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Urus-Martan | 27. After that the first applicant went to the district department of the FSB and managed to speak to one of the officers, Mr K., and the deputy head of the department, named Sergey. They advised the first applicant to search for his son in the |
Europe | 22. The court heard the applicants, four witnesses (who had watched the rehearsals) produced by the applicants, namely, P.M. a consultant psychiatrist, J.S. an educator, child psychologist and actress, K.D. a tourism marketing executive and actor, a priest who was a former film classifier for the Archdiocese of Malta, as well as the author of the play. The latter testified that the play had been performed uninterruptedly in all parts of the world and extensively in |
Schengen | 20. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining his claims and adding that the spelling of his name differed in the various documents because the transcriptions from Arabic had been made by different persons. He had his passport but had been afraid to hand it over to the Migration Board for fear of being returned to Libya. His relationship with N. was serious; they were married and lived together. It would also become known in Libya that he was homosexual if he were to apply for a residence permit from there, which would expose him to a real risk of persecution and ill-treatment. Moreover, he would not be able to apply for a residence permit from Libya since Sweden had a consulate only in Benghazi. He submitted a copy of his passport, from which it appeared that he had been granted a |
the Urus-Martanovskiy District | 65. With a view to examining the possibility that representatives of the State had been involved in the applicant's son's abduction, on unspecified dates the investigating authorities made enquires with various State bodies, including the commander of military unit no. 6779, the military commander of |
premises | 66. When questioned by the trial court, the two taxi drivers who had signed the report of 25 February 2004 on the handing in of the PSM pistol by the woman and her son stated that they had been taken to the main police headquarters under coercion, on pain of having their driving licences confiscated by the police, in order to take part as witnesses in an investigative procedure. They were told by an officer that a woman and a child were going to bring in a weapon, and they would have to confirm that fact by signing a record. They had waited in vain for an hour and a half for the woman and child to arrive. The two policemen had then taken a weapon equipped with a silencer out of a drawer in a table, explaining to the taxi drivers that it was the weapon in question. The police officers had drawn up a report saying that a woman and child with non-Georgian names had brought the weapon to the station. The two taxi drivers had signed the fabricated document in order to get their driving licences back and leave the |
Doktorlar Sitesi | 99. The Report contains one page on which information on Yusuf Ekinci's personal background and activities is set out. This pages states:
“Yusuf Ekinci
Son of Kamil, and born in Lice-Diyarbakır in 1942.
In June 1963 he was a second year student at the Ankara University, Faculty of Law. He was known as a pro-Kurdish socialist. In December 1963 he was a member of the “youth branch” of the TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkish Workers Party) which was established in Ankara. He was further the editor of the “Emekçi” newspaper, the official bulletin of that party.
After his graduation in April 1969, he went to Diyarbakır in order to finish his traineeship. In Diyarbakır he participated in an organised demonstration against the Law on the Protection of the Constitution.
He was detained on remand in 1970 <or> 1971 and subsequently prosecuted on charges of involvement in pro-Kurdish activities in the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Grouping (Doğu Devrimci Kültür Ocakları).
As from 1972 he worked as a lawyer in Diyarbakır, where he tried to direct the Kurdish movement.
In April 1971, during the 4th TIP General Assembly, he declared that he opposed the ideas of his brother Tarık Ziya Ekinci, and added that his own objective was the creation of Kurdistan and that he was a Kurdish nationalist.
Since 1984 he worked as a lawyer in Ankara.
In February 1990 he was expelled from the SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti - Social Democrat People's Party). He became involved in establishing a Marxist party together with M. Ali Eren.
