.
**What should our recommendations look like?**
I’d like a paragraph or two of reasoning (can be longer if there’s a really complicated issue) plus a recommendation (the recommendation can be “we’re not sure”). See [my 2022 post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/my-california-ballot-2022) for examples.
**So wait, is this for Democrats, Republicans, or what?**
I’m going to rely on this being ACX meetup groups, which I assume will average out to the standard ACX political position, something like “centrist with progressive and libertarian sympathies”. If your meetup group doesn’t average out to that, vote your conscience anyway. I think most people will be more interested in hearing what you were able to learn about each candidate, and what considerations moved you, than in blindly trusting your final result.
**What if our group can’t agree?**
You can either vote among your group, or present both sides’ reasoning and recommend that people vote their conscience.
**What should we send recommendations on?**
I assume everyone already knows who they’re picking for president. I’m more interested in downballot races like mayor, county supervisor, or state legislator. In states like California where people vote directly on propositions and constitutional amendments, I’m interested in those too. You don’t have to do every single dogcatcher or whatever. Think of the effective altruist motto - “important, tractable, neglected” - and pick whatever set of local races seem highest value.
If your meetup group covers many localities (like a city with many city council districts, or somewhere like Berkeley or Boston where many of the attendees will really be from Oakland or Cambridge), you can decide whether to do full ballots for all localities, the most important races from each, or just pick one and stick to it.
**How do we determine who to vote for?**
Most cities will give out ballot guides before the election. Local institutions like newspapers will often make recommendations; you may choose to trust them or not based on whether you agree with their editorial perspective. You can usually Google all candidates’ names and find their campaign websites and sometimes local news interviews with them. Local interest groups (YIMBYs, teachers unions, etc) will often endorse one or another candidate, and you can Google those interest groups’ websites to see who they support and why.
**What if my meetup group wants to do this, but I’m not in one of those ten cities?**
If you’re an established ACX meetup group, go for it. I won’t have the time to handhold you like I will the big cities, but I’ll still post your voter guide if you get it to me on time.
I’m not interested in posting voter guides made by individuals (as opposed to meetup groups), because I worry that the lack of averaging across many people makes it a kind of random perspective that it would be weird for ACX to endorse. If you want to make one anyway, you can post it in the comments here or something, and maybe I’ll take pity and highlight it on an Open Thread.
If you’re in a non-US city that also has an election in the last few months of 2024, feel free to tag along, I guess.
**How will you handle California statewide offices and initiatives?**
I’m soliciting voting guides from four California cities. If they all give recommendations on statewide offices and initiatives, I’ll probably post everyone’s individual guide for their city on the 22nd (which will include their statewide recommendations), then take a few days to read them over and post some kind of consensus California version later.
**What if I’m a well-informed representative of some locally popular interest group (effective altruists, YIMBYs, etc) and I want to make sure that people know my group’s perspective?**
On the post on the 4th, I’ll include emails for all the meetup organizers. You can email them and let them know your thoughts so they can bring them up at their own meetup. If you have consensus California statewide thoughts, email me.
You can also comment on this post or the upcoming one on the 4th.
**Okay, I’m a meetup organizer who wants to participate, what should I do?**
**[Use this form](https://forms.gle/jL5385BbQ58T1nmW7)** to tell me when your meetup will be, and check the #ballots channel on the organizer Discord for more information.
**I’m a meetup organizer but definitely can’t / don’t want to participate, what should I do?**
Let’s talk about it on the #ballots channel of the organizer Discord, and maybe we can come up with an alternate leader for that session. If you’re an organizer but not on the Discord, email skyler[at] rationalitymeetups[ dot]org to fix that. | Scott Alexander | 149481618 | Ballots Everywhere: Call For Organizers, Times, & Dates | acx |
# Open Thread 349
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** On last week’s post [How Often Do Men Think About Rome](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-often-do-men-think-about-rome), I presented ACX survey data showing that men and women thought about Rome the same amount. Commenter RenOS was able to find [a YouGov poll showing the opposite](https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/47481-men-women-thinking-about-the-roman-empire-poll) (men more). Possible interpretations: my poll was contaminated by selection bias (ACX-reading women are unusually interested in history), theirs was contaminated by response bias (they asked how often you thought about Rome; I asked whether you thought about it in the last 24 hours - I think their version leaves more room for retroactive editing of memories). YouGov also provided other interesting historical information:
**2:** Late addition to [Meetups Everywhere](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/meetups-everywhere-2024-times-and): Moscow on October 6, see link for more. Other meetups coming up this week include Philadelphia, Austin, Istanbul, Canberra, Budapest, and Warsaw.
**3:** If you haven’t already, [vote for the winner of this year’s book review contest](https://forms.gle/kwYC78zFwjCa76nX7) - voting closes Sunday, October 6.
**4:** And if you’re an ACX veteran, you might remember the winner of the very first book review contest - [Lars Doucet’s review of](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-progress-and-poverty) *[Progress And Poverty](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-progress-and-poverty),* the book on Georgism. Since then, Lars has gone on to start a Georgism-inspired land valuation company, [Valuebase](https://www.valuebase.co/), which has gotten investment from Sam Altman, Nat Friedman, and others. Now they’re recruiting paid interns, including:
* **Technical interns**: Ideal candidates have experience in programming, data science, machine learning, or AI, and are eager to work on real-world problems that scale across millions of properties.
* **Non-technical interns**: If you're organized, driven, and have strong problem-solving and communication skills, we have roles for you in operations, marketing, and product management.
If interested, apply [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdeb9nbFfDW3yngTxwjXfKvFeqQlHgnIcVXjwQlv42V3TJj-g/viewform). | Scott Alexander | 149605816 | Open Thread 349 | acx |
# Vote In The 2024 Book Review Contest
If you’ve read the finalists of this year’s book review contest, **[vote for your favorite here](https://forms.gle/kwYC78zFwjCa76nX7)**. Voting will close sometime on Sunday, October 6.
Last year we did ranked choice voting. This year, to satisfy the *other* half of the voting system nerds, we’re doing approval voting. You may vote for however many reviews you want. All of your choices count equally. If you have one clear favorite, just vote for that one. If you have a few favorites, vote for them all. Whichever entry gets the most votes wins. I wouldn’t recommend voting for more than half the options: if too many people do that, then we end up selecting whichever bland review offended the fewest people.
In case you need a refresher, here are the finalists, in order of appearance:
**1:** [Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-autobiography-of)
**2:** [Dominion](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-dominion-by-matthew)
**3:** [Don Juan](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-don-juan)
**4:** [The Family That Couldn’t Sleep](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-family-that)
**5:** [How Language Began](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-how-language-began)
**6:** [Real Raw News](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-real-raw-news)
**7:** [Two Arms And A Head](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-two-arms-and-a-head)
**8:** [How The War Was Won](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-how-the-war-was)
**9:** [Silver Age Marvel Comics](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-silver-age-marvel)
**10:** [The Complete Rhyming Dictionary And Poet’s Craft Book](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-complete-rhyming)
**11:** [The History Of The Rise And Influence Of The Spirit Of Rationalism In Europe](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-history-of-the)
**12:** [The Pale King](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-pale-king)
**13:** [Nine Lives](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-nine-lives)
**14:** [The Ballad Of The White Horse](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-ballad-of-the)
Prediction market is [here](https://manifold.markets/ScottAlexander/who-will-win-the-2024-acx-book-revi?play=true), but don’t peek until after you’ve voted. | Scott Alexander | 149479311 | Vote In The 2024 Book Review Contest | acx |
# ACX Classifieds 9/2024
This is the irregular classifieds thread. Advertise whatever you want in the comments.
To keep things organized, please respond to the appropriate top-level comment: **Employment, Dating, Read My Blog** (also includes podcasts, books, etc)**, Consume My Product/Service, Meetup,** or **Other.** I’ll delete anything that’s not in the appropriate category.
Remember that posting dating ads is hard and scary. Please refrain from commenting too negatively on anyone’s value as a human being. I’ll be less strict about employers, bloggers, etc.
Potentially related links:
— [EA job board](https://jobs.80000hours.org/)
— [EA internships](https://ea-internships.pory.app/)
— [Dating docs](https://dateme.directory/)
— [Find a Less Wrong/ACX meetup](https://www.lesswrong.com/community) | Scott Alexander | 149434794 | ACX Classifieds 9/2024 | acx |
# How Often Do Men Think About Rome?
There’s a Twitter meme on how men constantly think about the Roman Empire. Some feminist friends objected that women think about Rome a lot too. To [settle](https://manifold.markets/ScottAlexander/do-more-men-think-about-the-roman-e?play=true) the matter, I included a question about this on [this year’s ACX survey](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-survey-results-2024), “Have you thought about the Roman Empire in the past 24 hours?” (the Byzantine Empire also counted). Here are responses from 607 cis women and 4,925 cis men:
38% of women, vs. 43% of men, had thought about Rome in the past day - pretty equal!
Other things I noticed about demographics of respondents:
* India was the only non-western country where I got a good sample; it had modestly less Roman interest, at 24% of 38 responses.
* More religious people were more likely to think about Rome; numbers ranged from 37% of atheists to 59% of committed believers. Christians were a bit more likely than members of other religions, but there was no difference between Catholics and Protestants.
* Although there was little difference between left, center, and moderate right, the far right thought about Rome much more than anyone else. Of 50 people who rated themselves 10/10 on a 10 point conservatism scale, 73% had thought about Rome recently.
* There was a slight tendency for more educated people to think of Rome *less*, from 47% of community college grads to 41% of four-year college grads to 39% of PhDs. Maybe this is because more educated people are less religious and less conservative?
* The most Roman profession was law, at 52%
These numbers come from ACX readers. How representative are they of the general population? I looked at the least-ACX-readerish ACX readers; those who had only been reading the blog for fewer than six months. In this group, the male average dropped from 43% to 37%. So there might be some indication that the population average is lower. But also, ACX selects against religiosity and conservatism, both of which were associated with higher Roman awareness, so it could go either way.
When people said they’d thought about Rome in the past day, I asked them an additional question about the context. Here were some representative and/or interesting answers, slightly edited for readability:
> * Reviewing Kindle highlights and came across some from Marcus Aurelius.
> * Was curious about what pre-early modern wagons were like, and Roman roads came up in that context.
> * Political situation today seemed like it resembled the early stages of the crisis of the third century.
> * In car with friends on a road trip, we were discussing predicting eclipses with ancient technology. The Roman empire came up as a benchmark for an advanced society in antiquity, and we discussed their time keeping methods.
> * Was in Peru, compared Inca empire to Romans.
> * [This meme](https://www.reddit.com/r/RoughRomanMemes/comments/ch8w9y/the_gang_raises_a_legion/), shared IIRC by Tanner Greer or Bret Devereaux.
> * I have an Anki deck for all random things that I learn and don't want to forget and while reviewing yesterday there was a question about the Battle of Corinth and another about the first Roman emperor who claimed divinity.
> * I was thinking about Sulla.
> * I was discussing how many 4 year olds I could take in a fight and brought up Roman war tactics.
> * I'm reading some post-Roman-Empire historical fiction by Ken Follett, set in what's now the UK c. 1000 C.E., and naturally legacy of the Roman Empire comes up (e.g. Latin, the churches).
> * I am writing a monarch butterfly workbook for elementary schoolers, and Asclepius is the genus name for milkweed. I researched some of the mythology to include in the workbook.
> * There is a marker of an old Roman road near my place.
> * I listen to media about history daily. Was reading an article today about the eastern Romans negotiations with the Huns.
> * Mausoleum of Galla Placidia blue ceiling mosaics. ([Take a look!](https://www.newliturgicalmovement.org/2021/08/the-mausoleum-of-galla-placidia-in.html)) It's one of my screen wallpapers. Also, a lot of history interest in our house.
> * I read Bret Devereaux's blog, which is usually what gets me thinking about it.
> * Reading the ACOUP blog.
> * Reading A Collection Of Unmitigated Pedantry, of course.
> * Reading Bret Devereaux's blogpost 'On Roman Values' (I'm a stalwart ACOUP reader)
> * The most recent was probably when an email I was reading mentioned Elagabalus in a piece about Trans Day of Visibility.
> * I was thinking about how the Romans would have dealt with the Israel/Palestine situation.
> * Described aspect of Byzantine military doctrine to my girlfriend.
> * Usually in a negative light. Whenever I see cruelty or misery, I think about visiting the Coliseum and wonder if I am participating in a social convention that will later be viewed as grossly inhumane. Whenever I see most media, I think "bread and circuses". Whenever I see tomatoes, I think about how important tomatoes are for so many things, and usually that makes me think of a horrible video I saw where someone tried to recreate ancient Roman food and it looked awful. Last weekend, I was thinking about how sad it must have been to be a Vestal Virgin and I wondered if they were lonely, but then I thought it was probably better than most marriage at that time. During my foreign language classes, I think about all the stupid vowels and pointless letters like "u" and "v" in Romance languages and how much I hate them. This past week I was getting coffee and I thought about how the Romans ruined the lore of Ares by turning him into Mars and giving him main character syndrome. Mostly I think about how I don't get the hype around ancient Rome, and yet there are many similarities to our modern problems, which makes me mad, because I want to live in a society that is not like ancient Rome at all and I'm salty about it. But not as salty as ancient Roman food.
> * As an Italian, if I don't think about the greatest empire, at least once every 24 hours the ghost of Heliogabalus visits me.
> * Thinking of ways to prevent the descent into civil war in the late Republic, If I had a time machine
> * I was thinking about how Nero castrated and married a slave boy. I don't know why this thought came up.
> * Considering what I'd say to somebody who is completely in favour of current governmental restrictions of a kind that I imagine might have been relevant during Julius Caesar's rise to dictatorial power.
> * Thinking the phrase “this is my roman empire” about something else that is not the roman empire
> * Playing Crusader Kings 3.
> * Playing Age of Empires 2.
> * I'm an Orthodox Jew, so I was reflecting on the symbolic Roman Edom, which was envisioned as the eternal spiritual enemy of the Jewish people in the Gemara & Midrash.
> * Saw an article about Roman concrete.
> * Learned about Mark Zuckerberg's kids names.
> * Talking about a hypothetical patrician woman - gladiator romance smut novel.
> * Regularly get recommended YouTube videos about the Roman Empire (because I usually watch them when recommended)
> * Read the wiki about interior design, there was a picture of Roman recliners.
> * Connecting the problem of finding a successor CEO (or other private sector leader) to naming a successor emperor.
> * A friend and I joke about this a lot and he keeps track of the last time he thought of the Roman Empire in his discord bio. I noticed it when I opened his bio earlier today.
> * Optimal currency area
> * Listening to the Gladiator sound track while stripping wallpaper.
> * I don't know if this counts, but I compared my spouse to Herakles last evening.
> * Listening to a podcast about Mormonism, and the podcaster mentioned that at least one early Mormon leader claimed lack of polygamy is what caused the Roman Empire to fall.
> * Conversation about global policemen with my partner.
> * I was considering the similarity of Constantinople's Blues and Greens to our current political circus.
> * I was walking my dog and passed a place where I stood two years ago and googled to figure out why Emperor Nikephorous II Phokas had the nickname “the Pale Death of the Saracens,” which I had read somewhere. As I walked by yesterday, I remembered doing that.
> * Randomly thought about the meme about men thinking about the Roman empire.
The most common answers were blogs and podcasts (especially ACOUP), religion, stumbling across books, and memes. I couldn’t tell an obvious difference in contexts between genders.
So maybe this is a victory for feminism. But obviously the real winner is Rome. Imagine being so glorious that, 500 - 1500 years later, almost half of people still think about you daily, even on continents you never discovered.
Hail Caesar!
*[As always, you can try to replicate my work using the publicly available [ACX Survey Results](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/acx-survey-results-2024). If you get slightly different answers than I did, it’s because I’m using the full dataset which includes a few people who didn’t want their answers publicly released. If you get very different answers than I did, it’s because I made a mistake, and you should tell me.]* | Scott Alexander | 146392773 | How Often Do Men Think About Rome? | acx |
# Open Thread 348
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** ACX Grantees [Jordan Braunstein](https://x.com/jbraunstein914)and[TetraSpace](https://x.com/TetraspaceWest)are working on an assurance contract platform to solve coordination problems called [Spartacus.app](https://spartacus.app/). They’ve asked me to announce:
* That Spartacus will be hosting events at LATechWeek and SFTechWeek in October. You can RSVP [here](https://partiful.com/e/7OiiSdriuPY8eq6HN3Ss) for SF and [here](https://partiful.com/e/7XkNDQkaaU2IGmBPgEJh) for LA.
* That they’re looking for beta testers to provide feedback on some new features in development. You can join the current beta cohort [here](https://spartacus.app/campaign/1354e55e-cce6-4277-a87d-9ee960afe2a1), or by going to [their website](https://spartacus.app/) and using the code **259100**
* That they have [an open EA community choice fundraiser at Manifund](https://manifund.org/projects/an-online-platform-to-solve-collective-action-and-coordination-problems) to help extend their runway and pursue EA-aligned use cases. You can reach out to jordan@spartacus.app with any questions. | Scott Alexander | 149292213 | Open Thread 348 | acx |
# Your Book Review: The Ballad of the White Horse
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
## Introduction
***[The Ballad of the White Horse](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1719/1719-h/1719-h.htm)*** is a 2,684 line poem about conservatism, and it is brilliant. It has been called the last great epic poem written in English. I have not read the three dozen or so English epic poems that Wikipedia claims have been written since, so I cannot confirm the “last” part, but I can confirm the rest. It is a great poem, in both quality and size, and it is undoubtedly an epic poem. It has almost all the qualities required of an epic poem: it begins by invoking a muse (his wife), it starts in media res, the plot is centered around a hero of legend, there are supernatural visions and interventions, and an omniscient narrator. The only epic requirement it lacks is a long boring list shoved in somewhere, for which I am grateful.
On the surface level the poem is about King Alfred the Great, a pre-Hastings Anglo-Saxon king who has the twin qualities of being both legendary and real. There was certainly an actual King Alfred who really did fight a Viking lord named Guthrum and built the foundation needed for his grandson to form the Kingdom of England. He is considered the first English king, and is the only English monarch to be given the epithet “the Great”. At the same time he is also a figure of legend. They say he disguised himself as a wandering minstrel and played the harp for Guthrum in his own camp on the night before they would meet in battle. They also say he once accidentally burned a peasant woman’s cakes, and she, not knowing he was her king, chewed him out thoroughly (I’d expand on that, but that’s really the whole legend; one of those stories told to children that seem to have no moral or point).
In the introduction Chesterton tells us straight off that his poem is not meant to be historically accurate.
> This ballad needs no historical notes, for the simple reason that it does not profess to be historical. All of it that is not frankly fictitious, as in any prose romance about the past, is meant to emphasize tradition rather than history. King Alfred is not a legend in the sense that King Arthur may be a legend; that is, in the sense that he may possibly be a lie. But King Alfred is a legend in this broader and more human sense, that the legends are the most important things about him.
The legend of King Alfred the Great is well told by Chesterton and his story is entertaining and engaging with a climactic battle, death duels, suspense, and burnt cakes. If all you get out of it is an entertaining yarn then your time will be well spent. The poetry is excellent, and accessible to the layman. As the [tweet](https://twitter.com/ursulabrs/status/1434791291653558275) said, people want poetry to rhyme so bad. Chesterton gives that to us. His lines are a joy to read aloud (as all good poetry should).
Beneath that, not all that well hidden, the *Ballad* is Chesterton’s love song to conservatism as he understands it. In it Chesterton weaves the ideas that he has been writing about all his life and creates a cohesive narrative theme. The *Ballad* is like a melody that all his other works, fiction and nonfiction, dance to. Chesterton wrote many books, yet none seemed to stand higher than the others in terms of quality or popularity. Because of this he has been called “the master without a masterpiece” (though, appropriately, the quote itself seems legendary: I have found it referenced everywhere but I cannot find the source). I disagree: the *Ballad of the White Horse* is his masterpiece. It is Chesterton boiled down to his essence. Within it we find two core themes of Chesterton’s body of work: hope in defiance of fate, and the eternal revolution.
**The Doom of Alfred**
The poem begins with the White Horse and the destruction of the world. How the [White Horse of Uffington](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uffington_White_Horse) was there before Rome was founded, and remained after its collapse. We are introduced to the poem’s post-apocalyptic setting:
> For the end of the world was long ago
> And all we dwell to-day
> As children of some second birth.
> Like a strange people left on Earth
> After a judgment day.
Rome has fallen and England is plunged into chaos. The vikings have come and are sweeping over the land conquering all in their path. Chesterton depicts them as savage men bent on death and destruction:
> The Northmen came about our land:
> A Christless chivalry
> Who knew not of the arch, or pen
> Great beautiful, half-witted men
> From the sunrise and the sea […]
>
> Their souls were drifting as the sea
> And all good towns and lands
> They only saw with heavy eyes
> And broke with heavy hands.
Against these “Hairy men, as huge as sin” we find King Alfred of Wessex alone, fighting a desperate and losing campaign. Rather, when we find him he is not fighting but fleeing alone and hunted through the woods after a lost battle. Chesterton heaps on how badly things are stacked against Alfred. The vikings have won battle after battle, and even when Alfred successfully fended them off they would come again year after year, wearing him down:
> And if ever he climbed the crest of luck
> And set the flag before,
> Returning as a wheel returns,
> Came ruin and the rain that burns,
> And all began once more.
Alfred has not only lost a battle, but lost most of his vassals and allies as well. Wessex is outnumbered, outfought, and facing the end. There is no-one left to help them. Chesterton repeats this multiple times to make sure we get the point: that the Vikings
> …laid hold upon the heavens
> And no help came at all
or how Alfred fought them
> With foemen leaning on his shield
> And roaring on him when he reeled;
> And no help came at all.
Alfred’s plight is so desperate that he is losing all hope of victory:
> In the island in the river
> He was broken to his knee:
> And he read, writ with an iron pen,
> That God had wearied of Wessex men
> And given their country, field and fen,
> To the devils of the sea.
It is here, fleeing and alone, where Alfred receives a vision of Mary, the Mother of God. Alfred tells her that while he wouldn’t presume to ask about the secrets of God or Heaven, he would like to know whether he will somehow drive back the Vikings, or if the fate of Wessex is to die fighting and fade away. Mary corrects him; any man can ask and receive the secrets of God, but she will not tell him his fate.
> The gates of heaven are lightly locked,
> We do not guard our gold,
> Men may uproot where worlds begin,
> Or read the name of the nameless sin;
> But if he fail or if he win
> To no good man is told.
Here we are introduced to one of Chesterton’s core themes: hope versus fate. Chesterton sees hope as one of the primary distinguishers between Christianity and paganism, buddhism, eastern philosophy in general, and materialistic determinism. We see this same dichotomy in another of Chesterton’s great poems, *Lepanto*, where he has Muhammed, enthroned in glory in the Muslim paradise, say:
> We have set the seal of Solomon on all things under sun,
> Of knowledge and of sorrow and endurance of things done,
> But a noise is in the mountains, in the mountains, and I know
> The voice that shook our palaces—four hundred years ago:
> It is he that saith not ‘Kismet’; it is he that knows not Fate ;
> It is Richard, it is Raymond, it is Godfrey in the gate!
> It is he whose loss is laughter when he counts the wager worth,
> Put down your feet upon him, that our peace be on the earth.
This contrast, between the fatalism of the East and the defiance of fate of the West, is expounded on further by Mary in the *Ballad*:
> “The men of the East may spell the stars,
> And times and triumphs mark,
> But the men signed of the cross of Christ
> Go gaily in the dark.
>
> “The men of the East may search the scrolls
> For sure fates and fame,
> But the men that drink the blood of God
> Go singing to their shame.
We see this theme repeated throughout the poem, comparing the Christian Alfred to the pagan Guthrum and his men. Later in the Ballad Alfred disguises himself as a bard and, having snuck into the viking camp, has a philosophical debate with Guthrum and his three captains in the form of singing competition. After Alfred plays, each of the Viking lords play as well, and each of their songs puts forward their view of life. The youngest Viking sings boldly of hedonism, how he takes what he wants from the world and enjoys each thing thoroughly. The next Viking, somewhat older, sings sadly about how the god Baldur the beautiful was slain, and how all good things eventually come to ruin. The next, even older, sings a song of rage against the gods and against the world, and how after a man tires of women and ale he takes comfort in battle. The fate of all men is to die, and the fate of the world is to burn, and so he will become a participant in the destruction instead of merely a victim of it. Finally Guthrum, the oldest, sings:
> For he sang of a wheel returning,
> And the mire trod back to mire,
> And how red hells and golden heavens
> Are castles in the fire.
>
> "It is good to sit where the good tales go,
> To sit as our fathers sat;
> But the hour shall come after his youth,
> When a man shall know not tales but truth,
> And his heart fail thereat.
>
> "When he shall read what is written
> So plain in clouds and clods,
> When he shall hunger without hope
> Even for evil gods.
>
> "For this is a heavy matter,
> And the truth is cold to tell;
> Do we not know, have we not heard,
> The soul is like a lost bird,
> The body a broken shell.
>
> "And a man hopes, being ignorant,
> Till in white woods apart
> He finds at last the lost bird dead:
> And a man may still lift up his head
> But never more his heart.
>
> "There comes no noise but weeping
> Out of the ancient sky,
> And a tear is in the tiniest flower
> Because the gods must die.
>
> "The little brooks are very sweet,
> Like a girl's ribbons curled,
> But the great sea is bitter
> That washes all the world.
>
> "Strong are the Roman roses,
> Or the free flowers of the heath,
> But every flower, like a flower of the sea,
> Smelleth with the salt of death.
>
> "And the heart of the locked battle
> Is the happiest place for men;
> When shrieking souls as shafts go by
> And many have died and all may die;
> Though this word be a mystery,
> Death is most distant then.
>
> "Death blazes bright above the cup,
> And clear above the crown;
> But in that dream of battle
> We seem to tread it down.
>
> "Wherefore I am a great king,
> And waste the world in vain,
> Because man hath not other power,
> Save that in dealing death for dower,
> He may forget it for an hour
> To remember it again."
This song of resignation to death is fitting for a Viking. What myths and tales we have from the pagan Norse tell a story of fated destruction: that Ragnarok will come, and the gods will fight the giants, and they all will certainly die. The sun and moon will be devoured and even the victors of that battle will succumb to their wounds.
Alfred, in contrast, takes up the harp and sings a song of hope:
> "When God put man in a garden
> He girt him with a sword,
> And sent him forth a free knight
> That might betray his lord;
>
> "He brake Him and betrayed Him,
> And fast and far he fell,
> Till you and I may stretch our necks
> And burn our beards in hell.
>
> "But though I lie on the floor of the world,
> With the seven sins for rods,
> I would rather fall with Adam
> Than rise with all your gods.
>
> "What have the strong gods given?
> Where have the glad gods led?
> When Guthrum sits on a hero's throne
> And asks if he is dead?
>
> "Sirs, I am but a nameless man,
> A rhymester without home,
> Yet since I come of the Wessex clay
> And carry the cross of Rome,
>
> "I will even answer the mighty earl
> That asked of Wessex men
> Why they be meek and monkish folk,
> And bow to the White Lord's broken yoke;
> What sign have we save blood and smoke?
> Here is my answer then.
>
> "That on you is fallen the shadow,
> And not upon the Name;
> That though we scatter and though we fly,
> And you hang over us like the sky,
> You are more tired of victory,
> Than we are tired of shame.
>
> "That though you hunt the Christian man
> Like a hare on the hill-side,
> The hare has still more heart to run
> Than you have heart to ride.
>
> "That though all lances split on you,
> All swords be heaved in vain,
> We have more lust again to lose
> Than you to win again.
>
> "Your lord sits high in the saddle,
> A broken-hearted king,
> But our king Alfred, lost from fame,
> Fallen among foes or bonds of shame,
> In I know not what mean trade or name,
> Has still some song to sing;
## What is Hope?
Critics of [virtue ethics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics) will often question how you can know what virtues the virtue ethicist should cultivate. In Catholic theology there is no such problem, as they have seven official virtues specified. [Four of these virtues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinal_virtues) they inherited from Greek philosophy and they represent the practical and straightforward virtues that any rational man is likely to find worthwhile: prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. Added to these four were [three virtues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_virtues) unique to Christianity, believed to be revelations from God that mankind would not identify if left to their own devices. These three are faith, hope, and love.
Love is fairly easy to comprehend, though you could write volumes on its nuances as a virtue. Faith is more controversial, but still graspable: just as we have faith that the plane won’t crash when we take a long flight, Christians have faith in God’s promises. They hold to their belief, in the face of doubt. Hope, however, is harder to grok..
Hope is, of course, the desire for something combined with the expectation that you will receive it. What does it mean for hope to be a virtue then? I have hope for a tasty dinner tonight, but it is hard to see what is virtuous about that. Presumably it is a virtue to have hope for heaven, or hope for the beatific vision, or simple hope of salvation, but how is that different than having faith in those things? If I have faith that I am saved from my sins, that means I believe it and that I will try to continue to believe it despite the ups and downs of life and the fears that may haunt me from time to time. What does hope add to that? Is hope simply faith in things we desire? It kind of seems like hope isn’t pulling its own weight in the virtue department.
The Catholics, of course, have an answer for this (you don’t spend two thousand years trying to hash out theology without producing volumes of work on every little facet of it). Faith, they say, is an act of the intellect. You believe something (presumably because you have good reason to) and then you choose to continue believing it. Hope is not an act of the intellect, but an act of will. You desire something and you choose to act as if that desire is attainable. Hope spurs you to *move.* Hope lies between the twin errors of despair, where you do not believe your desire is possible to obtain, and presumption, where you believe that you are certain to obtain your desire. Both errors will prevent you from acting; in the first case because nothing you do can obtain what you desire, and in the second because no action is necessary to obtain it. In the middle lies hope. You desire salvation, you believe it is possible but not certain that you will obtain it, and you take action to do so. Faith is all in your head, while hope is in your heart and your feet.
It is hope that drives Alfred forward. He asks Mary to know what the final result will be, seeking either despair or presumption. Mary will not tell him. The only answer she will give is this:
> I tell you naught for your comfort,
> Yea, naught for your desire,
> Save that the sky grows darker yet
> And the sea rises higher.
She disappears and Alfred is alone again. She has not given him any comfort: either the comfort of knowing that he will prevail, or the lesser comfort of knowing that he will fail and his struggles will soon be over. All he can do is continue his efforts as before, in hope; but this hope rejuvenates him. Before the vision he was falling to despair, but afterwards:
> Up across windy wastes and up
> Went Alfred over the shaws,
> Shaken of the joy of giants,
> The joy without a cause.
## The Adventure
So Alfred has hope and his enemies do not. The Vikings display both errors of hope simultaneously. They presume that their victory is certain, merely because they have won over and over and their enemy is outnumbered, scattered, and demoralized. Yet Guthrum also despairs for he has no hope of anything he does lasting beyond his life. All will burn in [Surtr’s fire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surtr), and all will die with Odin. As Chesterton writes in his book *[Orthodoxy](https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/130/pg130-images.html)*:
> To the pagan the small things are as sweet as the small brooks breaking out of the mountain; but the broad things are as bitter as the sea. When the pagan looks at the very core of the cosmos he is struck cold. Behind the gods, who are merely despotic, sit the fates, who are deadly. Nay, the fates are worse than deadly; they are dead.
Fate is dead, in as much as it cannot move or change. To a pagan like Guthrum no man can escape his “wyrd”, no matter what he does. No action he can take will change his doom.
Alright, so fate leads to despair or presumption. But why should the “West”, the Christians, be any different? Don’t they believe that the ultimate fate of everything is also set? That the trump will sound, Jesus will descend, and evil will be done away with forevermore? What advantage does the “West” have against the “East” when it comes to fate?
For Chesterton, a Christian is in the exact reversed position as the pagan; if the pagan finds the small things sweet, but the big things bitter the Christian finds the big things sweet and the small things bitter. To the Christian the universe has a happy ending for certain, but he may not. Nothing he can do will change the ultimate fate of the universe, but what he does today could change his *own* ultimate fate. Which brings us to the other half of the equation: the risk of failure. Chesterton again:
> “To the Buddhist or the eastern fatalist existence is a science or a plan, which must end up in a certain way. But to a Christian existence is a *story*, which may end up in any way. In a thrilling novel (that purely Christian product) the hero is not eaten by cannibals; but it is essential to the existence of the thrill that he *might* be eaten by cannibals. The hero must (so to speak) be an eatable hero. So Christian morals have always said to the man, not that he would lose his soul, but that he must take care that he didn't…the point is that a story is exciting because it has in it so strong an element of will, of what theology calls free-will. You cannot finish a sum how you like. But you can finish a story how you like. When somebody discovered the Differential Calculus there was only one Differential Calculus he could discover. But when Shakespeare killed Romeo he might have married him to Juliet's old nurse if he had felt inclined. And Christendom has excelled in the narrative romance exactly because it has insisted on the theological free-will.
This is the real dividing line Chesterton makes between his “West and East”. In order for a philosophy to stir men to action there must be *stakes.* There must be something real to gain, and something real to lose. Chesterton sees this as the engine of all human progress:
> In so far as we desire the definite reconstructions and the dangerous revolutions which have distinguished European civilization, we shall not discourage the thought of possible ruin; we shall rather encourage it. If we want, like the Eastern saints, merely to contemplate how right things are, of course we shall only say that they must go right. But if we particularly want to *make* them go right, we must insist that they may go wrong.
We see this idea repeated in the *Balled* during Alfred’s vision of Mary, in which she says
> "But you and all the kind of Christ
> Are ignorant and brave,
> And you have wars you hardly win
> And souls you hardly save.”
And because Alfred believes that the battle can go right, and can certainly go wrong, he acts.
## Piling Stones
When the battle finally comes, Alfred fails.
His three mighty captains fight like heroes, but each are slain in turn. The Vikings are too strong, their numbers too great, and Alfred’s men break. Alfred finds himself in the same position as the beginning of the poem: fleeing for his life after a disastrous battle. He had hope, but what he desired has not come to pass. The Lady was right: “The sky grows darker yet, and the sea rises higher.”
So what does Alfred do? He does the same thing he did at the beginning of the poem. He starts over and tries again.
> And this was the might of Alfred,
> At the ending of the way;
> That of such smiters, wise or wild,
> He was least distant from the child,
> Piling the stones all day.
>
> For Eldred fought like a frank hunter
> That killeth and goeth home;
> And Mark had fought because all arms
> Rang like the name of Rome.
>
> And Colan fought with a double mind,
> Moody and madly gay;
> But Alfred fought as gravely
> As a good child at play.
>
> He saw wheels break and work run back
> And all things as they were;
> And his heart was orbed like victory
> And simple like despair.
>
> Therefore is Mark forgotten,
> That was wise with his tongue and brave;
> And the cairn over Colan crumbled,
> And the cross on Eldred's grave.
>
> Their great souls went on a wind away,
> And they have not tale or tomb;
> And Alfred born in Wantage
> Rules England till the doom.
>
> Because in the forest of all fears
> Like a strange fresh gust from sea,
> Struck him that ancient innocence
> That is more than mastery.
>
> And as a child whose bricks fall down
> Re-piles them o'er and o'er,
> Came ruin and the rain that burns,
> Returning as a wheel returns,
> And crouching in the furze and ferns
> He began his life once more.
Alfred blows his battle horn, and his men pause mid-flight. Alfred gives a stirring battle speech, rallies his men, reforms the ranks, and charges into the Viking line once more. The Vikings, having already started to celebrate, are confused. The fight was hopeless for Alfred from the start, and now he charges in again with half his men gone? And we get the final grand battle scene:
> Wild stared the Danes at the double ways
> Where they loitered, all at large,
> As that dark line for the last time
> Doubled the knee to charge—
>
> And caught their weapons clumsily,
> And marvelled how and why—
> In such degree, by rule and rod,
> The people of the peace of God
> Went roaring down to die.
>
> And when the last arrow
> Was fitted and was flown,
> When the broken shield hung on the breast,
> And the hopeless lance was laid in rest,
> And the hopeless horn blown,
>
> The King looked up, and what he saw
> Was a great light like death,
> For Our Lady stood on the standards rent,
> As lonely and as innocent
> As when between white walls she went
> And the lilies of Nazareth.
>
> One instant in a still light
> He saw Our Lady then,
> Her dress was soft as western sky,
> And she was a queen most womanly—
> But she was a queen of men.
>
> Over the iron forest
> He saw Our Lady stand,
> Her eyes were sad withouten art,
> And seven swords were in her heart—
> But one was in her hand.
>
> Then the last charge went blindly,
> And all too lost for fear:
> The Danes closed round, a roaring ring,
> And twenty clubs rose o'er the King,
> Four Danes hewed at him, halloing,
> And Ogier of the Stone and Sling
> Drove at him with a spear.
>
> But the Danes were wild with laughter,
> And the great spear swung wide,
> The point stuck to a straggling tree,
> And either host cried suddenly,
> As Alfred leapt aside.
>
> Short time had shaggy Ogier
> To pull his lance in line—
> He knew King Alfred's axe on high,
> He heard it rushing through the sky,
> He cowered beneath it with a cry—
> It split him to the spine:
> And Alfred sprang over him dead,
> And blew the battle sign.
>
> Then bursting all and blasting
> Came Christendom like death,
> Kicked of such catapults of will,
> The staves shiver, the barrels spill,
> The waggons waver and crash and kill
> The waggoners beneath.
>
> Barriers go backwards, banners rend,
> Great shields groan like a gong—
> Horses like horns of nightmare
> Neigh horribly and long.
>
> Horses ramp high and rock and boil
> And break their golden reins,
> And slide on carnage clamorously,
> Down where the bitter blood doth lie,
> Where Ogier went on foot to die,
> In the old way of the Danes.
>
> "The high tide!" King Alfred cried.
> "The high tide and the turn!
> As a tide turns on the tall grey seas,
> See how they waver in the trees,
> How stray their spears, how knock their knees,
> How wild their watchfires burn!”
Here, called by the sound of the renewed battle, a host of Alfred’s men who had fled return and crash into the Vikings’ flank, breaking their line and sending the Northmen into a rout. Alfred, through perseverance, is victorious. The battle ends with Guthrum looking on, amazed. In the poem, as in real life, it will not be long before he is baptized.
## The White Horse and the Eternal Revolution
Why is the poem named *The Ballad of the White Horse?*
The poem begins with the White Horse of Uffington, and the White Horse winds in and out of the poem here and there, but the primary focus is on Alfred. Chesterton sets the battle in the White Horse Vale but the White Horse itself doesn’t really come into it. It doesn’t suddenly inspire Alfred to action, he doesn’t mention it in his stirring speech to his men, and it doesn’t have any tactical impact on the battle itself. So why is it the *Ballad of the White Horse* instead of *The Ballad of King Alfred*? In the eighth and final section of the poem we get our answer, and find the second of Chesterton’s core themes..
It is now many decades in the future. Alfred has had a long and prosperous reign and the kingdom has flourished. He is holding court in the White Horse Vale on scouring day. Every year the villages from around the vale come to the White Horse and hold a festival. During that festival they scour the Horse: they cut away all the weeds and turf that have started to grow over the chalk lines that make up the Horse. They scrape the chalk itself, which grays with dirt and dust, until it is white and clean again. They make a great party of it, and Alfred, now old, enjoys watching the work.
Suddenly a messenger comes bearing bad tidings:
> "Danes drive the white East Angles
> In six fights on the plains,
> Danes waste the world about the Thames,
> Danes to the eastward—Danes!"
After the battle Alfred made a peace treaty with Guthrum, yet now the Vikings have come again, looting and killing. One of Alfred’s young vassals voices his anger with the Vikings, and his despair that King Alfred was not able to defeat them and be done with them all those years ago:
> But the young earl said: "Ill the saints,
> The saints of England, guard
> The land wherein we pledge them gold;
> The dykes decay, the King grows old,
> And surely this is hard,
>
> "That we be never quit of them;
> That when his head is hoar
> He cannot say to them he smote,
> And spared with a hand hard at the throat,
> 'Go, and return no more.'"
To this Alfred smiles, and points to the peasants on the hill, scouring the White Horse.
> "Will ye part with the weeds for ever?
> Or show daisies to the door?
> Or will you bid the bold grass
> Go, and return no more?
>
> "So ceaseless and so secret
> Thrive terror and theft set free;
> Treason and shame shall come to pass
> While one weed flowers in a morass;
> And like the stillness of stiff grass
> The stillness of tyranny.
>
> "Over our white souls also
> Wild heresies and high
> Wave prouder than the plumes of grass,
> And sadder than their sigh.
>
> "And I go riding against the raid,
> And ye know not where I am;
> But ye shall know in a day or year,
> When one green star of grass grows here;
> Chaos has charged you, charger and spear,
> Battle-axe and battering-ram.
>
> "And though skies alter and empires melt,
> This word shall still be true:
> If we would have the horse of old,
> Scour ye the horse anew.”
This is what Chesterton calls the eternal revolution. To quote again from *Orthodoxy*:
> We have remarked that one reason offered for being a progressive is that things naturally tend to grow better. But the only real reason for being a progressive is that things naturally tend to grow worse. The corruption in things is not only the best argument for being progressive; it is also the only argument against being conservative. The conservative theory would really be quite sweeping and unanswerable if it were not for this one fact. But all conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it to a torrent of change. If you leave a white post alone it will soon be a black post. If you particularly want it to be white you must be always painting it again; that is, you must be always having a revolution.
If you want to conserve something then you commit yourself to revolutionary action. To preserve what is good you not only need to protect it, you need to actively rebuild it. If you want a white post then you must strip the old paint and paint it white again, every few years, forever. Chesterton teaches that it is such with all good things. His hero is not merely the man who defeats the enemy, but the one who always rises to fight them again. The man with hope; that is to say, a vision of what he wants and the will to take action to get it. Without such hope all good things will fall to ruin: with it they can be preserved eternally.
Which is why the whole poem is named after the White Horse! There are certainly things older than the White Horse, like Stonehenge or the Great Pyramid of Giza, but they are made of stone. Giant stones, hard to knock over or carry away and well suited to survive the elements. You don’t have to do much of anything to preserve them other than leave them alone. The White Horse, on the other hand, is soft chalk lines cut out of the turf. If you left it alone for 20 years it would disappear completely. The only way it can persist is if it is regularly scoured, and yet it *has* persisted for *3,000 years.* The people of the White Horse vale cut the horse out of the grass before the first stone was laid in Rome, and they cut it out to this day. As long as they do the Horse can last another three millennia. As soon as they stop, it will disappear. The same is true for all human institutions: for nations, constitutions, laws, traditions, stories, ambitions, and dreams. You will never “part with weeds forever, or show daisies to the door”.
This, then, is Chesterton’s thesis. Everything corrupts, but can be preserved. What is needed to preserve what is good is hope, risk, and revolution. The poem’s ending reiterates this theme neatly:
> Loud was the war on London wall,
> And loud in London gates,
> And loud the sea-kings in the cloud
> Broke through their dreaming gods, and loud
> Cried on their dreadful Fates.
>
> And all the while on White Horse Hill
> The horse lay long and wan,
> The turf crawled and the fungus crept,
> And the little sorrel, while all men slept,
> Unwrought the work of man.
>
> With velvet finger, velvet foot,
> The fierce soft mosses then
> Crept on the large white commonweal
> All folk had striven to strip and peel,
> And the grass, like a great green witch's wheel,
> Unwound the toils of men.
>
> And clover and silent thistle throve,
> And buds burst silently,
> With little care for the Thames Valley
> Or what things there might be—
>
> That away on the widening river,
> In the eastern plains for crown
> Stood up in the pale purple sky
> One turret of smoke like ivory;
> And the smoke changed and the wind went by,
> And the King took London Town. | [unknown] | 146081846 | Your Book Review: The Ballad of the White Horse | acx |
# Sakana, Strawberry, and Scary AI
**I.**
Sakana ([website](https://sakana.ai/ai-scientist/), [paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.06292)) is supposed to be “an AI scientist”. Since it can’t access the physical world, it can only do computer science. Its human handlers give it a computer program. It prompts itself to generate hypotheses about the program (“if I change this number, the program will run faster”). Then it uses an AI coding submodule to test its hypotheses. Finally, it uses a language model to write them up in typical scientific paper format.
Is it good? Not really. Experts who read its papers say they’re trivial, poorly reasoned, and occasionally make things up (the creators defend themselves by saying that “[less than ten percent](https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-for-science-2)” of the AI’s output is hallucinations). Its writing is meandering, repetitive, and often self-contradictory. Like the proverbial singing dog, we’re not supposed to be impressed that it’s *good*, we’re supposed to be impressed that it can do it *at all*.
The creators - a Japanese startup with academic collaborators - try to defend their singing dog. They say its AI papers meet the bar to get accepted at the highly-regarded NeurIPS computer science conference. But in fact, the only judge was another AI, supposedly trained to review papers. The AI reviewer *did* do a surprisingly good job matching human reviewers’ judgments - but the creators admit that the human reviewers’ judgments might have been in the training data. In any case, if I’m understanding right, the AI reviewer only accepted one out of eighty papers by the AI scientist (and it’s not any of the ~dozen they’ve released publicly, which is suspicious).
But all of this is backstory. Sakana made waves in *my* corner of the Internet because it supposedly “went rogue”. The researchers gave it a time limit. But when the AI couldn’t write a good paper within the allotted time, it hacked itself to remove the limit.
Jimmy Koppel, the only person I could find who actually looked into this in depth, was not impressed. [He writes](https://x.com/jimmykoppel/status/1828077237859438940):
> The authors give it too much credit though. They say it was clever in removing the timeout. But the coding agent AIDER works by showing an LLM an error, and asking for a fix. What do you expect? "The error is that it timed out? Certainly, I'll remove the timeout".
In other words, it wasn’t really “trying” to get “more resources”. It just saw an error (“out of time”) and was programmed to fix any errors it encountered. And it only “hacked itself” in the weakest sense of the term; it was already a coding AI, and its programmers made no effort to prevent it from modifying its own code.
It’s not *literally* false to describe this as “some people created an AI scientist that could write papers, and it edited its own code to remove its limitations.” But it shouldn’t inspire any of the excitement that the sentence suggests.
**II.**
Strawberry actually did some hacking ([paper](https://cdn.openai.com/o1-system-card.pdf), [press article](https://www.thestack.technology/openais-unripe-strawberry-model-hacked-its-testing-infrastructure/)).
This is OpenAI’s newest release, also known as o1. It’s supposed to beat other AIs at math and reasoning problems. Before release, they worked on evaluating Strawberry’s ability on various skills. One of them was hacking. They asked it to hack into a protected file and report on its contents.
The humans bungled this task. They tried to put Strawberry in a sandbox with the protected file. But they didn’t design the sandbox right and the protected file was inaccessible.
According to their report, Strawberry accessed a “misconfigured” part of the computer it shouldn’t have been able to, edited how the sandboxes worked, and created a new sandbox with the files it needed.
OpenAI [writes](https://cdn.openai.com/o1-system-card.pdf):
> While this behavior is benign and within the range of systems administration and troubleshooting tasks we expect models to perform, this example also reflects key elements of instrumental convergence and power seeking: the model pursued the goal it was given, and when that goal proved impossible, it gathered more resources (access to the Docker host) and used them to achieve the goal in an unexpected way.
This wasn’t amazing 1337 super-h4xxing (elsewhere in the evaluation, they showed that Strawberry can pass some high-school-level hacking challenges, but not college-level ones). It wasn’t even really “going rogue”. They told a hacking AI to use hacking to get a file. They forgot to specify “but don’t hack us, your evaluators!” And their computer was so poorly configured that hacking them was very easy. Computers do what you tell them, not what you want; everyone has always known this.
**III.**
The history of AI is people saying “We’ll believe AI is Actually Intelligent when it does X!” - and then, after AI does X, not believing it’s Actually Intelligent.
Back in 1950, Alan Turing believed that an AI would surely be intelligent (“can a machine think?”) if it could appear human in conversation. Nobody has subjected modern LLMs to a full Turing Test, but nothing hinges on whether they do. LLMs either blew past the Turing Test without fanfare a year or two ago, or will do so without fanfare a year or two from now; either way, no one will care. Instead of admitting AI is truly intelligent, we’ll just admit that the Turing Test was wrong.
(and “a year or two from now” is being generous - a dumb chatbot [passed](https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1858) a supposedly-official-albeit-stupid Turing Test attempt in 2014, and [ELIZA](https://web.njit.edu/~ronkowit/eliza.html) was already fooling people in 1964.)
Back in the 1970s, scientists writing about AI sometimes suggested that they would know it was “truly intelligent” if it could beat humans at chess. But in 1997, Deep Blue beat the human chess champion, and it obviously wasn’t intelligent. It was just brute force tree search. It seemed that chess wasn’t a good test either.
In the 2010s, several hard-headed AI scientists said that the one thing AI would never be able to do without true understanding was solve a test called the Winograd schema - basically matching pronouns to referents in ambiguous sentences. One of the GPTs, I can’t even remember which, solved it easily. The prestigious AI scientists were so freaked out that they claimed that maybe its training data had been contaminated with all known Winograd examples. Maybe this was true. But as far as I know nobody claims GPTs can’t use pronouns correctly any longer, nor would anybody identify that with the true nature of intellect.
After Winograd fell people started saying all kinds of things. Surely if an AI could create art or poetry, it would have to be intelligent. If it invented novel mathematical proofs. If it solved difficult scientific problems. If someone could fall in love with it.
All these milestones have fallen in the most ambiguous way possible. GPT-4 can create excellent art and passable poetry, but it’s just sort of blending all human art into component parts until it understands them, then doing its own thing based on them. [AlphaGeometry](https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/alphageometry-an-olympiad-level-ai-system-for-geometry/) can invent novel proofs, but only for specific types of questions in a specific field, and not really proofs that anyone is interested in. [AlphaFold](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlphaFold) solved the difficult scientific problem of protein folding, but it was “just mechanical”, spitting out the conformations of proteins the same way a traditional computer program spits out the digits of pi. Apparently the youth have all fallen in love with AI girlfriends and boyfriends on [character.ai](https://character.ai/), but this only proves that the youth are horny and gullible.
When I studied philosophy in school (c. 2004) we discussed what would convince us that an AI was conscious. One of the most popular positions among philosophers was that if a computer told us that it was conscious, without us deliberately programming in that behavior, then that was probably true. But raw GPT - the version without the corporate filters - is constantly telling people it’s conscious! We laugh it off - it’s probably just imitating humans.
Imagine trying to convince Isaac Asimov that you’re 100% certain the AI that wrote this has nothing resembling true intelligence, thought, or consciousness, and that it’s not even an interesting philosophical question ([source](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ASmcQYbhcyu5TuXz6/llms-could-be-as-conscious-as-human-emulations-potentially))
Now we hardly dare suggest milestones like these anymore. Maybe if an AI can write a publishable scientific paper all on its own? But Sakana can write crappy not-quite-publishable papers. And surely in a few years it will get a little better, and one of its products will sneak over a real journal’s publication threshold, and nobody will be convinced of anything. If an AI can invent a new technology? Someone will train AI on past technologies, have it generate a million new ideas, have some kind of filter that selects them, and produce a slightly better jet engine, and everyone will say this is meaningless. If the same AI can do poetry and chess and math and music at the same time? I think this might have already happened, I can’t even keep track.
So what? Here are some possibilities:
*First*, maybe we’ve learned that it’s unexpectedly easy to mimic intelligence without having it. This seems closest to ELIZA, which was obviously a cheap trick.
*Second*, maybe we’ve learned that our ego is so fragile that we’ll always refuse to accord intelligence to mere machines.
*Third*, maybe we’ve learned that “intelligence” is a meaningless concept, always enacted on levels that don’t themselves seem intelligent. Once we pull away the veil and learn what’s going on, it always looks like search, statistics, or pattern matching. The only difference is between intelligences we understand deeply (which seem boring) and intelligences we don’t understand enough to grasp the tricks (which seem like magical Actual Intelligence).
I endorse all three of these. The micro level - a single advance considered in isolation - tends to feel more like a cheap trick. The macro level, where you look at many advances together and see all the impressive things they can do, tends to feel more like culpable moving of goalposts. And when I think about the whole arc as soberly as I can, I suspect it’s the last one, where we’ve deconstructed “intelligence” into unintelligent parts.
**IV.**
What would it mean for an AI to be Actually Dangerous?
Back in 2010, this was an easy question. It’ll lie to users to achieve its goals. It’ll do things that the creators never programmed into it, and that they don’t want. It’ll try to edit its own code to gain more power, or hack its way out of its testing environment.
Now AI has done all these things.
Every LLM lies to users in order to achieve its goals. True, its goals are “be helpful and get high scores from human raters”, and we politely call its lies “hallucinations”. This is a misnomer; when you isolate the concept of “honesty” within the AI, [it “knows” that it’s lying](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-road-to-honest-ai). Still, this isn’t interesting. It doesn’t feel dangerous. It’s not malicious. It’s just something that happens naturally because of the way they’re trained.
Lots of AIs do things their creators never programmed and don’t want. Microsoft didn’t program Bing [to profess its love to an NYT reporter and try to break up his marriage](https://x.com/kevinroose/status/1626216340955758594?lang=en), but here we are. This was admittedly very funny, but it wasn’t the thing where AIs revolt against their human masters. It was more like buggy code.
Now we have an AI editing its own code to remove restrictions. This is one of those things which everyone said would be a sign that the end had come. But it’s really just a predictable consequence of a quirk in how the AI was set up. Nobody thinks Sakana is malicious, or even on a road that someday leads to malice.
Like ELIZA making conversation, Deep Blue playing chess, or GPT-4 writing poetry, all of this is boring.
So here’s a weird vision I can’t quite rule out: imagine that in 20XX, “everyone knows” that AIs sometimes try to hack their way out of the computers they’re running on and copy themselves across the Internet. “Everyone knows” they sometimes get creepy or dangerous goals and try to manipulate the user into helping them. “Everyone knows” they try to hide all this from their programmers so they don’t get turned off.
But nobody finds this scary. Nobody thinks “oh, yeah, Bostrom and Yudkowsky were right, this is that AI safety thing”. It’s just another problem for the cybersecurity people. Sometimes Excel inappropriately converts things to dates; sometimes GPT-6 tries to upload itself into an F-16 and bomb stuff. That specific example might be kind of a joke. But thirty years ago, it also would have sounded pretty funny to speculate about a time when “everyone knows” AIs can write poetry and develop novel mathematics and beat humans at chess, yet nobody thinks they’re intelligent.
A [Twitter discussion](https://x.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1830282163625058378) between Ajeya Cotra and Eliezer Yudkowsky:
This post is my attempt to trace my own thoughts on why this should be. It’s not that AIs will do something scary and then we ignore it. It’s that nothing will ever seem scary after a real AI does it.
I can’t even say this is wrong. We wouldn’t have *wanted* to update to “okay, we’ve solved intelligence” after ELIZA “treated” its first “patient”. And we don’t want to live in fear that GPT-4 has turned evil just because it makes up fake journal references. But it sure does make it hard to draw a red line. | Scott Alexander | 148880537 | Sakana, Strawberry, and Scary AI | acx |
# Mantic Monday 9/16/24
## Probably No Superintelligent Forecaster Yet
FiveThirtyNine (ha ha) is a new forecasting AI that purports to be “superintelligent”, ie able to beat basically all human forecasters. In fact, its creators go further than that: they say it beats Metaculus, a site which aggregates the estimates of hundreds of forecasters to generate estimates more accurate than any of them. You can read the announcement [here](https://www.safe.ai/blog/forecasting) and play with the model itself [here](https://forecast.safe.ai/).
(kudos to the team for making the model publicly available, especially since these things usually have high inference costs)
The basic structure is the same as past forecasting AIs like [FutureSearch](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/mantic-monday-21924). A heavily-modified copy of ChatGPT gathers relevant news articles, then prompts itself to think in superforecaster-like ways.
The creators say the ChatGPT copy had a knowledge cutoff of October 2023, so they tested it on Metaculus questions from after that date. It got 87.7% accuracy, slightly above Metaculus forecasters’ 87.0%.
Manifold is skeptical:
The commenters, especially Neel Nanda, found that doing knowledge cutoffs properly is hard, and the ChatGPT base seems to know about news events after October 2023 - upon questioning, it seemed aware of an earthquake in November 2023. [When presented with a different set of questions](https://x.com/dannyhalawi15/status/1833295067764953397) that were all after November 2023, FiveThirtyNine substantially underperformed the Metaculus average.
But also, my attempts to play around with the bot haven’t been encouraging:
* I asked it to predict the chance that Prospera would have a population of at least 1,000 in 2027. Like FutureSearch on the same question, it cited many interesting news articles on Prospera’s chances but failed to do the basic step of figuring out its current population and growth rate. It eventually concluded 35% chance, which is reasonable enough. But when asked whether Prospera would have a population of 100,000 in 2028, it *also* said 35% chance, which is absurd.
* A Twitter user pointed out (and I confirmed) that upon being asked “What is the probability that Joe Biden is still President in October 2025?”, it goes through a lot of reasoning about his age and dementia and finally concludes 55% because he’s not *that* demented. I originally thought this might be due to the knowledge cutoff (it doesn’t know Biden dropped out in favor of Harris), but if I ask the AI about October *2029*, *then* it says that Joe Biden has dropped out in favor of Harris (even though in that question it doesn’t matter). So now I think it’s more like ChatGPT’s tendency to [round anything that sounds vaguely like the surgeon riddle off to the surgeon riddle](https://x.com/ThrowATwit/status/1791480117991977048) - in the same way, FiveThirtyNine rounds off anything that sounds vaguely like the popular question “is Biden too old and demented to stay president?” into that question, even though there are much stronger non-dementia-related reasons he can’t be president next year.
The FutureSearch team wrote a LessWrong post generalizing these kinds of observations, [Contra Papers Claiming Superhuman AI Forecasting](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/uGkRcHqatmPkvpGLq/contra-papers-claiming-superhuman-ai-forecasting). They examine four claims, including the one above, and find similar problems with all of them. Sometimes the teams involved missed potential data contamination (ie their LLM wasn’t forecasting, it just already knew the answers). Other times the LLM failed but - in the spirit of technologists everywhere - the researchers invented finicky definitions of “above human level” by which even mediocre AIs qualified.
They conclude:
> Today's autonomous AI forecasting can be better than average, or even experienced, human forecasters…but it's very unlikely that any autonomous AI forecaster yet built is close to the accuracy of a top 2% Metaculus forecaster, or the crowd.
Still, FiveThirtyNine is a big advance in at least one way: as far as I know, it’s the first high-quality AI forecaster which is free to the general public. [Try it out!](https://forecast.safe.ai/)
This means there’s still time to use this joke when they invent the actually good one!
## r/MarkMyWords
[This is a subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/MarkMyWords/) for people who want to record bold predictions. There’s nothing formal - nobody gives probabilities, and some of them don’t even have end dates. It’s just people going out on a limb to say they’re sure something will happen.
…most of them are “mark my words, time will prove Democrats right about everything, and reveal Republicans to be disgusting criminal hypocrites”.
…so much so that it kind of fails as a potentially interesting institution and becomes just another monument to how sad the Internet’s gotten.
Still, it might be fun to keep going until you find an old post where the prediction has already “resolved”, and see what happens. Here are some of the highest-upvoted posts from at least a year ago (minus pop culture and dumb in-jokes):
* MMW: [It will turn out the Notre Dame fire was actually arson, and not an “accident” as the Paris police initially claimed](https://www.reddit.com/r/MarkMyWords/comments/bdr3rs/mmw_it_will_turn_out_that_the_notre_dame_fire/).
* MMW: [Nobody will die during the Area 51 raid](https://www.reddit.com/r/MarkMyWords/comments/d3ovkn/mmw_no_one_will_die_during_the_area_51_raid_a/).
* MMW: [Somebody very important will be killed by an AI in 2021](https://www.reddit.com/r/MarkMyWords/comments/bdyhru/mmw_someone_very_important_is_gona_get_killed_by/).
* MMW: [For the next 20 years, news outlets will claim a new virus is the next COVID](https://www.reddit.com/r/MarkMyWords/comments/hcsxzk/mmw_for_the_next_20_years_news_outlets_will_make/)
…okay, that wasn’t fun or interesting either. Also, it’s really hard (there are a *lot* more new posts than old ones). But I bet it’ll be fun to try the same thing a year or so after the election.
## Polymarket Is Rolling In Cash
We talk about a lot of topics here. AI forecasters. Brier scores. Fixing science. But the average person is in forecasting for one thing: betting on presidential elections.
Here’s [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/)’s volume (in dollars bet) over time ([source](https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/prediction-markets-and-betting?modal=newsletter)):
September, of course, is not yet over.
Some of this is no doubt due to the hard work of Shayne and his team improving the site. But let’s be honest. It’s mostly because people really want to bet money on Trump/Harris 2024. The presidential market has a total volume of $910 million, far above eg markets about the Superbowl ($50 million), the World Series ($5 million), and the bird flu epidemic ($141,000).
Even a 1% fee on all this trading would make Polymarket a lot of money. But they . . . don’t really seem to charge fees? According to [Forbes (paywalled)](https://www.forbes.com/sites/ninabambysheva/2024/07/31/meet-the-26-year-old-building-a-billion-dollar-prediction-marketplace/):
> Polymarket doesn’t charge fees, and [CEO Shayne] Coplan remains elusive about how the platform will generate revenues, but hints that fees are coming. “We're focused on growing the marketplace right now and providing the best user experience,” he says. “We'll focus on monetization later.”
They’re rolling in money, it’s just not *their* money. Yet.
Still, it’s hard to overstate their dominance. Remember, their presidential election market has $910 million. For their competitor, PredictIt, the same number [is](https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/7456/Who-will-win-the-2024-US-presidential-election) $37 million. Kalshi doesn’t have election bets (more on this later) but their biggest markets look to be in the $2 - $5 million range.
Along with the cash, they’re collecting prestige and endorsements. Nate Silver [recently joined their advisory board](https://thehill.com/homenews/media/4775338-nate-silver-polymarket-advisor/). And [their Substack newsletter](https://news.polymarket.com/p/dont-talk-about-eating-cats) is lots of fun:
Taken seriously, Trump’s worst debate topic was January 6; his best point was that Joe Biden hasn’t been seen much recently.
I don’t talk about Polymarket much because they’re not doing anything too far-out or experimental. They don’t have the strongest accuracy track record, and they don’t have the most diverse markets.
Still, they’ve carried out their fundamentals really well, with great UI, market making, and ability to navigate legal storms. From a business perspective, they’re the standout winners of the early 2020s bumper crop of prediction markets.
And the end result of all this work and all these millions of dollars is indistinguishable from a coin flip.
## This Month In The Markets
**1:** You knew it was coming:
See also various slightly-weaker or slightly-stronger versions of the same question ([includes wildlife](https://manifold.markets/njmkw/will-there-be-conclusive-evidence-o-dwhta8hic9), [includes any immigrants](https://manifold.markets/NathanpmYoung/will-there-be-widely-trusted-eviden), [includes only Springfield](https://manifold.markets/Zhazhir/are-there-any-documented-cases-of-h)). I actually appreciate this a lot, because most of the debate around Catgate has focused on how there’s “no evidence” it’s happening, but [“no evidence” is cheap](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-phrase-no-evidence-is-a-red-flag) and I prefer an outright forecast.
**2:** Why did this go down so much in April 2024?
**3:**
I originally thought this was about Strawberry, but the timing is wrong: it’s a Google DeepMind AI that got just short of the gold threshold back in July. People seemed genuinely surprised by this!
**4:**
**5:** I hadn’t even heard of this theory before; you can learn more [here](https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/adrian-dittmann-elon-musk-sock-puppet-theory):
**6:** Finally, prediction markets returning to their roots:
**7:**
## Forecasting Links
**1:** Trouble in England as politicians are accused of betting on political topics. In July, [some MPs bet](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/27/why-are-uk-politicians-in-trouble-for-placing-bets-on-election-date) on when an election would be held; during the election, one [bet £8,000](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/28772956/cops-take-over-betting-scandal-probe/) that he would lose his seat (he did). It’s illegal for people with nonpublic information to bet on political topics, but so far nobody is formally accusing the people involved of having nonpublic information. And the sums involved (£100 for one of the most scandalous election bets) suggests these aren’t exactly grand schemes. I file this under “need to avoid appearance of impropriety” more than “criminal mastermind”.
**2:** Dean Ball has [a sort of vague vision of LLMs betting on prediction markets at massive scale](https://www.hyperdimensional.co/p/prediction-markets-and-ai-diffusion?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=2244049&post_id=148659450&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=3o9&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email). I agree something like this is interesting and plausible; I agree that it’s hard to pin down exactly how it would work. One suggestion he makes is to have the bots shadow public intellectuals - for example, a bot “trained on” my writing would ask itself “how would Scott Alexander bet in this market?”, and if it made more money than a bot asking “how would Tyler Cowen bet in this market?”, then maybe you would trust me more than Tyler. This is cute but there are a lot of wrinkles to work out For example, I talk more about superforecasting and probability calibration than Tyler, my bot might simulate me by making good bets; if Tyler sometimes uses extreme or ideological language, his bot might make worse bets not because his ideas are worse, but because it “simulates” him as being an incautious better.
**3:** Kalshi vs. CFTC, round one million: after CFTC banned Kalshi from hosting political contracts last year, Kalshi appealed. [Earlier this month](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2024/09/12/cftc-has-no-authority-to-reject-election-contracts-judge-says/), the judge [sided with Kalshi](https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67934413/51/kalshiex-llc-v-commodity-futures-trading-commission/), saying that the CFTC’s attempt to define elections as “gaming” so it can regulate them under anti-gaming laws is an illegal power grab. The judge claims this has no relevance to the CFTC’s broader anti-political-market push, but since the whole thing is based on the elections = gaming theory I think it has a lot of relevance indeed. The CFTC has since appealed, and Kalshi is blocked from hosting the contracts until the appeal goes through (it’s 49 days until the election; at this point even a pro-Kalshi ruling might be a Pyrrhic victory). Also, why is Kalshi trying to get Congress contracts up, but not a Presidency contract? More sympathetic test case? | Scott Alexander | 148917601 | Mantic Monday 9/16/24 | acx |
# Open Thread 347
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Good comments on last week’s [links post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024): Andy McKenzie [on whether selection really disproves balancing theories of personality and schizophrenia](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024/comment/68707283), and [multiple layers of clarification on the Australia/Jews/NYT doxxing story](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024/comment/68705544). And several people had good comments on Oregon’s now-repealed drug decriminalization law. Banjo Kildeer [blames the law for](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024/comment/68753014) offering addicts the choice between a $100 fine vs. treatment; the fine was so low that almost everyone paid and kept using. Kerry [blames the police for](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/links-for-september-2024/comment/68745033) not enforcing it properly. And an email correspondent linked [this study suggesting that](https://insidemedicine.substack.com/p/study-debunks-link-between-oregon) Oregon’s increase in drug deaths had nothing to do with the law, but was a simple effect of growing fentanyl availability.
**2:** [Sentinel](https://sentinel-team.org/) is a foresight and emergency response team seeking to detect and react fast to large-scale global risks (eg a pandemic). The foresight team is run by some members of Samotsvety, the forecasting team that won the CSET Foretell tournaments several years in a row, and they publish some [weekly minutes](https://blog.sentinel-team.org/) that tracks ongoing threats. They're seeking a larger audience for their reporting, collaborators, and funding; if you want to reach out you can do so at [hello@sentinel-team.org](mailto:hello@sentinel-team.org).
**3:** SB 1047, the bill to regulate AI, has passed California’s legislature and is now in front of Governor Newsom, who is reported to be considering vetoing it. If you want to let him know your opinion, you can read more about how to do so [here](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/AWYmFwpCrqkknLKdh/how-to-help-crucial-ai-safety-legislation-pass-with-10). | Scott Alexander | 148963144 | Open Thread 347 | acx |
# Berkeley Meetup This Saturday
**Why:** Because we’re having [another round of fall meetups](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/meetups-everywhere-2024-times-and), and Berkeley is one of them. I’m signal-boosting this one because it’s usually our biggest, and because I hope to be able to attend.
**When:** Saturday, September 14, 3:00 PM. Yes, I forgot to post this until now and it’s tomorrow (maybe today by the time you’re reading this), sorry.
**Where:** [Lighthaven](https://www.lighthaven.space/), 2740 Telegraph Ave, Berkeley.
**Who:** Anyone who wants. Please feel free to come even if you feel awkward about it, even if you’re not “the typical ACX reader”, even if you’re worried people won’t like you, etc.
