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8637cc97-865a-4bd5-bb40-93eb099706dc

Ex parte Don Davis

1140456

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

STATE OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015 1140456 Ex parte Don Davis, Judge of Mobile County Probate Court oRDER The petition filed in this Court by the Mobile County Probate Judge on February 9, 2015, in substance is a request for an advisory opinion. Section 12-2-10, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes this Court to address requests for advisory opinions fron only the Governor or the Legislature. See opinion of the Justices No, 199, 286 Ala. 156, 158, 238 So. 2d 326, 327 (1970). Because this Court is not authorized to address this petition, the petition is dismissed, PETITION DISMISSED stuart, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Bolin, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur specially. Parker, J., concurs in the result Moore, C.d., recuses himself. hherowith set out as same appear(s) of recordin aid Wiese my hae this Ly op orcs 1 conccloerlonn asta 1140456 BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially). “What has been an orderly process, I suspect, will soon resemble a three-ring circus." Tyson v. Macon Cnty, Greyhound Kk, Inc., 43 So, 3d 587, 595 (Ala, 2010) (Woodall, dissenting). Admittedly this quotation is taken out of context. From the perspective of a probate judge in Alabama, however, the events that have unfolded subsequent to the issuance of the memorandum opinion and order by United States District Judge Callie S$. Granade, in the United states District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, in Civil Action No. 14-0208-cG-N surely brings to mind this quotation. I do not intend to trivialize the important constitutional questions presented by this controversy, but the unfortunate path this litigation has taken so far has resulted in mass confusion that I suspect has led the public to wonder what has happened to the orderly rule of law. As a former probate judge, I am aware of the many duties imposed by law upon the office of probate judge, only one of waich is judicial. Some of the other "hats" worn by some or all probate judges include being the keeper of records and 1140456 documents that must be maintained for posterity, serving as the chief election official of the county in all elections, and, although this particularly may vary from county to county, issuing a variety of licenses, e.g., hunting licenses, fishing licenses, driver's license renewals, automobile-tag renewals, and marriage licenses. Although I concur fully with the dismissal of the action herein, as will be addressed further below I am disappointed and concerned that, amongst everyone heretofore connected with the constitutional issues and the litigation, nowhere has there been a probate judge with a seat as a party at any of these proceedings, except for Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis, who was diemissed from the proceedings on duly 25, 2014, and added again as a party on February 10, 2015. The only two judicial participants who exercised wisdom, restraint, and discretion on the record were United states Supreme Court Justices Thomas and Scalia. I specifically refer to Justice Thomas's dissent to the United states Supreme Court's denial of a stay in the federal court matter, which Justice Scalia joined and which states as follows: wThe Attomey General of Alabama asked us to stay a federal injunction preventing him from 1140456 ' enforcing several provisions of Alabama law defining marriage as a legal union of one man and one woman pending our consideration of Obergefell v. Hodses, No. 14-556; Tanco v. Haslam, No. 14-562; DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571; and Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, Those cases are scheduled to be argued this ‘Term and present the same constitutional question at issue here: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize unions between two people of the same sex as a marriage under state law. en courts declare state laws unconstitutional \ and enjoin state officials from enforcing then, our ordinary practice is to suspend those injunctions from taking effect pending appellate review. see, e.g., Herbert v. Kitchen, (Ms. 13A687, January 6, 2014] 571 U.S. (2014); see also san Diegans for Mt, Soledad Nat War Menoxial v. Paulson, 548 9.8. 1301 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (staying an i injunction requiring a city to renove its religious | memorial). Although a stay is not a matter of right, this practice reflects the particularly strong showing that States are often able to make in favor of such a stay. Because States are required to i comply with the Constitution, and indeed take care to do so when they enact their laws, it is a rare case in which a State will be unable to make at least some showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. States also easily meet the requirement of irreparable injury, for '"{alny time a state is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury."' Maryland v, King, (Ms. 12948, July 30, 2012] 567 U.S. (2012) (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W, Fox Co,, 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). The equities and public interest likewise generally weigh in favor of enforcing duly enacted state laws (slip op., at 2-3) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) | 1140456 "It was thus no surprise when we granted a stay in eimilar circumstances a little over a year ago. See Herbert v. Kitchen, gupra. Nor was it a surprise when we granted a stay in similar circumstances less than six months ago. McQuigg v, Bostic, [Ms. 140196, Aug. 20, 2014] 573 U.S. _ (2024). Those decisions reflected the appropriaté respect we owe to States as sovereigns and to the people of those States who approved those laws. "This application should have been treated no differently. That the Court more recently denied several stay applications in this context is of no moment. Those denials followed this Court's decision in October not to review seven petitions seeking further review of lower court judgments invalidating state marriage laws. Although I disagreed with the decisions to deny those applications, Armstrong v. Brenner, ante, p. __; Hilson v. Condon, ante, D. _i Moser v. Marie, ake, p. __, 1 acknowledge that there was at least an argument that the October decision justified an inference that the Court would be less likely to grant a writ of certiorari to consider subsequent petitions. That argument is no longer credible. The Court has now granted a writ of certiorari to review these important issues and will do so by the end of the Term. The Attorney General of Alabama is thus in an even better position than the applicant to whom we granted a stay in Herbert yet rather than treat like applicants alike, the Court looks the other way as yet another Federal District Judge caste aside state laws without making any effort to preserve the status quo pending the Court's resolution of a constitutional question it left open in United States v. Windsor, [Ms. 12-307, June 26, 2013] 570 U.S (2013) (slip op., at 25-26). This acquiescence may well be seen as a signal of the Court's intended resolution of that question. This is not the proper way to discharge our Article III responsibilities. And, it is 1140456 indecorous for this Court to pretend that it is. Today's decision represents yet another example this rt's increasingly cavi toward the States. Over the past few montns, the Court has repeatedly denied stays of lower court judgments enjoining the enforcement of state laws on questionable constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Mari ey v z-Valenzuela, (Ms. 140493, Nov. 13, 2014) 574 U.S. __, (2014) (slip op., at 2) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., respecting denial of application for stay) (collecting cases) It has similarly declined to grant certiorari to review such judgments without any regard for the people who approved those laws in popular referendums or the elected representatives who voted for them. In this case, the Court refuses even to grant a temporary stay when it will resolve the issue at hand in several months. "I respectfully dissent from the denial of this application. I_would have shown the people of Alabama the x: they deserve and preserved the 1 Et resol: his important constitutional question." Strange v. Searcy, [Ms. 140840, February 9, 2015] 574 U.S , —— (2015) (emphasis addeq) . The highly emotional issue involved in the federal proceeding, on both sides of the argument, it appears will be decided only by the United states supreme Court. The plaintiffs in the two cases decided by the federal district court could have joined the various probate judges in the State as parties, if nothing else, as relief parties. For 1404s chat matter, the federal district court could have provided chat the probate judges were made defendants. see Rules 19 and 20, Fed. 8. Civ. P, (allowing for joinder and permissive joinder, respectively). This would have allowed the probate judges notice and an opportunity to be heard. Rather, the only probate judge made an original party to the federal court action was Judge Davis, the petitioner in the instant proceeding, who was later dismissed from that action with prejudice and who has now been added as a party again, The federal district judge in her order acknowledged both that the united states Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case to be decided in this Term of Court and that that case will "definitively" decide the important constitutional issues involved, However, the same federal district court denied a stay past February 9, 2015, although the definitive decision lies just four months ahead. rt is my judgment that the united states Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with due respect, also contributed to the resulting confusion by refusing to take further action in this and similar same-sex- marriage cases in that circuit until the United States Supreme Court issues a decision and by denying a stay of the federal 1140456 court matter before Judge Granade. While all of the above was occurring, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court sent a letter to the probate judges giving them advice on how to address this issue, together with a memorandum of law, and finally issued an order to the probate judges on the eve of yn of the federal court's temporary stay that the expiral reflected a view of the law that directly conflicted with the federal judge's view of the law as espoused in her order. The ensuing legal "circus" has left the probate judges, who had no voice or opportunity to be heard in this matter, an untenable position -- caught between a federal district judge's order, the statewide precedential value of which is uncertain, and an order from the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. If the term "circus" is hyperbole, the current predicament at least qualifies as a "darned if I do, darned if 1 don't" dilemma for the probate judges, and this is no way to wisely, fairly, and deliberately administer justice. ‘The Chief Justice has wide powers pursuant to § 12-2- 30(b) (7) and (8), Ala, Code 1975, but the question arises as to whether those powers apply to probate judges’ administrative, as opposed to judicial, actions. should a 1140456 probate judge follow the order of the chief judicial officer in the State of Alabama? Or should the probate judge follow an order of a federal district judge, of which he or she has possibly been made aware by media or by word of mouth through his or her professional association, not by having had a seat at the table in the courtroom as a party? There are many federal district judges in the three federal districts in Alabama, From a precedential standpoint, what happens if the which opinions of two federal district judges conflict: opinion, if either, would be the binding precedent on a federal question? who wins if there is a conflict between a federal court order and a state-court opinion on a federal question? Although I do not agree with the entirety of the article, these questions were recently examined in the introduction to that article in the Vanderbilt Law Review, which does state correctly the following pivotal questions: "Lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts, or so we are told, Most state courts assert that they are free to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of federal law, even when doing so creates a conflict with the federal court of appeals presiding over the geographic region in which they sit. Several federal circuits have conceded that their decisions are not binding on state courts, and, in concurring opinions, two justices have emphatically agreed. A number of federal courts  1140456 scholars have declared that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent because state courts are ‘coordinate’ with lower federal courts and not ‘subordinate! to them. ‘and yet, upon closer inspection, the role of lower federal court precedent in state court decisionmaking remains unclear. A few state courts appear to believe that they are bound to follow the decisions of the federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law, and many others have issued inconsistent opinions on that question. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Bighth and Ninth Circuits claim that state courts must follow their lead on federal questions, creating a circuit split that has never been resolved by the Supreme Court. only a handful of legal scholars have opined on the matter, and most have done so in passing in articles devoted to other subjects. Remarkably, then, this significant question about the interplay between the state and federal judicial systems lingers anresolved more than two-hundred years after the Constitution's ratification. t "the xelationship between the lower federal courts and the state courts raises foundational questions about the place of those federal courts in Gur constitutional structure, Are the lower federal rts’ interpretatis f_federal lay i the Supreme Col Alternatively, are state _and lower federal courts | soequals under the Constitution such that neithe: 1_the other's ruling: ‘the Supreme Court have the constitutional authority fo Tequire that stare courte follow lower federal Z oR ‘sourt_pr 2 i inci ft federalien forbid ouch intexference with state institutions, or bec: ni Judicial independence, or both? "similar foundational questions were 10  1140456 seventy-five years ago in Erie Railroad v, Tompkins, [304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938),] when the Supreme Court overruled swift v, Tyson, [41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842),] and held that federal courts must follow state law as articulated by a state's highest court. The Court explained that federal courts undermined state sovereignty by failing to treat state courts’ views on state law as controlling. Although Exie focused on the federal courts’ obligation to adopt state common law, the decision confirmed that federal courts ‘must follow state courts’ interpretations of state positive law as well. The bottom line after Erie is that state courts have the final word on the meaning of state law. “Exie is one of a handful of iconic cases that has shaped our understanding of not only the relationship between state and federal courts but s0 our entire federal system, According to John Hart Ely, Brie ‘implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.’ And yet Brie left the job half done. The case tells us how federal courts should treat state courts’ precedent on state law, but it does not address how state courts should respond to federal courts’ interpretation of federal law. Of course, some might argue that Exie supports the conclusion that state courts are bound only by the Supreme Court on questions of federal law, just as federal courts are required to follow only the precedent of the highest court of the state on questions of state law. And yet the unique and limited role of the Supreme Court creates a significant disjunction: the Court cannot quickly resolve disputes between state and federal courts on the meaning of federal law, leaving intrastate splits to linger between these court systems for decades.” Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, a 3404s 68 Vand. L. Rev. 53, 55-59 (2015) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) . The purpose of this writing is not to try today to answer the questions posed by the article quoted above. It is offered solely to illustrate the probable angst and consternation that each of the 68 probate judges of this state has undergone since the federal court's order and Chief Sustice Moore's order were issued, and it did not have to be this way. Ae stated above, I place the blame for the confusion that now exists in the various probate courts of this State since the two-week stay expired at the feet of everyone involved, save the Attorney General, who has properly requested a stay at all levels, and gustices Thonas and Scalia, who offered a solution that would have delayed this matter for only four months or less -- after which we would have had the final answer, no confusion, and, most importantly, an orderly administration of justice In conclusion, I feel compelled to comment on a portion of the amended pleading in the “In Rem Action" that is actually before thie Court and that the Court properly 12 1140456 dismisses. There is 2 portion contained in the "action" with which T sharply disagree. 1 quote from paragraph 7 of the "action": "7, If this Court either fails to docket this amended in rem action regarding the Administrative Order or fails to address this amended in rem action filed within this Court before the federal court in the Southern District of Alabama enters an Order requiring Judge Davis to abide by the above federal court orders, then Judge Davis will accept this Honorable Court's failure to act on this amended in xem _matter ae an implicit directive to Judge Davis to abide by the Orders of the Southern District of Alabama on January 23rd and also January 28th, 2015 Judge Davis anticipates that Judge Granade could enter this Order as quickly as tomorrow based on the Order the judge has entered today." (Bmphasis added.) With due regard for the fact that the above document was submitted to this Court by a probate judge who is suffering the uncertainties set forth in this writing, I would caution any litigant coming before this court that, although, proverbially, silence may be golden, the silence of this court, as an institution, should never be treated as an “implicit directive" to take any particular course of action. 13 1140456 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). ‘The amended petition before us quotes from the February 2015, order of Judge Granade in the case of Searcy v. Strange (Ms, 14-0208, S.D, Ala., gan, 23, 2015), stating that her injunction in that case “enjoined ... [the] Attorney General for the state of Alabama" and those under his supervision and that, because the petitioner was not a party to that case, his actions or inactions did not constitute a “fail[ure] to comply with th[at] order." ‘The petitioner asks this Court for guidance with respect to the issue of the constitutionalicy of the various statutes enacted by the Alabama Legislature providing for the governmental licensing and recognition of what are referred to in those statutes as vmarriages," see Ala. Code 1975, §§ 30-1-3 through -19. Inherent in the petitioner's request for guidance, particularly given the facts alleged in the petition, is whether, under the terms of those statutes, particularly § 30- 1-9, @ probate judge has an affirmative obligation to issue marriage licenses at all, and whether, under the principles articulated in such cases as Newton v, City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala, 209, 36 So, ad 487 (1948), and City of Birmingham v. 14 1140456 smith, 507 So, 24 1312 (Ala. 1987), and considering the meaning of the term "marriage" intended by the Legislature in those statutes, they may be deemed to survive, or mist be stricken as wholly void, i¢ they are not to be applied solely co a union between a man and a woman.’ These are substantial questions. These questions, however, are not before us in an adversary proceeding or in the context of a request for an advisory opinion by the Governor or the Legislature, Nor has exe been a showing that these questions are properly before us on some other basis. I therefore concur in the order of this court. inthe act ‘ought not to be wholly void unless the invalid portion is so important to the general plan and operation of the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional.'" 251 Ala. at 217, 36 So. 2d at 493 (quoting A, Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So. 2d 23, 25 (1945)). "The test is ... whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the [unconstitutional aspect included therein]." 507 So. 2d at 1317. 1s 1140456 SHAW, Justice (concurring specially) In the matter before this Court, Mobile County Probate court Judge Don Davis references an order of the United states District Court for the Southern District of Alabama that states: "Ala. Const. Art. I, § 36.03 (2006) and Ala. Code 1975, § 30-1-19 are unconstitutional ...." Searcy v, Strange (Ms. 14-0208, Jan. 23, 2015). Judge Davis then notes that on February 8, 2015, Alabama's Chief Justice issued an administrative order stating that “no Probate Judge of the State of Alabama nor any agent or employee of any Alabama Probate Judge shall issue or recognize a marriage license that is inconsistent with Article I, Section 36.03, of the Alabama Constitution or § 30-1-19, Ala. Code 1975." ‘he matter Judge Davis filed in this Court states that it "is filed in order to give this Honorable Court acting as the entixe Supreme Court of Alabama the opportunity to review the application of the above Administrative order." ‘This invitation to "review" the administrative order issued by the Chief gustice, in my view, is a request for an advisory opinion. However, only the governor or the legislature may request an advisory opinion. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-2-10 ("The 16 1140456 Governor, by a request in writing, or either house of the Legislature, by a resolution of such house, may obtain a written opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Alabama or a majority thereof on important constitutional questions."). See also Opinion of the Justices No, 199, 236 Ala. 156, 158, 238 So. 24 326, 327 (1970) ("[T]he present request originated not with the Governor, but with the Contest Subcommittee of the State Committee ..., which course of action is not within the purview of (§ 12-2-10). To hold otherwise would add a new concept to the prerogatives of [§ 22-2-10] and set a new precedent for litigants to request advisory opinions whenever the constitutionality of a law arises."). This Court is not empowered "'to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have these questions decided for the government of future cases.'* Stamps_v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Hduc., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala 113, 114, 152 So. 24 661, 662 (1963) (emphasis omitted)). See also AIRCO, Inc, v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 So, 24 970, 971 (Ala. 1978) ("To render an opinion based solely upon the Commission's alleged improper actions (without seeking a a7 1140456 remedy therefrom) or upon its prospective improprieties would be to render impermissible advisory opinions.) 28 

b513f47fa3d1518ad1b3372e111f9170de149bc934637678449f598a1553bf52

2015-02-11T00:00:00Z

7b8c2141-c097-44a3-ac90-858fcc7b15cc

Ex parte Scottsdale Insurance Company.

1140631

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

STATE OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBBR TERM, 2014-2015 1140631 Ex parte Scottsdale Insurance Company. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Har-Mar Collision, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company et al.) (Mobile Circuit Court: cv-11-838) ORDER The petition for a writ of mandamus of Scottsdale Insurance Company directed to the Honorable Michael A Youngpeter, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, having been filed and submitted to the Court, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the emergency motion to stay the proceedings in the trial court is moot Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Murdock, J., concurs specially. 1140631 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially}. Scottsdale Insurance Company seeks mandamus relief fron this Court in regard to the Mobile Circuit Court's decision to deny its motion to dismiss certain claims against it for lack of standing. I concur in the denial of this petition As a general rule, interlocutory appellate review is not available by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss or its denial of a motion for a summary judgment. x par: Liberty Nat'l Life Ing, Co., 825 So. 24 758, 761-62 (Ala. 2002). Among the exceptions to this general rule is one that allows this Court to consider a petition for a writ of mandamus when the petitioner's motion asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. Bx_paxte Heal hcorp., 974 So. 24 288, 292 (Ala. 2007). Here, Scottsdale Insurance asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that Har-Mar Collision, Inc., the plaintiff below, does not have "standing" to file an action alleging breach of contract and bad faith because, according to Scottsdale Insurance, Har-Mar is not a party to the contract at issue. 1140631 It may be considered axiomatic, however, that a party who claims a private right of action against another has standing to assert its claim in our courts. The claim may fail for lack of support in the law or in the facts, including, in the case of a claim of breach of contract, a lack of proof of the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. such a failure, however, is a failure on the merits, not a failure of standing on the part of the plaintiff to assert its claim and to attempt to prove the claim. And the prospect of failure of a claim on such grounds certainly does not deprive the trial court of the subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether a claim properly presented to At does in fact find support in the law and in the facts. Our precedents are now clear to this effect. See Ex parte Home Loans Servicing, LP, (Ms. 1110373, Sept. 13, 2013] So. 34__, ___ (Ala. 2013) (overruling Cadle v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2006), and discussing at length the inapplicability of standing as a gatekeeping mechanism in private-law actions, as opposed to public-law actions); Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So, 34 316, 318-19 (Ala. 2013); Whitty v. Montgomery cnty,, 141 So. 3d 1015, 1020-21 (Ala. 2013); 1140631, EX parte MERSCORP, , 141 So, 3d 984, 991-92 (Ala. 2013); Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So, 34 959, 978-79 (Ala. 2011); Steele v, Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So. 34 89, 91 n.2 (Ala. 2010); and Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 42 So. 3d 1216, 1219-21 (Ala. 2010). 

2690f4041034027ba9bf76c0cf14524289fa087b1a00b1d77f9ae038483b0dff

2015-04-17T00:00:00Z

fcbe0fa9-12b0-4ced-b522-6cf855361420

Ex parte Corey Beantee Melton. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Corey Beantee Melton v. State of Alabama) (Shelby Circuit Court: CC-06-1139; Criminal Appeals : CR-08-1767). Writ Denied. No Opinion.

1100327

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

RELEASED. WAR 11 2011 ures CSOT OF MARA Yotice: Tals opinion ie subject to forms! revision before publication in the advance sh ot Southern Heporter. Readers are requested co nobity she Reporter of Deckelons, Alabata Kepeilace Coures, 300 Dexter hvense, Nonegowary, Alabana 36104-3741 { (224) 229-0609), oF any Cypoarapaical or’ other ezvora, in Seder ease corrections may be ade betore the opinion 1s printed’ in Zoutharn Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 1100327 Bx parte Corey Beantee Melton PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 10 THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (tm xe: Corey Beantee Melton ve State of Alabama) (Shelby Circuit Court, CC-06-1139; Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-08-1767) WOODALL, Justice. WRIT DENIED, NO OPINION Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., Murdock, J., concurs specially Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.* *gustice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court of Criminal Appeale when that court considered this case. 1100327 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in denying the petition for the writ of certiorari in this case. The sole question raised in the petition to this Court is whether the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in its opinion in this case conflicts with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Walter v, United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). The facts of the two cases and, consequently, the holdings of the two courts are sufficiently different that those holdings do not conflict with one another. In Walter, there was no dispute that the government clearly exceeded the scope of the search actually conducted by a third party. Likewise, in the present case, there is little dispute that the government exceeded the scope of the search actually conducted by a third party. In Walter, however, there was no dispute but that the government exceeded the scope of any search that had been authorized by the defendant. The same cannot be said here. More specifically, the petition focuses on evidence indicating that employees of Best Buy electronics retail stores who were working on customers’ computers were restricted by their employer from opening computer files they suspected of containing illegal content. The petition does not address, nor assert a conflict or an issue of first impression with respect to, whether Corey Beantee Melton knew or reasonably should have 2 1100327 known that employees of Best Buy would need to open certain folders on his computer and thereby gave up any expectation of privacy with respect to such folders. Compare Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that a defendant reasonably should have expected that a third party hired to install a new DVD drive in his computer might use videos already in his computer as a method to test the newly installed equipment) . Although I concur in denying the petition for the writ of certiorari in this case, I do not wish to be understood as agreeing in all respects with the analysis employed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Among other things, I am concerned about the treatment of the inquiry, in the second half of Part II of that court's opinion, into whether any expectation of privacy Melton retained in his computer files was "an expectation that society is prepared to consider reasonable," __ $0. 3d at _, as somehow different from the inquiry in the first half of Part II into "whether Melton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files," ___ So, 3d at __. By definition, the two inquiries are the same. See United States v, Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1983) ("A ‘search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.) 

412c852714804141fcefddcd2e2fe319b17c882d47573628bd332c30a8d6eddd

2011-03-11T00:00:00Z

58a726ac-425b-4249-8d13-bcad1ec83fbb

Chris Dwayne Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections

1180400

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

LEASED supe COURT OE ALABAMA STATS OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL TERM, 2019 1180400 Chris Dwayne Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-18-667). PARKER, Chief Justice. AFFIRMED. NO OPINION Seo Rule 53{a) (1) and (a) (2) (P), Ala. 8. App. P Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JZ., concur. Mitchell, J., recuses himself. 

8e89c0138f7044056b3778a60e493f69201d950cbf1e7b1d2350a5abda3a9af7

2019-08-09T00:00:00Z

e3fd4e28-0f32-4484-8d13-d38cca31bb52

Ex parte Clarence E. Haynes, Talladega County Circuit Clerk, and Amber Edwards, Talladega County Juvenile Intake Officer. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Ex parte G.L. (In the Matter of H.C.L., a minor child))

1081171

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

RELEASED Notice: This opinion is subject to fora! revision before publication in the advance ‘sheets of Southern Reporter. eaders are rogsasted to notity the Raporear Of Deciaionay Alabama. appellate” Courtsy. 300, Dexter Avenue, Mantgcnacy, Alabama 36106-3761 (S00) Zascaeto}, ‘of any typograpnice: or other errors, in eeder that corrections may be sade otore the opinion is printed in gesthasn Rapoxtar SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2009 1081171, Ex parte Clarence E. Haynes, Talladega County Circuit Clerk, and Amber Edwards, Talladega County Juvenile Intake Officer PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (in re: Ex parte G.L. (in the Matter of H.C.L., @ minor child)) (Talladega Juvenile Court; Court of Civil Appeals, 2080260) SHAW, Justice. ‘The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied. 1081271 In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, Horsley v, Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So. 24 185 (1973). WRIT DENIED. Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur. 

445287ab5bc588e6146aa4e2ab599d57a28367ce6def5edca8ba0479ef4516c9

2009-09-04T00:00:00Z

c6e49f67-47eb-4f37-a060-dfe365faec05

Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute, Alabama Citizens Action Program, and John E. Enslen, in his official capacity as Judge of Probate for Elmore County.

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA March 10, 2015 1140460 Bx parte State of Alabama ex rel, Alabama Policy Institute, Alabama Citizens Action Program, and John &. Enslen, in his official capacity as Judge of Probate for Elmore County. ORDER In an opinion issued on March 3, 2015, this Court ordered Judge Don Davis, the Probate Judge for Mobile County, "to advise thie Court, by letter brief, no later than 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, March 5, 2015, as to whether he is bound by any existing federal court order regarding the issuance of any marriage license other than the four marriage licenses he was ordered to issue in Strawser (yv. Strange (Civil Action No 14-0424-cG-c, Jan. 26, 2015)]. [*] on March 5, dudge Davis filed a motion seeking an 11-day extension of time, until March 16, 2015, to comply with this court's order. On March 9, Judge Davis filed a "Response to Show Cauge Order" in which he asserts that he should not be included in this Court's March 3 order out of concern that doing so would require him to violate the federal district ‘The decision of the federal district court in strawser was premised on its earlier decision in Searcy v. Strange, [Civil Action No. 14-0208-CG-N, Jan. 23, 2015] __ F. Supp. 34 __. (8.D. Ala. 2015). 1140460 court order previously entered in Strawser.? Because we find Judge Davis's concern to be without merit, and for the additional reasons discussed below, Judge Davis's motion for extension is denied, and he is added as a respondent to this mandamus proceeding and is enjoined from issuing any further marriage licenses contrary to Alabama law. Judge Davis asks for the 11-day extension to respond to this Court's question because he has asked for a "ruling* as to that question from the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Conmission (tthe are") : "As grounds for this Motion, Judge Davis sets out as follow: "2, Judge Davis has sought instruction today from the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Coumission. "3, Proper response to this Court is best made after [United States District Court] Judge Granade rules and/or after the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission rules." (amphasis added.) Our inguiry to Judge Davis was intended as a factual one. We fail to see what knowledge the JIC might have as to the facts regarding whether Judge Davis is bound by 2, "corrected" copy of Judge Davis's response has since been filed with this Cour. aaaoaso an order in any case other than Strawser v. Strange (Civil Action No. 14-0424-CG-C, Jan. 26, 2015), or the fact of what the gtrawser order says. As to the latter, the task of reading the order in Strawser and understanding what it says is the task of this court, not the JIC.” Judge Davis also notes that he has asked the federal district court "for a stay" of its order in Strawser. The fact of this request offers no basis for delay here; indeed, the prospect of such a stay by the federal court is compatible with the action of this Court. Further, Judge Davis has made no showing that the federal court order for which he seeks a stay is one that has not already been executed, i.e., one that concerns any license other than those already issued to the plaintiffs in that case. ‘The latter task is to read the Strawser order and to consider the import, if any, of that order as a decision by a court in a coordinate judicial system. The JIC is a tribunal commissioned solely for the investigation and prosecution of "complaints" against judges regarding violation of the Canons of Judicial mthics and the physical and mental ability of judges to perform their duties. Ala. Const. 1901, § 156. It is not a court of law, and it has no authority -- and no role in the performance by this Court of its nal duties as a court of law to decide the cases brought before it. 1140460 Our opinion of March 3 serves as binding statewide precedent. To ensure compliance with that precedent, we also entered on that date and as part of our opinion an order specifically directing Alabama probate judges not to issue marriage licenses contrary to that precedent. Davis has made no showing that he was, or is, the subject of any previously entered federal court order other than the one issued in Strawser, and he makes no showing that that order has any continuing, binding effect on him as to any marriage-license applicants beyond the four couples who were the plaintiffs in that case and who already have received the relief they requested. The inapplicability of the federal court order to any other couple is evident from the terms of the order itself: "probate Judge Don Davis is hereby ENJOINED from refusing to iseue marriage licenses to plaintiffs due to the Alabama laws which prohibit same-sex marriage. If Plaintiffe take all steps that are required in the normal course of business as a prerequisite to issuing a marriage license to opposite-sex couples, Judge Davis may not deny them a_license on the ground th intifts r same-sex Couples er because it is prohibited by the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment [, Ala. Const. 1901, § 36.03,] and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act [, Ala, Code 1975, § 30-1-19,] or by any other Alabama law or Order pertaining to same-sex marriage." 1140460 (capitalization in original; emphasis added.) In his motion, Judge Davis himself places emphasis on the same passages we have emphasized above, In the absence of a showing otherwise, we are left to read this language in accordance with its plain meaning: It grants injunctive relief against gudge Davis only as "to [the] plaintiffs" in Strawser. our reading of this plain language is confirmed by the fact that the plaintiffs in Strawser sought relief only on their own behalf, not on behalf of any others, and by the fact that federal jurisprudence contemplates that a federal court decides only the case before it, see Ex parte State ex rel. natitute, IMs. 1140460, March 3, 2015] So. 34, ___ (Part 11.¢.) (Ala. 2025),4 in turn binding the ‘as we noted in Part II.C., "'"[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the game judge in a different case,"'*" So. 3d at (quoting Camreta v, Greene, U.S. H.7, 1318. GT 2020, 2033 n.7 (2021), quoting in turn i8 ¢. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02(1] (dl, pp. 134-26 (3d ed. 2011)), much less upon'a defendant sued by new plaintiffs in a different case. The principle quoted above from the United States Supreme Court decision in Camreta was manifestly reflected in orders entered on this date by the United states istrict Court for the Middle District of Alabama, in which that court chose to stay its consideration of a case similar to Strawser and stated that "{tJhis court is not bound by Searcy.". Hard v, Bentley (Case No. 2:13-cv-00922-WKW; 5 1140460 parties before then only with respect to the other parties in the case.* Notwithstanding the plain description of the activity enjoined by the quoted language in the federal court order requiring Judge Davis to issue licenses "to [the] plaintiffs" in the Strawser case, dudge Davis questions whether the following language somehow was intended to enjoin him in relation to persons other than the four couples who sued and obtained a judgment against him for their personal benefit: March 10, 2015) (M.D. Ala.) °tn Brenner v. Scott (No. 4:14cvi07, Jan. 1, 2015) (N.D. Fla.), a case similar in many respects to the present one, the court explained that "[t]he Clerk has acknowledged that the preliminary injunction requires her to issue a marriage license to the two unmarried plaintiffs," but that, in "the absence of any request by any other plaintiff for a license," "(t}he preliminary injunction now in effect does not require the Clerk to issue licenses to other applicants." See also Vikram David Amar, Justia-Verdict, February 13, 2015; https: //verdict justia. com/2015/02/13/ just-lawless-alabama- state-court-judges-refusing-issue-sex-marriage-licenses (explaining that generally a federal district court can enjoin a defendant only with respect to the defendant's treatment of plaintiffs actually before the court and that the remedial limitation on federal district courts is defined by the identity of the plaintiffs, not just the identity of the defendants) (last visited March 10, 2015; a copy of the Web page containing this information is available in the case file of the clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court) 6 1140460 “This injunction binds Judge Don Davis and all his officers, agents, servants and employees, and others in active concert or participation with any of them, who would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama which prohibit or fail to recognize same-sex marriage." ‘The apparent purpose of this latter passage was to clarity who is bound by the federal court's order, not what action that order requires of those persons. ‘The question of wwhat" is the subject of the clear statement in the previous paragraph quoted above, i.e., that the enjoined parties are directed to issue marriage licenses specifically “to [thel plaintiffs." The subsequent reference to persons who "would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama" is in reference to Judge Davis and his agents, employees, etc., to the extent that they would seck to enforce the marriage laws of Alabaa as “to [the] plaintiffs.” We are further confirmed in our reading of the federal court's order by our understanding, as, discussed in notes 4 and 5, supra, that federal court jurisprudence contemplates that a federal district court adjudicates the obligations, if any, of a defendant or defendants only with respect to the plaintifé or plaintiffs in the case before the court. See also Meinhold v, United States Dep! fense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) ("An 1140460 injunction ‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99S. Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L, Ra, 24176 (1979). ... This is not a class action, and Meinhold sought only to have his discharge voided and to be reinstated. ... Beyond reinstatement ..., DOD should not be constrained from applying its regulations to Meinhold and all other military personnel." (emphasis added)); Zepeda v, United States Inmig, & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A federal court ... may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court."); Hollon v. Mathis Indep, Sch, Dist., 491 F.2d 92, 93 (sth Cir. 1974) (holding that "the injunction against the School District from enforcing its regulation against anyone other than [the plaintiff] reaches further than is necessary" (emphasis added) ). ‘As we explained in our March 3 opinion, this Court has acted to ensure statewide compliance with Alabama law in an orderly and uniform manner. We have before us in this case @ petitioner in the form of the State that has an interest in and standing as to the actions of every probate judge in the aas0aso State. Moreover, as we noted in the opinion, Alabama's probate judges took a variety of different positions in the wake of the federal district court's decisions, and no single circuit court has jurisdiction over all probate judges to enable it to address that disarray. The inclusion of oudge Davis, along with all the other probate judges in this state, as a respondent subject to this Court's March 3 order as to future margiage-License applicants is necessary and appropriate to the end of achieving order and uniformity in the application of Alabama's marriage laws. : Based on the foregoing, Judge Davis is added to this mandamus proceeding as a respondent and is subject to this court's order of March 3, 2015. Section 30-1-9, Ala. Code 1975, provides that gudge Davis "may" issue "marriage licenses." To the extent he exercises this authority, he must issue those licenses in accordance with the meaning of the term "marriage" in that Code section and in accordance with other provisions of Alabama law, as discussed in our March 3 opinion.  Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, dissents 1140460 SHAW, Justice (dissenting) As explained in my dissent in Ex parte State ex re. Ali 2 , (Ms. 1140460, March 3, 2015) So. 3d __, ___ (Ala. 2015), I do not believe that this Court has jurisdiction in this case; therefore, I dissent. a 

5c825c09e40b29d15c56a1b425aac1801964b07fe0ff0ce7c2c30875f7da1706

2015-03-10T00:00:00Z

6e438a17-bd5a-4380-91b0-a765623039da

Korte v. Betsey Bayless, ...Preserve Arizona -- Yes on Proposition 100 Committee... (Supreme Court Order)

CV-00-0308-AP/EL

arizona

Arizona Supreme Court

FILED ‘AUG 3 1 2000 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA VIRGINIA KORTE; CARLA, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-00-0308-AP/EL Plaintiffs/Appeliees, Maricopa County Superior court No. cv 2000-01435 BETSEY BAYLESS, Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, Defendant, PRESERVE ARTZONA--YES ON PROPOSITION 100 COMMITTEE, RUTH HAMILTON, Chairwoman, Defendant /Appeliant. ORDER > ) ) ) > ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) i ) ) ‘The court having considered this expedited appeal, IT 18 ORDERED vacating and reversing the judgment of the trial court entered on August 14, 2000. A formal opinion of the court will follow in due course DATED this lst day of August, 2000. THOMAS A. Chief Justice Supreme Court No. CV-00-0308-AP/EL Page 2 of 2 To: Andrew § Gordon, Esq., Coppersmith & Gordon PLC ‘Timothy J Casey, Esq., Snell & Wilmer LLP Hon. Janet A Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General Hon. Joseph A Kanefield, Esq., W Scott Bales, Esq. Jack Pfister John # Lundin, Esq., Jeffrey D Gross, Esq., John D DiTullio, Esq, Gallagher @ Kennedy Hon Susan R Bolton, Maricopa County Superior Court Hon Colin F Campbell, Presiding Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Michael K Jeanes, Clerk, Maricopa County Superior Court, Central Court Building ame 