He was found dead on 25 February 1994 close to the |
Gajeva | 16. Following an appeal by the applicant, by a decision of 20 May 1983 the relevant second-instance administrative authority quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case. It held that the applicant retained the status of a holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. Instead of seeking her eviction, the first-instance housing authority should have followed the procedure stipulated for situations where a tenant held a specially protected tenancy in respect of two flats (see paragraph 48 below). That procedure provided for the possibility of exchanging the two flats for a single one if neither flat satisfied the housing needs of the tenant’s household (but would if taken together). It instructed the first-instance housing authority to examine whether the flats in |
the Urus-Martan District | 52. The Government further submitted that the investigating authorities had granted the status of victim to the applicant, but failed to specify the date. According to them, the applicant had been questioned on 30 June and 18 October 2001 and then at some point in late 2005. During her interview, the applicant had stated that, following her son’s apprehension, she had found out from the head of the local administration that he was being held in the Urus-Martan Division of the FSB and would be released three days later. She had also talked to Mr G., the military commander of |
Zone D | 18. Ms Moxamed Ismaacil, the first applicant, was initially detained in Zone D and later moved to an unspecified Zone in Lyster Barracks, in conditions which she considered prison-like and basic, although she considered |
Alkhan-Kala | 85. On 6 October 2004 the military prosecutor’s office in charge of investigating Yandiyev’s kidnapping opened a criminal investigation into Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s involvement in an illegal armed group, a crime under Article 208 part 2 of the Criminal Code. On the same day Yandiyev was charged in absentia with the above crime and his name was included on the federal search list. This investigation was assigned case file number 34/00/0040-04.
i) Information related to the discovery of bodies in |
the Radomsko District | 7. In issue no. 33 of 18 August 2004 the applicant published an article entitled “Elegantly wrapped dung” (“Łajno – elegancko opakowane”). It read, in so far as relevant:
“A poser is someone who does everything to produce external effects by his conduct, speech and, in particular, with the populism he preaches. He is a numbskull posing as the people’s tribune. The only panacea, or universal cure, for such a person is to recognise his intentions and take up a bloodless fight using arguments. An argument against any kind of tricks by a poser or populist will be always a counter‑argument based on reality, logic and the opportunity to put one’s intentions into practice.
I remember when, not so long ago, the author of the proposal to develop a quail farm as a panacea against rural unemployment had a go at me in an accommodating local newspaper, accusing me of malice, a willingness to discredit every good idea, and mindlessness leading to nasty mental disease and many other irreversible disorders of the mind. At the same time he declared that he would continue doing his job, that is, condemning farmers to breeding nice little birds in order to collect their eggs. His boss considered the quail business very important, because it would eliminate the need for viagra. There has not been a sideshow like it in |
Oktyabrskiy district | 8. At the same time the applicant enclosed a copy of her application to the Chairman of the National Public Commission for Investigation of Offences and Protection of Human Rights in the North Caucasus of 25 August 2000 where she provided a detailed account of the circumstances of her husband’s alleged detention and contended that he had been apprehended while queuing at a centre of distribution of foodstuffs. The application read as follows:
“I ... ask you for help in searching for my husband, the father of my children, Magomed Uvaysovich Dzhabayev, born in 1953, a resident of Grozny.
During the attack at Grozny and the military campaign my husband... stayed at home in Grozny at the address |
Volga | 12. The article concerned a joint press conference held by Mr P., the Chief Federal Inspector for the Kirov Region, and Mr K., the Mayor of Kirov. The press conference was about the media coverage of the regional project “Kirov, cultural capital of the |
the Pionerskaya river | 52. On 28 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office of the Leninskiy District of Vladivostok (“the district prosecutor’s office”) brought criminal proceedings in case no. 292025 against officials of the Vladivostok municipal and Primorskiy regional authorities under Article 286 (1) of the Russian Criminal Code (abuse of power) on suspicion on them having, in excess of their power, allocated plots of land for individual housing construction within a water protection zone of |
premises | 28. On 13 March 2009 the Varna District Public Prosecutor, to whom the file was sent for competence reasons following a legislative amendment, refused to open criminal proceedings (see paragraph 37 below) against the police officers. She found that a special police operation aimed at gaining access to the offices of the company and seizing unlicensed software had been carried out on 18 June 2008. The initial information available had been that the company had connections with organised criminal groups and that its main activity was the collecting and disseminating of unlicensed software. Officers from CSCOC had been in charge of the operation; masked officers from CSCOC Sector “Operational Intervention” (сектор “Оперативна реализация”) and officers from different units of the Varna Regional Police Directorate, had taken part in the operation. Following a preparatory briefing session, at around 3.30 in the afternoon the officers had tried to enter the office premises of the company. Someone on the inside had locked the front door; following this, the company’s employees had gone to their computers and started deleting data sought by the police. The employees had not complied with several orders by the police officers to open the doors. Acting upon the instructions to enter the company’s |
