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Gasco owns a storage facility where flammable gases are stored in liquified form under high pressure in large spherical tanks. The facility was constructed for Gasco by Acme Company, a firm that specializes in the construction of such facilities. After the facility had been in use for five years, an explosion in the facility started a large fire that blanketed the surrounding countryside with a high concentration of oily smoke and soot. Farber owns a large truck farm near the facility. His entire lettuce crop was destroyed by oil deposits left by the smoke.If Farber asserts a claim against Gasco for the loss of his lettuce crop and is unable to show any negligence on the part of Gasco, will Farber prevail?
[ "Yes, because the operation of the storage facility was an abnormally dangerous activity. ", "Yes, because the intrusion of the smoke onto Farber's farm amounted to a trespass. ", "No, if the explosion was caused by internal corrosion that reasonable inspection procedures would not have disclosed. ", "No, if the explosion was caused by negligent construction on Acme's part." ]
0A
Gasco owns a storage facility where flammable gases are stored in liquified form under high pressure in large spherical tanks. The facility was constructed for Gasco by Acme Company, a firm that specializes in the construction of such facilities. After the facility had been in use for five years, an explosion in the facility started a large fire that blanketed the surrounding countryside with a high concentration of oily smoke and soot. Farber owns a large truck farm near the facility. His entire lettuce crop was destroyed by oil deposits left by the smoke.If Farber asserts a claim against Acme Company for the loss of his lettuce crop, will Farber prevail?
[ "No, if Acme did not design the storage facility. ", "No, because Acme was an independent contractor. ", "Yes, because the operation of the storage facility was an abnormally dangerous activity. ", "Yes, if the explosion resulted from a defect of which Acme was aware" ]
3D
Johnson and Tenniel owned Brownacre as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Johnson executed a mortgage on Brownacre to Lowden in order to secure a loan. Subsequently, but before the indebtedness was paid to Lowden, Johnson died intestate, with Stokes as her only heir at law. The jurisdiction at which Brownacre is located recognizes the title theory of mortgages. In an appropriate action, the court should determine that title to Brownacre is vested
[ "in Tenniel, with the entire interest subject to the mortgage. ", "in Tenniel, free and clear of the mortgage. ", "half in Tenniel, free of the mortgage, and half in Stokes, subject to the mortgage. ", "half in Tenniel and half in Stokes, with both subject to the mortgage" ]
2C
Pursuant to a state statute, Clovis applied for tuition assistance to attend the Institute of Liberal Arts. He was qualified for such assistance in every way except that he was a resident alien who did not intend to become a United States citizen. The state's restriction of such grants to United States citizens or resident aliens seeking such citizenship is probably
[ "valid, because aliens are not per se \"a discrete and insular minority\" specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ", "valid, because the line drawn by the state for extending aid was reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 99 ", "invalid, because the justifications for this restriction are insufficient to overcome the burden imposed on a state when it uses such an alienage classification. ", "invalid, because the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV does not permit such an arbitrary classification" ]
2C
A written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label "Premium VintageBouquet." The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility. "If Vintage refuses to distribute the wine through Claret and Claret then sues Vintage for breach of contract, is it likely that Claret will prevail?
[ "Yes, because Vintage's performance was to run to Claret rather than to Bouquet. ", "Yes, because Bouquet and Vintage could reasonably foresee that Claret would change his position in reliance on the contract. ", "No, because Bouquet and Vintage did not expressly agree that Claret would have enforceable rights under their contract. ", "No, because Bouquet and Vintage, having no apparent motive to benefit Claret, appeared in making the contract to have been protecting or serving only their own interest" ]
3D
A written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label "Premium VintageBouquet." The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility. "For this question only, assume the following facts. Amicusbank lent Bouquet $200,000 and Bouquet executed a written instrument providing that Amicusbank "is entitled to collect the debt from my share of the profits, if any, under the Vintage-Bouquet contract." Amicusbank gave prompt notice of this transaction to Vintage. If Vintage thereafter refuses to account for any profits to Amicusbank and Amicusbank sues Vintage for Bouquet's share of profits then realized, Vintage's strongest argument in defense is that
[ "the Bouquet-Vintage contract did not expressly authorize an assignment of rights.", "Bouquet and Vintage are partners, not simply debtor and creditor. ", "Amicusbank is not an assignee of Bouquet's rights under the BouquetVintage contract.", "Amicusbank is not an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the Bouquet-Vintage contract" ]
2C
A written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label "Premium VintageBouquet." The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility. ""For this question only, assume the following facts. Soon after making its contract with Bouquet, Vintage, without Bouquet's knowledge or assent, sold its vineyards but not its winery to Agribiz, a large agricultural corporation. Under the terms of this sale, Agribiz agreed to sell to Vintage all grapes grown on the land for five years. Agribiz's employees have no experience in wine grape production, and Agribiz has no reputation in the wine industry as a grape producer or otherwise. The Bouquet-Vintage contract was silent on the matter of Vintage's selling any or all of its business assets. If Bouquet seeks an appropriate judicial remedy against Vintage for entering into the VintageAgribiz transaction, is Bouquet likely to prevail?
[ "Yes, because the Vintage-Agribiz transaction created a significant risk of diminishing the profits in which Bouquet would share under his contract with Vintage. ", "Yes, because the Bouquet-Vintage contract did not contain a provision authorizing a delegation of Vintage's duties. ", "No, because Vintage remains in a position to perform under the Bouquet-Vintage contract. ", "No, because Vintage, as a corporation, must necessarily perform its contracts by dlegating duties to individual" ]
0A
Which of the following is most likely to be found to be a strict liability offense?
[ "A city ordinance providing for a fine of not more than $200 for shoplifting.", "A federal statute making it a felony to possess heroin.", "A state statute making it a felony to fail to register a firearm.", "A state statute making the sale of adulterated milk a misdemeanor" ]
3D
Simmons and Boyd entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of Wideacre. The contract provided that "Simmons agrees to convey a good and marketable title to Boyd 60 days from the date of this contract." The purchase price was stated as $60,000. At the time set for closing Simmons tendered a deed in the form agreed to in the contract. Boyd's examination of the record prior to the date of closing had disclosed, however, that the owner of record was not Simmons, but Olson. Further investigation by Boyd revealed that, notwithstanding the state of the record, Simmons had been in what Boyd conceded as adverse possession for 15 years. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. Boyd refuses to pay the purchase price or to take possession "because of the inability of Simmons to transfer a marketable title." In an appropriate action by Simmons against Boyd for specific performance, Simmons will
[ "prevail, because he has obtained a \"good and marketable title\" by adverse possession. ", "prevail, because Simmons' action for specific performance is an action in rem even though Olson is not a party. ", "not prevail, because Boyd cannot be required to buy a lawsuit even if the probability is great that Boyd would prevail against Olson. ", "not prevail, because Simmons' failure to disclose his lack of record title constitutes fraud" ]
2C
When Mary Weld visited Dugan's Alleys to participate in the weekly bowling league competition held there, she brought her twoyear-old son, Bobby, along and left him in a nursery provided by Dugan for the convenience of his customers. The children in the nursery were normally supervised by three attendants, but at this particular time, as Mary Weld knew, there was only one attendant present to care for about 20 children of assorted ages. About 30 minutes later, while the attendant was looking the other way, Bobby suddenly started to cry. The attendant found him lying on his back, picked him up, and called his mother. It was later discovered that Bobby had suffered a skull fracture. If a claim is asserted against Dugan on Bobby's behalf, will Bobby prevail?
[ "Yes, because Dugan owed the child the highest degree of care. ", "Yes, because a tw0-year-old is incapable of contributory negligence. ", "No, unless Dugan or his employees failed to exercise reasonable care to assure Bobby's safety. ", "No, if Mary Weld assumed the risk by leaving Bobby in the nursery" ]
2C
Congress passes an act requiring that all owners of bicycles in the United States register them with a federal bicycle registry. The purpose of the law is to provide reliable evidence of ownership to reduce bicycle theft. No fee is charged for the registration. Although most stolen bicycles are kept or resold by the thieves in the same cities in which the bicycles were stolen, an increasing number of bicycles are being taken to cities in other states for resale. Is this act of Congress constitutional?
[ "Yes, because Congress has the power to regulate property for the general welfare. ", "Yes, because Congress could determine that in inseverable aggregates bicycle thefts affect interstate commerce. ", "No, because most stolen bicycles remain within the state in which they were stolen. ", "No, because the registration of vehicles is a matter reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment" ]
1B
Donaldson broke into Professor Ruiz's office in order to look at examination questions. The questions were locked in a drawer, and Donaldson could not find them. Donaldson believed that looking at examination questions was a crime, but in this belief he was mistaken. Charged with burglary, Donaldson should be
[ "acquitted, because he did not complete the crime and he has not been charged with attempt. ", "acquitted, because what he intended to do when he broke in was not a crime. ", "convicted, because he had the necessary mental state and committed the act of breaking and entering. ", "convicted, because factual impossibility is not a defense" ]
1B
A statute of the state of Lanape flatly bans the sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to minors. Drugs, Inc., a national retailer of drugs and related items, is charged with violating the Lanape statute. Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument Drugs, Inc., could make in defending itself against prosecution for violation of this statute?