e5f34f2e1b4be23a967b01163955b0a4d64e39b2f1d1c38bd821f3221b173485

2000-08-31T00:00:00Z

77f5a6e2-0631-40ee-977a-9a87e97d7dcd

MARK V. SCHEEHLE v JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT et al

CV-04-0103-CQ

arizona

Arizona Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARTZONA MARK V. SCHEEHLE, Arizona Supreme Court No, CV=04-0103-co Plaintife, United states District court No. CIV-98-1095-PHx-siat QUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, CHARLES = JONES, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, RUTH V. MCGREGOR, and THOMAS A. 2UAKET; JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN_AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA: MICHAEL R. MoVEY, ROBERT D. MYERS, JONATHAN H. SCHWARTZ and CHRISTOPHER M SKELLY, oprNnron Defendants. Certified Question from the United states District Court for the District of Arizona ‘The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, Chief Judge QUESTION ANSWERED MARK V. SCHEEHLE Fountain Hills Plaintiff Pro Se TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix sy Paula S. Bickett, Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals Attorneys for Defendants SNOW, tude a ‘The United States District Court for the District of Arizona has asked us whether this Court ‘can promulgate court rules mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of Arizona Revised statutes (*A.R.S.") section 12-133 (2000) authorizing only voluntary service?" We h Jurisdiction to decide the certified question pursuant to A.R.S § 12-1861 (2001) .* 2 We hold that this Court has authority to promulgate a court rule authorizing the superior courts in each county of this state to require active members of the state bar to provide limited service as arbitrators, We further hold that the exercise of that authority is neither constricted by, nor inconsistent with, A.R.S. 12-133. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY x3 In 1971, the legislature passed a statute permitting the superior courts to implement by court rule non-binding mandatory arbitration programs. The statute assigned to the courts the responsibility for appointing arbitrators in such cases and further specified that courts opting to create a mandatory arbitration Program ‘shall maintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators, subject to the right of each person to refuse to serve in a particular The district court also requested that we determine whether the Maricopa County Superior Court had authority under A.R.S. § 12-133 to promulgate a program mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators. Because, as we explain in this opinion, the Supreme Court Rule explicitly authorizes the superior court to include active members of the Arizona bar on its list of eligible arbitrators, this question is not presented by the facts of this case. We thus decline to answer it. 2 assigned case.*? 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 1 (current version codified at A.R.S. § 12-133(C) (2003)). The legislature has amended the statute several times, to raise the mandatory arbitration limits and to require, as opposed to merely permit, superior courts to create mandatory arbitration programs, among other reasons. See, e.g., 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 35, § 1; 1984 Ariz. Seas. Laws, ch. 53, § 1; 1986 Ariz. Seas. Lawa, ch. 360, § 1; 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 110, § 1; 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 9, $2) 2000 Ariz. Seas. Laws, ch. 35, § 1. ry In 1974, this Court promulgated the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Arbitration. Rule 1 indicated that the Uniform Rules were for those superior courts that implemented a mandatory arbitration program under A.R.S. § 12-133, and further directed the superior courts how to enact rules for such programs. Rule 2 specified how arbitrators would be appointed. That rule provided that if the parties could not stipulate to an arbitrator, the court would, through a randon selection procedure, appoint an arbitrator froma list. The list would be comprised of ‘members of the Bar of the State of Arizona residing within the County in which the Court is located." Unif. R.P. Arb. 2(b) (1980). The rule allowed * the statute also provided that an arbitrator be paid fifty dollars per day for conducting an arbitration hearing. The statute has since been amended to raise the payment to seventy-five dollars per day. A.R.S. § 12-133(6) This rule and its successor, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 73, have been modified several tines. Rule 73 currently 3 attorneys to remove their names from the list and also allowed then to refuse to serve if appointed as an arbitrator. 5 In 1984, pursuant to the rule and the statute, Maricopa County added a local rule implementing the mandatory arbitration program.* x6 In 1986, the legislature amended the statute to require, 8 opposed to merely permit, superior courts to implement mandatory arbitration programs by rule. in 1989 and 1990, the State Bar of Arizona, the Maricopa County Superior Court, and other attorneys, judges, and court administrators, petitioned this Court to remove the provisions from Rule 2 allowing attorneys to opt out of arbitration service absent good cause. In response, we adopted four changes to Rule 2. First, we omitted the provisions allowing practicing attorneys to renove their names from the list of Potential arbitrators. Second, we specified the reasons that would permit an arbitrator to be excused from service. Third, we added @ provision allowing an attorney who “has served as an Arbitrator provides that ‘all residents of the county in which the court is located, who, for at least four years, have been active members of. the State Bar of Arizona” may be placed on a county's list of eligible arbitrators. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(b) (1). Tt also permits the superior court to place on this list other lawyers of any bar. both active and inactive, who “have agreed to serve as arbitrators in the county where the action is pending.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(b) (2). <The Maricopa County Superior Court initially set the mandatory arbitration threshold at $15,000. Ariz. Local R. Prac. Super. Ct. (Maricopa) 3.10 (1984), In 1994 it adopted the $50,000 maximum threshold authorized by A.R.S. § 12-133. Pursuant to these Rules for two or more days during the current year to be excused." Unif, R.P. Arb. 2(e)(3) (1992). Fourth, we ‘added a comment to the rule confirming that "[i]t is the obligation of all qualified lawyers to serve as Arbitrators and only exceptional circumstances should justify removal from the list.* Unit. R.P, Arb. 2 emt, (1992). Im 2000, the Uniform Rules for Arbitration were incorporated into the Arizona Rules of civil Procedure as Rules 72-76. Rules 1 and 2 of the Uniform Rules are how renumbered respectively as Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 72 and 73.° 0 In this case, attorney Mark V. Scheehle challenges the provision of Rule 73 authorizing the Maricopa County Superior Court to include him on its list of eligible arbitrators without his consent. Scheehle’s federal court complaint alleged that mule 73 violated a number of his federal constitutional rights. scheehle also raised a pendent state law claim that Rule 73 was invalid because it compelled him to serve as an arbitrator, whereas A.R.S. § 12-133 authorized the appointment only of arbitrators who had agreed to serve. 5 In 2000, this provision was amended to excuse an appointed arbitrator who had “completed contested hearings and ruled as an arbitrator . . . in two or more cases assigned during the calendar year.* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(e) (3). ‘The balance of this opinion will refer to these rules as they are currently codified in the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. x8 The district court granted summary judgment a Scheehle on his federal civil rights claims. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law clains after resolution of all the federal questions and accordingly dismissed the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the decision, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 257 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir, 2001), but then withdrew that opinion. Scheehle v. Justices of the Suprene Court, 269 P34 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). It then certified a question to this Court asking whether A.R.S. § 12- 133 mandated compulsory participation of attorneys as arbitrators ry This Court, addressing only that very limited question, held that A.R.S. § 12-133 does not require that lawyers serve as arbitrators. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 203 Ariz. 520, $22, 4 6, 57 P.34 379, 381 (2002). after our decision, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further consideration. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 315 F.3d 3191 (9th cir. 2003). mo Upon remand, the district court again reaffirmed its rejection of Scheehle’s federal constitutional arguments and dismissed them from this case mi In the same order, the district court certified the following question to this Court: Whether the Arizona Supreme Court under its exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law can promulgate court rules 6 mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of A.R.S. § 12-133 authorizing only voluntary The district court stayed all further consideration as to Scheehle’s state law claim pending the anewer to its certified question.” ANALYSIS uz In his briefing on the certified question, Scheehle makes three alternative arguments. First, Scheehle argues that Rule 73 violates the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend, V, and the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Second, he argues that Rule 73 impermissibly conflicts with the legislation authorizing the mandatory arbitration program. Third, he asserts that this Court’s power to regulate the practice of law does not extend to compelling attorneys to serve as arbitrators. we analyze each argument in turn, The District Court Was Already Decided scheehi Federal Law Claims. m3 Scheehle acknowledges that the district court has already dismissed his federal constitutional claims, But he nonetheless asserts that it would be improper for this Court “to answer the Upon certification, Scheehle objected to the participation of Justices McGregor, Berch, Ryan, and Murwitz in answering the certified questions because they are defendants in the underlying federal court complaint. We considered and rejected Scheehle’s objections in a previous order that is appended to thi decision and incorporated herein. 7 certified questions, when the district court seeks answers from this Court devoid of any analysis of the impact of the Constitution of the United States on such state law authority.” We disagree 4 It is not the role of this Court in responding to a certified question of state law to review the federal law rulings of the certifying federal court. The authority pursuant to which we respond to the district court's questions permits us to answer only questions of state law. A.R.S. § 12-1861 (The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it . . . if there are involved in any proceedings before the certifying court questions of the law of this state which may be determinative of the cause"). This opinion is thus limited to the question certified: Does this Court have authority under state law to promulgate the rules at issue and, if it does, is that authority limited by the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-1337 Rule 73 Does Not Conflict with A.R.S. § 12-133, ms Scheehle next contends that A.R.S. § 12-133(c), by requiring each superior court to “naintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators," limits the court to appointing arbitrators from that List. A.R.S. § 12-133(c). We disagree. wus In interpreting a statute, we “try to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ing. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). T£ we cannot do so by looking at the plain language of the statute, “we consider the statute’s context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its effects and consequences; and ite spirit and purpose." Id. We also avoid interpretations that unnece: ily implicate constitutional concerns. In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 78, 876 P.2d 548, 574 (1994) (opting for statutory interpretation that does not limit this court in interpreting range of sanctions it could impose on attorneys so as not to implicate constitutional concerns); Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 273, 872 P.2a at 677. 7 The language upon which Scheehle relies has been in A.R.S. § 12-133 since its adoption in 1971. ‘The full text of the relevant provision states: ‘The court shall maintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators, subject to the right of each person to refuse to serve in a particular assigned case and subject further to the right of any party to show good cause why an appointed arbitrator should Rot serve in a particular assigned case. ‘The court rules shall provide that the case Subject to arbitration shall be assigned for hearing to a panel of three arbitrators, or in the alternative, to a single arbitrator, each of whom shall be selected by the court. ALRS. § 12-133(¢). us Scheehle argues that under this statute the list of voluntary arbitrators is the only source from which the superior court may appoint arbitrators. Nowhere, however, does the statute say so. Rather, the plain text of the statute vests in the superior court the authority, without limit, to select each arbitrator. “The court rules shall provide that the ca: subject to arbitration shall be assigned . . . to [an arbitrator or arbitrators] . . . each of whom shall be selected by the court.* ALR.S. § 12-233(¢) m9 While implying a limitation not explicitly stated in a statute may be appropriate in some circumstances, it is not in this case for several reasons. First, the legislature has been aware since 1974 that this Court, by rule, authorized superior courts to Place active members of the bar on their lists of eligible arbitrators. After we promulgated the rule, the legislature repeatedly amended the statute, but never indicated that the court could appoint only arbitrators who volunteered. we, therefore presume that the legislature approved of the rule’s operation. as we have said in the context of statutory interpretation: it is universally the rule that where a statute which has been construed by a court of last resort is reenacted in the same or Substantially the same terms, the legislature is presumed to have placed its approval on the judicial interpretation given and to have adopted such construction and made it part of the reenacted statute. State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 442, 454 P.2d 982, 984 (1969) (quoting Madrigal v. indus. Comm'n, 69 Ariz 338, 142, 210 P.24 967, 971 (1949)). 20 After this Court promulgated the rule authorizing superior courts to appoint active members of the bar as 10 arbitrators, the legislature amended the statute both to increas the jurisdictional limit on cases that must be referred to mandatory arbitration and to require, as opposed to merely authorize, each superior court to adopt a mandatory arbitration Program. In doing so the legislature mist have anticipated a corresponding increase in the demand for arbitrators. Yet it made no provision for additional arbitrators. We therefore presume that the legislature relied on this Court's rule authorizing the service of the members of the bar as arbitrators to meet that demand, 21 Second, nothing in the statute seeks to regulate attorneys. To imply in the statute a limitation on the court's power of appointment would limit not only a superior court's power to appoint arbitrators but also the scope of this Court's power to require bar menbers to assist in the administration of justice by authorizing superior courts, on a limited basis, to appoint menbers of the bar as arbitrators. We do not interpret a statute as intending to limit the court's ability to otherwise act unless the legislature explicitly indicates such an intent. Hayes, 178 ariz. at 273, 872 P.2d at 677. None is evident here s22 As Scheehle acknowledges, this Court has exclusive authority over the regulation of attorneys. “[T]he practice of law is a matter exclusively within the authority of the Judiciary. The determination of who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition is a function placed by the state constitution in this un court." Hunt v, Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 259, 261-62, 619 P.24 1036, 1038-39 (1980). 23 This Court fulfills the administrative responsibilities assigned to it under the constitution by, among other methods, promulgating rules. Those rules are distinct from those enacted by state administrative agenci Pursuant to legislation. when this Court promulgates rules pertaining to attorneys or to court Procedures, it does so pursuant to its own constitutional authority over the bench, the bar, and the procedures pertaining to them. Heat Pump Equip. Co. v. Glen Alden Corp., 93 Ariz. 361, 363, 380 P.2d 1036, 1017 (1963) (stating that courts have constitutional Power to promulgate rules on judicial matters); Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 363, 129 P.2a 308, 309 (1942) (courts have power to promulgate rules to fulfill constitutional mandates). 24 Such rules are valid even if they are not completely cohesive with related legislation, so long as they are an appropriate exercise of the court’s constitutional authority. Although the legislature may, by statute, regulate the practice of Jaw, such regulation cannot be inconsistent with the mandates of this Court. Creasy, 198 Ariz. at 544, 4 18, 12 P.3d at 219 * Since the early days of statehood, we have recognized that our constitution gives authority to this Court to regulate the Practice of law. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961); In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 244 P. 376 (1926); In re Bailey, 30 Ariz, 407, 248 P. 29 (2326). 12 (stating that legislature cannot authorize by statute activity that would result in the unauthorized practice of law because a court rule governing the practice of law “trumps statutory law"); see also Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. at 95, 366 P.2d at 14 (although the legislature may impose additional restrictions which affect the licensing of attorneys, it cannot infringe on the ultimate power of the courts to determine who may practice law") (citing In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 389-90, 81 P.24 96, 98 (1938); Conway, 60 Ariz. at 81, 132 P.2d at 988 (*When, however[,) it appears that the legislative rule unduly hampers the court in the @uties imposed upon it by the Constitution, the rule adopted by the court will prevaii.*). ss We are reluctant to imply a statutory limitation that would create a conflict in the constitutional prerogatives of Separate branches of Arizona government. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 78, 876 F.2d at 574; Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 273, 872 2.24 at 677. Scheehle’s proposed interpretation would unnecessarily create such a conflict. $26 We therefore hold that A.R.S, § 12-133 does not limit the courts right to appoint persons other than volunteers to serve as arbitrators B This Court’s Responsibility to Administer an Integrated Judicial system Gives it Authority to Promilgate Rules Requiring Limited Service by Attorneys to the Judiciary. 27 Scheehle finally argues that the power to regulate the practice of law does not permit this Court to oblige attorneys to serve as court-appointed arbitrators because appointing such arbitrators “is not a function of regulating the practice of law.* This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the constitutional basis from which this Court derives its power to regulate the Practice of law.’ This Court's power to regulate the practice of law is a function of its responsibility to administer an integrated judiciary. The power to administer the judicial branch allows this Court to regulate the practice of law to further the administration of justice. x28 Article 6, section 1 of our constitution vests the judicial power "in an integrated judicial department,” which includes a11 of the courts of this state. Because “the practice of law is so intimately connected and hound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice . . . the right to ° Wholly apart from the power to regulate the bar given by our state constitution to the judiciary, extensive authority supports the inherent authority of the courts to regulate the practice of law. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 75, 876 P.2d at 571 (*the judiciary’s authority to regulate and control the practice of law is universally accepted and dates back to the year 1292."); Bridegroom v. State Bar, 27 Ariz. App. 47, 49, 550 P.2d 1089, i091 (2976) (“There is no question but that the Supreme Court has inherent power to integrate the bar of this state.*) (citations omitted) . a4 define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.24 at 572 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. state Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937)). m9 Consequently, the Arizona Constitution's creation of an integrated judiciary gives to this Court the power not just to Fegulate all courts but also to regulate the practice of law. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.2d at 572; see also Creasy, 198 Ariz. at $41, 97, 12 P.3d at 216 (“The court’s authority over the practice of law is also based on the creation of an integrated judicial department and the revisory jurisdiction of this court as Provided in article VI sections 1 and 5(4) of the arizona Constitution. *); In re Smith, 189 Ariz. 144, 146, 939 2.24 422, 424 (2997) (The State Bar exists only by virtue of this court’s rules, adopted under authority of article III and article VI, §§ 1 and 5 of the Arizona Constitution.) . 30 The constitution’s mandate in article 6, section 3 that this Court shall have ‘administrative supervision” over the courts of this state enables this Court to supervise judicial officers, including attorneys. “Administrative supervision contemplates managing the conduct of court personnel. . . . attorneys are universally recognized as ‘officers of the court,’ . . . and officers of the court, attorneys are amenable to the court as their Superior.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76-77, 876 P.2d at 573 (citations 15 omitted); Bailey, 30 Ariz. at 412, 248 P, at 30 (quoting In re Splane, 16 A. 421 (Pa. 1899)) (*The attorney is an officer of the court, and is brought into close and intimate relations with the court.*) 31 By virtue of our constitutional power over attorneys ai officers of the court, this Court created the State Bar of Arizona. Ariz. R. Sup, Ct. 32(a)(1). We require those practicing law in this state to be members of this bar. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31. As officers of the court, State Bar members are invested with significant rights and responsibilities. As the United states Supreme Court has observed: As an officer of the court, a menber of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients but to appear in court and try cases; as an officer Of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985). Attorneys are invested with these powers because they have an individual and collective role in achieving “(t]he primary duty of courts (which) is the Proper and efficient administration of justice.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.2d at 572 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass‘n, 275 N.W. at 268) 16 32 Contrary to Scheehle’s argument, this Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law is therefore not independent from its responsibility to supervise an integrated judiciary, Tt is derived from that very power. The power extended to this Court by the constitution includes the authority to Promilgate regulations assigning limited quasi-judicial functions to lawyers as judicial officer 23 Scheehle cites Schware v. Board of Examiners of the State of New Mexico, 363 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), and its progeny, for the Proposition that any qualification a state places on the entry to the practice of law ‘mist have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.* The obligation to perform limited service as an arbitrator, however, is not a restriction placed on the entry to the practice of law in this state. Rather it is a uniform regulation requiring limited service to the judiciary for those already admitted to practice relating to their roles as officers of that judiciary. 4 A state may engage in reasonable regulation of licensed professionals. See, e.g., Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.24 1325, 3328 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 342 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955)); Watson v. Md., 218 U.S. 173, 177 (1910); se0 also Ohralik v. Ohio state Bar Ase’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). Our precedents involving attorney regulation underscore this point. 25 For example, this Court has rejected a challenge to its uv constitutional authority to require annual continuing legal education ("CLE") as a condition of continued practice. smith, 189 Ariz. at 146, 939 P.2d at 424; Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 45. Compliance with the mandatory CLE rule generally requires not only that an attorney spend unreimbursed time attending the courses but also that the lewyer pay for the course. Nevertheless, we rejected a constitutional challenge to such a rule because, like the requirement to provide limited arbitration services to benefit the Judiciary, “auch requirements . . . are rationally related to the court’s obligation to serve the public interest.* zd. 36 An attorney's right “to pursue a profession is subject to the paramount right of the state . . . to regulate . professions . . . to protect the public . . . welfare." Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 10, 588 P.2d 299, 303 (2978) (citing Ariz. state ‘Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Hyder, 114 Ariz. 544, 546, 562 P.24 727, 719 (1977)). In addition to exacting time and money to meet the continuing standards necessary to retain a license, the state may exact @ reasonable consideration from those who are engaged in a profession that it regulates. Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 332, 248 P.24 879, 883 (1952) (*[A] ‘License’ is a ‘permit, granted by the sovereign, generally for a consideration . . . to a person, firm, or corporation to pursue some occupation or to carry on sone business subject to regulation ) (quoting State Bd. of Barber sxam‘rs v. Walker, 67 Ariz, 156, 167, 192 P.2d 723, 730 (2948)) 18 (emphasis added). that consideration need not be exclusively monetary, but can also be in the form of limited service to the bench, bar, or community 337 Scheehle, citing zarabia v. aradshaw, 185 Ariz. 1, 912 P.2d 5 (1996), argues that whatever this Court's authority to tion in compel service from attorneys without adequate compen: individual cas + it has no authority to enact rules that systematically deprive attorneys of their time, no matter how small the deprivation. We do not so read Zarabia. 38 Jn Zarabia, attorneys and defendants challenged Yuna County's procedures for providing criminal representation to indigent defendants. 185 Ariz. at 2, 912 P.2d at 6. At the tine, Yuma County had no public defender’s office and provided representation to indigent defendants in criminal cases through a mix of contract attorneys and attorneys appointed from the private bar. Id. The private practitioners were appointed on a rotational basis and were obliged to provide the representation regardless of experience or expertise. These lawyers were reimbursed “a total of $375 for up to twenty hours’ work on a case ($17.50 per hour), and $50 an hour if more than twenty hours [were] required to complete the representation.” Id. at 3, 912 P.2d at 7. x9 In reviewing that appointment system, we decided no constitutional questions. Rather we held that the system violated both A.R.S. § 13-4013, which requires that an attorney receive a3 *reasonable* compensation when appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.5(C), which requires that in appointing an attorney to represent a Gefendant in a criminal matter the court take “into account the skill Likely to be required in handling a particular case.” Zarabia, 185 Ariz. at 3, 912 P.2d at 7 40 We expressly recognized in zarabia, however, that the court has authority to require a lawyer's services, even on a pro bono basis, to assist in the administration of justice. ~{NJothing we say here should be interpreted as limiting a judge's inherent authority to achieve justice by appointing a particular lawyer to represent a [party] in a particular case, even if the appointment is pro bono or causes financial hardship to the appointed lawyer.” Id, at 4, 912 P.2d at 8. We thus confirmed, as have other courts, the ability of a court to require attorneys, by virtue of their effice, to provide pro bono publico service in certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.24 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Courts have long recognized that attorneys, because of their profession, owe some duty to the court and to the public to serve without compensation when called on... . This duty of public service is a condition of Practicing law, and constitutes neither a taking under the fifth amendment, nor involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment.) (citations omitted): see algo United States v. Dillon, 20 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) (the state can condition a lawyer‘s ability to practice law upon the acceptance of certain responsibilities in the furtherance of the administration of justice) wat Stressing that such power was limited, however, we remarked upon the difference between “requiring @ lawyer to handle one case or @ few and conscripting lawyers to handle “all cases regardless of their ability or willingness to do so." Zarabia, 185 Ariz. at 4, 912 P.2d at 8, We therefore noted that “{w)hatever appointment process a court adopts should reflect the principle that lawyers have the right to refuse to be drafted on a systematic basis and put to work at any price to satisfy a county's obligation vo provide counsel to indigent defendants.* rd. 42 Contrary to the appointment system in Zarabia, which was neither quantitatively nor qualitatively limited, the system authorized by Rule 73 contains several inherent limitations. First, Rule 73 does not, in and of itself, compel a lawyer to be an arbitrator. It merely authorizes superior courts to place attorneys on a list of eligible arbitrators. thus, presumably, if sufficient volunteers exist in a particular county to meet that county’s need for arbitrators, that county’s superior court need not place eligible members of the state bar on the list of persons eligible for appointment. 43 Second, Rule 73 provides for random appointment of au arbitrators from the list. Thus, placement on the list does not necessarily result in service as an arbitrator in any given year. m4 Third, when a lawyer is randomly selected to serve, Rule 73 explicitly limits the extent of that service, Under Rule 73, an attorney cannot be compelled to accept arbitrations in any year in which the attorney has already held hearings and ruled on two matters. According to Schechie’s own affidavit, service as an arbitrator typically requires only four to eight hours of his time Because Schechle and imposes only minor out-of-pocket expen was asked to serve twice in 1997, he would have provided no more than sixteen hours of arbitration service in that year. this simply does not constitute the systematic deprivation condemned in zarabia. sas Citing Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1966), Scheehle also argues that this Court cannot condition his practice of law on the deprivation of his constitutional rights. The district court, however, has already determined that no such rights were infringed upon here. “When the annual time an attorney might be required to serve as an arbitrator is combined with the fifteen hours of continuing legal education an attorney is obliged to obtain, it is still well within the range of training hours required by state administrative agencies from other professionals. See, @.9., A.A.C. R4-1-453(D) (requiring accountants to obtain between sixty and eighty hours of continuing education every two years); ALAC, R4-26-207 (requiring psychologists to obtain sixty hours every <wo years); A.A.C. R4-11-1203 (requiring dentists to obtain seventy-two hours every three years); A.A.C. R4-16-101 (requiring physicians co obtain forty hours every two years). 22 conctusroN a6 We therefore answer the Certified Question as follows This Court has the constitutional authority to require active menbers of the state bar to serve as arbitrators pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 73. Further, A.R.S. § 12-133 does not restrict this Court’s authority to promulgate that rule. G Murray Snow, Juage™ Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice Rebecca white Berch, Vice Chief Justice Michael D. Ryan, Justice Rndrew D. Hurwitz, Justice ‘The Honorable Charles E. Jones recused himself; pursuant to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable G. Murray Snow, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit in his stead. 23 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA MARK V. SCHEBHLE, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-04-0103-cQ Plaintite, United States District court No. CV-98-1095-PHX-siat QUSTICES OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, CHARLES E. JONES, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, RUTH V. MCGREGOR, and THOMAS A. ZLAKET; JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA: MICHAEL R. MevEY, ROBERT D. MYERS, JONATHAN H. SCHWARTZ and CHRISTOPHER M. SKELLY, ORDER Defendants. When this Court accepted questions certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, chief Justice Jones recused himself, Thereafter, the Plaintiff in the underlying federal action, Mark V. Scheehle, filed with this Court an “Objection to Defendants in Plaintiff’s Federal Action Participating in the Adjudication of the Questions Certified to this Court by the District Court." In it, ur. Scheehle argues that the remaining four permanent members of this Court, gustices MeGregor, Berch, Ryan, and Hurwitz, are disqualified from answering the certified questions. We here decide that objection. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ‘The Maricopa County Superior Court assessed a $900 fine against ur. Scheehle for his refusal to accept assignment as an arbitrator pursuant to court rules that require Arizona attorneys with more than five years’ of experience to serve as arbitrators in matters in which a Limited damage amount is at issue. Mr. Scheehle filed a special action in this Court challenging the fine and the right of the superior court to require his service as an arbitrator. This Court declined to exercise its special action jurisdiction. Thereafter, instead of seeking appellate review of the fine, Mr. Scheehle filed a civil rights complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) Im his First Amended Complaint in the federal action, Mr. Scheehle named a number of defendants. Among them he named che superior court judge who had assessed the fine, several other judges of the superior court who enforced the arbitration program, the Maricopa County Superior Court, and “the Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court, Stanley G. Feldman, Charles =. Jones, Frederick J. Martone, Ruth V. McGregor, and Thomas A. Zlaket.* Although Mr. Scheehle sued all of the judyes individually, he specified that the action was brought against them in their official capacities. Thus, he alleged, they were not immune from his federal civil rights action. In the federal complaint, Mr, Scheehle attacked the arbitration program on both constitutional and state law grounds. He asked for declaratory relief establishing that the Arizona statute and court rule implementing the program are unconstitutional. He also sought injunctive relief ordering the Maricopa County Superior Court to remove his name from the list of arbitrators and enjoining the court from enforcing the $900 sanction entered against him. He finally requested that he be awarded costs and his co-counsel’s reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).! The district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on all of Mr. Scheehle’s § 1963 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 257 F.34 1082 (9th Cir. 2001), but later withdrew the opinion. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme court, 269 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit then certified a 2 Of course “[sJuits brought against individual officers for injunctive relief are for all practical purposes suits against. the State itself. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978). The public officials sued are not personally liable for any attorneys" fees that might be awarded. Id.; see also Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d. 201, 213 (Sth Cir. 1990) (“Any such [attorneys’ fees) award, however, must be paid by the state and cannot be assessed against the defendants in their individual capacity, as the injunctive relief sought and won by Scott can be obtained from the defendants, only in their official capacity as commissioners."); Echols v. Parker, 909 P.2d 795, 800 (Sth Cir. 1990) (concluding State liable for attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when county prosecutor, district attorney, and justice court judge were sued in Official capacities as enforcing agente of an unconstitutional statute) question to our Court asking whether Arizona Revised statutes (A.R.S.") section 12-133 (Supp. 2001) authorized a system of compulsory participation of attorneys in the mandatory arbitration system, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 203 Ariz. 520, 521, 4 1, $7 P.34 379, 380 (2002), After accepting jurisdiction of the certified question, all justices named in the complaint recused themselves. ‘Their positions on this Court were filled for purposes of responding to the certified question by four judges from the Court of Appeals and @ judge from the Yuma County Superior Court.! This court then Fesponded that A.R.S. § 12-133 does not authorize the creation of an arbitration system mandating lawyer participation. rd. at 522, 416, 57 P.3d at 381, The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court for further consideration in light of our answer. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 315 F.3d 1191 (seh cir. 2003). After remand, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1861 (2003), the Gistrict court certified the following state law question to this court: ‘These judges were the Honorable Edward C. Voss, Susan A. Ehrlich, John C. Genmill, and Jefferson L. Lankford, of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division one, and the Honorable Tom C. Cole, Presiding Judge of the Yuna County Superior Court. Scheehle, 203 Ariz. at 523 n.2, $7 P.2d at 382. 4 Whether the Arizona Supreme Court under ite exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law can promulgate court rule: mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of A.R.S. § 12-133 authorizing only voluntary service? Tf the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, then the district court aleo requests that we answer the following question: Whether the Maricopa County Superior court, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-133, has authority independent from the Arizona Supreme Court, to promulgate a program mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of statutory language that the superior courts ‘shall maintain a list of qualified persons . who have agreed to serve?" The district court stayed all further consideration of Mr. Scheehle’s state law claim pending the answer to these questions. After the district court certified the questions to thie Court, and before filing his objection, Mr. Scheehle filed with the district court a “Motion to Tdentify for the Record and to Notify the Arizona Supreme Court of Current Defendants and Counsel." in that motion, Mr. Scheehle noted that the caption on the action reflected the nai of the individual defendants against whom he had originally brought suit, but who had left office since that time. He requested that the court update the caption and inform the individual menbers of this court that, pursuant to the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they were automatically substituted as defendants in this action Mr. Scheehle noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) provides that a public official sued in an official capacity is automatically replaced as a defendant in any action by his successor in office In denying Mr. Scheehie’s motion to amend the caption, the district court acknowledged that becaui Mr. Scheehie only brought suit againat the original defendants in their official capacities, the federal rule automatically substituted their successors as defendants in this case. Nevertheless it denied ur. Scheehle’s request to anend the caption because, given the length of the case and the number of officials originally named, there would be many such substitutions, and it is clear from the record that all current defendants were avare of their status as defendants in the action. Two weeks after this order was entered, Mr. Schechle filed his objection to the four justices answering the certified question. We treat it as a motion to disquality. ANALYSIS Im his objection, Mr. Scheehle asserts that the participation of the permanent members of this Court in this case ® Mr. Scheehle also filed documente in this Court in which he apparently requested that this Court update the caption. The questions certified to us are certified from the case in which they arose. We have no authority to alter the district court’s caption. is prohibited by two of the rules set forth in Canon 3(B) of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. He alleges that the justices are Gisqualified from hearing the case because they are parties to it and are thus interested in it. Model Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B) (1) (4) (4. He also alleges that they are biased and prejudiced with respect to the case, rd. at 3(E)(1) (a). In addition to these reasons, Mr. Schechle asserts several other reasons for Aisqualification that are not related to the Code of Judicial Conduct. We examine each in turn. The Code of Judicial conduct Justices as Parti to the Proceeding Canon 3(B) (1) (a) (i) requires a judge to ‘disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which . . . (a) the judge (4) is a party to the proceeding. Mr. Scheehle argues that this canon admits of no exceptions and that if a judge is named as @ defendant in an action, the judge is disqualified from hearing it. Although we have no doubt that the canon requires such a result in the general run of cases, Mr. Scheehle is incorrect that it admits of no exceptions. This Court, in a similar factual context, has recognized at least one. In In re Ronwin, Baward Ronwin, a repeatedly unsuccessful applicant to the Arizona bar, filed a number of civil rights and antitrust actions in federal court alleging that a conspiracy existed to keep him from being admitted to the practice of law in this state. 139 Ariz. $76, 580-81, 680 P.2d 107, 111-12 (1983). Ronwin named the menbers of this Court as defendants in a nunber of those actions. id. After filing the claims, Ronwin filed yet another application for admission to the Arizona bar. zd. Because “(t]he ultimate responsibility for admitting candidates for the practice of law is vested in* the supreme court, id. at 578, 680 P.24 at 109, we ruled on the application directly. in raising and Giscussing the ethical issues created by each justice’s status as @ defendant in the federal court actions, we noted: If we are to recuse ourselves simply because we have been sued by the applicant, then who is left to decide this case? As the Ninth Circuit stated: **(A) judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.’* Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d at 701, quoting United States v. Grismore, $64 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977); see also smith y. Smith, 115 Ariz. 299, 303, 564 P.2d 1266, 1270 (App. 1977). we agree; the mere fact that a judge has been sued by reason of his rulings in a case does not require recusal. Nor can the fact that all judges in the court have been sued require yecusal. To honor such a technique would be to put the weapon of disqualification in the hands of the most unscrupulous. Id. at 586, 680 P.2d at 117. We thus decided that it was the obligation of the individual justices comprising this Court to decide on Ronwin's application, despite any possible appearance of impropriety. rd. We did so, ultimately denying that application. Id. at 587, 680 P.2d at 118. Even though in Ronwin we did not specially identify a doctrine that justified our decision to sit, euch a doctrine, known as the rule of necessity, is widely applied by other jurisdictions. Although there are several formslations of the rule, a common one is that the rule of necessity will prevail over disqualification standards when it is not possible to convene a body of Judges who fare not subject to the disqualification standards. United states v. Wi21, 449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980); Dacey v. Conn. Bar Ass'n, 368 A.2d 125, 129 (Conn. 1976); State v. Rome, 685 P.24 290, 296 (Kan. 1984); Jeffrey M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.03, at 112 (34 ed. 2000) (*(DJisqualification mst yield to necessity if recusal would thwart the only tribunal where relief [is] available. In Ronwin we concluded that because it was ultimately the responsibility of the supreme court to determine who could be admitted to the bar, the supreme court would have to answer the question. 139 Ariz. at 578, 680 P.2d at 109. ‘Thus, practically, the permanent members of the Court could not recuse thenselves. Similarly in this case, Mr. Scheehle’s suit requires a definitive interpretation of the scope of this Court's administrative authority to regulate the practice of law in this state. Such questions are inevitably questions of Arizona law. This Court is the court of last resort on the interpretation of such questions. Ariz. Const. art. 3; Hedlund v. superior court, 171 Ariz. 566, 567, 832 P.24 219, 220 (1992) (The supreme court has the final say on the interpretation of rules.). It is presumably for this reason that the legislature authorized only this court to answer questions of state law certified by other jurisdictions. A.R.S. § 12-1861 ("The Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by* federal and tribal courts involving dispositive questions of state law.). Mr. Scheehle’s objection thus presente the same question this Court asked in Ronwin, “If we are to recuse ourselves simply because we have been sued by the applicant, then who is left to decide this case?" Ronwin, 139 Ariz. at 586, 680 P.ad at 117. Although Mr. Scheehle does not raise the rule of necessity in his objection, and hence offers no argument why it should not apply, we have an independent ethical obligation to ensure that this exception to the general rule of disqualification does apply before sitting on this case. we note that there are some distinctions between this matter and Ronwin. Though the Court was called upon to exercise authority that ultimately rested with it, as we are here, the matter at issue in Ronwin did not also require the Court, as it does here, to determine the scope of its own authority. Moreover, the Ronwin Court did not consider whether each justice should recuse as the justices did the last time a 10 question was certified to this Court in this matter. Given that recusal is possible, it could be argued that it is not "necessary" that any single justice sit on this case, because a replacenent can be appointed to sit in each justice’s stead. Finally, in Ronwin, unlike the present case, the justices thenselves were not parties to the matter they decided. Courts in other jurisdictions have determined that when @ litigant names each menber of a state's highest court as a party to litigation challenging the court's authority or actions, and then moves to disqualify each menber of the court from sitting on the case, the rule of necessity obliges the individual members of the court to sit. See New York State ass’n of Criminal Def. Counsel v. Kaye, 744 N.B.24 123 (N.¥. 2000) (holding that the rule of necessity required the individual judges of the New York Court of Appeals to serve even though they were named defendants in Proceeding challenging capital fee structure promulgated by that court); Vermont Supreme Ct. admin. Directive No. 17 v. vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d 127, 132 (Vt. 1990) (determining that the rule of necessity required individual justices to serve even though they were named defendants in proceeding challenging administrative order that they had entered); see also Office of State Ct. Adn’r v. Background Info. Servs., 994 P.24 420, 425-26 (Colo. 1999) (upholding rule that required members of supreme court to sit in determining whether its own order restricting access to court un records was valid); Rome, 685 P.2d at 296 (determining that supreme court must sit even though it is interpreting its own authority); x parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Ky. 1978) ( Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980) appeal dismissed by 450 U.S. 1036 (1981) (same); Berberian v. Kane, 425 A.24 527, 527 (R.T. 1981) (same); Cameron v, Greenhill, 582 $.W.2d 778, 776 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (same); State ex rel. Hash v. Mcgraw, 376 $.£.24 634, 638 (W. Va. 1988) (same). The rule of necessity applies even when there are provisions for a member of the court to be temporarily replaced in @ matter, See Kaye, 744 N.E.2d at 128 (*The constitutional provision for the designation of substitute Judges is not to be used as a vehicle to force removal of the constitutionally appointed members of this Court by naming them as parties when challenging adninistrative actions of the Court.*). For the following reasons, we agree that the rule of necessity obliges us to sit in answering the questions certified in this case even though we are nominal parties to the action. As Mr. Scheehle’s complaint and subsequent motions indicate, he has sued the permanent menbers of this Court in their offic: 1 capacities only, He does not argue that any of the four justices he seeks to disqualify has a personal stake in the Litigation, when a justice has a personal conflict or is otherwise unable to serve, there is a procedure for the substitution of that 2 individual justice Substitution based on individual considerations, however, is very different from an assertion that every sitting justice is disqualified by virtue of his or her position as a member of this Court. Téa permanent menber of this Court being sued in an official capacity steps aside so that another judge can be appointed to sit, the person temporarily appointed then becomes a temporary member of this Court. That person thus suffers from the me infirmity, albeit on a temporary basis, that caused the Permanent menber’s recusal. [If] . . . the court could be regarded as an adversary of the petitioners, how would matters be any different if its regular members saw fit to vacate the bench? ‘The special members appointed temporarily to replace them would still constitute that same court and, perforce, they too would be @isqualified.* Farley, 570 $.W.2d at 623; see also Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.24 467, 469 n.3 (N.Y. 1962) (finding use of substitutes for all menbers of the court would turn the substitutes into the Court of Appeals); Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d at 132 (stating that ‘[s]ince the actions challenged in this proceeding were taken in our official capacity as the Vermont Supreme Court, the asserted disqualification to act cannot be eliminated simply by a temporary reconstitution of the Court") Mr. Scheehle bases his objection, in part, on the operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), which B automatically substitutes as defendants to a federal lawsuit Successors in office to those public officials who are sued in sued the their public capacities. Because Mr. Scheehle hi permanent members of this Court only in their official capacity, it appears that, should a menber recuse or be disqualified, the temporary replacement would be substituted in by operation of the Rule. The replacement would thus also be subject to Gisqualitication under the Rule. Even if temporary successors were not automatically substituted in as parties, the reconstituted Court still could not address Mr. Scheehle's objections as set forth in his First Amended Complaint. That complaint alleges that ‘Arizona courts do not provide an impartial forum for litigating this cause because if Plaintiff is successful in his challenge of the System, arizona judges may face a substantial increase in workload. Thus, even assuming the merit of Mr. Scheehle’s objection, if any Arizona court would be incapable of answering the certified question without bias, it would not be possible, by appointing temporary replacements on this Court, to cure the basis of his objection. Even assuming disqualification or recusal could cure the problem, it would create additional problems of constitutional @imension if the menbers of this Court recused for the reasons Suggested by Mr. Scheehle. The Arizona Constitution specifies the qualifications for justices of this Court and the process by which 1a justices mist be appointed and retained. Ariz. Const. art. 6, 55 6, 36-38. The constitution further specifies the unique duties and prerogatives of this Court, ‘These constitutional prerogatives involve both administrative responsibilities, Ariz. const. art. 6 S$ 1, 3 (placing judicial power in an integrated judicial Gepartment and providing the supreme court with administrative Supervisory authority over all lower courts), and the authority to interpret the law. Ariz. Const. art. 3 (creating a judicial Gepartment separate from executive and legislative departments) The constitution requires that’ those _—_ constitutional responsibilities be exercised by the justices appointed to this Court. A disqualification of all menbers of this Court based only on an asserted conflict that arises from each justices’s performance of his or her constitutional function would be an abdication of duty by those who are constitutionally designated to perform such functions. Other courts have also recognized this Problem. See Kaye, 744 N.E.2d at 126 (“If disqualification were vequired whenever the Judges were sued as individuals upon a challenge to an act of the Court, the result could be substitution of the entire constitutionally appointed court, leaving ‘the most fundamental questions about the Court and its powers’* to be decided by persons who were not appointed to that purpose.); Berberian, 425 A.2d at 528 (Disqualifying the justices of the supreme court each time their administrative powers are challenged a5 would “render the rule-making process self-defeating and hugatory."); Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d at 226 (finding Substitution of all members of the court “leaves the most fundamental questions about the Court and its powers to persons whose selection and retention are not tested by constitutional processes") Further, as we previously recognized in Ronwin, if Sisqualification were allowed in this case, it would provide Litigants the ability to disqualify the membership of this entire Court merely by naming each member as a party. 139 Ariz. at 586, 680 P.2a at 117, Such an easy method for obtaining @isqualification should not be encouraged or allowed." 1d. This Court is regularly called upon to interpret or decide the validity of its own rules. see, e.g., State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 342, 43 6-8, 982 P.24 815, 817 (2999) (rule granting 120 days to file a petition for post conviction relief upheld); In re Smith, 189 Ariz. 144, 146, 939 P.24 422, 424 (1997) (upholding rule imposing mandatory continuing legal education); Stapleford v. Houghton, 185 Ariz. 560, 562, 917 P.2d 703, 705 (1996) (finding provision of Rules of Criminal Procedure superseded by Victim's Bill of Rights); state v. Rosco 105 Ariz. 68, 912 F.2d 1297 (1996) (same) . Our adoption of a rule does not constitute a prior determination that the rule is valid and constitutional against any 16 challenge. (CJourt rules and comments thereto cannot be given effect if they conflict with valid provisions of the constitution.” Stapleford, 185 Ariz. at 562, 917 P.2d at 705, Such a determination awaits a judicial proceeding in which opposing interests are provided a full opportunity to be heard. See, e.9., Kaye, 744 N.B.24 at 127 (quoting Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.24 at 30) (*COlur promulgation of the [rule] is not a prior determination that it is valid and constitutional. That determination must await the adjudication in this or a future case.*). Both this Court and lower Arizona courts have upheld challenges to the validity of rules promulgated by this Court in such settings. See, e.g., Stapleford, 185 Ariz, at 560, 917 P.2d at 70: Roscoe, 185 Ariz. at 68, 912 P.2d at 129 State v. Uriarte, 194 Ariz. 275, 981 P.2d 575 (App. 1996) (holding court rules must give way to statutes appropriately implementing constitutional provisions). It is unusual, however, for the individual justices of this Court to be named as nominal defendants to a suit challenging @ court rule. Declaratory judgment actions brought in state court challenging procedural or administrative rules of this Court do not require that the individual justices be named to obtain relief. Although Mr. Scheehle’s § 1983 action brought in federal court presumably does require that a public official be named, Mr. Scheehle named a number of officials, including the superior court judge who enforced the rule and imposed the nction against rd him. Presumably, therefore, he did not have to name each justice of this Court as a defendant to obtain the relief identified in his complaint.‘ That he did so, however, does not, under these facts. require our disqualification. the rule of necessity mandates our individual participation in responding to the questions certified. See will, 449 U.S. at 214 2, Bias and Prejudice Me. Scheehle alleges that each of the four permanent justices should be disqualified because each is already committed to a view on the certified questions. This partiality, according to Mr. Scheehle, constitutes bias or prejudice sufficient to @isqualify the justices pursuant to Canon 3(#)(1)(a), which specifies that [a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding . . . where . . . the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.” The objection asserts that the bias of the justices is clear because of “the pleadings and papers filed over the past < Opinion 96-14 of the Arizona Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, entitled “Limitations on Disqualification Requirement,” November 21, 1996, posits that if a disinterested but informed observer would conclude that suit was brought against a judge solely to disqualify the judge from presiding over litigation, the judge is not disqualified, so lang as the judge feels that he or she can fairly preside over the case. We need not decide whether a disinterested but informed observer would make such a determination as to Mr. Scheehle’s suit against the individual menbers of this Court because we conclude that the rule of necessity requires the permanent menbers to sit in answering the certified questions. 38 seven years or so by the defendants in (this action] (which include, of course, the four justices in question).* sven suning that the pleadings filed by the Attorney General representing all the defendants could be attributed for purposes of this motion to represent the views of each of the permanent menbera of this Court, ech, Ryan and Hurwitz) are relatively three of the four justices ( recent appointees to the Court, and Mr. Scheehle suggests no pleading filed during the tine of their service on the Court that would suggest that any of them has a preconceived view on the Sasue, ‘The only specific pleading mentioned in the objection is the brief filed by defendants with our reconstituted supreme court when the Ninth Circuit first certified a question to us in this same proceeding in 2002. According to Mr. Schechle, in that pleading the defendants took the position that the supreme court “had the inherent power to require the attorneys it regulates to serve as arbitrators." Because Justice McGregor was a menber of the Court at that time, Mr. Scheshle asserts that the defendants’ position can be attributed to her for purposes of establishing her personal bias. There are both legal and factual problens with this argunent. As a matter of law, even if Mr. Scheehle could establish that any of the justices has a view on the question at issue, such an allegation does not constitute the kind of bias or prejudice as required for disqualification under the canon. Canon 3(8) (1) (a) specifies that disqualification is appropriate when “the judge has @ personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.* “Bias and prejudice means a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will . . . towards one of the litigants. The fact that a judge may have an opinion as to the merits of the cause or a strong feeling about the type of litigation involved, does not make the judge biased or prejudiced.* State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 286, 686 P.24 1248, 1256 (2984) (quoting State v. Myers, 117 Ariz. 79, 86, 570 P.2a 1252, 1259 (1977) (quoting In re Guardianship of Styer, 24 Ariz. App. 148, 151, 536 P.24 717, 720 (1975))); Shaman etal., supra, § 4.04, at 113 (*However, neither bias nor prejudice refer to the attitude that a judge may hold about the subject matter of @ lawsuit... . That a judge has a general opinion about a legal . . . matter that relates to the case before him or her does not disqualify a judge from presiding over the case.) (citations omitted); see also Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial conduct 24 (24 ed. 1992) (“only personal bias or prejudice constitutes a disqualifying factor.*). Thus, Mr. Scheehle’s allegation that the four permanent justices already have a view about the questions certified does not constitute a basis for disqualification even if it could be established. 20 And, even as a factual matter, Mr. Scheehle ie unable to establish such a pre-existing view. when the supreme court or other departments of the State require representation, they obtain that representation from the Attorney General’s office. For cases involving the supreme court, the legal representation is coordinated with the Chief Justice, only he was aware of the position taken by the defendants in this case. That is the basis for his own recusal in this matter, Ae the New York Court of Appeals noted in Kaye, “[i]t is not an uncommon practice for the Chief [Justice] alone to be recused in similar appeals involving judicial administration.* 744 N.E.2d at 125 n.2. Neither Justice McGregor nor any of the other justices who are challenged by Mr. Scheehle’s motion tock any role in the defense, nor were they aware of the positions or theories advocated by the State before the State's papers were filed. Mr. Scheehle challenges the validity of a court rule, names each of the individual justices as nominal party defendants, and then asserts that any answer or argument advanced by the State in favor of the validity of the rule mist be attributed to each of the justices for the purpose of establishing his or her individual bias. In cases in which the rule of necessity requires the permanent members of this Court to sit on a question, and the justices have taken no role in the preparation of the defense, such an attribution cannot be made. The rule of necessity itself requires such an accommodation. Cf, Disqualification Concerns When the Attorney General's Office Represents Judges, Op. 02-05 Ariz. Supreme ct. Jud, Ethics Advis. Comm. (Sept. 12, 2002) (While normally a judge should recuse from hearing a case in which the Assistant Attorney General representing him in other mattera appears before him, “if the lawyer currently represents all judicial officers in the county or state (e.g., in a challenge to entire court’® authority or an attack on a judicial policy or rule), the ‘rule of necessity’ may prevail, making disqualification impractical and unnecessary. B. Other Arguments for Disqualification In addition to these argunents, Mr. Scheehle also briefly argues that the individual justices should recuse because (1) he has filed a complaint against the individual justices with the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct resulting from their failure to recuse themselves in this matter, and (2) the naned defendant justices previously recused themselves when a question was earlier certified in this same matter. 41. Complaint to the Commission on Judicial conduct Mr. Scheehle asserts that the individual justices are disqualified from deciding this matter because he has filed a complaint against each of them with the Commission on Judicial Conduct resulting from their failure to recuse. As far as we can discern, every state that has considered the question, including Arizona, has determined that a complaint to 22 the Commission on Judicial Conduct alone does not require recusal. “The mere fact that a complaint has been made against a judge alleging the judge is biased and cannot be impartial does not require automatic disqualification or recusal by the judge. Tf this were so any party or attorney could easily disrupt court proceedings at any time by filing a complaint against the judge. Disqualification Considerations When Complaints Are Filed Against Judges, Op. 98-2 Ariz. Supreme Ct. Jud. Ethics Advie. Comm. (Mar. , 1998) (quoting Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.06 (24 ed, 1995)); see also Op. No. 98-04 Wash. Ethics Advis. comm. (Apr. 20, 1998); Op. 45 calif. (gan. 23, 1997). ‘Thus, Mr. Scheehle’s complaint against the justices with the Commission on Judicial Conduct does not alone merit disqualification. 2. The Justic Previously Recused in this Matter Mr. Scheehle correctly asserts that when the Ninth Circuit previously certified a question to us in this matter, the five permanent justices then on the Court all recused themselves. ‘The recusal did not cone as a result of an objection brought by Mr. Scheehle. Each justice recused on his or her own motion. We have no record of their reasons for recusal. Even when the canons do not require recusal, a judge may recuse from judicial duties Zuniga v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. 222, 224, 269 P.2d 720, 721 (2954) ("A judge may on his own motion, if he acts timely, recuse 23 himself even though the reason given might not be sufficient to form the basis of a legal disqualification. *) We do not now question the decision of each of the members of this Court at that time to recuse themselves. Nor are we bound by that decision. zt is, however, our determination for the reasons set forth above that Mr. Scheehle presents no legal or factual argument requiring the disqualification of ali four Permanent justices, merely because the last time a question was certified in this matter each individual justice chose to recuse. concuusron We recognize that each justice in this case has a continuing individual responsibility to exercise “considerable introspection and intellectual honesty,“ in determining whether he or she may appropriately sit upon any matter that cones before the Court. op. 98-2 Ariz. Supreme Ct. Jud. Ethics Advis. Comm. (Mar. 24, 1998). Such an evaluation depends on considerations that may be unique to each justice and cannot be evaluated or discussed in this collective opinion. Apart. «from such individual, considerations, however, we here determine that Mr. Scheehle has set forth no arguments in his objection that would compel @isqualification of any of the four justices from sitting on the certified questions. Therefore, 24 XT IS ORDERED, denying Scheehle’s motion to disqualify. G. Murray Snow, Judge CONCURRING: Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice Michael D. Ryan, Justice Rndvew D. Hurwitz, Justice * The Honorable Charles E. Jones recused himself, pursuant to article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. The Honorable ¢. Murray Snow, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, waa designated to sit in his stead. 25. 

