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Gyro, an expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, contracted in a signed writing to lift and emplace certain air-conditioning equipment atop Tower's building. An exculpatory clause in the contract provided that Gyro would not be liable for any physical damage to Tower's building occurring during installation of the air-conditioning equipment. There was also a clause providing for per diem damages if Gyro did not complete performance by a specified date and a clause providing that "time is of the essence." Another clause provided that any subsequent agreement for extra work under the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties. With ample time remaining under the contract for commencement and completion of his performance, Gyro notified Tower that he was selling his business to Copter, who was equally expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, and that Copter had agreed to "take over the Gyro-Tower contract." If Tower refuses to accept Copter's services, which of the following clauses in the GyroTower contract will best support Tower's contention that Gyro's duties under the contract were not delegable without Tower's consent?
[ "The exculpatory clause.", "The liquidated-damage clause.", "The \"time is of the essence\" clause. ", "The extra-work clause." ]
0A
Gyro, an expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, contracted in a signed writing to lift and emplace certain air-conditioning equipment atop Tower's building. An exculpatory clause in the contract provided that Gyro would not be liable for any physical damage to Tower's building occurring during installation of the air-conditioning equipment. There was also a clause providing for per diem damages if Gyro did not complete performance by a specified date and a clause providing that "time is of the essence." Another clause provided that any subsequent agreement for extra work under the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties. With ample time remaining under the contract for commencement and completion of his performance, Gyro notified Tower that he was selling his business to Copter, who was equally expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, and that Copter had agreed to "take over the Gyro-Tower contract." For this question only, assume that Tower orally agreed with Gyro to accept Copter's services and that Copter performed on time but negligently installed the wrong airconditioning equipment. Will Tower succeed in an action against Gyro for damages for breach of contract?
[ "Yes, because Tower did not agree to release Gyro from liability under the Gyro-Tower contract. ", "Yes, because Tower received no consideration for the substitution of Copter for Gyro. ", "No, because by accepting the substitution of Copter for Gyro, Tower effected a novation, and Gyro was thereby discharged of his duties under the Gyro- Tower contract. ", "No, because the liquidated-damage clause in the Gyro-Tower contract provided only for damages caused by delay in performance. " ]
0A
Allen owned Greenacre in fee simple of record on January 10. On that day, Maria loaned Allen $50,000 and Allen mortgaged Greenacre to Maria as security for the loan. The mortgage was recorded on January 18. Allen conveyed Greenacre to Barnes for a valuable consideration on January 11. Maria did not know of this, nor did Barnes know of the mortgage to Maria, until both discovered the facts on January 23, the day on which Barnes recorded Allen's deed. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." There is no provision for a period of grace and there is no other relevant statutory provision. Maria sued Barnes to establish that her mortgage was good against Greenacre. The court should decide for
[ "Barnes, because he paid valuable consideration without notice before Maria recorded her mortgage. ", "Barnes, because Maria's delay in recording means that she is estopped from asserting her priority in time. ", "Maria, because Barnes did not record his deed before her mortgage was recorded. ", "Maria, because after the mortgage to her, Allen's deed to Barnes was necessarily subject to her mortgage. " ]
2C
Park sued Dunlevy for copyright infringement for using in Dunlevy's book some slightly disguised house plans on which Park held the copyright. Park is prepared to testify that he heard Dunlevy's executive assistant for copyright matters say that Dunlevy had obtained an advance copy of the plans from Park's office manager. Park's testimony is
[ "admissible as reporting a statement of an employee of a party opponent.", "admissible as a statement of a co- conspirator.", "inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ", "inadmissible, because there is no showing that the assistant was authorized to speak for Dunlevy. " ]
0A
Congress enacted a statute providing grants of federal funds for the restoration and preservation of courthouses that were built before 1900 and are still in use. The statute contains an inseverable condition requiring that any courthouse restored with the aid of such a grant must be equipped with ramps and other facilities necessary to accommodate physically handicapped people. A law of the state of Blue requires public buildings in Blue to have ramps and other facilities for handicapped people. It exempts from those requirements any building that is more than 70 years old if the State Board of Architects finds that the installation of such facilities would destroy the architectural integrity of the building. The Red County Courthouse in the state of Blue was built in 1895 and is still in use. It does not contain ramps or other special facilities for handicapped people. The State Board of Architects has determined that the installation of those facilities would destroy the architectural integrity of the building. Nevertheless, the County Board of Red County applies for a federal grant to restore and preserve that county's courthouse. If the County Board of Red County restores the Red County Courthouse with the aid of a federal restoration and preservation grant, is the board bound to install ramps and other facilities for handicapped people in that building?
[ "Yes, because Congress may impose reasonable conditions related to the public welfare on grants of federal funds to public bodies when the public bodies are free to accept or reject the grants. ", "Yes, because the rights of handicapped and disabled people are fundamental rights that take precedence, as a constitutional matter, over considerations of architectural integrity. ", "No, because the Constitution does not authorize the federal government to direct the actions of the states or any of their political subdivisions with respect to matters affecting their own governmental buildings. ", "No, because any acceptance of this condition by the Red County Board of Supervisors would, as a matter of law, be considered to be under duress. " ]
0A
Arnold decided to destroy an old warehouse that he owned because the taxes on the structure exceeded the income that he could receive from it. He crept into the building in the middle of the night with a can of gasoline and a fuse and set the fuse timer for 30 minutes. He then left the building. The fuse failed to ignite, and the building was not harmed. Arson is defined in this jurisdiction as "The intentional burning of any building or structure of another, without the consent of the owner." Arnold believed, however, that burning one's own building was arson, having been so advised by his lawyer. Has Arnold committed attempted arson?
[ "Yes, because factual impossibility is no defense. ", "Yes, because a mistake of law even on the advice of an attorney is no defense. ", "No, because his mistake negated a necessary mental state. ", "No, because even if his actions had every consequence he intended, they would not have constituted arson. " ]
3D
"Look-alike drugs" is the term used to describe nonprescription drugs that look like narcotic drugs and are sold on the streets as narcotic drugs. After extensive hearings, Congress concluded that the sale of look-alike drugs was widespread in this country and was creating severe health and law enforcement problems. To combat these problems, Congress enacted a comprehensive statute that regulates the manufacture, distribution, and sale of all nonprescription drugs in the United States. Which of the following sources of constitutional authority can most easily be used to justify the authority of Congress to enact this statute?
[ "The spending power.", "The commerce clause.", "The general welfare clause.", "The enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment." ]
1B
Peter and Donald were in the habit of playing practical jokes on each other on their respective birthdays. On Peter's birthday, Donald sent Peter a cake containing an ingredient that he knew had, in the past, made Peter very ill. After Peter had eaten a piece of the cake, he suffered severe stomach pains and had to be taken to the hospital by ambulance. On the way to the hospital, the ambulance driver suffered a heart attack, which caused the ambulance to swerve from the road and hit a tree. As a result of the collision, Peter suffered a broken leg. In a suit by Peter against Donald to recover damages for Peter's broken leg, Peter will
[ "prevail, because Donald knew that the cake would be harmful or offensive to Peter. ", "prevail, only if the ambulance driver was negligent. ", "not prevail, because Donald could not reasonably be expected to foresee injury to Peter's leg. ", "not prevail, because the ambulance driver's heart attack was a superseding cause of Peter's broken leg. " ]
0A
Decker, charged with armed robbery of a store, denied that he was the person who had robbed the store. In presenting the state's case, the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence that Decker had robbed two other stores in the past year. This evidence is
[ "admissible, to prove a pertinent trait of Decker's character and Decker's action in conformity therewith. ", "admissible, to prove Decker's intent and identity. ", "inadmissible, because character must be proved by reputation or opinion and may not be proved by specific acts. ", "inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. " ]
3D
Twenty-five years ago, Seller conveyed Blackacre to Buyer by a warranty deed. Seller at that time also executed and delivered an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Whiteacre to Buyer. Seller thought she had title to Whiteacre but did not; therefore, no title passed by virtue of the Whiteacre deed. Whiteacre consisted of three acres of brushland adjoining the west boundary of Blackacre. Buyer has occasionally hunted rabbits on Whiteacre, but less often than annually. No one else came on Whiteacre except occasional rabbit hunters. Twenty years ago, Buyer planted a row of evergreens in the vicinity of the opposite (east) boundary of Blackacre and erected a fence just beyond the evergreens to the east. In fact both the trees and the fence were placed on Greenacre, owned by Neighbor, which bordered the east boundary of Blackacre. Buyer was unsure of the exact boundary, and placed the trees and the fence in order to establish his rights up to the fence. The fence is located ten feet within Greenacre. Now, Buyer has had his property surveyed and the title checked and has learned the facts. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 15 years. Buyer consulted his lawyer, who properly advised that, in an appropriate action, Buyer would probably obtain title to
[ "Whiteacre but not to the ten-foot strip of Greenacre.", "the ten-foot strip of Greenacre but not to Whiteacre.", "both Whiteacre and the ten-foot strip of Greenacre.", "neither Whiteacre nor the ten-foot strip of Greenacre." ]
1B
Elda, the aged mother of Alice and Barry, both adults, wished to employ a live-in companion so that she might continue to live in her own home. Elda, however, had only enough income to pay one-half of the companion's $2,000 monthly salary. Learning of their mother's plight, Alice and Barry agreed with each other in a signed writing that on the last day of January and each succeeding month during their mother's lifetime, each would give Elda $500. Elda then hired the companion. Alice and Barry made the agreed payments in January, February, and March. In April, however, Barry refused to make any payment and notified Alice and Elda that he would make no further payments. 64. Will Elda succeed in an action for $500 brought against Barry after April 30?
[ "Yes, because by making his first three payments, Barry confirmed his intent to contract. ", "Yes, because Elda is an intended beneficiary of a contract between Alice and Barry. ", "No, because a parent cannot sue her child for breach of a promise for support. ", "No, because Alice and Barry intended their payments to Elda to be gifts. " ]
1B
Elda, the aged mother of Alice and Barry, both adults, wished to employ a live-in companion so that she might continue to live in her own home. Elda, however, had only enough income to pay one-half of the companion's $2,000 monthly salary. Learning of their mother's plight, Alice and Barry agreed with each other in a signed writing that on the last day of January and each succeeding month during their mother's lifetime, each would give Elda $500. Elda then hired the companion. Alice and Barry made the agreed payments in January, February, and March. In April, however, Barry refused to make any payment and notified Alice and Elda that he would make no further payments. For this question only, assume that there is a valid contract between Alice and Barry and that Elda has declined to sue Barry. Will Alice succeed in an action against Barry in which she asks the court to order Barry to continue to make his payments to Elda under the terms of the Alice-Barry contract?