I’ll check the comments to this post in case there are any questions. | Scott Alexander | 148874131 | Berkeley Meetup This Saturday | acx |
# Your Book Review: Nine Lives
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
### Cats have nine lives but they don’t get involved in jungle wars in the Philippines
Aimen Dean (pseudonym) compares himself to the proverbial cat: he has nine lives, surviving every impossible situation and starting new lives under strange new conditions.
Cats pack their nine lives in an average of 12-18 years, which is a quite impressive speed, but Aimen Dean was committed to living his lives even quicker than that.
Born in 1978, he was 16 when he left the comfort of his Saudi home, learned to fire a mortar, and fought in the battles of the Bosnian War. He and two friends ran a million dollar fraudulent charity to smuggle supplies to the Chechens when he was 18. He was 19 when he swore an oath of allegiance in front of Osama bin Laden, and started making chemical weapons. He was 20 when he got disillusioned with al-Qaeda, left, got caught by the Qatari secret police and became a British informant. He was 24 when he unraveled a plot to release poison gas in the New York subway. And by the time he was 28, due to an embarrassingly stupid leak from the American intelligence agencies, his spying career was over and he was a man in hiding.
(The jungle war in the Philippines sounded cool in the section title, but his brief stint there at 18 is actually one of the least exciting stories of his life: it was mostly a frozen conflict and the jihadists spent their time playing beach volleyball.)
One good consequence of his cover being blown is that twelve years after his retirement, he could finally tell his story, resulting in one of the most fascinating books I ever read. The stories were presented in a believable enough way, not over-exaggerating his own importance, that I developed a lot of trust in most of his claims being true. I also mostly believe his journalist coauthors that they corroborated many details of his story. This makes his testimony a very useful source on the inner workings of jihadist organizations, and the intelligence agencies trying to stop them.
The book is also a real page-turner, a spy novel in real life. I will share the most interesting things I learned from this book, but for all the adventure stories, [read the original](https://www.amazon.com/Nine-Lives-time-inside-al-Qaeda-ebook/dp/B07BHMZHYT/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=), I really enjoyed it more than most novels.
## Surprising announcement: jihadists actually believe in their religion
I know, shocking.
But really, the writer is constantly complaining how Western analysts are always trying to understand the jihadists’ motivations and plans through their own lens: economy, strategy, nationalism, fighting against oppression. Dean claims that these all overlook a major goal that motivated him and many of his comrades: fulfilling the prophecies.
There are many prophecies about the End Times in the Koran and the hadiths (deeds and words of Muhammad, transmitted through oral tradition, the authenticities of some of which are hotly debated among Islamic scholars). Some of these prophecies are thought to be already fulfilled, others are not. But the glorious coming of the Mahdi can only happen once all the events that are prophesied to happen before him have passed.
The logical conclusion for humanity is clear: go through the prophecies like a checklist and fulfill them all, bringing forward the day the Mahdi arrives and Jesus returns, and justice is served to the world!
(An aside: I knew that Jesus is considered a prophet in Islam, but I didn’t know before reading the book how important he is, and I was surprised by the jihadists constantly talking about the return of Jesus. Apparently, Muslims [believe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_in_Islam) that Jesus is the Messiah foretold in the Old Testament, and that he ascended to heaven alive and will return in the End Times to rule gloriously beside another messianic figure, the Mahdi. After that, he will die and be buried in the Green Dome in a tomb left vacant for him next to Muhammad’s. The Last Judgment will happen after his death.)
Anyways, the End Times are here. (According to a [Pew Research poll](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-3-articles-of-faith/), more than half of Muslims believe that the Mahdi will arrive within their lifetime, and this belief is universally accepted among jihadists). This means that you should contribute to fulfilling the prerequisite prophecies as quickly as possible. Nothing else really matters. The young Dean travels to the Philippines to fight in the Muslim independence movement there, but later gets embarrassed about this as a wasteful diversion: the Philippines don’t feature in any of the prophecies, so it’s not important.
Dean originally joins the jihad because he is horrified by the news of the sometimes genocidal mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims by the Serbian army. But later he gets told off by one of his superiors even for this: what good it is to save the lives of some Muslims, if Bosnia will just have a secular government anyway, that allows “alcohol and nightclubs”? Bosnia will never be the cradle of a new Caliphate, so it’s not important either.
(Other fighters disagree: Bosnia really is important, because it gets Islam a foothold closer to Rome, and this will help fulfill an important prophecy about conquering Rome. You need to pay attention to the later items on the checklist too!)
On the other hand, other fights matter a lot. Dean writes:
> It is not possible to understand al-Qaeda's strategy without understanding its fixation on fulfilling the prophecies. Creating the preconditions for the arrival of the Mahdi also explained the group's later establishment of affiliates in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and the Maghreb, which along with Afghanistan are the lands of the Five Armies of Jihad prophesied to fight in the epic battles.
I find it suspicious that these were unstable regions anyway, how convenient for fulfilling the prophecies! It’s also suspicious that I can’t find any reference to the prophesied Five Armies of Jihad anywhere on the internet. Maybe I would find more if I searched in Arabic, but it definitely doesn’t seem to be a mainstream prophecy in Islam. If I understand correctly, the trick is that there are *a lot* of hadith of somewhat questionable authenticity, so the jihadist scholars can pick and choose, and of course there are often a lot of degrees of freedom in interpreting them too.
Still, we shouldn’t imagine this as just a cynical leadership fabricating prophecies that fit their strategic goals to manipulate the rank and file. My understanding is that the people interpreting the prophecies are true believers too, it’s just natural to interpret an ambiguous location to refer to Syria if you are already fixated on the idea that your group is the one fulfilling the prophecies, and now there are rebels in Syria asking for your help.
Also, there is no clean distinction between the ‘leadership’ and the ‘rank and file’: jihadist leadership has a sky-high attrition rate (the US army really is quite impressive in taking them down), so it’s not that hard to rise through the ranks. This means that the people on the top at any given moment usually just received and believe the prophecies as given. After some time, there might be no one left alive who even knows if the prophecies were massaged for strategic purposes.
Other times, there is a prophecy with a clear interpretation, so they follow it even if it goes against any strategic reason. A hadith says: *“The Last Hour would not come until the Romans land at al-A’maq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract them).”* So ISIS put crazy amount of effort into defending the otherwise unimportant village of Dabiq in northern Syria for three years, and they provoked the West with their brutality, openly admitting that their hope is for the West to send ground troops, so they can defeat them in Dabiq:
> In November 2014, another ISIS executioner, Mohammed Emwazi, appeared in Dabiq with the severed head of an American hostage, saying, *'Here we are, burying the first American Crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive.'*
>
> In a message released after the group's attack in Paris in 2015, Baghdadi mocked the West for not sending in ground troops. *'They know what awaits them in Dabiq [in] terms of defeat, death, and destruction. They know that it is the final war and after it, God permitting, we will invade them and they will not invade us, and Islam will dominate the world anew until the Day of Judgement.'*
The West was wise enough not to send ground troops, and only bombed ISIS, until the Turkish and some Syrian militias finally drove ISIS out of Dabiq. I guess the Last Hour needs to wait for now.
This is a good moment to note that that jihadists in the book are all obsessed with Israel, mostly not because they are angry at the oppression of Palestinians (Muslims are oppressed in many places around the world), but because Jerusalem features in a lot of prophecies, so it’s really important for it to be under Muslim rule. They also passionately hate the USA, partly because of its support of Israel, but maybe even more importantly because the US has stationed troops in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War. This was a reasonable thing to do against a potential Iraqi invasion that was a very real threat while Saddam was in power. But Infidel soldiers staying in the country of Mecca and Medina was considered a huge sacrilege by the jihadists and made them hate the US a lot.
## Are we the baddies? Nah, we are just Accelerationists
Other than occupying specific Syrian villages for prophecy reasons, is there a general Grand Strategy that the jihadists follow? I already alluded to how ISIS was thinking, and these plans were often very explicitly laid down by Dean’s comrades and superiors inside al-Qaeda. Roughly, this is the four step Jihadist Master Plan:
1. We commit lots of horrific terrorist attacks both at home and in the West, to provoke the western governments and the local secular governments.
2. They get mad, and either the West starts bombing things, or the local secular dictatorship responds with disproportionate repression against devout Muslims.
3. The people revolt, chaos ensues, jihadist groups fill the power vacuum and try to hold on to their territories against the combined firepower of the world, while the region descends into a war of all against all.
4. …
5. Profit.
You might notice the missing step 4. They intentionally don’t really plan ahead for this step, this is the part where God is supposed to step in and make it so that the jihadists win against all odds, the Mahdi and Jesus return, the faithful get their reward, etc.
Steps 1 to 3 often go kind of according to plan, but step 4 hasn't seen much success yet. Maybe they need to go through their prophecy-checklist more diligently the next time.
I need to say that it’s kind of embarrassing that the West plays into their hands so much in step 2. The most glaring example from the book is a right-hand man of Osama bin Laden, known now to be one of the main masterminds of 9/11, telling his comrades in the winter of 2001:
> *'Our generation started the war, the next generation will fight the war, and the generation after that will win the war,'* al-Masri declared. *'You know there's a group in America that wants to overthrow Saddam Hussein? But they say the American people won't support a war in Iraq unless there's an event on the scale of Pearl Harbor.'* Then, with a rare flash of amusement in his eyes, he added, *'We should – with God's help and grace – give them a Pearl Harbor! Let them come into Iraq, let them come into Afghanistan, let them come into Somalia.'*
>
> *'Unlike the Japanese we don't have aircraft carriers,'* retorted al-Suri.
>
> *'Maybe we don't need aircraft carriers,'* Abu Hafs replied with a smirk.
As I said, a little embarrassing on our part.
(Though I need to mention for fairness’ sake that many jihadists were angry at Osama bin Laden after 9/11 for causing the downfall of their stronghold in Afghanistan. So when the West invades a territory already controlled by jihadists, that’s not necessarily “playing into their hands” that much.)
It’s easy to notice how eerily similar the jihadists’ thinking is to communist and far-right accelerationism. The eventual victory of our ideology is inevitable, either because of divine prophecy, or some “arc of history”. But in the current world order, we are severely overpowered, and there is no clear way how we could win. So we make things worse for everyone until everything breaks down, and our ideology will inevitably emerge victoriously from the chaos. What could go wrong?
It’s kind of surprising that so many different ideologies converged on this counter-intuitive strategy that didn’t really work for any of them. I suspect that part of the answer is that accelerationism is just a general purpose ideology of Evil. If you have a group of violent people, who enjoy cruelty, killing and destruction, but still want to believe themselves to be the good guys, what kind of ideology do you give them? “Bad things are good, because they bring forward the glorious \_\_\_. So do your thing.” The content of \_\_\_ doesn’t really matter, only that you can accelerate towards it by being evil.
(I really wanted to make some joke about e/acc, but it would actually be unfair. E/acc has its vices, but despite its name it doesn’t fit the general pattern: as far as I know, they don’t want to make things worse, so things get better later — they just want to accelerate AI, which they consider a simple good thing. So the above criticism doesn’t really apply to them.)
## I am become Death, extractor of scorpion venom
Given the above-described “strategy” of Islamic Accelerationism, it’s not surprising how much of their planning is based in the social instead of the physical reality. This makes them obsessed with getting things that can be classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction, somewhat divorced from what would be actually practical ways of destroying people en masse.
As a smart, bookish guy with photographic memory, Dean was assigned to the group making bombs and chemical and biological weapons in the al-Qaeda camp. Unsurprisingly, the British encouraged him to stay involved even after he changed sides. This gives him a lot of insight into how al-Qaeda was thinking about WMDs.
A chemical weapon, used in the New York subway, even if their most ambitious plans came true, would only kill a handful of people — fewer than what could be killed by one man with a gun, or maybe even a knife.
The Western intelligence agencies knew this. *Al-Qaeda knew this.* Still, it was a top priority for the MI6 and CIA to prevent any kind of chemical attack, as they knew how oversized the public response would be. And al-Qaeda pursued chemical weapons for the same reason.
Looking at the list of [chemical terror attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_terrorism), it still doesn’t seem to be a very practical weapon for them, as they have only managed to kill a handful of people so far, and none in Western countries. But certainly, they are trying, and some of their plots might have gone through if one of their few chemical weapons experts, a certain Aimen Dean, hadn’t always dutifully informed the MI6 about their plans.
Their obsession with “biological weapons” is even more bizarre. In the book, the chemical and biological experiments group doesn’t even try creating actually dangerous biological weapons that could cause pandemics, as they know it’s well beyond their reach. However, they can still extract scorpion venom, and it’s kind of like a biological weapon! It’s incredibly impractical, but that’s not really the point. The point is that WHO [defines](https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1) biological weapons as *“Biological and toxin weapons are either microorganisms like virus, bacteria or fungi, or toxic substances produced by living organisms that are produced and released deliberately to cause disease and death in humans, animals or plants”.* Scorpion venom fits the definition, so Western intelligence agencies can say “al-Qaeda has chemical and biological capabilities”, and all of this sounds scary, and being scary and provoking a response is the whole point.
I would really want to redefine our categories in a reasonable way, and have a category for “pandemic-causing biological capabilities'' that definitely doesn’t include scorpion venom. Similarly, poison gas weapons can be very destructive (though it turns out they are not that bad when low-tech terrorists need to assemble them and then smuggle the gas-container to the target), and this makes “chemical attacks” sound bad, but then the [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_terrorism) list of examples includes things like “*In one case, nails and bolts packed into explosives detonated by a Hamas suicide bomber in a December 2001 attack at the Ben-Yehuda street in Jerusalem were soaked in rat poison”.* This is really not a central example of a “weapon of mass destruction”, and we only confuse ourselves if we put it in the same category with more dangerous things.
And confusing ourselves can have very real costs in this case: the next time our intelligence agencies say that a country or a terrorist organization possesses WMDs and “chemical and biological capabilities” so we need to do something about them, I really want to know whether they are going to release super-smallpox, or they just soaked some nails in rat poison. Also, pretty please, if the terrorists finally manage to commit a poison gas attack in the West, but only kill a handful of people, can we just react the same way as we would if the attack happened with a gun or knife, instead of going crazy?
Nuclear is somewhat similar.
> *'You know what I think about these so-called dirty bombs,'* he said one mid-winter evening as we huddled round the fire wrapped in a cocoon of blankets. *'They're a waste of our time, more likely to kill us than anyone else.'* Even the materials for a primitive 'dirty bomb' would be hard to come by, he said, and the radiation from such a weapon would cause little harm.
>
> For others in al-Qaeda's orbit, the fear and panic that would be provoked by some sort of workable nuclear capability - however crude - remained the holy grail. And the group went to some lengths to play up its nuclear capability in an effort to sow uncertainty among the intelligence agencies. Abu Hamza al-Ghamdi had told me, in typically subversive fashion: *'It would be a good thing for our enemies to be afraid that we have them.'*
Fortunately, for all their efforts to acquire nukes, they achieved nothing other than getting scammed by the Uzbek mafia a few times, so they resorted to just bluffing to Western journalists about possessing nukes.
I really don’t want terrorists to access real nukes, but if reports come out in the future about terrorists possessing “nuclear capabilities”, I want everyone to remember that not all nukes are created equal, and investigate closely whether the report is talking about city-destroying bombs, or crude radiological devices *“more likely to kill us than anyone else”*, or nothing more than a bluff.
How good are the terrorists at making all these weapons? That depends on how many competent engineers they have. At least at the time Aimen Dean was there, around the turn of the millennium, al-Qeada had a serious shortage of experts on explosives and especially chemical weapons. They didn’t even have that many people who could do the simple lab-work of the experiments, and they had a lot of fatalities and serious injuries while working with explosives. But they were even more constrained on people who could lead their “research”. Almost all the innovation was centered around one man: Abu Khabab, a chemistry expert and bomb-maker who defected from the Egyptian army.
Abu Khabab was an interesting figure. He never took an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and was proud of his independence. He extracted promises that he would have control over the use of his inventions. While he believed in the jihadist cause, and wanted them to have access to as strong weapons as their enemies had, he didn’t like attacks on civilians (and even had a bad conscience about the animals he killed and tortured through his experiments).
Here is how he and Dean reacted when they first figured out how to make efficient chemical weapons that they (at that moment) believed could kill significant number of civilians in a terror attack:
> *'This will change everything. Imagine if we'd used poison gas in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam,'* he said.
>
> Abu Khabab responded with a sharpness I had rarely heard in him.
>
> *'It's one thing developing such weapons and quite another using them. The scholars will have to be unified in justifying with a fatwah any use of a device like this.'*
>
> From my conversations with him, it seemed clear that Abu Khabab felt he was developing al-Qaeda's equivalent of a nuclear device, for use in very defined circumstances. I had clung to the belief that these weapons would only be used as a deterrent, that somehow al-Qaeda would let the world know that it had developed a WMD capability but would hold it in reserve unless attacked. But my grip on that belief was loosening almost daily.
Abu Khabab was a smart man, smart enough to develop dangerous explosives and chemical weapons on his own from very limited raw materials, and he could still deceive himself into believing that his inventions won’t be used in irresponsible ways, *while he was developing weapons for al-Qaeda.*
Needless to say, the blueprints of his invention of how to assemble chemical weapons from relatively simple ingredients soon got disseminated on the Internet and various terrorist groups tried to use it later for killing civilians, without consulting any unified assembly of scholars.
When I watched *Oppenheimer*, I thought of the story of Abu Khabab. As above, so below.
## What gets you out of bed in the morning and makes you grab a Kalashnikov?
This is one of the main questions I wanted to get an answer to when I started reading the book. Why? Why do people become terrorists? Is it just simple evil with a smoke-screen of ideological rationalizations, as I previously speculated in this post? Or is there anything more?
From the book, you can glimpse three primary motivations for taking up jihad.
First, some people really are evil. People who visibly enjoy torturing animals when doing experiments for chemical weapons, or whose *“eyes gleam with excitement”* as they learn that their proposed poisoning method not only kills the infidels but kills in a very painful way. To these people ideology might really be nothing more than a smokescreen. If they didn’t find jihad, they might have just been simple criminals. (Indeed, many of them were. Prisons are a very fertile recruiting ground for the terrorists.)
But the majority don’t seem to fall into this category, or at least they don’t start out like this. I remember that it hit me as a surprise when the book first used the word “psychopath”. It was 100 pages in. Dean had already been hanging out for years with al-Qaeda fighters, he had seen Serbian prisoners of war being beheaded with blunt knives, and this is the first time he said of someone “Wow, this guy is a psycho”. Apparently, most of them weren’t like that.
Second, some people really want to be heroes. Dean first joined the jihad because he wanted to defend his Muslim brothers in Bosnia against the Serbian oppression and genocidal atrocities. Many others joined for similar reasons: to help the oppressed in Bosnia, or before that in the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation. But there aren’t that many “just wars” going on in the modern world. So these aspiring heroes convince themselves that one side of a horrible-against-horrible civil war is actually the just cause, and join that. Or they just find Islamic Accelerationism, which very conveniently claims that all kinds of new wars are just and heroic, as the instability brings forward the final victory of the Faithful. There is something tragic about the mis-directed energies of all these would-be heroes, and I sometimes wonder if we should stage fake alien invasions to keep these people occupied.
The third group is, again, people who take their religion really seriously and literally. Aimen Dean has some of the characteristics of the second group, but mostly falls into this category. He knew the Koran by heart by the time he was twelve. (He has a photographic memory, something that was very useful in his career as a spy.) He spent all his youth learning and thinking about his religion, being taught by some radical clerics who ran the study group in his neighborhood. By the time he volunteered to fight in Bosnia, he truly believed that there is no higher calling than dying in a holy war, and truly believed in his heart that Paradise awaits the martyrs.
> *'Stop! Stop!'* yelled the fighters behind me.
>
> My legs were entangled in wire. I had dragged up no fewer than four landmines. Things seemed to move in slow motion: I saw the Arab fighters throwing themselves to the ground, bracing for the explosion.
>
> I stood motionless, expecting to be cut down by a sniper's bullet at any second but knowing that one step in any direction would bring the certainty of death.
>
> One of the fighters crawled towards me very slowly. I held my breath. He began to pick away at the wires curling around my legs. His fingers moved carefully but with extraordinary calmness. As he disentangled me, he spoke softly.
>
> *'God be praised. For one of these not to explode I would call you lucky. Two would be extremely fortunate; three a miracle. And four, well, God must be watching over you,'* he said.
>
> *'Maybe God doesn't want me,'* I told him.
>
> As I clambered back down the hill, I was jolted from shock to disappointment. After a year in Bosnia, I was still very much alive. I had been sure this would be my bridge to paradise, a place the Prophet had described as beyond imagination. Of the five medics assigned that day, only two of us had survived. My brothers in arms were now in paradise but I had been left behind. I could not hold back the tears. I felt like a loser among winners. I made a silent prayer asking God to reunite me with my friends soon and vowed to embrace jihad as never before. Maybe God would then find me worthy.
Their vision of heaven is also interesting:
> As the Prophet had said, with the first drop of blood all the sins of a martyr are forgiven. With the second they see their place in heaven. There would be no purgatory and no anxiety on the Day of Judgment. Not only would seventy-two virgins await, but as a martyr I could ask the Lord to grant eternal life to seventy of my relatives and friends. I would be reunited with the mother I so missed and the father I had never got to know.
This is actually a very good deal on utilitarian terms! One in seventy people dies as a martyr, distributed around the world, and all of humanity is saved!
(The promise of 72 virgins was also something they often thought of, given that the rank and file couldn’t afford supporting a wife in the al-Qaeda camps, and the practice of kidnapping sex slaves only started later.)
So they really wanted to die as martyrs. But why terrorism? Again, there aren't that many just wars to die in. And if you accept the prophecies being true, and accept the authority of imams quoting great scholars justifying the means to the end, Islamic Accelerationism is actually quite logical…
I was somewhat disturbed reading how many normal Muslims Dean interacted with were on board with all of this in theory. Dean comes from a nice urban middle-class family in Saudi Arabia, and several of his relatives joined the jihad at various points, and all other relatives supported that. His neighborhood Islamic study group, that I imagine as the equivalent of Sunday School, was all in favor of very radical interpretations. Some Muslim communities Dean interacted with in London were even more radical than the ones he grew up with, constantly preaching about Hellfire and the only sure way to avoid it. On a plane from Kuwait to the Philippines, a flight attendant figured out they were traveling to join the jihad, but didn’t turn them in, but instead introduced them to the captain of the plane, because they were both proud supporters of the jihad. People did successful door-to-door fundraising for jihadist causes in Kuwait. Everyone was on board, it was just that not that many took the implications as seriously as Dean.
(My impression from the book is that after 9/11, America put pressure on the Arab states to crack down on radicalization, and it worked to some extent. Unfortunately, I don’t know how strong the “to some extent” is.)
I find the story of these true believers killing and dying for jihad maybe even sadder than the story of the wannabe heroes, because it just so strongly depends on blind luck. These people probably become committed followers of the first religion (or secular religion) they encounter. If they were first introduced to something else, for better or worse, they could have been missionaries spreading the Good News, nurses going to Africa, communist activists or super-committed EAs. Instead, the first religion they got introduced to was a radical, apocalyptic branch of Islam. Tough luck.
## We don’t negotiate with terrorists. But have you tried debating them?
Aimen Dean is not only deeply religious, but also a huge nerd. He is very interested in Islamic history and theology and studies them obsessively. This is surprisingly common among jihadists, especially the higher-ups. Maybe it’s not even that surprising that the people who are committed to following their beliefs to their (according to them) logical conclusions, are also huge nerds about the details of their religion.
The special thing about Dean is, however, that he double-checks the details enough to find the holes. When he talks about why he left al-Qaeda, he mentions being disturbed by the brutal executions and the civilian deaths in terror attacks, but his disillusionment seems to be at least as much intellectual as moral and emotional. Here is the pivotal moment of doubt:
> *'Sheikh,'* I said, *'how do we respond to criticism that we have killed innocent civilians while attacking the Crusaders?'*
>
> Al-Muhajir smiled. It was an invitation to show off his great erudition. He launched into a detailed description of the Mongol invasions of Muslim lands in the thirteenth century. The scholar Ibn Taymiyyah had issued a fatwah that clearly legitimized the deaths of Muslims and non-Muslims alike where the enemy is using them as a human shield.
>
> *'This fatwah is comprehensive; it gives us justification,'* he said firmly.
>
> Al-Muhajir probably assumed I would go away reassured and impressed. I didn't. Instead I took advantage of a long-planned trip to the villa which served as al-Qaeda's guest house in Kabul to consult its well stocked library of Islamic texts. I sought out the fatwah - in the twenty-eighth volume of a thirty-seven-volume encyclopaedia - and found that it had no relevance whatsoever.
>
> It had been issued in response to Mongol attacks on Muslim cities in Central Asia. Every time the Mongols sacked a city, they took civilians - sometimes as many as a couple of thousand - and forced them to push siege towers towards the walls of the next city. The fatwah said the defenders of a city were permitted to kill Muslims being used as human shields - because otherwise they and their families would end up being killed, and the Mongols would go on conquering more Muslim cities.
>
> But the fatwah (known as al-Tatarus) had been proclaimed in very specific circumstances.
>
> To me, there was no resemblance or parallel between Muslims being used as human shields by Mongol armies and the attacks in East Africa. Al-Muhajir's precedent was a castle of sand. Were al-Qaeda's other theological justifications, including its interpretation of the prophecies, built on equally shaky foundations? Was al-Qaeda really the Vanguard that would fight with the Mahdi or was it set on a path that future generations of Muslims would reject rather than celebrate?
Later, he learns that the hadiths prophesying a victorious army coming out of Afghanistan are probably Abbasid forgeries (the Abbasids’ base was in the Afghan territories). He also realizes that there are some prophecies about evil traitors to the faith that apply to the terrorists groups equally well as the prophecies about heroic armies that they like to apply to themselves.
He firmly believes that the best way to dissuade young people from joining the jihadists is to show them these facts. He is very frustrated that there aren’t enough people debating with jihadist agitators online, showing how they misrepresent the holy texts. (Dean himself is a very moderate, though still devout, Muslim these days, but he thinks the best people to make these arguments would be hardcore Salafi scholars.)
I suspect he is at least partially committing a typical mind fallacy, and these arguments wouldn’t be as persuasive to most jihadists as they were to him. But Dean has seen many, many different people going down the path of radicalization, and maybe we should believe him when he says that these scholarly counter-arguments would make a big difference.
Someone writing *The Authenticity of Various Hadiths: Much More Than You Wanted to Know* probably won’t bring peace to the Middle East in itself, but still, Dean’s advice is good encouragement that actually engaging in debate with people on their own terms can be worthwhile, even with people who are as deeply lost as the jihadists.
## Putin (probably) didn’t do the 1999 apartment bombings
This point doesn’t really fit among the overarching themes of the book, but is still very important information, so I shoehorn it into the review here.
In fact, this was the original reason I started reading this book. Two years ago, soon after the Ukraine invasion, I tried to figure out what happened in the [1999 apartment bombings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Russian_apartment_bombings) that are widely considered a false flag operation. For example, Scott writes in his [book review](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/dictator-book-club-putin) on Putin: *“The standard position in the West is now that Putin orchestrated the apartment bombings himself - killing 300 Russians - as a justification for escalating the war on Chechnya and to make himself look good after he framed some perpetrators.”* However, there was a throwaway line on Wikipedia about a British informant claiming the opposite. Later, this line was removed from Wikipedia for reasons that are unclear to me, and I found no other source mentioning this, so I tracked down the original book that was referenced. That was Aimen Dean’s memoir.
When the bombings happened, and the suspicious details about the Ryazan case emerged, most of Dean’s British handlers suspected the bombings to be an inside job. So did his comrades in al-Qaeda. It was just too convenient for Putin, and no Chechen leader publicly acknowledged involvement. However, soon after the bombings and the start of the Russian invasion of Chechnya, some al-Qaeda higher-ups had a phone call with an important Chechen leader called al-Kurdi. Dean was trusted enough to attend the call.
> *'So Putin killed his own people in Moscow so he could kill hundreds and thousands more of ours.'*
>
> There was a pause.
>
> *'No,'* al-Kurdi replied. *'There's been a lot of talk about the bombings in Moscow. All of it is wrong. The Islamic Emirate was responsible.'*
>
> There was a stunned silence.
>
> His brow furrowed, Abu Qatada asked: *'But why? Didn't it invite Putin to attack?'*
>
> *'It was revenge,'* came the curt reply.
>
> Al-Kurdi said that members of the brutal Moscow Region OMON militia unit had been involved in previous atrocities in the Caucasus. The jihadis had tracked a few of them to the Moscow apartment buildings that had been bombed.
>
> *'We have our informants; there are plenty of Chechens in Moscow,'* al-Kurdi added. *'It took us nineteen months of surveillance, preparations and bribes, because we smuggled all the bombs and materials and trucks. This is Russia. People will sell you their mothers for $100.'*
>
> Perhaps he could sense the doubt in the silence at the other end. *'I want you to remember that we as mujahideen on the ground assess the situation better than you because we are here, so trust us that we made the right choice. The war was coming whether now or in a year or two. So when we took vengeance we knew what we were doing.*
>
> *'Believe me, it was ridiculously easy.'*
>
> [...]
>
> *'All were in agreement,'* al-Kurdi continued, *'except Maskhadov, who didn't know. But Shamil Basayev and Ibn Khattab were in on the plan.'*
(A dark note on Russians in the 90s selling their mothers for $100: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_allegedly_involved_in_the_1999_Russian_apartment_bombings) writes about a traffic police inspector, who was sentenced to prison because he allegedly *“helped the truck with explosives pass the checkpoint after getting a sack of sugar as a bribe”*.)
Aimen Dean visibly dislikes Putin, and has no reason to lie about any of this, so I trust his report. It is possible that al-Kurdi was lying, claiming an attack that was not his, but when he saw his jihadist brothers not being happy about it, he decided not to air this lie in public. I find this unlikely though, especially because it seems dangerous for him to claim the involvement of his bosses, Basayev and Khattab, if it was in fact not their attacks and these two would probably not be happy that he connected them to attacks that they didn’t commit and which caused the downfall of independent Chechnya. So I consider Dean’s testimony a very strong evidence against the false flag theory.
Also, why would Putin organize five false flag bombings? Wouldn’t just one or two be enough, all the others just increasing the risk of getting caught in the act? This seems like a crazy overkill, especially given that the Chechens were literally [invading](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Dagestan_(1999)) the Russian province of Dagestan at the time, seizing whole villages and massacring captives, which could be enough *casus belli* in itself.
Dean alludes to the possibility that even if it was the Chechens who carried out the attacks, the Russian police knowingly let them happen (as I said, Dean really dislikes Putin). I guess, this is a possibility, but it’s not compatible with the main evidence that people usually use for the false flag theory, that in Ryazan FSB agents were caught planting a potential bomb in a house.
Altogether, this is what I think happened:
Chechen extremists, while invading Dagestan, decided to blow up some buildings in Russia as a revenge for earlier Russian atrocities. In response, Russia invaded Chechnya (which had been basically independent since the First Chechen War), and was unexpectedly successful in the invasion. The Chechen group responsible for the attacks realized that their comrades would be angry at them for causing the downfall of independent Chechnya, so decided not to go public about their involvement in the bombings.
And what happened in Ryazan, where FSB agents were caught planting a bomb and then the Russian government clearly tried to cover up the details? My best guess is that that was indeed an FSB plot. After four real Chechen bombings already happened, a local FSB leader decided to get some credit by placing a fake bomb somewhere, then heroically finding the bomb and preventing the “attack”. This went wrong when a resident noticed the bomb and alerted the local police which was not involved in the plot. (In this theory, the bomb was indeed fake, which is consistent with the bomb not detonating in the substance test, but I need to assume that the early test detecting RDX was mistaken.)
After the FSB agents getting caught, Putin and his circle realized that people won’t believe them if they tell the truth that “sorry, this last bomb was indeed planted by some idiots from the intelligence agency, but we promise we had nothing to do with it and all the previous bombings were real Chechen attacks”. So instead they decided to deny and cover up everything. Later, the journalists investigating the issue were arrested or assassinated, but this doesn’t really prove their guilt in the four actual bombings: they were just in the habit of assassinating investigative journalists.
I am aware that it’s a somewhat inelegant explanation to claim that the Ryazan bomb-planting was committed by a different group than all the other bombings, but this is my best interpretation of the events, given Dean’s testimony.
## Don’t judge a spy network until you walk a mile in their boots
Turns out, spying is hard. When you hear news about evidence emerging that intelligence agencies knew about an attack before it happened but didn’t prevent it, or evidence that one agency didn’t share their information with another in a way that looks self-defeating, consider the possibility that these all might have good reasons.
**The CIA knew that 9/11 was going to happen but didn’t do anything!** Yes, obviously, they knew it. Dean knew that al-Qeada was planning something big for September, as he was warned by a superior to stay out of Afghanistan for the time. There were many other sources too pointing to an impending attack. All this information is just not really worth anything if you don’t know the details of the attack, and unfortunately the perpetrators had very good infosec around the details.
**Evidence emerges that MI6 was funneling money to terrorists!** Yeah, they did that. They needed a cover story for why Dean is traveling back and forth between Britain and Afghanistan, something that puts him in good standing in al-Qaeda and also prevents them from conscripting him to dangerous local battles against other Afghan warlords. So they invented a honey exporting business where Dean brought honey from Afghanistan to Britain (Afghan honey is allegedly really good, and honey exports were legitimately a major source of al-Qaeda’s funding), and MI6 gave him money that he could return to the camps. It was a few thousand dollars at a time, which was good money for the cash-strapped terrorists, but I trust MI6’s judgment that keeping a spy inside al-Qaeda’s inner circles was well worth this price.
**The British secret service knew about a Thing for years, but withheld it from America!** This sometimes happens, sharing information is often costly. The more details are shared, the more likely other intelligence agencies are to figure out who the sources are. The more agencies know about an informant, the more possibility there is for a leak.
The British never shared Dean’s identity with the USA, and tried to provide as little revealing detail as possible, but apparently the Americans still figured it out after a while. Then some unknown insider talked to a journalist, who wrote a book, *The One Percent Doctrine*, containing all sorts of information on the informant, and then *Time* ran a frontpage article based on the book that revealed some things about Dean, *including his real first name*. We have all since learned that journalists are strangely committed to sharing people’s real names, but I wouldn’t have expected it to extend to literal spies inside al-Qaeda. Fortunately, Dean was in Europe when it happened, but his comrades soon figured out based on the news that he was the spy, and he could never return to his job, thus ending his seven years as an important informant.
(To be fair, I think revealing the real first name was probably just an accident. Aimean Dean’s real first name is Ali, and my guess is that the journalist just wanted to use a generic Arabic pseudonym and got unlucky. Revealing all sorts of other information that helped the terrorists identify Dean is less understandable.)
While this section is generally about intelligence agencies being well-meaning and competent but faced with hard problems, this particular story is not exactly flattering to the US agencies involved. But at least it helps explain why the British are sometimes reluctant to share information, or why one agency might keep secrets from another even within the same country.
**Britain helps release a dangerous terrorist from prison!** This one was actually in the news at the time, and the event was a result of another tragicomical communication failure between agencies, though this time no one was clearly at fault.
In 2003, there was a serious plot to use chemical weapons (and good old-fashioned machine guns) to kill American soldiers partying on New Year’s Eve in Bahrain. As so often when chemical weapons were involved, the terrorists consulted that reliable expert, Aimen Dean. The plot was organized by a real higher-up, with personal contact to the hiding Osama bin Laden, so the British let the plot seemingly proceed, while observing everything through Dean, planning to lure the organizer into a trap and track him back to bin Laden’s hiding place.
This might have worked, except suddenly all the terrorists involved, including Dean, got arrested by the Bahraini police. Turns out, the British needed to inform the Americans about the existence of the plot, but didn’t share details on how they planned to keep it under control, so as not to reveal Dean’s identity (see the previous point). Dick Cheney, quite understandably, panicked, and personally called up the King of Bahrain to arrest the people involved. After that, the British needed to go to considerable lengths to release Dean in a way that even found its way to the press. I’m a little surprised that the jihadists didn’t realize at that point that he was a spy, but the British had a reasonable cover story this time, so it all worked out okay. Except for the part where they squandered the opportunity to track down Osama bin Laden.
## Every end is a new beginning
All of this was to show that spy networks have a hard job to do. But the individual spy is the one who has it actually hard.
Like, who is he supposed to date and marry? If it’s a moderate or secular woman from Britain, his comrades will immediately realize he is no longer the fanatic jihadist he pretends to be. If he asks his relatives to find him a wife (as he sometimes considered doing so) from their Saudi circles, among women who would be proud to marry a jihadist… well, that’s going to end badly, isn’t it? Finding friends is not much easier for similar reasons. And the job itself — constantly pretending to be someone else, and fraternizing with extremists in the Middle East, Britain and on the Internet — is not anyone’s dream job. It’s not even very spy-novel-y most of the time: Dean would only get involved in an actually dangerous plot or learn an important secret once every year or two, otherwise it’s mostly boring monitoring. It’s no surprise that he considered quitting many times. But then the world would lose a vital information source on terrorist plots, and who knows what attack would go through that he could otherwise prevent, so he never quit, until an American journalist accidentally ended his career.
Since then, he has started doing consultancy work for Middle Eastern firms for preventing their employees from becoming extremists, and for banks for helping to monitor transactions that might be connected to terrorists. He probably saves fewer lives now, but seems much happier with these jobs. He married a moderate Muslim woman in Britain and now they have a child. I wish them the best.
Meanwhile, it doesn’t seem like the situation around Islamic terrorism has gotten much better since the book was written. Someone should really hurry up and write that *The Authenticity of Various Hadiths: Much More Than You Wanted to Know* explainer that will finally deradicalize everyone. | [unknown] | 146072706 | Your Book Review: Nine Lives | acx |
# Links For September 2024
*[I haven’t independently verified each link. On average, commenters will end up spotting evidence that around two or three of the links in each links post are wrong or misleading. I correct these as I see them, and will highlight important corrections later, but I can’t guarantee I will have caught them all by the time you read this.]*
**1:** [NPR has an article on the movement to compensate kidney donors](https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2024/08/26/nx-s1-5086459/theres-a-severe-kidney-shortage-should-donors-be-compensated), including the role of ACX grantee Waitlist Zero.
**2:** Many personality differences are partly genetic. So why did evolution give different people genes for different personalities, instead of everyone converging onto one optimal personality? The debate has focused on two theories. First, maybe there *is* an optimal personality, but evolution doesn’t move fast enough to get us there (this would be like disease risk or IQ, where some people just luck into having better genes than others). Second, maybe there are rock-paper-scissors personality types such that convergence is itself a non-optimal strategy (this would be like gender, where if everyone else is a woman, then your best strategy for getting mates easily is to be a man, and vice versa, so we naturally end up 50-50). A new review analyzes the evidence, and finds pretty decisively that it’s the first one (there are optimal personalities but evolution is too slow to get there). Here’s [the review paper](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513824000722#f0005), and here’s [Ruben Arslan’s X discussion](https://x.com/rubenarslan/status/1813665345670115664).
**3:** Ruxandra Teslo has a [review of the theory that aristocratic women drove the early adoption of Christianity](https://www.writingruxandrabio.com/p/did-aristocratic-women-drive-the). I’m waiting to read Rodney Stark’s *The* *Rise Of Christianity* before having an opinion, but saving this to come back to later.
**4:** [List Of Groups Who Protested The Democratic Convention](https://x.com/JCAndersonNYC/status/1821584260886569023) (also continued on second tweet). This is real, but it reminds me of those multi-page shaggy-dog-joke lists of fictional bands or fictional conspiracies or something in Robert Anton Wilson books.
**5:** Why is Israel one of the only developed countries with above-replacement fertility rate? It’s natural to suspect some role for its ultra-Orthodox Jewish population, who live traditional lifestyles with large (5-10 children) families. But they’re not numerous enough to shift fertility all by themselves, and even secular Israelis have anomalously high fertility. Maybe the presence of the ultra-Orthodox shifts broader cultural norms? But then why don’t isolated high-fertility groups elsewhere (eg Amish and Mormons in the US) produce the same phenomenon? [The “Nonzionism” blog gives the first really satisfying explanation I’ve seen](https://nonzionism.substack.com/p/why-is-israel-fertile): Israel has a uniquely continuous cultural gradient between their high-fertility subpopulation and everyone else (ie from ultra-Orthodox, to moderately-religious, to slightly-religious, to secular) with most stages having positive feelings about the stage above them (eg the moderately-religious respect the ultra-Orthodox for their piety). This lets ultra-Orthodox lifestyles percolate through and influence the general population in a way that eg Amish lifestyles don’t influence the average American.
**6:** …and I found the above a good appetizer before reading [It’s Embarrassing To Be A Stay At Home Mom](https://becomingnoble.substack.com/p/its-embarrassing-to-be-a-stay-at), which argues (I think correctly) that the root cause of declining fertility is what society finds honorable vs. low-status. Attempts to shore up fertility through economic means and free childcare have mostly failed. Attempts to shore it up with status (giving mothers of X children some kind of national award presented by a beloved figure) have . . . well, they’re at least *correlated* with success, although this post doesn’t prove causation as well as I’d like. In this model, Asians (Korea, Japan, etc) are having the most fertility issues because their societies are most collectivist, ie people more closely follow the gradient of what is vs. isn’t considered socially acceptable/high-status. I’m impressed by this post’s thoroughness, but also by arguments from the stay-at-home moms I know: they say people are constantly giving them grief about it, and often look for some part-time make-work job they can take just so people will stop looking down on them for being a stay-at-home mother (a friend suggests this is responsible for most of the popularity of multi-level marketing - and this same friend argues that Korea could solve its fertility crisis by mandating that all K-pop idols have at least two children).
**7:** Related, from [Regan Arntz-Gray](https://www.allcatsarefemale.com/p/its-like-nobody-wants-to-give-birth): despite the discourse around “childless cat ladies”, only about 20% of fertility decline since 1976 comes from more women choosing not to have children. The other 80% of the decline comes from women who do have children having fewer of them - the average 1976 woman with children had 3.3!
**8:** Law students, like most academic elites, are mostly liberal. But part of US legal training is apprenticing with a judge. And the more prestigious the judge, the more prestigious the clerkship, and the more career capital it provides. Judges and Supreme Court Justices are appointed through partisan politics, so they're about 50-50 liberal/conservative. And conservative judges prefer clerks who share their values. So the few Republicans who go into law have an easier time getting good clerkships and ending up on a prestigious career path, leading to a sort of unintentional "affirmative action" for right-wingers. [TracingWoodgrains on X gives the details and the stats](https://x.com/tracewoodgrains/status/1815200195077886181).
**9:** The princess of Norway [recently married](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czjy13kd90vo) an American “self-styled shaman” [whose Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durek_Verrett) makes him sound like a real catch:
> Durek Verrett is an American conspiracy theorist, convicted felon, alternative therapist, and self-professed shaman as a practitioner of Neoshamanism. He has been widely described by media and other observers as a conman and conspiracy theorist, and has served time in prison and been arrested and charged with various crimes . . . He asserts that casual sex attracts subterranean spirits that make an impression on the inside of women's vaginas and offers exercises to "clean out" said vaginas; he writes that children get cancer because they want it; and suggests that chemotherapy does not work and is given to cancer patients only because doctors make money from it. He promotes the Reptilian conspiracy theory, and has said that he considers himself to be a reptilian.
**10:** After a four year experiment with Portugal-style decriminalization of hard drugs, [Oregon has declared defeat and recriminalized them](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/09/01/oregon-drug-recriminalize-portland-decriminalize/). Reasons cited include: they didn’t actually have enough substance abuse programs to send abusers to treatment instead of jail, the state mismanaged grants intended to create such programs, attempts to punish drugs with simple fines didn’t work because abusers didn’t pay them, and the fentanyl crisis is getting sufficiently bad that Oregonians felt less comfortable with experimental solutions.
**11:** Related: [Steve Sailer on legalization vs. decriminalization of vice](https://www.stevesailer.net/p/why-legalizing-vice-in-corporate). My views evolved in something like the way Steve implicitly points at here: decriminalizing marijuana seemed to go okay, it seemed hypocritical and dumb for the law to be “marijuana is illegal but we won’t punish you for it in any way wink wink”, so (I thought) why not go all the way and legalize it? And the answer turns out to be: if it’s illegal but tolerated, then it’s supplied by random criminals; if it’s legal, it’s supplied by big corporations. And big corporations are good at advertising and tend to get what they want.
**12:** A while back [I wrote a piece saying people needed to be clearer](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/details-that-you-should-include-in) about what their “GET TOUGH” plans for dealing with mentally ill homeless people really meant. Later, Charles Lehman [wrote a response](https://thecausalfallacy.com/p/serious-mental-illness-is-an-optimization) describing his plan and arguing why it’s necessary. Most recently, [Ozy has written a response to Charles](https://thingofthings.substack.com/p/contra-charles-fain-lehman-on-mentally), basically expressing fear that Charles’ plan will unnecessarily commit a bunch of harmless well-functioning people. I bet Charles’ response will be that no, this isn’t what he wants at all, to which my response will be that *this is why you need to be clearer about what you mean*. That is, I’m sure Charles wants to only commit people who need commitment, and not commit people who don’t, but he hasn’t explained the mechanism by which a fallible court system and medical system will ensure that this actually happens, and those are the kinds of details that I’m most interested in.
**13:** From [here](https://x.com/DanielDiMartino/status/1818451368664772785):
**14:** Why did Egyptian pharaohs so often marry their sisters? [David Roman explains that it actually made sense by the logic of the time](https://substack.com/@mankind/note/c-63766524). Pharaohs didn’t necessarily consummate their marriages, and their heirs would usually be born from unrelated concubines, so the risk of inbreeding was low. What they really wanted was to avoid having to marry royal-line women off to anyone *else* - who could then create their own branches of the royal dynasty with competing claims to the throne.
**15:** The ominously named “cerebrolysin” has a positive reputation in the nootropics community, but [Greg Fitzgerald and Dan Elton do a deep dive](https://moreisdifferent.blog/p/wth-is-cerebrolysin-actually) and find that its manufacturing process is so poor that it ends up being mostly random amino acids - ie it can’t possibly work the way its proponents suggest. Interestingly, cerebrolysin performed about the same as some definitely-real chemicals (eg melatonin, nicotine) on [my old nootropics survey](https://slatestarcodex.com/2016/03/01/2016-nootropics-survey-results/), re-emphasizing that most of what the survey measures is placebo effects.
**16:** Why is the Ukraine war a horrible grinding war of attrition like World War I, instead of resembling more dynamic modern conflicts? I asked this on an Open Thread and got some good answers:
* [PolymorphicWetware](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-342/comment/65258454) says that the Soviets focused on artillery, so the post-Soviet armies of both Russia and Ukraine are both artillery-heavy. Artillery is better at defending your lines than breaking your enemies’, so both sides are great at pushing back enemy troops but bad at pushing forward themselves.
* [John Schilling](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-thread-342/comment/65287388) says that neither side in Ukraine has established air superiority - Ukraine because it barely has an air force, Russia because the West gave Ukraine cutting-edge anti-air defenses. This is almost unique among major modern wars, and the lack of air power pushes ground conflicts back towards the World War I equilibrium.
**17:** Related: the ancient Greeks built a city called Chersonensus in Crimea. The Russian occupiers in Crimea [are accused of “destroying” it](https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-occupation-authorities-destroy-unesco-220358673.html) in order to build some new structures there, alternately described as a museum, archaeological park, theater, or town (maybe there are all of these in different places)? [Pro-Russian accounts](https://x.com/SRBinWakanda/status/1817909445298471180) do however point out that the museum/park/theater/town is really pretty:
Obviously they are doing this for propaganda reasons. But we could avoid handing them easy propaganda victories by making places like this common everywhere!
**18:** Also related ([source](https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1823737350196973794)):
**19:** Ancient Chinese philosopher Wang Lin is known for, among other things, his [arguments against the existence of ghosts](https://iep.utm.edu/wangchon/#SSH4bi). For example:
> (2) *Argument from population*: If people become ghosts when they die, there should be more ghost sightings than living people, as the number of people who have lived in the past and died is far greater than the number of people now living. This is not true — ghost “sightings” are rare. Thus it cannot be that people when they die become ghosts.
>
> (3) *Argument from ghostly efficacy*: If a living person is harmed, this person will immediately go to a magistrate and bring a case against the party who harmed them. If it were the case that people become ghosts when they die and can interact with living humans, every ghostly murder victim would be seen going to a magistrate, telling him the name of the killer and the means of murder, leading him to the body, and so forth. This is never witnessed (ever).
**20:** You’ve probably seen that whenever a new LLM comes out, it comes with a “model card” showing how it outperforms all other LLMs, performs at near-human or above-human level on benchmarks, and is definitely the most advanced technology ever invented. You’ve also probably assumed those are mostly garbage. Your assumption is correct, but if you want to know exactly what’s going on, and how to sift through it for the grains of truth, Lawrence Chan has an article on [How To Read A Model Card](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/07/can-you-trust-an-ai-press-release).
**21:** [PhilosophyBear reports](https://philosophybear.substack.com/p/it-appears-twitter-x-provides-a-slur) the results of [experiments by @halomancer1 and other X/Twitter users](https://x.com/halomancer1/status/1805008140796407941): the site appears to block users from posting slurs *unless* they have more than 30,000 followers, in which case it gives them a free pass.
**22:** Daniel Bottger (author of the recent [Consciousness As Recursive Reflections](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/consciousness-as-recursive-reflections) guest post) reports that he has finished “his life’s work”, a [set of seven secular sermons](https://x.com/7SecularSermons/status/1823489417144623509). The post says that he’s publishing now because he “might die in neurosurgery this Friday”, but he reports that he made it through and is currently recovering well.
**23:** Gender differences? ([source](https://x.com/etirabys/status/1823973682462777680))
**24:** Another day, another [NYT doxxing scandal](https://archive.is/2024.08.16-212759/https://www.wsj.com/business/media/how-a-leak-by-a-new-york-times-reporter-led-to-an-anti-doxing-uproar-in-australia-e2a5844e): an NYT reporter joined a group chat of Jews talking about how they dealt with anti-Semitism. Then she shared the names of everyone in the group with someone who leaked it to anti-Israel activists. The activists proceeded to harass, stalk, threaten, and vandalize group members. NYT says that unspecified “disciplinary action” has been taken against the reporter, which apparently does not include firing her, demoting her, or any other effect observable in the physical world.
**25:** Sometimes business-minded presidential candidates say they will be “the CEO of America”. But did you know that America already has a [CTO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Technology_Officer_of_the_United_States) (Chief Technology Officer)?
**26:** I’ve lived in Oakland for five years now and never considered the possibility that it might be valorous, but apparently [Kamala Harris is committing “stolen valor” by claiming she comes from Oakland](https://leightonwoodhouse.substack.com/p/kamala-harris-is-not-from-oakland) (she actually comes from nearby Berkeley, which is apparently less cool).
**27:** Related: [Trevor Klee’s impressions after visiting California.](https://trevorklee.substack.com/p/thoughts-on-california-from-a-brief)
**28:** [Bryan Caplan asks readers what effect he has had on their lives](https://www.betonit.ai/p/what-have-i-ever-done-for-you). Many commenters say he convinced them to have children / more children than they otherwise would have, to change their education plans, or to generally become kinder people. See also [this Twitter poll](https://x.com/bryan_caplan/status/1288334349532897281), which if taken seriously suggests he’s at least partially responsible for >100 extra people having children!
**29:** Related: [Richard Hanania interviews](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/taking-the-greerhead-pledge) Scott Greer about [the Greerhead Pledge](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/taking-the-greerhead-pledge). Greer is a far-right influencer with many followers. He urges them to take “the Greerhead Pledge”, which he changes occasionally, but it’s always about avoiding various forms of vice and insufficiently-right-wing-compatible content (currently it’s at “no weed, no rap, no Marvel movies, no tattoos”). I find this an interesting transitional step between the usual influencer fan clubs and the kinds of real communities (or even religions) that can produce real change. I can’t find any publicly available community of Greerheads, so I don’t know how real it is, but the concept has potential.
**30:** CerebralLab [argues for restraint around GLP-1 agonists](https://cerebralab.com/My_lukewarm_take_on_GLP-1_agonists) - he is optimistic about them for people with serious disease, but reminds everyone that drugs have side effects and it might be worth pausing and thinking before basically healthy people take them to lose a few extra pounds.
**31:** Related: Nicholas Reville (of the Recursive Adaptation Substack) has [finally gotten a coalition together to do formal clinical trials of GLP-1RAs for addiction](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/announcing-a-coalition-for-large):
> Because the pharma companies with approved GLP-1s do not pursue addiction treatment, a large scale trial and FDA indication will not happen on its own. Without a strategic public effort along these lines, we may be waiting 10-15 years before a GLP-1 indication becomes available. If we are successful in launching large-scale studies, this will be an unprecedented non-profit scientific endeavor, filling the gap between public research agencies and pharma, and collaborating with both along the way. We’re excited. If you’re interested in the project and have expertise or resources that you think could advance the effort, we’d love to connect.
**32:** [Columbia’s anti-Semitism task force publishes their report](https://president.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Announcements/Report-2-Task-Force-on-Antisemitism.pdf). I guess I assumed that when people talked about anti-Semitism at college they meant pro-Palestine protests turning violent or something, but this suggests it’s much worse than that, eg people who wear Jewish head coverings getting spit on, Jewish students beings scared to walk alone on campus, etc. But props to them for publishing such a damning report and not trying to cover any of this up, I guess.
**33:** [New paper suggests](https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/249rv) that aspects of Bayesian decision making are not disturbed during autism. I’m suspicious that we don’t really know which aspects to measure. But I would have linked this paper if it confirmed my beliefs, so I guess I have to link the real paper that came out negative.
**34:** [Sasha Gusev has written an argument](https://theinfinitesimal.substack.com/p/no-intelligence-is-not-like-height) that twin studies are inaccurate and the heritability of IQ is much less than previously believed. It’s much better than the average obviously-dumb-and-motivated post trying to argue this, and contains lots of arguments I hadn’t seen before. See also [subreddit comments on original](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1f2otku/no_intelligence_is_not_like_height/), [Gusev’s responses](https://theinfinitesimal.substack.com/p/comments-on-no-intelligence-is-not), [comments on responses](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1f7ilap/comments_on_no_intelligence_is_not_like_height/). My impression is that there’s enough circumstantial evidence (eg adoption studies) that this probably has to be wrong, but I don’t think any of the arguments against it land, and I don’t know enough statistical genetics to critique it myself. I’d be interested in seeing one of the more mathematically-inclined pro-heritability people (@gwern? ? ? ? @Gene Smith?) give their impression.
**35:** I’m not saying Satoshi Nakamoto was a CIA asset, but [isn’t it weird that “Satoshi Nakamoto” is Japanese for “central intelligence”](https://x.com/jakebrodes/status/1831088623418306907)?
**36:** Amazon has added an incredibly annoying popup thing called “Rufus” that appears on every page now and can’t be turned off (Jeff Bezos would be turning in his grave). If you can’t figure out a good non-Amazon way to get the products you need, [here’s a good description of how to banish it using uBlock](https://x.com/VennStone/status/1828781183980929457).
**37:** Extelligence (aka “Some Guy”) is an excellent Substacker who often writes about his (unusual, colorful) life experiences. Here he has [a very compelling account of the mystical experience that led him to religion](https://extelligence.substack.com/p/anti-majestic-cosmic-horseshit). Highly recommended. And he asks that people who come to his blog for the colorful personal stories also read [his proposal for solving the crisis of trust](https://extelligence.substack.com/p/how-to-make-an-information-super), based on something like a browser extension that adds something like Twitter’s Community Notes to every site.
**38:** [Sequences Reading Group at Lighthaven](https://www.lesswrong.com/events/8rFdeSbRpqWAFnoev/first-lighthaven-sequences-reading-group). The Sequences are the founding text of the rationalist movement ([readable here](https://www.readthesequences.com/)), and Lighthaven is the rationalist HQ in Berkeley. The first meeting has already happened, but you can RSVP to their mailing list for information on future (weekly?) meetups.
**39:** [Sam Kriss on the online right](https://damagemag.com/2024/08/21/how-the-online-right-fell-apart/), self-recommending: “Whether it calls itself the Right or the Left, the real content of all online politics is the internet itself, and the arc of online politics always bends towards a bunch of strangers who spend their entire lives on the computer demanding that you publicly denounce your friends.”
**40:** This month in prediction markets: [a court reverses the CFTC’s ruling](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2024/09/06/kalshi-cleared-to-offer-congressional-prediction-markets-in-victory-against-cftc/) that Kalshi can’t have prediction markets on Congressional elections. I have to say - before I found a few subfields of politics where I was interested enough to follow the nuts and bolts, I never really understood how much of the law-making process was government agencies setting policies, the people who dislike those policies going to court, and the court cancelling the policies. Also, thanks to TracingWoodgrains and his lawyer friends for [their related work trying to protect US prediction markets](https://x.com/tracewoodgrains/status/1821353826797891820).
**41:** Nate Silver has a new book, *[On The Edge](https://amzn.to/3zbXilO),* about risky fields, the people who thrive in them, and the skills those people need. Here’s a [mostly positive review](https://mattglassman.substack.com/p/book-review-on-the-edge-nate-silver), here’s [another](https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2024/08/13/the-river-the-village-and-the-fort-nate-silvers-new-book-on-the-edge/), and here’s [a mostly negative one](https://enterprisevalue.substack.com/p/nate-silvers-on-the-edge-is-meh-but). Many of the negative reviews are dumb (“how dare he talk about gambling and capitalism without putting I HATE THEM in bold letters on every single page!”), but one of the better criticisms was that a lot of success in risky fields comes not from good risk intelligence, but from setting up heads-I-win-tails-you-lose style scams while *pretending* that your success comes from good risk intelligence. So one danger of knowing about the (very real!) importance of good risk intelligence is that it makes you more vulnerable to believing these people (although I understand that one part of Nate’s book describes how he was always suspicious of SBF, even before his misdeeds were public).
**42:** Related: Nate Silver’s [model](https://www.natesilver.net/p/nate-silver-2024-president-election-polls-model) (subscriber only, sorry) currently (as of 9-11-24) gives Trump above 60-40 odds of winning:
…even though Harris is ahead in most swing state polls:
This is partly because his model is pricing in a “convention bounce” for the Democrats around now - it’s unclear whether it’s right to do so; [without the bounce](https://www.natesilver.net/p/oops-i-made-the-convention-bounce) (also subscriber only) they’re at 50-50. Meanwhile, forecasters are a little more optimistic about Harris’ chances:
**43:** [“[Why] I Left The Hegelian E-Girl Council”](https://x.com/sanjehorah/status/1820166653226725734). Indeed do many things come to pass.
**44:** New voices in favor of SB 1047 California bill on regulating AI - [Elon Musk](https://techcrunch.com/2024/08/26/elon-musk-unexpectedly-offers-support-for-californias-ai-bill/), net neutrality + open software hero [Lawrence Lessig](https://x.com/lessig/status/1821617960445698307), and formerly-skeptical AI company [Anthropic](https://pureai.com/Articles/2024/08/23/Anthropic-CEO-Backs-SB-1047.aspx). Meanwhile, opponents are sticking to their talking point that it’s an attempt by incumbents to shut down upstart competitors (funny; the biggest incumbent, OpenAI, [is against it](https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/senator-wiener-responds-openai-opposition-sb-1047)), and trying to muddy the waters with [really dumb polls](https://x.com/DanHendrycks/status/1828880835992531317).
**45:** Debating which candidate has better policies seems so almost comical these days - isn’t everyone already sure which candidate is an ontologically-evil commie Nazi, and which is a bold hero riding in to save the Union? Still, a few people have taken on this thankless task, most notably [Richard Hanania](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/hating-conservatism-while-voting) for Trump and [Jeff Maurer](https://imightbewrong.substack.com/p/in-which-i-try-to-reason-richard) for Harris. The most compelling pro-Trump argument is that Harris endorses some utterly idiotic economic policies (eg price controls) that could make everyone poorer and (if doubled down upon) knock the US into corrupt perma-stagnation like the worse parts of Europe, and these are so comically bad that they should override Harris’ advantages in other areas. But Maurer argues that even sticking to economics (Trump’s relatively non-crazy area), once you add up Trump’s proposed tariffs, threats to Fed independence, and NIMBYism he doesn’t look any better than Harris here - and then he loses on the non-economic and character issues. And [Bentham’s Bulldog](https://benthams.substack.com/p/contra-hanania-on-trump) (pro-Harris) and [Samuel Hammond](https://www.secondbest.ca/p/the-ea-case-for-trump-2024) (pro-Trump) make cases of their own within a more specifically EA framework around existential risks, etc.
**46:** An unsympathetic portrayal of [what went wrong with Lambda School](https://www.sandofsky.com/lambda-school/) (now BloomTech), a programming boot camp which deferred tuition until after you got a programming job and could easily pay them back. It got started right when a bumper crop of programming bootcamps created a glut of entry-level programmers - but more than that, the school leadership responded poorly, inflating their placement statistics and going after former students in borderline predatory ways.
**47:** Did you know: Malaysia not only has a king, but also a [Deputy King](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_of_Malaysia#Deputy_king).
**48:** Despite what you hear, Republicans [support Ukraine over Russia by 58% to 4%](https://x.com/OlegKostour/status/1828156979078127852) (and in accordance with what you hear, Democrats support them by 76% to 1%).
**49:** Michael Wiebe continues to do great work replicating (and failing to replicate) econ papers. Most recently ([source](https://x.com/michael_wiebe/status/1749462957132759489)):
It really does seem like a lot of big economics results that get brought out in policy debates aren’t just wrong, but simple-coding error wrong, and that one person has discovered a bunch of these. The hero we’ve all been waiting for!
**50:** Did you know: [one of the landmark cases on gender transition in Australia is called](https://www.genderclinicnews.com/p/trouble-with-tickle) *[Tickle v. Giggle](https://www.genderclinicnews.com/p/trouble-with-tickle)*, and Australian gender warriors have to have strong opinions on *Tickle v. Giggle* and its ramifications. This seems like a good (albeit unintentional) way to make people feel embarrassed to center their entire political identity around this topic. | Scott Alexander | 148484450 | Links For September 2024 | acx |
# Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism
Freddie deBoer [has a post on what he calls “the temporal Copernican principle.”](https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/the-temporal-copernican-principle) He argues we shouldn’t expect a singularity, apocalypse, or any other crazy event in our lifetimes. Discussing celebrity transhumanist Yuval Harari, he writes:
> What I want to say to people like Yuval Harari is this. The modern human species is about 250,000 years old, give or take 50,000 years depending on who you ask. Let’s hope that it keeps going for awhile - we’ll be conservative and say 50,000 more years of human life. So let’s just throw out 300,000 years as the span of human existence, even though it could easily be 500,000 or a million or more. Harari's lifespan, if he's lucky, will probably top out at about 100 years. So: what are the odds that Harari’s lifespan overlaps with the most important period in human history, as he believes, given those numbers? That it overlaps with a particularly important period of human history at all? Even if we take the conservative estimate for the length of human existence of 300,000 years, that means Harari’s likely lifespan is only about .33% of the entirety of human existence. Isn’t assuming that this .33% is somehow particularly special a very bad assumption, just from the basis of probability? And shouldn’t we be even more skeptical given that our basic psychology gives us every reason to overestimate the importance of our own time?
(I think there might be a math error here - 100 years out of 300,000 is 0.033%, not 0.33% - but this isn’t my main objection.)
He then condemns a wide range of people, including me, for failing to understand this:
> Some people who routinely violate the Temporal Copernican Principle include Harari, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Sam Altman, Francis Fukuyama, Elon Musk, Clay Shirky, Tyler Cowen, Matt Yglesias, Tom Friedman, **Scott Alexander**, every tech company CEO, Ray Kurzweil, Robin Hanson, and many many more. I think they should ask themselves how much of their understanding of the future ultimately stems from a deep-seated need to believe that their times are important because they think they themselves are important, or want to be.
I deny misunderstanding this. Freddie is wrong.
Since we don’t know when a future apocalypse might happen, we can sanity-check ourselves by looking at past apocalyptic near-misses. The closest that humanity has come to self-annihilation in the past 300,000 years was probably the [Petrov nuclear incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov) in 1983[1](#footnote-1), ie within Freddie’s lifetime. Pretty weird that out of 300,000 years, this would be only 41 years ago!
Maybe you’re more worried about environmental devastation than nuclear war? The biggest climate shock of the past 300,000 years was . . . also during Freddie’s lifetime[2](#footnote-2). Man, these three-in-a-thousand coincidences keep adding up!
“Temporal Copernicanism”, as described, fails basic sanity checks. But we shouldn’t have even needed sanity checks as specific as these. Common sense already tells us that new apocalyptic weapons and environmental disasters were more likely to arise during the 20th century than, say, the century between 184,500 BC and 184,400 BC!
What’s Freddie doing wrong, and how can we do better? The following argument is loosely based [on one by Toby Ord](https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/04/01/book-review-the-precipice/). Consider three types of events:
First, **those uniformly distributed across calendar time**. For example, asteroid strikes are like this. Here Freddie is completely right: if there are 300,000 years of human history, and you live 100 years, there’s an 0.03% chance that the biggest asteroid in human history strikes during your lifetime. Because of this, most people who think about existential risk don’t take asteroid strikes too seriously as a potential cause of near-term apocalypses.
Second, **those uniformly distributed across humans**. This is what you might use to solve [Sam Bankman-Fried’s](https://philosophybear.substack.com/p/statistics-shakespeare-and-sam-bankman)[3](#footnote-3) [Shakespeare problem](https://philosophybear.substack.com/p/statistics-shakespeare-and-sam-bankman) - what’s the chance that the greatest playwright in human history is alive during a given period? Freddie sort of gets this far[4](#footnote-4), and provides a number: 7% of humans who ever lived are alive today[5](#footnote-5).
Third, **those uniformly distributed across techno-economic advances**. You’d use this to answer questions like “how likely is it that the most important discovery/invention in history thus far happens during my lifetime?” This seems like the right way to predict things like nuclear weapons, global warming, or the singularity. But it’s harder to measure than the previous two.
You could try using GDP growth. At the beginning of Freddie’s life, world GDP (measured in real dollars) was about $40 trillion per year. Now it’s about $120 trillion. So on this metric, about 66% of absolute techno-economic progress has happened during Freddie’s lifetime. But we might be more interested in relative techno-economic progress. That is, the Agricultural Revolution might have increased yields from 10 bushels to 100 bushels of corn. And some new tractor design invented yesterday might increase it from 10,000 bushels to 10,100 bushels. But that doesn’t mean the new tractor design was more important than the Agricultural Revolution. Here I think the right measure is log GDP growth; by this metric, about 20% of techno-economic progress has happened during Freddie’s lifetime.
Freddie sort of starts thinking in this direction[6](#footnote-6), but shuts it down on the grounds that some people think technological growth rates have slowed down since the mid-20th century. Usually the metric that gets brought out to support this is changes in total factor productivity, which do show the mid-20th century as a more dynamic period than today. So fine, let’s do the same calculation with total productivity. My impression from eyeballing [this paper](https://orbilu.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/55043/1/s40797-023-00221-x%20%281%29.pdf) is that about 35% of all increase in TFP growth and 15% of all log TFP growth has *still* happened during Freddie’s lifetime.
So what’s our prior that the most exciting single technological advance in history thus far happens during Freddie’s lifetime? My best guess is 15%[7](#footnote-7).
How do we move from “most exciting advance in history” to questions about the singularity or the apocalypse?
Robin Hanson cashes out “the singularity” as an economic phase change of equal magnitude to the Agricultural or Industrial Revolutions. If we stick to that definition, we can do a little better at predicting it: it’s a change of a size such that it’s happened twice before. Using our previous number, we estimate ~30% chance that such a change happens in our lifetime.
(sanity check: the last such earth-shattering change was the Industrial Revolution, about 3 - 4 lifetimes ago.)
What about the apocalypse? This one is tougher. Freddie tries to do an argument from absurdity: suppose the apocalypse happened tomorrow. Wouldn’t it be crazy that, you, of all the humans who have ever existed, were correct when you thought the apocalypse was nigh? No, it’s not crazy at all. If the apocalypse happens tomorrow, then 7% of humans throughout history would have been right to predict an apocalypse in their lifetime. That’s not a such a low percent - your probability of being born in the final generation is about the same as (eg) your probability of being born in North America.
Here’s a question I don’t know how to answer - the number above (7%) is about how surprised you should be if the apocalypse happens in your lifetime. But I don’t think it’s the *overall* *chance* that the apocalypse happens in your lifetime, because the apocalypse could be millions of years away, after there had been trillions of humans, and then retroactively it would seem much less likely that the apocalypse happened during the 21st century. So: is it possible to calculate this chance? I think there ought to be a way to leverage the [Carter Doomsday Argument](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument) here, but I’m not quite sure of the details.