the Achkhoy-Martan District | 95. On 2 May 2002 a prosecutor at the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic drew up a report “on the results of the internal inquiry into the actions of the officials of the prosecutor's office of the Achkhoy-Martan District during the examination of the applicants' complaint about inhuman treatment in the Achkhoy-Martan VOVD and the Chernokozovo SIZO between 12 April and 5 October 2000”. The report stated that the internal inquiry had been carried out in connection with the complaint by the SRJI lodged on the applicants' behalf against the decision of the district prosecutor's office dated 7 January 2002 to dispense with criminal proceedings as regards the applicants' allegations that they had been ill-treated while in detention. The report stated that the internal inquiry had established the following:
“In January 2002 [the second applicant] and his father were invited to the prosecutor's office of the Achkhoy-Martan District in connection with information about the use of illicit methods of investigation in respect of [the applicants]. [The second applicant] personally did not complain that any pressure had been put on him to extract any statements. Therefore he voluntarily gave explanations to investigator Ch. to the effect that no illicit methods of investigation had been applied to him and that he had no claims against law-enforcement bodies.
Neither the investigator nor the prosecutor put any pressure on him to extract this explanation. No threats were made in his respect.... Moreover, he talked to prosecutor A.-K. after he had given his explanations to investigator Ch.
His father refused to give any explanations. Presently he is undergoing medical treatment outside the territory of the republic. He refused to give any explanations, as he is fed up with all this.
[The second applicant] does not know whether [the first applicant] has applied to any human rights organisations. At present [the first applicant] lives in Poland and [the second applicant] has no contact with him.
Apparently, it was his younger brother ... who had met a representative [of the SRJI] in Moscow and provided the information in question. Thereafter he spoke to [his younger] brother and forbad him further from applying to human rights organisations with unverified information.
The investigator of the prosecutor's office of |
Kareli | 7. The applicant was a member and one of the leaders of a group which called itself the National Religious Movement, which was founded in Tbilisi on 11 May 2011. On 26 May 2011 a police officer drew up a report, which stated that he possessed information that twenty-four individuals, including the applicant, were plotting a violent overthrow of the Government of Georgia. According to the report, all the alleged plotters were located at the Kintsvisi Monastery, in the |
Europe | 18. By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement – in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 – in an association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question. The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows:
“- [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar, a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group;
- ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France;
- ... was the main contact person in |
Nivas | 34. On 26 January 2006 the investigators also questioned Officer Yu.E. of the ROVD who stated that he had been driving in the vicinity of the airport when he had seen a group of five or six people standing next to a white VAZ-2107 car. They had told him that unidentified men in |
CPA South’ | 80. He then examined whether, on the facts, it could be said that British troops were in effective control of Basra City during the period in question, such as to fix the United Kingdom with jurisdiction under the “effective control of an area” doctrine. On this point, Brooke LJ concluded as follows:
“119. Basra City was in the [Coalition Provisional Authority] regional area called ‘ |
Nord-Ost | 33. On the next day the first applicant had called investigator Ya. of the Shalinskiy district prosecutor’s office and he had assured her that he had not arrested Khamzat Tushayev and had not instructed any authority to do so. Lastly, the first applicant also stated that her husband’s brother had been an active member of illegal armed groups and had been killed in a special operation in 2002. She also submitted that after her husband had been arrested by officers of Operational and Search Bureau no. 2 (ORB-2) in March 2006, he had told her that they had asked him about their daughter, A.T., who had been killed in 2002 in Moscow along with other rebel fighters during the rescue operation of |
Krajina | 9. On 26 September 1999 the applicant lodged a civil action against the Sisak Municipality and the Sisak Market in the Sisak Municipal Court, seeking payment of a sum of money on account of his investments in certain premises. The applicant stated that in July 1991 he left the town of Sisak fearing for his personal safety. He returned to Croatia in 1996. As a result, he was not able to lodge his claim within the five-year statutory time-limit. In his oral evidence given on 19 February 2002 the applicant said that after having left the town of Sisak, he had first moved to Glina, in the territory of the |
the Sabail District | 6. The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstrations at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku – the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of |
European Economic Area | 6. The first version of the scheme required that in order to marry, persons subject to immigration control had to have either entry clearance expressly granted for the purpose of enabling them to marry in the United Kingdom or a Certificate of Approval. The definition of “persons subject to immigration control” excluded |
Seine | 11. The novel recounts the trial of a Front National militant, Ronald Blistier, who, while putting up posters for his party with other militants, commits the cold-blooded murder of a young man of North African descent and admits that it was a racist crime. He is defended by a Jewish, left-wing and homosexual lawyer, Pierre Mine.