[ "Yes, because Alice's remedy at law is inadequate. ", "Yes, because Alice's burden of supporting her mother will be increased if Barry does not contribute his share. ", "No, because a court will not grant specific performance of a promise to pay money. ", "No, because Barry's breach of contract has caused no economic harm to Alice. " ]
0A
Mom owned Blackacre, a two-family apartment house on a small city lot not suitable for partition-in-kind. Upon Mom's death, her will devised Blackacre to "my sons, Joe and John." A week ago, Ken obtained a money judgment against Joe, and properly filed the judgment in the county where Blackacre is located. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered. Joe needed cash, but John did not wish to sell Blackacre. Joe commenced a partition action against John and Ken. Assume that the court properly ordered a partition by judicial sale. After the sale, Ken's judgment will be a lien on
[ "all of Blackacre.", "only a one-half interest in Blackacre.", "all of the proceeds of sale of Blackacre.", "only the portion of the proceeds of sale due Joe." ]
3D
Dora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury. If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against the grocery store, the store's best defense will be that
[ "a store owes no duty to its customers to control the use of its shopping carts.", "a store owes no duty to its customers to control the conduct of other customers.", "any negligence of the store was not the proximate cause of Peterson's injury.", "a supervised child pushing a cart does not pose an unreasonable risk to other customers." ]
3D
Dora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury. If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora's mother, will Peterson prevail?
[ "Yes, if Dora was negligent. ", "Yes, because Dora's mother is responsible for any harm caused by Dora. ", "Yes, because Dora's mother assumed the risk of her child's actions. ", "Yes, if Dora's mother did not adequately supervise Dora's actions. " ]
3D
Dora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury. If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora, Dora's best argument in defense would be that
[ "Dora exercised care commensurate with her age, intelligence, and experience. ", "Dora is not subject to tort liability.", "Dora was subject to parental supervision.", "Peterson assumed the risk that Dora might hit Peterson with the cart." ]
0A
Adam entered into a valid written contract to sell Blackacre, a large tract of land, to Betsy. At that time, Blackacre was owned by Adam's father, Fred; Adam had no title to Blackacre and was not the agent of Fred. After the contract was executed and before the scheduled closing date, Fred died intestate, leaving Adam as his sole heir. Shortly thereafter, Adam received an offer for Blackacre that was substantially higher than the purchase price in the contract with Betsy. Adam refused to close with Betsy although she was ready, willing, and able to close pursuant to the contract. Betsy brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Adam. In that action, Betsy should be awarded
[ "nothing, because Adam had no authority to enter into the contract with Betsy. ", "nothing, because the doctrine of afteracquired title does not apply to executory contracts. ", "judgment for specific performance, because Adam acquired title prior to the scheduled closing. ", "judgment for specific performance, to prevent unjust enrichment of Adam. " ]
2C
Dayton operates a collection agency. He was trying to collect a $400 bill for medical services rendered to Pratt by Doctor. Dayton went to Pratt's house and when Martina, Pratt's mother, answered the door, Dayton told Martina he was there to collect a bill owed by Pratt. Martina told Dayton that because of her illness, Pratt had been unemployed for six months, that she was still ill and unable to work, and that she would pay the bill as soon as she could. Dayton, in a loud voice, demanded to see Pratt and said that if he did not receive payment immediately, he would file a criminal complaint charging her with fraud. Pratt, hearing the conversation, came to the door. Dayton, in a loud voice, repeated his demand for immediate payment and his threat to use criminal process. If Pratt asserts a claim against Dayton, based on infliction of emotional distress, will Pratt prevail?
[ "Yes, if Pratt suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Dayton's conduct. ", "Yes, unless the bill for medical services was valid and past due. ", "No, unless Pratt suffered physical harm as a result of Dayton's conduct. ", "No, if Dayton's conduct created no risk of physical harm to Pratt. " ]
0A
Public schools in the state of Green are financed, in large part, by revenue derived from real estate taxes imposed by each school district on the taxable real property located in that district. Public schools also receive other revenue from private gifts, federal grants, student fees, and local sales taxes. For many years, Green has distributed additional funds, which come from the state treasury, to local school districts in order to equalize the funds available on a per-student basis for each public school district. These additional funds are distributed on the basis of a state statutory formula that considers only the number of students in each public school district and the real estate tax revenue raised by that district. The formula does not consider other revenue received by a school district from different sources. The school boards of two school districts, together with parents and schoolchildren in those districts, bring suit in federal court to enjoin the state from allocating the additional funds from the state treasury to individual districts pursuant to this formula. They allege that the failure of the state, in allocating this additional money, to take into account a school district's sources of revenue other than revenue derived from taxes levied on real estate located there violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint does not allege that the allocation of the additional state funds based on the current statutory formula has resulted in a failure to provide minimally adequate education to any child. Which of the following best describes the appropriate standard by which the court should review the constitutionality of the state statutory funding formula?
[ "Because classifications based on wealth are inherently suspect, the state must demonstrate that the statutory formula is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. ", "Because the statutory funding formula burdens the fundamental right to education, the state must demonstrate that the formula is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. ", "Because no fundamental right or suspect classification is implicated in this case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the funding allocation formula bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. ", "Because the funding formula inevitably leads to disparities among the school districts in their levels of total funding, the plaintiffs must only demonstrate that the funding formula is not substantially related to the furtherance of an important state interest. " ]
2C
A car driven by Dan entered land owned by and in the possession of Peter, without Peter's permission. Which, if any, of the following allegations, without additional facts, would provide a sufficient basis for a claim by Peter against Dan? I. Dan intentionally drove his car onto Peter's land. II. Dan negligently drove his car onto Peter's land. III. Dan's car damaged Peter's land.
[ "I only.", "III only.", "I, II, or III. ", "Neither I, nor II, nor III. " ]
0A
In which of the following cases is Morrow most likely to be convicted if she is charged with receiving stolen property?
[ "Morrow bought a car from Aster, who operates a used car lot. Before the purchase, Aster told Morrow that the car had been stolen, which was true. Unknown to Morrow, Aster is an undercover police agent who is operating the lot in cooperation with the police in exchange for leniency in connection with criminal charges pending against him. ", "Morrow bought a car from Ball. Before the purchase, Ball told Morrow that the car was stolen. Ball had stolen the car with the help of Eames, who, unknown to Morrow or Ball, was an undercover police agent who feigned cooperation with Ball in the theft of the car. ", "Morrow bought a car from Cooper. Before the purchase, Cooper told Morrow that the car was stolen. Unknown to Morrow, Cooper had stolen the car from a parking lot and had been caught by the police as he was driving it away. He agreed to cooperate with the police and carry through with his prearranged sale of the car to Morrow. ", "Morrow bought a car from Dixon. Before the purchase, Dixon told Morrow that the car was stolen. Unknown to Morrow, Dixon was in fact the owner of the car but had reported it to the police as stolen and had collected on a fraudulent claim of its theft from his insurance company. " ]
1B
The constitution of State X authorizes a fivemember state reapportionment board to redraw state legislative districts every ten years. In the last state legislative reapportionment, the board, by a unanimous vote, divided the greater Green metropolitan area, composed of Green City and several contiguous townships, into three equally populated state legislative districts. The result of that districting was that 40% of the area's total black population resided in one of those districts, 45% of the area's total black population resided in the second of those districts, and 15% resided in the third district. Jones is black, is a registered voter, and is a resident of Green City. Jones brings suit in an appropriate court against the members of the state reapportionment board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would require the boundary lines of the state legislative districts in the greater Green metropolitan area to be redrawn. His only claim is that the current apportionment violates the Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it improperly dilutes the voting power of the blacks who reside in that area. If no federal statute is applicable, which of the following facts, if proven, would most strongly support the validity of the action of the state reapportionment board?
[ "In drawing the current district lines, the reapportionment board precisely complied with state constitutional requirements that state legislative districts be compact and follow political subdivision boundaries to the maximum extent feasible. ", "The reapportionment board was composed of three white members and two black members and both of the board's black members were satisfied that its plan did not improperly dilute the voting power of the blacks who reside in that area.", "Although the rate of voter registration among blacks is below that of voter registration among whites in the greater Green metropolitan area, two black legislators have been elected from that area during the last 15 years. ", "The total black population of the greater Green metropolitan area amounts to only 15% of the population that is required to comprise a single legislative district." ]
0A
Paulsen Corporation sued Dorr for ten fuel oil deliveries not paid for. Dorr denied that the deliveries were made. At trial, Paulsen calls its office manager, Wicks, to testify that Paulsen employees always record each delivery in duplicate, give one copy to the customer, and place the other copy in Paulsen's files; that he (Wicks) is the custodian of those files; and that his examination of the files before coming to court revealed that the ten deliveries were made. Wicks's testimony that the invoices show ten deliveries is
[ "admissible, because it is based on regularly kept business records. ", "admissible, because Wicks has first- hand knowledge of the contents of the records. ", "inadmissible, because the records must be produced in order to prove their contents. ", "inadmissible, because the records are self-serving. " ]
2C
Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is
[ "admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement. ", "admissible, because Dan was not in custody. ", "inadmissible, because Dan's confession was a product of his mental illness and was therefore involuntary. ", "inadmissible, because under these circumstances, there was no valid waiver of Miranda warnings. " ]
0A
Leaseco owned Blackacre, a tract of 100 acres. Six years ago, Leaseco leased a one-acre parcel, Oneacre, located in the northeasterly corner of Blackacre, for a term of 30 years, to Eatco. Eatco intended to and did construct a fast-food restaurant on Oneacre. The lease provided that: 1. Eatco was to maintain Oneacre and improvements thereon, to maintain full insurance coverage on Oneacre, and to pay all taxes assessed against Oneacre. 2. Leaseco was to maintain the access roads and the parking lot areas platted on those portions of Blackacre that adjoined Oneacre and to permit the customers of Eatco to use them in common with the customers of the other commercial users of the remainder of Blackacre. 3. Eatco was to pay its share of the expenses for the off-site improvements according to a stated formula. Five years ago, Leaseco sold Oneacre to Jones, an investor; the conveyance was made subject to the lease to Eatco. However, Jones did not assume the obligations of the lease and Leaseco retained the remainder of Blackacre. Since that conveyance five years ago, Eatco has paid rent to Jones. Eatco refused to pay its formula share of the off-site improvement costs as provided in the lease. Leaseco brought an appropriate action against Eatco to recover such costs. The most likely outcome would be in favor of
[ "Leaseco, because the use of the improvements by the customers of Eatco imposes an implied obligation on Eatco. ", "Leaseco, because the conveyance of Oneacre to Jones did not terminate Eatco's covenant to contribute. ", "Eatco, because the conveyance of Oneacre to Jones terminated the privity of estate between Leaseco and Eatco. ", "Eatco, because Jones, as Eatco's landlord, has the obligation to pay the maintenance costs by necessary implication. " ]
1B
While Patty was riding her horse on what she thought was a public path, the owner of a house next to the path approached her, shaking a stick and shouting, "Get off my property." Unknown to Patty, the path on which she was riding crossed the private property of the shouting owner. When Patty explained that she thought the path was a public trail, the man cursed her, approached Patty's horse, and struck the horse with the stick. As a result of the blow, the horse reared, causing Patty to fear that she would fall. However, Patty managed to stay on the horse, and then departed. Neither Patty nor the horse suffered bodily harm. If Patty brings an action for damages against the property owner, the result should be for
[ "Patty, for trespass to her chattel property. ", "Patty, for battery and assault. ", "the defendant, because Patty suffered no physical harm. ", "the defendant, because he was privileged to exclude trespassers from his property. " ]
1B
In which of the following situations would a court applying common-law doctrine be most likely to convict Defendant of the crime charged, despite Defendant's mistake?