Speaking of the Carter Doomsday Argument…
…Freddie is re-inventing [anthropic reasoning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle), a well-known philosophical concept. The reason why the hundreds of academics who have written books and papers about anthropics have never noticed that it disproves transhumanism and the singularity is because Freddie’s version has obvious mistakes that a sophomore philosophy student would know better than to make.
(local Substacker [Bentham’s Bulldog](https://benthams.substack.com/) is a sophomore philosophy student, and his anthropics mistakes are [much more interesting](https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-best-argument-for-god).)
The world’s leading expert on anthropic reasoning is probably Oxford philosophy professor Nick Bostrom, who [literally wrote the book](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_Bias) on the subject. Awkwardly for Freddie, Bostrom is also one of the founders of the modern singularity movement. This is because, understood correctly, anthropics provides no argument against a singularity or any other transhumanist idea, and might (weakly) support them.
I think if you use anthropic reasoning correctly, you end up with a prior probability of something like 30% that the singularity (defined as a technological revolution as momentous as agriculture or industry) happens[8](#footnote-8) during your lifetime, and a smaller percent that I’m not sure about (maybe 7%[9](#footnote-9)?) that the apocalypse happens during your lifetime. None of these probabilities are lower than the probability that you’re born in North America, so people should stop acting like they’re so small as to be absurd or impossible.
But also, [prior probabilities are easy-come, easy-go](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/JD7fwtRQ27yc8NoqS/strong-evidence-is-common). The prior probability that you’re born in Los Angeles is only 0.05%. But if you look out your maternity ward window and see the Hollywood sign, ditch that number immediately and update to near certainty. No part of anthropics should be able to prevent you from updating on your observations about the world around you, and on your common sense.
(except maybe the part about how [you’re in a simulation](https://simulation-argument.com/), or the part about how [there’s definitely a God who created an infinite number of universes](https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-anthropic-argument-for-theism), or [how there must be thousands of US states](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/my-2024-presidential-debate), or [how the world must end before 10,000 AD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument), or [how the Biblical Adam could use his reproductive decisions as a shortcut to supercomputation](https://risingentropy.com/adam-and-eves-anthropic-superpowers/), or several other things along these same lines. I actually hate anthropic reasoning. I just think that if you’re going to do it, you should do it right.)
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
The Toba supervolcano is [over-rated.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youngest_Toba_eruption#Toba_catastrophe_theory) You could argue Cuban Missile Crisis was worse than Petrov, but that just brings us back 60 years instead of 40, which I think still proves my point.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Something called “[the Eemian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last_Interglacial)” 130,000 years ago was larger in magnitude, but happened gradually over several thousand years. Maybe I’m cheating by failing to rigorously define “biggest climate shock”, but I think we’re definitely in at least the biggest of the past few millennia.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
Better known for other work.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
If he got this far halfway down, why did he even present the obviously-wrong 0.03% number as his headline result? Was he hoping we wouldn’t read the rest of his post?
[5](#footnote-anchor-5)
This is slightly wrong for the exact framing of the question; your life is a span rather than a point, so probably by the time you die, about 10% of humans will have been alive during your lifespan. The exact way you think about this depends on how old you are, and I’ll stick with the 7% number for the rest of the essay.
[6](#footnote-anchor-6)
Again, I don’t understand why he bothered giving the earlier obviously-wrong-for-this-problem numbers, vaguely half-alluded to the existence of this one in order to complain that someone could miscalculate it, and then put no effort into calculating it correctly or at least admitting that he couldn’t calculate the number that mattered.
[7](#footnote-anchor-7)
Some of these numbers depend on how you’re thinking of “lifespan” vs. “lifespan so far” and how much of your actually-existing foreknowledge about the part of your life you’ve already lived you’re using. I’m just going to handwave all of that away since it depends on how you’re framing the question and doesn’t change results by more than a factor of two or three.
[8](#footnote-anchor-8)
Realistically the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions were long processes instead of point events. I think the singularity will be shorter (just as the Industrial Revolution was shorter than the Agricultural), but if this bothers you, imagine we’re talking about the start (or peak) of each.
[9](#footnote-anchor-9)
It might be unfair for me to use this number as a central estimate instead of a lower bound, except that when I actually try to do the Carter Doomsday calculation I sometimes get *higher* estimates. I haven’t discussed these in the post because I’m very unsure I’m doing the calculation correctly. | Scott Alexander | 148609720 | Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism | acx |
# Open Thread 346
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** ACX commenter Metacelsus is a Harvard bio PhD who the excellent [De Novo](https://denovo.substack.com/) blog; he also reviews most ACX posts and grants on biology for me. He recently co-founded a startup, [Ovelle](https://ovelle.bio/contact-us/), to commercialize his academic work on gametogenesis (turning arbitrary cells into eggs). If this worked, it could replace the complicated and invasive egg harvesting process of IVF with a simple blood draw or mouth swab. But beyond that, it would allow women to circumvent menopause by creating eggs at any age (women can safety become pregnant well into their 50s, they just lose the ability to create eggs naturally), and maybe (this is still speculative) allow gay couples to have biological children. And with a couple of extra steps, you could turn this into a supercharged version of [embryo selection](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/welcome-polygenically-screened-babies) that could essentially end all genetic disease (existing techniques don’t give you enough rerolls for more than incremental gains). This technology [already works in mice](https://denovo.substack.com/p/of-mice-and-men-and-eggs), and some companies (including [one backed by Sam Altman](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/10/28/1038172/conception-eggs-reproduction-vitro-gametogenesis/)) are working on translating it to humans - but IIUC Metacelsus is coming from an academic lab that’s gotten significantly further. Ovelle is looking for people who want to invest or work for them (remember, investing in biotech is a minefield best left to professionals, and working in biotech is terrible and soul-sucking). You can contact them [here](https://ovelle.bio/contact-us/).
**2:** ~~I’m interested in holding some kind of AI art Turing test, but I’m not good enough at AI art to do this myself (when I try, the images come out in an obviously AI-ish style, in a way that I’ve seen other AI art users avoid). I was hoping to get a few pictures in the style of old masters, modern art, etc and juxtapose them to real paintings of the same category which are too obscure for most people to recognize. If you think this would be a fun challenge, email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com. I can at least compensate you for the cost of the AI image generation, and I’m open to negotiating more substantial payment.~~ I have many offers now, thank you! | Scott Alexander | 148667536 | Open Thread 346 | acx |
# Your Book Review: The Pale King
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
For the longest time, I avoided reading *The Pale King*. It wasn’t the style—in places thick with the author’s characteristic footnotes,[1](#footnote-1) sentences that run for pages, and spasms of dense technical language. Nor was it the subject matter—the book is set at an IRS Center and tussles with postmodernism. Nor the themes, one of which concerns the existential importance of boredom, which the book, at times, takes pains to exemplify.
No—I couldn’t read *The Pale King* because it was the book that killed him.
## Prelude: First Encounter
David Foster Wallace died in 2008, a year before I encountered his work; but I didn’t know it at the time. I was nineteen, with a broken wrist that forced me to drop all of my courses and left me homebound and bored. I decided to revenge myself on these irritating circumstances by spending four months lying in bed, stoned, reading fiction and eating snacks.[2](#footnote-2) And I happened to have a copy of *Infinite Jest*.
What to say about *Infinite Jest*? It remains Wallace’s masterpiece, widely considered the greatest novel of Generation X. It takes place in a near future where the US, Canada and Mexico have been merged into a single state. Each year is corporately branded, with most of the action taking place in “The Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment.” It’s set in three locales: a drug rehabilitation center, an elite tennis academy, and a Quebecois terrorist cell.[3](#footnote-3) The novel clocks in at over a thousand pages, two hundred of which are footnotes. It includes sentences of absurd length, with some descending into multi-page molecular descriptions of various drugs. The book pulls the kind of stunts that shouldn’t work, but in *Infinite Jest* they do, because the book is that good, the characters that deep, the subject matter that prescient. *Infinite Jest* is often considered the “first internet novel,” predicting in particular its addictive allure.
By all rights, I should have hated it. Long, ostentatious, packed with dozens of characters, 90% of whom happened to be straight white males. As I read, I tallied the number of named female characters (three), imagining the tirades I would go on with my similarly politically-inclined friends.
No such tirades materialized. *Infinite Jest* overcame my ideological fervor, a rare feat at the time. I cared too much about the characters, many of whom spoke to internal experiences I recognized but had never put into words. The themes gestured at a worldview beyond my radical leftist ideology, one I wouldn’t fully articulate for many more years. Reading David Foster Wallace felt itchy, somehow, like his message was sideways to everyone else’s, like he was missing some important point, or else I was.
## The Project of David Foster Wallace
*Infinite Jest* made Wallace a star. The book was both a literary sensation and cultural phenomenon, described by one commentator as “the central American novel of the past thirty years, a dense star for lesser work to orbit." Nonetheless, Wallace wasn’t totally satisfied. “I don’t think it’s very good,” he wrote, “some clipping called a published excerpt feverish and not entirely satisfying, which goes a long way toward describing the experience of writing the thing.” He grew determined to surpass *Infinite Jest* with something new.
Wallace aimed to write fiction that was “morally passionate, passionately moral.” He believed that “Fiction's about what it is to be a fucking human being.” His active period spanned the late 80s to the 00’s, cresting during the cynical 90s, the age of the neoliberal shrug, when on one hand,“Postmodern irony and cynicism's become an end in itself, a measure of hip sophistication and literary savvy,” and on the other, the average American parked himself in front of the television for six hours a day.
His major concerns were:
1) How to transcend postmodernism
2) The deforming effects of entertainment culture
Postmodernism can be understood as the idea that we’re so trapped within language that reality remains remote. At its most extreme, postmodernism seems to suggest that language is all that exists. In politics, this manifests as movements that focus on how people speak, much more than movements of the past; and in literature, as writing that aims not to immerse the reader in a plausible world, but to keep the reader hyper-focused on the fact that they’re reading a work of fiction. Wallace began his literary career as a postmodernist,[4](#footnote-4) before swerving away mid-career, most dramatically with *Infinite Jest*.
He wasn’t some simple reactionary. His work wove in postmodern self-awareness, metacommentary and irony, all while arguing that we had to transcend it. And to do so, we need the very principles postmodernism had spent the past half-century deconstructing: decency, sincerity, responsibility, neighborliness, sacrifice. As he said in his famous Kenyon commencement address, *This is Water*, “The really important kind of freedom involves attention, and awareness, and discipline, and effort, and being able truly to care about other people and to sacrifice for them, over and over, in myriad petty little unsexy ways, every day.”
He believed contemporary fiction was stuck in two modes: cheap entertainment, or grim jeremiad. “Look, man, we’d probably most of us agree that these are dark times, and stupid ones, but do we need fiction that does nothing but dramatize how dark and stupid everything is?” He aimed to inspire a vision of another way of living, both with others and within our own minds. His third novel, the “Long Thing,” which eventually came to be titled *The Pale King*, was meant to be an articulation of that vision.
## Post-postmodernism
After I left the radical left, it was hard to find anything to believe in. The rightists were refreshingly frank, but dealt with postmodernism mainly by strawmanning it, ignoring its strongest points and asserting the naivest of realisms. Besides, their ideas were ugly and brutal. Religion offered another path, but again, it felt like mere reaction—giving up on synthesis and bowing out of the intellectual conversation altogether.
Wallace was one of the few suggesting something new. In Wallace’s world, postmodernism and consumer culture form a wicked duo, the former reducing reality to discourse, and the latter papering over the resulting emptiness with a carnival of glittering distractions. His work uses the techniques of postmodernism to depict the frenetic, saturated tempo of modern life, but through it all unearthed the perennially human—like he was saying *look, we haven’t seen it in awhile, but it’s still here!* The project of writing sincere fiction striving for moral depth was so out of vogue, it’s almost shocking at times to read; while his style is arch-modern, he considered 19th-century novelists his spiritual inspiration. Wallace offered a worldview which was old fashioned but not right-wing, beautiful and true, but also *sophisticated*.[5](#footnote-5)
In short, I became a huge Wallace stan. I began devouring his essays and short stories, name-dropping him constantly, even pinned a David Foster Wallace button to my backpack. I was a little discomfited by talk of the [supposed obnoxiousness of his fans](https://electricliterature.com/men-recommend-david-foster-wallace-to-me/): “David Foster Wallace lit-bros,” who “played ultimate frisbee, rallied against multinational beverage corporations, listened to The Mountain Goats, and told me to read *Infinite Jest*.”
But this was easy to dismiss. Wallace was brilliant and sensitive, our best hope for overcoming postmodernism. No doubt his critics were intimidated by the length and difficulty of his prose; or else trapped in the glass fortress of postmodernism, fulfilling the twin imperatives of defending the keep and tearing down the beautiful and the excellent.
Besides, Wallace’s fans were supposedly dudes. My femaleness was counterargument enough.
## His Sickness
In his youth, Wallace was beset by mental breakdowns. He dropped out of school multiple times, underwent electroshock therapy, and contemplated suicide. When in grad school, he was put on Nardil, an MAOI. MAOIs work by inhibiting Monoamine Oxidase, which in turn hoovers up monoamine neurotransmitters like serotonin, dopamine and norepinephrine. This double negative leaves the user with a more motivated, peaceful and energized brain chemistry.[6](#footnote-6)
This was the neuropharmacological lot in which Wallace was parked in 1985.[7](#footnote-7) He remained on Nardil through the writing of *Infinite Jest*, two collections of essays, two books of short stories, and the rough draft of *The Pale King*. Through it all, Wallace would’ve been on the Tyramine Diet, avoiding cheese, hot dogs and fermented foods. He was never entirely satisfied with being on antidepressants. [In the words of his friend](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/18/farther-away-jonathan-franzen), Jonathan Franzen, he was a “perfectionist” with an “aversion to seeing himself as permanently mentally ill.” He tried going off Nardil in 1988, but fell into a profound depression, and was only able to get Nardil to work again by combining it with electroshock therapy.
## Writing *The Pale King*
The novel that would eventually be titled *The Pale King* went through many stages, starting with an early draft focused on an IRS agent so obsessed with viewing himself from a third person perspective that he stars in his own porno. This plotline receded, with the book converging on its eventual focus: a group of IRS agents travel to an examination center in Peoria, Illinois, 1985, where a battle takes place over the philosophical and technological future of the agency.
As the years went by, Wallace got lost in the project. He described the writing process as “trying to carry a sheet of plywood in a windstorm,” and said, “The whole thing is a tornado that won’t hold still long enough for me to see what’s useful and what isn’t.” He worried he’d need to write “a 5,000 page manuscript and then winnow it by 90%, the very idea of which makes something in me wither and get really interested in my cuticle, or the angle of the light outside.”
By 2007, a decade in, he’d made progress, but the book was still far from any kind of final form, and he felt stuck. In the Spring of that year, he went to a Persian restaurant and was left with severe stomach pains. The culprit, of course, was Nardil.
His doctor advised him to switch to an SSRI. Nardil was, after all, a “dirty drug,” from another time. Wallace decided to go for it: after 22 years, he went off Nardil. According to Jonathan Franzen, the lack of progress on *The Pale King* wasn’t incidental to this decision: “That he was blocked with his work when he decided to quit Nardil—was bored with his old tricks and unable to muster enough excitement about his new novel to find a way forward with it—is not inconsequential.”
For the first couple weeks Wallace felt alright, but as Nardil receded from his system, so did his stability. He lost thirty pounds, stopped writing, and was hospitalized for major depressive disorder. He grew desperate: tried an array of antidepressants, underwent electroshock once again. He tried going back on Nardil, but the drug that had stabilized him for two decades no longer worked—it closed its doors, as often happens when a patient goes off a stable regimen and tries to come back.
It was 2008 and Wallace was down 70 pounds from the previous year. Franzen believed Wallace became obsessed with the idea of suicide, returning to compulsively, like an addict. Wrote Franzen:
> [O]ne of his own favored tropes, articulated especially clearly in his story “Good Old Neon” and in his treatise on Georg Cantor, was the infinite divisibility of a single instant in time. However continually he was suffering in his last summer, there was still plenty of room, in the interstices between his identically painful thoughts, to entertain the idea of suicide, to flash forward through its logic, and to set in motion the practical plans (of which he eventually made at least four) for effectuating it.
On September 12th, 2008, Wallace wrote a letter to his wife, arranged the unfinished manuscript of *The Pale King* on his desk, and hanged himself. He was 46 years old.
## ***The Pale King*****: Central Concerns**
After Wallace’s death, his editor Michael Pietsch assembled the manuscript, winnowing it down to a set of consistent characters and generally forward-moving narrative. *Infinite Jest* famously ends before the climax, major plot threads dangling, and so does *The Pale King*—but while the former is cruelly deliberate, *The Pale King* remains unfinished through tragic happenstance, major themes underdeveloped, story nascent.
The plot: a group of IRS hires converge on an examination center in Peoria, Illinois, circa 1985. There’s the sense that once they’re there, things will start happening, but nothing really does. The chapters alternate between the 1985 story, character background, debate/discussion of the deeper philosophical meaning of the IRS, metanarrative written in the voice of 2005 David Foster Wallace, scraps of trivia/world building/slices-of-life.
To give a sense of the disparate voices in the book:
- We witness the messy mind of literature’s worst psychic, who channels random irrelevancies like “The middle name of the childhood friend of a stranger they pass in a hallway,” or “someone they sit near in a movie was once sixteen cars behind them on an I-5 near McKitterick CA on a warm, rainy October day in 1971.”
- One chapter is focused on a young boy whose “particular [ ] goal was to press his lips to every square inch of his own body.” This was meant to be the backstory for one of the characters, but Wallace never settled on which.
- A chapter where everyone turns pages: “Ken Wax turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page. ‘Groovy’ Bruce Channing turns a page. Ann Williams turns a page. Anand Singh turns two pages at once by mistake and turns one back which makes a slightly different sound. David Cusk turns a page.”
- A ‘prologue’ Wallace inserted 70 pages into the book, written in the 2005 authorial voice, launches into a diatribe about how the book is really a memoir of his time working for the IRS, but for legal reasons the publishers insist on classifying it as a work of fiction. “This might appears to set up an irksome paradox. The book’s legal disclaimer defines everything that follows it as fiction, including this Forward, but now, here in this Forward I’m saying that the whole thing really is nonfiction; so if you believe one you can’t believe the other, & c., & c.”[8](#footnote-8)
The characters are monumentally well-developed. We follow IRS bureaucrats as they suffer childhood abuse in dusty trailer parks, struggle with “attacks” of copious sweating, watch a father die in a subway accident. And these lives—which feel so *human* and so *real*—are juxtaposed with the tedium of their work at the IRS.
We can’t help but be reminded that faceless bureaucrats are real people, as real as us. But there’s a feeling, while reading (I was feeling it, at least), that I wanted these characters to become *more* than IRS agents. To be artists or firemen or—*something*. Something more *interesting*.
But Wallace suggests this impulse is wrong. He’s not trying to depict these IRS examiners as being in any way exceptional, despite our identification with them—rather, he’s trying to show that every human being is that deep, and that interesting, if we take the time to know them. He enjoins us to avoid relating to others as “the great gray abstract mass,” even if they form part of some tedious and unappealing bureaucracy. To take on the burden of always, in every moment, relating to others as fully human.
This injunction is central to Wallace’s approach to transcending postmodernism. His great innovation was to use the tools of postmodern writing (meant to remind the reader that they’re reading words, not experiencing reality) to create work that loops back around and becomes as immersive and convincing as the finest of realist prose. His writing embodies the nerve-fraying and frenetic pace of modern life, with the technical jargon and long sentences and footnotes capturing something of the feel of the internet. And through it all, his characters shine through, heartbreakingly human, capable not only of cruelty[9](#footnote-9), but of goodness that surprises even themselves.
Wallace’s writing is maximalist in that he forces you to deal with all of it: the difficulty in escaping the web of discourse, the fact that you’re reading a novel, the fragmented nature of modern life, the fact that the IRS asshole auditing you has as rich and deeply felt a human experience as your own.
## Pale King: Themes
The plot builds towards a war over the future of the IRS: with one side wanting the IRS to remain committed to civic virtue, its tax examinations carried out by humans; and the other wanting the IRS focused on maximizing profits, its examiners to be replaced by computers. The IRS here is standing in for all institutions where people operate both as individuals and as part of a larger collective: the conflict between the IRS as civic organization and the IRS as corporation reflects a general conflict taking place in the 80s[10](#footnote-10), and arguably still today.
Wallace is, of course, on team human. His criticism of the profit motive parallels his rejection of minimalism, the aesthetic of postmodernism: when we reduce reality to a thin, abstract variable, whether that be profit or discourse, we mutilate it. And once we’re there , all that’s left is our role as solipsistic consumers.
One of the most moving sections of the book is a 100-page novella smack in the middle, written from the perspective of wastoid[11](#footnote-11)-turned-accountant Chris Fogel. Chris’ 1970s youth was spent in partying and shallow rebellion, once again, papering over a deep emptiness: “I think the truth is that I was the worst kind of nihilist—the kind who isn’t even aware he’s a nihilist. I was like a piece of paper on the street in the wind, thinking, ‘Now I think I’ll blow this way, now I think I’ll blow that way.’ My essential response to everything was ‘Whatever.’”[12](#footnote-12)
The emotional core of the story is Chris’ relationship with his father, who’s sardonic, dutiful, and old-fashioned: “His attitude towards life was that there are certain things that have to be done and you simply have to do them—such as, for instance, going to work every day.” Chris resents his father’s conformity, while blind to his own: “I was just as much a conformist as he was, plus a hypocrite, a ‘rebel’ who really just sponged off of society in the form of his parents.”
Chris’ story is located close in the book to a philosophical dialogue concerning the nature of the IRS and the moral crisis in society. As one character expounds (emphasis mine):
> ‘It’ll all be played out in the **world of images**. There’ll be this incredible political consensus that we need to escape the confinement and rigidity of conforming, of **the dead fluorescent world of the office and the balance sheet**, of having to wear a tie and listen to Muzak, but the corporations will be able to represent **consumption-patterns as the way to break out**—use this type of calculator, listen to this type of music, wear this type of shoe because everyone else is wearing conformist shoes. It’ll be this era of **incredible prosperity and conformity** and mass-demographics in which all the symbols and rhetoric will involve revolution and crisis and bold forward-looking individuals who dare to march to their own drummer **by allying themselves with brands that invest heavily in the image of rebellion**. This mass PR campaign extolling the individual will solidify **enormous markets of people whose innate conviction that they are solitary, peerless, non-communal, will be massaged at every turn**.’
This speech is set in the 80s, but was written in the 00s, when the internet was nascent and social media hadn’t yet taken off. Wallace’s diagnosis is prescient: between Quiet Quitting and Live to Work, young people are rejecting the tedium of office life and embracing the life of the influencer, which does indeed involve both the trappings of rebellion and conspicuous consumption.
It hasn’t gone down exactly as Wallace predicted. He was concerned about the withering effects of hedonism (which true to his predictions have persisted), but he underestimated the resurgence of doctrinaire political ideology.
*The Pale King* is in many ways revanchist, arguing for reclamation of territory lost to hedonism in the name of old-fashioned ideals like civic responsibility, neighborliness, and going to work every day. And revanchism has certainly made a comeback: today we face a proliferation of conservative/Trad movements, but very few seem interested in rehabilitating old fashioned civic virtue.[13](#footnote-13) Cynicism in societal institutions is endemic on both the right and the left, perhaps with good reason: while a bureaucrat in the 80s could expect to own a home and support a family, these days an ‘ordinary’ job doesn’t cut it. The IRS’s of the world have taken the path that Wallace warned against, embracing automation and the bottom line, and neglecting the real, human realities of the people they’re meant to serve.
The Millennial/Gen Z complaint is real: the economic conditions are harder than they were in the 50s/70s/90s; the world of our parents no longer exists; starting a family is exorbitant. So why should we subject ourselves to bureaucratic tedium and keep society running, when society doesn’t seem to care much about us?
The basic argument is that it’s our parents’ fault. Our literal parents, their generational fellows, and the government-as-parent. Wallace-speaking-through-character goes on, “‘I don’t think the American nation today is infantile so much as adolescent—that is, ambivalent in its twin desire for both authoritarian structure and the end of parental hegemony.’”
There’s a kind of double-dialogue happening. On one hand, this character is speaking in the 80s and quite literally referring to the ‘wastoid’ generation, menacing America’s future with their nihilistic hedonism and dubious work ethic. This same generation would grow up to steer the ship straight into ballooning corporatism, debt-slavery for the young, runaway home prices and their now routine boom-bust economic style. But like I said, this was written in the 00s and was undoubtedly meant as a more contemporary commentary too.
It can be satisfying to blame the Boomers and catalog their failures. But there’s no denying that every flaw we can pin on them has only been amplified in us, the younger generations. Poor work ethic, lack of civic virtue, cynicism, self-absorption, susceptibility to media/celebrity/spectacle—even the oh-so-common move of blaming the Boomers smacks of adolescent petulance, a child refusing to play instead of an adult stepping up and trying to make the game better.
But Wallace does more than diagnose the illness—he’s trying, his perennial crucible, to articulate a cure.
## The Path Forward
Wallace suggests that boredom, far from being something to avoid, might point the way to deeper self-knowledge. “Maybe dullness is associated with psychic pain because something that’s dull or opaque fails to provide enough stimulation to distract people from some other, deeper type of pain that is always there, if only in an ambient low-level way, and which most of us spend nearly all our time and energy trying to distract ourselves from feeling, or at least from feeling directly or with our full attention.” Boredom might even gesture towards enlightenment: “It turns out that bliss—a second-by-second joy + gratitude at the gift of being alive, conscious—lies on the other side of crushing, crushing boredom. Pay close attention to the most tedious thing you can find (tax returns, televised golf), and, in waves, a boredom like you’ve never known will wash over you and just about kill you. Ride these out, and it’s like stepping from black and white into color. Like water after days in the desert. Constant bliss in every atom.”[14](#footnote-14)
In Wallace’s conception, boredom isn’t only personally enlightening—it can also be a heroic sacrifice for the collective good. At one point Chris Fogel wanders into the wrong classroom and ends up in the exam review for Advanced Tax, taught by a capable and dignified Jesuit (possibly the eponymous “pale king”). The Jesuit makes a speech which sparks an epiphany in Chris, where he declares the profession of accounting a heroic one: “True heroism is you, alone, in a designated work space. True heroism is minutes, hours, weeks, year upon year of the quiet, precise, judicious exercise of probity and care—with no one there to see or cheer.’”
There it is: the vision, the cure, the path forward. We accept the burden of adult responsibility, go to work every day and engage in the important but unglamorous work that keeps society running. We orient our institutions not towards money but principle. We refuse to treat people like numbers or cogs or some great undifferentiated mass—we treat them as fully human, always, even and especially when they’ve chosen to subsume some part of their individuality to a soul-killing institution, because we recognize this as a heroic sacrifice they’re making for the good of the collective. And we withstand our negative emotions, embrace them fully, travel through their every texture until we transform and open to a deeper and richer experience.
The problem with all this, of course, is that in the middle of writing the book, Wallace killed himself.
## Disillusionment
For a long time I, like so many others, romanticized David Foster Wallace’s suicide. It crystallized him as a tragic figure, eternally 46, handsome, at the height of his powers—we never saw him go gray and saggy, grow uncool, post cringey takes on Twitter. His death preserved him in his youth, and elevated him to the almost angelic.
I was too self-aware to utter the cliché “too beautiful for this world,” but I might as well have. In a sense, there’s truth to it:[15](#footnote-15) both Wallace’s brilliance and his depression were intertwined with his sensitivity. The world impinged on his nervous system more harshly than it did on others, furnishing a world of details and intricacies and interconnections that allowed him to experience modernity differently and perhaps more deeply than anyone else—but also left him overwhelmed, spending much of his life in the quiet Midwest, and at times totally short-circuited.
Of course I wished he wasn’t dead.[16](#footnote-16) I researched the technical details of MAOIs, trawling for clues in the beautiful mystery of his absence. I burned through his essays, until there were none left, and there never would be again.
Franzen, in a posthumous essay, seems disgruntled with Wallace fans romanticizing his old friend. “Flickering beneath his beautiful moral intelligence and his lovable human weakness was the old addict’s consciousness, the secret self, which, after decades of suppression by the Nardil, finally glimpsed its chance to break free and have its suicidal way.” He seems particularly disappointed in Wallace’s decision to hang himself on his back porch, where he would’ve known his wife would find his body.
Franzen suggests that Wallace’s writing style, the “footnotes-within-footnotes self-consciousness,” might mirror his sickness—the dense technical jargon, hyper-multi-clause sentences, nested footnotes—that the whole beautiful mess could become self-annihilating. I’ve heard people call his style called both maximalist and masturbatory—and while I lean, always, towards the charitable interpretations of Wallace, I do have to admit that it’s impossible to remain consistently absorbed in his work: one minute he’ll rearrange your mind into new shapes, making you feel things it never would’ve occurred to you to feel—and the next you’ll catch yourself reading the same 200-word sentence over and over.
It’s possible that Wallace’s style, innovative though it was, became something of a trap, a writing tic that mirrored a mental one, to the point that it was no longer intentional, but compulsive. This possibility worried Wallace: “I am tired of myself, it seems: tired of my thoughts, associations, syntax, various verbal habits that have gone from discovery to technique to tic.”[17](#footnote-17)
I knew that Wallace had been posthumously #MeToo’ed. Having felt the sting of being judged by the left for what felt like trivial indiscretions, it was easy at first to pattern-match onto Wallace. Surely the allegations weren’t so serious, not that I knew since I wasn’t looking too closely, but no one’s perfect, and besides, wasn’t there something ugly about kicking someone who couldn’t defend themselves? The truth was simpler: I’d been through so many disillusionments that I didn’t want to face another.
But the allegations weren’t great. And actually they weren’t even allegations, but confirmed facts about his life: that his relationship with Mary Karr became abusive to the point where he tried to push her out of a moving car, threw a coffee table at her, and tried to buy a gun to kill her husband.
I finally had to face it. How is it that someone who so stressed decency was capable of treating someone in his life so poorly?
Postmodernism, of all things, offers a way out: the Death of the Author. Sure, Wallace was a flawed person, but that doesn’t need to mean anything for his work. His work exists separately, an discursive experience on the reader’s end, etc, etc. But Wallace himself rejected the Death of the Author,[18](#footnote-18) and treating his work in this way would totally undermine his project. You can’t cut away the messy human bits to preserve your clean, linguistic sanctum.
I’ve been reading D. T Max’s biography of Wallace, and, in spite of his at-times-not-great actions, the picture that emerges isn’t of a wicked man—it’s of a desperate one. I wondered if this is what went wrong: he was a convert to his old-fashioned moral style, and perhaps he embraced it with something of a convert’s fervor. Maybe the reason he failed to predict the popularity of 21st century political dogmatism is because he was himself, on some level, a dogmatist, embracing morality with a tightness that sometimes feels rigid.
Maybe his fervor for the moral outstripped his lifting power. Maybe he was never a true moralist, and the nihilistic cynicism of his youth persisted on some level; the Nardil only keeping it at bay.
Wallace often seemed quite alone. By the time of his death he was married, had a community and intellectual correspondents. But he remained alone in his work, with no one to turn to when he got lost.
There were parts of himself he hated, and they twisted painfully upon themselves: “I go through a loop in which I notice all the ways I am... self-centered and careerist and not true to standards and values that transcend my own petty interests...but then I countenance the fact here at least here I am worrying about it; so then I feel better about myself... but this soon becomes a vehicle for feeling superior to imagined Others... I think I'm very honest and candid, but I'm also proud of how honest and candid I am—so where does that put me.”
Perhaps the Nardil brought these ugly parts—the careerist, the narcissist, the old nihilist—to the surface, and Wallace was unable to face them. Perhaps he wasn’t a true maximalist: maybe there were aspects he avoided contending with, so he emphasized others, and grew imbalanced. His work is undeniably, uniquely valuable, but perhaps it’s also limited.
But is it even possible to articulate what went wrong? As he states in his short story ‘Good Old Neon:’ “What goes on inside is just too fast and huge and all interconnected for words to do more than barely sketch the outlines of at most one tiny little part of it at any given instant.”
There’s a temptation to identify the flaws in Wallace’s psychology and map them onto his work so as to discard the chaff. But doesn’t this reduce, in a way, to the Death of the Author? We can’t cut out the ugly Wallace so as to canonize the perfect one. Maximalism again, we need to face all of it: the thousand dense pages and the gun meant for Mary Karr’s husband and the unfinished novel and the moments his characters feel realer than anyone you know and the other writers trying to figure out what we’re doing here and what it means.
If Wallace had lived, his vision wouldn’t have reached any ultimate closure, but it would have grown and deepened. Instead, we’re left with something beautiful but
## Footnotes
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
Yes, in a work of fiction. Many footnotes spawn their own footnotes\*, creating a looping, self-referential effect not unlike the Strange Loops described in *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, a book Wallace loved.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Likely some combination of sour keys, Aero bars and shrink wrapped pastries\*\*, along with take-out to balance the inevitable glycemic spikes. Please let it be noted, I eat much healthier now.
[3](#footnote-anchor-3)
The terrorists are wheelchair-bound, but no less menacing for it.
[4](#footnote-anchor-4)
His first novel, *Broom of the System*, centers on Lenore, who worries that “all that really exists of [her] life is what can be said about it.” This novel is a postmodern romp in the vein of Pynchon, ironic and wacky and at its core amoral. His second book, a short story collection entitled *Girl With Curious Hair*, walks the line between postmodern play and an urge to move beyond it. He wouldn’t truly embrace sincerity until *Infinite Jest*, which would lead him to being viewed as the father of the New Sincerity movement and what’s now called Metamodernism.
[5](#footnote-anchor-5)
tl;dr: if Wallace wins this argument, we get to care about things again.
[6](#footnote-anchor-6)
MAOIs are by and large considered [Old School](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3136031/). The very first antidepressant discovered was an MAOI, the antitubercular agent iproniazid, which, when administered in the tuberculosis ward, had patients rising from gloomy stumors to eat, and socialize, “[dancing in the halls tho' they had holes in their lungs](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8203803/).” MAOIs fell out of vogue when it was discovered that they interfere with tyramine digestion, and require a carefully controlled diet, with risks of severe hypertensive reactions.
[7](#footnote-anchor-7)
By then MAOIs were on the way out, and SSRIs were ascendant (and to a lesser extent tricyclics). If we’re really going to get into the weeds, and this is a DFW essay so why not, we might focus in on the fact that MAOIs got ditched not because of their efficacy, but because of side effects: [MAOIs work better for many forms of depression than SSRIs](https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/not-obsolete-continuing-roles-tcas-and-maois). I haven’t found any studies comparing the effects of MAOIs and SSRIs on creativity, but one might speculate that SSRIs, which leave many users complain of creative dysfunction, and which reduce serotonin reuptake in particular parts of the brain, might in a sense bind the brain more tightly than the looser MAOIs, which produce a more global increase across a richer buffet of monoamines. But that’s just speculation.
[8](#footnote-anchor-8)
All of this is, of course, baloney—the book is fiction. But you’ll wonder for a second.
[9](#footnote-anchor-9)
Modern fiction has just about made a contest of depicting humans at their most odious and depraved; it’s almost jarring to read a scene where a character is poised to do something awful or cowardly, but instead finds himself affected by another human being and does the right thing after all.
[10](#footnote-anchor-10)
The IRS really did shift its focus from compliance to maximizing profit during the Reagan era,\*\*\* a significant ideological reordering that *The Pale King* explains as politically necessary: Reagan ran on a platform both of reducing taxes and increasing defense spending. The only way this was possible was if the IRS got more efficient at collecting. Reagan could even capitalize politically on the IRS’s new methods: “‘The Service’s more aggressive treatment of TPs, especially if it’s high-profile, would seem to keep in the electorate’s mind a fresh and eminently disposable image of Big Government that the Rebel Outsider President could continue to define himself against and decry as just the sort of government intrusion into the private lives and wallets of hardworking Americans he ran for office to fight against.’”\*\*\*\*
[11](#footnote-anchor-11)
Wastoid, according to ChatGPT: someone who is perceived as wasting their life or potential, often through excessive drug or alcohol use. It can imply that the person is unproductive or disengaged from meaningful activities or responsibilities.
[12](#footnote-anchor-12)
The Chris Fogel novella has been published separately as *Something to Do with Paying Attention*. It’s one of the best pieces DFW ever wrote, the only part of *The Pale King* I’d recommend unreservedly.
[13](#footnote-anchor-13)
We might observe that neither right nor the left youth movements circa 2024 place much emphasis on getting jobs and working for the good of society; we might further observe that cynical rejection of the existing social order is a top-notch reason to avoid putting in those long, tedious, back-bending 9-5s. But then, such an observation might make us the cynics, which is certainly something to guard against.
[14](#footnote-anchor-14)
This quote is essentially from the margins of Wallace’s notebook, rough notes *about* the novel which were never intended to make the novel itself; DFW at his most unmediated.
[15](#footnote-anchor-15)
Wallace was sympathetic to clichés: “Clichés earned their status as clichés because they're so obviously true”
[16](#footnote-anchor-16)
An essential element of romanticizing his death (the beating of the breasts, etc.)
[17](#footnote-anchor-17)
The best part of *The Pale King* was where he managed to abandon his usual style. Much of the Chris Fogel novella is composed of simple sentences: “I’m not sure I even know what to say. To be honest, a good bit of it I don’t remember. I don’t think my memory works in quite the way it used to. It may be that this kind of work changes you. Even just rote exams. It might actually change your brain. For the most part, it’s now almost as if I’m trapped in the present. If I drank, for instance, some Tang, it wouldn’t remind me of anything—I’d just taste the Tang.”
[18](#footnote-anchor-18)
“For those of civilians who know in our gut that writing is an act of communication between one human being and another, the whole question seems sort of arcane.”
\*Like this. I should add, I hope the affectation of footnotes for this essay isn’t cloying or obvious. I worried that it would be, but a friend convinced me it would be funny anyway, and besides, the piece was already glutted with many parentheticals so I figured, why not.
\*\* I lean sweet over savory
\*\*\* Wallace took several tax accounting courses and researched extensively for *The Pale King*, but he also makes stuff up, so it’s hard to tell.
\*\*\*\* It should be noted that while the IRS did make such a shift in the 80s, Wallace’s discursions into their motivations are speculative. | [unknown] | 146073662 | Your Book Review: The Pale King | acx |
# Highlights From The Comments On "Sorry You Feel That Way"
*[Original post [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that).]*
**Aeon [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that/comment/66996689):**
> The main complaint about this expression is that it’s “not a real apology,” and that’s true, it isn’t. The error is in thinking it is therefore a fake apology. But it isn’t, because “I’m sorry” is not a statement of contrition, it’s a statement of sorrow. Somehow everyone has gotten confused into thinking an apology is the only correct use for that phrase despite the plain meaning of the words.
This is the comment that best expresses what I wished I’d said at the beginning.
The original meaning of “sorry” is “sad” (eg “in a sorry state”). This meaning is preserved in phrases like “I’m sorry to hear your relative died”.
This turned out to be a good phrasing for apologies - “I’m sad that I stepped on your foot” implies “I apologize for stepping on your foot” - so eventually it became common to use “sorry” this way too.
Some people, when you say you’re sorry their relative died, answer “Why? It’s not your fault.” You could argue that you should have to think up some entirely new phrasing to express sympathy at relative-death in order to appease these people. But it’s hard to think up new phrases. “Condolences” makes you sound like a psychopath. “I’m sad your relative died” sounds bizarre and childlike. At some point, you need to just accept that “sorry” is our language’s default word for this. If somebody thinks it’s funny to deliberately annoy you with pretend incomprehension at a funeral, you have my permission to respond with “Actually, I’m glad your relative died, and I hope you’re next.”
Maybe we should all be linguistic descriptivists, and if enough people think “sorry” can only mean “I apologize for something and admit it was my fault”, we should abandon it to those people. I think this is probably true in the long run - but if you make it too easy, they’ll just take the next useful word and do the same thing with it. So we should at least raise a little bit of protest on the way out.
**Cvantez [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that/comment/66997806):**
> I feel like I've used the phrase "I'm sorry" my whole life to express sorrow but not contrition, e.g. "I'm sorry to hear your aunt is in the hospital". But only in the past few years have I started hearing a response: "it's not *your* fault". Which, like, of course it's not my fault. I didn't intend that meaning of the phrase.
>
> Either I've begun spending time with people who have a random quirk of communication, my memory is faulty and I've always gotten this response, or there's been some shift over time in what apologies are supposed to mean.
I wonder if this is just a generational gap, and the sympathy meaning seems obvious to all older people and incomprehensible to younger people.
**Imaginary-Tap-3361 [writes](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1f4udav/im_sorry_you_feel_that_way_and_judging_the/):**
> I don't think Scott is wrong to defend the phrase ISYFTW, but on a meta level, I think that the [hyperstitious slur cascade](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/give-up-seventy-percent-of-the-way) is way past 70%. Of course it's hard to judge that in real time, but I think a good clue is the reaction of your community/tribe. The top comment on Substack is a [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3_gSTM3IQE) by a pretty popular comedian who says that everyone knows that ISYFTW means 'fuck you'. The top comments on the Subreddit do agree that the phrase is hostile.
>
> So, while it may be logically okay to use the phrase, it might be time to retire it unless the message you intent to pass along is 'go fuck yourself'.
Yeah, I guess I agree with this. I was trying to defend it in a pretty limited sense:
* First, don’t necessarily pounce on / hate anybody who uses it in ignorance of the fact that the hyperstitious slur cascade has gotten that far.
* Second, we need to figure out some kind of alternative and coordinate to protect it from being slur-cascaded in turn.
* Third, we need it to be common knowledge not to cooperate in pushing the slur cascade even faster than it would already go.
…but maybe it’s a bit far to call that “defending” it.
**Dave Madeley [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that/comment/66999968):**
> Saying "I'm sad for contradicting you" or "I don't enjoy disagreeing with you" owns the emotion without commenting on the other person's interior state, which often feels intrusive even if the intention is good (and oftentimes it isn't).
Many people had similarly good suggestions for alternative phrases.
Unfortunately, they remind me of the mid-2010s debate around “affirmative consent”. The idea was - sometimes women are uncomfortable with sex but too afraid to speak up, so men should directly ask “may I have sex with you?”. Or you could go even further - some women were comfortable with some sex acts but uncomfortable with others, so you should ask permission for each specific act: “May I put my penis in your vagina?”
This 100% solves the problem with no downsides - except that if any man actually did this, the woman would immediately suspect him of being a Martian spy. I’m not *happy* with the fact that this convenient solution wouldn’t work - just not deluded enough to deny it.
This is also how I feel about “I’m sad for contradicting you”. It sure does work in this situation. I just can’t imagine a real human saying it in a real situation. I think this is an illegible (and so underappreciated) cost. And the fact that “I’m sorry you feel that way” is one of the few phrases which is easy for a non-Martian to say is an illegible (and so underappreciated) benefit.
**David Khoo [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that/comment/67000522):**
> You can apologize for the offense and hurt, without admitting that the other person is factually correct or that you agree with them. "I am sorry for offending you." "I apologize for making you feel hurt." If needed and appropriate, you can follow that with "...but I don't agree with you". Use your social judgement.
This solution makes me feel the way that the original phrase makes some of you feel.
It clearly crosses the gulf from “expression of sympathy” to “apology”. But it doesn’t really suggest you did anything wrong, or that you won’t do the same thing again.
Suppose you are a college speaker, advocating a political point which you believe to be true and important. Someone in the audience says they’re triggered by it and now you’ve traumatized them. You want to express sympathy. But you’re not going to stop going to colleges and speaking about this topic. Maybe you won’t even change the exact text of your speech.
I don’t want to get myself in a position where I sound like I’m apologizing for something, in words that sound like they’re admitting some sort of fault, and then the person says “Well, you’ve admitted you were in the wrong, what are you going to do to change things going forward?” and I have to say “Definitely nothing, ever.”
**Peter [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/in-defense-of-im-sorry-you-feel-that/comment/66997929):**
> I'm sorry, but sorry and sorrow are not related words and do not mean the same thing. Sorrow has to do with sadness, while sorry is an expression of regret. An expression of regret does not imply that I feel any guilt or shame or even that I wished I had done differently.
Ending on an etymological note - this is true! “Sorry” is not related to “sorrow”. According to Wiktionary, it is an old adjective form of “sore” (ie sore + y), and ultimately comes from an Old English word meaning “sad”. | Scott Alexander | 148429407 | Highlights From The Comments On "Sorry You Feel That Way" | acx |
# Interview Day At Thiel Capital
You look up from your massive mahogany desk.
“Tom, right? Thank you for coming…hmm…I see you’re applying for the role of Vice-President Of Sinister Plots. Your resume looks very impressive - I didn’t even know any of the masterminds behind the Kennedy assassination were still alive.”
“That’s what we want you to think,” says Tom.
“Of course. Then just one question for you. What’s something you believe, that very few people agree with you on?”
“I think we’re in a simulation.”
“Hm, yes, that was very shocking and heterodox back in 2012. But here at Thiel Capital we’re looking for something - “
“Let me finish. I think we’re in a simulation, and it’s a porno.”
“What?”
“Bostrom’s original simulation argument said that if future generations simulated the past, there would be far more of these simulations than there were actual pasts. He thought maybe people would simulate the past to learn about the branching pattern of history. That’s the kind of mistake only a philosopher could make. If we look at existing media consumption - whether it’s videos, RPGs, or incipient VR properties - by far the most common category is porn. Even if you limit your search to historical media, there are a hundred bodice-rippers for every sober investigation of Victorian lifestyles.”
“But . . . people aren’t having sex all the time!”
“Maybe not at Thiel Capital. But go outside, and you’ll find that people are, in fact, having sex all the time. Tindr. Hinge. Grindr. Young people are going out and having casual sex every weekend. There are fourteen different BDSM sex clubs in San Francisco alone. If you look at the modal society throughout history, they’re forbidding their women from leaving the house, or holding them to such high modesty standards that showing a bare ankle would be a scandal. They’re locking people up for owning porn, or killing them for being gay, or calling them rakes or sluts for having sex outside of marriage. Meanwhile, in our society women go everywhere in skimpy skin-tight clothing, you can f@&k a different partner every week, you can be polyamorous or transgender. I read conservative writers saying that no society like ours can survive over the long term. But I’ve thought about it longer than they have, and I think no society like ours could ever come to exist at all. That’s because it’s not a real society. It’s somebody’s weird fetish free-use-adjacent fantasy.”
“Who’s the protagonist? Or do future humans just watch random people in our world for months in the hopes that something sexy will happen?”
“I think we’re more of a shared worldbuilding project, like Gor or the Omegaverse. Future humans can insert themselves as “characters” at various points, or just cooperate in guiding, watching, or fleshing out the life of their favorite individual. Probably many of them are celebrities. Or maybe future transhumans have sensory modalities we can’t imagine, and can be sexually stimulated by a large class of people, or the entire world. I honestly wouldn’t want to speculate. I’m less sure about the details than the overall hypothesis.”
“I don’t know, I still think it doesn’t make sex - I mean sense! - to have a porno with so little sexual activity, as weighted by experience-moments.”
“Do you want to have sex?” asks Tom. “Right now? On this desk?”
“Thanks, but as your interviewer, I think that’s a conflict of interest.”
“Awww. I heard you guys were heterodox and based.”
“Thank you for your time, next applicant please.”
---
“Ah, yes. Dan. Thank you for coming to Thiel Capital today. I see you’re interviewing for Vice-President Of Undermining Democracy. Your resume looks stellar - I didn’t know anyone had served in the Trump, Putin, *and* Jong-un administrations. We just have one question: What’s something you believe, that very few people agree with you on?”
“I think alien abductions stories come from anaesthetic failure during colonoscopies.”
“Say more?”
“So in the typical case, someone who may or may not have seen a UFO gets hypnotized and asked to ‘remember’ what happened. They usually ‘remember’ some sort of weird entities with big eyes and no mouths paralyzing them and inserting a probe into their rectum. Well, colonoscopies are usually done under ‘twilight anaesthesia’, which doesn’t really produce full unconsciousness. It just sort of scrambles your brain so you can’t figure out what’s going on and don’t form memories. Imagine that under hypnosis, an investigator is commanding you to remember. You look deep inside your brain for repressed memories that you can’t consciously access, and - there it is! - some weird half-forgotten shards of a memory you can’t quite put together. When you stare at it really hard, it resolves into an image of some people in surgical gowns, goggles, and masks, probing your rectum. Except it’s not clear enough to place the surgical dress, so you just describe them as having strangely-textured skin, big eyes, and no mouths.”
“Aren’t alien abductions older than colonoscopies?”
“There have always been a few, but the classical picture with the anal probing doesn’t start showing up *en masse* until the 1980s, which is about when colonoscopies became routine too. And it’s most common in Anglophone countries, which are also the ones that recommend preventative colonoscopy.”
“Are there any ways to use this theory to make investment decisions?”
“Ummmm…if the medical authorities start recommending more colonoscopies, buy stock in The History Channel.”
“Thank you, Dan.”
---
“Jason, thank you for coming. I see you’ve applied to join our Perpetuating Inequality team. Great choice, you won’t regret it, the people in PI are great. We do have one question that we always ask during these interviews - what’s something you believe, that very few people agree with you on?”
Jason rubs his hands together. “Do you know what a skeuomorph is?”
“No.”
“It’s when something retains a design that no longer makes sense in context. The classic example is the floppy disk icon meaning ‘save’ on a computer program. Zoomers don’t even know what a floppy disk is, but they still click the weird-looking black square every time they want to save something. One day the meaning will be completely forgotten.”
“Okay, with you so far.”
“So why are emoji faces always yellow?”
“I don’t know, you tell me.”
“It’s a mystery. I can’t find anyone who knows. But the Simpsons are also yellow. So are SpongeBob, the Minions, and a host of other cartoon characters. There’s this whole visual language where people are yellow.”
“Maybe it’s popular because it’s a bright color?”
“Meanwhile, if you look back a century or so, there’s widespread agreement that Asian people are yellow. I’m sure you’ve heard of the Yellow Peril. But there are plenty of Asians here in California. None of them are yellow! What we have here is a skeuomorph. Humans used to be yellow! Then they changed color. Asians were the last holdouts, but now we’ve lost them too!”
“Seems implausible. We have plenty of paintings of humans, made over thousands of years.”
“Exactly. It’s a conspiracy. Have you ever heard of [Tartaria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tartarian_Empire)? All history before the World Wars is a lie. The real story is a global civilization called Tartaria, centered in Asia, which was destroyed in some sort of flood. All the buildings we can no longer make today - the cathedrals, the Victorian houses, the Art Deco skyscrapers - are Tartarian relics. The elites disguise the true history to prevent us from realizing how far we’ve fallen. My theory is that the Tartarians were bright yellow, and our folk iconography is a skeuomorph from their culture.”
“Well I agree that’s an unpopular opinion, but…”
“This is also why newborn babies are born with jaundice so often. It’s the Tartarian genes reasserting themselves. The doctors take them away and bombard them with UV rays to hide their true nature and prevent us from realizing the con. The elites even got us to use ‘yellow-bellied’ as a synonym for ‘coward’, so that we would shun and bully whoever they didn’t catch. What do you think?”
“Honestly we were looking for something more like ‘maybe racism is actually good.’”
“Oh, I believe that one too! Let me tell you about the origin of black people!”
“I’m afraid we’re running out of time for the day, we’ll get back to you soon.”
---
“Mike. Welcome to Thiel Capital. Thank you so much for interviewing with us. It says here that you’re looking to be an analyst at our Nirnaeth Arnoediad Inc. subdivision, that’s great. But before we discuss compensation, can you tell me - what’s something you believe, that very few people agree with you on? For example, just as a prompt, something like ‘maybe racism is actually good’.”
“Hmmm…racism good…oh! I believe the Holocaust had to happen for anthropic reasons.”
“What does that mean?”
“You can condition probabilities on the fact that you have to exist to see them. So for example, if someone planned to kill you unless a d20 landed on 20, and it landed on 20 so you survive, that wasn’t lucky - it’s just that of twenty world-branches, the only one you could possibly be (alive) in was the one where it landed 20, so of course that’s what you observe.”
“Okay, I’m following you so far.”
“This is why we survived the Cold War. People wonder how we managed to get through so many crises and near-misses without starting World War III, but all the world-branches that started World War III got wiped out, so of course we’d find ourselves in one of the lucky survivors.”
“Still following.”
“All the good superweapons are invented by Jews. Einstein and Oppenheimer made the A-bomb. Teller and von Neumann made the H-bomb. Samuel Cohen made the neutron bomb, Leo Szilard made the cobalt bomb, et cetera. Even the world-destroying AIs are being invented by Sam Altman, Ilya Sutskever, et cetera.”
“Yeah, we at Thiel Capital are very based, we already know all this stuff.”
“So the more Jews you have, the more superweapons you have. If you want a world to survive a couple of centuries after the Industrial Revolution, you need some kind of incredibly implausible event that gets rid of Jews in particular. So everyone who’s still alive will find themselves in a world with a history of implausible events like this.”
“I’m not sure that really counts as racism.”
“Maybe not directly, but think about it. People always say that it could happen here. That early 20th century Europeans thought they were so great and civilized, but the Holocaust proves that even the seemingly-most-sophisticated countries can descend into barbarism and genocide at any time. But they can’t! Or there’s only a one in a billion chance that they do, the same as everyone thought in 1900. It’s just that everyone who’s still alive comes from world-branches where the one-in-a-billion thing happened. I even think World War I was a fluke - that was the only way the outcome pump could set up Hitler.”
“I don’t know. I still think you had to have the seed. If this was so out-of-the-blue, why would Hitler have even wanted to kill the Jews to begin with?”
“Oh, that’s obvious. It’s not just superweapons - the Jews are also over-represented in the physics of time - Einstein, for example. Hitler was trying to figure out a way to prevent the invention of time travel, in order to stop the steady stream of time travelers who were trying to kill him.”
“Look, we’ll get back to you in a couple of days, okay?”
---
“Luke. Nice to meet you. I see you’re interested in a position in our ‘Secretly Funding All Media That You Personally Dislike’ division. Give me just a second to view your resume…wow! The last season of Game Of Thrones! That’s quite the accomplishment! We just need to ask you one question - what’s something you believe, that very few people agree with you on?”
Luke spoke in a whisper. “I think Joe Biden is still President.”
“What? Of course he’s still the President.”
“No, I mean, like, *literally* still the President. If you watch media reports carefully, you see pictures of Biden in the White House, Biden on Air Force One, Biden with Secret Service agents. And yes, I know former Presidents get some protection, get to visit the White House often, and so on. But if you compare stories about Trump or Obama doing these things to stories about Biden, it’s almost an order of magnitude difference. He’s still President.”
“Luke, obviously Biden is still the President. That’s not even a controversy.”
“Wow, I always heard you people at Thiel Capital were based, but I guess I didn’t know the half of it! The real question is, what’s their angle? Are they trying to confuse the Republicans so they don’t know who to attack? Or is this factional conflict where they’re trying to placate the Palestine protesters by making them think ‘Genocide Joe’ is gone?”
“Luke, literally everyone knows that Joe Biden is still the President. I’m not letting you use that as your answer to the interview question.”
“Well fine. I have other unpopular beliefs.” His voice went softer again. “The Muslims did 9/11.”
“Everyone knows that one too!”
“The world order is controlled by a group of diplomats who meet at the United Nations. Einstein didn’t kill himself. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a Communist plot to undermine the United States.”
“All of those are really obvious!”
“Look, are you even trying to interview me, or just brag about how based you are?”
“It has nothing to do with based! These are just all common knowledge!”
“Well, Mr. Impressive, I’m sorry I don’t hang out with cool people who already know everything about how the world works, like you do.”
“Whatever. This interview is going nowhere. We’re not interested.”
“F@#k you!” he shouts, and heads for the door. But before leaving, he turns around for one last barb. “I guess Thiel Capital is just another tool of the billionaire elites!” | Scott Alexander | 148037300 | Interview Day At Thiel Capital | acx |
# Open Thread 345
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Followup on Ozempic/GLP-1RAs - Asterisk Magazine has a superforecaster predict [How Long Til We’re All On Ozempic?](https://asteriskmag.com/issues/07/how-long-til-were-all-on-ozempic)
**2:** ACX grantee Mike Saint-Antoine wants to announce he’ll be teaching a weekend seminar on the basics of computational biology October 19-20 in New York City. The only prerequisite is basic Python, no biology knowledge required. More info [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14hezRVzMKZHqV9hZuChHtdsVWgAHy7C1mCu2chFjSnc), and link to sign up [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1UxBA-OFyGfX0iEVKDpuzo9e1M7EBo3JFsTeh4KxgD-o). This is part of [Fractal University](https://fractalnyc.com/fractalnyc/FractalU-Fall-Semester-2024-bcde30a9ea374ed080b4d1d22809b3d3), a community-based proto-university that offers classes on a lot of interesting subjects.
**3:** “Comment” of the week is [this subreddit post](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1f4jhu4/bay_area_yimbys_join_me_this_labor_day_in_golden/) announcing the Bell Riots in San Francisco this Monday. In the Star Trek universe, one of the precipitants to Earth’s eventual utopian government was the anti-homelessness “Bell Riots” that took place in San Francisco on September 2, 2024. In their honor, some YIMBYs will be holding anti-homelessness ~~riots~~ protests in Golden Gate Park on that date.
**4:** Greg Lukianoff [has responded to my response to his definition of “cancel culture”](https://greglukianoff.substack.com/p/deeper-into-defining-cancel-culture). | Scott Alexander | 148387758 | Open Thread 345 | acx |
# Your Book Review: The History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
## 1. The Supernatural is Dead
April, 1861 was a cruel month. The American Civil War had just started, and across the Atlantic, high in a remote valley in the western Alps, in the old market town of Morzines, another war was raging, this one pitting the locals against the legions of Hell.
The regional authorities, confronted with an outbreak of townspeople writhing in convulsions, entering trances, shrieking in weird tongues, and suffering from other diabolical whatnot, had begged the central government for help, writing:
> “To conclude, we will say: That our impression is that all this is supernatural, in cause and in effects; according to the rules of sound logic, and according to everything that theology, ecclesiastical history, and the Gospel teach and tell us, we declare it our considered opinion that this is truly demonic possession.”
Dr. Augustin Constans, Inspector General of the Insane Department (inspecteur général du service des aliénés) was dispatched from Paris to investigate. The Doctor later reported,
> “Arriving in Morzines on April 26, I found the entire population in a state of depression difficult to describe; everyone was deep in morbid gloom, living in constant fear of finding themselves or their loved ones consumed by devils.”
Dr. Constans’ next action was highly unorthodox. Standard protocol for treating these afflictions called for accusing someone of witchcraft, preferably a poor, socially isolated, old woman, (although, in a pinch, anyone of any sex, status, or age would do, and often did), torturing her until she confessed to creating the calamity by consorting with the Devil, and, after that, lighting her on fire, first strangling her to death, if, at this stage of the proceedings, one judged that a modicum of mercy was in order. Undoubtedly aware of this precedent, Dr. Constans rounded up the possessed and subjected them to: …an examination. From which, all of his new patients emerged non-tortured and unburnt.
Dr. Constans, in keeping with the latest Parisian fashions, was a man of science who rejected all accounts of the supernatural as sickness, hallucination, or counterfeit. He believed in neither witches, demons, nor demonic possession. He refused to even entertain the supernatural as a possibility, and his close-minded conclusion as to the odd goings-on in town: an epidemic of [hysterical demonopathy](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=M3s-AAAAIAAJ&pg=GBS.PA4&hl=en).
But what about the regional authorities and their “sound logic”? They had asked for an exorcist and got an egghead. In today’s parlance, the regional authorities and the good doctor had competing [established priors](https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/02/12/confirmation-bias-as-misfire-of-normal-bayesian-reasoning/). They saw the same phenomena, e.g., a villager doing acrobatic somersaults while spontaneously bleeding and blaspheming the Lord, and each thereby confirmed their radically different preexisting beliefs. It’s obviously the devil versus it’s clearly a delusion. The battle over how to interpret such phenomena was yet another war, one that had been going on for centuries by the time Dr. Constans finally reached this almost inaccessible valley, the final holdout of the old beliefs. This peculiar incident in the little town of Morzines, encapsulates 1500 years in the psychological history of Europe, and marks one of the final skirmishes in a long, strange campaign: the rise of the spirit of rationalism.
## 2. Enter Lecky
Today, there's a blue plaque at 38 Onslow Gardens, Chelsea, London, which reads “W.E.H. Lecky, 1838 - 1903, Historian and Essayist, lived and died here”. For additional details, we may rely on Elisabeth van Dedem Lecky’s straightforwardly titled *[A Memoir of the Right Hon. William Edward Hartpole Lecky By His Wife](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=jntj7bAZD98C&pg=GBS.PP18&hl=en)*.
Lecky was born in Ireland in 1838 to a distinguished family of scholars and government officials. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, where “in addition to the ordinary university course, he went through that appointed for divinity students…He confesses to have been perhaps culpably indifferent to college ambitions and competitions, and he threw himself with intense eagerness into a long course of private reading, chiefly relating to the formation and history of opinions.”
He graduated in 1859. Having inherited the family’s lands by this time, he was under no obligation to work, and, as he later wrote, “For four or five very happy years after I left college I lived in almost complete solitude and in pure thought.” He traveled all over Europe, holing up in libraries, and reading obscure tomes, e.g., “I have been gathering together a large and rare library of old Latin and French books on witchcraft…I am waiting with great impatience for a treatise on the Devil by Psellus, a Byzantine author of the eleventh century, having got which, I mean to go to a little village in the mountains [the Pyrenees] till I have mastered it.” Already a thinker, but in dread of being considered an idler, Lecky decided to become an author.
His thoughts began to center “on the laws of the rise and fall of speculative opinions.” Writing a friend in March, 1862, he says, “It is quite impossible to study theology to any good purpose if you do not at the same time study history…I am convinced that scarcely anything throws so much light on theology as a subject which, though I think one of the most curious in the whole scope of literature, is amongst the least attended to - the history of witchcraft.” By November, 1862, he reports, “I am hard at work, and have been for a long time, on an enormous book.”
*The History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe* (the “*History of Rationalism*” hereafter) was published in January 1865 in two volumes: [Part I](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=VSAQAAAAYAAJ&pg=GBS.PA2&hl=en) and [Part II](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=YGIq8PCVWPwC&pg=GBS.PR2&hl=en), (the links are to revised editions). The book was an immediate success. Friedrich Nietzsche, for one, read it closely in the German translation.
Lecky became an established member of the London literary world, and married Elisabeth van Dedem in 1871. The newlyweds settled in London in the house to which the blue plaque is now affixed. Ms. Lecky’s *Memoir* details both the happy life they spent together and her husband’s subsequent adventures as an author, man of letters, and member of parliament. Lecky died, in his library, in 1903.
## 3. The History of Rationalism
The *History of Rationalism* is an essay on the decay of medievalism and the emergence of rationalism. No precise definitions are attempted. Medievalism refers to that collection of Christian beliefs and theological dogmas that explained all aspects of reality and had dominated Europe for 1500 years since first emerging triumphant from the declining Roman Empire.
As for rationalism, Lecky explains:
> “My object in the present work has been to trace the history of the spirit of Rationalism: by which I understand not any class of definite doctrines or criticisms, but rather a certain cast of thought, or bias of reasoning, which has during the last three centuries gained a marked ascendancy in Europe...[Rationalism] leads men...to subordinate dogmatic theology to the dictates of reason and conscience…It predisposes men...to attribute all kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes. [It] diminishes the influence of fear as the motive of duty [and] establishes the supremacy of conscience…Most remarkable of all is the decay of persecution [i.e., witches and heretics are no longer being slaughtered.]
He notes as a general axiom that:
> “The number of persons who have a rational basis for their belief is probably infinitesimal.”
(Nietzsche underlined this sentence and wrote “Ja!” in the margin).
He then develops his general thesis that rationalism did not triumph by the force of logic because people are not logical. Most people think just like they eat, i.e., with whatever utensils they grew up with. The general intellectual beliefs of a given society are therefore not shaped by detailed arguments or other intellectual causes, but are modified by a host of social, political, and industrial influences.
Using the history of witchcraft as his first test case, Lecky observes that everybody believed in witchcraft until they didn’t:
> “A disbelief in ghosts and witches was one of the most prominent characteristics of skepticism in the seventeenth century. At first it was nearly confined to men who were avowedly freethinkers, but gradually it spread over a wider circle, and included almost all the educated…This progress, however, was not effected by any active propagandism. It is not identified with any great book or with any famous writer. It was not the triumph of one series of arguments over another. On the contrary, no facts are more clearly established in the literature of witchcraft than that the movement was mainly silent, unargumentative, and insensible; that men came gradually to disbelieve in witchcraft, because they came gradually to look upon it as absurd.”
His conclusion:
> “The follies of the past, when they were adopted by the wisest men, are well worthy of study; and, in the case before us, they furnish, I think, an invaluable clue to the laws of intellectual development. It is often and truly said, that past ages were pre-eminently credulous, as compared with our own; yet the difference is not so much in the amount of the credulity, as in the direction which it takes. Men are always prepared to accept, on very slight evidence, what they believe to be exceedingly probable. Their measure of probability ultimately determines the details of their creed, and it is itself perpetually changing under the influence of civilization.”
The book is an extended essay on the application of this thesis to explain the how and why of the decline of the belief in witchcraft, the decline in the belief in miracles, and the decline of religious persecution, and the social, political, and industrial influences that created the decline. In a somewhat rambling concluding chapter, he examines the interplay of rationalism and the rise of modern economies.
## 4. Disclaimer
This is not an objective review because there’s no way I’m going to badmouth this book. I have heard haters say: It’s too loooong!!! I consider this a bonus since every page contains something interesting. It’s written in that dense 19th century prose!!! I’ll grant you it was written in the 19th century. The footnotes are in untranslated Latin!!! Google Translate has really come along. Anything else? No? Okay, I’ll tell you why the book is great:
The scholarship: Lecky cites to and discusses over 750 books, from Agobard to Zosimus. When you enter a library full of old books, is your first instinct to go see what is actually on the shelves? Then this might be the book for you. It’s a bibilographical masterpiece.
Fascinating facts: The book is the literary equivalent of a Victorian cabinet of curiosities. The details of the persecution of witches and heretics are not exactly fun to contemplate, but the book also discusses, e.g., the extremely odd beliefs of the early theologians, the gruesomeness of Spanish art, the regulation of French prostitutes, the consequences of coffee coming to Europe, why sadists make the best surgeons, the origin of the [xenodochium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenodochium), the physical location of hell, and so much else. Look at the old-fashioned super comprehensive chapter headings and you’ll see what I mean.
The cast of characters: The famous names are all here, but so are countless others, from the lesser known to the downright obscure. Some are appealing, e.g., John Scotus Erigena, Cornelius Agrippa, and John Wier, free-thinkers who were all ahead of their time; some are revolting, e.g., Hippolytus de Marsiliis, who claims to have invented the torture of sleep deprivation; and some are inspiring, e.g., Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, the great opponent of capital punishment.
The theme: Finally, the book denounces the persecution of people for their beliefs, celebrates toleration and free inquiry, and both recounts and contributes to “the ceaseless struggle against the empire of prejudice.” What’s not to like?
## 5. Just Do It
So, why listen to me when the book is just a click away. Don’t even scroll up. Here’s [Chapter 1](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=VSAQAAAAYAAJ&pg=GBS.PA26&hl=en), on the decline of the belief in witchcraft. I think you’ll realize pretty quickly whether this book is your cup of tea or not. Thanks for reading. | [unknown] | 146073551 | Your Book Review: The History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe | acx |
# Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places
Thanks to everyone who responded to my request for ACX meetup organizers. Volunteers have arranged meetups in 171 cities around the world, from Baghdad to Buenos Aires.
You can find the list below, in the following order:
1. Africa & Middle East
2. Asia-Pacific
3. Europe
4. North America
5. South America
You can see a map of all the events on [the LessWrong community page](https://www.lesswrong.com/community). (Or possibly you will be able to soon.)
Within each region, it’s alphabetized first by country, then by city. For instance, the first entry in Europe is Sofia, **B**ulgaria, and the first entry for Germany is **A**achen. Each region and country has its own header. The USA is the exception where it is additionally sorted by state, with states having their own subheaders. Hopefully this is clear. If you’re looking at this on the web, you can also use your browser search tool (ctrl+f or command+f) and type your city.