3a4c836b03cf83e156dc0e2039f60131b81830475a4bf59d5272848f30afb21b

2005-10-05T00:00:00Z

8e048733-33a0-4851-9a0c-235c696a3abd

State of Alabama ex rel. Luther Strange v. Tyrone Clark, Sr.

1151021

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court of Alabama duly 27, 2016 State of Alabama ex rel. Luther Strange, Attorney General 1151021 Tyrone Clark, sr., Sheriff of Sumter County PER CURIAM. In January 2015, Tyrone Clark, Sr., began his present term of office as the sheriff of sumter County. on June 30, 2016, the State of Alabama, by and through its attorney General, pursuant to §§ 36-11-4 and 36-11-5, Ala. Code 1975, filed an information of impeachment and a prayer for ouster, charging that sheriff Clark, during his present term of office, willfully neglected his duty and engaged in corruption while in office, in violation of § 36-11-1, Ala. Code 1975,? 'section 36-11-1 provides, in pertinent part: (a) The following officers may be impeached and removed from office: ... sheriffs "(b) The officers specified in subsection (a) of this section may be impeached and removed from office for the following causes: "(1) Willful neglect of duty; "(2) Corruption in office;  3151021 and Art. VII, § 173 and § 174, Ala. Const. 1901.7 ‘The information contained two charges: willful neglect of "(3) Incompetency; (4) Intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its duties as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties; or "(5) Any offense involving moral turpitude while in office or committed under color thereof or connected therewith." *article VII, § 174, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: “The chancellors, judges of the circuit courts, judges of the probate courts, and judges of other courts from which an appeal may be taken directly to the supreme court, and solicitors and sheriffs, may be removed from office for any of the causes specified in (Art. VII, § 173,] or elsewhere in this Constitution, by the supreme court, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The legislature may provide for the impeachment or removal of other officers than those named in this article.” Article VII, § 173, Ala. Const. 1901, provides that officials "may be removed from office for willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the ‘use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of the duties, as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving moral turpitude while in office, or committed under color thereof, or connected therewith ...." See also § 36-11-1, Ala. Code 1975 2 3151021 @uty and corruption in office. With regard to Charge one in the information, willful neglect of duty by Sheriff clark during his present term of office, the information included the following nine specifications, namely that Clark 1. “{WJillfully neglected his duty to secure and Supervise inmates in his custody under Ala. Code (1975,] § 14-6-1[,] when he made Rodney Coats, an inmate in the Sumter County Jail, a trust [y]. Coats had an extensive criminal history for drug-related offenses, and he was placed in jail under these criminal’ — charge: Trafficking in Cocaine, Trafficking in Methamphetamine, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Marijuana First Degree, Receiving stolen Property Second Degree, Certain Persons Forbidden to Possess a Pistol, Assault First Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. His bond for these charges totaled $675,000.00. “when he made Coats a trust(y], Sheriff Clark gave Coats privileges, including allowing him to move freely about both the Jail and Administration Buildings of the Sumter County Sheriff's Office and allowing Coats to leave the Jail, sometimes without law enforcement oversight." 2. "{W)illfully neglected his duty to prevent the introduction of contraband into the Jail and supervise the inmates housed therein under Ala. Code (1975,] §§ 14-6-1 and 13A-10-37 and -38. Specifically, Sheriff Clark aided Rodney Coats in bringing contraband into the Sumter County Jail by ordering the Sumter County Detention Officers not to search Coats when he would return to the Jail after being outside of the Jail and free of law enforcement oversight. This contraband included controlled substances, cell phones, and cigarettes 1181021 "sheriff Clark also protected Coats from ‘shake downs’ performed by the Sumter County Jail Staff, as well as ‘drug sweeps’ at the Jail by outside la enforcement agencies, by removing him from the Jail or instructing Jail staff to leave Coats alone. "Furthermore, Sheriff Clark allowed Coats to receive visitors at the Sumter County Sheriff's Office Administrative Building who were not searched or subjected to any security measures before meeting with Coats. These visitors were also allowed to access the Sumter County Sheriff's Office Administrative Building through an entrance that was not monitored by surveillance cameras." 3. _"(W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala. Code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to supervise the inmates in the Sumter County Jail and prevent inmates from possessing a deadly weapon under Ala. Code (1975, ] § 13A-10-36, by allowing Rodney Coats to have access to firearms, even though Coats had pending charges for Assault First Degree and Certain Persons Forbidden from Possessing a Handgun." 4, "{W]ilifully neglected his duty under Ala. code [1975,] § 14-6-16[,] to safely preserve the process or order by which prisoners are committed to jail by permitting Rodney Coats, himself an inmate, to process prisoners." 5. "{W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala, code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to maintain custody of inmate Ronald James. Sheriff Clark gave James, who was serving a 10-year sentence, split to serve 14 months, for the violent offense of Burglary Second Degree, a ‘jail pass.' This allowed James to leave the custody of the Sumter County Jail for extended periods of time, endangering the safety of the victim involved in the case for which James was incarcerated, as well as endangering the safety of the residents of sumter County." 1152021 6. "(W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala. Code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to maintain custody of inmate James Markell Bell. Sheriff Clark also failed to swear out an arrest warrant, apprehend, or arrest Bell after Bell escaped from the Sumter County Jail in violation of Ala. Code [1975,] § 13A-10-32." " (w] il1fully neglected his duty to supervise jail inmates and secure the Jail under Ala. Code [1975] § 14-6-11,] by giving inmate Rodney Coats access to an unsecured room in the administration building, where Coats had sexual intercourse with female visitors. The visitors were never searched, and the entrance to the room was not monitored by cameras or otherwise." " (w] i11 fully neglected his duty to supervise jail inmates, secure the Jail, and enforce the law under Ala. Code [1975,] §§ 14-6-1 and 36-22-3[,] when he provided an environment in the Administration Building that allowed Rodney Coats to engage in Human Trafficking in the Second Degree, in violation of Ala. Code (1975,] § 13A-6-153 (a) (2 9. "{W]illfully neglected his duty to properly appoint and supervise deputies under Ala. Code (1975,]_ § 36-22-3[,] when he appointed Johnny Archibald a deputy sheriff and directed Archibald to patrol on his own, even though Archibald had not been certified as a law enforcement officer by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission, in violation of Ala. Admin. Code [ (Peace Officers Training), Rule] 650-X-2-.01." With regard to Charge two in the information, corruption in office by Sheriff Clark during his present term of office, the information included the following three specifications, namely that Clark: 3181022 1. "[U)sed his official position or office to benefit himself by personally and privately employing inmates of the Sumter County Jail, namely Rodney Coats and Glenn Brown, in violation of Ala Code [1975,] §§ 14-5-11 and 36-25-5. Among other things, Sheriff Clark directed Coats and Brown to perform work at his personal home "[U]sed his official position or office to benefit himself by operating an undocumented work release program, wherein he allowed inmates from the Sumter County Jail to be released for the purpose of working for individuals and/or businesses on the condition that the inmates pay Sheriff Clark a portion of their wages, in violation of Ala. Code (2975,] §§ 36-22-16 and 14-8-37. 3. "{A] tempted to use his official position or office to coerce a female employee to have sexual intercourse with him." On June 30, 2016, this Court ordered Sheriff Clark to appear before it on July 25, 2016, to answer the information filed against him. The clerk of this Court issued a summons, ordering Terry W. Peeler, the coroner of Sumter County, to serve the summons to appear and the attached order and information on Sheriff Clark. ‘That same day, Peeler served Sheriff Clark with the summons and the attached order and information on duly 25, 2016, Sheriff Clark appeared before this Court, waived the reading of the information, denied each and every specification charged in the information, and entered a 2151022 plea of not guilty. The Court then heard ore tenus testimony. Alabama caselaw is well settled that a proceeding brought pursuant to Art. VII, § 174, Ala. Const. 1901, is criminal in nature. Alonzo v. State ex rel, Booth, 283 Ala. 607, 219 So. 2d 858 (1969); State ex rel. Mullis v. Matthews, 259 Ala. 125, 66 So, 24 1105 (1953). The State must prove the charges on which the proceeding is based beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Mullis, supra; State ex rel. Attorney Gen, v. Robinson, 111 Ala. 482, 20 So. 30 (1896); and State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599 (1875). Justice McClellan, concurring specially in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Martin, 180 Ala. 458, 461, 61 So. 491, 492 (1913), defined "willful neglect of duty" as an "intentional failure or omission of an officer to perform a plain and manifest duty which he is able to perform when he omits to do 80. “Corruption in office," also known as “official misconduct," has been defined as "[a] public officer's corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance," misfeasance, °Malfeasance is defined as "(a] wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act; esp., wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official." Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (10th ed. 2014). ‘Misfeasance is defined as "[a] lawful act performed in a wrongful manner." Black's Law Dictionary 1151 (10th ed. 7 1151021 or nonfeasance."" Black's Law Dictionary 1150 (10th ed 2014) (defining "official misconduct" as an entry under the term "misconduct®) . Based on specifications 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Charge one in the information and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the Court finds that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of willful neglect of duty during his present term of office. Based on specifications 1, and 3 of Charge two in the information and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the Court finds that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of corruption during his present term of office. It is the judgment of this Court that sheriff Clark be impeached, and Tyrone Clark, Sr., is hereby ousted from the office of sheriff of Sumter County, Alabama. Parker, Murdock, and Wise, JJ., concur. Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur specially. 2014). ‘Nonfeasance is defined as "(t]he failure to act when a duty to act exists." Black's Law Dictionary 1216 (10th ed. 2014). 2181021 BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially). I concur fully with the findings of the per curiam opinion that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of corruption in office during his present term of office, as set forth in Charge two of the information, and that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of willful neglect of duty during his present term of office, as set forth in Charge one of the information, and as reflected in the seven acts specified in the opinion as supporting that finding. I write specially to state that I find from the evidence that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is also guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of specified acts 4 and 9 in charge one. Stuart, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 

c247d7fd516e3483b10fb161a02b82308b7880e2990369d1e110db84fb6f1b2a

2016-07-27T00:00:00Z

07932394-a56b-4791-9436-6b7073efdecf

Zimmerman v. Betsey Bayless, ...and House of Representatives and Senate of the State of Arizona ...and Arizonans for Wildlife Conservation (Supreme Court Order)

CV-00-0316-AP/EL

arizona

Arizona Supreme Court

FILED AUG 3 1 2000 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA DOUGLAS G. ZIMMERMAN, Arizona Supreme Court No. C¥-00-0326-a8/E2, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appeliee, ) Maricopa County Superi: Cours No. CV 2000-15083 BETSEY BAYLESS, Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, De! dant-Appellee, and ‘THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and SENATE OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, by and through BRENDA BURNS, President of the Senate and JEFF GROSCOS?, Speaker of the House, Real Parties in Intere Appellee/Cross Appellat ORDER and ARIZONANS FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Intervenor-Appellee/ Gross-Appellant, , ) ‘ ) ) 5 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) This Court has read and considered all the briefs in this case on appeal and cross-appeal. hile the late filing in superior court may not have prejudiced that court's consideration of this matter on the merits, the matter reached this Court far too late for the Court to address the merits in a meaningful yet timely way. Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 973 P.2d 1166 (1998). Therefore, dismissing the appeal. ORDERED dismissing the cross-appeal as moot. DATED this 31" day of August, 2000. THOMAS A. Zi Chief Justice 10: Stephanie Nichols-Young, Esq. Lisa T. Hauser, Esq., Meyers Taber Meyers P.C. Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Esq., Arizona Attorney General Attn: Joseph A. Kanefield, Esq. Hon. Robert D. Myers, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Hon. Colin F, Campbell, Presiding Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Michael K. Jeanes, Clerk, Maricopa County Superior Court 

432888e5dadaf4f7644881b856d8a24c956154c61abc29c9c758e75957230ec9

2000-08-31T00:00:00Z

e235637a-3976-4140-9396-52ad51cab9c1

THOMAS HANEY v TOM RICE et al

CV-08-0195-AP/EL

arizona

Arizona Supreme Court

FILED JUL 11 2008 soieueueic SUPREME COURT OF ARTZONA In Division THOMAS HANEY, an individual and qualified elector, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-08-0195-AP/EL Appellant, ) Maricopa County Superior Court No. cv2008-014383 ‘THE HONORABLE R. FULTON BROCK, DON STAPLEY, ANDREW KUNASEK, MAX W. WILSON and MARY ROSE WILCOX, THE DULY ELECTED or APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY: THE MARTCOPA COUNTY ) ) > ) ) ) ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) ) > ) ) BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (Not for Publication - Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111) HONORABLE HELEN PURCELL, THE DULY ELECTED MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THE HONORABLE KAREN OSBORNE, THE DULY APPOINTED MARICOPA’ COUNTY DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, WHO 15 NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL capacrTy, Appellees, ‘ToM RICE, an individual, Real Party in Interest. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County ‘The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, Judge AFFIRMED WILLIAMS & ZINMAN, P.C. Scottsdale By Scott £. Williams Mark B. Zinman Attorneys for Thomas Haney RAYMOND, GREER @ SASSAMAN, P.C. Phoenix By Michael J. Raymond Attorneys for Tom Rice BERCH, Vice Chief Justice a We have been asked to decide whether nominating petitions that contain only twelve signature lines per page comply with Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 16- 315(A) (3) (2006). Under the facts of this case, we hold that they do. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Tom Rice seeks his party’s nomination to run for Justice of the Peace of the Dreamy Draw Justice Precinct. To be eligible, Rice needed to submit 441 valid signatures to the Maricopa County Elections Department. Rice submitted forty-five petition sheets that contained 498 valid signatures. only thirty-six of the forty-five petition sheets contained the statutorily prescribed fifteen signature lines; the other nine contained only twelve lines per page. Those nine sheets bore a total of sixty-seven valid signatures. 2 Thomas Haney, a qualified elector, challenged Rice’s petitions on the ground that the nine petition sheets containing only twelve signature lines were invalid, and therefore, Rice -2- failed to submit the required 441 signatures (498 less 67 is 431). On June 23, 2008, the superior court conducted a hearing and held that the deficient petition sheets substantially complied with § 16-315(A)(3). Haney subsequently appealed to this Court, and by an order dated July 1, 2008, we affirmed. In that order we informed the parties that a written decision would follow; this is that decision. oo We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and A.R.S. § 16- 391(A) (2006). II. pIscussrow 45 Arizona law prescribes the form in which nominating petitions must be made. At the center of this controversy is A.R.S. § 16-315(A) (3), which provides as follows: A, The nomination petitions shall be in substantially the following form: 3. There shall be fifteen lines spaced three-eighths of an inch apart and consecutively numbered one through fifteen. a6 Haney argues that the text of § 16-315(A)(3) is clear on its face ~ that is, because the statute uses the word “shall,” the doctrine of “substantial compliance” does not apply, and the petitions are therefore deficient because they contain only twelve lines. To support his argument, Haney -3- asserts that our decision in Clark v. Pima County Board of Supervisors, 128 Ariz. 193, 624 P.24 871 (1981), requires strict adherence to the statute's text. He also maintains that accepting Rice's position would open the door to future interpretations of § 16-315(A), which would frustrate the statute’s purpose. Haney urges us to reject the nine petitions containing only twelve signature Lines. 7 Rice agrees that the text of § 16-315(A) governs. Unlike Haney, however, Rice argues that the prefatory clause of § 16-315(A) requires only that the petition substantially comply with the specific enumerated subsections. Rice distinguishes Clark and asserts that our decisions in Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 139 P.3d 612 (2006), Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 927 P.2d 772 (1996), and Marsh v. Haws, 111 Ariz. 139, 526 P.2d 161 (1974), support the textual conclusion that substantial compliance suffices. a8 Resolution of this case requires us to answer two related inguiries: first, whether substantial compliance is the correct standard, and second, if so, whether Rice's petitions satisfy that standard. Both questions present issues of law, which we review de novo. Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 101-02, $ 40, 139 P.3d at 619-20. A. The Applicable Standard 9 We agree with the trial court that the correct standard is substantial compliance. Although Haney is certainly correct that § 16-315(A) uses the term “shall,” the term must be viewed in context with the remaining parts of § 16-315(A). See Ariz. Dep't of Rev. v. Action Marine, Inc., 218 Ariz. 141, 143, $ 10, 181 P.3d 188, 190 (2008) (construing statutes as a whole, considering context, language, and purpose). The prefatory clause of § 16-315(A) requires the nominating petitions to be in “substantially the . . . form” of the enumerated subsections. Reading subsection (3) in isolation, as Haney does, without reference to the prefatory clause, would strip the words “substantially the following form” of meaning and purpose. Although the term “shall” and the phrase “substantially the following form” are not entixely consistent, the statute should be read to avoid a construction that would render the latter meaningless, while also giving due weight to the former. See Keiz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 379, 701 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1985). Thus, we conclude that the best reading of § 16-315(A) gives weight to both; that is, the statute requires substantial compliance with the mandatory enumerated statutory subsections. s10 We concluded similarly in Clifton. There, we decided whether nominating petitions for a general election complied -~5- with the requirements of A.R.S. § 16-341(D) when the petition forms did not designate the party affiliation of an independent candidate who left the party designation portion of the petition blank. 187 Ariz. at 113, 927 P.24 at 773. Like § 16-315(A), the statutory provision at issue in Clifton required that “(t}he nomination petition shall be . . . substantially” in the form provided by the statutory text requiring the candidate to indicate the party name or its equivalent. To be sure, Clifton explored a different statute, but we find its analysis particularly persuasive because the prefatory clause in § 16- 341(A) is almost identical to that for § 16-315(A). saa The statutory purpose behind nominating petitions also supports our conclusion, As we stated in Clifton: (WJominating petitions were designed to “in some measure [weed] out the cranks, the publicity seekers, the frivolous candidates who have no intention of going through with the campaign” . . . “yet not keep out those who are serious in their efforts and have a reasonable nunber of supporters.” 187 Ariz. at 115, 927 P.2d at 775 (second alteration in Clifton) (quoting Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320, 271 P.2d 472, 475 (1954)). Requiring only substantial compliance furthers this statutory purpose, and we therefore conclude that § 16-315(A) “does not mandate perfection but only that candidates substantially comply with its requirements.” Id. at 116, 927 P.2d at 776. m2 Finally, we find Haney's citation to Clark unhelpful. The issue in Clark was whether “the signers of nominating petitions must sign with the exact name under which they are registered to vote,” not whether the forms thenselves substantially complied with the statutory requirements. 128 Ariz. at 194, 624 P.2d at 872. Clark required only that the proponent be prepared to offer additional proof that the signatories were properly registered when their names did not natch voter registration affidavits. Id. at 195, 624 P.2d at 873; see also 1993 Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch. 98, $ 22 (Ist Reg. Sess.) (modifying statutory section at issue in Clark). B. Substantial Compliance with A.R.S. § 16-315 3 Having determined that substantial compliance is the appropriate standard, we must now determine whether the petitions containing only twelve lines substantially comply with § 16-315. We conclude that they do. na ‘In determining whether a nomination petition form substantially complies with the statutory requirements, this court has focused on whether the omission of information could confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.” Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102, $ 42, 139 P.3d at 620. To be sure, § 16-315(A) ‘allows a measure of inconsistency” so long as it does not affect the result. Id. (quoting Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927 P.2d at 776). 1s Here, the nominating petition sheets containing only twelve signature lines were identical, in both form and substance, to the unchallenged petition sheets with the exception that the bottom three lines were cut off. This was likely the result of copier error. Indeed, all the information necessary to understand the petitions was present - the name of the court and office sought, the party affiliation, the nane of the candidate, the candidate’s address, the county, and the date of the election. No potential signer would distinguish between the deficient and non-deficient sheets, and any signer would be able to reject or accept the petition on its face. s6 We believe that having fewer lines than required by $ 16-315 does nothing to confuse or mislead an elector. Finally, having fewer lines is considerably less substantial than those deficiencies that were not disqualifying in Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102, J 44, 139 P.3d at 620 (omission of day and month of primary election date), Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927 P.2d at 176 (omission of party designation for independent candidate), and Marsh, 111 Ariz. at 140, 526 P.2d at 162 (using “SO. PHX. Precinct” as an abbreviation for the South Phoenix Precinct). Thus, we hold that the petitions in this case substantially comply with § 16-315(A) (3). III. CONCLUSION m7 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the superior court. Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice CONCURRING: Michael 0. Ryan, Justice W Scott Bales, Justice 

0bed4ca1c78ba52b77a95d28d963f66f23d166b29dec2f79b89ed7e47fcd5c40

2008-07-11T00:00:00Z

80f28235-b70d-42bf-aa20-f1d67a2c845d

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Southern Natural Gas Company