The novel is based on real events and in particular the murders, in 1995, of Brahim Bouaram, a young Moroccan who was thrown into the |
Urus-Martan | 90. On the same date the investigators questioned Mr M.D. who stated that on 17 April 2002 unidentified armed men had abducted his son Mr Sh.D. On 24 April 2002 human remains had been discovered on the outskirts of Goyty village in |
Urus-Martan | 11. Ms. A.M., one of M.M.'s neighbours, residing at 47 Lomonosova Street, was woken up at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 by the sound of heavy military vehicles in the street. She looked out of the window and saw an APC (armoured personnel carrier) and two military UAZ vehicles (“таблетка”) parked in the street. A.M. did not go outside because of the curfew. According to A.M., at the material time APCs were frequently driven in |
premises | 43. On 6 and 8 January 2003 the Shali ROVD replied to the investigators’ requests of 19 December 2002, stating that they could not establish the perpetrators of Abdul Kasumov’s abduction and that he was not detained on their |
Lachin | 14. At the time of the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was an autonomous region (oblast) of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”). Situated within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, it covered 4,388 sq. km. There was at the time no common border between Nagorno-Karabakh (known as Artsakh by its Armenian name) and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Armenian SSR”), which were separated by Azerbaijani territory, the district of |
Gazi | 38. On 10 July 1995 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Eyüp Assize Court against twenty police officers who had been on duty during the demonstrations between 12 and 13 May 1995. The indictment involved the death of Dilek Şimşek Sevinç, Reis Kopal, Zeynep Poyraz, Fevzi Tunç, Fadime Bingöl, Ali Yıldırım and Mehmet Gündüz. In his indictment, the prosecutor relied on witness statements, medical reports, police reports, autopsy reports, video footage and newspaper clippings. He stated that, following the attack on the cafés located in the |
premises | 49. The statement by Captain D.Y., commander of the CGP, on that matter can be summarised as follows:
“This affair did not begin on 2 September [1999]; its origins go back into the distant past. In Ulucanlar, but also in all the other prisons housing ‘terrorists’, the prison authorities had no control over the sections reserved for such prisoners; this is a well-known fact. In those sections ... the ‘terrorists’ ruled the roost ...; TV and the other media covered this: the State Prosecutor sitting down with the prisoners and negotiating with them, and the latter then taking hostages and obtaining everything they had been demanding. Despite all the denials, whole pages of such agreements have been published in the newspapers ...; it was obvious that a lot of weapons and mobile phones were circulating in the prison; during ordinary body searches, even where prison guards felt a weapon, they were all too scared to confiscate it ... An incident was sure to occur if gendarmes raided the ‘terrorists’’ dormitories ... because no gendarme had ever entered those |
Europe | 52. In 1996 the Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation no. R(96)10, on “The Guarantee of the Independence of Public Service Broadcasting”, which stated as follows:
“The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage;
Recalling that the independence of the media, including broadcasting, is essential for the functioning of a democratic society;
Stressing the importance which it attaches to respect for media independence, especially by governments;
Recalling in this respect the principles endorsed by the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe set out in the declaration on freedom of expression and information of 29 April 1982, especially as regards the need for a wide range of independent and autonomous means of communication allowing for the reflection of a diversity of ideas and opinions;
Reaffirming the vital role of public service broadcasting as an essential factor of pluralistic communication which is accessible to everyone at both national and regional levels, through the provision of a basic comprehensive programme service comprising information, education, culture and entertainment;
Recalling the commitments accepted by the representatives of the states participating in the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994) in the framework of Resolution No. 1 on the future of public service broadcasting, especially respect for the independence of public service broadcasting organisations;
