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The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 297 (AC 26651), is denied. Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, in support of the petition. Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, in opposition. Decided April 25, 2006

The petition by the named defendant for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 92 Conn. App. 906 (AC 25379), is denied.

The petition by the defendant Ortansa Michaelesco for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 26136) is denied.

Opinion KATZ, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly dismissed as moot the appeal of the defendants, Valley View Associates and Kings Highway Associates, from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, RAL Management, Inc. More specifically, the issue is whether the opening and reentry of a judgment of strict foreclosure to set new law days and to revise the amount of the debt, while an appeal from that judgment is pending and a stay of the judgment is in effect, rendered the appeal moot. The defendants contend that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that, under Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, 137 Conn. 277, 77 A.2d 80 (1950), the trial court's actions had rendered void the original judgment from which the plaintiff appealed and thus mooted the appeal. RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 88 Conn. App. 430, 432, 872 A.2d 462 (2005). We conclude that the defendant's appeal is not moot and, accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment. The record reflects the following facts and procedural history. On July 23, 1998, the defendants entered into a $250,000 loan transaction with the plaintiffs assignor, Timothy McDonald. Pursuant to that transaction, the defendants executed a* promissory note payable to McDonald in the principal sum of $87,000, with payment due on or before July 20, 1999. The $87,000 note provided for an annual interest rate of 6 percent, but upon default, the interest rate would increase to 30 percent per month. Also pursuant to the loan transaction, the defendants guaranteed a $163,000 promissory note payable to McDonald that had been executed by a related party, Kersten Rigi (Rigi note). See footnote 1 of this opinion. The Rigi note did not provide for a default rate of interest. To secure both the note and guarantee, the defendants mortgaged to McDonald real property located at 320-322 Kings Highway in North Haven. On July 28, 2000, McDonald assigned his interest in the notes and mortgage to the plaintiff. On April 3,2001, claiming that the principal and interest due on July 20, 1999, under both notes had not been paid, the plaintiff exercised its right under the mortgage and notes to declare the entire balance due, and sought to foreclose on the mortgage and to obtain a deficiency judgment against the defendants. On July 9, 2001, the defendants were defaulted for failure to plead. On February 27, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure. On March 19, 2003, the defendants filed an answer and three special defenses, essentially premised on the 30 percent per month default rate in the $87,000 note, contending that: (1) the terms of the note, guarantee and mortgage were unconscionable and usurious; (2) the note, guarantee and mortgage were invalid and unenforceable because of mutual mistake; and (3) the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure because of unclean hands, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and unfair trade practices. On May 5, 2003, the trial court heard and granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. The court determined the amount of the debt to be $191,167.50 on the basis of the affidavit of debt filed by the plaintiff. That affidavit pertained only to the $87,000 note and reflected a 30 percent per annum default interest rate, not a 30 percent per month default rate. The defendants were not present at the hearing on the motion, thereafter claiming that they had not received notice of the hearing. On May 23, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to reargue the judgment of strict foreclosure, which was heard on July 3, 2003. At a hearing on the motion, the defendants argued that the note was unconscionable and usurious because it contained the default interest rate of 30 percent per month. In response, the plaintiff explained that, despite an earlier demand for payment based on the 30 percent per month default rate of interest; see footnote 2 of this opinion; the law firm that drafted the note had informed the plaintiff that the 30 percent per month reflected in the note was a scrivener's error that should have read 30 percent per year. Before the court rendered its decision on the defendants' motion to reargue, the defendants filed a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure, alleging that there was no evidentiary basis for the court's judgment as to the amount of the debt, specifically, as to the reformed interest rate. On August 4, 2003, after a hearing, the court granted the defendants' motion to open, but ordered reentry of a judgment of strict foreclosure, set a law day of September 22, 2003, and again set the debt at $191,167.50. On August 20, 2003, the defendants appealed from the August 4, 2003 judgment of strict foreclosure to the Appellate Court, which initiated an automatic stay of the foreclosure. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a). On September 30, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate the automatic stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (c) and (d). On October 30, 2003, the trial court granted the motion to terminate the stay. On November 10, 2003, the defendants timely filed in the Appellate Court a motion for review of the trial court's order terminating the automatic stay. On December 1, 2003, the plaintiff filed a new motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure with the trial court. On December 9, 2003, the Appellate Court denied the motion for review. On December 19, 2003, the defendants timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion for review, claiming that they would be deprived of their right to appeal if the judgment were executed. On December 22, 2003, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and set a new law day of February 23, 2004. The court also revised the debt to $423,735.98, based on the plaintiffs amended affidavit of debt that then also included the $163,000 Rigi note. On January 14, 2004, however, the Appellate Court granted the defendants' December 19, 2003 motion for reconsideration of its denial of their motion for review of the trial court's termination of the automatic stay. Thereafter, the Appellate Court ordered the trial court to articulate the basis of its decision to terminate the automatic stay and its factual and legal basis for reforming the $87,000 note. After the court issued its articulation, on July 8, 2004, almost seven months after the trial court had opened the judgment and set new law days, the Appellate Court granted the defendants' motion for review and vacated the order of the trial court terminating the automatic stay. Thus, as a result of the various procedural mechanisms invoked by the defendants in response to the plaintiffs efforts to exe cute the judgment of strict foreclosure, a stay of the judgment was in effect from August 20, 2003, the date the defendants had filed their appeal. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a), 63-1 and 71-6. In light of the procedural history of the case, shortly before oral argument, the Appellate Court sua sponte ordered the parties to be prepared to address the issue of whether the appeal had been rendered moot. RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 88 Conn. App. 435. Specifically, the court questioned whether the appeal had been rendered moot because the trial court had opened the August 4, 2003 judgment of strict foreclosure from which the appeal derived and had rendered a new judgment of strict foreclosure on December 22, 2003, with new law days and a revised debt. Id., 437. In its opinion, the Appellate Court noted that, under similar circumstances, in Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, supra, 137 Conn. 278-79, this court had concluded that a motion to open rendered the original judgment void and, therefore, the appeal was moot. RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 437-38. Although the Appellate Court questioned the result required under Milford Trust Co. as judicially inefficient; id., 439; the court concluded that it nonetheless was constrained under that precedent to dismiss the appeal as moot because the original, August 4, 2003 judgment from which the defendants had appealed had been rendered void by the December 22,2003judgment. Id., 441-42. This certified appeal followed. The defendants claim that the appeal is not moot because the trial court's actions in granting the motion to open violated the automatic stay in effect pending the appeal and, therefore, should be considered a nudity. Specifically, they contend that the trial court's action was undertaken only to implement its order terminating the appellate stay, an order that the Appellate Court ultimately vacated. The defendants further contend that the appeal is not moot because there is a live controversy from which practical relief can be granted. Finally, they contend that Milford Trust Co. is inapplicable because: there was no violation of an automatic stay in that case; it may be distinguishable based on facts that cannot be ascertained from the sparse record in that case; and there are prejudicial collateral consequences that preclude mootness in the present case. The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court properly dismissed the appeal as moot under Milford Trust Co. because the trial court's December, 2003 judgment of strict foreclosure did not violate the stay and properly extinguished the prior judgment. The plaintiff further contends that, to preserve their right of appeal, the defendants were required to have filed a new appeal, subsequent to the trial court's decision on the motion to open, within the new appeal period provided under Practice Book § 63-1. We conclude that the defendant's appeal is not moot and that Milford Trust Co. should be overruled. We begin with the "well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 201, 856 A.2d 997 (2004). Mootness implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction, raising a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 156, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005). We turn, therefore, to Milford Trust Co. In that case, this court granted the plaintiffs motion to erase, which is the equivalent to a motion to dismiss under the current rules of practice, the named defendant's appeal from a judgment of foreclosure on the ground that the trial court's subsequent modifications to the judgment rendered void the judgment from which the defendant had appealed. Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, supra, 137 Conn. 278. Specifically, on May 5, 1950, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure, with execution stayed until June 8, after the law dates set for June 5 through 7 had passed. Id., 277. On May 15, the named defendant appealed from that judgment. Id., 278. On June 8, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for execution, pursuant to then Practice Book, 1934, § 366, with that court's order including an extension of the law days. Id. On June 13, the trial court granted the motion of the other defendant in the action to open the judgment "for the sole purpose of extending the dates of redemption to July 10 and succeeding days, and in all other respects the judgment of May 5 was re-entered as originally rendered." Id. The plaintiff then moved to erase, or dismiss, the appeal on the ground that the May 5 judgment from which the named defendant had appealed was nonexistent as a result of the trial court's subsequent actions. Id. After first concluding that the trial court properly had opened the judgment despite the pending appeal; id.; the court in Milford Trust Co. reasoned that "[t]he [trial] court's order of June 8 involved a modification of the judgment of May 5 and necessarily implied an opening of the preceding judgment which it modified, and a complete substitution for its operative portions. [It] was in essence and substance a new judgment. . . . The same holds true as to the effect of the subsequent judgment of June 13 upon the judgment of June 8. . . . Since the court's order of June 8 was operative to open the judgment of May 5, the case then stood as though that judgment as originally entered had never been rendered. . . . Accordingly, any appeal from that judgment would be void." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 278-79. It appears from the limited record available based on the procedural posture of the case; see footnote 6 of this opinion; that Milford Trust Co. is consistent with the facts of the present case in that, after the appeal from the judgment of foreclosure had been filed, a motion to open the judgment was filed and granted, and the motion sought only to change the dates of redemption, i.e., law days. We conclude, however, that the facts of the present case may be distinguished in a significant respect from those in Milford Trust Co., and that, even absent such a distinction, the defendants' appeal was not vitiated by the opening of the judgment. I In the present case, it is undisputed that, as a result of the Appellate Court's decision of July 8, 2004, vacating the trial court's order terminating the automatic stay, the stay of the judgment from which the defendants had appealed was in effect pending the appeal. It appears from the opinion in Milford Trust Co. that the trial court in that case terminated the appellate stay pursuant to its June 8, 1950 order on the plaintiffs motion for execution. Assuming that to be true, the present case presents a different threshold issue, namely, whether the trial court properly opened the judgment while the appellate stay was in effect merely to change the law days. We conclude that such an action was improper and therefore should not operate to invalidate the original judgment and the defendant's appeal therefrom. It is well established that a trial court properly may open a judgment while an appeal is pending, even to address the issue raised on appeal. Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 482-83, 706 A.2d 960 (1998), and cases cited therein. The rules of practice, however, preclude any proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment while an appellate stay is in effect. See Practice Book § 61-11. Specifically, with respect to appeals from judgments of strict foreclosure, we have held that the law days set forth in such judgments cannot be given legal effect while there is an appellate stay in effect because to do so would result in the extinguishment of the right of redemption pending appeal. As this court explained in Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 347-48, 579 A.2d 1054 (1990): "This court has often recognized that the law days established in a foreclosure judgment are ineffective while an appeal is pending. In Zinman v. Maislen, 89 Conn. 413, 94 A. 285 (1915), the holding of the court is summarized in the headnote as follows: 'The seasonable filing of a notice of appeal . . . operates as a stay of further proceedings under a judgment of foreclosure; and therefore, pending such appeal, the parties respondent are not obliged to redeem on or before the expiration of the law-day fixed by the judgment, nor can the plaintiff, under such circumstances, acquire title absolute under a certificate of foreclosure.' 'Upon the filing of [the defendant's] appeal . . . [the rules of practice] became operative to stay further proceedings under the judgment . . . precluding the passage of title upon any of the law days provided for in that judgment.' Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, [supra, 137 Conn. 278], 'Because of delays incident to the legal process of appeal, the judgment of the trial court [becomes] ineffective in an essential respect, and what is in effect a new judgment [becomes] necessary.' Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Tucker, 195 Conn. 218, 222, 487 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 875, 106 S. Ct. 135, 88 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1985)." In other words, the law days are ineffective pending the stay because to treat them otherwise would carry out the judgment in violation of the stay. It necessarily follows, therefore, that if the law days have no legal effect and necessarily will lapse pending the appeal; see Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, supra, 216 Conn. 348; any change to those dates pending appeal similarly have no- effect. Indeed, the rules of practice anticipate such a circumstance by providing specific authority for the trial court to set new law days if the court's judgment is affirmed on appeal. See Practice Book § 17-10. In the present case, the record suggests that the trial court opened the judgment to change the law days to effectuate its order terminating the appellate stay. That order could not be given effect, however, because the Appellate Court's order vacated that order, thus reviv ing the stay. Therefore, the trial court's action must be viewed as either a legal nullity or an action in contravention to the appellate stay barring actions to carry out orto enforce the judgment pending appeal. Accordingly, the trial court's actions in opening the judgment to set new law days was improper and cannot be given effect to invalidate the defendants' appeal. II Although our conclusion in part I of this opinion resolves the specific matter before us, we nonetheless conclude that we should take this opportunity to address the continuing vitality of Milford Trust Co. Specifically, we turn to the question of whether the opening of a judgment of strict foreclosure to modify certain terms of that judgment necessarily renders the original judgment void and the attendant appeal moot. We conclude that the appeal is not rendered moot as a matter of law. As an initial matter, we note that the opinion in Milford Trust Co. contains no explicit reference to the issue of mootness or, indeed, any citation to our mootness jurisprudence. Instead, Milford Trust Co. relied on case law addressing two effects that flow from the opening of a judgment — one relating to whether a final judgment exists upon the opening of a judgment, and the other relating to whether the granting of a motion to open creates a new judgment for purposes of the time limitation for filing a subsequent motion to open. On the basis of this case law, the court in Milford Trust Co. concluded that a judgment necessarily is rendered "ineffective," and hence void, if a motion to open has been granted. In our view, neither of these principles controls the issue before us. It is well settled that, as a general rule, the granting of a motion to open renders a trial court's judgment nonfinal and, therefore, ineffective pending its resolution. State v. Phillips, 166 Conn. 642, 646, 353 A.2d 706 (1974); Ostroski v. Ostroski, 135 Conn. 509, 511, 66 A.2d 599 (1949); Clover Farms, Inc. v. Kielwasser, 134 Conn. 622, 623, 59 A.2d 550 (1948); Simpson v. Y.M.C.A. of Bridgeport, 118 Conn. 414, 417-18, 172 A. 855 (1934). Therefore, with limited exceptions; see Ostroski v. Ostroski, supra, 511; this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal filed subsequent to the granting of a motion to open because there is no final judgment, an essential prerequisite to our jurisdiction. See General Statutes § 52-263; Practice Book § 61-1; Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997) ("lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal"). The rules of practice protect the right to appeal under such circumstances by tolling or creating a new appeal period pending resolution of that motion. See Practice Book § 63-1. When a timely appeal has been filed before a motion to open has been filed, however, there is an effective, final judgment at the time of the appeal, and thus this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See Governors Grove Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Hill Development Corp, 187 Conn. 509, 510 n.2, 446 A.2d 1082 (1982) ("[t]he fact that the trial court has the power to open a judgment . . . does not mean that the judgment is not final for purposes of appeal" [citations omitted]), overruled on other grounds by Morelli v. Manpower, Inc., 226 Conn. 831, 628 A.2d 1311 (1993). "As a general rule, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost or divested by subsequent events." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loulis v. Parrott, 241 Conn. 180, 198, 695 A.2d 1040 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 261 Conn. 263, 802 A.2d 55 (2002); see also Practice Book § 60-2. Because we may suspend the exercise of our jurisdiction while a trial court resolves a matter necessary to the proper resolution of the appeal, the granting of a motion to open while the appeal is pending does not divest us of jurisdiction to consider the appeal upon the resolution of that motion. See O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78, 521 A.2d 599 (1987) (remanding case to trial court to consider motion to open but retaining case on appellate court docket pending resolution of that motion); see also Nesmith v. Michelsen, 243 Conn. 237, 238, 702 A.2d 138 (1997) (reversing judgment and remanding case to trial court with direction to cite in additional party and to resolve issues again, while retaining jurisdiction over appeal for purposes of any further appellate proceedings, without necessity of filing another appeal); Higgins v. Karp, 239 Conn. 802, 811, 687 A.2d 539 (1997) (reversing judgments and vacating orders denying motions to set aside defaults, remanding case to trial court to redetermine whether good cause exists to set aside defaults but retaining jurisdiction of case for purposes of appellate review of other issues on appeal in event trial court does not find good cause to set aside defaults); State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 489, 680 A.2d 147 (1996) (remanding case to trial court for hearing on defendant's state constitutional claim but retaining jurisdiction of case solely for purpose of appellate review following trial court's determination of that issue). Thus, final judgment considerations do not preclude our jurisdiction over an appeal when that appeal properly is before us in the first instance. We turn, therefore, to Milford Trust Co.'s reliance on case law holding that the reentry of judgment following the granting of a motion to open created a new judgment. Specifically, in its per curiam opinion, the court principally relied on Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taft Realty Co., 123 Conn. 9, 15, 192 A. 268 (1937). In that case, the trial court had opened and vacated a judgment of foreclosure after twice opening the judgment to extend the law days to accommodate related interests in a pending federal bankruptcy proceeding. Id., 11-12. The relevant issue was whether the motion to open, pursuant to which the judgment had been vacated, was filed within the time period prescribed by statute. Id., 13-14. This court rejected the appellant's claim that the date of the original judgment controlled, concluding that a new judgment was created and hence a new limitations period commenced after each modification to the judgment. See id., 15-16 ("The original judgment . . . was twice modified. Each of these modifications was one made under the provisions of [then General Statutes § 5084, now § 49-15] with regard to the opening and modification of foreclosure judgments, each necessarily implied an opening of the preceding judgment which it modified, and a complete substitution for its operative portions. Each was in essence and substance a new judgment."). We read Union & New Haven Trust Co. merely as establishing that the opening and modification of a judgment triggers a new limitations period under which the modified judgment may be opened. See also Coxe v. Coxe, 2 Conn. App. 543, 547-48, 481 A.2d 86 (1984) (relying on Union & New Haven Trust Co. in concluding that modifications to dissolution judgment triggered new four month period under General Statutes § 52-212a to file motion to open judgment). We do not read it as establishing that any modification to a judgment renders the original judgment void such that it extinguishes all rights that flowed from that judgment. To the extent that Union & New Haven Trust Co. held that the modified judgment gives rise to a "new" judgment for purposes of dictating a new time limitation under which a motion to open properly could be filed, we also recognize that the judgment is new to the extent that the supplanted terms no longer exist. See Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taft Realty Co., supra, 123 Conn. 15 (modification results in "a complete substitution for its operative portions" [emphasis added]). Indeed, in this regard, there is a substantive distinction between opening a judgment to modify or to alter incidental terms of the judgment, leaving the essence of the original judgment intact, and opening a judgment to set it aside. Under the latter circumstances, the original judgment necessarily has been rendered void and any appeal therefrom would be rendered moot. See Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 224 Conn. 106, 109-10, 616 A.2d 798 (1992) (original judgment void when court opened judgment and issued corrected memorandum of decision rendering judgment in favor of party against whom it originally had rendered judgment); William G. Major Construction Co. v. DeMichely, 166 Conn. 368, 372, 349 A.2d 827 (1974) (original judgment void when trial court opened and set aside judgment of strict foreclosure, substituting judgment of foreclosure by private sale); but see id., 373 (suggesting that defendant may have been able to preserve appeal from original judgment by having court's order reflect stipulation of parties that defendant's appeal from original default judgment was not affected by defendant's motion to substitute judgment of foreclosure by sale). In Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, supra, 137 Conn. 277-78, the only change to the original judgment was an extension of the law days; all other substantive terms of the original judgment were unchanged. Under such circumstances, the opening of the judgment did not render void the original judgment and thus require dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, we agree with the Appellate Court that the Milford Trust Co. rule fosters judicial inefficiency, requiring that a new appeal be filed each time a modification is made, irrespective of its impact on either the substance of the judgment (i.e., a substitution of a party or an extension to a sale or law date) or the issues on appeal. We cannot countenance such a rule. Therefore, Milford Trust Co. must be overruled. Under our well established jurisprudence, "[m]ootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties. . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pritchard v. Pritchard, 92 Conn. App. 327, 339-40, 885 A.2d 207 (2005). In other words, the ultimate question is whether "the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Allison G., supra, 276 Conn. 165. In considering the effect of the opening of a judgment on a pending appeal, then, the appropriate question is whether the change to the judgment has affected the issue on appeal. If, in opening the judgment, the trial court reverses itself and resolves the matter at issue on appeal in the appellant's favor, it is clear that the appeal is moot as there is no further practical relief that may be afforded. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 224 Conn. 109-10; see also O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, supra, 10 Conn. App. 78. Conversely, if the judgment is opened to address issues entirely unrelated to the appeal, the opening of the judgment has had no effect on the availability of relief. A more difficult question may be presented if the trial court addresses the matter at issue on appeal, but does not entirely afford the appellant the relief sought. In such cases, the extent to which the trial court alters the judgment may require either a new appeal or an amended appeal. See Practice Book § 61-9 and 63-1 (c) (3). As "[t]he determination of whether a claim has become moot is fact sensitive"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Chimblo v. Monahan, 265 Conn. 650, 655, 829 A.2d 841 (2003); the facts of each case similarly must dictate the appropriate procedure to follow. The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of the appeal. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The original complaint also named as defendants Kersten Rigi and the law firm of DiSerio, Martin, O'Connor and Castiglioni, LLP (law firm), which allegedly had represented both parties to the loan transaction. The plaintiff thereafter withdrew the complaint as to Rigi, and the law firm is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to Valley View Associates and Kings Highway Associates as the defendants. While the litigation was pending, the defendants had requested from the plaintiff the payoff amount. They received a letter that, in part, advised them that the payoff amount for the $87,000 note was in excess of $1 million, of which more than $900,000 was default interest calculated at 30 percent per month. At the hearing on the defendants' motion to reargue, the trial court opened the judgment to set new law dates commencing August 11, 2003. The plaintiff originally had filed the same motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and a motion to set new law days on November 3, 2003, but the court did not act on that motion. We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the defendants' appeal as moot?" RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 274 Conn. 902, 876 A.2d 12 (2005). The Appellate Court had observed in this regard: "[W]e have no way of assessing whether there was some special nuance in [Milford Trust Co.] that led the Supreme Court to its determination. Because the case was dismissed on a motion, there are no appellate briefs or a record in the bound volumes of the Supreme Court records and briefs that would assist us with such an assessment. For that reason, we must accept the case on its face." RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 88 Conn. App. 431 n.1. Practice Book, 1934, § 366 provides: "Stay of Execution. In all civil actions, execution shall be stayed for two weeks after final judgment; and if an appeal be filed, or a notice of appeal as provided in [§] 368, then execution shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause; but if the judge trying the same is of the opinion that the appeal is taken only for delay, or that the due administration of justice requires it, he may order execution at any time upon motion and hearing. "If a stay of execution has been ordered by a trial court and [the Supreme Court] shall, upon appeal, advise that no new trial be granted, or decide that there has been no error, any judge of the court which ordered the stay may release it by giving a written notice order to that effect to the clerk, who shall file it with the papers in said cause, and thereupon issue such execution. "Such stay applies to every judgment in a civil action providing for the recovery of damages or requiring the performance of an act." See footnote 9 of this opinion for the text of the current version of the rule under Practice Book § 61-11. If, contrary to the suggestion in Milford Trust Co., the appellate stay was not terminated, we note that that opinion does not address the issue of the effect of the appellate stay. Moreover, it appears that the defendants in the present case did not squarely raise before the Appellate Court the issue of whether the present case was distinguishable from Milford Trust Co. because of the effect of the stay. Nonetheless, we reach this issue because the factual record is clear on the matter and the issue before us is our subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Practice Book § 61-11 (a) provides: "Automatic stay of execution "Except where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to take an appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause. If the case goes to judgment on appeal, any stay thereafter shall be in accordance with Section 71-6 (motions for reconsideration), Section 84-3 (petitions for certification by the Connecticut supreme court), and Section 71-7 (petitions for certiorari by the United States supreme court)." This court similarly has explained that, "[i]f a motion to reopen judgment is filed during the appeal period [but no appeal has been filed], the time for filing the appeal then commences from the issuance of notice of the decision on the motion, as provided in [then Practice Book § 4009, now § 63-1]. This rule can have profound effects on a foreclosure decree, since [Practice Book § 4046, now § 61-11] stays proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment . . . until the time to take an appeal has expired. Thus, law days in a strict foreclosure cannot run, or' a sale cannot take place, if a motion to reopen was filed during the appeal period but has yet to be ruled upon; any redemption or auction under such circumstances would be violative of the automatic stay, and any title derived through such stayed proceedings would be subject to defeasance. D. R. Caron, Connecticut Foreclosures (2d Ed. [1989]) § 17.06.".(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, supra, 216 Conn. 349 n.7. Practice Book § 17-10, which in all significant respects mirrors its predecessors dating back to the 1934 rules of practice, provides: "Modifying Judgment after Appeal "If a judgment fixing a set time for the performance of an act is affirmed on appeal by the supreme court and such time has elapsed pending the appeal, the judicial authority which rendered the judgment appealed from may, on motion and after due notice, modify it by extending the time." See Practice Book, 1963, § 272; Practice Book, 1951, § 205; Practice Book, 1934, § 203. The author's comment to § 272 of the 1966 Practice Book Annotated explains that "[the] rule was passed primarily to apply in mortgage foreclosure cases" to allow the trial court to set new law dates. J. Kaye & W. Moller, 1 Connecticut Practice Series, Practice Book Annotated (1st Ed. 1966) § 272, author's comments. We surmise that the trial court did not act knowingly in violation of the stay. The record indicates that the defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Court's denial of their motion for review of the trial court's decision terminating the stay on the last day permitted for filing that motion. The plaintiff represented to this court that it had received a copy of the motion for reconsideration the following business day, after the trial court had held the hearing on the motion to open the judgment, the same day the court granted that motion. We also note that the trial court revised the amount of the debt when it reentered the judgment of foreclosure with new law days. The plaintiffs December 1, 2003 motion for the new judgment, however, did not seek to revise the amount of the debt, but, rather, sought only to have the new law days set. The plaintiff filed its amended affidavit of debt on December 22, 2003, the day that the court reentered its judgment of foreclosure. We, therefore, do not consider whether it would have been proper for the trial court to open the judgment to revise the amount of debt pending appeal had the plaintiff sought to open the judgment on that basis. One notable exception to that rule is when subsequent events have rendered the appeal moot. Loulis v. Parrott, 241 Conn. 180, 198 n.11, 695 A.2d 1040 (1997). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, however, that exception has not been satisfied in the present case. Practice Book § 60-2 addresses the authority of the court to, inter alia, order the trial court to take necessary measures to complete the record for appeal and provides in relevant part: "Supervision of Procedure "The supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed, or earlier, if appropriate, and, except as otherwise provided in these rules, any motion the purpose of which is to complete or perfect the trial court record for presentation on appeal shall be made to the court in which the appeal is pending. The court may, on its own motion or upon motion of any party, modify or vacate any order made by the trial court, or a judge thereof, in relation to the prosecution of the appeal. It may also, for example, on its own motion or upon motion of any party, (1) order a judge to take any action necessary to complete the trial court record for the proper presentation of the appeal . (4) order a stay of any proceedings ancillary to a case on appeal . (9) remand any pending matter to the trial court for the resolution of factual issues where necessary . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Thus, once this court has acquired jurisdiction over the appeal, if a motion to open were pending in the case, we would have the authority to order the trial court either to address the motion or stay proceedings on that motion. Subsequent to the court's decision in Union & New Haven Trust Co., the legislature enacted a statute permitting a trial court, for cause, to open a judgment of strict foreclosure at any time before title has become absolute in any encumbrancer. See General Statutes § 49-15 (a). We note that the rules of practice similarly create a new appeal period when a motion is filed within the original appeal period "that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective"-, (emphasis added) Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1); and expressly provide that one such motion is a motion to open the judgment. See id. (also listing motions seeking to set aside judgment, for new trial, and for judgment notwithstanding verdict). In our view, however, particularly in light of the nature of the other motions that trigger the new appeal period, this language simply reflects the fact that, typically, a motion to open is used as a procedural vehicle to obtain the equivalent of a motion to set aside the judgment. See, e.g., William G. Major Construction Co. v. DeMichely, 166 Conn. 368, 372, 349 A.2d 827 (1974) (opening judgment of strict foreclosure and substi tuting judgment of foreclosure by private sale); Padaigis v. Kane, 125 Conn. 727, 727-28, 4 A.2d 335 (1939) (addressing defendant's motion to open seeking to offer further evidence and to file new special defense after trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff); Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 306, 142 A. 838 (1928) (opening and setting aside judgment of default); see also Practice Book § 63-1 (c). In such cases, consistent with our conclusion herein, the granting of such a motion actually would render the original judgment ineffective in the sense of being void. Even when the motion does not seek to vacate the judgment, such an action is not precluded by the trial court because, once a judgment is opened, the court "may then take any action that it could have taken prior to the entry of the original judgment." 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 199 (c), p. 426.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 392 (AC 25189), is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 812 (AC 25609), is denied.

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 617 (AC 25390), is granted, limited to the following issues: "1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant was a keeper of the dog? "2. Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court's admission of evidence of insurance was prejudicial?"

Opinion BORDEN, J. The principal issue in this appeal is whether a voluntary arbitration panel is bound to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to a second arbitration claim involving the interpretation of the same provision of a contract between the same parties. The defendant, Doctor's Associates, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court confirming an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, Michael J. LaSalla, and denying the defendant's application to vacate the award. The defendant claims that the award: (1) violated public policy; and (2) was issued in manifest disregard of the law. We disagree and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The parties entered into a voluntary, unrestricted arbitration proceeding. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff applied to the trial court to confirm the award, and the defendant applied to vacate the award. The trial court rendered judgment granting the plaintiffs application to confirm and denying the defendant's application to vacate the award. This appeal followed. Certain of the facts, and the following procedural history, are undisputed. The defendant is a franchiser of Subway sandwich shops that contracts with development agents, who, in turn, develop and support Subway stores in particular areas. On February 1, 1986, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a development agent agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff became a development agent for northwestern Florida (plaintiffs territory), and the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff one third of the royalties and transfer fees that it receives from the Subway stores located in the plaintiffs territory, subject, however, to a reduction based on a modifier. Because, prior to the execution of the agreement, there were already twenty-nine Subway stores in the plaintiffs territory, the modifier was designed to reduce the payments from the defendant to the plaintiff to reflect those previously established stores. The agreement has a broad, unrestricted arbitration clause, requiring that "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . ." In 1998, the plaintiff filed a claim for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (1998 arbitration) regarding several matters in dispute between the parties under the agreement. Among the items in dispute was the interpretation of the modifier as applied to stores that were in existence at the time of the execution of the agreement, but that subsequently were " 'permanently closed' . . . ." The plaintiff presented the arbitrators in that proceeding with an exhibit indicating that, of the twenty-nine stores in existence on February 1, 1986, six had been permanently closed and nine had been relocated. On the basis of this exhibit, the plaintiff claimed that the denominator of the modifier should be reduced by the six permanently closed stores and, therefore, the calculation of the modifier that the defendant had been using should be changed to reflect the larger figure claimed by the plaintiff. In this connection, moreover, although the plaintiff sought money damages with respect to his other claims in the arbitration, as to the modifier issue he sought only a declaration of the modifier's proper interpretation and application, not money damages. The panel in the 1998 arbitration agreed with the plaintiff, and, in an award dated June 14,2000, declared: "The denominator of the modifier . . . shall be reduced for each store that was in place when the [agreement] was signed and thereafter permanently closed, so that the modifier will be determined in the manner suggested by [the plaintiff], reflected on [his exhibit, which chose a measurement date of January 30, 1999], that produces a modifier of 0.8642857, rather than in the manner suggested by [the defendant], that produces a modifier of 0.8214286." The plaintiff then applied to the Superior Court to vacate the panel's award, based upon two other issues in the arbitration upon which he had not prevailed. The defendant correspondingly applied to the court to confirm the award in its entirety. In June, 2002, the trial court, Alander, J., denied the plaintiffs application to vacate and granted the defendant's application to confirm the award. The plaintiff did not appeal further. In November, 2002, the plaintiff filed the arbitration claim that is involved in the present case before the American Dispute Resolution Center. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff sought "the enforcement of' the agreement and of the award in the 1998 arbitration. He stated that the award in the 1998 arbitration "provided relief to [him] in the form of a declaration of certain rights that arise under the [agreement]. Based on that declaration, [the plaintiff] now seeks an award of money damages, legal fees, interest and cost of this arbitration." He quoted the award in the 1998 arbitration regarding the modifier. He claimed that, since February 1, 1986, when the agreement was executed, until the award in the 1998 arbitration, the defendant had underpaid the plaintiff in breach of the agreement. He stated that, "[b]ased on the [award in the 1998 arbitration], it is now clear that the [m]odifier clause should have been interpreted to be flexible and subject to adjustment, taking into consideration the criteria set forth in the [agreement]," and that as a result of the defendant's "misapplication of the [m]odifier, [the plaintiff] has been underpaid for [fourteen] years." He stated, further, that, even after the 1998 arbitration, the defendant "has refused to make good on the unpaid balance in conformity with the [a]ward [in the 1998 arbitration]," and that the defendant had taken the position that "the panel's interpretation of the [m]odifier only applies prospectively, from the date of the [a]ward forward." Finally, the plaintiff sought "an appropriate award of money damages," and "a declaration that the determina tion of the net number of units added to the [t]erritory is governed by the contractual definition of the term 'unit' so that in the future, the parties will be able to conduct business without further disputes on the application of this clause. For this purpose, a 'unit' should be taken out of the [mjodifier calculation when it closes at one location and ceases operations at that location, as described in the [agreement]." The defendant moved the arbitration panel to dismiss the arbitration demand on the grounds of, among other things, res judicata, or claim preclusion. The defendant presented a brief to the panel, fully explaining the factual background of the dispute between the parties, the ruling in the 1998 arbitration, the ruling of the court confirming that award, and the legal bases for its motion. In response, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, presenting his factual and legal arguments in favor of continuing the arbitration. The panel denied the motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the panel issued two interim awards and a final award. The substance of the awards was as follows: (1) the award in the 1998 arbitration was retroactive to the execution of the agreement, but damages would be recoverable by the plaintiff "only from June 15, 1992"; (2) for purposes of determining the numerator and denominator of the modifier, only units paying a royalty were to be considered a " 'unit' (3) for purposes of calculating the denominator of the modifier, a " 'permanently closed' " unit was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering a number of factors; (4) nine relocated stores affected the modifier, resulting in a modifier as of January 30,1999, of0.90714; and (5) the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $1,096,011 and interest to the date of the award in the amount of $608,434. The defendant applied to vacate, and the plaintiff applied to confirm the award. The trial court, Stevens, J., rejected the defendant's claims that the award violated the public policy of claim preclusion, and that the award's treatment of the doctrine of claim preclusion and its award of interest were in manifest disregard for the law. Accordingly, because it was an unrestricted submission and the award was within the submission, the court confirmed the award. I The defendant does not take issue with the propositions that a voluntary arbitration award issued pursuant to an unrestricted submission must be confirmed so long as the award is within the submission, and that, in the absence of an applicable exception to this rule in the present case, this award meets that standard. The defendant relies on the public policy exception to that rule, namely, that such an award nonetheless must be vacated if it "would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 273 Conn. 634, 655, 872 A.2d 423, cert. denied sub nom. Vertrue, Inc. v. MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc., 546 U.S. 960, 126 S. Ct. 479, 163 L. Ed. 2d 363 (2005). Specifically, the defendant claims that the award violates the explicit, well-defined and dominant policy of claim preclusion, and the corresponding explicit, well-defined and dominant policy of the finality and binding nature of arbitration proceedings. Thus, the defendant argues, because the award in the present case arrived at a different calculation of the modifier from that arrived at in the 1998 arbitration, and because it permitted the plaintiff to raise and prevail on a claim that he could have but did not make in that earlier arbitration, namely, his claim for damages, it violated these policies and must be vacated. We are not persuaded. We agree with the defendant that the proper scope of review, in both the trial court and this court, for a colorable claim that an award violated public policy is plenary. Id. Thus, we need not consider the defendant's claim that the trial court applied an improper scope of review, because we apply the proper one. We next note that, to the extent that the defendant's public policy claim rests on its claim that this award conflicts with the award in the 1998 arbitration regarding the interpretation of the modifier, and its calculation and application to permanently closed stores, that claim is foreclosed by our decision in Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999). In Stratford, we squarely held that "as a matter of public policy, arbitrators are not required to give collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitral awards," even where the prior award involves "the interpretation of the same provision of a contract between the same parties." Id., 109. We explained that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. . . . Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is essential to the judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 117. We recognized that whether a subsequent arbitral panel must, as a matter of public policy, be bound by a determination on the same question of a prior panel presented "a conflict between two competing policy considerations: (1) the desire to promote stability and finality of judgments, and the closely related interest of judicial economy; and (2) the desire to maintain the flexibility of the arbitral process." Id. We concluded that, "in the absence of a specific contract provision to the contrary, an arbitrator is not bound to follow prior arbitration decisions, even in cases in which the grievances at issue involve the same parties and interpretation of the same contract provisions. Although an arbitrator may find well reasoned prior awards to be a compelling influence on his or her decision-making process, the arbitrator need not give such awards preclusive effect. Rather, the arbitrator should bring his or her own independent judgment to bear on the issue to be decided, using prior awards as the arbitrator sees fit, as it is the arbitrator's judgment for which the parties had bargained." Id., 125. Our reasoning in reaching this conclusion was as follows. First, we noted the overwhelming precedent in the federal courts reaching the same conclusion. Id., 118-20. Second, because arbitration is a creature of contract, and because it is the agreement that limits the powers of the arbitrators, "the parties are free to bargain for whatever terms they choose, including a provision establishing a system of arbitral precedent." Id., 121. Thus, in the absence of such a provision, "arbitrators are free to attach to prior awards whatever precedential value they deem appropriate." Id. Third, even when, as is ordinarily the case, the agreement provides that the arbitration shall be "final and binding," that language does not mandate the application of collateral estoppel in any given case. Id., 123-24. The "scope of such a phrase is determined by each arbitrator in turn." Id., 124. Finally, because of the ordinarily single tiered nature of arbitration and the very limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, it is "all the more important that arbitrators be afforded the greatest opportunity to render correct decisions. Allowing arbitrators the flexibility to follow arbitral precedent where they deem appropriate, but to disregard it when they conclude otherwise, creates an informal system of checks and balances in the arbitral process and thus helps to ensure that arbitration proceedings result in just dispositions." Id. Part of the defendant's claim in the present case is nothing more than a recast of what we squarely rejected in Stratford. The defendant claims that the arbitrators in this case were required to follow the award in the 1998 arbitration in their interpretation and calculation of the modifier, and in its application to the facts of the case. Specifically, the defendant cites the following examples of how the award violated public policy: arriv ing at a different number of units in the denominator; arriving at a different method of calculation of the modifier, namely, the multifactor method of determining the number of units, which was not present in the award in the 1998 arbitration; and arriving at a wholly different modifier, namely, 0.90714, rather than 0.8648257. These contentions fall squarely within our holding in Stratford and the reasoning supporting it: public policy did not require the panel in this proceeding to make the same determinations arrived at in the 1998 arbitration. Furthermore, as we anticipated in Stratford, the panel in the present case was requested to, and could have, applied the doctrine of issue preclusion if it determined that to be the more appropriate course. It declined to do so, and that decision cannot be disturbed by the court. Id., 124-25. We turn, therefore, to the aspect of the defendant's claim that we have not squarely decided, namely, that the doctrine of claim preclusion should be imposed in voluntary arbitration as a matter of public policy. Put another way, the defendant claims that an award that does not follow the doctrine of claim preclusion violates an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy, and, specifically, that this award, by permitting the plaintiff to recover monetary damages that he did not seek to recover in the 1998 arbitration, violated that public policy. We disagree. We conclude that the public policy exception does not require that arbitrators in a second arbitration between the same parties, involving interpretation and application of the same contractual provision, apply the doctrine of claim preclusion. "Claim preclusion, sometimes referred to as res judicata, and issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel, are first cousins. Both legal doctrines promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of issues or claims previously resolved. State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 466, 497 A.2d 974 (1985). The concepts of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are simply related ideas on a continuum, differentiated, perhaps by their breadth, and express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest. . Id., 464-65. "The subtle difference between claim preclusion and issue preclusion has been so described: [C]laim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . . [I]ssue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit. Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988), quoting Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 15 Conn. App. 392, 401-402, 546 A.2d 284 (1988), aff'd, 211 Conn. 67, 557 A.2d 540 (1989). Under claim preclusion analysis, a claim — that is, a cause of action — includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. . . . Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Ins. Co., 200 Conn. 360, 364-65, 511 A.2d 333 (1986), quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 24 (1) (1982). Moreover, claim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made. Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 317, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124, 127-28, 617 A.2d 440 (1992). Thus, if the doctrine of claim preclusion were required to be applied to the present case, the plaintiff would have been barred from seeking damages in the present arbitration because he could have done so, but did not do so, in the 1998 arbitration. We decline to impose such a limitation on the scope of consensual arbitration. In contrast, we see no valid reason to distinguish between the closely related doctrines of issue preclusion and claim preclusion in this regard. Put simply, much of the reasoning that undergirded our decision in Stratford to decline to impose issue preclusion on the arbitral process applies to claim preclusion as well. In the absence of a specific contractual provision governing the issue, for which the parties are certainly free to bargain, arbitrators are not required to apply claim preclusion; rather, they are free to apply or to reject the doctrine to the extent that they deem it appropriate because the parties have bargained for their judgment. Furthermore, the fact that, as in the present case, the agreement provides that the arbitration shall be "final and binding," does not require the application of the doctrine. The meaning and scope of that phrase is determined by each arbitrator in turn. In addition, given the nature of arbitration and the limited scope of judicial review, arbitrators should be given the maximum opportunity to render correct and just decisions. Finally, another consideration makes the doctrine of claim preclusion an even less likely candidate for the public policy exception than issue preclusion. Arbitration is often the dispute resolution method of choice between contracting parties who, because of the nature of the contract, must deal with each other in an ongoing business relationship for a lengthy period of time. Indeed, the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant presents precisely such a case. Applying the doctrine of claim preclusion as a matter of public policy to such agreements would require the party who seeks arbitration on a particular matter for the first time to bring forth, not only the particular claim or form of relief that he seeks to have resolved at the time, but any and all other related claims or forms of relief that he could then bring, even if he anticipates or hopes that it may not be necessary and that the related claims or forms of relief are likely to be worked out amicably between the parties. This could force the complaining party to inject a needless source of tension into the business relationship. This risk further supports our conclusion that the public policy exception does not require the imposition of the doctrine of claim preclusion to a prior arbitration award. The defendant contends, however, that the arbitration statutes, namely, General Statutes § 52-408 through 52-424, "articulate the explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy that arbitration awards are final and binding and have the same effect between the parties as a civil judgment." Thus, the defendant relies on the following statutory provisions: the court's judgment regarding an award "shall have the same force and effect" as a civil judgment; General Statutes § 52-421 (b); the strict procedures, standards and time lim its for confirming an award; General Statutes § 52-417; the procedural requirements for vacating an award; General Statutes § 52-418 (a); and procedures for modifying or correcting an award. General Statutes § 52-419 (a). The defendant argues that these "statutory procedures reflect the strong public policy that arbitration awards are final and binding, and that a dissatisfied party who ignores these provisions may not later collaterally attack a final award." We agree that, in general, these provisions express a policy in favor of the final and binding nature of arbitration awards. We disagree with the defendant, however, that the policy they express is so powerful that it overrides the other considerations that, as we concluded in Stratford and we conclude in the context of the present case, leave to the arbitrators the decision of whether to apply the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion to prior arbitral awards. The defendant also contends that our decision in Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996), supports its position that an arbitral panel must, as a matter of public policy, apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to a prior arbitral award between the same parties and involving the same contractual provision. We disagree. In Fink, the plaintiff in a judicial lawsuit had brought a prior arbitration proceeding against one of the defen dants. In the prior arbitration proceeding, the plaintiff had asserted claims that the particular defendant, Joan A. Magner, had breached her employment contract with the plaintiff. Id., 193. In the lawsuit, the plaintiff asserted tort claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with a business opportunity, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; arising out of the same employment relationship. Fink v. Golenbock, supra, 238 Conn. 193. We held that, in that procedural context, the doctrine of claim preclusion applied so as to bar the plaintiff from litigating the tort and CUTPA claims in the lawsuit because he could have but did not assert them in the prior arbitration proceeding. Id., 196-97. We reasoned: "The plaintiff had the opportunity to present and litigate fully these issues before the arbitration panel, but failed to do so. It would be a waste of judicial resources to permit litigation of these issues now. Given our strong commitment to the arbitration of disputes, especially when the parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitration, and in light of the broad language in the submission of the parties in this case, we conclude that the plaintiff could have litigated all the issues presently before us in the arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, these issues are barred by res judicata and the judgment against Magner must be set aside and a judgment must be rendered in her favor." Id., 197. The difference between Fink and the present case is the difference between the application of the doctrine of claim preclusion by a court in a judicial proceeding, irrespective of whether the prior proceeding was an arbitral or judicial proceeding, and the application, in an arbitration proceeding, of the doctrine of claim preclusion by a subsequent arbitral panel to a prior arbitral award. In the former, the policy of conservation of judicial resources counsels in favor of the application of the doctrine. In the latter, the reasons that we have already given counsel against the mandatory application of the doctrine. In that situation, whether to apply the doctrine is a question for the arbitrators. II The defendant also claims that the award was issued in manifest disregard of the law, in two respects: (1) the arbitration panel's recalculation of the modifier manifestly disregarded the law requiring that full force and effect be given to arbitral awards; and (2) the award of prejudgment interest was an egregious disregard of established law regarding prejudgment interest. We disagree. "[A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. We emphasize, however, that the manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles. . . . "The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreci ated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 86, 95, 868 A.2d 47 (2005). The defendant cannot meet its heavy burden under this standard. The reasons that we have given in support of our conclusion that the doctrine of claim preclusion is not required as a matter of public policy effectively dispose of the defendant's manifest disregard claim. Those persuasive reasons demonstrate that the arbitration panel's decision not to apply the doctrine to this arbitration proceeding was not patently irrational or an egregious disregard of applicable law. Similarly, the defendant cannot prevail on his contention that the panel's award of interest was in manifest disregard of the law. At the judicial level, we have stated: "Pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a, interest may be recovered in a civil action as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. We have construed the statute to make the allowance of interest depend upon whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances. . . . The allowance of interest as an element of damages is, thus, primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. . . . We have seldom found an abuse of discretion in the determination by a trial court of whether a detention of money was wrongful." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Hara v. State, 218 Conn. 628, 643, 590 A.2d 948 (1991). Gauged by this relaxed standard, the panel's award of interest was certainly not in manifest disregard of the law. The principal amount was liquidated; the panel certainly could have considered the defendant's withholding of the damages as wrongful and the plaintiffs claim for money damages as reasonably timely; and it was undisputed that the defendant had the use of the money for the disputed period of time. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Specifically, the modifier provides as follows: "[F]or Subway units established in the Territory prior to the execution of the Agreement, payment to the Development Agent [namely, the plaintiff] will be reduced to reflect the efforts of the Company [namely, the defendant] in establishing those units. All units operating at the time the contract is executed shall be counted as four. Royalties from the Territory shall be calculated by multiplying the collected royalties from the Territory by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the net number of units added in the Territory by the [plaintiff] after date of this Agreement plus [four] and the denominator shall be the total number of units in the Territory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, all other things being equal, the larger the denominator of the fraction, the smaller the payout from the defendant to the plaintiff and, conversely, the smaller the denominator of the fraction, the larger the payout from the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff defined a permanently closed store as one that was "no longer in business. The franchise has been retired." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Put in the terms of the modifier; see footnote 2 of this opinion; the plaintiff's claim was that, in the definition of the denominator as "the total number of units in the Territory," the number of units was to be calculated by subtracting six therefrom, leading to a larger payout from the defendant to the plaintiff. The parties had agreed that this arbitration proceeding would be instituted before the American Dispute Resolution Center, rather than the American Arbitration Association. The defendant also presented, as bases for its motion to dismiss, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, and the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is a federally recognized doctrine that precludes a party from asserting a factual position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position taken previously by that party in a prior legal proceeding. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is not involved in this appeal, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not involved except insofar as we discuss it in part I of this opinion. Neither party specifically questioned the propriety of this date, either in the trial court or in this court. The factors listed by the panel included the following: whether the original franchisee owned and operated the unit; how long the location had not been paying a royalty; the original and present location of the unit; the extent to which the defendant was instrumental in establishing the existing unit; and whether a franchise or transfer fee was paid, and whether the defendant received any portion thereof. Although the awards do not specifically reference either the date of January 30, 1999, as the measurement date, or the specific figure of 0.90714 as the modifier, the defendant asserts in its brief that these were part of the awards, and the plaintiff does not take issue with this assertion. The award in the 1998 arbitration based its calculation of the modifier on plaintiffs exhibit 123, which used January 30, 1999, as the measurement date. We therefore assume for purposes of this appeal that the award in this case differed from the award in the 1998 arbitration, in arriving at a different modifier, 0.90714 rather than 0.8642857. Although in Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, supra, 248 Conn. 117, we referred to issue preclusion as limited to "an issue of ultimate fact"-, (emphasis added); that limitation was something of a misstatement. "Issue preclusion applies if 'an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment . . . .' 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27 (1982)." (Emphasis added.) Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124, 128, 617 A.2d 440 (1992). Indeed, in the present case, the plaintiff claimed that, before the 1998 arbitration, both he and the defendant anticipated that, after that arbitration was resolved, the parties would apply the panel's interpretation mathematically; it was only thereafter, when the defendant took the position that the panel's interpretation had only prospective effect, that the second arbitration became necessary. We recognize that the same problem could arise under a contract that does not have an arbitration clause; in such a case, the doctrine of claim preclusion would apply to lawsuits. The law imposes the doctrine in that situation because of the overriding policy in favor of conserving judicial resources. That policy does not have the same force, however, in the arbitration context. General Statutes § 52-421 (b) provides: "The judgment or decree confirming, modifying or correcting an award shall be docketed as if it were rendered in a civil action. The judgment or decree so entered shall have the same force and effect in all respects as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment or decree in a civil action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in a civil action in the court in which it is entered. When the award requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, the court or judge entering the judgment or decree may direct the enforcement thereof in the manner provided by law for the enforcement of equitable decrees." General Statutes § 52-417 provides: "At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419." General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides: "Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." General Statutes § 52-419 (a) provides: "Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated, or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or (3) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy." The defendant also claims that courts in other jurisdictions have required arbitral panels to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to prior arbitral decisions; see, e.g., Byron's Construction Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 463 N.W.2d 660, 663 (N.D. 1990) (doctrine of claim preclusion barred party from raising issue in second arbitration proceeding that could have been raised in first arbitration); Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B and C, 251 Va. 417, 434, 468 S.E.2d 894 (1996) (doctrine of claim preclusion barred second arbitration action because "even though the first demand described only specific defects, the doctrine of res judicata applies to all claims which could have been brought"); and, more specifically, have distinguished between issue preclusion and claim preclusion in requiring a subsequent arbitral panel to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion based upon a prior panel's determination. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 824 and n.2, 982 P.2d 229, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1999) (holding that prior arbitration has no collateral estoppel effect, absent agreement of parties, on subsequent arbitration, but noting that California precedent accords res judicata effect to serial arbitration proceedings); but see, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (issue of res judicata effect of prior arbitration on subsequent arbitration is decision for arbitrator, not court). We decline to follow the cases on which the defendant relies, however, for all of the reasons that we have stated. We recognize that there is broad language in Fink, on which the defendant relies, that read out of context could be seen as supporting the defen dant's interpretation of it. We note, however, that, as with any precedent, its language must be considered in the context of the precise question before the court. See Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 190, 896 A.2d 777 (2006).