[ "The statute constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce.", "The statute denies minors one of their fundamental rights without due process.", "The statute denies Drugs, Inc., a privilege or immunity of state citizenship. ", "The statute violates the First Amendment right to freedom of religion because it regulates morals." ]
1B
In a tort action, Fisher testified against Dawes. Dawes then called Jones, who testified that Fisher had a bad reputation for veracity. Dawes then also called Weld to testify that Fisher once perpetrated a hoax on the police. Weld's testimony is
[ "admissible, provided that the hoax involved untruthfulness. ", "admissible, provided that the hoax resulted in conviction of Fisher. ", "inadmissible, because it is merely cumulative impeachment. ", "inadmissible, because it is extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of misconduc" ]
3D
Astin left her car at Garrison's Garage to have repair work done. After completing the repairs, Garrison took the car out for a test drive and was involved in an accident that caused damages to Placek. A statute imposes liability on the owner of an automobile for injuries to a third party that are caused by the negligence of any person driving the automobile with the owner's consent. The statute applies to situations of this kind, even if the owner did not specifically authorize the mechanic to test drive the car. Placek sued Astin and Garrison jointly for damages arising from the accident. In that action, Astin crossclaims to recover from Garrison the amount of any payment Astin may be required to make to Placek. The trier of fact has determined that the accident was caused solely by negligent driving on Garrison's part, and that Placek's damages were $100,000. In this action, the proper outcome will be that
[ "Placek should have judgment for $50,000 each against Astin and Garrison; Astin should recover nothing from Garrison. ", "Placek should have judgment for $100,000 against Garrison only. ", "Placek should have judgment for $100,000 against Astin and Garrison jointly, and Astin should have judgment against Garrison for 50 percent of any amount collected from Astin by Placek. ", "Placek should have judgment for $100,000 against Astin and Garrison jointly, and Astin should have judgment against Garrison for any amount collected from Astin by Placek." ]
3D
Martinez, a widower, owns in fee simple a ranch, Ranchacre. Martinez has one child, Enrique, who is married. Enrique has one child, Ana Maria, who is also married but has no children. In an effort to dispose of Ranchacre to his descendants and to honor a request by Ana Maria that she be skipped in any disposition, Martinez conveys Ranchacre to his son, Enrique, for life with the remainder to Ana Maria's children in fee simple. What interest, if any, is created in favor of Ana Maria's unborn children at the time of the conveyance?
[ "A contingent remainder.", "A vested remainder subject to divestment.", "A springing use.", "None." ]
0A
On June 1, Kravat, a manufacturer of men's neckties, received the following order from Clothier: "Ship 500 two-inch ties, assorted stripes, your catalogue No. V34. Delivery by July l." On June 1, Kravat shipped 500 three-inch ties that arrived at Clothier's place of business on June 3. Clothier immediately telegraphed Kravat: "Reject your shipment. Order was for two-inch ties." Clothier, however, did not ship the ties back to Kravat. Kravat replied by telegram: "Will deliver proper ties before July 1." Clothier received this telegram on June 4, but did not reply to it. On June 30, Kravat tendered 500 two-inch ties in assorted stripes, designated in his catalogue as item No. V34; but Clothier refused to accept them.Did Clothier properly reject the ties delivered on June 3?
[ "Yes, because the ties were nonconforming goods. ", "Yes, because Kravat did not notify Clothier that the ties were shipped as an accommodation to Clothier. ", "No, because Kravat could accept Clothier's offer by prompt shipment of either conforming or nonconforming goods. ", "No, because Clothier waived his right to reject the ties by not returning them promptly to Kravat." ]
0A
On June 1, Kravat, a manufacturer of men's neckties, received the following order from Clothier: "Ship 500 two-inch ties, assorted stripes, your catalogue No. V34. Delivery by July l." On June 1, Kravat shipped 500 three-inch ties that arrived at Clothier's place of business on June 3. Clothier immediately telegraphed Kravat: "Reject your shipment. Order was for two-inch ties." Clothier, however, did not ship the ties back to Kravat. Kravat replied by telegram: "Will deliver proper ties before July 1." Clothier received this telegram on June 4, but did not reply to it. On June 30, Kravat tendered 500 two-inch ties in assorted stripes, designated in his catalogue as item No. V34; but Clothier refused to accept them.Did Clothier properly reject the ties tendered on June 30?
[ "Yes, because Kravat's shipping the threeinch ties on June 1 was a present breach of contract. ", "Yes, because Kravat's shipping the threeinch ties on June 1 was an anticipatory repudiation. ", "No, because Kravat cured the June 1 defective delivery by his tender of conforming goods on June 30. ", "No, because a contract for the sale of goods can be modified without consideration" ]
2C
Dent, while eating in a restaurant, noticed that a departing customer at the next table had left a five-dollar bill as a tip for the waitress. Dent reached over, picked up the five-dollar bill, and put it in his pocket. As he stood up to leave, another customer who had seen him take the money ran over to him and hit him in the face with her umbrella. Enraged, Dent choked the customer to death. Dent is charged with murder. He requests an instruction allowing the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Dent's request should be
[ "granted, because the jury could find that Dent acted recklessly and not with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. ", "granted, because the jury could find that being hit in the face with an umbrella constitutes adequate provocation. ", "denied, because the evidence shows that Dent intended to kill or to cause serious bodily harm. ", "denied, because the evidence shows that Dent provoked the assault on himself by his criminal misconduct" ]
1B
Dever drove his car into an intersection and collided with a fire engine that had entered the intersection from Dever's right. The accident was caused by negligence on Dever's part. As a result of the accident, the fire engine was delayed in reaching Peters' house, which was entirely consumed by fire. Peters' house was located about ten blocks from the scene of the accident. If Peters asserts a claim against Dever, Peters will recover
[ "the part of his loss that would have been prevented if the collision had not occurred.", "the value of his house before the fire.", "nothing if Dever had nothing to do with causing the fire.", "nothing, because Dever's conduct did not create an apparent danger to Peters" ]
0A
Miller applied to the state liquor board for transfer of the license of Miller's Bar and Grill to a new site. The board held a hearing on the application. At that hearing, Hammond appeared without being subpoenaed and stated that Miller had underworld connections. Although Hammond did not know this information to be true, he had heard rumors about Miller's character and had noticed several underworld figures going in and out of Miller's Bar and Grill. In fact, Miller had no underworld connections. In a claim against Hammond based on defamation, Miller will
[ "not recover if Hammond reasonably believed his statement to be true.", "not recover if the board granted Miller's application.", "recover, because Hammond's statement was false. ", "recover, because Hammond appeared before the board voluntarily" ]
0A
Santos agreed to sell and Perrine agreed to buy a described lot on which a single-family residence had been built. Under the contract, Santos agreed to convey marketable title subject only to conditions, covenants, and restrictions of record and all applicable zoning laws and ordinances. The lot was subject to a 10-foot sideline setback originally set forth in the developer's duly recorded subdivision plot. The applicable zoning ordinance zones the property for single-family units and requires an 8.5-foot sideline setback. Prior to closing, a survey of the property was made. It revealed that a portion of Santos's house was 8.4 feet from the sideline. Perrine refused to consummate the transaction on the ground that Santos's title is not marketable. In an appropriate action, Santos seeks specific performance. Who will prevail in such an action?
[ "Santos, because any suit against Perrine concerning the setback would be frivolous. ", "Santos, because the setback violation falls within the doctrine de minimis non curat lex. ", "Perrine, because any variation, however small, amounts to a breach of contract. ", "Perrine, because the fact that Perrine may be exposed to litigation is sufficient to make the title unmarketable" ]
3D
Young, believing that Brown suffered from arthritis, told her that for $100 he could cure her with a device he had invented. The device was a large box with a series of electric light bulbs along the sides. Brown, after examining the device, agreed to take the treatment, which consisted of placing her hands inside the box for several ten-minute periods. Brown gave Young $100 and went through the treatment. Young is charged with obtaining money by false pretenses. Each of the following, if true, will absolve Young of guilt for obtaining money by false pretenses EXCEPT:
[ "Young honestly believed that the device would cure arthritis, but his belief was unreasonable. ", "Brown honestly believed that the device would cure arthritis, but her belief was unreasonable. ", "Young was playing a practical joke on Brown and intended to return the money.", "Brown was an undercover police officer and did not believe that the device would cure arthritis." ]
1B
Congress enacted a law prohibiting the killing, capture, or removal of any form of wildlife upon or from any federally owned land. Which of the following is the most easily justifiable source of national authority for this federal law?
[ "The commerce clause of Article I, § 8. ", "The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.", "The enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "The property clause of Article IV, § 3" ]
3D
David is being tried in federal court for criminal conspiracy with John to violate federal narcotics law. At trial, the prosecutor calls David's new wife, Wanda, and asks her to testify about a meeting between David and John that she observed before she married David. Which of the following is the most accurate statement of the applicable rule concerning whether Wanda may testify?
[ "The choice is Wanda's.", "The choice is David's.", "Wanda is permitted to testify only if both Wanda and David agree.", "Wanda is compelled to testify even if both Wanda and David objec" ]
0A
Opus, the owner of Stoneacre, entered into a written agreement with Miner. Under this written agreement, which was acknowledged and duly recorded, Miner, for a five-year period, was given the privilege to enter on Stoneacre to remove sand, gravel, and stone in whatever quantities Miner desired. Miner was to make monthly payments to Opus on the basis of the amount of sand, gravel, and stone removed during the previous month. Under the terms of the agreement, Miner's privilege was exclusive against all others except Opus, who reserved the right to use Stoneacre to any purpose whatsoever, including the removal of sand, gravel, and stone. One year after the agreement was entered into, the state brought a condemnation action to take Stoneacre for a highway interchange. In the condemnation action, is Miner entitled to compensation?