[ "Defendant was charged with bigamy. He married his neighbor four years after her husband was reported missing at sea. The rescued husband returns alive. A state statute provides that a person is presumed dead after five years of unexplained absence. Defendant believed the statutory period was three years.", "Defendant was charged with murder after he shot and killed a man who had extorted money from him. Defendant mistakenly thought the victim had raised his hand to shoot, when, in fact, the victim was shaking his fist at Defendant to frighten him. ", "Defendant was charged with assault with intent to rape a woman who he mistakenly believed had agreed to have sexual intercourse with him.", "Defendant was charged with burglary. He had broken into an office where he once worked and had taken a typewriter that he erroneously believed had been given to him before he was fired." ]
0A
Spender owed Midas $1,000, plus interest at 8% until paid, on a long-overdue promissory note, collection of which would become barred by the statute of limitations on June 30. On the preceding April 1, Spender and Midas both signed a writing in which Spender promised to pay the note in full on the following December 31, plus interest at 8% until that date, and Midas promised not to sue on the note in the meantime. Midas, having received some advice from his nonlawyer brother-in-law, became concerned about the legal effect of the April 1 agreement. On May 1, acting pro se as permitted by the rules of the local small claims court, he filed suit to collect the note. Assuming that there is no controlling statute, is the April 1 agreement an effective defense for Spender?
[ "Yes, because Spender's promise to pay interest until December 31 was consideration for Midas's promise not to sue. ", "Yes, because the law creates a presumption that Spender relied on Midas's promise not to sue. ", "No, because there was no consideration for Midas's promise not to sue, in that Spender was already obligated to pay $1,000 plus interest at 8% until the payment date. ", "No, because Spender's April 1 promise is enforceable with or without consideration. " ]
0A
Spender owed Midas $1,000, plus interest at 8% until paid, on a long-overdue promissory note, collection of which would become barred by the statute of limitations on June 30. On the preceding April 1, Spender and Midas both signed a writing in which Spender promised to pay the note in full on the following December 31, plus interest at 8% until that date, and Midas promised not to sue on the note in the meantime. Midas, having received some advice from his nonlawyer brother-in-law, became concerned about the legal effect of the April 1 agreement. On May 1, acting pro se as permitted by the rules of the local small claims court, he filed suit to collect the note. For this question only, assume that on January 2 of the following year Midas's suit has not come to trial, Spender has not paid the note, Midas has retained a lawyer, and the lawyer, with leave of court, amends the complaint to add a second count to enforce the promise Spender made in the April 1 agreement. Does the new count state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
[ "Yes, because Spender's failure to pay the note, plus interest, on December 31 makes Midas's breach of promise not to sue before that date no longer material. ", "Yes, because Spender's April 1 promise is enforceable by reason of his moral obligation to pay the debt. ", "No, because such relief would undermine the policy of the statute of limitations against enforcement of stale claims. ", "No, because Spender's April 1 promise was lawfully conditioned upon Midas's forbearing to sue prior to December 31. " ]
3D
Which of the following acts by the United States Senate would be constitutionally IMPROPER?
[ "The Senate decides, with the House of Representatives, that a disputed state ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment is valid. ", "The Senate determines the eligibility of a person to serve as a senator.", "The Senate appoints a commission to adjudicate finally a boundary dispute between two states.", "The Senate passes a resolution calling on the President to pursue a certain foreign policy." ]
2C
While driving his car, Plaintiff sustained injuries in a three-car collision. Plaintiff sued the drivers of the other two cars, D-l and D-2, and each defendant crossclaimed against the other for contribution. The jurisdiction has adopted a rule of pure comparative negligence and allows contribution based upon proportionate fault. The rule of joint and several liability has been retained. The jury has found that Plaintiff sustained damages in the amount of $100,000, and apportioned the causal negligence of the parties as follows: Plaintiff 40%, D-l 30%, and D-2 30%. How much, if anything, can Plaintiff collect from D-l, and how much, if anything, can D-l then collect from D-2 in contribution?
[ "Nothing, and then D-l can collect nothing from D-2. ", "$30,000, and then D-l can collect nothing from D-2. ", "$40,000, and then D-l can collect $10,000 from D-2. ", "$60,000, and then D-l can collect $30,000 from D-2. " ]
3D
Hal and Wan owned Blackacre as joint tenants, upon which was situated a two-family house. Hal lived in one of the two apartments and rented the other apartment to Tent. Hal got in a fight with Tent and injured him. Tent obtained and properly filed a judgment for $10,000 against Hal. The statute in the jurisdiction reads: Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered. Wan, who lived in a distant city, knew nothing of Tent's judgment. Before Tent took any further action, Hal died. The common-law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. Wan then learned the facts and brought an appropriate action against Tent to quiet title to Blackacre. The court should hold that Tent has
[ "a lien against the whole of Blackacre, because he was a tenant of both Hal and Wan at the time of the judgment. ", "a lien against Hal's undivided onehalf interest in Blackacre, because his judgment was filed prior to Hal's death. ", "no lien, because Wan had no actual notice of Tent's judgment until after Hal's death. ", "no lien, because Hal's death terminated the interest to which Tent's lien attached. " ]
3D
In litigation on a federal claim, Plaintiff had the burden of proving that Defendant received a notice. Plaintiff relied on the presumption of receipt by offering evidence that the notice was addressed to Defendant, properly stamped, and mailed. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that she never received the notice. Which of the following is correct?
[ "The jury must find that the notice was received.", "The jury may find that the notice was received.", "The burden shifts to Defendant to persuade the jury of nonreceipt.", "The jury must find that the notice was not received, because the presumption has been rebutted and there is uncontradicted evidence of nonreceipt. " ]
1B
In a medical malpractice suit by Payne against Dr. Dock, Payne seeks to introduce a properly authenticated photocopy of Payne's hospital chart. The chart contained a notation made by a medical resident that an aortic clamp had broken during Payne's surgery. The resident made the notation in the regular course of practice, but had no personal knowledge of the operation, and cannot remember which of the operating physicians gave him the information.The document is
[ "admissible as a record of regularly conducted activity.", "admissible as recorded recollection.", "inadmissible as a violation of the best evidence rule.", "inadmissible, because it is hearsay within hearsay. " ]
0A
Parr sued Davis for damages for physical injuries allegedly caused by Davis's violation of the federal civil rights law. The incident occurred wholly within the state of Chippewa but the case was tried in federal court. The Chippewa state code says, "The common-law privileges are preserved intact in this state." At trial, Davis called Dr. Webb, Parr's physician, to testify to confidential statements made to him by Parr in furtherance of medical treatment for the injuries allegedly caused by Davis. Parr objects, claiming a physicianpatient privilege. The court should apply
[ "state law and recognize the claim of privilege.", "federal law and recognize the claim of privilege.", "state law and reject the claim of privilege.", "federal law and reject the claim of privilege." ]
3D
In a prosecution of Dahle for assault, Wharton is called to testify that the victim, Valerian, had complained to Wharton that Dahle was the assailant. Wharton's testimony is most likely to be admitted if Wharton is
[ "a doctor, whom Valerian consulted for treatment. ", "a minister, whom Valerian consulted for counseling. ", "Valerian's husband, whom she telephoned immediately after the event. ", "a police officer, whom Valerian called on instructions from her husband. " ]
2C
Betty Bower, an adult, asked Jeff Geetus to lend her $1,000. Geetus replied that he would do so only if Bower's father, Cash, would guarantee the loan. At Bower's request, Cash mailed a signed letter to Geetus: "If you lend $1,000 to my daughter, I will repay it if she doesn't." On September 15, Geetus, having read Cash's letter, lent $1,000 to Bower, which Bower agreed to repay in installments of $100 plus accrued interest on the last day of each month beginning October 31. Cash died on September 16. Later that same day, unaware of Cash's death, Geetus mailed a letter to Cash advising that he had made the $1,000 loan to Bower on September 15. Bower did not pay the installments due on October 31, November 30, or December 31, and has informed Geetus that she will be unable to make repayments in the foreseeable future. On January 15, Geetus is entitled to a judgment against Bower for which of the following amounts?
[ "Nothing, because if he sues before the entire amount is due, he will be splitting his cause of action. ", "$300 plus the accrued interest, because Bower's breach is only a partial breach. ", "$1,000 plus the accrued interest, because Bower's unexcused failure to pay three installments is a material breach. ", "$1,000 plus the accrued interest, because the failure to pay her debts as they come due indicates that Bower is insolvent and Geetus is thereby entitled to accelerate payment of the debt. " ]
1B
Betty Bower, an adult, asked Jeff Geetus to lend her $1,000. Geetus replied that he would do so only if Bower's father, Cash, would guarantee the loan. At Bower's request, Cash mailed a signed letter to Geetus: "If you lend $1,000 to my daughter, I will repay it if she doesn't." On September 15, Geetus, having read Cash's letter, lent $1,000 to Bower, which Bower agreed to repay in installments of $100 plus accrued interest on the last day of each month beginning October 31. Cash died on September 16. Later that same day, unaware of Cash's death, Geetus mailed a letter to Cash advising that he had made the $1,000 loan to Bower on September 15. Bower did not pay the installments due on October 31, November 30, or December 31, and has informed Geetus that she will be unable to make repayments in the foreseeable future. For this question only, assume that Bower's entire $1,000 debt is due and that she has failed to repay any part of it. In an action by Geetus against Cash's estate for $1,000 plus accrued interest, which of the following, if any, will serve as (an) effective defense(s) for Cash's estate? I. There was no consideration to support Cash's promise, because he did not receive any benefit. II. Cash died before Geetus accepted his offer. III. Cash died before Geetus notified him that his offer had been accepted.