The petitioner Ben Jenkins' petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 902 (AC 25911), is denied.

The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 667 (AC 25313), is granted, limited to the following issues: "1. Did the Appellate Court properly decide that the defendant's conviction of sexual assault in the third degree under General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (2) was not supported by sufficient evidence that the defendant was the stepfather of the victim? The Supreme Court docket number is SC 17677. James M. Ralls, senior assistant state's attorney, in support of the petition. Martin Zeldis, public defender, in opposition. Decided May 31, 2006 "2. Did the Appellate Court properly decide that General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (2) violated the guidelines of equal protection?"

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 26762) is denied.

Opinion SULLIVAN, C. J. This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff, Flora Smith, against the defendants, 200 Greenwich Acquisition, LLC (Greenwich Acquisition), 19 West Elm Street Associates, LLC (19 West Elm Street), the town of Greenwich (town), and Ronald R. Passerelli, Jr., in connection with injuries that the plaintiff suffered when she slipped and fell on an ice patch on the sidewalk in front of certain property located in the town. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that her injuries had resulted from negligence on the part of Greenwich Acquisition and 19 West Elm Street in maintaining the sidewalk. Following a jury trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against Greenwich Acquisition only, from which Greenwich Acquisition appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On December 30, 2000, a snowstorm deposited approximately thirteen inches of snow in the Greenwich area. In addition, it snowed less than one-half inch on both January 5 and January 9, 2001. On the morning of January 17,2001, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of ice on the sidewalk near the property line between Greenwich Acquisition's property and 19 West Elm Street's property, severely fracturing her ankle. The town owned the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell. The ice had formed next to a pile of snow that lay on a planting bed located on Greenwich Acquisition's property that was perpendicular to the sidewalk, as well as on the sidewalk abutting the bed. Warmer temperatures partially had melted the snow on the previous day, and ice had formed from the meltwater on the sidewalk adjacent to the snow pile between 4 a.m. and 7 a.m. on January 17, 2001. Upon discovering the injured plaintiff, Joseph Voisene, the building manager for Greenwich Acquisition, called 911. A Greenwich police officer, John Thorme, arrived to care for the plaintiff and to conduct an investigation. At the time of the investigation, Thorme did not know the exact location of the boundary line between Greenwich Acquisition's property and 19 West Elm Street's property. Shortly after the accident, Voisene called Passerelh, Greenwich Acquisition's snow removal contractor, and asked him to remove the portion of the snow located on the sidewalk next to where the plaintiff had fallen. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the town, Greenwich Acquisition and 19 West Elm Street. Greenwich Acquisition then filed an apportionment complaint against Passerelh claiming, inter aha, that, to the extent that the plaintiff had been injured as alleged, Passerelh had caused the injuries through his negligence. In her initial complaint, the plaintiffs only allegation against Greenwich Acquisition was that it negligently had failed to maintain the sidewalk. Greenwich Acquisition filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it had no legal duty to maintain the public sidewalk. The plaintiff subsequently filed, and the court granted, a request for leave to amend the complaint, seeking to add claims that Greenwich Acquisition had created a dangerous condition and a nuisance by piling snow at the base of its driveway adjoining the public sidewalk so that the runoff from melting snow created an ice slipping hazard. The plaintiff also amended her complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102b (d), to assert a direct claim of negligence against Passerelh. The trial court subsequently denied Greenwich Acquisition's motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. During jury selection, the plaintiff withdrew her claims against the town and Passerelh, leaving Greenwich Acquisition and 19 West Elm Street as the only direct defendants, although Passerelli remained as an apportionment defendant. On the first day of trial, the trial court denied a motion in limine by Passerelli seeking to preclude evidence concerning the apportionment complaint. Passerelli argued that under Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 257-58, 765 A.2d 505 (2001), a property owner could not name a snow removal contractor as an apportionment defendant under the circumstances of this case. The trial court declined to rule on the motion at that time. Later in the trial, however, the trial court, sua sponte, granted Passerelli's motion for summary judgment on the basis of its interpretation of Gazo. The court subsequently submitted the case to the jury on the theories of negligence and nuisance only. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against Greenwich Acquisition and found no fault on the part of 19 West Elm Street. It assessed 70 percent negligence to Greenwich Acquisition, and 30 percent to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the trial court denied Greenwich Acquisition's motions to set aside the verdict, to determine collateral source reduction, and for remittitur. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, Greenwich Acquisition claims that the trial court improperly: (1) declined to instruct the jury that, for Greenwich Acquisition to be liable for the accumulation of ice on the public sidewalk, the plaintiff needed to prove that Greenwich Acquisition's positive act altered the natural flow of water from its property; (2) declined to direct a verdict in its favor when the evidence was insufficient to establish that the ice on the sidewalk did not result from a natural accumulation of snow and the natural flow of water from Greenwich Acquisition's property; (3) allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence that Greenwich Acquisition, through its snow removal contractor, Passerelli, had performed subsequent remedial measures by removing snow from the sidewalk after the plaintiffs fall; (4) declined to instruct the jury that evidence regarding Passerelli's removal of snow from the sidewalk after the incident was not relevant to the issue of whether Greenwich Acquisition was negligent; (5) rendered summary judgment in favor of Passerelli, on the ground that, as a matter of law, a property owner may not assert an apportionment claim against a snow removal contractor; and (6) denied Greenwich Acquisition's motion for summary judgment where Greenwich Acquisition argues that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to maintain the public sidewalk, because the applicable ordinance failed to transfer the town's liability to Greenwich Acquisition. We reject these claims, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. I We first address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury that, for Greenwich Acquisition to be liable for the accumulation of ice on the public sidewalk, the plaintiff needed to prove that Greenwich Acquisition's positive act altered the natural flow of water from its property. We disagree. The record reveals the following additional facts and procedural history. Greenwich Acquisition submitted a request to instruct the jury on the law as stated in Young v. Talcott, 114 Conn. 675, 678-79, 159 A. 881 (1932), and Langlois v. Murphy, 15 Conn. Sup. 137, 138 (1947). These cases state that a landowner whose property is next to a public sidewalk "is not hable for the formation of ice upon a public sidewalk due to the natural flow of surface water from [its] land. . . . "[A] showing [is] required that the defendant so maintained [its] premises as to cause the water which flowed from [its] premises to be diffused upon the sidewalk in a manner substantially different in volume or course than would naturally have been the case." (Citation omitted.) Langlois v. Murphy, supra, 15 Conn. Sup. 138. The trial court stated: "I just don't think this whole thing of flow of water is relevant to this case," and did not include the instruction requested by Greenwich Acquisition in its charge to the jury. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: "An important principle of law in Connecticut, and this is really the key to understanding and deciding this case, is that an abutting landowner . . . [is] under no duty to keep the public sidewalk in front of [its] property] in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. "An abutting landowner . . . can be held liable, however, in either negligence or public nuisance for injuries resulting from the unsafe condition of a public sidewalk caused by the landowners' positive act. . . . "By positive act, we mean taking affirmative steps to create the hazard that caused the accident and resulting injuries. "The plaintiff alleges that the positive act in this case was the piling up of a mound of snow, which resulted in the later thaw and freeze cycle. "Now, the opposite side of that coin is that if the accumulation of snow, the pile of snow in issue, was not created by the affirmative act of the defendant[s], but rather was a natural accumulation of snow, then the defendants cannot be held liable or responsible to the plaintiff." Later, in explaining the concept of causation, the trial court stated that "[t]he test for cause in fact is simply would the accident or incident have occurred were it not. for the defendants' conduct? "The second component of legal cause is proximate cause. . . . The test of proximate cause is whether the defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs fall and resulting injuries. . . . "Your inquiry . is focused on the connection, if any, between the defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs fall. In order for a defendant to be held legally responsible for the plaintiffs accident, there must be a causal connection between [the two]. . It means that the negligence . . . must have entered into the production of such accident as a cause thereof." The trial court also submitted special interrogatories to the jury asking the jury to determine, inter alia, whether the plaintiff had "prove [d] by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendants . . . acted negligently by mounding up the snow in a pile while in the course of snow removal as alleged in the complaint," and whether the plaintiff had "prove[d] by a fair preponderance of the evidence that . . . the negligence on the part of the defendants . . . was a proximate cause of, that is, a substantial factor in causing the accident . . . and the plaintiffs injuries as alleged in her complaint." Greenwich Acquisition now claims that it was improper for the court to refuse to instruct the jury that it could not find Greenwich Acquisition liable unless the plaintiff could show that Greenwich Acquisition's positive act altered the flow of water from its premises to the sidewalk. Although we agree with Greenwich Acquisition that it would have been better if the trial court had charged the jury in accordance with Greenwich Acquisition's request, we conclude that any impropriety was harmless. "Our analysis begins with a well established standard of review. When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . we will not view the instructions as improper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiStefano v. Milardo, 276 Conn. 416, 421, 886 A.2d 415 (2005). "Failure to charge precisely as proposed by a defendant is not error where the point is fairly covered in the charge. . . . Instructions are adequate if they give the jury a clear understanding of the issues and proper guidance in determining those issues." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 662, 791 A.2d 518 (2002). In the present case, Greenwich Acquisition claims that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on the law as set forth in Young and Langlois. Under the reasoning of those cases, Greenwich Acquisition could not be held liable unless it "so maintained [its] premises as to cause the water which flowed from [its] premises to be diffused upon the sidewalk in a manner substantially different in volume or course than would naturally have been the case." Langlois v. Murphy, supra, 15 Conn. Sup. 138, citing Young v. Talcott, supra, 114 Conn. 679. The plaintiff counters that Greenwich Acquisition's reliance on Langlois, which, in turn, relied on Young, "is misplaced as the facts in Young presented an attenuated circumstance where snow and ice on the roof of a property owner's house melted and dripped upon an embankment also contained on the owner's property and then such melting then trickled onto the adjoining sidewalk where it froze. The court in Young distinguished the facts there from other cases with instructive similarities to the instant case, where the owner of property used it in such a fashion so as to render the adjoining highway unsafe." See Young v. Talcott, supra, 678, citing Kane v. New Idea Realty Co., 104 Conn. 508, 515, 133 A. 686 (1926); Calway v. Schaal & Son, Inc., 113 Conn. 586, 590, 155 A. 813 (1931). This amounts to an argument, however, that the evidence presented by the plaintiff would have compelled a reasonable jury to find that Greenwich Acquisition had used its property in such a way as to affect the flow of water from the planting bed and to render the sidewalk unsafe. In other words, the plaintiff effectively argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict on this specific question. She made no such argument to the trial court, however, and the court concluded only that issues concerning the flow of water were not relevant to the case, not that there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction. In the absence of any explanation for this conclusion or any argument by the plaintiff that the principles enunciated in Young and Langlois were inapplicable to the present case as a matter of law, we are constrained to agree with Greenwich Acquisition that the court improperly declined to instruct the jury that Greenwich Acquisition could not be held hable unless the plaintiff could show that Greenwich Acquisition's positive act altered the natural flow of water from its property. This does not end our inquiry, however. We have repeatedly recognized that "[i]t is axiomatic . . . that not every error is harmful. . . . [W]e have often stated that before a party is entitled to a new trial . he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . An instructional impropriety is harmful if it is likely that it affected the verdict." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scanlon v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 258 Conn. 436, 448, 782 A.2d 87 (2001). In determining whether an instructional impropriety was harmless, we consider "not only the nature of the error, including its natural and probable effect on a party's ability to place his full case before the jury, but the likelihood of actual prejudice as reflected in the individual trial record, taking into account (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel's arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 244, 828 A.2d 64 (2003). The trial court instructed the jury in the present case that it could hold Greenwich Acquisition liable only for "injuries resulting from the unsafe condition of a public sidewalk caused by the landowner's positive act. . . . By positive act, we mean taking affirmative steps to create the hazard that caused the accident and resulting injuries." (Emphasis added.) It further instructed the jury that it must determine whether the accident would have occurred were it not for the defendants' conduct and that, in order for Greenwich Acquisition to be held legally responsible for the plaintiffs injuries, there must be a connection between Greenwich Acquisition's conduct and the accident. Finally, the court submitted special interrogatories to the jury requiring the juiy to determine, first, whether the defendants had negligently mounded the snow in a pile and, second, whether this negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injuries. We conclude that, applying these instructions, the jury could have found Greenwich Acquisition liable only if it found that the cause of the plaintiffs injuries, namely the ice patch on the sidewalk, was caused by Greenwich Acquisition's negligent conduct in mounding the snow in a pile. Accordingly, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions and that the court's failure to instruct the jury in accordance with Greenwich Acquisition's request was harmless. II We next address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly declined to direct a verdict in its favor because the plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to establish that the ice on the sidewalk did not result from a natural accumulation of snow and flow of water from Greenwich Acquisition's property. We disagree. "We begin with the well established and rigorous standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims. . . . We must consider the evidence, including reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the parties who were successful at trial . . . giving particular weight to the concurrence of the judgments of the judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony . The verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if we find that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion. . . . We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintiffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury's function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765, 773-74, 882 A.2d 653 (2005). "If the jury, without conjecture, could not have found a required element of the cause of action, it cannot withstand a motion to set aside the verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 50, 873 A.2d 929 (2005). As we have indicated, absent a specific statute or ordinance to the contrary, owners of land abutting public sidewalks are not liable for negligence to those who are injured while walking on the sidewalks as a result of natural accumulations of snow and ice. Abutting landowners may be held liable, however, if they act to change the volume or the course of the watery melt that refreezes to create the dangerous condition that results in injury. Thus, the plaintiffs burden at trial was to present evidence from which the jury reasonably could conclude that Greenwich Acquisition positively had acted to create the snow pile that subsequently formed the ice patch, and that the resulting snow pile made the sidewalk more dangerous by contributing a materially different flow or volume of water than would have existed had Greenwich Acquisition not acted. We conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff satisfied this burden. Greenwich Acquisition claims that there was no evidence from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that it had piled the snow next to the ice patch on which the plaintiff slipped, or that Greenwich Acquisition in any way had acted to cause the flow of water from its property to vary substantially in its volume or course from its natural state, so as to form the ice patch. It points out that none of the witnesses testified that the snow pile was not a result of natural accumulation, and notes that the plaintiffs expert, Robert Maxon, a meteorologist, conceded that it was impossible for him to determine whether the snow shown in the photographs was the result of natural accumulation. Greenwich Acquisition cites Novak v. Anderson, 178 Conn. 506, 508, 423 A.2d 147 (1979), in support of its claim that, although the jury was free to accept or reject testimony by Maxon, Thorme, Voisene, and Passerelli about the origin of the snow pile, even if it disbelieved the testimony of all the witnesses, this disbelief would not form the basis for concluding that Greenwich Acquisition had created the pile. We address first the evidence supporting the plaintiffs claim that Greenwich Acquisition positively acted to create the snow pile that subsequently led to the ice patch upon which the plaintiff slipped. Maxon testified at trial that approximately thirteen inches of snow had fallen eighteen days before the plaintiffs accident, and approximately one inch of snow had fallen eight to twelve days prior to the accident. Although the issue initially was disputed by Greenwich Acquisition and 19 West Elm Street, the jury saw and heard evidence that the snow pile was located on property owned exclusively by Greenwich Acquisition. The jury, viewing the photographs of the ice, the snow pile and the planting bed, could compare those areas to other areas around the accident site to determine whether the pile on the sidewalk and the resulting ice looked natural, or whether the pile appeared uneven, larger than other accumulated snow piles in the area, or in any way to have been created by human action. Using those same photographs, the jury had the opportunity to compare the appearance of the snow pile next to the planting bed with the appearance of the snow on the planting bed to determine whether the pile on the sidewalk looked as if it had accumulated naturally, or been piled. In addition, the jury heard testimony and saw photographic evidence that Greenwich Acquisition's building manager, Voisene, had called Passerelli shortly after the accident to ask him to clear the walkway of snow and ice. The jury reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that Greenwich Acquisition, through Passerelli, was in control of the area where the snow pile existed, that it had created the snow pile, and that the accumulation of snow on the planting bed would not have been so great if not for Greenwich Acquisition's actions. In light of our deferential scope of review of jury fact-finding, and recognizing that we may set aside a jury's verdict only if we find that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached its conclusion, we conclude that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to infer that Greenwich Acquisition's positive act created the snow pile. We next consider the evidence supporting the plaintiffs claim that Greenwich Acquisition, by creating the snow pile, caused a materially different flow or volume of water that formed the ice patch. Maxon examined thermal data to conclude that the three foot by eight foot ice patch formed when the snow pile started to melt on the previous day, and then refroze overnight. Thorme testified that his investigation led him to conclude that the snow pile, approximately four feet by three feet by six inches high, created the ice patch on which the plaintiff fell. As we concluded previously, the jury reasonably could have determined that Greenwich Acquisition had piled snow in the area and, thus, reasonably could have determined that there was more snow in the area next to the planting bed than there would have been if Greenwich Acquisition had not acted. In addition, the jury saw photographic evidence of the area shortly after the accident, which showed the tapering of the ice and water runoff from the snow pile as it progressed across the sidewalk. The jury reasonably could have determined that the additional snow piled on the sidewalk led to increased water flow when the snow melted, which increased the size and dangerousness of the resulting ice patch. Again, in light of our deferential scope of review of jury fact-finding, and recognizing that we may set aside a jury's verdict only if we find that the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached its conclusion, we conclude that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to infer that Greenwich Acquisition, by creating the snow pile, caused a materially different and more dangerous condition than would have existed had Greenwich Acquisition not acted. Ill We next address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence that Greenwich Acquisition, through Passerelli, had performed subsequent remedial measures by removing snow from the sidewalk after the plaintiffs fall. We disagree. The following additional procedural history is relevant to Greenwich Acquisition's claim. At trial, the plaintiff introduced as evidence a photograph of Passerelli clearing the snow pile, photographs of the area after the sidewalk had been treated with salt, and testimony from Voisene that he had called Passerelli after the accident. Greenwich Acquisition made a motion in limine to exclude any evidence that Passerelli had cleared the sidewalk after the accident, and timely objected to the admission of each item of evidence on the ground that it constituted evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The plaintiff argued that the evidence was admissible because it was being offered to prove the issues of control of the premises and the feasibility of precautionary measures, and to show the source of the water that formed the black ice. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-7 (a); Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 66, 463 A.2d 252 (1983). The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, denied Greenwich Acquisition's motion, and admitted the evidence over Greenwich Acquisition's objections. On appeal, Greenwich Acquisition cites § 4-7 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence in support of its claim that evidence that a defendant has taken remedial measures subsequent to an accident " 'is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.' " Greenwich Acquisition argues, on the basis of our holding in Hall v. Burns, 213 Conn. 446, 457-58, 569 A.2d 10 (1990), that such evidence is inadmissible because it has little probative value on the issue of a defendant's culpability, and because defendants will be less likely to correct hazardous situations if their conduct will be used against them at trial. Greenwich Acquisition further argues that the plaintiffs photographs of Passerelli cleaning up the snow pile and the icy sidewalk shortly after the plaintiffs accident showed the remediation in progress, had little or no probative value as to Greenwich Acquisition's culpability, fit no exception to the rule of exclusion, and "formed a pillar" of the plaintiffs argument that, if Passerelli removed the snow, he must have put it there in the first place. The plaintiff counters: (1) the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was properly admitted under § 4-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence because it was " 'offered to prove controverted issues such as ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary measures' (2) Greenwich Acquisition has failed to identify, on appeal, the photographs to which it objects; (3) the photographs provided evidence of Greenwich Acquisition's control over the snow pile, which was a contested issue at trial; (4) the photographs were probative on the issue of the feasibility of precautionary measures and the importance of the pile in causing the hazardous condition; and (5) even if the court's decision to admit the photographs was improper, any impropriety on the part of the trial court in admitting them was harmless, because the jury already had learned through the unchallenged oral testimony of Voisene, Greenwich Acquisition's property manager, that he had contacted Passerelli shortly after the plaintiff had fallen. The plaintiff argues that the jury could have inferred from that exchange that the purpose for calling Passerelli was to request that he clean up the snow pile and treat the ice on the sidewalk. We agree with the plaintiff that the evidence was relevant to the issue of control. "As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard by which we review the trial court's determinations concerning the [admissibility] of evidence. The trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677, 683, 822 A.2d 228 (2003). "Even when a trial court's evidentiary ruling is deemed to be improper, we must determine whether that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial. . In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful. . . . Finally, the standard in a civil case for determining whether an improper ruling was harmful is whether the . . . ruling [likely] would [have] affectfed] the result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. McClintock, 267 Conn. 399, 403, 838 A.2d 972 (2004). "The general rule is that evidence of subsequent repair is not admissible on the issue of negligence. . . . This court, however, has admitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures if offered for other purposes . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Burns, supra, 213 Conn. 456. "[T]he rule barring evidence of subsequent repairs in negligence actions is based on narrow public policy grounds, not on an evidentiary infirmity. . It presupposes that to admit evidence of subsequent repairs to an identified hazardous condition as proof of negligence penalizes the defendant for taking remedial measures. This discourages alleged tortfeasors from repairing hazards, thereby perpetuating the danger. This policy fosters the public good by allowing tortfeasors to repair hazards without fear of having the repair used as proof of negligence "Even in negligence actions, however, we have held proof of subsequent remedial measures admissible if offered for a purpose other than to show culpable conduct on the part of a defendant. In several cases, we have admitted such evidence when the defendant's control of the hazardous instrumentality is at issue in the suit. See, e.g., Williams v. Milner Hotels Co., 130 Conn. 507, 510, 36 A.2d 20 (1944); Killian v. Logan, 115 Conn. 437, 439, 162 A. 30 (1932). . . . The existence of these exceptions to the general rule illustrates that the strength of the public policy supporting the rule is not so great as to demand the exclusion where there is a strong probative use for the evidence, as contrasted with the somewhat dubious legal relevance of subsequent repairs to the question of negligence itself." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 143-45, 491 A.2d 389 (1985). "The central question is the plaintiffs purpose in introducing the evidence. The doctrine bars evidence of subsequent repairs when offered to prove negligence. It does not exclude such evidence when offered to prove some other material issue." Rokus v. Bridgeport, supra, 191 Conn. 66. While repairs made after an accident tend to prove that the party conducting them retains control over the area in question; Killian v. Logan, supra, 115 Conn. 439; if the defendant has admitted orally that it controlled the premises on which the injury occurred, no reference in testimony to subsequent repairs should be made. Haffey v. Lemieux, 154 Conn. 185, 192-93, 224 A.2d 551 (1966). In the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographic evidence as probative on the issue of control over the snow pile. Although Greenwich Acquisition conceded at trial that the plaintiff fell on the sidewalk abutting its land, it did not concede that it was the party responsible, if any party was responsible, for creating the snow pile. Indeed, the trial court directed the jury to determine which of the defendants, Greenwich Acquisition or 19 West Elm Street, if either, was liable for creating the snow pile. Thus, the jury could have used photographs of Passerelli clearing the pile shortly after the accident as evidence that Greenwich Acquisi tion controlled the pile and caused the dangerous conditions on the sidewalk. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographic evidence. IV We next address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury that evidence regarding Passerelli's removal of snow from the sidewalk after the incident was not relevant to the issue of whether Greenwich Acquisition was negligent. We disagree. The principles governing our review of claims of improper jury instructions are set forth in part I of this opinion. The following additional procedural history is relevant to the resolution of this claim. As noted in part III of this opinion, Greenwich Acquisition made a motion in limine to exclude any evidence that Passerelli had cleared the sidewalk after the accident, and timely objected to the admission of testimony and photographs showing that Passerelli had cleared the ice and snow pile after the plaintiffs accident on the ground that they constituted evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The court denied Greenwich Acquisition's motion and overruled its subsequent objections. During closing arguments, the plaintiffs counsel told the jury that "the question is who placed the snow pile there? And . . . I think the evidence will tend to tip the scales in favor of [Passerelli] having done it . . . . [H]e was the one [who] was called to remove the offending snow bank. . . . [T]he [photographic exhibits] show [Passerelli] coming to remove that snow. If you didn't put it there, why in the world would you call your contractor to come remove it?" Subsequent to closing arguments and prior to the jury's deliberation, Greenwich Acquisition took exception to the charge on the ground that the trial court "did not charge on subsequent remedial mea sures as not being a basis for an inference of negligence." Greenwich Acquisition noted that, although it had not requested a charge, the plaintiffs counsel, dining closing arguments, had asked the jury to draw the inference that Passerelli had piled the snow because he was the one who had cleaned it up. Although the plaintiff had conceded on the first day of trial that the court would have to provide a limiting instruction concerning subsequent remedial measures, the plaintiffs counsel responded that the inference he intended for the jury to draw from the photographs of Passerelli cleaning up the snow and from his closing arguments, was that "it was [Passerelli's] snow that was placed there to begin with. It's essentially an argument of control . of that mound, whose was it. And so, it wasn't to argue for purposes of finding liability because he fixed something, but more of an argument based on control." The trial court overruled Greenwich Acquisition's exception to the charge as given. On appeal, Greenwich Acquisition cites Blanchard v. Bridgeport, 190 Conn. 798, 805, 463 A.2d 553 (1983), in support of its claim that, having admitted evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, the trial court was required, upon exception, to provide the jury with a limiting instruction concerning the use of the evidence. The plaintiff claims that the issue is not preserved for appeal because, although Greenwich Acquisition took exception to the trial court's charge for failure to charge on subsequent remedial measures, it failed to state distinctly the nature of its complaint as required by Practice Book § 16-20. The plaintiff argues that Greenwich Acquisition failed to specify the particular testimony, photographs, or combination of the two, to which it objected, and failed to state distinctly how the trial court should have addressed the matter. The plaintiff also notes that Greenwich Acquisition failed to object when Voisene testified at trial that he had called Passerelli shortly after the accident, and argues that the photographs merely serve to corroborate that testimony and to confirm the inference that Voisene had made the call so that Passerelli would clean up the sidewalk. The plaintiff further notes that Greenwich Acquisition's counsel elicited testimony from Passerelli that Voisene had called him after the plaintiffs fall, and requested that he "come out there and . . . clean up the snow that was there." We first address the issue of preservation. "An appellate court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the . . . exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered. Counsel taking the exception shall state distinctly the matter objected to and the ground of objection." Practice Book § 16-20. Greenwich Acquisition took exception immediately after the trial court delivered the charge on the ground that the trial court "did not charge on subsequent remedial measures as not being a basis for an inference of negligence." In the context of Greenwich Acquisition's prior, specific, and consistent objections, we conclude that this exception was sufficiently distinct to alert the trial court of any defects in the charge. See State v. Ramos, 271 Conn. 785, 801, 860 A.2d 249 (2004). Accordingly, we address the merits of Greenwich Acquisition's claim. "Evidence admissible for one purpose but not for another may nevertheless be admitted. . . . The court should, however, caution the jury . . . about the limited purpose of the exhibit." (Citation omitted.) Blanchard v. Bridgeport, supra, 190 Conn. 805. "Although it is the better practice for the trial court to instruct the jury whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose even when not requested to do so," a trial court's failure to do so does not constitute per se error. Rokus v. Bridgeport, supra, 191 Conn. 67. We agree with Greenwich Acquisition that it would have been preferable had the trial court provided an instruction limiting the reasonable inferences the jury could draw from the evidence of Passerelli's subsequent remedial actions. The failure to do so in this case, however, was harmless. We are persuaded that the photographs and testimony to which Greenwich Acquisition objected merely corroborated Voisene's testimony that he had contacted Passerelli shortly after the accident. Thus, the jury reasonably could have drawn the same inferences from Voisene's testimony as they could have drawn from the photographs of Passerelli cleaning up the snow. We also note that the plaintiff did not argue to the jury that the photographs or testimony should be used as evidence of negligence, but rather as evidence of Greenwich Acquisition's control over the snow pile. Because the issue of control was clearly delineated during the trial, and the argument of counsel fairly presented the case; Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 287, 294 A.2d 67 (1972); we conclude that any impropriety by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury as to the limited use of the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was harmless. V We next address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of Passerelli, ruling as a matter of law that a property owner may not assert an apportionment claim against a snow removal contractor. We disagree. As an initial matter, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. "[T]he standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judg ment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 321, 885 A.2d 734 (2005). Whether the trial court properly concluded that, as a matter of law, no claim for apportionment could be brought against Passerelli is a pure question of law. Therefore, our review is plenary. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. Greenwich Acquisition had retained Passerelli by oral agreement to perform snow removal services on Greenwich Acquisition's premises, including the adjacent public sidewalk. This agreement required Passerelli to clear snow and spread calcium chloride following snowstorms, or when Greenwich Acquisition notified him that his services were needed. Greenwich Acquisition and Passerelli disagreed over whether Passerelli had a duty under the contract to inspect the premises for snow and ice. After the plaintiff filed her original complaint against Greenwich Acquisition, 19 West Elm Street and the town, Greenwich Acquisition served an apportionment complaint on Passerelli pursuant to General Statutes § 52-1026 and 52-572h (c). Greenwich Acquisition alleged that, to the extent that the plaintiff suffered injuries in her fall, Passerelli directly and proximately caused such injuries by failing to maintain and inspect the sidewalk as required under contract and by negligently performing his duties. Passerelli filed a motion in limine to preclude all parties at trial from introducing evidence regarding the apportionment claim or the apportionment of liability between Greenwich Acquisition and himself, arguing that Connecticut law does not recognize such claims against independent contractors where the defendant has a nondelegable duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The trial court initially denied the motion. Later in the trial, however, the court raised the issue sua sponte and rendered summary judgment in favor of Passerelli, finding that, as a matter of law, under Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 245, 257-58, no claim for apportionment could be brought against him. Passerelli did not participate in the remainder of the trial. Greenwich Acquisition claims that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of Passerelli. It argues that the court's ruling constituted a misinterpretation and unwarranted extension of this court's ruling in Gazo. The plaintiff and Passerelli argue that the trial court properly granted Passerelli's motion for summary judgment because: (1) Connecticut has recognized historically the nondelegable duty doctrine in premises liability cases; (2) Greenwich Acquisition owed the public a nondelegable duty to maintain its premises in reasonably safe condition, and thus its most appropriate remedy was not an apportionment claim against Passerelli, but rather a claim for indemnification; and (3) as set forth in Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 257-58, the nondelegable duty doctrine and the relationship between property owners and independent contractors preclude defendant property owners from making apportionment claims against contractors for breaches of nondelegable duties. We agree with the plaintiff and Passerelli. "Prior to 1986, Connecticut tort law adhered to the common-law rule of joint and several liability for the allocation of responsibility for damages resulting from an injury caused by more than one person. . . . Under this doctrine, an injured person was entitled to recover the entire amount of a damages award from any defendant whose conduct proximately caused the injury." (Citation omitted.) Nash v. Yap, 247 Conn. 638, 644-45, 726 A.2d 92 (1999). Through various enactments known collectively as Tort Reform I and Tort Reform II, however, the legislature enacted our present apportionment statute, § 52-572h. Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338, § 3 (c); see Nash v. Yap, supra, 645. Section 52-572h (c) provides in relevant part that "[i]n a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for such party's proportionate share of the recoverable . . . damages . . . except as provided in subsection (g) of this section." In addition, we long have held that a property owner cannot escape liability for injury to a third party by hiring a contractor to inspect and maintain the property as conditions appear to demand, because the "negligence of the servant [is] the negligence of the [master] . . . Koskoff v. Goldman, 86 Conn. 415, 420, 85 A. 588 (1912). Landlords with tenants are "obligated to use reasonable care to keep those approaches reasonably safe . . . and . it is no defense that some one else is charged . . . with, or assumes the performance of, that duty, if it [is] not performed. . . . This obligation of the landlord extends also to all those who have lawful occasion to visit the tenants for social or business purposes." (Citations omitted.) Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 386, 128 A. 705 (1925); see also Newell v. K. & D. Jewelry Co., 119 Conn. 332, 334, 176 A. 405 (1935) (when defendant store owner hired contractor to wash floors and contractor failed to dry them properly, causing injury to third party, court held that fact that independent contractor had caused condition complained of constituted no defense to defendant). In Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 245, we considered a claim very similar to the present case. In Gazo, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen on an icy and snowy sidewalk. Id., 247. The plaintiff brought a statutory highway defect claim against the city of Stamford and alleged that the record owner of the property abutting the sidewalk where the plaintiff had fallen (owner), and the tenant in possession (tenant) of the property abutting the sidewalk where the plaintiff had fallen, had failed in their duty to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and snow, causing his injuries. Id. The tenant, in turn, filed an apportionment complaint against the independent contractor (apportionment defendant), who had been hired by the tenant to maintain the property in a safe condition. The plaintiff subsequently filed a substitute complaint against the original defendants and the apportionment defendant. Id. The apportionment defendant in Gazo moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the apportionment complaint and on the negligence count that the plaintiff had raised in his substitute complaint, on the ground that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. Id., 248. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that the landlord's duty to keep the premises safe could not be delegated to a snow removal contractor. Id. Because the tenant did not appeal from the judgment in favor of the apportionment defendant on the apportionment complaint, the propriety of that ruling was not before us. Id. Rather, we considered "the question of whether [the apportionment defendant] owe[d] a direct duty of care to the plaintiff based on [his] contractual relationship with [the tenant]." Id., 249. We concluded that the apportionment defendant did owe such a duty. Id., 250. As part of our reasoning, we stated that "[the apportionment defendant] contracted to perform ice and snow removal services for [the tenant], which had a nondelegable duty to keep its premises safe." Id., 253. The apportionment defendant argued, inter alia, that the nondelegable duty doctrine precluded the plaintiff from bringing an action against an independent contractor for its negligence because, under the doctrine, only the property possessor could be held liable for injuries sustained on the property. Id., 255. We agreed with the apportionment defendant that, under the nondelegable duty doctrine, the party with such a duty "may not absolve itself of liability by contracting out the performance of that duty. . . . [T]he nondelegable duty doctrine means that a party may contract out the performance of a nondelegable duty, but may not contract out his ultimate legal responsibility." Id. We disagreed with the apportionment defendant in Gazo, however, that the independent contractor could not be held liable. We stated that "it is not a necessary implication of the nondelegable duty doctrine that the contractor to whom the performance of the duty has been assigned may not, under appropriate circumstances, also owe the same duty to a party injured by its breach. . . . Instead, we view the nondelegable duty doctrine as involving a form of vicarious liability, pursuant to which the party with the duty may be vicariously liable for the conduct of its independent contractor. . . . "Under the general rule, an employer is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. Douglass v. Peck & Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 627, 95 A. 22 (1915); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 71, p. 509; 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Independent Contractors § 29 (1995). One exception to this general rule, however, is that the owner or occupier of premises owes invitees a nondelegable duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of such persons. . . . The nondelegable duty doctrine is, therefore, an exception to the rule that an employer may not be held liable for the torts of its independent contractors. See, e.g., Petition of Alva S.S. Co., Ltd., [616 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1980)] ([a]nindependent contractor remains liable for his own negligence even though the law also imposes liability on the owner under the non-delegable duty rule); Chapman v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 35 F. Sup. 2d 699, 706 ([E.D. Wis.] 1999) (nondelegable duty doctrine is exception to independent contractor rule). Nondelegable duties create a form of vicarious liability. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 71, p. 511; Ray v. Schneider, [16 Conn. App. 660, 664, 548 A.2d 461] (where the employer has a nondelegable duty . . . the employer may be vicariously liable to others for the negligent acts of the independent contractor) [cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822, 551 A.2d 756 (1988)]. In vicarious liability situations, the law has . . . broaden[ed] the liability for that fault by imposing it upon an additional, albeit innocent, defen dant . . . W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 69, p. 499; namely, the party that has the nondelegable duty." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 256-57. We further concluded that "[o]ur analysis of [the apportionment defendant's] liability to the plaintiff is consistent with the abolition of joint and several liability by tort reform. [Section] 52-572h (c) provides: 'In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property . if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable . . . damages . . . .' This provision 'replaced the common-law rule of joint and several liability with a system of apportioned liability that holds each defendant liable for only his or her proportionate share of damages.' Nash v. Yap, [supra, 247 Conn. 645]. That provision, however, proceeds on the premise that the defendants, between or among any of whom liability is apportioned, are at least potentially liable in differing proportions. It does not apply, therefore, to a case of vicarious liability of one defendant for the conduct of another. Thus . § 52-572h (c) does not apply, for example, when the two defendants are a servant and his master who is vicariously liable for his servant's tortious conduct. Consequently, in the present case, if [the apportionment defendant] were to be held liable to the plaintiff based on his contractual assumption of [the tenant's] duty of care to the plaintiff, in effect [the tenant's] liability would be tantamount to a form of vicarious liability for [the apportionment defendant's] conduct. In that circumstance, there would be no revival of joint and several liability inconsistent with § 52-572h (c)." Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 257-58. In the present case, Greenwich Acquisition argues that the issue before this court, namely, the viability of an apportionment complaint by a property owner against its contractor, was not before us in Gazo, because in Gazo, the judge had rendered summary judgment on an apportionment complaint against the contractor, and the judgment was not appealed. Thus, Greenwich Acquisition claims, this court's discussion of the relationship between the nondelegable duty doctrine and vicarious liability was dicta and is not binding on this court. Regardless of whether the language in Gazo was dicta or was part of our holding, we now formally adopt the reasoning of that decision and conclude that the owner or occupier of a premises owes a nondelegable duty to keep the premises safe by protecting third persons from foreseeable slip and fall injuries. Should the owner or occupier of the premises hire a contractor to maintain the property, the owner or occupier is vicariously hable for the consequences arising from that contractor's tortious conduct. Section 52-572h (c) does not apply to cases of vicarious liability, like the present one, where defendants are not potentially liable to the plaintiff in differing proportions. We conclude, therefore, that in such circumstances, a defendant that owns or controls property may not bring an apportionment claim against a contractor hired to carry out the defendant's nondelegable duties. In support of its claim, Greenwich Acquisition argues that the nondelegable duty doctrine, while recognized in various contexts in Connecticut, historically had little relationship to the duties of property owners. As we recognized in Koskoff v. Goldman, supra, 86 Conn. 420, and in our analysis in Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 257-58, the party in control of a premises long has had a nondelegable duty to maintain the safety of those premises. We perceive no reason to reconsider this question. Greenwich Acquisition also relies on Henriques v. Magnavice, 59 Conn. App. 333, 338, 757 A.2d 627 (2000), to support its claim that apportionment is consistent with the nondelegable duty doctrine. In Henriques, the Appellate Court stated that " [apportionment does not affect the determination of whether the defendant is liable under a theoiy of negligence but, rather, affects the determination of his degree of fault . . . ." Id. Greenwich Acquisition concedes that, "under the nondelegable duty doctrine, a property owner cannot avoid liability on the ground that it hired a competent contractor to discharge its duty." (Emphasis added.) It argues, however, that the nondelegable duty doctrine does not govern "the issue of whether the property owner's degree of fault must be identical to that of the contractor . . . ." (Emphasis added.) We recognize that the apportionment statute was intended to make a defendant's liability to the plaintiff proportionate to the defendant's degree of fault. The very essence of the nondelegable duty doctrine, however, is that the property owner is fully liable to a plaintiff who has been injured as a result of a breach of a nondelegable duty regardless of whether the property owner actually is at fault or the degree of fault. When a property owner's liability to the plaintiff for the wrongful conduct of an independent contractor legally cannot be apportioned, then there is no reason to apportion fault between the property owner and the contractor in an apportionment proceeding. Finally, Greenwich Acquisition argues that, in implementing tort reform, the legislature intended to impose " 'limitations on a negligent defendant's obligation to pay damages.' Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 232 [717 A.2d 202] (1998)." See also Donner v. Kearse, 234 Conn. 660, 668-69, 662 A.2d 1269 (1995). Greenwich Acquisition argues that the apportionment statute balances the plaintiffs interest in recovering her loss against the defendant's interest in limiting its payment by allowing the defendant to make direct claims against an apportionment defendant. Greenwich Acquisition argues that this balance of rights would be upset if the defendant could not bring an action against an apportionment defendant, whereas the plaintiff could bring an action against the property owner, the contractor, or both. In addition, Greenwich Acquisition argues that such a conclusion could lead to an increased burden on the courts because property owners would be forced to file separate actions against contractors when they previously would have brought apportionment actions within the context of the original litigation. We disagree. It is widely recognized that, when one party is vicariously liable for another party's conduct, the appropriate remedy for an innocent party who has been held vicariously liable is a claim for indemnity rather than for apportionment. Restatement (Third), Torts, Apportionment of Liability § 13, comment (f), p. 115 (2000) ("a party held liable solely because of the tortious conduct of another may be entitled to indemnity from the latter"); 2 D. Pope, Connecticut Actions and Remedies, Tort Law (1993) § 25:30, p. 25-50 ("a right of indemnity may arise between master and servant, when the servant's negligent conduct has caused the master to become liable to a third party"); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 51, p. 341-42 ("it is generally agreed that there may be indemnity in favor of one who is held responsible solely by imputation of law because of a relation to the actual wrongdoer, as where an employer is vicariously liable for the tort of a servant or an independent contractor"). Greenwich Acquisition argued at oral argument that an indemnification action places a greater burden upon the defendant than an apportionment claim. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., 152 Conn. 405, 407, 207 A.2d 732 (1965) (to recover as indemnitee, plaintiff must prove that defendant is primarily liable, which requires proof that [1] defendant was negligent, [2] defendant's negligence was direct, immediate cause of accident and resulting injury, [3] defendant was in control of situation to exclusion of plaintiff, and [4] plaintiff did not know of defendant's negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and could reasonably rely on defendant not to be negligent). Even assuming that an indemnification action does place a greater burden on the defendant, requiring the defendant to bring such an action would not constitute an additional burden on the courts, because defendant property owners can assert third party claims for indemnification against contractors, thus enabling the indemnification claims to be tried in the same action as the plaintiffs original claims. See generally Harvey v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 52 Conn. App. 1, 724 A.2d 1143 (1999). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Passerelli. VI We next address Greenwich Acquisition's claim that the trial court improperly denied its motion for summary judgment. Greenwich Acquisition argues that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to maintain the public sidewalk because the applicable town ordinance failed to transfer the town's liability to Greenwich Acquisition. "The standard of review of a trial court's decision granting summary judgment is well established. Prac tice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 263 Conn. 140, 146, 819 A.2d 216 (2003). "[Ajbsent exceptional circumstances, a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable where a full trial on the merits produces a verdict against the moving party. . . . The basis of this policy is that even if the motion is improperly denied, the error is not reversible; the result has merged into the subsequent decision on the merits. To hold otherwise would be to depart from this sound policy which allows a decision based on more evidence to preclude review of a decision made on less evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 541 n.7, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "Cases in which appellate courts have reviewed such a denial typically have involved a judgment without a full trial on the merits. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 295 n.12, 596 A.2d 414 (1991); Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 325, 334, 830 A.2d 314, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 928, 837 A.2d 803 (2003)." U.B. Vehicle Leasing, Inc. v. Davis, 90 Conn. App. 206, 218, 876 A.2d 1222 (2005). Greenwich Acquisition argues that it owed no duty to maintain the public sidewalk adjacent to its property, because under common law, such maintenance was the municipality's responsibility. Thus, Greenwich Acquisition argues, because it filed a motion for summary judgment at a time when the plaintiffs only allegation against it was that it negligently had maintained the public sidewalk, the plaintiff had no other basis upon which to recover against Greenwich Acquisition, and the claim should have been dismissed summarily at that time. In response to Greenwich Acquisition's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging, in addition to its allegations that Greenwich Acquisition had failed to properly maintain the sidewalk, that Greenwich Acquisition "[i]n clearing snow from the driveway . . . piled the snow at the base of the driveway immediately adjoining the public sidewalk in a manner which it knew or should have known would cause run-off from melting snow resulting in a dangerous ice slipping hazard on the public sidewalk." The trial court subsequently denied Greenwich Acquisition's motion because it concluded that there were "unresolved fact issues relative to liability." We will permit a party to appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial on the merits only in exceptional circumstances. After reviewing the record, we conclude that this case does not present an exceptional circumstance that would justify reviewing on appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment where a trial was held on the merits. See Gurliacci v. Mayer, supra, 218 Conn. 541 n.7; Bristol v. Vogelsonger, 21 Conn. App. 600, 601 n.2, 575 A.2d 252 (1990); Greengarden v. Kuhn, 13 Conn. App. 550, 552, 537 A.2d 1043 (1988); see also Denby v. Voloshin Cadillac, Inc., 3 Conn. App. 181, 181-82 n.3, 485 A.2d 1360, cert. dismissed, 196 Conn. 802, 491 A.2d 1105 (1985). The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Prior to trial, the plaintiff withdrew her complaint against the town and Passerelli. After a trial on the plaintiffs claims against Greenwich Acquisition and 19 West Elm Street, the jury returned a verdict against Greenwich Acquisition and in favor of 19 West Elm Street. Greenwich Acquisition appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. General Statutes § 52-102b (d) provides: "Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitation or repose, the plaintiff may, within sixty days of the return date of the apportionment complaint served pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, assert any claim against the apportionment defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original complaint." See also Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 280, 567 A.2d 829 (1989); Young v. Talcott, supra, 114 Conn. 678-79; Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525, 532 (1881) ("The individual owes no duty to the public in reference to [a sidewalk abutting his property] except . to refrain from doing or placing anything thereon dangerous to the traveler. So far as defects in it result wholly from the operations of nature, the proprietor at whose front they exist is without responsibility for them."); Calway v. Schaal & Son, Inc., 113 Conn. 586, 590, 155 A. 813 (1931) ("[i]f one by his acts creates a dangerous condition in a highway, or so conducts his own affairs that such a condition follows and he has notice of it, he is under a duty to use reasonable care to protect travelers from it; the liability for failure to do so does not arise out of the fact that the highway is defective but out of the duty resting upon him to guard persons subjected to danger by his act"); Kane v. New Idea Realty Co., 104 Conn. 508, 515, 133 A. 686 (1926) (owners of property abutting highway have obligation to use reasonable care to keep premises in condition that will not endanger travelers in lawful use of highway); Dunn v. J. P. Steven & Co., 192 F.2d 854, 855 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[i]f it should be proved at the trial that the defendant piled the snow in ridges on the walk . in a manner to make it more dangerous than in its natural state and that the conditions so created caused the plaintiffs fall, the defendant would incur liability"). Our review of the evidence does not support such a claim. The jury reasonably could have found that the flow of water from naturally existing snow on the planting bed would have been sufficient to create an ice patch even if Greenwich Acquisition had not piled snow on the bed. At trial, counsel for the plaintiff argued during his closing remarks that, "the question is who placed the snow pile there? . I believe [Passerelli] did it, and I think the evidence will tend to tip the scales in favor of [Passerelli] having done it, making [Greenwich Acquisition] responsible for what he did . . . . [H]e was the one [who] was called to remove the offending snow bank. . . . [T]he [photographic exhibits], show [Passerelh] coming to remove that snow. If you didn't put it there, why in the world would you call your contractor to come remove it?" Practice Book § 16-20 provides in relevant part: "An appellate court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered. Counsel taking the exception shall state distinctly the matter objected to and the ground of objection. . . ." This court has not yet received a written memorandum of decision or a signed transcript of the trial court's decision granting Passerelli's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's legal analysis is not essential to this court's consideration of the issue on appeal, however, where the issue is purely a question of law warranting plenary review. See Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 182-83, 819 A.2d 765 (2003). Moreover, Greenwich Acquisition maintains that the trial court's reasoning is sufficiently set forth in the unsigned transcripts of the trial. See Carrasquillo v. Carlson, 90 Conn. App. 705, 708 n.2, 880 A.2d 904 (2005) (record adequate for review where unsigned transcript contains sufficiently detailed and concise statement of trial court's findings). General Statutes § 52-572h (c) provides in relevant part: "In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1,1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be hable to the claimant only for such party's proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages . . . The plaintiff also claimed in her brief to this court that the general verdict rule bars review of Greenwich Acquisition's claim because Greenwich Acquisition failed to submit special interrogatories requesting a factual determination distinguishing its conduct from Passerelli's. We disagree. In light of the trial court's ruling that Greenwich Acquisition could not apportion any liability to Passerelli in this case, there was no reason for Greenwich Acquisition to submit a request for such special interrogatories to the court. As we discuss later in this opinion, when one party is vicariously liable for another party's wrongful conduct, the innocent party may bring a claim for indemnity against the actual wrongdoer. We recognize that several jurisdictions have concluded that, when both parties to an indemnity proceeding are negligent, liability may be allocated between the plaintiff and the defendant according to the degree of fault. See, e.g., Sehulster Tunnels v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1350-51, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 665 (2003); D'Ambrosio v. New York, 55 N.Y.2d 454, 464, 435 N.E.2d 366, 450 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1982). To the extent that Greenwich Acquisition argues that fault may be allocated between it and Passerelli in the present case, any such claim must be raised within the context of an indemnity proceeding.