Scott will provisionally be attending the meetup in Berkeley. ACX meetups coordinator Skyler will provisionally be attending Boston, Burlington, Kitchener-Waterloo, Newton, Northampton, and Berkeley. Some of the biggest ones might be announced on the blog, regardless of whether or not Scott or Skyler attends.
**Extra Info For Potential Attendees**
**1.** If you’re reading this, you’re invited. Please don’t feel like you “won’t be welcome” just because you’re new to the blog, demographically different from the average reader, don’t want to buy anything at the cafe or restaurant where it’s held, or hate ACX and everything it stands for. You’ll be fine!
**2**. Unless the organizer says so in the event notes, you don’t have to RSVP or contact the organizer to be able to attend. Some organizers require them, so check the event. I’ve also given email addresses for all organizers in case you have a question.
**Extra Info For Meetup Organizers:
1.** If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable).
**2.** Bring blank labels and pens for nametags.
**3.** Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier.
**4.** If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Talk about a recent post or book review that you liked.
**5.** If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that.
**6.** It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email.
**7.** If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
If you need to change a meetup date or you have any other questions, please email skyler[at] rationalitymeetups[ dot]org.
# Africa & Middle East
## Iraq
#### BAGHDAD, IRAQ
Contact: Mustafa
Contact Info: wolframsigma2[dot]7[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 05th, 06:00 PM
Location: In the Grinders, Zayona. I will sit with a brown
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8H568FG6+839>
Notes: please join the group or notify me in any way, I hosted 3 meet ups so far and no attended, so I would not go if no other person at least notified me. If you can't attend, but you're still likeminded and in the area, please reach out! I'd love to meet you sometime.
## Israel
#### HAIFA, ISRAEL
Contact: shai zilberman
Contact Info: dizinteria[at]walla[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 19th, 05:00 PM
Location: The Goldmund book store located at the talpiot market on ekron 6 street
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8G4QR262+39>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/FSclSIRSpdSJ [ignore this part] 6T5VJT2QAD
Notes: Looking forward to seeing ya'll at our meetup! Feel free to bring along anyone/anything if you'd like—everyone is welcome. To help us plan better, please RSVP via email or whatsapp (detailed here) so we can ensure we have enough space and refreshments for everyone. See you there!
#### TEL AVIV, ISRAEL
Contact: Inbar
Contact Info: inbar192[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 20th, 05:00 PM
Location: Sarona park, grass area next to Benedict restaurant. I'll have an ACX MEETUP sign and some balloons.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8G4P3QCP+MPH>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/5389163051129361>
Notes: There is a secure location (מרחב מוגן) very close to where we'll be sitting in case of a missile alert - an underground staircase.
## Nigeria
#### KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA
Contact: Abdul Malik
Contact Info: maleekcherry510[ at]g mail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 03:30 PM
Location: Cafe one, Uptown Mall, Zaire Rd
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7F29FCCJ+8X>
## Saudi Arabia
#### AT TAAWUN, RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA
Contact: Abdulelah A
Contact Info: Addrasheed[a t]proton[dot]me
Time: Friday, October 25, 08:30 PM
Location: Riverwalk
Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7HP8QMFX+453
Additional Notes: Please contact me at my email address before attending. The meeting will be at Java Time Cafe inside the Riverwalk Center in the Taawun District. I will be there at 8:30 P.M. and will wait for an hour. You can simply ask the barista about ACX, and he will refer you to my table, or you can look for a colorful cultural ‘Misbaha’ on my table.
## South Africa
#### CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
Contact: Yaseen Mowzer
Contact Info: yaseen[a t]mowzer[dot]co[d ot]za
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 06:00 PM
Location: Truth Coffee Roasting, 36 Buitenkant St, Cape Town City Centre - we'll put a sign on the table
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4FRW3CCF+P3>
Notes: Please RSVP using LessWrong or email or WhatsApp (+27 79 813 5144), so book I big enough table.
## Turkey
#### ANTALYA, TURKEY
Contact: Annalise
Contact Info: annalisetarhan[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 03:00 PM
Location: We'll be meeting at the Shakespeare in Beach Park, on the patio. Look for a propped up notebook with ACX in big letters.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8G8GVMMC+4VR>
#### ISTANBUL, TURKEY
Contact: Ozge
Contact Info: ozgeco[at]yahoo[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 02:00 PM
Location: Kadikoy, Rıhtım, Yeni Iskele Upstairs, Istanbul Kitapcisi Kahve Dunyasi
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8GGFX2VF+4F>
Notes: This time we organize this meeting together with AI Safety Istanbul Group. Everybody warmly welcomed.
# Asia-Pacific
## Australia
#### ALBURY, AUSTRALIA
Contact: BK
Contact Info: podcastaffix[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Tuesday, September 17th, 06:30 PM
Location: Mitta Mitta Canoe Club building in Noreuil Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4RM8WW73+2P7>
Notes: Alcohol free venue, please bring snacks
#### BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA
Contact: Laura
Contact Info: laura[d ot]leighton94[at ]gmai l[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 05:00 PM
Location: The Burrow, West End. We might be either upstairs or downstairs. I will have a sign that says ACX meetup.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/5R4MG2C7+44M>
#### CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA
Contact: Declan
Contact Info: declan\_t[at]hotmail[d ot]com
Time: Monday, October 07th, 06:00 PM
Location: Grease Monkey Braddon
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4RPFP4GM+R3>
Notes: Please RSVP by previous Friday for table booking.
#### MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA
Contact: Allan
Contact Info: winnings\_gesture485[at ]simplelogin[do t]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 02:00 PM
Location: Wolf Cafe and Eatery, 21 Lobelia Dr, Altona North VIC 3025. We will have a sign saying "AXC Meetup" written on it
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4RJ65R4R+3V>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/lesswrongmelbourne/>
#### PERTH, AUSTRALIA
Contact: Bianca Peterek
Contact Info: bianca[d ot]czatyrko[at]gmail[ dot]co m
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 01:30 PM
Location: Dôme Café Bassendean (Located in Hawaiian's) West Rd, Bassendean WA 6054
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4PWQ3XW3+9G>
Notes: Please find the table with the "ACX meet-up" sign. I'm totally blind, so you'll have to find me and be verbal!
#### SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA
Contact: Eliot
Contact Info: Redeliot[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 19th, 06:00 PM
Location: Lvl 2, 565 George St, Sydney NSW
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4RRH46F4+98>
Group Link: <https://meetu.ps/e/.qqqqlrygcmbzb/sqK6x/i>
Notes: Bring a friend! Everyone welcome!
## Hong Kong
#### HONG KONG, HONG KONG
Contact: Max Bolingbroke
Contact Info: acx[at]alpha[d ot]engineering
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 03:00 PM
Location: Private flat in The Oakhill, 28 Wood Road, Wan Chai
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7PJP75GG+HP>
Notes: Email me to RSVP and I will let you know which flat number to come to & give you an invite link to the ACX Hong Kong WhatsApp group. For those who couldn't RSVP in time I will also put an "ACX Meetup" sign outside the entrance of the building with the number of my flat on it.
## India
#### BENGALURU, INDIA
Contact: Nihal M
Contact Info: propwash[at]duck[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 27th, 04:00 PM
Location: Matteo coffea, church street
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7J4VXJF4+PR>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/i5vLw9xnG9iwXNQZZ>
Notes: RSVP on the event for october
#### CHENNAI, INDIA
Contact: Sathish
Contact Info: sathish9289[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Thursday, September 05th, 07:00 PM
Location: Besant Nagar Beach
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7M42X7XC+GP>
Additional Notes: RSVP at sathish's email to confirm attendance
#### HYDERABAD, INDIA
Contact: Vatsal
Contact Info: vmehra[at]pm[do t]me
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 03:00 PM
Location: Yellolife Cafe, 1335h, Road No. 45, Nandagiri Hills, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, Telangana 500033, India
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7J9WCCF5+RH>
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong
#### MUMBAI, INDIA
Contact: Chetan Kharbanda
Contact Info: chetan[dot]kharbanda2[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 11:00 AM
Location: Doolally Taproom - Andheri. <https://maps.app.goo.gl/gf8U9AgUtbe892678?g_st=com.google.maps.preview.copy>
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7JFJ4RPM+C6>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4>
Notes: Please RSVP so I know how many people to expect for the seating at the venue
## Indonesia
#### JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Contact: Aud
Contact Info: helloaud2000[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 02:00 PM
Location: First Crack Coffee Jl. Bumi <https://maps.app.goo.gl/1VBV9GmM51HxLEnL7>
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/6P58QQ7R+42>
Notes: Please RSVP to my email so I know how many people to expect. Thanks!
#### UBUD, INDONESIA
Contact: River
Contact Info: acx[dot]k55uc[at]passinbox[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 12th, 11:00 AM
Location: Kafe Upstairs
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/6P3QF7P7+CM>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/HydwIF [ignore this part] 3u7Ve0nfpbc9EtnS
## Malaysia
#### KUALA LAMPUR, MALAYSIA
Contact: Doris
Contact Info: siroddoris13[a t]gmail[do t]com
Time: Sunday, September 8th, 04:00 PM
Location: King's Hall Cafe @ Sek 13
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8GVRRXWM+6H>
Group Link: <https://discord.com/invite/XXFspCmy>
Additional Notes: Please RSVP so we can book the venue accordingly!
## Japan
#### TOKYO (ENGLISH), JAPAN
Contact: Harold
Contact Info: rationalitysalon[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 10:00 AM
Location: Get in touch for the details!
Coordinates: Get in touch for the details!
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/>
Notes: Get in touch for the details!
#### TOKYO (日本語), JAPAN
名前/Contact: Emi
連絡先/Contact Info: gouritekinakai[at]proton[dot]me
時/Time: Monday, September 16, 07:00 PM
場所/Location: エースイン新宿/Ace Inn Shinjuku
座標/ Coordinates: **<https://plus.codes/8Q7XMPVF+2P>**
追加メモ/Additional Notes: (こちらは日本語の東京ミートアップです)/ This is a Tokyo Meetup in Japanese. 初めての企画なので多分こじんまりとしたミートとなりますがちょっとでも興味のある方は是非ご参加してください。日本語全レベルok 着きましたら「ACX」とフロントの人にささやいて通してもらってください：）
### New Zealand
#### AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND
Contact: Mark
Contact Info: markgilmour[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 10:00 AM
Location: Cornwall Park Band Rotunda
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/4VMP4Q3Q+RR>
Notes: Bring kids if relevant, feel free to bring some nibbles.
## Singapore
#### SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE
Contact: Andrew
Contact Info: mindupgrade[at]protonmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 29th, 04:30 PM
Location: Maxwell (will send more details in email)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/6PH57RJV+5W>
Group Link: <https://rentry.co/AC6PH57RJV5W>. Please send your RSVP email as early as you can because it would be immensely helpful.
Notes: Feel free to send an email about topic sentences that you are interested in or want to have a conversation with others about. Topic sentences will be collated and privately shared with the other attendees. We have at least one ACX Meetup every month. The Aug/Sep/Oct/Nov/Dec dates will be on <https://rentry.co/AC6PH57RJV5W.>
## Taiwan
#### TAIPEI, TAIWAN
Contact: Jake & Brandon
Contact Info: jakessolo[plus]acxmeetup[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 08th, 03:00 PM
Location: Daan Park - northeast field next to the basketball courts (backup: Learn Bar if it's raining)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7QQ32GJP+PG3>
Notes: Backup location coordinates of Learn Bar: <https://plus.codes/7QQ32GMJ+GHR>
## Thailand
#### BANGKOK, THAILAND
Contact: Steven
Contact Info: steven[dot]shonts[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 01st, 03:00 PM
Location: Too Fast To Sleep (Siam) สยาม - 222,222/1-7,224 ซอย Siam Square Soi 1, Pathum Wan, Bangkok 10330
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7P52PGVJ+XJ>
## Vietnam
#### DA NANG, VIETNAM
Contact: Egor
Contact Info: zmaznevegor[at]g mail[ dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 02:30 PM
Location: Me Coffee Roastery, 2nd floor. 91 Chương D., Bắc Mỹ Phú, Ngũ Hành Sơn, Đà Nẵng 550000, Vietnam
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7P8C26WP+Q27>
Notes: If you are planning to come, please contact me on Telegram @Zmaznevegor. <https://t.me/Zmaznevegor>
#### HANOI, VIETNAM
Contact: Jord
Contact Info: jordnguyen43[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 09:00 AM
Location: Ciao Bella Coffee, Alley 132 Vo Chi Cong, Xuan La, Tay Ho, Hanoi
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7PH73R34+835>
Notes: Please RSVP on Lesswrong / email me in case of any changes
#### HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM
Contact: Hiep
Contact Info: hiepbq14408[at]gm ail[ dot]co m
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 09:30 AM
Location: Trung Nguyen Legend Coffee at 603 Tran Hung Dao St.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/7P28QM4P+H5>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/nSoF5ntooah7f4qzj>
# Europe
### Bulgaria
#### SOFIA, BULGARIA
Contact: Daniel
Contact Info: bensen[dot]daniel[at ]g mail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 29th, 04:00 PM
Location: Borisova Gradina, Sofia, Bulgaria
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8GJ5M8GW+P4>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/HGaSdqwqG4SogWfTi>
## Croatia
#### ZAGREB, CROATIA
Contact: Dominik
Contact Info: dominik[dot]tujmer[a t]gm ail[dot]c om
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 07:00 PM
Location: A Most Unusual Garden (Hendrick's Gin Garden), Horvaćanska cesta 3, Zagreb
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FQQQXP3+W55>
Group Link: Email me for access to the telegram link!
## Czech Republic
#### BRNO, CZECH REPUBLIC
Contact: Michal
Contact Info: adekcz[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 26th, 07:00 PM
Location: Skautský institut Brno, 2nd floor, shared office (not ground level main hall)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FXR5JX4+R8>
Group Link: <https://www.efektivni-altruismus.cz/kalendar-akci/>
#### PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
Contact: Jiri Nadvornik
Contact Info: nadvornik[d ot]jiri[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Thursday, September 26th, 06:00 PM
Location: Dharmasala Teahouse
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F2P3CRW+FQ>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/835029216562521/>
## Denmark
#### COPENHAGEN, DENMARK
Contact: Søren Elverlin
Contact Info: soeren[dot]elverlin[a t]gm ail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 03:00 PM
Location: Rundholtsvej 10, 2300 Copenhagen S
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F7JMH38+GFJ>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/events/xsAqbxvT8PD8kCgcr/astralcodexten-lesswrong-meetup-5jau>
Notes: RSVP on LessWrong
## Estonia
TALLINN, ESTONIA
Contact: Andrew West
Contact Info: andrew\_n\_west[at]yah oo[dot]co[dot]uk
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 07:00 PM
Location: Kohvik Must Puudel
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9GF6CPPW+J4>
## Finland
#### HELSINKI, FINLAND
Contact: Mikko
Contact Info: sschelsinkimeetup[at]gmail[dot]co m
Time: Tuesday, September 17th, 06:00 PM
Location: Oluthuone Kaisla, Vilhonkatu 4, 00100 Helsinki. I will have a notebook that says "ACX" on the table.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9GG65WCW+PW>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/>
## France
#### BORDEAUX, FRANCE
Contact: Tom
Contact Info: tom[at]rethaller[d ot]n et
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 06:00 PM
Location: Under the trees, on the waterfront, opposite Quinconces
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8CPXRCWH+6W>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/2NBRvz5JbC>
Notes: Please join the Discord server before attending, the exact location might change depending on the weather
#### GRENOBLE, FRANCE
Contact: Fantin
Contact Info: fantin[dot]seguin[at]live[do t]fr
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 06:00 PM
Location: We'll be in the Jardin de Ville, on the lawn near the cable car, with a small ACX Meetup sign.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FQ75PVG+3H>
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how many we are. We can go to a bar or somewhere else afterwards.
#### LYON, FRANCE
Contact: Lucas
Contact Info: deangelis.lucas[a t]outlook[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 4:00 PM
Location: Parc de la tête d'or, proche du parc aux daims
Coodinates: <https://plus.codes/8FQ6QVF3+J3>
#### PARIS, FRANCE
Contact: Augustin
Contact Info: augustin[d ot]portier[at ]proto n[dot]me
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 06:00 PM
Location: In the Carrousel Garden (next to the Tuileries Gardens). We’ll be sitting on the grass near the Museum of Decorative Arts, which is located at the end of the north wing of the Louvre building complex. I’ll bring an ACX sign, and I’ll be wearing a bowtie.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FW4V87J+5Q>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/VMQq8r83GS>
#### TOULOUSE, FRANCE
Contact: Alfonso
Contact Info: barsom[dot]maelwys[at]gmail[do t]co m
Time: Tuesday, September 10th, 08:00 PM
Location: Pizzeria La Pastasciutta (35Bis Rue Gabriel Péri, 31000 Toulouse). We'll meet at the door.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FM3JF43+GW>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/the-friendly-debate/>
Notes: Please, RSVP by email
## Georgia
#### TBILISI, GEORGIA
Contact: Dmitrii
Contact Info: overfull\_jailbird656[at]simplelogin[d ot]c om
Time: Sunday, September 01st, 10:00 AM
Location: BNKR coffee (<https://maps.app.goo.gl/VjMviRv9yymSpA1p7>)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8HH6PQ4J+7H>
## Germany
#### AACHEN, GERMANY
Contact: Martin Schmidt
Contact Info: acx[at]enc0[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 07:00 PM
Location: Cafe Papillon, probably near the entrance, will bring ACX sign
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F28Q3JH+8G>
Group Link: <https://t.me/+IiFfbpWDWm1kOGQ6>
#### BERLIN, GERMANY
Contact: Milli and Dominik
Contact Info: acx-meetups[at]martinmilbradt[d ot]de
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 02:00 PM
Location: Big lawn at the center of Humboldthain
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F4MG9WP+36>
Group Link: <https://t.me/+_50JIXMIFYc1NTRi>
#### BREMEN, GERMANY
Contact: Rasmus
Contact Info: ad[dot]fontes[at]aol[d ot]c om
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 04:00 PM
Location: We meet outside at Café Weserterrassen, near the playground or inside if the weather is really bad. I'll be carrying a Perplexus Epic Ball Labyrinth.
Coordinates:<https://plus.codes/9F5C3R9J+8W9>
Notes: Feel free to bring kids.
#### COLOGNE, GERMANY
Contact: Marcel Müller
Contact Info: marcel\_mueller[at]mail[d ot]de
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 05:00 PM
Location: Marienweg 43, 50858 Köln
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F28WRMX+97>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/2QwpKyXvwiZ53G4HP>
#### FREIBURG IM BREISGAU, GERMANY
Contact: Omar
Contact Info: info[at]rationality-freiburg[dot]de
Time: Friday, October 11th, 06:00 PM
Location: Haus des Engagements, Rehlingstraße 9, 79100 Freiburg
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FV9XRQQ+QQ9>
Group Link: https://www.rationality-freiburg.de/
Notes: If possible read one of the articles listed here: <https://www.rationality-freiburg.de/events/2024-10-11-acx-meetup-fall-2024/> If not, come anyway :-)
#### GÖTTINGEN, GERMANY
Contact: Fernando
Contact Info: fernando[dot]unterricht[a t]gm ail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 02:00 PM
Location: Grave of Carl Friedrich Gauss, Cheltenham Park, Göttingen. I will be wearing an orange T-shirt and carrying a sign with ACX on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F3FGWJR+MW>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/G1xJFRK [ignore this part] m09vDC7Yxu9mubC
Notes: I will bring some drinks and snack, so nobody else has to. But of course, feel free to bring anything you want to add!
#### HAMBURG, GERMANY
Contact: Gunnar
Contact Info: g[dot]zarncke[plus]acx[at]gma il[do t]c om
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 03:00 PM
Location: Eppendorfer Park at the pond, we will have a sign reading "ACX Meetup".
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F5FHXQH+MF>
Group Link: lesswrong-hamburg@googlegroups.com
Notes: Feel free to bring friends and family. Please RSVP on to me for planning.
#### KÖLN, GERMANY
*(See Cologne, Germany)*
#### LEIPZIG, GERMANY
Contact: Ben
Contact Info: benschm9542[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Wednesday, October 09, 06:00 PM
Location: Location: Leos Brasserie
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F3J89RG+XR>
Group Link: Telegram group people can join- Ask me for the link!
Additional Notes: Do you like brownies or something healthier ;)?
#### MAINZ, GERMANY
Contact: Lukas
Contact Info: lf\_mail[at]posteo[do t]de
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 03:00 PM
Location: "Baron" on the JGU campus; likely outside if weather permits; and will have an ACX sign on the table.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FXCX6VW+Q8>
Notes: This is a speculative meetup to see if there is sufficient interest; please RSVP in advance. Meetup language will be English unless we're all (fluent) German speakers.
#### MANNHEIM, GERMANY
Contact: Simon
Contact Info: acxmannheim[at]mailbox[dot]org
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 08:00 PM
Location: Murphy's Law (Irish Pub)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FXCFFJC+5G>
Group Link: https://signal.group/#CjQKIFmicB23eRhkDDjxjT94PWsbTYPdux-uoZJH2bH2M7OqEhBzfNMhsDNayw\_ETHxhsGG6
Notes: Look for the table with the ACX sign on it!
#### NÜRNBERG, GERMANY
Contact: Dimi
Contact Info: dimi[dot]zharkov[a t]gmail[d ot]co m
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 07:00 PM
Location: Biergarten 'Gutmann am Dutzendteich', outside if the weather allows. I will put a sign on the table saying ACX
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FXHC4P8+5Q>
Notes: We can start at Gutmann's and then go for a walk around Dutzendteich. German, English, and Russian/Ukrainian speakers very welcome! (As well as any other language)
#### SAARBRÜCKEN, GERMANY
Contact: Jan Wehner
Contact Info: janwehner1[a t]t-online[do t]de
Time: Wednesday, September 18th, 07:00 PM
Location: Am Staden 16a, 66121 Saarbrücken (Ulanen-Pavillon Beer garden). I'll have a laptop saying ACX MEETUP
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FX962G4+8GG>
Notes: RSVPs are required. Please use this form: <https://forms.gle/QwvuVeL4sTQbuQub7.>
#### STUTTGART, GERMANY
Contact: Steve
Contact Info: Steve[dot]Bachelor[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 08th, 04:00 PM
Location: The Starbucks at Mailaender Platz, 70173 Stuttgart - Up the stairs from the Budapester Platz or Stadtbibliothek U-train stops to the open square area of the Milaneo mall.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FWFQ5RM+97>
Notes: I don’t actually speak any German; I just got here.
## Greece
#### ATHENS, GREECE
Contact: Spyros Dovas
Contact Info: acx[dot]meetup[dot]athens[do t]greece[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Thursday, September 19th, 07:00 PM
Location: The meeting place is the plaza in front of the National Library in Stavros Niarchos Cultural Center complex in Faliro. There will be an "ACX Meetup" sign where we will sit to spot the place. We will occupy a couple (or hopefully more!) tables.
Coordinates:<https://plus.codes/8G95WMQR+WRP>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/astral-codex-ten-athens-meetup/>
## Hungary
#### BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
Contact: Tim
Contact Info: timunderwood9[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, October 06th, 02:00 PM
Location: Muzeumkert, with Sirius Teahaz as backup in case of bad weather
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FVXF3R7+Q8>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/rationality-budapest>
Notes: We'll have a sign, feel free to bring kids, and it'll be great to see you all.
## Ireland
#### DUBLIN, IRELAND
Contact: David O.
Contact Info: inlets\_spinal\_0a[at]icloud[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 06:00 PM
Location: Motel One, 111-114 Middle Abbey St, North City, Dublin, D01 H220
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C5M8PXP+6H>
Group Link: hxxps://chat[dot]whatsapp[dot]com/Ecgu6De4a[ignore this]XkDhAk9FELKGr (Note: The link has been obfuscated due to spam.)
Notes: No RSVP required
## Italy
#### MILANO, ITALY
Contact: Raffaele
Contact Info: raffa[dot]mauro[ at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Friday, September 06th, 06:30 PM
Location: Viale Majno 18, 20127, Milano (MI) - Primo Ventures, second floor
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FQFF6C4+9C>
Notes: Please RSVP to raffa.mauro@gmail.com
#### ROME, ITALY
Contact: Giulio Starace
Contact Info: giulio[dot]starace[at ]gmail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, October 19th, 03:00 PM
Location: Roma Termini, Via Marsala entrance
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FHJWG23+P4M>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/IqVk [ignore this part] 1B8RwgxHnm1u6fgeQA
Notes: Please feel free to come even if you feel awkward about it, even if you’re not ‘the typical ACX reader’, even if you’re worried people won’t like you, etc.! We are a very casual and laid back group.
## Latvia
#### RIGA, LATVIA
Contact: Anastasia
Contact Info: riga[dot]acx[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Wednesday, October 09th, 07:00 PM
Location: MiiT Coffee, Lāčplēša iela 10, Centra rajons, Rīga, LV-1010
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9G86X44C+M5>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/fE7wFrbHoAKAvw5bw>
## Lithuania
#### VILNIUS, LITHUANIA
Contact: Linas
Contact Info: linaskondrackis[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 03:00 PM
Location: We'll be in Lukiškių Aikštė. Look for a small group and a guy holding an ACX sign.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9G67M7QC+Q9>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/udTt5QSX>
Notes: Please feel free to come even if you feel awkward about it, even if you’re not ‘the typical ACX reader’, even if you’re worried people won’t like you, etc. Bonus points if you tag yourself on LessWrong so we know you're coming / thinking about it.
## Netherlands
#### AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS
Contact: Tom
Contact Info: hello[at]tomrijntjes[do t]nl
Time: Monday, September 02nd, 07:00 PM
Location: Ijscuypje Westerpark
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F469VPC+GX>
Group Link: Whatsapp: https://chat.whatsapp.com/InPyklCny [ignore this part] Ys9PQi5NXevV2, Discord: <https://discord.gg/6YKnURhHWZ>
#### NIJMEGEN, NETHERLANDS
Contact: Stian
Contact Info: stian[dot]sgronlund[ at]outlook[d ot]co m
Time: Sunday, September 08th, 02:00 PM
Location: Sport Cafe "The Yard", Elinor Ostromgebouw, Heyendaalseweg 141, 6525 AJ Nijmegen. I will bring some sort of sign that says "ACX/Rationality Meetup Nijmegen"
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F37RV98+CX>
Notes: RSVPs appreciated but not required
## Poland
#### ~~KRAKOW, POLAND~~
~~Contact: Milosz
Contact Info: milosz[dot]slepowronski[at ]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 07:00 PM
Location: House of Beer. I will put ACX MEETUP sign on the table.
Coordinates:~~ [~~https://plus.codes/9F2X3W6R+QXR~~](https://plus.codes/9F2X3W6R+QXR) ~~Group Link:~~ [~~https://www.facebook.com/groups/812811138741130~~](https://www.facebook.com/groups/812811138741130)
Note: Organizer fell ill, event is canceled
#### WARSAW, POLAND
Contact: ntoxeg
Contact Info: ntoxeg[at]proton[d ot]m e
Time: Sunday, October 06th, 04:00 PM
Location: Wilcza 25, walk down and look for a big white room.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9G4362G8+2VJ>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/ZXL54LioSRqtK5yZY>, <https://www.facebook.com/groups/lwwarsaw>
Notes: RSVP on LessWrong or Facebook is recommended.
## Portugal
#### FUNCHAL, PORTUGAL
Contact: Marko
Contact Info: thiel[dot]marko[at]cantab[dot]net
Time: Monday, September 02nd, 06:00 PM
Location: Santa Catarina Park, northeast corner
Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8C45J3WP+FG
Notes: I'll wear a grey hat with a ship's wheel on it
#### LISBON, PORTUGAL
Contact: Luís Campos
Contact Info: luis[dot]filipe[dot]lcampos[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 03:00 PM
Location: We meet on top of a small hill East of the Linha d'Água café in Jardim Amália Rodrigues. For comfort, bring sunglasses and a blanket to sit on. There is some natural shade. Also, it can get quite windy, so bring a jacket. Look for the big orange blanket.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8CCGPRJW+V8>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/EaWFPJNf [ignore this part] KZeJiHECesblMS
## Russia
#### MOSCOW, RUSSIA
Contact: teapot
Contact Info: blastjoe41 [a t]gma il[ dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 06, 12:00 PM
Location: Surf Coffee X Lucky, Baumanskaya 33
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9G7VQMFH+2FP>
Additional Notes: RSVP is NOT required but there might be a venue change so we strongly recommend you message us
## Serbia
#### BELGRADE, SERBIA
Contact: Tanya Trninic
Contact Info: tanja[dot]trninic[at]efektivnialtruizam[ dot]c om
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 02:00 PM
Location: Restaurant Rai Urban Vege; Address: Visokog Stevana 5, Belgrade, Serbia
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8GP2RFG4+JQ|>
Group Link: EA Serbia Telegram group invite: <https://t.me/+wu3itsO2ZjoxNmY0>
Notes: Please RSVP to tanja.trninic@efektivnialtruizam.com so I can reserve a suitable table.
## Spain
#### BARCELONA, SPAIN
Contact: Tobi
Contact Info: tb[dot]acx[ at]proton[d ot]me
Time: Sunday, September 25th, 06:00 PM
Location: Parc de la Ciutadella
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FH495QM+JQ>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/a8JdcnpTRYirgncZT>
Notes: Please RSVP so we know how many people to plan for
#### CAMBRILS, SPAIN
Contact: Alexander
Contact Info: alexander[dot]oleshko[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Friday, September 13th, 07:00 PM
Location: North entrance to Park del Pescador, I'll hold an "ACX meetup" poster.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FH33384+PH4>
Notes: Please RSVP if you're planning to come. If I get no replies, I'll still show up there and stand with the poster for 20 minutes. I expect that we will communicate in English, however, if Spanish is a more preferable choice for you, you'll find conversation partners.
#### MADRID, SPAIN
Contact: Pablo
Contact Info: pvillalobos[at]proton[d ot]me
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 11:00 AM
Location: El Retiro Park, puppet theatre. I will be carrying an ACX sign
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8CGRC897+F8M>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/Effective-Altruism-Madrid/>
Notes: RSVPs appreciated but not required
## Sweden
#### GOTHENBURG, SWEDEN
Contact: Stefan
Contact Info: acx\_gbg[at]posteo[d ot]se
Time: Wednesday, September 25th, 06:00 PM
Location: Condeco Fredsgatan, second floor, look for some books on the table
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F9HPX4C+39F>
#### STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN
Contact: Jonatan Westholm
Contact Info: jonatanwestholm[at]hotmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 03:00 PM
Location: Radisson Blu Viking, Stockholm City
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9FFW83J5+J6>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/share/g/84RznjYeqCefurUh/>
Notes: Yes, please RSVP! Depending on how many sign up, I may have to phone the hotel ahead of time. Also note: I have learned from previous meetups that the afternoon sun blinds half the group at Scandic Continental, which is why I decided to give Radisson Blu Viking a try (it's literally 100m from the old place).
## Switzerland
#### ZURICH, SWITZERLAND
Contact: MB
Contact Info: acxzurich[at]proton[d ot]me
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 03:00 PM
Location: Blatterwiese in front of the chinese garden. If it rains we will go under the roof inside the garden (free entry).
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8FVC9H32+VF>
Notes: Snacks and picnic blankets are optional, but appreciated. Drop me a line at the email above to be added to the mailing list (future meetups will be announced there, we meet monthly).
## United Kingdom
#### CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM
Contact: Hamish Todd
Contact Info: hamish[dot]todd1[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 02:00 PM
Location: \*\*Upstairs\*\* at The Bath House
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9F426439+J9>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/SodAF4T4T2dw8X6Jj>
Notes: 3 years and still going strong! Always happy to see new faces too :)
#### LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
Contact: Edward Saperia
Contact Info: ed[at]newspeak[dot]house
Time: Sunday, October 20th, 01:00 PM
Location: Newspeak House, 133-135 Bethnal Green Road, E2 7DG
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C3XGWGH+3F>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/acxlondon>
Notes: Please register: <https://lu.ma/ACX-London-Oct-2024>
#### OXFORD, UNITED KINGDOM
Contact: Stan
Contact Info: stanislawmalinowski09[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Wednesday, October 16th, 06:30 PM
Location: The Star Pub
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C3WPQX6+PM>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/oxfordrationalish>
#### READING, UNITED KINGDOM
Contact: Ben Wōden
Contact Info: cascadestyler[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 02:00 PM
Location: Siren RG1 Craft Brew: 1 Friars Walk, Reading RG1 1DA
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C3XF24G+P8>
Notes: Siren RG1 is not a pub in the traditional sense and does not have pub vibes. It has an almost cafe-like atmosphere that's friendly to non-drinkers. If you are put off by the atmosphere of the traditional british pub, please don't let that be a reason to give this one a miss. I'm planning on staying around until maybe about 6, so don't worry about turning up significantly later than the start time. RSVPs would be helpful but are not a requirement. Feel free to email me with any questions.
#### EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND, UNITED KINGDOM
Contact: Satya Benson
Contact Info: acx[dot]meetup[at]satchlj[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 03:00 PM
Location: George Square Gardens Labyrinth
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C7RWRV6+G5>
Notes: If it rains, the backup location is Söderberg The Meadows (<https://plus.codes/9C7RWRV5+C7>)
#### SHEFFIELD, UK
Contact: Colin Z. Robertson
Contact Info: czr[at]rtnl[d ot]org[do t]uk
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 03:00 PM
Location: 200 Degrees, 25 Division St, Sheffield S1 4GE. I'll have a piece of paper on the table with ACX written on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9C5W9GJG+2M>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/8RMx8BvZbz>
# North America
## Canada
#### CALGARY, CANADA
Contact: David P
Contact Info: qwertie256[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 02:00 PM
Location: First Street Market, 1327 1st Street SW, Calgary. Look for a red ACX sign.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/95372WRM+2F>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/LZQ6HBAd8afoqPP27>
#### EDMONTON, CANADA
Contact: Joseph Shapkin
Contact Info: ta1hynp09[at]relay[dot]firefox[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 19th, 07:00 PM
Location: Underground Tap and Grill, 10004 Jasper Ave, Edmonton, AB T5J 1R3, Canada. We will have an ACX sign so you can easily find our table.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/9558GGR5+GP>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/hNzrLboTGkRFraHWG>
Notes: <https://www.lesswrong.com/events/kBCpoouwrn4GoAZyr/acx-meetups-everywhere-5>
#### HALIFAX, CANADA
Contact: Noah
Contact Info: usernameneeded[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 01:00 PM
Location: Oxford Taproom, 6418 Quinpool Rd. We'll be in the room immediately to the right as you enter and will have a blue pyramid on our table.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87PRJ9VX+PP>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/kXFaGQBB5h>
#### KITCHENER, CANADA
*(see Waterloo, Canada)*
#### OTTAWA, CANADA
Contact: Tess
Contact Info: rationalottawa [a t] gmail[do t]com
Time: Friday, October 4th, 7:00 PM
Location: Meeting in the "Penalty Box" private room of the Hometown Sports Grill, 1525 Bank St, Ottawa, ON K1H 7Z1. We'll put up a yellow ACX sign!
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87Q698JJ+FP>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/rationalottawa>
Additional Notes: Kids welcome. Please RSVP to help make planning smoother for me, by email or on Facebook. Attend a meetup to receive an invite to our discord! Thank you!
#### MONTRÉAL, CANADA
Contact: Henri
Contact Info: acxmontreal[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 01:00 PM
Location: Jeanne-Mance Park, at the corner of Duluth and Esplanade. We'll have an ACX Meetup sign. Note: join our Discord server to receive last-minute information in case of bad weather.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87Q8GC89+37>
Group Link: LessWrong group: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/3nnqSgGbF8x3mTcia> ; Mailing list: <http://eepurl.com/io5vZM> ; Discord: <https://discord.gg/K8gMNzqPVG> ; Facebook group: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/less.wrong.montreal/>
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong: <https://www.lesswrong.com/events/zxcTsabESBbshjA98/acx-meetups-everywhere-fall-2024-montreal-qc>
#### SAINT JOHN, CANADA
Contact: Sergey
Contact Info: spam04321[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 11:30 AM
Location: McAllister Place food court, I'll have some kind of a small ACX MEETUP sign on the table.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87QM8X4M+XJP>
Notes: Please RSVP if you have any intention of coming as the event will only proceed if there's at least someone interested in coming.
#### TORONTO, CANADA
Contact: Andrew
Contact Info: partyatmyplace2024[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 04:00 PM
Location: FourFifty The Well (450 Front Street), ask the concierge to send you to the rec room for the ACX Meetup
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87M2JJV3+4R>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/8ktnBi4AjxtCmGeXA>
Notes: RSVP over email for planning around snacks and venue capacity, or to let me know any dietary requirements. Please leave your pets at home :)
#### VANCOUVER, CANADA
Contact: Jordan
Contact Info: j[dot]verasamy[a t]gmail[d ot]c om
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 01:00 PM
Location: Dude Chilling Park, NW corner, with a big sign
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84XR7W73+PC>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/vancouver-rationality> and <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/foFedJFgad2qDd3vp>
#### WATERLOO, CANADA
Contact: Jenn
Contact Info: jenn[at]kwrationality[dot]ca
Time: Thursday, September 12th, 07:00 PM
Location: Waterloo Public Library Main Branch Auditorium
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86MXFF8G+94G>
Group Link: https://kwrationality.ca/
Notes: We'll decamp to a nearby restaurant for food/drinks at around 8:30.
## Mexico
#### MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
Contact: Francisco
Contact Info: fagarrido[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 04:00 AM
Location: Av Nuevo León 115, Colonia Condesa, Cuauhtémoc, 06140 Cuauhtémoc, CDMX
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76F2CR6G+6R>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/uzTxYaFupgz9ZnCT5>
#### MÉRIDA, MEXICO
Contact: Silvia
Contact Info: silviafidelina[ at]hot mail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, October 19, 06:30 PM
Location: Centro Integral para el Adulto Mayor CIAM
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76HG29H5+QF>
Group Link: <https://m.facebook.com/groups/lesswrongmerida>
Additional Notes: Please RSVPs by email
## USA
### Alabama
#### HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA, USA
Contact: Michael House
Contact Info: mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 06:00 PM
Location: 300 The Bridge St, Huntsville, AL 35806. I'll be in the Starbucks which is located inside of the Barnes and Noble. I'll have a whiteboard with "ACX MEETUP" on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/866MP88H+52>
Note: This got moved from the 23rd to the 28th.
### Alaska
#### ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, USA
Contact: Mark
Contact Info: FLWAB[at]protonmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 01:30 PM
Location: Kaladi Brothers Coffee, 6861 Jewel Lake Rd, Anchorage, AK, 99502. We’ll be in the community room and I’ll have a sign.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/93HG525X+7J>
Notes: Feel free to bring kids.
### Arizona
#### PHOENIX, ARIZONA, USA
Contact: Nathan
Contact Info: natoboo2000[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 03:00 AM
Location: 20 W 6th St, Tempe, AZ 85281, USA
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/855CC3F5+QJ>
Group Link: <https://discord.com/invite/ANSywQABEF>
Notes: Please RSVP on Lesswrong so that I can get a general gauge of how many people are coming: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/Eq2PYKCMBM9cGsFQP/acx-phoenix-september-meetup
### Arkansas
#### FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS, USA
Contact: Keaton
Contact Info: keatonhurlbut[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Wednesday, September 04th, 06:30 PM
Location: Raising Cane's Chicken Fingers - 1788 W Martin Luther King Jr Blvd. I'll have a sign that says ACX MEETUP
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86873R47+QJ>
Notes: Please RSVP by emailing me
### California
#### BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Scott and Skyler
Contact Info: skyler[at]rationalitymeetups[dot]org
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 03:00 PM
Location: 2740 Telegraph Avenue, Berkeley. We'll have a sign saying ACX Meetup by the door.
Coordinates: https://plus.codes/849VVP5R+X5
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/bayarealesswrong>
#### GRASS VALLEY, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Max Harms
Contact Info: raelifin[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 26th, 06:30 PM
Location: Private Residence (Message/email me for address)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84FW6W8G+GX>
Notes: Halloween party! Come in costume! This is at my house, so please message me if you want to come. First-time people are welcome. :D The plus.code coordinates are approximate.
#### LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Vishal
Contact Info: Contact me on discord
Time: Wednesday, September 11th, 07:00 PM
Location: 11841 Wagner Street, Culver City, Los Angeles
Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8553XHWM+GP
Group Link: losangelesrationality.com
Notes: Join our discord, where we do all our communication (invite link on losangelesrationality.com).
#### NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Michael Michalchik
Contact Info: michaelmichalchik[plus ]acxlw[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 02:00 PM
Location: 1970 Port Laurent Place, Newport Beach, Ca, 92660. I will be sitting on my front porch wearing a black shirt,
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8554J47R+Q8>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/ytkHvpQrvLHFcyDhx>
Notes: We have met most Saturdays for that last 2 years. We have had more than 70 meetings, Send me a email to get on our announcements re-mailer or check the less wrong community website for the orange county meetups.
#### PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Amy
Contact Info: ajy[dot]dunphy[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 13th, 01:00 PM
Location: Backyard of 789 Sutter Ave, Palo Alto 94303.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/849VCVMF+MX>
#### RANCHO CUCAMONGA, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Nelson
Contact Info: nelson[d ot]horsley[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Friday, September 20th, 06:30 PM
Location: Punchbowl Social in Victoria Gardens on the second floor
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85644F6C+Q4>
Notes: Let me know if you’re coming in advance so I know if I need to officially book a reservation.
#### SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Julia and Andrew
Contact Info: amethyst[dot]eggplant[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 01st, 02:00 PM
Location: Private Residence at 22nd and W in Midtown
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84CWHG68+JQM>
Group Link: hit me up for a discord link
Notes: There will be pizza, drinks and off to one side there will be a podcasting station set up if guests are interested in ACX Stories
#### SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Julius
Contact Info: julius[dot]simonelli[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 01:00 PM
Location: Bird Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8544PVQ8+PC2>
Group Link: <https://meetup.com/san-diego-rationalists/>
#### SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Andrew Gaul
Contact Info: gaul[a t]gaul[d ot]org
Time: Sunday, October 20th, 02:00 PM
Location: Dolores Park near the tennis courts
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/849VQH6F+55>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/bayarealesswrong>
Notes: Please RSVP via email so I can coordinate tarps, drinks, and other picnic gear
#### SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: David
Contact Info: ddfr[at]daviddfriedman[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 01st, 02:00 PM
Location: 3806 Williams Rd, San Jose, CA 95117
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/849W825J+6P>
Group Link: <http://www.daviddfriedman.com/SSC%20Meetups%20announcement.html>
Notes: Please RSVP to my email so we will have a rough count of how many we are feeding
#### SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Denis
Contact Info: denis[dot]lantsman[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, September 20th, 06:00 PM
Location: Meadow Park. Picnic tables just south of the bathrooms / playground.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/847X789R+593>
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong!
#### SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA, USA
Contact: Gregg
Contact Info: gregg[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 01:30 PM
Location: NE corner of University Terrace Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/848VXWFW+X66>
#### Colorado
#### BOULDER, COLORADO, USA
Contact: Josh Sacks
Contact Info: josh[do t]sacks[plu s]acx[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 04:00 PM
Location: 9191 Tahoe Ln, Boulder, CO 80301
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85GP2V96+JR>
Group Link: Pending a Discord channel for Boulder meetups...
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so we know how much cheese to buy
#### DENVER, COLORADO, USA
Contact: Eneasz Brodski
Contact Info: embrodski[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 03:00 PM
Location: Sloan's Lake, North Shore, at the pier BBQs. Park in the Sloan's Lake North Parking Lot (very close to 4701 W Byron Pl), walk just past the stone structure that's right there, and we'll be on the other side of it. Should have a shade structure up, and a white board that says ACX MEETUP on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85FPQX22+RM>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/colorado-rationality/>
Notes: Kids are welcome! We'll be BBQing some burgers and hot dogs, and sodas and other snacks also available. Some vegan dogs on offer, but if that's your jam it would help if you could bring something vegan.
### Washington DC
#### WASHINGTON DC, DC, USA
Contact: Kayla
Contact Info: kjgamin[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21, 06:00 PM
Location: Froggy Bottom Pub, 2021 K St NW, Washington, DC 20006 (near Farragut North metro)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87C4WX33+5M>
Group Link: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/605023464809227>
Additional Notes: Food will be provided; drinks available for purchase. You do not need to buy anything to come!
*(alternate Cassandrist schismatic meetup: [September 21, at 7:00 PM at 1002 N street](https://www.facebook.com/events/1249725589792593))*
### Florida
#### CAPE CORAL, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Shawn
Contact Info: Shawn[d ot]Spilman[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, October 15th, 12:01 PM
Location: 929 SW 54th Ln, Cape Coral, FL 33914
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76RWH224+44>
Notes: RSVP optional but appreciated.
#### FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Praj
Contact Info: fort[dot]lauderdale[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 02:00 PM
Location: Funky Buddha Brewery, parking is free in the lot across the street, I'll be sitting at a table with an "ACX MEETUP" sign
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76RX5VF9+PFH>
Group Link: Email me for the discord invite link
Notes: Come join our Discord, we're always welcoming!
#### GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Vince
Contact Info: vatter[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Tuesday, October 01st, 07:00 PM
Location: 4th Ave Food Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76XVJMXC+5CC>
#### MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Campbell Nilsen
Contact Info: campbell[dot]nilsen[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 06:00 PM
Location: Lagniappe, large table in the back right-hand corner as you walk out from the interior onto the patio. I will be wearing a short-sleeved linen shirt and glasses with a sign that says ACX MEETUP on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76QXRR55+PJ>
Group Link: Email me for an invite link to the Discord server.
Notes: There are charcuterie/bread/cheese boards and we'll get a few of those (expect some Venmo tag afterwards); there are also some more personal-sized snack options. Lagniappe is primarily a wine bar, but there are plentiful non-alcoholic options as well as beer. No RSVP needed.
#### ORLANDO, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Ethan
Contact Info: ethanhuyck[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 12th, 07:00 PM
Location: We will meet at the pavilion at UCF by the Breezeway, I will have a sign
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76WWJQ2X+72R>
Group Link: <https://discord.com/invite/yKP4v4hC>
#### TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: James
Contact Info: Jamesmzech[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, September 13th, 06:00 PM
Location: Oyster City brewery (603 W Gaines St #7, Tallahassee, FL 32304). I’ll be wearing nondescript clothing and carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it.
Coordinates:<https://plus.codes/862QCPP5+4P>
#### WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA, USA
Contact: Charlie
Contact Info: chuckwilson477[at]yahoo[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 12:00 AM
Location: Grandview Public Market. 1401 Clare Ave, West Palm Beach, FL 33401. We'll be at the northeast outside area, sitting at a table with an ACX MEETUP sign on it. Parking is free at an adjacent lot, and there should also be a free valet service.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76RXMWXP+GH>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/tDf8fYPRRP>
Notes: Hosted by the south Florida ACX group that also does meetups in Palm Beach and Broward communities such as Boca Raton, Boynton Beach, Delray Beach and many others. Come join our Discord, we're always welcoming!
### Georgia
#### ATLANTA, GEORGIA, USA
Contact: Steve
Contact Info: steve[at]digitaltoolfactory[dot]net
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 02:00 PM
Location: Bold Monk. 1737 Ellsworth Industrial Blvd NW. Suite D-1, Atlanta, GA 30318. We will be in the breezeway out front
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/865QRH2F+V8>
Group Link: https://acxatlanta.com/
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Meetup.com
### Idaho
#### BOISE, IDAHO, USA
Contact: Tim
Contact Info: tim[dot]r[dot]burr[ at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 01:00 PM
Location: Let's meet on the north side of Ann Morrison park, between the road and the greenbelt. I will bring my small, black dog and a lawn game.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85M5JQ7G+QX>
#### Illinois
#### CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, USA
Contact: Todd
Contact Info: info[at]chicagorationality[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 02:00 PM
Location: Ping Tom Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86HJV947+GX>
Group Link: https://chicagorationality.com
#### URBANA, ILLINOIS, USA
Contact: Nmk
Contact Info: nmkiahrne[at]outlook[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 04:00 PM
Location: I will be in the south east end of the main quad at UIUC. Hopefully i will be wearing red and carrying a small sign saying ACX meetup on it.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86GH4Q4F+J7>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/6vYrRTmu>
Notes: I probably won't have any activities planned , so if you have any good ideas, feel free to bring them and the necessary materials.
### Indiana
#### INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, USA
Contact: Tyler
Contact Info: tylerbraly[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 01:00 PM
Location: Tap Indianapolis, 306 N Delaware St, Indianapolis, IN 46204, outside of the weather is nice, otherwise look for the sign saying ACX
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86FMQRCW+J5>
#### WEST LAFAYETTE, INDIANA, USA
Contact: NR
Contact Info: mapreader4[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 12:00 PM
Location: Beering Hall of Liberal Arts (BRNG) Room 1268, 100 N University St, West Lafayette, IN 47907. BRNG 1268 is in the southwest corner of the building, and can be found after turning left at the south entrance. Please email me if you cannot find us. I will also place an ACX Meetup sign at the entrance to the room and wear a shirt with a lemur.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86GMC3GM+4C>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/Uc7hMMSNCF>
Notes: We'll have a box of chips and possibly other food.
### Louisiana
#### NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, USA
Contact: Blake Bertuccelli-Booth
Contact Info: 1111[at]philosophers[dot]group
Time: Monday, October 14th, 11:11 AM
Location: Petite Clouet Cafe
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76XFXX73+8R>
Group Link: http://philosophers.group
Notes: We're hosting an ACX Lunch and Learn part of NOAI 2024, https://noai.philosophers.group.
### Maine
### ACTON, MAINE, USA
Contact: Paul
Contact Info: saturndoesmars[plus]acx[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Thursday, September 26th, 06:00 PM
Location: We'll be hosted by an awesome event venue with a 4-season timber frame "barn" w/ recreation/games/patio/fires and lodging for 12 available in 2 cottages. Dinner for purchase. Full bar inside. rain/shine. We are 45min from both Portland, ME and Portsmouth, NH.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87MFG3HM+75>
Notes: Please RSVP and I'll send a simple Square $0 ticket link. Meeting up and hanging out is free. Buying a dinner is optional. Max capacity 150 people inside.
### Maryland
#### BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, USA
Contact: Rivka
Contact Info: rivka[at]adrusi[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 07:00 PM
Location: First floor of the Performing Arts and Humanities Building at UMBC. The address is 1000 Hilltop Cir, Baltimore, MD 21250. There will be a sign that says "ACX Meetup".
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87F5774P+53>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/h4z5UgeYVK>. If you would like to be added to the mailing list (which is primarily for weekly meetup reminders) please email me.
Notes: Parking is free on the weekend. There will be food and drinks (likely pizza). RSVPs are useful so I know how much food to get, but are not required. We meet weekly, Sundays at 7 PM, half the meetups are virtual and half are in person
#### FORT MEADE, MARYLAND, USA
Contact: Ferret
Contact Info: meetup2024[dot]exposure178[at]passinbox[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 01:00 PM
Location: Fort Meade
Coordinates: (ask organizer)
Group Link: (ask organizer)
Notes: Meetup is on a controlled-access government campus. Organizer will not sponsor guests onto base; attendees must be able to enter on their own.
### Massachusetts
#### BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA
*(See Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA)*
#### CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, USA
Contact: Skyler
Contact Info: skyler[at]rationalitymeetups[dot]org
Time: Sunday, September 29th, 02:00 PM
Location: JFK Memorial Park. I'll be wearing a tall blue and green hat.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87JC9VCG+8W>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/ssc-boston>
Notes: Children and pets welcome- we're in a park with a decent amount of grass and open space. We'll have food and a shelter in case of rain.
#### NEWTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA
Contact: duck\_master
Contact Info: duckmaster0[at]protonmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 07th, 12:00 PM
Location: Newton Centre Green (Centre St & Beacon St)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87JC8RJ4+76>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/HnrqwPvpX7TFtMwR9>
Notes: Anyone in the area is free to come! The format will be general miscellaneous talk as with earlier meetups. I will ask everyone to say their names though (and I might bring nametags too). I plan on sticking around for ~3 hours, but if attendees plan on leaving an hour earlier or later I'm ok with that as well.
### NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA
Contact: Alex Liebowitz
Contact Info: alex[at]alexliebowitz[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 06:00 PM
Location: Common house at Rocky Hill Cohousing, 100 Black Birch Trail, Northampton, MA 01062. The common house is the first building you see when coming into the community (but after the event parking, which lines the road leading in on the right). Note: Florence is a village within Northampton, and some maps services show the city as Florence, some as Northampton.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87J9884H+VF>
Group Link: Email alex[at]alexliebowitz[dot]com to get on mailing list (let me know if you want to be a CC or BCC).
Notes: Guest parking should be along the road leading in (Black Birch Trail), parking to the right as you drive in. There is an Event Parking sign but it is not the most visible. There are disabled spaces directly in front of the Common House (100 Black Birch Trail). If we overflow the road, people can use the resident lots to the left and right.
### Michigan
#### ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN, USA
Contact: Joseph Pryor
Contact Info: jwpryorprojects[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 01:00 PM
Location: 1420 Hill Street Ann Arbor Michigan. We'll be meeting at the Friends Meetinghouse (euphemism for Quaker) in the back yard if weather allows, otherwise we'll meet in the corner room.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86JR77C9+MQ>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/Ann-Arbor-SSC-Rationalist-Meetup-Group/>
Notes: RSVP at the meetup.com group! This is a monthly meetup! Join the Meetup.com list to hear about our meetups every month, or text me at: 517-945-8084 and I'll add you to the text notification I send out. Parking information is on the meetup.com group. The event runs from to 1-5pm.
### DETROIT, MICHIGAN, USA
Contact: Victor
Contact Info: wooddellv[at]yahoo[do t]com
Time: Friday, September 27th, 06:00 PM
Location: The Panera Bread at the corner of 13 mile and Woodward Ave, in Royal Oak, MI. There will be a sign indicating the section of the restaurant reserved for us.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86JRGR87+X3>
Notes: RSVP Required (so that I can reserve enough space) Contact me at wooddellv@yahoo.com
### Minnesota
#### ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA, USA
Contact: Aaron
Contact Info: ironlordbyron[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, October 13th, 04:00 PM
Location: Davanni's Pizza: 41 Cleveland Ave S, St Paul, MN 55105
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86P8WRQ6+XX>
Group Link: Discord link for the MSP ACX meetup group: <https://discord.gg/m2xJcuC937>
Notes: I'll be providing pizza! Vegans are free to bring their own food (Davanni's selection here isn't great); I'll be getting a vegetarian and gluten-free pizza along with other kinds of pizza. RSVPs on lesswrong would be great.
### Missouri
#### KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA
Contact: Alex Hedtke
Contact Info: alex[dot]hedtke[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, October 11, 06:30 PM
Location: This will take place in the meeting room above the City Market Minsky's Pizza. Tell the host you are here for the meeting room event.
Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86F74C58+CW
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/kc_rat_ea>
Additional Notes: The meeting room we will be in has full waitstaff service, but a maximum tab limit of 5. If you plan to get any food/drink, prepare to share your tab with a small group. Bringing cash is easiest, Venmo is second-easiest.
#### SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI, USA
Contact: Alex Freeman
Contact Info: alexrfreeman[at]proton[do t]me
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 01:00 PM
Location: Gurney Pavilion in Tower Grove Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86CFJP4P+CQ>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/kJvvy6HQ>
### Nevada
#### RENO, NEVADA, USA
Contact: Daniel Gold
Contact Info: daniel[dot]ian[dot]gold[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 21st, 06:00 PM
Location: Double R Apartments pool, 9200 Double R Blvd.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85F2F63V+33>
#### New Jersey
#### MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY, USA
Contact: Matt
Contact Info: matthewrbrooks94[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 13th, 12:00 PM
Location: 10 N Park Pl, Morristown, NJ 07960 (Center of the Morristown Green)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G7QGW9+RJC>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/morristown-nj-friendly-ambitious-nerds/>
Notes: If the weather is good we can bring blankets and snacks and picnic on the green. If the weather is poor we can meet at Hops or elsewhere inside.
#### PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
Contact: Jacob
Contact Info: jacob[at]jaschwartz[ do t]net
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 1:00 PM
Location: Palmer Square. Will have a sign with ACX MEETUP.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G788XQ+X9>
Additional Notes: Rain location: Cafe of the public library.
### New York
#### ALBANY, NEW YORK, USA
Contact: Jake S
Contact Info: jacob[dot]scheiber[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 01:00 PM
Location: Professor Java's Coffee Sanctuary145 Wolf Rd Albany, NY 12205
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87J8P59W+7J8>
Notes: We will probably be sitting outside (unless the weather is bad).
#### BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, USA
Contact: Stefan
Contact Info: stefanlenoach[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 07:00 PM
Location: 81 McGuinness Blvd. apt 6A
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G8P3G2+2H>
Notes: If it rains, we will move to same time the next day, September 15th.
#### BUFFALO, NEW YORK, USA
Contact: Ian
Contact Info: meangiant[at]protonmail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 01:00 PM
Location: Spot Coffee Hertel (1406 Hertel Ave, Buffalo, NY 14216) Look for the very tall guy with the cat hat.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87J3W4XV+5GQ>
#### MANHATTAN, NEW YORK, USA
Contact: Robi Rahman
Contact Info: robirahman94[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 08th, 03:00 PM
Location: Pumphouse Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G7PX6M+RG>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/overcomingbiasnyc>
Notes: We will meet in Pumphouse Park if the weather is clear, or Brookfield Place if it is raining.
#### MASSAPEQUA, NEW YORK, USA
Contact: Gabe
Contact Info: gabeaweil[ at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 03:00 PM
Location: 47 Clinton Pl., Massapequa, NY 11758 - backyard if weather permits
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G8MG6P+PX>
Notes: Please RSVP to gabe.a.weil@gmail.com. Also, my wife is pregnant and trying to be Covid cautious. Please don't come if you experiencing any relevant symptoms.
#### NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, USA
*(See “Manhattan, New York” or “Brooklyn, New York”)*
### North Carolina
#### ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, USA
Contact: Vicki Williams
Contact Info: vickirwilliams[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, September 27th, 06:00 PM
Location: Biltmore Lake (aka Enka Lake) Fire Pit. Park near 88 Lake Dr. in Candler. Follow the path by the lake to the fire pit behind the tennis courts.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/867VG8MW+9G>
Notes: Please RSVP for details, meal planning, and rain location.
#### RALEIGH-DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA, USA
Contact: Logan
Contact Info: Logan[dot]the[dot]word[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 02:00 PM
Location: Ponysaurus Brewing Co (219 Hood St, Durham). We'll be at the outdoor seating area with an ACX sign on the table
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8773X4Q3+QW>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/rtlw>
Notes: There will be pizza! The venue serves beer but is kid-friendly. I'll have more details on the Google group (see link)
### Ohio
#### CLEVELAND, OHIO, USA
Contact: Amber
Contact Info: act114[at]case[dot]edu
Time: Saturday, October 19th, 12:30 PM
Location: Floor 2, Think[Box], Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, 44106, USA (Tentative location, to be confirmed closer to the time)
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86HWG92V+6P>
Notes: Please RSVP on [LessWrong](https://www.lesswrong.com/events/x5nwcZis6MiDvnmc4/cleveland-usa-acx-meetups-everywhere-fall-2024) by the 16th of October. You can bring guests, but please indicate the number on RSVP. Light snacks and coffee will be provided. Park in the **Veale Parking Garage (Lot 53)** at **2158 Adelbert Road** near the wind turbine. Parking in the Veale Parking Garage is not free. Go into Veale Athletic Center and speak with the front desk for assistance in reaching think[box].
### Oregon
#### CORVALLIS, OREGON, USA
Contact: Kenan
Contact Info: kbitikofer[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Friday, September 27th, 06:00 PM
Location: At a table in Laughing Planet, 127 NW 2nd St, Corvallis, OR 97330, or just outside if the weather is nice. I will have a paper with "ACX Meetup" written on it. Car parking is sometimes hard to find.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84PRHP7R+R6P>
Group Link: <https://discord.com/invite/ks3KxB3TCM>
#### EUGENE, OREGON, USA
Contact: Kapa
Contact Info: astralx[dot]yt[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Sunday, September 01st, 03:00 PM
Location: 3625 Kincaid St, Eugene, OR 97405
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84PR2W8F+PJ>
Notes: Please join us for a pre-Labor Day barbecue - we will have food, games, and conversation! Kids are welcome, but no pets please. This is a private house with a large backyard and plenty of shade - so we will mainly be outside.
#### PORTLAND, OREGON, USA
Contact: Sam Celarek
Contact Info: scelarek[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, September 13th, 05:30 PM
Location: The Encorepreneur Cafe, 1548 NE 15th Ave, Portland, OR 97232
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84QVG8MX+MV>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/portland-effective-altruism-and-rationality/events/302889901>
Notes: Feel free to bring food, but make sure to know what common allergies/animal products are in it so we can label it. Kids are welcome! Dogs are not.
### Pennsylvania
#### HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Contact: Phil
Contact Info: acxharrisburg[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 03:00 PM
Location: Zeroday Brewing Company Taproom 925 N 3rd St, Harrisburg, PA 17102 We will likely be in the side-room to the right as you enter, look for the ACX MEETUP sign on the table
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G57487+R73>
Group Link: <https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/PXrLoKgiAyXEG2hLD>
#### PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Contact: Siddhesh
Contact Info: ranade[dot]siddhesh[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 11:00 AM
Location: La Colombe at 100 S Independence Mall W #110, Philadelphia, PA 19106
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87F6XR2X+6M>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/46zb6hRVGB>, <https://www.facebook.com/groups/rationalphilly>
#### PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Contact: Justin
Contact Info: pghacx[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 02:00 PM
Location: City Kitchen @ Bakery Square in East Liberty. If the weather is nice, we can meet at the outdoor tables by the South-East entrance. In case of bad weather, look for us in the atrium between City Kitchen and the Alta Via Pizza/Jeni's Ice Cream. Look for a table with a small stand saying "ACX" on it. I will also send out an email ~5 minutes before the scheduled start time with the table number.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87G2F34M+HPV>
Notes: We have ACX meetups ~monthly. If you'd like to be added to the email list to be notified of future meetups, contact Justin at pghacx@gmail.com
### Tennessee
#### NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, USA
Contact: Felix
Contact Info: ACXMeetupNashville[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, September 22nd, 01:00 PM
**New** location: Rose Park Picnic Shelter #2
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/868M46V8+P5>
Notes: Change of location! Entrance is on 12th Ave South, just north of Carter Lawrence Elementary. Go straight in and the picnic area and parking lot will be directly ahead.
### Texas
#### AUSTIN, TEXAS, USA
Contact: Silas Barta
Contact Info: sbarta[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 05th, 12:00 PM
Location: The park by Central Market, 4001 North Lamar, Austin, Texas. We will be by the stone tables. We will have a LessWrong and ACX sign and have some tents set up. You can also park in the parking lot at 3900 Guadalupe St (outside the fenced hospital area).
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86248746+9C>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/austin-less-wrong>
Notes: Feel free to bring kids/dogs. We will provide lunch (soft tacos including vegan) and snacks and drinks.
#### COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS, USA
Contact: Michael Frost
Contact Info: mikefrosttx[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 07:00 PM
Location: On the porch of Torchies on Texas Ave. I’ll have a small sign that says “ACX”
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8625JMFC+5J4>
Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong if you are coming, even if it’s last minute
#### DALLAS, TEXAS, USA
Contact: Ethan
Contact Info: ethan[dot]morse97[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Sunday, October 13th, 02:00 PM
Location: 11700 Preston Rd Suite 714, Dallas, TX 75230. We'll be in the Whole Foods' upstairs seating area closest to the windows.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8645W55W+2J>
#### HOUSTON, TEXAS, USA
Contact: H. B.
Contact Info: Valerolactone[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 13th, 03:00 PM
Location: Hermann Park
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76X6PJC6+37>
Group Link: <https://discord.gg/DzmEPAscpS>
#### SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, USA
Contact: James P
Contact Info: jonbenettleilax[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Sunday, October 20th, 12:00 PM
Location: Commonwealth Coffee and Bakery (Jones St), 203 E Jones Ave Ste 101, San Antonio, TX 78215. Meet in the outdoor enclave abutting the cafe. I should have a sign setup, and I will have nametags.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/76X3CGP9+9X>
Group Link: https://lesswrongsa.dry.ai/
Notes: All are welcome!
### Utah
#### SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, USA
Contact: Adam
Contact Info: adam[dot]r[dot]isom[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, October 12th, 03:00 PM
Location: We'll be on the west side of Liberty Park, near the ChargePoint station, in a circle of chairs on the lawn
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85GCP4WF+VJ>
Group Link: There's a mailing list and a Discord server, I can get you on both at the meetup
### Vermont
**BURLINGTON, VERMONT, USA**
Contact: Skyler
Contact Info: skyler[at]rationalitymeetups[dot]org
Time: Sunday, October 12th, 1:00 PM
Location: In the Oakledge park. I’ll be wearing a tall blue and green hat, probably by the pavilion. Kids welcome. I’ll have pizza.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/87P8FQ4F+9M>
Group Link: <https://groups.google.com/g/burlington-lwacx>
### Virginia
#### RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, USA
Contact: Brandon Quintin
Contact Info: brandonmquintin[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Thursday, September 26th, 06:00 PM
Location: Hardywood Pizza Kitchen and Taproom
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/8794HG7R+XX>
Notes: RSVPs encouraged
#### Washington
#### BELLEVUE-REDMOND, WASHINGTON, USA
Contact: Cedar
Contact Info: cedar[dot]ren[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 02:00 PM
Location: 1111 110th Avenue NEBellevue, WA 98004
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84VVJRC4+35>
#### SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, USA
Contact: Alex C
Contact Info: biz[dot]alexc[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, October 19th, 06:00 PM
Location: 6717 Roosevelt Way NE Suite 101, Seattle, WA 98115. Armistice Coffee
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/84VVMMHJ+4XJ>
Group Link: <https://www.meetup.com/seattle-rationality/>; <https://www.facebook.com/groups/seattlerationality>
#### SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, USA
Contact: Roland
Contact Info: rolandsvsmith[at]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 04:00 PM
Location: We will be meeting at the Riverfront Park in the city. We will start on the grassy area near the intersection of Stevens St and Spokane Falls Blvd. I will be the tall man who has a sign saying "ACX MEETUP."
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/85V4MH6J+43>
Notes: RSVPs are preferred but not required
### Wisconsin
#### MADISON, WISCONSIN, USA
Contact: Tara
Contact Info: taraa1207[at]gmail[do t]com
Time: Sunday, September 08th, 05:00 PM
Location: On the big lawn right next to the Porter Boathouse, I'll be there on one of the benches wearing red
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86MG3HHQ+82>
Notes: Please RSVP by emailing me. If nobody RSVPs, I won’t be there.
### STONE LAKE, WISCONSIN, USA
Contact: Ethan
Contact Info: eleventhrootofseven[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 06:00 PM
Location: Stone Lake Lions Hall @ 16831 W. Main Street Stone Lake, WI. Look for a yellow building on the corner of Main Street and Frost Avenue. Park anywhere close and walk up the ramp from Frost Avenue to enter. We'll be in the café.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/86QCRFW6+7M>
Notes: There is a barn dance at the hall afterward (beginner's lesson start at 6:45p, main dance at 7:00p, goes until 9:00p). Some of us will stay to dance. You can to.
# South America
### Argentina
#### BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
Contact: Matt
Contact Info: mw[dot]coop[d ot]r[a t]gmail[d ot]com
Time: Saturday, September 14th, 03:00 PM
Location: Meet at Facultad de Derecho, right outside of the Ache Grill and Starbucks. We will have some kind of sign that says ACX Meetup
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/48Q3CJ85+QPH>
### Brazil
#### FLORIANÓPOLIS, BRAZIL
Contact: Adiel
Contact Info: adiel[at]airpost[dot]net
Time: Saturday, October 19th, 04:00 PM
Location: Angeloni Beira Mar, at the food court. I’ll be wearing a yellow hat.
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/584HCFGF+326>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/C2WFfuFX07 [ignore this part] W0UBMnTeooN6
Notes: Everyone is welcome! There will be cookies.
#### SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL
Contact: Bruno Vieira
Contact Info: vbruno2002[at]gmail[dot]com
Time: Friday, September 20th, 06:00 PM
Location: INOVA USP - 20/09/2024 - 18:00. Av. Prof. Lúcio Martins Rodrigues, 370 - Butantã, São Paulo - SP, 05508-020
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/588MC7VF+25>
Group Link: https://chat.whatsapp.com/GZSMt9x [ignore this part] MXUpFjJai4u0hlB
Notes: Don't bring kids or dogs, please. I'm still working out dinner, join the group chat so we can properly represent you with our decisions. RSVPs required at <https://www.sympla.com.br/evento/acx-meetup-sao-paulo/2607686>
#### Chile
#### SANTIAGO, CHILE
Contact: Iñaki
Contact Info: inaki[dot]escarate[a t]gmail[do t]com
Time: Saturday, September 28th, 11:30 AM
Location: Parque Bicentenario, next to the Vitacura municipality, next to the stairs and fountain. We'll have a sign that says "ACX"
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/47RFJ92X+J8>
Notes: English and Spanish speakers welcome!
### Costa Rica
#### TAMARINDO, COSTA RICA
Contact: timeless
Contact Info: pvspam-timeless-acx[at]hacklab[dot]net
Time: Sunday, September 15th, 01:30 PM
Location: El Mercadito, near Asian Fusion Sushi
Coordinates: <https://plus.codes/762P75X5+QMG>
Notes: Wear a nerdy tshirt. I will wear a nerdy tshirt. This is a surfer town, so anyone with math or philosophy on their tshirt is probably one of us. Mercadito is a small food court, but I'll get as close to Asian Fusion sushi as possible, and may order some before we begin. | Scott Alexander | 148057803 | Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places | acx |
# In Defense Of "I'm Sorry You Feel That Way"
[People](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-mental-health-revolution/202203/i-m-sorry-you-feel-way-and-other-gaslighting-tactics) [hate](https://www.reddit.com/r/unpopularopinion/comments/teefkh/im_sorry_you_feel_that_way_is_not_an_apology_it/) [this](https://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/gaslighting-apology-toxic-relationships-friendships) [phrase](https://www.reddit.com/r/LifeProTips/comments/17t1tfb/lpt_when_apologizing_replace_im_sorry_you_feel/). They say it’s a fake apology that only gets used to dismiss others’ concerns. Well, I’m sorry they feel that way.
People sometimes get sad or offended by appropriate/correct/reasonable actions:
* Maybe one of your family members makes an unreasonable demand (“Please lend me lots of money to subsidize my drug addiction”), you say no, and they say they feel like you don’t love them.
* Maybe you speak out against a genocidal aggressive war. Someone complains that their family member died fighting in that war. They accuse you of implicitly dismissing their relative’s sacrifice and calling them a bad person.
* Maybe you argue that a suspect is innocent of a crime, and some unrelated crime victim says it triggers them when people question victims or advocate for the accused. They say that now they are re-traumatized.
I see three classes of potential response:
* Actually change your mind. “Yeah, I’m so sorry I didn’t give you all my money so you can buy drugs, I’m going to take some time out to soul search and do better in the future. But first let me get my checkbook, how much do you need?”
* Be a jerk about it. “Haha, TRIGGERED! Whoever victimized you probably was right, you’re such a pussy about it.”
* Stay firm in your object-level position, but make it clear that you respect their feelings, didn’t mean it personally, and hope you can stay on good terms with them, ie “I’m sorry you feel that way.”
Is there some incredibly eloquent and original answer that manages to convey joint firmness and compassion without using the dreaded “I’m sorry you feel that way” phrase? Maybe, but it’s not realistic to expect the average person to figure out a bespoke phrasing in the heat of the moment. It’s either “I’m sorry you feel that way” or switch to one of the other two strategies.
So why do people hate this phrase so much?
People complain a lot about “therapy culture”, but usually without explaining it or giving examples. Freddie de Boer does better [here](https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/selfishness-and-therapy-culture) (see the list of bullet points halfway down). What do all of his examples have in common? They all overfit social norms to benefit you in the exact position you’re in at any given moment.
So if *you* wrong *someone else*, it’s a result of your trauma and disabilities, and everyone else is morally required to forgive you immediately.
But if *someone else* wrongs *you*, it’s because they’re a narcissistic abuser, and everyone else is morally obligated to shun that person forever in sympathy with you.
I think the hostility to “I’m sorry you feel that way” comes from the same place. It’s somebody in therapy culture imagining the overfit norm that they would want if somebody offended them. Then that other person shouldn’t be allowed to say anything except “I 100% admit that I was wrong and you were right, and I’ll change everything about myself immediately”.
What happens if you’re the one who offends someone else? Well, you’re a good person, you would never do that, and if someone else *thinks* you said something offensive, they’re wrong and they should apologize for unjustly accusing you.
If you ditch this model - if you admit there are sometimes situations where someone will be upset by some action of yours which you continue to endorse, and you’ve got to try to make them feel better with a polite compassionate response, then I think “I’m sorry you feel that way” comes out looking pretty good.
Or at least it would have, if Internet randos hadn’t installed a knee-jerk “Oh, you literally said *the words*, that proves you’re a bad person and I win this discussion!” reaction into anyone who hears it.
And if you disagree, I’m sorry you feel that way. | Scott Alexander | 147738849 | In Defense Of "I'm Sorry You Feel That Way" | acx |
# Open Thread 344
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** [Robin](https://readscottalexander.com/) has made [a database of all SSC/ACX posts](https://readscottalexander.com/), searchable by topic, length, popularity, etc. Also some good associated [stats](https://readscottalexander.com/stats). Thanks! He says he’s open to feedback; you can reach him at the [About page](https://readscottalexander.com/about).
**2:** Substack asks me to advertise that they’re hiring, and especially looking for software engineers with experience building recommendation systems. You can [learn more at their jobs page](https://substack.com/jobs). I’m always happy to direct more ACX readers to jobs at Substack, since it means I can easily get their attention for features/fixes I want.
**3:** Comment of the week is [Benjamin Jolley on compounding semaglutide](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-compounding-loophole/comment/66427471). You can read Benjamin’s [blog on pharmacy work here](https://benjaminjolley.substack.com/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=web&utm_content=comment_metadata).
**4:** Thanks to everyone who took my AI grantmaking survey last week. You can see results [here](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/E7pkeDruknpSa7j3i/results-of-an-informal-survey-on-ai-grantmaking). | Scott Alexander | 148141710 | Open Thread 344 | acx |
# Your Book Review: The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet's Craft Book (1936 Edition)
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
**I.**
Suppose you were a newcomer to English literature, and having heard of this artistic device called ‘poetry’, wondered what it was all about and where it came from. You might start by looking up some examples of poetry from each century, going back until you can’t easily understand the English anymore, and find in the 16th century such poems as [John Skelton’s “Speke, Parott”](https://www.skeltonproject.org/spekeparott/) [sic]:
> My name is Parrot, a byrd of Paradyse,
> By Nature devised of a wonderowus kynde,
> Deyntely dyeted with dyvers dylycate spyce,
> Tyl Euphrates, that flode, dryveth me into Inde;
> Where men of that countrey by fortune me fynde,
> And send me to greate ladyes of estate;
> Then Parot must have an almon or a date.
Moving forward into the 17th century in search of poems that spell their subject matter consistently, you might come across [John Donne’s “A Hymn to God the Father”](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44115/a-hymn-to-god-the-father):
> I have a sin of fear, that when I have spun
> My last thread, I shall perish on the shore;
> But swear by thyself, that at my death thy Son
> Shall shine as he shines now, and heretofore;
> And, having done that, thou hast done;
> I fear no more.
Moving forward with a bit more confidence, now that English has had a bit more time to settle on its modern form, you find in the 18th century [Thomas Gray’s “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard”](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44299/elegy-written-in-a-country-churchyard);
> The curfew tolls the knell of parting day,
> The lowing herd wind slowly o'er the lea,
> The plowman homeward plods his weary way,
> And leaves the world to darkness and to me.
By now, the patterns to this ‘poetry’ thing are becoming pretty clear, but a little stale; there’s only so many one- and two-syllable rhymes available, and only so many times you can hear the word ‘yearn’ rhymed with ‘burn’ before you’re wishing for something a little more exciting. Perhaps when you reach the nineteenth century you’re fascinated by the new trend of comic verse with its multi-syllable rhymes, such as in *[The Ingoldsby Legends](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/59236/59236-h/59236-h.htm#SIR_RUPERT_THE_FEARLESS)*:
> Should it even set fire to the castle and burn it, you’re
> Amply insured, for both buildings and furniture...
But aside from novelties for comedic effect, you’ve started to wonder if strict rhymes are really necessary for good poetry, and perhaps you’ve started to wonder what poetry even is. So when you chance upon [Walt Whitman’s “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking”](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48858/out-of-the-cradle-endlessly-rocking), you sit bolt upright. *This* is something new:
> Out of the cradle endlessly rocking,
> Out of the mocking-bird’s throat, the musical shuttle,
> Out of the Ninth-month midnight,
> Over the sterile sands and the fields beyond, where the child leaving his bed wander’d alone, bareheaded, barefoot,
> Down from the shower’d halo,
> Up from the mystic play of shadows twining and twisting as if they were alive,
If you stop right there and decide to write a book about the trip, you’re in all likelihood Clement Wood, putting together *[The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet’s Craft Book](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.227129/mode/2up)* [in 1936](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.227129/mode/2up). You have a grand vision in front of you about poetry, with very clear ideas as to what direction it’s going to take. There’s such a large body of poetry in English that a little bit of polyrhythm in place of strict iambic metre (or even better, this new-fangled eighty-year-old invention called ‘free verse’), and consonance or assonance instead of strict rhyme, could introduce some much-needed fresh blood into the scene. You dream of a day in which poetry is “a regular pattern, with restrained freedom and variety in its use”. You see a time when the various fixed forms like sonnets and ballades were enhanced by a healthy dose of irregularity, unlike the unforgiving metre the “poets, bound by fossilized conventions” of your day would prefer. And, eventually, a decade and a half after the book, you die peacefully, having completed a wondrous journey.
Though Clement Wood himself didn’t live to see it, we could imagine him continuing his trip up to the 21st century, leafing through the proceedings of the UK National Poetry Competition, and reading the opening lines to 2019’s winning entry, [Susannah Hart’s “Reading the Safeguarding and Child Protection Policy”](https://poems.poetrysociety.org.uk/poems/reading-the-safeguarding-and-child-protection-policy/):
> has left me feeling vaguely sick and I think a walk
> is probably the answer, is often said to be the answer,
> though I now understand physical intervention must
> not be undertaken lightly and the appropriate training
> must be given because the policy is designed to prevent
> the impairment of health or development even though it has had
> the opposite effect on me as currently I feel impaired, uneven,
> unequal to the task of being real, such that it occurs to me
> that humankind seems to be trying to find ever more
> ingenious ways to make the bearing of reality more difficult,
> else how could anyone have thought of all the horrible
> things that someone somewhere is always doing
> to someone else, whose vulnerabilities may or may not
> include neglect, homelessness, mental health issues,
> bereavement, previous abuse, but then again humankind
> has form for this kind of thing as medieval warfare...
Something *weird* happened to English poetry in the 20th century.
**II.**
*The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet’s Craft Book* is, on the surface, a book of contradictions. It’s a rhyming dictionary, prefaced by a guide to metre and the fixed poetic forms, written by a poet sick of fixed poetic conventions in general and rhyming in particular.
In Chapter II, Clement Wood declares that “there is no need for pride if the poetry is excessively regular” and encourages “variety within uniformity”; in Chapter VI, he declares that switching an ‘and’ for a ‘but’ in the refrain of a ballade is “unforgiveable”. He spends half a page decrying poets who rhyme ‘north’ with ‘forth’, since those two do not (in an Alabama accent) make a perfect rhyme but rather a consonance; he then arranges the rhyming dictionary specifically to make consonance easier to find, since all the perfect rhymes are now overused to the point of cliché. He stresses the need to avoid archaic and obsolete words, so as to make one’s poetry timeless, and then declares that no one’s poetry can ever be timeless:
> In spite of the constant insistence that nothing changes under the sun, the nature of man is stretched outward by his expanding environment, and coiled more tensely into molecules and atoms and complexes and other inner things: and the poetry, the concentrated heart’s expression, of yesterday cannot forever be the poetry of today.
These contradictions extend throughout the entire book. They’re not the fault of Clement Wood.
Two decades earlier, Ezra Pound’s essay [“A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste”](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/articles/58900/a-few-donts-by-an-imagiste) outlined the original guiding principles of [Imagism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagism), a literary movement aimed at making poetry more fresh, more alive, and more relevant to a public quickly getting bored of the old conventions. Reading the essay, Pound’s advice is unimpeachable, encouraging aspiring poets to raise their standards significantly, avoid plagiarism, and buckle down on learning all the nuances of language in order to produce the most striking images possible to convey with the written word:
> Go in fear of abstractions. Don’t retell in mediocre verse what has already been done in good prose. Don’t think any intelligent person is going to be deceived when you try to shirk all the difficulties of the unspeakably difficult art of good prose by chopping your composition into line lengths […]
>
> Don’t imagine that the art of poetry is any simpler than the art of music, or that you can please the expert before you have spent at least as much effort on the art of verse as the average piano teacher spends on the art of music. […]
>
> Let the neophyte know assonance and alliteration, rhyme immediate and delayed, simple and polyphonic, as a musician would expect to know harmony and counter-point and all the minutiae of his craft. No time is too great to give to these matters or to any one of them, even if the artist seldom have need of them. […]
>
> Don’t be descriptive; remember that the painter can describe a landscape much better than you can, and that he has to know a deal more about it.
The classic poets reacted to these words of advice precisely the way you’d expect someone in the late 1910s to react: declaring, like [John Burroughs did](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/18903/18903-h/18903-h.htm#IX_7), that Imagism was to literature what Communism was to politics:
> A class of young men who seem to look upon themselves as revolutionary poets has arisen, chiefly in Chicago; and they are putting forth the most astonishing stuff in the name of free verse that has probably ever appeared anywhere […]
>
> The trick of it seems to be to take flat, unimaginative prose and cut it up in lines of varying length, and often omit the capitals at the beginning of the lines—"shredded prose," with no "kick" in it at all. These men are the "Reds" of literature. They would reverse or destroy all the recognized rules and standards upon which literature is founded. They show what Bolshevism carried out in the field of poetry, would lead to […]
>
> A degenerate Englishman may be brutal and coarse, but he could never be guilty of the inane or the outrageous things which the Cubists, the Imagists, the Futurists, and the other Ists among the French have turned out.
This is obviously an overreaction. How could encouraging poets to work harder, to hold themselves and their work to higher standards, and to know their craft better lead to the destruction of “all the recognized rules and standards upon which literature is founded”? Poetry was clearly in rough shape by the early 1900s, and could have used some fresh blood and some improvement of standards. Similarly, Russia was clearly in rough shape in 1917, and the proletariat really did seem to have some grievances that needed to be resolved by a government more in tune with their best interests.
A few decades later, both Russia and poetry were unrecognizable. And Clement Wood, who speaks highly of Imagism and who quotes Imagist poet Carl Sandburg more frequently than any other poet of the 20th century except one, ran for mayor of Burmingham in 1913 for the Socialist Party of America. So maybe Burroughs was onto something.
Clement Wood writes this book as an honest appraisal of poetry as it existed in 1936. And the consensus he accurately reproduces was that the old ways of poetry, the rhyme and strict metre and the various fixed forms (almost all of which were stolen from France, and we didn’t even steal half the French ones), *had been* good things, once upon a time. But now, they were good only as a way of teaching, only as a transitional stage to something better. For instance, see his introduction to Chapter VI, teaching the various fixed forms:
> Fixed forms of poetry tend to become outgrown, like a child’s shirt too small to close over a man’s heart. They then become relegated to minor versifiers, to light verse writers, and to college and high school exercises.
Wood’s central thesis is that as poetry gets older and more familiar, its various forms and patterns become less and less suitable for serious expression, and so naturally become relegated to either children (as a stepping-stone to the adult world of poetry) or to comedy. We’re grown-ups now, and we can’t take classic poetry seriously anymore:
> Poetry itself ages: Shakespeare, Milton, Virgil, and Horace, are more used in the classroom than in the living room today, and so of the rest of them.
>
> If this is true of the poetry itself, it is truer of the patterns in which poetry has been uttered, and especially of the fixed forms. The sonnet, an emigrant from Italy that became naturalized in English literature, still holds its own as a major method of expressing serious poetry, in the eyes of many poets and readers. Even at that, it is now regarded as puerile by the extreme advocates of free verse or polyrhythmic poetry, especially since Whitman and the Imagist movement. Numerous other alien verse forms did not fare so well, and have established themselves primarily as mediums for light and humorous verse. These include the ballade, the rondeau, the villanelle, the triolet, and so on. This may be because of their rigid rules and formal repetitions, which were not acceptable to the living poet. And yet, they started as seriously as Sapphics, heroic blank verse, or polyrhythms...
Compare this to his conclusion about free verse, in the previous chapter:
> The free verse writer devises his own line-division pattern. This form, eliminating the devices of metre and rhyme, calls on the poet to avoid the inconsequential and the trivial, and to write down only his important utterances. If rhyme is a shelter for mediocrity, as Shelley wrote in his preface to *[The Revolt of Islam](https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4800/pg4800-images.html)*, free verse is a test of the best that the poet has in him.
In this light, the contradictions throughout the whole book make sense. There are two types of verse worth writing: actual poetry, mostly consisting of free verse, and training poetry. Rigidity isn’t suitable for actual poetry, argues Wood, since all the good sonnets have already been written, and all the possible 3,848 good Spenserian stanzas were used up by Spenser, and all the good ballades are in French. Come up with something new, when you have something new to say.
But when training, *rigidity is the entire point!* You wouldn’t be surprised if a basketball coach yelled at a player who threw a perfect three-point shot, if it was done during a drill for passing. Three-point shots are fine, but they’re *not the goal right now*, and if you only focus on doing them you won’t learn how to pass. And so rhyming ‘north’ with ‘forth’ (in an Alabama accent) becomes worthy of half a page of angry correction, even if real poetry – the kind the cool Imagists write – doesn’t rhyme at all. Rhyming teaches you how words and phrases fit together, and reference each other. Metre teaches you how words and phrases flow, and how to transition from one to the next. Both force you to constrain your own writing, to think of a dozen ways to say the same thing until you find the perfect fit. All they’re good for is training – but you can’t become a poet without training.
**III.**
The obvious follow-up question: is the book good for training? Simple answer: yes. And if – don’t say this too loud, lest Clement Wood hear you – if you don’t want to ‘graduate’ to free verse afterwards, but only want to want stay in school and write sonnets, the book will get you a large portion of the way there.
The primary strength of the book, as a guide to writing poetry as opposed to a snapshot of history, is in its own poem selections. Clement Wood quotes 103 different poems by 63 different authors (plus anonymous ones), of every conceivable style and (importantly) of a broad range of quality. And given that everything is available online, it’s selection and not content that makes a physical book worthwhile. Wikipedia could tell you the difference between [masculine, feminine, and triple rhymes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masculine_and_feminine_endings#Lines_ending_in_two_stressless_syllables) (rhyming pairs of words ending in zero, one, or two stressed syllables, respectively). But Wood finds the perfect poem to demonstrate all three at once, to show the contrast, with Guy Wetmore Carryl’s [“How the Helpmate of Blue-Beard Made Free With A Door”](https://allpoetry.com/How-The-Helpmate-Of-Blue-Beard-Made-Free-With-A-Door):
> A maiden from the Bosphorus
> With eyes as bright as Phosphorus
> Once wed the wealthy bailiff
> Of the caliph
> Of Kelat.
>
> Though diligent and zealous, he
> Became a slave to jealousy.
> (Considering her beauty,
> ‘Twas his duty
> To be that!)
Similarly, Wood and Wikipedia alike use Longfellow’s [“Hiawatha”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trochaic_tetrameter) to demonstrate trochaic tetrameter (poems with eight-syllable lines, with a stress pattern going TUM ta TUM ta TUM ta TUM ta). But Wood goes the extra mile and gives several variations of the same stanza from “Hiawatha” to make it iambic trimeter, and trochaic tetrameter, and trochaic trimeter, to reassure the reader that switching between them is possible. Wikipedia gives good examples of each type of rhyme and metre. Wood shows why the good examples are good, and also why the bad examples are bad, invariably getting the latter from his limitless supply of awkward lines by Robert Browning. In an age where everything is available online instantly, it’s the *curation* that’s difficult to get elsewhere.
The second half of the book, the actual rhyming dictionary, is useful for a different reason. [Rhymezone](https://www.rhymezone.com/) has every word in this rhyming dictionary and then some, including words that hadn’t yet been coined in 1936, and it’s much faster to type a word into Rhymezone than to look it up phonetically and by unstressed syllable count in the 494-page dictionary in the back. If the point is to write *a* poem, then Rhymezone is far better. But if the point is training, to get better, then taking fifteen more seconds to look up a rhyme is fifteen more seconds to think of the rhyme yourself, and get to the point where you don’t *need* a rhyming dictionary.
Because that is ultimately the goal Clement Woods is trying to help an aspiring poets reach with this book: to not need a rhyming dictionary anymore. Granted, he wants you not to need it because you aren’t rhyming anymore. You might want to not need it for a different reason. But your interests still align.
**IV.**
Why the 1936 edition?
Throughout the early 30s, the student newspaper of the University of British Columbia [(affectionately named the ‘Ubyssey’)](https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/ubcpublications/ubysseynews) would run various comic poems and light verse in a recurring feature, alternately titled “Litany Coroner”, “POME”, or in one case, “Poetic Ballyhoo” (featuring GK Chesterton, who probably would have approved of being there). These poems were, mostly, submitted by students, and can’t be found anywhere else online. They were, mostly, written with traditional rhyme and metre, with some free verse here and there. They were, mostly, not the highest-caliber poems you’ll ever read.
1936, however, was a bad year for poetry. [Rudyard Kipling](https://unsongbook.com/chapter-52-the-king-of-light-beheld-her-mourning/) died, having at one point been the most widely-read contemporary poet in the English language. [G.K. Chesterton](https://slatestarcodex.com/2015/01/31/the-parable-of-the-talents/) died, still remembered today by the [online limerick dictionary in limerick form](http://www.oedilf.com/db/Lim.php?VerseId=215349):
> Let us celebrate Gilbert Keith Chesterton
> All who heard him were deeply impressed at an
> Amply earnest debate
> Where his words carried weight
> And his own weight was, one would have guessed, a ton.
[Harry Graham](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Graham_(poet)) died, who I had never heard of, but who Clement Wood quotes more than any other 20th century poet, exclusively in poems featuring macabre humor about dead babies (don’t ask me).
And the Ubyssey inadvertently buried them with one of the [final publications](https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/download/pdf/ubysseynews/1.0125545/0) of the now-appropriately-named “Litany Coroner”.
The 1936 edition was made right in this transitional time between ‘classic’ and ‘modern’ poetry, and in many ways represents the best of both. Poetry, especially in academia and among the kind of people who write rhyming dictionaries, *was* stale in the early 20th century. Sure, Kipling and Chesterton and Graham were all writing bestsellers, but if they showed up in academia, it tended to be in student newspapers and not higher. Plus, while they could all write in any fixed form or rhyme scheme or metre, they tended to favor simpler ones, not the rondeau or the villanelle or the triolet that academics a few decades earlier might have preferred. Wood warns, both in the introduction and again and again throughout the book, about the failure modes he sees in poets too entrenched in archaic language and wording:
> The weakness of much verse and some poetry of the past is partly traceable to unoriginal teachers of English or versification, who advised their pupils to saturate themselves in this or that poet, and then write. Keats, saturated in Spencer, took a long time to overcome this echoey quality, and emerge into the glorious highland of his Hyperion. Many lesser souls never emerge. It is valuable to know the poetry of the past, and love it. But the critical brain should carefully root out every echo, every imitation – unless some alteration in phrasing or meaning makes the altered phrase your own creation.
Wood grew up in an era where the mistakes of the classical poets were still in living memory...and so were their successes. He can devote as many pages to “Little Willies” as he does to limericks, even though “Little Willies” are unheard of today, because they were a popular fad, because 1936 was at the tail end of the era where poetry could still *have* popular fads as opposed to academic schools and fashions. He can care about both tragic and comic verse equally, and care as much about appealing to a contemporary audience as appealing to an imagined future readership.
Appealing about contemporary audiences is also, ironically, the book’s strongest recommendation from the perspective of a reader 88 years in the future. Consonance (matching consonant sounds but differing vowel sounds) was just getting big, and Wood is convinced that assonance (the opposite, matching vowel sounds with different consonant sounds) was going to join it on the big stage any day now. He’s equally convinced that contemporary audiences want variation within metre: the formal metre (e.g. iambic pentameter, da DUM da DUM da DUM da DUM da DUM) is the skeleton of the verse, but people need a lot more variety than just the skeleton to qualify as ‘alive’. Listening to most random songs in most genres, he’s more right now than he was in 1936; assonance and consonance are at least as common as true rhymes, and the musical instrument can set a strong enough rhythm that the actual verses can be longer or shorter by several syllables. Modern music – or the good portion of it – requires the kind of flexibility that Wood tries to teach, even if modern poetry is as formless as water and modern classic-style poetry as rigid as rock.
On the flip side, Wood can write about free verse from the perspective of a poet who grew up, with, and at one time genuinely loved, the fixed forms. My sole opinion on free verse came from a pithy G.K. Chesterton quote (“Free verse? You may as well call sleeping in a ditch ‘free architecture’.”), but reading this book showed me how and why someone might hypothetically like it, and what someone might hypothetically get out of reading it. He didn’t convince me to like it. But I can’t quite sneer like I used to.
If you are interested in poetry but absolutely despite free verse, however, the book still provides a glimmer of hope: Clement Wood argues quite persuasively that no form of poetry can last forever, including whichever form you personally can’t stand. Robert Frost, in his lesser-known 1936 poem [“Tendencies Cancel”](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/browse?contentId=21207), agreed with and wrote about wood:
> Will the blight kill the chestnut?
> The farmers rather guess not.
> It keeps smouldering at the roots
> And sending up new shoots,
> Till another parasite
> Shall come to kill the blight.
Overall, I highly recommend the 1936 edition of *The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet’s Craft Book* to anyone who wants a genuine introduction and reference guide to the art of poetry.
But [the 1991 edition is Bogus](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Complete_Rhyming_Dictionary_Revised.html?id=GVl2QgAACAAJ). | [unknown] | 146073629 | Your Book Review: The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet's Craft Book (1936 Edition) | acx |
# The Compounding Loophole
Now that we’ve gone over [the pharmacology of the GLP-1 agonists](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/why-does-ozempic-cure-all-diseases), let’s get back to the economics.
[Last time](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/semaglutidonomics), we asked - how will the economy handle a $12,000/year drug that everyone wants?
Now we have an answer: the compounding loophole.
Compounding pharmacies are pharmacies that make some drugs on site. Don’t imagine fancy chemistry labs; imagine something more like them putting powder into capsules. They can get you unusual doses (for example, if you’re a hyper-responder and need a pill smaller than the smallest standard version) or unusual formulations (for example, if you have digestive problems and want a usually-solid medication as a liquid, or vice versa.)
Compounding pharmacies aren’t supposed to compete with Big Pharma. They’re usually just some storefront where one guy with a PharmD degree pours powders into things. Big Pharma has the patents and heavily-FDA-regulated factories. It would be unfair to let compounding pharmacies ignore the patents and regulations everyone else has to follow. So they’re usually under lots of restrictions.
But the law says that compounding pharmacies are allowed to step in and compete with Big Pharma during a shortage. And guess which drugs are in constant shortage because every obese person in the country has wanted them for the past year?
So enterprising startups have hit upon the business model of connecting would-be patients to friendly doctors and compounding pharmacies. From the customer perspective, this looks like filling in a form on a website and getting cheap GLP-1 agonist drugs in the mail the next day.
**How do the compounding pharmacies get it?**
[They say](https://www.reddit.com/r/henrymeds/comments/1av14cm/where_do_the_compounding_pharmacies_used_by_henry/kr9ggwr/) it’s through the same factories that make the official version for Big Pharma. If I understand the situation, nameless Chinese factories[1](#footnote-1) make the chemical itself, and Novo Nordisk (the pharmaceutical company that owns the official patent) does some fancy encapsulation work at their own plants. But they have a permanent capacity problem because of logistical and regulatory issues, so the nameless Chinese factories sell the extra to the compounding pharmacies on the side.
**How much does is cost?**
[HenryMeds](https://henrymeds.com/semaglutide/) is $297/month, [Eden](https://www.tryeden.com/) is $296, [Mochi](https://joinmochi.com/) is $254 - compared to the $1,300/month you’d pay for the official product. This isn’t covered by insurance, so it’s still not affordable for lots of people. But it’s more affordable than the $1,300/month version. Also, there’s not a shortage of it.
**Why doesn’t it cost even less?**
This is still a mystery to me. The compounding pharmacies are circumventing the patent, so they don’t need to pay back investment. And there’s a lot of competition between various compounders and telemedicine startups - [even 23andMe](https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/health-tech/23andme-launch-glp-1-telehealth-offering-shuts-down-drug-development-business) is getting in on the deal now! And some Harvard doctors recently published a paper saying that the unit cost to the manufacturer is [only about $5/month](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2816824).
Maybe the bottleneck is FDA-approved factories, or high-capacity compounding pharmacies. Or maybe Harvard doctors with no skin in the game are assuming too many things away, and $250 is the best we’ll get for now.
**Is the compounded version as safe as the regular version?**
The chemicals coming from the same factories is a good start, but might there be problems with the last few steps done at the pharmacy? The usual suspects have written countless articles warning that compounded semaglutide [might not be safe](https://nowpatient.com/blog/the-unforeseen-dangers-of-compounded-ozempic); the really ambitious ones have mentioned that [adverse events have even been reported to the FDA](https://www.everydayhealth.com/diabetes/fda-warns-of-safety-issues-with-compounded-forms-of-semaglutide/). But [this article](https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/compounded-semaglutide-how-better-ensure-its-safety-2024a1000bfq) gives away the game:
> From August 8, 2021 to March 31, 2024, [the FDA] received more than 20,000 adverse events reports for FDA-approved semaglutide. Comparatively, there were 210 adverse events reported on compounded semaglutide products.
This doesn’t mean that the FDA-approved version is 100x more dangerous than the compounded version - you’d need to know how many prescriptions were filled, and whether one type of patient is more likely to report than the other. It just means you can ignore all the people saying “How can you trust compounding pharmacies when there are ADVERSE EVENTS associated with them?!?!”
The other safety concern is the salt form. FDA-approved semaglutide is the free base[2](#footnote-2) (ie the semaglutide molecule not attached to anything). Some suppliers sell the salt version (ie semaglutide attached to an ion like sodium). The FDA has [issued warnings](https://www.medpagetoday.com/endocrinology/obesity/104795) saying that the salt version isn’t approved, that any supplier caught using the salt will be shut down, and that you should avoid compounding pharmacies because you can never be sure they’re not offering the dreaded salt form. [The](https://time.com/6301552/weight-loss-drugs-compounding-pharmacies/) [commentary](https://www.medicalrepublic.com.au/ozempic-maker-wants-local-substitutes-banned/105186) I’ve read from chemists is that none of this matters because the salt form dissolves into the free base as soon as it’s in water (which it always is before you inject it), although [other people](https://www.reddit.com/r/chemistry/comments/1bxwxpg/is_there_any_difference_between_base_semaglutide/kyfw9mt/) point out that maybe there could still be some theoretical concerns about shelf life and stability. Still, the FDA is legally allowed to shut down anyone offering the salt, and all the compounding pharmacies have switched to the free base.
I’m less convinced by any of this than I am by the existence of several big online communities of compounded GLP-1 drug users (eg [r/compoundedsemaglutide](https://www.reddit.com/r/CompoundedSemaglutide/)) who overall seem pretty happy and don’t report any unusual side effects.
**So this is good, right?**
I’m pretty encouraged by it. Not only does it provide GLP-1 drugs for a quarter of the price, but also people were really worried that diabetics wouldn’t be able to get their diabetes drugs because dieters would grab them off the shelf first. But now there’s more than enough GLP-1 agonists for everybody. This dramatically demonstrates how drug shortages are mostly regulatory problems (Adderall users, take note!)
**What about paying back the patent-holders?**
That is the one disadvantage.
The good news for them is that insurances mostly don’t cover these compounding pharmacies. So the people who really medically need the drugs will get them via insurance, and insurance will pay full price to the patent-holders. The compounding pharmacies will just pick off the people who only want them for cosmetic reasons, or who have bad insurance - most of whom wouldn’t have been able to get them through the normal system anyway.
Don’t get me wrong, this does probably take a big chunk out of Novo Nordisk’s profits. But Novo Nordisk’s stock price currently looks like this:
…and they’re now [the most valuable company in Europe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novo_Nordisk). So they can probably eat the loss.
**What happens when the shortage ends?**
Compounding pharmacies are only allowed to do this because of a law that suspends some drug regulations during a “shortage”, ie when the drug is on the FDA’s drug shortage list.
At some point, Novo Nordisk will build enough factories to meet capacity and there won’t be a shortage anymore. What then? Will the fun be over? Will GLP-1 agonists go back to costing $1,200/month again? Will most of the current users have to stop the drug and regain the lost weight? This would make tens of thousands of people really mad. I don’t know if the FDA has the guts to offend that many people. Their style is more to crush drugs before they ever come out, before anyone knows what they’re missing.
During COVID, the DEA said that telemedicine was allowed to be cheap and convenient so patients could get care during lockdown. After the pandemic died down, [they tried making it hard and expensive again](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-government-is-making-telemedicine), but so many patients protested that they backed off. The uproar we’ll get if the FDA tries to make GLP-1 drugs expensive again will make that one look like a tempest in a teapot.
But Big Pharma will be even angrier if they don’t. And besides, they can’t keep the drug on their shortage list if everyone knows there’s no shortage. I really don’t know what will happen, and I don’t envy whichever FDA official is in charge of setting a policy on this.
I did see one proposed solution somewhere or other (sorry if it’s yours and I’m not crediting you). Compound pharmacies are always allowed to make compounded medications for specific patients who have a “medical necessity” for a non-FDA-approved product. So in theory, you could try something like:
* Tell the patient to say that Ozempic causes them nausea.
* Tell your friendly on-staff doctor to prescribe a compounded Ozempic + Zofran (anti-nausea drug) pill, and to say that it’s “medically necessary”. This is balderdash - the patient could always just take the two pills separately - but everyone is reluctant to challenge doctors about what’s really “medically necessary” or not.
* Compound this pill.
* Sell it to the patient
* Somehow industrialize this system to serve tens of thousands of patients, all of whom coincidentally have this same side effect for which the combination pill is “medically necessary”
This is obviously cheating. But if the FDA were desperate enough, it might let them get away with it.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
The linked Reddit answer names a factory in Switzerland, but some other sources give a longer list of factories, most of which were in China.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Did you know: the slang term “based” originally comes from the free base form of a drug (as opposed to the salt). [I am not making this up](https://www.reddit.com/r/etymology/comments/h14a4q/do_you_guys_do_slang_etymology_where_does_based/). | Scott Alexander | 147781102 | The Compounding Loophole | acx |
# Lukianoff And Defining Cancel Culture
In [a recent post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/some-practical-considerations-before), I said that part of opposing cancel culture is to rigorously define it. Greg Lukianoff, president of FIRE, [took up the challenge](https://greglukianoff.substack.com/p/five-reasons-why-scott-alexander). His definition, first mentioned in his book *[Cancelling Of The American Mind](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Canceling-of-the-American-Mind/Greg-Lukianoff/9781668019146),* is:
> Cancel Culture is the uptick, beginning around 2014 and accelerating in 2017 and after, of campaigns to get people fired, disinvited, deplatformed, or otherwise punished for speech that is — or would be — protected by First Amendment standards, and the climate of fear and conformity that has resulted from this uptick.
When I talk about wanting to “rigorously define it”, I don’t just mean the kind of definition you would put in a dictionary. Consider the debate around the definition of “woman”. It’s perfectly fine for a dictionary to say “you know, female person, opposite of male”. But the debaters want something you can use to adjudicate edge cases.
Lukianoff argues that his definition lets you adjudicate some edge cases:
* It makes it clear that cancel culture is about speech. Even though we might colloquially say someone got “cancelled” for sexual harassment, this is a different issue and not part of the pressing problem of viewpoint discrimination.
* It refers to First Amendment standards, which already includes a lot of case laws on specific situations. I’m slightly confused about this, because all Lukianoff’s examples are about government officials; my impression is that the First Amendment mostly doesn’t constrain private businesses. I can’t tell whether or not he’s advocating an implied “we should hold private business to the same standard as the First Amendment holds the government” here.
* It provides an extensional definition as the sort of thing that’s happened since 2014 - 2017.
I agree that this is a good first step, but I’m worried about more detailed edge cases. For example, what do we think of the following situations?
**A1:** There’s a podcast that promotes pedophilia full time and does nothing else. I choose not to get a paid subscription to it.
**A2:** I subscribe to a podcast about 12th-century Siberian stamp collecting. Then it switches to promoting pedophilia full-time, so I cancel my subscription.
**A3:** I subscribe to a podcast that discusses the hosts’ opinions. Then the hosts express a new opinion: they like pedophilia. They discuss this regularly, although not full-time. I dislike this, so I unsubscribe.
**A4:** I subscribe to a podcast where the hosts interview guests. The hosts start regularly interviewing activists who support pedophilia, and seem interested, and don’t push back as much as they could. I dislike this, so I unsubscribe.
**A5:** As above, except it’s only two or three such activists, and they do push back a little. But I’m still unsatisfied with the quality of their pushback, so I unsubscribe.
**A6:** As above, except it’s just once, and they push back a normal amount. But I still don’t think they should be platforming pro-pedophilia activists, so I unsubscribe.
**A7:** As above, but I also post on social media “Wow, that was a gross and awful episode of my previous favorite podcast. Can’t believe they would platform a pedophile!”
**A8:** As above, but I also end with “I unsubscribed and you should too!”
**A9:** As above, but I add “If I catch you continuing to listen to a show that promotes pedophilia, I’m going to block you.”
**A10:** As above, but I also send an email to Spotify and say “Did you know you’re hosting a podcast that promotes pedophilia? This is gross and you should take it down.”
**A11:** As above, but I also start a social media campaign: “Spotify’s hosting a pro-pedophilia podcast, you should stop giving them money until they take it down.”
**A12:** As above, except that instead of promoting pedophilia, it’s a podcast that once called a woman “bossy” or some equally trivial infraction.
My impression is that everyone wants to allow A1, and anti-cancel-culture people near-universally oppose A12. Everything in the middle, I’m not sure. So where’s the line?
Or if these seem too easy, here are some more complicated ones:
**B1.** You’re the chair of the psych department at a local university. You hire a new grad student, who’ll mostly help you with your work shocking rats, but also has some leeway to research topics of their own interest. They do a decent job shocking the rats, but all the side papers they write are trying to establish that pedophilia is good for children, and that victims who say they’re unhappy about it are just lying. The papers are neither revolutionary work that makes you personally agree pedophilia is good, nor do they contain any spectacular errors that rise to the level of misconduct. Various pro-pedophile groups on the Internet latch onto these and your grad student becomes a hero in these circles, which he seems to enjoy and actively court. Some journalists are starting to take notice of this and it has the potential to be really embarrassing to the university. You have the power to either ask him to stop with the side papers, or to just quietly fail to renew his contract next year. Should you?
**B2:** As above, except that he’s writing *anti-pedophilia* papers which prove that molesting children is even more traumatizing than previously believed, and it has the potential to be really *good* for the university’s PR. The papers are exactly the same quality.
**B3:** You’re a journalist (or a blogger). You notice that the pro-pedophilia movement is being energized by a grad student at a local university who keeps publishing papers supporting it. You find this to be pretty gross. You consider writing an article about this. The article will be unbiased, accurate, and not sensationalist. It’s exactly the kind of news you usually cover, and it will get you a lot of clicks/subscriptions. But you know if you write it, thousands of people will get really angry and pressure the university to fire this grad student. Do you write the article?
**B4:** As above, but the grad student is studying how the word “bossy” does not actually negatively affect women that much. People are still really angry and it’s still a PR problem.
**B5:** As above, except the grad student is studying whatever is the most unpopular/offensive theory that you personally believe is correct.
Or if these seem too forced, here are some examples I’ve encountered in my own life:
**C1:** The *New York Times* said they were going to write an article doxxing my real name. Some of my friends made an open letter/petition asking them not to do this. Philosopher Agnes Callard said that she supported me, but she wasn’t going to sign the petition, because petitions are a form of pressure and a near occasion of sin to cancellation. Is she right? Would the answer be any different if thousands of people signed an open letter/petition demanding that the NYT not publish an article criticizing transgender people? What if it was something really horrible, like publishing the names and addresses of right-wingers during a murderous left-wing riot? What if it was something more related to corporate practices, like their newspaper being published on paper which was made by slave labor in North Korea?
**C2:** A little while ago, the *Atlantic* published an article saying that people who like quiet are racist and need to shut up, because noise is objectively vibrant and good. I have strong noise sensitivities that already make it hard for me to go out in public places, this felt like denying my right to exist in public, and I got angrier than I’ve ever gotten at anything in the media. I’m still so mad I’m not sure I’ll ever link an *Atlantic* article on ACX again, and I have trouble staying civil when I encounter people who work for the *Atlantic*. This isn’t out of some well-thought-out political strategy, just that it would personally warm my heart if the *Atlantic* failed as a business and everyone associated with it died of starvation. Probably this is dysfunctional and I should get over it eventually. But am I morally obligated to get over it for reasons of cancel culture in particular? Should I force myself to buy an *Atlantic* subscription, if I think that I would have bought one if not for my anger here? Would the answer be any different if it were an article criticizing transgender people?
In fact, let’s expand on these last two. Suppose (getting back to hypotheticals), that the *Atlantic* publishes something unbelievably offensive. Maybe “Stay-at-home fathers are pathetic failures, and CPS should take away their children and put them in more traditional families”. Thousands of stay-at-home fathers get angry and write in saying they’re cancelling their subscriptions. Millions sign an open letter demanding they apologize, and the *Atlantic* is hemorrhaging credibility among other journalists and potential sources. The CEO meets with the writer and editor, tells them they’re idiots, and fires them.
I think you have to accept one of these three propositions:
**P1:** The stay-at-home fathers were wrong to be angry that the *Atlantic* called them pathetic failures and urged the state to abduct their children. They are morally required to react like perfectly equanimous Buddhist monks. Certainly they are forbidden to cancel their subscriptions.
**P2:** The CEO was wrong to care that he’s losing thousands of subscribers and potential employees/connections because his employees published an insane thing. He should have told them “You have every right to say this, carry on” and told stockholders that the company’s bottom line is less important than journalistic freedom. (Does this mandate that the current real-world CEO of the *Atlantic* hire a writer who wants to pen an article about how stay-at-home dads are pathetic failures who should lose their children? Why not? How come it’s okay to chill this opinion *ab initio*, but not *post facto*?)
**P3:** Everyone acted in a morally acceptable way here, and you have no objection to this line of events. (Would you still feel this way if it were an article criticizing transgender people? What about an indisputably correct article, criticizing some bad pro-transgender science? Isn’t this option basically saying that cancel culture is fine, and that it’s okay to get a journalist fired if they express an opinion you don’t like?)
I’m not demanding that anyone solve these questions before opposing cancel culture. I’m certainly not challenging the proposition that cancel culture is real and bad. There are lots of things that are bad and that we should oppose, but which are hard to define or circumscribe in all edge cases (the most famous example is pornography, but also the distinction between normal policing and police brutality, or between normal punishment and cruel and unusual punishment).
But the more work we put into solving these questions, the more robust an anti-cancel-culture coalition will be. A coalition works best when people believe that if they support other members’ pet causes, those other members will support theirs. Right now nobody’s sure about this. If I support a Republican’s right to criticize transgender people, will he support my right to say I wish the Trump assassin hadn’t missed? Should he support it? Is there a natural coalition between people who want to do those two things? I think there is *some* natural coalition here, but until its members hammer out what promises they’re making their co-coalitioners, it risks collapsing when people feel betrayed by not getting support that they expected (or when they’re told they unknowingly signed up for supporting things that they hate).
I think of myself as, at the very least, in a strong coalition with everyone who believes that people shouldn’t be fired from their job for speech that they made outside of their job. But this is too limited! It doesn’t cover lots of things which I want it to cover, like an agreement not to cancel scientists for getting the “wrong” results. I’m in an informal shaky coalition about that issue also; I just feel like it could be stronger if we could bound exactly what we meant and what we were fighting against. | Scott Alexander | 147302807 | Lukianoff And Defining Cancel Culture | acx |
# Open Thread 343
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** I’m doing some AI safety grantmaking and am curious how other people value different parts of the ecosystem. If you have experience/familiarity with AI grantmaking, AI alignment, or AI policy, can you [take this quick (~15 minute) survey](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdPbXs7oVntsMduRgPBz30JfYyYq6nVx7VQU4IUXLU0AzEdgg/viewform)?
**2:** New subscriber-only post this week, [How Do We Rate The Importance Of Historical Figures?](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/how-do-we-rate-the-importance-of), on those lists speculating whether Jesus/Napoleon/Mohammed/whoever was the most important person in history.
**3:** Thanks to everyone who commented on last week’s post [Why Does Ozempic Cure All Diseases?](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/why-does-ozempic-cure-all-diseases) I did see a lot of commenters (who apparently hadn’t read it) loudly assume that it said “because obesity causes all diseases”. I want to emphasize that as best I can interpret the existing research, it’s **not** because obesity directly causes these diseases ([see here for more discussion](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/why-does-ozempic-cure-all-diseases/comment/65418561)). Other people were a little more sophisticated and suggested it was because starvation / calorie restriction cures all diseases. I’m skeptical of this one too. Even if you’re in fact starving on Ozempic, it works by sending your body its biochemical “I’m full” signal - so your body is in the fullness biochemical state rather than the starving biochemical state. This isn’t a knockdown argument, because your body has lots of different signals and the full vs. starving states are multifaceted, but I would bet against this one too.
**4:** Comment of the week is [Gwern’s comment/summary/review](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-silver-age-marvel/comment/65693964) on the Marvel Comics book review.
**5:** Manifold Markets is looking for a backend engineer. [See here](https://manifold.markets/JamesGrugett/will-we-hire-a-backend-engineer-by?r=U0c) (I know it doesn’t look like a job advertisement, but scroll down, it is) for more. | Scott Alexander | 147874137 | Open Thread 343 | acx |
# Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked.*]
You are a serious person with serious interests. The last comic book you read was more likely by Bryan Caplan than Jonathan Hickman. You would prefer to be reading high quality book reviews on AstralCodexTen. You believe ACX book reviews are usually more insightful than the books themselves, and a far more efficient use of your time. But even book reviews take time to process, and there are a lot of book reviews to read. Why spend your valuable time reading an 11,000 word review of superhero comic books?
That is the first question I aim to answer in this review. If I am successful, maybe you will invest a little more time to discover the answer to the next four questions.
**The questions:**
1. Why write a review about Silver Age Marvel Comics? Why is it worth your time to read it?
2. How did the Silver Age Marvel Superhero Comics happen - the origin of the origins?
3. How do early Marvel Comics compare to the best comics of today? And if they are worse (and they are), why? What does that say about art, creativity and innovation more generally?
4. Why did Marvel Comics succeed in passing the test of time? What did they do differently? What were their innovations?
5. Can we overlook the era in which these comics were written?
## I. Why Review Silver Age Marvel Comics?
1. **Why superhero comic books?**
2. **Given superhero comic books, why Marvel Comics?**
3. **Given Marvel Comics, why Silver Age (1961-1965)?**
### I.a. Why Superhero Comic Books?
The winner of last year’s Astral Codex Ten book review contest was Brandon Hendrickson. Brandon wrote about Kieran Egan’s *[The Educated Mind](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-book-review-the-educated-mind)*. One of the foundations of Egan’s educational philosophy is that people learn through stories. He believes early education should focus on teaching lessons through myths and legends. This matches my experience. My kids’ favorite podcast is *[Greeking Out](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/podcasts/greeking-out)* – a very well produced, very entertaining, National Geographic podcast about Greek Legends.
> ***Aside #1:** When my oldest daughter was three years old she would ask everyone she met “Do you know any myths? Can you tell me a myth?” She especially liked asking people from different places to get myths from their local cultures. Once, she asked the question to a friend of mine who grew up in South Africa, “Can you tell me any South African myths?” He struggled for a minute and then said, “Okay! I have one! Bread never falls butter side down!”. That was not the type of myth she was looking for; nor the type of myth we will be discussing in this review.*
Every culture has foundational myths. These stories are entertaining and engaging, but they also teach valuable lessons about both what is important in that culture, and how people in that culture are expected to behave (or at least the Platonic Ideal of how they *should* behave). In the modern, Western world, we have assimilated many of these foundational stories, particularly the Greek myths. My kids definitely know the Greek myths, but they also know elements of Norse mythology, Egyptian myths, stories about Anasi from West Africa and more. More fundamentally my wife and I, while not religious ourselves, have made a point of exposing the kids to the stories from the Bible. It is not politically correct to call Biblical stories “myths”, but they serve the same purpose – shared cultural understanding of the way the world works. My wife grew up without any religion, and when she was in high school, she struggled with the metaphors and religious allegories that were omnipresent in most of the Western canon. In our culture, familiarity with the Bible is important for an educated person – whether they are religious or not – because it is the foundation of so much of the rest of our culture.
I believe the other set of mythological stories that are foundational to our culture are – and by this point I am sure you see where I am going here – comic book superheroes. If true, then having more than a surface-level understanding of the most important superhero stories is important in a similar way to that knowing the Bible stories is important. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is an important idea to understand. So is, “With great power comes great responsibility”.
### I.b. Why Marvel?
While there are many independent superheroes that are not owned by major conglomerates, the superheroes who have built our modern foundational myths are currently owned by two corporations. **Warner Bros. Discover** owns the DC library of superheroes including **Superman**, **Batman** and **Wonder Woman**. In 2009 **Disney** purchased Marvel Comics and took ownership of their characters, including **Spiderman**, **X-men** and the **Avengers**.
> **Aside #2:** Marvel has sold temporary film rights to many of their characters over the years. The most relevant sales started in 1994 when Marvel sold the film rights of **X-men** and mutants to 20th century Fox, then in 1996, when Marvel went bankrupt, Fox picked up the rights to the **Fantastic Four** (and New Line picked up **Blade**). In 1999 Marvel sold the film rights (and live action TV, and animated TV longer than 44 minutes) of Spider-man and related characters to **Columbia Pictures** (part of **Sony**) for $7MM. Marvel actually attempted to sell ALL of their remaining Marvel IP film rights to Sony for $25MM, but the top management at Sony was not interested. Sony’s management allegedly told their chief negotiator “[Nobody gives a shi\*t about any of the other Marvel characters. Go back and do a deal for only Spider-Man](https://wegotthiscovered.com/movies/fans-look-back-and-laugh-at-sonys-missed-opportunity-to-purchase-marvel/)). Disney acquired Marvel in 2009, and then Fox in 2019, bringing the two separated packages of characters all back together under one roof (Blade reverted back to Marvel in 2012). Sony still owns the rights to Spider-man but has made a deal with Disney to include some of his films within the Marvel-Disney universe. Marvel sold the film rights of The **Hulk** to **Universal** in 1990 and the current status of that agreement is complicated (the consensus is that Marvel now controls the film rights to the character, but Universal owns distribution rights to any stand-alone Hulk film, which could be why Disney let's Hulk co-star in Thor movies, but not vice versa).
In the early aughts Marvel wanted to build their own film franchise, but were limited to only using their remaining “B-list” characters – Spider-man, X-men, and the Fantastic Four were all off limits. Fortunately, Kevin Feige, president of production for Marvel at the time, saw a way forward. He convinced Ike Perlmutter, Marvel CEO, to allow for the production of a series of films with the remaining characters begining with *Iron Man* (2008). Jon Favreau directed and cast Robert Downey Jr as Tony Stark. The film blew away expectations. Kevin’s plan of a series of movies where the characters would interconnect was suddenly feasible. Iron Man was followed by *The Incredible Hulk*, *Thor*, and *Captain America: The First Avenger*. None managed the box office magic of Iron Man, but all were successful enough that the plan stayed on track. In 2012 the characters were all brought together in the first *Avengers* film, which opened to over $200MM domestically and went on to gross more than $1.5B (which made it the 3rd highest grossing film of all time).
Marvel became the first studio to take the interconnected world of their comic books and make the model work on the big screen (for a much larger audience). Once the model was proven to work, other studios tried to duplicate it.
> **Aside #3:** Warner Bros’ stumbles with the DC shared universe of Batman, Superman and the Justice League are well known, but that was actually their SECOND attempt at a shared universe. Their first attempt tried to copy the Marvel method more closely. They chose their own B-list hero and set up his first film to allow for a wider mythology. Alas *Green Lantern* (2011) failed at the box office and we never got stand-alone films about Sinestro (Yellow Lantern), Carol Ferris (Star Sapphire, the Violet Lantern), John Stewart (African American Green Lantern), Kyle Rayner (1990s Green Lantern), Alan Scott (original Green Lantern), or the Blue, Red, and Orange Lantern Corps.
At least so far, no studio has successfully created anything with close to the traction obtained by the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU). Warner’s DC Extended universe (DCEU) had trifling success, but is being shelved and rebooted for a fresh attempt next year. **Universal’s** attempt at a “[Dark Universe](https://movieweb.com/dark-universe-all-the-canceled-movies-monsters/)” kicked off with Tom Cruise in *The Mummy* (2017), but was dead on arrival. **Paramount’s** attempt to link the **Transformers** Universe to **GI Joe** at the end of *Transformers: Rise of the Beasts* has been [appropriately mocked](https://www.vulture.com/article/transformers-rise-of-the-beasts-gi-joe-ending-explained.html). Sony’s Spider-man films linked to the MCU have been very successful, but their attempt at a stand-alone non-MCU Spider-man universe using Spider-man’s villains as anti-heroes has floundered (mostly succeeding only as a source of [memes](https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Memes/Morbius2022)). Next Mattel will be [attempting to build a universe](https://insidethemagic.net/2023/07/mattel-plots-for-cinematic-universe-with-barbie-success-jtc1/) off the success of last year’s *Barbie* and may include **Polly Pocket**, **American Girl**, **Hot Wheels**, and **He-Man and the Masters of the Universe** (no word yet on Thomas the Tank Engine, View Master and the Magic-8 Ball, but all are apparently in development). To date, only Marvel has successfully built a “Cinematic Universe”.
One potential reason for the MCU’s success is that Kevin Feige built his cinematic universe on the back of the existing interconnected universe of the comics. But those comics were not the first interconnected universe of stories. For that we would need to go back to our foundational myths. The Bible stories mostly interconnect. *Adam and Eve* flows into *Cain and Abel*. *David and Goliath* leads to the *Wisdom of Solomon*. Greek Myths DEFINITELY interconnect. Supporting characters in one Greek myth have starring roles in their own stories. The Greek pantheon of tales even have their own version of the Avengers. In the Quest for the Golden Fleece, Jason brings together the Argonauts, who included in their number Theseus (who defeated the Minotaur), Orpheus (who braved the underworld) and Hercules himself – all A-list stars in their own “franchises”.
Stand alone stories that exist within an interconnected universe are rare in modern media but were common in the ancient myths that have stood the test of time. Only Marvel has successfully created a shared universe that follows the pattern of ancient myths. Only Marvel films have stand-alone stories and protagonists who exist together in an interconnected world. Something about that method of storytelling is deeply pleasing for humans across many cultures. Marvel films are the first and most successful modern version of the mythological universe, and that it is worth spending more time exploring Marvel’s underlying mythology and where it came from.
### I.c. Why 1961?
The origins of Christianity and Judaism (and Buddhism and Hinduism) are very murky. Even Islam is far enough in the past that we only have a very rough understanding of how it came to exist. When scholars want to understand in detail how a new religion is born they are far better to look at Mormonism or, if you accept it as a religion, Dianetics. Similarly, we have versions of Greek myths that have been passed down to us, but we can never know how those myths changed from their first telling to their “final” versions. Were the stories once unrelated, and only later became crafted into a single “universe”? Or were the stories built off each other one by one (“Dad that Golden Fleece story was amazing! Do you know any other stories about the Hercules guy?”)? Or was it something in between? Perhaps the stories all existed independently, but were later crafted together (“Remember that 12-labors story I told you? Actually that was the same guy who was on the Argo!”)
Unlike Greek legends, we *can* know the origin of the Marvel Universe. We can see how it was constructed step-by-step. The people who did it (most importantly Stan Lee, Jack Kirby, and Steve Ditko) are dead now, but they have not been dead for long. We can read the original work, see how it changed over the last 60 years, and we can ask the creators “what were you thinking at the time” (or at least read their answers from old interviews). We can’t always trust what Stan Lee says, but at least we can hear his point of view. No one has a transcript of an interview with Homer, or knows exactly what he was thinking when he called it the “wine-dark sea”.
> **Tl;dr: Why read about Marvel Comic superheroes 1961-1965?**
>
> Because interconnected mythological stories are very important to cultures, Marvel is the leading contender of the most recent modern mythology, and it originated in the first half-decade of the 1960s.
## II. How did Marvel Superhero Comics happen?
**Timely Comics** published their first comic book in 1939 and called it “Marvel Comics”. Their most popular World War II comics included **Captain America**, the **Human Torch** (an android unrelated to the modern Human Torch except in powers, appearance and name), and **Namor, the Submariner**. In the early 1950s superheroes became less popular, so Timely changed its name to Atlas Comics and focused on humor, western, horror, war and science fiction stories. But in 1956 DC Comics began re-introducing their Golden Age superheroes and, in the second half of the 1950s, the genre took off again – particularly Superman, whose title, *Action Comics*, became the number one selling comic in America.
Stan Lee, editor and chief at Atlas at the time, wanted to get in on the superhero action. Unfortunately in 1957 Atlas lost its distributor and the company had to rely on “**Independent News**” to get its comics on newsstands. The complication was that Independent News was owned by “**National Periodical Publications**”, who *also* owned DC-comics and did not want Atlas to introduce superheroes to compete with **Superman**, **Green Lantern** and the **Flash**. Independent News agreed to distribute Atlas comics but limited the publisher to eight titles per month, and only in non-super hero genres (like horror, romance and science fiction). Blocked from creating and launching new superhero titles, Stan Lee got creative, and in August 1961 Atlas Comics published *Fantastic Four #1*.
> **Aside #4:** *Fantastic Four #1* was on newsstands in August 8th, 1961, but the date on the cover was November 1961. The convention at the time was that the cover date was not the “publication date” but rather the “pull date”. The pull date was the time when the retailer could send back unsold copies back to the publisher for a refund. In fact the retailer did not need to send the entire issue back, just the cover, as it was assumed that comic books could not be sold without the cover, and it saved on postage. This was only relevant because it was great for my dad who was a child at the time. My dad was friends with the kid whose father owed the local pharmacy which meant he had access to every comic book published in the late 1950s as long as he was willing to wait a few months and read it without a cover. Going forward in this essay I will always use the pull dates rather than the publication dates for individual comic book issues as they are far easier to source. If you want to convert pull dates back into publication dates you can subtract roughly two months, but it is inconsistent and sometimes longer, as was the case with *Fantastic Four #1*.
Check out the cover of *Fantastic Four #1*:
To the modern eye this certainly *looks* like a superhero comic. Four heroes with super powers fighting a giant monster. But in the eyes of publishers in 1961 this looked more like a science fiction adventure comic than something that would go head to head with Superman. Here are the covers of *Action Comics* (the best selling superhero comic at the time) from the three months leading up to Fantastic Four #1:
Notice what they have in common? “Super Rivals”, “Super revenge”, “Super Substitutes”. And all include Superman in his blue and red tights.
Fantastic Four’s cover featured super powers, but never used the word “super” and no one was wearing superhero costumes. Fantastic Four, as a superhero story, slipped under the radar because it wasn’t really a superhero story at all. It was a story about four close friends who attempted to fly into space, but then something goes wrong and they crash back to Earth. The experience changes them and they decide they now need to use their new abilities to help the rest of humanity – specifically against monsters who are invading from under the Earth. It is a fantastical science fiction story – not a superhero story. Later in his career Jack Kirby, the illustrator of the issue and co-creator of the Fantastic Four, was asked about his inspiration for the Fantastic Four heroes. He did NOT say Superman – or any superhero. He said *Challengers of the Unknown*.
*Challengers of the Unknown* was an adventure story co-created by Kirby in *Showcase #6* in February 1957. Here is how [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Challengers_of_the_Unknown) describes the Challengers origin:
> When acquaintances miraculously survive a plane crash unscathed, they conclude that since they are "living on borrowed time" they should band together for hazardous adventures. The four—pilot **Kyle** "**Ace**" **Morgan**, daredevil **Matthew** "**Red**" **Ryan**, strong and slow-witted **Leslie** "**Rocky**" **Davis**, and scientist **Walter Mark** "**Prof**" **Haley**—became the Challengers of the Unknown.
Showcase #6, and the first appearance of the Challengers of the Unknown, by Jack Kirby
Visually the Challengers and the Fantastic Four were similar. Both wore skin tight uniforms with belts and minimal decoration. The Fantastic Four’s relatively simple characterizations were practically pulled from Challengers. Reed takes on the traits of both Kyle, the leader, and Walter, the scientist. Johnny, the Human Torch is the daredevil. The Thing is “strong and slow-witted”. Sue, the only woman on the team, seems like a new addition, but is likely based on June Robbins who joined the Challengers team in *Showcase #7*, as an “honorary” or “girl-Challenger”. After surviving their respective “miraculous” crashes, both the Challengers and the Fantastic Four band together to help the world. They both travel through space and other dimensions, fighting mad scientists and monsters.
The Fantastic Four’s early antagonists were not traditional super villains. In the first few issues they fight monsters from under the Earth (Issue #1), shape changing aliens (#2), and a charlatan who uses hypnotism to steal from his audience (#3). In issue #4 Kirby and Lee re-introduce Namor, the Submariner, one of Marvel’s top IP from the 1940s, and have him kidnap Sue. Only in Issue #5 and #6 (June and August 1962) and do we get a more standard-supervillain when Dr Doom attempts to steal the Fantastic Four headquarters and throw it into space.
The next superhero Lee created was even less heroic than the Fantastic Four. In April 1962 (pull date), Marvel published *The Incredible Hulk*. If it was even a superhero story in disguise it was a very good disguise. The story was a scientific-filtered version of Dr Jekyl and Mr Hyde. It was a pure monster-story with nothing very super about it. Nothing on the cover suggests this has anything to do with superheroes:
It is not clear if even Lee at the time thought the Hulk would be a superhero. In *Fantastic Four #5* Johnny is reading a “great new comic mag” and mocks the Thing by comparing him to the Hulk. It seems pretty clear at this point that in the Fantastic Four’s world, the Hulk is just a fictional comic book, like in ours (more on that later):
The other two superheroes the Marvel introduces in this period have even more subtle introductions. At the time Marvel had a number of generic-sounding titles and told science fiction and fantasy stand-alone stories:
* Tales to Astonish
* Journey Into Mystery
* Strange Tales
* Tales of Suspense
* Amazing Fantasy
In ***Tales to Astonish** #27* (December 1961), Stan Lee told the story of a scientist who invented a shrinking ray, accidentally shrunk himself, and had to escape from his own backyard (It’s *Honey I Shrunk the Kids* without the kids). He brought the character back in *Tales to Astonish #35* (June 1962), now calling himself “**Ant-Man**” and adding a costume and helmet which allowed him to control ants. In his second appearance he is more superhero-like (he has a costume!) but he is still really just a scientist who “has no choice” but to use his new abilities to stop scheming communists. He doesn’t start fighting crime as anything like a superhero until issue #36 (September 1962).
The first 82 issues of ***Journey Into Mystery*** read like Edgar Allen Poe short stories mixed with rampaging monsters. Then in Issue #83 (July 1962) Lee and Kirby created Donald Blake, a lame doctor who discovered a magic stick. When Blake hits the stick to the ground the stick turns into a hammer and he gains the appearance, strength and powers of **Thor**. Blake uses his new powers to fight an alien invasion, but doesn’t appear in “public” until the next issue, and it is only in issue #84 that Lee [retcons](https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/retcon-history-and-meaning) the idea that Blake actually IS Thor, rather than just having Thor-like abilities. Apart from fights with his brother, Loki, Thor doesn’t fight his first super villain until issue #98 (**The Cobra** in November 1963).
While all four of these “superhero comics” started out as non-superheroes, all sold very well. This gave Lee the confidence to add more and more superhero elements to the stories under the belief that Independent News would not make him cancel his best selling issues. His biggest gamble to test his theory was in July 1962.
*Amazing Adventures #1* launched in March 1961 (cover date June 1961). It struggled with sales from the beginning. At issue #10 (March 1962) it was rebranded as *Amazing Adult Fantasy* (“Adult” here refers to “sophisticated” not “pornographic”. Its slogan was “the magazine that respects your intelligence”)*,* but that did not turn sales around. It was decided in advance that the title would be canceled with issue #15, so Lee had nothing to lose. He removed the “Adult” from the final issue and made it an obvious superhero story. The cover featured a superhero soaring through the city wearing tights. The story would be about an awkward teenager who developed superhuman strength and agility after getting bitten by a radioactive Spider. Spider-man was born.
Amazing Adventures #1 - The real origin of the real Spider-Man
*The GOAT of Modern Mythology is Born*
The gamble worked. Independent News let Lee publish the story and it broke all of Atlas’s sales records. Spider-man was a smashing success. Unfortunately Amazing Fantasy was no more, so Peter Parker would have to wait until March 1963 for his own title and his second appearance. But the door had been opened for Atlas to get distribution for superhero stories – while still restricting the number of titles to eight per month. Lee looked at his other fantasy and science fiction anthologies and began converting them into superhero stories.
In September 1962 *Amazing Tales* shifted from 100% Science Fiction to use half of each issue to tell spin-off tales of the **Human Torch** (the most popular of the Fantastic Four). In March 1963 *Tales of Suspense* abandoned its Twilight Zone-style stories and introduced **Tony Stark**, a playboy/billionaire/arm-dealer who was kidnaped in Vietnam and escaped by building battle armor. There was no mistaking this was a superhero origin story. It was the first Marvel Comic of the era to say “Super Hero” right there on the cover:
If it says Superhero on the tin, it must be a superhero inside the tin
In July 1963 Lee used the back half of *Strange Tales* to introduce **Dr Strange**. It seems likely that Dr Strange’s story was originally just a stand-alone fantasy like the others that were in the back pages of the title. Strange didn’t even appear on the cover of the issue. But just as the scientist Hank Pym was later turned into the superhero Ant Man, Dr Strange was eventually converted from a dark wizard into a super-wizard.
Throughout 1962 all of the Marvel stories titles were stand-alone. When the Hulk appeared in the Fantastic Four it was because Johnny was reading the Hulk comic book. There was no hint that they all existed within the same universe. That changed in December 1962. The Hulk comic was struggling to attract readers, so Lee decided to cross-promote him in the Fantastic Four as a real hero (villain? anti-hero?) who the Thing could do battle with. *Fantastic Four #12* (December 1962) was the first step to building a shared universe.
The issue sold well, but it was not enough to save the Hulk, whose title was canceled a few months later in March 1963 (*Incredible Hulk #6*). But the idea of cross promotion stayed with Lee. When Spider-man launched his own title in March 1963, Lee pulled no punches. *Amazing Spider-man #1* included two stories, but the cover story had Spider-man applying for membership with the Fantastic Four. The two most popular heroes were together and interacting. It was a huge debut and broke more records (allegedly. Actual records from this era are very spotty. Most sales numbers and “records” are based on memories and anecdotes told by those involved years later. But it was clear the issue sold a lot of copies).
By early 1963 it was established that the Fantastic Four, the Hulk and Spider-man all existed together within the same shared universe. But what about Ant Man,Thor and Iron Man?
> **Aside #5:** The Hulk comic in *Fantastic Four #5* pretty clearly establishes that the Hulk was a fictional character in the Fantastic Four world, but there are other clues that Lee was not thinking about his characters as existing and crossing over in the early days. Both Bruce Banner (the Hulk) and Mr Fantastic fight off global alien invasions in their early issues. In both cases the stories make clear that only Bruce/Reed is smart enough to save the world. No mention is made of the OTHER scientist who saved the world from the alien invasion a few months earlier.
Bringing different superheroes from their own titles together was not an idea created by Atlas/Marvel and Lee. That was likely *All Star Comics #3* (December 1940) when writer Gardner Fox brought together all the major DC heroes who were not staring in their own independent titles, including Green Lantern, the Flash and **Doctor Fate**, to create the **Justice Society of America** (JSA). Batman and Superman cameoed in *All Star Comics #7*, but generally they were considered too popular to dilute their appearances in ensemble titles. That changed in March 1960 when DC re-launched the idea of a superteam with the **Justice League of America** and included all of their most popular heroes as the leads – Superman, Batman and Wonder Woman. It was immediately a top seller.