[ "Yes, because he has a license, which is a property right protected by the due process clause. ", "Yes, because he has a profit à prendre, which is a property right protected by the due process clause. ", "No, because he has a license, and licenses are not property rights protected by the due process clause. ", "No, because he has a profit à prendre, which is not a property right protected by the due process clause." ]
1B
Dan was an alcoholic who frequently experienced auditory hallucinations that commanded him to engage in bizarre and sometimes violent behavior. He generally obeyed these commands. The hallucinations appeared more frequently when he was intoxicated, but he sometimes experienced them when he had not been drinking. After Dan had been drinking continuously for a three-day period, an elderly woman began to reproach him about his drunken condition, slapping him on the face and shoulders as she did so. Dan believed that he was being unmercifully attacked and heard the hallucinatory voice telling him to strangle his assailant. He did so, and the woman died. If Dan is charged with second-degree murder, Dan's best chance of acquittal would be to rely on a defense of
[ "intoxication.", "lack of malice aforethought.", "self-defense.", "insanity" ]
3D
Mater, a wealthy widow, wishing to make a substantial and potentially enduring gift to her beloved adult stepson Prodigal, established with Vault Savings and Loan Association a passbook savings account by an initial deposit of $10,000.For this question only, assume the following facts. The passbook was issued solely in Prodigal's name; but Mater retained possession of it and Prodigal was not then informed of the savings account. Subsequently, Mater became disgusted with Prodigal's behavior and decided to give the same savings account solely to her beloved adult daughter Distaff. As permitted by the rules of Vault Savings and Loan, Mater effected this change by agreement with Vault. This time she left possession of the passbook with Vault. Shortly thereafter, Prodigal learned of the original savings account in his name and the subsequent switch to Distaff's name. If Prodigal now sues Vault Savings and Loan for $10,000 plus accrued interest, will the action succeed?
[ "Yes, because Prodigal was a third-party intended beneficiary of the original MaterVault deposit agreement. ", "Yes, because Prodigal was a constructive assignee of Mater's claim, as depositor, to the savings account. ", "No, because Prodigal never obtained possession of the passbook. ", "No, because Prodigal's right, if any, to the funds on deposit was effectively abrogated by the second Mater-Vault deposit agreement" ]
3D
Mater, a wealthy widow, wishing to make a substantial and potentially enduring gift to her beloved adult stepson Prodigal, established with Vault Savings and Loan Association a passbook savings account by an initial deposit of $10,000."For this question only, assume the following facts. The passbook was issued by Vault to Mater solely in her own name. That same day, disinterested witnesses being present, she handed the passbook to Prodigal and said, "As a token of my love and affection for you, I give you this $10,000 savings account." Shortly thereafter, she changed her mind and wrote Prodigal, "I hereby revoke my gift to you of the $10,000 savings account with Vault Savings and Loan Association. Please return my passbook immediately. Signed: Mater." Prodigal received the letter but ignored it, and Mater died unexpectedly a few days later. In litigation between Prodigal and Mater's estate, which of the following is a correct statement of the parties' rights with respect to the money on deposit with Vault?
[ "The estate prevails, because Mater's gift to Prodigal was revocable and was terminated by her death. ", "The estate prevails, because Mater's gift to Prodigal was revocable and was terminated by her express revocation. ", "Prodigal prevails, because he took Mater's claim to the savings account by a gratuitous but effective and irrevocable assignment from Mater. ", "Prodigal prevails, because his failure to reject the gift, even if the assignment was revocable, created an estoppel against Mater and her estate" ]
2C
In a civil suit by Pine against Decker, Decker called Wall, a chemist, as an expert witness and asked him a number of questions about his education and experience in chemistry. Over Pine's objection that Wall was not shown to be qualified in chemistry, the trial court permitted Wall to testify as to his opinion in response to a hypothetical question. On cross-examination, Pine asked Wall if he had failed two chemistry courses while doing his graduate work. The answer should be
[ "admitted, because it is relevant to the weight to be given to Wall's testimony. ", "admitted, because specific acts bearing on truthfulness may be inquired about on cross-examination. ", "excluded, because the court has determined that Wall is qualified to testify as an expert. ", "excluded, because Wall's character has not been put in issue" ]
0A
Congress enacts a law providing that all disagreements between the United States and a state over federal grant-in-aid funds shall be settled by the filing of a suit in the federal district court in the affected state. "The judgment of that federal court shall be transmitted to the head of the federal agency dispensing such funds who, if satisfied that the judgment is fair and lawful, shall execute the judgment according to its terms." This law is
[ "constitutional, because disagreements over federal grant-in-aid funds necessarily involve federal questions within the judicial power of the United States. ", "constitutional, because the spending of federal monies necessarily includes the authority to provide for the effective settlement of disputes involving them. ", "unconstitutional, because it vests authority in the federal court to determine a matter prohibited to it by the Eleventh Amendment. ", "unconstitutional, because it vests authority in a federal court to render an advisory opinion" ]
3D
Purvis purchased a used car from Daley, a used car dealer. Knowing that they were false, Daley made the following statements to Purvis prior to the sale: Statement 1. This car has never been involved in an accident. Statement 2. This car gets 25 miles to the gallon on the open highway. Statement 3. This is as smooth-riding a car as you can get. If Purvis asserts a claim against Daley based on deceit, which of the false statements made by Daley would support Purvis' claim?
[ "Statement 1 only.", "Statement 2 only.", "Statements 1 and 2 only.", "Statements 2 and 3 onl" ]
2C
In a contract suit by Perez against Drake, each of the following is an accepted method of authenticating Drake's signature on a document offered by Perez EXCEPT:
[ "A non-expert who, in preparation for trial, has familiarized himself with Drake's usual signature testifies that, in his opinion, the questioned signature is genuine. ", "The jury, without the assistance of an expert, compares the questioned signature with an admittedly authentic sample of Drake's handwriting. ", "A witness offers proof that the signature is on a document that has been in existence for at least 20 years, that was in a place where it would be if it was authentic, and that has no suspicious circumstances surrounding it ", "A witness testifies that Drake admitted that the signature is his." ]
0A
For a valuable consideration, Amato, the owner of Riveracre, signed and gave to Barton a duly executed instrument that provided as follows: "The grantor may or may not sell Riveracre during her lifetime, but at her death, or if she earlier decides to sell, the property will be offered to Barton at $500 per acre. Barton shall exercise this right, if at all, within 60 days of receipt of said offer to sell." Barton recorded the instrument. The instrument was not valid as a will. Is Barton's right under the instrument valid?
[ "Yes, because the instrument is recorded. ", "Yes, because Barton's right to purchase will vest or fail within the period prescribed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. ", "No, because Barton's right to purchase is a restraint on the owner's power to make a testamentary disposition. ", "No, because Barton's right to purchase is an unreasonable restraint on alienation" ]
1B
James and Mary Green were walking to their car one evening after having seen a movie. As they were passing a dark alleyway, Daves leaped out brandishing a gun. He pushed Mary against the wall of a nearby building, held the gun to her head, and demanded money from James. James handed over his cash. Daves grabbed the cash and ran away. Which of the following, listed in descending order of seriousness, is the most serious crime for which Daves may be convicted?
[ "Robbery from James Green.", "Larceny from James Green.", "Assault on James and Mary Green.", "Assault on Mary Green" ]
0A
Dunbar and Balcom went into a drugstore, where Dunbar reached into the cash register and took out $200. Stone, the owner of the store, came out of a back room, saw what had happened, and told Dunbar to put the money back. Balcom then took a revolver from under his coat and shot and killed Stone. Dunbar claims that Stone owed her $200 and that she went to the drugstore to try to collect the debt. She said that she asked Balcom to come along just in case Stone made trouble but that she did not plan on using any force and did not know that Balcom was armed. If Dunbar is prosecuted for murder on the basis of felony murder and the jury believes her claim, she should be found
[ "guilty, because her companion, Balcom, committed a homicide in the course of a felony. ", "guilty, because her taking Balcom with her to the store created the risk of death that occurred during the commission of a felony. ", "not guilty, because she did not know that Balcom was armed and thus did not have the required mental state for felony murder. ", "not guilty, because she believed she was entitled to the money and thus did not intend to steal" ]
3D
Dunbar and Balcom went into a drugstore, where Dunbar reached into the cash register and took out $200. Stone, the owner of the store, came out of a back room, saw what had happened, and told Dunbar to put the money back. Balcom then took a revolver from under his coat and shot and killed Stone. Dunbar claims that Stone owed her $200 and that she went to the drugstore to try to collect the debt. She said that she asked Balcom to come along just in case Stone made trouble but that she did not plan on using any force and did not know that Balcom was armed. If Dunbar is prosecuted for murder on the basis of being an accessory to Balcom in committing a murder and the jury believes her claim, she should be found
[ "guilty, because in firing the shot Balcom was trying to help her. ", "guilty, because she and Balcom were acting in concert in a dangerous undertaking. ", "not guilty, because she had no idea that Balcom was armed and she did not plan to use force. ", "not guilty, because she was exercising selfhelp and did not intend to steal. " ]
2C
The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, "when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government." Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?
[ "Suit dismissed, because Dunn does not have standing to bring this action. ", "Suit dismissed, because there is no adversity between Dunn and the defendants. ", "Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question. ", "Suit decided on the merits" ]
2C
Acorp and Beeco are companies that each manufacture pesticide X. Their plants are located along the same river. During a specific 24-hour period, each plant discharged pesticide into the river. Both plants were operated negligently and such negligence caused the discharge of the pesticide into the river. Landesmann operated a cattle ranch downstream from the plants of Acorp and Beeco. Landesmann's cattle drank from the river and were poisoned by the pesticide. The amount of the discharge from either plant alone would not have been sufficient to cause any harm to Landesmann's cattle. If Landesmann asserts a claim against Acorp and Beeco, what, if anything, will Landesmann recover?
