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Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | Siloscape uses Tor to communicate with C2. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | Traffic traversing the Tor network will be forwarded to multiple nodes before exiting the Tor network and continuing on to its intended destination. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | Uroburos can use implants on multiple compromised machines to proxy communications through its worldwide P2P network. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | Ursnif has used Tor for C2. |
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy | WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic. |
Proxy:Domain Fronting | It has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic. |
Proxy:Domain Fronting | Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting. |
Proxy:Domain Fronting | meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination. |
Proxy:Domain Fronting | Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers. |
Proxy:Domain Fronting | SMOKEDHAM has used a fronted domain to obfuscate its hard-coded C2 server domain. |
Remote Access Software | During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network. |
Remote Access Software | During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems. |
Remote Access Software | During C0027, It directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools. |
Remote Access Software | It has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool. |
Remote Access Software | It used legitimate programs such as AmmyyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems. |
Remote Access Software | It used the Ammyy Admin tool as well as TeamViewer for remote access, including to preserve remote access if a Cobalt Strike module was lost. |
Remote Access Software | It used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement. |
Remote Access Software | Dridex contains a module for VNC. |
Remote Access Software | Egregor has checked for the LogMein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines. |
Remote Access Software | EVILNUM has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to run a legitimate TeamViewer application to connect to compromrised machines. |
Remote Access Software | It has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system. |
Remote Access Software | It has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil. |
Remote Access Software | Hildegard has established tmate sessions for C2 communications. |
Remote Access Software | It has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel. |
Remote Access Software | It has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally. |
Remote Access Software | It has installed TeamViewer on targeted systems. |
Remote Access Software | During Night Dragon, threat actors used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels. |
Remote Access Software | It has the capability to download a VNC module from command and control (C2). |
Remote Access Software | It has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access. |
Remote Access Software | It has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers. |
Remote Access Software | It has established tmate sessions for C2 communications. |
Remote Access Software | It used a cloud-based remote access software called LogMeIn for their attacks. |
Remote Access Software | TrickBot uses vncDll module to remote control the victim machine. |
Traffic Signaling | Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port. |
Traffic Signaling | Kobalos is triggered by an incoming TCP connection to a legitimate service from a specific source port. |
Traffic Signaling | Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command. |
Traffic Signaling | Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions. |
Traffic Signaling | Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement. |
Traffic Signaling | SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages. |
Traffic Signaling | Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet. |
Traffic Signaling | Uroburos can intercept the first client to server packet in the 3-way TCP handshake to determine if the packet contains the correct unique value for a specific Uroburos implant. If the value does not match, the packet and the rest of the TCP session are passed to the legitimate listening application. |
Traffic Signaling | Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism. |
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking | Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server. |
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking | metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure. |
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking | It has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports. |
Traffic Signaling:Socket Filters | Penquin installs a TCP and UDP filter on the eth0 interface. |
Web Service | It has used Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads. |
Web Service | BADHATCH can be utilized to abuse sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service, as part of actor-controlled C2 channels. |
Web Service | Bazar downloads have been hosted on Google Docs. |
Web Service | BoomBox can download files from Dropbox using a hardcoded access token. |
Web Service | Brute Ratel C4 can use legitimate websites for external C2 channels including Slack, Discord, and MS Teams. |
Web Service | Bumblebee has been downloaded to victim's machines from OneDrive. |
Web Service | During C0017, It used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications. |
Web Service | During C0027, It downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee. |
Web Service | Carbon can use Pastebin to receive C2 commands. |
Web Service | CharmPower can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets. |
Web Service | DarkTortilla can retrieve its primary payload from public sites such as Pastebin and Textbin. |
Web Service | Doki has used the dogechain.info API to generate a C2 address. |
Web Service | DropBook can communicate with its operators by exploiting the Simplenote, DropBox, and the social media platform, Facebook, where it can create fake accounts to control the backdoor and receive instructions. |
Web Service | It has used Discord's content delivery network (CDN) to deliver malware and malicious scripts to a compromised host. |
Web Service | It has used file-sharing services including WeTransfer, TransferNow, and OneDrive to deliver payloads. |
Web Service | It has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations. |
Web Service | It has used sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service that also makes SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption, as part of their command and control. |
Web Service | It has used Amazon Web Services to host C2. |
Web Service | It has used GitHub repositories for downloaders which will be obtained by the group's .NET executable on the compromised system. |
Web Service | GuLoader has the ability to download malware from Google Drive. |
Web Service | Hildegard has downloaded scripts from GitHub. |
Web Service | It has incorporated at least five different cloud service providers into their C2 infrastructure including CloudMe. |
Web Service | It has used GitHub to host its payloads to operate spam campaigns. |
Web Service | It has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of PlugX. |
Web Service | NETWIRE has used web services including Paste.ee to host payloads. |
Web Service | ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains. |
Web Service | During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads. |
Web Service | It has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control. |
Web Service | SharpStage has used a legitimate web service for evading detection. |
Web Service | Sibot has used a legitimate compromised website to download DLLs to the victim's machine. |
Web Service | SMOKEDHAM has used Google Drive and Dropbox to host files downloaded by victims via malicious links. |
Web Service | Snip3 can download additional payloads from web services including Pastebin and top4top. |
Web Service | It has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2. |
Web Service | It has used legitimate web services including Pastebin, Dropbox, and GitHub for C2 communications. |
Web Service | WhisperGate can download additional payloads hosted on a Discord channel. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | It used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | Astaroth can store C2 information on cloud hosting services such as AWS and CloudFlare and websites like YouTube and Facebook. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | BADNEWS collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | BLACKCOFFEE uses Microsoft’s TechNet Web portal to obtain a dead drop resolver containing an encoded tag with the IP address of a command and control server. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | It's MSGET downloader uses a dead drop resolver to access malicious payloads. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | During C0017, It used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably It updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | CharmPower can retrieve C2 domain information from actor-controlled S3 buckets. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | Grandoreiro can obtain C2 information from Google Docs. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | Javali can read C2 information from Google Documents and YouTube. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | The KEYPLUG Windows variant has retrieved C2 addresses from encoded data in posts on tech community forums. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | Metamorfo has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | Some MiniDuke components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no hard-coded C2 server responds. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | It hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | PlugX uses Pastebin to store C2 addresses. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | PolyglotDuke can use Twitter, Reddit, Imgur and other websites to get a C2 URL. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | It has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting updated malware. |
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver | It has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. It has also hidden Pony C2 server IP addresses within transactions on the Bitcoin and Namecoin blockchain. |