Opinion ZARELLA, J. The sole issue in this appeal is whether a new home construction contract that fails to comply with the registration, disclosure and contract language provisions of the New Home Construction Contractors Act, General Statutes § 20-417a et seq., is unenforceable. The defendants, Steven P. Cordovano and Sarah M. Cordovano, appeal from the judgment of the trial court declaring such a contract to be enforceable and declining to invalidate a mechanic's hen placed on their property by the plaintiff, D'Angelo Development and Construction Company. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are undisputed. In the summer of 2000, the defendants offered to purchase a parcel of land located at 134 Highland Avenue in Norwalk from Leonard D'Angelo, Jr., the plaintiffs president and sole employee. D'Angelo had planned to build a home on speculation at 134 Highland Avenue but agreed to sell the land to the defendants on the condition that they retain the plaintiff to build a home for them on that parcel. On October 30, 2000, the parties closed on the sale of 134 Highland Avenue and signed an agreement calling for the plaintiff to build a home for the defendants at that location. The plaintiff had been licensed by the state as a home improvement contractor since 1994. See Home Improvement Act, General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. Before October 30, 2000, D'Angelo was unaware of the New Home Construction Contractors Act and its registration requirement for new home construction contractors. See General Statutes § 20-417d (d) ("[n]o person shall . (5) engage in the business of a new home construction contractor or hold himself or herself out as a new home construction contractor without having a current certificate of registration"). Upon learning of the act on October 30, 2000, the plaintiff sought a certificate of registration as a new home construction contractor. The plaintiff obtained the certificate on November 2, 2000, three days after signing the contract with the defendants. The plaintiff began construction of the new home at 134 Highland Avenue only after having received the certificate of registration. In July, 2002, following completion of construction and the defendants' failure to pay the total amount due under the agreement, the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien against the property in the amount of $86,699.26.® The plaintiff then commenced an action against the defendants, asserting claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit, and seeking foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. The defendants moved to substitute a bond for the lien. They then filed an application with the court to declare the lien invalid. In support of their application, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the registration, disclosure and contract language provisions of the act, and that its noncompliance rendered the contract between the parties unen forceable and the lien invalid. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment denying the defendants' application. The trial court concluded that "a violation of the [act] does not relieve a party from a contractual obligation" and that "the lien at issue [was] not invalid as a matter of law." The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. On appeal, the defendants renew their claim that the plaintiffs failure to comply with the act renders the contract unenforceable and the lien invalid. The defendants premise their claim on Wilson Building & Design Associates, Inc. v. Vanderkerckhove, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-01-0096157 S (January 25, 2002) (Wilson Building), in which the court held that a new home construction contract entered into by the parties was unenforceable due to the contractor's noncompliance with the act. The plaintiff contends, conversely, that the statutory text and legislative intent behind the act preclude a finding that such contracts are unenforceable. We agree with the plaintiff. We begin by noting that, "the general rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, [is] that no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent purpose of which is to violate the law. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will they enforce any alleged right directly springing from such contract . . . ." Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas, 115 Conn. 418, 423, 161 A. 856 (1932); accord Robertson v. Stonington, 253 Conn. 255, 260, 750 A.2d 460 (2000). In the present case, there is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the purpose of the contract was illegal. Moreover, the defendants make no allegation to that effect. Rather, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was unaware of the statutory requirements relating to new home construction contractors and, upon learning of the act on October 30, 2000, the day that the agreement was signed, it immediately sought and obtained the required certificate of registration. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not commence construction until after it had received the certificate of registration. We thus conclude that the purpose of the contract was not to violate the law but to effectuate an otherwise legal transaction. We next examine the defendants' claim that the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the act renders the contract unenforceable. Because this claim raises a question of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 Conn. 12, 18, 866 A.2d 1273 (2005). When interpreting a statute, "[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 735, 792 A.2d 752 (2002). "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z. We first consult the text of the act. The New Home Construction Contractors Act, which took effect on October 1, 1999, regulates the activities of new home construction contractors. The act requires a contractor to obtain a certificate of registration from the commissioner of consumer protection (commissioner) before he or she may "engage in the business of new home construction or hold himself or herself out as a new home construction contractor . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417b (a). The act also specifies the circumstances under which the commissioner may revoke, suspend or refuse to issue or renew a certificate of registration. See General Statutes § 20-417c. Other provisions of the act affirmatively regulate the conduct of new home construction contractors, prohibit new home construction contractors from engaging in certain activities and set forth various requirements as to the format and content of new home construction contracts. The act further provides three distinct penalties for a violation of its provisions. First, the act empowers the commissioner to impose a civil penalty on, among others, "any person who engages in or practices the work for which a certificate of registration is required by [the act] . . . without having first obtained such a certificate of registration" or any person who "violates any of the provisions of [the act] . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417f. Second, the act provides that "any person who violates any provision of subsection (d) of section 20-417d shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor." Gen eral Statutes § 20-417e. Finally, the act provides that a violation of any of its provisions "shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under subsection (a) of section 42-110b"; General Statutes § 20-417g; thereby exposing the violator to a private lawsuit under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Significantly, the act contains no provision addressing the enforceability of contracts that fail to comply with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, there is nothing in the act to suggest that its enumeration of penalties excludes all other remedies. We therefore conclude that the text of the act is ambiguous with regard to the enforceability of noncompliant contracts and turn for additional guidance to other closely related statutes regulating the home construction industry. See General Statutes § 1-2z (meaning of statutory provision is determined by examining text of statute itself and its relationship to other statutes). The Home Improvement Act was enacted in 1979; see Public Acts 1979, No. 79-606; twenty year's prior to the New Home Construction Contractors Act, to provide consumers with protection from unscrupulous home improvement contractors. See Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Dowling, 247 Conn. 218, 231, 720 A.2d 235 (1998) (underlying purpose of Home Improvement Act is to provide "public with a form of consumer protection against unscrupulous home improvement contractors"). Unlike the New Home Construction Contractors Act, however, the Home Improvement Act contains a provision explicitly invalidating and declaring unenforceable contracts entered into by an unregistered contractor. See General Statutes § 20-429 (a) (8). It is a well established rule of statutory interpretation that, when a statute concerning one subject contains a particular provision, "the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show that a different intention existed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) M. DeMatteo Construction Co. v. New London, 236 Conn. 710, 717, 674 A.2d 845 (1996). In the present case, the omission of any provision regarding the enforceability of noncompliant contracts from the New Home Construction Contractors Act suggests that the legislature did not intend for noncompliant new home construction contracts to be deemed invalid or unenforceable. We nevertheless conclude that the statutory scheme remains unclear. We therefore turn to an examination of the legislative genealogy of the New Home Construction Contractors Act. The act originated in 1999 as a pro posed amendment to the Home Improvement Act for the purpose of extending then existing consumer protections against unscrupulous home improvement contractors to the victims of unscrupulous new home construction contractors. See 42 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1999 Sess., p. 3309, remarks of Representative Art Feltman (likening purpose of act to that of Home Improvement Act). Because one of the penalties under the Home Improvement Act is the unenforceability of a contract entered into by an unregistered contractor, an amendment to extend the applicability of the Home Improvement Act to new home construction contractors would have subjected new home construction contractors to the same penalty. Indeed, multiple speakers at a February 4, 1999 public hearing on the bill described its purpose as "bring[ing] new home contractors under the same set of regulations . as home improvement contractors . . . ." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1999 Sess., p. 12, remarks of Representative Arthur J. O'Neill; see also id., p. 14, remarks of Attorney General Richard Blumenthal ("[t]he . . . bill . . . relates to extending all of the protections that we currently provide to people who are victims of home improvement contractor fraud when they are victims of the same kind of fraud . . . involving new home construction"). During the legislative session, however, the bill was revised substantially so as to create a new chapter of the General Statutes that would be applicable only to new home construction contractors and that would leave undisturbed the provisions of the preexisting Home Improvement Act. The resulting bill, which was adopted by the House and Senate with only minor technical amendments and which subsequently was codified at General Statutes § 20-417a through 20-417j, did not include a provision invalidating or declaring unenforceable noncompliant contracts. In fact, it did not include any provision regarding the enforceability of non-compliant contracts. Instead, the legislature chose to adopt the comprehensive scheme of penalties previously described, which subjects violators to civil penalties, criminal liability and exposure to a private lawsuit under CUTPA. We therefore conclude from this review of the language and legislative history of the act, and the contrasting penalty provisions of the Home Improvement Act, that the legislature did not intend to render noncomplying contracts unenforceable under the New Home Construction Contractors Act. We recognize that, in certain cases, this court has deemed contracts unenforceable due to a party's noncompliance with the relevant statutory requirements, notwithstanding the presence of a statutory penalty or series of penalties. See, e.g., Solomon v. Gilmore, 248 Conn. 769, 790-91, 731 A.2d 280 (1999); Westville & Hamden Loan Co. v. Pasqual, 109 Conn. 110, 115-17, 145 A. 758 (1929) (Westville). But see Sagal v. Fylar, 89 Conn. 293, 297, 93 A. 1027 (1915) (statute's penalization of noncompliance by fine or imprisonment without mention of any additional penalty "has frequently been regarded as a significant indication of a purpose that the penalty expressed should be exclusive"). In none of these cases, however, has the scheme of penalties been nearly as comprehensive as that provided under the New Home Construction Contractors Act. In Solomon, the plaintiffs, Alan M. Solomon and Mary Ellen Torneo, issued a secondary mortgage without first obtaining a license as required by the Secondary Mortgage Act. Solomon v. Gilmore, supra, 248 Conn. 771, 774. The named defendant, William C. Gilmore, opposed the plaintiffs' attempt to foreclose the mortgage, arguing that the plaintiffs' noncompliance with the Secondary Mortgage Act rendered the resulting secondary mortgage unenforceable. See id., 771-73. The Secondary Mortgage Act calls for only administrative penalties for noncompliance with its provisions, empowering the banking commissioner to seek injunctive relief, monetary penalties, or a court order mandating restitution, or, alternatively, to issue a temporary cease and desist order. General Statutes § 36a-517 (allowing banking commissioner to proceed under General Statutes § 36a-50 and 36a-52, latter of which authorizes banking commissioner to issue temporary cease and desist order); see Solomon v. Gilmore, supra, 780-81. Accordingly, we determined that enforcing a mortgage when the lender had failed to comply with the licensing requirement of the Secondary Mortgage Act would "thwart the remedial object of the statute . . . .''(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Gilmore, supra, 790. Likewise, in Westville, the plaintiff, Westville and Hamden Loan Company, which was licensed as a small loan company under the Small Loans Act, loaned the defendant borrowers a sum exceeding the statutory cap on such loans. Westville & Hamden Loan Co. v. Pasqual, supra, 109 Conn. 113-14. The Small Loan Act penalized violations of its provisions by a fine of up to $500, imprisonment of up to six months, or both. Id., 116. The plaintiff claimed that these penalties were intended to be exclusive and that the promissory note was enforceable, notwithstanding its violation of the statutory cap. See id., 115. We determined, however, that " [i]f th[e] note were held to be enforceable the door would be opened wide for evasions of the legislative limitation of loans by licensees under [the Small Loans] Act"; id., 116-17; and therefore determined that the note was unenforceable. Id., 116. By contrast, the present case does not involve a situation in which enforcing a noncompliant contract would thwart the purpose of the statute or invite violations thereof. The New Home Construction Contractors Act's existing penalties cumulatively are adequate to deter noncompliance with the act's provisions. See Sagal v. Fylar, supra, 89 Conn. 298. Moreover, as we previously described, the act exposes a person who violates its provisions to a private lawsuit under CUTPA. General Statutes § 20-417g. Whereas the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on a person who violates the act will not inure to the benefit of the aggrieved consumer, any consequent liability under CUTPA directly benefits the consumer and is correlated to the consumer's loss. See General Statutes § 42-110g (a) (permitting recovery of "actual damages," as well as punitive damages, and provision of equitable relief). The act's existing scheme of multiple, cumulative and qualitatively different penalties well serves the underlying public policy of the act to protect consumers against unscrupulous new home construction contractors. Our conclusion that the existing statutory scheme of penalties effectuates the act's underlying public policy thus provides independent support for our conclusion that holding noncompliant contracts unenforceable under the act is unwarranted. The defendants contend that, in interpreting the New Home Construction Contractors Act, this court should follow Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 323, 576 A.2d 455 (1990), in which we determined that a contract was unenforceable for failure of the plaintiff contractor, Barrett Builders, to comply with the written contract requirement of the Home Improvement Act. In that case, the contract omitted certain essential details regarding materials and construction as well as a completion date for performance. Id., 318. Thereafter, the defendant consumer, Rhoda Miller, refused to pay the second and third installments on the total contract price. See id., 319. The plaintiff argued that, even if the contract was unenforceable under the Home Improvement Act it should have been permitted to bring a cause of action against the defendant under a quasi contract theory because, inter alia, the statutory scheme did not prohibit recovery under such a theory. Id., 321-22. We disagreed, reasoning that the nonenforceability provision was mandatory and that to permit recovery in the manner urged by the plaintiff "would defeat and nullify the statute." Id., 325. We conclude that Barrett Builders is not controlling because it is legally inapposite to the present case. First, the contract in Barrett Builders was governed by the Home Improvement Act. The contract in the present case, however, is governed by the New Home Construction Contractors Act. As we already have explained, the Home Improvement Act contains a provision explicitly invalidating and declaring unenforceable noncompliant contracts whereas the New Home Construction Con tractors Act does not. Second, the issue in Barrett Builders was the availability of quasi contractual relief in lieu of the enforcement of a concededly unenforceable contract. See id., 321-23. The issue in the present case, however, is the very unenforceability of a contract. In light of these distinctions, we conclude that the conclusion and reasoning of Barrett Builders are inapposite to the present case. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the New Home Construction Contractors Act by its full name or as the "act." D'Angelo learned of the act when he sought a building permit from the city of Norwalk on October 30, 2000. The building inspector informed D'Angelo about the necessity of obtaining a certificate of registration under the act. The plaintiff contemporaneously filed a second lien against 134 Highland Avenue in the amount of $72,606.59. That lien is not a subject of this appeal. In addition to alleging that the plaintiff failed to comply with the registration requirement of § 20-417d (d) (5), the defendants also alleged that the plaintiff had failed to provide the defendants with a copy of its new home construction contractor's certificate of registration prior to entering into the contract, in noncompliance with § 20-417d (a) (1). General Statutes § 20-417d (a) (1) requires, inter alia, a new home construction contractor, "prior to entering into a contract with a consumer for new home construction, [to] provide to the consumer . . . written notice that (A) discloses that the certificate of registration does not represent in any manner that such contractor's registration constitutes an endorsement of the quality of such person's work or of such contractor's competency by the commissioner, (B) advises the consumer to contact the Department of Consumer Protection to determine (i) if such contractor is registered in this state as a new home construction contractor, (ii) if any complaints have been filed against such contractor, and (iii) the disposition of any such complaints, and (C) advises the consumer to request from such contractor a list of consumers of the last twelve new homes constructed to completion by the contractor during the previous twenty-four months, or if the contractor has not constructed at least twelve new homes to completion during the previous twenty-four months, then a list of all consumers for whom the contractor has constructed a new home to completion during the previous twenty-four months, and to contact several individuals on the list to discuss the quality of such contractor's new home construction work . . . General Statutes § 20-417d (b) requires a new home construction contractor to "include in every contract with a consumer a provision advising the consumer that the consumer may be contacted by such contractor's prospective consumers concerning the quality and timeliness of such contractor's new home construction work, unless the consumer advises such contractor, in writing, at the time the contract is executed, that the consumer prefers not to be contacted." Subsection (c) of § 20-417d contains boilerplate language that a new home construction contractor may use to satisfy the disclosure requirements of § 20-417d (a). See footnote 5 of this opinion. The defendant stipulated, however, that "there is or was probable cause for [a] [c]ourl. to find . . . that the certificate of mechanic's lien was timely filed, under the applicable . . . statute, and that the amount is valid and not contested . . . ." The only contested issue is the strength of the defendants' statutory defense premised on the plaintiff's noncompliance with the act. The issue of whether a new home construction contract is unenforceable due to a contractor's failure to comply with the act has generated disagreement within the Superior Court. At least two Superior Court decisions have echoed the court's conclusion in Wilson Building that such a contract is unenforceable. See Westminster Associates v. Head, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-01-0454381 (February 26, 2004) (finding that contractor's noncompliance with act renders construction contract unenforceable and operates as defense against contractor's attempt to foreclose mechanic's lien); Hopko v. St. Peter, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-02-0100039-S (November 17,2003) (concluding that contract between contractor and consumers was unenforceable because contractor had not complied with act). Another line of Superior Court decisions, however, has found such contracts to be enforceable. See Pulte Home Corp. of New England v. Appleton, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 557401 (July 1, 2002) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 452) (concluding that contract entered into in noncompliance with act is not unenforceable on basis of public policy considerations); Jencik v. American Custom Homes, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 120889 (September 24, 2001) (enforcing contract when contractor was in "technical violation of the [act] at most" and consumer suffered no damages as result of contractor's noncompliance). Neither this court nor the Appellate Court previously has addressed this issue. Cf. Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 271 Conn. 65, 75, 856 A.2d 364 (2004) (determining that, in presence of valid arbitration clause, enforceability of contract being challenged on basis of contractor's noncompliance with act "must be decided initially by the arbitrator"). The act defines a " '[n]ew home construction contractor' "as"anyperson who contracts with a consumer to construct or sell a new home or any portion of a new home prior to occupancy . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417a (5). The act defines a " '[cjonsumer' " as "the buyer or prospective buyer, or the buyer's or prospective buyer's heirs or designated representatives, of any new home or the owner of property on which a new home is being or will be constructed regardless of whether such owner obtains a building permit as the owner of the premises affected pursuant to section 29-263 . . . General Statutes § 20-417a (8). For example, the act requires a new home construction contractor to provide the consumer with a copy of his or her certificate of registration and other written advice and disclosures before entering into a contract with that consumer. See footnote 5 of this opinion. The act also requires a new home construction contractor to "state in any advertisement, including any advertisement in a telephone directory, the fact that such contractor is registered, and . . . include such contractor's registration number in any such advertisement." General Statutes § 20-417d (a) (2) and (3). See generally General Statutes § 20-417d (d). Of these prohibitions, the most relevant to the present case is that found in § 20-417d (d) (5), which prohibits a new home construction contractor from "engagpng] in the business of a new home construction contractor or hold[ing] himself or herself out as a new home construction contractor without having a current certificate of registration . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417d (b) requires that such contracts contain "a provision advising the consumer that the consumer may be contacted by such contractor's prospective consumers concerning the quality and timeliness of such contractor's new home construction work, unless the consumer advises such contractor, in writing, at the time the contract is executed, that the consumer prefers not to be contacted." Section 20-417d (c) sets forth the form that the written advice and disclosures required by § 20-417d (a) must take. General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110g (a) provides in relevant part: "Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may bring an action . to recover actual damages. Proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required in any action brought under this section. . . ." The Home Improvement Act defines the term " '[h]ome improvement' " as including, but not limited to, "the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, rehabilitation or sandblasting of, or addition to any land or building or that portion thereof which is used or designed to be used as a private residence, dwelling place or residential rental property, or the construction, replacement, installation or improvement of driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, roofs, siding, insulation, solar energy systems, flooring, patios, landscaping, fences, doors and windows and waterproofing in connection with such land or building or that portion thereof which is used or designed to be used as a private residence, dwelling place or residential rental property or the removal or replacement of a residential underground heating oil storage tank system, in which the total cash price for all work agreed upon between the contractor and owner exceeds two hundred dollars." General Statutes § 20-419 (4). The Home Improvement Act expressly provides that the term "home improvement" does not include "[t]he construction of a new home . . . ." General Statutes § 20-419 (4). The Home Improvement Act requires home improvement contractors to obtain a certificate of registration from the commissioner. See General Statutes § 20-420. The act also establishes a "New Home Construction Guaranty Fund" (fund) for the purpose of compensating consumers determined by a court to have sustained "loss or damages . by reason of any violation of the provisions of [the act] . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417i (d). Compensation from the fund, however, is limited to $30,000 in actual damages and is available only when the judgment is against a "new home construction contractor holding a certificate or who has held a certificate under [the act] . . . within the past two years of the date of entering into the contract with the consumer . . . ." General Statutes § 20-417i (d). The defendants seize upon the latter limitation, arguing that it would be unjust and illogical to deny recovery to consumers who have been victimized by unlicensed contractors. The defendants' argument, however, suffers from a fallacy of composition. The mere fact that the defendants have no recourse under the narrow rubric of the fund does not mean that they have no recourse under the broader rubric of the act as a whole. In fact, as we explain in this opinion, the act's penal and remedial scheme provides sufficient recourse to aggrieved consumers to effectuate the act's underlying public policy. When the plaintiffs issued the mortgage in Solomon, the Secondary Mortgage Act provided in relevant part: "No person shall engage in the secondary mortgage loan business in this state as a lender or a broker unless such person has obtained a license under this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, a person shall be deemed to be engaged in the secondary mortgage loan business if: Such person . . . makes a secondary mortgage loan . . . ." General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 36-224b, now codified as amended at General Statutes § 36a-511 (a).

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 747 (AC 25828), is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 95 Conn. App. 62 (AC 26414), is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 95 Conn. App. 139 (AC 25959), is denied.

The defendants' petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 93 Conn. App. 799 (AC 26235), is denied.