[ "Nothing, because neither company discharged enough pesticide to cause harm to Landesmann's cattle. ", "Nothing, unless Landesmann can establish how much pesticide each plant discharged. ", "One-half of Landesmann's damages from each company.", "The entire amount of Landesmann's damages, jointly and severally, from the two companies" ]
3D
Paulsen sued Daly for nonpayment of a personal loan to Daly, as evidenced by Daly's promissory note to Paulsen. Paulsen called Walters to testify that he knows Daly's handwriting and that the signature on the note is Daly's. On direct examination, to identify himself, Walters gave his name and address and testified that he had been employed by a roofing company for seven years. During presentation of Daly's case, Daly called Wilson to testify that she is the roofing company's personnel manager and that she had determined, by examining the company's employment records, that Walters had worked there only three years. The trial judge should rule that Wilson's testimony is
[ "inadmissible, because it is not the best evidence. ", "inadmissible, because it is impeachment on a collateral question. ", "admissible as evidence of a regularly conducted activity.", "admissible as tending to impeach Walters' credibility" ]
1B
Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is
[ "nothing.", "a valid executory interest.", "a possibility of reverter.", "a right of entry for condition broken" ]
0A
Cycle Company manufactured a bicycle that it sold to Bike Shop, a retail bicycle dealer, which in turn sold it to Roth. Shortly thereafter, while Roth was riding the bicycle along a city street, he saw a traffic light facing him turn from green to yellow. He sped up, hoping to cross the intersection before the light turned red. However, Roth quickly realized that he could not do so and applied the brake, which failed. To avoid the traffic that was then crossing in front of him, Roth turned sharply to his right and onto the sidewalk, where he struck Perez, a pedestrian. Both Perez and Roth sustained injuries."If Roth asserts a claim against Bike Shop based on strict liability in tort, will Roth prevail?
[ "Yes, if the brake failed because of a defect present when the bicycle left the factory of Cycle Company. ", "Yes, because the brake failed while Roth was riding the bicycle. ", "No, if Roth contributed to his own injury by speeding up. ", "No, if Bike Shop carefully inspected the bicycle before selling it. " ]
0A
Cycle Company manufactured a bicycle that it sold to Bike Shop, a retail bicycle dealer, which in turn sold it to Roth. Shortly thereafter, while Roth was riding the bicycle along a city street, he saw a traffic light facing him turn from green to yellow. He sped up, hoping to cross the intersection before the light turned red. However, Roth quickly realized that he could not do so and applied the brake, which failed. To avoid the traffic that was then crossing in front of him, Roth turned sharply to his right and onto the sidewalk, where he struck Perez, a pedestrian. Both Perez and Roth sustained injuries.""If Perez asserts a claim based on negligence against Cycle Company and if it is found that the brake failure resulted from a manufacturing defect in the bicycle, will Perez prevail?
[ "Yes, because Cycle Company placed a defective bicycle into the stream of commerce. ", "Yes, if the defect could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care by Cycle Company. ", "No, because Perez was not a purchaser of the bicycle. ", "No, if Roth was negligent in turning onto the sidewalk" ]
1B
Damson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is
[ "guilty of burglary and larceny.", "guilty of burglary and attempted larceny.", "guilty of burglary but not guilty of any larceny offense.", "not guilty of burglary or any larceny offense" ]
0A
On October 1, Toy Store, Inc., entered into a written contract with Fido Factory, Inc., for the purchase at $20 per unit of 1,000 mechanical dogs, to be specially manufactured by Fido according to Toy Store's specifications. Fido promised to deliver all of the dogs "not later than November 15, for the Yule shopping season," and Toy Store promised to pay the full $20,000 price upon delivery. In order to obtain operating funds, Fido as borrower entered into a written loan agreement on October 5 with the High Finance Company. In relevant part, this agreement recited, "Fido Factory hereby transfers and assigns to High Finance its (Fido Factory's) October 1 mechanical dog contract with Toy Store, as security for a 50-day loan of $15,000, the advance and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged by Fido Factory." No copy of this agreement, or statement relating to it, was filed in an office of public record. On October 15, Fido notified Toy Store, "We regret to advise that our master shaft burned out last night because our night supervisor let the lubricant level get too low. We have just fired the supervisor, but the shaft cannot be repaired or replaced until about January 1. We can guarantee delivery of your order, however, not later than January 20." Toy Store rejected this proposal as unacceptable and immediately contracted with the only other available manufacturer to obtain the 1,000 dogs at $30 per unit by November 15. "For this question only, assume that on November 1, Toy Store sues Fido for damages and alleges the above facts, except those relating to the Fido-High Finance loan agreement. Upon Fido's motion to dismiss the complaint, the court should
[ "sustain the motion, because Fido on October 15 stated its willingness, and gave assurance of its ability, to perform the contract in January. ", "sustain the motion, because Toy Store's lawsuit is premature in any case until after November 15. ", "deny the motion, because Toy Store's complaint alleges an actionable tort by Fido. ", "deny the motion, because Toy Store's complaint alleges an actionable breach of contract by Fido." ]
3D
On October 1, Toy Store, Inc., entered into a written contract with Fido Factory, Inc., for the purchase at $20 per unit of 1,000 mechanical dogs, to be specially manufactured by Fido according to Toy Store's specifications. Fido promised to deliver all of the dogs "not later than November 15, for the Yule shopping season," and Toy Store promised to pay the full $20,000 price upon delivery. In order to obtain operating funds, Fido as borrower entered into a written loan agreement on October 5 with the High Finance Company. In relevant part, this agreement recited, "Fido Factory hereby transfers and assigns to High Finance its (Fido Factory's) October 1 mechanical dog contract with Toy Store, as security for a 50-day loan of $15,000, the advance and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged by Fido Factory." No copy of this agreement, or statement relating to it, was filed in an office of public record. On October 15, Fido notified Toy Store, "We regret to advise that our master shaft burned out last night because our night supervisor let the lubricant level get too low. We have just fired the supervisor, but the shaft cannot be repaired or replaced until about January 1. We can guarantee delivery of your order, however, not later than January 20." Toy Store rejected this proposal as unacceptable and immediately contracted with the only other available manufacturer to obtain the 1,000 dogs at $30 per unit by November 15. ". For this question only, assume that by November 16, Fido, without legal excuse, has delivered no dogs, and that Toy Store has brought an action against Fido. In an action brought on November 16 by Toy Store against High Finance Company on account of Fido's default, Toy Store can recover
[ "nothing, because the October 5 assignment by Fido to High Finance of Fido's contract with Toy Store was only an assignment for security. ", "nothing, because no record of the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance was publicly filed. ", "$10,000 in damages, because Toy Store was a third-party intended beneficiary of the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance. ", "$10,000 in damages, because the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance effected, with respect to Toy Store as creditor, a novation of debtors." ]
0A
A 10-lot subdivision was approved by the proper governmental authority. The authority's action was pursuant to a map filed by Diaz, which included an undesignated parcel in addition to the 10 numbered lots. The undesignated parcel is differently shaped and somewhat larger than any one of the numbered lots. Subdivision building restrictions were imposed on "all the lots shown on said map." Diaz contracts to sell the unnumbered lot, described by metes and bounds, to Butts. Is title to the parcel marketable?
[ "Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not a lot to which the subdivision building restrictions apply. ", "Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not part of the subdivision. ", "No, because the undesignated parcel has never been approved by the proper governmental authority. ", "No, because the map leaves it uncertain as to whether the unnumbered lot is subject to the building restrictions." ]
3D
A state statute requires the permanent removal from parental custody of any child who has suffered "child abuse." That term is defined to include "corporal punishment of any sort." Zeller very gently spanks his six-year-old son on the buttocks whenever he believes that spanking is necessary to enforce discipline on him. Such a spanking occurs not more than once a month and has never physically harmed the child. The state files suit under the statute to terminate Zeller's parental rights solely because of these spankings. Zeller defends only on the ground that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to his admitted conduct. In light of the nature of the rights involved, which of the following is the most probable burden of persuasion on this constitutional issue?
[ "The state has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to Zeller is necessary to vindicate an important state interest.", "The state has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to Zeller is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.", "Zeller has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to him is not necessary to vindicate an important state interest.", "Zeller has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to him is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest." ]
0A
According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?
[ "Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.", "The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.", "Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot. ", "The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters." ]
1B
In March, when Ohm was 17, Stereo delivered to Ohm a television set. At that time Ohm agreed in writing to pay $400 for the set on July 1 when he would reach his 18th birthday. Eighteen is the applicable statutory age of majority, and on that date Ohm was to receive the proceeds of a trust. On July 1, when the reasonable value of the television set was $250, Ohm sent Stereo a signed letter stating, "I'll only pay you $300; that is all the set is worth." In an action against Ohm for money damages on July 2, what is the maximum amount that Stereo will be entitled to recover?
[ "Nothing", "$250, the reasonable value of the set ", "$300, the amount Ohm promised to pay in his letter of July 1 ", "$400, the original sale price" ]
2C
Dray was prosecuted for bank robbery. At trial, the bank teller, Wall, was unable to identify Dray, now bearded, as the bank robber. The prosecutor then showed Wall a group of photographs, and Wall testified that she had previously told the prosecutor that the middle picture (concededly a picture of Dray before he grew a beard) was a picture of the bank robber. Wall's testimony is
[ "inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception. ", "inadmissible, because it is a violation of Dray's right of confrontation. ", "admissible as prior identification by the witness.", "admissible as past recollection recorded" ]
2C
Which of the following is LEAST likely to be the underlying felony in a prosecution for felony murder?