1110698

alabama

Alabama Supreme Court

e1:06/26/2013, Wotice: Tis opinion i aubject to fomsl revision before publication in the advance shects of Southern Reporter, Readers are requested to notity the Reportar of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36106-3741 ((334) 229" 9648) of any Papograpnical or ether grrore, sn order that corrections may ba made bafore She Qpsion Le Betneed in ssuchers neporeac ¥ SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 1110698 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and Certain London Marketing Insurance Companies Southern Natural Gas Company 1110769 Southern Natural Gas Company Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and Certain London Marketing Insurance Compan: Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court (cv-01-6388) BOLIN, Justice. This appeal and cross-appeal result from a multiphase trial involving liability-insurance policies regarding roverage af anvirnnmantal-ramadiatinn enste On Aetnher 15, 2001, Southern Natural Gas Company ("Sonat") sued Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and Certain London Marketing Insurance Companies (hereinafter referred to collectively as "IMI") alleging that LMI had breached numerous umbrella and excess-liability-insurance policies by failing to pay Sonat for coxtain cnvironmental remediation coote, Thio io the third time this case has come before this Court. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 939 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2006) (dism:ssing appeal following Phase I of the trial as not being from a final judgment); Certain Underwriters at Llovds, London v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 41 So. 3d 56 (Ala. 2009) (dismissing appeals following Phase II of the trial as not being from a final judgment). The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of LMI during Phase III of the trial, adjudicating all the claims before it. The appeal and the cross-appeal are now properly before this court. 1110698 and 1110769 E Procedural Hi Sonat operates a natural-gas pipeline that spans an area from Texas to Georgia. A series of 38 compressor stations are positioned on the pipeline (11 are located in Alabama) in order to maintain the flow of natural gas through the pipeline, Suuat's inteyiated pipeline system alou includes numerous mercury-metering stations, 131 of which are in Alabama, The integrated pipeline system is controlled from Sonat's headquarters in Birmingham. From 1057 ta the early 147s, Sonat emplayass need the lubricating oil, "Pydraul," in the air-compressor engines at the compressor stations. in 1989, Sonat Learned that vyaraul contained the toxin polyctlorinated biphenyl ("PCBN) . Environmental testing conducted by Sonat on its own initiative revealed the presence of PCBs at 13 of the 38 compressor stations. Sonat conducted remedial activities at the compressor stations to remove the PCB and to prevent further migration of the PCB into the groundwater. Sonat also discovered that mercury may have been discharged from mercury-metering stations located along the pipeline. For years, Sonat used manometers or mercury- 1110698 and 1110769 metering stations along its pipeline to measure the flow of natural gas through its pipeline. The mercury meters were used to determine if there were leaks in the pipeline and to determine customers’ qas usage for billing purposes. Those mercury meters were eventually replaced with newer technology. we Buvisul Ue However, in 1992, weulal Protection Ayeuuy EPA") notified other gas-pipeline companies that mercury meters may have leaked. Sonat was notified in 1994 by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality that it had hegnn investigating Sonat's merenry meters located in Louisiana. In 1994, Sonat conducted remedial activities at hundreds of its mercury stations to prevent rurtner migration of mercury into the groundwater. IMI had issued umbrella and excess-liability-insurance policies to Sonat from 1949 to 1987. Most of the policies in effect during those years defined an "occurrence" as: "An accident or a happening, event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results unexpectedly and unintentionally as applied to the Assured seeking indemnity hereunder, in property damage ... during the policy period. All ouch oxpocurce to oubotantially the oame goncral conditions existing at or emanating from one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence." Other policies in effect during those years defined an 1110698 and 1110769 occurrence as “one happening or series of happenings arising out of or caused by one event taking place during the term of this contract All the policies limited coverage to sums Sonat became “leaally obligated" to pay “as damages." The policies barred coverage of claims for damage to property wumued Ly" sunat. On August 28, 1991, and September 3, 1991, Sonat notified LMI of the PCB contamination et the 13 compressor stations Sonat informed LMI that it was informing all affected nnderuritars af Sonat'a potential Mahiliry with regard te the contamination cleanup costs. 0n November 2, 1994, Sonat sent um notice that tne cleanup process was completed. On November 13, 1995, LMI issued a reservation-of-rights letter to Sonat. In that letter, LMI asked for copies of additional underlying policies from 1959 to 1962, in order to determine coverage for contamination at the compressor sites under the umbrella and excess-liability-insurance policies issued by IMI. LMI reserved its right to deny coverage under the policies issued from 1962 to 1978 for several reasons. ltt ie unclear when fonat notified IME of the contamination at the mercury-metering stations 5 1110698 and 1110769 IMI also reserved its right to deny coverage in “Whiteshield No. 31" and "Pike County Drum Superfund."* In 1996, Sonat notified LMI that it would appear from the cost of the cleanup that LMI's volicies would not be impacted. However, Sonat reserved its rights to seek coverage under the policies in Ule eveul Liat sual received alleyatious of third-party property damage or bodily injury. Subsequently, Sonat notified LMI that it would be seeking coverage for its PCB and mercary-remediation programs under the nmbrella and excess-1iahi vy policies taaned hy TMT. Th July 2001, LMI filed a declaratory-judgment action against Sonat in Georgia, seeking a resolution of tne coverage issue. The Georgia action was removed to federal court and was later dismissed. On October 15, 2001, Sonat filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court a "an action for a declaratory judgment and for breach of contract and anticipatory breach of contract and avoidance of contractual obligations under umbrella and excess liability °rt fe unclear from the bricfe what contamination had occurred at these sites. 1110698 and 1110769 insurance policies"? against LMI. In its complaint, Sonat asserted that the EPA, “other governmental agencies and departments and/or private parties," including Alabama residents, “have brought or asserted lawsuits, claims, and demands against Sonat alleging property damage, personal injury, bodily injury, aud otter damayef] and causes of action, including, without limitation, nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict liability, allegedly as a result of Sonat's operations and ownership" of the natural-gas integrated-pipeline system. Sonat asserted that ir has "paid substantial amounts under legal obligation for the remediation or gamage in, at, and around tne vicinity ot compressor stations, and for mercury damage arising from mercury meters." Sonat alleged as follows: Claims, demands and suits have been asserted against Sonat concerning property damage and other damages arising out of Sonat's integrated operations at compressor stations -- including 11 compressor stations located in the State of Alabama. The claimants in the environmental actions, allege, inter alia, damage and other injury ‘based on ‘The “liability insurance policies" referred to in the complaint are those "Known Primary, Umbrella and Excess General Liability Insurance Policies issued to [Sonat] by Cortain Underwritere at Lloyd'e" and licted in Appendix 1 to Sonat's complaint. 1110698 and 1110769 purported damage including the presence of polychlorinated biphenyls and other substances of concern including petroleum-related hydrocarbons, volatile o1yanic chemicals, semi-volatile vryanic chemicals, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and various metals, in the groundwater, surface water, air and general environment in, at, around, and in the vicinity of the compressor stations. Claimants seek damages for past and future response costs for alleged property damage and personal injury which is voutinuvus and pruyessive, Leyiuuing in ur befure 1949 and extending until at least 1986. The monies spent and to be spent in response to demands of a governmental agency, or a private party are ‘damages' under the Liability Insurance Policies. Alabama viating Uo. v. united states rigelity ana Guar. Co., 690 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1997). As such, the Liability Insurance Policies respond to and are reqnired ta pay for all damages hecanse of property damage, bodily injury or personal injury (or a combination thereof) which Sonat is or becomes legally obligated to pay as respects the compressor Stations. Ine damages tnat Sonat nas paid or 1s likely to become legally obligated to pay because of property damage, bodily injury and personal injury ariging ont of environmental and fart actiane concerning Sonat's compressor stations are within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. “Claims, demands and suits nave been assertea against Sonat concerning property damage and other damage[] arising out of Sonat's integrated operations at mercury metering stations -- including 131 mercury metering stations located in the State of Alabama. The claimants in the environmental and tort actions, allege, inter alia, damage and other injury based on purported damage including the prcocnes of moroury in the groundwater, ourface water, air and general environment in, at, around, and in the vicinity of the mercury metering stations. Claimants seek damages for past and future response costs for alleged property damage 1110698 and 1110769 which is continuous and progressive, beginning in or before 1949 and extending until at least 1986. The monies spent and to be spent in response to demands of @ yovernmental agency, o: a private party are ‘damages’ under the Liability Insurance Policies. Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 690 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1997). As such, the Liability’ Insurance Policies respond to and are required to pay for all damage because of property damage, bodily injury or personal injury (or a combination Uterecf) whieh Sonal is ur becomes legally obligated to pay as respects the mercury metering stations. The damages that Sonat has paid or is likely to become legally obligated to pay because of property danage, bodily injury and personal injury arising out or environmental ana tort actions concerning Sonat's mercury metering stations are within the jurisdictional limits of this Cont.” Sonat went on to list in its complaint the location of tne atrected compressor stations. sonat's asserted claims tor relief included: (1) that IMI was obligated to pay in full Sonat's legal liabilities arising out of or in connection with the previously described “environmental and tort actions" and had "failed, or threatened to fail, to fulfill, or acknowledge completely [its] insuring obligations to pay in full Sonat's legal liabilities"; (2) that there was an actual and justiciable controversy as to IMI's obligations; (3) that LMI had breached its insuring obligations to Sonat and was obligated to pay Sonat “all direct, indirect, consequential, 1110698 and 1110769 incidental, special, compensatory and other damages resulting from" the breaches of contract; (4) that LMI's conduct effected a waiver of its right "to enforce any contractual obligation, limitation, exclusion, or other provisions running in [its] favor" and Sonat was entitled to a judicial Ueelaralion Ly Ulal effects 15) Wiel EME had breached ite contracts of insurance by "disclosing confidences of Sonat and confidential settlement communications of Sonat in violation of [its] contractual duties to act with good faith and with reasonable care and pridence with regard to [ite] inanred,™ thereby waiving LMI's “ability to enforce any contractual obligation, limitation, exclusion, or other provision running in [its] favor," entitling Sonat to a judicial declaration to that effect; and (6) that LMI's conduct represented an anticipatory breach of contract entitling Sonat to damages. In its concluding “prayer for relief," Sonat demanded a judgment declaring that LMI was "obligated to pay or reimburse in full Sonat's cost and expenses for investigation and defense of the environmental and tort actions and to pay or reimburse in full Sonat's legal liabilities in connection with said environmental and tort actions" and to pay an award for 10 1110698 and 1110769 "compensatory damages in an ancunt or amounts to be determined by the trier of fact at trial, and attorneys’ fees and costs." Because of the size and complexity of the case, the parties aqreed that the trial should be conducted in phases. The trial court entered an order on October 25, 2002, that the (adel be cumducLed 1 pases because IL would nul be pussible to try the issues related to all the sites involved in Sonat's complaint at one trial. The parties proposed to the trial court that two sites be chosen for the initial phase of the frial, ane chosen by each party. Sonat chase the compressor station located in Tarrant, and LMI chose the compressor station Locatea in Kerorm. IM filed several sunmary-judgment motions in Phase I. In one of its motions, IMI argued that the Tarrant and Reform compressor-station sites were separate "occurrences" under the majority of policies, which limited coverage to occurrences at a single-premises location. LMI also argued that no costs at either site would implicate the attachment points of the umbrella and excess policies. IMI also moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the policies do not provide coverage for liability arising out of damage to Sonat's own nu 1110698 and 1110769 property. Additionally, LMI argued that the remediation costs had been voluntarily incurred by Sonat and were not recoverable without third-party compulsion. The trial court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact remaining and denied the motions. AL Ute Cluse uf Lie evidence in Phase I, Lie Lidal court submitted special interrogatories to the jury, which the jury marked as indicated below: INTERROGATORIES: You are hereby directed to answer the following Questions after you have fully considered all the evidence relating ta your answers and the applicable rules of law as explained to you by the Court: Question 1: Did Sonat reasonably satisfy you by the evidence af the existence of each nf the following insurance policies? “voLicy No. volacy verioa . cu 1887 1952-65 _X Yes __No . K 11477 1985-68 —X Yes __No 2 cu 10353 1958-71 TE Yes No K 23900 1971-71 —X Yes __No 1K 24880 1971-72 ie Yes To : K 25800 1972-75 Tx ves No uct 1330 1975-76 Tr veo “ne ua 1370 1976-77 Tc ves Two : VIL 1680 1977-78 Tx ves No "If your answer to all parts of this Question(] 2 1110698 and 1110769 is 'No,' stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of this verdict form and Notify the Court. If your answer to any part of this Question is "Yes," proceed to Question No. OCCURRENCE: "Question 2: (A) Did Sonat reasonably satisfy you that there was an ‘occurrence’ under the iusurauce policies in force Cxum 1962 uulil 19727 "An occurrence is defined in those policies as follows: “tyne term “vccurrence” wnenever usea nerein shall mean an accident or a happening, event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which reanits nnexpectadly and nnintentianally as applied to the Assured seeking indemnity hereunder, in ... property damage ... during the policy period. All such exposures to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating trom one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence.’ see Policy Numbere cl 1A77; K 11477 and cit 10353 X_ Yes No "(B) Did Sonat reasonably satisfy you that there was an ‘occurrence’ under the insurance policies in effect from 1971 until 1978? "An occurrence for these policies means as follows: "tthe word Yocourrence" shall be underotood to mean "one happening or series of happenings arising out of or caused by one event taking place during the term of this contract."' B 1110698 and 1110769 "See Policy Nos. K 23900; K 24880; K 25800; UGL 1330; UHL 1370; UJH 1680 "I£ your answers to all of the parts of this Question are 'No,' stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of this verdict form and Notify the Court. "If your answer to any part of this Question is proceed Lu Question No. 3. tres, LATE NOTICE: ‘Question 3: (A) Was Sonat's Notice to IMI of any occurrence at the Tarrant Compression Station late? Yes X_ No (8) Was Sonat's Notice to LMI of any occurrence at the Kerorm Compressor station Late? Yes X_No "If your answer to either Question 3(A) or 3(B) is "Yes," please proceed to Question 4. If your answer to both Questions 3(A) and 3(B) is ‘No,’ Please proceed to Question >. ‘WAIVER ‘Question 5: Did LMI reasonably satisfy you by the evidence that Sonat waived its claim? Yes X_ No "IE your answer to this Question is "Yes," stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of the verdict rT) 1110698 and 1110769 rorm, ana notiry tne vourt. if your answer to tnis Question is 'No,' proceed to Question 6. INIIMRER /OCCHRRENCE (8! "Question 6: Did Sonat reasonably satisfy you by the evidence that a sincle occurrence caused the property damage|) at Yarrant Compressor station ana Reform Compressor Station? x Yes No ‘Question 7 (A) Are you reasonably satisfied from the evidence that there wae damage to property owned by anyone other than Sonat at the Tarrant Compressor Station? X_ Yes No "(B) Are you reasonably satisfied from the evidence that there waco damage to property owned by anyone other than Sonat the Reform Compressor Station? X_ Yes No "IE your answer to both Questions 7(A) and 7(B) io to, otop, have the foropereon oign at the end of the verdict form, and notify the Court. If your answer to either Question 7(A) or 7(B) is 'Yes,* Proceed to Question 8. TRIGGER: ‘Question 8 "(A) When did any property damage begin at Tarrant Compressor Station? wpate __1997 15 1110698 and 1110769 “(s) wnen aia any property damage begin at tne Reform Compressor Station? nate 1957 "(C) When did the property damage at the Tarrant Compressor Station end? Date __1988 "(D) When Aid the property damage at the Reform Compressor Station end? "Date __1988 IAS DAMACES: ‘Question 9 (A) Were the amounts paid by Sonat at the Tarrant Compressor Station incurred because Sonat was legally obligated to pay them as damages? X_ Yes __ No "(B) Were the amounts paid by Sonat at the Reform Compressor Station incurred because Sonat was legally obligated to pay =hem as damages? x Yeo No "If your answer to both Questions 9(A) and 9(B) is 'No,' stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of the verdict form, and notify the Court. If your auswer Lo citer Question 9(A) ur 9(B) is "Yes," please proceed to Question 10. EXPECTED AND INTENDED: "Question 10: 7 (A) bo you CLud Wat Sonal expected ur intended 16 1110698 and 1110769 011 contamination at tne ‘warrant compressor Station? Yes Xx No "(B) Do you find that Sonat expected or intended soil contamination at the Reform Compressor Station? '___ Yes No "TF your aneuar to hath Qnestians 1004) and 10(B) is 'Yes,' stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of the verdict form, and notify the Court. If your answer to either Question 10(A) or 10(B) is 'No,' please proceed to Question 11. BREACH OF CONTRAC’ ‘Question 11: Did LMI breach the contracts? X_ Yes No "r£ your anower to thie Queotion ic 'No,! have the foreperson sign at the end of this verdict form and notify the Court. If your answer to this Question is 'Yes,' then what is the date when the breach occurred? "Month Nov Day_13__ Year 1995 'QUANTUM/COSTS: "Question 12: Please state the total amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result LL PCB CuuLawinalion al Uke Tazraul Compressor Station Site. xe Million Three Hundred Ninety Two Thousané Nine Hundred Fifty Eight and 87/1 ($4,392, 958.87) vv 1110698 and 1110769 “yuestion 13: ¥lease state tne total amount, ir any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Reform Compressor Station Site ‘Five Hundred Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Four and 57/100 ($512, 884.57) ATTACHMENT POTTS: Question 14: Are policies CU 1887 (in effect between 1962-65), K 11477 (in effect between 1965- 68), and CU 10353 (in effect between 1968-71), exesee of $1,050,000.00 in limite of underlying insurance or $50,000.00 in underlying insurance? "__ $1,050,000.00 _x_ $50,000" Based on the jury's answers to the interrogatories, the txial court entered an order making a pro rata allocation of the loss based on each policy year's share of the loss. The trial court determined that LMI owed Sonat $974,277. The trial court purported to make its order final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. LMI appealed, and this Court concluded that because there was no adjudication of any single claim in Sunal"s Complaint, Ue Lidel court lad impeoperly cezticied the judgment as final. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's, London v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 939 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2006). 18 1110698 and 1110769 subsequentiy, tne parties proceeded to rnase 11 of tne case, which involved the remaining 11 compressor stations where PCB had been found and remediated. The LMI excess- liability policies were the sare policies involved in Phase I. Sonat filed a motion for a summary judgment in Phase IT fn the grannd that there was nn gannine taane af material fant with respect to Sonat's unitary-pipeline operation and that the PCB-cleanup project constituted a single occurrence under the LMI policies based on the jury's findings in Phase I of the case. The trial court entered the following order: "This matter is before the court on [Sonat's] motion for summary judgment on the following: Insurance Related Findings. "(LMI] concedes the following: "(1) Phase I established that LMI insurance policies exist; (2) Phase I established (erroneously) the attachment points of the LMI policies; (3) Phase I established (erroneously) Wal Sonal did Hol waive ils claim undez the LMI policies. [LMI1 contests [Sonat's] motion of the remaining issues. This Court finds that the jury made factual Uelerminalious wich are bindluy in Phase IZ un Lhe 19 1110698 and 1110769 Tollowing: (4) The PCB Remediation Program constituted an torenrrence! under the policies; "(5) The PCB Remediation Expenses incurred by [Sonat] vere recoverapie; "(6) [Sonat] provided timely notice to IMT af the PCR Contaninatian isane The Court finds that there is a jury issue whether LMI breached the contracts with [Sonat]. 2. Single Occurrence. "[LMI] contends that there was a common cause and, therefore, each site is distinct and separate. However, the trial in Phase I was for two representative sites. The issue presented was whether Pydraul was the common cause of the contamination in the pipeline oyetem. The jury decided it was. Therefore, this court finds that the jury determination that there was a single occurrence is binding on che Phase II trial. "Therefore, it is Ordered as follow: 1. The LMI inourance policice exicty 2. The attachment points are established; 3. Sonat did not waive its claim; 4. The Remediation Program was an ‘occurrence’; ‘5. The Remediation Expenses are recoverable: [Sonat] provided timely notice; and The PCR Cleanup was a Sluyle vecurcenee. 20 1110698 and 1110769 vyne motion ror sunmary jJuagment is aeniea except as provided herein. At the close of the evidence in Phase TT, the trial conrt submitted interrogatories for the jury to answer, which the jury answerea as inaicatea: "Question 1: ‘Are you reasonably satisfied from the evidence that, prior to the PCB remediation at the sites, there was damage to the property of a third party or an imminent threat to third party property, {noluding groundwater and eurface water, at the following compressor stations? "DeArmanville Yes XL No "Ellerslie _% Yes No "BImore KL. veo Ne "Enterprise __ Yes XL No "Gallion _& Yes No "Louisville _X Yes __ No "McConnells yes _X_ No "Ocmulgee _& Yes _—_ No wad A res we Rankin __ Yes XL No "Thomaston Yes XL No If your answer to this Question as to all Compressuz Station sites 1s "Nu," slop, have Uke 2 1110698 and 1110769 Toreperson sign at tne end or tne verdict rorm, notify the Court. "Tf your answer te this Qnestion as to any Compressor Station Site is 'Yes,' please proceed to Question 2. wyuestion 2. "Are you reasonably satisfied that [Sonat] neither expected nor intended property damage at the following Compressor Station Sites? "Dearmanville __ Wo ELlorelio __ wo "Elmore _X Yes __ No Enterprise XK ves __ No "Galion _X Yes __ wo Louisville x Yes __ wo "wcconnells _X Yes __ No *ocmulgee _& Yes __ Wo lonward i eo __ wo "Rankin _X Yes wo Thomaston _X Yes No "If your answer as to all Compressor Station Sites is 'No,' stop, have the foreperson sign at the end of the verdict form, notifv the Court. "If your answer as to any Compressor Station Site is 'Yes," please proceed to Question 3. 22 1110698 and 1110769 “yuestion 3 "Are you reasonably satisfied that LMI breached its contracts with (Sonat? X_ Yes No “ir you answered "No to uestion 3, stop, nave the foreperson sign at the end of the verdict form, and notify the Court. If you answered 'Yes' to Question 3, what is the date when the breach occurred? "Month November Day 13. Year 1995 "If you answer 'Yes' to Question, 3, then proceed to Question 4. ‘Question 4. "Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat io ontitled to recover a0 a rcoult of PCB Contamination at the DeArmanville, Alabama Compressor Station Site: Zero DOLLARS ($0.00) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Elmore, Alabama Compressor Station Site: ‘Two Hundred One Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Six and 36/100 DOLLARS ” ($201,946.36) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sunt ls entitled Ly recover as a sesull Of PCB 23 1110698 and 1110769 Contamination at the Gallion, Alabama compressor Station Site: a Hundred Righty Two Thousand Five Hundred Eifty Four and 63/100 DOLIARS ” (582,554.63) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contaminatian at the MeCannells, Alahama Comprasenr Station Site: Zero DOLLARS "Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Ellerslie, Georgia Compressor Station Site: Onc Hundred Gixty Two Thousand Bight Hundsod Twenty Eight and 69/100 DOLLARS ” ($162,828.69) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Ocmslgec, Ccorgia Compressor Station Site: "Three Hundred Ninety Four Thousand One Hundred Six and 95/100 DOLLARS (9394, 106.95) Please state the tctal amount, if anv, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Thoraston, Georgia Compressor Station Site: 24 1110698 and 1110769 Zero VULLAKS ($0.00) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Enterprise, Mississippi Compressor Station site: Zero DOLLARS (30.00) "Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Louieville, Mieeicoippi Compressor Station Site: ‘Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Sixty Three and 237100 DOLLARS " ($639,063.23) Please state the tctal amount, if any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB Contamination at the Onward, Mississippi Compressor Station Site: "Four Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Three Hundred ive ona 71/100 ($422,305.74) Please state the total amount , if any, that Sunal is entitled Lu secover ao @ ‘resull Of PCB Contamination at the Rank:n, Mississippi Compressor Station Site: "Zero DOLLARS (30.00) 25 1110698 and 1110769 “yuestion 3. “What is the amount of interest that [Sonat] is entitled to on its damages? Two Million Four Hundred Thirty Two One Hundred Ten and 40/100 DOLLARS (92,432,110. 40) Raced nn the jury's anawers ta the aperial interrogatories, the trial court entered an order finding that, based on its prior orders and answers to the special interrogatories from Phase I and Phase II, (1) the PCB remediation program constituted an "occurrence" as defined in the policies; (2) the attachment point of the policies for LMI" cxceos coverage was $50,000, (3) fonat was legally obligated to pay for the remediation program and, therefore, Sonat had incurred damage; and (4) the PCB-remediation program constituted a single occurrence under the policies. The trial court concluded that LMI had breached its contracts with Sonat. The court divided the total damages awards from Phase To qud Phase I ou a piu tala basis aud cuueluded Ula LMT owed, Sonat $2,377,962.45 in damages in Phase II. The court purported to certify the order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. PL 26 1110698 and 1110769 Lm appeaiea. Un vecemper 30, 2009, this Court conc1uaea that the order certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) was not a final judgment and, therefore, was not appealable because the issue of the mercury contamination was still before the trial court and the same policies issued by IMI were involved in Sonatte allegatians that IMT had hraachad ite rantracte in refusing to pay for the cleanup of the PCB-contaminated sites and the sites contaminated with mercury from the mercury- metering stations. Certain Underwriters at Llovds, London v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 41 So. 3d 56 (Ala. 2009). Accordingly, this Court dismissed the appeal as not being from @ final judgment. The parties proceeded to Phase III regarding the sites contaminated with mercury, Sonat's cleanup of the mercury- metering stations, and Sonat's claims that the umbrella and excess-liability policies issued by IMI provided coverage for the environmental cleanup. Both Sonat and LMI moved for a Summary Judyuent. Ou Febiucry 8, 2022, Une etal cout entered an order, denying both parties" motions. The parties proceeded with additional discovery. On September 9, 2011, LMI filed a motion in limine to 2 1110698 and 1110769 exclude 171 mercury-contaminatea sites that sonat allegealy had failed to disclose in accordance with a prior discovery order of the trial court in which Sonat had identified 737 mercury-contaminated sites. LMI also sought to exclude 59 sites (of the 737 disclosed sites) because Sonat allegedly had Failed te produce dacnments ar reparts af the work performed at those sites. LMI also argued that Sonat should not be allowed to present aggregate costs of its mercury remediation. IMI argued that evidence of aggregate costs without site- specific damage figures might confuse the jury because some of the costs related to Sonat's investigation and remediation of ito own property and oites, which wore not damaged by moroury contamination. On September 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and subsequently granted the motion. That same day, LMI moved for a partial summary judgment, arguing: "In prior trial phases of this case, the Court required Sonat to prove the value of the damage and AUS iemedialion efforts al each compressuz stallun site. This necessarily required Sonat to prove, not only that each site sustained 'property damage, ' but also that the amount expended at each location is covered ‘as damages' under the terms of the LMI policies. Both Phase I and Phase II juries were asked to identify the dollar amount of the covered expendiluzes al each remediation site. This 28 1110698 and 1110769 requirea tne juries to ‘state tne total amount, ir any, that Sonat is entitled to recover as a result of PCB contamination at' each individual station. Sonat raised no objection to this requirement Because some of the sites were owned by Sonat, no amount was awarded to Sonat for contamination at those sites. In Phase III discovery, Sonat failed to produce any evidence demonstrating the amount spent on marenry-ralated activities at any single lncatian Additionally, in its proposed jury interrogatories, Sonat revealed that it did not intend to prove the costs expended at each individual mercury location. Specifically, the proposed jury interrogatories cubmitted by Sonat, unlike the interrogatories weed in the earlier phases, do not ask the jury to identify the covered damages at each site. Instead, Sonat proposed only that the jury identify a ‘total amount’ of covered damages at all locations ‘along its pipeline operations’ in a single interrogatory. Sonat admitted in open court on Soptomber 19, 2011, that io hao no ability to prove amounts spent at any one of the 737 mercury sites that Sonat proposed were at issue in the Phase IIT trial. "In open court on September 19, 2011, the Court geanted LMI's Motion in Limine to Preclude Certain Evidence Regarding Mercury Expenditures. In their motion in limine, LMI argued that Sonat should not be allowed to present invoices and summaries to the Phase III jury because those invoices and summaries are undifferentiated as to any of the sites at issue du Phase IIT, On Lue basis Uf Ulal motion aud Lu light of Sonat's admitted inability to present any evidence of costs or damages at individual Phase III sites, IMI hereby moves for summary judament as to all mercury sites placed at issue in Phase III and/or Sonat's complaint in this action. In gesponse Lo LMZ"S suiwary~Judymenl wollun, Sonal 29 1110698 and 1110769 arguea that aamages do not nave to be proven to a matnematical certainty. Sonat also argued that other jurisdictions have allowed proof of aggregate damages. The trial court granted LMI's summary-judgment motion. on January 24, 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment hhased an the prior triala in Phase T and Phase TT af the case. and based on its partial summary judgment in favor of LMI in Phase III. LMI appeals; Sonat cross-appeals. LMI's Appeal (No. 1110698) LMI argues (1) that environmental contamination occurring at different geographical locations and at different times conotituted coparate Mocourrences") (2) that none of the policies provide coverage for damage to Sonat's own property? (3) that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury regarding imminent threat; (4) that Sonat's cost for a voluntary remediation of environmental contamination is not recoverable because Sonat neve: became "legally obligated" to vay any sums as “Uamayes7 (9) Ulal Ue Ural court erred in instructing the jury regarding Sonat's compliance with environmental regulations; (6) that Sonat failed to present substantial evidence that LMI breached its contracts because 30 1110698 and 1110769 um. reservea its rights to challenge its 1iapiiity; (7) tnat Sonat failed to present substantial evidence that LMI breached its contracts when Sonat had expressly stated that LMI could close its files on the claims; (8) that the umbrella and excess-liability policies involved had not attached because the damages did nat exceed the limite nf the nndarlying insurance; and (9) that the trial court erred in imposing in Phase II findings by the jury in Phase I. First, we will address IMI's argument that the trial court erred in applying the jury's findings in Phase I to the jury in Phase IT. LMI complains that the trial court improperly applicd the jury!o findingo from Phase I -~ that the PCB contamination was a single occurrence, that the remediation program was the cause of the costs Sonat incurred as damages, and that Sonat gave timely notice of its remediation claim related to the PCB contamination. In support of its argument, LMI cites Black v. Comer, 920 So. 2d 1083, 1089-30 (Ala. 2005), fur Le yeneral prupusition What the grant of an offensive motion for a summary judgment is proper only when a plaintiff conclusively proves every element of its claim. LMI then goes on to argue that the only issues 3 1110698 and 1110769 berore tne jury in rhase 1 irvolvea tne varrant ana kerorm compressor sites and that the Phase I jury was not presented with any evidence regarding the 11 compressor sites involved in Phase II. IMI also cites Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 HS. 800, 81-11 (1959), for the propnsitinn that applying the finding from Phase I to Phase II effectively denied LMI its right to trial by jury. Although not noted by LMI, Beacon concerned legal and equitable issues brought in the same action where there were common issues of fact between the two claims so that a court's resolution of an issue would forcelooe rolitigation of that icouc before a jury under the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and the court in Beacon held that the legal claims must be tried first to ensure that the right to a jury trial of legal issues is not lost. Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. » provides: wrhe uutl, in Curtiezanve Uf convenience, or Lo avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross- claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or dssues, always presezviuy invivlale We right of 32. 1110698 and 1110769 trial py jury as declarea py article 1, section 11 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901." mtrnle 42(b) allows the court te order a separate trial of any claim.... Separate trials usually will result in one juagment . vavis v. Hanson aggregates soutneast, inc., 952 So. 2d 330, 339 (Ala. 2006) (quoting 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2387 (1995)). In short, Rule 42 authorizes the trial court te bifureate triale in furthorance of convenience or to avoid prejudice or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and econony. Here, the parties agreed that it would be inefficient to try the issues related to all 13 compressor-station sites contaminated with PCB at once, and they therefore chose 2 sites to try in Phase I, The trial court cannot be put in error for doing what the partico had agreed to do. Walker Southern Trucking Corp., 283 Ala. 551, 219 So. 2d 379 (1968). Also, we note that nothing in LMI's brief indicates that LMT objected to the interrogatories posed to the jury in Phase I. Failure to timely object to a special interroaatorv waives the objection. MWetterhan v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 844 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 2002); Nusfulk Su. Ry. vs BraUley, 772 Su. 2d 1147 33 1110698 and 1110769 (ala. 2000). Furthermore, it is not tne auty or tne appellate court to search the record for evidence to support an appellant's contention of error. Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So. 2d 379 (Ala. 2007). LMI now complains that it should not have been bound in Phase TT hy the anawars ta the interragatarias given hy the jury in Phase I of the trial. However, the factual determinations in Phase I should not be reexamined by a second or subsequent jury because to do so would lead to the unacceptable risk that the jury at each phase would consider evidence differently with possibly inconsistent results. Baced on the facte and argumento before uo, wo cannot say that the trial court erred in applying the facts as found in Phase I to the jury in Phase II. We recognize that following Phase I IMI objected to the trial court's application of the jury's findings in Phase I to the Phase II jury. However, LMI had agreed to a multiphased trial, and it had agreed to try the issues related lu two compressur-stalion sites ay representative. LMI apparently agreed to, or at least failed to object to, the questions asked of the jury in Phase I. Accordingly, we cannot say tha: the trial court erred in this 34 1110698 and 1110769 regara. IMI argues that PCB contanination occurring at different compressor stations at different times and by different means of contamination from PCBs amounted to separate "occurrences" under the terms of the policies. “Where an insurance policy fafines cartain wards ar phrases a court mist defer ta the Paul, definition provided by the policy." $ re & Marine Ins. Co. v. Christiansen Marine, Inc., 893 So. 2d 1124, 1136 (Ala. 2004). The majority of the policies at issue here define an * " as follows: courrenc "An accident or a happening, event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which rooulto uncxpectedly and unintentionally ac applied to the Assured seeking indemnity hereunder, in ... property damage ... during the policy period. All such exposures to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence." The other applicable policice define an "occurrence" act "[O]ne happening or series of happenings arising out of or caused by one event taking place during the term of this contract. IMI argues that the trial court should have entered a judament as a matter of law based on the unambiquous definitions of an “occurrence” in the policies. However, in ALS Uriyinal Liles Lu Uuds appeal, LMT dues nul address Lhe 35 1110698 and 1110769 gerinitions containea in tne pelicies. instead, uM relies on caselaw from Alabama and other jurisdictions interpreting an "occurrence" and focuses its argument on the cause of the "occurrence." It is well settled that, "[w)hen a trial court Ge [faced] with a contract issue, it is important for the trial court to determine as soon as practicable the ‘threshold issue’ whether the contract is ambiguous. If the trial court determines that there is no ambiguity, it muet 'Wdotermine the force and offect of the terms of the contract as a matter of law."" Cherokee Farms, Inc. [v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.l, 526 So. 2d [871,] 873 [(Ala, 1988)], quoting Wigington ‘v. Hill*Soberq Co., 396 So. 2d 97, 98 (Ala. 1981). However, if the trial court finds the contract to be ambiguous, it ‘must employ cotabliched rulceo of contract conctruction to resolve the ambiguity.’ Voyager Life Ins. Co. v. Whitson, 703 So. 2d 944, 948 (Ala. 1997). If the application of such rules is not sufficient to resolve the ambiguity, factual issues arise: If one must go beyond the four cornero of the agreement in conotruing an ambiguous agreement, the surrounding circumstances, including the practical construction put on the language of the agreement by the parties to the agreement, aie cuntrelliny in aesulving Lue ambiguity.’ "Id. at 949, Where factual issues arise, the resolution of the ambiguity becomes a task for the jury. McDonald v. U.S. De Casting & Dev. Co., 585 So. 2d 853 (Ala. 1991). 36 1110698 and 1110769 alta Lire ins. Corp. v. yonnson, 822 0. 2a 400, 404-09 (Ala. 2001). Without a discussion from LMI of the specific definitions in the policies, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the policies were ambiguous and that the Interpretation af the dafinitinns af Tacenrrence™ in the policies should have been submitted to the jury. This Court has addressed in other cases the term "occurrence" and whether there had been more than one occurrence. In United States Fire Insurance Co. Safeco Insurance Co., 444 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1983), the insurance policy provided that, "[£]or the puspoos of determining the limit of the company's liab:lity, all bodily injury and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence." When called on to look at the definition in that policy, this Court Revuyiized Ula insurance cuuLiacls, Like auy uLie: CunLLacly must be construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and that, if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction. The 7 1110698 and 1110769 excess insurer in sareco naa arguea tnat tne terms "substantially" and "general" were ambiguous. The Court did not find those terms to be ambiguous and construed them in accordance with their common meaning and import. In Safeco, water had leaked through the roof of a Initding, damaging the marchandiae af the lasses arenpying the building. Subsequently, the lessee incurred additional damage by rainfall when the roofing crew repairing the roof failed to effectively cover a portion of the roof on which it was working. The excess insurer argued that these instances were two occurrences because some of the damage resulted from negligent acte of the roofing crew. The Court determined that the issue was whether the definition of the term "occurrence" in the policy involved the question whether “substantially the same general conditions," 444 So. 2d at 846, existed at the time of the damage. The Court recognized that the definition of "occurrence" in the policy contemplated Ula one ULcuLLeHLY may Mave MULLIple aud disparale impacts on individuals and that injuries may extend over time. The Court went on to address the question whether the damage stemmed from one proximate cause and concluded that there was a 38 1110698 and 1110769 separate intervening cause pecause tne initial water leaking through cracks in a roof and the subsequent negligent act of a roofing crew in failing to effectively cover a portion of the roof so that further damzge resulted during additional rains were two separate occurrences. "[I]f the cause is interrupted ar replaced hy annther eanae, the chain nf causation is broken and more than one accident or occurrence has taken place." Safeco, 444 So. 2d at 847. The Court recognized that a majority of courts have recognized the "cause" theory rather than looking to the number of claimants or injuries.‘ In short, a separate, intervening cause can break the chain of causation 20 that there io more than one "occurrence." In Home Indemnity Co. v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1984), the City of Mobile sought a judgment declaring its liability under § 11-93-2, Ala. Code 1975 (limiting recovery of damages against governmental entities), to numerous flood victims why lad pending ayainst Une city actions seeking compensation for property damage. Because there was no ‘the minority view "focuses on the effect of the insured's action and considers each event or each injury a separate eccurrence-" Quneze Ine. Co. vs Salmoneon, 266 .C. 936, 339, 622 8.B.2d 525, 526 (2005). 39 1110698 and 1110769 gerinition or “occurrence” in tne statute, tnis Court statea: We recently had occasion to define the phrase tone ocenrrence.! [Inited States Fire Insurance Co Safeco Insurance Co., 444 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1983). We concluded that 'as long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single occurrence.’ dd. at 8a» (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Lipert Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3rd Cir. 1982)). While in Safeco we were attempting to give effect to the intentian af the parties ta the inanrance contract and here we are trying to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, we find that difference to be of no consequence, since in both situations the drafting parties were attempting to accomplich the camo objective. They cought to limit liability by limiting recoveries for injuries that result from a common source. 459 So. 2d at 843. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Christiansen Marine, Inc., 893 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 2004), this Court was asked to determine the deductible applicable to a towing company's claims against the buyer of seven barges where one barge began taking on water caucing the tow to break apart. The marine-insurance policy did not define "accident" or "occurrence" so this Court looked to Black's Law Dictionary to define those terms and to Sefeco, supra, for guidance in determinina whether there had been one accident, event. or continuing condition that resulted in property damage that was nelle: expected uur luLended by Lue barge umes. The CouZL 40 1110698 and 1110769 statea: "In this case, [the barge owner's] barges were not operating separately and were not involved in separate incidents; they were all bound together and under the control of the same two tugboats. Although the exact cause of the loss has not been identified, the record re-iects that one or more or [the barge owner's] barges took on water while being towed and that this event caused the entire tow to break apart. (The fowing company] snstained damage as a result. The fact that all seven barges were involved in the incident giving rise to [the towing company's] damage does not establish that there were seven ‘occurrences, ' for purposes of calculating the deductible duc under the policy. Moreover, [the insurer] has not offered any evidence to establish that [the towing company's] damage resulted from more than one proximate cause or that another cause intervened to break the chain of causation created by [the towing company's} tow taking on water." 292 60. 2d at 1137, In the present case, Sonat presented testimony during Phase I that it operated an integrated pipeline as a part of which the compressor stations worked in unison to move natural gas though the pipeline. Sonat presented testimony that Pydraul was used to lubricate the engines at the compressor statiuus alld Uual Pydiaul was Une uly material coutaLuiiy PCBs used at the compressor stations. Sonat presented testimony that Pydraul had leaked through the seals in the air-compressor cylinders and had mixed with moisture in the a 1110698 and 1110769 stream of compressea air anc tnat russ trom tne ryaraul thereby had seeped into the soil and groundwater. LMI contends that some of the compressor sites were contaminated in different ways and that, because the contamination was caused by different acts or omissions, there was nn camman chain af cansatian at all the sites and, therefore, there was more than one occurrence. LMI cites testimony from Phase II of the trial that indicated that contamination had occurred at different places at each compressor station. LMI refers to testimony from Phase II of the trial, indicating, for exanple, that contamination at one bite had rcowlted from omploycco! washing rago contaminated with PCBs or throwing rags contaminated with PCBs into a burn pit after those rags had been used to lubricate the compressor stations. We note that the jury in Phase I found that Sonat proved that there had been an "occurrence" as that term was defined in the applicable policies and that the jury in Phase IT was bound by iat Cludiny. The Jury Lu Phase T found Chat there had been one “occurrence” under the applicable policies. ‘The jury in Phase II answered the questions whether there was a threat of contamination to a third party's property and 42 1110698 and 1110769 wnetner the rUs contamination was expected or intenaea at tne remaining 11 compressor stations. Even if we limit our discussion to evidence presented at Phase II as LMI has done, IMI still has not shown that there was more than one occurrence. The taatimany from Phase TT froma retired Sanat engineer explains how Pydraul was used in lubricating the compressor stations: In the utilization of the air compressor in that system and that storage tank, do you ever have occasion to have some of the lubricant actually end up in the air system? "A: Yes. You're lubricating the walls of a rooiprocating compressor end thio comprcooor hao got rings on it just like rings on a car, so with wear and with time, you're going to get some oil carryover into the air system. It's just a normal part of the operation is to get some carryover, just like you get some oil carryover in the rings of a piston on a car engine and therefore have to replenich the oil from tine to time. I may have asked you this, if I have I apologize. Do you also get water vapor or water condensate that builds up in the storage or receiver (awk for Chese al: Compressor systeus? : Especially, with the humidity that we have here in the south, when vou take air at atmospheric pressure and compress it, then there's water squeezed out basically. The air is not capable of holding as much moisture in a vapor form at two undred aud Cifly PSE ay LL is al almusphesie 43 1110698 and 1110769 pressure. so yes, you would nave some tree water that would drop out typically in the air receivers and it was common practice just to drain that water nt of that receiver once a day so it didn't take np space that could be occupied by the compressed air. : What do you mean it was common procedures to arain that water out? explain that ror us. Well, you would have a valve in the bottom of the air receiver, again, jnat Tike yon wanld have in the bottom of an air compressor that you went to Lowe's and picked up today, there's a little drain cock in the bottom of those tanks and it's to drain the water off that's going to accumulate in that eank to keop it from cecupying epace and alco to keep it from creating a corrosion problem in the bottom of the vessel. These are steel tanks that the air was stored in so any liquids that was in there would over time cause some corrosion problems if you weren't draining that out on a daily basis. "or T undorotand thar in the mid to late 1800 that your procedures changed a little bit, but before that time, was it the practice to remove the condensate by opening the blowdown valve and letting it go to the ground? ‘Ar Yes. It was typically just water. Like I aid, occaoionally there would be a little oil in that that had carried over into the tank, but essentially, it was water that was being blown out and it was a routine part of an operator's day is to go by the tank, the air receivers periodically and pen Lie valve aid blow iL wall Lieze was uULlLig but air coming out and close the valve back off." IMI's own expert testified that all compressors have to be "blown down" and that doing so is part of the routine uperation uf Lie compressu:. Sunal's early praclice was Lo 44 1110698 and 1110769 aiscnarge tne condensate plowdown onto the ground. vart or the air-compressor-station operator's routine is wiping off the machines and cleaning up the rags used in the blowdown process. The operator would open the valve and discharge the condensate, and the water containing Pydraul would go into the gronnd. ‘The operatar wanld take the rags need in this process and wash them and then the water they were washed in, which contained Pydraul, would go into the ground at that location. Based on the arguments before us, we cannot say that there was a separate intervening cause. Sonat had cleanup areas at each site where Pydraul (and the PCBs in that lubricant) had contaminated the groundwatery that contamination was caused by the use of Pydraul through a unitary pipeline, and the manner of operating each compressor station was the same. In Safeco, the excess insurer was not liable under its policy for the additional damage to the lessee that resulted from the intervening cause of the roofing company's nol covering Ue 200f where Lt was perfurmluy Une repairs. In the present case, some compressor stations exhibited PCB at different places. In Safeco, we recognized that the definition of “occurrence” in that policy 45 1110698 and 1110769 contemplatea that one occurrence may nave multiple ana disparate impacts on individuals and that injuries may extend over time. Accordingly, we cannot say that LMI has shown that the trial court erred in finding that there had been one "occurrence." Next, IMT argnes that sane af the palietes provide coverage for damage to Sonat's own property, including the PCB-contaminated groundwater on Sonat's property, The policies bar coverage of “any claim ... brought by the named Assured for damages to or destruction of its property,” and other applicable policies bar coverage of “property owned by tho named inoured ...." IMT argues that the policice cxelude coverage of Sonat's costs to clean up the contaminated groundwater that had not migrated from Sonat's own property. In Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 690 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1996), this Court addressed the insurer's argument that the costs of performing euvicoumental remediation ordered by Lie Alabama Departmen Of Environmental Management are not "damages" under a comprehensive-general liability ("CGL") policy and that the “owned-property" exclusion in its CGL policy precluded 46 1110698 and 1110769 coverage ror cleanup or water or soil within tne pounaaries or an insured's property. We stated: ‘This Court has not previously addressed these specific issues, and the relevant terms are not defined in the CGL policies at issue. However, as noted previously, tne policies in question are standard-form policies issued nationwide, so the rulings of courts in other states are of some omidance. Wa find that as ta each iaane ahve, the clear majority of courts that have answered the questions have ruled against the arguments made by USF & G. Thus, we adopt the majority position on each issue: environmental remediation costs are damagee covered by CCL policice, and tho ‘owned property’ exclusion does not exclude coverage for the costs of remediating groundwater contamination. ‘These rulings are consistent with prior decisions of this Court. We have prev-ously refused to narrowly limit the type of costs covered as damages under a liability policy. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Leode, 630 Go. 24 206 (Als. 1988). Wo have also held that a landowner's interest in the groundwater beneath his property is a limited right, see Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1995), not one of ownership.” 690 So. 2d at 336-37 (footnotes omitted) . In support of our holding in Alabama Plating that the owned-property exclusion does not preclude coverage for the cools Uf emediaLing yruunlmile: CUnLaminaliony we ciled numerous cases addressing groundwater spread. In Claussen v etn rt i a» 754 F, Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1990), Aetna's insurance policy did not cover claims based a7 1110698 and 1110769 solely on damage to its insurea’s property. accoraing to Aetna, the pollution discharge from the property damaged only the groundwater beneath the :nsured's own land, and Aetna asserted that under Georgia law a property owner owns all that is below and above his property. Accordingly, Aetna argued that the anviranmantal diaastar at the site damaged anly the insured's own property and that Aetna was not liable. The Georgia court held that Aetna's argument failed for three reasons. First, under controlling law, the insured did not own the groundwater under the insured's land. Thus, the owned- property exclusion did not bar coverage for any damage to the groundwater. econd, the toxic dumping damaged not only the insured's land, but also surrounding land and water. Third, the EPA had required the insured to clean up the site to prevent damage to third person's property as well as to the insured's own property. In Upiohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 178 Mich. App. 706, 444 N.W.20 613 (1989), rev'd UH ULL grounds, 436 Mich. 197, 476 N.W.2d 392 (1991), the insured discovered contamination and cleaned up its own subsoil as contaminants Were slowly making their way into the groundwater. The Court 48 1110698 and 1110769 or Appeais or michigan notea: "(We agree with the trial court that governmental agencies conld have ordered lpjahn ta act and, had they done so, Upjohn vould have been legally obligated to pay the cost of cleanup .... We note that the improper release of toxic wastes may cause property damage not only to tne actual owner or tne land, but also the government because of its independent interest, behind the titles of its citizens, in all the air and earth (ie, ite natural resources) within its domain. We believe that it makes no difference that Upjohn took the remedial action it did before being ordered to do so, and, in fact, we believe that such swift romedial’ action ehould be encouraged, rathor than discouraged.” 178 Mich. App. at 719-20, 444 N.W.2d at 819 (internal citations omitted). In Northorn States Powcr Co. vs Fidelity ¢ Caoualty Co. of New York, 504 .N.W.2d 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota rejected an insurer's argument that certain environmental cleanup costs were excluded from coverage by an owned-property exclusion. The insurer argued that it did not have to pay for aemuval Uf CUuLaminaled sud Crom ils insured"s properly because no money had been spent to remedy the contamination of the groundwater but only to excavate and remove contaminated soil. The court held that "because groundwater pollution has 49 1110698 and 1110769 occurred, tne ‘own property’ exclusion aces not par coverage for cleanup expenses needed to correct already existing soil contamination which continues to damage the groundwater." 504 N.W.2d at 246. This Court in Alabama Plating also cited Patz v. St. Paul Fire £ Marine Insurance Co, 817 Fo Supp 781 (FN wis 1993), in which the insurer ergued that the owned-property exclusion did not bar coverage of the costs of preventing future harm to groundwater or adjacent property that might arise from contamination that has already taken place, whether such contamination had occurred on the insured's property or on the property of others. In the present case, testimony presented at Phase I and Phase II showed that the soil and groundwater on Sonat's property were contaminated with PCBs. Additionally, testimony from both phases indicated an imminent threat to third parties’ property based on the levels of PCBs found both in Ure suLl aud sediment, Ue movement uf FEDS Lu Ute environment, and the toxic nature of PCBs. Moreover, there was testimony indicating that the PCB contamination at several of the compressor stations had already migrated from Sonat's 50 1110698 and 1110769 property. In conjunction with its argument that the owned-property exclusion did not provide coverage for remediation of Sonat's property, LMI argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, over its objection, as follows: "(W]ith ragard te the awn property qmeation an insured may recover, notwithstanding the own property exclusion, where the remediation was the result of imminent threat of harm to third parties or third party property." In Arthur v. Bolen, 41 So, 3d 745, 749 (Ala. 2010), this Court stated: "A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, provided those inotructions accurately reflect the law and the facts of the case.’ Pressley v. State, 770 So. 2d 115, 139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, ‘generally speaking, the standard of review for jury instructions is abuse of discretion." Pollock v. CCC Invs. I, LLC, 993 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. ‘App. 2006) .” This Court has also stated: "Under Alabama law, '"[a] party is entitled to proper jury instructions regarding the issues pieseuled, aid an incursecl uz misleading charge may be the basis for the granting of a new trial." King v.W.A. Brown & Sons, Inc., 585 So. 2d 10, 12 (Ala. 1981) (citation omitted). When an objection to a jury charge has been prorerly preserved for review on appeal, as this one was, we ‘"look to the entirety of the [jury] charge to see if there was feversible wizur,°" gid seversal 1s wassauted unly 51 1110698 and 1110769 ne error 18 prejudicial. sing, 989 So. Za at George H. Lanier Mem'! Hosp. v. Andrews, a9 Sn. 24 AN, ROK (Ala. 2001). in the present case, tne trial court‘s instruction is a correct statement of the law as stated in Alabama Plating: The owned-property exclusion does not bar coverage for the costs of remediating groundwater contamination. We recognize, as did the Court in Alabama Plating, that a landowner'e interest in the groundwater beneath the landowner's property is a limited right and not one of ownership. Accordingly, on-site soil cleanup is not barred by an owned-property exclusion where there is a threat that the contaminants in the soil on the insured's property will migrate to groundwater or to the property of others. Next, IMI argues that Sonat's costs for ito voluntary remediation of the PCB contamination were not recoverable under the terms o: the policies. Specifically, LMI argues that Sonat's cleanup costs were not "damages" that it was legally obligated to pay because the PCB-remediation project was an internal business decision and not the result of any compulsory process by a court or a state or federal agency. 52 1110698 and 1110769 he applicable policies requirea im to “indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured shall he obligated to pay by reason of the liability (a) imposed upon the Assured by law, (b) assumed under contract or agreement by the Named Assured ... for damages, direct or consequential and expenses ... on account ot ... vroperty damage ... used by or arising out of each occurrence happening anywhere in the world." IMI does not cite a definition of "damages" in its policies; instead, it refers to the definition of damages found in Jenolle Mime March ¢ Charlee W. Camblo, Alabama Law of Damages § 1.1 (5th ed. 2004): "{A] pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss ... through the unlawful act, omission, or negligence of another." We note that if a word or phrase is not defined in an insurance policy, then a court construing the policy should construe the word or phrase according to the meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably give it. Lambert v. Coregis Ins. Co., 950 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. 2006). In Alabama Plating, 690 So. 2d at 336, besides addressing the issue whether an owned-property exclusion barred recovery of the costs to clean up the groundwater, this Court addressed Uke question wuelue: envizonmenLal-semediation costs wese 53 1110698 and 1110769 “gamages” covered by the ULL policies. ne ULL policies provided that they covered all sums the insured was "legally obligated to pay as damages." 690 So. 2d at 333. This Court adopted the majority position that environmental-remediation costs were damages the insured was legally obligated to pay. Th auppart af any halding in Alahama Plating, we cited numerous cases from other jurisdictions, including Bausch § Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993). In Bausch & Lomb, relevant environmental statutes imposed strict liability upon the insureds to clean up their polluted properties. Although the state had not filed an adminictrative proceeding, it had lioted the insured's property on a list of hazardous sites and later conducted an investigation. ‘The insured cleaned up the site before any action was filed. The Maryland Court took the position that “response costs, undertaken in the regulatory context, represented a sum the corporation was legally Ubligated Lo pay" because Une “Lacit Ulmeat of formal state intervention was always present." 330 Md. at 780, 625 A.2d at 1032. We also cited Atlantic Wood Industries, Inc. v. 54 1110698 and 1110769 humpernan‘s underwriting Alliance, 198 Ga. App. 903, 398 $.£.2d 541 (1990), in which the term “damages” in the policy was not being used in its legal and technical sense, and the court held that it was a ter susceptible of more than one definition. Clearly there ia a specific, technical dafinitian for the word ["damages"]: “payments to third person: when those persons have a legal claim for damages. [Cit.] If the insurer intended that "damages" have only this meaning, it should have so indicated in the policy. The incured vould then have undereteed that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to government mandate were not covered, and would have been able to enter into other insuring agreements. Because such a limiting definition was not included in the policy, we must conclude that the parties did not intend “damages” to have a specific technical meaning in tho inowrancs policy. thor, they intended to use its ordinary meaning. 196 Ga. App. at 505, 396 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft, Etc. Co., 326N.C. 133, 151, 368 6.8.24 557, S68 (19901). Although not cited in Alabama Plating, we believe Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Wash. 2d 891, 874 P.2d 142 (1994), conveys the reason remedial cleanup beaun prior to aovernmental action or the actual filina of a lawsuit should be treated the same as cleanup performed as a gesull of yuverimental action vz Judicial dizectiow. Zu 55 1110698 and 1110769 Wevernaeuser, tne policy provicea coverage wnen tne policyholder's legal obligation to pay was “imposed by law. The insured argued that its liability was imposed by law by its liability under pollution statutes and that it did not need to await the overt threat of suit before cleaning up pollntinn damage. The Snprame Conrt af Washington recagni zed that "(i]nsurance coverage in the environmental claims area may be quite different than in other insurance settings. Environmental statutes impose liability, often without fault, on polluters in order to safeguard society in general." 123 Wash. 2d at 909, 874 P.2d at 152. The court stated: "A number of commentators have oxprcoocd the concern that the environment will suffer severe harm if owners have to postpone a cleanup until a clear third party claim prompts a lawsuit. One recent text explains that claims for coverage for environmental cleanup arise in three contexts: the insured may be held liable for the costs of cleanup incurred by a third party (typically the federal government or a state); the insured may incur cleanup costs pursuant to administrative order, judicial injunction, or consent decree directing cleanup; or the insured nay voluntarily undertake Cleauup, possibly in guticipation of iucurriuy une of the forms of liability just described. The author points out that if the three forms of liability were treated differently for insurance coverage purposes, the policyholder would have a strong incentive not to undertake voluntary cleanup which, in turn, would delay cleanup, exacerbate the degree of conlaminallvn ald increase Lie ullimale cost of 56 1110698 and 1110769 cleanup. He also observea tnat it would severely impede the ability of the federal and state governments to accomplish cleanup at the thousands of contaminated sites extant. This anthar notes that most courts (either implicitly or explicitly) have consequently, and he deems correctly, treated all three contexts the sane. 123 Wash. 2d at 910, 874 P.2d at 910 (footnote omitted). The court eanelnded that liahilities impnsed hy Taw can reasonahl y ions taken at hazardous-waste be read to encompass remedial sites before liability to a third party is fixed. Sonat presented testimony in Phase I of the case that the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., required Sonat to report PCB ccntamination to the EPA. Sonat precented tcotimony regarding the goncral way the EPA handled PCB contamination and remediation programs and testimony that Sonat was on a list of companies against which the EPA would pursue enforcement actions. Furthermore, Sonat also presented evidence of a consent order issued in Mississippi in which the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality had required Sunal Ly clea up Une cumpiessu: slaliuis luvaled in Mississippi. Sonat presented evidence indicating that it had a legal obligation to remediate the PCB contamination at its 37 1110698 and 1110769 compressor sites, anda we will not limit 1s aamages to tnose arising out a suit, claim, or action by a third party. Furthermore, in the present case, a third party had required such action. Additionally, in its answer, IMI argued as an affirmative defense that Sonat failed to mitigate, minimize, fpr avaid seme af ar all the damage referancad in the complaint. "(FJorcing a policyholder to both promptly act to mitigate further environmental damage and to await formal threat of legal action creates an unresolvable conflict and results in destroying the contractual right to liability coverage in many cases involving environmental pollution damagco." Hoyorhscuocr, 123 Wooh. 2d at 913, 074 P.2d at 154. In conjunction with its argument that the policies did not provide coverage for damage Sonat was not legally obligated to pay, LMI argues that he trial court in Phase I erred in instructing the jury as follows: "An insured is legally obligated for cleanup if it was required to engage in such cleanup activities by law. TU is nut mecessary Ulal auyuue actually commenced a lawsuit to compel the cleanup. It is sufficient that a statute or regulation imposed responsibility for such a cleanup. As we noted earlier, a trial court has broad discretion Au Cormulaling Jury Lusteuctiuus, provided Ube Lusteuctions 58 1110698 and 1110769 accurately reriect tne law. Adaitionaliy, reversal 1s warranted only if the error in the instructions is prejudicial. Here, the trial court's jury charge regarding damages is in accordance with our holding in Alabama Plating and with the facts of this case as discussed above. Next, TMT argnas that Sonar failed to prasant euherantial evidence that LMI breached its contracts because, it says, LMI simply reserved its rights to challenge its liability. IMI argues that a reservation-of-rights letter does not amount to a breach of contract. IMI is correct that a reservation of rights allows the Anourer to challenge ito Liability on the underlying claim while still fulfilling its obligations under the policy. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 839 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 2002). In the present case, Sonat presented evidence at Phase I and Phase II indicating that LMI initially received notice of Sonat's potential claims in 1991. on Novewber 13, 1995, LMT seseived ils siylils Lo deny coveraye while it decided whether the policies provided coverage. At no time has LMI conducted an investigation into Sonat's claims. In 1996, Sonat notified LMI that it would appear that 59 1110698 and 1110769 uui's policies would not pe impactea py tne rUs-remeaiation project. However, Sonat reserved its rights to seek coverage under the policies. At some point that is unclear in the briefs, the parties began discussing coverage under the policies. In 2001, IMI sued Sonat in Georgia, seeking a Judgment daclaring whether the palieies provided eovarage far Sonat's claims. During Phase I of the case in 2005, a corporate representative for LMI testified that LMI had still not formed an opinion on coverage and was awaiting more information. We note that, in its order denying LMI's postjudgment motion following Phase I, the trial court concluded that the jury!o findings of LMI'o broachco of contract could properly be based on the evidence indicating that LMI had not acted reasonably in its delay after issuing its reservation-of-rights letter. Under the facts of this case, after being notified in 1991 of the PCB contamination, IMI's 10-year delay after issuing its reservation-of-rights letter (1999 Lo 2003) in detenm. Hing whelle: Lv provide coverage under the policies is not reasonable. LMI argues that Sonat failed to present substantial evidence that LMI breached its contracts when Sonat expressly 60 1110698 and 1110769 stated in 1996 that Limi could close its riles on tne claims. In support of this argument LMI cites only one case for the general proposition that a plaintiff is required to prove that performance is due under a ccntract and that the defendant failed to perform. | Authority supporting only general propasitians af law is nat a anffieient argumant for reversal Beachcroft Props. LLP v. City of Alabaster, 901 So. 2d 703 (Ala. 2004). Furthermore, Sonat, in notifying LMI that it could close its files, specifically reserved its right to seek coverage under the policies. Last, LMI argues that three of the policies had not attached beoaucc the remediation costs did not cxcced the limits of Sonat's underlying insurance. Specifically, LMI argues that three of the applicable polices did not reach the attachment points of its umbrella and excess-liability policies because Sonat had not exceeded the limits of the underlying primary policies. LMI argues that the trial court eiaed in submilting Lids issue Lo Ue jury because LL coutenus that policies CU 1887, K 11477, and CU 10353 were unambiguous. IMI cites a schedule of underlying insurance that it says is similar to the schedules in the three policies. LMI then goes a 1110698 and 1110769 on to aiscuss only CU 1887." We will likewise limit our discussion to CU 1887. CU 1887 is an umbrella policy. An umbrella policy is different from an excess-liability policy in that they are meant to fill gaps in coverage both vertically (by providing execs coverage) and horizontally (hy providing primary coverage). Roval Ins. Co. of America v. Thomas, 879 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. 2003). The schedule provides as follows: "Schedule of Underlying Insurance (1) General and Autonobile B.I. [bodily injury] & P.D. (property damage] CSL (including $1,000,000 each occurrence Products and Watercraft) excess of the following: (A) General Liability (including Products and Watercraft) B.I. $50, 000/$100,060/$1, 000, 000 aggregate products PD. $50, 000/$100,060 except opecial B.D. C.C.C. $25,000/$100, 000 (B) Automobile Liability B.I. §100,000/$500, 600 P.D. $50,000" LMI's argument is that its policy was not triggered or SLMI sometimes refers to "CU 1887" as "CV 1887." 62 1110698 and 1110769 aia not attach until tne damage incurrea under tne unaeriying policies exceeded $1,050,000. According to LMI, there are two underlying primary insurance policies: one insurance policy attachment point with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit, and another policy identified in subsection (A) with a $50,000 aeenrrancea limit IMT antenda that the langnage i unambiguous and, therefore, that the trial court erred as a matter of law and should not have submitted the attachment- point issue to the jury. We disagree. First, IMI cites only cases concerning general propositions of law regarding ambiguities. | "Authority oupporting only 'goncral propooitions of law! doce not constitute a sufficient argument for reversal." Beachcroft Brops., 901 So. 2d at 708 (quoting Geisenhoff v. Geisenhoff, 693 So. 2d 489, 491 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)). LMI does not discuss the nature of umbrella policies or whether CU 1887 was, the main or controlling umbrella policy for the period it was An effecl. LMT dues HuL discuss “cSb," which is in section (1) of the schedule and stands for "combined single limit." IMI does not discuss “drop-down coverage" in the umbrella policy. LMI does not discuss "split" limits of liability, 63 1110698 and 1110769 wnicn are rererrea to in tne scneaule witn property aamage limited to a certain amount and bodily injury limited to a certain amount. It is not the function of this Court to create arguments for an appellant. McLemore v. Fleming, 604 So. 2d 353 (Ala. 1985). In order to secure a reversal, the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing arrar upon the record. Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. 1983). Second, in section (1), the schedule references “underlying insurance." No underlying primary insurer or insurers is referred to by name. Cf. American Res. Ins. Co Y.-H & H Stephens Constr. Inc., 939 So. 2d 868 (Ala. 2006) (diccuscing coverage under an umbrella policy and the schedule of underlying insurance policies where those policies referred to the underlying primary-insurance carriers by name). The failure to name the primary insurer alone would not create an ambiguity because CU 1887 requires Sonat to maintain insurance, but the schedule does not appear to refer Lu Uwe primary Lusurers as LM argues. Section (1) referenves: combined single limit of coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The schedule then refers to general liability in subsection (A) and automobile liability in subsection (B). Under 64 1110698 and 1110769 subsection (a), the scheaule rerers to split limits petween bodily injury and property damage involving general liability. Subsection (A) refers to property damage "C.C.C." which stands for property in Sonat's care, custody, or control but not owned by Sonat and is not applicable here. Subsection (A) refers te property damage af $80,000 far each arenrrance and $100,000 where applicable and also is not involved in the present case. The schedule could be interpreted as being triggered by $50,000 in property damage where section (1) refers to a combined single linit of $1,000,000 split between bodily injury and property damage. Tellingly, section (1) has 2 oubocction (1) (A) and (1) (B), and it refero to a combined single limit. CU 1887 was in force from 1962 to 1965, and the underlying insurance referred to in the schedule could be read to refer to a single $1,000,000 that sits over two underlying limits, one of which is the $50,000 in property damage that triggered LMI's liability. Accordingly, we cannot say, based uu Ube arguments before us, Wat Ue Urlal court ened in concluding that CU 1887 was ambiguous. Sonat's Cross-Appeal (No. 1110769: Sonat argues that the trial court erred in granting LMI's 65 1110698 and 1110769 partial-summary-Juagment motion. This Court's review of a summary judgment is de nove. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Ruka, Ins. Ca., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima racie snowing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule Be(o), Ala R Civ. Pos Bine Croce g Bina Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1996), Once tho movant makee a prima facio showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce "substantial evidence’ as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 24 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. '[elubotantial evidence ie ovidence Sf ouch weight, and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. cf Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 co. 24 1025, 1020-29 (Ala. 2004). During Phase III of the trial, the trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude any reference to mercury sites that had not been disclosed or documents that had not been produced. The trial court also concluded that Sonat should MUL be allowed Lu presen ayyzeyale costs of Is mezcury 66 1110698 and 1110769 remediation. A trial court nas broad aiscretion in determining whether to grant a motion in limine. Jefferson Cnty. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 621 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1993). Sonat argues that the trial court's requirement that damages far the marenry ramadiatinn he proven an a aiteshy- site basis would likely mislead the jury because such an approach contradicts Sonat's single-occurrence theory. As discussed earlier regarding tne damage arising out the PCB contamination, Sonat presented evidence of its single- occurrence theory where damages at the compressor stations wore diccusced on a oite-by-oite baoic, Thio ic concietent, with our caselaw that damage from a single occurrence may have multiple and disparate impact on individuals and property and that injuries may extend over time. Assuming that the leaking of the mercury meters was a single occurrence, we cannot say that the damage was the same at each site simply because Sonat Wid Wel ULLcerenLiale Lie CusLs assuciated WLU Lie Cleanup of each site. Sonat argues that because the mercury remediation was conducted in a uniform manner to address damage caused by the 7 1110698 and 1110769 systematic use or mercury at nunareas or tne metering stations, it makes sense that contractors would account for its activities by region rather than send several hundred smaller invoices, Sonat cites the transcript from Phase I of the trial for the proposition that it remains prepared to prove cnats on a ragian-hy-reginn hasia for the mercury remediation. This testimony regarded Sonat's ability to look at accounting summaries and determine the specific costs for specific compressor stations regarding the PCB remediation. We cannot say that Sonat should get a second bite at the apple to do the same now. Sonat citce E.t. Du Pont De Nemours ¢ Co. vs Allotate Insurance Co., (Ms. C.A. No. 99C-12-253 JTV, July 31, 2006) (Del. Super. Ct. 2006)(not reported in A.2d), for the proposition that overall costs from an occurrence need not be divided or spread when costs were not originally accounted for on that basis. Du Pont is distinguishable; it involved excess policies Liat Covered Liligaliun expenses azisiny oul uf mass tort claims and two of the insurers attempted to allocate specific litigation expenses across multiple policy years when all the insurers were jointly and severally liable and each 68 1110698 and 1110769 policy coverea tne ruil amount of tne expenaitures. sonar also cites Newmont Mines, Ltd. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1986), for the proposition that a jury should be allowed to decide damage on proof of a unitary damage number as between two occurrences. In Newmont, the Inanred annght enverage far damage te a hit lding canaed hy tun separate roof collapses. The insurers argued that the insured failed to prove the amount of damage that should be allocated to each occurrence. The court disagreed, stating: Because the two collapses were discovered only three days apart, they were repaired simultaneously and no effort was made at that time to allocate repair costs between the two collapses. The parties otipulated that the aggregate coot of repairing the building was $6,600,000 (Canadian). In addition, Newmont introduced the estimate of its engineering expert, Calder, that the cost of repairing the hole in the lower portion of the roof was $1,936,606; the balance of the aggregate $6,600,000 (Canadian) cost of repair, it followed, could be attributed to the eccond collapse. Hence, the jury's finding of damages in the amount of $4,663,394 (Canadian) for the second collapse was arrived at not by speculation, as Hanover and Utica contend, but by simple subtraction ($6,600,000 - $1,936,606). The Jury plaluly was eutitied Lo base its Couclusious on Calder's estimate, see W.L. Hailey & Co. v. County of Niagara, 388 F.2d 746, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), and we find that the subtraction method described above provided a rational basis for computing damages attributable to the second occurrence with an acceptable degree of certainty, see Lexington Feuuucts, Lid. v. B.D. communications, iuc., 677 69 1110698 and 1110769 Fiza 251, 293 (2a Lar. 1962). 784 F.2d at 137-38. Newmont indicates that the damages were not speculative when there was an estimate upon which the jury could base its damages. Conclusion Rased nn the faregaing, the duegmant af the trial ennrt made the subject of LMI's appeal and of Sonat's cross-appeal is due to be affirmed. 1110698--AFFIRMED. Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Murdock, J.) diocento. 1110769--AFFIRMED. Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 70 1110698 and 1110769 MUMUULR, Justice (aissenting in appeal no. 1110698). I respectfully dissent as to this Court's affirmance of the trial court's judgment in case no, 1110698. I question the rejection by this Court of more than one of the arguments made by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and Certain London Marketing Insurance Conpanies (hereinafter "IMI") in their appeal of this judgment. among other things, I disagree with the main opinion's understanding and application of the term "occurrence" in the IMI policies at issue. The release of PCBs occurred at separate geographical locations at separate times, resulting in separate "occurrences." Each ocenrrance resnited from some practice in which the insured engaged at each of the contaminated locations that was specific to that location (notwitnstanaing tne ract tnat some of these practices were repeated from one location to another) . I also question the application by the trial court and by this Compt nf the Mowned-property" evelusian in the mut policy, including this Court's approval of the trial court's anstruction to the jury that an imminent threat ot narm to a third party or to the property of a third party was sufficient to avoid the application of this exclusion. I am concerned n 1110698 and 1110769 that tnis application or tne “ownea-property” exclusion 1s inconsistent with the language of the insurance policy voluntarily agreed to by the insurer and the insured. 72 