[ "I only.", "II only.", "I and III only.", "Neither I nor II nor III." ]
3D
At Darrow's trial for stealing an automobile, Darrow called a character witness, Goode, who testified that Darrow had an excellent reputation for honesty. In rebuttal, the prosecutor calls Wick to testify that he recently saw Darrow cheat on a college examination. This evidence should be
[ "admitted, because Darrow has \"opened the door\" to the prosecutor's proof of bad character evidence. ", "admitted, because the cheating involves \"dishonesty or false statement.\" ", "excluded, because it has no probative value on any issue in the case. ", "excluded, because Darrow's cheating can be inquired into only on crossexamination of Goode. " ]
3D
The Federal Family Film Enhancement Act 100. assesses an excise tax of 10% on the price of admission to public movie theaters when they show films that contain actual or simulated scenes of human sexual intercourse. Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of this federal act?
[ "The act imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.", "The act is not rationally related to any legitimate national interest.", "The act violates the equal protection concepts embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it imposes a tax on the price of admission to view certain films and not on the price of admission to view comparable live performances.", "The act imposes a tax solely on the basis of the content of speech without adequate justification and, therefore, it is prohibited by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment. " ]
3D
Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?
[ "Yes, if his rescue attempt was reasonable. ", "Yes, because the law should not discourage attempts to assist persons in helpless peril. ", "No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care. ", "No, because Pearson's rescue attempt failed and therefore did not benefit Desmond. " ]
2C
At a party for coworkers at Defendant's home, Victim accused Defendant of making advances toward his wife. Victim and his wife left the party. The next day at work, Defendant saw Victim and struck him on the head with a softdrink bottle. Victim fell into a coma and died two weeks after the incident. This jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as an assault with any weapon or dangerous implement and punishes it as a felony. It defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought or in the course of an independent felony. Defendant may be found guilty of murder
[ "only if the jury finds that Defendant intended to kill Victim.", "only if the jury finds that Defendant did not act in a rage provoked by Victim's accusations.", "if the jury finds that Defendant intended either to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.", "if the jury finds that the killing occurred in the course of an aggravated assault." ]
2C
In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?
[ "No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device. ", "No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters. ", "Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device. ", "Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed. " ]
3D
Pitt sued Dill for damages for back injuries received in a car wreck. Dill disputed the damages and sought to prove that Pitt's disability, if any, resulted from a childhood horseback riding accident. Pitt admitted the childhood accident, but contended it had no lasting effect. Pitt calls Dr. Webb, an orthopedist who had never examined Pitt, and poses to Webb a hypothetical question as to the cause of the disability that omits any reference to the horseback riding accident. The question was not provided to opposing counsel before trial. The best ground for objecting to this question would be that
[ "Webb lacked firsthand knowledge concerning Pitt's condition.", "the hypothetical question omitted a clearly significant fact.", "hypothetical questions are no longer permitted.", "sufficient notice of the hypothetical question was not given to opposing counsel before trial." ]
1B
Daggett was prosecuted for murder of Vales, whose body was found one morning in the street near Daggett's house. The state calls Witt, a neighbor, to testify that during the night before the body was found he heard Daggett's wife scream, "You killed him! You killed him!" Witt's testimony is
[ "admissible as a report of a statement of belief.", "admissible as a report of an excited utterance.", "inadmissible, because it reports a privileged spousal communication. ", "inadmissible on spousal immunity grounds, but only if the wife objects. " ]
1B
Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was struck in the rear by a car driven by First. The collision resulted from First's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout. Plaintiff's physician found that the collision had aggravated a mild osteoarthritic condition in her lower back and had brought on similar, but new, symptoms in her neck and upper back. Six months after the first accident, Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was struck in the rear by a car driven by Second. The collision resulted from Second's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout. Plaintiff's physician found that the second collision had caused a general worsening of Plaintiff's condition, marked by a significant restriction of movement and muscle spasms in her back and neck. The physician believes Plaintiff's worsened condition is permanent, and he can find no basis for apportioning responsibility for her present worsened condition between the two automobile collisions. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against First and Second. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, as outlined above, each of the defendants moved for a directed verdict in his favor on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence on which the jury could determine how much damage each defendant had caused. The jurisdiction adheres to the common-law rules regarding joint and several liability. Plaintiff's best argument in opposition to the defendants' motions would be that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's entire harm, because
[ "the wrongdoers, rather than their victim, should bear the burden of the impossibility of apportionment. ", "the defendants breached a common duty that each of them owed to Plaintiff.", "each of the defendants was the proximate cause in fact of all of Plaintiff's damages.", "the defendants are joint tortfeasors who aggravated Plaintiff's preexisting condition." ]
0A
Darby was prosecuted for sexually abusing his 13-year-old stepdaughter, Wendy. Wendy testified to Darby's conduct. On cross-examination, defense counsel asks Wendy, "Isn't it true that shortly before you complained that Darby abused you, he punished you for maliciously ruining some of his phonograph records?" The question is
[ "proper, because it relates to a possible motive for Wendy to accuse Darby falsely. ", "proper, because Wendy's misconduct is relevant to her character for veracity. ", "improper, because the incident had nothing to do with Wendy's truthfulness. ", "improper, because it falls outside the scope of direct examination. " ]
0A
David entered the county museum at a time when it was open to the public, intending to steal a Picasso etching. Once inside, he took what he thought was the etching from an unlocked display case and concealed it under his coat. However, the etching was a photocopy of an original that had been loaned to another museum. A sign over the display case containing the photocopy said that similar photocopies were available free at the entrance. David did not see the sign. Burglary in the jurisdiction is defined as "entering a building unlawfully with the intent to commit a crime." David is guilty of
[ "burglary and larceny.", "burglary and attempted larceny.", "larceny.", "attempted larceny." ]
2C
Insurance is provided in the state of Shoshone only by private companies. Although the state insurance commissioner inspects insurance companies for solvency, the state does not regulate their rates or policies. An insurance company charges higher rates for burglary insurance to residents of one part of a county in Shoshone than to residents of another section of the same county because of the different crime rates in those areas. Foster is a resident of that county who was charged the higher rate by the insurance company because of the location of her residence. Foster sues the insurance company, alleging that the differential in insurance rates unconstitutionally denies her the equal protection of the laws. Will Foster's suit succeed?
[ "Yes, because the higher crime rate in Foster's neighborhood demonstrates that the county police are not giving persons who reside there the equal protection of the laws. ", "Yes, because the insurance rate differential is inherently discriminatory. ", "No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. ", "No, because there is a rational basis for the differential in insurance rates. " ]
2C
Jack, a bank teller, was fired by Morgan, the president of the bank. Jack decided to take revenge against Morgan, but decided against attempting it personally, because he knew Morgan was protected around the clock by bank security guards. Jack knew that Chip had a violent temper and was very jealous. Jack falsely told Chip that Chip's wife, Elsie, was having an affair with Morgan. Enraged, Chip said, "What am I going to do?" Jack said, "If it were my wife, I'd just march into his office and blow his brains out." Chip grabbed a revolver and rushed to the bank. He walked into the bank, carrying the gun in his hand. One of the security guards, believing a holdup was about to occur, shot and killed Chip. If charged with murder of Chip, Jack should be found
[ "guilty, based upon extreme recklessness. ", "guilty, based upon transferred intent. ", "not guilty, because he did not intend for Chip to be shot by the security guard. ", "not guilty, because he did not shoot Chip and he was not acting in concert with the security guard. " ]
0A
Jack, a bank teller, was fired by Morgan, the president of the bank. Jack decided to take revenge against Morgan, but decided against attempting it personally, because he knew Morgan was protected around the clock by bank security guards. Jack knew that Chip had a violent temper and was very jealous. Jack falsely told Chip that Chip's wife, Elsie, was having an affair with Morgan. Enraged, Chip said, "What am I going to do?" Jack said, "If it were my wife, I'd just march into his office and blow his brains out." Chip grabbed a revolver and rushed to the bank. He walked into the bank, carrying the gun in his hand. One of the security guards, believing a holdup was about to occur, shot and killed Chip. If charged with attempted murder of Morgan, Jack should be found
[ "guilty, because he intended to kill Morgan and used Chip to carry out his plan. ", "guilty, because he was extremely reckless as to Morgan. ", "not guilty, because Morgan was never in imminent danger of being killed. ", "not guilty, because Chip, if successful, would be guilty of no more than manslaughter and an accessory cannot be guilty of a higher crime than the principal. " ]
0A
Sally told Michael she would like to have sexual intercourse with him and that he should come to her apartment that night at 7 p.m. After Michael arrived, he and Sally went into the bedroom. As Michael started to remove Sally's blouse, Sally said she had changed her mind. Michael tried to convince her to have intercourse with him, but after ten minutes of her sustained refusals, Michael left the apartment. Unknown to Michael, Sally was 15 years old. Because she appeared to be older, Michael believed her to be about 18 years old. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "A person commits rape in the second degree if he has sexual intercourse with a girl, not his wife, who is under the age of 16 years." If Michael is charged with attempting to violate this statute, he is
[ "guilty, because no mental state is required as to the element of age. ", "guilty, because he persisted after she told him she had changed her mind. ", "not guilty, because he reasonably believed she had consented and voluntarily withdrew after she told him she had changed her mind. ", "not guilty, because he did not intend to have intercourse with a girl under the age of 16. " ]
3D
Alice entered into a contract with Paul by the terms of which Paul was to paint Alice's office for $1,000 and was required to do all of the work over the following weekend so as to avoid disruption of Alice's business. For this question only, assume the following facts. If Paul had started to paint on the following Saturday morning, he could have finished before Sunday evening. However, he stayed home that Saturday morning to watch the final game of the World Series on TV, and did not start to paint until Saturday afternoon. By late Saturday afternoon, Paul realized that he had underestimated the time it would take to finish the job if he continued to work alone. Paul phoned Alice at her home and accurately informed her that it was impossible to finish the work over the weekend unless he hired a helper. He also stated that to do so would require an additional charge of $200 for the work. Alice told Paul that she apparently had no choice but to pay "whatever it takes" to get the work done as scheduled. Paul hired Ted to help finish the painting and paid Ted $200. Alice has offered to pay Paul $1,000. Paul is demanding $1,200. How much is Paul likely to recover?
[ "$1,000 only, because Alice received no consideration for her promise to pay the additional sum. ", "$1,000 only, because Alice's promise to pay \"whatever it takes\" is too uncertain to be enforceable. ", "$1,200, in order to prevent Alice's unjust enrichment. ", "$1,200, because the impossibility of Paul's completing the work alone discharged the original contract and a new contract was formed. " ]
0A
Alice entered into a contract with Paul by the terms of which Paul was to paint Alice's office for $1,000 and was required to do all of the work over the following weekend so as to avoid disruption of Alice's business. For this question only, assume the following facts. Paul commenced work on Saturday morning, and had finished half the painting by the time he quit work for the day. That night, without the fault of either party, the office building was destroyed by fire. Which of the following is an accurate statement?