[ "Arson.", "Manslaughter.", "Attempted rape.", "Burglary" ]
1B
Morris was driving north on an interstate highway at about 50 miles per hour when a tractor-trailer rig, owned and driven by Dixon, passed her. The tractor was pulling a refrigerated meat trailer fully loaded with beef carcasses hanging freely from the trailer ceiling. When Dixon cut back in front of Morris, the shifting weight of the beef caused the trailer to overturn. Morris was unable to avoid a collision with the overturned trailer and was injured. The trailer had been manufactured by Trailco. A number of truckers had complained to Trailco that the design of the trailer, which allowed the load to swing freely, was dangerous. Dixon knew of the dangerous propensity of the trailer. A restraining device that could be installed in the trailer would prevent the load from shifting and was available at nominal cost. Dixon knew of the restraining device but had not installed it"If Morris asserts a claim based on strict liability tort against Trailco, she will
[ "recover unless Morris was negligently driving when the truck overturned.", "recover, because Dixon's knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the trailer does not relieve Trailco of liability. ", "not recover, because there was no privity of contract between Morris and Trailco. ", "not recover if Dixon was negligent in failing to install the restraining device in the trailer" ]
1B
Morris was driving north on an interstate highway at about 50 miles per hour when a tractor-trailer rig, owned and driven by Dixon, passed her. The tractor was pulling a refrigerated meat trailer fully loaded with beef carcasses hanging freely from the trailer ceiling. When Dixon cut back in front of Morris, the shifting weight of the beef caused the trailer to overturn. Morris was unable to avoid a collision with the overturned trailer and was injured. The trailer had been manufactured by Trailco. A number of truckers had complained to Trailco that the design of the trailer, which allowed the load to swing freely, was dangerous. Dixon knew of the dangerous propensity of the trailer. A restraining device that could be installed in the trailer would prevent the load from shifting and was available at nominal cost. Dixon knew of the restraining device but had not installed it"If Morris asserts a claim for her injuries against Dixon, she will
[ "prevail if the use of a restraining device would have prevented the trailer from overturning.", "prevail, because Dixon is strictly liable to Morris for injuries resulting from defects in the trailer. ", "not prevail unless Dixon was driving in a negligent manner at the time Morris was injured.", "not prevail, because Dixon was not the manufacturer or seller of the trailer" ]
0A
Fernwood Realty Company developed a residential development, known as the Fernwood Development, which included single-family dwellings, townhouses, and high-rise apartments for a total of 25,000 dwelling units. Included in the deed to each unit was a covenant under which the grantee and the grantee's "heirs and assigns" agreed to purchase electrical power from only a plant Fernwood promised to build and maintain within the development. Fernwood constructed the plant and the necessary power 111 lines. The plant did not supply power outside the development. An appropriate and fair formula was used to determine price. After constructing and selling 12,500 of the units, Fernwood sold its interest in the development to Gaint Realty Investors. Gaint operated the power plant and constructed and sold the remaining 12,500 units. Each conveyance from Gaint contained the same covenant relating to electrical power that Fernwood had included in the 12,500 conveyances it had made. Page bought a dwelling unit from Olm, who had purchased it from Fernwood. Subsequently, Page, whose lot was along the boundary of the Fernwood Development, ceased buying electrical power from Gaint and began purchasing power from General Power Company, which provided such service in the area surrounding the Fernwood Development. Both General Power and Gaint have governmental authorization to provide electrical services to the area. Gaint instituted an appropriate action against Page to enjoin her from obtaining electrical power from General Power. If judgment is for Page, it most likely will be because
[ "the covenant does not touch and concern the land.", "the mixture of types of residential units is viewed as preventing one common development scheme.", "the covenant is a restraint on alienation.", "there is no privity of estate between Page and Gaint" ]
0A
Congress passes an Energy Conservation Act. The act requires all users of energy in this country to reduce their consumption by a specified percentage, to be set by a presidential executive order. The act sets forth specific standards the President must use in setting the percentage and detailed procedures to be followed. The provision that allows the President to set the exact percentage is probably
[ "constitutional, because it creates a limited administrative power to implement the statute. ", "constitutional, because inherent executive powers permit such action even without statutory authorization. ", "unconstitutional as an undue delegation of legislative power to the executive.", "unconstitutional, because it violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." ]
0A
Ortega owned Blackacre in fee simple and by his will specifically devised Blackacre as follows: "To my daughter, Eugenia, her heirs and assigns, but if Eugenia dies survived by a husband and a child or children, then to Eugenia's husband during his lifetime with remainder to Eugenia's children, their heirs and assigns. Specifically provided, however, that if Eugenia dies survived by a husband and no child, Blackacre is specifically devised to my nephew, Luis, his heirs and assigns." While Ortega's will was in probate, Luis quitclaimed all interest in Blackacre to Eugenia's husband, José. Three years later, Eugenia died, survived by José but no children. Eugenia left a will devising her interest in Blackacre to José. The only applicable statute provides that any interest in land is freely alienable. Luis instituted an appropriate action against José to establish title to Blackacre. Judgment should be for
[ "Luis, because his quitclaim deed did not transfer his after-acquired title. ", "Luis, because José took nothing under Ortega's will. ", "José, because Luis had effectively conveyed his interest to José. ", "José, because the doctrine of after-acquired title applies to a devise by will" ]
2C
Duncan was charged with aggravated assault. At trial Duncan did not testify; however, he sought to offer opinion evidence of his good character for truth and veracity. This testimony should be
[ "admitted, because a criminal defendant is entitled to offer evidence of his good character. ", "admitted, because a party's credibility is necessarily in issue. ", "excluded, because character is not admissible to prove conduct in conformity therewith. ", "excluded, because it is evidence of a trait not pertinent to the case." ]
3D
Alford was a suspect in a homicide committed during a robbery of a liquor store. Barber was a friend of Alford. Police telephoned Barber and asked if he would help locate Alford. Barber agreed and met the police officers at headquarters later that night. After a discussion during which police asked questions about Alford and the homicide, Barber said that he wanted to get something "off his chest" and advised the officers that he was in on the robbery but that Alford had shot the owner of the store without his permission or prior knowledge. The officers then for the first time gave Barber his Miranda warnings. Barber was indicted for felony murder. He moved to prevent the introduction of his statement into evidence. His motion should be
[ "granted, because Barber was effectively in custody and entitled to receive Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion. ", "granted, because Barber's rights to counsel and to due process were violated by the interrogation at police headquarters. ", "denied, because his statement was freely and voluntarily given and he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. ", "denied, because by visiting headquarters voluntarily, Barber waived his right to receive Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion" ]
2C
The federal government has complete jurisdiction over certain parkland located within the state of Plains. To conserve the wildlife that inhabits that land, the federal government enacts a statute forbidding all hunting of animals in the federal park. That statute also forbids the hunting of animals that have left the federal park and have entered the state of Plains. Hanson has a hunting license from the state of Plains authorizing him to hunt deer anywhere in the state. On land within the state of Plains located adjacent to the federal park, Hanson shoots a deer he knows has recently left the federal land. Hanson is prosecuted for violating the federal hunting law. The strongest ground supporting the constitutionality of the federal law forbidding the hunting of wild animals that wander off federal property is that
[ "this law is a necessary and proper means of protecting United States property.", "the animals are moving in the stream of interstate commerce.", "the police powers of the federal government encompass protection of wild animals.", "shooting wild animals is a privilege, not a right" ]
0A
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth."If Poe asserts a claim based on defamation against Kane, will Poe prevail?
[ "Yes, if Kane's remarks were heard by any of Poe's neighbors. ", "Yes, because Kane's conduct was extreme and outrageous. ", "No, unless Kane knew that Poe owed no money to Store. ", "No, unless Poe suffered some special damage" ]
3D
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth.""If Poe asserts a claim based on intentional . If Poe asserts a claim based on intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kane, will Poe prevail?
[ "Yes, because Kane's conduct was extreme and outrageous. ", "Yes, because Kane was intruding on Poe's property. ", "No, unless Poe suffered physical harm. ", "No, if Poe still owed Store for the merchandise." ]
0A
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth."If Kane asserts a claim of battery against Poe, will Kane prevail?