504cc020be43ba33e6b4b9adca2068e1b6b533928a8e5735a44764b95fd60730

2013-06-28T00:00:00Z

783ca9cc-ce7e-424b-9f59-fb561f8885d3

In re First Judicial Cir. (Unknown)

15-371

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. 15-371 ‘Order Detnered November 19, 2015 IN RE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, CROSS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT ORDER Pursuant to amendment 66 of the Arkansas Constitution, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commision filed on November 17, 2015, formal charges against Cross County District Judge Joseph Boeckman. The Commission alleges, inter alia, that Judge ‘Boeckman has exhibited gender bias in sentencing, has used his judicial status to form personal and sexual relationships with certain litigants, and has solicited sexual relations from certain litigants in exchange for reductions or dismissals of court fines and costs. Alljudges are afforded the rights provided in amendment 66, and this order should not be deemed as a Judgment about, or determination of, any charges pending before the Arkansis Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission ‘Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provides thatthe supreme cour, through the Chief Justice, shall exercise general superintending control over district courts, which includes the power to temporarily appoint special judges. See Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 4. If the Chief Justice determines that “there is... [a] ned fora Special Judge to be temporarily to serve during the period appointed, a Special Judge may be assigned by the Chief Justice . of... need,” Ark. Const amend. 80, § 13(C), To prosectthe integrity ofthe judicial system and to maintain public confidence in the ‘administration of justice, I find it necessary to appoint by separate order, a special judge, or judges, tothe Cross County District Court, Wynne, Cherry Valley, and Parkin Departments, to hear all pending cases and any cates led while this order iin effect. The special judge, o judges, shall have exclusive authority over the Cross County District Court docket from the ate of this order until further notification. Hesmd We Brash Chief justice 

67328bf1f020722e6c6e6dc17a1a8c8b8e02b4e08bc6bf5e8df3b6ab55a4e75a

2015-11-19T00:00:00Z

f0d30bf6-1007-45aa-9962-6ff38eb56a5a

William Dale Morrison v. State of Arkansas

CR08-572

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No, CROB-572 WILLIAM DALE MORRISON, Opinion Delivered 6-508 APPELLANT, | MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK vs. STATE OF ARKANSAS, MOTION GRANTED. APPELLE! PER CURIAM Appellant, William Dale Morrison, by and through his attomey, Thurman Ragar, Je, has filed a motion for rule on clerk. The clerk of the supreme court and court of appeals refused to docket this appeal or accept the record due to a failure to comply with Arkansas Rll of Appellate Procedure ~ Civil 5(6)(1)(). In McDonald v, State, 356 Ark, 106, 146 S.W.34 883 (2004), this court clarified our treatment of motions for belated appeals and motions for rule on clerk. We explained: Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attomey filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was not timely perfected. ‘The party or attorney filing the appeal is therefore faced with two ‘options. First, where the party or attorney filing the appeal is at ful, faule should be admitted by affidavit filed with the motion or in the motion itself There is no advantage in declining to admit frult where fault exists. Second, where the party or attorney believes there is good reason the appeal was not perfected, then the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and this court will decide if good reason is present. an affidavit Id, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (Ootnote omitted). While this court no longer req admitting faule before we will consider the motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault ‘where he has erred and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id In accordance with McDonald v. Site, supra, Mr. Ragar has candidly admitted that it ‘was his responsbility to assure compliance with Rule 5(b)(1)(C) and that this was not done. ‘The motion is, therefore, granted. A copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. Motion granted. ‘CRO8-S72 

c1cf13476d026dd3ed4c5ac21ea1837def13f279bb60ffa8047ecde054eb3c73

2008-06-05T00:00:00Z

851eacf0-aa8c-4d0e-a2fd-9d8fed085883

Mark Brown v. Laura Brown

07-994

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS Ne. 07-994 MARK BROWN, Opinion Detivered May 1, 2008 APPELLANT, APPEAL FROM THE UNION vs. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. DR-05-766-6, LAURA BROWN, HON, DAVID FREDERIC GUTHRIE, JUDGE, AEEIRMED. ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Associate Justice Appellant Mark Brown appeals from an order of the Union County Circuit Court, which divided marital property and set child support. He cites the following four points where the circuit court erred: 1) in determining the amount of child support when it considered the income attributable to Mark ina limited partnership; 2) in considering Mark's interest in the limited partnership to justify an unequal division of marital property; 3) in finding that the increase in value of the limited partnership's stock brokerage accounts was marital property; and 4) in finding that two residences were marital property, Because this appeal presents issues of first impression and of significant publi terest, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(6)(1) & (4) (2007). We find no error and affirm, ‘Mark and Laura Brown were married in September of 1986 and separated in July of 2005. Laura sought a divorce from Mark on the grounds that they had been living separate and apart for eighteen continuous months. Following 2 tral, the circuit court entered a decree of divorce, granting temporary custody of the two minor children to Laura, setting temporary child support at $250 per week, and taking all issues of property division under advisement until such time as postrial brief were submitted. A letter opinion confirmed by final decree granted custody ofthe children to Laura and ordered Mark to pay child support in the amount of $384 per week, based on his two-year average income. ‘The circuit court determined that the increase in value of Mark's inheritance from his father, which was ‘maintained ina limited partnership with Mark's mother, was marital property. The court also found thatthe marital residence and another piece of real estate, both of whiek his mother had helped to purchase with funds from the limited partnership, were marital property. Because ‘Mark’sonmartal estate was valued at $3,032,703, while Lauras was valued at only $306,780, the court found an unequal division ofthe marital property to be appropriate. Mark filed a timely notice of appeal! ‘The limited partnership at ise in this appeal was formed in 1995 under the laws of the State of Louisiana. Mark's father, George A. Brown, had eamed considerable income as the owner of cocktail lounges, liquor store, and commercial real estate. He died in 1990 and had bequeathed to Mark, his only child, all property owned at his death, with the exception of the marital home and certain furnishings within it and his wife's one-half share of their community property estate. George A. Brown's will noted that Mark's inheritance was “subject to the usuffuct heretofore granted to my wife, Billie Jean Brown[,]” Mark and his "Laura filed a notice of cross-appeal but has since abandoned her argument. ‘mother, Billie Brown, created the G.A. Brown Properties Limited Partnership after George ‘A. Brown's death, for the purpose of managing the estate Billie Brown was the sole general partner and was also a Class A limited partner; Mark ‘was a Class B limited partner. Each owned 2 fifty percent partnership interest. Mark contributed tothe partnership the property he had inherited from his father, and Billie Brown contributed her one-half share of the community property estate. The partnership agreement contained the following provision: Mark S. Brown specifically acknowledges that pursuant to the Judgment of Possession rendered by the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, Louisiana in the Succession of George A. Brown on August 25, 1993, as amended by said Court on November 12, 1993, the property which’ he contributes to this Partnership is subject to 2 usuffuct in favor of his mother Billie J, Brown and that such usufruct attaches to and continues over the Class B Limited Partnership interest which he receives in exchange for such property ‘on the same terms and conditions as the usuffuct over the contributed property itself] According to the agreement, the partnership's profits and losses were to be allocated ified proportionately between the partners, according to their partnership interests. Mark: that his mother had discretion as to whether to share the partnership's income with him. He stated that his mother had gifted certain amounts of money to him from the partnership's assets, but that he had not received income from the partnership. An accountant testified, however, that Mark's mother had the option to “yield” the usuffuct with respect to properties in the partnership that had been changed fom their original form. Ifthe property was no longer part of the original corpus, Billie Brown could allocate a portion of its income to her son, provided that he was willing to accept the income and to pay taxes on it. According to the accountants testimony, Billie Brown had in the past chosen to allocate certain income to ‘Mark, and he had accepted the income. ‘The marital residence was purchased with funds provided by Mark’s mother from the G.A. Brown Properties Limited Partnership. Testimony by the parties and by Mark's mother indicated that the home was intended to be a gift. Mark and Laura later acquired a mortgage ‘on the house to pay for an addition. Payments on the note were made by Mark and Laura. The other property at issue, known as the West Oak Street property, was purchased ‘asa home for Mark's mother, who at one point intended to relocate to El Dorado from her former home in Shreveport, Louisiana. The funds for the down payment on the property and forsome, ifnot al, of the mortgage payments came from the G.A. Brown Properties Limited Partnership. For estate-tax purposes, however, the property was titled jointly in the names ‘of Mark and Laura, At the time of tril, Mark’s mother had not yet moved into the home, and Mark was residing there. While Laura agreed thatthe purpose of purchasing the property ‘was to provide a home for Mark's mother, she contended that she had an interest in the property, as it was titled in her name along with Mark's, 1. Child Support For his first point on appeal, Mark argues that it was error for the circuit court to consider his income from the limited partnership in determining the appropriate amount of child support, because that income was not available for his use. He contends that the usuffuct in fivor of his mother prevented him from realizing any income from the partnership and that the only distribusions made to him were provided so that he could pay taxes on the income attributed to him, (Our standard of review for an appeal from a child-support order is denove, and we will not reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. Hardy . Wilboune, 370 Ark. 359, __S.W.3d__ (2007). In reviewing a circuit cour’s findings, we give due deference to that cour’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Id However, a circuit court's conclusion of law is given no deference on appeal. Id In determining an appropriate amount of child support, courts are to referto the family support chart contained in our Administrative Order Number 10. See Ark. Code Ann, § 9- 12-312(a)(2) (Repl. 2008). ‘The family support chart provides a means of calculating child support based on the payor’s net income. Administrative Order Number 10 defines income as “any form of payment, periodic or otherwise, due to an individual, regardless of source, including wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, workers’ compensation, disability, payiments pursuant to a pension or retirement program, and interest less proper deductions" Administrative Order No. 10, section II. It is well established that this definition of income is broadly construed, intended to encompass the widest range of potential income sources. Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 341 Ark. 349, 20 S.W.3d 273 (2000); White v White, 95 Ark, App. 274, 236 S.W.3d 540 (2006). The administrative order also states that for self-employed payors, support isto be calculated based on the last two years’ federal and state income tax returns and the quarterly estimates for the current year.’ Administrative Order No. 10, section III(c) ‘The circuit court in the instant case calculated Mark's child-support obligation based ‘upon the income reported on his 2004 and 2005 tax returns. Thus, pursuant to the administrative order and its broad definition of income, the calculation was correct. We ate ‘unconvinced by Mark's argument that his income from the partnership should not have been considered because it wasnot realized. The administrative order does not distinguish between realized and recognized income, While our court of appeals has cautioned that income for child-support purposes may differ from income for tax purposes, the cases articulating a difference have done so only when the circuit court disallowed depreciation deductions or recognized gain as income upon the sale or disposition of property. See White v. White, supra; Brown v. Brown, 76 Ark. App. 494, 68 S.W.3d 316 (2002); Stepp v. Gray, 58 Ark. App. 229, ‘947 S.W.24 798 (1997), Moreover, the administrative order instructs that the court should also consider “the amount the payor is capable of earning or a net worth approach based on property, life-style, etc.” Administrative Order No, 10, section III(e). We affirmed the use of the net-worth approach for child-suppost determinations in Tucker. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 368 Ark, 481, __S.W.3d __(2007)._ It is clear chat Mark’s ownership interest in the G.A. The panies do not dispute the contention that Matk a elemployed payor. He was, employed athe time of trial aan analyst with El Dorado Chemis, where he eared spproximately $40,000 per year. However, the occupation fed on his 2004 and 2005 eax eturns wat “managerinvetment.”” His tetimony eal confined that he considered hinsel co bbe a manager-investor, with that being his primary occupation throughout the mariage 6 Brown Properties Limited Partnership is a significant portion of his net worth; thus, that ownership interest would be 2 proper consideration. In the instant case, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that Matk’s income for child-support purposes was that reflected on his tax returns, HL, Unequal Division of Marital Property For his second point on appeal, Mark contends that it was error for the circuit court ‘to consider his interest inthe limited partnership in determining that an unequal division of the marital property was appropriate. He argues that, due to the usufruct in favor of his ‘mother, the property in the partnership has no present value, and perhaps even no future value, to him. ‘With respect to the division of property in a divorce case, we review the chancellor's findings of fict and affirm them unless they are clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence. Conlee v. Conlee, 370 Ark, 89, S:W.34 __ (2007). The division of property itself is also reviewed, and the same standard applies. Id, A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is eft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. In order to demonstrate that the ‘chancellor's ruling was erroncous, an appellant must show that the tral court abused its ‘discretion by making a decision that was arbitrary or groundless, Id, We give due deference to the chancellor's superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id A circuit court has discretion to consider the partes’ potential opportunities for further acquisition of property when determining the appropriate division of marital asets. At the time a divorce decree is entered, all marital property is to be distributed one-half to each party, unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable, Ark. Code Ann, § 9-12- 315(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2008). In that event, the court is to make some other division that the court deems equitable, taking into consideration several factors: the length of the marriage; age, health, and station in life of the partes; occupation of the parties; amount and sources of income; vocational skill; employability; estate, lubilities, and needs of each party and ‘opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income; contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital property, including services as a homemaker; and the federal income tax consequences of the cour’s division of property. Id. Clearly, in reaching a determination as to the equitable division of marital property under this statute, the circuit court was free to consider Mark’s interest in the G.A. Brown Properties Limited Partnership, and his opportunity to double the size of his estate upon the death of his ‘mother. The limitation on Mark's interest in the partnership, in the form of the usufruct, is ‘of no relevance, as the opportunity to add to his estate is a proper consideration. In addition, Mark has received some present value from the partnership. He testified to routine distributions from the partnership since its inception, noting specifically two pieces of ral estate; a boat, motor, and trailer; vacations; gas for his vehicle; and cellular telephone service. Therefore, his contention that his interest in the partnership should have been ignored by the court because it had no present value to him is unavailing. Likewise, his claim thatthe partnership may have no fature value to him is without ‘merit. Under Louisiana law, Mark will receive the value of his contribution to the partnership at the termination of the usuffuct, which will occur at the time of his mother’s remarriage or death. The Louisiana Civil Code defines consumable things as things “that ‘cannot be used without being expended or consumed, or without their substance being ‘changed, such 2s money, harvested agricultural products, stocks of merchandise, foodstulls, and beverages.” La. Civ. Code Art. 536. With respect to consumables subject to a usuftuct, the usufuctuary becomes the owner ofthem. La. Civ. Code Art. 538. Thus, Mark's mother “may consume, alienate, or encumber them as [s}he sees fit.” Id. However, at the termination of the usufiuct, she is “bound to pay to the naked owner either the valte thatthe things had at the commencement ofthe usufruct or deliver to him things ofthe same quantity and quality.” Id. Conversely, nonconsumable things are defined as things “that may be enjoyed without akeration of their substance, although their substance may be diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by the use to which they are applied, such as lands, houses, shares of stock, animals, furniture, and vehicles." La. Civ, Code Art. 537. With respect to nonconsumable things subject to a usufruct, “the usufructuary has the right to possess them and to derive the utility, profits, and advantages that they may produce, under the obligation Of preserving their substance.” La, Civ. Code Art. 539, However, as the usufructuary, ‘Mark's mother is “bound to use them as a prudent administrator and to deliver them to the raked owner at the termination of the usuffuct.”. Id ‘Mark will receive value from his interest in the limited partnership at the time of his, ‘mother’s remarriage or death. He has already been the recipient of distributions from the partnership. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in considering his partnership determining that an unequal division of the marital property was appropriate. IL Irease im Velue of Partnership Interest For his third point on appeal, Mark contends thatthe increase in value of the limited partnerships stock brokerage accounts is hs separate property. Hie also argues thatthe circuit court erred in failing to set forth its reasons for awarding the increase in value of those accounts to him in the division ofthe marital assets ‘The definition of marital property excludes property “acquired prior to marriage orby ‘ft orby reason of the death of another, including, but not limited to, life insurance proceeds, payments made under a deferred compensation plan, or an individual retirement account, and property acquited by right of survivorship, by a tust distribution, by bequest or inheritance, oor by a payable on death or a transfer on death arrangement{]” Atk. Code Ann, § 9-12- 315(b)(1). Under this exclusion, Matk’s interest in the G.A. Brown Properties Limited Partnership, which he received by inheritance, was properly deemed nonmarital property, ‘The definition of marital property also excludes the “increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage orby gift or by reason of the death of another” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12- 31505). (Our case law has articulated an exception to this rule for the active appreciation of nonmarital assets. In Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 543, 731 S.W.24 771, 774 (1987), we held that “when one spouse makes significant contributions of time, effort and skill which are 10. directly atributable to the increase in value of nonmarital property the presumption arises that such increase belongs to the marital estate.” We affirmed this rule under the current version of the statute in Farell v. Farell, 365 Ark, 465, 476, 231 S.W.3d 619, 627 (2006), ‘wherein we stated that “we follow an ‘active appreciation’ analysis in determining if one spouse's efforts significantly contributed to the increase in value of nonmatital assets[” In accordance with these decisions, the circuit court in the instant case did not err in determining that the increase in value of the nonmarital accounts was marital property. By Mark’s own admission, he expended considerable time and effort during the marriage managing and investing the assets of the partnership. Mark nonetheless contends that the Fanell decision is inapplicable here because the Farell court did not decide whether the increase in value of the stocks at isue was marital or nonmarital property. We disagree. This court, in addressing the issues on cross-appeal, held that the trial court “correctly concluded thatthe increase in value of the nonmarital stock was due in large part to Ms, Farrell's efforts. As we follow an ‘active appreciation’ analysis... we cannot say thatthe trial court erred in finding that the increase in value was a marital asset.” 1d, at 476, 231 S.W.3d at 627. In short, the Farell decision supports the circuit court's conclusion in the instant cae that Mark's efforts, which resulted in the increase in value of the accounts, caused the inerease to be classified as marital property We also fail to see any merit in Mark's argument that the circuit court filed to set forth its reasons for awarding him the increase in value of the accounts, It is true chat the circuit court is required to state its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally between the partes, and that the basis and reasons should be recited in the order. Ark, Code Ann. § 9-12-315(2)1)(B). The circuit court isnot required to lst each factor in the order or to weigh al fctors equally. Hemandez v. Hemandex, 371 Ark. 323, _S.W.34d__ (2007). Furthermore, the specific enumeration of the factors within the statute does not preclude a circuit court from considering other relevant factors, where exclusion of other factors would lead to absurd results or deny the intent of the legislature to allow for the equitable division of property. Id ‘The statute does not require thatthe circuit court ls its basis and reasons regarding cach individual piece of marital property. Instead, it “must state its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally between the parties[” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12- 315(@)(1)(B). We have never required the circuit court to state individual reasons for each piece of property. Moreover, the circuit court in the instant case sufficiently set forth its reasons for determining that an equal division of the marital property was inappropriate: ACA. §9-12-315 sets forth the factors to consider in an unequal division of property. In this case the parties have been married 20 years, are in the 40s (Plaintiff, 43; Defendant, 45); in good health and have an affluent lifestyle PhincitVs the corporate credit manager for Murphy Oil Corporation with a salary and bonuses of approximately $90,000. Defendant is lab analyst for El Dorado Chemical Company with asilary of $41,598. In addition, Defendant ‘manages his investments which produced $70,322 in earings and capital gains for 2005. Each party has above average vocational skills as a resule of their ‘education and work experience and should maintain stable employment at the present or ahigherlevel. The factor which weighs most heavily inthe decision for an unequal division of the marital property isthe size ofthe estate and the ‘opportunity of each party to increase their estate, The value of Plant's nonmarital estate is $306,780 while Defendant's is $3,032,703. Defendant's ‘tate could double in value with an inheritance from his mother. ‘There was no evidence of any possibilty of a similar inheritance by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's retiement plans will have to arise from her continued employment. “n- Defendant’ retirement plans can be satisfied from his present estate. From the consideration of the statutory factors, I find that an unequal division of marital Property is appropriate. IV, Real Estate For his final point on appeal, Mark argues that the circuit court erred in its disposition ‘ofboth the marital residence and the West Oak Street property. With respect to the marital residence, he contends thatthe circuit court should have either divided it equally or set forth its reasons for refusing to do so. With respect to the West Oak Street property, he argues that a purchase-money resulting trust was established in favor of Billie Brown and that the property therefore should not have been considered in the division of marital property. 1. Marital Residence Mark relies on Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317 (Repl. 2008) for the proposition that “entirety property” is not marital property and that it isto be divided equally between the parties unless the court finds that an equal division would be inequitable, in which case the ‘court must use the criteria set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315 to distribute the property. [He contends that the marital residence was entirety property that should have been divided equally, rather than granted to his wife in the court's unequal division of the marital assets. However, section 9-12-317 actually says that estates by the entirety or by survivorship held by parties to a divorce are automatically dissolved upon divorce, unless a court order specifically provides otherwise. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317(2). The patties are to be treated thereafier as tenants in common. Id, The statute also provides that when a court “dissolves estates by the entirety or survivorship in real or personal property under this section, the court Ee ay distribute the property 2s provided in § 9-12-315. ‘The court shall et forth its reasons in writing in the decree for making an other than equal distribution to each party, when all the property is considered together, taking into account the fictors enumerated in § 9-12- 315(@)(1).” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317(0) ‘The marital residence was owned by Mark and Laura as tenants by the entirety. ‘Thus, the circuit court had the option of disposing of the property in the manner required for the distribution of marital property, that is, one-half to each party unless such a division would be inequitable, The circuit court adequately set forth its reasons for the unequal division of the property, as outlined earlier in this opinion. The court was not required to provide reasons specific to the marital residence, but rather to provide reasons for the unequal division “when all the property is considered together[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317(¢). Thus, the court fulfilled its obligation to supply its reasoning. 2. West Oak Steet Property Matk r ls on this court's opinion in Eduurds v. Eiluands, 311 Ark. 339, 843 S.W.2d £846 (1992), in support of his argument that Billie Brown owned a purchase-money resulting trust in the West Oak Street property. As we stated in Edwards, a resulting trust arises where ‘one disposes of property under circumstances that raise an inference that he or she docs not intend that the putative grantee should have the beneficial interest in the property. Id Instead, the inference is that the transferor intends to transfer only bate legal title. HM. A resulting trust arises in favor of the person who transfers the property or causes it to be transferred. Id. More specifically, a purchase-money resulting trust “arises where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his/her direction the vendor converts the property to another person.” Id. at 343, 843 $.W.2d at 849. ‘We stated in Edwards that when a grantor directs that the property be conveyed to a third party who is a stranger, there is presumption that there has been no gift to the third party but a conveyance of the property to be held in trust for the grantor. Id. “If, however, the third party stands in such relationship to the party furnishing the purchase money as to be the natural object of his/her bounty, things get more complicated, as 2 gift may have been intended.” Id. at 344, 843 S.W.2d at 849 (citing G.G, Bogert and G.T. Bogert, The Law of ‘Trusts and Trustees § 459 (2d ed, 1991)). Generally, a resulting trust must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. In situations involving third partes who are the natural objects ‘of the grantor’s bounty, the presumption of a gift must be overcome by clear and convincing proof that no such gift was intended. Id, We stated the following in Edwards: Where a motheris the payor and a child is made the grantee, with the mother’s consent, the courts have not been entirely unanimous in their application of presumption. Most decisions, however, treat the ease inthe same way as where the father pays the price, and presume a gif, whether the child be an adult oF an infant... . Gifs from her to her children, out of mere generosity or for the purpose of distributing her estate at the end of her life, are quite natural and 1M, at 345, 843 S.W.2d at 849 (quoting Bogert, supra, § 460, at 360-365) (emphasis in original. In the instant case, the testimony indicated that the West Oak Street property was tiled in Mark’s and Laura's names in order to avoid estate taxes. As contemplated in the Bogert treatise, Mark's mother made a gift to her child “for the purpose of distributing her “1s. ‘state at the end of her life” 1d. Moreover, Mark testified thatthe property was placed in his and his wife's names “justso it wouldn't be an esate. Ifmother pases away, we wouldn't hhave that 28 a tax consequence. It woul already be ours.” This testimony suggests that Billie Brown intended for her son and his wife to have a beneficial interest in the property, subject only to her use of it during her lifetime, In addition, Mark was residing in the West Oak Street house at the time of trial, and his mother was not, indicating a beneficial interest in Mark’ favor. Finally, Billie Brown testified as follows, when asked about her intentions with respect to the West Oak Street property: “[I]nstead of paying cash frit like T usually do everything else I decided I was going to get some interest, you know, and I thought it might as well go to him so I went ahead and just put it in his name, but I'm paying fori.” Again, the evidence suggests an intention on the part of Billie Brown to grant her son a beneficial interest in the property. Thus, the presumption of gift has not been overcome by clear and convincing proof, and no purchase-money resulting trust arose. The property was correctly deemed marital property. Affirmed. 16 

116000406682271fc79f4fcb03b3bc221e2a90560ea84065291f5d34cbd7c9c5

2008-05-01T00:00:00Z

99f059ae-c716-4daa-88d0-6627729b04ca

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, Sheffield Nelson, Sanford SSonnyVarnell, Freddie Black, Brent Morgan, John Benjamin, George Dunklin, Jr., Ronald Pierce, Kimberly G. Smith, and Scott Henderson, Director of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, in their official capacities v. Bill Mills, White County Circuit Court Judge, on Petition for Writ of Prohibition

07-227

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. 07-227 ARKANSAS GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, SHEFFIELD NELSON, SANFORD “SONNY” VARNELL, FREDDIE BLACK, BRENT MORGAN, JOHNBENJAMIN, GEORGE DUNKLIN, JR. RONALD PIERCE, AND KIMBERLY G, SMITH, AND SCOTT HENDERSON, DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES PETITIONERS, vs, BILL MILLS, WHITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE RESPONDENT, Opinion Datvere Ocaber 28,2007 PETITION FOR WRIT PROHIBITION. WRITDENIED, or TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice ‘On August 16, 2006, Respondents John Tarlton Morrison and Cynthia Mortison, husband and wife, William Price Morrison, Jr, and Gray J. Morrison, husband and wife, Joseph ‘McCaughan Morrison and Brandon G. Morrison, husband and wife, Carl Eugene Morrison, IM, and Nancy Morsisor husband and wife, William Todd Carlisle and Carolyn Morrison (Carlisle, husband and wife, Westley Cooper Morrison and Grace Ann F. Morrison, husband and wife, (herein after the "Morrison Family”), filed a lawsuit in White County Circuit Court against the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, Sheffield Nelson, Sanford “Sonny” Carnell, Freddie Black, Brent Morgan, John Benjamin, George Dunkin, Jr, Ronald Pierce, and 7-207 Kimberly G. Smith, and Scott Henderson, Director of the Arkansas Game and Fish ‘Commission, in their representative capacities, (hereinafter “AGFC”), seeking an injunction enjoining the AGFC from leasing, conveying, encumbering or otherwise transferring the ‘mineral rights to land located in White and Prairie Counties. The complaint requested that the ‘circuit court reform four (4) warranty deeds so that the Morrison Family could maintain the ‘mineral interestin the land. AGFC filed a motion to dismiss, contending Ark. Code Ann. § 16- {60-103 & Ark, Code Ann, § 16-160-101(d) mandated that the actions against the AGFC and its commissioners be filed only in Pulaski County. Moreover, contending that there was five- ‘year statute of limitations pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-111(a), AGEC argued that the Morrison Family no longer had a eause of action asthe complaint was filed six years afer the contract at issue had been executed. ‘The circuit court entered an order finding that, because this was a dispute over a contract, 2 deed, and realestate in White and Praitie Counties, this action could be properly filed in White County Circuit Court. Additionally, the circuit court ‘concluded that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the issue of mutual mistake “until the mistake was discovered or until the facts proved laches. ‘Therefore, the circuit court held that the Morrison Family's cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations Now, AGFC bring this petition for writ of prohibition in this court, contending that the White County Circuit Court was entiely without authority or jurisdiction to make this decision. We deny the petition for writ of prohibition. [A writ of prohibition isissued to prevent or prohibit the lower court from acting wholly ‘without jurisdiction, Hatfield». Thomas, 351 Ark, 377, 379, 93 S.W.3d 671, 672 (2002). The purpose ofthe wit of prohibition isto prevent a court from exercising a power not authorized oo 07-227 by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, ld, Thus, a wit of prohibition lies only where itis apparent on the fice of the record that (1) the citeuit court is ‘wholly without jurisdiction and (2) there is no other adequate remedy. 1d. ‘Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow inseope and operation, and they are to be used with great caution and forbearance. Id. Prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Id, A characteristic of prohibition is that it docs not lie as a matter ‘of right but asa matter of sound judicial discretion. 1d. When considering a petition for writ of prohibition, jurisdiction is tested on the pleadings, not the proof. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co. . (Gree Cour forthe Osceola Disc of Missippi County, 317 Ark. 493, 878 S.W.2d 745 (1994) ‘Again, a wit of probibition is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. Pike v. Benton Circuit Court, 340 Ark. 311, 10 S.W.3d 447 (2000). A review of the pleadings reveals thatthe writ of prohibition is not warranted. First, the <icuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. Arkansas ‘Code Annotated Section 16-60-101 (Repl. 2008) provides: Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county in which the subject ofthe action, or some part thereof, is situated, except as provided in § 16- 60-1644) (1) The recovery of real property, ov of am estate or interest therein; (2) The partition of teal property; (3) The sale of real property under a morgage, lin, or other encumbrance or charges and (4) An injury to real propery 1M, (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Atk. Code Ann. § 16-60-103 (Repl. 2005) states a 07-227 The following actions must be brought in the county in which the seat of government is situated: (3) All actions against the state and all actions against state boards, state commissioners, or state officers on account of thei offical acts, except that ifan ‘action could othenvise be brought in another countyor counties under the venue laws ofthis state, as provided in § 16-60-101 et seq, then the action may be brought ether in Pulaski County oF the other county or counties] (Emphasis added.) The plain language of these statutes provides the circuit court with the authority to conclude that venue was properin White County; thats, the eireuit court was not ‘wholly without jurisdiction to determine that the action could be maintained in White County and not Pulaski County. Relying on Ark, Code Ann. § 16-106-101(4) (Repl. 2006), AGFC argues that Pulaski ‘County isthe only place for proper venue, That section states, (4) All actions for debts due the State of Arkansas, ll actions in favor of any state officer, state board, or commissioner, in their official capacity, all actions which are authorized by the provisions ofthis code orby law to be broughtin the name of the state, and all ations against the board, commissioner, oF sate oficer for ‘or on account of any oficial act done or omitted to be done shall be brought and prosecuted in the county where the defendant resides, As pointed out by the Morrison Family, ths statute was enacted in 1871 by Act 48. However, ‘Ark, Code Ann. § 16-60-103(3) was amended to include the exception as set forth in Act 806 ‘0f2001, which, s quoted above, sates thatthe action may be brought in a county other than Pulaski County ifthe action could otherwise be brought in another county as provided by § 16- {60-101 et seq, While we are not to reach the underlying merits in a petition for writ of hibition, we can certainly recognize the express authority given to the circuit court by § 16- prot en 60-103, as amended, in determining that venue may lie in 2 county other than Pulaski 4 07-227 Moreover, our case law relied on by AGFC is inapposite to the instant appeal. Specifically, for the proposition that this writ should be granted, AGFC: cites Daniels v. Weaver, 367 Atk. 327, —_S.W.3d __ (2006); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, 345 Ark. 279, 45 S.W.3d 829 (2001); Wills v. Circuit Court of Phillips Cty., 342 Ark. 128, 27 $.W.3d 372 (2000); Valley v. Bogard, 342 Ark. 336, 28 S.W.3d 269 (2000); Tortorich v. Tortorch, 333 Ark. 15, 968 S.W.2d 53 (1998); Ark, Game & Fisk Comm’n v, Lindiey, 292 Atk, 314, 730 S.W.2d 474 (1987); Downey v. Toler, 244 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 305 (1963); Fomest City Machine Works v. Colin, 257 Atk, 889, 521 S.W.2d 206 (1975); Dean v. Cole, 236 Ark. 64, 364 S.W.2d 305 (1963); and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Bd. v. Newton, 230 Ark. 267, 322 S.W.2d 67 (1959). Notably, the majority of those cases are not writ cases. See Davies v. Weaver, supra; Valley v. Bogard, sup; Tortovich v. Tortovich, supa; Ark. Game & Fish Come’ v. Lindsey, prs; Dean v. Cole, supra; and Liquefied Petolewn Gas Ba. v, Newton, supra. In addition, the remainder of the cases cited that involve petitions for writs ether do not involve real property or were cases decided prior tothe 2001 amendment. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, supra; Wills v. Circuit Court of Phillips Cty., supra; Downey v. Toler, supa Fomest City Machine Works v. Calvin, supra, Thus, despite AGFC’s argument otherwise, the circuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction to determine that venue was proper in White County ‘As to the second prong, AGFC possesses another adequate remedy. Specifically, AGFC «an appeal this decision, once a final order is entered. Consequently, given the narrow scope and operation of writ of prohibition, and the availabilty ofanother adequate remedy, we hold that wit of prohibition would not be appropriate. Finally, AGEC argues that a writ of prohibition lies because the circuit court was wholly Se 07-227 ‘without jurisdiction because the statute of limitations barred the Morrison Family’s cause of action. A writ of prohibition is not warranted with respect to this argument as this is a procedural argument, not a jurisdictional one. ‘We addressed this issue in Tatrov. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.24 118 (1997). In that case, the petitioner filed a writ of prohibition with this cour, arguing that the circuit court ‘was wholly without jurisdiction as the three-year statute of limitations had expired on the underlying produet-lability tort claim, ‘The court denied that writ, and we explained that statutes of limitations constitute an affirmative defense, see Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(¢), and are generally not jurisdictional. 1 Those statutes of limitations that are jurisdictional are tied to the right itself, and not jut the remedy. For instance, the statute of imitations for wrongful- cath claims is jurisdictional because it is tied to the right itself See Vermeer Mf Cov. Steel _Judge, 263 Ark, 323, 564 S.W.24 518 (1978). ‘Thus, ina wrongfl-death ase, prohibition may be proper to raise a statute-of limitations challenge. However, prohibition is not an available remedy if the statute of limitations governing a particular proceeding is not jurisdictional, but muy be raised as an affirmative defense. Tato v. Langston, supra. Here, the underlying complaint raises a cause of action for specific performance ~ reformation of a contract. Because the applicable statute of limitations is not tied to the right to bring that claim, the statute-of-limitations argument made in this petition for writ of prohibition must be denied asi is not jurisdictional, but procedural. In addition, AGFC is fee to appeal this issue, once a final order is entered. Writ denied 6 07-227 