Opinion KATZ, J. The issue in this appeal is the validity of an automobile insurance policy's exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage for government owned vehicles when the insurance carrier that issued the government's policy is insolvent. The substitute plaintiff, the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (association), appeals from the trial court's judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, American Economy Insurance Company (American Economy), on cross motions for summary judgment. The association contends that the trial court improperly concluded that § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, under which the exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage is authorized, is valid and does not conflict with the uninsured motorist statute, General Statutes § 38a-336, or the public policy embodied in the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act, General Statutes § 38a-836 through 38a-853 (guaranty act). We conclude that the regulation authorizing the exclusion is valid and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. On December 16, 1996, Diane M. Giglio was operating her vehicle on a public highway in Wallingford, when her vehicle was struck by a police cruiser owned by the town of Wallingford (town) and operated by a Wallingford police officer, Anthony DeMaio. At the time of the collision, the town was insured for liability by Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance) and Giglio was insured by the defendant, American Economy. Giglio's policy covered bodily injury for which she is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The policy, however, specifi cally excluded from the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" any vehicle or equipment "owned by any governmental unit or agency." Following the collision, Giglio brought an action against the town and DeMaio, alleging that the accident had caused her serious personal injury and damages for which they legally were liable. Following the commencement of that action, however, the town's insurance carrier, Reliance, was declared insolvent by a Pennsylvania court. Giglio subsequently brought an action against American Economy, seeking recovery under her policy's uninsured motorist coverage. She alleged that, because of the insolvency of Reliance, the town's insurance policy no longer was available to compensate her for her losses. Thereafter, the trial court, Wiese, J., granted Giglio's motion to consolidate her action against the town and DeMaio with her action against American Economy. American Economy moved for summary judgment, claiming that Giglio's uninsured motorist coverage did not extend to claims involving a government owned vehicle. When Reliance was declared insolvent, the association determined that it had become obligated under the guaranty act to pay certain covered claims arising out of and within the coverage of Reliance policies. Accordingly, the association moved to intervene in Giglio's action against American Economy, anticipating that, if American Economy prevailed on its summary judgment motion, Giglio would look to the association to compensate her for her losses. After the trial court, Graham, J., denied the association's motion to intervene, the association reached a settlement with Giglio under which it agreed to pay Giglio's claim for damages in exchange for her withdrawal of the action against the town and DeMaio. Pursuant to the settlement, Giglio also assigned to the association her rights under her uninsured motorist coverage against American Economy. Following its substitution for Giglio as the plaintiff in this action, the association filed an amended complaint seeking recovery of the damages it had paid to Giglio and a declaratory judgment holding American Economy obligated as a solvent insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for a claim of bodily injury caused by a municipality whose insurer became insolvent. In response, American Economy filed two special defenses, claiming that: (1) the association's action is barred because Giglio's policy prohibited the transfer of her rights and duties under the policy without American Economy's written consent, which had been neither sought nor secured; and (2) the tortfeasor who had caused the accident was operating a government owned vehicle, which is excluded from coverage under the policy. The association moved for summary judgment, claiming that the exclusion from coverage in American Economy's policy was not valid. The trial court, Arnold, J., then considered the cross motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of American Economy. In so doing, the court concluded that, although Giglio could assign to the association the right she might have to recovery under the uninsured motorist provision of her policy, that policy did not provide any coverage for Giglio's assigned claim because of its explicit exclusion from the definition of uninsured motorist vehicles any vehicle owned by a governmental unit or agency. As part of its determination, the court concluded that American Economy's exclusion of government owned vehicles was authorized pursuant to § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C), and that the regulation itself was valid because it does not conflict with the public policy embodied in the uninsured motorist statute, § 38a-336, or the public policy underlying the guaranty act. The association then appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. On appeal, the association essentially contends that the trial court improperly concluded that claims related to government owned vehicles that were insured under a policy issued by a now insolvent insurer may be excluded from uninsured motorist coverage. Specifically, the association's contentions distill to two claims: (1) the regulation, § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C), is not valid because it conflicts with § 38a-336, the uninsured motorist statute, which does not provide an exemption from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage for government owned vehicles; and (2) the regulation is not valid because it conflicts with the guaranty act. According to the association, in order to avoid such conflict, the regulation must be interpreted not to apply to government owned vehicles insured by an insurer determined thereafter to be insolvent. We disagree and, accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. As an initial matter, we set forth the well established standard of review for summary judgment. "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., 248 Conn. 195, 201, 727 A.2d 700 (1999). Moreover, "[construction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 37, 40, 801 A.2d 752 (2002). The association's claims also raise issues of statutory construction. Although our legislature recently has enacted General Statutes § 1-2z, in the pres ent case, neither of the parties claim that the guaranty act in conjunction with the uninsured motorist statute yields a plain and unambiguous answer to the question of whether the regulation authorizing the exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage is valid. Accordingly, our analysis is not limited, and we, therefore, apply "our well established process of statutory interpretation, under which we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 498 n.7, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005). We begin our analysis with a review of the applicable statutory and regulatory scheme. Pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) and 38a-334, all automobile liability policies must provide a minimum level of uninsured motorist coverage for the protection of persons insured thereunder. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Specifically, § 38a-336 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that, "[e]ach automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 38a-334 (a), in turn, directs the insurance commissioner to "adopt regulations with respect to minimum provisions to be included in automobile liability insurance policies," and provides that, "[s]uch regulations shall relate to the insuring agreements, exclusions, conditions and other terms applicable to the bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments and uninsured motorists coverages . . . Section 38a-334-6, the regulation promulgated by the insurance commissioner pursuant to § 38a-334, sets forth those mandated núnimum requirements for the provision of protection against uninsured motorists. The regulation requires the insurer to pay all sums that the insured legally is entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The regulation specifies that the term "uninsured motor vehicle" includes a motor vehicle insured against liability by an insurer that is or becomes insolvent, but it also provides that the "insurer's obligations to pay may be made inapplicable . if the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle is owned by . . . any government or agency thereof . . . ." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C); see footnote 2 of this opinion. The parties do not dispute that a comparison of the language in the exclusion for government owned vehicles in American Economy's insurance policy to the language in § 38a-334-6 makes it clear that the exclusion is authorized by the regulation. Thus, if the regulation is valid, then the policy's exclusion is valid. The association claims that the regulation is not valid, however, because it is inconsistent both with the uninsured motorist statute and with the guaranty act. I We turn first to the uninsured motorist statute and the association's contention that the regulation, § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C), is not valid because it conflicts with the uninsured motorist statute, which does not provide an exemption from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage for government owned vehicles. American Economy responds to this contention by noting that its exclusion of government owned vehicles from uninsured motorist coverage expressly is authorized by the regulation. It contends that the insurance commissioner acted within the authority conferred by the legislature when promulgating the regulation, and that the regulation is consistent both with the public policy and legislative intent of the uninsured motorist statute. We agree. In determining whether the government owned vehicle exclusion of the regulation is inconsistent with the uninsured motorist statute requiring that each automobile policy "shall provide" uninsured motorist coverage; General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (1); see footnote 3 of this opinion; we first look to the text of the uninsured motorist statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. It is well established that "[a] statute is enacted as a whole and must be read as a whole rather than as separate parts or sections. . . . Further, [w]ords in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004). Although the phrase "shall provide insurance" contained in § 38a-336 (a) (1) might be very broad in the abstract, within the context of the uninsured motorist statute, the legislature narrowed its meaning by modi lying it with the qualifying phrase, "in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 . . . ." As we have noted previously, § 38a-334 (a), in turn, authorizes the insurance commissioner to adopt regulations establishing "minimum provisions," and provides that "[s]uch regulations shall relate to insuring agreements, exclusions, conditions and other terms applicable to . . . uninsured motorists coverages under such policies. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Mindful of the relationship between these two statutes, we have explained more than once that the uninsured motorist statute "does not require that [uninsured] motorist coverage be made available when the insured has been otherwise protected . Nor does the statute provide that the [uninsured] motorist coverage shall stand as an independent source of recovery for the insured, or that the coverage limits shall not be reduced under appropriate circumstances. [Rather] [t]he statute merely requires that a certain minimum level of protection be provided for those insured under automobile liability insurance policies; the insurance commissioner . . . has been left with the task of defining those terms and conditions which will suffice to satisfy the requirement of protection." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Farrish-LeDuc, 275 Conn. 748, 757, 882 A.2d 44 (2005), quoting Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., 248 Conn. 195, 205, 727 A.2d 700 (1999). "[T]he insurance commissioner has a very broad grant of regulatory authority in filling in the interstices of the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage legislation, and in doing so his regulation is entitled to great deference." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mass v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 222 Conn. 631, 649, 610 A.2d 1185 (1992). Indeed, "[i]t is well established that an administrative agency's regulations are presumed valid and, unless they are shown to be inconsistent with the authorizing statute, they have the force and effect of a statute. . . . This presumption is further underscored by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which provides for legislative oversight through the legislative regulation review committee prior to approval of the regulations. General Statutes § 4-170." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Andersen Consulting, LLP v. Gavin, 255 Conn. 498, 520 n.15, 767 A.2d 692 (2001). "Moreover, [a] person claiming the invalidity of a regulation has the burden of proving that it is inconsistent with or beyond the legislative grant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mass v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 222 Conn. 649. The association simply has not met this burden. In addition to the presumption of validity and deference to the broad grant of regulatory authority given to the insurance commissioner, we also consider that the government owned vehicle exclusion at issue was part of the original regulation, formerly § 38-175a-6 (c) (2) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, that was promulgated by the commissioner shortly after the enactment of the uninsured motorist statute and that took effect on January 1, 1968. If "a regulation has been in existence for a substantial period of time and the legislature has not sought to override the regulation, this fact, although not determinative, provides persuasive evidence of the continued validity of the regulation." (Internal quotation mar ks omitted.) Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., supra, 248 Conn. 204. Indeed, since 1967, when uninsured motorist coverage was first mandated; Public Acts 1967, No. 510; the legislature has amended § 38a-334 and 38a-336 numerous times, but it never has taken any action to prohibit an automobile liability insurer from excluding government owned vehicles from uninsured motorist coverage as authorized by the regulation, § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C). We consider this "strong evidence that the commissioner's authorization of the exclusion is valid." Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., supra, 204. Our conclusion is further buttressed by our previous similar treatment of two other exclusions created by subsection (c) (2) of the regulation. See footnote 2 of this opinion. In Lowrey v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 152, 157, 617 A.2d 454 (1992), this court concluded that § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (A), authorizing an exclusion from coverage requirements for vehicles that are owned or regularly used by the named insured or a relative in the same household, is "fully consistent with the underlying rationale of underinsured motorist coverage . . . ." This court relied in part on the fact that the regulation "was repromulgated after legislative review in 1986." Id., 162. In Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., supra, 248 Conn. 203, this court similarly concluded that § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (B), authorizing an exclusion for vehicles owned by a self-insurer, did not contravene the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute. We found "nothing inconsistent between the public policy under lying underinsured motorist coverage and a regulation that permits a coverage exclusion that is based upon a demonstrated ability to pay judgments rendered." Id., 206. Finally, in recognizing that "[t]he automobile liability insurance business is one which is extensively regulated"; Wilson v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 532, 539, 569 A.2d 40, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814, 111 S. Ct. 52, 112 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005, 112 S. Ct. 640, 116 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1991); we also have noted that, in regulating the industry, the legislature and the insurance commissioner have determined that some parties may self-insure, and they have determined the degree of proof of solvency required by such parties. See, e.g., General Statutes § 14-129 and 38a-371 (c); see also Boynton v. New Haven, 63 Conn. App. 815, 819-20, 779 A.2d 186 ("[u]nlike private owners of a fleet of motor vehicles, the city was not required to provide evidence of financial responsibility"), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 905, 782 A.2d 136 (2001); Willoughby v. New Haven, 254 Conn. 404, 435-36, 757 A.2d 1083 (2000) (setting forth legislative history relevant to municipal exemption from self-insurance requirements). The legislature thus allows a governmental entity to obtain the status of a self-insurer merely by filing a notice that it is self-insured, presumably, because of its ability to pay claims for which it chooses not to seek commercial insurance. J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (3d Ed. 2004) § 3.14, p. 299. As in Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., supra, 248 Conn. 206, we find "nothing inconsistent between the public policy underlying [uninsured] motorist coverage and a regulation that permits a coverage exclusion that is based upon [a legislatively determined] . . . ability to pay judgments rendered." The fact that the governmental entity presently before us chose not to self-insure, but, rather, to seek commercial insurance coverage from the now insolvent Reliance, does not render the otherwise proper regulation providing an exclusion for government owned vehicles improper. Thus, we conclude that the association has failed to meet its burden to establish that the regulation, adopted by the insurance commissioner to permit the exclusion of government owned vehicles, is inconsistent with the uninsured motorist statute. II We next turn to the association's alternative contention that, even if the regulation does not conflict with the uninsured motorist statute, in order to be consistent with the guaranty act, it must be interpreted not to apply to government owned vehicles insured by a now insolvent insurer. The association's argument distills to a claim that the legislative intent behind the guaranty act, as evidenced by its definition of a covered claim and its exhaustion provision, is to preserve the association's limited resources by shifting loss from the association to a solvent insurer. Therefore, the association contends, the government owned vehicle exclusion in the regulation is inconsistent with the guaranty act because it relieves a solvent insurer of an obligation to pay uninsured motorist coverage. In other words, the association seeks to shift the cost of Giglio's claims against the town, and therefore against the association through the town's insolvent insurer, Reliance, to Giglio's own insurer, American Economy, by asking this court to rewrite the policy issued to Giglio by her insurance company. We decline to create coverage where none exists. It is well recognized that the "association was established for the purpose of providing a limited form of protection for policyholders and claimants in the event of insurer insolvency. . . . When an insurer is determined to be insolvent under [General Statutes] § 38a-838 (7), the association becomes obligated pursuant to [General Statutes] § 38a-841, to the extent of covered claims within certain limits. . . . Limitations on the association's obligations . . . provide another form of protection against increased premiums for policyholders in addition to the primary protection afforded all claimants against losses resulting from insurer insolvency." Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 451, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997). The association's contention focuses on two limitations on its obligations under the guaranty act, as well as the public policy that it claims these limitations are intended to effectuate. Specifically, the association's obligation is limited by the statutory definition of the term "covered claims" that explicitly excludes several types of claims, including "any claim by or for the benefit of any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise . . . ." General Statutes (Sup. 2006) § 38a-838 (5) (B) (i). The association's obligation also is limited by an exhaustion requirement under General Statutes § 38a-845 (1), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy, other than a policy of an insolvent insurer, which is also a covered claim under [the guaranty act] shall exhaust first his rights under such policy. . . ." The guaranty act does not address the validity of exclusions from uninsured motorist coverage. Cf. Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., supra, 243 Conn. 451 (involving statutory interpretation of specific language in guaranty act, court determined phrase "as subrogation recoveries or otherwise" in definition of "covered claim"). Indeed, the guaranty act does not provide any specific direction as to how to interpret the scope of coverage under an insurance policy. See Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 791-92, 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (contra proferentem rule of statutory interpretation applies to association to same extent it applies to insolvent insurer). It is true that the guaranty act does not require the association to pay claims "by or for the benefit of any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise . . . ." General Statutes § 38a-838 (5) (B) (i). Giglio's claim, however, does not fall within the scope of that provision. As we previously have explained, the regulation, and therefore American Economy's policy that is congruent with that regulation, is consistent with the uninsured motorist statute. Thus, the payments made to Giglio by the association did not benefit American Economy by relieving it of an obligation it otherwise would have had, because, in fact, it had no such obligation. The exhaustion provision of the guaranty act requiring that a claimant exhaust other available policies before recovery is permitted from the association is similarly inapplicable. See General Statutes § 38a-845. The exhaustion requirement applies only when there is a valid claim against another insurance company. In the present matter, Giglio did not have a valid claim against her insurance company because the policy explicitly excluded government owned vehicles from uninsured motorist coverage. Neither the limitations of the definition of covered claims, the exhaustion provision, nor the public policy behind the guaranty act automatically shift liability from the association to the nearest solvent insurer when liability does not rest there already. As this court repeatedly has noted, "[although the association correctly states that it is a nonprofit entity whose resources are to be distributed carefully, this court . . . has recognized that [t]he association was established for the purpose of providing a limited form of protection for policyholders and claimants in the event of insurer insolvency. Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., [supra, 243 Conn. 451]. The association's statutory mandate, and sole reason for existence, is to provide compensation for those whose remedy otherwise would be thwarted by insurer insolvency. Doucette v. Pomes, [247 Conn. 442, 459-60, 724 A.2d 481 (1999)]; see also General Statutes § 38a-841 (1) (a) ([the] association shall . . . [b]e obligated to the extent of the covered claims existing prior to the determination of [insurer] insolvency and arising within thirty days after the determination of insolvency). Additionally, the legislature has accounted for the possibility that the association might, at times, incur substantial liability. See General Statutes § 38a-841 (1) (c) ([i]f the maximum assessment, together with the other assets of said association in any account, does not provide in any one year in any account an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from that account, the funds available may be prorated and the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon thereafter as funds become available)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 85-86, 896 A.2d 747 (2006). Indeed, we also have noted that "[i]n general, the legislative objective was to make the [association] liable to the same extent that the insolvent insurer would have been liable under its policy. . . . Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Union Carbide Corp., 217 Conn. 371, 390, 585 A.2d 1216 (1991) (association may not use exhaustion or nonduplication of recovery provisions to avoid its responsibilities for paying claims that should have been covered by insolvent excess insurer)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, supra, 278 Conn. 791-92. Thus, an interpretation of the guaranty act that automatically would shift liability from the association to the nearest solvent insurer when liability does not rest there already would do violence to the legislatively established scheme. We also are not persuaded by the association's contention that American Economy is hable because the regulation, as applied to these facts, is inconsistent with the guaranty act. First, as we have noted, the guaranty act does not conflict explicitly with the government owned vehicle exclusion expressed in the regulation. Second, we presume that when the legislature enacted the guaranty act, it was aware of and considered the language contained in the other provisions of the insurance code. See, e.g., Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003) ("legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The government owned vehicle exclusion had been in effect for several years before the legislature enacted the guaranty act; see footnote 10 of this opinion; Public Acts 1971, No. 466; and still was in effect when the legislature amended the guaranty act on numerous occasions over a significant time span. It is neither absurd nor unworkable to conclude that, when a town has chosen to manage its risk by seeking insurance through a carrier rather than self-insuring, the legislature intended that the association would provide limited coverage if the town's carrier is declared insolvent. Indeed, we see no incongruity with the policy underlying both the uninsured motorist statute and the guaranty act and the availability of the association's resources in such cases. If the municipality chooses to purchase a policy so that an insurer will be responsible for claims, it pays indirectly into the association's fund through its policy premiums and becomes a policyholder. Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., supra, 243 Conn. 451. As we have noted many times, "[t]he association was established for the purpose of providing . . . protection for policyholders and claimants in the event of insurer insolvency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, supra, 278 Conn. 85-86. We therefore decline, through a tortured construction or wholesale invalidation of the exclusion clearly expressed in a regulation that validly was promulgated pursuant to the uninsured motorist statute, to shift the burden to pay claims against an insolvent insurer from the association to another still solvent insurer that otherwise is not liable. To the extent that the association believes that its funds should not be utilized in this matter or that the government owned vehicle exclusion is unwise as it pertains to government entities that do seek insurance coverage, this is a matter for the legislature. "The automobile liability insurance business is one which is extensively regulated . . . and judicial revision of the terms upon which such policies are issued may produce extensive repercussions throughout the insurance industry of the state." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Security Ins. Co., supra, 213 Conn. 539. In view of the very broad grant of regulatory authority to the insurance commissioner, we are not persuaded that the commissioner was without authority to adopt the exclusion for government owned vehicles in the regulation, § 38a-334-6. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The present action seeking uninsured motorist benefits originally was brought by the plaintiff, Diane M. Giglio, against the defendant, American Economy Insurance Company, her automobile insurer. As a result of a settlement agreement, Giglio assigned her rights under her insurance policy to the association, and the association then was substituted for Giglio as the plaintiff in the present action. The association is a " 'nonprofit unincorporated legal entity' created by General Statutes § 38-276 [now General Statutes § 38a-839] and composed of all insurers licensed to transact business in this state that write any kind of direct insurance, except for those specifically excluded from the application of the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act by General Statutes § 38-274 [now General Statutes § 38a-837]." Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Union Carbide Corp., 217 Conn. 371, 375-76, 585 A.2d 1216 (1991). Section 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, entitled "Minimum provisions for protection against uninsured or underinsured motorists," provides in relevant part: "(a) Coverage. The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every motor vehicle to which the bodily iryury liability coverage applies. 'Uninsured motor vehicle' includes a motor vehicle insured against liability by an insurer that is or becomes insolvent. . . . "(c) Exclusions. The insurer's obligations to pay may be made inapplicable: "(1) To any claim which has been settled with the uninsured motorist without the consent of the insurer; "(2) if the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle is owned by "(A) the named insured or any relative who is a resident of the same household or is furnished for the regular use of any of the foregoing, "(B) a self insurer under any motor vehicle law, or "(C) any government or agency thereof; "(3) to pay or reimburse for workers' compensation or disability benefits. . . ." General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: "Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. . . ." The guaranty act establishes the association "for the purpose of providing a limited form of protection for policyholders and claimants in the event of insurer insolvency. The protection it provides is limited based upon its status as a nonprofit entity and the method by which it is funded. . . . When an insurer is determined to be insolvent under [General Statutes] § 38a-838 (7), the association becomes obligated pursuant to [General Statutes] § 38a-841, to the extent of covered claims within certain limits. The rates and premiums charged by member insurers are authorized by General Statutes § 38a-849 to include amounts sufficient to recoup the assessments levied upon insurers by the association." Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 451, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997). The policy issued by American Economy also provided underinsured motorist coverage. "Under our law the statutes and regulations applicable to uninsured motorist coverage also apply to underinsured motorist coverage." Lowrey v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 152, 153 n. 1, 617 A.2d 454 (1992). Because this case involves a claim for uninsured coverage, we refer herein only to that coverage. Specifically, subsection A of part C of the policy, pertaining to uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage, provides in relevant part: "If a limit for this coverage is displayed on the declarations, we will pay compensatory damages which an 'insured' is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 'uninsured motor vehicle' or 'underinsured motor vehicle' because of 'bodily injury:' "1. Sustained by an 'insured;' and "2. Caused by an accident." Subsection C of part C sets forth the following exclusions to the terms "[u]ninsured motor vehicle" and "[u]nderinsured motor vehicle" providing in relevant part: "However 'underinsured motor vehicle' does not include any vehicle or equipment . . . "1. To which a liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or insuring company: "a. Denies coverage; or "b. Is or becomes insolvent. "2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law. "In addition, neither 'uninsured motor vehicle' nor 'underinsured motor vehicle' includes any vehicle or equipment: "1. Owned by or furnished or available for your regular use. "2. Owned by any governmental unit or agency. . . ." The trial court's ruling regarding the assignment of the policy by Giglio to the association is not a subject of this appeal. We recognize that the association has characterized its appeal as involving the following five issues: "(1) [wjhether the trial court erred . . . when it ruled that uninsured motorist benefits are not available to [Giglio] under the insurance policy issued to [her] by [American Economy] . (2) [w]hether the trial court erred . . . when it ruled that . § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C) [of the regulations] is valid . (3) [w]hether the trial court erred . . . when it ruled that . § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C) does not conflict with . § 38a-336 [the uninsured motorist statute] . (4) [wjhether the trial court erred . . . when it ruled that . § 38a-334-6 (c) (2) (C) does not conflict with . § 38a-836 et seq. [the guaranty act] [and] (5) [wjhether the trial court erred . . . when it ruled that uninsured motorist benefits are not available in situations where a government-owned vehicle is insured but the insurer is subsequently declared insolvent." These issues are subsumed, however, in our two part analysis. We note that, "[w]hen an insurer seeks to limit its liability for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage based on [a] regulation issued pursuant to [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 38-175c [now § 38a-336], it may do so only to the extent that the regulation expressly authorizes. . . . Similarly, where an insurer seeks to limit its liability based on the statute itself, rather than on the regulation, it should only be permitted to do so to the extent that the statute expressly authorizes. In order for a policy exclusion to be expressly authorized by [a] statute [or regulation], there must be substantial congruence between the statutory [or regulatory] provision and the policy provision." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lowrey v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 152, 156, 617 A.2d 454 (1992). The necessary congruence exists in the present case. In 1968, § 38-175a-6 (c) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, now § 38a-334-6 (c), provided in relevant part: "The insurer's obligations to pay may be made inapplicable . . . (2) if the uninsured automobile is owned by . . . (C) any government or agency thereof . . . ." Moreover, we note that the legislative history of the uninsured motorist statute does not illuminate the intention of the legislature with respect to the exclusions authorized by § 38a-334-6 of the regulations. General Statutes § 4-170 (a), requiring approval of state agency regulations by the legislative review committee, provides in relevant part: "There shall be a standing legislative committee to review all regulations of the several state departments and agencies following the proposal thereof . . . ." "The fact that the [insurance] commissioner's regulation has been approved by the standing legislative regulation review committee, although not dispositive of the issue before us, is an important consideration in our determination of whether the commissioner's regulation comports with the legislative intent . . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 169, 183, 713 A.2d 1269 (1998). General Statutes § 14-129 provides: "(a) Any person in whose name more than twenty-five motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by the [insurance] commissioner as provided in subsection (b) of this section. "(b) The commissioner may, in his discretion, upon the application of such person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when he is satisfied that such person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay judgments obtained against such person. "(c) Upon not less than five days' notice and a hearing pursuant to such notice, the commissioner may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel a certificate of self-insurance. Failure to pay any judgment within thirty days after such judgment has become final shall constitute a reasonable ground for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance." General Statutes § 38a-371 (c) provides: "Subject to approval of the Insurance Commissioner the security required by this section, may be provided by self-insurance by filing with the commissioner in satisfactory form: (1) A continuing undertaking by the owner or other appropriate person to perform all obligations imposed by this section; (2) evidence that appropriate provision exists for the prompt and efficient administration of all claims, benefits, and obligations provided by this section; and (3) evidence that reliable financial arrangements, deposits or commitments exist providing assurance for payment of all obligations imposed by this section substantially equivalent to those afforded by a policy of insurance that would comply with this section. A person who provides security under this subsection is a self-insurer. A municipality may provide the security required under this section by filing with the commissioner a notice that it is a self-insurer." (Emphasis added.) In reaching this conclusion, we reject the association's contention that this court should follow the holding of a Massachusetts trial court, which addressed facts similar to those presently before us and granted summary judgment in favor of the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund. See Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Premier Ins. Co., Superior Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County, Docket Nos. 044581BLS, 045250BLS, 045251BLS (September 15, 2005). That trial court relied upon a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Safety Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 309, 312, 787 N.E.2d 555 (2003), which it interpreted as holding that a court could not consider the condition or status of the owners of motor vehicles, but must consider only the motor vehicles themselves when interpreting Massachusetts General Laws c. 175, § 113L (1), the Massachusetts uninsured motorist statute. The court then concluded that the "policy language stating that [government owned] vehicles, purely because they are 'owned by a governmental unit,' are not uninsured when, in fact, they were insured by a company that became insolvent, cannot be read in a manner consistent with the holding in [Safety Ins. Co.]." Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Premier Ins. Co., supra, 7. We decline to adopt the trial court's holding for two reasons. First, we are not persuaded by the trial court's interpretation of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision. Second, even if we were to assume that the meaning attributed to the Safety Ins. Co. decision by the trial court is accurate, Connecticut law and precedent do not similarly limit the insurance commissioner's power to promulgate regulations with respect to minimum provisions to be included in automobile liability insurance policies relating to the insuring agreements, exclusions, conditions and other terms applicable to uninsured motorists coverages. There is nothing in § 38a-334 that prevents the Connecticut insurance commissioner from expressing an exclusion that he or she is authorized to promulgate in terms of ownership. General Statutes (Sup. 2006) § 38a-838 (5) provides: " 'Covered claim' means an unpaid claim, including, but not limited to, one for unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and subject to the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which sections 38a-836 to 38a-853, inclusive, apply issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer after October 1, 1971, and (A) the claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the time of the insured event; or (B) the claim is a first party claim for damage to property with a permanent location in this state, provided the term 'covered claim' shall not include (i) any claim by or for the benefit of any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise; provided that a claim for any such amount, asserted against a person insured under a policy issued by an insurer which has become an insolvent insurer, which, if it were not a claim by or for the benefit of a reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool or underwriting association, would be a 'covered claim' may be filed directly with the receiver of the insolvent insurer but in no event shall any such claim be asserted against the insured of such insolvent insurer, (ii) any claim by or on behalf of an individual who is neither a citizen of the United States nor an alien legally resident in the United States at the time of the insured event, or an entity other than an individual whose principal place of business is not in the United States at the time of the insured event, and it arises out of an accident, occurrence, offense, act, error or omission that takes place outside of the United States, or a loss to property normally located outside of the United States or, if a workers' compensation claim, it arises out of employment outside of the United States, (iii) any claim by or on behalf of a person who is not a resident of this state, other than a claim for compensation or any other benefit which arises out of and is within the coverage of a workers' compensation policy, against an insured whose net worth at the time the policy was issued or at any time thereafter exceeded twenty-five million dollars, provided that an insured's net worth for purposes of this section and section 38a-844 shall be deemed to include the aggregate net worth of the insured and all of its subsidiaries as calculated on a consolidated basis, (iv) any claim by or on behalf of an affiliate of the insolvent insurer at the time the policy was issued or at the time of the insured event, or (v) any claim arising out of a policy issued by an insurer which was not licensed to transact insurance in this state either at the time the policy was issued or when the insured event occurred Moreover, to the extent that the guaranty act and the regulation ostensibly could be read to conflict, it is well established that, "[i]f two statutes appear to be in conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court should give effect to both. . If a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to do so." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 157, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002). By rejecting the association's contentions, this court construes as consistent with each other the guaranty act, the uninsured motorist statute and the regulation.

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 26200) is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 325 (AC 24666), is denied. Jennifer Vickery, special public defender, in support of the petition. Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, in opposition. Decided June 7, 2006

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 72 (AC 25415), is denied.

Opinion KATZ, J. Two of the defendants in this foreclosure action, Willard L. Hargrove and Alaina Hargrove (defen dants), appeal from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The defendants contend that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs foreclosure rights were not extinguished or invalidated by a previous foreclosure action, by operation of General Statutes § 49-30 as a matter of law or equity, even though the plaintiff improperly had been omitted as a party to that action. We disagree, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following factual and procedural background. The genesis of the present matter is a debt of $108,000 owed by the named defendant, Margaret White, to First NLC Financial Services, LLC (First Financial), which was evidenced by a promissory note dated November 8, 2000. White secured the note with a mortgage on real property located at 24 Tampa Street in the city of West Haven (city), and the mortgage was recorded on the West Haven land records (first mortgage). On November 15,2000, shortly after the first mortgage had been executed, First Financial assigned that mortgage to the plaintiff, and, on August 30, 2001, the assignment was recorded on the West Haven land records. In 2000, prior to the recording of the first mortgage, the city filed a lis pendens notice relating to certain property tax liens on the subject property. In December, 2000, and in September, 2002, respectively, the defendant Beneficial Mortgage Company of Connecticut recorded a second mortgage on the property, securing a debt of $26,332.85 and a judgment hen in the amount of $31,462. In 2003, the city brought an action to foreclose the property tax liens (tax foreclosure action). West Haven v. White, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03-0475261S (March 17, 2003). The city named First Financial as a defendant but did not make the plaintiff a party to the tax foreclosure action. The trial court, Moran, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, listing the debt to the city as $17,121.12 and finding a property value of $138,000. Thereafter, Michael Quoka purchased the property for $75,500 and took title pursuant to a committee deed. The trial court thereafter issued a supplemental judgment in the tax foreclosure action indicating that $29,975.76 was disbursed to pay the city, the committee and related fees. As of January 12, 2004, the remaining $45,524.24 of the sale proceeds was held subject to further order of the court. In June, 2004, the defendants purchased the property from Quoka via warranty deed for $243,000. This transfer was recorded on June 10, 2004, along with a mortgage on the property securing a debt in the original principal amount of $218,700 to Full Spectrum Lending, Inc. In July, 2004, the plaintiff commenced the foreclosure action at issue in this appeal (mortgage foreclosure action), alleging that it is the holder of the note and first mortgage, that the note and mortgage are in default, and that the plaintiff had exercised its option to declare the entire balance of the note due. In their answer, the defendants admitted the existence of the note and first mortgage, but denied that they were in default. They also asserted four special defenses barring the foreclosure. The first special defense contended that the plaintiff cannot enforce its mortgage because § 49-30 cured its omission from the tax foreclosure action by making the first mortgage invalid and because, as a matter of equity, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover more than it would have recovered had it been named properly in the tax foreclosure action. The defendants' other special defenses asserted: (1) unjust enrichment, on the grounds that the plaintiff was seeking to recover (a) more than it would have recovered had it been included in the tax foreclosure action, and (b) from a party that did not owe it a debt; (2) estoppel, on the ground that the lis pendens filed by the city prior to the recording of the plaintiffs assignment of the first mortgage gave the plaintiff notice of the tax lien foreclosure; and (3) accord and satisfaction, to the extent that the plaintiffs predecessor in interest, First Financial, had received any moneys in connection with the tax lien foreclosure. The defendants also asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs mortgage is null and void because the admittedly improper omission of the plaintiff from the tax foreclosure action was cured by § 49-30. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that it had established all necessary elements and that the defendants' special defenses were insufficient as a matter of law. The plaintiff also contended that it was entitled to summary judgment on the defendants' counterclaim because § 49-30 is not self-executing, and a proper action to cure the omission of the plaintiff from the tax lien foreclosure had not been brought. The defendants objected to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and filed a cross motion for summary judgment with their counterclaim. During a hearing on the summary judgment motions, the plaintiff explained that it was seeking summary judgment only as to liability, stating "we're not asking the court to enter a final judgment. That obviously requires an equitable consideration with regard to the value of the property and the debt and all sorts of other factors and it would not be right for summary judgment." The trial court, Moran, J., granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to liability only and denied the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded, without further explanation, that the defendants' reliance on § 49-30 was misplaced and that they had not provided evidence to support their special defenses. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff has properly maintained this action and is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability only. In response to a motion for articulation filed by the defendants, the trial court explained from the bench that § 49-30 does not apply in this case as to the defendants' counterclaim, wherein the defendants essentially were seeking to quiet title to the property, but, instead, allows the plaintiff to cure its omission from the tax foreclosure action by bringing the present foreclosure proceedings. The defendants filed notice of their intention to appeal, after which, the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate the stay pending the appeal, which the trial court, Curran, J., denied because judgment had not yet been rendered. The trial court then rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding the amount of the debt to be $124,769.81, as reflected in the plaintiffs affidavit, and ordering foreclosure by sale. The defendants did not contest the judgment as to the amount of the debt or fees awarded. This appeal followed. The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. They contend that: (1) § 49-30, by operation of law, automatically cured the plaintiffs omission from the tax foreclosure action, by extinguishing the plaintiffs first mortgage on the property; (2) § 49-30 may be raised properly as a special defense to a foreclosure action and must be considered in order to ensure that justice is done; and (3) unjust enrichment precluded recovery for judgment on the full amount of the debt. The defendants also claim that the trial court improperly denied their motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the property pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. They contend that, under § 49-30, their counterclaim in this action was a "proper legal proceeding" that operated to cure the plaintiffs omission from the tax foreclosure action and thus extinguish its mortgage interest in the property. In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in its favor as to liability because there were no disputed issues of material fact regarding the debt or the improper omission of the plaintiff from the tax lien foreclosure. The plaintiff further contends that the defendants' special defenses did not preclude summary judgment as to liability and that the defendants were not entitled to prevail under § 49-30 on their counterclaim. We agree with the plaintiff. Guiding our inquiry as to all of the claims is our well established standard of review regarding a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 6-7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). "Finally, because this case distills to an issue of statutory interpretation, our review of that issue of law is plenary." Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 570, 887 A.2d 848 (2006). Because, in essence, all of the defendants' claims essentially are premised on their contention that the plaintiffs encumbrance on the property has been extinguished or affected by the operation of § 49-30, we begin our analysis with an examination of this statute. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case. . . . When construing a statute, we first look to its text . . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 253, 881 A.2d 114 (2005). Section 49-30 provides: "When a mortgage or lien on real estate has been foreclosed and one or more parties owning any interest in or holding an encumbrance on such real estate subsequent or subordinate to such mortgage or lien has been omitted or has not been foreclosed of such interest or encumbrance because of improper service of process or for any other reason, all other parties foreclosed by the foreclosure judgment shall be bound thereby as fully as if no such omission or defect had occurred and shall not retain any equity or right to redeem such foreclosed real estate. Such omission or failure to properly foreclose such party or parties may be completely cured and cleared by deed or foreclosure or other proper legal proceedings to which the only necessary patties shall be the party acquiring such foreclosure title, or his successor in title, and the party or parties thus not foreclosed, or their respective successors in title." In support of their assertion that the plaintiffs foreclosure rights were extinguished or invalidated by the previous tax foreclosure action, by operation of § 49-30, the defendants point to the language in that statute providing that a "foreclosure or other proper legal proceedings" may cure the omission and contend that either the plaintiffs foreclosure action or the defendants' counterclaim seeking to quiet title were such proper proceedings to which the necessary parties were named — the plaintiff as the party not foreclosed in the earlier action and the defendants as the successors in interest to the party acquiring the foreclosed title. The defendants further contend that § 49-30 reflects a balancing of the equities by the legislature in which it chose to clear title in favor of a foreclosing party and its successors who inadvertently had omitted a subsequent interest from its foreclosure proceedings. According to the defendants, this balance reflects a preference for clear titles and thus deprives omitted parties of a security interest in the property but not of the debt itself, which still may be enforced against the defaulting debtor. Therefore, the defendants contend that § 49-30 either cuts off the plaintiff's interest automatically or, alternatively, requires the court, when the equities of the case so demand, as in the present case, to protect an innocent party from the consequence of a debt it did not owe. Conversely, the plaintiff contends that such an application of § 49-30 cannot be countenanced as it would result in the taking of private property without notice and hearing in violation of due process under the state and federal constitutions. The plaintiff further contends that § 49-30 does not provide a substantive basis for discharging an encumbrance omitted from a foreclosure action, but, rather, it provides a procedural mechanism for bringing a subsequent, constitutionally valid proceeding with respect to the omitted encumbrance. We agree with the plaintiff that its omitted mortgage interest has not been extinguished by operation of § 49-30. Our analysis begins by noting that the statute provides that an omission may be completely cured and cleared by either deed, foreclosure or other proper proceedings to which the only necessary parties are the acquirer of the equity in the property and the party not foreclosed. See General Statutes § 49-30. Implicit in the requirement of a "proper" procedure, however, is that either of these necessary parties legally is entitled to bring such proceedings to enforce their rights. Thus, the statute does not in and of itself provide substantive rights under which title "automatically" is cleared in favor of the party invoking it. Because there is a paucity of Connecticut appellate authority addressing the application of § 49-30, a further-understanding of this matter requires an examination of the basic tenets of mortgages and foreclosure. "Generally, foreclosure means to cut off the equity of redemption, the equitable owner's right to redeem the property. . . . The equity of redemption can be cut off either by sale or by strict foreclosure." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) National City Mortgage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 793, 888 A.2d 95 (2006). "General Statutes § 49-25 sets forth the procedure pursuant to which a foreclosure sale is conducted. The purpose of the judicial sale in a foreclosure action is to convert the property into money and, following the sale, a determination of the rights of the parties in the funds is made, and the money received from the sale takes the place of the property. The vesting of title to a . . . property in the mortgagee [or lien holder] under a foreclosure decree constitutes appropriation of the property to the payment of the . . . debt, and, where the value of the property foreclosed exceeds the amount of the . . . debt, the mortgagee [or lien holder] is enti tied to nothing more. . . . Accordingly, when the mortgagee [or lien holder] takes title to the property, the fair market value of which exceeds the amount of the debt, its debt is satisfied by virtue of its ownership of the collateral. When the mortgagee [or hen holder] becomes the owner of the property and its debt is satisfied, its status as mortgagee [or hen holder] ceases and the rights and obhgations estabhshed by the terms of the mortgage are nullified. . . . "Under Connecticut law, the rights of the mortgagor [or debtor] in the . . . property are terminated by confirmation of the foreclosure sale, and subsequent to such sale, any interest the mortgagor [or debtor] may claim is in the proceeds of the sale solely and not in the property. . [A] judicial sale becomes complete and creates a legal right to obhgations among parties when it is confirmed and ratified by the court. . . . Although the court's approval of a sale extinguishes the rights of redemption of other parties, it does not automatically vest title with the purchaser. General Statutes § 49-26 provides that after a sale has been ratified or confirmed by the court, a conveyance of the property sold shall be executed by the person appointed to make the sale, which conveyance shall vest in the purchaser the same estate that would have vested in the mortgagee or lienholder if the mortgage or lien had been foreclosed by strict foreclosure . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794-95. Thus, the estate that passes by committee deed to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is no more nor less than the estate that had been held by the mortgagor or hen holder, minus the interests of parties to the foreclosure action that had been terminated during the sale. If that estate is encumbered by a valid mortgage that was not foreclosed, then the estate that passes to the purchaser is subject to that mortgage. See General Statutes § 49-26 (providing that conveyance by foreclosure sale is valid against "all parties to the cause and their privies, but against no other persons" [emphasis added]). With respect to mortgages, "Connecticut follows the title theory of mortgages, which provides that on the execution of a mortgage on real property, the mortgagee holds legal title and the mortgagor holds equitable title to the property. . In a title theory state such as Connecticut, a mortgage is a vested fee simple interest subject to complete defeasance by the timely payment of the mortgage debt. . . . The mortgagor has the right to redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing the conditions specified in the mortgage document. "The mortgagee's legal title is a defeasible fee subject to an equitable right of redemption that persists until it is foreclosed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) National City Mortgage Co. v. Stoecker, supra, 92 Conn. App. 792-93. It has long been established that when there is a "mortgage, having been duly recorded . . . every subsequent purchaser of any interest in the land took with constructive notice of its existence. The defendants who are now in possession cannot defeat [the] lien on the ground that they had no actual knowledge of the [e]ncumbrance, because the attorney at law, whom they employed to search the title, failed to discover or to disclose it. . . . Whatever in fact appeared upon the records, they were, so far as [the] legal title is concerned, conclusively presumed to know." (Citation omitted.) Ensign v. Batterson, 68 Conn. 298, 305, 36 A. 51 (1896). Thus, at common law, when a party with a valid encumbrance on the property had been omitted from, or received defective notice of, a foreclosure action, that party's right of redemption was not extinguished. See Washington Trust Co. v. Norwich & Westerly Traction Co., 89 Conn. 59, 64-65, 92 A. 880 (1915) ("[The] second mortgageefs] [right] to redeem the first mortgage does not appear to have been cut off by the foreclosure sale. The purchaser at that sale took no better title than the first mortgagee would have taken by a strict foreclosure . . . and as the plaintiff was not a party to that suit its right of redemption was not cut off by the judgment. . In the absence of a finding that the plaintiffs rights were actually litigated and determined in that action, the mere filing of an intervening petition [in a foreclosure action to which it was not a party], which was never acted on, cannot operate by estoppel as the equivalent of a foreclosure of the plaintiffs equity of redemption." [Citations omitted.]). At common law, then, a second mortgagee who had not been made a party to foreclosure proceedings brought by the first mortgagee was unaffected by those proceedings. Consequently, the relations of the second mortgagee to the first and the relations between the second mortgagee and the mortgagor remained unchanged. The question therefore arose as to whether, when a second mortgagee had been omitted from the foreclosure proceedings and thus its encumbrance remained on the property subject to redemption, the mortgagor retained the right to redeem that mortgage or whether the first mortgagee had, by virtue of its foreclosure, succeeded to the owner's right to redeem the second mortgage. This court concluded that the mortgagor who had been foreclosed in the first foreclosure action nonetheless should be able to redeem the property through his relationship with the second mortgagee. Indeed, we reasoned that, "[t]he right to redeem the second mortgagee may be a valuable privilege to the mortgagor even after the foreclosure by the first [e]ncumbrancer; it may enable him to reclaim his estate; and it would seem as he should only be deprived of this right by a proceeding instituted by the voluntary act of the second mortgagee, or by his own; at least not by the act of the first mortgagee, professing in his bill to assert no other privilege than that conferred by the first mortgage." Goodman v. White, 26 Conn. 317, 323 (1857); see also Ensign v. Batterson, supra, 68 Conn. 305; Loomis v. Knox, 60 Conn. 343, 350, 22 A. 771 (1891); Colwell v. Warner, 36 Conn. 224, 234, 235 (1869). Thus, "a title derived through a foreclosure could be totally negated if a subsequent encumbrancer had been omitted from that foreclosure." D. Caron, Connecticut Foreclosures (4th Ed. 2004) § 24.02A, p. 529. As a result, a question arose as to whether, in order to remedy the defect, a new action of foreclosure should be brought against the omitted encumbrancer alone or whether the prior foreclosure proceeding should be deemed void. Id. It is against this background that the legislature enacted § 49-30, originally codified as General Statutes § 693 (f) in 1941, to address the omission of a party from a foreclosure action. The statute first provides that, when there has been a foreclosure and a party with an interest has been omitted from that proceeding, for any reason, all parties who were foreclosed by the judgment are bound as fully as if no omission had occurred and do not retain any equity or right to redeem. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The statute then provides that the omission "may be completely cured and cleared by deed or foreclosure or other proper legal proceedings to which the only necessary parties shall be the party acquiring such foreclosure title, or his successor in title, and the party or parties thus not foreclosed, or their respective successors in title." General Statutes § 49-30. Because we construe statutes to change common law "only if the language of the legislature plainly and unambiguously reflects such an intent"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 381, 778 A.2d 829 (2001); it is clear that, except to the extent that the statute explicitly so pro vides, § 49-30 does not abrogate the aforementioned common law pertaining to mortgages and foreclosures. See DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 274 Conn. 196, 216, 875 A.2d 28 (2005) (noting rule of construction that legislature expressly must state if it intends to abrogate common-law right). As this court explained in Milici v. Ferrara, 133 Conn. 141, 144, 48 A.2d 562 (1946), "[b]efore [§ 49-30], if a first mortgagee foreclosed the mortgage without making a second mortgagee a party to the proceeding the second mortgagee might redeem the first mortgage, and the mortgagor, still having a right to redeem the second mortgage, might, by so doing, acquire the right of the second mortgagee to redeem the first. Loomis v. Knox, [supra, 60 Conn. 350]; 2 [L.] Jones, Mortgages (8th Ed. [1928]) § 1355. The statute has no effect upon the rights of the parties where a second mortgagee brings an action to foreclose a third mortgagee who has not been made a party to a previous action of foreclosure brought by the former. . . . [T]he third mortgagee [has] the same right he would have had if the statute had not been passed, namely, the right to redeem [the plaintiff second mortgagee's] mortgage." Thus, as Milici explains, the effect of § 49-30 was to change the common-law rights of parties who had been included in the first foreclosure by statutorily foreclosing all of their interests, including the right to redeem through an omitted party. The statute does not change the rights of those parties who had been omitted from the first foreclosure. Against this background and in light of the facts presently before us, the fallacy of the defendants' contentions become obvious. The plaintiff, by virtue of its assignment from the mortgagee, holds legal title to the property subject to complete defeasance by the timely payment of the mortgage debt. At the time the mortgage was executed, White, the mortgagor, had the right to redeem the legal title. The foreclosure sale and resulting transfer by committee deed to Quoka, the defendants' predecessor in interest, is valid against White and the other parties to that tax foreclosure action. This is so despite the fact that the plaintiff improperly had been omitted from that action, because, under § 49-30, "all other parties foreclosed by the foreclosure judgment shall be bound thereby as fully as if no such omission or defect had occurred and shall not retain any equity or right to redeem such foreclosed real estate." Thus, White, who had been a party to the tax foreclosure action, was divested of all interest in the property, including the right to redeem through the plaintiff in the future. Similarly, under § 49-26, pursuant to which Quoka obtained the property by committee deed; see footnote 4 of this opinion; the transfer is not valid against those persons who were not parties to the tax lien foreclosure, including the plaintiff, who continues to hold legal title to the property subject to complete defeasance by payment of the debt. Thus, under § 49-30, the parties whose interests were foreclosed in the previous tax lien foreclosure are not necessary to quiet title because, once properly foreclosed, those interests remain so. Based on the change to the common law effected by the first sentence of § 49-30, parties such as White, who once may have had a right to redeem the first mortgage through the omitted party, no longer need to be included in the action. As we previously have noted, § 49-30 does not change the common-law rights of those parties who had been omitted from the first foreclosure and thus does not create substantive rights. The second sentence of § 49-30 merely clarifies that the omission of the plaintiff from the tax lien foreclosure may be cured in a proper proceeding between the only necessary parties, the defendants and the plaintiff. The plaintiffs foreclosure action does not seek to do anything other than foreclose on its interest. Thus, there has been no such proceeding to cure any other defect and, § 49-30, which does not otherwise affect the plaintiffs interest in the property, certainly does not operate to divest the plaintiff of its interest. The defendants do not contest the plaintiffs standing as the holder of a validly recorded interest in the property. Indeed, they have admitted that the plaintiff was improperly omitted from the tax lien foreclosure. In other words, they have alleged no facts that deny the plaintiffs interest in the property or serve to divest it of its interest. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to liability. Similarly, the defendants' counterclaim seeking to quiet title does not reflect any facts that provide a legal basis to extinguish or affect the plaintiffs interest in the property. Because we already have concluded that § 49-30 does not provide a substantive basis otherwise to clear the title as a matter of law, we also conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The plaintiff, solely as nominee for Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., brought this foreclosure action against the Hargroves, Margaret White, Beneficial Mortgage Company of Connecticut and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The trial court entered a default for failure to appear against White and Beneficial Mortgage Company of Connecticut. Due to the procedural posture of the present matter, unless otherwise indicated, references to the defendants are to Willard L. Hargrove and Alaina Hargrove. General Statutes § 49-30, entitled "[o]mission of parties in foreclosure actions," provides: "When a mortgage or lien on real estate has been foreclosed and one or more parlies owning any interest in or holding an encumbrance on such real estate subsequent or subordinate to such mortgage or lien has been omitted or has not been foreclosed of such interest or encumbrance because of improper service of process or for any other reason, all other parties foreclosed by the foreclosure judgment shall be bound thereby as fully as if no such omission or defect had occurred and shall not retain any equity or right to redeem such foreclosed real estate. Such omission or failure to properly foreclose such party or parties may be completely cured and cleared by deed or foreclosure or other proper legal proceedings to which the only necessary parties shall be the party acquiring such foreclosure title, or his successor in title, and the party or parlies thus not foreclosed, or their respective successors in title." The tax foreclosure action was brought by the city against Margaret White, the West Haven water pollution control committee, the South Central Connecticut water authority, First Financial, Beneficial Mortgage Company of Connecticut, Leroy White, LeroyaD. White, Lanita White and other "interested parties." Committee deeds are issued pursuant to General Statutes § 49-26, which provides: "When a sale has been made pursuant to a judgment therefor and ratified by the court, a conveyance of the property sold shall be executed by the person appointed to make the sale, which conveyance shall vest in the purchaser the same estate that would have vested in the mortgagee or lienholder if the mortgage or lien had been foreclosed by strict foreclosure, and to this extent such conveyance shall be valid against all parties to the cause and their privies, but against no other persons. The court, at the time of or after ratification of the sale, may order possession of the property sold to be delivered to the purchaser and may issue an execution of ejectment after the time for appeal of the ratification of the sale has expired." The plaintiff now serves as nominee for Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., and thus also is a defendant in that capacity in the action presently before this court. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Although the defendants' counterclaim did not expressly indicate that the claim was an action to quiet title pursuant to § 47-31, the defendants thereafter elaborated on their counterclaim in the hearing on the motion for an articulation to make clear their intention in that regard. Although, under General Statutes § 1-2z, we may consider nontextual sources such as legislative history when the text of a statute is ambiguous, and we conclude that the meaning of § 49-30 is not plain as applied to the issue before us, we note that there is no legislative history available to shed any further light on this issue. With respect to the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment because the plaintiff will be unjustly enriched in this foreclosure action as a result of having been omitted from the tax foreclosure action, we note that the defendants did not allege that the plaintiffs interest would have been essentially without value or foreclosed had it been included in the tax lien foreclosure. Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bombero, 37 Conn. App. 764, 770-73, 657 A.2d 668 (1995) (affirming judgment granting foreclosing mortgagee discharge of mistakenly omitted junior lien holder where, at all relevant times, defendant's junior lien, although valid as matter of law, was found to be worthless as matter of fact), appeal dismissed, 236 Conn. 744, 674 A.2d 1324 (1996). Therefore, the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to liability. To the extent that the defendants were attempting to raise issues concerning the valuation of the plaintiffs right to recovery, we note that the defendants did not contest the judgment rendered on May 9,2005, finding the amount of the debt to be $124,769.81, as reflected in the plaintiffs affidavit, and ordering foreclosure by sale. Thus, the record in this case does not afford us an opportunity to undertake an examination of any issues pertaining to valuation.