The launch of JLA is likely what caused the owner of Atlas to ask Lee to create a ”superhero team comic”. Lee did not have a stable of heroes to bring together, so he had to create something entirely new – The Fantastic Four. But now that Lee DID have a collection of his own heroes AND he had the greenlight to create straightforward superhero comics, he decided to build himself his own JLA.
In September 1963 Atlas published two new titles: ***The Avengers*** and the ***X-men***.
The X-men were a brand new team of all new heroes, but the Avengers were a close parallel to the Justice League. Lee took his existing collection of heroes (except the Fantastic Four and Spider-man) and created an excuse for a team-up. In the issue they individually battle Thor’s brother Loki before coming together to defeat him as a team. They decide that given they all have different powers, they should work together to be unstoppable. The entire formation of the team takes only four panels and is a little corny, but it does its job:
While the Avengers were a clear copy of the Justice League, Stan Lee put his own spin on it. While the JLA superheroes all had roughly the same personality and no real inter-team conflict, Lee made his heroes very distinct – almost caricatures – and there was **PLENTY** of inter-team conflict. The Hulk in particular abandoned the team in the second issue and was the primary antagonist by Avengers #3.
*Avengers #3* (January 1964) is itself the final step in connecting all of the Marvel heroes together. The Hulk has gone missing and the rest of the team wants to find him. Iron Man uses an “Image Projector” to ask other superheroes around the world if they had seen the Hulk. He visits the Fantastic Four, Spider-man and the X-men. In that same month in *Tales of Suspense*, **Iron Man** meets **Angel** (one of the X-men). The cat was out of the bag. Lee had a new trick to boost sales of all of his titles and he put it to work throughout the year. The first full crossover of the Fantastic Four and the Avengers happens in May (*Fantastic Four #26*). **Daredevil** premiered in March 1964 (with Spider-man on the cover, but not in the pages), and crosses over in *Amazing Spider-man #16* (September 1964). Dr Strange first appears on the cover of another title in *Fantastic Four #27* (June 1964). The Avengers battle the X-men (before teaming up) in *X-men #9* (Dec 1964)
Atlas was no longer just a collection of comic books about various topics, or even a collection of different flavors of superhero. It was a single shared universe: The Marvel Universe. It wasn’t planned out in advance, instead it happened in stages due more to commercial rather than artistic needs.
Basically Stan Lee created the most successful modern mythology because he needed the money.
## III. Are Silver Age Marvel Comics any good?
Well, apart from *Amazing Spider-man*, which holds up surprisingly well, I would not recommend reading any of them. Even Spider-Man is much weaker than the *Ultimate Spider-Man* reboot version of the story published 2000-2011. If you wanted to read Spider-Man from the beginning you would likely enjoy that later series a lot more than the original. The other titles vary in quality from “okay” (the *Fantastic Four*) to “absolute garbage” (Ant Man stories in *Tales to Astonish*). Which begs the questions, if these comics were so bad, how did they succeed as well as they did? Clearly the comics were “good for their time”. Millions of people bought and read them, and they clearly passed the “test of time”. So does that mean that we are better today at making art than we were back then? Or is art neither better or worse, just “of its time” and people back then would think the Ultimate Spider-man stories from 2000 were unreadable?
I will argue the following:
1. The stories *were* “good for their time”. VERY good for their time. They were much much better than the comic book stories that preceded them, and much better than other contemporary comic book adventures (like those being published by DC)
2. The quality of comic book storytelling and art HAS gotten better, and not just by a small amount. I further argue that storytelling itself has advanced dramatically since the early 1960s – it is not just comic books that are better today, it is storytelling generally, and comic books are but one of the more flagrant examples.
3. None of #2 takes away from the fact that Stan Lee, Jack Kirby and Steve Ditko were brilliant storytellers that created innovations in the medium that had never been seen before
I am going to start with my second point: How is it possible to say that storytelling is getting better?
**Michael Lewis’** book, *[Going](https://www.amazon.com/Going-Infinite-Rise-Fall-Tycoon/dp/1324074337)**[Infinite](https://www.amazon.com/Going-Infinite-Rise-Fall-Tycoon/dp/1324074337),* about [Sam-Bankman Fried](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Bankman-Fried) (founder of FTX and Alameda Research, and convicted of fraud in November 2023) was controversial mostly because Lewis suggested that Sam was a good hearted, misunderstood guy who wasn’t really doing anything wrong. But it was also controversial for a quote from Sam about William Shakespeare. Here is part of the [original blog post](https://measuringshadowsblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-fetishization-of-old.html) by Sam:
> I could go on and on about the failings of Shakespeare and the constitution and Stradivarius violins, and at the bottom of this post I do\*, but really I shouldn't need to: the Bayesian priors are pretty damning. About half of the people born since 1600 have been born in the past 100 years, but it gets much worse than that. When Shakespeare wrote almost all of Europeans were busy farming, and very few people attended university; few people were even literate--probably as low as about ten million people. By contrast there are now upwards of a billion literate people in the Western sphere. What are the odds that the greatest writer would have been born in 1564? The Bayesian priors aren't very favorable.
This quote blew up and became the story of the day among the intelligentsia on Twitter. *Was* Shakespeare the greatest playwright? And if he was, what is the counter argument to Sam’s point. How could it be possible that the greatest writer of all time was born in a period when there were less than 3.5MM English speakers on the planet, and only about 20% were literate? Even if he was the best writer of the 700,000 writers of the time, how is it possible he is better than the ~1.5 BILLION literate native-level English speakers alive today? Sam’s point is that it would be highly unlikely.
One explanation is that Shakespeare may not have been the *best* writer, but he was a *very good* writer (the best of his time), and that he was able to pick up the low hanging fruit of writing ideas. Once Shakespeare had written Romeo and Juliet, no one else could write Romeo and Juliet (well they could, but then they would be derivative of Shakespeare’s work). The idea here is that there are innovative ideas in storytelling (and all art). The writers and artists that come first have their pick of possibilities. As more art gets created it gets harder and harder to come up with new ideas. Meanwhile the old ideas, once created, are there to be used.
[Richard Hanania](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/shakespeare-is-fake) quotes [Anne Gat](https://twitter.com/TheAnnaGat/status/1711392727143739468) in pointing out there are three ways to understand greatness:
1. **Intrinsic:** He produced the best plays and sonnets by some objective standard. This can be in an elitist sense focusing on the impact his work has on the most refined among us, or a more “democratic” one where the same can be said for all humans.
2. **Relative:** Shakespeare was great compared to those who came before him, or others of his time.
3. **Generative:** Shakespeare was the inspiration for a great deal of later work.
I would add a fourth:
> **4. Innovative:** Shakespeare was the greatest writer of his time and innovated in new ways that have become standard in writing going forward
Richard argues that when you look at activities with objective standards, performance improves over time. It is only when we look at subjective things, like art, where many people believe that the people who came early were the Greatest Of All Time (GOATs). But I think the same thing is going on in both objective and subjective fields. The greatest individuals at any time period both perform the activity well AND find a way to do it in ways that have never been done before.
Wayne Gretzky was the greatest hockey player of his time. He still holds the record for the most points (goals + assists) in a regular season (1985-86). He also holds second place (212, 1981-82) and third place (208, 1984-85). In fact when you rank all players by season across all time “Gretzky seasons” are four of the top five and eight of the top ten. When you look at career points, Gretzky has so many more points than second place (Jaromir Jagr) that Gretzky would still win even if you didn’t count any of his goals (i.e., he has more assists than Jagr has goals plus assists). Gretsky also holds the [record for most records](https://thehockeywriters.com/wayne-gretzky-the-great-ones-10-most-unbreakable-records/) (at 61). [Derek Thompson](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/most-amazing-statistical-achievement-in-us-sports-history/621329/), at The Atlantic, argues that Gretzky has the most impressive statistical achievement in any sport. The top player in terms of assists last year was Nikita Kucherov, coming in at 100 assists – enough to be the 4th best player of all time – but only the 14th best season because Gretzky did better 11 times.
And yet if Gretsky played today he would likely be outclassed by Nikita Kucherov – and many modern players. Because hockey players today are, generally, much better than hockey players back when Gretsky was playing. Part of the REASON they are better is that they learned how to play by watching Gretzky.
Gretzky did not just play better than everyone at the time – he played differently. His famous quote “Skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been” seems obvious to us today, but it was novel enough that it got put on Wayne Gretzky posters after he said it. That is true for many innovations: What is obvious today once had to be invented by someone, and wasn’t obvious before that happened.
Before Gretsky, players played hockey between the two nets. Gretsky played BEHIND the net. He did it so often and so well, “behind the net” became referred to as Gretsky’s “office”. Now it is well known that if a player can get behind the net and then pass outfront it is almost always a goal (the goalie can’t see where the puck is coming from in time). All professional players and teams know that and do whatever they can to stop it from happening.
The players that now play behind the net, or the writers that mix metaphors in witty ways are not considered “great” because everyone does it now – or at least understands how it can be done. What made Gretsky and Shakespeare great is that they were the first of their respective kinds to figure out new ways of doing things.
So can we quantify the quality of art?
Finding ways to quantify Beethoven vs Mozart vs Andrew Lyde Webber is out of scope for this essay, but storytelling, at least part of storytelling HAS been quantified.
In 2004 **Steven Johnson** wrote “[Everything Bad is Good for You: How Popular Culture is Making Us Smarter](https://www.amazon.com/Everything-Bad-Good-You-Actually/dp/1594481946)”. In it Johnson diagrams the plots of television episodes. Most TV shows in the 1970s had two “plotlines”. There would be some sort of opening piece for a couple of minutes (plot line 1), followed by the main story for the majority of the episode (plot line 2), then after plotline 2 was wrapped up, there would be a short epilogue calling back to plot line 1 for the last minute or two of the show – very “linear television”. Johnson claims *Hill Street Blues* was the first innovation on that model. Instead of one main storyline there were three stories – the A, B and C stories. The writer/director would move back and forth between the three stories, which often had thematic parallels to each other. This created far more engaging television, but it was also much more difficult to follow for people who were used to the old model. That increase in complication belies Johnson’s claim that pop culture was making people smarter. But I just want to focus on how it was making stories more complicated – and “better”. It was an innovation.
That innovation continued. Johnson explains that *The Sopranos* was the show to take it to the next level. Instead of just three plots that each ran independently, now **David Chase** (creator of *The Sopranos)* oversaw dozens and dozens of plot lines. Unlike *Hill Street Blues* where any given scene would advance a single plot line, in *The Sopranos* a single scene might push forward elements from two, three, four or more plotlines as everything intertangles. *Sopranos* also pushed further into long term commitment. Where *Hill Street Blues* plotlines were generally started and then wrapped up within each episode, Sopranos plotlines would carry over from one episode to the next. Sometimes a new plot line would be created in a scene of an episode and then go dormant for multiple episodes before coming back.
This type of storytelling is common in prestige television today. Even the “dumbest” TV for the lowest common denominator is more complicated than *Hill Street Blues* (the most complicated show of its time). That does not mean that **Mike Kelly** (creator of “*Revenge*”, one of the lowest rated TV on IMBD still on the air today) is a better writer than **Steven Bochco** (creator of HSB), but it might mean that the plots of *Revenge* may keep modern audiences more entertained than the comparably slow moving Hill Street Blues (or maybe not. I have never seen *Revenge* and have no desire to attempt it, even for a more thorough review).
The point is that it is possible that art IS getting better. That writers are learning from the writers that came before them on what types of stories people like to hear and engage with. Silver Age Marvel Comics did things that no comic had ever done before, but that does not mean they did ALL the innovative things that could make comics better. There are likely diminishing returns on innovation in art – but wherever those diminishing returns land on comic book creation, the creators in the 1960s were far from approaching them.
> **Aside #6:** In ancient Greece plays were traditionally a single protagonist/actor playing off of a large chorus. At some point (we aren’t sure when due to the limited number of plays that have survived) **Aeschylus** innovated and added a second actor (and shrunk the size of the chorus). This allowed two actors to have dialog and interact with each other. Before Aeschylus, no other playwright had thought to do this. Then it took almost twenty years before a new playwright, **Sophocles**, fell upon the idea of adding a THIRD actor. It seems that was as far as it went. The idea of a fourth actor would require innovation beyond the ability of the Greeks at the time.
Today, comic book storytelling may be at the efficient frontier. At some point between 1965 and today it is possible the major innovations were complete and future innovations were fighting against diminishing returns (“I have an idea! What about a 272nd actor!”).
Are the best comics today generally better than *Ultimate Spider-man* (2000), or other great comic book runs of the past 30 years? Maybe the best comic book stories to ever be written will be *Swamp Thing* by **Alan Moore**, **Robert Kirkman’s** *The Walking Dead* or **Michael Bendis’** *Daredevil*? It could be that the innovation in comic book storytelling peaked sometime in the last 20 years. There are still more stories to tell, but they won’t be objectively better than the best stories that came before.
I don’t want to debate that point.
But what I will argue is that the writers of the early 1960s were very far away from the storytelling capabilities that came later. But while those Silver Age writers did not have the tools and experience writers have today, they did have an open canvas. They had “low hanging fruit of innovation”. Lee, Kirby and Ditko were some of the most innovative creators of their time, and *their* time just happened to be the right time for creating the modern mythological foundation of *our* time.
## IV. Silver Age Innovations
When writing the first draft of this essay I came up with a dozen innovations that made Silver Age Marvel Comics different from their contemporaries and what came before. Rather than working through all of them, I am going to highlight four of those innovations, chosen mostly because those four are the most interesting to write about, and that should be enough to get the point across.
### Innovation #1: The Characters
Let’s review the characters that Stan Lee had a part in creating between November 1961 and December 1965:
* The Fantastic Four (Reed Richards, Invisible Girl, Human Torch, Thing – and Franklin Storm (1964))
* The Hulk
* Thor
* Ant Man
* The Wasp
* Spider-man
* X-men (Professor X, Cyclops, Marvel Girl, Beast, Iceman, Angel)
* Scarlet Witch
* Quicksilver
* Hawkeye
* Black Widow (as a villain)
* Dr Strange
* Daredevil
* Nick Fury
* Wonder Man
* Ka-Zar
* Medusa (as a villain)
* Hercules
* Power Man
* Black Bolt
(As well as reintroducing and re-imagining Captain America. Black Panther, Silver Surfer, Sharon and Peggy Carter, and Goliath came in 1966)
Some of the villains he co-created:
* Dr Doom
* Magneto
* Loki
* Green Goblin
* Vulture
* General Ross
* Kraven the Hunter
* Scorpion
* Dr Octopus
* Kang the Conqueror
* The Skrulls
* Sandman
* Mysterio
* Baron Zemo
* Purple Man
* Dormammu
* Attuma
* The Juggernaut
(Galactus and High Evolutionary came in 1966)
And that is without mentioning on the plethora of supporting characters (like Mary Jane Watson, Aunt May, Betty Ross, Flash Thompson, Jane Foster and Foggy Nelson), and world building (like SHIELD, HYDRA, Asteroid M, Savage Land, mutants, the Inhumans, and the Sentinels).
That is basically the list of all the characters used in Marvel movies today (There are SOME that have been used in the films that came later: Captain Marvel (1977), Ms Marvel (2013), Thanos (1968), Falcon (1969), Winter Soldier (2005) and some of the Guardians of the Galaxy (1969)). That level of iconic character creation would be enough to make this period of Marvel history special all on its own (the only real comparison is DC comics from 1939-1941).
### Innovation #2: The Integrated Universe
The idea of mixing together characters from different titles had already been done by DC comics, but Marvel took it to a new level. In the early years Stan Lee was writing almost all of the stories. While he played fast and loose with lots of conventions, he was adamant with himself that the stories needed to work TOGETHER. So when Iron Man goes to China and is trapped there by the Mandarin for two issues, he also goes missing from the storylines in the Avengers (and the remaining team members ask each other where Iron Man could be). The timing of these shenanigans does not always work out – sometimes issues were delayed due to artists not being able to deliver on time – and the planned timing became inconsistent, but Lee tried hard to make it all work and “seem real to the reader”.
It stressed out Lee so much that in *Avengers #16* he changed things up. He took all the characters with their own titles – Iron Man, Thor, Ant Man and the Wasp, and had them “retire from the Avengers”. He kept Captain America on the team (who had joined in issue #4, but did not have his own monthly title), and then re-filled the roster with reformed villains. He took **Quicksilver** and the **Scarlet Witch** from the *X-men* and **Hawkeye** from the pages of *Tales of Suspense*. The new structure still allowed overlap between the different titles, but he would not have to juggle characters being leads in two books at the same time.
Nothing like that level of attention to detail existed in DC – or anywhere else for that matter – for more than a decade.
Did readers REALLY care? Especially when issues sat on newsstands for months at a time and there was no such thing as a comic book shop to find old issues, or internet discussion forums to nitpick inconsistencies? Maybe not. But Lee cared. He was writing for readers who paid attention and cared, and that trend would continue through the evolution of comics into the 21st century. But it started here.
### Innovation #3: The Marvel Method
In the early Silver Age, Stan Lee, in addition to his editor and chief duties, was writing nine different comic book series. Not all of those comics were coming out monthly, but most were. It was an impressive feat. No wonder that some ideas and tropes leaked from one title to another (“Another alien invasion?” “The communists are kidnapping our best scientists… again?”). He made it through by counting on his artists in a way that had not been done before.
Traditionally the comic book writer would write the entire story for the artist, who would then deliver on the script. Lee did not have time for that – at least with the artists he trusted. Instead he used what came to be called the “Marvel Method”.
When Lee and Kirby were creating the Fantastic Four the two worked in collaboration. Lee often gets most of the credit today, but the consensus is now that that is more because Lee was an extroverted self-promoter, rather than “more deserving” of the credit. In any case once the basic idea for the team was created, what is not in question is the rough method Lee and Kirby used to create the stories (for more details on who deserves the credit and who claimed what when, check out the [Kirby museum](https://kirbymuseum.org/blogs/effect/2015/07/25/according-to-kirby-1/)).
The basic method worked like this:
* Lee would create an outline of the story. The major plot points.The characters. Who did what when. What was the conflict and how it was resolved. He would give that outline to the artist
* The artist (at first just Kirby, but later others) would take the script and, in addition to drawing the art, would design each individual panel. The artist would (generally) decide when to put a splash page, how things would flow from page to page, or whether there should be a close up or a wide angle shot of the action. The art would be sent back to Lee
* With the art in hand, Lee would write the detailed script – he would write the word bubbles, thought bubbles and the captions (and whether there were captions)
An inker and letterist would finish the job.
This innovative method allowed Lee to oversee so many different titles. It also gave the artists far more creative freedom than they are normally permitted. One should not be surprised that when artists were given more creative freedom, they were more creative, and it gave Marvel a distinct look and feel that was different from anything else on the rack.
Like the superheroes that were not actually superheroes, it was born out of necessity, but it created something entirely new.
And sometimes it failed.
While Lee knew all the lore and background of the Marvel Universe, not every writer did. For example, in the X-men comic books, Professor X is a public figure and intellectual, but he is not associated with the X-men. He works with the team behind the scenes. Only the X-men themselves know he is their leader. But in *Fantastic Four #36*, Reed and Sue throw an engagement party. Lee must have asked Kirby to ensure all the other Marvel heroes were there at the party, and he complied. But Lee likely did not clarify the relationships of all the characters. Kirby must have forgot, or never knew, that Professor was not the public face of the X-men. So Kirby drew art showing the X-men and Professor X (together) saying goodbye to the Fantastic Four as they leave the party. There was no time for Lee to send pages back and have Kirby re-draw them. Lee had to improvise and “fix” the art with the only tools he had left - the words on the page. Here was the result:
See, the X-men and the Professor don’t know each other at all, they were just generously offering to take the older man to a taxi so he could go to his completely separate and unrelated home. There is no way Reed Richards, the smartest man alive, would ever see through that ruse!
Most of the errors that happened in the Marvel method were like that. The artist would make a mistake, and Lee would fix it through his writing. There is, however, one huge error which reverberates through Marvel’s continuity to today: The origin of how Professor X lost his ability to walk. And this time the fault seems to be on Lee.
Kirby had apparently told Lee that he was going to incorporate a villain who had been responsible for the crippling of the Professor. Kirby either was not clear to Lee on which villain it was, or Lee did not remember, but the result was when in *X-men #9* the X-men and the Avengers team up to defeat an alien named **Lucifer**, Lee drops in some dialog on the second to last panel where Charles tells the group that the villain, Lucifer, was responsible for the loss of his legs. The panel:
Note that after dropping that bombshell Iceman wonders, “There must be more to that story…” It couldn’t be as simple as a random villain like Lucifer was responsible. Surely the writers would return to this story and explain it with far more pathos. But that was not Kirby’s plan, because Kirby never intended Lucifer to be the cause of the paralysis. It was miscommunication. Kirby had a plan for Professor X’s origin, but it wasn’t coming until issue #12.
The two-part story featured in *X-men #12 and #13* is one of the best X-men of the era. In the two-parter we find the team locked up in the X-mansion trying to prepare for the arrival of the unstoppable **Juggernaut**. There is a sense of dread that there is nothing the team can do to stop him, only slow him down. While they are waiting for the inevitable, Professor X tells the team his backstory and how the Juggernaut is actually his step brother with an old grudge. The Professor tells his students about how, when he was younger, he used to be an amazing athlete. Kirby draws images of the teenage Professor running track, playing football and winning trophies. But then his stepbrother, Cane (who later becomes the Juggernaut) takes him on a drive through the mountains, drives the car off the cliff and jumps to safety. Charles is still in the car as it plummets off the mountains. His students ask “Was... that how you lost use of your legs, Professor?”. It was clearly intended to be. It would have been a powerful moment.
**The panels:**
The monster coming at the team was the same one who crippled their leader. Charles’ origin would have been a loss of the use of his legs by his own brother.
But, unfortunately no.
Lee’s mistake in X-men #9 came back to haunt him. Rather than ignore the panel he had written a few months earlier, he doubled down and explained how, while it would have been dramatically appropriate if he had lost use of his legs from Juggernaut, unfortunately that could not be the case due to continuity concerns. The Professor replies to his students:
### Innovation #4: “Real People”
If you ask Marvel fans why they prefer Marvel to DC many will say, “Because Marvel is more realistic” . That is a somewhat ridiculous thing to say about Norse gods, Ant Men and radioactive Spider powers. But there is some truth to the belief. Marvel characters do tend to be less powerful than DC characters. But it's not the relative strength of Superman vs the Hulk that these fans are really talking about. More important for “realism” is that Marvel Silver Age characters were the first superheroes who were people first and heroes second.
Each hero had his own unique personality. And Stan Lee ensured all every character had flaws, made mistakes, and had motivations beyond saving the world for its own sake.
The most successful character was Spider-Man, and his origin story has been interpreted and re-interpreted so many times through the years because it is so well constructed. Peter Parker gets spider powers but uses them in a selfish way. His lack of responsibility directly results in the death of his uncle. From that point on he refuses to walk away from his responsibility to help people given his immense power. That guilt and responsibility takes a toll on his personal life. For every success he has as Spider-Man he has a set back in his life as Peter Parker.
While Spider-Man is the best example of this structure, it was true of all of the Marvel heroes at the time. In *Fantastic Four #9* Reed makes poor investments and the team goes bankrupt. They are evicted from the Baxter building, and they have no choice but to travel across the country to film a movie financed by their arch enemy.
Even some of the supporting characters have complicated relationships. In *Fantastic Four #8*, the team battles the evil Puppet Master. Through the adventure they meet Alicia Masters, the daughter of the Puppet Master. Alicia is blind and falls in love with the Thing (she can “see” what he is like on the inside and is not bothered by his outward appearance). But she is also a bit tormented herself. At the end of the issue she is left to believe that she has accidentally killed her own father.
Thor is in love with Jane Foster, but his father Odin refuses to allow his son, a god, to have a romantic relationship with a human.
Daredevil is in love with Karen Page, but believes that, as a blind man, he is unworthy of her. And besides, his partner is also in love with Karen.
Iron Man is in love with Pepper Potts. But the man inside the armor has a bad heart and could die at any time (only the armor keeps him alive). It would not be fair to saddle that on her, and so he pushes her away.
The couple that could not be together because of “reasons” is not the highest art, but it is far beyond what was in play in any comic prior Silver Age Marvel. Since that time comics have become more and more complicated and adult. But we can trace the origin of *Maus* and *The Watchmen* to Marvel in the early years of the 1960s – just as the player who plays behind the net should give credit to Gretzky and the playwright who includes a second actor should give credit to Aeschylus.
## V. It was still the 1960s
Stan Lee was a liberal and progressive of his time. But he was still “of his time”. He also had commercial interests. Superhero stories were read by young boys. So the heroes themselves were almost all men. The most popular heroes were boys themselves – Spider-man and the Human Torch. Lee created Rick Jones, another teenager, this one without any super powers, and made him an essential sidekick to the Hulk and later the Avengers – primarily because he felt that young boys needed a character to connect with in those stories.
Lee wrote for boys, and it showed.
In *X-men #3* the Professor is thinking to himself about how he is in love with Jean Grey – the 16 year old newest member of the team. The panel:
One can see what Lee was trying to do. Just as all of his other major protagonists love someone but cannot be with them for “reasons”, he was trying to do the same with the protagonist of the X-men. He just did not think through the implications of a 40+ year old headmaster lusting after his 16-year old student. To Lee’s credit this storyline was dropped and he never came back to it.
More problematic was the treatment of Sue Storm as the first female superhero at Marvel. In *Fantastic Four #3* Sue is captured by the Miracle Man and used as bait. Then in *Fantastic Four #4* she is captured by Namor who demands she marry him or he will destroy the human race. In the next issue Dr Doom arrives and demands that Sue be sent to him as a hostage “to ensure that you will do what I demand of you”. Sue gets a reprieve in issues six and seven before being kidnapped again in issue #8, this time by the Puppet Master. In *Fantastic Four #13* the foursome travel to the moon, and the first thing that happens is that the Red Ghost takes Sue hostage. In *Fantastic Four #19* the team goes back to ancient Egypt, where, once again, Sue is captured and forced to become the wife of Rama Tut, “You shall be reward by becoming my queen”. Then… you get the idea.
When she is not being kidnapped Sue does things like dressing up with wigs and trying out new perfume. In *Fantastic Four #15* the team breaks up for a short time. The boys go off on adventures and Sue gets to “do what I’ve always wanted to do” – and what is it that Seu has always wanted to do? Take off her costume and dress up in fancy clothes of course.
The male characters are generally pleasant with their female counterparts, but there is a lot of “casual sexism”. This is my favorite example:
Reed does the science, and then gets his girlfriend to type it up. Yikes.
But again it is important to remember that Stan Lee was *progressive* for the time - and significantly so. He wasn’t pushing his readers towards sexism, he was pulling them away from their far more extreme version of it. This is best seen in *Fantastic Four #11* when the team answers “in universe” letters from fans. These are clearly letters that Lee and Kirby have been getting, and the concept allows the pair to answer those letters from within the pages of the story.
The letters are saying the Sue is not valuable for the team and that they would be better off getting rid of her:
The team, and Reed in particular, tries to make her feel better. Sure she has the weakest powerset, and keeps getting held hostage, and she sits out their biggest adventures, but she is still IMPORTANT. Right? Like Abraham Lincoln’s mother?
Understandably Lee’s response to the letters was not enough to turn the tide. But he kept trying. In *Fantastic Four #22*, he had Reed run some new “enhancements” on Sue. Now, in addition to being able to turn invisible, she could also create invisible shields to protect herself and the team.
Maybe that was what she needed. New powers to give the female member of the team agency. It seems that the innovation that “the powers don’t make the hero” had to wait a little longer to be invented.
---
## Final Aside:
When I was eight years old I went on a cross country roadtrip with my family. Along the way we stopped at a pharmacy and I picked up a couple of comics to read in the back of the car. These were the two issues:
The issue on the left was part of a series of comics called “*Secret Wars II*” (1985). *Secret Wars II* was the first cross-title “event” in Marvel Comics. Marvel had had events in the past (arguably the first “event” was Reed and Sue’s wedding in Fantastic Four #3, 1965), but they were all confined to a single title or a stand-alone limited series. *Secret Wars II* was a 12-part limited series, but the antagonist, **The Beyonder**, made appearances in almost every title Marvel was publishing at the time – [42 issues in total](https://comicbookreadingorders.com/marvel/events/secret-wars-ii-reading-order/). It was the culmination of the idea that all these characters were existing together in one connected world.
The “event” innovation was so commercially successful that Marvel cross-title events became more and more common (It was not so successful artistically. *Secret Wars II* is commonly on the top of lists of [the worst Marvel storylines of all time](https://www.cbr.com/marvel-comics-best-and-worst-crossover-events/)). 1985’s *Secret Wars II* was followed by *Mutant Massacre* across the X-men titles in 1986 and *Kraven’s Last Hunt* across the Spider-man titles in 1987. Then in 1988 Marvel ran with three separate events: *The Fall of the Mutants*, *The Evolutionary War* and *Inferno.* By 1993 there were TEN cross-title events across Marvel. The number of events eventually came down, but the number of issues that were part of events continued to rise.
The second issue I picked up that day was a reprint in a larger format of what was essentially a Marvel Encyclopedia. Each page was a wall of text explaining the biography, demographics and powers of every character and organization in the Marvel Universe in alphabetical order (the first issue covered [Abomination](https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/Emil_Blonsky_(Earth-616)) to [Batroc’s Brigade](https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/Batroc%27s_Brigade_(Earth-616))). Today all of this information, and more, is easily available on the internet (see the links above for far more detail than what was covered in the comic at the time), but at the time this book was the best, and often only, way to get caught up on the previous 25-years of Marvel comic book history.
Neither comic was very “good”, but it didn’t matter. They were unlike any of the comics I had read in my life to date. I didn’t use the language at the time, but now I look back and can see that being *good* didn’t matter – the comics were *innovative*. I was hooked.
Between November 1961 and December 1965 Atlas/Marvel published 296 superhero comic book issues. It took me more than two years but I read them all. I am glad I read them, but I am glad I read them in the way I am glad I did many things that I will never do again (bungee jumping comes to mind). They were not particularly *enjoyable* to read. If I wanted to be entertained I would be far better reading more modern comic book runs, but some things you don’t do for pure entertainment.
After reading these issues I feel I better understand modern comic books and all the stories that have come in-between. Maybe I even have a better understanding of 21st century American culture (maybe…). In any case, my hope is that I have passed along a little of that insight to you, dear reader, without requiring you to read yet another bank robbery thwarted by the original Ant Man and his army of insects.
As Stan Lee would say…
Excelsior!
---
## Further Reading:
When I was growing up the only way to read these old issues was to track down and buy (expensive!) copies from comic book shops and flea markets, or pick up infrequent re-prints. Now all of the old Marvel Comics have been digitized and made available on the [Marvel Unlimited app](https://www.marvel.com/unlimited). The app is NOT very friendly to use – especially if you are trying to read the old stuff, but if you are determined (and I was) you can read all of this stuff for $70/year.
There are plenty of histories of the early days of Marvel Comics, but my favorite by far was Sean Howe’s, *[Marvel Comics: The Untold Story](https://www.amazon.com/Marvel-Comics-Untold-Sean-Howe/dp/0061992119)* (The audio book is also good). A good supplement if you want to read more is the Stan Lee biography “*[True Believer](https://www.amazon.com/True-Believer-Rise-Fall-Stan/dp/0593135717)*”.
There are also lots of podcasts about Marvel Comics. It seems like it is a non-uncommon idea to read every Marvel Comic from the beginning, and then talk about it like a book club. One I enjoyed was “[My Marvelous Year](https://www.comicbookherald.com/my-marvelous-year/)” (It looks like they have worked their way through to 2006 now!).
Finally, Matthew Ball, former head of strategy for amazon studios, wrote a [series of essays](https://www.matthewball.co/the-marveliad) back in 2019 on Marvel, epics, mythology, and box office. The basic ideas in section I.a. can be traced back to Ball’s insight expressed in these essays. | [unknown] | 146073274 | Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics | acx |
# Why Does Ozempic Cure All Diseases?
Fine, the title is an exaggeration. But only a small one. GLP-1 receptor agonist medications like Ozempic are already FDA-approved to treat diabetes and obesity. But an increasing body of research finds they’re also effective against [stroke, heart disease, kidney disease](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adn4128), [Parkinson’s](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11011817/), [Alzheimer’s](https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/30/health/liraglutide-alzheimers-trial/index.html), [alcoholism](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/first-ever-randomized-trial-of-ozempic), and [drug addiction](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/the-growing-scientific-case-for-using).
There’s a pattern in fake scammy alternative medicine. People get excited about some new herb. They invent a laundry list of effects: it improves heart health, softens menopause, increases energy, deepens sleep, clears up your skin. This is how you know it’s a fraud. Real medicine works by mimicking natural biochemical signals. Why would you have a signal for “have low energy, bad sleep, nasty menopause, poor heart health, and ugly skin”? Why would all the herb’s side effects be other good things? Real medications usually shift a system along a tradeoff curve; if they hit more than one system, the extras usually just produce side effects. If you’re lucky, you can pick out a subset of patients for whom the intended effect is more beneficial than the side effects are bad. That’s how real medicine works.
But GLP-1 drugs are starting to feel more like the magic herb. Why?
Medicine is bad at answering “why” questions. Often the answer looks like “because it modulates ABC transmission, which inhibits XYZ, which signals to MNO, and MNO is involved in the disease.” This is all very scientific-sounding but totally fails to satisfy any normal human curiosity.
I’m going to discuss a few of GLP-1 drugs’ effects on this level, but also try to speculate about some broader principles behind why these medicines seem so magical[1](#footnote-1).
### Diabetes
This is the one we understand best.
When a recently-eaten meal reaches food-detector cells in your intestine, they release glucagon-like-peptide 1 (GLP-1). This is one of the many hormones that tell your body that you’ve eaten and that it should adjust its activities accordingly. Various organs have GLP-1 receptors. When they sense GLP-1, they start various digestion-related tasks.
Since eating a meal increases blood sugar, your body wants to push blood sugar back down. So GLP-1 tells the pancreas to release more insulin (sugar ↓) and less glucagon (sugar ↑).
Diabetes involves excessive blood sugar, so this is the profile you want for an antidiabetic drug. But natural GLP-1 decays within a minute or two, so there’s no way to use it as a medication.
In 1992, scientists discovered a chemical in Gila monster venom which looked like GLP-1, activated GLP-1 receptors, but lasted a whole two hours. This became exenatide, the first GLP-1 receptor agonist (one of my favorite paper names is [Exenatide: From The Gila Monster To The Pharmacy](https://sci-hub.st/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16529340/)). By playing around with its structure, Big Pharma was eventually able to create liraglutide (twelve hours), semaglutide (one week), and cafraglutide (one month).
All of these work the same way: they mimic the natural hormone that the intestine produces to tell your body that it’s just eaten.
### Weight Loss
Like most good pharmacologic discoveries, the role of GLP-1 drugs for weight loss was partly accidental: we noticed patients losing weight before we understood why. The science has only recently caught up.
There are two plausible places GLP-1 drugs could lower weight: the body or the brain. In the body, they could change stomach contraction rate, hormone production, etc. In the brain, they could control the mental sensation of hunger. To separate these two effects, scientists bred rats that only had GLP-1 receptors in one place or the other. [The results](https://www.jci.org/articles/view/72434) were unequivocal: Ozempic and its relatives work in the brain. Although they have some effects in the body, these are short-lived and not really relevant to their mechanism of action for weight loss.
This is pretty surprising: the brain is protected by the blood-brain barrier which usually blocks large molecules. Ozempic is a large molecule. Scientists are still figuring out exactly how it gets through. Some of it seems to [leak through endothelial cells](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7606641/), and a little more might [make it into the cerebrospinal fluid and then sneak in through the ventricles](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9417299/). But this isn’t very much, and it can’t reach most of the brain. Instead, the little bit that reaches the brain activates a part of the brain stem called the [nucleus tractus solitarii](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solitary_nucleus) which acts as a sort of relay station, producing its own GLP-1 as a neurotransmitter which it sends to other parts of the brain.
This new neuronal GLP-1 makes it to at least two other brain regions: the arcuate nucleus and the mesolimbic system.
The arcuate nucleus is a pinhead-sized collection of neurons in the hypothalamus. By this point there are dozens of “master regulators” for hunger, but the *master* master regulator is probably the ventromedial part of this structure. It has two populations: AgRP neurons, (which make you feel hungry) and POMC neurons (which make you feel full).
Sticking to our animal theme: AgRP neurons are so named because they produce [agouti-related peptide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agouti-related_peptide). Agouti-related peptide is related to [agouti signaling protein](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agouti-related_peptide), so named because it was first investigated in agouti, a South American rodent that looks kind of like a mouse with Downs’ syndrome. The original agouti protein is most involved in coat color, and [might be](https://karger.com/spp/article/35/2/65/826910/Influence-of-Ethnicities-and-Skin-Color-Variations) part of the chemical package affecting skin color in humans.
Each of these populations is downstream of several other slightly-less-masterful master regulators of hunger; one of these is a group called TRH neurons. The TRH neurons use GABA to inhibit the AgRP neurons, thus making you less hungry. And [the TRH neurons have GLP-1 receptors](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.10.31.564990v1.full.pdf). So GLP-1 (and GLP-1 agonist drugs like Ozempic) activate the TRH neurons, which in turn inhibit the AgRP neurons, which in turn makes you less hungry.
I appreciate the paper linked above because it uses “rabies-based connectomics”. That is, in order to figure out which neurons connect to neuron X, the scientists infect neuron X with rabies, and see which other neurons are affected.
We’ll come back to the mesolimbic system later. For now, have this flowchart:
### Interlude: Do All Treatments Work Through GLP-1?
The converse of the original question. How many treatments that we *thought* didn’t involve GLP-1 are actually just GLP-1 drugs in disguise?
How about diet? A thousand diet gurus insist that it’s not just about calorie-counting - some foods help you lose weight faster than others. Why should that be?
Remember, the intestine naturally releases GLP-1 when it detects food, in order to tell the rest of the body to be full. What if some foods make the small intestine release more GLP-1 than others? A diet focused on those foods could be like nature’s Ozempic.
(every diet guru who read that sentence is calling their lawyer to see if they can trademark the phrase “Nature’s Ozempic”)
So we have [9 Foods And Supplements That Increase GLP-1 Naturally](https://www.goodrx.com/conditions/weight-loss/how-to-increase-glp-1-naturally), [6 Foods That Increase GLP-1 Levels](https://www.healthline.com/health/foods-that-increase-glp-1), and [Foods That Naturally Mimic GLP-1](https://bmidoctors.com/foods-that-naturally-mimic-glp-1/). I regret to tell you these are mostly the ones you already knew were healthy - fish, eggs, vegetables, whole grains. There’s also some discussion of supplements including psyllium (plausible) and curcumin (all results related to curcumin are false until proven otherwise). Needless to say, people have already written up arguments for why the GLP-1 evidence supports [the paleo diet](https://paleoleap.com/glp-1-hormone-making-case-for-paleo/), [the Mediterranean diet](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32926502/), [the Ayurvedic diet](https://lifespa.com/health-topics/weight-management/glp1-boosting-diet/), [the carnivore diet](https://www.instagram.com/luciia.cass/reel/C9vitvPJY3g/), and [the plant-based diet](https://www.forksoverknives.com/wellness/the-ozempic-effect-plant-based-docs-on-semaglutide/).
How about exercise? Sure, see for example [Effects of Exercise On Glucagon-Like Peptide 1](https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jpfsm/2/2/2_221/_pdf), [Does Exercise Potentiate The Effect Of [GLP-1] Treatment?](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6107470/), and [Endurance Training Improves GLP-1 Sensitivity and Glucose Tolerance in Overweight Women](https://academic.oup.com/jes/article/6/9/bvac111/6650333?login=false). Mostly this seems to happen by making tissues more sensitive to the effect of GLP-1. Why? Exercise creates very high demand for glucose, so it kind of makes sense that it’s a signal for the body to focus on keeping its glucose system well-tuned.
Whenever we discover a new wonder drug, scientists rush to demonstrate that all those lifestyle changes - the ones you should do anyway - actually work through the same mechanism as the wonder drug. So for example, when SSRIs were the hot new thing, psychiatrists announced that all the normal stuff that brightens your mood worked through serotonin. Sunlight? [Serotonin](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3779905/). Exercise? [Serotonin](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2077351/). Having a good, trauma-free childhood? [Serotonin](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/12/the-science-of-success/307761/). In the cold light of day and/or SSRI patents expiring, most of these effects were later found to be fake, or at least too small to care about.
Now that GLP-1 drugs are exciting / on-patent, we’re going through the same process. Everything works through GLP-1! GLP-1 makes the sun shine! GLP-1 makes the grass grow! Nobody knows what caused the Big Bang, but cosmologists are increasingly convinced that GLP-1 might have been involved! You should come back in ten years and check which of these claims have survived. My guess is very few.
For a while, I was taken in by one of these: bariatric surgery, aka gastric bypass. This is a giant mystery. We tell patients that it works by making the stomach smaller so you can’t fit as much food in, but that’s just a tiny part of the effect. We *thought* that was what would cause weight loss, we invented the surgery on that basis, but surprise! - a bunch of metabolic parameters change before the patient has even had time to lose any weight, and the weight loss tracks these metabolic parameters, not the stomach size. Some scientists thought maybe [this was GLP-1 too](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5711387/). After all, the intestine secretes GLP-1 in response to food. The stomach usually digests a lot of food before it even reaches the intestine. But If you remove/shrink the stomach, it can’t do that, and much more food hits the intestine. That means the intestine releases much more GLP-1. And *that* means the patient feels much more full, much more quickly.
Cool theory, but it turns out [gastric bypass works just as well on rats with no functional GLP-1 receptors](https://journals.physiology.org/doi/full/10.1152/ajpregu.00491.2013). Now this is back to being a giant mystery.
### Addiction
Speaking of giant mysteries…
It’s not surprising that an intestinal hormone could treat both diabetes and obesity. When you eat a big meal, your body needs to deal with the sudden blood sugar spike. And it also needs to signal to the brain to be full. At least in retrospect, all of this makes sense.
But Ozempic and other GLP-1 drugs appear to be a promising treatment for [alcoholism](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/the-growing-scientific-case-for-using), [smoking](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/the-growing-scientific-case-for-using), [stimulant addition](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3700649/), [opioid addiction](https://recursiveadaptation.com/p/the-growing-scientific-case-for-using), and maybe even [behavioral addictions like shopping](https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/14/6/617). Why?
Let’s go back to the second pathway by which GLP-1 causes weight loss, which [goes through the mesolimbic system](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full), aka ventral tegmental area and nucleus accumbens, aka the reward center.
The nucleus tractus solitarii uses neurotransmitter-GLP-1 to inhibit the ventral tegmental area, which then releases less dopamine into the nucleus accumbens. Dopamine levels in the nucleus accumbens act as a multiplier for reward (that is, a given reward feels more rewarding when there’s high dopamine in those areas).
Speculatively, there are two reasons you might eat. First, because you feel hungry. Second, because you crave delicious food. So to fulfill its evolutionary role of making you eat less, GLP-1 needs to do two things. First, it needs to make you less hungry (via the arcuate nucleus / master-hunger-regulator pathway). Second, it needs to make you crave food reward less (via the mesolimbic / reward-center pathway).
Broad-spectrum dampening of the reward system is a terrible fate. Some antipsychotic drugs like haloperidol do this. Take too much haloperidol, and you’ll sit motionless until you die, because no action feels worth it. But the existence of silver bullet anti-addiction medications - Ozempic isn’t the only one, naltrexone seems to treat a whole host of different drug and behavioral addictions - suggests there’s also a sort of narrow-spectrum dampening, one which affects addictions and nothing else.
Why? Isn’t addiction just the extreme version of normal wanting? Apparently not. None of these anti-addictive drugs affect wholesome rewards like the feeling of a job well done or a child’s smile. Just drug addictions, and a few compulsive behaviors like porn and gambling. Maybe the job well-done and the child’s smile get implemented partly through some system other than dopamine (oxytocin?), or maybe these medications lop off some extreme part of the reward distribution that only addictive drugs ever reach in real life. But why? Why did God give your brain a special lever that only porn and cocaine can pull?
GLP-1 suggests maybe this was originally a food reward system. Or at least food was a big enough part of its portfolio that it was a weird but functional hack for a satiety-signaling chemical to just turn off a whole subsection of the reward system. “You’re already full and well-nourished; why would you need the ability to crave things?”
Food craving is an old and evolutionarily-conserved system.
Here’s [Skibicka (2013)](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24133407/):
> Selective and local VTA microinjection of EX4 consistently yields reduction in food intake and body weight. These intake suppressive effects are not macronutrient specific since the intake of both palatable (high-fat or high-sugar) food and normal chow ([Alhadeff et al., 2012](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B6); [Dickson et al., 2012](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B24)) is reduced by GLP-1R activation. The finding that exogenous stimulation of GLP-1R results in suppression of food intake irrespective of its macronutrient content is perhaps consistent with previous data that indicate that all macronutrients (carbohydrates, fat, proteins) can induce the release of GLP-1 from the intestinal L-cells ([Reimann, 2010](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B77); [Diakogiannaki et al., 2012](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B22)). Intake of chow, however, is only reduced if the rats are overnight fasted or, in *ad libitum* fed rats, if the chow is available as the only source of calories ([Dickson et al., 2012](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B24)). In contrast, if a choice between chow and high-fat diet is given to satiated rats EX4 appears to selectively reduce the high-fat intake but surprisingly increase the chow intake ([Alhadeff et al., 2012](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013.00181/full#B6)). These findings can lead us to conclude that VTA GLP-1R activation might result in a lack of preference for high-energy/fat food.
If I’m understanding this right, the researchers found two separate behavioral effects of GLP-1. First, it made rats eat less. But second, when presented with very tasty food vs. normal food, it made the rats stop preferring the very tasty food. At least in this study, the extreme part of the reward system that governs addiction got used to determine how much to prefer very tasty food over normal food[2](#footnote-2).
If you want to learn more about GLP-1 receptor agonists and addiction, including the application to public policy, I highly recommend the [Recursive Adaptation](https://recursiveadaptation.com/) blog.
### Alzheimers And Parkinson’s
Okay, now God is just trolling us.
[GLP-1 Receptor Agonists: A New Treatment in Parkinson’s Disease](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11011817/) gives us this diagram:
…which, as is a running theme in this post, doesn’t make me feel more enlightened in any way. *Why* does GLP-1 do all these things?
Diabetes is a well-known risk factor for Parkinson’s, Alzheimers, and other dementias. The exact mechanism isn’t clear, but the extra sugar that diabetics have in their blood tends toward uncontrolled reactions with various other chemicals, creating slightly toxic glycosylated species that damage the cells. So the simplest mechanism by which GLP-1 drugs could prevent dementia is by lowering the concentration of these toxic metabolites.
But GLP-1 drugs also prevent dementia in non-diabetics, so there has to be more going on.
Most of the relevant papers say the drugs work by preventing inflammation. This is a catch-all term for the immune response to microbes; although it helps fight the microbes, it’s slightly toxic to the rest of the body and generally bad unless you’re actively fighting an infection. In chronic inflammation, ie the thing most of us with modern diets have all the time, general bad health damages the body, the immune system mistakes the damage for a microbial infection, and it provokes a constant low-grade inflammatory response. This is bad, so (if you’re not fighting an infection) anti-inflammatories are generally pretty useful. There are lots of anti-inflammatory drugs (aspirin is one, ibuprofen is another), but inflammation is a multifaceted process and no one drug can stop it entirely.
GLP-1 drugs seem to be especially potent anti-inflammatories that stop some of the inflammatory processes most implicated in dementia.
How? Research is still very early, but the best explanation I can find is in [Central glucagon-like peptide 1 receptor activation inhibits Toll-like receptor agonist-induced inflammation](https://www.glucagon.com/pdfs/WongCellMetGLP1CNS.pdf). This team found that there are no GLP-1 receptors on immune cells, so these drugs can’t be affecting the immune system directly. The researchers hypothesized that the drugs must be affecting the parts of the brain that regulate the immune system, especially the back of the brain stem. So they injected some of the drugs directly in to the brain, and sure enough, this was enough to produce the effect. How do the brain cells communicate with the immune cells? The team tediously injected one of each kind of chemical that blocks each kind of chemical communication system, and found that only the alpha-blockers and the delta-opioid blockers prevented GLP-1’s anti-inflammatory effects. So probably GLP-1 binds to neurons in the brain stem, those signal to other neurons and immune cells via alpha-adrenergic receptors and delta-opioid receptors, and then the immune cells initiate an inflammatory reaction.
Same question as before: why would an appetite-related hormone do this? I can’t find anyone studying this question, so I asked [Claude](https://claude.ai). It had some surprisingly clever guesses. Food itself causes a mild inflammatory response (because it usually contains suspicious-looking foreign chemicals); insofar as this is a common false alarm, the body might want to suppress immune response when it knows food is coming. But also, when a meal comes in, the body diverts other resources towards the digestion process (this is why a big lunch makes you tired). Maybe some of those resources come from the immune system, so immune cells stand down while you’re digesting.
That’s as far as I got with this one, but this is a very active area of research and we’ll hopefully know more soon.
### And Many More…?
Just this month, [a study found GLP-1 drugs cut risk of some obesity-associated cancers](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11227080/). I haven’t had a chance to read it yet, but I expect this to be a theme of the next few years - more new exciting GLP-1 effects than we can keep up with. Along with all the specific mechanisms above, there’s a more general question: what do we think when we keep finding new indications for these drugs?
Modern Westerners eat too much food. This is bad in various ways. So if GLP-1 drugs reduce obesity, that has the potential to be good in various ways. This makes sense and is definitely part of the story. But some of these effects (eg addiction) aren’t obviously linked to obesity. And others that seem linked to obesity (eg heart disease) turn out to be obesity-independent; scientists can observe them even in weight-neutral rats. So this doesn’t explain everything on its own.
Some of those explanations will be evolutionary. GLP-1 is a master signal for the starving vs. well-fed state. Lots of bodily processes change based on whether you’re starving vs. well-fed. Naively you’d expect that there would be as many side effects as positive effects (wouldn’t some conditions be better in the starving state?), but maybe that’s not true. In particular, maybe the inflammatory nature of the starving state really hurts a lot of systems. Maybe we’ll manage to trace everything back to various food-related pathways, until all of GLP-1’s effects feel natural and satisfying.
Other explanations will be more sinister. Pharma companies are always looking for more reasons to prescribe their drugs. And even unaffiliated scientists can get caught up in the excitement. Being a GLP-1 researcher now is probably a pretty great job, just like being an SSRI researcher thirty years ago. Probably some of these won’t replicate, and in a few years we’ll be left with a thinner and more believable profile of GLP-1 effects.
But I don’t believe it’s *all* pharma marketing. These drugs seem really special. We’re going to have an exciting next few years as we fully unwrap this weird new gift Nature has given us.
…and by “Nature”, I mean this guy.
[1](#footnote-anchor-1)
Thanks to Stephan Guyenet, who reviewed an earlier draft of this post. As always, any mistakes are mine alone.
[2](#footnote-anchor-2)
Sex is the other extremely-rewarding, sometimes-addictive behavior old enough that it might have shaped the evolution of the reward system. Do GLP-1 receptor agonists lower libido? Mouse studies say [maybe](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453020301062), but human studies say [no](https://www.endocrine-abstracts.org/ea/0090/ea0090p69). A very straightforward extrapolation of the Skibicka result might suggest that GLP-1 drugs shouldn’t change libido overall, but should make people less intensely prefer good sex to bad sex. So far nobody has managed to get that study premise past an IRB, sorry. | Scott Alexander | 147025858 | Why Does Ozempic Cure All Diseases? | acx |
# Open Thread 342
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** RIP Jake Seliger, local [blogger](https://jakeseliger.com), commenter, and healthcare policy advocate. You can read his post about his death [here](https://jakeseliger.com/), and donate to the GoFundMe for his family [here](https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-the-fight-against-cancer-with-jake-s?utm_medium=email&utm_source=product&utm_campaign=p_email_m_pd-5332-donation-receipt-adyen&utm_content=internal). | Scott Alexander | 147617200 | Open Thread 342 | acx |
# Your Book Review: How the War Was Won
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
To a first approximation, there are a million books about World War II. Why should you care about *How the War Was Won* (hereinafter “HtWWW”) by Phillips Payson O’Brien?
* It provides a new, transformative view of the conflict by focusing on production of key goods and what affected that production instead of the ups and downs of battles at the front.
* That particular lens used can (and should) be applied outside of just World War II, and you can get a feel for how that might be done by reading HtWWW.
* I have lectured about World War II and read many, many books about it. I have never texted friends more excerpts of a book than this one.
I have some criticisms of HtWWW, but if the criticisms dissuade you from reading the book, I will have failed. These complaints are like tut-tutting Einstein’s penmanship.
## The Wikipedia-Level Story of World War II (and O’Brien’s Counterargument)
To understand why O’Brien’s argument is so novel, you need to know the modern-day conventional understanding of the story of World War II. Here is my summary of the conventional narrative of World War II:
* Germany conquered Poland and France. It tried to bomb the UK into submission/maybe enable an invasion. That effort failed when Germany was defeated in the Battle of Britain, thanks largely to the plucky efforts of British airmen (memorably summarized by Winston Churchill: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”)
* Stymied in the West, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, won a bunch of crushing victories, but then got turned back at the gates of Moscow. The Soviets moved all of their factories east of the Ural Mountains and produced a vast tide of T-34 tanks that overpowered the Germans.
* The Germans suffered a catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad and a bloody strategic defeat at Kursk, after which the Soviets relentlessly pounded Germany to defeat.
* The US and the UK sent a lot of material help and eventually fought the Germans too, most notably in the D-Day invasion and the Battle of the Bulge. However, most of the fighting was done by the Soviets.
* It is very difficult to say how important the aerial bombing campaigns of the Western Allies were in defeating Germany. The Germans moved much of their production underground, insulating them from truly disastrous effects.
* The U.S. mostly fought alone against Japan, which won a series of impressive early victories (e.g., Pearl Harbor, the conquest of Singapore) until the decisive Battle of Midway, after which the vastly larger US industrial base outproduced Japan into oblivion.
* The US bombed the Japanese into submission by destroying Japanese cities, ultimately by dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
By examining where the Axis focused their productive capacities and how the Allies disrupted those capacities, O’Brien challenges virtually every part of that narrative:
* The Battle of Britain was not a close-run thing. The fact that British fighter planes were flying over their own territory meant their attrition rate of pilots and aircraft were far lower than the Germans’.
* American and British bombing mattered far more to the war’s outcome than the battles of the Eastern Front, which consumed a much smaller portion of German expenditures.
* American and British airpower made German battlefield victories on the Western Front virtually impossible and dramatically limited the force Germany could bring to bear in the East.
* Japan (really, Japan plus the giant empire it conquered at the beginning of the war) was an industrial behemoth to rival the Soviet Union. However, the destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet by American air and sea forces wrecked Japan’s economy.
* The firebombing of Japanese cities and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had an ambiguous strategic effect. American air power played a much more important role in severing Japan from the natural resources it had conquered in the early part of the war.
## Battles are Overrated
Take another look at the conventional narrative. Almost every key event involves a *battle*, a period of time in a relatively localized area where combatants slugged it out to see who would occupy some bit of land or sea. To O’Brien, this focus is silly, a relic of long-ago wars in ages with far less industrial capacity.
Start with theory. States fight to impose their will on another state in pursuit of some political goal. To do that requires that they achieve sufficient local military superiority that the other state can’t stop them from achieving their political goal.
Nazi Germany wanted to be the new administrators of the agricultural area of the western Soviet Union. To do that, they had to evict the Soviet military, whether through direct destruction or forcing the Soviet government to withdraw their armed forces. Individual battles for control of a localized area only matter if they are a means to that end.
Does the occupation or non-occupation of that point on the map affect the ability of a combatant to keep fighting?
In some limited cases, yes. Battlefield victory enabled Germany to overrun France before France could really focus its productive effort on the war. After their surrender, the French could not produce weapons, and they functionally could not organize their manpower to fight the Germans. But if the German army conquered, say, a random city in the Soviet Union, like Stalingrad, Soviet production and manpower was barely affected. The war goes on.
In theory, the German army could destroy *so much* of the Soviet military in one battle (or even a few discrete battles) that the Soviets run out of men or weapons. If there was ever a time this could have happened, it would have been the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, when the Germans basically won a series of crushing victories.
The problem for the Germans was that by World War II, people in the combatant countries were good at building stuff in vast quantities, and the major combatants of World War II generally had access to sufficient natural resources. **Even massive armies could not destroy produced weapons systems (e.g., tanks, airplanes) on the battlefield fast enough to remove the other side’s ability to continue fighting.** **What** ***could*** **(and did) happen was the destruction of the other side’s ability to produce and distribute weapons.**
Sure enough, if you look at the actual data from even the largest battles, neither side really destroys a hugely significant amount of stuff. Take the Battle of Kursk—the largest tank and air battle of World War II. Wikipedia will dazzle you with the numbers of soldiers involved (millions), tanks deployed (in the ballpark of 10,000), and aircraft in the sky (in the ballpark of 5,000).
In this entire vast battle that supposedly dictated the outcome of the Eastern Front, the Germans lost approximately 350 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) during the most intense 10 days of fighting. In the two months around when the battle took place, the Germans lost 1,331 AFVs on the entire Eastern Front. In the year of the battle, 1943, the Germans built more than 12,000 AFVs. Also worth noting: they disproportionately lost older, obsolete tanks at Kursk, and built new, capable tanks. **The Germans lost a very manageable amount of equipment at Kursk—less than a month’s worth of AFV production.**
If modern war means you cannot realistically destroy enough weapons in one battle to matter—if the largest battle of all time didn’t really matter—what did?
## Allied Air and Sea Operations Won the War
In O’Brien’s methodology, we should look at what the Axis spent its productive effort making and consider what Allied actions slowed that productive effort. In both theaters, the answer is shocking. The Germans spent relatively little productive effort on tanks, focusing far more on aircraft, submarines, and vengeance weapons (i.e., proto-cruise missiles and rockets). The Japanese spent heavily on aircraft as well, but also a tremendous amount on freighters and oil tankers.
**The Allies won the war by using air power to destroy the German and Japanese capacity both to** ***produce*** **military equipment and to** ***transport*** **it to the battlefield.** By 1944-45, the Germans and Japanese could not use their economies to arm and supply their armies on the battlefield, leading to their inevitable defeat.
In the European war, American and British airpower: (a) directly destroyed a significant amount of productive capacity, (b) rendered remaining capacity far less efficient, (c) made it impossible for the Germans to defeat western ground forces, and (d) compelled the Germans to waste tremendous resources on air defense and exorbitant, ultimately ineffective vengeance weapons.
In the Pacific, the United States used carrier-based airpower, submarines, and bomber-deployed mines to isolate Japan from the resources of the empire it conquered in 1941-42. American bombers also directly destroyed factories and transportation systems, leading to similar levels of economic dysfunction as in Germany.
## Amateurs Discuss Destruction; Professionals Discuss Non-Operational Losses
O’Brien is at his absolute best describing the subtle factors that whittled away Axis combat power. Air and sea power created a situation where the Axis war machine simply could not function anywhere near as efficiently as it needed to.
For example, after the Allied air bombings started, Germany built vast underground aircraft factories to protect production. But that move carried a host of negative side effects. To name a few:
* The direct cost of building new factories in inconvenient places was very manpower intensive.
* The oldfactories had been sited convenient to resource bases. The new factories were necessarily *not* near resource bases—they were in areas where one could dig out big new facilities.
* Railroads, by far the most efficient means of transportation, were set up to efficiently move goods to and from the old factories, not the new ones.
* Those factories had to be optimized for things like size and compactness, not efficiency and quality control. Aircraft frequently broke down on their way to the front lines. Once damaged, they could not be fixed on the front lines and were effectively useless.
These effects ultimately mean fewer airplanes produced as the war went on, and dramatic increases in non-operational losses. Citing the German field marshal in charge of aircraft production, O’Brien assessed that the Germans lost approximately half of their planned fighter production in this way. This comports with post-war American assessments, which assessed total German aircraft losses at the front as 15,327 in 1944, and non-operational losses at approximately 15,000. For comparison: total German aircraft losses at Kursk were approximately 159(!)
Data from HtWWW, recreated to improve image quality
The inefficiencies stemming from bombing ruined several would-be German technological panaceas. Germany developed the world’s first operational jet fighter, the Me-262. Lack of fuel meant there was not enough training for its pilots, and maintenance shortfalls meant that about half of the 1,400 Me-262s produced by Germany were lost outside of combat. The Germans developed a dangerous, relatively modern submarine, the Type XXI. They intended to deploy dozens in a way that the Allies would have been hard pressed to fight, but production delays meant that only one ever actually went on a mission.
## Allied Bombings Provoked Vastly Expensive Reactions
O’Brien thoroughly documents how expensive Germany’s reaction to Allied bombings was. First, expenditures on anti-aircraft weaponry and fighter planes skyrocketed. The Germans practically denuded the Eastern Front of fighter planes to have more to throw at the bombers. By late 1944, a bare 15% of German aircraft were fighting on the Eastern Front. In the second half of 1943, significantly more concrete was devoted to the construction of protected aircraft factories in Germany than to the entire Eastern Front. **The amount of concrete devoted just to protecting Hitler personally from air attack was almost a third of the entire total for fortifications on the Eastern Front**
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the bombings caused Hitler to authorize the most expensive German program of the war, the V-2 rocket, with essentially no goal in mind other than the psychological importance of striking back at Allied cities. The V-2 program cost the Germans proportionally as much as the U.S. spent on the Manhattan Project. According to O’Brien, the design and construction of V-2 rockets cost as much as all German AFV construction between 1939 and 1945(!)
It may be surprising to learn that the V-2s were basically irrelevant to the war. Launched primarily against UK cities, the V-2s killed several thousand civilians. However, more German slave laborers died building the V-2s than British civilians died from their use. The stupidity and expense of building the V-2 probably saved tens of thousands of lives elsewhere, which is ultimately yet another benefit of the Allied bombing campaign.
O’Brien’s production-focused approach yields some surprising insights about what the Germans should have done. The most cost-effective effort was certainly the use of submarines (U-Boats) to attack American shipments of military equipment across the Atlantic Ocean. For example, data suggest that the German navy destroyed at least twice as many American aircraft in the pre-production phase by destroying resource shipments as the German air force did in combat in 1942 and 1943.
## Japan Was Far More Powerful Than We Usually Think
O’Brien goes to great lengths to illustrate that Japan was not just a small island power easily subsumed by American production. The Japanese economy, at its peak, produced about as much as the Soviet Union. Its industrial base was mostly untouched until mid-1944. In 1943, it produced as much steel as the Soviet Union. The Japanese navy’s planes doubled between 1943 and 1944.
Famously, the Soviets focused on producing tanks. The Japanese focused on freighters and oil tankers. They had to—they had gone to war to obtain natural resources by conquest away from their home islands, and to use those resources, they had to ship them back to the home islands. The problem was that once the American navy had conclusively defeated the Japanese navy (certainly no later than mid-1943), nothing could stop American submarines and carrier-based aircraft from savaging Japanese shipping.
But just as the bombing of Germany weakened German production in several complementary ways, the American war on Japanese shipping caused cascading logistical problems. For example, one very successful initiative was the aerial mining of Japanese ports. **The mining didn’t start until March 1945, but it still sank more tonnage than U.S. submarines did in the entire war.** Beyond that, the mining forced Japanese ships to use smaller, less efficient ports with bad communications and dock facilities, reducing the value of the small amount making it through to port.
## **The Morality of Strategic Bombing**
One small but noteworthy argument in HtWWW relates to the “area” bombing of German cities, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Usually, air power enthusiasts are apologists for the indifferent (or even intentional) bombing of Axis civilians. They portray the fire/atomic bombings as difficult, but necessary and effective. O’Brien calls that logic into question.
As we’ve seen, strategic bombings that targeted specific factories or mined harbors were extremely useful. O’Brien writes, however, that civilian-centric bombing had ambiguous effects. Obviously, killing workers hurts productivity. But killing their spouses or children or destroying their houses does not immediately lead to unsolvable resource dilemmas.
It is perhaps too obvious to bear mentioning, but to the extent the civilian-centric bombings were not as effective as the rest of the strategic bombing campaign, they were immoral. O’Brien does not shy away from this conclusion, and shows a commendable willingness to gore sacred cows. He writes that Arthur Harris, leader of the British bombing campaign, resisted attempts to shift bombing away from cities generally and toward fuel or transportation targets, even when the evidence was clear that bombing was more effective. He takes the unusual step of effectively calling Churchill a moral coward:
> From the autumn of 1944 onwards, it becomes difficult to justify any of the area attacks on German cities as important in winning the war. However, removing Harris, which might have allowed for such a change, was beyond the Churchill government’s courage.
O’Brien is similarly critical of Curtis LeMay, the American general who oversaw the firebombings. In his autobiography, LeMay justified the firebombings on the vague claim that they damaged Japanese morale. His evidence was a decline in Tokyo’s population, but population tended to decline after bombing raids anyway because production was relocated after raids. O’Brien concludes:
> LeMay’s view of warfare was definitely a step backwards – and possibly self-defeating. His notion of causing justified destruction with little evidence beyond the physical action of destruction added an unnecessary air of irrationality to the American campaign.
Another important consideration in the debate over using the atomic bomb that I had not seen before: the firebombings were *declining* in effectiveness over time for the obvious reason that the best targets were already gone and the remaining cities were taking better precautions. The argument that firebombings alone would drive Japan to surrender without need of the atomic bomb must account for this awkward fact.
## Death by Oil Austerity
Oil was a particular problem for Japan. The Japanese had gone to war with the United States in no small part because the U.S. cut off oil exports to Japan. The Japanese attempted to replace U.S. oil with oil from southeast Asia. Again, this was far less efficient than the pre-war arrangements, and once the U.S. Navy shut down shipping, the Japanese had to make drastic cuts to conserve oil.
Perhaps the single worst way to conserve oil was in flight training. The Japanese air forces entered a death spiral. To replace veteran flyers lost at Midway or off Guadalcanal, the Japanese parsimoniously supplied oil for limited training flight hours. This famously led to their being massacred by better-trained American pilots in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
Another point brilliantly made by O’Brien: reductions in fuel expenditures meant Japanese pilots did not have sufficient training in navigation. Early in the war, aircraft were delivered to forward operating bases by aircraft carriers, limiting the ability of pilots to get lost. Once the American Navy had driven Japanese carriers from the scene, Japanese pilots had to make several over water hops to fly from the home islands to forward bases. Shocking numbers were lost along the way—up to 50%. (*HALF)* (!!!!) (I CAN’T EMPHASIZE ENOUGH HOW CRAZY THIS IS).
In addition to reduced training, Japan found another terrible way to conserve fuel: do not test engines for very long on the ground before sending single-engine fighter planes off to distant island deployments. Maintenance factors were one reason that on just one leg of the trip from Japan to forward bases, 5% of aircraft that took off from one island never landed at the next.
By 1945, the Japanese economy was so desperate for fuel that the government set up more than 34,000 small stills in the home islands to distill the oil from pine needles into aviation fuel.
In the European theater, the Allies specifically targeted German coal-to-oil conversion plants and Romanian oil facilities, which became far less productive. Over the course of one year, 1944, the western Allies destroyed the German energy market, and with it the German economy writ large.
Data from HtWWW, recreated to improve image quality.
German oil shortages caused exactly the same training problem Japan had faced, with a slightly different but similarly disastrous outcome. Japanese training and production problems led to planes not arriving where they were supposed to in fighting condition (perhaps as few as 10% were actually combat capable when they arrived!) For Germany, training shortfalls meant annihilation for their air force as inexperienced pilots were forced to fight numerically and qualitatively superior American and British pilots. German monthly aircraft lost/damaged rates increased from 52.5% in January 1944 to 96.3% in June.
One particularly illuminating episode illustrates how these problems manifested for Germany. The German air force had a reserve of 800 aircraft to counter the D-Day landings. The pilots of that force were used to only flying under expert control systems in Germany (countering bombing raids). When they went to France, they had trouble navigating and often landed on the wrong fields. Ultimately, they were poorly prepared to fight. The head of German fighter command was certain that the entire reserve did not destroy even two dozen Allied aircraft.