[ "Both parties' contractual duties are discharged, and Paul can recover nothing from Alice. ", "Both parties' contractual duties are discharged, but Paul can recover in quasi-contract from Alice. ", "Only Paul's contractual duty is discharged, because Alice's performance (payment of the agreed price) is not impossible. ", "Only Paul's contractual duty is discharged, and Paul can recover his reliance damages from Alice. " ]
1B
The state of Erehwon has a statute providing that an unsuccessful candidate in a primary election for a party's nomination for elected public office may not become a candidate for the same office at the following general election by nominating petition or by write-in votes. Sabel sought her party's nomination for governor in the May primary election. After losing in the primary, Sabel filed nominating petitions containing the requisite number of signatures to become a candidate for the office of governor in the following general election. The chief elections officer of Erehwon refused to certify Sabel's petitions solely because of the above statute. Sabel then filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of this Erehwon statute. As a matter of constitutional law, which of the following is the proper burden of persuasion in this suit?
[ "Sabel must demonstrate that the statute is not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.", "Sabel must demonstrate that the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.", "The state must demonstrate that the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.", "The state must demonstrate that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." ]
2C
In order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is
[ "constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended. ", "constitutional, because an exemption for the issuance of tickets for travel between cities that will not be served by the new airports would deny the purchasers of all other tickets the equal protection of the laws. ", "unconstitutional, because the burden of the tax outweighs its benefits for passengers whose travel does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of the ten largest cities. ", "unconstitutional, because the tax adversely affects the fundamental right to travel. " ]
0A
Stoven, who owned Craigmont in fee simple, mortgaged Craigmont to Ulrich to secure a loan of $100,000. The mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Stoven later mortgaged Craigmont to Martin to secure a loan of $50,000. The mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Subsequently, Stoven conveyed Craigmont to Fritsch. About a year later, Fritsch borrowed $100,000 from Zorn, an elderly widow, and gave her a mortgage on Craigmont to secure repayment of the loan. Zorn did not know about the mortgage held by Martin. The understanding between Fritsch and Zorn was that Fritsch would use the $100,000 to pay off the mortgage held by Ulrich and that Zorn would, therefore, have a first mortgage on Craigmont. Zorn's mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Fritsch paid the $100,000 received from Zorn to Ulrich and obtained and recorded a release of the Ulrich mortgage. The $50,000 debt secured by the Martin mortgage was not paid when it was due, and Martin brought an appropriate action to foreclose, joining Stoven, Fritsch, and Zorn as defendants and alleging that Martin's mortgage was senior to Zorn's mortgage on Craigmont. If the court rules that Zorn's mortgage is entitled to priority over Martin's mortgage, which of the following determinations are necessary to support that ruling? I. Ulrich's mortgage was originally senior to Martin's mortgage. II. Zorn is entitled to have Ulrich's mortgage revived for her benefit, and Zorn is entitled to be subrogated to Ulrich's original position as senior mortgagee. III. There are no countervailing equities in favor of Martin.
[ "I and II only.", "I and III only.", "II and III only.", "I, II, and III. " ]
3D
One evening, Parnell had several drinks and then started to drive home. As he was proceeding down Main Boulevard, an automobile pulled out of a side street to his right. Parnell's car struck this automobile broadside. The driver of the other car was killed as a result of the collision. A breath analysis test administered after the accident showed that Parnell satisfied the legal definition of intoxication. If Parnell is prosecuted for manslaughter, his best chance for acquittal would be based on an argument that
[ "the other driver was contributorily negligent.", "the collision would have occurred even if Parnell had not been intoxicated.", "because of his intoxication he lacked the mens rea needed for manslaughter.", "driving while intoxicated requires no mens rea and so cannot be the basis for misdemeanor manslaughter." ]
1B
Seisin and Vendee, standing on Greenacre, orally agreed to its sale and purchase for $5,000, and orally marked its bounds as "that line of trees down there, the ditch that intersects them, the fence on the other side, and that street on the fourth side." In which of the following is the remedy of reformation most appropriate?
[ "As later reduced to writing, the agreement by clerical mistake included two acres that are actually beyond the fence. ", "Vendee reasonably thought that two acres beyond the fence were included in the oral agreement but Seisin did not. As later reduced to writing, the agreement included the two acres. ", "Vendee reasonably thought that the price orally agreed upon was $4,500, but Seisin did not. As later reduced to writing, the agreement said $5,000. ", "Vendee reasonably thought that a dilapidated shed backed up against the fence was to be torn down and removed as part of the agreement, but Seisin did not. As later reduced to writing, the agreement said nothing about the shed. " ]
0A
Airco operates an aircraft maintenance and repair business serving the needs of owners of private airplanes. Flyer contracted with Airco to replace the engine in his plane with a more powerful engine of foreign manufacture. Airco purchased the replacement engine through a representative of the manufacturer and installed it in Flyer's plane. A short time after it was put into use, the new engine failed, and the plane crashed into a warehouse owned by Landers, destroying the warehouse and its contents. Airco was guilty of no negligence in the procurement, inspection, or installation of the engine. The failure of the engine was caused by a defect that would not be disclosed by inspection and testing procedures available to an installer. There was no negligence on the part of Flyer, who escaped the disabled plane by parachute. Landers recovered a judgment for damages from Flyer for the destruction of his warehouse and its contents, and Flyer has asserted a claim against Airco to recover compensation on account of that liability. In that action, Flyer will recover
[ "full compensation, because the engine was defective. ", "no compensation, because Airco was not negligent. ", "contribution only, because Airco and Flyer were equally innocent. ", "no compensation, because Landers's judgment established Flyer's responsibility to Landers. " ]
0A
To encourage the growth of its population, the state of Axbridge established a program that awarded $1,000 to the parents of each child born within the state, provided that at the time of the child's birth the mother and father of the newborn were citizens of the United States. The Lills are aliens who are permanent residents of the United States and have resided in Axbridge for three years. When their first child was born two months ago, they applied for and were denied the $1,000 award by Axbridge officials on the sole ground that they are not citizens of the United States. The Lills filed suit in federal court contending that their exclusion from the award program was unconstitutional. Assume no federal statute addresses this question. In this case, the court should hold that the exclusion of aliens from the Axbridge award program is
[ "constitutional, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states plenary authority over the spending of state funds. ", "constitutional, because Axbridge has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of its population, and a rational legislature could believe that families in which both parents are United States citizens are more likely to stay in Axbridge and contribute to its future prosperity than those in which one or both of the parents are aliens. ", "unconstitutional, because strict scrutiny governs judicial review of such state classifications based on alienage, and Axbridge cannot demonstrate that this classification is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. ", "unconstitutional, because state classifications based on alienage are impermissible unless explicitly authorized by an act of Congress. " ]
2C
Olin owned Blueacre, a valuable tract of land located in York County. Olin executed a document in the form of a warranty deed of Blueacre, which was regular in all respects except that the only language designating the grantees in each of the granting and habendum clauses was: "The leaders of all the Protestant Churches in York County." The instrument was acknowledged as required by statute and promptly and properly recorded. Olin told his lawyer, but no one else, that he had made the conveyance as he did because he abhorred sectarianism in the Protestant movement and because he thought that the leaders would devote the asset to lessening sectarianism. Olin died suddenly and unexpectedly a week later, leaving a will that bequeathed and devised his entire estate to Plum. After probate of the will became final and the administration on Olin's estate was closed, Plum instituted an appropriate action to quiet title to Blueacre and properly served as defendant each Protestant church situated in the county. The only evidence introduced consisted of the chain of title under which Olin held, the probated will, the recorded deed, the fact that no person knew about the deed except Olin and his lawyer, and the conversation Olin had with his lawyer described above. In such action, judgment should be for
[ "Plum, because there is inadequate identification of grantees in the deed. ", "Plum, because the state of the evidence would not support a finding of delivery of the deed. ", "the defendants, because a deed is prima facie valid until rebutted. ", "the defendants, because recording established delivery prima facie until rebutted. " ]
0A
Old City police officers shot and killed Jones's friend as he attempted to escape arrest for an armed robbery he had committed. Jones brought suit in federal district court against the Old City Police Department and the city police officers involved, seeking only a judgment declaring unconstitutional the state statute under which the police acted. That newly enacted statute authorized the police to use deadly force when necessary to apprehend a person who has committed a felony. In his suit, Jones alleged that the police would not have killed his friend if the use of deadly force had not been authorized by the statute. The federal district court should
[ "decide the case on its merits, because it raises a substantial federal question. ", "dismiss the action, because it involves a nonjusticiable political question. ", "dismiss the action, because it does not present a case or controversy. ", "dismiss the action, because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from deciding cases of this type. " ]
2C
Dooley and Melville were charged with conspiracy to dispose of a stolen diamond necklace. Melville jumped bail and cannot be found. Proceeding to trial against Dooley alone, the prosecutor calls Wixon, Melville's girlfriend, to testify that Melville confided to her that "Dooley said I still owe him some of the money from selling that necklace." Wixon's testimony is
[ "admissible as evidence of a statement by party-opponent Dooley.", "admissible as evidence of a statement against interest by Melville.", "inadmissible, because Melville's statement was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. ", "inadmissible, because Melville is not shown to have firsthand knowledge that the necklace was stolen. " ]
1B
Pocket, a bank vice president, took substantial kickbacks to approve certain loans that later proved worthless. Upon learning of the kickbacks, Dudd, the bank's president, fired Pocket, telling him, "If you are not out of this bank in ten minutes, I will have the guards throw you out bodily." Pocket left at once. If Pocket asserts a claim against Dudd based on assault, will Pocket prevail?