The petitioner Gary Klinger's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 579 (AC 25978), is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 510 (AC 26289), is denied. NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 93 Conn. App. 582 (AC 25509), is denied. Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state's attorney, in opposition. Decided April 7, 2006

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 569 (AC 26461), is denied. BORDEN and PALMER, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition. John R. Williams, in support of the petition. Anthony M. Fitzgerald and David S. Hardy, in opposition. Decided May 16, 2006

Opinion NORCOTT, J. In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court properly concluded that a loss of consortium claim is covered under the terms of a professional liability insurance policy covering claims that arise "because of bodily injury." The plaintiff, the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (association), brought this declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation to pay a loss of consortium claim brought in connection with a medical malpractice action that had been commenced by the named defendant, Carol Fontaine, and her husband, Thomas Fontaine. The association appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the named defendant's cross motion for summary judgment on the basis of the insurance policy's plain and unambiguous language. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but on the alternate ground that the language at issue is ambiguous and, therefore, properly construed against the association in place of the insolvent insurer that drafted the policy. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In 1999, the named defendant and her husband brought an action against the defendant physician, Michael Jimenez, alleging that his medical malpractice had caused Thomas Fontaine bodily injury, and the defendant a resulting loss of consortium. At the time of the alleged malpractice, Jimenez was insured by the PHICO Insurance Company (PHICO) under a policy that covered "[p]hysician and [s]urgeon [professional [liability" and "[institutional [professional [liability." The relevant portion of the policy stated that PHICO "agree [d] with the named insured to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by a medical incident . . . ." The policy further defined " '[b]odily [ijnjury' " as " 'injury to the human body, illness or disease sustained by [a] person, including death at any time resulting therefrom.' " Thereafter, PHICO was declared insolvent by a Pennsylvania court of competent jurisdiction, and the association became responsible for the payment of all "covered claims" pursuant to the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Act (guaranty act), General Statutes § 38a-836 et seq. The association then brought this declaratory judgment action seeking determinations, inter alia, that it has: (1) "no obligation to pay [the defendant's] claim for loss of consortium"; and (2) "no obligation to defend or indemnify . . . Jimenez with respect to [the defendant's] loss of consortium claim." The plaintiff moved, and the defendant cross moved, for summary judgment, with each party claiming that the relevant policy lan guage clearly and unambiguously supported its position. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment, concluding that, "it is clear under the policy that [the defendant's] loss of consortium claim comes within the coverage for damages because of . . . bodily injury . . . caused by a medical incident . In this action, the coverage is not limited by the policy terms to damages paid for the direct bodily injury suffered by [Thomas] Fontaine. The language at issue does not require that recovery be limited to one who sustained a bodily injury. . . . [T]here is no question of material fact that [the defendant's] claim for loss of consortium is covered under the terms and conditions of the policy." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) This appeal followed. On appeal, the association, relying primarily on this court's decision in Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 305, 524 A.2d 641 (1987), and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Diamond International Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1498 (1st Cir. 1983), claims that the unambiguous language of the policy is limited to claims for bodily injuries, which precludes coverage for the defendant because she has not suffered a bodily injury, and claims only loss of consortium. In response, the defendant contends that the association's reliance on Izzo is misplaced and that its reading of the policy's plain language ignores the import of the phrase, " 'damages because o/bodily injury,' " as her loss of consortium claim would not exist, but for her husband's bodily injury. (Emphasis added.) The defendant also claims, alternatively, that the policy's language is ambiguous and, under the well established doctrine of contra proferentem, should be construed against the insurer, or in the present case, the association in the insurer's place. We conclude that the policy language is ambiguous and should, therefore, be construed to afford coverage for the defendant's loss of consortium claim. "We begin by setting forth the well settled standard of review for interpreting insurance contracts. [C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo. . It is the function of the court to construe the provisions of the contract of insurance. . . . The [interpretation of an insurance policy . . . involves a determination of the intent of the parties as expressed by the language of the policy . . . [including] what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . [A] contract of insurance must be viewed in its entirety, and the intent of the parties for entering it derived from the four comers of the policy . . . [giving the] words . [of the policy] their natural and ordinary meaning . . . [and construing] any ambiguity in the terms . in favor of the insured . . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 457, 462-63, 876 A.2d 1139 (2005). Moreover, although the legal definition of the disputed claim is relevant in determining whether that claim is covered under the policy language at issue, that policy language remains the touchstone of our inquiry. See Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 518, 838 A.2d 993 (2004) (although plaintiffs bystander emotional distress forms basis of "separate and independent direct action," that characterization was not determinative of whether that claim was subject to coverage limit applicable to claims arising from physical injuries to plaintiffs son). We begin our coverage analysis by briefly reviewing the nature of the action for loss of consortium, which this court first recognized in Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 486, 408 A.2d 260 (1979), a medical malpractice case in which this court concluded that a husband had a valid claim that, "because of the defendants' negligence he was deprived of the love, affection and consortium of his wife . . . ." See also id., 487 (overruling Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 [1911], which held that "a married person whose spouse has been injured by the negligence of a third party has no cause of action for loss of consortium"). "A cause of action for loss of consortium does not arise out of a bodily injury to the spouse suffering the loss of consortium; it arises out of the bodily injury to the spouse who can no longer perform the spousal functions." Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 203 Conn. 312. "[Although loss of consortium is a separate cause of action, it is an action [which] is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action. . . . Loss of consortium, although a separate cause of action, is not truly independent, but rather derivative and inextricably attached to the claim of the injured spouse." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omited.) Id.; see also Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) Goss of consortium recovery may be diminished by injured spouse's comparative responsibility, even when punitive damages have been awarded, because "derivative action is dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action, i.e., that action which can be brought on behalf of the injured spouse himself or herself'). We next determine whether the term "because of bodily injury" is ambiguous with respect to loss of consortium claims in the context of a policy wherein the insurer "agree[d] with the named insured to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by a medical incident . . . ." (Emphasis added.) See Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, 274 Conn. 462-63. "The fact that the parties advocate different meanings of the [insurance policy] does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois, 247 Conn. 801, 806, 724 A.2d 1117 (1999). Rather, insurance policy language is ambiguous if we determine that it is "reasonably susceptible to more than one reading." (Internal quota tion marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 255 Conn. 295, 305, 765 A.2d 891 (2001); see also, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 406, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004) ("[w]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally reasonable] inteipretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted" [internal quotation marks omitted]). We start our ambiguity inquiry with the language of the key phrase "because of bodily injury." The phrase "because of' has been defined as "[o]n account of; by reason of." American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2002); see also id. (defining "because" as "[f]or the reason that; since"). It is undisputed that the defendant's husband, but not the defendant, suffered a "bodily injury," as that term is defined by the policy as " 'injury to the human body, illness or disease sustained by [a] person, including death at any time resulting therefrom.' " We conclude that this policy language is ambiguous because the association reasonably reads this phrase as limiting the insurer's obligation to paying damages caused only by direct injury to the body of the affected person, while the defendant adopts a reasonable, but more expansive reading of the policy language, which would encompass claims such as loss of consortium that are derivative, and would not exist, but for a predicate "bodily injury." Indeed, the reasonableness of both parties' positions is exemplified by the split of authority on this very point between two other New England appellate courts, both of which are cited by the association. Compare Diamond International Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 712 F.2d 1504-1505 (applying New Hampshire law and concluding that insurer was not obligated "to cover suits brought by third parties for losses occasioned by a covered bodily injury to another person" because "bodily injury" defini tion did not include "loss of services" [internal quotation marks omitted]) with Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day School, Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 415, 558 N.E.2d 958 (1990) (concluding that failure of "bodily injury" definition to include loss of services did not preclude coverage for loss of consortium claim because "the simplest and most direct interpretation of damages because of bodily injury includes any damages, including loss of consortium, arising from a bodily injury" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, having concluded that the relevant policy language is ambiguous, we ordinarily would be free to consider extrinsic evidence, although "[i]f the extrinsic evidence presents issues of credibility or a choice among reasonable inferences, the decision on the intent of the parties is a job for the trier of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 255 Conn. 306. The present case is, however, before both the trial court and this court on a statement of stipulated facts, and, accordingly, the language falls into the category of ambiguities "that cannot be resolved by examining the parties' intentions." Id. We, therefore, conclude that "the ambiguous language should be construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured when he entered into the contract. . . . Courts in such situations often apply the contra proferentem rule and interpret a policy against the insurer." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Indeed, our interpretation of ambiguous policy language in favor of coverage under the doctrine of contra proferentem has become near axiomatic in insurance coverage disputes. See, e.g., R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 465, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005) (policy language ambiguous when two "equally reasonable" definitions of term "suit" exist, so interpretation allowing for coverage must be adopted); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 406 ("[w]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally reasonable] interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted" [internal quotation marks omitted]). We see no reason to distinguish between the rule's application as to an insurance company that drafted the policy; see footnote 7 of this opinion; and its application as to another entity that assumes the drafter's responsibilities, in other words, that stands in the shoes of the drafter. Thus, we read the ambiguous language in favor of extending insurance coverage, and we conclude that the defendant's loss of consortium claim is covered under the policy because it would not exist but for the bodily injury to her husband. The association claims, however, that this conclusion is inconsistent with the guaranty act, which it contends precludes application of the contra proferentem rule in this context. We disagree. The association does not point to any provision of the act purporting to alter the usual methods of interpreting insurance policies, and relies primarily on the general description of the association's responsibilities from this court's decision in Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 451, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997), providing that "[t]he association was established for the purpose of providing a limited form of protection for policyholders and claimants in the event of insurer insolvency. The protection it provides is limited based upon its status as a nonprofit entity and the method by which it is funded. Specifically, the association is a nonprofit legal entity created by statute to which all persons licensed to transact insurance in the state must belong. . . . When an insurer is determined to be insolvent . . . the association becomes obligated . to the extent of covered claims within certain limits. The rates and premiums charged by member insurers are authorized . to include amounts sufficient to recoup the assessments levied upon insurers by the association. Because . . . insurers may pass on the costs of the assessments made against them by the association, it is in reality policyholders who pay for the protections afforded by the association. Limitations on the association's obligations, therefore, provide another form of protection against increased premiums for policyholders in addition to the primary protection afforded all claimants against losses resulting from insurer insolvency." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Any review of the guaranty act's legislative history is incomplete without consideration of the very next paragraph of Hunnihan, which provides that "[t]he legislative history confirms that the association was established for the benefit of consumers. At the public hearing held prior to passage of the bill proposing the creation of the association, Peter Kelly, a member of the state insurance department stated: [T]his bill provides the means to avoid financial loss to Connecticut residents because of the insolvency of [insurance com- parties]. . . . In the late 1960s . . . [consumers were being hurt and on a personal scale, an insolvency can be ruinous. . . . [The bill] provides the means for all insurance companies assessed to recover from the entire insured residents of this state the cost of such assessments so that it is really not an assessment on a company but an assessment on the entire residents of the state who are insured after the fact. This is spreading the risk amongst all Connecticut residents. . I think you must remember that industry is not paying the cost. This bill provides that Connecticut residents will pay the cost. . . . This bill provides for protections of residents of this state and the residents if any assessments are ever made will pay for the cost of such assessments in their future insurance premiums." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 452, quoting Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real Estate, 1971 Sess., pp. 55-59. Moreover, the association's reliance on General Statutes § 38a-838 (5), which defines "covered claim" under the guaranty act, is similarly circular and unpersuasive. Section 38a-838 (5) provides in relevant part that a " '[c]overed claim' " is an "unpaid claim, including, but not limited to, one for unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and subject to the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which sections 38a-836 to 38a-853, inclusive, apply . . . ." This statutory definition does not provide any specific direction as to how to interpret the insurance policies at issue. Indeed, we have noted that, "[i]n general, the legislative objective was to make the [association] liable to the same extent that the insolvent insurer would have been liable under its policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Union Carbide Corp., 217 Conn. 371, 390, 585 A.2d 1216 (1991) (association may not use exhaustion or nonduplication of recovery provisions to avoid respon sibilities for paying claims that should have been covered by insolvent excess insurer). Thus, we disagree with the association's argument that the rationale behind the rule of contra proferentem; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is inapplicable in this context since it did not draft the policies at issue, because acceptance of that position would frustrate the legislature's objective in enacting the guaranty act. We also note that other state courts applying substantively the same guaranty act have followed the usual contra proferentem rule of construing ambiguous insurance policies in favor of affording coverage, even when the ultimate payer will be an insurance guaranty association. See Alabama Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Magic City Trucking, Inc., 547 So. 2d 849, 855-56 (Ala. 1989) (concluding in case wherein both primary insurer and excess insurer were insolvent that, under ambiguous language of excess policy, excess coverage "dropped down" and guaranty association was required to pay full amount recoverable under excess policy); Florida Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. App. 1995) (construing insolvent insurer's ambiguous policy provision governing payment of supplemental expenses in addition to liability caps with "intent of extending coverage"); Missouri Property & Casualty Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Petrolite Corp., 918 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Mo. App. 1996) (construing insolvent insurer's ambiguous policy in favor of insured with respect to coverage of intentional discrimination claims); Guttman Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guaranty Assn., 429 Pa. Super. 523, 529, 632 A.2d 1345 (1993) (considering insurance guaranty association to be drafter when construing insolvent insurer's ambiguous policy in favor of insured with respect to time limitation for commencement of suit to recover improperly withheld deductibles), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 663, 644 A.2d 1200 (1994). Finally, our conclusion that the ambiguous policy language encompasses the defendant's loss of consortium claim is consistent with our decision in Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 203 Conn. 305, a case upon which both parties rely. In Izzo, which involved the interpretation of insurance policy language similar to that at issue in the present case, the insurers did not "argue that a claim for loss of consortium is not covered by the policy. Instead, [they] argue[d] that their liability is limited to $100,000, an amount which they have already paid" to the injured spouse under the automobile liability policy at issue. Id., 309 n.4. This court adopted the majority approach to this issue and concluded that the " 'per person' limit applies to all damages resulting from bodily injury to one person, including a claim for loss of consortium." Id., 312-13. Thus, the loss of consortium claim did not constitute a separate claim that could be paid under the policy's higher " 'per occurrence' " limit. Id., 311-13. In so concluding, this court noted that "the plaintiff would not have a claim under this policy for damages for loss of consortium but for the bodily injury his wife sustained in the accident . A cause of action for loss of consortium does not arise out of a bodily injury to the spouse suffering the loss of consortium; it arises out of the bodily injury to the spouse who can no longer perform the spousal functions." Id., 312. Thus, Izzo supports the defendant's position that her loss of consortium claim exists "because of' her husband's bodily injury, particularly in light of the fact that this case does not require us to determine whether it fits into a particular category of damages, such as the "per person" limit at issue in that case. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The association appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. The association also named Jimenez a defendant in this declaratory judgment action, but subsequently withdrew the complaint against him, and he has not filed a brief in this appeal. Hereafter, all references in this opinion to the defendant are to Carol Fontaine. Although all parties had claimed that the policy language clearly and unambiguously supported their respective positions, the trial court initially found the language ambiguous. It, therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that, because the policy language was ambiguous, it was to be construed in favor of the insured under the doctrine of contra proferentem. Thereafter, the association moved for reargument, claiming that this doctrine for resolution of ambiguities does not apply to the association, and that discovery and a trial on the merits were required to determine whether the parties intended to provide insurance coverage for loss of consortium claims. The trial court then vacated its initial memorandum of decision, and issued a substitute memorandum of decision granting the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy's plain and unambiguous language supported her position. We note that this argument and the association's opposition thereto were properly raised before, and ruled on, by the trial court when it applied the doctrine of contra proferentem in the initial memorandum of decision construing the policy in favor of the defendant. See footnote 3 of this opinion; see also New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 498, 863 A.2d 680 (2005) (alternate grounds for affirmance must be raised before trial court). Moreover, although the defendant failed to raise this issue as a separate alternate ground for affirmance in a responsive statement pursuant to Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1), we may consider it because doing so will not prejudice the association, which has discussed the issue extensively in its opening brief. See, e.g., Liscio v. Liscio, 204 Conn. 502, 506 n.6, 528 A.2d 1143 (1987). The definition of the term "consortium" includes spousal services, financial support and "the variety of intangible relations which exist between spouses living together in marriage. . . . These intangible elements are generally described in terms of 'affection, society, companionship and sexual relations.' . . . These intangibles have also been defined as the 'constellation of companionship, dependence, reliance, affection, sharing and aid which are legally recognizable, protected rights arising out of the civil contract of marriage.' " (Citations omitted.) Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 487. See also Sparks v. American Fire & Indemnity Co., 769 P.2d 501, 503 (Colo. App. 1989) (husband could recover loss of consortium damages under uninsured motorist policy when wife sustained "bodily injury" and policy allowed recovery "for damages . . . because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies" [internal quotation marks omitted]), overruled on other grounds by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 797 P.2d 46, 49 n.3 (Colo. 1990) (prejudgment interest award is subject to policy limits). We explained the policy reasons behind the contra proferentem rule, which is "more rigorously applied in the context of insurance contracts than in other contracts," in Israel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 503, 509, 789 A.2d 974 (2002). "The premise behind the rule is simple. The party who actually does the writing of an instrument will presumably be guided by his own interests and goals in the transaction. He may choose shadings of expression, words more specific or more imprecise, according to the dictates of these interests. . A further, related rationale for the rule is that [sjince one who speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity are resolved in favor of the latter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 508-509. Sister state decisions are helpful in construing and applying the guaranty act because it is "based on a model statute drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that has been adopted in substantial part by the legislatures of many of our sister states . . . ." Robinson v. Gailno, 275 Conn. 290, 300, 880 A.2d 127 (2005). In further support of its argument that the doctrine of contra proferentem is inapplicable because it did not draft the policy terms at issue, the association relies on a line of out-of-state cases holding that the doctrine is inapplicable when the ambiguous policy terms are dictated by legislation or regulation; in such cases, ordinary rules of statutory construction apply. See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 137 N.J. 190, 199, 644 A.2d 1098 (1994) (statutorily mandated incontestability clause in disability insurance policy). The association's reliance on these cases is misplaced because it points to nothing in this record demonstrating that the policy terms at issue were the product of governmental creation or imposition. That the association's responsibilities axe themselves creatures of statute has nothing to do with our construction of the policy terms at issue. The policy language at issue in Izzo provided that the insurer "will pay all sums that the insured under this coverage is legally required to pay as damages for bodily injury. . . . The limits of Coverage portion of the policy stated that [tjhere are two limits of coverage for Bodily Injury Liability. The amount shown on your Declarations Page for Each Person [$100,000] is the most [w]e'll pay for damages because of bodily injury to one person caused by any one occurrence. The amount shown on your Declarations Page for Each Occurrence [$300,000] is the most we'll pay for all damages as a result of any one occurrence, no matter how many people are injured. . . . Bodily Injury, as defined in the policy, means injury to a persons body, sickness or disease, and death that results from any of these." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 203 Conn. 309. Accordingly, the association's reliance on some of the many sister state cases that deal with the issue in Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 203 Conn. 311-13, namely, where loss of consortium claims fit with respect to the "per person" or "per occurrence" limits of automobile liability policies, is misplaced.

The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 93 Conn. App. 527 (AC 24295), is granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant's appeal from the judgment revoking his probation was moot because the defendant was serving concurrent sentences for (1) the violation of probation and (2) the conviction of attempted assault in the first degree and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree?"

The petitioner Lesly Saintval's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 283 (AC 26434), is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 94 Conn. App. 61 (AC 25567), is denied. VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Opinion McLACHLAN, J. The defendants, ABC Stores, LLC (ABC), and Mohammed A. Sheikh, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Small Business Transportation, Inc., awarding it $37,880.87. The sole issue raised on appeal is the defendant's claim that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff damages in that amount because the plaintiffs claimed damages were unenforceable. We agree and set aside the judgment of the trial court in part. The plaintiff is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Merrillville, Indiana. The purpose of the plaintiffs business is to arrange for the transportation of goods between buyers and sellers. Here, the defendant made an arrangement with the plaintiff to have goods, which the defendant purchased from a wholesaler in California, transported to the defendant's retail shop in Hartford. The defendant signed a written agreement as to the terms and conditions. The contract provided that a discounted fee would be charged if payment was made by the defendant within thirty days of the date of the invoice. If payment were not made within thirty days, then the discount would be forfeited and an unspecified higher price would apply. In addition to the forfeiture of the discounted rate, the contract called for service charges at the rate of 2 percent per month from the date of service until the date of payment and attorney's fees of 25 percent of the amount owed. The invoices that were sent to the defendant also provided that a penalty of 19 percent would be assessed to all invoices that were past due. The original charge for the shipments was $7251.48. The defendant concedes that payment was not made within thirty days of the invoice date. After the invoice date had passed, the payment that the plaintiff claimed was due was $24,831.99, plus interest and penalties. This was based on the defendant's failure to pay the freight and shipping charges within the thirty day period specified in the contract. After a trial to the court, the court found that the defendant's failure to pay entitled the plaintiff to damages, contractual interest and attorney's fees. The defendant does not challenge the plaintiffs entitlement to interest and attorney's fees. In an articulation, the court stated that it did not find that the late payment charged was an unenforceable penalty. We disagree with that assessment. The defendant's claim raises an issue of contract interpretation, for which our standard of review is well established. "[W]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law. . . . Because a question of law is presented, review of the trial court's ruling is plenary, and this court must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are legally and logically correct, and whether they find support in the facts appearing in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 74 Conn. App. 319, 322, 811 A.2d 273 (2002). The defendant claims that the portion of the contract that stated "allowances, discounts, exception clauses . . . shall apply only when charges are paid within a maximum period of (30) days from the date of invoice" was unenforceable. "In contract actions, the price must be capable of being ascertained from the contract. By this [it] is not meant that the exact amount in figures must be stated in the agreement; however, where that is not the case, the price must, by the terms of the agreement, be capable of being definitely ascertained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Melvin, 12 Conn. App. 711, 715, 533 A.2d 1231 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 804, 540 A.2d 74 (1988). Here, the nondiscounted rate is not ascertainable by the terms of the contract. The evidence establishes that, at the time of the signing of the credit application and the subsequent telephone calls, the defendant was aware that it would forfeit the quoted discounted rate, if not timely paid, and that the discounted rate would apply only when charges were paid within thirty days. The contract, however, did not identify the amount of the "nondiscounted" rate. It was not possible, therefore, for the defendant to ascertain what the damages would be in the event of a breach. The defendant claims in its brief that "there was no agreement as to the nondiscounted amount; rather [there was] avague contractual provision which warned the defendant that discounts would not apply when the defendant failed to pay and the matter was turned over for collections." "[C]ourts increasingly have been willing to flesh out the intended meaning of indefinite contract language by recourse to trade custom, standard usage and past dealings." Willow Funding Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates, 63 Conn. App. 832, 844, 779 A.2d 174 (2001). Here, however, the transcript is devoid of any testimony regarding the term as used in any prior dealings between the parties, nor is there evidence of trade usage of the "nondiscounted rate." Thus, there was no evidence adduced at trial that established that the nondiscounted rate was ascertainable by either the terms of the contract, with reference to the parties' prior course of conduct, or by trade usage. Accordingly, we conclude that the term "nondiscounted rate" in the parties' written agreement is so vague and indefinite as to be unenforceable. The judgment in the amount of $37,880.87 is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $7251.48 and for further proceedings to determine, consistent with this opinion, the amount of interest and attorney's fees that the plaintiff may recover. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The individual defendant in this case, Sheikh, was sued because he had guaranteed the obligations of ABC to the plaintiff, Small Business Transportation, Inc. For convenience, we refer to ABC as the defendant. The terms and conditions of the contract provided: "Payment of Charges: Allowances, discounts, exception classes and commodity rates shall apply only when charges are paid within a maximum period of 30 days from the date of invoice. In the event of default on any invoice, [the plaintiff] has the right to declare all invoices due and payable at once. Shippers who request invoices be mailed to the consignees, assume liability for charges not paid after 90 days. [The plaintiff] does NOT settle, consider or handle claims associated with shipments when [the plaintiff] is the third party responsible for freight charges. The filing of a cargo claim against carriers will not relieve payers from the terms on [the plaintiffs] invoice. "Litigation of Delinquent Bills: Failure to make payment of freight charges for services performed which subsequently results in placement with a collection agency or legal action taken against the shipper and or the con signee will be subject to the following: 1) Forfeiture of all discounts, allowances, commodity rates, brokerage agreement incentives or any other rate reduction enjoyed by such shipper or consignee, if any, on all unpaid freight bills. 2) In addition to above, shipper and or consignee will be responsible for reasonable [ajttorney fees and/or court costs associated with or as a result of suit." The charges were still unpaid at the time of trial. The total amount of the judgment for the plaintiff, as calculated by the court, including interest and attorney's fees was 437,880.87. Cf. J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (4th Ed. 1995) § 3-8, p. 147 (for sale of goods, court may in certain circumstances fill the gap for missing price terms). The court found that the parties had transacted business with one another in the past. There was no evidence, however, that the defendant had failed to pay the discounted rate in the past and no evidence as to whether the term "nondiscounted rate" was previously involved in any past dealings of the parties.

Opinion McLACHLAN, J. The plaintiffs brought this action in two counts, claiming that they acquired title to a certain parcel known as the "Reserved for Road" parcel (parcel) by reason of adverse possession and that the defendants had abandoned any right, title and interest to the parcel. The plaintiffs sought a judgment determining the rights of the parties in and to the parcel. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants John M. Maiorino, Jr., and his wife, Lanette M. Maiorino, as to the adverse possession count of the complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiffs are the owners of lots 37 and 38 as shown on a certain map entitled "Building Lots Owned by Eugene C. Palmer Oxford, Conn.," dated July 23, 1946. The two lots are located on the westerly side of Stephenson Dam Road (Route 34) in Oxford and front on the Housatonic River. The parcel in dispute is located between the plaintiffs' two lots and is bounded by Stephenson Dam Road, the Housatonic River and the respective lots of the parties. The defendants, owners of other lots shown on the map, have or claim an interest in the parcel by reason of certain deeds, including mortgage deeds. Many of the defendants were defaulted, and several filed appearances and responsive pleadings. The Maiorinos filed a motion for summary judgment on the first count of the complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the exclusivity requirement to prove adverse possession, and on the second count, claiming that the plaintiffs predicated abandonment solely on nonuse by the Maiorinos, which they claim is insufficient by itself to establish abandonment as a matter of law. The court, Moran, J., rendered summary judgment as to the first count on the grounds that the plaintiffs, who submitted only the uncertified transcripts of the depositions of Edwin W. Barlow, Florence F. Sysak and Diane Dyson, a tenant on the Barlow parcel, failed to offer an affidavit or any other evidence that would put the material fact of Lanette Maiorino's denial of the plaintiffs' exclusive use into dispute, and because the shared use alleged by the plaintiffs defeats their claim of exclusivity. The court denied summary judgment as to the abandonment count. At the trial on the issue of abandonment, the court, Hon. Hugh C. Curran, judge trial referee, found that the plaintiffs had not proved their claim of abandonment. On appeal, the plaintiffs first challenge the trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Maiorinos as to count one of the complaint. The rule for granting motions for summary judgment is set forth in Practice Book § 17-49. Summary judgment is to be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-46 provides: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto." Our review of the court's decision to grant a summary judgment motion is plenary. Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). Whether the court properly excluded the deposition transcripts is an evidentiary ruling that we review under the abuse of discretion standard. Cote v. Machabee, 87 Conn. App. 627, 630, 866 A.2d 639 (2005). We first address the issue of whether the court properly granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the opposing party submitted an uncertified transcript of the deposition in opposition to the motion. If the court properly granted the motion on that basis, whether the court was correct as to the ruling on the issue of exclusivity as a matter of law is immaterial. Here, refusing to consider the deposition testimony, the court found that the "plaintiffs have failed to offer an affidavit, or any other evidence, that would tend to put [the] material fact in dispute" and, therefore, the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue as to whether the use that Lanette Maiorino claimed in her affidavit defeats the plaintiffs' claims of exclusive use. Thus, that issue turns on whether the uncertified transcripts could be and should be disregarded by the court. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . Sworn or certified copies of all papers . . . shall be attached [to the affidavit]." Practice Book § 17-46. Aparty opposing a motion for summary judgment must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Gould, Larson, Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, P.C. v. Pánico, 273 Conn. 315, 321, 869 A.2d 653 (2005); United Services Automobile Assn. v. Marburg, 46 Conn. App. 99, 107-108, 698 A.2d 914 (1997). In interpreting the rules liberally, the deposition testimony could have been admitted at trial without objection to create an evidentiary foundation for the determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists, particularly where, as here, both parties submitted uncertified deposition transcripts. Therefore, a court properly could consider such a submission without objection. Nevertheless, we are reluctant to find that the trial court incorrectly insisted on certified transcripts to support an evidentiary finding when the rule provides that such documentation shall be supplied. Accordingly, the court did not improperly fail to consider the plaintiffs' opposition to the Maiorinos' motion. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim that the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the Maiorinos. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiffs are David J. Barlow, Richard E. Barlow, Edwin W. Barlow and Florence F. Sysak. The complaint was brought against twenty-four defendants, including John M. Maiorino, Jr., and his wife, Lanette M. Maiorino. The plaintiffs have not appealed from the court's rulings with respect to abandonment We note that, the trial courts are divided on the issue of whether an uncertified copy of a deposition may be used in support of or in opposition to summary judgment. LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC, 69 Conn. App. 824, 831, 798 A.2d 445 (2002). See, e.g., Ennis v. Dixon, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 502559 (January 20,2006), and cases cited therein. Here, the deposition transcript was submitted to the court without objection. The sole issue decided here is whether the court abused its discretion in not considering the uncertified deposition testimony. Practice Book § 1-8 provides: "The design of these rules being to facilitate business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work suiprise or injustice." Such a result would appear to be consistent with the purpose of Practice Book § 17-47, which provides: "Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that such party cannot, for reasons stated, present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial authority may deny the motion for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."

Opinion FLYNN, C. J. The pro se plaintiff, Paul Robert, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding a lesser amount in damages on his trespass claim against the defendants, Carmen Scarlata and Wanda Bermudez, than was sought by the plaintiff. The defendants initially had pleaded a special defense of adverse possession but before the presentation of evidence, withdrew that defense and admitted that their conduct constituted a trespass. Accordingly, the sole issue determined by the court was the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined the amount of damages it awarded to him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The trial court found the following relevant facts. "[The] plaintiff is the owner of a home located at 268 Trout Brook Drive in West Hartford . . . having acquired the house by a deed dated November 19,1999. The defendants have owned the house located at 18 Carol Road in West Hartford since June 22, 2001, and lived in the house as tenants prior to that date. The parties' properties abut. "The relevant portion of [the] plaintiffs land is surrounded by a chain-link fence [that] was in place before he bought the property. A portion of [the] plaintiffs land, which is immediately adjacent to the defendants' land, is outside the chain-link fence. The area in question is approximately 105 square feet. [The] plaintiff testified that in or about April, 2000, the defendants began encroaching upon the 105 square feet in question by placing a barbecue grill and a portable tool shed in that area. [The] defendants also hung a tire swing from a tree limb, from a tree on [the] plaintiffs property, which limb hung over the area in dispute. In 2003, [the] defendants installed several sections of stockade fence parallel to the chain-link fence, thereby further restricting [the] plaintiffs access to the 105 square feet of his land, which was on the outside of the chain-link fence. At about the same time, the defendants hung a clothesline in the area in question. "[The] plaintiff testified that he confronted [the] defendants about their trespass on several occasions and that they told him to take them to court if he wanted them to stop. He brought this action by writ of summons and complaint dated September 1,2004. The defendants sold their house on or about September 15, 2004. Prior to the sale, all structures encroaching on [the] plaintiffs land were removed." On the basis of these facts, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover "at least" nominal damages for the defendants' trespass. It also found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of $500 on the basis of an appraisal report, prepared by Peter R. Marsele, an experienced real estate appraiser, which opined that "the defendants' encroachment on [the] plaintiffs property reduced its value by $500." This report had been offered by the plaintiff and was not contested by the defendants. The court found the report "credible and probative on the issue of damages" and awarded damages in accordance therewith. The court did not credit the plaintiffs testimony that he also was entitled to the rental value of this property for the sixty months in which the defendants had encroached on it, which the plaintiff opined was valued at $180 per month, for a total of $10,800, finding this testimony "to be neither credible nor probative." The court further found that the plaintiff had not "established any entitlement to compensatory damages beyond the slight diminution of the value of his property caused by the encroachment." This appeal followed. We first set forth our standard of review. "Normally, we review a court's determination of damages under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . When, however, a damages award is challenged on the basis of a question of law, our review [of that question] is plenary." (Citation omitted.) Motherway v. Geary, 82 Conn. App. 722, 726, 846 A.2d 909 (2004). It is axiomatic that damages are awarded on the basis of facts and credible evidence, as found by the trier of fact. On appeal, "[w]e will upset a factual determination of the trial court only if it is clearly erroneous. . . . We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses." (Internal quo tation marks omitted.) Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn. App. 634, 640, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined the amount of damages it awarded to him. He argues that the court used an improper measure of damages because it awarded only "nominal damages, based on the appraisal [report], which provided that the defendants' encroachment reduced the value of the plaintiffs property by $500, without considering the value of the plaintiffs loss of use of the area encroached." We disagree. "Whenever a harm to land occurs from an invasion of property rights, the measures of damage to be considered are the difference in the value of the land before and after the harm, the loss of the use of the land, and the discomfort and annoyance to the party harmed as an occupant." (Emphasis added.) 75 Am. Jur. 2d 97-98, Trespass § 130 (1991); see 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 929, p. 544 (1979). "If one is entitled to a judgment for the detention of, or for preventing the use of, land or chattels, [however] the damages include compensation for (a) the value of the use during the period of detention or prevention . . . and (b) harm to the subject matter or other harm of which the detention is the legal cause." (Emphasis added.) 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 931, pp. 551-52. "The measure of damages to be awarded for an injury resulting from a trespass depends upon whether the injury is permanent or temporary . A temporary injury is one which may be abated or discontinued at any time . . . and, when injury to property is remedial by restoration or repair, it is considered to be temporary." 75 Am. Jur. 2d 95-96, Trespass § 127 (1991); see also Vincent v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 77 Conn. 431, 441-42, 59 A. 491 (1904) (discussing difference between permanent and temporary taking and damages occasioned thereby). "There is no fixed, inflexible rule for determining the measure of damages for injury to . . . property resulting from a trespass. The measure of damages differs according to the nature of the injury. . . . Damages for the dispossession of property are regarded as an award of compensatory damages for the violation of a recognized property right and encompass more than actual pecuniary loss. . If one is entitled to a judgment for detention of or preventing the use of . . . land . . . the damages include compensation for . . . [t]he value of the use during the period of detention . . . and . . . [t]he harm to the property or other harm of which the detention is the legal cause." 75 Am. Jur. 2d 95-96, supra, § 126; see 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 931, pp. 551-52; 1 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts (3d Ed. 1996) § 1.8, p. 1:36 ("[w]hen the injury is to possession alone, damages are typically measured by rental value" [internal quotation marks omitted]). In this case, there is no dispute that the defendants' invasion of the plaintiffs property was temporary in nature. On the basis of this temporary trespass, which caused no lasting physical damage, we agree with the plaintiffs contention that he was entitled to damages based on the lost use value of the property and any harm caused by the trespass during the time of the defendants' occupation. See 75 Am. Jur. 2d 95, supra, § 126; see 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 931, pp. 551-52; 1 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, supra, § 1.8, p. 1:36. We disagree, however, that the court used a different measure of damages in this case. The record supports the conclusion that the court used the loss of use value of the property, as set forth in the appraisal report, and that it specifically found that the plaintiff had proven no other damages. When making its assessment of damages, the court had before it the uncontested appraisal report, which the plaintiff had submitted. In this report, Marsele noted that he was opining on the damages resulting from a nonpermanent encroachment. Specifically, he stated: "The purpose of this report is to estimate the damage from the encroachment on [the] subject property, with a fence and shed over 105.4 S.F. of land for a period of approximately five years, by an adjoining neighbor. I personally inspected the premises on March 25, 2005 and after careful analysis of all the facts pertaining to [the] subject property, its environs and general neighborhood, it is my opinion the Estimate of Damage as of September 2004 is: "Value Before The Encroachment $160,000 "Value After the Encroachment 159,500 "Total Estate of Damage $ 500." (Emphasis added.) The court specifically credited this opinion, which was offered into evidence by the plaintiff, and found that the encroachment on the plaintiffs property reduced its value by $500. There is nothing in the record that indicates that this reduction in value is for anything other than the loss of use value of the property over the five year period of encroachment. In addition to finding the appraiser's opinion credible, the court specifically discredited the plaintiffs testimony concerning the rental value of the property. The court also found that the plaintiff had proven no other compensatory damages beyond the $500. Although the plaintiff argues that the court should have credited his testimony, as we have stated previously, "[w]e cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stohlts v. Gilkinson, supra, 87 Conn. App. 640. The plaintiff points us to nothing in the record that would demonstrate that these findings were clearly erroneous or that the court used an improper measure of damages. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiff also argues that Hie court failed to consider the intentional nature of the trespass when making its damages award and that it should have awarded punitive damages. We conclude that this argument concerning punitive damages is without merit. First, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the court found this trespass to be anything but intentional; the defendants, themselves, admitted the trespass, and trespass to land is, by definition, an intentional tort. See generally Right v. Breen, 277 Conn. 364, 372, 375, 890 A.2d 1287 (2006). Second, and more important, the plaintiff did not request punitive damages in his complaint, nor did he plead any facts consistent with, or in support of, a request for punitive damages. Therefore, the court was correct in not making such an award.

Opinion McLACHLAN, J. The defendant, Kevin B. Logan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for contempt and granting the motion for modification filed by the plaintiff, Heather V. Logan. He claims that the court improperly (1) failed to provide him with accommodations in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (2) denied his motion for contempt and (3) granted the plaintiffs motion for modification, ordering that he be prohibited from driving the parties' minor child in his motor vehicle and ordering that the minor child no longer have overnight visits with him. We agree with the defendant only as to the order prohibiting overnight visits with his daughter. The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows. On December 23,1993, the court issued a memorandum of decision ordering the dissolution of the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant. The memorandum of decision resolved financial, custodial and visitation issues. On December 2, 2004, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff was interfering with his visitations, vacations and holidays with the parties' minor child. He further alleged that the plaintiff was refusing to allow him to pick up and drop off the minor child and that she was being difficult in communicating with him about their child. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs actions were in violation of the December 23,1993 court orders. On January 3, 2005, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for contempt, stating that his motion should be denied because he failed to exercise the majority of his visitation rights with the minor child in the last six years. On January 4, 2005, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for modification in which she requested that the court modify the December 23, 1993 court orders. Specifically, she stated that there had been a substantial change in circumstances because the defendant's ability to care for the parties' minor child had diminished. She stated that the defendant had been in several car- accidents since December, 1993, and that the minor child wanted to have her visitation with the defendant limited to one night per week. The plaintiff requested that the court enter orders that the defendant's parenting time with the minor child be limited to weekly visits without an overnight stay and that the defendant be prohibited from driving the minor child in a motor vehicle. On February 8, 2005, the court heard testimony, evidence and argument from both parties and the guardian ad litem for the minor child regarding the motion for contempt and the motion to modify. After the hearing, the court issued a ruling denying the defendant's motion for contempt and granting the plaintiffs motion to modify. An additional order was entered by the court, on the basis of an agreement that the parties reached during the hearing, which provided that all correspondence from the minor child's school would be sent to the defendant and that the defendant's contact information would be provided to the school. This appeal followed. I The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the court improperly failed to provide him with accommodations according to the ADA. This claim was not raised in the trial court, and no specific accommodation was requested by the defendant in the trial court. The defendant asserts that he has been diagnosed with chronic pain in his neck, back and left and right rotator cuff, and that he suffers from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and myofacial syndrome, which affect his skeletal muscles. He also claims that he has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety disorder. His disabilities affect his motor skills and ability to communicate. "Practice Book § 4185 [now § 60-5] provides in pertinent part: The court on appeal shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court. Practice Book § 4185 [now § 60-5] provides that this court is not bound to consider a claim that was not distinctly raised at trial. This rule applies to constitutional claims. . . . [0]nly in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brubeck v. Burns-Brubeck, 42 Conn. App. 583, 588, 680 A.2d 327 (1996). Because the defendant did not raise his ADA claim in the trial court, nor did he provide any information to suggest that the issue raised by him was an exceptional circumstance that would permit this court to review this unpreserved issue, we decline to review the defendant's first claim. II The defendant's second claim on appeal is that the court improperly denied his motion for contempt. "A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the court abused its discretion in failing to find that the actions or inac-tions of the [plaintiff] were in contempt of a court order. . To constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful. . . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gina M. G. v. William C., 77 Conn. App. 582, 590, 823 A.2d 1274 (2003). "[T]he fact that [an] order had not been complied with fully . . . does not dictate that a finding of contempt must enter. It is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure to honor the court's order." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Niles v. Niles, 9 Conn. App. 240, 253-54, 518 A.2d 932 (1986). Here, the defendant claims that the plaintiff violated the December 23, 1993 court order by interfering with his parenting time and involvement with their child's school and by preventing him from driving with the minor child. The defendant fails to cite any other evidence or testimony, besides his testimony, that supports his claim that the plaintiff wilfully violated a court order. The defendant offers conclusory, unsupported opinions that the plaintiff was interfering with his relationship with the minor child. Furthermore, we note that the minor child had expressed her discomfort with driving with the defendant. On the basis of the record, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for contempt. Ill The defendant's third claim on appeal is that the court improperly granted the plaintiffs motion for modification, ordering that the defendant be prohibited from driving the parties' minor child in his motor vehicle and ordering that the minor child no longer have overnight visits with him. We agree with the defendant only as to the order prohibiting overnight visits with the minor child. "The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb atrial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion . . . we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gina M. G. v. William C., supra, 77 Conn. App. 588. The plaintiff claims in her motion to modify that it is not in the best interest of the minor child to be transported by the defendant. The court heard evidence and testimony regarding the defendant's prior motor vehicle accidents, his use of medications and his physical and mental disabilities. The court also heard from the guardian ad litem, who stated that the minor child did not want to be transported by the defendant. Any of these facts can serve as a sufficient basis for the court's determination that it was not in the child's best interest to be transported by the defendant, and, therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to grant this portion of the plaintiffs motion to modify. We disagree, however, that there was a sufficient factual basis for the court to determine that it was not in the best interest of the child to have overnight visits with the defendant. There was absolutely no evidence presented at the hearing on February 8, 2005, from which the court could conclude that it was not in the best interest of the child to have overnight visits with the defendant. The judgment is reversed only as to the order prohibiting overnight visitation and the case is remanded for a hearing on the issue of what restrictions, if any, should be imposed on overnight visitation. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The parties have one minor child together, bom on June 25, 1990. The court gave the plaintiff and defendant joint legal custody with physical custody to the plaintiff. The defendant was granted visitation with the minor child on alternate weekends, one evening per week and various vacations and holidays.

Opinion HARPER, J. The defendant, Dameisha Moore, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b (a), accessory to criminal impersonation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-8 (a) and 53a-130 (a) (1), and failure to appear in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-173 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of accessory to criminal impersonation and failure to appear in the second degree. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 4, 2003, while shopping at a Costco store in Brookfield, the defendant took a sealed package containing a telephone off a shelf and placed it in her shopping carriage. She walked to another aisle and tried to open the package but was unable to do so because of its heavy plastic wrapping. As a result, she put the telephone back on the shelf, proceeded to an aisle containing tools and opened a package of drill bits. The defendant then returned to the telephone package and used a drill bit to piy it open. She placed all of the telephone components in her bag and walked toward the exit of the store. Before she reached the door, the defendant was stopped by Carlton Newell, a loss prevention agent who had been observing her activities. Newell informed the defendant of his suspicions, at which point a struggle ensued between the defendant and Newell, causing the defendant to drop her bag. The contents of her bag, including the telephone components, spilled onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, Jameson Zaloski, an officer from the Brookfield police department, arrived at the scene and interviewed Newell and the defendant. He obtained the driver's license of the defendant, which identified her as Dameisha J. Moore. The defendant informed Zaloski that she had been married recently and that her married name was Dameisha Baptiste, but Zaloski was unable to verify this information through state records or a license check. On the basis of his investigation, Zaloski arrested the defendant on a misdemeanor summons, which required her to appear in court on September 16, 2003. The defendant signed her name on the misdemeanor summons as "Dameisha Baptiste." At the time of her arrest, the defendant was a bail bondsperson in Danbury. In an effort to conceal her arrest from the people with whom she worked at the Danbury courthouse, the defendant sent Ketura Henderson, a close friend, to meet with Vicki H. Hutchinson, a defense attorney in Danbury. The defendant arranged the meeting with Hutchinson by telephone and then gave Henderson the misdemeanor summons and $300. On September 12,2003, Henderson met with Hutchinson at her office. She told Hutchinson that her name was Daneisha Baptiste, that she had been arrested for shoplifting at Costco and that she had an upcoming court appearance. Henderson paid Hutchinson $300 for her representation at the court appearance. She also informed Hutchinson that she was related by marriage to the defendant, but that the defendant was not involved in the case and that she did not want the defendant to learn of her arrest. Hutchinson told Henderson that she had a scheduling conflict on September 16, 2003, and that she would contact the clerk's office to request that the hearing be continued to September 19. She told Henderson that she would contact her if there were any problems obtaining a continuance. On September 15, Hutchinson filed an appearance on behalf of Daneisha Baptiste and requested a continuance. The court granted the continuance that day and rescheduled the defendant's court appearance for September 19. On September 16, the prosecutor called the case against the defendant, but the clerk noted that it had been continued to September 19. The next day, Hutchinson saw the defendant in a hallway of the courthouse. The defendant told Hutchinson that she had heard that her cousin's case had been called the day before and that she thought it had been resolved. Hutchinson advised her that the case had been continued to September 19. On September 18, Hutchinson met with Deborah Mabbett, an assistant state's attorney, about the defendant's case. During their conversation, Mabbett informed Hutchinson that the defendant was the bond-sperson who worked regularly in the Danbury courthouse. Hutchinson disagreed and noted that someone else had retained her for this matter. Mabbett said that she would confirm the defendant's identity through a photograph taken after the incident at Costco and further informed Hutchinson that the state intended to file a substitute information charging the defendant with robbery. In the meantime, Henderson had reconsidered her actions and decided not to impersonate the defendant in court. When she spoke to Hutchinson, she asked Hutchinson to try to continue the hearing on September 19 to a later date, but Hutchinson refused because she was aware that Henderson was not the defendant in this case. The defendant's case was called on September 19. Hutchinson was present, but neither the defendant nor Henderson was in court. At that time, the state filed a substitute information charging the defendant with robbery in the third degree. The defendant's case was called a second time later that morning, but the defendant still was not present. Consequently, the court ordered that the defendant be rearrested. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. ' 'The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . "We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 542, 881 A.2d 290, (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S. Ct. 1798, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2006). I The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of being an accessory to criminal impersonation. We disagree. General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another . . . . " Because the defendant was charged as an accessory, the state had to prove that the defendant, while acting with the intent required for criminal impersonation, solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided another person, in this case Henderson, to engage in criminal impersonation. See General Statutes § 53a-8 (a). The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for being an accessory to criminal impersonation because § 53a-130 (a) (1) does not prohibit the giving of a false name unless the name provided is that of a real person. See State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 221-22, 479 A.2d 814 (1984). She contends that, because Henderson provided Hutchin son with the name Daneisha Baptiste, a fictitious name, there was insufficient evidence that she was impersonating a real person. Although we recognize that the mere act of providing a false name does not expose an individual to culpability for criminal impersonation, we disagree with the defendant that this is the end of the inquiry under the facts of this case. In Smith, the defendant was convicted of criminal impersonation for providing a false name to an arresting police officer. Id., 216. Our Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that "[t]he statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name; it prohibits impersonating another." Id., 222. If Henderson had only provided Hutchinson with a fictitious name, then we agree that, under Smith, there may have been insufficient evidence that she had impersonated another. In the present case, however, Henderson told Hutchinson that her name was Daneisha Baptiste, that she was the individual who was arrested for shoplifting at Costco and that she had a court appearance on September 16. Thus, in addition to providing a false name, Henderson provided Hutchinson with information such that she specifically identified herself as the defendant in this case, at the defendant's request. Unlike the facts of Smith, therefore, Henderson did impersonate a real person— the defendant; that she also referred to the defendant by a false name is immaterial for the purposes of culpability under § 53a-130 (a) (1). The defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence that she intended to defraud another by aiding Henderson. Regardless of whether there was evidence that the defendant intended to defraud another, there was evidence that the defendant intended to obtain a benefit by aiding Henderson. To warrant conviction under § 53a-130 (a) (1), the statute requires that Henderson had impersonated another "with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) (1). Because this provision is expressed in the disjunctive, the jury only had to find that Henderson and the defendant intended one of these consequences. See, e.g., State v. Van Eck, 69 Conn. App. 482, 503 n.23, 795 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 937, 802 A.2d 92, 261 Conn. 915, 806 A.2d 1057 (2002). There was evidence before the jury that, by having Henderson impersonate the person who was arrested at Costco, the defendant sought to conceal her arrest from her coworkers at the Danbury courthouse. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, it also was reasonable and logical for the jury to find that, by helping Henderson impersonate her, the defendant intended to obtain the benefit of avoiding prosecution. To the extent that the defendant challenges her role as an accessory to Henderson's criminal impersonation, we find this argument unpersuasive as well. There was evidence before the jury that the defendant arranged a meeting between Henderson and Hutchinson to discuss the incident at Costco. In addition, there was evidence that the defendant gave Henderson the misdemeanor summons and $300 to retain Hutchinson. On the basis of these facts, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that, with the intent required for criminal impersonation, the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided Henderson. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of being an accessory to criminal impersonation. II The defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of failure to appear in the second degree. We agree with the defendant. The following additional facts are relevant to our review. On July 8, 2004, the state filed a substitute long form information that charged the defendant with, inter alia, failure to appear in the second degree and charged that "at the [t]own of Danbury, during the month of September, 2003, the said [defendant], while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor and while released under procedure of law, she wilfully failed to appear when legally called according to the terms of her promise to appear, in violation of § 53a-173 (a) (1) . . . During its closing statement, the state argued that the defendant was not present in court on either September 16 or 19 and, further, that although she was required to be in court for an appearance on September 16, the defendant was not present. Adhering to the theory presented by the state, the court instructed the jury that "[f]or you to find the defendant guilty of [failure to appear in the second degree], the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant was released on bail or under another procedure of law upon the condition that she appear personally in connection with her criminal proceeding at a future given date; that on September 16, 2003, the defendant was required to appear before a court or a judicial officer in connection with the charge of larceny in the sixth degree; and that the defendant wilfully failed to appear as required." The court did not reference September 19 at any point during its instructions on the charge of failure to appear in the second degree. To support a conviction for failure to appear in the second degree in violation of § 53a-173 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor . . . for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law . . . wilfully fail[ed] to appear when legally called according to the terms of his . . . promise to appear . . . ." General Statutes § 53a-173 (a) (1). Because the court's instructions to the jury focused on the defendant's failure to appear on September 16, we confine our review to whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of failure to appear in the second degree with respect to that date. See State v. Fauci, 87 Conn. App. 150, 163, 865 A.2d 1191 (noting that absent contrary evidence, we presume juries follow instructions given by trial judge), cert. granted on other grounds, 273 Conn. 921, 871 A.2d 1029 (2005). When the defendant was arrested for shoplifting, she was given a misdemeanor summons that required her to appear in court on September 16. On September 15, however, the court continued the hearing to September 19. As a result, the defendant legally was not required to appear until September 19, and her failure to appear on September 16 was of no legal consequence. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the evidence reasonably supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant was guilty of failure to appear in the second degree. The judgment is reversed with respect to the conviction of failure to appear in the second degree and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment of not guilty of that crime. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The court imposed a total sentence of one year imprisonment, execution suspended immediately, and two years of conditional discharge. The defendant does not challenge the conviction of larceny in the sixth degree. In reviewing the evidence, the prosecutor noted: "You heard from assistant state's attorney Deborah Mabbett . [Y]ou heard her testify with regard to September 16 and September 19, the defendant is never in court when the case is called. You know, from Officer Zaloski and the misdemeanor summons, that she had a court appearance that was required on September 16; she never shows, no date." The state made several arguments before this court supporting the conviction for failure to appear on September 16. First, the state argued that notwithstanding the continuance to September 19, the defendant still had an obligation to appear in court on September 16. The state also argued that the court lacked the authority to continue the hearing to September 19 because it had been requested by an attorney who was not retained by the defendant. We find both of these arguments to be wholly without merit.