[ "Yes, because Poe had not first asked Kane to leave the property. ", "Yes, if Poe knew that the door was substantially certain to strike the bullhorn. ", "No, if Kane's conduct triggered Poe's response. ", "No, because Kane was an intruder on Poe's propert" ]
1B
Eureka, Inc., inventor of the LBVC, a laser-beam vegetable chopper, ran a television ad that described the chopper and said, "The LBVC is yours for only $49.99 if you send your check or money order to Box 007, Greenville. Not available in stores." Gourmet, who owned a retail specialty shop, wrote Eureka, "What's your best firm price for two dozen LBVCs?" Eureka sent a written reply that said in its entirety, "We quote you for prompt acceptance $39.99 per unit for 24 LBVCs." Gourmet subsequently mailed a check to Eureka in the appropriate amount, with a memo enclosed saying, "I accept your offer for 24 LBVCs."A contract would arise from these communications only if
[ "both parties were merchants.", "Eureka had at least 24 LBVCs in stock when Gourmet's check and memo were received.", "Gourmet's check and memo were mailed within three months after his receipt of Eureka's letter.", "Gourmet's check and memo were mailed within a reasonable time after his receipt of Eureka's letter." ]
3D
Eureka, Inc., inventor of the LBVC, a laser-beam vegetable chopper, ran a television ad that described the chopper and said, "The LBVC is yours for only $49.99 if you send your check or money order to Box 007, Greenville. Not available in stores." Gourmet, who owned a retail specialty shop, wrote Eureka, "What's your best firm price for two dozen LBVCs?" Eureka sent a written reply that said in its entirety, "We quote you for prompt acceptance $39.99 per unit for 24 LBVCs." Gourmet subsequently mailed a check to Eureka in the appropriate amount, with a memo enclosed saying, "I accept your offer for 24 LBVCs."For this question only, assume the following facts: Eureka shipped 24 LBVCs to Gourmet after receiving his check and memo, and with the shipment sent Gourmet an invoice that conspicuously stated, among other things, the following lawful provision: "These items shall not be offered for resale at retail." Gourmet received and read but disregarded the invoice restriction and displayed the 24 LBVCs for resale. Eureka has a cause of action against Gourmet for breach of contract only if
[ "Eureka, as inventor of the LBVC, was not a merchant. ", "the invoice restriction was a material alteration of preexisting terms.", "Eureka's written reply that quoted $39.99 per LBVC but did not contain a restriction on retail sales, was not an offer that Gourmet accepted by ordering 24 LBVCs. ", "Gourmet was consciously aware when taking delivery of the goods that the television ad had said, \"Not available in stores." ]
2C
Downs was indicted in state court for bribing a public official. During the course of the investigation, police had demanded and received from Downs's bank the records of Downs's checking account for the preceding two years. The records contained incriminating evidence. On the basis of a claim of violation of his constitutional rights, Downs moves to prevent the introduction of the records in evidence. His motion should be
[ "granted, because a search warrant should have been secured for seizure of the records. ", "granted, because the records covered such an extensive period of time that their seizure unreasonably invaded Downs's right of privacy. ", "denied, because the potential destructibility of the records, coupled with the public interest in proper enforcement of the criminal laws, created an exigent situation justifying the seizure. ", "denied, because the records were business records of the bank in which Downs had no legitimate expectation of privacy" ]
3D
Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids these activities in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, "Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it." Snipe traps cost about $15 each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply.""For this question only, assume that Prentis demonstrates that common carriers are permitted to transport snipe traps as cargo across Midland for delivery to another state and that in practice the Midland statute is enforced only against private individuals transporting those traps in private vehicles. If Prentis challenges the application of the Midland statute to her on the basis only of a denial of equal protection, the application of the statute will probably be found
[ "constitutional, because the traps constitute contraband in which Prentis could have no protected property interest. ", "constitutional, because there is a rational basis for differentiating between the possession of snipe traps as interstate cargo by common carriers and the possession of snipe traps by private individuals. ", "unconstitutional, because the state cannot demonstrate a compelling public purpose for making this differentiation between common carriers and such private individuals. ", "unconstitutional, because interstate travel is a fundamental right that may not be burdened by state law" ]
1B
Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids these activities in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, "Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it." Snipe traps cost about $15 each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply.""For this question only, assume that a valid federal administrative rule, adopted under a federal consumer product safety act, regulates the design of snipe traps. The rule was issued to prevent traps from causing injury to human beings, e.g., by pinching fingers while persons were setting the traps. No other federal law applies. Which of the following best states the effect of the federal rule on the Midland state statute?
[ "The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule regulates the same subject matter: snipe traps. ", "The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule does not contain affirmative authorization for continued state regulation. ", "The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the Midland state statute regulates wild animals, a field of exclusive state power. ", "The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the purposes of the federal rule and the Midland state statute are different." ]
3D
Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 yearsAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in
[ "Hull.", "Orris.", "Burns.", "Powell" ]
0A
Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 yearsAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to the earthen dam was in
[ "the person who then held title to Brownacre in fee simple.", "Burns, as purchaser of the dam under the bill of sale. ", "the person who then owned the water rights as an incident thereto.", "Hull, as the builder of the dam" ]
0A
An issue in Parker's action against Daves for causing Parker's back injury was whether Parker's condition had resulted principally from a similar occurrence five years before, with which Daves had no connection. Parker called Watts, his treating physician, who offered to testify that when she saw Parker after the latest occurrence, Parker told her that before the accident he had been working full time, without pain or limitation of motion, in a job that involved lifting heavy boxes. Watts's testimony should be
[ "admitted, because it is a statement of Parker's then existing physical condition. ", "admitted, because it is a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. ", "excluded, because it is hearsay, not within any exception. ", "excluded, because Parker is available as a witness" ]
1B
West, a witness in a contract case, testified on direct examination that four people attended a meeting. When asked to identify them, she gave the names of three but despite trying was unable to remember the name of the fourth person. The attorney who called her as a witness seeks to show her his handwritten notes of the part of his pretrial interview with her in which she provided all four names. The trial court is likely to consider the showing of the notes taken as
[ "a proper attempt to introduce recorded recollection.", "a proper attempt to refresh West's recollection.", "an improper attempt to lead the witness.", "an improper attempt to support West's credibility" ]
1B
While hospitalized, Marsh asked her attorney to draw a deed conveying her home to her son, Simon. While Marsh remained in the hospital, the deed was drawn, properly executed, and promptly and properly recorded. On being informed of the existence of the deed, Simon told his mother, "I want no part of the property; take the deed right back." Marsh recovered and left the hospital, but shortly thereafter, before any other relevant event, Simon died intestate. Marsh brought an appropriate action against Simon's heirs to determine title. If Marsh wins, it will be because
[ "the court will impose a constructive trust to carry out the intent of the deceased son.", "the presumption of delivery arising from the recording is not valid unless the grantee has knowledge at the time of the recording.", "Simon's declaration was a constructive reconveyance of the land.", "there was no effective acceptance of delivery of the deed." ]
3D
Plummer, a well-known politician, was scheduled to address a large crowd at a political dinner. Just as he was about to sit down at the head table, Devon pushed Plummer's chair to one side. As a result, Plummer fell to the floor. Plummer was embarrassed at being made to look foolish before a large audience but suffered no physical harm. If Plummer asserts a claim against Devon for damages because of his embarrassment, will Plummer prevail?
[ "Yes, if Devon knew that Plummer was about to sit on the chair. ", "Yes, if Devon negligently failed to notice that Plummer was about to sit on the chair. ", "No, because Plummer suffered no physical harm along with his embarrassment. ", "No, if in moving the chair Devon intended only a good-natured practical joke on Plummer" ]
0A
In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $25,000 to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly, and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, "all of my rights and duties under my design and construction supervision contract with Threedee." Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability."For this question only, assume that Threedee, on learning of the assignment, refused to allow Drafty to proceed as architect and brought an action against Plannah to compel him to resume and complete performance of the contract. Is Threedee entitled to such relief?
[ "Yes, because Plannah's services under the contract are unique. ", "Yes, because Plannah has personally completed two-thirds of the design work. ", "No, because the Plannah-Threedee contract is one for personal services by Plannah. ", "No, because Plannah effectively delegated his remaining duties under the PlannahThreedee contract to Draft" ]
2C
In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $25,000 to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly, and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, "all of my rights and duties under my design and construction supervision contract with Threedee." Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability."". For this question only, assume that Threedee allowed Drafty to proceed with the design work but that Drafty without legal excuse abandoned the project shortly after construction began. Which of the following legal conclusions are correct? I. Plannah is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. II. Drafty is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. III. Threedee is indebted to Drafty, on a divisible contract theory, for a prorated portion of the agreed $25,000 architect's fee promised to Plannah.
[ "I and II only", "I and III only", "II and III only", "I, II, and II" ]
0A
There is high and persistent unemployment in the industrialized state of Green. Its legislature therefore enacted a statute requiring every business with annual sales in Green of over $1 million to purchase each year goods and/or services in Green equal in value to at least half of its sales in Green Which of the following parties most clearly has standing to contest the constitutionality of this statute of Green in federal court?