Noting the need to develop further the principles on the independence of public service broadcasting set out in the aforementioned Prague resolution in the light of the challenges raised by political, economic and technological change in |
premises | 30. Ms S.G. called the third applicant and together with him, Ms A.K. and other relatives they went to the GOM-2 in Nogmov Street. Upon arrival at the police station Ms S.G. knocked at the door and tried to obtain information about her husband, the second applicant, from the on-duty officers. She also tried to explain to them that her husband had a stomach ulcer which could start bleeding at any moment if aggravated. The policemen refused to speak to her, but they did not deny that the first and the second applicants were detained on their |
premises | 24. By a final judgment of 25 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal on points of fact and law and upheld the decisions of the prosecutor’s office and the judgment of the first-instance court. It held, among other things, that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation and in their professional capacity. According to the relevant criminal procedure rules, police officers were entitled and had a duty to carry out operations seeking to identify and investigate unlawful acts and to gather and seize relevant evidence. Furthermore, any natural and legal person had a duty to turn over impugned evidence. The applicant organisation’s submissions that the police officers had entered its |
Europe | 48. The first-instance court noted that A.G., K.O., Ş.Ö., H.K., N.Y., M.Ş., A.Y., C.P. and V.T. had asserted in their statements that the applicant was a member of the PKK and the leader of the organisation in |
Sokolović kolonija | 31. Further to the Constitutional Court’s decision of 4 October 2008 (see paragraph 27 above), on 17 November 2008 the State Court assessed the national security evidence and upheld the Ministry of Security’s decision of 27 July 2007 mentioned in paragraph 22 above. It relied on the applicant’s conviction of May 2000 (see paragraph 20 above), his public threats against State authorities, his standing in the mujahedin community which allowed him to issue a binding ruling (fatwa), his lectures at a mosque in |
Eastern | 12. On 7 January and 2 February 2009 respectively, the applicant lodged a second asylum request with the Federal Office for Migration (hereinafter “the FOM”), indicating that he had in the meantime become a political activist in Switzerland in such a way that he would face a real risk of persecution if expelled to Sudan. He explained that he had become an active member of the Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity (hereinafter “the SLM‑Unity”) in Switzerland, had been appointed its human rights officer, and had participated in several of its public activities since 2006. In addition, he also had become a member of the newly-founded Darfur Peace and Development Centre (hereinafter “the DFEZ”) in Switzerland. He stated that because of an interview broadcast on a local TV channel in |
the Pervomayskiy District | 9. On 28 August 2003 at around 9.15 a.m. the applicant was transferred to the Kirov IZ-43/1 remand centre, where he underwent a medical examination which attested to the presence of a large haematoma on the inside of his left thigh and two bruises on the left side of his forehead. The applicant was furnished with a certificate reflecting the results of the examination. He explained that he had sustained his injuries as a result of the beatings by the police; this information was then forwarded to the prosecutor’s office of |
Urus-Martan | 59. On 7 February 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. In her letter she stated that her son had been abducted by representatives of Russian power structures and pointed out that there was irrefutable evidence to this effect, such as: the abductors had used armoured military vehicles; the abductors must have obtained the permission of the Russian military to move around in the area during curfew; the large number of the abductors and their unaccented Russian had also demonstrated that they were military servicemen; when on the morning of 12 April 2002 the applicant had complained about the abduction to the law enforcement agencies, they had failed to block the roads or arrest the culprits; after the abduction the military vehicles had driven away in the direction of the Russian military checkpoint; at the material time the town had been under the full control of Russian federal forces and all roads leading to and from the city were blocked by checkpoints. The applicant requested the investigators to take, inter alia, the following measures: to establish the identity of the owners of the APCs and URAL vehicles in |
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