Opinion DiPENTIMA, J. The plaintiff, Eugene P. Mercer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action seeking monetary damages, attorney's fees and declaratory and injunctive relief for the allegedly discriminatory actions of the defendants, employees of the department of correction (department). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, was barred by General Statutes § 4-165, which provides for statutory immunity, because the complaint had not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim that the defendant state employees had acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants by way of a four count complaint, in which he alleged that the defendants violated Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, and article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments. The complaint indicated that each of the defendants was being sued in his or her official capacity. All of the plaintiffs claims stem from his belief that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his physical disability by refusing his request for placement in a single cell in the back of one of the housing facilities at the correctional institution in which he is housed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the plaintiffs claims were barred by the doctrines of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity. In a memorandum of decision dated March 28, 2005, the court dismissed the action, concluding that sovereign immunity was not an effective bar to the plaintiffs ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, but that the plaintiffs state claims were barred by § 4-165 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment of dismissal as to the entirety of the plaintiffs claims, and this appeal followed. The trial court's judgment was rendered and the parties' briefs to this court were filed prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S. Ct. 877, 163 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006), in which the court explained the extent to which claims made pursuant to Title II of the ADA are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. At oral argument before this court, both parties requested that the case be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of United States v. Georgia, supra, 151. Although we agree with the parties that remand for this purpose is appropriate, we first must consider the propriety of the court's judgment dismissing the action on statutory immunity grounds because if the plaintiff s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are barred by statutory immunity, then any consideration of sovereign immunity is academic at best. I Prior to discussing the role of statutory immunity in this action, it is necessary to understand in what capacity the named defendants were sued. Throughout the course of this litigation, it has been understood that the plaintiff sued the defendants in their official capacities, and the complaint, in fact, alleges as much. Although a statement by the plaintiff that he has sued the defendants in their official capacities is not dispositive of the issue and is a question of law over which our review is plenary; see Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003); the nature of the pleadings and relief sought by this plaintiff clearly indicate that the suit is against the defendants in their official capacities. See id. "[A] suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313. This is because a state can act only through its officers and agents. Id. In suits, therefore, in which the officials or agents are being sued for actions that concern matters in which they represent the state, we consider such suits as if they were solely against the state. See Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550-51, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984). Having determined the capacity in which the named defendants have been sued, we now consider the propriety of the court's decision dismissing the plaintiffs claims on the ground of statutory immunity. "Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn. App. 103, 113-14, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Id., 114. It is well settled that the defense of sovereign immunity can be raised for claims brought directly against the state or against state employees acting in their official capacities. Likewise, the defense of statutory immunity can be raised for claims brought against state employees acting in their individual capacities. Id.; see also Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Because an action against state employees in their official capacities is, in effect, an action against the state; see Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 313; the only immunity that can apply is the immunity claimed by the state itself— sovereign immunity. The United States Supreme Court explained this concept well in Kentucky v. Graham,, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985), in which it stated: "In an official-capacity action, [individual capacity] defenses are unavailable. . . . The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment. While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the basic distinction between personal- and official-capacity actions." (Citations omitted.) Id., 167; see also Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center, 74 Conn. App. 264, 268, 812 A.2d 95 (2002) ("[b]y its own terms, § 4-165 applies only to state officers and employees sued in their personal capacities, and is therefore inapplicable to [whether state officers or employees sued in their official capacities are] immune from suit"). We have concluded that the plaintiff brought this action against the named defendants solely in their official capacities. Because suing these state employees in their official capacities is tantamount to bringing the action against the state, the only immunity defense available to these defendants is sovereign immunity. The court, therefore, improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory immunity. II Because the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff does not address the applicability of the defense of sovereign immunity to his claim under the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants also did not brief this question and instead stated: "On appeal, [the] plaintiff assumes that the trial court dismissed his claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants do not read the trial court's decision as such, and [do] not address the Rehabilitation Act claim in this memorandum." Although we agree with the defendants that the court's decision does not dispose of the plaintiffs claim under the Rehabilitation Act in a clear and articulate manner, it nonetheless is trae that the plaintiffs complaint was dismissed in its entirety, including the claim made pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. We therefore disagree with the defendants that the court did not dismiss the plaintiffs claim under the Rehabilitation Act. We consider whether the defense of sovereign immunity is applicable to claims raised under the Rehabilitation Act because the question implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Manifold v. Ragaglia, supra, 94 Conn. App. 113-14. As with determinations made by the trial court regarding the applicability of statutory immunity, our review of the court's conclusions regarding sovereign immunity is plenary. Id. It is well settled law in this jurisdiction that Congress intended states' acceptance of federal funds to constitute waiver of their sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment as to claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198-200, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 135 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1996); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center, 280 F.3d 98, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001). This waiver applies both to claims seeking injunctive relief; Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 288-89 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936, 124 S. Ct. 1658, 158 L. Ed. 2d 356 (2004); and to claims seeking monetary damages. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center, supra, 115; My slow v. New Milford School District, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9868 *27-28 (D. Conn. 2006); Sacca v. Buffalo State College, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9134 *11-18 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); Johnson v. Southern Connecticut State University, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21084 *9 (D. Conn. 2004); Doe v. Goord, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24808 *57-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that the department receives federal funding, which would subject the department to the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. See Powell v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004). We therefore conclude that the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to defeat the defense of sovereign immunity as to his claim under the Rehabilitation Act. III Having concluded that proper disposition of this appeal includes a remand to the trial court for consideration of the plaintiffs claim under the Rehabilitation Act, we must determine whether the court on remand also must address the plaintiffs claim under the ADA. As indicated previously, the legal landscape in this area has changed significantly since the trial court's initial consideration of the plaintiffs claim because of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Georgia, supra, 546 U.S. 151. There is no question that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from liability and suit under the eleventh amendment. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12202, the relevant provision of the ADA provides: "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State." In abrogating the states' immunity in this manner, Congress sought "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (4). Until recently, however, the question has remained whether and to what extent the abrogation of sovereign immunity was valid congressional action. The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Georgia, supra, 546 U.S. 151, answered this question in part. The court held that when a claim under the ADA is made for conduct that violates the fourteenth amendment, either by violation of one of the stated provisions of that amendment or by violation of one of the amendments that has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process, Title II of the ADA validly abrogates states' sovereign immunity. Id., 158-59. Therefore, on remand, the court must consider whether any of the actions of which the plaintiff complains constitutes a constitutional violation. If the court concludes that the complaint alleges constitutional violations, the court then must consider whether these violations also are covered under the ambit of Title II of the ADA. To the extent that the alleged conduct both constitutes a constitutional violation and is forbidden under the ADA, the defense of sovereign immunity does not apply to bar the plaintiffs claim. It is unclear however, even after United States v. Georgia, supra, 546 U.S. 151, whether Congress' abrogation of states' sovereign immunity under the ADA is valid as it applies to conduct that does not violate the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court remanded this question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for consideration in the first instance. Id., 159. We likewise remand this issue to the trial court insofar as the plaintiffs complaint may implicate it. To that end, the court, on remand, should consider (1) which aspects of the defendants' alleged conduct violated the ADA; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated the ADA but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress' purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. See id. In considering any portion of the plaintiffs claim that alleges conduct that comes within the scope of the ADA, but does not violate any constitutional guarantee so that it falls within the prophylactic aspects of the ADA, the court must consider whether that aspect of the legislation exhibits "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means to be adopted to that end." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004). If the portion of the legislation triggered by the plaintiffs claim is congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented, then the abrogation of the defendants' sovereign immunity is valid as to that claim, and further litigation of the plaintiffs claim may proceed. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiff named the following individuals as defendants: (1) David Strange, warden of the Osbom Correctional Institution (Osbom); (2) Dan Bannish, the health services program director and ADA administrator for the department of correction; (3) Sheila Hughes, a nursing supervisor and ADA facility coordinator at Osborn; (4) Patricia Wollenhaupt, a nursing supervisor and medical grievance coordinator at Osborn; (5) John Gitzus, the infectious disease specialist at Osbom; (6) Michele Cabana, the infectious disease nurse at Osbom; (7) Richard Stratton, the unit manager of the J1 housing unit at Osbom, which is a medical dormitory; and (8) Dennis Morgan, the grievance coordinator at Osbom. "Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are applicable to inmates in state prisons." Divine Allah v. Goord, 405 F. Sup. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the court's judgment only as to his claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Because the plaintiff no longer pursues his claims under the federal and state constitutions, we do not consider whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation of those claims. We therefore decline the defendants' invitation to discuss those claims, even though they otherwise might bear on the court's subject matter jurisdiction, because the claims have been abandoned, and any discussion thereon would be purely academic. See Knight v. Commissioner of Correction, 81 Conn. App. 163, 164 n.1, 838 A.2d 1023, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 905, 845 A.2d 407 (2004). The court's memorandum of decision does not address the plaintiffs federal constitutional claim in any way. Additionally, the court's memorandum of decision states that the "state law claims" are barred by the doctrine of statutory immunity. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the action in its entirety after stating "statutory immunity applies, and the motion to dismiss is granted on that ground." We therefore read the court's decision as having granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all counts of the plaintiffs complaint on the ground of statutory immunity. The defendants did not address either in their brief or at oral argument before this court whether, on remand, the trial court should consider the plaintiffs claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff, on the other hand, requested a remand for his claims to be considered under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. We note that the release of the slip opinion in United States v. Georgia, supra, 546 U.S. 151, so close in time to oral argument in this case likely affected the parties' focus at oral argument. As indicated in this opinion, how'ever, a remand for purposes of considering the plaintiffs claims under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is appropriate. "[W]e have consistently held that we do not render advisory opinions. . . . [W]here the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Echavarria v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Conn. 408, 419, 880 A.2d 882 (2005). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a), provides in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 706 (20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . ." Although the specific language of the ADA abrogates sovereign immunity only for suits brought in federal court, we previously recognized that because the Rehabilitation Act is in accord with the ADA, which may be enforced in either state or federal court; see 42 U.S.C. § 12202; plaintiffs bringing claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA may pursue those claims in Connecticut state courts. Mercer v. Rodriguez, 83 Conn. App. 251, 266, 849 A.2d 886 (2004); see also Capitano v. State, 178 Ariz. 599, 601 n.2, 875 P.2d 832 (1993); White v. California, 195 Cal. App. 3d 452, 461 n.3, 240 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1987); Shields v. Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961, 965-67 (La. 1991); Elek v. Huntington National Bank, 60 Ohio St. 3d 135, 138-40, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). Although Garcia held that New York's acceptance of funds under the Rehabilitation Act was insufficient to waive its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act, that holding was limited to the circumstances surrounding the case, specifically that, during the time in question, New York was under the belief that Title II of the ADA acted as an abrogation of its sovereign immunity, making any concurrent waiver under the Rehabilitation Act inconsequential. After Garcia, Connecticut could not rely on abrogation under Title II, and therefore knowingly and intentionally waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act when accepting federal funds. See Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7839 *26-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). On remand, however, to prevail on this claim, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he is a "qualified individual" with a disability, as that term is defined in the Rehabilitation Act, (2) he is "otherwise qualified" to participate in the offered program or activity or to enjoy the services or benefits offered, (3) he is being denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendants' services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendants by reason of his disability and (4) the defendants, or the entity they represent, receive federal financial assistance so as to be subject to the Rehabilitation Act. See Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Sup. 1019, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, supra, 331 F.3d 272. Previously, in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004), the court concluded that Title II of the ADA was a valid abrogation of states' sovereign immunity insofar as it sought to prohibit state conduct that infringed on certain fundamental rights, such as access to the courts. Those aspects of the ADA that are prophylactic in nature proscribe facially constitutional conduct in order to prevent and to deter unconstitutional conduct. Tennessee v. Lane, supra, 541 U.S. 518. Under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress' power "includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of the rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Opinion PER CURIAM. This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to intervene in an action involving the alleged sexual abuse of a child. Because that action has been withdrawn, we dismiss the appeal as moot. The relevant facts are not in dispute. In the spring of 2005, the plaintiff, John Doe, commenced a civil action against the defendants, the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (diocese), Saint Augustine Church of North Branford (church) and Daniel McSheffery. The complaint sought damages for, inter alia, sexual abuse allegedly suffered at the hands of a priest. On May 25, 2005, Roger J. Frechette filed a motion to intervene in the matter. The plaintiff subsequently filed an opposition to the motion to invervene, which the court sustained. Frechette thereafter filed a motion to reargue his motion to intervene, which the court denied on September 1, 2005. On September 19, 2005, Frechette filed an appeal from that judgment; he then filed a motion for permission to file a corrected appeal on September 22, 2005. On December 5, 2005, the plaintiff withdrew the entire action against the defendants. This court granted Frechette's motion to file a corrected appeal from the denial of his motion to intervene on December 8, 2005, which he filed on December 12, 2005. Prior to oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on, inter alia, the issue of whether the appeal is moot due to the withdrawal of the underlying action. In addition, we permitted the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association and the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests to file an amicus curiae brief. "Mootness implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 492-93, 778 A.2d 33 (2001). The plaintiff withdrew the underlying action on December 5, 2005. That development is dispositive of the present appeal. Under Connecticut law, withdrawal of the action underlying an appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene renders the appeal moot. Commissioner of Revenue Services v. Estate of Culpeper, 4 Conn. App. 249, 250, 493 A.2d 297 (1985); see also Jones v. Ricker, 172 Conn. 572, 576, 375 A.2d 1034 (1977). Frechette argues that his claim implicates the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine as enunciated in Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 660 A.2d 323 (1995). To qualify for review under that exception, an otherwise moot question must meet three requirements. "First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot." Id., 382-83. To satisfy the first requirement, the challenged action must possess "an intrinsically limited lifespan." Id., 383. As the Loisel court explained, "[i]f an action or its effects is not of inherently limited duration, the action can be reviewed the next time it arises, when it will present an ongoing live controversy." Id., 383-84. The present action lacks that prerequisite to review. While the plaintiff in this particular action chose to withdraw the action, he was under no compulsion to do so. Future litigants in a similar proceeding likewise will be free either to withdraw their respective actions or to proceed to trial. Put simply, this action involves no functionally insurmountable time constraints. We further conclude that the challenged action fails to satisfy the second requirement of the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. Analysis under that requirement "entails two separate inquiries: (1) whether the question presented will recur at all; and (2) whether the interests of the people likely to be affected by the question presented are adequately represented in the current litigation." Id., 384. Commonly referred to as the "surrogacy concept," that second inquiry requires "some nexus between the litigating party and those people who may be affected by the court's ruling in the future." Id., 386. No such nexus is present here. While it did not precisely define the contours of the surrogacy concept, the Loisel court stated that "a public interest advocacy group purporting to litigate on behalf of, without actually representing, any of the affected parties" certainly would be excluded. Id., 387. Frechette is, in many respects, akin to a public interest advocacy group. He appears pro se in this litigation, as he has done previously in other-civil actions of a similar nature. He characterizes his attempted intervention as one "of prime public importance . . . ." Moreover, his attempted intervention is predicated on statutory defenses he seeks to assert on behalf of the diocese and church. Frechette represents none of the affected parties; his involvement in the action is, in the words of the Loisel court, "completely divorced from the relevant parties . . . ." Loisel v. Rowe, supra, 233 Conn. 387. As such, the necessary nexus is lacking. We conclude that the issue before the court is not capable of repetition, yet evading review and, therefore, does not qualify for review under that exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. The gist of Frechette's claim is "that his cash contributions to both the church and the archdiocese, if utilized to pay for the wrongdoings of pedophile priests, is a misuse of his money and an illegal payment of funds by [the church and the diocese] . . . ." We also ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether Frechette has demonstrated a colorable claim of intervention as of right. Because we conclude that the appeal is moot, we do not reach that issue. Frechette's reliance on Wallingford Center Associates v. Board of Tax Review, 68 Conn. App. 803, 793 A.2d 260 (2002), is misplaced. That case represents a very narrow exception to the mootness doctrine. The prospective intervenor in Wallingford Center Associates owned aparc.el of property in Wallingford. When it learned that the previous owner of the property had commenced a property tax appeal involving the property, it sought to intervene so as to challenge the assessment for the years it owned the property. The motion to intervene was denied, and the court, subsequently sustained the plaintiffs appeal. The prospective intervenor then appealed to this court. After noting that an appeal is considered moot if there is no possible relief that can be granted to the appealing party, we stated that. "[lr]ere . . . there is relief that can be granted to [the prospective intervenor] . . . even though there no longer is a proceeding into which it could intervene." Id., 807. We continued: "[T]here is relief that can be granted . . . without the need for any further trial court proceedings. . . . [The prospective intervenor] should have been allowed to intervene so that the judgment would have applied not only to the years [the plaintiff] owned the property, but to the years that it was owned by [the prospective intervenor]. Once . . . made a party, it would have been entitled to the same relief that [the plaintiff] obtained on appeal. The relief that [the prospective intervenor] should have received can be given to it simply by directing the trial court to open the judgment, grant [the] motion to intervene and to amend the judgment to cover the years of [the prospective intervenor's] ownership. Such an amendment would be a simple ministerial act." Id., 807-808. We further explained (hat the case "is saved from mootness by the fact that the relief that the new owner seeks can be given by this court, without further trial court proceedings. That rare circumstance is the exception, rather than rale . . . Id., 804 n.l. That precedent is inapplicable to the present case. Because the underlying action has been withdrawn, there is no judgment that could be amended to include Frechette as a party. Moreover, Frechette explicitly asks us to remand the matter for further trial court proceedings.

Opinion BISHOP, J. The defendant, Anthony Jones, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempted assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (l) and 53a-49 (a), and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38. On appeal, he claims that (1) attempted assault of a peace officer is not a cognizable offense under Connecticut law, (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish attempted assault of a peace officer, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to open its case, after the defendant rested, to offer additional evidence of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and (4) the failure of defense counsel to move for acquittal on the basis of a lack of evidence of a pistol permit constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 2 a.m. on March 27, 2000, Officers Edwin DeJesus and Michael Ortiz of the New Haven police department were dispatched in two marked cars to Clinton Avenue Park in New Haven to investigate a report of a fight. As the officers approached the park, they observed a group of people run and enter a maroon Toyota Camry and drive off at a high rate of speed toward Maltby Street. The officers also observed two males, one of whom was later identified as the defendant, quickly run to and enter a Chevrolet Caprice, which was parked adjacent to the park. DeJesus drove his vehicle in front of the Caprice to prevent it from being driven away, and he activated the overhead lights on his police cruiser. As DeJesus activated his cruiser lights, Ortiz approached the Caprice from behind and also activated his overhead cruiser lights. As Ortiz approached, the defendant put his car in reverse and sped directly toward Ortiz' vehicle. Ortiz put his car in reverse and backed onto Clinton Avenue to avoid a collision. After barely missing a collision with Ortiz' vehicle, the defendant then spun his vehicle into the middle of Clinton Avenue and drove down Clinton Avenue toward Grand Avenue. Both officers pursued the defendant, with Ortiz in the lead. DeJesus activated his vehicle's siren. Clinton Avenue ends at Grand Avenue. The defendant crossed Grand Avenue and entered the parking lot of a senior residence at 50 Grand Avenue with Ortiz following close behind. DeJesus entered the parking lot from the other end in an effort to block the defendant's only path of egress. The defendant continued at a high rate of speed toward DeJesus, causing DeJesus to make a sharp left turn onto a ramp for the handicapped, almost striking the building. DeJesus testified that, had he not taken this evasive maneuver, the defendant would have struck his car. As the defendant left the parking lot, he turned his vehicle right and proceeded along Grand Avenue, then to East Grand Avenue, with both officers still in pursuit. At the intersection of East Grand Avenue and Russell Street, the defendant lost control of his vehicle, which came to rest in the driveway of a nearby house. Ortiz drove in behind the defendant's car, and DeJesus drove in on the left side of the car. As the officers approached the defendant's vehicle, both occupants exited the car and began to flee on foot. DeJesus apprehended the passenger. The defendant, with Ortiz in pursuit, ran around the house, jumped over a fence, ran back to the car, put it in reverse and sped back along East Grand Avenue. Ultimately, the defendant lost control of his vehicle, and, after backing it into a building, he was apprehended by the police. At the time the defendant was apprehended, the officers found two Ruger .357 magnum pistols in the vehicle he had been driving, one located on the floor behind the driver's seat, and the other on the floor behind the front passenger's seat. The defendant was charged with two separate counts of attempted assault of a peace officer in violation of § 53a-167c (a) (1) and 53a-49 (a), and one count of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of § 29-38. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one count of attempted assault of a peace officer and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, and he was given a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration. This appeal followed. I The defendant first asserts that the crime of attempted assault of a peace officer does not exist under Connecticut law. Specifically, the defendant claims that because the very essence of a criminal attempt is the defendant's intention to cause the proscribed result, it follows that there can be no crime of attempted assault of a peace officer because one cannot attempt to cause an unintended act. The defendant misconstrues the statute. A person is guilty of assault of a peace officer in violation of § 53a-167c (a) when "with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer . is acting in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer . . . ." "It is plain from a reading of General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) that the intent required for attempt liability is the intent required for the commission of the substantive crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 734, 654 A.2d 359, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906, 660 A.2d 859 (1995). The criminal result must be the conscious object of the actor's conduct. The requisite intent for assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the peace officer from performing his duties rather than the intent to cause the resulting injury. "Intent to cause physical injury is not a prerequisite to culpability under this statute." State v. Nixon, 32 Conn. App. 224, 237, 630 A.2d 74 (1993), aff'd, 231 Conn. 545, 651 A.2d 1264 (1995). The intent portion of the statute in question relates, then, to the intent to impede a police officer and not to the harm that results from such interference. Thus, one may be culpable under the statute if one attempts to impede, regardless of whether one intends the consequence of injury to a police officer. In sum, we conclude that when coupled with the attempt statute, the intent required for the crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the officer from performing his duties. Under § 53a-167c, one may be held liable for assault of a peace officer whether the injury is intended or not. See State v. Nixon, 231 Conn. 545, 552-54, 651 A.2d 1264 (1995). Because there is no mens rea element regarding the injury, which distinguishes this case from those relied on by the defendant, there is no inconsistency between the elements of the underlying crime and the intent to prevent the officer from performing his duties required by the criminal attempt statute. In support of his contention that the crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is not a cognizable crime in Connecticut, the defendant cites cases that support the proposition that it is a logical impossibility either to attempt or to conspire to achieve an unintentional or reckless result. See State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 303, 309, 455 A.2d 1326 (1983) (attempt to commit manslaughter does not exist under Connecticut law because it is not possible to have specific intent to commit an. unintentional killing), on appeal after remand, 196 Conn. 507, 493 A.2d 890 (1985); State v. Beccia, 199 Conn. 1, 4, 505 A.2d 683 (1986) (conspiracy to commit arson in third degree not cognizable because arson requires reckless mental state). The defendant's reliance on these cases, however, is inapposite because the underlying crimes in those cases either have dual intent requirements, the intent to engage in the proscribed conduct and the intent to cause a specific result, or, by their language, the harm resulting from the proscribed behavior must be unintentional. Neither is so in the present case. Accordingly, the defendant's claim that the crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is not cognizable in Connecticut must fail. II The defendant next claims that he could not have been convicted of attempted assault of a peace officer because there was no evidence of injury to DeJesus. We disagree. "An attempt of a crime is accomplished when a person intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. . . . The defendant also must have possessed the specific intent to commit the underlying crime. An attempt is an inchoate crime, meaning that it is unfinished or begun with the proper intent but not finished." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn. App. 681, 707, 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev'd on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533, 898 A.2d 789 (2006). "[T]he attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether the purpose fails by reason of interruption . . . or for other extrinsic cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 47 Conn. App. 205, 220, 703 A.2d 1164 (1997). To establish the defendant's culpability for the crime of attempted assault of a peace officer, the state needed to prove only that the defendant attempted to injure DeJesus with the intent to prevent him from performing his duty. The fact that the defendant did not accomplish the result, the injury to the officer, speaks to the essence of the attempt charge. Because the state was not required to prove that the officer incurred an actual injury, the defendant's claim fails. Ill Next, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in allowing the state to open its case, after the defendant rested his case, to offer additional evidence regarding the charge of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. We are not persuaded. The following additional facts are pertinent to the defendant's claim. As part of the state's case-in-chief, DeJesus testified that he had determined that neither the defendant nor his passenger had a pistol permit. On October 15, 2002, the state rested its case, after which the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. As to the possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle count, he claimed that the state had failed to prove that he knew that a weapon was in the car. He did not, however, challenge the adequacy of the state's evidence regarding whether he had a permit for the weapon. The court denied the motion for acquittal. After the defense rested its case, the state moved to open the evidence to present two witnesses to testify that the defendant did not have a pistol permit from the city of New Haven or the state of Connecticut. The prosecutor stated that he had planned to call the witnesses in his initial presentation of evidence but had inadvertently failed to do so. The defendant objected to the motion to open, arguing that he would be prejudiced if the state were permitted to establish an essential element of the offense once the state had rested its case-in-chief. During argument on this point, defense counsel acknowledged that one officer had testified that there were no pistol permits relating to the defendant and that, for this reason, he had not included the absence of evidence of permits as a basis for his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Nevertheless, defense counsel argued that the proposed testimony would bolster the testimony that had already been adduced, prejudi-cially highlighting it to the jury. The court granted the state's motion to open the evidence to offer the testimony of two additional witnesses. Thereafter, Officer Kenneth Blanchard testified that neither the defendant nor his passenger had pistol permits in New Haven, and Sergeant Timothy Osika testified that neither the defendant nor his passenger had state permits. "The decision to open a criminal case to add further testimony lies within the sound discretion of the court, which should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . . The purpose . is to preserve the fundamental integrity of the trial's truth-finding function." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Meikle, 60 Conn. App. 802, 817, 761 A.2d 247 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 947, 769 A.2d 63 (2001). "Unless the state's offer seeks to fill an evidentiary gap in its prima facie case that was specifically called to the state's attention by the defendant's motion for acquittal; see State v. Allen, [205 Conn. 370, 385, 533 A.2d 559 (1987)]; the trial court may permit additional evidence to be presented even though that evidence strengthens the case against the defendant." State v. Roman, 224 Conn. 63, 71, 616 A.2d 266 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1039, 113 S. Ct. 1868, 123 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993). "In determining whether the court abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action." State v. Lowe, 61 Conn. App. 291, 303, 763 A.2d 680 (2001). In the present case, the state presented testimony in its case-in-chief that the defendant had no permits. The evidence proffered on the opening of the state's case was cumulative, although more specific. In permitting the state to open the evidence for this limited purpose, the court properly exercised its discretion. We will reverse a trial court's exercise of its discretion only on a showing of manifest abuse of discretion or injustice. State v. Dunbar, 51 Conn. App. 313, 319, 721 A.2d 1229 (1998) , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 962, 724 A.2d 1126 (1999) . In this instance, the defendant has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating that the court abused its discretion in granting the state's motion to open. IV Finally, the defendant claims that trial counsel's failure to move for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant lacked a permit constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. "Almost without exception, we have required that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised by way of habeas coipus, rather than by direct appeal, because of the need for a full evidentiary record for such [a] claim. . . . Absent the evidentiary hearing available in the collateral action, review in this court of the ineffective assistance claim is at best difficult and sometimes impossible. The evidentiary hearing provides the trial court with the evidence which is often necessary to evaluate the competency of the defense and the harmfulness of any incompetency. . . . [0]n the rare occasions that we have addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal . we have limited our review to situations in which the record of the trial court's allegedly improper action was adequate for review or the issue presented was a question of law, not one of fact requiring further evidentiary development." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 151-52, 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926, 126 S. Ct. 2981, 165 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2006). The defendant claims that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be addressed on direct appeal because the record adequately reflects defense counsel's incompetence. Specifically, the defendant argues that no competent defense attorney familiar with the elements of the offense of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle would have failed to make the appropriate motion for acquittal on the appropriate ground. The defendant contends that the record is complete in this regard and that the fact-finding role of the habeas court is not necessary to conclude that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. "The transcript of the proceedings in the trial court allows us to examine the actions of defense counsel but not the underlying reasons for his actions." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tirado, 194 Conn. 89, 92, 478 A.2d 606 (1984). "Our role . is not to guess at possibilities, but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. Without a hearing in which the reasons for counsel's decision may be elicited, any decision of ours . . . would be entirely speculative." State v. Chairamonte, 189 Conn. 61, 64, 454 A.2d 272 (1983). In the present matter, the record reveals only that defense counsel opted not to challenge the adequacy of the state's evidence regarding the lack of a permit because there was testimony from DeJesus stating that he had conducted a check that revealed that the defendant did not have a permit. The record does not reveal any other reasons for defense counsel's actions. The reasons for defense counsel's decisions and actions are questions of fact that cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we decline to review the defendant's claim and leave the defendant to relief by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion FLYNN, J., concurred. MCDONALD, J., concurring. I concur in the result. General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer . is acting in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer . . . ." General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime." The Supreme Court of Washington has similarly rejected the claim that an attempt charge for crimes that lack a mens rea element is legally inconsis tent. See State v. Chhom, 128 Wash. 2d 739, 743, 911 P.2d 1014 (1996) (en banc). The defendant also relies on People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 605, 532 N.E.2d 86, 535 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1988), in which the New York Court of Appeals held that there is no offense of attempt to commit assault in the second degree under a subsection of the New York assault statutes similar to General Statutes § 53a-167c. The court interpreted the absence of a mens rea requirement for the injury to be equivalent to a statutory requirement that the injury be unintended. People v. Campbell, supra, 606. As noted, our Supreme Court has not interpreted § 53a-167c similarly. See State v. Nixon, supra, 231 Conn. 552-54. In denying the motion for ajudgment of acquittal, the court stated: "Then having reviewed the evidence from the testimony that the monitor — the reporter was able to read back and looking at the case law and statute, although it's an extremely close call, the court is going to exercise its discretion. I don't see substantial prejudice to the defendant in allowing the state to present the necessary witnesses regarding the permits. And I should make it perfectly clear that this was not an evidentiary gap, that was raised by the defense or pointed out by the defense and, after having looked at State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 533 A 2d 559 (1987), and State v. Nelson, 17 Conn. App. 556, 555 A.2d 426 (1989), the court is going to exercise its discretion and allow the state to put on those witnesses."

Opinion HARPER, J. The plaintiff Sharyn N. D'Urso appeals from the trial court's judgment affirming the order of the Probate Court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that an attorney may have a valid charging lien on the proceeds of litigation when the representation was based on an hourly fee agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. In 1995, the defendant Deborah Lyons, acting in her capacity as trustee for Robert B. D'Urso, instituted an action against Robert D'Urso's sisters, Marion Amendola and Sharon D'Urso, to foreclose a mortgage on real property in New Haven. The mortgage secured a note in the amount of $40,000. Attorney John J. Resnik represented Robert D'Urso until 1999, when a conflict of interest arose. At that time, the defendant David A. Shaw began representing Robert D'Urso pursuant to a written fee agreement that was executed by Lyons. The fee agreement provided for an hourly billing rate of $200 per hour. Payment was not contingent on the outcome of litigation, and the agreement was silent as to whether the fee would be paid from the proceeds of any recovery. Shaw successfully resolved the litigation. Shortly thereafter, Robert DTJrso died. His estate solely consists of $40,000 that was recovered through the litigation handled by Shaw. Shaw subsequently presented a claim to the Probate Court for attorney's fees in the amount of $12,780. Those fees were wholly attributable to the litigation that Shaw had handled on behalf of Robert D'Urso prior to his death. The Probate Court concluded that Shaw had a common-law charging lien against the proceeds of the litigation that he had handled for Robert D'Urso and ordered payment of Shaw's claim in full. The trial court affirmed the Probate Court's order. The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that Shaw had a valid charging lien against the proceeds that were recovered as a result of his representation of Robert D'Urso. She argues that because the applicable fee agreement provided for an hourly rate rather than a contingency fee, there was no basis for a charging lien. In the absence of such a lien, the plaintiff argues that Shaw merely is a general creditor pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-365. We begin by setting forth our standard of review. Whether Shaw has a common-law charging lien against the proceeds of litigation is a question of law. "When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santana v. Hartford, 94 Conn. App. 445, 457, 894 A.2d 307, cert. granted on other grounds, 279 Conn. 901, 901 A.2d 1223 (2006). Although not often litigated in the courts of Connecticut, the common-law charging lien has been recognized since 1836, when our Supreme Court noted that "[a]n attorney, as against his client, has a lien upon all papers in his possession, for his fees and services performed in his professional capacity, as well as upon judgments received by him." Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168, 173 (1836). In Gager, the court acknowledged the existence of an attorney's retaining lien, which is a possessory lien on a Ghent's papers and files that the attorney holds until his fee has been paid, as well as a charging hen, which is a hen placed on any money recovered or fund due the chent at the conclusion of the lawsuit. Marsh, Day & Calhoun v. Solomon, 204 Conn. 639, 644, 529 A.2d 702 (1987). The Supreme Court further discussed the existence of charging hens in Cooke v. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105 (1883), in which the court stated: "If an attorney has rendered services and expended money in instituting and conducting a suit and the [chent] orally agrees that he may retain so much of the avails thereof as will pay him for his services and expenses therein and for previous services in other matters, and he thereafter conducts the suit to a favorable conclusion, he has, as against such [chent], an equitable hen upon the avails for the services and expenses in the suit, and for the previous services embraced in the agreement . . . ." Id., 107. More recently, this court considered the propriety of an attorney enforcing an equitable hen against a judgment recovered on behalf of a chent in Perlmutter v. Johnson, 6 Conn. App. 292, 505 A.2d 13, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 517 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035, 107 S. Ct. 886, 93 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1987). In that case, the attorney represented a client in two matters for which he had not been paid completely. Id., 293. Upon recovering a judgment in one of the matters, the attorney placed the funds in escrow and instituted an action against the client for payment of the fees that were due. We affirmed the trial court's judgment, which permitted the attorney to keep the funds as an offset against the fees that he was owed. Relying on Cooke, we concluded that "[i]t has long been held that an attorney has an equitable hen upon the avails [of his actions for a client] for the services and expenses in the suit. . . . [The attorney's] undisputed testimony was that he obtained the funds on [the client's] behalf as a result of an action which he undertook as [the client's] attorney. He, therefore, had a lien upon those funds." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 298. In the present case, Shaw represented Robert D'Urso in the foreclosure action against his sisters. As a result of that litigation, Shaw obtained a judgment in the amount of $40,000. After Robert D'Urso died, Shaw received the funds pursuant to that judgment. Because he had not been paid for his services at that time, Shaw retained the funds and presented a claim to the Probate Court for attorney's fees. As in Perlmutter, Shaw obtained the funds on Robert D'Urso's behalf as a result of the foreclosure action that he undertook as Robert D'Urso's attorney. Shaw, therefore, had a valid charging lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure action in the amount of the attorney's fees to which he was owed pursuant to the fee agreement signed by Lyons. The plaintiffs claim that an hourly fee agreement may not be the basis for a charging lien is without merit. In Perlmutter, the attorney agreed to represent the client pursuant to a fee agreement that provided for an hourly rate of $65 per hour. Id., 297. Consequently, this court's conclusion that a valid charging lien existed in that case was not dependent on the existence of a contingency fee agreement. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly determined that Shaw had a valid charging hen against the proceeds of the litigation that he undertook on Robert D'Urso's behalf. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Richard A. D'Urso also was a plaintiff at trial. Because only Sharyn D'Urso has appealed, we refer to her as the plaintiff in this opinion. The named defendant is referred to as both Deborah Lyons and Deborah Lyon in the record and the parties' briefs. We refer to her as Deborah Lyons because that is the name under which the case was filed. She is not a party to this appeal. General Statutes § 45a-365 provides: "'Claims, expenses and taxes in the settlement of a decedent's estate shall be entitled to preference and payment in the following order of priority: (1) Funeral expenses; (2) expenses of settling the estate; (3) claims due for the last, sickness of the decedent; (4) all lawful taxes and all claims due the state of Connecticut and the United States; (5) all claims due any laborer or mechanic for personal wages for labor performed by such laborer or mechanic for the decedent within three months immediately before the decease of such person; (6) other preferred claims; and (7) all other claims allowed in proportion to their respective amounts."