[ "A business in another state that supplies from that other state 95 percent of the goods and services bought by a corporation that has annual sales in Green of $20 million.", "A corporation selling $300,000 worth of goods in Green but presently purchasing only $10,000 in goods and services in Green. ", "The governor of an adjacent state on behalf of the state and its residents.", "The owner of high-grade, secured bonds issued by a corporation with sales in Green of $10 million that currently purchases only $1 million in goods and services in Green." ]
0A
Constance owned Greenacre in fee simple. She executed two instruments in the proper form of deeds. The first instrument purported to convey an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre to Henry and his wife, Audrey, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The second instrument purported to convey an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre to Susan, the only child of Henry. Susan was 13 years old at the time. The common law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. No actual consideration was paid for the deeds. Constance handed the two deeds to Henry. Henry promptly and properly recorded the deed to himself and Audrey and put the deed to his daughter, Susan, in a safe-deposit box without recording it. The same year, Henry, Audrey, and Susan were on a vacation when the plane in which they were flying went down, and all three were killed simultaneously. Henry, Audrey, and Susan died intestate. The applicable statute in the jurisdiction provides that "when title to property on its devolution depends on priority of death and there is insufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived." An appropriate action was instituted by the heirs of Henry, Audrey, and Susan. Constance, who is not an heir of any of the deceased, was a party to the action. The court should determine that title to Greenacre is
[ "entirely in Constance.", "one-half in the heirs of Henry and one-half in the heirs of Audrey.", "one-half in Constance, one-quarter in the heirs of Henry, and one-quarter in the heirs of Audrey. ", "one-half in the heirs of Susan, one-quarter in the heirs of Henry, and one-quarter in the heirs of Audrey" ]
3D
In Peck's antitrust suit against manufacturers of insulation, Peck's interrogatories asked for information concerning total sales of insulation by each of the defendant manufacturers in a particular year. The defendants replied to the interrogatories by referring Peck to the Insulation Manufacturers' Annual Journal for the information. If, at trial, Peck offers the annual journal as evidence of the sales volume, this evidence is
[ "admissible as an adoptive admission of the defendants.", "admissible as a business record.", "inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception. ", "inadmissible as lacking sufficient authentication" ]
0A
When Denton heard that his neighbor, Prout, intended to sell his home to a minority purchaser, Denton told Prout that Prout and his wife and children would meet with "accidents" if he did so. Prout then called the prospective purchaser and told him that he was taking the house off the market.If Prout asserts a claim against Denton for assault, Prout will
[ "recover if Denton intended to place Prout in fear of physical harm.", "recover, because Denton's conduct was extreme and outrageous. ", "not recover if Denton took no action that threatened immediate physical harm to Prout.", "not recover, because Prout's action removed any threat of harmful force" ]
2C
When Denton heard that his neighbor, Prout, intended to sell his home to a minority purchaser, Denton told Prout that Prout and his wife and children would meet with "accidents" if he did so. Prout then called the prospective purchaser and told him that he was taking the house off the market.If Prout asserts a claim against Denton for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Prout will
[ "recover if Prout suffered severe emotional distress as a consequence of Denton's conduct.", "recover, because Denton intended to frighten Prout. ", "not recover, because Denton made no threat of immediate physical harm to Prout or his family. ", "not recover if Prout suffered no physical harm as a consequence of Denton's conduct" ]
0A
The German-made Doppelpferd, featuring sleek styling and remarkable fuel efficiency, is the most popular automobile in the United States. Its U.S. sales are booming, and the average retail markup in such sales is 30 percent. Hardsell Motors, Inc., a franchised Doppelpferd dealer in the United States, contracted with Shift to sell him a new Doppelpferd for $9,000 cash, the sale to be consummated after delivery to Hardsell of the car, which Hardsell ordered from the manufacturer specifically for Shift. The signed retail contractual document was a contract drafted by Hardsell's lawyer, and Shift did not question or object to any of its terms, including the price inserted by Hardsell. When the car arrived from Germany, Shift repudiated the contract. Hardsell at once sold the car for $9,000 cash to Karbuff, for whom Hardsell had also ordered from the manufacturer a Doppelpferd identical to Shift's. In an action against Shift for breach of contract, Hardsell will probably recover
[ "$9,000 minus what it cost Hardsell to purchase the car from the manufacturer. ", "$9,000 minus the wholesale price of an identical Doppelpferd in the local wholesale market among dealers. ", "nominal damages only, because Hardsell resold the car to Karbuff without lowering the retail price. ", "nothing, because the parties' agreement was an adhesion contract and therefore unconscionable" ]
0A
A statute in a jurisdiction makes it a crime to sell ammunition to a minor (defined as a person under the age of 18). The courts have interpreted this statute as creating a strict liability offense that does not require knowledge of the age of the purchaser and as creating vicarious liability. Duncan, who was 16 years old, but looked four or five years older, entered a store owned by Matthews and asked a clerk for a box of .22-caliber shells. Matthews had instructed her employees not to sell ammunition to minors. The clerk asked Duncan his age. Duncan said he was 20. The clerk then placed a box of shells on the counter and asked, "Anything else?" Duncan said that was all he wanted but then discovered he did not have enough money to pay for the shells, so the clerk put the box back onto the shelf. If Matthews, the owner of the store, is charged with attempting to violate the statute, her best argument would be that
[ "it was impossible for the sale to have occurred.", "she had strictly instructed her employees not to sell ammunition to minors.", "Duncan lied about his age.", "the clerk did not have the mental state needed for attempt." ]
3D
Otto conveyed Goldacre to "Andy, his heirs and assigns, but if Andy dies and is not survived by children by his present wife, Jane, then to Bob and his heirs and assigns." Shortly after taking possession, Andy discovered rich metal deposits on the land, opened a mining operation, and removed and sold a considerable quantity of valuable ore without giving Bob any notice of his action. Andy has no children. Andy, Jane, and Bob are all still living. Bob brought an action in equity for an accounting of the value of the ore removed and for an injunction against further removal. If the decision is for Andy, it will be because
[ "Bob has no interest in Goldacre.", "the right to take minerals is an incident of a defeasible fee simple.", "the right to take minerals is an incident of the right to possession.", "there was no showing that Andy acted in bad fait" ]
1B
A state statute makes fraud for personal financial gain a crime. Jones was convicted of violating this statute on three separate occasions. Following his most recent conviction, he professed to have undergone a religious conversion and proclaimed himself to be the divine minister of "St. Rockport," an alleged messiah who would shortly be making his appearance on earth. Jones solicited cash donations from the public to support his efforts to spread the word of St. Rockport and his coming appearance on earth. Following complaints by several contributors who claimed he defrauded them, Jones was again charged with fraud under this state statute. The charge was that Jones "should have known that his representations about St. Rockport were false and, therefore, that he made them solely to collect cash donations for his personal gain." A witness for the prosecution in Jones' trial stated that Jones had admitted that, at times, he had doubts about the existence of St. Rockport. Jones was the only religious minister prosecuted for fraud under this state statute. The strongest constitutional defense that Jones could assert would be that this prosecution
[ "deprived him of the equal protection of the laws because other religious ministers have not been charged under this statute.", "denied him procedural due process because it placed upon Jones the burden of rebutting evidence, submitted by the state, of his bad faith in raising this money. ", "denied him rights conferred by the obligation of contracts clause by preventing him from taking money from persons who wished to contract with him to spread the word of St. Rockport.", "denied him the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it required the state to determine the truth or falsity of the content of his religious beliefs" ]
3D
Hammond decided to kill his wife by poisoning her. He asked his friend, Jordan, a pharmacist, to obtain some curare, a deadly poison, and to give it to him without recording the transaction. Because Jordan suspected Hammond's motive, she supplied Hammond with a small quantity of Marvane, an antibiotic, instead of curare. Marvane is harmless if administered in small quantities, except for the less than one percent of the population who are allergic to the drug. Hammond injected his wife with the Marvane while she slept. She was allergic to the drug and died from the injection. Jordan was distraught and confessed the entire affair to the police, explaining that she had failed to report Hammond's conduct to the authorities because she feared that it would end their friendship if she did.". Jordan is an accomplice to
[ "murder.", "manslaughter.", "criminally negligent homicide.", "no degree of criminal homicide" ]
3D
Hammond decided to kill his wife by poisoning her. He asked his friend, Jordan, a pharmacist, to obtain some curare, a deadly poison, and to give it to him without recording the transaction. Because Jordan suspected Hammond's motive, she supplied Hammond with a small quantity of Marvane, an antibiotic, instead of curare. Marvane is harmless if administered in small quantities, except for the less than one percent of the population who are allergic to the drug. Hammond injected his wife with the Marvane while she slept. She was allergic to the drug and died from the injection. Jordan was distraught and confessed the entire affair to the police, explaining that she had failed to report Hammond's conduct to the authorities because she feared that it would end their friendship if she did."In a common law jurisdiction, Hammond is guilty of
[ "murder only.", "murder and conspiracy.", "attempted murder only.", "attempted murder and conspirac" ]
0A
While on a hiking trip during the late fall, Page arrived, toward the end of the day, at a clearing where several similar cabins were located, none of which was occupied. One of the cabins belonged to Levin, Page's friend, who had given Page permission to use it. Page entered one of the cabins, which she thought was Levin's, and prepared to spend the night. In fact the cabin was owned, not by Levin, but by Dwyer. When the night turned cold, Page started a fire in the stove. Unknown to Page, there was a defect in the stove that allowed carbon monoxide fumes to escape into the cabin. During the night the fumes caused serious injury to Page. If Page asserts a claim against Dwyer for her injury, will Page recover?
[ "Yes, if Dwyer knew that the stove was defective. ", "Yes, if Dwyer could have discovered the defect in the stove by a reasonable inspection. ", "No, because Dwyer had no reason to anticipate Page's presence in the cabin. ", "No, unless Page needed to use the cabin for her own protection." ]
2C
On January 1, Awl and Howser agreed in writing that Awl would build a house on Howser's lot according to Howser's plans and specifications for $60,000, the work to commence on April 1. Howser agreed to make an initial payment of $10,000 on April 1, and to pay the balance upon completion of the work. On February 1, Awl notified Howser that he (Awl) would lose money on the job at that price, and would not proceed with the work unless Howser would agree to increase the price to $90,000. Howser thereupon, without notifying Awl, agreed in writing with Gutter for Gutter, commencing April 1, to build the house for $75,000, which was the fair market cost of the work to be done. On April 1, both Awl and Gutter showed up at the building site to begin work, Awl telling Howser that he had decided to "take the loss" and would build the house for $60,000 as originally agreed. Howser dismissed Awl and allowed Gutter to begin work on the house.""In a contract action by Awl against Howser, which of the following would the court decide under the prevailing American view?