[ "No, because the guards never touched Pocket. ", "No, because Dudd gave Pocket ten minutes to leave. ", "Yes, if Dudd intended to cause Pocket severe emotional distress. ", "Yes, because Dudd threatened Pocket with a harmful or offensive bodily contact. " ]
1B
Lee contracted with Mover, an interstate carrier, to ship household goods from the state of Green to his new home in the state of Pink. A federal statute provides that all liability of an interstate mover to a shipper for loss of or damage to the shipper's goods in transit is governed exclusively by the contract between them. The statute also requires the mover to offer a shipper at least two contracts with different levels of liability. In full compliance with that federal statute, Mover offered Lee a choice between two shipping agreements that provided different levels of liability on the part of Mover. The more expensive contract provided that Mover was fully liable in case of loss or damage. The less expensive contract limited Mover's liability in case of loss or damage to less than full value. Lee voluntarily signed the less expensive contract with Mover, fixing Mover's liability at less than the full value of the shipment. Mover's truck was involved in an accident in the state of Pink. The accident was entirely a product of the negligence of Mover's driver. Lee's household goods were totally destroyed. In accordance with the contract, Mover reimbursed Lee for less than the full value of the goods. Lee then brought suit against Mover under the tort law of the state of Pink claiming that he was entitled to be reimbursed for the full value of the goods. Mover filed a motion to dismiss. In this suit, the court should
[ "dismiss the case, because the federal statute governing liability of interstate carriers is the supreme law of the land and preempts state tort law. ", "dismiss the case, because the contractual relationship between Lee and Mover is governed by the obligation of contracts clause of the Constitution. ", "deny the motion to dismiss, because the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires that state tort law be given effect. ", "deny the motion to dismiss, because it is unconstitutional for a federal statute to authorize Mover to contract out of any degree of liability for its own negligence." ]
0A
Metro City operates a cemetery pursuant to a city ordinance. The ordinance requires the operation of the city cemetery to be supported primarily by revenues derived from the sale of cemetery lots to individuals. The ordinance further provides that the purchase of a cemetery lot entitles the owner to perpetual care of the lot, and entitles the owner to erect on the lot, at the owner's expense, a memorial monument or marker of the owner's choice, subject to certain size restrictions. The Metro City ordinance requires the city to maintain the cemetery, including mowing the grass, watering flowers, and plowing snow, and provides for the expenditure of city tax funds for such maintenance if revenues from the sale of cemetery lots are insufficient. Although cemetery lots are sold at full fair market value, which includes the current value of perpetual care, the revenue from the sale of such lots has been insufficient in recent years to maintain the cemetery. As a result, a small amount of city tax funds has also been used for that purpose. A group of Metro City taxpayers bringssuit against Metro City challenging the constitutionality of the city ordinance insofar as it permits the owner of a cemetery lot to erect a religious memorial monument or marker on his or her lot. Is this suit likely to be successful?
[ "No, because only a small amount of city tax funds has been used to maintain the cemetery. ", "No, because the purpose of the ordinance is entirely secular, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. ", "Yes, because city maintenance of any religious object is a violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. ", "Yes, because no compelling governmental interest justifies authorizing private persons to erect religious monuments or markers in a city-operated cemetery. " ]
1B
Dexter was tried for the homicide of a girl whose strangled body was found beside a remote logging road with her hands taped together. After Dexter offered evidence of alibi, the state calls Wilma to testify that Dexter had taped her hands and tried to strangle her in the same location two days before the homicide but that she escaped. The evidence is
[ "admissible, as tending to show Dexter is the killer. ", "admissible, as tending to show Dexter's violent nature. ", "inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. ", "inadmissible, because it is unfairly prejudicial. " ]
0A
Blackacre was a tract of 100 acres retained by Byron, the owner, after he had developed the adjoining 400 acres as a residential subdivision. Byron had effectively imposed restrictive covenants on each lot in the 400 acres. Chaney offered Byron a good price for a five-acre tract located in a corner of Blackacre far away from the existing 400-acre residential subdivision. Byron conveyed the fiveacre tract to Chaney and imposed the same restrictive covenants on the five-acre tract as he had imposed on the lots in the adjoining 400 acres. Byron further covenanted that when he sold the remaining 95 acres of Blackacre he would impose the same restrictive covenants in the deed or deeds for the 95 acres. Byron's conveyance to Chaney was promptly and properly recorded. However, shortly thereafter, Byron conveyed the remaining 95 acres to Dart for $100,000 by a deed that made no mention of any restrictive covenants. Dart had no actual knowledge of the restrictive covenants in Chaney's deed. Dart now proposes to build an industrial park which would violate such restrictive covenants if they are applicable. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." In an appropriate action by Chaney to enforce the restrictive covenants against Dart's 95-acre tract, if Dart wins it will be because
[ "the deed imposing the restrictions was not in the chain of title for the 95 acres when Dart bought.", "the disparity in acreage means that the covenant can only be personal to Byron.", "negative reciprocal covenants are not generally recognized.", "a covenant to impose restrictions is an illegal restraint on alienation." ]
0A
A grand jury indicted Alice on a charge of arson, and a valid warrant was issued for her arrest. Paul, a police officer, arrested Alice and informed her of what the warrant stated. However, hoping that Alice might say something incriminating, he did not give her Miranda warnings. He placed her in the back seat of his patrol car and was driving her to the police station when she said, "Look, I didn't mean to burn the building; it was an accident. I was just burning some papers in a wastebasket." At the station, after being given Miranda warnings, Alice stated she wished to remain silent and made no other statements. Alice moved to suppress the use of her statement to Paul as evidence on two grounds: first, that the statement was acquired without giving Miranda warnings, and second, that the police officer had deliberately elicited her incriminating statement after she was in custody. As to Alice's motion to suppress, the court should
[ "deny the motion.", "grant the motion only on the basis of the first ground stated.", "grant the motion only on the basis of the second ground stated.", "grant the motion on either ground." ]
0A
Debtor's $1,000 contractual obligation to Aunt was due on July 1. On the preceding June 15, Aunt called Niece and said, "As my birthday gift to you, you may collect on July 1 the $1,000 Debtor owes me." Aunt also called Debtor and told him to pay the $1,000 to Niece on July 1. On July 1, Debtor, saying that he did not like Niece and wouldn't pay anything to her, paid the $1,000 to Aunt, who accepted it without objection. Will Niece succeed in an action for $1,000 against Debtor?
[ "Yes, because Aunt had effectively assigned the $1,000 debt to her. ", "Yes, because Aunt's calls to Niece and Debtor effected a novation. ", "No, because Aunt's acceptance of the $1,000, without objection, was in effect the revocation of a gratuitous assignment. ", "No, because Debtor cannot be compelled to render performance to an assignee whom he finds personally objectionable. " ]
2C
The School Board of the city of Rulb issued a rule authorizing public school principals to punish, after a hearing, students who engage in violations of the board's student behavior code. According to the rule, violators of the behavior code may be punished in a variety of ways including being required to sit in designated school confinement rooms during all school hours, with their hands clasped in front of them, for a period of up to 15 school days. Teddy, a fifth grade student in Rulb Elementary School, was charged with placing chewed bubble gum on a classmate's chair, a violation of the student behavior code. He had never violated the code before and was otherwise an attentive and well-behaved student. After a hearing on the charges, Teddy's principal determined that Teddy had violated the behavior code in the manner charged, and ordered Teddy to spend the next 15 school days in the school confinement room with his hands clasped in front of him. Teddy's parents file suit in federal court challenging, solely on constitutional grounds, the principal's action in ordering Teddy to spend the next 15 school days in the school confinement room with his hands clasped in front of him. Which of the following arguments would be most helpful to Teddy's parents in this suit?
[ "Because the school board rule limits the freedom of movement of students and subjects them to bodily restraint, it denies them a privilege and immunity of citizenship guaranteed them by Article IV, Section 2. ", "Because the school board rule is substantially overbroad in relation to any legitimate purpose, it constitutes a facial violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ", "Because application of the school board rule in this case denies the student freedom of movement and subjects him to bodily restraint in a manner grossly disproportionate to his offense and circumstances, it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ", "Because the school board rule is enforced initially by administrative rather than judicial proceedings, it constitutes a prohibited bill of attainder. " ]
2C
Davidson and Smythe were charged with burglary of a warehouse. They were tried separately. At Davidson's trial, Smythe testified that he saw Davidson commit the burglary. While Smythe is still subject to recall as a witness, Davidson calls Smythe's cellmate, Walton, to testify that Smythe said, "I broke into the warehouse alone because Davidson was too drunk to help." This evidence of Smythe's statement is
[ "admissible as a declaration against penal interest.", "admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.", "inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ", "inadmissible, because the statement is not clearly corroborated. " ]
1B
On March 1, Hotz Apartments, Inc., received from Koolair, Inc., a letter offering to sell Hotz 1,200 window air conditioners suitable for the apartments in Hotz's buildings. The Koolair offer stated that it would remain open until March 20, but that Hotz's acceptance must be received on or before that date. On March 16, Hotz posted a letter of acceptance. On March 17, Koolair telegraphed Hotz to advise that it was revoking the offer. The telegram reached Hotz on March 17, but Hotz's letter did not arrive at Koolair's address until March 21. As of March 22, which of the following is a correct statement?
[ "The telegram revoking the offer was effective upon receipt.", "The offer was revocable at any time for lack of consideration.", "The mail was the only authorized means of revocation.", "Under the terms of Koolair's offer, Hotz's attempted acceptance was ineffective. " ]
3D
A statute of the state of Illitron declares that after five years of continuous service in their positions all state employees, including faculty members at the state university, are entitled to retain their positions during "good behavior." The statute also contains a number of procedural provisions. Any state employee who is dismissed after that five-year period must be given reasons for the dismissal before it takes effect. In addition, such an employee must, upon request, be granted a postdismissal hearing before an administrative board to seek reinstatement and back pay. The statute precludes any other hearing or opportunity to respond to the charges. That post-dismissal hearing must occur within six months after the dismissal takes effect. The burden of proof at such a hearing is on the state, and the board may uphold the dismissal only if it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. An employee who is dissatisfied with a decision of the board after a hearing may appeal its decision to the state courts. The provisions of this statute are inseverable. A teacher who had been employed continuously for seven years as a faculty member at the state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, she was informed that she was being dismissed because of a charge that she accepted a bribe from a student in return for raising the student's final grade in her course. At that time she requested an immediate hearing to contest the propriety of her dismissal. Three months after her dismissal, she was granted a hearing before the state administrative board. The board upheld her dismissal, finding that the charge against her was supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. The faculty member did not appeal the decision of the state administrative board to the Illitron state courts. Instead, she sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to the effect that the state statute prescribing the procedures for her dismissal is unconstitutional. In this case, the federal district court should
[ "dismiss the suit, because a claim that a state statute is unconstitutional is not ripe for adjudication by a federal court until all judicial remedies in state courts provided for by state law have been exhausted. ", "hold the statute unconstitutional, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the facts constituting good cause for termination of a state employee. ", "hold the statute unconstitutional, because a state may not ordinarily deprive an employee of a property interest in a job without giving the employee an opportunity for some kind of a predismissal hearing to respond to the charges against that employee. ", "hold the statute constitutional, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles state employees who have a right to their jobs during good behavior only to a statement of reasons for their dismissal and an opportunity for a post-dismissal hearing. " ]
2C
Dorfman's dog ran into the street in front of Dorfman's home and began chasing cars. Peterson, who was driving a car on the street, swerved to avoid hitting the dog, struck a telephone pole, and was injured. If Peterson asserts a claim against Dorfman, will Peterson prevail?