Opinion DUPONT, J. The defendant, Edward Dalzell, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession of narcotics with the intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a), possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267 (a), operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) and failure to wear a seat belt in violation of General Statutes § 14-100a (c) (1). The plea followed a denial of the defendant's motions to suppress. The defendant received a total effective sentence of five years incarceration on the first four counts, and a $15 fine was remitted on the fifth count. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress because the stop of his motor vehicle for his failure to wear a seat belt was pretextual, and the subsequent search of his vehicle constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under article first, § 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand the case with direction to grant the defendant's motions to suppress. The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Adam Marcus, a police officer with the Danbury police department. Marcus testified that, at approximately noon on February 27, 2004, he observed the defendant driving a 1991 Ford Escort on Town Hill Avenue in Danbury. Marcus followed the defendant for approximately one mile after he observed that the defendant was not wearing a shoulder harness type of seat belt. Marcus followed the defendant along Town Hill Avenue to the stop sign at Liberty Street. The defendant stopped and turned left at Old Oak Restaurant & Pizzeria. Marcus continued to follow the defendant along Liberty Street. The defendant, with Marcus following, traveled along Liberty Street and proceeded straight onto Patriot Drive at the intersection where Liberty Street turns left. Traveling along Patriot Drive, the defendant proceeded along Balmforth Avenue where it intersects Patriot Drive and White Street. Somewhere after the area on Balmforth Avenue where train tracks intersect, Marcus stopped the defendant's vehicle. During the time Marcus followed the defendant, he did not observe the defendant violate any traffic rules. Marcus testified that the defendant must have observed all posted signs, speed limits, traffic control signals and markings because otherwise he would have stopped the defendant before and made a note in his report. Marcus also testified that in the past, he had observed other drivers not wearing seat belts and had not stopped them. Once stopped, Marcus checked the defendant's license plate with the police dispatcher, which provided him with information that the vehicle was validly registered. According to Marcus, he received no other information about the defendant prior to approaching the vehicle, and, as he approached the defendant's vehicle, he was not in fear of his safety. Marcus exited his vehicle, approached the defendant's vehicle, notified the defendant that he was being stopped for failure to wear a seat belt and requested the defendant's license, registration and proof of insurance. The defendant, attempting to satisfy Marcus' request, removed an envelope from his glove compartment that had several different papers in it. As the defendant surveyed the papers, Marcus examined the defendant. Marcus observed that it was a clear, sunny day in February and that the defendant was not wearing sunglasses. According to Marcus, the defendant's eyes were contracted and his nose was red around the nostrils and running. Marcus testified that the defendant "appeared, like, slow and lethargic" because he passed over his registration several times while looking for all of the documentation requested by the officer and because it was taking the defendant "a few seconds" but less than one full minute to retrieve the documentation. At the same time, Marcus observed a rolled up dollar bill in the square area of the center console between the two seats. After the defendant retrieved the requested information, Marcus asked the defendant whether he had used narcotics. The defendant replied, "No, and I'm not getting out of the vehicle, so start writing me a ticket. " Marcus informed the defendant that he suspected that the defendant was under the influence of narcotics and requested again that the defendant exit the vehicle. The defendant refused to exit. Marcus opened the door to the vehicle, grabbed the defendant by the arm, escorted him out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. Marcus then performed an inventory search of the defendant's vehicle because he decided to impound the car. Marcus secured the dollar bill that he had previously viewed from outside the vehicle. Once in possession of the dollar bill, Marcus observed that it had white residue on it. The residue was later field tested and tested positive for heroin. In the vehicle, Marcus also discovered a cigarette pack that contained four small glassine packets that were stamped "red devil" in red ink and contained white powder. A field test of that substance indicated that it was heroin. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of narcotics, possession of drug paraphernalia, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs and failure to wear a seat belt. On August 25, 2004, the defendant filed three motions to suppress. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the defendant's motions to suppress. The court stated in its memorandum of decision that there was "a credible foundation for the stop . . . ." The court also commented on the arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs: On the basis of "the conduct of the defendant, his speech, his behavior, his demeanor, the presentation of his eyes, the runny nose and the like," as well as the rolled up dollar bill in plain view, Marcus reasonably concluded that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating substances. According to the court, "[e]verything that flows from that — search incident to the arrest, inventory of a vehicle which is part of the arrest process, all those things flow from what is considered to be, at least under our practice, to be reasonable conduct for a police officer in conducting a follow-up investigation." On appeal, the defendant asserts that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was not wearing a seat belt to justify the initial stop. The defendant further argues that, even if there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion on which the officer could have effected a valid stop for a seat belt violation, the stop was pretextual because the real reason for the stop was to search for, and to obtain, evidence of an unrelated crime or crimes. The defendant also contends that even if the initial stop was justified and not pre-textual, Marcus never had probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or to search the vehicle. "As an initial matter, we note that [o]ur standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the court's memorandum of decision . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 92, 890 A.2d 474 (2006). "Because a trial court's determination of the validity of a . . . search [or seizure] implicates a defendant's constitutional rights, however, we engage in a careful examination of the record to ensure that the court's decision was supported by substantial evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weaver, 85 Conn. App. 329, 335, 857 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 942, 861 A.2d 517 (2004); see also 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d Ed. 1996) § 11.7 (c), pp. 399-400. Our plenary review of the defendant's claim that the court's denial of his motions to suppress violates our state constitution includes the following tools of analysis: (1) the particular facts of the case; (2) the test of the relevant statutory or constitutional provision; (3) prior holdings and dicta of the Connecticut appellate courts; (4) federal precedent; (5) decisions of other state courts; and (6) historical and socioeconomic considerations. State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). "It is well settled that we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the contours of article first, § 7 and 9. . It is well established that federal constitutional . . . law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . In [state] constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut citizens have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law. . . . Recognizing that our state constitution is an instrument of progress . is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally . we have concluded in several cases that the state constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 504-505, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). The defendant argues that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the initial stop because he could have committed the infraction only if both his shoulder harness and also his lap belt were unfastened. Specifically, the defendant claims that on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was violating § 14-100a (c) and that, therefore, the stop was pretextual. "Article first, § 7 and 9, of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest . In determining whether the detention was justified in a given case, a court must consider if [b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officers [had] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. . A court reviewing the legality of a stop must therefore examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom. . . . These standards, which mirror those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] with regard to fourth amendment analysis, govern the legality of investigatory detentions under article first, § 7 and 9, of our state constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 507-508. "An investigatory stop is authorized if the police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bolanos, 58 Conn. App. 365, 368, 753 A.2d 943 (2000). "When a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the detaining officer may conduct an investigative stop of the suspect in order to confirm or dispel his suspicions. " State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 495. "A police officer has the right to stop a motor vehicle operating on a Connecticut highway even if the reason for the stop is only an infraction under our traffic laws." State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1998). Failure to wear a seat belt is an infraction that is clearly prohibited under Connecticut law. General Statutes § 14-100a (c). Here, Marcus observed that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle without wearing a shoulder harness type of seat belt. Applying the objective standard to these circumstances, we conclude that there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was violating § 14-100a (c). The initial investigatory stop, as a result, was justified. The defendant also argues that, even if there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion on which Marcus could have effected a valid stop for a seat belt violation, the stop of his car was also pretextual because the real reason for the stop was to obtain or to search for evidence of an unrelated crime or crimes. The defendant asks this court to hold that it is the subjective intent of law enforcement officers that should govern whether the motor vehicle traffic stop was pretextual and violative of § 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution, although he admits that Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), used an objective standard to test whether the action of the law enforcement officer violated the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. The state contends that this claim of pretext should not be reviewed for three reasons. It argues that the claim is unpreserved and was waived. The state also argues that this claim is dependent on factual findings of the intent of the officer in stopping the defendant that were not made by the court and that, therefore, there is a lack of an adequate record for review. The state further claims that, even if the question is reviewable, the initial stop was not pretextual under our state constitution. Contrary to the state's argument, the defendant did preserve the issue at trial. His written motions to suppress and the evidentiary hearings following the motions clearly state and argue, respectively, that he claims both state and federal constitutional protection. Furthermore, a review of the entire transcript of the hearings on the motions to suppress shows that the defendant did not waive his claim of a pretextual stop. The state cites a portion of the transcript from the suppression hearing to substantiate its claim of waiver by the defendant. The comment of defense counsel cited by the state is that he would not want to address the issue of whether a pretextual stop occurred, but that comment was made immediately after the court had asked if there was a claim of racial profiling here as the pretext for the stop, and counsel had said no. Reasonably interpreted, together with the many other references to pretextual stops in the transcript, the remark indicates only that counsel did not claim that the stop was made because of the defendant's race and that, therefore, the stop was pretextual for that particular reason. Even if the defendant had not preserved the issue at trial, appellate review would be warranted because the issue is of constitutional magnitude and the record is adequate for review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). On the basis of the record in this case, no Connecticut constitutional violation occurred because there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation of the seat belt statute and no indication at all of any ulterior or different motive of the officer for the stop. The defendant also asserts that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was no probable cause to believe that he was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs. The defendant brings this claim under the protections of article first, § 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, fearing that Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001), controls the present case under the federal constitution. If the full custodial arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs is to withstand a state or federal constitutional attack, the circumstances, in their totality, must provide a basis for the expansion of the scope of the initial investigatory stop for an infraction. In order for a warrantless arrest to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause. State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 236, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). "The determination of whether probable cause exists under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, and under article first, § 7, of our state constitution, is made pursuant to a 'totality of circumstances' test." State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 189-90, 728 A.2d 493 (1999); see also State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 544-45, 594 A.2d 917 (1991). "Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a [crime] has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trine, supra, 236-37. "The probable cause test then is an objective one." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 237. Here, the totality of the circumstances must have provided probable cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs in order for the arrest to survive a state constitutional attack. There is a difference between the standard of review to determine whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists to justify a brief investigatory detention and the standard used to determine whether probable cause to arrest exists. See id., 235. "Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . . The probable cause determination is, simply, an analysis of probabilities. . . . The determination is not a technical one, but is informed by the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431, 440, 733 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030, 120 S. Ct. 551, 145 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1999). Probable cause requires more than reasonable suspicion. State v. Trine, supra, 236 Conn. 235-37. The standard of proof for the constitutional validity of the arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs is whether probable cause existed and is not the same test of reasonable and articulable suspicion that is used to determine whether the stop for a failure to wear a seat belt was valid. In order to determine whether the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, we briefly review the elements of that crime. A driver operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug is one whose mental, physical or nervous processes have become so affected that he lacked to an appreciable degree the ability to function properly in the operation of his vehicle. State v. Gordon, 84 Conn. App. 519, 526, 854 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 941, 861 A.2d 516 (2004). Typical indicia of the inability to function as a driver because of the intoxicating effect of drugs or alcohol include whether a defendant smells of the drug, has slurred speech, fumbles in retrieving paperwork, has glassy and bloodshot eyes, admits that he has, while driving, been using drugs or fails sobriety tests. Id., 528. Most importantly, the main indicia of intoxication relates to the ability to operate the vehicle without committing traffic violations. See State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). After approaching the vehicle, Marcus made several observations that he cited in his testimony as arousing his suspicion that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating drugs. Marcus observed that the defendant's pupils were contracted, his nose was red around the nostrils and running, it was taking more than a few seconds but less than one minute for the defendant to retrieve his license, registration and proof of insurance, and there was a rolled-up dollar bill in the center console of the vehicle. On the basis of these observations, Marcus informed the defendant that he suspected the defendant of driving while under the influence of narcotics, which the defendant denied. The defendant refused to participate in a field sobriety test. Marcus articulated those facts as the basis for his arrest of the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. The circumstances, recited by Marcus, significantly, did not include his observations while following the defendant for more than a mile along various roads in Danbury. During this time, the defendant used his signals correctly and observed all posted signs, speed limits, traffic control signals and markings. According to Marcus, if the defendant had committed any motor vehicle violations, he would have stopped the defendant before and made a note in his report that the defendant had committed a moving violation. Despite the defendant's acceptable driving while Marcus followed him, Marcus pieced together four otherwise innocuous facts to form the probable cause for an arrest of the defendant. To arrive at the conclusion that probable cause existed, one must ignore the fact that, except for the seat belt violation, the defendant operated his motor vehicle in a manner consistent with that of an ordinary, careful and prudent driver over a considerable distance on multiple city roads. Although we recognize that there are instances in which Marcus' four observations might create probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence of intoxicating substances, this is not one of those instances. We cannot separate the four facts observed by Marcus, all of which are indistinguishable from otherwise innocent conduct, from the fact that he followed the defendant over a considerable distance along a winding path of intersecting roads beset with stops and traffic signals without observing any traffic violation. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer's conclusion that there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs must fail. The defendant was also arrested for possession of a narcotic substance, possession of a narcotic substance with the intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the time of the stop, nothing in plain view and no observation of the defendant indicated that there was probable cause or a reasonable or articulable suspicion that any of the latter crimes had been committed. If the only charge had been the noncriminal charge of failure to wear a seat belt, even under federal constitutional principles, any search of the car without consent would have violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, and the motion to suppress the drugs found would have been granted. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001). We also conclude that the same result would be true, as the defendant argues, under the state constitution. Before the search of the car, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was about to commit the crimes of possession of a narcotic substance, possession of a narcotic substance with the intent to sell or possession of drug paraphernalia. Since 1985, a long line of Connecticut appellate cases has recognized the efficacy of § § 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution, as opposed to the federal constitution, to provide for enhanced rights to prevent the use of evidence obtained, after a legal detention, unless there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion or probable cause that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. See, e.g., State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 838 A.2d 981 (2004); State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 504-508; State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); State v. Lamme, supra, 216 Conn. 172; State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 233,496 A.2d 498 (1985). Justice Arthur Healey, writing for the court in State v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. 115, recognized an immutable concept. "The Connecticut constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens." The words of article first, § 7, of our state constitution, that "[t]he people shall be secure in their persons . . . and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures," and the words of article first, § 9, that "[n]o person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law" have present day significance. We conclude that there was an objective justification for the arresting officer to stop the defendant for failure to wear a seat belt, which was reasonable and articula-ble, but that there was no probable cause justifying the seizure and arrest of the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or to search the car for drugs or drug paraphernalia. The judgment is reversed, except as to the defendant's seat belt infraction, and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendant's motions to suppress. In this opinion the other judges concurred. General Statutes § 54-94a and Practice Book § 61-6 (a) (2) (i) allow a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to file an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress on the basis of an unreasonable search or seizure. The defendant filed motions to suppress tangible evidence and statements, all on the basis that the evidence and statements were obtained in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution and article first, § 1, 7, 8 and 9, of the state constitution. The defendant does not make any federal constitutional claims on appeal, relying solely on article first, § 7 and 9, of the state constitution. He fears that under federal constitutional law his claims would fail. We resolve these issues under the state constitution, although recognizing that under federal constitutional principles he might also prevail. See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 497, 838 A.2d 981 (2004). In this case, on the basis of its facts, it is difficult to conclude that the meaning or the application of the provisions of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and those of article first, § 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution differ in any meaningful way. See State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 230, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 7, provides: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation." The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 9, provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." Marcus stated that, prior to approaching the vehicle on foot after he had stopped the defendant, he had no way of knowing whether the defendant was wearing a lap type seat belt. After approaching the vehicle, Marcus confirmed his suspicion that the defendant was not wearing a seat belt, either the shoulder type or lap type. The defendant's vehicle was equipped with separate lap belts and shoulder harnesses. The defendant's argument for an unconstitutional, pretextual stop includes his claim that no violation of the seat belt statute is possible unless the officer knew prior to the stop that both the lap belt and shoulder harness were not fastened. Failure to wear a seat belt is a violation of General Statutes § 14-100a (c) (1), (4), which constitutes "an infraction" and provides that the violator "shall be fined fifteen dollars. . . ." General Statutes § 54-33m provides: "The failure of an operator of, or front seat passenger in, a private passenger motor vehicle or vanpool vehicle to wear a seat safety belt as required by section 14-100a shall not constitute probable cause for a law enforcement official to conduct a search of such vehicle and its contents." The defendant previously had been convicted of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) on September 23, 1997, and September 16, 1998. Marcus testified that prior to stopping the defendant's car, he did not recall if he had "run the defendant's plate," and he testified that he did not know anything, other than the defendant's name and the make of the car, after checking the defendant's license plate with the police dispatcher at the time of the stop. Marcus testified that his training and experience taught him that persons under the influence of opium based narcotics exhibit contracted pupils and that red nostrils and a runny nose are indicators that a person has inhaled narcotics through their nose. From his vantage point, Marcus could not see if there was any residue on the bill, which might indicate that it had been used to inhale narcotics. Marcus testified that he was not in any greater fear of his safety during the stop than compared to a normal traffic stop and that the defendant, although he refused to exit his vehicle, never resisted or struggled with Marcus. Marcus testified that in the past, he had allowed the car of a person who had been arrested, under similar circumstances, to be driven away by a friend of the person who had been arrested if the car was not part of a crime or a crime scene. Nevertheless, in this case, he failed to give the defendant that option and ordered the car impounded, which made an inventory of its contents necessary. The defendant ignores those Connecticut cases that also use an objective standard. See footnote 10. The state argues that the record is inadequate for review because the court made no findings as to any subjective motivation of the police officer for stopping the car. A reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred is, under the fourth amendment, an objective standard that does not focus on the actual state of mind of a police officer, but on whether a reasonable person's suspicion would have been raised, having the information known to the officer. State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 149, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005); see also Whren v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. 812. The subjective motivation of the police officer to stop the defendant for a violation of the seat belt law is, therefore, irrelevant, and no findings were necessary under either federal or state constitutional law. The standard in Connecticut for determining whether there has been a reasonable and articulable suspicion for a motor vehicle violation stop is the same as the standard employed under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382-83, 645 A.2d 529 (1994); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. 122. A review of the record does not support any pretextual motivation of the officer. Atwater involved a civil action to recover damages on the basis of an alleged detention and subsequent warrantless arrest for a seat belt violation. The United States Supreme Court concluded that if a person has committed a misdemeanor seat belt violation, the suspect may be detained and arrested without any fourth amendment violation. Atwater v. Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. 354. Although the United States Supreme Court correctly cites Connecticut's statute authorizing warrantless misdemeanor arrests in its appendix to the opinion for its proposition that all fifty states permit such arrests in some circumstances, Atwater does not control the outcome of the present appeal. The state jurisdiction involved in Atwater, unlike Connecticut, designated seat belt violations as misdemeanors, for which an arrest is allowed. Connecticut, however, treats the motor vehicle equipment violation of failure to wear a seat belt as an infraction for which no arrest is authorized. See General Statutes § 14-100a (c) (4); Practice Book § 44-23. A resident of Connecticut charged with an infraction involving a motor vehicle shall not be taken into custody. Practice Book § 44-23. The determination of probable cause was dependent entirely on facts that do not point any more in the direction of criminal behavior than in the direction of entirely benign circumstances. For instance, as the officer conceded, the defendant's contracted pupils could have been due to the fact that it was a sunny day and the defendant was not wearing sunglasses, the defendant's runny nose and irritated nostrils were symptoms indistinguishable from those suffered by a person with a cold and the defendant's delay while retrieving his license, insurance and registration, which amounted to a matter of seconds, was not unusual, given the uncommon occurrence of a police stop. Moreover, the presence of a rolled up dollar bill in a console commonly used to store loose change and small bills does not indicate drug use rather than an innocuous reason for the location of the money in the vehicle's console. These noninculpatory findings, when coupled with the fact that the officer followed the defendant for one mile while observing that he obeyed all posted signs, speed limits, traffic control signs and markings, and operated his vehicle in an entirely proper manner, do not afford a basis for a probable cause determination that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998), decided two years alter Whren, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a nonpretextual stop lor speeding could not be enlarged into a search of the suspect's car unless the law enforcement officer feared for his safety or needed more evidence for the crime for which the motorist was stopped.

Opinion GRUENDEL, J. In this action for breach of contract, the defendants, Kemper Construction Company, Inc. (Kemper), and its president, Theodore L. Kemp, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with a report by an attorney trial referee (referee) in favor of the plaintiff, TradeSource, Inc. (Trade-Source). On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly rendered judgment on the report in favor of TradeSource. We agree and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are germane to our discussion. TradeSource is an employment service that provides laborers to building contractors. Kemper is a building contractor for commercial and residential remodeling. On September 22, 1997, Trade-Source and Kemper entered into an agreement under which TradeSource would provide Kemper with laborers for construction projects and, in return, Kemper would pay TradeSource for the labor provided. Pursuant to paragraph three of the contract, Kemper was responsible for paying the established hourly rate for each hour a laborer worked. Further, if TradeSource wanted to adjust its rates, it was obligated to provide Kemper with at least ten days notice of any change in the established rate, providing Kemper the opportunity to decide whether to order the worker at the adjusted price. Kemper satisfied all invoices from TradeSource from 1997 through 1999. None of these invoices included a separate sales tax charge. Beginning with Trade-Source's invoice dated January 11, 2000, TradeSource changed its billing practice and added a 6 percent sales tax on its invoices. Kemper refused to pay that portion of the invoices that was labeled as sales tax, claiming that a separate sales tax charge was not included in the original contract. Tradesource served a complaint against the defendants, dated March 11, 2002, seeking damages for breach of contract. In the complaint, TradeSource claimed that it provided construction workers to the defendants at an agreed on rate and price, and that Kemp personally guaranteed payment of all amounts due. The complaint further asserted that a balance of $23,585.97 was due for the period of July 3 to September 25, 2001, and that the defendants had refused to pay. The defendants' answer admitted that TradeSource had provided construction workers, but denied the remaining allegations. The case was tried before the referee, Thomas P. Weldy, who requested posttrial briefs on the sales tax issue. The defendants argued that this claim did not fall under the parties' contract, was inconsistent with the terms of the parties' contract and, because they had relied on the parties' agreement and prior practice, was prejudicial to them. The referee rejected these arguments, holding that General Statutes § 12-408 (2), the statute concerning sales and use tax imposed on retailers, obligated the defendants to pay the sales tax in addition to the other charges on the invoices, which TradeSource began issuing on January 11, 2000. In his report, the referee found that TradeSource had supplied services to Kemper that were subject to the Connecticut sales tax charge. Therefore, the referee concluded that TradeSource had a duty to impose the tax on and collect the tax from Kemper. The defendants filed an objection to the referee's report with respect to the imposition of the sales tax charge. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the report, thereby overruling the defendants' objection. The court reasoned that the "state statute required the collection of the tax and '[u]nless the agreement indicates otherwise, [an applicable] statute existing at the time an agreement is executed becomes a part of it and must be read into it just as if an express provision to that effect were inserted therein.' Sicaras v. Hartford, 44 Conn. App. 771, 782, 692 A.2d 1290, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916, 696 A.2d 340 (1997). The agreement did not indicate otherwise, and the sales tax was applicable." This appeal followed. The defendants claim that the court improperly found that pursuant to the report of the referee, they had breached their contract with TradeSource. Specifically, the defendants argue that as a matter of law, they are not obligated to pay sales tax in addition to the contract price on which they originally relied. We agree. We first set forth the standard of review. Under our well established principles of contract interpretation, "[a] contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 188, 819 A.2d 765 (2003). "If . . . the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the court's determination of what the parties intended in using such language is a conclusion of law. . In such a situation our scope of review is plenary . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Choi v. Argenti, 91 Conn. App. 681, 683-84, 881 A.2d 1053 (2005). "[B]ecause the attorney trial referee does not have the powers of a court and is simply a fact finder, [a]ny legal conclusions reached by an attorney trial referee have no conclusive effect. . . . The reviewing court is the effective arbiter of the law and the legal opinions of [a referee], like those of the parties, though they may be helpful, carry no weight not justified by their soundness as viewed by the court that renders judgment. . . . Where legal conclusions are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts found by the . . . referee." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chila v. Stuart, 81 Conn. App. 458, 465, 840 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 917, 847 A.2d 311 (2004). As an initial matter, we note that the facts found by the referee are not in dispute and that the issue regarding Kemper's liability on the sales tax charge involves a question of law. Therefore, the recommendation of the referee as to whether the 6 percent sales tax should be added to the terms of the contract need not be heeded. The defendants maintain that the referee properly found that § 12-408 (2) must be read into the parties' original contract, dated September 22, 1997. To this end, the defendants acknowledge that Kemper legally was obligated to pay TradeSource sales tax beginning on September 22,1997, in accordance with § 12-408 (2), but argue that the tax was included in the contract price. The defendants do not agree, however, with the referee's conclusion, approved by the court, that they were obligated to pay TradeSource an additional 6 percent sales tax beginning January 11, 2000. Like the defendants, we do not agree that Kemper was liable for the 6 percent sales tax that TradeSource began charging in addition to other billed services on January 11,2000. The court essentially permitted Trade-Source to charge Kemper sales tax on two occasions— both at the time the contract was made and later, when TradeSource imposed a 6 percent sales tax charge in addition to the other billings on January 11, 2000. The issue of a seller's ability to add sales tax when the buyer relied on the negotiated price of the contract has not been addressed directly by Connecticut courts. As the defendants highlight in their brief, a number of other jurisdictions, however, have addressed this issue and found that when applicable taxes are assumed to be included in the contract price, the seller remains liable for the payment of any additional tax. In Ready Trucking, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 248 Ga. App. 701, 548 S.E.2d 420 (2001), for example, the parties contracted for the delivery of oil on the basis of an agreed on price. By statute, the seller was obligated to collect the tax, but failed to include it in the sales price. Although the government collected the tax from the buyer, the court determined that the negotiated price must be held to have included all applicable taxes. The buyer therefore was able to recover from the seller any tax amount paid above and beyond the agreed on contract price. OilLikewise, we conclude that the defendants should not have to pay TradeSource any tax amount not already included in the contract price. The language of the contract was clear and unambiguous. Among other terms, the September 22, 1997 contract stipulated that Kemper was to pay the laborers' hourly rates as established by TradeSource. As a matter of law, these rates incorporated the 6 percent sales tax that Kemper legally was obligated to pay TradeSource under § 12-408 (2). "As a general matter, parties are presumed to have contracted with knowledge of the existing law, and contract language must be interpreted in reference thereto. . . . Unless the agreement indicates otherwise, a statute existing at the time an agreement is executed becomes part of it and must be read into it just as if an express provision to that effect were inserted therein." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) LMK Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., 86 Conn. App. 302, 307, 860 A.2d 1229 (2004). Further, a merger clause on the final page stipulated that the contract was the entire agreement of the parties and could not be modified except in writing signed by both parties. Such a modification was never effectuated, as the parties did not, in addition to the sales tax already included in the contract price, impose or contemplate another sales tax charge at a later date. "[T]he unambiguous terms of a written contract containing a merger clause may not be varied or contradicted by extrinsic evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alstom Power, Inc. v. Balcke-Durr, Inc., 269 Conn. 599, 610, 849 A.2d 804 (2004). The defendants satisfied their promise under the contract by paying the negotiated contract price of the laborers' wages. In paying these hourly wages, the defendants also paid the statutory 6 percent sales tax and fully complied with their duties and obligations as set forth under the terms and conditions of the parties' agreement. "[I]n private disputes, a court must enforce the contract as drafted by the parties and may not relieve a contracting party from anticipated or actual difficulties undertaken pursuant to the contract, unless the contract is voidable on grounds such as mistake, fraud or unconscionability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibson v. Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 730-31, 699 A.2d 68 (1997). Any additional liability beyond the rate originally contracted for, including another 6 percent sales tax charge by TradeSource beginning January 11, 2000, would be contrary to the terms of the contract. Kemper therefore did not breach the contract when it did not pay TradeSource an additional 6 percent over and above the established rates. Accordingly, we conclude that with respect to its determination regarding the 6 percent sales tax, the court improperly determined that the facts found legally and logically led to the conclusion that Kemper breached its contractual obligations to TradeSource. Finally, we address whether the court improperly awarded TradeSource certain other damages for breach of contract. "[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining whether damages are appropriate. . Its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn. App. 14, 31, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). The court awarded TradeSource $31,313.07 in damages. This award consisted of $21,575.06 for unpaid invoices, $8738.01 for finance charges and $1000 for attorney's fees. As the defendants note in their reply brief, of the $21,575.06 of unpaid invoices, approximately $17,956.61 consisted of sales tax charges. The remaining $3618.45 related to charges for which the defendants had sought credit, but which TradeSource refused to apply to the defendants' account. Inasmuch as we have determined that the defendants did not breach the parties' agreement with respect to the 6 percent sales tax, it was improper for the court to award damages consisting of the sales tax charges and any finance charges and attorney's fees incidental thereto. Whether the defendants are liable to Trade-Source for the remaining credit charges of $3618.45, and any related charges thereto, is a question to be determined by the court on remand. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendants on the sales tax issue and for further proceedings to redetermine damages, if any, in accordance with this opinion. In this opinion the other judges concurred. General Statutes § 12-408 (1) imposes a 6 percent tax on sales in Connecticut, providing in relevant part: "For the privilege of making any sales, as defined in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 12-407, at retail, in this state for a consideration, a tax is hereby imposed on all retailers at the rate of six per cent of the gross receipts of any retailer from the sale of all tangible personal property sold at retail or from the rendering of any services constituting a sale in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 12-407 . . . ." In its brief, TradeSource claims that in 2000, the state required providers to charge a sales tax for temporary services. It further claims that it sent a letter, dated January 12, 2000, to all of its customers explaining that it recently had been audited by the state and was then required to add sales tax to its invoices. The defendants claim, and we concur, that there was no applicable change in the law regarding sales tax in 2000. Rather, pursuant to § 12-426-27 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, from the signing of the original contract on September 22, 1997, TradeSource was always responsible for collecting sales tax from Kemper. Kemper paid TradeSource $454,509.56, or $21,575.06 less than Trade-Source's net billings of $476,084.62. In addition to seeking payment for the unpaid sales tax, TradeSource further sought 1.5 percent per month in finance charges pursuant to the contract, together with reasonable attorney's fees and costs. General Statutes § 12-408 (2) provides in relevant part: "Reimbursement for the tax . . . shall be collected by the retailer from the consumer [and] shall be paid by the consumer to the retailer" and "[s]uch tax shall be a debt from the consumer to the retailer, when so added to the original sales price, and shall be recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts . . . ." The court remanded the case to the referee for a finding of attorney's fees. The referee issued a supplemental report on July 7, 2004, which the court accepted and on which it rendered judgment on September 22, 2004, in favor of TradeSource for $31,313.07. At oral argument, the defendants conceded that the facts found by the referee were not in dispute. Although TradeSource was not present at oral argument before this court, TradeSource, in its brief, also did not contest the facts found by the referee. In reaching its conclusion, the court stated: "The parties do not contend that the discussion or the facsimile ever mentioned the applicable taxes. However, the parties do not dispute that as a retail seller, BP incurred a statutory obligation to collect and remit all applicable sales taxes to the State. . . . This obligation necessarily became a term of the agreement because laws in existence at the time a contract is executed are part of that contract. . . . Accordingly, absent an agreement to the contrary, a simple quote to purchase gasoline at a certain price would include an agreement that the price included all applicable taxes." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ready Trucking, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., supra, 248 Ga App. 702.

Opinion LAVINE, J. Although the jury returned a verdict in their favor, the plaintiffs, Heather Medes and Dara Medes, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Geico Corporation, in this underinsured motorist action. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) admitted evidence about their religion and related activities, (2) allowed impermissible arguments in summation to the jury, (3) pressured the jury by setting an implicit time limit on deliberations and (4) denied their motions to set aside the verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural histoiy are relevant to the resolution of the plaintiffs' appeal. The defendant had issued the plaintiffs' father a motor vehicle insurance policy that provided underinsured motorist coverage. On April 22, 1994, the plaintiffs were injured while passengers in a motor vehicle that was covered by the policy. The tortfeasor paid each of the plaintiffs $100,000 as compensation for the injuries they sustained when the motor vehicle was struck from behind. The plaintiffs then commenced this action against the defendant seeking underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the accident, they sustained permanent injuries that rendered them unable to function as they had prior to the accident and diminished their quality of life. During the trial, the defendant's counsel questioned the plaintiffs extensively about the effect their injuries had on their daily lives, including their religious activities as Jehovah's Witnesses. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $50,000 for Dara Medes and $75,000 for Heather Medes. The plaintiffs each filed motions to set aside the verdict or, in the alternative, for additur. The defendant filed a motion for judgment in its favor on the ground that the plaintiffs had been fully compensated by the tortfeasor. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions to set aside the verdict and for additur and granted the defendant's motion for judgment in a memorandum of decision filed April 13, 2005. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary. I The plaintiffs' first claim is that the court denied them their right to a fair trial when it allowed the jury to consider evidence about their religion and related activities. More specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the court permitted the defendant's counsel to "repeatedly . . . inject religious prejudice into this case" by allowing him to question the plaintiffs about their ability to participate in various religious activities, including attending church meetings and sharing their faith with others by distributing literature door to door. We disagree. The following facts are relevant to the plaintiffs' claim. The defendant's counsel asked the plaintiffs' father about his family's practices as Jehovah's Witnesses and if he was familiar with the doctrine of theocratic warfare. The plaintiffs' counsel objected to this line of questioning. The court promptly excused the jury and instructed counsel not to pursue this area of inquiry, stating that it was not appropriate. The court then instructed the jury to "disregard any questions that were asked of this witness . . . concerning his religion or religious beliefs or practices." We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "It is well settled that the trial court's eviden-tiary rulings are entitled to great deference. . . . The trial court is given broad latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb such a ruling unless it is shown that the ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion." (Citation omitted.) Pestey v. Cushman, 259 Conn. 345, 368-69, 788 A.2d 496 (2002). We have recognized that "fi]t would be a rare trial, indeed, if counsel for one side or the other did not pose an objectionable question, whether by design or inadvertence, the motive for which we have no way of determining. Our rules of practice provide a means to prevent improper questions from being answered." State v. Camacho, 92 Conn. App. 271, 297, 884 A.2d 1038 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 935, 891 A.2d 1 (2006). In this instance, the plaintiffs' counsel objected to the questioning about "theocratic warfare." The court sustained the objection and took curative measures to remove any taint the objectionable questions may have caused. We presume that the jury followed the court's curative instruction, absent evidence to the contrary. See Hayes v. Caspers, Ltd., 90 Conn. App. 781, 800, 881 A.2d 428, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 915, 888 A.2d 84 (2005). Given that the court sustained the objection, prohibited further questioning in this area, and gave a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard any questions concerning the witness' religion, religious beliefs and practices, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly permitted the defendant's counsel repeatedly to ask questions regarding their religious activities in violation of their first amendment rights. The plaintiffs' counsel did not object to this questioning and did not include it as a basis to grant the motions to set aside the verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs ask us to analyze the claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A2d 823 (1989). The fact that the defendant's counsel asked questions related to the plaintiffs' participation in religious activities does not in and of itself implicate constitutional rights. See State v. Rogers, 41 Conn. App. 204, 208, 674 A.2d 1364, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 926, 677 A.2d 949, 950 (1996). We decline to review the claim because the plaintiffs have put a constitutional tag on an evidentiary issue. "[Ejvidentiary issues are not ordinarily of a constitutional magnitude." Wakefield v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 90 Conn. App. 441, 444 n.4, 877 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 931, 883 A.2d 1253 (2005). In seeking significant damages for a diminished capacity to carry on and enjoy life's activities, the plaintiffs directly put at issue the extent to which their injuries affected their ability to participate in certain activities related to their religious practices. We accordingly decline to analyze the claim under Golding, as it is not of constitutional magnitude. II The plaintiffs next claim that the court abused its discretion by permitting the defendant's counsel to make improper remarks in summation to the jury. More specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the court allowed counsel to interject several impermissible statements of personal opinion as to the credibility of the plaintiffs' testimony. The following facts are relevant to our analysis of the plaintiffs' claim. During his summation, the defendant's counsel first stated that "[i]n my eighteen years of doing this, I've never seen a case full of so many misrepresentations, so many untruths, so many exaggerations." Second, the defendant's counsel stated that an expert witness the plaintiffs had called, David Astrachan, a physician, "had a beef with insurance companies." The plaintiffs' counsel objected to the second statement but not to the first statement. We decline to consider the plaintiffs' argument with regard to the first statement because it was not properly preserved for appellate review. See Trumpold v. Besch, 19 Conn. App. 22, 30, 561 A.2d 438 ("absence of any objection or exception to improper argument, which we may infer from the absence of any such indication in the transcript, has . . . been regarded as a waiver of the right to press such a claim of error" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 212 Conn. 812, 565 A.2d 538 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029, 110 S. Ct. 1476, 108 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1990). We turn to the comment regarding Astrachan. The court overruled the plaintiffs' objection because the statement that he "had a beef with insurance companies" was made during the course of argument to the jury. "A trial court is invested with a large discretion with regard to arguments of counsel, and appellate courts should only interfere with a jury verdict if the discretion has been abused to the manifest injury of a party." Palkimas v. Lavine, 71 Conn. App. 537, 548, 803 A.2d 329, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 919, 812 A.2d 863 (2002). Moreover, we note that "[i]n addressing the jury, [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durso v. Aquilino, 64 Conn. App. 469, 476, 780 A.2d 937 (2001). In reviewing whether the court abused its discretion in allowing the argument, our task is twofold. First, we must determine whether the remarks were improper. Palkimas v. Lavine, supra, 546. If we determine that the remarks were improper, we must then determine whether a new trial is necessary. Id. In the present case, the court overruled the plaintiffs' objection because it determined that the remarks regarding Astrachan were within the realm of permissible argument. On the basis of our review of the transcript, we agree and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing counsel latitude in argument and overruling the objection. Ill The plaintiffs' third claim is that the court denied them their right to a fair trial by repeatedly pressuring the jury to confine its deliberations to a single day and that this constitutes reversible error. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the claim was not properly preserved at trial. A review of the trial transcript reveals that near the end of the evidence and just prior to being excused for a long weekend, several jurors raised questions concerning previously scheduled engagements and asked the court whether they should change their plans. In response to one juror's question regarding whether he should alter flight arrangements scheduled for the end of the following week, the court replied: "I can't really answer that question, because it depends upon how long — there is no time limit, as to your deliberation, and if you were to go one or two or three days on deliberations, then it would be a problem." Then, the court indicated that "hopefully, hopefully, if you have a full day to deliberate, that should be sufficient." The court then advised the jury that it would have as much time as it needed for deliberations. Review of the transcript further reveals that the plaintiffs' counsel participated in discussions concerning the scheduling of the final stages of the trial, had a full opportunity to object to the court's comments and failed to do so. See Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 90 n.9, 881 A.2d 139 (2005) (discussing action that induces claimed error); State v. Felder, 95 Conn. App. 248, 255-56, 897 A.2d 614 (same), cert. denied, 279 Conn. 905, 901 A.2d 1226 (2006). We therefore decline to reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim because we conclude from a review of the record that the issue is not reviewable. IV The plaintiffs' final claim is that the court improperly denied their motions to set aside the verdict because the verdict was contrary to the evidence. We disagree. "The standard of review governing our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict is well settled. The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence. . . . [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion . . . that, in the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edmands v. CUNO, Inc., 277 Conn. 425, 452-53, 892 A.2d 938 (2006). In a detailed memorandum of decision, the court explained the reasons why it denied the plaintiffs' motions to set aside the verdict. Heather Medes was a front seat passenger, and Dara Medes was a rear seat passenger. The plaintiffs claimed almost identical injuries to identical parts of their bodies. They both claimed a loss of cognitive ability and visual impairment. As a result of these injuries, they asserted that their educational pursuits were adversely affected. In the court's opinion, the similarity of the plaintiffs' claims had an adverse effect on their case. The plaintiffs' and the defendant's experts offered contradictory evidence as to the nature and extent of the plaintiffs' injuries. The court concluded that "the plaintiffs' expert witnesses and the evidence in the case presented the jury with multiple issues of credibility on which it based its verdict." The court noted that it is the jury's role to make credibility determinations. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that there was substantial contradictory evidence presented at trial as to the extent of the plaintiffs' injuries and the effect they had on the plaintiffs' daily lives. "The existence of conflicting evidence . . . curtails the authority of the court to overturn the verdict because the jury is entrusted with deciding which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hughes v. Lamay, 89 Conn. App. 378, 384, 873 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 922, 883 A.2d 1244 (2005). Given that the nature and extent of the plaintiffs' injuries were highly disputed, it was the jury's task to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including experts, and to weigh the evidence. See Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 119-20, 663 A.2d 398 (1995). The jury's verdict fell somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motions to set aside the verdict. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. We note that the record does not disclose what is meant by the term "theocratic warfare." We stress that courts have a heightened duty to scrutinize questions that relate to a person's religious practices or beliefs because of the potential for abuse or prejudice to parties or witnesses. Gratuitous, irrelevant questioning about religious beliefs and practices should not be permitted. Cf. State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 723, 738-40, 535 A.2d 808 (1988) (discussing impermissible questions impheating religious beliefs in a criminal trial); State v. Rogers, 41 Conn. App. 204, 217-18, 674 A.2d 1364 (same) (Hennessy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 926, 677 A.2d 949, 950 (1996). We note that the plaintiffs could prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial "only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the [plaintiffs] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the [defendant] has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239—40. For the same reasons, we decline to review the plaintiffs' claim that the court improperly permitted the defendant's counsel to state that Robert A. Novelly, a physician, the plaintiffs' main witness, "had a problem with malpractice." In their motions to set aside the verdict, the plaintiffs claimed, as a reason to set aside the verdict, the alleged misconduct of the defendant's counsel. No memoranda of law accompanied the motions. If the court heard oral arguments on the motions from counsel, there is no transcript of the arguments for us to review. In its memorandum of decision, the court addressed the reference of the defendant's counsel to the plaintiffs' religious beliefs during cross-examination. The court did not address counsel's conduct during final argument, and the plaintiffs failed to file a motion for articulation to perfect the record. See Practice Book § 66-5. We note, however, that it is proper for the court to inform the jurors of their duties and responsibilities. See State v. Delgado, 8 Conn. App. 273, 278 n.3, 513 A.2d 701 (1986).