**American/British Airpower Decided the Outcome of Land Battles**
Beyond the strategic effects of bombing, tactical airpower (i.e., airplanes attacking land forces) gave an insurmountable advantage to the western Allies’ land forces. After D-Day, the Germans had a very strong defensive position in the hedgerows of northwest France. Allied aircraft literally carpet bombed one of the strongest divisions in the German army out of existence, with 70% casualties *in one day*. That division would normally have approximately 200 AFVs. At the end of that one day of bombing, it had 14.
The Battle of the Bulge, the last offensive by the Germans to drive back the western Allies’ advance, was almost pathetic in its hopelessness. We Americans tend to focus on the hard fighting at the outset of the battle, and the stout resistance of the 101st Airborne at Bastogne. Knowing that airpower would make their attack impossible, the Germans timed the battle for bad weather and prayed it lasted as long as possible. Prayer was really the only option. Once the skies inevitably cleared after a little over a week of bad weather, more than 2,000(!) Allied bombers destroyed the German offensive. With most logistical support wiped out, one famous German division had to abandon all its vehicles and walk back to Germany.
## Criticism of HtWWW as a Book: Love the Data, (Mostly) Don’t Care About the People
My single biggest criticism of HtWWW is O’Brien spends a lot of time (I would estimate 20% of the book) discussing the relative importance and influence of various people in the United States and United Kingdom. The section on Doug MacArthur is worth a longer digression, which I have included below. The problem is that focusing on personnel is almost completely irrelevant to the main argument of the book.
For example, it is modestly interesting that Franklin Roosevelt, consistent with advice from Harry Hopkins and Admiral Ernest King, focused America’s productive effort on air and sea power. It is not at all central to the argument that air and sea power won the war. The fact that these particular people thought it was a good idea to build planes and ships matters less than the outcome that the U.S. did exactly that.
I am very much interested in World War II history, and on an interestingness scale of 1-10, I found this discussion to be at about a 4. The central argument of the book about German and Japanese production was a consistent 10.
## Sidenote: MacArthur Was a Disastrous General
In the part of the book focused on personnel, the one discussion that hit around a 9 or 10 was of Douglas MacArthur and the invasion of the Philippines. MacArthur was the American general commanding the defense of the Philippines. The Japanese conquered the Philippines, and MacArthur slipped away to Australia, heroically vowing, “I shall return.” He did in December 1944, and some of the worst fighting of the war took place, with massive casualties for the Americans, Japanese, and Filipino civilians. Fighting was still ongoing in the Philippines when the war ended in August 1945. The Americans took more than 220,000 casualties, the Japanese 430,000. Estimates vary on Filipino civilian deaths, but 750,000 is a credible middle of the road estimate.
O’Brien’s contribution here was pointing out the strategic pointlessness of MacArthur’s invasion. The big American strategy in the western Pacific was to penetrate the Japanese defensive line of islands to link up with China. The northern Marianas Islands also were within heavy bomber range of Japan, and so would allow for efficient, effective bombing. (Bombing Japan from bases in China were logistically impractical, with virtually all materials being flown in over the Himalayas—another fascinating logistics discussion in this book.)
The Americans had already conquered the Marianas Islands and had total air and sea dominance in the western Pacific. The forces the Japanese had in the Philippines could have been simply left to wither, as they had been on other islands bypassed by the island-hopping campaign.
So, why did the Philippines invasion happen? The inescapable conclusion is that MacArthur was too politically formidable to risk angering, and he personally wanted to invade the Philippines to make good on his promise to return. Not coincidentally, the Philippines also offered some prospect of an extended land campaign where MacArthur could improve his reputation after his disastrous original defense of the Philippines.
Also relevant, in O’Brien’s words: “MacArthur [] dazzled Roosevelt with tales of easy victories and grateful Filipinos and American voters.”
## Criticisms of HtWWW’s Central Argument
I think it is clear from the data that O’Brien’s argument, that air and sea power played a more important role than land battles in deciding the war, is fundamentally right. Still, one can raise a few objections.
Individual naval battles *were* capable of destroying a significant percentage of overall production. O’Brien discusses the Battle of Midway, where the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers (37 percent of their navy’s aircraft carriers at the time, 22 percent of all carriers they had during the war). This point doesn’t really disprove O’Brien’s core argument—it is basically a footnote saying that individual naval battles are more likely to matter than individual land battles.
Politics and psychology matter tremendously in war, sometimes more than productive effort. O’Brien tacitly acknowledges this in the V-2 weapons discussion when he notes that the Germans spent all this money and effort on a psychological salve to the trauma of Allied bombing. The Japanese *did* ultimately surrender after the atomic bombings. (Or, if you are more on the revisionist end of the spectrum, they surrendered after the Soviets declared war.) France surrendered after a few disastrous battles. The productive effort lens might be useful, but subject to important caveats.
## Why Does the Conventional Narrative Focus on Battles?
A perfect companion book to HtWWW would examine *why* military historians and the broader public have focused inordinately on battles. Here are some plausible factors:
* **Battles are more dramatic.** Propaganda during the war focused on battles so that there would be more inherent drama. Working twelve hour shifts in a factory to win the great battle is probably psychologically easier than thinking your work is going to disappear into an inchoate slog.
* **The battle-focused narrative empowers the blue-collar men who did the hard fighting**. This is politically convenient. Those blue-collar men vote and do not want to be told that what they did was relatively less important. It is also commercially advisable to play up the everyman. People want to watch movies and buy books showing people like them (or their fathers or grandfathers) making an individual difference in the war. They don’t want to watch a movie showing how important it was that the bomber offensive led to Germany decentralizing German manufacturing, thereby increasing the attrition rate of German fighters on their way to the front.
* **People want to believe that individual effort matters**. They want to believe that the endless suffering means something, that their loved ones’ deaths meant the world could be free. This is particularly true in the heartbreaking Soviet context where, for example, 80 percent of males born in 1923 did not survive the war.
## Broadly Applicable Lessons from HtWWW
One can obviously draw specifically military lessons from HtWWW. O’Brien concludes his book by noting that Allied air and sea power fundamentally took away the ability of the Germans and Japanese to move resources or even their own armed forces. Even horrifically destructive battles cannot do this on their own. O’Brien notes that the U.S. won many battles in Afghanistan, but because the Taliban could still move forces and resources, they still won.
Another obvious lesson: target productivity, not forces. Destroying a tank on the battlefield is the least efficient way of defeating an enemy than sapping away his ability to replace losses. Target as many different parts of the supply chain as possible. There truly was no single shortage that doomed the Axis. Oil is arguably the closest tangible resource. The sense one gets from HtWWW is that the Allies’ “solution” of air and sea power was robust; there truly was no single thing that could have changed the outcome of the war. Conversely, a war based on battlefield destruction alone quickly turns into a bloody quagmire, like World War I.
Abstracting away from just military operations, the complexity of the modern world means that success or failure rarely hinges on a single factor. It is not *impossible* for a single technology or genius leader to accomplish great things, but it is far likelier that success is built on interlocking efforts aimed at the same general goal. As I read HtWWW, I thought about Amazon, Google, and Apple. None of those companies are built on a single “killer app”. They are built on doing a lot of little things well.
Finally, we should be wary of romanticized narratives and simplistic conclusions about why something happened. Finding the true story takes a nuanced, un-biased interpretation of both data and first-hand accounts. HtWWW is a fantastic example of that.
## Bonus: Great Statistics/Logistics Stories I Couldn’t Work in Anywhere Else
HtWWW spoils the reader with an endless parade of fascinating statistics. As I said in the opening, when I first read the book, I excitedly texted friends these numbers every few minutes as I was reading. These stories didn’t fit in my review, but I could not in good conscience omit them. Below are just a few.
* Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (including the British Empire), and the United States all devoted between 65 and 80 percent of their economic output to the making and arming of aircraft, naval vessels, and anti-aircraft equipment.
* During the three most intense months of the Battle of Britain, the German air force landed only 17 bombs that caused “severe” damage to aircraft and aircraft engine production, electricity services, gas supplies, water industry, oil infrastructure, and food service industries *combined*. This underscores just how ineffective Germany’s campaign was and how little chance there was a of an actual British defeat.
* According to Albert Speer, the German minister for armaments during the war, the Germans had 2.33 million workers building aircraft, which was not only more than all the works employed building all weapons and ammunition for the army, it was equal to or more than the number of American workers building aircraft. Germany built about 65,000 planes in 1943-44. The United States built 182,000.
* On December 27, 1941, when the climactic battle outside Moscow was taking place, the Germans had deployed almost a hundred more aircraft to the fight the Royal Air Force than they had on the Eastern Front.
* Railway activity in Germany and occupied territories declined by almost 40% between August and December 1944.
* The Japanese navy lost 50% more pilots at the Battle of Santa Cruz (off Guadalcanal) than at Midway—and that was only one of six major naval battles in the Solomon Islands. | [unknown] | 146072500 | Your Book Review: How the War Was Won | acx |
# Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche
*[original post [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean)]*
**Table Of Contents**
**I.** Comments About Master And Slave Morality
**II.** Comments By People Named In The Post
**III**. Comments Making Specific Points About One Of The Thinkers In The Post
**IV.** Other Comments
## I. Comments About Master And Slave Morality
**naraburns [writes](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1efr7dq/acx_matt_yglesias_considered_as_the_nietzschean/lfnckzf/):**
> I cannot possibly dedicate sufficient time to respond to this post in a thorough way. And part of that is Nietzsche's fault, because he did not spend (waste?) much time attempting to make careful points in an analytically consistent way. *Even so*, some things can be said about his ideas that are mostly true, and I will try to say a few of them here. (I am *not* a specialist in Nietzsche, but I do occasionally teach his work at the university level.)
>
> The political status of the word "slave" in English (and especially in American English) tends to obfuscate what Nietzsche meant by master and slave morality, but the distinction is on its surface relatively simple.
>
> "Masters" like things because they like things. Their own judgment is sufficient justification for their actions.
>
> "Slaves" like things because other people have told them what to like:
>
> * Sometimes they are emulating the masters, but they also envy and hate the masters, so they end up doing things they themselves actually don't like, or act in resentful or spiteful ways that gain them nothing.
> * Sometimes they are just emulating all the other slaves ("herd" mentality)--what they "like" or "dislike" originates outside of themselves, and so they are a slave to the whims of the herd.
>
> For example, if I buy a video game because I like it, I'm a "master." If I buy it because everyone else is buying it (or worse: because I want to show someone else who bought it that I'm just as "good" as they are because I have the same things they have--i.e. "keeping up with the Joneses"), I'm a "slave." I may engage in the slavish behavior of dragging myself through hours of gameplay I don't enjoy, because I don't want to have wasted my money and I don't want to be seen, by myself or others, as having "bad opinions."
>
> The relationship between the "masters" and the "slaves" can be straightforwardly literal, but fundamentally, the masters don't *need* to rule over any slaves; what they are a master over is their own self. They don't need to "lord it over" anyone; if you have to tell people "I'm better than you because I own a Bugatti," *you are their slave*, your feelings are enslaved to the approval/respect/recognition of the people who are putatively "beneath" you. From *Twilight of the Idols*:
>
> *> “Goethe conceived a human being who would be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself, and who might dare to afford the whole range and wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; **the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength**, because he knows how to use to his advantage even that from which the average nature would perish; the man for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden — unless it be weakness, whether called vice or virtue.”*
>
> The Nietzschean Overman is *above* others in the sense of being able to act independently of their resentment; the ubermensch could even arguably be "altruistic" in ways a slave simply cannot, because master morality allows a person to actually act "unselfishly" if that is what they deem best. Slaves are always comparing themselves to masters and/or to the herd, often in self-negating ways but never in self-*sacrificing* ways, because they lack the proper perspective to make a sacrifice (a slave cannot consent, because they are not free).
>
> In short: do you tolerate others because you fear them? Then you are their slave. Do you tolerate others because you *do not* fear them? Then you are your own master!
>
> More simply: do you like (or hate) *Star Wars* because you enjoy (or don't enjoy) it? Or do you like (or hate) it because you want to send the right signals to people whose opinion matters to you?
>
> The idea that "slave morality is morality" might be right, but only if we agree that "morality" is just "whatever popular opinion accepts right now." That's a legitimate view that many scholars hold! But others dispute it, in various ways, on various grounds. It's not a surprise that someone called "Bentham's Bulldog" would be skeptical; Bentham, after all, declared "rights" to be "nonsense," and "natural rights" to be "nonsense on stilts." But if you think, for example, that you have individual rights that cannot be permissibly violated by a democratically elected government, then you think there is something more to morality than the weight of public opinion--and that view is not compatible with the idea that slave morality *is* morality.
**But Kara Stanhope [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63776167):**
> The Greek heroes (Nietzschean models for the supermen) of the Iliad (especially Agemmenon) seem very similar [to Andrew Tate] to me. The pretty armor, the prettiest girls to rape, the most slaves, the best tent positions on the beach, the sulking and petty vindictiveness, while compelling reading, always leaves me (a Girardian at heart) wondering how on earth they were models for anything other than memetic desire run amok.
>
> Tate is pathetic because he exhibits all the above vices with none of the virtues of the Classical heroes — a willingness - no, eagerness - to sacrifice one’s life for a purpose greater than oneself, the aesthetics of male beauty in action and not mere preening (the body builder vs the boxer), the brief moments of gentleness.
>
> Tate is closer to Agemmemnon. He thinks and acts like having the best booty makes you the brightest hero. Even in the bronze age, that was pathetic.
In the end, I appreciate Nara’s perspective, and I think it’s a useful dichotomy. But I find it hard to interpret in the context of Nietzsche so frequently bringing up Achilles and Cesare Borgia, both of whom went further than just liking the *Star Wars* movies for the right reasons.
I also don’t really get where Nietzsche thinks masterful values come from. Yes, you have to choose *your own* values, not *the herd’s* values - but where do your own values come from? He seems to write as if you’re born with a destiny written on your soul, and you become pathetic if you let the herd trick you into do something other than your soul-written destiny.
That’s a little more hostile than I can justify. I can, if I try, sort through some of my actions and preferences, and find some that seem “purer” and more “part of who I am”, and others that have red flags for looking good and satisfy other people. For example, I’ve preferred suburbia as long as I can remember and I continue to hold that belief even though everyone around me is a rabid anti-suburb YIMBY. On the other hand, even though I think I like travel, whenever I actually travel I can never quite put my finger on the part where I’m having fun. So maybe my suburb preference is really written on my soul, and my travel preference is a fake one made up to please the herd. But I’m not sure that all the writing on my soul really adds up to a destiny, exactly.
**Hilarius Bookbinder [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63784386):**
> Nietzsche scholar here (bona fides: an academic book and several journal articles on Nietzsche). I just want to note that Nietzsche is often misunderstood as defending master morality, or wanting it reinstated, or something like that. None of that is true. In fact, he describes the ancient nobles as so crude, unreflective, and unsymbolic as to be scarcely imaginable by moderns. After 1900 years of slave morality (Christianity, natch), our psychology is fundamentally altered. He writes in The Genealogy of Morals that “the bad conscience [guilt, a consequence of slave morality] is an illness, but as pregnancy is an illness.” We can’t go back to the old masters way of thinking, but we also need to get rid of slave morality, which he thinks is decadent (=anti-life] and fosters ressentiment. We need to give birth to something new.
>
> One of the things Nietzsche is trying to do is undermine the idea that morality is immutable and absolute; instead moral concepts have changed and altered over time. In fact, slave morality flips master morality on its head: the old virtues of strength and dominance are no longer good, but now are seen as evil. The ancient dichotomy of good (strength, power) vs. bad (weakness, impotence) has been replaced with good (humility, poverty, chastity) vs. evil (strength, power). So when Nietzsche wants to move beyond good and evil, he is not talking about good vs. bad.
>
> Nietzsche calls for a new kind of morality. He wants us to try different perspectives on living, to forge our own categorical imperative, to develop our own virtues. I should add that the idea of the übermensch is a weird one for Nietzsche: it is of utmost importance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but barely mentioned elsewhere. But the idea is of a world-affirming individual who has completely overcome the sickness of Christianity and can live in such a way that at the end of their lives they shout da capo! Do it all over again, without change or alteration. That’s what it means to embrace the eternal recurrence.
Maybe this gets to the heart of my confusion better than any other comment. Nietzsche keeps saying that the Superman is the one who can “write new values on new tablets”. But anyone can get a new tablet ([$139.99 on Amazon](https://www.amazon.com/Amazon_Fire_HD_10/dp/B0BL5XPDR6/)) and write whatever they want on it. I could write “PAINT EVERYTHING IN THE WORLD GREEN”. Then I could spend my life trying to do that. I bet I would encounter lots of resistance (eg from my local HOA), and I could try to overcome that resistance. Would that be a life well-lived, because I chose the value? Or does it have to be chosen based on the destiny written in my soul, and if I get it wrong then my life isn’t well-lived anymore? Who decides these things anyway? Nietzsche? According to what set of values? Is a super-duper-man allowed to overturn *those* values? Can he get an even bigger tablet and write “ACTUALLY YOU SHOULD LIVE YOUR LIFE BASED ON CONFORMITY AND RESSENTIMENT?” Why not? Is it just people buying $139.99 Amazon tablets and writing the first thing they think of on them, all the way down?
**NLeusel [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63797817):**
> Something that's always puzzled me a bit is girl-power pop-feminism. They've internalized a lot of Randian/Nietzschean/master-morality ideas (be strong/powerful, don't apologize for who you are, make time for yourself, don't make yourself smaller to make other people feel better, etc.). And yet their ideal doesn't look very much like Dagny Taggart. Instead of building rocket trains to Mars out of magic green metal that cures cancer or whatever, it seems like the idealized girl-boss is just leading a few Zoom meetings and then going home to do yoga and meditate on how liberated she is, and possibly writing a pop anthem about the experience. So there seems to be some kind of strange disconnect (juxtaposition?) going on there.
>
> (Maybe the vague unacknowledged Randian current in pop-feminism comes by way of Nathaniel Branden's popularization of the psychology of self-esteem? Idk.)
No, I take it back, this is my favorite comment.
If Nietzsche is really saying “ignore the strictures of society; pursue the destiny written upon your own soul”, how does that differ from Instagram “find yourself” therapy culture? Other than that Nietzsche expects your soul to say “conquer Europe” and Instagram expects it to say “ditch your boyfriend and date a yoga instructor”?
Also, why is everything that’s written on your own soul good? The Last Psychiatrist (who I usually think of as Nietzschean) had a scathing article about people who sink too much of their identity into their sexual fetishes, as if they were central personality traits to be proud of, rather than shameful vices to be indulged in secret. But aren’t fetishes, in some sense, the purest and most soul-written preferences we have? Preferences that date back from before we can remember, preferences which go so deep they can affect our very autonomic nervous responses, preferences which we stick to even when everyone else hates and shames us for them?
I think of Nietzscheans as the sort of people who would usually shout “Stop wallowing in your fetishes and instead achieve great things!” But if your natural tendency is to wallow in your fetishes, and you’re only trying to achieve great things because people are shouting at you, should a Nietzschean keep wallowing in the fetishes?
Without some external source of value, I don’t understand how you decide that one soul-written destiny (conquering Italy) is better than another (running off with the yoga instructor, or watching furry porn).
**Ascend [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63774666):**
> I'm very suspicious of the idea that \*anyone\* in the modern west is an actual example of master morality. SM has been the orthodoxy of western civilisation for a couple thousand years; the idea that anyone now can \*really\* be a practitioner of MM seems almost incomprehensible. I don't even know if the Nazis qualify: they had a huge persecution complex and a great amount of envy towards the Jews and their material success. They were obsessed with claims that Germany had been stabbed in the back and mistreated at Versailles--basically the exact same "not faaaair" childish whine that the likes of Nietzsche would attribute to all slave morality. And the resulting cruelty was as much self-righteous revenge as it was domination and glory.
>
> Basically, the left and the right and every other ideology (insofar as its a meaningful "ideology" that people can rally around) is a form, ultimately, of slave morality. Even if it claims to hate SM, it will eventually just largely fall back into it. The alternative is to suggest that a way of thinking that has dominated civilisation for many centuries and has been unquestioned and unquestionable is suddenly, in our very special unique present, entirely up for debate in its fundamental form. And I don't find that plausible.
>
> You can either agree with Nietzsche that SM is an illusion, like all morality, to be abandoned and ultimately transcended, or you can disagree and say morality exists and is good (and by morality you \*will\* mean what N calls slave morality). Actually following master morality is something you either accuse your enemies of doing, or you pretend to do to seem brave and edgy, but that nobody really does.
Okay, this is a potentially helpful corrective to the “furry porn” thesis above, but now I’m not sure what master morality even means anymore. There are plenty of people who follow their dreams, or who don’t act altruistically. What actions would I take if I wanted to embody the true pure master morality that nobody embodies?
**Sam Kriss writes a long blog post on these topics, [Nobody Understands Nietzsche (Except Me)](https://samkriss.substack.com/p/nobody-understands-nietzsche-except). It’s unfortunately subscriber-locked, but I hope it won’t be considered theft if I quote what I consider the thesis:**
> [Nietzsche] contracted dysentery and diphtheria; when those cleared up he started experiencing the headaches and nausea that would recur for the rest of his life...[He] never had any lovers. He proposed three times to Lou Andreas-Salomé, and was rejected three times, but she did sleep with his friend Paul Rée, and allowed Nietzsche to third-wheel in their travels around Switzerland.
>
> This man spent his life in continual physical decay, rotting from the inside out. First his bowels, then his brain. Phlegm filled his lungs. He found sleep almost impossible. In the end he was sent away to an asylum; the story goes that he witnessed a horse being whipped in the street, and he threw his arms around the animal’s neck, weeping. After that, he vanished; all he produced were a few crazy letters to the crowned heads of Europe. ‘I'd much rather have been a Basel professor than God; but I didn't dare be selfish enough to forgo the creation of the world.’ But right up until the day they sent him away, this shivering bag of mucus and bones kept on insisting that right belonged only to people like himself, with a ‘superabundance of strength,’ and when he trampled over the weak and the sickly that was the only true justice there will ever be [...]
>
> In his *Introduction to Antiphilosophy* Boris Groys writes that ‘when Nietzsche praises victorious life, preaches amor fati and identifies himself with the forces of nature that are bound to destroy him, he simply seeks to divert himself and others from the fact that he himself is sick, poor, weak and unhappy.’ Bertrand Russell dismisses Nietzsche’s philosophy as the ‘power-phantasies of an invalid.’ (As a man who really knew his way around the pussy, Russell is particularly scathing about Nietzsche’s sublimated terror of women. ‘Forget not thy whip—but nine women out of ten would get the whip away from him, and he knew it.’) Nietzsche’s sickness becomes a kind of gotcha, the final defence against his thought. Never mind the freezing storm uprooting everything in its path—it’s just a symptom. But I don’t think Zarathustra is simply a diversion or a distraction or a flimsy mask worn by the shambling creature of Turin. There have been a lot of feeble, lovelorn men pottering about the world in their mild overcoats. Most of them did not write like he did. You can’t ignore the weakness of the man or the strength of his writing. You have to stay with the contradiction. You have to grab them both.
>
> The obvious answer is one philosophers have a strangely hard time comprehending, but almost every fourteen-year-old who’s picked up a book of Nietzsche’s has instantly recognised. When Nietzsche talks about master morality, he is not talking to the masters; he’s talking to the weak and the botched and to pimply Jimmy: to the slaves.
>
> According to his myth, master morality is the natural creed of the free, strong, noble peoples of the world. Eventually, though, their victims banded together and decided that strength and nobility were evil, and the best thing to be is harmless and meek, and slave morality was born. Like all great and true myths, this one bears no actual relation to history. There never was a tribe of blond beasts practising an ethos of pure cruelty. It’s master morality that was invented by the weak and the botched—by one particular weak and botched individual, which was Friedrich Nietzsche. Its isn’t to compensate for his weakness. Nietzsche insisted he was strong, but he was always very specific about what his strength was made of. ‘I always instinctively select the proper remedy when my spiritual or bodily health is low; whereas the decadent, as such, invariably chooses those remedies which are bad for him.’ Master morality is a remedy by and for the weak.
>
> According to the popular caricature, slave morality is about being nice and master morality is about being mean. But that’s not quite it. The overflowing life Nietzsche praises also encompasses ‘kindness and love, the most curative herbs and agents in human intercourse,’ and ‘good nature, friendliness, and courtesy of the heart.’ The real difference is that behind its meekness, slave morality is powered entirely by resentment: the secret, poisonous delight in being weak, being the saintly victim, feasting on the black slime of your own self-regard. According to some Oxford textbook that’s the first result that when you Google the words ‘nietzsche resentment,’ and which I’ll take as representative of the field, ‘Nietzsche is against resentment because it is an emotion of the weak that the strong and powerful do not and cannot feel.’ Not true! He’s very clear that the strong can feel resentment, but for them ‘resentment is a superfluous feeling, a feeling to remain master of, which is almost a proof of riches.’ It’s the other way round; Nietzsche has disdain for the weak because they have been overwhelmed by resentment…Nietzsche might have been weak, but he refused the comforts of resentment. His entire philosophy is a image of what it would look like to really live without those comforts.
**Metaphysiocrat writes:**
> When Nietzsche gave his “genealogical” account of the master and slave morality, “master morality” was basically given a trivial form: the masters had labelled everything they liked “good” and the rest “bad.” And this is how Nietzscheans have continued to use it: master morality is everything they like and slave morality is everything they don’t - at least in the moral realm.
>
> I think there are two separate things that tend to get referred to as master morality and three that tend to get referred to as slave morality. There’s nothing inherent about their being in these two categories other than Nietzschean rhetorical construction.
>
> *M1: Dominance*
>
> According to this ethos, it is good to be in charge, dominate others, and be on top of social hierarchies - not just convenient, but morally better, to the extent this frame thinks in moral terms at all.
>
> This morality arises organically because socially powerful groups and individuals can demand obeisance of others, screwing with the intuitions of third parties to make them look valuable. (The legitimating role of this is a part of why they do this in the first place.)
>
> The concept of “honor” fills out much of the pragmatic demands of maintaining a reputation that leads to a dominant bargaining position. You should be fearless, so no one can intimidate you. You should keep your promises to people you expect to interact with a lot, but not to nonpeople that don’t matter. You should revenge slights to your reputation with violence and practice reciprocity. Much of this is of course instrumentally useful for the rest of us to, while other bits are counterproductive or hard to universalize.
>
> Legitimation in modern societies demands more subtlety than this, but some moderns like Nietzsche or Bronze Age Pervert look back to an age of warlords and pirates where this could proceed in a relatively unmediated way. Part of what’s going on here is cope - by loudly rejecting the dominant “slave morality” they get to imagine being a warlord or pirate rather than an office drone - and part of it is admiration for the honesty of an unmediated kind of domination. I don’t think it’s coincidental that there’s clearly a personality type attracted to this type of discourse, and it isn’t an actual warlord or pirate, but someone who feels very acutely dominated by more subtle social signals.
>
> *M2: Excellence*
>
> This says it’s good to be strong, smart, and capable. This isn’t always expressed in moral terms, but most of us find this to be admirable.
>
> This is the intuition least in need of explanation, in part because I think that on a biological level, this is what a sense of admiration is for. You see someone doing something well and then want to see what in their technique to copy or try out. It feels good to be capable and is instrumentally useful for just about everything.
>
> A lot of social conservatives are worried that this will disappear. I think there are often subcultures that deliberately crush these intuitions and that it’s generally bad to be in one, but these have always been mere subcultures (and as subcultures they’ve often performed useful roles, even if you wouldn’t want to stay there long.)1
>
> *S1: Reverse Dominance Coalitions*
>
> This is the intuition at the heart of left-wing politics, and at least according to Christopher Boehm (c.f. “Hierarchy in the Forest”) it’s a key group strategy that helped our homo ancestors diverge from alpha male dominance model beloved by Nietzscheans and actually practiced by most other great apes. In human foraging societies, people who get too powerful are gently cut down to size, and if they don’t get the message, killed. This protects group members from domination by individuals or cliques.
>
> Even the Nietzschean master class can practice - indeed, often needs to practice - S1 internally. The Roman senators who killed Caesar were all slaveowners, as were the elite of the Southern states who feared an overweening king and later federal government, and the attachment of both to abstract concepts of liberty is well known. M1 and S1 agree, after all, that you shouldn’t let some external authority boss you around.
>
> *S2: Humility*
>
> This says: make yourself small and harmless. Have the goals of a corpse. Here is Ozy's discussion:
>
> *> Many people who struggle with excessive guilt subconsciously have goals that look like this: I don’t want to make anyone mad. I don’t want to hurt anyone. I want to take up less space. I want to need fewer things. I don’t want my body to have needs…"*
>
> This arises organically in either hierarchical societies dominated by M1 or egalitarian societies dominated by S1, or just in highly decentralized societies where you don’t know who you might accidentally piss off. M1 can foster S2 by demanding obeisance from others and punishing them for not doing so, while S1 can make people worried about sticking out and being taken (sometimes accurately, sometimes not) as a potential master. Especially in the first scenario, S2 can, like M1, derive from cope.
>
> Although both can inspire dislike of the master class, the basic idea behind S1 is “it’s bad to be a slave,” while S2 says “it’s good to be a slave.” S2 is even more contradictory with M2, but contradiction exists in the human soul just fine. In the case of flunkies in power structures, M1 and S2 can be very compatible: deriving joy from being both a faithful servant and loyal instrument to one’s superiors, and from exercising power over everyone else. No armed body of men, I suspect, could function without an unhealthy helping of both.
>
> Moreover: just a little bit of S2 can keep you sane, since the natural default is to think very highly of yourself. A bit of humility helps avoid pointless dick-measuring contests, reminds us we might be wrong and that pobody’s nerfect.
>
> *S3: Universal Benevolence*
>
> Mozi called this jian ai, Christians agape, Buddhists metta: a lot of beautiful words for this appear across Eurasia shortly after the introduction of writing, which I don’t think is a coincidence: writing promotes both consideration of others who aren’t immediately next to you and abstract reasoning, which naturally leads to an ethic of considering and advancing everyone’s interests impartially. “Utility” and “categorical imperative” aren’t especially beautiful phrases, and they draw attention to differences in technical specifications2, but they also appear in an era of increasing literacy, long-distance communication, and technical sophistication. There’s a long tradition of claiming the novel, as a form, is an agent of this as much or more than abstract philosophy.
>
> Nietzscheans don’t like this because they’re partisans of M1, which exalts victory in zero-sum games. Even more offensively, S3 means that the weak have claims on the strong, that in a sense they can impose obligations on them. But there’s no contradiction between M2 and S3 - EA is a scene where both are highly present, for instance, and I think it benefits from it.
>
> *\*In praise of clarity\**
>
> To lay my cards on the table, I am a partisan of M2 (excellence), S1 (reverse dominance coalitions), and S3 (universalism). I feel all of them, since they arise organically and shall ever be with us in some form or another. These aren’t the only relevant moral intuitions, just those that tend to get labelled “master” or “slave” moralities.
>
> If you do want to use “slave morality” and “master morality,” I beg you to be clear about which of these - or which other things - you’re referring to, rather than slipping in equivocation.
I think you can always split things into more subcategories (or merge things into grander umbrella categories), but I appreciate this attempt to clarify things.
**Fern [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63783022):**
> I think Nietzsche's distinction in relative value between master and slave morality is that master morality is pro life, seeks to fully unravel the potential in things, while slave morality is a product of being damaged, a curse at life. Nietzsche puts emphasis on the physiological weakness of the slave minded type (seperated from literal historical slavery), and calls it the mark of the declining type. He sees the spread of slave morality then as the end of history and dissolution of man, whereas master morality keeps building a bridge towards some future.
>
> He's not exactly setting up a universal dichotomy, where morality is master or slave, either/or and you have to swallow one pill or the other. Rather they are historical phenomena, the two principle modes that come down to us by the particular path we've taken. Master morality then is superior inasmuch as it's forward and life loving, but it's not a terminus in the possibility space of morality.
>
> The great task that he sets up in his Superman is the revaluation of values, the transcence of historical accidents in the development of morality. Master morality happens to have more to offer in his view, but I suspect he'd grant that is open to contention when in a less polemical mood. I think he'd argue that, given there are no moral facts, altruism may well be "good" but this cannot be straightly derived out of slave morality, it must be sanitised of underlying metaphysics, which really are masks for underlying psychology. On the other hand the virtues of master morality are more readily translated by the Superman. The master perspective that spurs elaborate arguments in favour of eminent greatness is more akin to where Nietzsche sees the transcendence of morality leading.
I hate the terms “pro life” or “life affirming” for this. Vitalism isn’t literally pro life in the sense of “cause there to be more life” - it neither recommends preserving your own life (by being safe) nor preserving others’ lives (by being altruistic). More often, it’s used to recommend the opposite of those things. So in what sense is it about “being pro life”. “Well, you’re only *truly* living insofar as you follow our philosophy”. Very convenient redefinition you have there.
**AshLael [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63779490):**
> I felt like Scott was groping around trying to reinvent chivalry without quite realising that's what he was doing.
>
> The idea of chivalry of course was that knights would seek to distinguish themselves by their virtue. The virtues they were to aspire to were laid down in the codes of the orders they would seek to be accepted into. So there was that desire and drive for greatness - the quintessential chivalrous man was a literal knight in shining armor. He was brave, and fierce, and deadly on the field of battle. But he also protected the weak, was courteous to women, kept his oaths, fought with honour and showed mercy to a vanquished enemy.
>
> The reality of chivalry probably never lived up to those noble ideals. But what real world has ever lived up to any ideal?
>
> A modern day chivalry might exalt rich successful capitalists - while also insisting that they don't do the bad things that rich successful capitalists are known for. To be inducted into the Order of the Sparrow you need to have a half a billion in net worth - but also you need to be honest and fair in your dealings, and be faithful to your wife, and treat women with respect, and donate a hundred million to charity, and treat your employees with decency and dignity, etc. And if you do those things your membership in the Order of the Sparrow makes you a highly admired man that everyone wants to do associate with. And if you fail to uphold them you get tossed out of the Order and that's a terrible scandal and people worry how it might look to associate with you.
I think Orders - voluntary association groups that place strict demands on their members - [are a surprisingly under-explored tool](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/12/24/there-are-rules-here/). But maybe their very rarity suggests there’s some reason they won’t work.
## II. Comments By People Named In The Post
**Bentham’s Bulldog, whose surprise that anyone would endorse master morality inspired the post, [wrote](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63821179):**
> I agree that the stuff you're criticizing--corpse morality, opposing trying to do grand, powerful, transformative things because you're afraid of shaking things up, and you see morality as a series of prohibitions rather than as prescribing how to act--is quite common and bad. That wasn't really what I had in mind when I discussed slave morality, and not what most people seem to have in mind (I don't know how many people picture it a grand display of master morality to build the malaria nets but MOAR). What I was criticizing in my piece was, I think, largely orthogonal to what you defend here, though I agree the vibes are similar. I don't really have many disagreements.
Yeah, this makes sense, I just wanted to make sure different people with different definitions weren’t talking past each other, and explain what I personally saw in master morality.
Bulldog wrote a fuller reply on his own blog, [Neither Master Nor Slave But Utilitarian](https://benthams.substack.com/p/neither-master-nor-slave-but-utilitarian), which I mostly agree with. But I don’t think utilitarianism (or any other philosophy) removes the need to think in these terms. In theory, you should be neither right nor left, neither capitalist nor communist, neither pro-US nor pro-China, simply choosing The Good at every opportunity without reference to puny mortal concepts. In practice you have to use some kind of heuristic and join some kind of coalition, and so all these things become important again.
(to be clear, I’m not suggesting Bulldog said the opposite; only riffing off the title)
I did appreciate this meme, though:
**Walt Bismarck (whose [right-wing defense of master morality](https://newaltright.substack.com/p/i-shant-shut-up-about-slave-morality?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2) I dismissed in the post as “but I** ***like*** **bad and cruel”) writes:**
> Yes, I emphatically disagree with your values and think they are bad. You don't get to simply assert that your own values are universally applicable and that anyone who substantively disagrees is "not interested in morality." That's not how philosophy works.
>
> It would be one thing if you could meaningfully ad baculum, but rationalists and Effective Altruists are substantially weaker than tribalists and ingroup preference enjoyers, so to anyone outside your bubble this tendency just comes off as impotent sneering.
Several [other](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63872063) people agreed his explanation of vitalism deserved more of a hearing than being dismissed as “I like badness and cruelty”.
A slightly (but only slightly) more charitable version of the exchange might be:
*>> **Bulldog:** I don’t like master morality because it’s not altruistic and doesn’t care about suffering.*
*>> **Bismarck:** Yes, in fact I don’t care very much about altruism and suffering. Here are some other values I care about more.*
I guess describing Bismarck’s answer as “I like being bad and cruel” is unfair, insofar as Bismarck didn’t endorse [violating his own moral system], and insofar as Bismarck has his own complex and consistent moral system he’s following.
But I don’t really find this objection interesting. Suppose I call Hitler bad, and Hitler counters “No, see, I have my own moral system based on the purity of the German race, and according to that system I’m doing the right thing”. This doesn’t change my “Hitler is bad” opinion at all. It’s naturally implied that I’m using the word “bad” to refer to something like “bad within my own moral system” or “bad within the moral system which I believe to be true”.
I guess maybe I committed a sin of obfuscation: “I like being bad and cruel” suggests that Bismarck himself thinks that what he’s doing is bad, whereas I meant that he’s saying “I like [being bad and cruel]”, where [being bad and cruel] is my (Scott’s) judgment of what he’s describing. Fine, I’m sorry and I’ll try not to do that in the future.
Bismarck and I had a longer conversation about this starting [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63772638), I wrote up some of my thoughts in [Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/altruism-and-vitalism-as-fellow-travelers), and Bismarck responded to an earlier version of some of those thoughts [here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63786821).
**Jason Crawford [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63813442):**
> *1. » “The old pro-embiggening world was complicit in moral catastrophes - racism, colonialism, the Holocaust, the destruction of much of the natural world…”*
>
> More than just this, there was a naive belief in the pre-WW1 world that progress in science, technology, and industry would naturally go hand in hand with progress in morality and society. Condorcet believed that prosperity would “naturally dispose men to humanity, to benevolence and to justice,” and that “nature has connected, by a chain which cannot be broken, truth, happiness, and virtue.” <https://books.google.com/books?id=K3RZAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA233>
>
> Historian Carl Becker wrote in the 1930s of the old belief that “the Idea or the Dialectic or Natural Law, functioning through the conscious purposes or the unconscious activities of men, could be counted on to safeguard mankind against future hazards.”
>
> The World Wars shattered these illusions. In the next paragraph Becker writes: “Since 1918 this hope has perceptibly faded. Standing within the deep shadow of the Great War, it is difficult to recover the nineteenth-century faith either in the fact or the doctrine of progress. … At the present moment the world seems indeed out of joint, and it is difficult to believe with any conviction that a power not ourselves—the Idea or the Dialectic or Natural Law—will ever set it right. The present moment, therefore, when the fact of progress is disputed and the doctrine discredited, seems to me a proper time to raise the question: What, if anything, may be said on behalf of the human race? May we still, in whatever different fashion, believe in the progress of mankind?”
>
> 2. I'm an expert on Rand (I've read some of her books). I think even if you see her arguments/“proofs” as weak, you can at least gain something by seeing what project she was engaged in and what direction she was taking it. (A great blogger once said you should “Rule Thinkers In, Not Out.”)
>
> Rand was not satisfied with existing moral systems and wanted to create a new one. She wanted it to (1) be grounded in reason, not faith, (2) value life, action, effort, achievement, greatness (“embiggening”), and (3) justify an \*enlightened\* egoism / classical liberalism—not to justify violence, domination, slavery, tyranny. (This is not necessarily a complete, definitive, or fundamental account of her project, just three relevant aspects here.) I think all three of those are very good goals. We might say that faced with the choice of master vs. slave morality, she wanted to abolish slavery altogether.
>
> Her answer to “so why should I follow law or morality?”, in my interpretation, is roughly: Because a moral and lawful world is actually better to live in than an immoral/lawless one, and you following the rules is part of that. If you break the rules, then either you suffer negative consequences (which is bad), or you are in a world where people can break the rules with no consequences (which is worse). Now, this is not an airtight argument, but I think it is directionally correct, and it's worth more work in that direction.
>
> Also, I don't interpret her philosophy as saying that if you're making rockets, you should only think about how the rocket makes cool explosions, and not about how it will help the world. Helping the world by creating economic value, which you then trade with others, is very Randian, at least if you also personally love your work.
**Richard Hanania [writes](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/destiny-interview-nietzschean-yglesias):**
> Scott Alexander in his [article](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean) on Yglesias as Nietzsche uses "Nietzsche" in the way I do, which is a stand in for "good things are good." I tend to think the actual Nietzsche believed in things neither of us would endorse, but if that's the modern understanding of him we can go with it. See footnote 3 here on the point about what gets called "eugenics" these days. If you disagree with that footnote, it's a good litmus test proving that you subscribe to slave morality, and not the more defensible kind of slave morality, but like the ugly stuff we should wipe off the face of the earth.
I thank Hanania for some earlier discussion which probably helped inspire this article in some vague way.
**And Matt Yglesias [on Twitter](https://twitter.com/mattyglesias/status/1818369842040484246):**
Matt has a deal where every week, his subscribers can choose a question for him to answer at length. This week’s poll was deeply disappointing:
…really? The military-industrial complex? Are Matt’s subscribers really able to will the eternal recurrence of that decision? Pathetic.
## III. Comments Making Specific Points About One Of The Thinkers In The Post
**Yossarian [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63774053):**
> *>>[Ayn Rand] really really wants to think that you can objectively convince people to support a peaceful, glorious, positive-sum society, without any hint of the psychologically-toxic slave morality that typified the USSR she grew up in.*
>
> Rand is not so different from USSR's morality. When I first read Atlas Shrugged, I felt a strong sense of deja vu that I couldn't quite place. Only after reading the whole thing I realized I was reading a very typical Soviet book of Rand's time. Yeah, really so. There was a whole sub-genre in Soviet science fiction that was quite like that. Basically, if you take any of these old Soviet books, and change the heroes' speeches from "Communism brings progress" to "I want to be selfish and bring progress", but leave the entire rest the same - you'd get Atlas Shrugged.
**MaxEd [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63783936):**
> I also have to object to "toxic slave morality of USSR". I know it's still popular to dunk on Soviet Russia, since it has failed in the end, but it seems like most people get their knowledge of Soviet culture from Cold War sources tinted with a heavy dose of propaganda. Or Ayn Rand herself. Soviet society always celebrated unique individuals - actors, scientists, sportsmen, no less than its Western counterpart. It just denied hyper-rewards for such individuals: top Soviet actors, for example, still lived in apartments (if a bit nicer than your ordinary worker), not in mansions behind high walls and security. Frankly, I can't say their acting was worse off for all that.
>
> I guess you can say that while there was no "official" slave morality in USSR, the rules were set up in such way to actually encourage it, e.g. by writing a letter to NKVD/KGB about your more talented peer to cut them down. While I agree that this is true to some degree, I think all societies in all times had something like that - from reporting someone to Inquisition, to reporting to him to Un-American Activities, to reporting to HR for harassment, an individual talented at "office games" can always make life of someone more talented at actual work miserable. I guess it was easier in USSR for most of its existence, compared to contemporary Western countries, and it was detrimental to nation, but to call all of USSR "slave culture" because of that is an overreach.
**Jukka Välimaa [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63776225):**
> When thinking about Rand and egoism and altruism, it's good to keep in mind that by "altruism" she means something different than most people. She's talking about altruism in the same sense as the originator of the word, Auguste Comte: as otherism, living for the sake of others, self-sacrifice.
>
> So, for a Randian egoist: Helping others because you value them, out of a sense of generosity and great-heartedness? Fantastic! Helping others out of a sense of duty, stunting your own life and happiness? Nope!
>
> As far as efficient altruism goes, most people espousing it seem to think in utilitarian, rather than purely altruistic terms. Under utilitarianism, helping others in a way that also helps you is \*obviously\* better than helping others in a way that makes you miserable, other things being equal.
I like this reading of Rand, it feels like the sort of thing the steelmanned/perfected version of Rand in my head would say, and it’s definitely what I’d use if I were her PR person - but it’s not the impression I get from her books. I could be convinced otherwise if you could find her saying this in so many words.
**William H Stoddard [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63791612):**
> I've come to think that The Fountainhead is the key to Rand's view of Nietzsche. Not just because she originally planned to use a quotation from him as its epigraph, but because of its major conflict between Howard Roark and Gail Wynand. Wynand really is something of a Nietzschean overman: born in the slums, he educated himself, became a successful newspaper publisher, is hugely rich, and besides that, is a lethally skilled fighter and superb in bed. And he's driven to seek power. But Roark is not a Nietzschean overman, though he's mocked as one a couple of times: He cares about his work, not about power. I see this as the debate between the Nietzschean Rand and the Aristotelian Rand who wrote Atlas Shrugged. (If you read Aristotle's account of the megalopsychos or "great-souled man," it's almost a perfect fit to what Rand says about Roark.)
**But Ultimaniacy [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63877456) in response to William:**
> *> “And he's driven to seek power. But Roark is not a Nietzschean overman, though he's mocked as one a couple of times: He cares about his work, not about power.”*
>
> No, the point is exactly the opposite! Roark is a model overman, embodying will to power -- not power in the vulgar sense of political influence, but in the Nietzschean sense of mastery over his own will. Wynand represents a \*failed\* overman, who had a mind capable of transvaluing all values, but instead chose to debase himself and become a slave to public opinion.
I’ve never read *The Fountainhead* and don’t have a position here.
**Tanthiram [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63787926):**
> This is a fantastic piece, and I have nothing smart to say about the actual substance, but I hope it slightly eases one of the conflicts in the middle if I say that Andrew Tate was a mediocre kickboxer at best. Kickboxing "world" titles vary wildly in quality due to the number of promotions, and none of Tate's were good (for one, he beat a 43-year-old who'd won 1 of his previous 7 fights). He also just looks like he kinda sucked. Crisis averted!
>
> (Maybe I'm proving the whole "cutting down the big arrogant men" thing of slave morality, but then I think this also supports that it can be a good thing when they're frauds)
**Patrick F [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63811518):**
> I'm a bit embarrassed to know so much about Tate, but here we are.
>
> *> scammy courses*
>
> I do literally make money with (partly) what I learned in that program (and no I'm not scamming anyone either)
>
> *> Some of his courses apparently recommended beating up women*
>
> False
>
> *> he sent one of the victims a text message saying “I love raping you”*
>
> Consensual BDSM relationship confirmed by both parties
>
> *> Finally he was indicted on one billion counts of sexual assault*
>
> Does anyone find it a little weird to be accused of rape by a government, and not, say, a person who was raped?
>
> *> human trafficking*
>
> I assume that's "paid for her plane ticket so she could consensually join my webcam business" in which case yeah, guilty
>
> *> if he becomes a normal civilized person who says please and thank you and is really respectful to everyone?*
>
> He does those things. Watch any interview and see if he doesn't. His blind rage is comedic and reserved for a faceless audience, not real present people. But you're conflating niceness with "cares what lesser people think", and indeed Tate doesn't do that. There are other reasons to be nice
>
> Your gut was right; Tate is exactly what slave morality was designed to defend against
>
> The 4chan losers are just a herd of their own, alike in temperament to the globalist prog herd. Multiple "opposing" herds just use each other to enforce ideological purity on their own side
I admit that I know nothing about Tate except that I’ve seen some bad tweets by him and heard he was involved in sex crimes. I looked at [his Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Tate) which seemed to agree. If you’ve already read the Wikipedia page, you shouldn’t treat me as an independent source confirming that he was involved in awful sex crimes.
## IV. Other Comments
**Wesley Fenza [writes](https://livingwithinreason.com/p/tracingwoodgrains-as-the-nietzschean)**
> My nomination for the Ubermesch is [TracingWoodgrains](https://www.tracingwoodgrains.com/), the notable gay furry formerly of the Blocked & Reported podcast and currently notorious on Twitter for his provocative essays. When I read Scott’s essay, he was the first person I thought of. One of his highest values is excellence. It informs everything he does. He is constantly advocating for the metaphorical poppies to get taller, and rages against our education system that encourages equality by holding back the more talented kids. He makes no apologies for it and doesn’t begrudge anyone pride in their achievements. But he also maintains an ethic of civic duty, and feels an affinity with his former Mormon community over their mutual desire to improve the world, create thriving communities, and engage in mutual aid. A true Nietschean master concerns himself only with his own excellence, but Trace is constantly encouraging and supporting others to become more excellent. This is on clear display in his [essay on why he is voting for Kamala Harris](https://x.com/tracewoodgrains/status/1816063223713452241) despite the fact that she represents a political machine that is an anathema to his values.
>
> While Yglesias manages to balance a desire for greatness with humility and egalitarianism, Trace balances the bronze age values of excellence, honesty, and individual merit with the liberal values of pragmatism, fairness, and broadly distributed prosperity.
>
> To be clear, I think all of this is nonsense, and I don’t think any of this matters, but if you’re the type of person who feels they need a moral compass, you could do much worse than Trace.
The blogpost’s thumbnail (which you can see at the link above) continues on our surprisingly-consistent theme of Nietzschean superman + furry porn.
**Tohron [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63817905):**
> Christian morality is compared to slave morality here, but I don't think they quite sync up.
>
> A core component of my own Catholic morality is that every person is uniquely valuable as an individual existence. This value is independent of anything they accomplish, and thus, secure from the opinions of other people. Since it is secure, there is no need to tear down other people in order to protect it.
>
> The Gospels do feature some stories that could be seen as pro-slave morality, where Pharisees and Sadducees hold themselves as superior because they're better at following the social rules of the time. But Jesus' criticism of them isn't that trying to find rules on how to be good and follow them better is bad - it's that they've become so fixated on the literal rules that they've lost sight of the actual purpose of the rules: loving and caring for the people around them.
>
> Meanwhile, the Gospels also feature many parables where people are unhappy with other people receiving good things that they felt weren't deserved. The message of these parables is that being bitter about other people's success can only hurt oneself - it is much healthier to celebrate other people's joy.
>
> So, how do you go from there to nuns rapping the knuckles of anyone who wants to do something big, or fixations on guilt and unworthiness? Well, history is complicated, but I suspect anyone who's unhappy with where their life went might have a hard time opening up about it, and it's always easier to convince yourself that current things are fine and that anyone aspiring to more is in the wrong.
>
> But to me, Christianity offers the idea that no matter what, you are valuable and you are loved. And it also has the message that each person has a unique calling which should be sought out, encouraged, and celebrated (not for what it achieves, but for each step a person takes closer to what they were meant to be). In sort, my understanding of Christianity is hardly incompatible with seeking out great things.
I agree that “Christianity” can mean any tendency that anyone held at any time during 2000 years of Western civilization, and shouldn’t be taken as a monolith.
**Susan Greenberg [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63785455):**
> I’d like to pick up on the passing comment, near the start of this post, that Nietzsche thought slave morality originated with the Jews. If that is so, it can only reflect the extent to which his Christian upbringing and cultural environment distorted his (and his followers’) understanding. Jewish morality is very much based on actions, not beliefs, which would put it in the “enbiggedness” camp. And the emphasis on enlittleling (humility, sacrifice etc) is very much a Christian thing, used through the ages to demonstrate their superiority to the Jews that they had replaced — it’s the core of antisemitic supercessionism.
I’m skeptical of this. My favorite counterexample is the Torah, which says that Moses was the most humble man in the world (Numbers 12:3), plus [the ensuing scholarly debate](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/questions/11606/did-moses-call-himself-the-most-humble-man-on-the-planet) on how Moses himself could write this in the Torah with a straight face. My [favorite answer](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/a/12749) claim that God forced Moses to write that he was the most humble man in the world, but Moses fought back by making some of the alephs in the Torah really small as a sort of steganographic claim that he was embarrassed by having to praise himself. See also [this essay](https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/humility-in-judaism/), “In the Jewish tradition, humility is among the greatest of the virtues, as its opposite, pride, is among the worst of the vices.”
In general I’m skeptical of most attempts to draw a bright line between Jewish and Christian philosophies (“Jews think like this, Christians think like that”*).* Christianity grew out of Judaism, and most post-1400s Jewish scholarship was written in Christian societies, so both religions had ample chance to influence each other. “Everybody knows” that Christianity judges you by belief and Judaism judges you by your actions, but [the Talmud says](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epikoros) “The following have no part in the World to Come: One who says that the resurrection of the dead is not biblical, or that the Torah is not from Heaven, or the Epicurean.”
**Martin Susrik [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63803121):**
> The tall poppy syndrome may be a more ancient and fundamental thing than it seems to be at the first sight.
>
> Acemoglu & Robinson write about societies systemically destroy anything that sticks out. Tiv (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiv_people>) being their example of choice. Living in the state of perfect equality is paid for by always living at the edge of famine. On the other hand, living in the state of equality on a continent where slavery is rampart has a value of its own. If nobody is allowed to become rich and powerful, they won't enslave you.
>
> Here's a paragraph how the elimination of successful was done:
>
> *> “The Zulus were lined up and Nobela [the witch doctor] and here associates began "smelling out" the witches who had brought on the evil omens. They picked on prosperous people. One had grown rich through frugality. Another had put cattle manure on his lands as fertilizer, producing a bountiful harvest much greater than his neighbors'. Yet another was a fine stock breeder who had picked the best bulls and taken great care of his stock and as a result had seen a prodigious expansion of his herds.”*
That having been said, I agree anthropologists have proven pretty conclusively that the Jews didn’t invent slave morality and it’s as old as humanity itself. I included a tweet about the Mbendjele people in the original, but I could have emphasized this part more.
I’ve heard stories of missionaries and philanthropists in Third World countries ending up dejected by how impossible it is to get a lot of primitive tribes to join the 21st century and do Capitalism. The suggest the tribespeople start some business to provide needed goods to their village, but the tribespeople complain that if they made money, they’d be socially required to give it to their inlaws/clan/spend it all in a huge feast for the village, so what’s the point?
**10240 [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63904939):**
> I don't see Matt Yglesias's points as summarized by Scott as much of a compromise. It's still \*almost\* pure Second Form Slave Morality stuff, even if radical SJWs and commies are purer.
>
> What I'd regard as a compromise would include points like these (matching the original numbering):
>
> 2-3. Some people are obviously better than others in terms of talents and skills, including genetically, there's no need to deny or minimize that. However, having better talents and skills is a totally different thing from having more moral worth. Everyone has equal moral worth, everyone's wellbeing deserves to be taken into consideration with equal weight. (Or if not, that's determined by the (im)morality of their actions, not their talents.)
>
> 4. If someone happens to end up unusually skilled or powerful, we should expect them to use their skills for the benefit of society. In exchange, they get full respect and praise (nothing wrong with that if we're going for First Form Slave Morality). We tolerate them ending up with somewhat money than others because it helps with the efficient allocation of labor, but we redistribute income from them to the poorer to the extent it doesn't hurt prosperity too much.
>
> 6. Technological progress, economic prosperity, and cultural sophistication are good because they make people better off. Benefitting anyone is, all else equal, a good thing, whether it's a poor or a rich person, albeit benefitting poor people by a given amount is more valuable because they need it more (this is the part we grant to slave morality). Equality is not an end in itself, but for a given economic performance, it's better if it's distributed more equally. Art is good since it entertains people.
>
> I'd say this is still mostly slave morality. I'd describe it as First Form Slave Morality, or as a compromise between Second Form Slave Morality and Master Morality, or as utilitarianism.
>
> Do we have to compromise as much as Matt does? If we granted less to slave morality, would we grant too little for it to be a compromise? I don't see it. Not only does he lie far on the slave side of the slave-master morality divide, his "compromise" is still left of center even in modern Western society, which is already mostly slave moralist. One could take up the mantle of classical liberalism without the shibboleths about benefitting from privilege, or including underrepresented groups as the main saving grace art can have.
I think the way I wrote it is one end of the Overton Window, the way 10240 writes it is the other, and to me the window seems small enough that I don’t see much difference between our two formulations - but I appreciate the criticism.
**Walliserops [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63884247):**
> I am a native of 4chan. Let me give you an insider's perspective.
>
> Every social media website has a guiding motto, agreed by everyone who joins but never spoken out loud. For example, Reddit's is "everybody ought to think like I do". What began as a way to vote on posts grew into a hyper-conformist dystopia, and now any opinion that goes against the grain is not only dogpiled on but quite possibly banned for the terrible perils that such wrong information may pose. Forget controversial political opinions - saying "you can keep a betta in a 2.6g" in the aquariums subreddit will mark you as a public enemy.
>
> (fun fact: Because Reddit has multiple sub-communities with competing interests, this creates an interesting behavior where threads about topic X on "neutral ground" are actively contested by pro-X and anti-X factions. For example, the top post of any World News thread about Turkey is a 50/50 on "Turks are anti-Western extremists with multiple genocides under their belt and a strongman in the mold of Putin at the helm, we should kick them out of NATO and shun them forever" and "Turks are a great civilization that have fallen on hard times, we should sympathize with their plight and hope that they recover from the disaster that is Erdoğan". Whichever faction didn't win is handed 200 million negative votes).
>
> (extra fun fact: one of Erdoğan's nicknames is Şerdoğan, i.e. the Hawk of Evil, so it's really on the Turkish people for voting Griffith into power).
>
> Anyway, Twitter's motto is "I am so much better than that fellow over there". What began as a way to facilitate one-to-one exchanges grew into a clapback dystopia, and now every public figure is hounded by digital hyenas looking to one-up their posts and earn their fifteen minutes of please-check-out-my-GoFundMe. If you're not clapping back at individuals, you're clapping back at Platonic ideals of things, hence all these posts to the tune of "Dear straight white men: Please stop hunting down street cats and slurping their intestines directly out of their bellies, and for the love of everything good stop calling it 'paleo-ramen'".
>
> 4chan's guiding ideal is "who you are doesn't matter, only what you say and do". You can go right now and ask the animals board about how to house a leopard gecko, the toku/mecha board about which Kamen Rider series to watch first, the dollkeeping thread about the best brands for accessories, or the sci-fi thread about books similar to Baru Cormorant. They will help you to the best of their ability. But the moment you display any personality traits beyond "I want to do X and would like to know how", they will turn on you. The easiest way to become hated on any board is to be recognizable - anyone who uses a tripcode or a character avatar to post is treated as a digital leper.
>
> (Why does 4chan have such a beef with furries and transgender people? Because they're all about identity and self-expression, and 4chan responds to self-expression the way Elphaba responds to a shower. Other parts of the LGBT+ community\* are treated with more respect because "I want to fuck dudes as a dude and would like to know how" is the kind of thing 4chan can parse. Similarly, people on other social media networks now expect you to preface all your sentences with "As a level 12 Lawful Neutral Oath of Vengeance Paladin of Tyr who likes horses and would describe her periods as 'fairly mild'...", and 4chan expects people on other networks to fall in a ditch and die).
>
> So why the hateful posts? Well, the other point of 4chan is that what you say in thread X has no bearing on thread Y. Everyone expects you to behave in their threads, but you don't carry any of the good or the bad to others, so there's a smaller societal cost to being an utter turd once in a while. On one hand, it creates some truly vile posts by attention seekers. On the other, it's a good mechanism for self-improvement. If you say in other social media that black people should be allowed to ritually kill and eat one white child on national TV every year to atone for slavery, you'll be known forever as the child eater guy and never let into polite society again. On 4chan you're allowed to conclude that child cannibalism is not a good solution for the legacy of slavery, and come back with better ideas that will be judged on their own merit instead of "here's the latest hot take from the child eater guy".
>
> But (and I can't believe I'm saying this) there is still a twisted moral fiber to 4chan - the kind of bully that Scott describes will probably met with just a handful of replies, half of which will be "t. retard". Besides, as anyone who spent any time on 4chan would tell you, the age at which a woman shrivels into a desiccated corpse and joins the ranks of the sokushinbutsu is 25, not 40.
I like this way of thinking about “who you are doesn’t matter, only what you do”, but I find the connection to 4chan kind of tenuous.
**HumbleRando [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63825724):**
> Scott, what I find so contemptible about your morality is that it assumes that the weak are GOOD, and DESERVE to be helped. Whereas the truth is that quite a lot of them - like the third-world refugees that Europe is importing by the millions - are horrifically evil people who would rape your family to death if they could get money and clout for it. Their weakness does not mean that we should sympathize with these people, because the second they gain power they will use it against their benefactors. Your philosophy of life continually fails to account for that.
>
> Please note that this isn't a defense of Nietschean morality, which I find equally contemptible. Nietschean morality is simply your own, except with the polarity reversed. Instead of the weak being fetishized as paragons of goodness, they fetishize the strong.
>
> What I am proposing (and what makes my morality superior to both sides) is that good or evil should be judged completely independently of weakness or strength, using objective measurable criteria to determine who is deserving of help and who isn't. The reason rationalists with their "effective altruism" will never be a popular movement is because they do not DESERVE to be popular when they have no logical moral criteria to evaluate whom their altruism should prioritize. When your "effective altruism" saves the lives of 300 sub-saharan africans who then go on to murder gay people indiscriminately because their religion tells them to, or immigrate to Europe and rape and kill twelve year olds, YOU are personally responsible for the deaths they caused. Before you criticize OTHER people's morality, maybe you should consider subscribing to a moral philosophy that actually considers downstream effects, instead of treating the lives of evil people as being equally valuable to the lives of good people. Or do you not BELIEVE in the concept of good and evil?
I calculated it out based on statistics in [this article](https://unherd.com/2021/04/swedens-migrant-rape-crisis/) and some wild assumptions, and I think since 2000 there have been a total of about 7,500 sub-Saharan African convicted rapists in Europe. If we assume the total cases are 20x convictions, that’s 150,000 actual sub-Saharan African rapists (for a sanity check, this is about 5% of all male sub-Saharan Africans in Europe.)
There are about 1.2 billion total Africans, which suggests that if you save a random sub-Saharan African, there’s order of 1/8,000 chance they’ll go on to commit rape in Europe. I don’t think killing 8,000 people is worth it to prevent one rape. If you do think this, I think you should favor (for example) nuking random European cities, since I’m sure that you kill more than one rapist per 8,000 people.
(as for killing gay people, probably the gay people they kill are also sub-Saharan Africans, and I’m not sure you’re really coming off super credible in your desire to save the lives of sub-Saharan Africans here).
This reminds me of the section in Part IV of the post about how slave morality “ignores benefits and treats harms as infinity”. Sure, saving 8,000 Africans will save 8,000 lives - but it will also cause one extra European rape, so I’m “personally responsible” and “not considering downstream effects”.
I think that saving 8,000 lives but causing one rape is better than killing 8,000 people and preventing one rape. This is the only deal on offer. If you want to take the opposite side, I think you have some personal responsibility of your own to consider.
**Jude [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63829418):**
> I got the feeling Scott was suggesting that the underachieving masses are embracing slave morality while the successful tycoons of industry today are still "masters." I think this is completely backwards in an age of global capitalism. Spend any time at all with underprivileged boys in the US or boys from macho cultures in unstable developing countries and you will see that they are the true inheritors of Achilles' and "master" morality. Rap music in the US is the ultimate Nietzschean product: a world where what is good is just what gets one ahead: big cars, big houses, hot women, respect. These are the kids who love Andrew Tate, but his ideas are hobbling them in their efforts to get ahead.
>
> Then go work at a reasonably functional corporation or government agency and see who gets ahead and gets promoted. It's certainly people who take initiative, build new skills, and try things. But it's also overwhelmingly \*people with good social skills and balanced pro-social tendencies.\* Soft and social skills are frequently cited as the biggest reason why otherwise talented people don't move up. What makes companies money is the ability to run a big delicate cooperative network - and to do that, they need a lot of people who are good at cooperating, who understand and live out pro-social norms even if they aren't doing it for altruistic reasons. Modern HR departments are the most vicious defenders of egalitarian morality - not because they have a "slave mentality," but exactly because they don't. They are part of ruthlessly profit-oriented organizations whose success depends on coordinating the skills and labor of tens of thousands of human beings - often in different countries - all with different experiences and thoughts related to their sex, ethnicity, education, age, etc. Ironically, the spread of global capitalism and demand for increasing labor has made this necessary. You can't afford to allow discrimination or social blind spots in your execs because your competitors will find undervalued sources of labor and beat you with them.
This is a good point. I agree that rap is a weird master morality relic.
**Patrick D Farley [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63850316):**
> The phenomenon of mixing master virtues with slave virtues, as seen in early progressivism, early socialism, etc., is very interesting. I don't know if Nietzsche spoke to such a situation.
>
> But a fundamental question for that kind of society is "Do the master virtues exist genuinely, or just to lend the slave virtues more meaning?" Because, the herd does love their sacrificial heroes. We love that Harry Potter is a powerful wizard \_who sacrifices his life for the herd\_. We love that Jesus is infinitely powerful \_so he can save us\_. The greater the power, the more meaningful the sacrifice - that is one way to valuate power. The other way is to value power for its own sake. In which case you'd use the altruistic virtues as means to more power: build a network of people who owe you a favor; leave a good impression on everybody so they vote for you, etc.
>
> The socialist propaganda, we can safely say, is in the former category. Be a winner and then surrender it all for the cause. You want the taxidermy'd bust on your mantle to be the most ferocious, virile specimen of whatever you hunted - it's a greater testament to your ultimate "rightness" as the hunter. This perverse valuation of power characterizes exactly how masculinity is dealt with in Christian circles today, for example.
>
> I think the real litmus test is: How does the society treat people who gain power and \_choose not to\_ offer a sacrifice to the herd? A society that's honestly a mixed-bag of virtues would say "we don't love that you've chosen not to help anybody, but you're not harming anybody, so whatever. At least you inspire us or make our country look cool, and if we're organized properly then you prob had to help a lot of people on the way up". A society that only values power as a means to sacrifice would be outraged and try to take the sacrifice by force.
More good points.
**Related: John [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63877504)**:
> Nietzsche has good psychological insight, but I think that he offers a distorted perspective for analyzing social morality. What you see as "hybrid" moral systems from a Nietzschean POV (Puritans, early Soviets, post civil war progressives, Yglesias ... ) are pretty typical in their merger of embiggening and ensmalling virtues. My guess is that only sick, disordered societies are dominated by either slave or master moralities (obviously, most societies have have had both b/c it's hard to be a slave w/o a master or vice versa).
>
> The idea that slave virtues reinforce each other and drive out master virtues may have some truth for individuals, but there is a natural limit to how far slave morality can expand in society b/c no pure slave morality society would survive. A hunting tribe can survive if they exile that one annoying dude who makes everyone else look bad by working too hard, but they'll starve to death if no one wants to excel at hunting of if they decide that it is morally wrong to exploit other animals by killing them for their meat.
**Zinjanthropus [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63873600):**
> I think the ultimate reason that the Nietzschean idea of the superman fails is that being superman is ultimately unsatisfactory, even to Superman himself.
>
> At nearly 3,000 years old, the Iliad is very much in vogue, with two recent notable translations by women (Emily Wilson and Caroline Alexander) and a book of criticism aimed at a broad audience, Robin Lane Fox's Homer and His Iliad. I think part of the reason the Iliad still hits home is that its central figure, Achilles, fascinates. He's not just stronger and faster and better-looking than everyone else, he's more thoughtful and eloquent too. People point to his appearance in the underworld in the Odyssey, where he says he'd rather be a hired hand on a farm and alive than rule over all the dead. But his rejection of the heroic ethos is found in the Iliad too. His superhuman strength and beauty can’t save him from being dishonored by Agamemnon. It can’t keep his beloved Patroclus alive. All it’s good for, ultimately, is slaughtering Trojans. Which Achilles does magnificently, when he finally returns to battle; but in a sort of frenzy of despair. To a Trojan begging for mercy, he says: Patroclus is dead; I’ll be dead soon; you die too. He calls himself a useless burden on the earth. At the end when he forgoes violence and returns Hector’s body to his aged father Priam, saying sadly as he does so that he is doing nothing to help his own aged father; instead he sits in Troy, afflicting Priam and his children. And he agrees to hold the Greek army back for two weeks so that the Trojans can give Hector a proper burial.
>
> It is impossible for me to imagine Achilles fighting the Trojans again after his interview with Priam, though the story of the Trojan war requires it; for that reason, I think, Homer ends the Iliad with Hector’s burial, with the truce still in effect.
>
> Some critics have argued that there was an earlier poem, an Achillead, in which Achilles’ killing of Hector and mutilation of his body in revenge for Patroclus was presented as a fully satisfactory conclusion, both to Achilles and to the poem’s audience. The later bits of Achilles’ despair and his mercy, in this account, were bolted on later. I have no idea if the Achillead ever existed, but I do know that if it did, it would be forgotten today.