[ "Yes, because Dorfman's dog was a cause in fact of Peterson's injury. ", "Yes, if Dorfman knew his dog had a propensity to chase cars and did not restrain it. ", "No, because a dog is a domestic animal. ", "No, unless a statute or ordinance made it unlawful for the owner to allow a dog to be unleashed on a public street. " ]
1B
Dower, an inexperienced driver, borrowed a car from Puder, a casual acquaintance, for the express purpose of driving it several blocks to the local drug store. Instead, Dower drove the car, which then was worth $12,000, 100 miles to Other City. While Dower was driving in Other City the next day, the car was hit by a negligently driven truck and sustained damage that will cost $3,000 to repair. If repaired, the car will be fully restored to its former condition. If Puder asserts a claim against Dower based on conversion, Puder should recover a judgment for
[ "$12,000.00 ", "$3,000.00 ", "$3,000 plus damages for the loss of the use of the car during its repair. ", "nothing, unless Dower was negligent and his negligence was a substantial cause of the collision. " ]
0A
Miller's, a department store, had experienced a growing incidence of shoplifting. At the store's request, the police concealed Best, a woman who was a detective, at a vantage point above the women's apparel fitting rooms where she could see into these rooms, where customers tried on clothes. Detective Best saw Davis enter a fitting room, stuff a dress into her pocketbook, leave the fitting room, and start for the street door. By prearranged signal, Best notified another police officer near the door, who detained Davis as Davis started to go out into the street. Davis was placed under arrest, and the dress was retrieved from her purse. Davis is charged with shoplifting. Her motion to prevent the introduction of the dress into evidence will be
[ "granted, because the police should have secured a search warrant to search her bag. ", "granted, because a customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy while using a department store fitting room. ", "denied, because the search and seizure were made incident to a valid arrest based on probable cause. ", "denied, because Detective Best could see into the room and thus Davis's activities were legitimately in plain view. " ]
1B
Deland operates a bank courier service that uses armored trucks to transport money and securities. One of Deland's armored trucks was parked illegally, too close to a street intersection. Pilcher, driving his car at an excessive speed, skidded into the armored truck while trying to make a turn. The truck was not damaged, but Pilcher was injured. Pilcher has brought an action against Deland to recover damages for his loss resulting from the accident. The jurisdiction follows a pure comparative negligence rule. In this action, Pilcher should recover
[ "nothing, because Deland was not an active or efficient cause of Pilcher's loss. ", "nothing, if Deland was less negligent than Pilcher. ", "his entire loss, reduced by a percentage that reflects the negligence attributed to Pilcher. ", "his entire loss, because Deland's truck suffered no damage. " ]
2C
Roberts, a professional motorcycle rider, put on a performance in a privately owned stadium during which he leaped his motorcycle over 21 automobiles. Spectators were charged $5 each to view the jump and were prohibited from using cameras. However, the local television station filmed the whole event from within the stadium without the knowledge or consent of Roberts and showed the film in its entirety on the evening newscast that day. Roberts thereafter brought suit to recover damages from the station for the admittedly unauthorized filming and broadcasting of the act. The television station raised only constitutional defenses. The court should
[ "hold against Roberts, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments authorize press coverage of newsworthy entertainment events. ", "hold against Roberts, because under the First and Fourteenth Amendments news broadcasts are absolutely privileged. ", "find the station liable, because its action deprives Roberts of his property without due process. ", "find the station liable, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not deprive an entertainer of the commercial value of his or her performances. " ]
3D
Stirrup, a rancher, and Equinox, a fancier of horses, signed the following writing: "For $5,000, Stirrup will sell to Equinox a gray horse that Equinox may choose from among the grays on Stirrup's ranch." Equinox refused to accept delivery of a gray horse timely tendered by Stirrup or to choose among those remaining, on the ground that during their negotiations Stirrup had orally agreed to include a saddle, worth $100, and also to give Equinox the option to choose a gray or a brown horse. Equinox insisted on one of Stirrup's brown horses, but Stirrup refused to part with any of his browns or with the saddle as demanded by Equinox. If Equinox sues Stirrup for damages and seeks to introduce evidence of the alleged oral agreement, the court probably will
[ "admit the evidence as to both the saddle and the option to choose a brown horse.", "admit the evidence as to the saddle but not the option to choose a brown horse.", "admit the evidence as to the option to choose a brown horse but not the promise to include the saddle.", "not admit any of the evidence." ]
1B
Parker sues Dix for breach of a promise made in a letter allegedly written by Dix to Parker. Dix denies writing the letter. Which of the following would NOT be a sufficient basis for admitting the letter into evidence?
[ "Testimony by Parker that she is familiar with Dix's signature and recognizes it on the letter.", "Comparison by the trier of fact of the letter with an admitted signature of Dix.", "Opinion testimony of a nonexpert witness based upon familiarity acquired in order to authenticate the signature.", "Evidence that the letter was written in response to one written by Parker to Dix." ]
2C
Green contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to Farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to Farmer on the same date. On January 15, Green notified Farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, Green would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured Farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. When Green tendered the deed and possession on January 30, Farmer refused to accept either, and refused to pay the $500,000. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000. Will Green probably succeed in an action against Farmer for specific performance?
[ "Yes, because the court will excuse the delay in tender on the ground that there was a temporary impossibility caused by the tenant's holding over. ", "Yes, because time is ordinarily not of the essence in a land-sale contract. ", "No, because Green breached by failing to tender the deed and possession on January 15. ", "No, because Green's remedy at law for monetary relief is adequate. " ]
1B
Green contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to Farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to Farmer on the same date. On January 15, Green notified Farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, Green would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured Farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. When Green tendered the deed and possession on January 30, Farmer refused to accept either, and refused to pay the $500,000. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000. For this question only, make the following assumptions. On January 30, Farmer accepted a conveyance and possession of Greenacre and paid the $500,000 purchase price, but notified Green that he was reserving any rights he might have to damages caused by Green's breach. Farmer intended to use the land for raising cattle and had entered into a contract for the purchase of 500 head of cattle to be delivered to Greenacre on January 15. Because he did not have possession of Greenacre on that date, he had to rent another pasture at a cost of $2,000 to graze the cattle for 15 days. Green had no reason to know that Farmer intended to use Greenacre for raising cattle or that he was purchasing cattle to be grazed on Greenacre. In an action by Farmer against Green for damages, Farmer is entitled to recover
[ "nothing, because by paying the purchase price on January 30, he waived whatever cause of action he may have had. ", "nominal damages only, because the market value of the land exceeded the contract price. ", "$2,500 only (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days). ", "$2,500 (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days), plus $2,000 (the cost of grazing the cattle elsewhere for 15 days). " ]
2C
Able, owner of Blackacre and Whiteacre, two adjoining parcels, conveyed Whiteacre to Baker and covenanted in the deed to Baker that when he, Able, sold Blackacre he would impose restrictive covenants to prohibit uses that would compete with the filling station that Baker intended to construct and operate on Whiteacre. The deed was not recorded. Baker constructed and operated a filling station on Whiteacre and then conveyed Whiteacre to Dodd, who continued the filling station use. The deed did not refer to the restrictive covenant and was promptly and properly recorded. Able then conveyed Blackacre to Egan, who knew about Able's covenant with Baker to impose a covenant prohibiting the filling station use but nonetheless completed the transaction when he noted that no such covenant was contained in Able's deed to him. Egan began to construct a filling station on Blackacre. Dodd brought an appropriate action to enjoin Egan from using Blackacre for filling station purposes. If Dodd prevails, it will be because
[ "Egan had actual knowledge of the covenant to impose restrictions.", "Egan is bound by the covenant because of the doctrine of negative reciprocal covenants.", "business-related restrictive covenants are favored in the law.", "Egan has constructive notice of the possibility of the covenant resulting from the circumstances." ]
0A
While walking on a public sidewalk, Anson was struck by a piece of lumber that fell from the roof of Bruce's house. Bruce had hired Chase to make repairs to his roof, and the lumber fell through negligence on Chase's part. If Anson brings an action against Bruce to recover damages for the injury caused to him by Chase's negligence, will Anson prevail?
[ "Yes, under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. ", "Yes, if Chase's act was a breach of a nondelegable duty owed by Bruce to Anson. ", "No, if Chase was an independent contractor rather than Bruce's servant. ", "No, if Bruce exercised reasonable care in hiring Chase to do the repair work. " ]
1B
Owen contracted to sell Vacantacre to Perry. The written contract required Owen to provide evidence of marketable title of record, specified a closing date, stated that "time is of the essence," and provided that at closing, Owen would convey by warranty deed. Perry paid Owen $2,000 earnest money toward the $40,000 purchase price. The title evidence showed that an undivided one-eighth interest in Vacantacre was owned by Alice. Perry immediately objected to title and said he would not close on Owen's title. Owen responded, accurately, that Alice was his daughter who would be trekking in Nepal until two weeks after the specified closing date. He said that she would gladly deed her interest upon her return, and that meanwhile his deed warranting title to all of Vacantacre would fully protect Perry. Owen duly tendered his deed but Perry refused to close. Perry brought an appropriate action to recover the $2,000 earnest money promptly after the specified closing date. Owen counterclaimed for specific performance, tendering a deed from himself and Alice, who had by then returned. The court will hold for
[ "Owen, because Alice's deed completing the transfer was given within a reasonable time. ", "Owen, because his warranty deed would have given Perry adequate interim protection. ", "Perry, because Owen's title was not marketable and time was of the essence. ", "Perry, because under the circumstances the earnest money amount was excessive." ]
2C
A statute provides: A person commits the crime of rape if he has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent. Dunbar is charged with the rape of Sally. At trial, Sally testifies to facts sufficient for a jury to find that Dunbar had sexual intercourse with her, that she did not consent, and that the two were not married. Dunbar testifies in his own defense that he believed that Sally had consented to sexual intercourse and that she was his common-law wife. At the conclusion of the case, the court instructed the jury that in order to find Dunbar guilty of rape, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had sexual intercourse with Sally without her consent. The court also instructed the jury that it should find the defendant not guilty if it found either that Sally was Dunbar's wife or that Dunbar reasonably believed that Sally had consented to the sexual intercourse, but that the burden of persuasion as to these issues was on the defendant. The jury found Dunbar guilty, and Dunbar appealed, contending that the court's instructions on the issues of whether Sally was his wife and whether he reasonably believed she had consented violated his constitutional rights. Dunbar's constitutional rights were
[ "violated by the instructions as to both issues.", "violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife, but not violated by the instruction on belief as to consent. ", "violated by the instruction on belief as to consent, but not violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife. ", "not violated by either part of the instructions." ]
1B
Star, who played the lead role in a television soap opera, was seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by Danton's negligent driving. As a consequence of Star's injury, the television series was canceled, and Penn, a supporting actor, was laid off. In an action against Danton, can Penn recover for his loss of income attributable to the accident?