Opinion HENNESSY, J. The plaintiffs, John Drabik and Ronald J. Rando, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' action as moot. The plaintiffs specifically argue that the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine applies to their otherwise moot action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiffs allege the following facts relevant to our resolution of their appeal. On December 17, 1999, the residents of the defendant, the town of East Lyme, passed a resolution appropriating $3.8 million for the construction of a specifically defined project known as the Niantic Bay Overlook project (project). On September 6, 2002, plans for the proposed construction were finalized and approved. Bids for the construction were received on November 6, 2002. The bids indicated that the total cost of the project would cost nearly $1 million more than was approved by the voters. In order to keep the project within the approved budget, the defendant, without voter consent, altered the project by scaling down the original design. Thereafter, the defendant entered into a contract with a private company for the construction of the newly designed project. On December 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and an accompanying application for a temporary injunction and an order to show cause against the defendant in an attempt to prohibit the defendant from proceeding with any construction that deviated from the original design. On December 22, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they had not alleged any particular statutory aggrievement or any specific, personal or legal interest that was specifically and injuriously affected by the defendant's action. The court ultimately denied both the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' application for a temporary injunction. The plaintiffs immediately sought Supreme Court review pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a. The plaintiffs' application for an expedited appeal was denied, and construction of the altered project was completed. Subsequently, on August 23, 2004, more then nine months after the original complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, in which they sought, inter alia, "[a] judgment declaring the construction of the [altered projected] to be an illegal action taken by the [defendant . . . since the construction does not conform to the approval granted by the voters and is not otherwise authorized by the town charter or any applicable law." In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case was moot because the altered project was completed. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss their amended complaint as moot. Specifically, they argue, as they did to the trial court, that the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine applies to their otherwise moot action. We are not persuaded. Before we address the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, we set forth the applicable standard of review and legal principles that guide our review. Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction and raises a question of law, our review of the plaintiffs' claim is plenary. See In re Claudia F., 93 Conn. App. 343, 345, 888 A.2d 1138, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924, 895 A.2d 796 (2006). As such, we must decide "whether [the trial court's] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Roe, 246 Conn. 652, 660, 717 A.2d 706 (1998). "[A]n otherwise moot question may qualify for review under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. To do so, however, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concetta v. Stamford, 246 Conn. 281, 295-96, 715 A.2d 756 (1998). The challenged action in question, as expressed by the plaintiffs, is "the construction of a project which is substantially different from the project approved by the voters." There is nothing in the record that indicates construction projects, in general, are of limited duration by their very nature so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about their validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. The duration of construction projects vary according to the size and scope of the project. The plaintiffs did not offer any statistical evidence or cite any authority that supports their argument that the validity of most construction projects will not be renewable because the majority of projects will be completed before appellate litigation can be concluded. The court's conclusion that the challenged action does not satisfy the first prong of the exception was therefore legally and logically correct and supported by the facts that appear in the record. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Opinion SCHALLER, J. This court recently observed that "[t]he sad fact is that there is a difference between parental love and parental competence." In re Christina M., 90 Conn. App. 565, 575, 877 A.2d 941, cert. granted on other grounds, 276 Conn. 903, 884 A.2d 1024 (2005). In the present case, we again are required to undertake the difficult task of determining whether a trial court properly terminated the parental rights of an individual who unquestionably loved his minor daughter but displayed an inability to provide sufficient care and support for his medically fragile child. The respondent father claims that the trial court improperly (1) violated his federal and state constitutional rights by adopting verbatim significant portions of the social studies in its memorandum of decision and (2) concluded that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to terminate his parental rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. On January 28, 2002, the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families, filed a neglect petition alleging that the child was denied proper care and affection and was permitted to live in conditions injurious to her well-being. The petitioner also claimed that the child was uncared for because she was not provided with the specialized care that she required. The child was bom with fetal alcohol syndrome and demonstrated indicia of numerous developmental deficiencies. On April 11, 2002, the child's mother sent the child to live with the respondent. On May 1,2002, she notified the petitioner that the respondent sounded intoxicated when she spoke with him on the telephone at 8:30 in the morning. The mother was concerned about the condition of the respondent, who was scheduled to drive the child to a medical appointment. In response, a social worker telephoned the respondent. During this conversation, the social worker noticed that the respondent's speech was slurred and that he was unable to answer questions posed to him. The social worker then traveled to the respondent's home. Upon arriving at the residence, the social worker observed the respondent "staggering" and smelling of alcohol. The respondent admitted to drinking tequila at four o'clock in the morning. The child was found in a crib wearing a diaper soaked from diarrhea and urine. The petitioner invoked a ninety-six hour hold and placed the child in protective custody. The court on May 2, 2002, found the child to be neglected and uncared for and set specific steps for the respondent to regain custody of her. The court, inter alia, instructed the respondent to keep all appointments with the petitioner, keep his whereabouts known, participate in counseling, attend parenting classes for children with special needs, learn about the child's special needs, submit to a substance abuse assessment and random drug testing, refrain from substance abuse, and maintain adequate housing and legal income. The petitioner eventually placed the child in the custody of P, the respondent's stepdaughter. The respondent objected to this placement; nevertheless, the commitment was maintained on April 17, 2003. The initial goal of the permanency plan, filed in February, 2003, was reunification of the respondent with the child. On July 7,2003, after learning of two instances of excessive alcohol use by the respondent, the petitioner revised the permanency plan and moved to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and the child's mother. See General Statutes § 17a-112. The petitioner alleged that the respondent failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he would be able to assume a responsible position in her life. The court held a hearing over the course of several days. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court denied the petitioner's motion for termination of the respondent's parental rights. The court ordered the respondent and P to pursue family counseling. The court continued the placement of the child with P. The court "felt that [the respondent] should be given more time to prove that he could care for [the child]." The petitioner subsequently renewed its motion to terminate the respondent's parental rights. Two social studies, dated January 2 and April 8, 2004, were completed. The court held a hearing on May 13, 2004, and issued its memorandum of decision on July 14, 2004. The court found that the petitioner had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and the child. The court further found that the petitioner had proven that the respondent had failed to achieve rehabilitation or to restore himself to a constructive and useful role as a parent. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii). "Although [the respondent] appears to love and care for the child and has attempted to gain knowledge and understanding of her medically and mentally complex status, it is readily apparent in his testimony and actions with the child that he lacks the awareness and insight necessary to accommodate and meet her complex needs at this time. This failure of [the respondent] to manifest this understanding and awareness from [the child's] birth . to the present, despite the fact that services and opportunities have been made available, but not fully utilized, and his failure to demonstrate such a degree of personal and positive support for [the child], lead to the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering [the child's] age and needs, [the respondent] would be unable to impart an ability or capacity to assume a responsible position in the life of his child." In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the court made findings pursuant to the seven factors listed in § 17a-112 (k). Notably, the court found that the child had little, if any, positive feeling toward her mother or the respondent but appeared bonded to and had significant emotional ties with P. The court ultimately found that it was in the child's best interest that the respondent's parental rights be terminated. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. At the outset, we note the standard of review and legal principles germane to our discussion. "Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The determinations reached by the trial court that the evidence is clear and convincing will be disturbed only if [any challenged] finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous. . . . "On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial court's conclusion was legally correct and factually supported. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached . . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, on review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheena I., 63 Conn. App. 713, 719-20, 778 A.2d 997 (2001); see also In re Javon R., 85 Conn. App. 765, 768-69, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Kristy A, 83 Conn. App. 298, 305-306, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004). Our Supreme Court has stated: "In order to terminate aparent's parental rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (2); and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112 (j) (3)." In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). "A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child. . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parents' parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in . § [17a-112 (k)] . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vanna A, 83 Conn. App. 17, 21-22, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). I The respondent first claims that the court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by adopting verbatim significant portions of the social studies in its written memorandum of decision. Specifically, he argues that his substantive due process rights were violated because "more than fifty (50%) percent of the [d]ecision consists of unattributed quotations from [the petitioner's] social study, dated April 8, 2004. " We conclude that, in the present case, in which sufficient evidence supported the court's decision, the specific manner in which the court crafted its memorandum of decision was not of constitutional magnitude. Accordingly, we reject the respondent's claim. In Cameron v. Avonridge, Inc., 3 Conn. App. 230, 486 A.2d 661 (1985), the plaintiffs appealed from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant and claimed, inter alia, that "they were denied a fair trial because the court wrote a twenty-two page memorandum of decision which adopted, almost verbatim, the defendant's trial brief." Id., 233. We rejected this claim. "[T]he trial court specifically acknowledged in its memorandum of decision that it relied heavily on the defendant's trial brief because the facts and legal theories advanced therein were consistent with the court's views, and it did not believe that it could improve on the defendant's language. Although we do not approve of this practice, we cannot find that it resulted in less than a fair trial. Nor was there any manifest abuse of discretion or injustice." (Emphasis added.) Id., 235. In Grayson v. Grayson, 4 Conn. App. 275, 494 A.2d 576 (1985), appeal dismissed, 202 Conn. 221, 520 A.2d 225 (1987), the defendant argued that she was denied a fair hearing with respect to her motion to open the judgment of dissolution on the ground of fraud because the twenty-three paragraph fact section in the court's memorandum of decision was taken verbatim from the plaintiffs proposed findings of fact. Id., 276-79. We noted our "strong disapproval" of this practice. Id., 284. "We stress this matter because of the grave importance of fact-finding. The correct finding, as near as may be, of the facts of a law suit is fully as important as the application of the correct legal rules to the facts as found. An impeccably right legal rule applied to the wrong facts yields a decision which is as faulty as one which results from the application of the wrong legal rule to the right facts. The latter type of error, indeed, can be corrected on appeal. But the former is not subject to such correction unless the appellant overcomes the heavy burden of showing that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. . . . "It is sometimes said that the requirement that the trial judge file findings of fact is for the convenience of the upper courts. While it does serve that end, it has a far more important purpose — that of evoking car e on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts. . . . "We can add little to this statement except to note that the practice of adopting parties' proposed findings of fact invites error or sloppy analysis on the judge's part. More importantly, the appearance of justice is just as important as the reality, and a verbatim adoption of the facts [proffered] by one of the advocates invites a public suspicion of the trial court's decision. The perceptions by the public and by the losing litigant of our system of justice are surely not enhanced by such apractice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 283-84. Despite our unequivocal disapproval of this practice, we nevertheless agreed with the "unanimous authority"; id., 284; found in an annotation entitled "Propriety and Effect of Trial Court's Adoption of Findings Prepared by Prevailing Party," 54 A.L.R.3d 868 (1973), that a verbatim adoption of the findings proposed by a prevailing party is not a per se finding of a denial of a fair trial. Grayson v. Grayson, supra, 4 Conn. App. 284-85. Instead, "[t]he ultimate test as to the adequacy of [the] findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for the decision and whether they are supported by evidence." (Emphasis added.) Id., 285; see also MacCalmont v. MacCalmont, 6 Conn. App. 117, 118, 503 A.2d 624 (1986). We also rejected the minority approach of a more scrutinized review of the court's findings in these types of cases "because a conscientious appellate court will make such examination of the record as is necessary in every case in which it is claimed that the finding is not supported by the evidence." Grayson v. Grayson, supra, 285. We remain mindful of the "suffocating court dockets" and the "desire to hasten the procurement of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Bridgeport Hospital, 40 Conn. App. 429, 434, 671 A.2d 405 (1996). Nevertheless, we reassert our emphatic disapproval of the verbatim adoption from another source of the fact section in a trial court's memorandum of decision, whether it be a proposal submitted by the prevailing party, or, as in the present case, directly incorporated from documentary evidence. We recently emphasized the need for thorough and comprehensive factual findings. "Particularly in cases involving the care and custody of children, it is incumbent on the trial courts to provide a decision, whether written or oral, that includes all of the necessary factual findings for the benefit of the parties, as well as for proper appellate review." In re Patricia C., 93 Conn. App. 25, 32 n.8, 887 A.2d 929, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 101 (2006). This need is not met by wholesale adoption of work produced by one of the parties or other participants, in this case, the preparers of the social studies. We emphasize the importance "as every judge knows, to set down in precise words the facts as he finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness in the discharge of that duty: Often a strong impression that, on the basis of the evidence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to expressing that impression on paper. The trial court is the most important agency of the judicial branch of the government precisely because on it rests the responsibility of ascertaining the facts. When a . . . trial judge sits without a jury, that responsibility is his. And it is not a light responsibility since, unless his findings are clearly erroneous, no upper court may disturb them. To ascertain the facts is not a mechanical act. It is a difficult art, not a science. It involves skill and judgment. As fact-finding is a human undertaking, it can, of course, never be perfect and infallible. For that very reason every effort should be made to render it as adequate as it humanly can be." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grayson v. Grayson, supra, 4 Conn. App. 297-98 (Borden, J., dissenting); see also In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn. App. 528, 539-40, 857 A.2d 963 (2004) (same). We have made clear that "parroting" significant portions from an exhibit into a memorandum of decision is a course of action that we neither endorse nor approve. Nevertheless, it is one thing to assess the actions of a trial judge with a critical eye and something quite different to conclude that such action is unconstitutional and violates a party's right to substantive due process. The respondent failed to provide us with any citation to a case holding that the manner in which a trial court crafted its memorandum of decision rises to the level of violating either the federal or state constitution. We decline the invitation to analyze with a constitutional lens the style or method employed by the trial court, despite our disapproval of the trial court's actions in the present case. The critical issue in this case is not how the court reported its findings but whether sufficient evidence supported the court's finding that the petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the respondent's parental rights was proper. We will, therefore, identify the relevant portions of the court's decision and determine whether they are supported by sufficient evidence. The court found that "[although [the respondent] has been partially compliant for the most part with services offered, he has thus far failed to grasp a competent knowledge and understanding of [the child's] medically complex status. To date, [the respondent] continues to lack awareness of how to specifically provide and care for his daughter's needs. Due to this lack of understanding, he currently does not have the insight necessary to care for his daughter's needs and be a positive support of her need for continuous treatment." After setting forth the various programs that had been offered to the respondent to educate and assist him in caring for the child, the court found that he had failed to grasp fully the severity and complications of her medical condition. The court also noted that the thirty-one month old child had spent twenty-five months in the care of her foster family. The court stated: "It is more sadly evident that [the respondent] has continued to demonstrate his inability to appropriately meet the physical, medical and emotional needs of [the child]. As has been noted, [she] is a physically, medically and emotionally fragile child who is completely dependent on a sober, competent caretaker." The court ultimately found that the evidence demonstrated that the child would require intense care and support for a long time. Despite the respondent's obvious love for the child, it was apparent, from the evidence presented, that he lacked the ability to accommodate and to meet her needs. "This failure . to manifest this understanding and awareness from [the child's] birth . to the present, despite the fact that services and opportunities have been made available, but not fully utilized, and his failure to demonstrate such a degree of personal and positive support for [the child], lead to the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering [the child's] age and needs, [the respondent] would be unable to impart an ability or capacity to assume a responsible position in the life of his child." We now must determine whether the evidence adduced at trial supported the court's findings. Rushnee Vereen Penix, a social worker employed by the petitioner, testified that the respondent believed that the child would "outgrow" the effects of fetal alcohol syndrome. She also indicated concern regarding his ability to advocate for the child with respect to her medical needs. She noted that the respondent failed to ask questions or take notes regarding the child's condition during her treatments. She also observed, on one occasion, that the respondent had difficulty feeding the child and did not attempt to follow the instructions that had been provided to him. Penix concluded that the respondent was in denial regarding his daughter's fragile medical condition. Penix then summarized: "In terms of basic things such as changing a [diaper], the ability to feed her, being able to play with her, he can do those things. I have observed him doing those things. The alcohol is definitely a problem because she — as I stated earlier, she is a very, very medically fragile child, and she needs a competent caretaker, and he — that definitely has to be addressed. One of the fears is, you know, him being under the influence while taking care of her. She needs somebody that, you know, is there and is not intoxicated. Also, the inability to grasp what her medical needs are. He does not — he does not understand it despite the programs he was referred to; despite the literature, he cannot — and I understand he may not be able to put in medical terms what her issues are, but just to even give a basic description of what is going on with her, he cannot do that." The court also heard testimony from Nada Gerta Light, a pediatric and child psychiatric nurse. As part of her employment duties, she provided educational training to parents of children with special needs. During her sessions with the respondent, he made it difficult for Light to maintain the focus on the child and her medical condition, rather than on himself and his personal problems. On one occasion, she consistently had to remind him to keep the child upright for thirty minutes after a feeding to prevent a reflux from occurring. She further stated that he failed to demonstrate a "knowledge [that] child development certainly [had been] compromised by the fetal alcohol syndrome." She referred to two instances as examples of this. First, the respondent's strong desire to see the child stand and walk, despite the fact that it was medically inappropriate at that time. Second, the respondent described the child as "lazy." In her opinion, the respondent did not have realistic expectations of his daughter. Light believed that, if not for his denial of his daughter's conditions, the respondent would have made more progress. Light also testified that the respondent often was distracted by outside events during his sessions. He never took notes or requested information on either the child's medical condition or the medications she was taking. On June 3, 2003, P testified that the respondent often disagreed with the diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome and insisted that "everything was fine" with the child. She also had observed that he never took notes or asked questions regarding the child's medical condition. Another social worker, Rebecca Stewart, stated that the respondent had displayed reluctance to follow suggestions regarding the proper method to hold the child and provide her with a drink. On May 13,2004, the court heard additional testimony regarding the termination of the respondent's parental rights. Mary Jane Todd, a pediatric nurse practitioner, indicated a concern regarding the respondent's inability to follow medical advice regarding the child on a consistent basis. She further testified that without consistent daily repetition, the child would not maximize her potential. She also noted that the respondent demonstrated difficulty in picking up cues from the child that she was done feeding. Susan E. Nolin, an educational specialist, subsequently stressed, during her testimony, the importance of consistent structure and routine for the child. In her expert opinion, she indicated that P was the better person to respond to the child's needs due to her background and experience with children with special needs. Nolin further stressed the importance of the availability of P's family, which could provide her with help and support in caring for the child. She also indicated that the respondent never asked specifically how he could assist in the child's development. She also noted that during her sessions with the respondent, he failed to maximize his opportunity to obtain information regarding the care of the child. William Morris, the author of the January 2 and April 8, 2004 social studies that recommended the termination of the respondent's parental rights, also testified at the hearing. Morris testified that when the instructors were not present, the respondent was less likely to use the techniques and skills he had been taught. Morris also stressed the importance of establishing a permanent situation for the child. He ultimately concluded that although the respondent had made progress, he was not ready to be the child's full time caretaker. Morris also indicated that the respondent never provided him with a name of a day care provider with training in caring for children with special needs, despite the respondent's claims of finding such an individual. Our review of the record reveals that the petitioner set forth sufficient, i.e., clear and convincing, evidence to support the court's factual findings regarding the termination of the respondent's parental rights, despite the parroting of the social studies. We reiterate that we "do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached . . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, on review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 477, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). Because the evidence supports the findings set forth in the court's memorandum of decision, we conclude that the manner in which the court elected to set forth those findings did not result in the violations claimed by the respondent. In other words, the verbatim adoption of portions of the social studies did not dilute the petitioner's burden of proof, as argued by the respondent. We note, however, the importance of independent and impartial fact-finding by the trial court, particularly, in cases involving parental rights and the care and custody of children. II The defendant next claims that the court improperly concluded that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to terminate his parental rights. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly found that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation and that, in the dispositional phase, several of the statutory factors warranted termination of his parental rights. Simply put, the respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the issues of personal rehabilitation and the best interest of the child. See In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 353, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). We disagree. "Our role in reviewing an appeal based on the sufficiency of the evidence is well defined. Where the claim is that the evidence produced did not satisfy the burden of proof factually, the duty of an appellate court is well established. An appeal based on the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual finding carries a legal and practical restriction to review. The function of an appellate court is to review, and not to retry, the proceedings of the trial court. . . . Further, we are authorized to reverse or modify the decision of the trial court only if we determine that the factual findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, or that its decision is otherwise erroneous in law. . . . The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine. . . . [W]e must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the [court's] verdict . . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 105-106, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000). A The respondent first argues that that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. He contends that the petitioner failed to introduce evidence regarding when he could resume responsibility for the child. We conclude that such specific evidence is not required and that the court's finding was supported by the evidence and, therefore, not clearly erroneous. We begin our discussion by setting forth the applicable legal principles. "Failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation is one of the seven statutory grounds on which parental rights may be terminated under § 17a-112 Q) (3). We have stated that [personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . . Rehabilitate means to restore [a . . . delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through social rehabilitation. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life. Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life. . . . "[T]he adjudicatory determination to be made by the trial court is whether the parent of a child who has been found by the [S]uperior [C]ourt to have been neglected [or] uncared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. . In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation. . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn. App. 248, 259-60, 881 A.2d 450 (2005); see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 383-84, 784 A.2d 457 (2001); In re John G., 56 Conn. App. 12, 17-18, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). In his brief, the respondent strenuously argues that the court improperly placed too much emphasis on his present ability to care for the child and that there was no evidence before the court regarding the length of time it would take for him to assume responsibility for her. With respect to the respondent's first argument, we note that the court's decision must be read in the context of the history of the case. The respondent had received significant services from the petitioner for an extended period of time. Moreover, on July 7, 2003, the court denied the petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights and specifically stated that he "should be given more time" to achieve rehabilitation. Nevertheless, in its decision on July 14, 2004, the court found that, despite granting him additional time, the respondent still lacked the necessary understanding of his daughter's conditions. Simply put, the court was not focusing exclusively on the respondent's "present" ability but on his inability to achieve rehabilitation over the course of the child's approximate two year placement in foster care, which began in May, 2002. Turning to the respondent's second argument, we note that he has not referred us to any case requiring such evidence. Our Supreme Court has instructed that the applicable standard in these types of cases "requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [a parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); see also In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 399, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re John G, supra, 56 Conn. App. 17; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn. App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984). A finding of when the respondent would be able to resume caring for the child was required neither by statute nor by case law. Instead, the court properly examined whether, "within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, [the] parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re John G., supra, 17. We recently emphasized the importance of conducting this inquiry by considering the factual context of the particular child's situation. "The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child. . . . What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn. App. 260; see also In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706; In re Christina V., 38 Conn. App. 214, 220-21, 660 A.2d 863 (1995); see also In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 173-74, 743 A.2d 165 (1999) (respondent's failure to achieve rehabilitation illustrated by lack of understanding of child's medical, psychiatric condition). The child in the present case suffers from the effects of fetal alcohol syndrome and exhibits numerous developmental disabilities. As a result, she required, and will continue to require, extensive medical treatment and intense participation by her caretaker in assisting her to maximize her potential. The court acknowledged the evidence that the respondent had made some progress in personal rehabilitation. Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the child's significant needs, such progress, made over approximately two years, was insufficient when considered in relation to the child's special needs and her need for permanency. Our case law contains numerous examples of a parent, who, despite an admirable attempt, was unable to achieve rehabilitation sufficiently and, as a result, lost his or her parental rights. See, e.g., In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn. App. 22-25; In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn. App. 479-82 (respondent's efforts at rehabilitation too little, too late and court's finding that she failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation despite some level of stability not clearly erroneous); In re Shyliesh H., supra, 56 Conn. App. 172-75 (although respondent testified that he loved child, trial court's finding that he lacked insight, responsibility to cope with her significant psychiatric disorder supported determination of failure to achieve rehabilitation). Our review of the record reveals that the evidence credited by the court supports its conclusion that the respondent failed to attain a degree of rehabilitation sufficient to warrant the belief that, at some time in the foreseeable future, he would be capable of assuming a responsible position with respect to the child's care. Accordingly, the court's decision to terminate the respondent's parental rights was not clearly erroneous. B The respondent's final argument is that that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate his parental rights. We disagree. "In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)]. On appeal, we will disturb the findings of the trial court in both the adjudication and disposition only if they are clearly erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005); see also In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002) (in dispositional phase, court concerned with best interest of child); In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001) (same). These seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. 104; see also In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 258-59, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). We have held, however, that the petitioner is not required to prove each of the seven factors by clear and convincing evidence. In re Victoria B., supra, 259; In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 528; In re Quanitra M., supra, 105. The court stated in its memorandum of decision that the parents of the child had been provided with ample, appropriate services, offered on a timely basis, to facilitate the return of their child. The court also concluded that the petitioner had made reasonable efforts at reunification and that the parents had not fulfilled their court-ordered obligations. The court noted the age of the child, and stated that she had "little if any positive feelings toward her mother or [the respondent], but appear[ed] bonded with and [had] significant emotional ties with her current foster parents . . . ." The court found that the petitioner encouraged the parents to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and neither economic circumstances nor unreasonable actions of any person prevented such a relationship. With respect to the sixth statutory factor, the court did not make a specific finding in its decision under a specific subheading concerning the respondent. Nevertheless, as the petitioner points out in her brief, the majority of the court's decision concerns this factor. The court, in considering the best interest of the child, focused on her need for permanency, the positive situation with the foster parents and the respondent's continuing inability to obtain a competent understanding of her medically complex status and its corresponding negative long-term effects on her future development. The respondent first argues that the court improperly failed to make a finding pertaining to him with respect to the sixth statutory factor, that is, "the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future . . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) (6). The respondent contends that the evidence supports a finding that he maintained consistent visitation with the child and provided her with encouragement and love. Although the court perhaps could have made this finding, it did not, and we are bound by the clearly erroneous standard of review. We cannot say that the court's finding that, despite the respondent's obvious care for the child and best efforts at rehabilitation, it was not in her best interest to return to the respondent's care in the foreseeable future was clearly erroneous. "We decide, not whether we would have drawn the same inferences or found the same facts, but whether the trial court could have reasonably done so." Greene v. Greene, 13 Conn. App. 512, 514, 537 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 809, 541 A.2d 1238 (1988). In other words, the court was not obligated or required to make the finding suggested by the respondent. As we have explained, the record reveals that the respondent failed to understand sufficiently his daughter's medical condition, and it follows that, absent that understanding, it would not be in the child's best interest to be placed in the care of the respondent. The respondent also challenges two other factual findings of the court. Even if we were to assume arguendo that the court improperly found that the respondent did not substantially comply with the orders of the court and that he did not avail himself of family counseling with P, we would still conclude that the court's ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child was proper. It is clear that the significant and determinative factors considered by the court were the need for permanency, the respondent's inability to comprehend the child's medical situation and the positive environment created for her by the foster parents. The findings challenged by the respondent are not related to these factors. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families, also sought to terminate the parental rights of the child's mother. She consented to the termination of her parental rights on May 13, 2004, and is not a party to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent. Mary Jane Todd, a pediatric nurse who treated the child, testified that fetal alcohol syndrome affects a child "through exposure to alcohol by one or two — or both parents throughout the pregnancy [and] gives [the child] some congenital defects. [The child] has the wide space eyes. Her [face is] very typical of children with fetal alcohol syndrome. They're often very sensitive to stimulation. You know, they're easily overstimulated and have a hard time dealing with loud noises. They're often retarded, have problems walking. Some, you know, eventually do — you know, some walk some. Some are so bad they don't ever walk. And they almost all have some visual problems and, of course, learning impairments." The child also suffers from seizures, which are controlled with the drug Topamax, and has difficulty swallowing. In addition to care from her pediatrician, the child receives medical treatment from a cardiologist, ophthalmologist, neurologist, physical therapist and an occupational therapist. As a result of these numerous health issues, the child functioned at the level of an eleven month old when she was twenty-six months old. General Statutes § 17a-101g permits the petitioner to remove a child from unsafe surroundings under a ninety-six hour hold. See General Statutes § 46b-129. "While a finding of neglect, resulting in non-permanent custody, may be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all of the elements of the termination of parental rights petition must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 828 n.7, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: "The Superior Court, upon hearing and notice as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) that . . . (B) the child . . . (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . ." General Statutes § 17a-l 12 (k) provides: "Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent." "The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent . Although that ultimate interference by the state in the parent-child relationship may be required under certain circumstances, the natural rights of parents in their children undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 164-65, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). The petitioner does not dispute the respondent's claim that significant sections of the court's memorandum of decision have been taken verbatim from the social studies. Our comparison of the social studies with the court's memorandum is consistent with this undisputed claim. Our Supreme Court has stated that "the words [a trial judge] used to perform this task [of preparing a memorandum of decision are] within [his] broad judicial discretion. Reversal is required where the abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done." Long v. Schull, 184 Conn. 252, 258, 439 A.2d 975 (1981); see also D'Angelo v. McGoldrick, 239 Conn. 356, 360 n.4, 685 A.2d 319 (1996). Our Supreme Court subsequently characterized the verbatim adoption of the findings of fact drafted by a plaintiff as "deplorable." Grayson v. Grayson, 202 Conn. 221, 223, 520 A.2d 225 (1987). See also Ernst Steel Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 13 Conn. App. 253, 257 n.5, 536 A.2d 969 (1988); Hartford v. Tucker, 8 Conn. App. 209, 214 n.10, 512 A.2d 944 (1986). Our Supreme Court has "stated on numerous occasions, a party cannot transform a nonconstitutional claim into a constitutional claim simply by virtue of the label placed upon it." State v. Whipper, 258 Conn. 229, 279, 780 A.2d 53 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Cruz, 269 Conn. 97, 106, 848 A.2d 445 (2004); see also State v. King, 249 Conn. 645, 680 n.39, 735 A.2d 267 (1999); State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 164, 728 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S. Ct. 152, 145 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1999). We note that constitutional implications permeate all termination of parental rights cases. "Like every other court in this country, we are mindful of our responsibility to respect and protect the constitutional rights of parents, rich or poor, to make decisions about the care, custody and control of their children. Like all other rights, however, these rights can be lost. The family is not . . . beyond regulation in the public interest, and the rights of parenthood are not beyond limitation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christina M., supra, 90 Conn. App. 584-85. The decision to extinguish the parent-child bond requires close consideration, due to its grave importance. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116, 117 S. Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1996). The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than [proof by the preponderance of the evidence to terminate parental rights]. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). The court noted the "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren] [which] does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of the child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preserving the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id., 753-54; see also In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688 n.19, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). A psychological study, dated October 9, 2002, indicated that the respondent did not understand fetal alcohol syndrome and thought that the child would "outgrow it." The author further noted that the respondent appeared unaware of the child's developmental issues and instead consistently commented on her beauty and growth. The respondent was unable to discuss her medical condition. Our Supreme Court has indicated that "[p]sychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 667, 420 A.2d 875 (1979); see also In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 707, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Light explained that reflux occurs when food travels back up from the stomach into the esophagus. The respondent, refers to evidence in the record pertaining to his undisputed love of the child and his efforts to comprehend and to address her medical condition. Despite his laudable attempt at rehabilitation, we cannot conclude that the court's findings were clearly erroneous. As we have stated: "[E]ven if a parent had made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kristy A., supra, 83 Conn. App. 318. See footnote 7. "Where . . . the record reveals that the trial court's ultimate conclusions [regarding termination of parental rights] are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we will not reach an opposite conclusion on the basis of any one segment of the many factors considered in a termination proceeding . The court thus properly determined that the commissioner, in the dispositional phase, need not prove by clear and convincing evidence the seven factors set forth in [General Statutes] § 17a-112 (e) prior to a finding by the court that it is in the best interests of the children to have the respondent's parental rights terminated.'' (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. 105. As we have stated, the petitioner was not required to prove each factor by clear and convincing evidence because the factors are guidelines to assist in determining the best interest of the child and not prerequisites to termination. We note that there was evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion that the respondent failed to comply substantially with the court's orders. Specifically, there was testimony that he failed to provide the petitioner with documentation regarding his participating in Alcoholics Anonymous.

Opinion HARPER, J. The plaintiff, James E. Sullivan, administrator of the estate of James P. Sullivan, the plaintiffs decedent (decedent), brought this wrongful death action against the defendant Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, alleging that the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain and to provide adequate security at one of its train stations. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment, claiming that the court improperly (1) precluded expert testimony, (2) excluded relevant evidence and (3) instructed the jury on the superseding cause doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of August 29, 1992, the decedent was shot and killed by Larone Hines in a stairway leading up from Monroe Street to the westbound platform of the South Norwalk train station. The station is located in a relatively high crime area of Norwalk. The city of Norwalk owns the two railroad station buildings at the South Norwalk station, a parking lot and an underground tunnel connecting the railroad station buildings. The state owns the railroad platforms and stairways leading up to the platforms from Monroe Street, including the stairway where the incident took place. The department of transportation has a service agreement with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the parent organization of the defendant, and the defendant for commuter rail service in Connecticut. Since 1983, the defendant has provided this rail service and is responsible for its daily operations. On the night of the incident, the decedent was a passenger on one of the defendant's trains from West-port to Norwalk. He arrived at the station at approximately 10:39 p.m. After frequenting a few establishments in Norwalk, the decedent had a brief encounter with Hines and a group of men outside a local nightclub on Monroe Street. The encounter became increasingly hostile. When the decedent walked away, Hines and the group of men followed him underneath a railroad trestle where they again exchanged angry words. The decedent ran from the group and made his way to the stairway underneath the trestle where a physical altercation ensued, and then Hines shot him. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the death of his decedent was a result of the defendant's failure to maintain and to provide adequate security at the station. The defendant raised several special defenses, including that the decedent's death was a result of the "intentional and/or criminal actions of a third person" that superseded any possible negligence on the part of the defendant. The jury returned a verdict finding that the decedent was an invitee of the defendant and that his death was not foreseeable to the defendant. The court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with the verdict. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The plaintiff first claims that the court abused its discretion when it precluded his premises security expert from testifying on the ground that he was not qualified to render expert testimony concerning the issues before the court. The defendant argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the plaintiffs expert because the witness had no experience, training or special knowledge related to railroad security systems. We agree that the court did not abuse its discretion. Prior to trial, the plaintiff disclosed John W. Kennish as an expert witness in premises security. The plaintiff intended him to opine as to the standard of care for maintaining railroad security and deviation therefrom. The defendant filed a motion to preclude the testimony on the ground that Kennish was not qualified to provide an expert opinion on railroad security. After hearing argument as to the admissibility of the plaintiffs proffered expert witness, the court precluded his testimony on the basis of the following rationale: "Kennish had no railroad experience, no involvement in railroad security [and] was not a railroad expert, a railroad police procedure expert or a railroad police security expert. [He] had consulted no discemable data, could not explain or support his methodology and had no objective criteria to support his opinions. . . . Kennish did not rely on any reliable studies, but used his personal experience, which, as stated, was not in the area of railroad security." "Our standard of review regarding a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is well settled. [W]e note that the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 514-15, 853 A.2d 460 (2004). As our Supreme Court recently articulated, "[e]xpert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 629, 877 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1049,126 S. Ct. 775, 163 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2. "The test for admissibility of the opinion of an expert witness is whether the expert knows the applicable standard of care and can evaluate the defendant's conduct, given that standard. . . . Even if a court has acted improperly in connection with the introduction of evidence, reversal of a judgment is not necessarily mandated because there must not only be an evidentiary error, there also must be harm." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keeney v. Mystic Valley Hunt Club, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 368, 371, 889 A.2d 829 (2006). Relying on that standard, the court precluded Ken-nish's testimony because it determined that he was not qualified as an expert in railroad security procedures. The court determined that Kennish's "opinions were unsupported and unqualified and would not add to the jury's understanding of the case, and that he was not an expert in the field for which his testimony was offered." The plaintiff argues that the court applied the wrong standard to assess Kennish's qualifications and should have, instead, focused on whether his testimony would have been helpful to the jury by virtue of his special skill or knowledge. It appears, however, that the court did precisely that when it determined that Kennish lacked the necessary qualifications to render an expert opinion for which his testimony was offered. The question before the court was whether Kennish had expertise on which to base an expert opinion as to whether the defendant negligently failed to provide adequate security procedures at its railroad station. Kennish, although having experience as a police officer in various settings, with a premises security background, testified at his deposition that he had no experience, training or individual knowledge of railroad security. On the basis of that testimony, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in precluding Kennish from testifying as to the appropriate standard of care for maintaining railroad security. It is not clear from his testimony that he knew the applicable standard of care or had the ability to evaluate the defendant's conduct. See Keeney v. Mystic Valley Hunt Club, Inc., supra, 93 Conn. App. 373. II The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly excluded evidence of (1) a report prepared by a third party and (2) a video image of a camera atop a neighboring building. We disagree. The standard of review of evidentiary rulings is well established. "[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility . of evidence. . . . The trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . Moreover, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 272 Conn. 515, 542, 864 A.2d 847 (2005). With that standard of review in mind, we turn to the plaintiffs two remaining evidentiary claims. A The plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion when it excluded a report prepared by a third party on the ground that its contents were irrelevant due to its remoteness. We are not persuaded. During the course of the trial, the plaintiff offered into evidence a report prepared by the St. Germain Group, Inc., of Boston, titled, "A Strategic Perspective on Policing the Long Island and Metro-North Railroads," for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1988. Included in the report was a statistical breakdown of criminal activity at various stations throughout Connecticut operated by the defendant. The defendant objected to the report being placed in evidence. During trial and out of the presence of the jury, the court stated that it would not admit the report into evidence because it was irrelevant. It is well established that "[Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common coruse of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worth or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not [unfairly] prejudicial or merely cumulative." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 200-201, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. In the present case, the report was proffered to support the plaintiffs contention that the decedent's death was foreseeable to the defendant on the basis of its knowledge of the statistical data contained in the report concerning reported crimes at Connecticut stations. The report, however, was based on data compiled from the years 1985 through 1987. In addition, in regard to stations operated by the defendant in Connecticut, the report specifically states that "[w]hile the number of incidents reflects substantial police activities, on the basis of daily averages, the number of incidents is quite small, and as shown in Table 17 [which details reported crime per day], the amount of crime on the system is relatively low, especially given the number of passengers carried." Moreover, the report did not contain any discemable data specific to the station at issue in this case. We already have noted that the court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of the evidence. Coughlin v. Anderson, supra, 270 Conn. 514-15. On the basis of our review of the report, we cannot agree that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the report from evidence. B The plaintiffs final evidentiary claim is that the court abused its discretion when it excluded a video image of a camera atop a neighboring building. We disagree. The plaintiff also sought to introduce into evidence a video image of a camera atop a building that abuts the station in order to show that the station was in a high crime area and that other property owners were taking additional security measures in the vicinity of the station. The defendant objected to the video image on the grounds of relevance and prejudice. After hearing arguments, outside the presence of the jury, the court sustained the objection. As stated, "[rjelevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, supra, 272 Conn. 200; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. We cannot agree with the plaintiff that a video image of a camera atop a neighboring building would have provided any assistance to the jury in determining whether the defendant had adequate security measures in place or to establish the standard of care for the defendant. The video image, therefore, was not relevant to the issues presented in this case. Moreover, as stressed by our Supreme Court, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded by the court if "its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cortes, 276 Conn. 241, 254, 885 A.2d 153 (2005). We conclude that the video image's potential for confusing the jury far outweighed its probative value, if any. The court properly excluded the video image. III The plaintiffs final claim on appeal is that the court improperly gave a jury instruction on superseding and intervening cause. The defendant argues that the doctrine of superseding cause is still valid in Connecticut. This claim was properly preserved at trial for our review. We agree with the defendant. At the conclusion of the trial, the court gave the following jury instruction relevant to this claim. "One of the defenses of the defendant is that even if you were to find it negligent, which negligence it denies, the actions of Larone Hines intervened to break the chain of causation between its alleged negligence and Mr. Sullivan's death. This is, after all, a corollary of the rule of law I have already given you that a defendant can only be found liable in negligence if its negligence was the proximate cause or a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injuries. Therefore, if you find that the actions of Mr. Hines intervened and superseded any negligence on the part of the defendant, then the defendant cannot be responsible to the plaintiff and your verdict must be for the defendant. If you find that Larone Hines' intentional acts were not within the scope of the risk which may have been created by the defendant's conduct, then the actions of Mr. Hines may be found by you to be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries relieving the defendant of liability even if you find that the defendant was negligent and their negligence created a situation which afforded an opportunity to Mr. Hines to commit the crime." "Our analysis begins with a well established standard of review. When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . we will not view the instructions as improper. . . . "The court has a duty to submit to the jury no issue upon which the evidence would not reasonably support a finding. . . . Although it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation. . . . The court should, however, submit to the jury the issues as outlined by the pleadings and as reasonably supported by the evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiStefano v. Milardo, 276 Conn. 416, 421, 886 A.2d 415 (2005). In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of superseding cause has been abolished in all civil cases as a consequence of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), and that, therefore, the jury instruction was improper. In response, the defendant contends that the application of the superseding cause doctrine in relation to unforeseeable acts of a third party is still valid. It is necessary for us, therefore, to first review the applicable law relating to the doctrine of superseding cause in order to decide this issue. As we have stated, "[t]he terms intervening cause and superseding cause have been used interchangeably. . . . The Restatement of Torts makes clear that the doctrine is properly referred to as superseding cause, and that it embodies within it the concept of an intervening force. . A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about. . . . "Regarding intervening cause, [our Supreme Court has] adopted the standard set forth in § 442B of [2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965)], that [w]here the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused by a, third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell, 73 Conn. App. 66, 75-76, 807 A.2d 1001 (2002). In Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 446, our Supreme Court did indeed determine that the doctrine of superseding cause was to be abandoned in favor of a proximate cause analysis in some circumstances. Id. As stated by the Barry court, "the rationale supporting the abandonment of the doctrine of superseding cause outweighs any of the doctrine's remaining usefulness in our modem system of torts. . . . [W]e believe that the instruction on a superseding cause complicates what is essentially aproxímate cause analysis and risks jury confusion. The doctrine also no longer serves a useful puipose in our tort jurisprudence, especially considering our system of comparative negligence and apportionment, where defendants are responsible solely for their proportionate share of the injury suffered by the plaintiff." Id. The Barry court did not, however, as the plaintiff suggests it did, abolish the doctrine of superseding cause in all civil cases. In fact, the court specifically stated the contrary. Id., 439 n.16. "Our conclusion that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful purpose is limited to the situation in cases . . . wherein a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence. Our conclusion does not necessarily affect those cases where the defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event supersedes its tortious conduct. See Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 761, 563 A.2d 699 (1989) (concluding that criminal attack on plaintiff was superseding cause of plaintiffs injuries notwithstanding plaintiffs claim that defendant's allowed overgrowth of vegetation on property where attack occurred was substantial factor in both occurrence and duration of attack), overruled in part on other grounds, Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 608, 662 A.2d 753 (1995)." (Emphasis added.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 439 n.16. In the present case, the defendant is not seeking to apportion liability. Rather, it put forth as a special defense its theory that the criminal acts of a third party superseded any possible negligence on its part. On the basis of our review of the applicable law relating to the doctrine of superseding cause, we conclude that the instructions were correct in law, appropriately adapted to the issues and sufficient to guide the juiy. See DiStefano v. Milardo, supra, 276 Conn. 421. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion McLACHLAN, J., concurred. The plaintiffs complaint also named the city of Norwalk, the redevelopment agency of the city of Norwalk and Ogden Allied Security Services, Inc., as defendants. Thereafter, summary judgment was rendered in favor of the city of Norwalk and the redevelopment agency of the city of Norwalk. The plaintiff withdrew the claims alleged against Ogden Allied Security Services, Inc. We therefore refer in this opinion to the Metro-North Commuter Railroad as the defendant. The court provided this rationale in its articulation of October 8, 2004. The plaintiff urges this court to consider the "totality of the circumstances" analysis applied to determine foreseeability in premises liability claims as set forth by our Supreme Court in Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 121, 869 A.2d 179 (2005), with regard to his appeal. Monk's holding does not change our analysis of the evidentiary issue before us. In Monk, our Supreme Court held that evidence concerning serious crimes in the vicinity of a defendant's premises, as well as security measures, either taken or not taken were factors to be considered in deciding foresee ability in premises liability cases. Id. As we concluded, in the present case, the court properly determined that a picture of a video camera atop a neighboring building' is not relevant to either of those considerations. Moreover, the plaintiff is appealing from evidentiary rulings that were based on lack of relevance. The court did not determine that serious crimes in the vicinity of the station were irrelevant to the issue of foreseeability. Rather, it excluded the proffered evidence because it determined that the video image of the camera was not relevant to establish such facts. We agree. The defendant suggests that this court should decline to review the plaintiffs claim because he failed to brief this issue properly. "Analysis, rather than abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004). We agree that the plaintiff did not set forth the standard of review and failed to provide the relevant portions of the court's charge. As we have oftentimes stated, however, our rules of practice 'are a means to justice, and not an end in themselves; their purpose is to provide for a just determination of every proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shapero v. Mercede, 77 Conn. App. 497, 508 n.18, 827 A.2d 11, 823 A.2d 1263 (2003). Although the plaintiffs treatment of this claim in his principal brief is not in complete compliance with our rules of practice, the plaintiff has provided adequate analysis therein to which the defendant responded, and he submitted a reply brief that contains the standard of review and relevant portions of the charge. In consideration of those factors and because the record is adequate, we will review this claim.

Opinion BISHOP, J. The plaintiff tenant, United Social and Mental Health Services, Inc., appeals, and the defendant landlord, Alma Rodowicz, cross appeals from the judgment of the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that it was a holdover tenant at the expiration of its lease. On cross appeal, the defendant claims, in essence, that the court improperly determined that (1) when the plaintiff became a holdover tenant in November, 1997, it was obligated to pay the defendant only the fair rental value of the premises, (2) the plaintiff was not liable for its failure to maintain the premises after the lease expired in October, 1997, and (3) the plaintiff was not obligated to repair the sprinkler system prior to the lease's expiration in 1997. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following factual and procedural history are germane to ouV discussion of the issues on appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a lease, effective November 1, 1987, through which the plaintiff leased certain premises owned by the defendant in Plainfield for a term of ten years. According to article IV-C and schedule B of the lease, the ®nly means by which the plaintiff could renew the lease was by notifying the defendant "of its intentions within six (6) months of the expiration of this [l]ease or any extension thereof." On October 29, 1997, the defendant's attorney sent a letter on behalf of the defendant to the plaintiff acknowledging that the parties had come to an agreement, through which the plaintiff would become a holdover tenant and pay a reduced rent of $4710 per month. The correspondence also noted that the parties were working toward creating a new lease and, until that time, the plaintiff would be bound by the terms of the original lease. The court found that although the plaintiff never responded to this correspondence, the plaintiff later referred to the new arrangement as a month-to-month tenancy and remitted rent in the amount of $4710 per month to the defendant for the next five years. By letter dated October 23, 2002, the plaintiff informed the defendant of its intent to renew the lease for an additional five year term. The defendant rejected the request to renew on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to seek a renewal within the six months prior to the expiration of the lease and demanded that the plaintiff vacate the premises. In this letter, the defendant also demanded that the plaintiff remit $5200 per month until it vacated the premises and perform certain maintenance of the building, as purportedly required by the original lease. The plaintiff, while protesting this increase, remitted rent of $5200 to the defendant and commenced this action seeking specific performance of the lease, a decree setting the correct monthly rent, an injunction and attorney's fees. The defendant responded by filing a counterclaim seeking damages because the plaintiff had committed waste and had failed to clean and maintain the premises. The court found that the parties' original lease had expired in October, 1997, when the plaintiff failed to renew the lease in accordance with the terms of schedule B of the lease agreement. Finding no evidence that the parties had agreed to create a new lease or to continue the terms of the original lease, the court held that as of November 1,1997, the plaintiff became a holdover tenant. The court also found that, absent evidence of the parties' intent to the contrary, the plaintiff was not bound by the terms of the original lease. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff, as a holdover tenant, was obligated to pay only the reasonable rental value of the property, as determined by the last agreed on rent. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff was "entitled to the differential in rent from the $5200 it was paying from the $4710 it had agreed on from November 1, 2002, to the date of [the] judgment." The court also held that the plaintiff could recover for certain structural repairs it made to the premises because it found that the plaintiff was under no obligation to maintain or to repair the premises after the lease expired on October 31,1997. As to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff had failed to repair and to maintain the sprinkler system during the time period from November 1, 1987, through October 31, 1997, when the lease was in effect, the court found that the lease did not define clearly which party would be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the sprinkler system. The court resolved the ambiguity in the lease against the defendant, as the party who drew the contract, and held that the plaintiff was due the amount it paid to repair and to maintain the sprinkler system during the period that the lease was effective. This appeal followed. I The plaintiff claims that the court improperly held that it was a holdover tenant at the expiration of its lease with the defendant in October, 1997, because it failed to exercise the option to renew the lease properly and the parties failed to reach an agreement creating a new tenancy. We disagree. "Whether an option in a lease to renew has been exercised is a question of fact for the trial court, which looks to the intent of the parties as expressed in their words and deeds. . . . This court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings provided the evidence supports those findings." (Citation omitted.) Perrotti v. Chiodo, 21 Conn. App. 288, 290, 573 A.2d 342 (1990). In this instance, we find no fault with the court's reasoning that although the plaintiff remained on the premises and remitted to the defendant an amount the parties mutually agreed on, the plaintiffs holdover did not constitute a renewal or extension of the lease. Cf. Warner Associates v. Logan, 50 Conn. App. 90, 96, 718 A.2d 48 (1998). Indeed, the record reveals that the lease contained an option to renew, which required the plaintiff to notify the defendant, in writing, of its intent to renew the lease within the six months prior to the expiration of the lease, that the plaintiff failed to provide such notice and that the parties did not reach an agreement creating a new lease. Thus, the court properly held that the plaintiff continued in possession of the premises as a holdover tenant after the expiration of its lease on October 31, 1997. II On cross appeal, the defendant first claims that the court improperly held that when the plaintiff became a holdover tenant in November, 1997, it was obligated to pay only the fair rental value of the premises. Specifically, the defendant invites this court to adopt a common-law rule from other jurisdictions that a holdover tenant is obligated to pay an increased rent once given notice of the increase by the defendant. We decline the invitation. In Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 609, 73 A.2d 295 (1950), our Supreme Court expressly rejected this common-law rule adopted in other jurisdictions and held, rather, that a tenant at sufferance is obligated "to pay the reasonable rental value of the property which he occupied." Id. "[A] tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance at the moment his or her rightful possession terminates. A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person who came into possession of land rightfully continues in possession wrongfully after his [or her] right thereto has terminated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Van Sickle, 52 Conn. App. 37, 42, 726 A.2d 600 (1999). Because, in this instance, the plaintiff became a tenant at sufferance when the parties failed to renew the lease or enter into a new agreement, the plaintiff was obligated to pay only the fair rental value for its occupancy of the premises. Thus, the defendant's claim is without merit. Ill Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly held that the plaintiff was not liable for its failure to maintain the premises, as required under the lease agreement, after the lease expired in October, 1997. The record belies this claim. It is axiomatic that "[i]n order for an enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that the parties' minds had truly met. . If there has been a misunderstanding between the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that their minds have never met, no contract has been entered into by them and the court will not make for them a contract which they themselves did not make." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MD Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. MLS Construction, LLC, 93 Conn. App. 451, 456, 889 A.2d 850 (2006). As we have noted, the record establishes that the defendant and the plaintiff did not reach an agreement as to a new lease after the original lease expired in October, 1997. Accordingly, the court correctly held that the terms of the original lease regarding the maintenance and repair of the premises did not apply to the plaintiff as a holdover tenant. IV Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly held that the plaintiff was not obligated to repair the sprinkler system prior to the lease's expiration in 1997. We disagree. Article VI (A) of the original lease provided that the plaintiff was to make all repairs to maintenance items and that the defendant would be responsible for all structural repairs. The court found, however, that the lease did not define what was to be considered a structural repair and, thus, the lease was ambiguous as to whether the sprinkler system constituted a structural repair. "We accord the language employed in the contract a rational construction based on its common, natural and ordinary meaning and usage as applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language is unambiguous, we must give the contract effect according to its terms. . . . Where the language is ambiguous, however, we must construe those ambiguities against the drafter." (Citations omitted.) Can-tonbury Heights Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Local Land Development, LLC, 273 Conn. 724, 735, 873 A.2d 898 (2005). When the "relevant contract language is ambiguous, [t]he determination of the intent of the parties to a contract . is a question of fact subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santana v. Hartford, 94 Conn. App. 445, 465, 894 A.2d 307 (2006). There was ample evidence in the record for the court's finding that the lease was ambiguous as to whether the sprinkler system was a structural item, and the court properly construed the ambiguity against the defendant, as the drafter of the agreement. Accordingly, the court's finding that the plaintiff was not obligated to repair the sprinkler system pursuant to the lease was not clearly erroneous. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiff also claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court improperly determined that the parties did not ratify the plaintiffs 1997 option to renew the lease. We decline to review this claim because it was neither pleaded in the plaintiffs complaint nor raised before the trial court. "[T]he principle that a plaintiff may rely only upon what he has alleged is basic. . . . It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint. . . . Furthermore, [i]t is well settled that the trial court can be expected to rule only on those matters that are put before it. . . . With only a few exceptions . . . we will not decide an appeal on an issue that was not raised before the trial court. . . . To review claims articulated for the first time on appeal and not raised before the trial court would be nothing more than a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Neff v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, 93 Conn. App. 534, 538 n.6, 889 A.2d 921 (2006). We note that the defendant has not challenged the court's determination of the reasonable rental value of the premises.