ff1bf17354cee6ca3d2f34b27de7bf4e0f0dd60f0a2be92883ade6f5a9c4143b

2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

cf1148c2-7321-4c8d-969b-c98d03516502

State of Arkansas v. Agustin Moreno

CR07-327

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS se. CR 07-327 STATE OF ARKANSAS, pina Daered Oder 25,2007 APPELLANT, | AppEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, vs NO. CR-2005-622, HON. GARY RAY COTTRELL, AGUSTIN MORENO, JUDGE, APPELLEE, DISMISSED. PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice ‘The appellant, the State of Arkansas, appeals ftom the circuit court’s order granting the motion to suppress of the appellee, Agustin Moreno. For its sole point on appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to suppress because the defendant was given valid Miranda warnings in his native tongue before he was given a second set of warnings at the beginning of his videotaped statement, the set which was later found to be unconstitutional. Because we hold that this is an improper state appeal, we dismiss the appeal. ‘The underlying facts are these. On December 4, 2005, Moreno was questioned by Crawford County Sheriff Deputy Halbert Torraca regarding events that had allegedly ‘occurred earlier in Moreno’s home. Moreno does not speak English, While he can speak Spanish, he is unable to read it. Additional facts were established at the October 23, 2006 suppression hearing by the testimony of Deputy Torraca. Torraca testified that he Mirandized Moreno in Spanish at his residence, translating it from an English Miranda waming card. While Torraca never received any formal education on reading and writing in Spanish, he grew up speaking Spanish as he lived with his grandparents who were Puerto Rican and could not speak any English, Atage eleven, Torraca moved in with his mother and stepfather, a man of Mexican descent, and both English and Spanish were spoken in that houschold. While he is admittedly “a litle bit slow at it," Torraca testified that he can read English and transate it into Spanish. ‘Torraca began to question Moreno regarding the allegations and Moreno started to answer affirmatively that he had inappropriately touched his niece, a minor child, At that time, Torraca noticed that the battery on his recording device had gone out and he decided to place Moreno under arest and take him to the Crawford County Sheriff's Department, ‘where he had access to audio and video recording. Moreno was then placed in an interview room at the sherif's department Before questioning Moreno further, a videotape was started and Torraca went over the rights form with him. Torraca had 2 copy of the English rights form and tried to explain the rights to Moreno, who was equipped with the Spanish rights form. Moreno never indicated that he could not understand what Torraca was explaining and signed the rights form when asked ‘The interpreter from the Administrative Office of the Courts provided the circuit cR07-327 ‘court with a transcript ofthe translation of Torraca’s interview with Moreno. The transcript provides in pertinent part: ToRRACcA: ‘MORENO: ToRRAca: Moreno: ToRRACa: MoRENO: ToRRaca: Moreno: TORRACA: Moreno: TORRACA: Sorry that took awhile there are a lot of (unintelligible). Ok .. ok, right now Iam going to re... um, I'm going to read you ...eh .. Pm going to read you the rights again, ok? Because I want you to understand your rights well, ok?’ Ok. And here you put (oninteligible). Ok, before uh ... ask you questions, uh ... you ca . you ... uh... you ha’... you have the right of to remain silent, do you understand that? Ushu. ‘OK? Uh... you, each thing that you says, can use it uh ... against you in... a court of law, ok? Uh .. you have the right to consulta lawyer, before I ask you rights. Do you understand that? Yes Yes? Ok, uh. ifyou don't uh... you .» ifyou want a lawyer and and ... don't have the money for a lawyer, we can writ .. write you down a law ... a lawyer, before I ask you rights. You do understand, that right? Mb-hu, OK? Uh.... Ifyou de ... decide to uh ... to answer my questions, ok? ‘Then some eh ..ats0 .. ome time, that you decide yourself you want a lawyer, you can stop to answer our question you can stop and eh to wait fora lawyer. You do understand that right? Ok, uh. ok, and here it says that uh ...uh .. Can you read Spanish? Very litte Very little? Ok. Here it says the place, ok. You see here that it says place? Yes. And here? Here ... here goes write down, this is the name of the ... of our cR07-327 ‘MoRENo: ToRRaca: ‘Moreno: TORRACA: Moreno: ToRRACA: Moreno: TorRaca: department, ok? Ok, today’s date time is; one thirty five, ok? Uh .. fora moment? ‘twelve, four, zero five and the uh... do you want to read this Let's see what it says (unintelligible) more or less. Uh... uh... ok, you do understand your rights? Yes, yes I understand. (Ok, uh. alo under .. uh. nobody hasn't threatened you or promised you nothing. No. (Ok, uh ... uh .. I didn’t promise you ... I haven't promised you anything, uh ... |haven’t threatened you, so you answer my questions, uh ... yes? Have I threatened you? No. No. No? Ok, uh ... [want you to sign here Moreno did sign the form indicating that he understood his rights and continued to make several incriminating statements during the course of the questioning by Torraca, On October 18, 2006, Moreno filed a motion to suppress any statement that he made to Torraca without the presence of counsel, claiming that his statements were made prior to his being properly informed of his Miranda rights and in violation of his constitutional right to the advice of counsel. The circuit court granted Moreno’s motion on January 26, 2007, finding that: Moreno did not speak English with enough proficiency sufficient for him to understand ‘Miranda warnings and rights; Moreno could not, in English, have made an intelligent waiver ‘of those rights; and, the transcript ofthe interrogation showed that Torraca sufficiently filed a cR 07-327 to advise Moreno of his Miranda rights in Spanish, The State filed a notice of appeal, which appeal is now before this court In its jurisdictional statement, the State argues that the instant appeal involves the correct and uniform administration of the law because the circuit court erroneously interpreted the law to conclude that the second of two sets of Miranda warnings given in Spanish was inadequate to support Moreno’s waiver of his Miranda rights and there isa risk that the circuit court’s interpretation of Ark. R. Crim. P, 16.2(¢) (2007) will be at odds with the interpretations of other circuit courts. The State contends that the circuit court erred by finding that Moreno did not receive proper Miranda warnings and that his waiver of those rights was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, as the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Moreno was given fll and correct warnings not only atthe time the video recording was made, but also when he was first arrested at his residence. Furthermore, the State alleges the circuit court erred in applying the law regarding Mivanda ‘warnings when it suppressed Moreno’s statements. Moreno responds that the State’s arguments realistically tum on the circuit courts application of the law under the specific facts of this case, that Moreno did not advance his ‘motion to suppress based on any new, novel, or untested legal theories, and that, for those reasons, the instant appeal is an improper state appeal. As to the merits, Moreno contends that the circuit court correctly decided thatthe insufficiency of Torraca’s translation of the ‘Miranda warnings into Spanish prevented Moreno from fully understanding the Miranda rights he waived. cR07-327 Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure-Criminal 3(a)(1)_ provides that “[ajn interlocutory appeal on behalf of the state may be taken only from a pretrial order in a felony prosecution which (1) grants a motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 162 to suppress seized evidence[” Ark. R. App. P—Crim. 3()(1) (2006). Ie further states: (0 When a notice of appeal is filed pursuant to either subsection (a) or (0) ofthis rule, the clerk of the court in which the prosecution sought to be appealed took place shall immediately cause a transcript ofthe tral record to be made and transmitted to the attomey general, or delivered to the prosecuting attomey, to be by him delivered to the attorney general. Ifthe attomey general, on inspecting the tral record, is satisfied that error has been committed to the prejudice of the state, and that the comect and uniform «administration of the criminal law requites review by the Supreme Court, he may take the appeal by filing the transcript of the trial record with the clerk of the Supreme Court within sixty (60) days after the filing of the notice of appeal. ‘Atk, R. Crim. P, 3(¢) (emphasis added). This court has frequently observed that there i a significant and inherent difference between appeals brought by criminal defendants and those brought on behalf of the State See State v. Nichols, 364 Ark. 1, 216 S.W.3d 114 (2005). The former is a matter of right, whereas the latter is not derived from the Constitution, nor is it a matter of right, but is granted pursuant to Ark. R. App. P—Crim. 3. See id. We accept appeals by the State when cour holding would be important to the correet and uniform administration of the eriminal law. See id. [As a matter of practice, this court has only taken appeals which are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law. See State v. Pittman, 360 Ark. 273, 200 S.W.3d 893 (2005). We do not permit State appeals merely to demonstrate the fact thatthe circuit court 6 cR07-327 erred. See id, Thus, where an appeal does not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal docs not involve the correct and uniform administration of the law. See id. Similarly, where the resolution of the issue on appeal tus on the facts unique to the case or involves a mixed ‘question of law and fact, the appeal is not one requiring interpretation of our criminal rules ‘with widespread ramification, and the matter is not appealable by the State. See id. Finally, where an appeal raises an issue of the application, not interpretation, of a criminal rule or statutory provision, it does not involve the correct and uniform administration ofthe eriminal law and is not appealable by the State under Ruule 3. See id Here, the State specifically concludes in its brief that the circuit court “erred in pplying the aw regarding Miranda warnings.” The State does not allege thatthe citeuit court misinterpreted the law; rather, the State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Torraca did not adequately translate the Miranda warnings in such a way that Moreno fully understood what rights he was being asked to waive, The State does not argue how the Circuit court misinterpreted the law; instead, it attempts to prove how the facts in this case are more analogous to cases that the State finds more favorable. In order to make a ruling. ‘on Moreno’s motion to suppress, the circuit court was required to review the facts and circumstances surrounding the Miranda warnings given to him and the waiver of his rights While the State, in its reply, contends that the question presented to this cout is “whether non-English language Miranda warnings are sufficient if they convey the esence ofthe Miranda rights and, alternatively, whether a previous giving of Miranda warnings in cR 07-327 4 suspect's native language is sufficient to supplant a later, arguably flawed, giving of those wamings,” both suggested questions presuppose that the wamings given in this case did properly convey the esence of the Miranda rights, which the circuit court did not find, and that a previous set of warnings were given fully inthe suspects native language. Those are ‘both large presumptions and would require an intensive factual investigation by this court Indeed, this appeal is not one requiring interpretation of our eriminal rules; instead, it raises issues involving the application of our rules to the specific facts ofthis cae. It does not appear that a review of this appeal would have widespread ramifications on the interpretation of our criminal law. As such, this appeal clearly does not involve the correct and uniform administration ofthe criminal law and does not fall within the confines of Ark R. App. P-Crim. 3. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed. R 07-327 

402b11bc4916ff1b878eae528b912c6835112098a498dfb6ab8a9e3db45e0eae

2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

6d2c6528-33d8-410f-b023-5c547345a9dd

State of Arkansas v. Carey L. Owens

07-58

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS Ne. 07-58 STATE OF ARKANSAS, Opbion Daweret ° SUN 28 2007 APPELLANT, | ppEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. PCN 92-1268, HON. ALICE SPRINKLE GRAY, JUDGE, vs. CAREY L. OWENS, APPELLEE, REVERSED & REMANDED. PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice “The State of Arkansas brings this appeal fom the order ofthe Pulaski County Circuit Cour, which granted appellee Carey L. Owen's motion to dismis for lack of jurisdiction. “The State's sole point on appeals thatthe circuit court erroneously interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-2-316 (Repl. 2006) a depriving the cour ofjursdicion. We reverse and remand the circuit coun’s order of dismissal. ‘Owens was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect forthe June 6, 1991 murder of his Either and was committed to the Arkanss State Hospital on August 14, 1992, A conditional-release order was initially entered on behalf of Owens on August 6, 1993. Since that time, Owens has been the subject of several conditional-release orders and their revocation oF modification, A review of the record reveals the following: 02/23/1994 Modified Order of Conditional Release 06/17/1994 Modified Order of Conditional Release 08/01/1994 Modified Order of Conditional Release 10/24/1994 Conditional Release 03/02/1995 Modified Order of Conditional Release 01/17/1996 Order Revoking Conditional Release 04/30/1997 Order of Conditional Release 06/09/2000 Order Revoking Conditional Release 12/06/2000 Order of Conditional Release 01/28/2004 Order of Modified Conditional Release 01/31/2005. Order Revoking Conditional Release 03/21/2006 Case Reopened for Act 911 Report in March 2006, the Arkansas State Hospital petitioned the Pulaski County Circuit Court for the conditional release of Owens. On March 31, 2006, the circuit court denied the petition and found that Owens “still pose(d] a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another due to a present mental disease or defect.” Its recorded on the circuit court docket sheet that an order of commitment was issued on March 31, 2006. The Arkansas State Hospital again petitioned the circuit court for the conditional release of Owens in September of 2006. The circuit court granted the petition and entered an order of conditional release on behalf of Owens on September 22, 2006, releasing him into the custody of Mid South Health Systems/Jonesboro Transitional Unit. However, Owens ea 07-38 alternatively moved the court for an outright dismissal in a letter to the court filed on September 29, 2006, which memorialized his oral motion. Owens argued that, pursuant to ‘Atk. Code Ann. § 5-2-316, the court lost jurisdiction over this case in 1998, five years after the initial order of conditional release entered on August of 1993. The court entered an order of dismissal on behalf of Owens on October 25, 2006, stating thatthe court did not have Jurisdiction because five years had lapsed since the initial order of conditional release. It is from that order of dismissal thatthe State now appeal. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-2-316 (Repl. 2006), in effect at the time of the cour’s ‘order, provided in pertinent part: {@)(1) any person conditionally released pursuant to § 5-2-314 or § 5-2-315 may apply to the court ordering the conditional release for discharge from or ‘modification ofthe order granting conditional release on the ground that he or she may be discharged or the order modified without danger to himself or herself or to the person or property of another. {(b)Within five (5) years after the order pursuant to § 5-2-314 or § 5-2-315 granting conditional release, and after notice to the conditionally released person and a hearing, ifthe court determines that the conditionally released person has violated a condition of release or that for the safety of the conditionally released person or for the safety of the person or property of another his or her conditional release should be revoked, the court may: (1) Modify a condition of release; oF (2) Order the coriditionally released person to be committed to the custody of the Director of the Arkansas State Hospital or another appropriate facility subject to discharge or release only in accordance withthe procedure prescribed in §5-2-315, We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo because it is for this court to determine the meaning ofa statute. See McMickle v. Grifin, _ Ark. __,__S.W.3d__ (Apr. 5, 2007). ‘The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the 3 07-58 legislature. Seed. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning ofthe language used. See id. In considering the ‘meaning ofa statute, we construe it just sit reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Se id. We construe the statue so that no word is Jefe void, superfiuous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. See id In the instant case, the circuit court found that section 5-2-316(b) instructs that a court loses jurisdiction over a case five years after an intial order of conditional release. Owens suggests that the commentary to the statute is quite significant in supporting his claim that the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute is that jurisdiction always tolls after five years from the initial conditional-release order. ‘The commentary prior to 2007" read in pertinent part: Section (b) is limitation on the state's right to hospitalize a person subsequent to 2 “conditional release.” Such hospitalization must take place within five years of the initial conditional release order. ‘The Commission believed it unwise and unfiir to subject an individual to the special commitment procedures established by 5-2-314, -315 for an indefinite period of time. Dangerous persons can always be hospitalized under the civil commitment statutes. While the commentary to a statute isa highly persuasive aid to construing the statute, itisnot controlling over the statute's clear language. See Huffman v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 344 Ark. 274, 42 S.W.34 386 (2001). Here, we hold that the plain language of the statute is clear and, even prior to amendments that were made during the "We note that during the 2007 legislative session, amendments were made to section 5-2-316 to specifically refute any confusion caused by the original commentary. Po 07-38 2007 legislative session, cannot be interpreted to suggest that the court automatically loses Jurisdiction over a case five years after an initial conditional-release order. In addition, while the commentary may suggest that there i imitation on the State's right to hospitalize and that hospitalization must occur within five years of the intial conditional-release order, it does not suggest that jurisdiction is lost aftr five years. The plain language of the statute simply instructs that within five years ofthe order pursuant to section, 5-2-314 or section 5-2-315 granting conditional release, the court may modify a condition of the release or order commitment if the court determines that the conditionally released person has violated 2 condition of release or if s for the safery of that person, the safety of another person, or the safety ofanother person’s property. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-316(b). Hid the legislature intended for the five years to an only fom the initial order of conditional release, it could have easly sad so by including such language in the statute. The basic question presented is what this statute means by “the order pursuant to § 5-2- 314 or § 5-2-315 granting conditional release.” 1d. (emphasis added). Owens urges that “the order” references the initial order granting conditional release. However, a already noted, the initial order and several subsequent orders in this case were revoked. The initial congitional-release order was filed on August 6, 1993, and an order revoking that conditional release was entered on January 17, 1996, within the five years permitted by the statute. To revoke is “to annul by recalling or taking back.” Webster's Third Naw Intemational, itionary 1944 (3d ed. 2002). A recognized synonym forthe term revoke is “cancel.” Id ‘See also Wells v. Hayes, 235 Ark. 891, 362 S.W.24 700 (1962) (wherein this court equated the Ss 07-38 cancelled and ‘word cancel to revoke). Ifan initial order of conditional release is revoked, i sno longer in effect. ‘Thus, it ean only be reasoned that a new order pursuant to section §-2- 314 orsection 5-2-315 must be then sought and that an individual would have to be granted ‘anew orderto again be conditionally released. Accordingly, “the order” described in section 5-2-316(b) could only be refering to the order of conditional release currently in effect, and the circuit court would have the sathe options to modify that order or to commit the conditionally released person if tis within five years. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-316(b). A review ofthe record reveals that the most recent order granting conditional release to Owens was entered on December 6, 2000. However, that order was revoked on January 31, 2005, within the five years allowed by the statute. Therefore, the circuit court had proper jurisdiction over the casein September of 2006 when the Arkansas State Hospital petitioned it yet again for Owens's conditional release. Moreover, the circuit court had proper jurisdiction to enterits order of September 22, 2006, releasing Owens into the custody of Mid South Health Systems/Jonesboro Transitional Unit. To hold that Ark. Code Ann, § 5-2-316(b) limits a circuit court's jurisdiction to five years after the initia order of conditional release could yield potentially devastating results in these types of cases. For example, it would potentially allow for the release of an individual ‘who still poses a danger to themselves or others, and even forthe release ofan individual who thas been recommitted since the first order of conditional release so long as the five years had ‘run, We will not interpreta statute to yield an absurd result that defies common sense, See Hanwell-Williams v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Sens, 368 Ark. 183, __ S.W.3d__ (2006). 6 07-38 Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in its order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, and we reverse and remand, Reversed and remanded. 1 07-38 

741e9a9425acd9de0afad1d1ea5f64546ccb4a3359db6524b43d99963d07577c

2007-06-28T00:00:00Z

5c508f9b-a110-4622-80d4-32f026545ce4

Running M Farms, Inc. and S&K Company, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc.

07-212

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, No. 07-212 RUNNING M FARMS, INC. AND S&K COMPANY, INC., pinion Datvered Osuber 28, 2007 AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, ARKANSAS, NO, CV-03-230-3, HONORABLE KIRK D. JOHNSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE APPELLANTS, vs. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF ARKANSAS, INC. APPELLEE , TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice “This cas isthe third appeal arising from a lawauit over a crop-hail insurance policy. See Farm Bur, Mut, Ins. Co, v. Ruiing M Farms, 366 Ark. 480, _S.W.3d__ (2006), and Far Bur. Mut, Ins, Co v. Running M Farms, 348 Ark. 313, 72S.W-3d 502 2002). At issue in he instant appeal isthe trial cours award of attorney's Fes to counsel for che appellans, Running M Farms and S&eK Company, Inc. (collectively referred to as “Rsnning M"). In March of 1997, Running M purchased crop-hailinsurance from the appellee in thi case, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (“Farm Bureau"), In Apri of 1997, Running M's young wheat crop was badly damaged by a hail storm. However, when Running M Sled a claim under its crop-hil policy with Farm Bureau, the insurance company iniilly denied coverage, Afra reinspection ofthe crops, Farm Bureau offered to sete the matter for $6,900. Running M declined the offer and filed suit, alleging that Farm Bureau had breached 07-212 its contract and caused damages inthe amount of $124,000 to both farms. See Farm Bur. Mut Ins. Co, v, Running M Farms, 348 Ark. 313, 72 S.W.3d $02 (2002) (Running M 1). Running M filed several amended complaints during the course of this litigation, aiding various claims for extra-contractual damages, fraud, bad th, and tortious interference with a business expectancy. The case was originally scheduled to go to trial on August 23, 1999, but after Farm Bureau filed a pleading entitled “Confession of Judgment,” admitting liability under the insurance policy in the amount of $76,000, the matter was continued, and anew tral was scheduled for June of 2000. Running M 1, 348 Ark. at 316, 72.W.3d 2t $04. Farm Bureau subsequently fled a motion to withdraw its confession of judgment on the basis thatthe parties were in dispute regarding the effect of the confession and that it was not possible to avoid a tial. The trial court granted Farm Bureau's request, and the ease proceeded to trial on June 22, 2000. ‘The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial. Following the mistrial, Farm Bureau filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied Farm Bureau's motion, and Farm Bureau appealed. Running M 1, 348 Ark, at 316-17, 72 8.W.3d at 504-05. On appeal, however, this court determined that the trial cour’s denial of Farm Bureau's motion for NOV was not a final, appealable order. Id. at 321-22, 72 S.W.3d at 508. Afier the mistrial and the first appeal, Farm Bureau again confessed judgment of $76,500, Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Running M Farms, 366 Ark, 480, 484, _S.W.3d__,__ (2006) (Running M 1). A second tial took place in 2004, and the jury, on special interrogatories, found in Running M's fvor on both its contract and tort claims. The trial 2 07-212 ‘court awarded Running M the contract damages previously confessed by Farm Bureau, 38 ‘well as the damages assessed by the jury on the tort claims. However, the court declined to award Running itsattomey’s fees orthe statutory 12% penalty pursuant to Ark. Code Ann, § 23-79-208 (Repl. 2005). Id at 484, _S.W.3d at __. Farm Bureau appealed, and this court reversed the jury's verdicts on Running M's tort claims, Running M also eross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in declining to award attomey's fees. This court agreed, holding that “the attomey’s fee and penalty attaches ifthe insured is required to file suit, even though judgment is confessed before tial. A good faith denial of liability is no defense to the claim for attomey’s fee and penalty.” Id. at 495, —_S.W.3d at __ (citing Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Gordy, 228 Ark. 643, 647, 309 ‘S.W.2d 330, 333 (1958)). ‘Thus, this court held that Running M was entitled to the 12% penalty and reasonable attorney's fes, and we reversed and remanded forthe circuit court to award 2 12% penalty based on the confessed judgment for breach of contract and to determine reasonable attomey’s fees. Id ‘The case then returned to the circuit court, and the circuit court entered an order on February 5, 2007, In that order, the court noted that, on August 17, 1999, Farm Bureau confessed judgment on the plaintiff claim for contract damages. Pursuant to the confession of judgment, the court awarded Running M Farms judgment in the amount of $45,000 against Farm Bureau for contract damages; $16,800 for attorney's fes related to the contract claim; $5,400 forthe 12% penalty pursuant to Ark. Code Ann, §23-79-208; and prejudgment interest in the amount of $5,520.40 for the time period from August 1, 1997, until August 17, 3 07-212 1999, the date on which Farm Bureau confessed judgment. The court also awarded S&K ‘Company $31,500 in contract damages; $11,760 in attorney's fees; $3,780 for the 12% penalty; and prejudgment interest of $3,864.28. In awarding fees, the court, citing Phelps v. U.S. Credit Life Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 439, 10 S.W.3d 854 (2000), noted that the fee provided for in Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208 was allowed only to reimburse an insurance policyholder or beneficiary for expenses incurred in enforcing the contract and to compensate him in engaging counsel thoroughly competent to protect his interest, The court also noted that it was basing its decision as to a “reasonable” fee on the factors set out in Phelps, supra. Running M filed a timely notice of appeal, and now ‘urges that the tral court erred in its award of attorney's fees. In its Gist argument on appeal, Running M contends thatthe tral court ersed in awarding attorney's fees based on a percentage of the plaintiffs’ recovery, as opposed to an award based upon the number of hours worked by counsel and legal staff. Running M and its attomeys, the Texarkana law firm of Crisp, Jondan & Boyd, L.L-P., had a contingency fee agreement whereby counsel would receive anywhere ffom one-third to one-half of the amount recovered by the plaintiff, depending on whether the matter went to tral or not, ‘Our court has held that attomeys’ fees are not allowed except where expressly provided for by statute. Harris v, City of Fort Smith, 366 Ark. 277, _S.W.3d (2006); Chris w, Sun Indus.,304 Ark, 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). An award of attorney's fees will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Hanis, supra. Given the tral judge's close familiarity with the trial proceedings and the quality of service rendered by the ao o7-212 prevailing party’s counsel, appellate courts usually recognize the superior perspective of the trial judge in determining whether to award attorney's fees. See FMC Corp. v. Helton, 360 ‘Ark, 465, 202 S.W.3d 490 (2005); Chris, supra. ‘Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-79-208(a)(1) (Repl. 2004) provides for attorney's fees in insurance eases as follows: In all cases in which loss occurs and the . . . insurance company . . liable therefor shall fail to pay the losses within the time specified in the policy after demand is made, the person, firm, corporation, or association shall be Tiable to pay the holder of the policy or his or her assigns, in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve percent (12%) damages upon the amount of the loss, together with all reasonable attomey's fees for the prosecution and collection of the los ‘This court has interpreted § 23-79-208 a providing that “Jn the event an insurer wrongfilly refuses to pay benefits under an insurance policy, the insured may recover the overdue benefits, twelve percent (12%) damages upon the amount ofthe loss, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Phelps v. U.S. Credit Life ns. Co., 340 Ark. at 442, 10 S.W.3d at 856 (quoting [Novtiwestem Nat Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 309 Ark. 319, 326-27, 832 8.W.2d 463, 467 (1992). Morcover, our court has held that the reasonableness ofthe attorney's fee is determined by examining the following factors: (1) the experience and ability ofthe attorney; (2) the time and labor required to perform the service properly; (3) the amount in controversy and the result obtained in the case; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved: (5) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the local area; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and (8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 07-212 preclude other employment by the attorney. Newrourt Financial v. Canal Ins. Co. 341 Ark. 452, 17 S.W.34 83 (2000); Southall ». Farm Bureau Mut, Ins. Co, of Ark, 283 Atk, 335, 676 S.W.24 228 (1984). While courts should be guided by the foregoing factors, there is no fixed formula in determining the reasonableness of an award of attomey’s fees. See Neweourt Financial, supra; Shepherd v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 312 Atk, 502, 850 S.W.2d 324 (1993). ‘On appeal, Running M argues that the trial court erred in awarding fees on a contingency basis, citing Equitable Life Assurance Society ofthe United States v. Rummell, 257 ‘Ark, 90, 514 S,W.2d 224 (1974), for the proposition that “reasonable attorney's fees” should not be contingent on the outcome of the case. Running M also cites Fuller. Harford Life Insurance Co,, 281 F.3d 704 (8 Cir, 2002) (interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208), in ‘which che Eighth Circuit awarded attomey’s fees totaling $125,000 on a plaintiff's award of $500,000. The attorney in Fuller had submitted two affidavits: the frst one set out an hourly tate of $350 for an estimated 250-300 hours worked on the case, plus additional hours by an associate attorney and a paralegal; the second affidavit set forth the contingent fee agreement whereby the expected fee would be one-third of the $500,000 insurance policy limits. ‘The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of $125,000 (although it noted the award was “very generous”), concluding that the trial court had properly taken into account the appropriate factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the attorney's fees pursuant to § 23-79-208. Fuller, 281 F.3d at 708-09 (citing Shepherd v. State Auto Prop. & as, Ins. Coy 312 Atk. 502, 850 S.W.2d 324 (1993)). Running M urges that, based on the 07-212 Fuller ase, even where there might be a fixed contingency fee agreement, the court should still consider all cight fictors when determining a reasonable attomey’s fee As mentioned above, Running M and its counsel had a contingency-fee agreement for attomey’s fees. On appeal, Running M farther asserts thatthe trial court effectively viewed that contingency-fee contract as an “absolute ceiling on the attorney's fees to be awarded.” Here, i cites Blanchard v, Bergeon, 489 U.S. 87 (1988), in which the Supreme Court held that the existence of a contingency-fee agreement should not serve as a cap on reasonable aromey’s fees. However, Blanchard involved a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ‘The central theme of the Court’ opinion was that ivi-rights cases fequently involve non- ‘monetary compensation, and to limit attomey’s fees solely to a percentage of the monetary awards recovered might put undue pressure on counsel to pursue money damages and to forego “important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.” Blanchard, 489 US. at 95. ‘The policy concems that are present in a civil-rights action are simply not present in a case such a the one at hand. Ths, Running M's reliance on this and other eivil-rghts cases is inapposite. Contrary to the Supreme Court's reluctance to impose a cap in civil-rights ‘cases, this court has held that, in insurance eases involving § 23-79-208, “the fee awarded should not exceed the amoune that che client is responsible for paying, otherwise the statute ‘would be susceptible to abuse.” Phelps, 340 Ark. at 443, 10 S.W.3d at 857, While our court has stated that the existence of a contingency fee is but one of the factors forthe tral court to consider, se id, there is no indication in the trial court’s decision thatthe existence of the 07-212 contingency-fee agreement dominated over the other factors or that the court viewed the contingeney-fee agreement as a “eap” on the amount it could award. Indeed, the court explicitly stated that it found the fee awarded to be reasonable based on a consideration of all ofthe cight factors. Other than the number of hours worked on the case, Running M does not specifically point to any other fictor that it claims would support a larger attorney's fee. However, among the factors to consider are the time required to perform the service properly, s well as the amount in controversy and the result obtained in the case. We note that the only issue fon which Running M ultimately prevailed was the contract damages. Running M_ was awarded $76,500 in contract damages — the same amount for which Farm Bureaus confessed Judgment, Had Running M accepted this confession of judgment and settlement, it would have avoided much of the time and expense involved in this case. While we certainly understand that many factors must have gone into counsel’s decision to pursue the matter through mull trials and appeals, we nonetheless cannot say that the tral court abused its discretion in its determination of what constituted a “reasonable” attorney's fee. In its second point on appeal, Running M argues that, assuming the tial court based itsaward of attorney's fees on the existence of the contingency-fee agreement, then the court crred in only awarding one-third of the recovery in attorney's fees. Running M points to the fee agreement, which provides that, in the event the matter is not settled until affer the completion of a trial, counsel would be entitled to receive fifty pereent of the amount 07-212 recovered, Because this case went to trial twice, Running M argues that tis entitled to a fifty percent attomey’s fee. However, as noted above, there is nothing in the trial court’s order that indicates that the court was guided solely by the contingency-fee agreement. Instead, the court determined that the amount of the attorney's fee was reasonable based on all eight of the factors enumerated by this court in countless cases, Because the trial court did not award the attorney's fee on the basis ofthe contingeney-fee contract, there is no merit to Running M's contention that it should have been awarded the fifty-percent fee provided for in the agreement. Finally, Running M argues that the trial court erred in its calculation of prejudgment interest. ‘The trial court awarded prejudgment interest for the time period from August 1, 1997, until August 17, 1999, the date on which Farm Bureau frst confessed judgment. On appeal, however, Running M argues that the tial court should have awarded additional prejudgment interest for the time from June 11, 2000, until January 22, 2004, which represents the time from the date on which the trial court allowed Farm Bureau to withdraw its confession of judgment until the date on which the confession of judgment was reinstated following the remand after the fist appeal. Running M argues that it is entiled to this additional amount of prejudgment interest because it did not concede to Farm Bureau's ‘withdrawal of its confession of judgment, and therefore did not waive its claim for these additional prejudgment interest amount - 07-212 rejudgment interest is compensation for recoverable damages wrongfully withheld from the time of the loss until judgment. Reynolds Health Care Servs, Inc. HMINH, Inc, 364 ‘Ark, 168, 217 S.W.3d 797 (2005); Perkins v. Cedar Mountain Sewer Improvement Dist, 360 ‘Ark, 50, 199 S.W.34 667 (2004). Thus, in determining whether Running M is entitled to the additional prejudgment interes it claims, the first question to be addressed is whether it ‘was entitled to recover damages that were “wrongfully withheld” from the time of the los until judgment. See Reynolds Health Care, supra. Here, the trial court found that, based on Farm Bureau’s confession of judgment, the insurer owed Running M the $76,500 that it confessed. However, the question is whether, in withdrawing its confession of judgment, Farm Bureau “wrongfilly withheld” those monies. Farm Bureau's motion to withdraw its confession appeats neither inthe record nor in the Addendum before us. Therefor, itis unclear why the insurer withdrew its confession of judgment. The only mention of Farm Bureau’s reasons is found in Running M I, where this, court noted that Farm Bureau “subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its confession of Jjudgment on the basis thatthe parties were in dispute regarding the effect ofthe confession and that it was not possible to avoid atrial.” Running M I, 348 Ark. at 316-17, 72.S.W.3d at 504-06. In its brief, Running M offers no proof or argument that Farm Bureau's withdrawal ofits confesion of judgment was wrongful it asserts only that it “did not concede to the withdrawal of the confession of judgment.” Moreover, it cites to no authority that would suppor this court’s drawing ofan inference that the withdrawal was in any way wrongful -10- 07-212 Iisa well-setled principle of appellate law that we will not make a party’s argument for him. See Kinchen v. Wilkins, 367 Ark. 71, S.W.3d__ (2006); Arkansas Dep't of Human Sens. +. Schroder, 353 Ark. 885, 122 S.W.3d 10 (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that Running ‘Mis not entitled to reversal on this issue. Affirmed. ae 07-212 