[ "Howser will win, because Awl in legal effect committed a total breach of contract. ", "Howser will win, because Gutter's contract price was $15,000 lower than the $90,000 demanded by Awl on February 1. ", "Awl will win, because Howser did not tell him before April 1 about the contract with Gutter. ", "Awl will win, because he attempted to perform the contract as originally agreed" ]
0A
On January 1, Awl and Howser agreed in writing that Awl would build a house on Howser's lot according to Howser's plans and specifications for $60,000, the work to commence on April 1. Howser agreed to make an initial payment of $10,000 on April 1, and to pay the balance upon completion of the work. On February 1, Awl notified Howser that he (Awl) would lose money on the job at that price, and would not proceed with the work unless Howser would agree to increase the price to $90,000. Howser thereupon, without notifying Awl, agreed in writing with Gutter for Gutter, commencing April 1, to build the house for $75,000, which was the fair market cost of the work to be done. On April 1, both Awl and Gutter showed up at the building site to begin work, Awl telling Howser that he had decided to "take the loss" and would build the house for $60,000 as originally agreed. Howser dismissed Awl and allowed Gutter to begin work on the house."For this question only, assume that Awl is liable to Howser for breach of contract and also assume the following additional facts: Gutter finished the house on schedule and then showed Howser that he (Gutter) had spent $85,000 on the job. Howser thereupon paid Gutter the full balance of their contract price plus an additional $10,000 so that Gutter would not lose money. In a contract action by Howser against Awl, Howser will recover
[ "the difference between the fair market value of the completed house and Awl's original contract price.", "$30,000, the difference between Awl's original contract price and the amount Awl demanded on February 1. ", "$25,000, the difference between Awl's original contract price and the total amount Howser paid Gutter for building the house. ", "$15,000, the difference between Awl's original contract price and Gutter's contract price." ]
3D
During the night, Murphy broke into a house with the intention of stealing a typewriter. On not finding a typewriter, she became angry, poured lighter fluid onto a couch, and set it on fire. The flames destroyed the couch and also burned a portion of the ceiling in the room. In a common law jurisdiction, Murphy is guilty of
[ "burglary only.", "arson only.", "burglary and attempted arson.", "burglary and arson" ]
3D
Argus Corporation is privately owned and incorporated in the state of Kiowa. It contracted with the United States to construct a dam across the Big Sandy River in the state of Arapaho. The state of Arapaho imposed a gross receipts tax on all business conducted within the state. Arapaho sued Argus Corporation to collect that tax on the receipts Argus received under this federal contract. No federal statutes or administrative rules are applicable, and the contract between the United States and Argus Corporation does not mention state taxation. The court should hold the state tax, as applied here, to be
[ "constitutional, because a state has exclusive jurisdiction over all commercial transactions executed wholly within its borders. ", "constitutional, because private contractors performing work under a federal contract are not immune in these circumstances from nondiscriminatory state taxation. ", "unconstitutional, because it violates the supremacy clause. ", "unconstitutional, because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce" ]
1B
Parmott sued Dexter in an automobile collision case. At trial, Parmott wishes to show by extrinsic evidence that Wade, Dexter's primary witness, is Dexter's partner in a gambling operation. This evidence is
[ "admissible as evidence of Wade's character.", "admissible as evidence of Wade's possible bias in favor of Dexter.", "inadmissible, because criminal conduct can be shown only by admission or a record of conviction. ", "inadmissible, because bias must be shown on cross-examination and not by extrinsic evidence." ]
1B
Taylor and Scott, an unmarried couple, purchased a condominium as tenants in common and lived in the condominium for three years. Subsequently, they made a verbal agreement that, on the death of either of them, the survivor would own the entire condominium, and, as a result, they decided they did not need wills. Two years later, Taylor and Scott were involved in the same automobile accident. Taylor was killed immediately. Scott died one week later. Both died intestate. Taylor's sole heir is his brother, Mark. Scott's sole heir is her mother, Martha. Mark claimed one-half of the condominium, and Martha claimed all of it. The jurisdiction has no applicable statute except for the Statute of Frauds; nor does it recognize common law marriages. In an appropriate action by Martha claiming the entire ownership of the condominium, the court will find that
[ "Martha owns the entire interest because Taylor and Scott did not make wills in reliance upon their oral agreement.", "Martha owns the entire interest because she is entitled to reformation of the deed to reflect the verbal agreement.", "Mark and Martha each own an undivided one-half interest because Taylor and Scott each died as the result of the same accident.", "Mark and Martha each own an undivided one-half interest because the Statute of Frauds applies" ]
3D
Telco, a local telephone company, negligently allowed one of its telephone poles, located between a street and a sidewalk, to become termite-ridden. Rhodes, who was intoxicated and driving at an excessive rate of speed, lost control of her car and hit the weakened telephone pole. One week later, the pole fell and struck Walker, a pedestrian who was walking on the sidewalk. The pole fell because of the combination of the force of the impact and the pole's termite-ridden condition. If Walker asserts a claim against Telco and Rhodes, will Walker prevail?
[ "Yes, against Telco but not Rhodes. ", "Yes, against Rhodes but not Telco. ", "Yes, against Telco and Rhodes, each for one-half of his damages. ", "Yes, against both Telco and Rhodes for the full amount of his damages" ]
3D
Dirk broke into Vera's house one night. As he started to stuff silverware into a sack, he was surprised by Vera, who had arrived home earlier than usual. Dirk struck Vera on the head with a candlestick and tied her up. He finished filling his sack and left. The police discovered Vera several hours later and rushed her to the hospital. Dirk was apprehended by the police early the following morning with the loot still in his possession. He was taken to police headquarters, given Miranda warnings, and asked if he wished to make a statement about the prior evening's events. The police did not mention that Vera had been seriously injured and was in the hospital. Dirk said he understood his rights and was willing to talk. He then admitted that he committed the burglary of Vera's house. The following day, Vera died from injuries caused by the blow to her head. If, at Dirk's trial for murder, Dirk moves to prevent introduction of the confession into evidence, his motion should most probably be
[ "denied, because failure of the police to advise Dirk of Vera's condition was harmless error since felony murder does not require intent to kill or injure. ", "denied, because Dirk's waiver of his rights did not depend upon the nature of the charges that were later filed against him. ", "granted, because Dirk could not make a knowing and intelligent waiver unless he had information concerning Vera's condition. ", "granted, because the use of a confession to burglary in a prosecution for murder violates due process where the police withheld information about the potential seriousness of the offense" ]
1B
In 1956, Silo Cement Company constructed a plant for manufacturing ready-mix concrete in Lakeville. At that time Silo was using bagged cement, which caused little or no dust. In 1970, Petrone bought a home approximately 1,800 feet from the Silo plant. One year ago, Silo stopped using bagged cement and began to receive cement in bulk shipments. Since then at least five truckloads of cement have passed Petrone's house daily. Cement blows off the trucks and into Petrone's house. When the cement arrives at the Silo plant, it is blown by forced air from the trucks into the storage bin. As a consequence cement dust fills the air surrounding the plant to a distance of 2,000 feet. Petrone's house is the only residence within 2,000 feet of the plant. If Petrone asserts a claim against Silo based on nuisance, will Petrone prevail?
[ "Yes, unless using bagged cement would substantially increase Silo's costs. ", "Yes, if the cement dust interfered unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of Petrone's property. ", "No, because Silo is not required to change its industrial methods to accommodate the needs of one individual. ", "No, if Silo's methods are in conformity with those in general use in the industry." ]
1B
On a wholly random basis, a state agency has given a few probationary employees who were not rehired at the end of their probationary periods a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a hearing; but the agency has very rarely done so. No statute or rule of the agency required such a statement of reasons or a hearing. The employment of Masters, a probationary employee, was terminated without a statement of reasons or an opportunity for a hearing. The agency did not even consider whether it should give him either. A suit by Masters requesting a statement of reasons and a hearing will probably be
[ "successful on the grounds that failure to give Masters reasons and an opportunity for a hearing constituted a bill of attainder.", "successful on the grounds that an agency's inconsistent practices, even if unintentional, deny adversely affected persons the equal protection of the laws. ", "unsuccessful, because Masters does not have a right to be rehired that is protected by procedural due process. 122 ", "unsuccessful, because the conditions of state employment are matters reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment." ]
2C
Able, an attorney, sued Clinton, a client, for his fee, based on an agreed hourly rate. Clinton subpoenaed the attorney's time records for the days on which he purported to have worked for Clinton, in order to show that Able had billed an impossible number of hours to Clinton and others on those days. Clinton's subpoena provided that any information concerning the matters handled for other clients be deleted or masked. Able moved to quash the subpoena on the ground of attorney-client privilege. The subpoena should be
[ "upheld, because the information about hours billed is not within the privilege ", "upheld, because an attorney has no right to invoke his clients' privilege without instructions from the clients. ", "quashed, because an attorney is entitled to a right of privacy for the work product in his files. ", "quashed, because no permission was obtained from the other clients to divulge information from their files." ]
0A
Furrow leased in writing a 100-acre farm from Quark for five years at $2,000 per year, with an option to purchase "five acres of the land for $10,000 cash" at the end of the lease term. Before the lease was executed, Quark orally promised to have a five-acre parcel surveyed before the end of the lease term. Furrow took possession of the farm and paid the rent for five years. During the fifth year, having decided that he would exercise the purchase option, Furrow planted several fruit trees and built a large grain silo on the property. At the end of the term, Furrow tendered Quark $10,000 and demanded a conveyance, but Quark repudiated the option agreement and retook possession of the farm. He had never had the five-acre parcel surveyed.In an action by Furrow against Quark for specific performance of the option agreement, which of the following is Quark's best defense?
[ "The option part of the agreement is unenforceable because it lacked a separate consideration.", "The description of the property to be sold in the parties' written agreement is too indefinite to permit the remedy sought.", "Quark's failure to have the five-acre parcel surveyed was failure of a condition precedent to his own duty of performance.", "The option part of the agreement is unenforceable under the parol evidence rule." ]
1B