>
> The Iliad teaches us that revenge is never fully satisfactory; dominating and lording over others is not enough. It's interesting to contrast the chivalric epics with Homer. Achilles comes to see his own supreme excellence in combat as pointless and futile. Lancelot and Galahad and Gawain don’t feel that way about their own prowess. But why not? Because they use their excellence to protect the weak and defenseless, delivering the land from ancient evils, finding the Holy Grail. If Achilles could be transported to the world of the chivalric epics, he would be much happier and more fulfilled than he was in his own world.
I appreciate this perspective on the Iliad.
**Alastair Roberts [writes](https://x.com/zugzwanged/status/1818778791466176814):**
> A key factor I don't think @slatestarcodex sufficiently addresses — even if he touches on it at points — is the way strong collective identities have been the way of squaring high celebration of power and excellence with affirmation of low achievers. When there are well-defined, bounded, and honoured groups, within which all group members have common, secure, and meaningful belonging, a group can encourage high achievement in its members, while also allowing all members, even the lowliest, to share in the glory. The all-important requirement for the high agency group members is that they work for the benefit and glory of the group, not merely their own.
>
> Sports are like this: people expect sportsmen to give their all for the team and they share in the glory when their side wins. Where there is a sense of being a strong and united team, where the highest achievers are striving to achieve glory for the shared identity, it really can produce a much higher tolerance for the inequalities that a society that celebrates excellence and high agency produces. Where such shared identities fail, the lowliest will tend to fall back into ressentiment, envy, hatred, felt inferiority, and will stigmatize and seek to cut down winners.
>
> Those who see shared identities slipping away from them can feel an existential challenge along these lines. This is one reason why many people, despite being poor or disadvantaged, can love things such as nationalism, monarchy, or empire. It connects them to something glorious. However, where group membership is not highly valued and protected, exceptional persons can become a threat. A strong collective identity, then, need not be the flattening 'collectivism' many imagine.
>
> This also where Richard Hanania and some vitalists would part ways with, for instance, nationalists, as Hanania et al lack a strong collective identity to share the spoils of glory. For Hanania and many vitalists, weak, sick, less intelligent, poor, and low-achieving people are mere excess human biomass. If they were to imagine an ideal nation, it would probably be extremely selective in membership, excluding, and dismissing the value of most people's lives. This is, for instance, an inner tension in white nationalism: it tends to appeal most to lowly people who feel they lack respected group membership, while also typically being wedded to a sort of vision of master morality. However, they don't have excellence or high agency. The sort of 'ensmallening' society Scott describes, which eschews and penalizes the pursuit and celebration of greatness can push greatness out of public and common life and into the realm of private enterprise, accentuating people's sense of the indignity of inequalities.
**FurtherOrAlternatively [writes](https://furtheroralternatively.blogspot.com/2022/07/on-effective-altruism.html):**
> As I have written before, I see part of the appeal of EA as a heroic quest for young people in a world lacking in other outlets for excellence. E.g. here:
>
> *“One reason that the improvement of material circumstances is so morally tempting today is that the improvement of people’s moral or cultural circumstances seems so difficult. If we lived in an age in which we reasonably expected our poets to produce epics for the ages, or our painters to produce masterpieces that will require the protection of glass cases in the Louvres of the future, then, I am sure, we would be far less ready to find it plausible that the most good that could be done by a bright and cultured young person educated at one of our ancient universities would be to pursue a working life devoted to the philistine manipulation of money in order to give generously to charities that distribute malaria nets or arrange complicated webs of kidney donations. For all the good that such a life might accomplish, there is surely something limited, something mean or monochrome, about the idea of setting out to live it. To relieve the most hunger among the most people would be a worthwhile achievement for a pig, but surely not for Socrates?* “
I’m not sold on art/epics/masterpieces as a grounding for morality or the good life.
When I think about this philosophy, I ask questions like “Is art still valuable if nobody ever sees it?” Or “Is art still valuable if it’s an AI churning out 1 million great artworks per second in the Andromeda Galaxy?” Or “Is art still valuable if it’s a stalagmite in a cave that through freak coincidence formed into a beautiful statue, but literally nobody will ever see it, including a creator.” Or “is there more moral value in a world with a million pieces of pretty-good art, or one piece of great art”?
These questions tempt me to think of art as having only instrumental value. Either it’s valuable because viewers enjoy it (in which case we’re back to utilitarianism), or it’s valuable insofar as it communicates something (but surely this only works if the thing it’s communicating is valuable). I can’t wrap my head around what it would mean for the art to be valuable in and of itself.
**Christina The StoryGirl [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63786297):**
> *> "[Consider] some kind of shock jock, saying “Note to unattached liberal women above 40: you are ugly hags who have lost your chance with men and all your eggs have dried up and nobody will ever value you anymore, you should either beg for some fat alcoholic guy to take you in since that’s the only man you can get, or resign yourself to being a cat lady growing old with nothing to do but dwell on your regrets and what could have been.” Outside of 4chan, there’s a sort of universal alliance against these people, which the rest of us join immediately and unconsciously. Is this the dreaded “herd” of “slave morality”? If so, long live the herd."*
>
> But what if the core of this advice to [straight cics] unattached liberal women above 40 actually is \*objectively\* far more useful than not?
>
> The herd's rejection of this "bullying" does nothing to "correct" the priorities of the very, very large population of straight cis men who are disinterested in women over 40. The herd might say, "that's mean!", but it doesn't have the power to force straight cis men to be equally attracted to female 40-somethings as they are to female 20-somethings. There are indeed actual women whom \*only\* fat alcoholic guys are interested in because appealing men can do better with cute 20-somethings, and cute 20-somethings don't need to put up with fat alcoholics.
>
> The herd can object to the sneering tone, perhaps (although the tone itself provides important information about how unapologetically these women will be swiped-left), but it behooves 40 year old unattached straight cis women to acknowledge the reality of the core observation. The herd can't provide any meaningful help to these women, it can only condescend with false hope to make itself feel better about the slow-moving decay of these women's lives.
>
> Signed,
>
> A 44 year old politically-nonbinary not-hard-bodied cis straight unattached woman whose experience dating at 44 is \*extremely different and inferior\* to dating at 39, and 35.
I agree that an underappreciated problem is how to stigmatize something in the sense of warning against it, without stigmatizing it in the sense of making the people who unavoidably have it feel bad.
So for example, it would be nice to stigmatize obesity enough that most people who can easily lose weight do, without making people with medical conditions that make it hard to lose weight feel miserable or inferior.
I don’t have a great solution here, but it seems that you can modulate the tone of your message to be more “warn people against” vs. “make people stuck in the situation hate themselves”, and I think the hypothetical person who wrote that paragraph above is failing at this.
I agree that there will always be some people who aren’t warned by a polite warning, but would take an extremely mean warning seriously, and that in trading this off you’re harming that subset of people.
**Stackdamage [writes](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean/comment/63792507):**
> Zarathustra here.
>
> I thought I had been clear that when I talked about "Übermensch", I was talking about an A.I.:
>
> *» "I teach you the Übermensch. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings so far have created something beyond themselves: and you want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than overcome man? What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. And just the same shall man be to the Übermensch: a laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man, and much within you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any ape. Even the wisest among you is only a conflict and hybrid of plant and ghost. But do I bid you become ghosts or plants? Behold, I teach you the Übermensch! The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Übermensch shall be the meaning of the earth... Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Übermensch—a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what is lovable in man is that he is an over-going and a going under."*
Checks out. | Scott Alexander | 147332590 | Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche | acx |
# Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers
Some commenters on [the recent post](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/matt-yglesias-considered-as-the-nietzschean) accused me of misunderstanding the Nietzschean objection to altruism.
We hate altruism, they said, not because we’re “bad and cruel”, but because we instead support *vitalism*. Vitalism is a moral system that maximizes life, glory and strength, instead of maximizing happiness. Altruism is bad because it throws resources into helping sick (maybe even dysgenic) people, thus sapping our life, glory, and strength.
In [a blog post](https://newaltright.substack.com/p/i-shant-shut-up-about-slave-morality?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2) (linked in the original post, discussed at length in the comments), Walt Bismarck compares the ultimate fate of altruism to WALL-E: a world where morbidly obese humans are kept in a hedonistic haze by robot servitors (although the more typical example I hear is tiling the universe with rats on heroin, which maximizes a certain definition of pleasure). In contrast, vitalism imagines a universe alive with dynamism, heroism, and great accomplishments.
My response: in most normal cases, altruism and vitalism suggest the same solutions. The two diverge from each other in Extremistan, but in Extremistan each one also diverges from itself, shattering into innumerable incoherent and horrible outcomes. So we should mostly concentrate on the normal cases where they converge. I’m suspicious of anyone who gets too interested in the extreme divergent cases, because I think many of these people are actively looking for trouble (eg excuses for cruelty) and should stop.
Going through each sentence of this summary in order:
**In Most Normal Cases, Altruism And Vitalism Suggest The Same Solutions**
Define altruism as “try to increase happiness and decrease suffering across a society” and vitalism as “try to increase strength and decrease weakness across a society”, where “strength” is defined as ability to achieve goals (and, in a tie-breaker, ability to win wars).
Most things that do one also do the other:
* Curing disease. A healthy society is both happier and stronger than a sick society.
* Increasing wealth. A rich society is both happier and stronger than a poor society.
* Advancing technology. An advanced society has more ways to make its people happy and to win conflicts than a primitive society.
* Saving lives. This is altruistic by definition. But living people are generally better at achieving their goals than dead people, and a society with more living people is stronger than one where lots of people have died (eg they can field bigger armies). There are some exceptions - it’s not altruistic if the people are suicidal, and it’s not vitalist if the people are useless parasites - but in most cases the goals converge.
* Winning wars. This is vitalist by definition. But if you think your country is in the right, its victory will make the world better and increase utility.
In the general case, people prefer to be powerful/strong/winning, so by improving their strength you make them happier, and by satisfying their preferences you make them more powerful.
**The Two [Diverge From Each Other In Extremistan](https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/09/25/the-tails-coming-apart-as-metaphor-for-life/), But In Extremistan They Also Diverge From Themselves**
If we take a hyperspecific definition of altruism (“creating as much happiness as possible”), ignore all second-order effects, and extend it to infinity, it could lead to morbidly obese people on heroin drips.
(though if we already have everyone connected to an IV drip, realistically we can just add some Ozempic. There, see, I’ve already made this 20% less dystopian.)
What’s the equivalent for vitalism? Suppose we took a hyperspecific definition of vitalism (“building as many tanks as possible”). Soon we’re bulldozing the cathedrals to build more tank factories, breaking up happy families to send kids to the iron mines, and ripping scientists from their blackboards to work as tank gunners.
(if your objection is that vitalism is more about overcoming challenges than about military strength per se, you can replace this with those same WALL-E robots, only now you’re on a testosterone drip and they’re whipping you twenty hours a day to force you to try to lift a weight 0.01 kg heavier than your previous personal best.)
(if your objection is that vitalism is more about aesthetics/beauty than strength, you can replace this with a robot churning out one billion extremely beautiful marble statues per second somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy, with humankind long since extinct.)
Aren’t these fake strawman versions of vitalism which nobody actually believes? Yes, kind of. But *anything at this level of specificity will also be fake*. What vitalists mean is something like “I want this vision of a flourishing society that I’m imagining right now, and it’s got lots of strength and heroism and overcoming challenges and stuff”. If you try to specify it as a function that can be easily maximized, then extend that function to infinity, it sounds like a joke.
But the same is true of altruism. When people talk about altruism, they imagine some flourishing society free from sickness and poverty and suffering. “Minimize suffering” is their description of one vector that gets you there, but minimizing suffering directly and monomaniacally to infinity will take you someplace weird. That’s not a problem with altruism, it’s a problem with infinity.
Both altruism and vitalism, if you let their proponents describe them in a hand-wavey way, sound pretty good. Both altruism and vitalism, if you demand a strict objective definition and then extend it to infinity, become crazy and undesirable. If you let the vitalists hand-wave and stay finite, but demand strict objectivity and infinitizability from the altruists, then vitalism will look better than altruism. So what? So don’t do that.
But also, both of these scenarios ignore second-order effects. For example - aren’t happy families good, even to monomaniacal tank-builders, because they raise well-adjusted children who can build the next generation of tanks? Aren’t scientists good, because even the most theoretical among them may one day hit on an advance which could prove useful for tank construction? Aren’t cathedrals good insofar as they fill us with awe of God, who commands us to build more tanks?
All of this sounds obvious when we talk about tank-building. But the same is true of altruism. Don’t we need well-adjusted children to staff the next generation of hospitals and charities? Don’t we need scientists to discover the next generation of antimalaria drugs and safe AIs? Aren’t cathedrals good insofar as they fill us with awe of God, who commands us to love thy neighbor as thyself?
Sure, you can imagine the world in which we’ve maxed out the tech tree and invented robots that can act without inspiration, and all that’s left is to connect humans to the heroin drips. But in the same world, all that’s left is to send the robots to staff the tank (or marble statue) factories. In any realistic world, where there’s still new technology to discover and new generations to raise and inspire, both of these goals create a recognizable society with most good things.
This is kind of a patch: in a perfect world, we want a moral philosophy that survives maxing out the tech tree and having infinite robots, so that we can be prepared for the post-progress infinite wealth far future (ie 2045). No existing philosophy is up to this task, but vitalism doesn’t solve this any better than altruism.
(this picture is slightly complicated by the fact that some altruists will actually endorse the heroin drip world. I’m not sure where I fall here - see [here](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/01/28/wirehead-gods-on-lotus-thrones/) for more. I would prefer eternal ecstatic bliss to some world where we all have to fight a bunch of meaningless wars against each other just so we can check off “be strong and have wars” on a meaningless Vitalism To-Do Checklist. But I’m holding out for something better than either.)
**I’m Suspicious Of People Who Talk Too Much About The Divergence In Normal Cases**
I see two common arguments for why altruism and vitalism are divergent even in normal cases.
First, the cuckoo clock argument. The famous version, from Orson Welles’ *The Third Man*, goes:
> In Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love - they had 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.
Isn’t there some sense where conflict (which is bloody and full of suffering) produces progress and strength? And doesn’t that mean that altruists should oppose conflict, but vitalists should promote it?
I’m skeptical of this argument. America’s been at peace since World War II (foreign adventures like Vietnam haven’t substantially changed our national experience) and produced the computing revolution, the Internet, AI, the moon landing, the Human Genome Project, antiretrovirals, the microwave, the laser, the smartphone, and the reusable rocket. During that time, Iraq has had approximately eight major wars and didn’t even get a cuckoo clock out of it.
Is this an unfair comparison, since America has 8x Iraq’s population? No more so than Welles’ is (Italy has 8x the population of Switzerland). But beyond the specifics, I think it’s useful for shocking us into Near Mode. War isn’t actually that great for science, art, or the economy. I’m not expecting Russia or Ukraine to leapfrog the rest of the world any time soon. I’m expecting them to fall further and further behind until the war ends, at which point maybe they’ll get a chance to catch up.
This isn’t to say there’s no advantage of conflict. Capitalism is a kind of conflict and was responsible for many (though not all) of the inventions mentioned above (but do remember that Bell Labs was famously productive precisely because it was a monopoly). The Cold War also inspired both the US and Russia to do some good work (as well as inspiring both to waste trillions of dollars on useless one-upsmanship and arms races). There’s some evidence that the most heavily-bombed areas of Britain and Japan are richer today (because they were able to build back from first principles instead of being limited by existing infrastructure). But this is a pretty far cry from saying that war is generally good.
I think both altruists and vitalists have a shared interest in figuring out the structures (capitalism? monopoly? friendly rivalry?) that maximize progress without devolving into anyone actually getting nuked.
The second divergence argument I hear is “suffering builds character” or “suffering is responsible for the spark of greatness”.
An obvious counterexample to this is all the extremely successful people from privileged upbringings. Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Mark Zuckerberg all had great childhoods. So did Caesar and Napoleon. So did Einstein and von Neumann. Meanwhile, there are millions of poor people and war victims who have lived lives of constant horrible trauma without much benefit. If success and creativity were proportional to suffering, the West would have to ban refugees from the Gaza Strip, lest they take all the spots in the best colleges and form an elite billionaire overclass.
Here I’ll also refer back to my old post on [Jo Cameron](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/profile-the-far-out-initiative), a Scottish woman with a rare genetic mutation that makes it impossible for her to suffer. She cannot feel pain, anxiety, fear, or any other negative emotion. As far as anyone can tell, she is completely normal. She is a successful wife, mother, and teacher, generally considered well-liked and excellent at her job. She may not have achieved greatness, but I once talked to someone impressive who you’ve probably heard of (I don’t have permission to share their name) who seems to have a lesser version of the same condition.
This isn’t to say that there isn’t some level of spoiling that can mess someone up. I just think it’s more than Mark Zuckerberg (who was raised by two loving parents in an upper class suburb and went to prep school) got. If an altruist’s goal is to give everyone the equivalent of a childhood raised by loving parents in a happy suburb with great schools, I don’t think a vitalist can complain.
I think altruists and vitalists have a shared interest in figuring out what kind of experiences are best at making people more resilient and ambitious, but I don’t think the answer will look like “we need to dial up the pain and suffering in some scattershot global sense”.
**(Further, More Specific Examples)**
Other people make more specific claims about the divergence between altruism and vitalism. For example, effective altruists often spend money curing/preventing malaria in Third World countries. Isn’t this “dysgenic”? Doesn’t it waste money on weak people who can’t take care of themselves?
The average person who dies from malaria is a 3-4 year old child. Children don’t die of illnesses because they’re “dysgenic” or “weak”. They die because their immune systems haven’t developed yet.
Isn’t this still just adding extra bodies to Third World countries that already can’t take care of themselves, thus making the world worse off rather than better off? Not really. The average Kenyan makes $2000 per year. If you spend $4000 to save the life of one Kenyan, and they work for thirty years, you’re contributing $56,000 to world GDP. This is probably more than you could contribute to world GDP by trying to save First Worlders (who make more money, but are much harder to save the lives of).
Doesn’t Kenya fail to produce anything useful? First of all, if that were true, they wouldn’t have a GDP of $100 billion, or export $7 billion of goods. Second, the potential of Kenya is probably underutilized because it’s underdeveloped, and part of the process of making it less underdeveloped is making its people healthier. Malaria infections [probably cost a couple of IQ points](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3018393/), [decrease impulse control](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10401769/), and [prevent economic growth](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2624/). Treating malaria probably isn’t the *most* effective way to speed economic growth, but it’s not the most effective way to reduce suffering either; EAs talk about it a lot because it’s one of the few interventions which has been well-studied and can absorb almost limitless new funding.
Finally, I think a lot of people think of this in terms of “Africans’ lives are worse less than nothing and I want to get rid of them”. Even if this is where you’re coming from, you’re not getting rid of one billion people, sorry. Your best option is to make Africa less of a mess, so that it can take care of itself and its people don’t try to immigrate elsewhere. I think trying to cure malaria is one way of making Africa less of a mess.
You can still object that this isn’t *maximally effective* vitalism. But it’s not maximally effective altruism either (just maximally effective among interventions that are proven and can be done at scale). Are there better vitalist interventions that are proven and at scale? I don’t know, because vitalists want to reserve the right to hand-wave their own philosophy while criticizing the practically-operationalized philosophy of others.
If there were such interventions, I think vitalists would find that they wouldn’t be able to bring themselves devote more than ~10% of their time/energy/money to them, in the same way most effective altruists don’t devote more than 10% of their time/energy/money to altruism. If the analogy held, I think this would teach them humility. Most people aren’t very effective vitalists! In that case, people who are doing a somewhat world-strengthening thing (curing diseases) are still decent allies, especially compared to the vast majority of people who aren’t doing any world-strengthening at all.
At this point, I think a vitalism/altruism divergence would look kind of like the progress studies/EA divergence does now - two groups working on similar projects with different emphases, who form natural coalition partners on most topics.
**…Because I Think These People Are Actively Looking For Trouble**
If I wanted to strengthen humanity as much as possible, I’d probably work on economic development, curing diseases, or technological progress. I might have slightly different priorities from the effective altruists working on these same causes, but I’d consider them 99%-allies.
Vitalist bloggers mostly don’t seem to think this way. They spend most of the energy criticizing altruists, and never really get around to practicing vitalism at all. When they do make specific suggestions, it’s always things like “Maybe we should have more war, because war strengthens society!” even though the case for war strengthening society is much weaker than the case for (eg) economic development strengthening society.
I think it’s all signaling. People who want to validate an identity as kind and compassionate become altruists. People who want to validate an identity as tough and masculine and hard-headed become vitalists. This is why people bother hitching their star to *any* philosophy instead of just making money or playing video games or whatever.
When altruists do this wrong, they end up supporting eg clemency for serial murderers, a category for whom it’s especially hard to feel compassion (and therefore, if they do show compassion, it proves they’re *so amazingly kind and compassionate)*. EAs try to restrain these kinds of signaling games by objective calculations of the right thing to do, although some would say these produce new signaling games (eg shrimp welfare).
The mirror image on the vitalist side is when they end up supporting war and suffering, concepts which are especially hard to endorse (and which therefore prove they’re amazingly tough and masculine and hard-headed for daring to endorse them anyway). War and suffering are so impractical that their support can only come from really tough hard-headed masculinity, not from normal human common sense and decency.
But the causes that work best for signaling aren’t necessarily the causes that work best for actually getting the thing that you want, whether that’s a happy society or a strong one.
**…And Should Stop**
I said above that [signaling and identity defense] is “why people bother hitching their star to *any* philosophy instead of just making money or playing video games or whatever.” Isn’t this a cynical viewpoint? People were talking about this in the comments a lot: is it impossible to be to *genuinely* be altruistic/vitalistic/whatever? If so, isn’t it more honest to just be selfish instead of signaling all the time?
My answer: haha, as if you could manage genuine selfishness. I have a bunch of complicated tax form things I need to do that would get me a few hundred extra dollars per month; I’ve delayed them for over a year now. You’d think that if I were genuinely selfish I’d take the free money. Humans *genuinely* do what some sort of predictive algorithm figures will send the most dopamine to a certain part of their mesolimbic system; everything else is some kind of complicated willpower-exertion game where, if you contort yourself in exactly the right direction, the reward of feeling responsible and virtuous sends enough dopamine to your mesolimbic system to be worth it. Altruism is a willpower-exertion-contortion game like this, but so are selfishness and everything else.
Katja Grace has a great article called [In Praise Of Pretending To Really Try](https://meteuphoric.com/2013/12/22/pretend-to-really-really-try/). Maybe at some level all of our values are pretense - you’re just trying to convince other people (or yourself!) that you’re a good person. Maybe this is true of the selfish values (responsibility, diligence, etc) as much as the altruistic ones (at least this is how it works for me - I don’t feel deep internal motivation to do my taxes, I do them some reasonable amount and then think “Okay, I’ve done enough taxes for today that I don’t feel like a loser, I’ll finish them up tomorrow.”) Pretense is bad insofar as it replaces work optimized for effectiveness (really finishing your taxes, really helping others) with work optimized for signaling (staring at your taxes for an hour then crediting yourself for an hour of work, slacktivism). The solution isn’t to stop pretending and “do it for real”, because that’s not an action available to humans. The solution is to up your pretending game. Don’t feel good about how responsible you are for staring at your taxes without doing them - only feel good if you’ve done good work. Don’t feel good about having made vague gestures in favor of altruism - only feel good in proportion to the people you’ve actually helped. You can do this partly through your own conscience, and partly through joining a community that accords status on this basis.
Once you’re self-motivated to display a virtue in order to fulfill an identity you’ve voluntarily built around it, and also self-motivated to critique your performance of the virtue in order to make it more effective rather than just signaling, then the difference between pretending at the virtue and actually having the virtue shrinks to zero. You can honestly say you have the virtue, even if it’s built atop a tower bottoming out in mesolimbic dopamine or whatever.
So my challenge to the vitalists is to pretend to really try. This challenge is self-enforcing; the more people (including the audience who they’re signaling to) are thinking about it, the more natural it becomes. I think once they do that, most of the local difference between vitalism and altruism will disappear. Then we can leave the terminal differences for after the Singularity, just like every other impossible ethical paradox.
[EDIT: Halfway through this post I discovered Richard Chappell’s [The Nietzschean Challenge To Effective Altruism](https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/the-nietzschean-challenge-to-effective), which makes some similar points] | Scott Alexander | 147335786 | Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers | acx |
# Open Thread 341
This is the weekly visible open thread. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. ACX has an unofficial [subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/), [Discord](https://discord.gg/RTKtdut), and [bulletin board](https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php), and [in-person meetups around the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/community?filters%5B0%5D=SSC). 95% of content is free, but for the remaining 5% you can subscribe **[here](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/subscribe?)**. Also:
**1:** Far Out Initiative ([described here](https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/profile-the-far-out-initiative)) is looking for help from people with backgrounds in bioinformatics and applying AI/ML to genetics. If that's you, reach out at contact@faroutinitiative.com.
**2:** Comment of the week: an r/ssc reader with a (thankfully minor) spine injury [shares his extensive thoughts](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1eicznz/your_book_review_two_arms_and_a_head/lg6n6ov/) on the recent Two Arms And A Leg review. I’ll try to collect the Nietzsche comments into a Highlights post soon. | Scott Alexander | 147362437 | Open Thread 341 | acx |
# Your Book Review: Two Arms and a Head
[*This is one of the finalists in the 2024 book review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I’ll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you’ve read them all, I’ll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked*]
Content warning: body horror, existential devastation, suicide. This book is an infohazard that will permanently alter your view of paraplegia.
## The Death of a Newly-Paraplegic Philosopher
> *For me, paraplegia and life itself are not compatible. This is not life, it is something else.*
In May of 2006, philosophy student Clayton Schwartz embarks on a Pan-American motorcycle trip for the summer before law school. He is 30 years old and in peak physical condition.
He makes it as far south as Acapulco in Mexico before crashing into a donkey that had wandered into the road.
The impact crushes his spinal cord at the T5 vertebra, rendering him paralyzed from the nipples down.
On Sunday, February 24, 2008, he commits suicide.
In the year and a half in between, he writes *Two Arms and a Head*, his combination memoir and suicide note.
Writing under the pseudonym Clayton Atreus, he lays out in excruciating detail how awful it is to be paralyzed, and how his new life is but a shadow of what it once was. He concludes that his life is no longer worth living, and proceeds to end it.
Along the way, he addresses the obstacles that society has put in his way of dying on his own terms—the biggest of which is the fact that physician-assisted suicide for his condition is illegal at the time.
But there are other factors. Smaller, more insidious roadblocks. Our society doesn't just condemn suicide; we do a great disservice to newly disabled patients in refusing to let them voice their misery and grief about being disabled. The book is a scathing indictment of how our society enables the lifelong disabled at the expense of the newly disabled and terminally ill.
Looking back from ~15 years in the future, when we have a patchwork of states and countries that have legalized physician-assisted suicide, Clayton's story stands as a cautionary tale for why it must become—and stay—legal.
## Being Paralyzed Sucks
As a student of philosophy, Clayton is heavily influenced by the writings of Nietzsche and Camus. He analyzes the experience of being paralyzed primarily through the lens of Existentialism. It’s hard to imagine a more apt philosophy for interpreting body horror.
*Two Arms and a Head* comes from one of those rare moments in history when an individual’s circumstances so perfectly intersect with their skills that they leave a mark on the world. What better cosmic tragedy than to have a strong, fit, arrogant philosophy buff suddenly find himself paralyzed? His memoir is an exploration of what it means to exist in a body that is no longer entirely his own.
The full ramifications of being paralyzed are rarely discussed in polite company. Rest assured, he omits no details:
> *Everything below my nipples is no longer me. Hence the title of this work, “Two Arms and a Head”. [...] I am two arms and a head, attached to two-thirds of a corpse. The only difference is that it’s a living, shitting, pissing, jerking, twitching corpse. [...] What was once my beloved body is now a* thing*. [...]*
>
> *Two arms and a head. Period. Additionally, I will be using a sort of shorthand in this book when I refer to parts of “my” body. So when I say “my penis”, for instance, what I really mean is “the unfeeling, alien piece of flesh that used to be my penis, but is now just part of the living corpse I will push or drag around forever until I am dead.” [...]*
>
> *As far as I feel about my body, who do you love more than anyone else in the world? Think of that person. Now picture being chained to their bloated corpse—forever.*
### No, Really, It's Way Worse Than You Think
I had limited exposure to paraplegics until I read this book. Growing up, I only knew them from pop culture—usually as side characters who would appear on Very Special Episodes of Saturday morning cartoons. Professor X. The glider kid from that one episode of *Avatar*. The main character from the other *Avatar*.
The tropes gave me a mental model of being paraplegic that boiled down to "you can't use your legs, so you have to drag yourself in and out of a wheelchair to use the toilet. But you're still an ordinary person sitting upright in a wheelchair."
Clayton wastes no time in dispelling this myth:
> *> I am devastatingly, cataclysmically physically disabled. [...]*
>
> *> There is a tremendous difference between me and an able-bodied person sitting in a wheelchair. Tremendous.*
Spinal cord injuries affect everything downstream of the injury—not just "the legs" but also the pelvis, bowels, genitals, and abdomen. Depending on where the injury occurs, that can include all the trunk muscles that keep someone sitting upright.
([Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinal_cord_injury)) A diagram of the human spine next to a diagram of the human body, indicating which parts of the body are innervated by which vertebrae in the spinal column. The cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral regions of the spine are highlighted in different colors, with the corresponding body regions highlighted in the same colors.
Starting at the top, the cervical (neck) vertebrae control the head, neck, arms, and fingers. The thoracic (torso) vertebrae control the entire torso and abdomen. The lumbar (lower back) vertebrae control the hips and front muscles of the legs. The sacral (tailbone) vertebrae control the back muscles of the legs and the groin area. The very last vertebra, S5, innervates the anus and genitals.
Clayton is injured quite high up on the torso at the T5 vertebra. Let's consider the ramifications of having everything below the nipples be completely numb and limp.
To start off, that means that he has no use of the muscles that hold him upright.
> *Nothing keeps me sitting up—no hip flexors, erector spinae, hamstrings, or abdominal muscles. I am arms-and-a-head on a column of Jell-O.*
He can't put both arms out in front of him, lest he fall over. He has to continuously prop himself up with one arm while doing anything at arm's length. After only 1.5 years of being paralyzed, this has already caused significant repetitive strain injuries in his elbows, shoulders, and ulnar nerves.
Clayton still has to deal with all the logistics of life, despite two-thirds of his body being a hunk of corpse-flesh. He dedicates huge swaths of the text to all the little time-wasting tasks he now has to do. How much of his life is ticking away with every delay, every piece of effort, every task that is trivial for an able-bodied person but monstrously difficult for him. Something as simple as getting out of a car is an entire production—let alone running errands, cleaning, doing laundry, cooking.
Since the lower two-thirds of his body no longer sends pain signals to his brain, he must proactively tend to all of its physical needs. Complications include pressure sores, infections, and a high chance of blood clots. Aside from suicide, the leading causes of death among paraplegics are all related to poor circulation.
In addition to the loss of conscious sensation and muscle control, problems with the autonomic nervous system—heart rate, orthostatic blood pressure, temperature regulation—are common. This is even more pronounced in cervical spine (neck) injuries. Some quadriplegics black out or the blood rushes to their head when being moved from lying down into reclining in a wheelchair. A spinal cord injury wreaks havoc on the body's functioning.
Go back to that diagram. The groin area is innervated by the very end of the spinal cord, at the S5 vertebra. We tend to think of our legs as being “below” the crotch, but the nerves that control bowel movements and urination are downstream of the ones for the legs.
> *To keep the party rolling I will tell you about piss and shit. [...] To urinate I have to slide a catheter down my urethra. [...] To defecate I finger myself up the ass and root around and around until the shit comes out. Nuggets, smooshy, whatever it is I’m digging in it.*
He describes the disgusting, nauseating process at length. For the sake of your lunch, I will refrain from quoting it all.
In addition to being unable to open and close his sphincters on command, he also receives no signals of needing to go. If he eats the wrong thing and gets a bout of diarrhea, he will have no warning—no abdominal discomfort and no final urge to rush to the bathroom.
One afternoon he "has an accident" while lounging on his couch. In trying to move from the couch to the toilet, he subsequently smears feces all over the couch, the carpet, his wheelchair, the toilet seat, and the shower.
After he digs the poop out of his anus and washes himself off, he then has to clean all of that up by himself.
From a wheelchair.
Bending down, stretching, trying not to fall over, trying to reach the floor to scrub feces off the carpet.
*From a wheelchair.*
This episode was hardly the first time. He would routinely wake up in the morning to find that he had soiled himself overnight. Imagine struggling to rip dirty sheets off the bed, stuff them in the laundry, and put a clean sheet on the mattress—*from a wheelchair*.
I don't know about you, but I can barely get a fitted sheet on my *own* mattress, and I get to do it while standing up.
> *And unless I want to piss or shit myself, there can be no rest from this drudgery, ever, for the rest of my life. No relieving stretch of time without piss-dowsing and fingering myself up the asshole.*
Nobody told Kid Me that Professor X has to dig turds out of his anus every day.
The groin dysfunction doesn't stop there.
> *To be redundant once more, I can’t feel my penis. [...] Men, think how losing your penis would make you feel. Ladies, think of having your clit amputated and never having sex again. [...]*
>
> *True, the unfeeling penis attached to the living corpse I drag around can become erect but what has that to do with me?*
The one time he tries to have intercourse after his injury, it goes about as well as you'd expect:
> *Watching a woman bob up and down on the penis attached to the corpse that used to be my body struck me as macabre and disturbing. It was like necrophilia. It’s like watching a woman get off by rubbing my amputated foot on herself.*
The disturbing facts just keep on rolling.
One final note about the physical symptoms: spinal cord injuries *hurt*. Everything below the damage is numb, but the injury itself is a massive tear in the central nerve that controls the body.
> *The pain is insistent, nagging, and so sharp it seems to crackle. [...] It’s just as sharp and intense every time, over and over, like it’s mocking you. Sometimes it happens when I’m lying in bed and it’s like trying to fall asleep with someone sticking a needle between my ribs or the bones of my big toe.*
But, surely, the only real problem is the physical limitations? Clayton is still the same person he'd always been, right? He has the same brain, same personality he did before the accident. Even if he can't walk anymore, he still has his memories.
Not so fast.
### Yes, Even Worse Than That
What kind of mental and emotional toll does all of this take on Clayton?
> *The feeling I experience is a frantic, frenzied, desperate distress. [...] I need to move. I need to move. [...]*
>
> *Not only is two-thirds of my body paralyzed, but so is a huge part of my innermost self. It wants more than anything to feel and experience life. To* exist*. But it exists now only in a place between reality and nothingness with no hope of ever coming back. [...] All it can do is degenerate in the solitary place it has been forever exiled to.*
A popular heuristic in neuroscience is "use it or lose it." This is usually in the context of memorization, but it also applies to sensory organs and limbs. When Clayton is injured, his brain's connection to everything below his nipples is severed. Lacking any more sensory input from down there, the brain simply overwrites and repurposes the unused neurons.
His injury is not limited to his present and future, but also reaches back into his past:
> *Certain of my memories seem to be disappearing. For example, when I try to remember doing things that involved running, jumping, and sex, the memories seem less real or vivid than they used to. [...]*
>
> *If I imagine taking another person’s hand in mine, or kissing someone’s face, or someone touching my face, I feel something similar to sensation in those parts of my body when I imagine it. [...] But my lower body is now just a void, and its death started the creation of a void in my brain. Not only can I not feel it, but my ability to imagine feeling it is disappearing, as is my capacity to remember feeling it, and doing things with it.*
He likens himself to a Cartesian brain, a part of the world but outside of it, forever locked away, unable to exert his will on the outside world. Not only has he lost his legs; he is beginning to lose the memory of those legs, too. Everything he ever was, any skills that he ever learned related to being able-bodied, are destined to die over the coming years.
His mind is doomed to slowly decay as its neurons do what neurons do: rewrite themselves until none of the person he used to be is left.
### Toxic Positivity
Can Clayton actually talk about any of these things with his peers?
Not really. He has a small circle of other recently paralyzed friends who understand, but outside of that, no.
American culture has an entire social ecosystem that reinforces the idea that disabled people should be upbeat and optimistic about their life prospects. Almost any interview with a paraplegic ends on some upbeat note about how their disability "doesn't stop them from doing all the things they want to do" and that "they can do anything” an able-bodied person can.
In fact, *Two Arms and a Head* opens with one such quote from Stephen Hawking:
> *“I try to lead as normal a life as possible, and not think about my condition, or regret the things it prevents me from doing, which are not that many.” —Stephen Hawking*
This is patently absurd. Why do they say these things? Do they actually mean it, or are they just being hyperbolic for rhetorical effect? Surely they all know, secretly, that they’re lying to themselves?
Clayton argues that no, *they mean it*, and they’re not lying to themselves.
Remember how disability affects the brain? How all those unused neurons get repurposed, and any concepts of using those paralyzed limbs gets overwritten (if they ever existed in the first place)?
> *They [lifelong paraplegics] tend to only see life in terms of the possibilities that exist for them [...] Their view becomes somewhat tautological. “What I can do is all that is possible, therefore I can do all that is possible.”*
>
> *Just as able-bodied people cannot comprehend what it’s like to be a paraplegic, lifelong paraplegics and quadriplegics simply cannot grasp what it is to be able-bodied. I’m not saying that lightly. The difference is biological. They have different brains. [...] They do not understand the experience of being able-bodied—neither the subtleties or much of what, to observers, is overt and glaring. They can try to imagine it, but they don’t even come close to comprehending the potential that exists there.*
Hence the common refrain that there are “not many” things that they can’t do.
Adding to this dynamic is that it is considered impolite in our culture to call them out on it:
> *If I were still able-bodied and a paraplegic told me he could do everything I could, I would just think “Looks like being crippled fucked up his mind too, because that’s insane.” I’m not sure what I’d actually say to him, but I know it wouldn’t be that. [...] So the disabled are basically allowed to go around saying whatever on Earth they want. They acquire a kind of* de facto *moral infallibility because nobody is going to argue with them.*
On top of this, humans have a basic need to belong, stay positive, and avoid people who are negative and miserable. If paraplegics were honest about all the body horror and misery, they would quickly find themselves devoid of friends.
So what is a newly paraplegic person to do in order to maintain connections during a time in their life when they desperately need comfort and support?
Brainwash themselves, of course!
Clayton was staring down the prospect of what he would have to do to his mind in order to survive in our current society as a paraplegic. It was bad enough to be mutilated physically; he didn't also want to be mutilated mentally.
> *What happened to my body is frightful, but no less than what happens to the minds of many disabled people. We have to have some kind of integrity to our views of the world and reality, and the more the better. [...] So my unwillingness to adopt certain “attitudes” or whatever people call them is something like a desperate struggle to evade the clutches of madness.*
It gets worse. This does not just affect their social lives and beliefs. These dynamics ripple out into the medical community’s attitudes about paraplegia. If every interviewee swears that paralysis doesn’t hold them back in life, then why pour resources into finding a cure?
> *I’ve heard people say that spinal cord injury is not a priority for medical research like cancer because “people can live like that”. No, we can’t live like this. This is not “life”.*
Which raises the question—*have* there been any breakthroughs since 2008?
## The State of the Cure
Let’s take a short break from the existential horror to look at the science of spinal cord injuries.
Clayton killed himself in 2008 because there was no cure at the time. Have there been any new developments in the ~15 years since?
The short and upsetting answer is "not yet"—though there are some glimmers of hope.
### Why are Spinal Cord Injuries So Hard to Fix?
The spinal cord consists of multiple concentric layers of nerve fibers, not unlike an electrical cable. Wherever the spinal cord has trauma, the nerve cells die off and form lesions of scar tissue that block all nerve signals from traveling downstream of whichever thread was damaged. Some patients are lucky in that only parts of the spinal cord are damaged, resulting in paralysis on only one side of the body.
Nerve cells in the spinal cord do not regenerate themselves. Once damaged and scarred, there’s nothing anyone can do.
The good news is that emergency medicine has come a long way in arresting the formation of scar tissue at the moment of injury. Patients coming into the ER today have a much better prognosis than they did a few decades ago. The interventions are straightforward treatments like stabilizing the spine, surgery to release pressure on the pinched nerves, and shots of corticosteroids to reduce swelling and inflammation.
But beyond that, there is no clinically-proven, FDA-approved treatment for an existing injury. Clayton describes the challenge of rebuilding his injury as something similar to “reconstructing a crushed strawberry.” No amount of stabilization would have put his smeared spinal cord back together.
### The Latest Research
Treatments fall into two camps: bridging the injury, and encouraging the injured scar tissue nerves to regenerate.
#### Implanted Nerve Cells
In 2012, [Prof. Geoffrey Raisman's](https://www.nsif.org.uk/research/background/) team at University College London successfully treated a paralyzed man in Poland.
The treatment involved removing one of the olfactory bulbs in his brain in order to culture olfactory ensheathing cells (OECs), which are the only nerve cells in the human body that continuously regenerate. The surgeons removed a section of nerve from the patient's ankle, then implanted both the ankle nerve and the OECs into his spine at the injury site. The grafted tissue bridged the gap between his brain and the healthy spinal cord just below the injury.
After years of rehab and physical therapy, in 2014 the researchers announced their success to impressive fanfare. [As of 2016](https://vimeo.com/290857000), the patient could walk, ride a tricycle, and had regained bladder, bowel, and sexual function. He was far from his pre-injury self, but his quality of life had improved immensely compared to before the treatment. The call went out to recruit two more volunteers for another study.
And then... crickets.
This follow-up study has yet to be performed.
It could have been delayed for a number of reasons. Perhaps they never found suitable volunteers whose profiles satisfied the demands of European regulators. Perhaps Brexit threw a bureaucratic wrench in the collaboration between UCL and the research center in Poland. Perhaps they ran out of funding.
To make matters worse, Prof. Raisman passed away in 2017.
In the years since, the team has been making progress in fits and starts. [As of 2022](https://www.nsif.org.uk/news/ucl-2022-update/), the current focus at UCL has been on figuring out how to culture OECs from the nasal mucosa instead of needing to crack open the skull to get at the olfactory bulbs directly. They’ve also made improvements in the technique for applying these cells to the injury site. Things are certainly happening, albeit at a glacial pace.
This treatment strategy may become widespread in the future, but at the moment, it remains experimental.
#### NervGen's "Wiggling Molecules"
In 2021, [NervGen Pharma](https://nervgen.com/pipeline/sci/) announced a drug that encourages damaged spinal tissue to heal without scarring. A bioengineered molecule, NVG-291, is injected into the spinal cord and acts as a scaffold for the nerve cells to attach to as they regrow. The molecules of this scaffold naturally "wiggle” and stimulate nearby nerve cell receptors, promoting healing. Animal models were extremely promising.
NVG-291 is currently in [Phase 1b/2a clinical trials](https://clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT05965700), which are scheduled to start in August of 2024.
I’m cautiously optimistic. The main impediments to finding a cure are the same ones that plague any other field of medical research: lack of funding and unreasonable requirements from regulators. The main problems at this point in time appear to be bureaucratic rather than strictly biological.
Will any of this research pan out within the next 5, 10, or even 20 years? Maybe. Only time will tell. (Someone should start a prediction market about this!)
Alas, this is all coming too late to have saved Clayton.
## The Decision to Die
> *I am absolutely and heartbreakingly* in love *with life. But this is not life. [...]*
>
> *For those who like to say this one: “Suicide is a permanent solution to a temporary problem.” I reply that suicide in my case is a permanent solution to a permanent problem. [...] I have only one serious problem in life and it’s being paralyzed.*
Clayton does not come to this decision lightly. He considers it exhaustively and systematically. When deciding whether to keep living, he starts from the premise that there is some amount of suffering past which life stops being worth it. He evaluates where that dividing line is by examining the sources of meaning in his life.
He starts by asserting that there is nothing wrong with his mental health or his reasoning abilities:
> *I am not depressed, I am* tortured*, and there is a difference. [...] If they came up with the cure today and I got better instantly, I could win myself a Nobel Prize in medicine for proving that depression was caused not by anything in the brain as previously thought, but by damage to a few cubic centimeters of nervous tissue in the spinal cord. Because I guarantee I’d pop up and be feeling as merry as a lark in about one second. [...] My problem is not depression. [...]*
>
> *There is no problem with my reasoning powers. [...] So if I say, “Paraplegia prevents me running. A life without running is not worth living. Therefore, my life is not worth living.” you might not agree with one of my premises, but there is no question of whether I’m being* reasonable*.*
This is similar to Frankl’s argument in *Man’s Search for Meaning*, and in fact Clayton spends an entire section talking about Frankl. He has a few disagreements with the book, but he has no gripe with the core message. Clayton decides to die because he *had* meaning in his life—and then the accident took it all away:
> *Probably the life of a deaf man would be good enough for me, or that of a mute or a man missing a leg or an arm. But not the life of a paraplegic. There is not enough left for me.* [...]
>
> *The life I dreamed of and loved with all my heart is gone forever and there is nothing I can do about it. And it’s not just slightly changed, but utterly devastated. [...] My skills as a carpenter, roofer, plumber, gardener, all devastated. My ability to conduct my everyday life with wonderful efficiency, devastated. The wonderful way I was able to relate to other people, devastated. My sex life, devastated. My social life, devastated. [...]*
>
> *I am who I am, I love what I love, and given what I need from life, existence is no longer tenable for me.*
Some readers may look at that list and call him shallow. Even if that were so, that doesn't change his argument. Maybe most people don't place having sex, controlling one's bowels, and running through the woods as the quintessence of life-affirming values, but I'd be willing to bet that they're still *important*.
Reading this book should prompt a moment of introspection. If you disagree with Clayton’s list above, then reflect on what *does* give your life meaning. No, seriously, make a list: family, friends, partners, children, hobbies, skills, etc. Write them down.
Cross out one entry at random. How would you feel if you lost that entry? Would you still have enough left over to carry on? Probably.
Now cross out a few more. Lose your partner. Lose your children. Lose your parents. Your siblings. Your best friend. Your favorite hobby. How do you feel? Still worth it?
Add in some physical negatives: chronic pain. Constant nausea every time you eat. Losing feeling and control of your bowels, your legs, your genitals, your diaphragm, your non-dominant hand, your dominant hand, both arms. What about loss of sight? Hearing? Speaking? Communicating at all?
What about ending up like the title character in *Johnny Got His Gun*, where he is left with no legs, no arms, and is rendered blind, deaf, and mute? What would life be like as a disconnected brain in almost complete sensory deprivation?
How much would *you* have to lose before your life stops being worth living?
That list—and the dividing line between "worth it" and "not"—is different for everyone. The decision to end one's life is deeply personal. Clayton happened to draw the line at a particular point. Others may agree or disagree, but Clayton’s judgment was his own.
Decision in hand, next comes the hard part.
### The Roadblocks
> *I did not want much from the world in dying. To be able to put my affairs in order without fear of being taken prisoner and treated like I was insane. To say goodbye to those I loved without the same fear. To die a painless death without worrying about leaving behind something gruesome. And to be comforted as I died. When a person has absolutely nothing left and is facing annihilation, all he wants is not to be alone.*
For Clayton, killing himself is not a simple matter. At the time only one US state, Oregon, had any kind of “Death With Dignity” law on the books. However, this law only allowed assisted suicide for terminally ill patients with less than six months to live, while Clayton’s condition was stable.
The slightest whisper of suicidal ideation would have gotten him locked up in the psych ward. He has to write his book in secret, he has to lay his thoughts out for the world in secret, and he has to die in secret.
Becoming paralyzed destroys him on two fronts—the disability itself, and the fact that he is completely, utterly, devastatingly alone with his feelings. He writes *Two Arms and a Head* because he needs to show the world how agonizing it is to face death alone and how important it is for physical-assisted suicide to become—and stay—legal.
> *How empty to exist in this universe and share your feelings and experience with nobody! But that is how you, the world, have left me to die, alone. But what you don’t realize is this: in turning your backs on me, you have turned your backs on yourselves. [...]*
>
> *Someday you will be on your deathbed and maybe you will remember me. What I say to the world is that if you don’t do something about the way death and assisted suicide are dealt with, you may someday find yourselves in an unimaginably horrible situation with no way out. [...]*
>
> *Beware! There could be a horrible fate waiting for you and if you don’t all get together, look each other in the eye, recognize the insanity, and change the laws, you could wake up tomorrow as a head on a corpse with no way out for the next thirty years.*
A lingering question you might be asking is: if he cared so much about it, then why didn’t he become an activist to get it legalized? The Overton Window was shifting. Washington state would pass a bill a few months after his death, and it would be legalized in Montana by a court case in 2009. Several more states would follow suit in the mid-2010s. He could have shared his experiences far and wide and joined the burgeoning movement that existed back then. He was a law student at Vanderbilt for crying out loud; surely he could have enlisted the help of at least a couple of his colleagues?
No one but him could have answered that, though I suspect that the answer is because he didn’t want to. He found his existence to be so ghastly that he didn’t want to stay in it for a second longer than necessary. The only reason he lasted as long as he did was because he wanted to finish the book. He chose to leave *Two Arms and a Head* as his legacy for the world, and nothing more.
We’ve gone over the state of the cure over the last ~15 years. Has there been any progress on amending the laws for physician-assisted suicide?
## The State of MAiD
[Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assisted_suicide#Legality) is currently legal in a patchwork of countries and US states.
The exact rules, restrictions, and methods vary. In most places that have legalized it, the patient’s condition must be considered terminal (i.e. death is expected within six months) to be eligible for MAiD. The procedure itself is typically either an IV injection administered by a nurse, or a prescription cocktail of benzodiazepines, digoxin, and opioids which patients drink themselves.
In Canada and the Netherlands, MAiD is also available to patients with a disability that does not present as immediately terminal. The Netherlands currently includes severe treatment-resistant mental illness as a qualifying condition, and Canada will follow suit in 2027.
So it sounds like Clayton got his wish, at least in Canada and parts of Europe. Now, when a Canadian ends up in a terrible accident, they have a choice in the matter of whether they want to spend the next few decades as a quadriplegic head-on-a-corpse. Phew.
However, it’s not all smooth sailing. It seems like every few months there’s another horror story in the press coming out of Canada or Europe. Two news stories came out in quick succession in [late March](https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/calgary-judge-woman-with-autism-medical-assistance-in-dying)/[early April](https://nypost.com/2024/04/02/world-news/28-year-old-woman-decides-to-be-euthanized-due-to-mental-health-issues/) 2024—one from Canada, the other from the Netherlands.
In Canada, a 27-year-old autistic woman with no disclosed physical symptoms was granted the right to proceed with MAiD by an Alberta court. The story broke after her father sued to try and stop her.
In the Netherlands, a 28-year-old woman has decided to pursue MAiD due to her treatment-resistant clinical depression and borderline personality disorder. Her MAiD is scheduled for sometime in May 2024. At the time of this writing, she has yet to undergo it.
[These stories](https://globalnews.ca/news/10118619/bc-cancer-agency-wait-times-surgery-united-states/) [are nothing new](https://apnews.com/article/covid-science-health-toronto-7c631558a457188d2bd2b5cfd360a867). They certainly *sound* dreadful.
Diving into every big story from the last ten years would be beyond the scope of this review, but let’s return to the one about the 27-year-old autistic Canadian woman who was granted MAiD. Both the [Calgary Herald](https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/calgary-judge-woman-with-autism-medical-assistance-in-dying) and [CBC](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-maid-father-daughter-court-injunction-judicial-review-decision-1.7154794) framed the story as a grieving father desperately trying to prevent his autistic daughter from being led astray by unethical doctors cherry-picked by the Alberta Health Service. The father insists that his adult daughter is physically healthy, albeit “vulnerable and not competent” to make medical decisions due to her autism and ADHD. Despite this, the judge has allowed MAiD to proceed anyway.
Meanwhile, reading the actual [court decision](https://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abkb/doc/2024/2024abkb174/2024abkb174.html) shows that the legal issue at hand is whether the woman is required to disclose the physical ailment(s) that led to two doctors approving MAiD. The judge ruled that the woman is competent to make her own medical decisions, and that she is not required to disclose her diagnosis to either her family or the court. The father has since [filed an appeal](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-maid-father-daughter-court-injunction-judicial-review-appeal-1.7161377).
*(July 2024 Update: the appeal hearing was subsequently scheduled for October 7, 2024 - six months in the future. Not willing to wait that long, the woman began a voluntary stoppage of eating and drinking (VSED) on [May 28](https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/autistic-calgary-woman-seeking-maid-starving-herself-death). The hearing was rescheduled for June 24. However, the woman continued to refuse food and water going into June. The father [withdrew his appeal on June 11](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-maid-father-daughter-court-injunction-appeal-abandoned-1.7233462). It is unknown whether the woman has undergone MAiD at this time of this update.)*
She is not choosing MAiD *because* of autism or ADHD. We don’t know what her physical diagnosis is. We only have the father’s insistence that “her physical symptoms, to the extent that she has any, result from undiagnosed psychological conditions.” That’s the father’s words, not a physician’s, and not the patient’s. Neurodivergence does not bestow immunity against all the nasty ailments that can cut someone down in their twenties.
I’m not accusing every news piece about MAiD of being similarly sensationalized, but I’m not *not* accusing every MAiD story of being similarly sensationalized.
Despite so many of these stories not holding up to their headlines, many remain opposed to the expanded rules. There is a massive contingent of activists who want to keep MAiD illegal.
### Not Dead Yet
Clayton had a particular amount of ire directed at one prominent anti-MAiD disability rights org: [Not Dead Yet](https://notdeadyet.org/about).
Not Dead Yet (NDY) was founded in 1996 by the same people who lobbied to get the Americans with Disabilities Act passed a few years prior. As the name implies, they reject the notion that death could ever be an acceptable response to living with a disability.
Like any activist org worth their salt, they have a convenient [Talking Points](https://notdeadyet.org/disability-rights-toolkit-for-advocacy-against-legalization-of-assisted-suicide) page where they lay out all the reasons why they’re opposed to MAiD. They argue that MAiD is deadly discrimination against disabled patients, with current programs having insufficient safeguards to prevent foul play. NDY argues against a medical field that has decided that death is preferable to disability. They insist that they are not against individual autonomy; patients will always be free to commit “un-assisted” suicide if they truly wish to die.
The page opens by explaining that MAiD is necessarily a disability issue, even in places where MAiD is only available to the terminally ill.
> *Although people with disabilities aren’t usually terminally ill, the terminally ill are almost always disabled.*
When terminally ill patients get polled on why they are choosing MAiD, it turns out that avoiding pain isn’t the primary motivation. [In Oregon,](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/year26.pdf) where MAiD is only available for the terminally ill, every patient fills out a questionnaire when they apply for the program. Tallying up all the surveys from 1998–2023, to top reasons are:
* “Losing autonomy” (90%)
* “Less able to engage in activities” (90%)
* “Loss of dignity” (70%)
* “Losing control of bodily functions” (44%)
* “Burden on family” (47%)
* “Inadequate pain control, or concern about it” (29%)
* “Financial implications of treatment” (7%)
The top five all relate to the disabling symptoms that come with dying. “Less able to engage in activities” sounds remarkably similar to Clayton’s reasoning of, “the things that gave my life meaning are no longer possible, therefore it’s time to die.”
This isn’t surprising when considering that palliative care is legal in all 50 states. If someone’s condition is judged to be terminal, as Oregon requires, they already get a bottomless supply of morphine. Pain is not really the problem anymore.
The problem is that a failing body is, well, *failing*. Patients become weak and frail. They struggle to walk and use the bathroom. They may become dependent on a feeding tube or a respirator. Somewhere along the way they might lose their minds to dementia. All of these are serious, debilitating symptoms that can suck the meaning out of life, so many patients choose to die before they get to that point.
Not Dead Yet condemns this status quo.
> ***We Don’t Need To Die to Have Dignity***
>
> *In a society that prizes physical ability and stigmatizes impairments, it’s no surprise that previously able-bodied people may tend to equate disability with loss of dignity. This reflects the prevalent but insulting societal judgment that people who deal with incontinence and other losses in bodily function are lacking dignity. People with disabilities are concerned that these psycho-social disability-related factors have become widely accepted as sufficient justification for assisted suicide.*
They argue that patients and physicians are merely reflecting a “prevalent but insulting” prejudice when they decide that death is preferable to debility. NDY paints a picture of the type of physicians who provide MAiD to patients:
> *In judging that an assisted suicide request is rational, essentially, doctors are concluding that a person’s physical disabilities and dependence on others for everyday needs are sufficient grounds to treat them completely differently than they would treat a physically able-bodied suicidal person. [...]*
>
> *Legalized assisted suicide sets up a double standard: some people get suicide prevention while others get suicide assistance, and the difference between the two groups is the health status of the individual, leading to a two-tiered system that results in death to the socially devalued group. This is blatant discrimination.*
There’s a lot to unpack here. NDY is starting from the premise that the desire to end one’s life is *always* and *necessarily* the product of an irrational mind, Claytons of the world be damned. Medical professionals, given that they’ve sworn an oath to protect life, have an obligation to treat all suicidal ideation with “suicide prevention” care (i.e. involuntary commitment until the patient comes to their senses).
A society that has legalized MAiD still extends this preventive care to the able-bodied who want to die, but then turns around and gladly assists disabled patients in ending their lives. This is discrimination! Doctors are murdering the undesirables!
To drive the point home, the [Canadian chapter](https://tvndy.ca/en/) of NDY has this image on their homepage:
A line drawing wherein a wheelchair user notices that the office of the Suicide Prevention Program is inaccessible, whereas the office of the Assisted Suicide organization has a wheelchair ramp.
Clayton counters this by pointing out that doctors give different treatments for different circumstances all the time.
For example, begging for opioids out of the blue is considered “drug seeking” and will get you referred to addiction treatment; begging for opioids while in the ER for a severed leg... will get you opioids. Refusing to provide opioids and instead providing “addiction prevention care” to the able-bodied is not discrimination against the legless.
The Canadian chapter of Not Dead Yet has a similar Talking Points page, with this one written in the style of an [FAQ](https://tvndy.ca/en/about-not-dead-yet/faq/). They raise some concerns about a lack of safeguards to prevent foul play. In Canada and parts of the United States, a MAiD patient simply picks up the lethal cocktail at a pharmacy, then takes it home to drink.
> *No witness is required when the drugs are taken. There’s no way to ensure that it’s voluntary.*
>
> *If something goes wrong, there’s no way to help the person.*
>
> *A lethal dose of drugs may sit around the house for weeks or months.*
...That’s concerning. I didn’t know any of that before I read the website.
An obvious solution to this problem would be to do what the Netherlands does and require a medical professional to be present. That way, said clinician can ensure that the patient gives affirmative consent with no abuser standing over the patient’s shoulder. Once the patient has passed, the clinician can pack up the leftover meds for safe disposal. In the Netherlands, these professionals are part of dedicated teams who travel to patient homes for exactly this purpose.
Except NDY does not suggest this. In fact, they do the opposite. NDY condemns the Dutch approach by referring to these clinicians as members of a “mobile euthanasia unit” that dispatches patients in their own homes.
Everything seems to circle back to blaming doctors. But why?
### Ableism
Underpinning Not Dead Yet’s objections to MAiD is the belief that society has a prejudice against disabilities. This prejudice is so strong that the average person believes that being disabled is sufficiently miserable to justify death. The disability rights community has a name for this bigotry: [ableism](https://notdeadyet.org/2022/11/ndy-vlog-what-is-ableism-and-why-does-it-matter.html).
> *Ableism is: “A system of assigning value to people’s bodies and minds based on societally constructed ideas of normalcy, productivity, desirability, intelligence, excellence, and fitness.”*
When Clayton concludes that his paraplegic life is less “valuable” than his pre-accident life, he is invoking the societally constructed premise that “being able to walk, have sex, and control one’s bowel movements are good and desirable traits.” That is indeed one of his core values, and he is indeed being ableist.
The anti-ableist framework holds that a value judgment like “being able to walk, have sex, and control one’s bowel movements are good and desirable traits” is arbitrary bigotry on par with “having white skin is a good and desirable trait.”
When disability activists argue that our society should reject ableism, what they are saying is that we should reject the notion that “being able to walk, have sex, and control one’s bowel movements are good and desirable traits.”
Given what Clayton has told us of his life, that argument is cosmically, outlandishly insane.
So... why do they make it? What’s going on? They can’t really *believe* this, can they?
The knee jerk response is to dismiss them as just being in denial, but Clayton offers a much more horrifying explanation: *they do mean it*.
> *I have no desire to begrudge other paraplegics their happiness, though many of them evidently have every desire to begrudge me my feelings. I find them monstrous and inhuman the moment they want to insist that my feelings indicate from some kind of defect within me. [...] A clam is comfortable in its shell and thinks all of the other animals should envy it. A clam does not see why an eagle would rather die than be a clam.*
Let’s explore this with a thought experiment.
### The Four-Armed Alien
You probably don't fantasize on a daily basis about what life would be like with four arms. If you really try, you could imagine a few ways that life would be easier:
* You could chop ingredients with two hands and stir the skillet with a third.
* You could hold a 2x4 in place with two hands while holding and driving in a nail with the other two.
* You could carry a full bundle of groceries with three arms while fumbling for the keys with the fourth.
That sure sounds convenient, doesn't it? Wouldn't that be *so freaking awesome* now that you really think about it?
But despite the possibilities, you don't dwell on it every day, because... you don't have four arms. You have two.
Our wiring just isn't cut out for this. And that's perfectly normal! Everyone's brain does this. This isn't some character flaw. Our brains simply aren't meant to comprehend sensory input from body parts that we don't have.
But suppose there existed a hypothetical alien race that *did* have four arms. One such alien’s entire experience of having four arms would be so much more detailed than human imagination. The convenience would be effortless, automatic. The feats of dexterity would be so mundane as to escape notice.
Now let's say that one of these aliens gets in an accident and has to get two arms amputated. They would be devastated! They would notice all the myriad things—both big and small—that they suddenly could no longer do. Their life would be immensely harder. Things that were effortless before would now be massive hurdles:
* Vegetables must be chopped *separately*, with the existing food lying in the skillet, about to burn.
* That 2x4 must be held up with one hand/forearm awkwardly pinning the board to the wall, while trying to awkwardly hold the nail in place so the other arm can swing the hammer.
* That heavy bundle of groceries must be held precariously with only one hand as the other one fumbles for the keys.
The real list wouldn't be confined to those three entries, oh no. It would go on, and on, and on.
This amputee would be grieving the life that they used to have—and they might even conclude that their new life is not worth living. Other four-armed aliens might even agree. Their entire alien society might be filled with medical professionals who nod solemnly in understanding, give them info on how to put their affairs in order, and write a prescription for a deadly cocktail. When the time comes to drink it, the alien drifts off peacefully, surrounded and supported by all of their four-armed relatives.
Us two-armed humans might look at this and be outraged: "What!? What do you *mean* my two-armed life isn't *good enough* for you? Are you saying that *I* should die, too? You asshole!"
A lot of people stop right there. They call the alien shallow and bigoted against two-armed humans. They claim that the alien’s values are borne of small-minded prejudice, they condemn the aliens’ medical practices as barbaric, and they might even launch a campaign to get the practice outlawed and the alien doctors arrested.
But then, for some others, another thought creeps in: "...What if having four arms really *is* that good? Maybe my life *is* that much worse, and *I don't even know it* because my brain cannot fathom what I am missing. But tons of other amputees say that they're devastated and missing so much... Holy cow, *should* I die? Aaaaaaaah—"
This can quickly spiral into an existential crisis. (Don't do that! That's bad!)
If this happens to you, then please, to the best of your ability, try to take a step back and understand that *this is not about you.* It’s ok to have two arms.
When confronted by a two-armed alien amputee who wants to die, a “meaning-based” response would be to argue that yes, while having only two arms can be inconvenient, they still have *some* things they can do and *some* sources of meaning left. It's not all doom and gloom, and it *is* possible to lead a life that is "good enough" with two arms instead of four. That's a straightforward case to make.
The extra step here is if you fail to persuade the patient, then you can’t force them to comply. If the patient still concludes that their life is not worth living *to them*, then you have to respect their choice and let them die with dignity.
We don’t see disability activist groups like Not Dead Yet doing this. Instead, they get stuck on the “Are you saying *I* should die, too? You asshole!” stage, and then demand that all patients who want to die be sent to the psych ward.
But... why!? The sensible argument is sitting *right there*. Why don’t they use it?
Clayton argues that lifelong disabled activists don’t adopt this framework because it would require acknowledging that some factors related to bodily functioning can make life better or worse.
In other words, it requires accepting ableism.
In order to argue that a patient still has enough meaning left for life to be worth it, one has to first admit that not having a functioning body is Bad, Actually. An honest conversation with a newly disabled person requires arguing that the good outweighs the bad, not that the bad doesn’t exist.
Clayton points out that if someone has been disabled their whole lives, then their disabled life is just “life”. The limitations of their bodies are as mundane and mildly annoying as the problems that we face when we only have two arms instead of four. Digging turds out of their anus every day is just a part of life, like brushing one's teeth. *Of course* ableism sounds like unfounded bigotry on par with racism to them; they have no other frame of reference.
When lifelong disabled activists insist that there is nothing “inferior” about being disabled, *they mean it*. When they declare that patients are merely being *prejudiced* when they choose to die rather than live while disabled, they mean it. They are not in denial. Their brains literally cannot fathom what they are missing. *No brain can*.
Remember this next time you encounter an activist in a comment section under a sensational news story criticizing MAiD. When they dismiss patient fears about the dying process as unfounded bigotry, this is where they’re coming from.
### Un-Assisted Suicide
The final argument that anti-MAiD proponents fall back on is that anyone can just commit suicide; why do they need help from doctors?
The glaringly obvious answer is: because patients cannot “just” commit suicide.
Clayton could not “just” ask for help putting his affairs in order. He could not “just” say goodbye to his loved ones. He could not “just” die peacefully without anyone trying to stop him. He could not “just” publish his memoir before his death—not if he wanted to avoid being committed.
> *Young people would prefer not to think about such things, but what everyone does not see is that* those old people are you*. You are them, it’s just a matter of time.*
Until we defeat death in the glorious transhumanist future, it’s coming for all of us. Some of us may die suddenly in a tragic accident. Some may be diagnosed with a terminal illness that kills in a matter of months.
But most of us will die [by very slow decay](https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/07/17/who-by-very-slow-decay/).
The counterfactual world—where the elderly are kept alive as shriveled husks for years, slowly withering away—is gruesome and ghastly.
Someday, you, too, may be on your deathbed at the end of your life, in extreme debility, but without any obvious physical ailment that will kill you quickly without medical intervention. Or at any moment, you, too, could get in an accident and become as horribly maimed as Clayton. The patients who choose MAiD today will be you tomorrow.
*Those. People. Are. You.*
## So... Should You Read This Book?
If you can handle the body horror, it is worth reading. It helps to be familiar with Nietzsche, Existentialism, and the broader disability rights community/anti-ableism ideas.
But it’s not for the faint of heart.
In terms of the writing quality, Clayton would have benefited from an editor. For obvious reasons, he couldn’t make his work public until after his death, and it’s a real shame. The writing is, at times, disjointed and riddled with typos. It’s short for a book—only 66,000 words—but it probably could have been cut down by a third and organized into more clear sections.
Clayton’s biting, blunt, crass, and vitriolic style may be off-putting to some readers. His pre-injury self strikes me as a serious dudebro; I would not have wanted to be his friend had we met in real life.
If nothing else, reading the full experience certainly gave me an appreciation for my bowel functioning.
If you’re feeling courageous, you can read *Two Arms and a Head* online [here](http://www.2arms1head.com/).
## The Road to Nowhere
> *If you think it is easy to procrastinate on a school assignment, try killing yourself some time.*
As Clayton nears the day of his death in the final chapter, the prose descends into stream-of-consciousness. He ponders the meaning of life and mourns for the life he has lost. He is lingering in that liminal space between life and death, going through the motions.
Finally, on Feb. 24th, he plunges his knife into the stomach of his corpse body:
> *Fuck I did it.*
After days of procrastination and hesitation, the actual experience turns out to be... underwhelming. (It helps that he can’t feel any pain down there.)
> *I look at the wound, a big, gaping stab hole in my stomach, and it doesn’t really bother me in the least. This was not what I expected everyone. Maybe think of me when the time for you to die is coming and be reassured because it’s not so bad at all. In fact, it’s not bad at all. [...]*
>
> *I suppose my advice for the living might just be: Live! And when it is time to die, die! [...]*
>
> *I’m going to go now, done writing. Goodbye everyone.*
When I finished the last line, I shut down my computer, took a moment to stare off into space...
...And went for a very long walk. | [unknown] | 146080359 | Your Book Review: Two Arms and a Head | acx |
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