036e3f7b8956a94dcd52df59a4f4d4a78b448f4b6f220613633178db93b0b7be

2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

7ceee406-c42d-41c1-b8ab-8e96ce86db84

Kevin Ray Adkins v. State of Arkansas

CR06-1082

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS: a, CRO6-1082 KEVIN RAY ADKINS, plan Dever Otte 4, 2007 APPELLANT, | ny APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BENTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS, NO. CR-04-988-1 and CR-05-1587-1, HONORABLE TOM KEITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE vs. STATE OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE, 1 TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice Appellant Kevin Adkins was convicted by a Benton County jury of aggravated assault ‘on a correctional facility employee, possession of marijuana, and flute to register as 2 sex offender. The jury recommended sentences of fiteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the falure-to-register conviction; fifteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for aggravated asaul '30 years in prison and a $5,000 fine forthe possession convietion. ‘The trial court then sentenced Adkins to fifteen years for failure to register and thirty years for possession of marijuana, to run concurrently; the court also suspended imposition of sentence forthe aggravated-assault conviction for fiffcen years and ordered payment ofa $10,000 fine. On appeal, Adkins does not challenge his conviction for aggravated assault on an ‘employee of a correctional facility. Instead, he argues that the tial court 1) should have granted his directed-verdiet motion on the filure-to-register charge; 2) erred in allowing certain testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial; and 3) erred in allowing testimony about the sate of Adkins’ clothing at the time of his initial encounter with police. CRO6-1082 In his first point on appeal, Adkins argues that the State filed to prove that he possessed a culpable mental state and thus filed to meet its burden of proving all of the clements of the crime of filing to register as a sex offender under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12- 901 et sq. (Repl. 2003). For that reason, he urges thatthe tral court erred in denying his mation for directed verdict. ‘We treat a motion for directed verdict asa challenge tothe sufficiency of the evidence. So Sta 45 Ak. 77,238 8:.34 373 200; Cine Sa, 356 ok 2416.9 ‘712 (2004). This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence ina light most fivorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). ‘We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it wll, with reasonable certainty, compel 4 conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id ‘Adkins angues on appeal that the State filed to prove that he violated the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Act because it did not establish that he possessed the requisite mental state atthe time of the alleged offense. Under the Act, a person who has been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense has a duty to register as a sex offender using a registration form prepared by the Arkansas Crime Information Center. See Atk. Code Ann. § 12-12-906 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2005); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-907 (Repl. 2003). The failure to register under the act was, atthe time of Adkins’s arrest, a Class D felony. Ark CRO6-1082 Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(1) (Repl. 2003)." Adkins does not deny that he was a sex offender who was required to register under the Act; rather, he urges thatthe Actis not strict lability offense, and the State was therefore required to prove that he acted with a culpable mental state With some exceptions, when a statute defining an offense does not specifically Aelineate a culpable mental state, “a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is ‘established only ifa person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2- 203(b) (Repl. 2006). Those exceptions are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (Repl. 2006), ‘which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (6) A person does not commit an offense unless he or she acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable mental state, (© However, a culpable mental state is not required if (2) An of defined by a statte nota pat ofthe Arkansas Crinsnal Code leat indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement forthe offense or for any element of the offense, (Emphasis added) In the instant case, the Sex Offender Registration Act is not a part of the Arkansas Criminal Code: rather, it is located in Title 12 of the Code, which deals with “Law Enforcement, Emergency Management, and Military Affits.” Thus, under § 5-2-204(c)(2), 4 culpable mental state is not required if the offense “clearly indicates 4 legislative intent to " Act 1743 of 2006 amended the classification of the offense to a Class C felony. ‘See Ark, Code Ann, § 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)() (Supp. 2006). 3 CRO6-1082 dispense with any culpable mental state requirement forthe offense of for any clement of the offense." ‘Adkins argues that the Acti silent 2s to the requirement ofa culpable mental state, and he relies on three cases — State v. Setzer, 302 Ark, 593, 791 S.W.2d 365 (1990); Yorum v. ‘State, 325 Ark, 180, 925 S.W.2d 385 (1996); and McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 '.W.24 325 (1996) — in support of his argument that this court should “graft” a mental-state requirement onto § 12-12-904, However, in each of those three cases, the crimes of which the defendants were accused were found in the Arkansas Criminal Code. Here, the erime of falling to register as a sex offender is not a part of the Criminal Code, and accordingly, ‘Adkins’ reliance on these case as examples of instances in which this court will graft a mens rea requirement into a erime is inapposite. More akin to the instant case is Stivers v, Sate, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003), in which this court found a strict-liability offense in a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53- 101 (Supp. 2003), which requires the driver ofa vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to return to and remain at the scene ofthe accident. In Stiven, the defendant had asked the trial court to give a jury instruction that would have required the jury to find that the State had to prove that Stivers knew the accident victim had been injured and purposely ued to.top his vehicle atthe scene of the accident. Stivers, 354 Ark. at 144, 118 S.W.3d at 560-61 (emphasis in original). The trial court refised to give the requested instruction, and on appeal, Stivers argued that the tial court was statutorily required to graft a mens rea requirement onto § 27-53-101. Id, 118 $.W.3d at 561. + CRO6-1082 This court rejected his argument, however, noting that the “language of the statute itself docs not explicitly enunciate any particular mental state,” but rather stated that the diver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person “shall immediately top the vehicle atthe scene of the accident.” Id, at 145-46, 118 S.W.3d at 562- 63. Our court concluded that “[tJhis mandatory language is a clear indication that the accident-causing driver's mental state is irrelevant.” Id. at 146, 118 S.W.3d at 562, In addition, the Stivers court noted that other statutes contained within the “Accidents” and “Accident Reports” chapters of Title 27 of the Arkansas code clearly set out the required ‘mental states necessary before a person could be penalized for violating those statues. Id. For ‘example, the court cited Ark. Code Ann, §27-53-201(b) (Supp. 2001), which provided that, “(for wilful refusal to comply [with other asiociated statutes), the commissioner shall revoke the driver’ license ... ofthe person so convicted.” 1d. Our court then concluded as follows: Clearly, when the General Assembly desires to incorporate 2 mens rea element into the statutes governing trafic accidents, it can and, as seen in § 27-53- 201(6), has done so. Hire, the legislature clearly intended to dispense with any intent requirement in § 27-53-101. Therefore, the trial court did not err in <eclning to engraft an element of intent into the statute, or in refusing Stivers's proffered instruction. ia. In Stivers, there was.a clear legislative intent to dispense with any mens rea requ ment. ‘Here, unless there is a clear legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement forthe offense of falling to register a a sex offender, “a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or CRO6-1082 recklessly” under § 5-2-203(b), because the Sex Offender Registration Act does not prescribe ‘culpable mental state. Accordingly, we must examine the Act itself, ‘As mentioned above, a person is “guilty of a Clas (D] felony who . . fils to register or verify registration 2s required under this subchapter.” § 12-12-904(a)(1). The portions of the statute that set out an offender's duty to register are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12- 906, which provides as follows: (2(1)(A) At the time of adjudication of guilt, the sentencing court shal ‘enter on the judgment and commitment or judgment and disposition form ‘whether or not the offender is required to register as a sex offender and shall indicate whether the offense is an aggravated sexual offense under § 12-12-903, (B) The Department of Correction shall ensure that a sex offender received for incarceration completes the sex offender registration form prepared by the Director of the Arkansas Crime Information Center pursuant to § 12 12-908. (0)@) Immediately prior to the release of a sex offender... , the Department of Correction . . . shall update the registration file of the sex offender who is to be released ‘Atk, Code Ann. § 12-12-906 (Supp. 2005).? Further subsections of the Act provide that, when registering or updating the registration fle of a sex offender, the Department of Correction is required to inform the offender of the duty to submit to assessment and to register and obtain the information required for registration, Ark, Code Ann. § 12-12-906(c)(1)(A)(i); inform the offender of the need to advise the ACIC of any changes of address, § 12-12-906(c)(1)(A)(i); inform the # As mentioned above, the Act was amended in 2006 and now incorporates several new provisions; however, because the new language was not in effect at the time of ‘Adkins's arrest, they do not apply to his situation, 6 CRO6-1082 offender of the need to register in another state ifthe offender moves out of Arkansas, § 12- 12-906(¢)(1}(A)Gii); obtain fingerprints and a DNA sample, § 12-12-906(€)(1)(A)(iw) ~ (v)s and require the sex offender to complete the entire registration process, “including, but not limited to, requiring the sex offender to read and sign a form stating that the duty of the sex ‘offender to register under this subchapter has been explained.” § 12-12-906(€)(1)(A)(vi. Reading these provisions as a whole with the rest of the Act certainly indicates a legislative intent to place the burden of knowing the gravity of the situation, as well as the ‘mandatory nature of the registration scheme, on the sex offender. As in Stivers, supra, although the General Assembly did not specifically spell out an intention to dispense with a scienter requirement, itis obvious that the registration requirements are mandatory, and that failure co comply with those duties isa strict Habilty offense Moreover, in Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Department, 339 Ark. 274, 5 S.W.3d 402 (1999), this cour stated that “no sienteris indicated in Arkansas's Act, and we conclude the offender’ filure to register alone is sufficient to trigger the Act’ provisions.” Kelle, 339 Ark. 3¢ 285, 5 S.W,3d at 409, Kellarwas concerned with whether the Act violated the ex pest fato provisions of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. In making that determination, this court had to consider whether the Act was punitive in nature, or was merely regulatory To that end, the Kellar court examined the seven factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza- ‘Martinez, 372,US. 144 (1963). Among those seven factors was whether the sanction imposed by the Act (the “sanction” in this case being the registration requirement itself) “comes into a CRO6-1082 phy only on a finding of scienter” Kellar, 339 Ark. at 282, 5 SW.3d at 407, Our court discussed the scenter factor as follows: ‘The third factor in Kennedy concerns the scenter element. States have taken at least two approaches with this factor. Some recognize that scienter “comes into play when the offender is adjudicated guilty of the underlying offense.” Colle [v. Site] 710 So, 2d [1000,] 1010 [(Fla. App. 1998)]; see also [State v.] Manning, 532 N.W.2d [244,] 247-48 [(Minn. App. 1995)] (because the registration requirement s dependent upon the conviction of an underlying crime, there will necessarily be a finding of scentey). Other states hold that there no element of scenter inherent in the registration statute, stating rather that the ‘affender need only be released into the community to trigger the provisions of these statutes.” [State v.] Cook, (83 Ohio St. 34 404,] 700 N.E.2d [570,] 573; [People | Logan, 705 N.E.2d [152,] 159 [(Il. 1998)]. In our case, no sinter is indicated in Arkansas's Ac, and we condude the offender's are to register alone is sufcent to trigger the As provisions. Accordingly, we hold this facor is not indicative of @ punitive fe. Kellar, 339 Ark. at 285, § S.W.3d at 408-09 (emphasis added). ‘Combining these statements from Kellar with an analysis ofthe entie statutory scheme, ‘we conclude that itis clear tha failure to register i a strict lability offense. Because the State proved that Adkins was required to register but filed to do so, and because it was not required to prove that he filed to do so with any particular culpable mental state, the trial court did not err in denying Adkins’s motion for directed verdict, In his second argument on appeal, Adkins contends that the trial court erred by “allowing irrelevant highly prejudicial hearsay testimony during the sentencing phase” of ‘Adkins’ tial A trial court's decision to admit evidence in the penalty phase of a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103 (Repl. 2006), certain evidence is admissible at CRO6-1082 sentencing that would not have been admisible at the guilt phase of the trial. Craufordv. ‘State, 362 Ack, 301, 208 S,W.3d 146 (2005). Section 16-97-103 provides in pertinent part Evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court or jury may include, Dut is not limited to, the following (6) Relevant character evidence} (© Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The criteria for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples of this type of evidence; (7) Evidence relevant to guilt presented in the frst stage: {© Evidence held inadmissible in the fist stage may be resubmitted for consideration in the second state ifthe basis for exclusion did not apply to sentencing; and (9) Rebutal evidence, ‘While evidence introduced during the sentencing phase may include evidence deseribed in this section, the list is not exhaustive. Crawford v. State, supra. However, the admissibility of proofin the penalty phase ofa jury trial is governed by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Hill 1, State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 1994), The Hill court alo noted that the State should not be precluded from introducing relevant evidence at a sentencing proceeding. Id. at 415, 887 S.W.2d at 278 (emphasis added) ‘Adkins argues thatthe testimony of three sentencing witnesses — Nancy Large, Kathy Taylor, and Corporal Keith Foster of the Rogers Police Department — constituted inadmisible hearsay evidence. Hearsay is defined by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence as a stement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ark. R. Evid. 801. Even if hearsay is deemed relevant and admissible under one of the hearsay exceptions, see Ark. R. Evid. 803 & 804, it may nonetheless still be excluded under Ark. R. Evid, 403 “if its CRO6-1082, probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfir prejudice, confision of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” ‘As mentioned above, the challenged testimony came from Nancy Large and Kathy Taylor during the sentencing phase of Adkins's trial. Both women testified generally that they had seen Adkins “acting suspiciously” in the neighborhood park on the day of his intial contact with police. Large stated that her daughter came home from the park and said that there was “a man down there that was watching her” and who “kept her from going on the slide and freaked her out.” Large aso testified that she approached the man, who tuned out to be Adkins, and asked him ifhe gd a problem. She stated that she asked Adkins why he ‘was talking to her daughter, and Adkins replied that he had asked the girl her name and that hhe knew a gil who lived down the street ffom a few years ago, ‘Taylor stated that her daughter was also playing in the park that day; when Taylor ‘went to the park, she saw a man sitting on the play equipment, and she gathered up her children and brought them home. Later, Taylor had a conversation with Large about the man in the park, and she called the police to report it. Officer Foster testified that he came to bein the park because he had gotten a call rom dispatch regarding a “suspicious incident of a person talking to kids in the park.” Upon arriving at the park, Foster saw Adkins, who was the only person in the park, and conffonted him, Adkins told Foster that he had asked a little git] her name because he thought he =10- ‘CRO6-1082 recognized her. On cross-examination, Foster acknowledged that Adkins had said he was sorry if he caused any alarm, and that he had seemed sincere in that statement. During the guilt phase of Adkinss trial, the trial court had deemed Large and Taylor's testimony inadmissible; however, during sentencing, the court allowed the testimony, informing the jury that the women's testimony was not being offered for the truth of the ‘matter asserted, but instead to explain why Large and Taylor may have subsequently called the police. Regarding Foster’s testimony, the court found that he could “testify 2s to what hhe saw, heard, or experienced. He can’t testify 2s to what other people said to him.” ‘On appeal, Adkins argues that the testimony of Large, Taylor, and Officer Foster was inadmissible hearsay that was not relevant for purposes of sentencing under Ark. Code Ann. {§16-97-103. He contends thatthe State introduced the testimony in an effort to inflame the _jurors by suggesting that he was engaged in improper conduct for which he was not charged and had no real bearing on the issues in the ease. ‘The State responds by asserting thatthe trial court correctly found that the statements were not hearsay, because they were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted This contention is correct; the trial court specifically instructed the jury that Large and ‘Taylor’ testimony was only to be considered to show why the women called the police. However, even ifthe testimony was not hearsay, we must still determine whether it ‘was admissible under Rule 403 — that is, whether its probative value was substantially ‘outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, We conclude that this testimony was not unduly prejudicial. In Crawford v. State, supra, this court held that evidence of subsequent ote CRO6-1082 drug offenses, introduced during the sentencing phase of Crawford's tial for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, was relevant character evidence, Noting that character evidence that might not be admissible at the guilt phase could, under Ark. Code ‘Ann. § 16-97-103(5), be admissible at sentencing, this court determined that evidence of Crawford's subsequent drug activity provided proof of his character and was relevant to the jury's determination of an appropriate punishment, Crawford, 362 Ark. at 306, 208 S.W.34 at 149, Similarly, we conclude that Large and Taylor’ testimony went to Adkins's character, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it. Finally, Adkins challenges the trial court's decision to allow Officer Tom Helmich, of the Rogers Police Department, to testify that Adkins’s pants were unbuttoned and unzipped atthe time of his arest, Adkins maintains that this evidence was irrelevant to the ise of Whether he was guily of the crimes of filure to register asa sex offender and possession of marijuana [At trial, Officer Helmich testified that, on August 12, 2005, he and a police trainee ‘were driving through the Maple Grove Park when they saw two men sitting on a park bench. [Helmich and the other officer drove back by several other times, and the two men were still there, which “seemed odd” in light of some complaints of “some activity in the park.” [Helmich stated that he recognized Adkins and knew him to be a sex offender; Helmich also testified that he knew there “had been some issues with him filing to register.” Helmich then contacted Adkins and also had dispatch check for any warrants on him for the registration issue. 2 CRO6-1082, At this point, Adkins objected and argued to the trial court that Helmich was going to testify that he saw Adkins’ pants unbuttoned and unzipped, and that this testimony would be irrelevant and prejudicial. However, the court overruled Adkins’s objection, and Helmich then proceeded to testify that, as he approached Adkins and Adkins stood up, Helmich noticed something bulging on the sides in front of him and wanted to make sure it wasn'ta ‘weapon. Helmich asked what it was, and Adkins replied that it was just his pants; Adkins lifted his shiet and revealed that his pants were unbuttoned and unzipped. Helmich was concemed as to why Adkins's pants were open, and Adkins said that his pants were too tight, so he unbuttoned them. Helmich also asked if Adkins had anything illegal on him, to which, ‘Adkins said he did not. Helmich then searched Adkins and discovered a marijuana cigarette in his pocket. (On appeal, Adkins argues that this testimony was unduly prejudicial because it “suggest[ed) he was engaged in improper sexual conduct for which he was not charged, and hhad no real bearing on the ultimate issues in the case.” However, Adkins cured any potential prejudice when he cross-examined Helmich. On that cross-examination, Helmich stated that although Adkins’ pants were unbuttoned, he did not observe Adkins “doing anything sexual” with the other man on the bench, and he did not observe “any activity . .. that was of a sexual nature” or see Adkins “doing anything sexual to himself” Helmich stated that, {w]hen he stood up, his pants were unbuttoned, and his explanation was they were too tight; the was sitting down and he had them unbuttoned." 13 (CRO6-1082 Moreover, as the State suggests, the appearance of Adkins’s clothing was relevant to ‘why Helmich searched him in the frst place. As mentioned above, Helmich noticed a bulge in Adkins's clothing and wanted to make sure Adkins was not carrying a weapon. Because ‘Adkins’s appearance was part of the reason Helmich decided to search him, the state of his ‘clothing was arguably relevant to the issue at hand. ae CRO6-1082 

44e6a4463c96f55f50b87bae7a326f27fb0a2a27eb42ddc46d8e51e031ee3c00

2007-10-04T00:00:00Z

024504cc-4975-4ae7-9412-c6b8ab6b16aa

Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Correction

2010 Ark. 129

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS. No. 10-260 JACK HAROLD JONES, Opinion Dativere 31210, APPELLANT/MOVANT, | ition FOR STAY OFEXECUTION vs. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND RAY HOBBS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, APPELLEE/RESPONDENTS, | MOTTON MOOT. PER CURIAM (On March 11, 2010, Jack Harold Jones, Jr. received a stay of execution from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. See Jones v. Hobbs, No. 5:10CV00065 (E.D. Ark) (Document #12) (March 11, 2010). Because this stay is currently in effect, Jones's motion fora stay of execution before this court is moot. wit J., not participating. 

93c862c572a9dc4c43e401204c8d0dc98370fed758e0b7ba905d7b8280a55f85

2010-03-12T00:00:00Z

8d2112c0-2bb8-4fd4-9e4d-a155faa2ba85

In re McIlroy

29526

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29526 a 8 8 = g ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURRENDER LICENSE 33.) Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, upon consideration of Petitioner Robert McTiroy’s Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore, IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the petition IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner McTiroy shall is granted. return his original license to practice law to the Clerk of this The Clerk shall retain the original license as Petitioner McIlroy shall comply with the (ad, tb, court forthwith. part of this record. notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16. I? IS FINALLY OROERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of Robert McIlroy, attorney nunber 1934, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing of this order. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 24, 2008. Peeater £6. rreseey ance Darn e Baby oats 

a26e7bcb6174fa4572a583a9897a61c69f0ac01bffd53f1cb99456493419a876

2008-12-24T00:00:00Z

762914fc-9eaf-47e3-b46e-b08528b527b7

Rebecca R. Price, Individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jessica R. Price, Deceased et al. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc. and Merls Bus Sales

06-1074

arkansas

Arkansas Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, REBECCA R. PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JESSICA R. PRICE, DECEASED, et al, APPELLANTS, vs. ‘THOMAS BUILT BUSES, INC. and MERLS BUS SALES, APPELLEES, 06-1074 opinion Davered June 28, 2007 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BENTON COUNTY, NO. 06-1074, HON. JAY JUDGE, FINCH, CIRCUIT ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Associate Justice ‘On May 19, 2003, a school bus carrying 43 students from the Siloam Springs School District ran off the road, flipped onto its side, and slid down an embankment. One student, Jessica Price, was killed, and ten other students sustained serious injuries. At the time of the accident, the bus was not outfitted with seat belts forall ofits passengers. ‘The specifications governing school bus design promulgated by the Arkansas Department of Education do not include passenger seat belts. Ina suit filed against the school bus manufacturer and distributor, the circuit court entered 4 mmary judgment, dismissing all tort claims based upon the manufacturers filure to provide passenger seatbelts. In so ruling, the court concluded that the General Assembly's decision not to require seat belts in school buses precluded 3 jury from deciding the issue again. Pursuant to the separation-of-powers doctrine, we agree and affirm the circuit court's sumnmary-judgment order. Appellants Rebecca Price, as administratrix of the Estate of Jessica Price, and the parents, as next of friends, of the ten injured students, filed suit against Appellees Thomas Built Buses, Inc, the bus manufacturer, and Mer!'s Bus Sales, the bus retailer." Appellants specifically pleaded that Appellees were negligent (a) in filing to warn the purchasers, users, and riders ofthe bus about the dangers of riding in the bus unrestrained by seatbelts, (b) in failing to test the safety of the bus in side rollover accidents, (€) in failing to create a safer altemative product, and (4) in failing to recall the bus for retrofitting with seat bels. Appellants also asserted claims based on strict lability and breach of express and implied warranties. In a motion for summary judgment, Appellees aserted they could not be held liable for any alleged defect from a lack of seat belts due to their compliance with the Arkansas Department of Education’s specifications for school bus design and safety. Furthermore, according to Appellees, because the General Assembly has declined to require seat belt in school buses, the issue oftheir negligence for filing to outfit the Siloam Springs bus with seat belts was not an issue a jury should decide. After hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that the legislature has spoken to the issue of requiring seat bets on school buses, and it was not appropriate fora jury to be allowed to decide the issue again. (On appeal, Appellants allege three points of error: (I) the circuit court erred in concluding that Appellants were precluded from bringing a tort action against Appellees when Appellees had complied with the federal and state minimum safety standards, (2) the circuit "Appellants did not file any claim against the Siloam Springs School District or the school district's insurance company; nor did they file claims with the Arkansas State Claims Commission. de ‘court erred in concluding that the doctrine of acquired immunity applied to Appellees, and (@) the circuit court erred in deciding that there was no genuine ise of material fet as t0 whether the bus was defective or unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability, ‘whether the lack of seat belts on the bus was the proximate cause of Appellants’ injuries, and ‘whether there was evidence that Appellees breached the express and implied warranties. We have jurisdiction over the instant case because it involves an isue of fint impression and an issue of statutory interpretation, Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (b)(1) & (6) (2007). ‘A party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the afidavits, if any, shows that there is rho genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving patty is entitled to judgment as ‘a matter oflaw” on the isue set forth in the party’s motion. Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 (€)(2) (2007). ‘The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is upon the moving. party. Windsong Enteprises, In. v. Upton, 366 Ark. 23, _S.W.3d___ (2006). On appellate review, we must determine whether summary judgment was proper based on whether the evidence presented by the moving party let a material question of fact unanswered. Id, This court views the proofin the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, resolving any doubts and inferences against the moving party, to determine whether the evidence left a material question of fact unanswered. Id ‘The issues in the instant case necessitate our interpretation of the statutes and regulations governing the design of school buses in Arkansas, ‘This court reviews a circuit ‘court's interpretation ofa statute de nove because itis for this court to determine what a statute 3 ‘means. Morgan v. Chandler, 367 Ark. 430, __S.W.3d (2006). In the absence of a showing that the circuit court erred, however, this court will accept the circuit court's interpretation as correct on appeal. Id. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent ofthe legislature. Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205 $.W.3d 767 (2005). ‘Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine the intent from the ordinary meaning ofthe language wed. Id, We construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. When a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to legislative intent. Id. ‘Then, our review becomes an examination of the whole act, reconciling the provisions to make them, consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Id. We must ako look atthe legislative history, the language and the subject matter involved, Id. Similar rules of construction apply to the interpretation of rules and regulations. See, e.., Srcelinv Hays, 332 Ark. 270, 965 S.W.24 103 (1998). Under the Arkansas Constitution Article 14 § 4, the General Assembly is vested with the “supervision of public schools, and the execution of laws governing the same.” Ark, Const. art. 14 § 14. The General Assembly has given the State Board of Education the authority to “adopt and enforce regulations . . . to govern the design and operation of all school buses used for the transportation of school children . ... and] such regulations shall by reference be made a part of any contract with a school district.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19- 111 (a)-(o) (Repl. 1999). Individual school districts are authorized to use district funds to purchase buses or transporting students to school asthe districts deem best, “affording safe and. +  convenient transportation to the pupils.” Ark, Code Ann, § 6-19-102 (a)-(b) (Repl. 1999). More specifically, the buses “shall be of such specifiations as may be prescribed by uniform rules and regulations of the State Board of Education.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-9-102 (e) (Repl. 1999) (emphasis added). ‘When purchasing a school bus, a school district must solicit bids from sellers, and the local school board has the exchisive jurisdiction to make bus purchases. Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-304 (a) & (b)(1) (Supp. 2005). However, under section § 6-21-304 (b) (2) & (3), the Department of Education, in consultation with a committee of school administrators, “shall be responsible for drawing up the minimum specifications for all school buses,” and under section § 6-19-102 , any bus purchased by a school board “shall be ofsuch specifications.” ‘See Atk. Code Ann. §§ 6-21-304 (b)(2) & (3) and 619-102 (¢) (Repl. 1999 & Supp. 2008). ‘The Arkansas Department of Education's specification for passenger seating design states that “fall seats... must comply with all requirements of FMVSS 222.” THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION RULES FOR THE SPECIFICATIONS GOVERNING. SCHOOL BUS DESIGN, § 63.00 (Mar. 2004), FMVSS 222 is a federal safety standard promulgated pursuant to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act (FMVSA), see 49 US.C § 3010, et seq (2000), that provides occupant protection requirements for school bus seating and restraining bartiers, See 49 C.E.R. § 571.222, S1 (2006). Although FMVSS 222 sets out restraining-barrier and impact-zone requirements, it does not address seat bet for school bus pasiengers. See 49 CLR. § 571.222 (2006). Appellants nonetheless suggest that the Department of Education only promulgates Se “minimum specifications” for school bus design, and that, although a bus manufacturer must ‘comply with the minimum specifications, nothing precludes manuficturers fom exceeding those specifications. Appellants point out that, because the General Assembly has not spoken to the issue of seat belts on school buses, the legislature did not prevent bus manufacturers from exceeding the minimum specifications by installing seat belts. They also point out that the federal courts have not interpreted the Federal Motor Safety Vehicle Act as preempting common-law tort claims against manufacturers. Instead, the federal courts have held that compliance with minimum standards only constitutes evidence of ordinary cate. See Geer. American Honda Motor Co., Inc, 529 US. 861 (2000); Hanis v. Great Dane Trailers, In, 234 F.3d 398 (8th Cir, 2000). Accordingly, Appellants assert that a plaintiff should be able to bring a common-law action against a manufieturer when safety measures beyond the ‘minimum would have better protected passengers from injury. Appellees, onthe other hand, insist that the General Assembly has repeatedly addressed the issue of mandatory seat bets in school buses, deciding each time not to require seat beks. [Appellees alo point out that the term “specification” isnot equivalent tothe term “standard” — that is, standards are aspirational in nature, whereas specifications are detailed technical descriptions of design requirements. According to Appellees, the Department of Education, {snot common consumer thats ignorant concerning bus safety features, and, therefore, bus ‘manufacturers may not deviate from the exact specifications set out by the department absent ‘consumer’ contrary request. Because Appellees assert that the legislature has spoken to the issue of mandatory seat belts in school buses, they claim that the judicial branch would violate 6- the separation-of-powers doctrine by deciding the question again. Although the statutes and regulations conceming school-bus designs are silent with regard to seat belts in school buses, the language of the act read as a whole indicates that a ‘manufacturer must comply with the specifications set out by the Department of Education. Specifications are defined as “a technical description or other description of the physical or fanctional characteristics of a commodity.” Ark, Code Ann. § 6-21-304 (a)(B)() (Supp. 2005). Any contract for the purchase of a school bus in Arkansas must contain the specifications promulgated by the Department of Education— that is, the bus must contain features that comply with the Department's technical descriptions. ‘The term standards, on the other hand, means an “object or quality or measure serving a a bass or example or degree of excellence.” OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2d Ed. 814 (2001), ‘Thus, contrary tothe federal governments decision to adopt “standards” through the FMVSS, ‘which serve asa bass and example for school bus design, the Arkansas legislature has chosen, to adopt particular specifications that will dictate the exact physical characteristics ofall school buses in Arkansas. Appellants assert that, because Arkansas has adopted the standards under FMVSS 222 by reference, the General Assembly intended to adopt the federal courts’ approach that compliance with minimum standards does not preclude common-law actions. Appellants, however, fail to recognize that the Department of Education has adopted the safety requirements under FMVSS 2s a mandatory specification for Arkansas school buses: ‘These rules are enacted pursuant to the authority under Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-304 .... It is the purpose of these rules to 2 ‘establish specifications governing school bus design forthe State ‘of Arkansas... . All seats shall have a minimum cushion depth ‘of 15 inches and must comply with all requirements of FMVSS, 222. School bus design capacities shall be in accordance with FMVSS 222 ..... All school buses (Including Type ‘A’) shal be ‘equipped with restraining baniers which conform to FMVSS 222. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION RULES FOR THE SPECIFICATIONS GOVERNING SCHOOL BUS DESIGN, §§ 1.02, 2.01, 63.01 & 63.06 (Mar. 2004) (emphasis added). Appellants farther confuse the federal statutory scheme with our own when they assert that our legislature, like Congress, did not intend to preclude common-law actions against ‘manufacturers that have complied with the minimum specifications. The federal courts have held that Congress did not intend for common-law actions to be precluded in such cases because Congress included a savings clause in the MVSA that expressly states “[cJompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempta person from lability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (¢) 2000). In contrast, no such savings clauses included in Arkansas's statutory scheme. Also, while Appellants cite to an Oklahoma «ease as support for their proposition, the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals centered con the issue of preemption under the federal at, an issue not argued by either party in this case, See Attocknie v. Carpenter Manufacturing, In, 901 P.2d 221 (Okla, Civ. App. 1995) ‘To the extent that any ambiguity may exist in the meaning of our state's school-bus safety statutes, it is laid to rest by the legislative history surrounding the issue of seat bets in school buses. In 1931, school districts were granted the authority to purchase school buses for the safe and convenient transportation of students to school, and, in 1937, the legislature gave the Department of Education the authority to promulgate regulations governing the 8 design of school buses. See Popes Digest § 675%(a) (1937); see also 1937 Ark. Acts 300 § 102 and 1931 Ark, Acts 169 § 102, From that point on, the Department of Education has never required passenger seat belts on school buses. In 1984, following a school-bus accident near Newport, the General Assembly's Legislative Council issued a report entitled “Feasibility of Requiring School Districts to Install Seat Belts on School Buses.” After discussing several national studies on the issue of ‘mandatory passenger seat belts on school buses, the Council made a detailed lst of the pros and cons for requiring seatbelts in Arkansas school buses. STATE OF ARKANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FEASIBILITY OF REQUIRING SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO INSTALL SEAT BELTS ON ScHOOL BUSES (Sept. 20, 1984). On the pro side, the Council found only two factors supporting the use of seat belts in buses, (1) riders would be better off restrained than ‘unrestrained in accidents where the bus rolls over, crashes into another object, or stops suddenly and (2) because seatbelts are required in cars, seatbelts on buses would encourage the habit of buckling-up in school children. Id. at7. On the con side, however, the Council found several reasons that militate against requiring seat belts on buses, including: (1) the increased danger that a small child would be trapped by his oF her seat belt in a erash; (2) students could use seat belts as weapons, increasing the risk of accidental injury; (3) seat belts ‘would require an asistant to the driver, thus increasing costs; (4) monitors would be required to ensure that the students wore their belts property; (5) seat belts would be vandalized, increasing replacement expenses; (6) seat belts would result in a 60% los of passenger seating ‘capacity, necesitating the purchase of more buses; (7) seat belts do not protect a student's 9 hiead, neck, ices, and upper torso from injury; (8) some seat belt designs could cause injuries to young students immature anatomies ina erash; and (9) lability insurance forthe use of seat belts could be excessive. Id, t 7-8. The Legislative Council concluded thatthe installation ‘of seat belts in school buses should not be mandated by the legislature. Id. at 8-9. ‘Then, in 1985, the legislature enacted legislation requiring school bus drivers to wear seat belts; but, in accordance with the Legislative Council’s recommendation, the legislature <i not mandate the same for school bus pasengers. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19-109 (Repl 1999); 1985 Ark. Acts 757 § 5. ‘The General Assembly considered the issue of passenger seat belts on school buses again in 2001, but the proposed bill, which would have mandated seat belt in all school buses purchased after January 1, 2003, died in committee. 2001 Ark. HLB, 1134. Based upon the legislature's extensive involvement in the regulation of school-bus ‘design and the legislature's repeated consideration of mandatory seat belts in school buses, we ‘conclude that the legislature has indeed spoken on the issue of whether manufacturers should include seat bels in theie bus designs. ‘The Supreme Court of Alabama considered a case involving similar issues in Denton v, Eidins & Lee Bus Sales, In, 491 So.24 942 (1986). In that ease, the plaintiff alleged that, although the Alabama legislature had not mandated seat belts on school buses, the legisature had not conclusively determined that a manufacturer or seller that distributed buses without seat belts could not be held liable under products-lability law. Id, Despite the absence of legislative history for the Alibama court to consider, the ‘court conchided that when the legislature decided to require seat belts for schoo! bus drivers, “10. the legislature ako considered the isue of passenger scat belts. Id. Thus, the Alabama court held that the legislature had impliedly decided that seat belts were not required in school buses, and a manufacturer could not be held liable under products-liability law for filing to install seat belts in school buses. Id Here, as in Dentson, the General Assembly has decided to require seat belts for school bus drivers but not for passengers. See Ark, Code Ann. § 6-19-109 (Repl. 1999). In ‘Dentson, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature's decision to require driver seatbelts reflected an implied intent to relieve manufacturers of lability for buses not ‘outfitted with passenger seat belts In this case, we have clear evidence, in the form of the 1984 report by the Legislative Council and the legislation following that report, that the legislature has caefilly considered the sue of mandating passenger seat belt in school buses but repeatedly declined to do so Based upon the statutory and regulatory framework governing the specifications for school bus design in Arkansas, we conclude that the Arkansas General Assembly has afirmatively decided not to require passenger seat belts in school buses, In fact, the General ‘Assembly has expressly stated that the specifications adopted by the Department of Education ‘must be a part of every school bus contract in Arkansas. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19-102 (@) (Repl. 1999), ‘Thus, a manufacturer must comply with those specifications. We hold that the General Assembly has thereby preempted any common-law tort claims against school bus ‘manufacturers that have complied with the Department of Education's design specifications. Ifwe were to hold otherwise, we would risk violating the separation-of-powers doctrine by ole deciding a public policy question over which the General Assembly has already affirmatively exercised its authority, For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’ summary-judgment order? Affirmed. 2 tm view of our holding tht an action cannot be maintained against the school bus smanuficturer and dsuibutor, we need not addes the osher points on zppeal 2 

23336d1ac1d01a74a5157bec6e90ec8c278f1ef4b1cc4862cb529adf98fd054e

2007-06-28T00:00:00Z

b2415988-37c8-4960-aac0-782e12806e79

Blaisdell v. State

29514

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29514 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I RICHARD BLAISDELL, Petitioner, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent. 2 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING s ‘ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Petitioner Richard Blaisdell, by papers dated December 8, 2008, petitions this court to invoke its original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to HRS § 660-3 (1993). The relief requested in the December 8, 2008 papers is the same relief that petitioner requested in papers dated October 25, 2008 and filed with this court in No. 29458. We disposed of No. 29458 on November 12, 2008 by denying petitioner habeas corpus relief, without prejudice te seeking such relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3. ‘Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall file petitioner's December 8, 2008 papers as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without payment of the filing fee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, De ass 

fd33ea2456557fc398914b37d36a5f07a29154f6ad8b3b721b690b71b14babc7

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

0fb9b87a-eee0-4459-90b7-34b2c2e7f62e

In re Boyce

29509

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29509 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAW 3 IN RE LEROY C. BOYCE, Petitioner. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURREND! (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. upon consideration of Petitioner LeRoy C. Boyce’s Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. IT TS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Boyce shall return his original license to’ practice law to the Clerk of this court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original license as part of this record. Petitioner Boyce shall comply with the notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (b), (4), and (g) of RSCH 2.16. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of LeRoy Clifford Boyce, attorney number 3544, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai'l, effective with the filing of this order. DATE! Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 22, 2008. 

c13bfed233d5d96d1ac6c2678f680660db30fd91d7a64f3fc7fba754e04a4f8d

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

ff919e11-e86c-4e4d-ba10-ec94fc38f6d5

In re Fisher

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29510 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T IN RE SHERES MICHELLE FISHER, Petitioner ORIGINAL PROCEEDING TITION TO RESIGN AND (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. upon coneideration of Petitioner Sheree Michelle Fisher's Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Fisher shall return her original license to practice law tothe Clerk of this court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original License 2s part of this record. Petitioner Fisher shall comply with the notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (bl, (a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of Sheree Michelle Fisher, attorney number 6396, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing of this order. Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 22, 2008. aad 

f219204c31d2807d0cfdf4f16a2a2d331abb43176af6a3ad23514fdfb43bfffb

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

5fd3e081-8a1d-4123-89fc-5fccb1946e85

Tataii v. Cronin.

119 Haw. 337

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY on ILICATION. i oo IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T ---000- STEVE TATAII, Plaintiff, KEVIN B. CRONIN, the State of Hawai'i and NETL ABE: omg No. 29477 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING s DECEMBER 16, 2008 MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. Pex Curiam. In this original proceeding, plaintiff Steve Tataii, an unsuccessful congressional candidate in the November 4, 2008 general election, challenged, pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 11-172 (1993)! and HRS § 11- 174.5 (Supp. 2007)%, the election results for the first HRS § 11-172 (1993) Contests for cause; generally. With respect to any election, any candidate, or qualified political party directly interested, or any thirty voters of ‘any election district, may file @ complaint in the supreme court. The complaint shall set forth any cause or causes, such as but not limited to, provable fraud, overages, or underages, that could cause a difference in the election results. The complaint shall also set forth any reasons for reversing, correcting, or changing the decisions of the precinct officials or the officials at a counting center in Sn election using the electronic voting system. A copy of the complaint shall be delivered to the chief election officer of the clerk in the case of county elections. * RS § 11-174.5 (Supp. 2007) Contests for cause in general, special general, special, and runoff elections fa) In general, special general, special, or runoff elections, the complaint shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of the supreme court not later than 4:30 p.m. on the twentieth day following the general, special general, special, of runoff election and shall be accompanied by a (continued...)  FOR PUBLI WAT! WIC a congressional district seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Pursuant to HRS § 11-174.5(b), we issued, concurrently with this opinion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in favor of defendant chief election officer Kevin Cronin and defendant Neil Abercrombie and against plaintiff Tataii We hold that: (1) plaintig£ Tataii’s election contest complaint, filed after 4:30 p.m. on the twentieth day following the November 4, 2008 general election, was filed within the time provision of HRS § 11-174.5(a); and (2) plaintiff Tataii failed (.. continued) deposit for costs of court as established by rules of the suprene court. The clerk shall issue to the defendants named in the complaint a summons to appear before the suprene court not later than 4:30 p.m. on the tenth day after service thereof. (b) In cases involving general, special general, special, or runoff elections the complaint shall be heard by the suprene court in which the complaint was filed as soon as it reasonably may be heard. On the return day, the Court, upon its motion or otherwise, may direct summons to be isfued to any person who may be interested in the result of the proceedings. ‘At the hearing, the court shall cause the evidence to be reduced to writing and shall give judgment, stating all findings of fact and of law. The judgment may invalidate the general, special generai, special, or runoff election on the grounds’ that a correct result cannot be ascertained because of a mistake or fraud on the part of the precinct officials: or decide that a certain candidate, or certain candidates, received a majority or plurality of votes cast and were elected. If the Judgnent Should be that che general, special general, special, or runoff election was invalid, a\certitied copy thereof shall be filed with the governor, and the governor shall duly call a new election to be held not later than one hundred twenty days after the judgment is filed. If the court shall decide which Candidate or candidates have been elected, a copy of that judgment shail be served on the chief election officer or Gounty clerk, who shall sign and deliver to the candidate or candidates certificates of election, and the same shall be Conclusive of the right of the candidate or candidates to the offices. _*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATL REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** to meet his burden of demonstrating errors, mistakes, or irregularities that could cause a difference in the election results. 1. Background Plaintiff Tataii was the Republican candidate in the November 4, 2008 general election for the office of U.S. Representative, District I. The election results for that office were: (1) Neil Abercrombie (0): 154,208 votes; (2) Steve Tataii (R): 38,118 votes? and (3) Li Zhao (L): 7,594 votes. Plaintiff Tataii challenged the above results by filing an election contest complaint pursuant to HRS §§ 2 -172 and 11- 174.5. The complaint was filed in the supreme court on Novenber 24, 2008 at 4:32 p.m. The complaint alleged tha (2) defendant Neil Abercrombie, despite representations that he would participate in pre-election debates with plaintiff Tataii, refused to debate plaintiff Tataiis (2) the absence of debates left Hawai's voters “in (the] dark about which candidate {was} the best choice”? (3) plaintiff Tatail’s 38,115 votes “could have been considerably higher if debates had taken place”; and (4) defendant Abercrombie’ s refusal to debate caused plaintiff Tataii to lose the election. Plaintiff Tataii sought a judgment from this court ordering a new election for the office of U.S. Representative, District I and ordering defendant Abercrombie to participate in a series of televised debates with plaintiff Tataii prior to a new election. Defendant Abercrombie moved to dismiss the complaint  (TER for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and as untimely filed after 4:30 p.m. on November 24, 2008. Defendant Cronin also moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and noted that this court acked jurisdiction over this proceeding “unless [this court) determine [4] that the 4:30 p.m. deadline [prescribed by HRS § 11-174.5(a)] is dizectory as opposed to mandatory.” Ii. Discussion A. The 4:30 P.M. Provision of HRS § 11-174 Dixectory. Plaintiff Tataii filed his election contest complaint in the supreme court at 4:32 p.m. on November 24, 2008, the twentieth day after the Novenber 4, 2008 general election. HRS § 11-174.5(a) provides that the complaint “shall be filed [in the suprene court] not later than 4:30 p.m. on the twentieth day fo! wing the general . . . election{.J.” “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous that a specific time provision must be met, it is mandatory and not merely directory.” Coon v. City and County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 255, 47 P.3d 348, 370 (2002) (quoting State v. Himuro, 70 Haw. 103, 105, 761 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1988). “We have also recognized, however, that while the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as mandatory, in certain situations it may be given a directory meaning.” Coon, 96 Hawai'i at 256, 47 P.3d at 371 (quoting Himuro, 70 Haw. at 105, 761 P.2d at 1149). “In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, the intent of the legislature must be ascertained.” 4 a “ATION IN HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Himuro, 70 Haw, at 105, 761 P.2d at 1149 (citing Jack Endo Electric, Inc. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 59 Haw. 612, 617, 585 P.2d 1265, 1269 (1978). “The legislative intent may be determined fron ‘a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.'” Id. (ellipsis omitted). “we are also mindful that ‘our primary duty in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which, in the absence of a clearly contrary expression is conclusively obtained by the language of the statute itself.” Id. (ellipsis and citation omitted) . As to the time provisions of HRS § 11-174.5(a), the twenty-day provision 1s clear and must be given a mandatory reading. A directory reading of the “no later than 4:30 p.m.” provision as being tantamount to “the close of business” would not be contrary to the legislature's intent to restrict the period for a general election challenge to twenty days and the consequences of @ directory reading of the 4:30 p.m. provision Would not extend the period for a general election challenge beyond twenty days and would not confound the statutory schene of HRS § 11-174.5(a). We hold that the twenty-day provision of HRS § 11-174.5(a) is mandatory and the “no later than 4:30 p.m.” provision of HRS § 11-174.5(a) is directory. Plaintiff Tataii’s complaint filed at 4:32 p.m. on Novenber 24, 2008 was filed within the time provision of HRS § 11-174.5(a). tee . "$ HAWAII " ORTER*** Denonstrath Tereaul That Could Cause A Difference In The Election Resulta, An election contest complaint “shall set forth any cause or causes, such as but not limited to, provable fraud, overages, or underages, that could cause a difference in the election results.” HRS § 11-172. “A complaint challenging the results of (a general] election pursuant to HRS § 11-172 fails to state a claim unless the plaintiffs demonstrate errors that would change the outcome of the election(.]” Akaka v, Yoshina, 64 Hawai"i 363, 387, 935 P.2d 98, 102 (1997) (citing Elking vs Ariyoshi, 56 Haw. 47, 48, 527 P.2d 236, 237 (1974) and Funakoshi vsKing, 65 Haw. 312, 317, 651 P.2d 912, 915 (1982) (**Difference in the election results’ in [HRS § 11-172] mean[s] a difference sufficient to overturn the nomination of any particular candidate or candidates in the primary.”)). [The (plaintift) must show that he or she has actual information of mistakes or errors sufficient to change the result. The [plaintiff] has the burden of demonstrating that the specific acts and conduct of which [he or she] complain[s] would have had the effect of changing the Eesults. in the absence of facts showing that irregularities exceed the reported margin between the candidates, the complaint is legally insufficient because, even if its truth were assumed, the result Of the election would not be affected. It is not sufficient that the [plaintif#] points to a poorly run and inadequatels Supervised election process that evinces room for abuse or possibilities of fraud. An election contest cannot be based upon mere belief or indefinite information... Akaka v. Yoshina, 84 Hawai'i at 387-388, 935 P.2d at 102-103, 6 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * (internal quotation marks, internal brackets, and citations omitted). Upon considering a complaint contesting a general election, this court “may invalidate the general . . . election on the grounds that a correct result cannot be ascertained because of a mistake or fraud on the part of the precinct officials; or decide that a certain candidate, or certain candidates, received a majority or plurality of votes cast and were elected." HRS § 11-174.5(b). When reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief, AELv. Bosque, 110 Hawai'i 318, 321, 132 P.3d 1229, 1232 (2006). ‘The court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings converts a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Buscher v, Boning, 114 Hawas'i 202, 212, 159 P.3d 814, 824 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, Silva y, City and County of Honolulu, 115 Hawai'i 1, 6, 165 P.2d 247, 252 (2007). Plaintiff Tataii made no showing that defendant Abercrombie was under any obligation to debate plaintiff Tataii. ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ‘Therefore, the refusal to debate was not an error, mistake, or irregularity that would change the results of the election for £ Tataii vu ve, District I. We hold that plaint = Represen’ failed to meet his burden of demonstrating errors, mistakes, or irregularities that could cause a difference in the election results. The renedy of ordering 2 new election with televised debates was not authorized by HRS § 11-174.5(b). steve Tataii plaintiff pro se Gor Aaron #. Schulaner - for defendant Bt inee— Kevin 8. Cronin Corianne W. Lau and Pesta Ene (ae EL Shannon M-i, Lau (of Aleson Hun! Floya & Ing) for defendant Neil Abercrombie Kane. Rul tr 

f4b61231202daae5377ef8aba40c06c38c8ebfc562a74afac90a0d9095528e9c

2008-12-16T00:00:00Z

f52e03a0-3a6c-45fe-8bf6-800cfeff911f

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Chun

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 29333 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T OFFICE OF DISGIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, a TERRIE CHUN, Respondent Wavy 1 VHRON uv ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (Dc 08-049-8692) @2+1 K4 C- 24 eud RECIPROCAL SUSPENSION ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel's ex parte petition for issuance of reciprocal dis notice to Respondent Terrie Chun, pursuant to Rule 2.15(b) of the Rules of the Suprene Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), the memorandun, affidavits, and exhibits thereto, and the record, it appears that: (1) on April 15, 2008, the Supreme Court of California suspended Respondent Chun for two years for her violation of Rule 3+-110(R) (failing to act competently) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct? (2) RSCH 2.15(b) requires issuance of notice and entry of an order imposing the same or substantially equivalent discipline, or restrictions or conditions upon the attorney's license to practice law in the State of Hawai'i, unless Respondent Chun shall show cause under RSCH 2.15(c) as to why imposition of the same or substantially equivalent discipline should not be imposed; (3) Respondent Chun did not respond to our Septenber 15, 2008 notice and order to show cause; and (4) a similar discipline in this jurisdiction is suspension for two years. Therefore, aa ID 1s |EREBY ORDERED that Respondent Terrie Chun i: suspended in the State of Hawai'i for two years. Notwithstanding RSCH 2.16(c), Respondent Chun’s suspension is effective upon entry of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Chun’ s reinstatement in the State of Hawai'i is conditioned (1) upon Payment of all costs of this proceeding, and (2) compliance with the conditions imposed by the Suprene Court of California. DATED: Honclulu, Hawai'i, December 3, 2008. hhc HeCcrnse Pracetes Naat tee BN Ga kts 

59fa72b04b7feb681f2d10cfc1a2ee810f3a6ec7cdd437784f39b62b0e0f8284

2008-12-03T00:00:00Z

9385771f-7355-4f4f-9cda-80a60b354068

Eline v. Frank

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

Wo, 29487 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I RICHARD C. ELINE, Petitioner, 61 230 6002 CLAYTON FRANK, Respondent a0 3 SHAY ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Sie ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of Richard C. Eline's petition for a weit of habeas corpus, it appears that habeas corpus relief is available to petitioner in the circuit court and petitioner presents no special reason for invoking the supreme court’ s original jurisdiction. See Qiliv, Chang, 57 Haw. 511, 512, 557 P.2d 787, 788 (1976). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall process the petition for writ of habeas corpus without payment of the filing fees. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to seeking habeas corpus relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3 (2993). DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 19, 2008. Spr ah licaI haste Psa Cadtoe ee aD Gore Kutt dy 