[ "Yes, because Danton's negligence was the cause in fact of Penn's loss. ", "Yes, unless Penn failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate his loss. ", "No, unless Danton should have foreseen that by injuring Star he would cause harm to Penn. ", "No, because Danton's liability does not extend to economic loss to Penn that arises solely from physical harm to Star. " ]
3D
On December 1, Broker contracted with Collecta to sell her one of a certain type of rare coin for $12,000, delivery and payment to occur on the next March 1. To fulfill that contract, and without Collecta's knowledge, Broker contracted on January 1 to purchase for $10,000 a specimen of that type coin from Hoarder, delivery and payment to occur on February 1. The market price of such coins had unexpectedly fallen to $8,000 by February 1, when Hoarder tendered the coin and Broker repudiated. On February 25, the market in such coins suddenly reversed and had stabilized at $12,000 on March 1. Broker, however, had failed to obtain a specimen of the coin and repudiated his agreement with Collecta when she tendered the $12,000 agreed price on March 1. Later that day, after learning by chance of Broker's dealing with Collecta, Hoarder telephoned Collecta and said: "Listen, Broker probably owes me at least $2,000 in damages for refusing wrongfully to buy my coin for $10,000 on February 1 when the market was down to $8,000. But I'm in good shape in view of the market's recovery since then, and I think you ought to get after the so-and-so." If Collecta immediately sues Broker for his breach of the Broker-Hoarder contract, which of the following will the court probably decide?
[ "Broker wins, because Collecta, if a beneficiary at all of the Broker-Hoarder contract, was only an incidental beneficiary. ", "Broker wins, because as of March 1 neither Hoarder nor Collecta had sustained any damage from Broker's repudiation of both contracts. ", "Collecta wins, because she was an intended beneficiary of the BrokerHoarder contract, under which damages for Broker's repudiation became fixed on February 1. ", "Collecta wins, because she took an effective assignment of Hoarder's claim for damages against Broker when Hoarder suggested that Collecta \"get after the so-and-so.\" " ]
0A
In a prosecution of Dale for murdering Vera, Dale testified that the killing had occurred in self defense when Vera tried to shoot him. In rebuttal, the prosecution seeks to call Walter, Vera's father, to testify that the day before the killing, Vera told Walter that she loved Dale so much she could never hurt him. Walter's testimony is
[ "admissible within the hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind.", "admissible, because Vera is unavailable as a witness. ", "inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception.", "inadmissible, because Vera's character is not an issue. " ]
0A
For an agreed price of $20 million, Bildko, Inc., contracted with Venture to design and build on Venture's commercial plot a 15-story office building. In excavating for the foundation and underground utilities, Bildko encountered a massive layer of granite at a depth of 15 feet. By reasonable safety criteria, the building's foundation required a minimum excavation of 25 feet. When the contract was made, neither Venture nor Bildko was aware of the subsurface granite, for the presence of which neither party had hired a qualified expert to test. Claiming accurately that removal of enough granite to permit the construction as planned would cost him an additional $3 million and a probable net loss on the contract of $2 million, Bildko refused to proceed with the work unless Venture would promise to pay an additional $2.5 million for the completed building. If Venture refuses and sues Bildko for breach of contract, which of the following will the court probably decide?
[ "Bildko is excused under the modern doctrine of supervening impossibility, which includes severe impracticability. ", "Bildko is excused, because the contract is voidable on account of the parties' mutual mistake concerning an essential underlying fact. ", "Venture prevails, because Bildko assumed the risk of encountering subsurface granite that was unknown to Venture. ", "Venture prevails, unless subsurface granite was previously unknown anywhere in the vicinity of Venture's construction site. " ]
2C
Owens owned Whiteacre, a dwelling house situated on a two-acre lot in an area zoned for single-family residential uses only. Although it was not discernible from the outside, Whiteacre had been converted by Owens from a single-family house to a structure that contained three separate apartments, in violation of the zoning ordinance. Further, the conversion was in violation of the building code. Owens and Peters entered into a valid written contract for the purchase and sale of Whiteacre. The contract provided that Owens was to convey to Peters a marketable title. The contract was silent as to zoning. Peters had fully inspected Whiteacre. Prior to the closing, Peters learned that Whiteacre did not conform to the zoning ordinance and refused to close although Owens was ready, willing, and able to perform his contract obligations. Owens brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Peters. In that action, Owens should
[ "win, because Owens was able to convey a marketable title. ", "win, because Peters was charged with knowledge of the zoning ordinance prior to entering the contract. ", "lose, because the illegal conversion of Whiteacre creates the risk of litigation. ", "lose, because the illegal conversion of Whiteacre was done by Owens rather than by a predecessor. " ]
2C
Morten was the general manager and chief executive officer of the Woolen Company, a knitting mill. Morten delegated all operational decision making to Crouse, the supervising manager of the mill. The child labor laws in the jurisdiction provide, "It is a violation of the law for one to employ a person under the age of 17 years for full-time labor." Without Morten's knowledge, Crouse hired a number of 15- and 16-year-olds to work at the mill full time. He did not ask their ages and they did not disclose them. Crouse could have discovered their ages easily by asking for identification, but he did not do so because he was not aware of the law and believed that company policy was to hire young people. If the statute is interpreted to create strict liability and Crouse is charged with violating it, Crouse is
[ "guilty, because he should have inquired as to the ages of the children. ", "guilty, because he hired the children. ", "not guilty, because in law the Woolen Company, not Crouse, is the employer of the children. ", "not guilty, because he believed he was following company policy and was not aware of the violation. " ]
1B
Ann's three-year-old daughter, Janet, was killed in an automobile accident. At Ann's direction, Janet's body was taken to a mausoleum for interment. Normally, the mausoleum's vaults are permanently sealed with marble plates secured by "tamper-proof" screws. After Janet's body was placed in the mausoleum, however, only a fiberglass panel secured by caulking compound covered her vault. About a month later, Janet's body was discovered in a cemetery located near the mausoleum. It had apparently been left there by vandals who had taken it from the mausoleum. As a result of this experience, Ann suffered great emotional distress. If Ann sues the mausoleum for the damages arising from her emotional distress, will she prevail?
[ "No, because Ann experienced no threat to her own safety. ", "No, unless the mausoleum's behavior was extreme and outrageous. ", "Yes, if the mausoleum failed to use reasonable care to safeguard the body. ", "Yes, unless Ann suffered no physical harm as a consequence of her emotional distress. " ]
2C
Wastrel, a notorious spendthrift who was usually broke for that reason, received the following letter from his Uncle Bullion, a wealthy and prudent man: "I understand you're in financial difficulties again. I promise to give you $5,000 on your birthday next month, but you'd better use it wisely or you'll never get another dime from me." Wastrel thereupon signed a contract with a car dealer to purchase a $40,000 automobile and to make a $5,000 down payment on the day after his birthday. If Wastrel sues Bullion for $5,000 after the latter learned of the car-purchase contract and then repudiated his promise, which of the following is Bullion's best defense?
[ "A promise to make a gift in the future is not enforceable.", "Reliance by the promisee on a promise to make a future gift does not make the promise enforceable unless the value of the promised gift is substantially equivalent to the promisee's loss by reliance.", "Reliance by the promisee on a promise to make a future gift does not make the promise enforceable unless that reliance also results in an economic benefit to the promisor.", "Reliance by the promisee on a promise to make a future gift does not make the promise enforceable unless injustice can be avoided only by such enforcement." ]
3D
Congress passed a bill prohibiting the President from granting a pardon to any person who had not served at least one-third of the sentence imposed by the court which convicted that person. The President vetoed the bill, claiming that it was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Congress passed it over his veto by a two-thirds vote of each house. This act of Congress is
[ "constitutional, because it was enacted over the President's veto by a two-thirds vote of each house. ", "constitutional, because it is a necessary and proper means of carrying out the powers of Congress. ", "unconstitutional, because it interferes with the plenary power of the President to grant pardons. ", "unconstitutional, because a Presidential veto based upon constitutional grounds may be overridden only with the concurrence of three-fourths of the state legislatures. " ]
2C
Defendant is on trial for the crime of obstructing justice by concealing records subpoenaed May 1, in a government investigation. The government calls Attorney to testify that on May 3, Defendant asked him how to comply with the regulations regarding the transfer of records to a safe-deposit box in Mexico. The testimony of Attorney is
[ "privileged, because it relates to conduct outside the jurisdiction of the United States. ", "privileged, because an attorney is required to keep the confidences of his clients. ", "not privileged, provided Attorney knew of the concededly illegal purpose for which the advice was sought. ", "not privileged, whether or not Attorney knew of the concededly illegal purpose for which the advice was sought. " ]
3D
Prad entered Drug Store to make some purchases. As he was searching the aisles for various items, he noticed a display card containing automatic pencils. The display card was on a high shelf behind a cashier's counter. Prad saw a sign on the counter that read, "No Admittance, Employees Only." Seeing no clerks in the vicinity to help him, Prad went behind the counter to get a pencil. A clerk then appeared behind the counter and asked whether she could help him. He said he just wanted a pencil and that he could reach the display card himself. The clerk said nothing further. While reaching for the display card, Prad stepped sideways into an open shaft and fell to the basement, ten feet below. The clerk knew of the presence of the open shaft, but assumed incorrectly that Prad had noticed it. Prad sued Drug Store to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the fall. The jurisdiction has adopted a rule of pure comparative negligence, and it follows traditional common-law rules governing the duties of a land possessor. Will Prad recover a judgment against Drug Store?
[ "No, because Prad was a trespasser. ", "No, unless Prad's injuries resulted from the defendant's willful or wanton misconduct. ", "Yes, because the premises were defective with respect to a public invitee. ", "Yes, if the clerk had reason to believe that Prad was unaware of the open shaft. " ]
3D
A statute in the jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as knowingly killing another person after deliberation. Deliberation is defined as "cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief." Murder in the second degree is defined as "all other murder at common law except felony-murder." Felony-murder is murder in the third degree. Manslaughter is defined by the common law. At 2 a.m., Duncan held up an all-night liquor store using an assault rifle. During the holdup, two police cars with flashing lights drove up in front of the store. In order to create a situation where the police would hesitate to come into the store (and thus give Duncan a chance to escape out the back) Duncan fired several rounds through the front window of the store. Duncan then ran out the back but upon discovering another police car there, surrendered quietly. One of the shots he fired while in the store struck and killed a burglar who was stealing items from a closed store across the street. The most serious degree of criminal homicide Duncan is guilty of is
[ "murder in the first degree.", "murder in the second degree.", "murder in the third degree.", "manslaughter." ]
1B