3dec9d790421c6340a6e57f9c8615a47d3f3fad68a16f26e42e013501a83aee6

2008-12-19T00:00:00Z

18cdf398-6b7a-4a19-89f2-a4b5aef70574

PIERCE v. THE STATE

S09A0663

georgia

Georgia Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: NOV 23 2008 090663. PIERCE v. THE STATE. NAHMIAS, Justice. In 2005, a Cobb County jury convicted Baretta Harold Pierce of felony ‘murder and other crimes arising out of the shaking death of her gitlfriend’s four- month-old baby, Donte West (Donte). The trial court denied Pierce's motion for new trial, and Pierce appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm,’ 1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed the following. Pierce met Candis West, Donte’s mother, in * Pierce committed her erimes on January 24, 2004. The Cobb County grand jury indicted hheron October 7, 2004. At the conclusion ofa jury trial conducted on October 19-25, 2008, the jury acquitted Pierce of malice murder but convicted her of two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated battery, and one count of cruelty to achild inthe first degree. ‘The second felony murder ‘conviction, one of the aggravated battery convictions, and the cruelty to a child inthe first degree conviction merged into the first felony murder conviction. The trial court sentenced Pierce on October 25, 2005, to life in prison for felony murder plus 15 years consecutive for aggravated battery. Pierce filed a motion for new trial on October 28, 2005, and a supplemental motion on, March 8, 2007, Following a hearing on March 27, 2008, the trial court denied the motion on April 10, 2008. Pierce filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals on May 2, 2008, and an amended notice of appeal on August 26, 2008, The Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to this Court on January6,2009. The case was docketed inthis Court on January 7,2009, and submitted for decision, ‘on the briefS on March 2, 2008. carly 2003 when West was three months pregnant with Donte. Pierce and West became romantically involved, and a month later, Pierce moved in with West. Pierce was abusive, both verbally and physically, throughout West’s pregnancy, and she actively worked to isolate West from her family. Donte was born six weeks premature, weighing just three pounds, 19 ounces. Pierce and West were eventually able to take Donte home from the hospital, and Pierce’s domineering, abusive treatment of West was thereafter visited on Donte as well. Pierce would yell and curse at the infant for crying, pick him up by his pajama collar, spank him on the leg, and shake him. Pierce prevented West from holding or nurturing her infant son, saying that it would spoil him and turn him into a “punk.” The abuse continued for several months. On the morning of January 24, 2004, Donte was especially fussy, cried much, and refused to eat. Irritated by his crying, Pierce demanded that West “shut him up, put his pacifier in his mouth, try to feed him.” West readied Donte for daycare at Carla Echols’s apartment, and Pierce drove West to work before heading to Echols’s apartment to drop off Donte. Echols saw Pierce drive into the apartment complex’s parking lot. Five or six minutes later, Pierce called Echols and told her that Donte would not 2 wake up. When Echols arrived at the car, Pierce was removing Donte from his, car seat. According to Echols, Donte was “just limp” and “gasping for air.” Pierce did not try CPR or ask Echols to call 911. Instead, she worried that the Department of Family and Children Services would be notified, Donte was nauseous, unresponsive, and slipping in and out of consciousness, and he eventually became comatose. Echols’s daughter called 911, and Donte was rushed to Scottish Rite Hospital. Donte suffered several seizures in the ambulance. At the hospital, the medical staff found that Donte had suffered severe brain damage. There was bleeding in his head, around the brain, and in all three layers of his retina. He also had extensive and severe optic nerve edema, or swelling. Both his legs were broken, Donte died two-and-a-half weeks later when life support was withdrawn. He was just four months old, After conducting an autopsy, the medical examiner concluded that Donte died from hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy caused by violent shaking, or shaken baby syndrome. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Pierce guilty beyond a 3 reasonable doubt of the crimes for which she was convicted. See Jackson v, Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2. Pierce contends that her convictions must be reversed because the State suppressed color photos of Donte’s autopsy, which she claims were exculpatory evidence under Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (83S. Ct. 1194, 10L. Ed. 2d 215) (1963). Pierce complains that the State turned over only black and white copies, not color copies, which prevented the defense’s consulting, forensic pathologist from being able to determine the time frames in which Donte’s various injuries were sustained. Pierce claims that had the color copies been made available to her, her consultant would have testified at trial and made a compelling argument that Donte’s injuries occurred in the hospital and not while he was with Pierce, To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that: (1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not obtain it through reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 622 4 (680 SE2d 850) (2009). However, Pierce did not raise a Brady claim at trial or in her motion for new trial, and she has therefore waived the right to raise this objection on appeal. Jones v, State, 258 Ga. 249, 249 (368 SE2d 313) (1988). Even if we overlooked Pierce's waiver, the claim fails on the merits. First, Pierce did not show that the State suppressed the autopsy photos. Instead, the iscovery certificate attached to the State’s supplemental disclosure stated clearly that copies of the autopsy photos were being provided to the defense and that the original autopsy photos were available for viewing. Pierce's failure to examine the originals made available to her cannot be held against the State. Second, even if the color versions of the photos had been suppressed, Pierce has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that their disclosure to the defense would have altered the outcome of her trial ~ a conclusion also dispositive of her related ineffective assistance of counsel claim discussed below. Pierce argues that: (1) if her consulting forensic pathologist had been able to review the color photos, he would have been better able to determine when the infant's various injuries were inflicted; (2) trial counsel ‘would have then placed the consultant on the stand at trial, and he would have opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injuries that led to 5  Donte’s death were inflicted at a time when the baby was not in Pierce’s care; and (3) this opinion testimony would have been so compelling that it would have convinced at least one juror to acquit. The recitation of Pierce's line of argument reveals its entirely speculative nature. Moreover, the affidavit from Pierce’s consulting forensic pathologist is, to say the least, unconvincing. The affiant’s qualifications to offer expert testimony in a case of this type are dubious.’ The opinions he offers in his affidavit are inconclusive. The most he is willing to commit to is that “the injury more probably occurred on January 21, 2004,” not three days later as the prosecution contended at trial; that it is “conceivable” that Donte could have been hurt by his mother because she was under great stress; and that the chronology from the hospital “points to the baby-sitter as the perpetrator.” Furthermore, the time line recited in the affidavit is contradicted by the time line of events as established by the record evidence, and at some points in the ? The defense’s consultant, who styles himself “Robert Goldberg M.D., J.D." and claims to bbe an expert forensic pathologist, isnot, in fat, licensed to practice medicine in the United States, ‘nor, a far as we can tll from the record, is he licensed to practice law inthe United States, He did not complete an accredited pathology program, which takes four years, and he does not have the training necessary to become a forensic pathologist. Nevertheless, because he is referred to as a “forensic pathologist” in the record and Pierce’s brief on appeal, we refer to him in that manner throughout this opinion. affidavit, the affiant appears to have confused Pierce and her girlfriend, Donte’s mother. Finally, the affidavit does not rule out the possibility that Pierce inflicted Donte’s fatal injuries, as the jury found. In fact, the lead prosecutor submitted an affidavit in connection with the motion for new trial stating that he had personally spoken to the defense's consulting forensic pathologist before Pierce’s trial to determine the subject ‘matter of his potential testimony. According to the lead prosecutor, in response, the consultant “vehemently insisted” that he would not be called by Pierce to testify at trial, he “laughed a little bit,” and he then “stated firmly that he actually agreed with the State’s doctors’ reports and the theory of our case, ie., that per the timeline of events and the medical evidence, the Defendant was the person that committed the act that killed D[o}nte West.” In sum, given the speculative nature of Pierce's argument for materiality and the weakness of the evidence she offered in support of it, in contrast to the strength of the evidence against her, she failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that obtaining the color copies of the autopsy photos would have changed the outcome of her trial. 3. Pierce claims that her convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred in allowing into evidence four supposedly inflammatory, prejudicial, 7 and duplicative photos of Donte in the hospital. She asserts that because the baby’s injuries were all internal, the photos could not assist the jury by showing the location and nature of his injuries, Pierce’s argument is based on a false premise. The fact that Donte did not have external injuries bolstered the State's argument that he died from shaken baby syndrome rather than some other cause, Accordingly, the photos could assist the jury in determining the nature and location of Donte’s injuries, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. See Bradley v. State, 281 Ga. 173, 174 (637 SE2d 19) (2006). 4. Pierce argues that the trial court erred in denying her claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally evaluated under the two-part test established in Strickland v, Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674) (2004). To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that, but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id, at 687- 696; Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 855 (622 SE2d 1) (2005). We need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient if we determine that the prejudice prong is not satisfied in any event. Jackson v, State, 282 Ga. 494, 497 (651 SE2d 702) (2007). The general requirement is that the defendant must “affirmatively prove” prejudice, because “attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Consequently, mere speculation on the defendant's partis insufficient to establish Strickland prejudice, see Cormier v. State, 277 Ga, 607, 608 (592 SE2d 841) (2004), and counsel’s failure to raise a claim that is meritlessis, by definition, not prejudicial, Hampton v, State, 282 Ga. 490, 492 (651 SE2d 698) (2007). Pierce contends her trial counsel's performance was prejudicially unprofessional in three respects. First, she points to trial counsel's failure to obtain the color copies of the autopsy photos. Second, she alleges inadequate investigation in waiting until 18 months after the crimes took place to secure funds from the court to hire an investigator. These two claims are plainly meritless. As explained in the discussion of her Brady claim in Division 2 above, Pierce has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the ‘outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to her had trial counsel 9 obtained color copies of the autopsy photos. Similarly, Pierce has failed to allege, much less show, any harm to her defense from trial counsel’s alleged undue delay in seeking funds from the trial court to hire an investigator. Pierce’s failure to show Strickland prejudice is fatal to these two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Pierce's third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves trial counsel’s failure to object, under Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69) (1986), to the State’s alleged racially discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes to obtain the all-white jury that convicted Pierce. In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court stated that Pierce “failed to provide any evidence as to the composition of the jury pool or the jury in this case,” and that “[wJithout such evidence, it is impossible to tell whether (trial counsel’s] failure to raise a Batson challenge prejudiced the defense.” The trial court's summary of the record evidence, however, is not entirely accurate, ‘At the motion for new trial hearing, Pierce presented testimony from her trial counsel, Kevin Joseph Rodgers, as well as the notes Rodgers took during voir dire, Rodgers testified that his failure to raise a Batson claim at trial was nota strategic decision, explaining that he intended to object but “just forgot to 10 keep track of it” after the third or fourth potential juror was questioned, On the merits of the Batson issue, Rodgers testified that “[iJt’s hard to find a black juror in Cobb County.” While he recalled that there were “five or six” African- Americans among the 46 potential jurors questioned in voir dire (even though his incomplete notes only indicated two African-Americans in the pool), no African-Americans were selected to serve on the jury. Thus, Pierce did present some evidence regarding the racial composition of both the jury pool and the 12 jurors and two alternates chosen to try her. Nevertheless, we will affirm the trial court’s denial of Pierce’s motion for new trial under the “right for any reason” rule if, despite its erroneous statement, the ultimate judgment was correct. See Abdulkadirv. State, 279 Ga, 122, 125 n.16 (610 SE2d 50) (2005), To succeed on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Pierce was required to show not only that trial counsel should have raised a Batson challenge, but also that the challenge would have been successful. Batson established a three-step process for ferreting out racial discrimination in jury selection: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Second, once the defendant has made out n a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, “[i]f' race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson v. California, $45 U.S. 162, 168 (125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129) (2005) (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted). See also Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 874 (608 SE2d 216) (2005). The first step of the Batson inquiry is not particularly onerous; adefendant need only “produc{e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson, 45 U.S. at 170. Pierce presented evidence that she is African-American, that the State used at least one peremptory strike to remove an African-American from the jury pool, that there were “five or six” potential African-American jurors, and that the jury that convicted her was all-white. In addition, Pierce’s counsel, an experienced criminal defense attorney, testified that African-American jurors are a rarity in Cobb County. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169 (noting “wide variety” of evidence that can be enlisted to make out prima facie case of discrimination). See also Miller-Elv. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-266 (125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196) (2005). 2 Pierce did not, however, show how many of the African-Americans in the jury pool were removed by the State as opposed to being struck by the defense or being among the final eight potential jurors, who were neither struck nor selected to serve, because a jury of 12 with two alternates was chosen before their numbers were reached in the jury selection process. Moreover, the record shows that the defense struck at least two of the at most “five or six” African- Americans in the jury pool, and of the two African-Americans Pierce identified as having been struck by the State, one was actually struck by the defense.’ Thus, we cannot conclude that Pierce presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to draw an inference of racial discrimination in the State’s use of its peremptory strikes. In addition, even if such an inference were drawn, the remaining record is insufficient for us to conclude that the Batson claim would have been successful. Had a Batson objection been raised at trial and the inference of purposeful discrimination accepted, the burden would have then shifted to the > Pierce's counsel testified that he was particularly surprised by the State's use of a peremptory strike to remove an Aftican-American he thought would be an ideal juror from the prosecution's standpoint: a retired veteran whose military experience consisted of prosecuting ‘lefendants in courts martil. As Rodgers pu it atthe motion for new tral hearing, “I thought the State would love him.” Apparently the State agreed asthe record shows thatit was the defense, not the State, that used a strike ~ indeed, Pierce's inal strike —to remove this potential juror. B State to come forward with race-neutral explanations for its peremptory strikes, However, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it was Pierce’s burden, not the State’s, to ensure that the trial court had sufficient information to determine the merit of a Batson challenge. See Stanley v. State, 283 Ga, 36, 39 (656 SE2d 806) (2008) (holding that to show ineffectiveness based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed if the motion had been filed, even though the States would have had the burden of proving the search was lawful at a pre-trial suppression hearing). See also Rakestrau, 278 Ga, at 874 (“The ‘ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”” (citation omitted). Pierce did not call the prosecutors in her case to testify at the motion for new trial hearing, nor did she seek their notes or other evidence from voir dire. ‘The trial court could have requested such evidence on its own, but it was not required to do so. See Trammel v. State, 265 Ga. 156, 156 (454 SE2d 501) (1995) (affirming where trial court, on motion for new trial, held sua sponte Batson hearing at which State introduced race-neutral reasons for challenged 4 strikes). Absent this evidence, or at least the State’s response to Pierce's attempts to gather this evidence,* the trial court had no way of knowing whether the State could produce race-neutral explanations for whatever strikes it made and, if so, of evaluating their credibility so that it could decide, at step three of the Batson analysis, whether there was purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of Pierce’s jury. Pierce's mere speculation that the State had no such explanations, or that the trial court would have found the State’s race-neutral explanations to be pretextual, is insufficient to establish a meritorious Batson claim. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172 (“{S]peculation does not aid our inquiry into the reasons the prosecutor actually harbored for a peremptory strike.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting Pierce's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and denying her motion for new trial. “ See Johnson, $45 U.S. at 171 n.6 (“Inthe unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge’s inquiry regarding his justification for making a strike, the ‘evidence before the judge would consist not only of the original facts from which the prima facie ‘case was established, but also the prosecutor's refusal to justify his strike in light ofthe court's request. Such a refusal would provide additional support for the inference of discrimination raised bya defendants prima facie case”) 1s 

06433d0d6799747ad336b05c745e8abf84d590a5d4f592a585495bbe93742da1

2009-11-23T00:00:00Z

5e1ed538-5597-4940-8084-01272a8ed4a4

State v. Iseke

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 27807 REME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAY'E 2 930 000d Wa z neil Nd STATE OF HAWAT', Respondent /Plaintiff-appelleg; DONALD J, ISEXE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (HPD CR. NO. $D0502454) aT OF CERTH: (By: Moon, C.J., for the court") Petitioner/defendant-appellant Donald J. Iseke’s application for writ of certiorari, filed November 13, 2008, hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 26, 2008. ee fipee— Shier sustic (or ®y SEAl Cees Considered by: Moon, C.., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, 39.5 Acoba, J., Dissenting 

d5e413b97ed18a9734342d352004bc1ab1d28013e947fbca5ca76a118d9568cd

2008-12-26T00:00:00Z

ac0e9c19-305a-4638-8fef-396e8ec194ff

In re Harrison

29412

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29412 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I IN RE: CRAIG S. HARRISON, Petitioner. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER DENYING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURRENDER LICENSE : Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Moon, C.J., Levinson, Upon consideration of Petitioner Craig S. Harrison’s Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the Petitioner Harrison's motion to waive the $125.00 filing fee required by RSCH 1.10(b) was denied on December 16, 2008, and Petitioner Harrison has not paid the $125.00 filing fee. Therefore, IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied Hawai'l, December 22, 2008. DATED: Honolulu, COsKY 22 930 eo aad 

b7536b5ad15a4beb0f538a62e8f790a1c54ed28f35c0847134541b55f6221cc9

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

3e617ee4-4778-4f50-b618-ae09305ee459

In re Coleman

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29515 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAZ SIs IN RE WILLIAM R. COLEMAN, Petitioner. aang 3 ORIGINAL PROCEEDIN( S 5 6 s 8 (ey: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acobs, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of Petitioner William R. Coleman's Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the Lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Suprene Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore, IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. BP IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Coleman shall return his original license to practice law to the Clerk of this court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original license as part of this record. Petitioner Coleman shall comply with the notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (b), (a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of William R. Coleman, attorney number 2640, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing of this order. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 23, 2008. in Petes Coes ares Goon 6 digs» 

51f2c87852f617ccf678458cbbbd5a60eaca10c6dab888040834b70fa2920b1b

2008-12-23T00:00:00Z

6c4cc8c7-0c4d-4757-b1a7-6805525a206a

State v. McMillen

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 28768 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee, qate "yeivi'd ViWuSt ha 91 03000 YVONNE M. McMILLEN, Petitioner-Appellant =; woah ¥ 1 CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CR. NO. 06-1-1685) (By: Moon, C.J., for the court") Petitioner-appellant Yvonne M. McMillen's application for weit of certiorari, filed November 17, 2008, is accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties w: 1 be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 16, 2008. yor Tz count: J ATE Lm By SEAL © Re oe Nakayama, Acoba, and Dutty, Jv + court: moon, ©: 

0ed6625f4191fb5acaa9ba236e298390af15fd45f7be0b7ff13d184678771e4e

2008-12-16T00:00:00Z

18c180ff-4918-498c-b4b9-6a5e55f1fb4a

Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd.

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 28359 oa PONO, an unincorporated associations WALTER RITTE, JR.i WAYDE LEE; MATTHEW ADOLPHO and JOSEPH KALIPT, as individuals and members of PONO, Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants-Appellants, and HALONA KAOPU‘IKI, Respondent /Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee, vs MOLOKAI RANCH, LTD., a Hawai'i corporation, Respondent /Defendant /Counterclainant~Appellee, and JAMES W. MOZLEY, JR.; CHARLES JENCKS, as an individual and in his capacity as Director of the County of Maui, Department of Public Works and Waste Management; LINDA CROCKETT LINGLE, as an individual and in her capacity as Mayor of the County of Mavis COUNTY OF MAUI, a governmental entity, Respondents /Defendants~Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 97-0383) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORART (By! Duffy, J., for the court") Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants- Appellants Pono, an unincorporated association, Walter Ritte, Jr., Wayde Lee, Matthew Adolpho, and Joseph Kalipi, as ‘considered by: Moon, C.J, Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Ouffy, JJ. individuals and menbers of Pono’s application for a writ of certiorari, filed on Novenber 20, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 29, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Gamen Balin» Associate Justice Alan T. Murakami, David Kimo Frankel, and Anthony f. Quan, Jr. (of Native Hawaiian’ Legal Corporation) for petitioners/ plaintiffs/counterclaim defendants-appellants on the application Kenneth R. Kupchak, Robert H. Thomas, and Gregory W. Kugle (of Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert) for respondent/ defendant /counterciaimant- appellee Molokai Ranch, Ltd, on the response Jane E. Lovell, Deputy Corporation Counsel, for respondents/defendants- appellees Charles Jencks, as an individual and in his capacity as Director of the County of Maui, Department of Public Works and Waste Management; Linda Crockett Lingle, as an individual and in her capacity as Mayor of the County of Maui: and County of Maui, a governmental entity, on the response 

f49906881eef923039275a2750d0d94340957d1bb69113fe1da3f9cc4486f274

2008-12-29T00:00:00Z

82fb5eda-719c-4b6b-a683-1432439955c5

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferrara

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY wo. 24083 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, CHRISTOPHER D. FERRARA, Respondent. IM RE APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT 0 CHRISTOPHER D. FERRARA ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (0D¢ 00-370-6716) (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Acoba, JJ., and Circuit ‘Judge Marks, in place of Duffy, J., recused) Upon consideration of the record and the Disciplinary Board's Report and Recommendation for the Reinstatement of Christopher 0. Ferrara to the Practice of Law in this jurisdiction, it appears that Petitioner Ferrara has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, his rehabilitation, fitness to practice law, competence, compliance with all applicable disciplinary orders and rules, and compliance with other requirements imposed by the court, as required by Rule 2.17(d) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, and should be reinstated to the practice of law. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Christopher 0. Ferrara’s Petition for Reinstatement is granted and Petitioner Ferrara is reinstated to the practice of law in this jurisdiction. oats  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon payment of all required dues and registration fees, the Clerk shall restore Petitioner Christopher D. Ferrara to the roll of attorneys eligible to practice in the State of Hawai’ DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 24, 2008. Yow Desai OU Rawtiy rom Melee S) 

14b21267c27d3de34a354da221c952dcbf1247ef168334d17a7cbcec30c2f6be

2008-12-24T00:00:00Z

4374e45e-b0c8-482d-923d-60e52b92d2af

Doe v. Doe

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 27062 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAZ'T soi Doe, Peistone/tton -Aoaoal Respondent /Defendant-Appel agai IW JANE DOE, g 3 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (FC-D NO. 95-2875) (By: Moon, C.J., for the court") Petitioner/plaintiff-appellee John Doe's application for writ of certiorari, filed October 14, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 14, 2008. Charles T. Kleintop and FOR THE COURT: Robert T. Nakatsuji (of Kleintop, Luria & Medeiros), for petitioner /plaintift- appellee, on the application Steven J. Kim, for respondent /defendant- appellant, on the response 3.) and 1 Considered by: Moon, ¢C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Acct ‘recused. chreult Judge Wife, in place of Duty, J 

6be53df20839310feb779acc24a4a44c25da4bdbd8cb76f532e4cbb3d9eaf7b9

2008-11-14T00:00:00Z

cb1831c4-6aac-4eb0-81eb-305b081d6e75

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 26517 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T OFFICE OF bISPLiMRE coMEEL, FeLLionen gy vs aa nn PETITION TO AMEND ORDER OF SUSPENSION, | 2 8 (ove 96-242-470%, on0 97-213-H407, 98-0645) Circuit Judge Crandall, in place of Acoba, ‘and Circuit Judge Wong, in place of Duffy, J., recused upon consideration of the Respondent Ronald G.S. Aus "Petition to Amend Order of Suspension, Filed June 7, 2005," which we treat as a motion made pursuant to Rule 27 of the Hawai‘ Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s response to Movant Au’s Petition to Amend Order of Suspension, Movant Au's Reply to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s response, and the record, it appears, upon careful review of the record, that the August 25, 2006 Affidavit of Wayne Yoshimoto does not recant the previous sworn testimony of Mr Yoshimoto that he had a St runner’s fee agreement with Movant Au. ‘Therefore, 93s IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to # motion to amend the order of suspension is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai’ , December 17, 200 Ronald G.S. Au, G Charles H. Hite, Acting Chief 0iSciplinary Counsel, for Office of Raut Grvueeney ae Disciplinary Counsel i $a Cran (nding 

bb10b17be55bcefb75e52898ad8e50bc28a1e833216239deae9a3895834877af

2008-12-17T00:00:00Z

5e287036-64b6-4a04-b991-869fd58cb3d0

State v. Lucero

28355

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 28355 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘ELIS STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintif£-Appellee ADRIAN LUCERO, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CR.NO, 06-1-1011} 1G APPLICATION FOR WRIT HO%6 KY OF zo ame (By: Acoba, J., for the court") The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on october 28, is hereby rejected. Honolulu, Hawai'i, FOR THE COURT: DATE! November 10, 2008. James $. Tabe, Deputy Public Defender, on the application for petitioner /defendant— appellant. + Considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, betty, 37. 2008 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Adrian Lucero and oss 

19b4bf5d37665a3e71837eee7d34efc8e6c07b1e38be4ad49a9911f689e49da7

2008-11-10T00:00:00Z

9e84f4b5-1110-4d35-9c6f-109cafdb181f

Martinez v. State

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 29488 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I MARSHALL MARTINEZ, Petitioner, ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of Marshall Martinez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it appears that habeas corpus relief is available to petitioner in the circuit court and petitioner presents no special reason for invoking the supreme court's original jurisdiction. See Qili v, Chang, 57 Haw. 511, 512, 557 P.2d 787, 788 (1976). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall process the petition for writ of habeas corpus without payment of the filing fees. IT 18 FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to seeking habeas corpus relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3 (2993). DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 19, 2008. Grom SleAicrasen Recsaaes Couto oo Soe Poe acs - 

93994597154d7061c243962a7f84a02ff86be4f52a7a0bc914714ca375aa9ba0

2008-12-19T00:00:00Z

6cc34e63-c4c4-4fba-a845-e92a11222625

Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua v. Dubois

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No, 27416 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF 2987 KALAKAUA, by its Board of Directors, Plaintiff/Counterciaim Defendant-Appellee, ns JOHN M. DUBOIS, and TIMOTHY M. PRINDABLE,2#),. Defendants /Counterclainants-Appellants, =~ = NOE Ns 22 230.000 osts and JOKN M. DUBOIS and TIMOTHY M. PRINDABLE,=3]/° Third Party Plaintiffs, 3 ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF 2987 KALAKAUA, by its Board of Directors, LOIS CANE, in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors, DIANNE NIELSEN, in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors, SHARON MINICHTELLO, in her capacity as a member of the Board Of Directors, RICHARD DIEHL, in his capacity ‘a2 a member of the Board of Directors as well as in his individual capacity, BONNIE PRIOR, in her capacity as a member of ‘the Board of Directors, TIMOTHY BARTON, in his capacity as a member of the Board of Directors, and SUZANNE MACGILL, in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors and in her individual capacity, Third Party Defendants. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (crv. No. 0-1-2060) (By: Nakayama, J., for the court) Petitioner-Appellant John M. Dubois’ application for writ of certiorari filed on November 17, 2008, is hereby ceceter 22, 2008, 65 eo FOR THE COURT: SEAL | Shawn Ay Lutz Pema 6 Neiyane te for petitioner-appel lant on the application rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, Associate Justice Bory considered by: Hoon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 9. 

8953d7e1bc0ff3539bd4aa1835b272160409863ec1b6514cdefffcc2feb2ca80

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

aa299e3a-6b18-420a-bb41-c1a246f5b275

Ornellas v. Kahoohalahala

29476

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 29476 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I JOHN W. ORNELLAS, Plaintife, SOLOMON P. KAHO'OHALAHALA; ROY 7. HIRAGA, in his offigial Capacity ee the County. Chet a'the County of Sagal BF CRONIN, in his official capacity as chiefs KEVIN B. Election Officer of the State of Hawai'i; and—/= DOES 1-20, Defendants. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING OF pisurs: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Accba and Duffy, JJ. and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Foley, in place of Levinson, J., recused) Upon consideration of the complaint filed on November 24, 2008, the amended complaint filed on November 26, 2008, and the motions to dismiss the complaints, it appears that the complaints are styled as election contests brought pursuant to HRS §§ 11-172 (1993) and 11-174.5 (Supp. 2007), but the complaints challenge candidate Solomon Kaho'ohalahala’s qualifications to be a member of the Maui County Council. challenge to a candidate’s qualifications for county office must be pursued in accordance with HRS § 12-8 (Supp. 2007), not HRS SS 11-172 and 11-174.5. Therefore, IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the Novenber 24, 2008 complaint and the November 26, 2008 amended complaint are Any dismissed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 15, 2008. Z Grr a 

70a520e1c8d7367aba86d3f5c5c0a03bd0d919222a5fbab5094531f2225851f8

2008-12-15T00:00:00Z

d0288250-3237-4ecf-9c67-480a0f097766

In re Estate of Damon.

119 Haw. 500

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE oF 8 SAMUEL H. DAMON, Deceasea <, & (P. No. 8664) c3 8 ons ‘TRUST CREATED UNDER THE WILL oF SAMUEL M. DAHON, Deceased (EQUITY NO. 2816-8) No. 27132 court APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCI DECEMBER 30, 2008 MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA AND ACOBA, JJ.. IN PLACE OF LEVINSON, J., RECUSED, CIRCUIT JUDGE ‘AYABE, AND CIRCUIT JUDGE NISHIMURA IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J., RECUSED QPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J, ("Haig”) Respondent-Appellant Christopher Damon Haig appeals from the first circuit court's (“probate court’ s”) 2005 judgment in favor of Petitioners-Appellees January 12, ("the Trustees”).! on ‘Trustees of the Estate of Samuel M. Damon as best as we can discern, Haig asserts seven points of appe error that may be combined into two general points of error, as follows: (1) the probate court abused its discretion by denying his request to disqualify James Kawachika, Esq. as master ‘The Honorable Colleen K. Hirai preside ILICATION IN WES! HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. ("Kawachika” or “Master”) of a petition that was filed by the Trustees for approval of the 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 income and principal accounts (“Petition”), and (2) the probate court erred in granting the Petition as recommended by the Master’s report. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the probate court abused its discretion when it denied Haig’s request to disqualify the Master because a conflict of interest existed between Kawachika and the Trustees. Accordingly, we vacate the probate court’s January 12, 2005 judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. T. BACKGROUND A. Factual ekground On November 10, 1914, a testamentary trust was created by the Last Will and Testament of Samuel M. Damon (“Trust”). Samuel M. Damon died on July 1, 1924. During the 1999-2003 accounting period, the Trustees managed the Trust's agsets with roughly half of its value in publicly traded securities and the other half in real estate. ‘The securities portion of the Trust's assets consisted mostly of 2138 interest in Bancliest Corporation’ common stock. The real estate portion of the Trust’s assets consisted primarily of prine industrial and commercial lands in Honolulu under long-term * ancllest Corporation was formed 2a 2 result of the 1998 merger between First Hawaiian, Ine. and Bank of the West 2 + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** leases, a sizeable cattle ranch on the island of Hawai'i, two walnut ranches located in California, and an industrial property located in California. In 2001, the Trust sold its entire 13% interest in BancWest Corporation common stock. In 2003, the Trust sold its prime industrial and commercial land in Honolulu, tvo walnut ranches, and a significant portion of real estate located on the island of Hawai'i, The net proceeds from these transactions has been reinvested into a diversified securities portfolio that is being advised and managed by Goldnan, Sachs & Company. B. Procedural Background The relevant procedural background for this case is as follows. On April 30, 2004, the Trustees filed the Petition in Equity No. 2816-A and Probate No. 6664. on May 4, 2004, the probate court filed an order appointing James Kawachika, Esq. as Master for the Petition. The probate court's order was filed pursuant to an “Amended order of Pre-Petition Reference,” which was filed on July 17, 2003, and stated that Kawachika “shall be appointed as Master for the petition and respond thereto, upon the filing of the petition.” On August 3, 2004, Haig filed a “Response” to the Petition. Therein, Haig raised several concerns, which included having “not been provided with a disclosure of potential or actual conflicts of interest as required by a formal written 3  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAl REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** conflict of interest policy” that was ordered by the probate court in its amended “Order Granting Petition for Approval of Income and Principal Accounts for the Period January 1, 19[)95 through December 31, 1997[.]” Haig also contended that “{t]he duty of the beneficiary requires a comprehensive legal review of potential or actual conflicts of interest . . . so they can be reported and resolved in a formal manner pursuant to” the probate court's amended order. On November 3, 2004, the Master filed his “Report of Master On Petition For Approval Of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Income and Principal Accounts.” In his report, the Master stated, inter alia, that “[w)hile no interested person has directly raised an issue regarding the implementation of the Trust's conflicts of interest policy, your Master independently does so now.” The Master then expressed his “concern about the manner in which the Trustees’ individual conflicts of interest are identified, disclosed, resolved and reported.” on November 23, 2004, Haig filed a “Response” to the Master's report for approval of the Petition. In his response, Haig disagreed with the Master’s statement that “no interested person has directly raised an issue regarding the implementation of the Trust’s conflicts of intezest policy[.]” Additionally, Haig asserted that the Trustees and Master failed “to disclose a potential conflict of interest arising from the appointment of  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, the Master,” inasmuch as the Master's law firm represented the Trustees in two lawsuits “involving leases in the Mapunapuna properties” while the instant Petition was being considered by the probate court, Because Haig believed that the Master's law firm's representation of the Trustees manifested a conflict of interest, Haig as ted at a hearing held on December 17, 2004, that the “conflict of interest should disqualify the (Mjaster from serving further in this matter.” On January 12, 2005, the probate court filed its “order Granting Petition For Approval Of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Income and Principal Accounts.” Therein, the probate court, Anter alia, granted the “Accounts Petition . . . as recosmended in the Master's Report, which is approved and adopted{.]” Additionally, the probate court made the following pertinent conclusions: 2. All requests for instructions, requests for determisations, and objections raised in response to the Recounts Petition, including with ¥e potential conflict of interest by the Master, Eeviewed by the (probate court] and are resected and denied, except as set forth in paragraph 4 below, 4." As'recommended by the Master, the Trustees are instructed to consider{} and consult with the Beneficsaries regarding, whether the Oanon Estate's Conflicts af interest Policy should be amended and inplenented in the following respects: 8, To provide that all conflicts of interest Gisclosures and the resolution of the be fully reported in the Minutes of the Trustess’ meeting: and b. To provide that in the uritten disclosures of any conflict of interest, the Trustees may, in their absolute’ discretion snd if they deem Af to be prudent and advisable to do 5  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** so, withhold from disclosing any information about pending Trust matters? 5. As recommended by the Master, the Trustees are cavtioned to be more circumspect in the waiver of disclosed Conflicts of interest of any Trustee, especially where Trustee nay be an officer or director of the corporation oF entity which Ls doing business, oF proposes to do business, With dr de otherwise negotisting with the Trust ox on the Judgment was filed on the same day. on February 11, 2005, Haig timely filed nis notice of appeal. IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW A probate court has discretion to “appoint a master to review any petition or dispute before the court and to report the recommendations of the ma x to the court.” HPR Rule 28 (a) (2004) ("The court may appoint a master to review any petition or dispute before the court and to report the recommendations of the master to the court.” (Emphasis added.)). Accordingly, a probate court's appointment of, and subsequent refusal to disqualify, a master is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See TSA Int'] Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92 Hawai'i 243, 252, 990 P.2d 713, 722 (1999) (stating that this court has “adopt (ed) the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a judge’s denial of @ motion for recusal or disqualification” (Block format and citation omitted.)). An abuse of discretion occurs where the probate court “bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, evidence.” Id, (quotation marks and citation omitted). IIT. DISCUSSION A. Notwithstanding Haig’s Technical Non-compliance with Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b) (4) (D), We Will Consider the Merits Of His Conflict Of Interest Argument. Preliminarily, the Trustees assert that Haig’s points of error are in non-compliance with Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b) (4) (2005) because they do not cite to where in the record the alleged error was objected to, and, where appropriate, include a quotation of the objection to the Master's report. The Trustees further assert that, in light of these errors, this court need not consider the merits of Haig’s arguments, and should consequently affirm the probate court’s judgment . Haig's “STATENENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL” merely quotes, with a single record citation to, six conclusions of the probate court that he is assigning as error, as follows: 1. The Erobate Court erred in finding: *. . . The Court hereby enters this Order Appointing Master and Appoint Janse Fawachika, Geq. ae the taster for the Petition who shall respond to auch Petition, Sn accorcance with the farther order of the court.” (4 May 2004) Ry at P.v. It, pp. aed 2, The Brobate Court erled in’ finding TALL requests for instructions, requests for determinations, and objections’ raises in response to the Accounts Petition, including with respect to. an sileged potential conflict of interest by the Master, have been reviewed by the Court and are ejected and Senied, except ae set forth in paragraph ¢ below wv Rat Pus 16, pps 96-100. 3. fhe Probate Court effed ta fading she Accounts Petition is granted, as recommended in the Master's Report, which ie approved and adopted, land the Response of the Guardian Ad Lites, which 19 approved and adopted to the extent that i¢ is Consistent wien the Masters Report...” R. at P.V. 7 {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 26, pp. 96-100. 4. The Probate Court erred in finding: ‘Te _incone and principal accounts and inventory of the Samuel Mills Damon Estate are settled, allowed and approved for the calendar years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 5." R. at Pov. 16, pp, 96-100- 5, The Probate Court erred in finding: TAs recomended by the Master, the Trustees are instructed to consider{] and consult with the Beneficiaries regarding, whether the Danon Estate's Conflicts of Interest Policy should be amended and implemented in the following respecte, enP'TO provide that all conflicts ef interest disclosures and the resolution of the sane be fully reported in the Minutes of the Trustees’ meeting? and b, Te'provide that in the written disclosures of any conflict of interest, the Trustees ray, in these absolute discretion and if they deem st to be prugent and advisable to do so, withhold from Gigelosing any sensitive or confidential information about pending Trust matters Re at P.V. 16, pp. 36-100. 6. Te Probate Court erred sn Ending: DAs recommended by the Master, the Trustees are cautioned to be more circumspect in the waiver of Gisclosed conflicts of interest of any Trustee, Gopecially where # Trustee may be an off ctherwise negotisting with the Trust of on the Trust Batters.” Re at P.V. 16, pp. 36-100. RAP Rule 28(b) (4) (C) and (D) instructs that the opening brief “shall” contain: (4) A concise statenent of the points of error set forth in separately numbered paragraphs. Each point ahalL state: (i) the alleged error conmitted by the court oF agency; (ii) where in the record the alleged error occurred: na’ (14) wherein the record the alleged error uas opiectes Dor agency. where applicable, ‘each pount ahali also include the following: ic) non the point involves a finding or conclusion of the court or agency, a quotation of the finding oF conclusion urges as error 2) her a aust the resort (Emphases added.)  '* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * All of Haig’s points of error do not comply with RAP Rule 28(b) (4) (ii) inasmuch as they do not state “where in the record the alleged error was objected to . However, with regard to his first point of error, the required citation is in fact located in his “STATEMENT OF THE CASE” section of his opening brief. Therefore, although the required citation is misplaced, Haig does include a citation to the record showing “where . . . the alleged error was objected tof, )” which sufficiently satisfies the requirements of HRAP Rule 28 (b) (4) (444). With regard to his remaining points of error, Haig also includes @ citation to the record showing “where . . . the alleged error was objected to[,)” although these citations are also located in the wrong section of his opening brief. See HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) (444) However, Haig's remaining points of error appear to dispute the probate court's approval of the Master’s report, inasmuch as his record citation to “R. at P.V. 16, pp. 96-100" is the probate court’s “Order Granting Petition For Approval Of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Income and Principal Accounts.” Among other things, the probate court’s “order” “approved and adopted” the “Accounts Petition . . . as recommended in the Master's Report|.)" As such, Haig’s remaining points of error trigger the additional requirement enunciated in RAP Rule 28(b) (4) (D); namely, “when the point [of error] involves a ruling upon the report of a master, a quotation of the objection to the report” “shall” be included. The required quotations have not been provided for in Haig’s opening brief. In fact, in his reply brief, rather than attempt to cure this {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** error that was raised by the Trustees in their answering brief, Haig attempts to justify his non-compliance by stating simply that his objections “were too voluminous to quote but are cited . This court has consistently held that failure to comply with the requirements of HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) is alone sufficient to affirm the circuit court's judgment. Morgan vy. Planning Dep't, County of Kauai, 104 Hawai'i 173, 180, 86 P.3d 982, 989 (2004). Nonetheless, without expressing an opinion in regard to Haig’s third through sixth points of error, his second point of error on appeal appears to raise the same conflict of interest issue as his first point of error. Because this court has Yadhered to the policy of affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases heard on the merits, where possible(,]” and the misplaced record citations point to the conflict of interest argument that Haig raised before the probate court, we will consider the merits of this argument. Id, at 180-81, 86 P.3d at 983-90 (citation and quotation marks omitted) . B. The Probate Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Haig’ Request To Disqualify the Master Because It Clearly Erred In Its Assessment Of the Evidence That Indicated That a Conflict Of Interest Existed Between Kawachika and the ‘Trustees. 1. Aconflict of interest existed between Kavachika and Haig asserts that the probate court erred in denying his request to disqualify Kawachika as the Master of the Petition because a conflict of interest existed between Kawachika and the Trustees. Specifically, Haig asserts that Kawachika should have qo  + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * been disqualified as the Master because of his firm's representation of the Trustees in tvo unrelated cases while the Petition was pending approval before the probate court. At a hearing held on Decenber 17, 2004, the probate court determined that, “{blased on the circumstances presented, . no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that the master’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The probate court reasoned further: “The master . . . conducted a thorough and an independent review of the accounts and prepared [hi]. . . report{] that assisted the (probate) court in its review of the petition.” Although we do not question Kawachika’ s performance of his duties as Master, we respectfully disagree with the probate court's assessment of the evidence and its determination that “no evidence has been presented to denonstrate that the master’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In Straub Clinic & Hospital v. Kochi, 81 Hawai'i 410, 422, 917 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1996), an attorney in the “Torkildson firm” represented Straub, Kapiolani Information Systems, and Infotech in connection with the finalization of a joint venture agreement between these three entities. Eventually, Straub, through the “Torkildson firm,” filed a complaint against Pest Marwick, who was engaged as @ consultant by Straub and the “Kapiolani entities.” Id, During the litigation, Peat Marwick filed a third party complaint against, inter alia, the “Kapiolani nu  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER entities.” Id, at 413, 917 P.2d at 1287. The “Kapiolani entities” then filed a motion to disqualify the “Torkildson firm” from continuing to represent Straub because the “Torkildson firm” had formerly represented the “Kapiolani entities” and had been counsel for them in matters substantially related to the subject matter of the complaint against Feat Marwick. Id, This court ultimately held that the circuit court’s “*basis upon which [it] rested its order of disqualification’ is not ‘clearly insufficient’” inasmuch as the “substantial relationship test” applied, the former representation of the “Kapiolani entities” by the “Torkildson firm” was “substantially related” to the Peat Marwick litigation, and the “Torkildson firm's” present and former clients were “materially adverse” in that case. Id. at 415-17, 917 P.2d at 1289-91 (quoting Chuck v. St, Pau) Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 61 Haw. 552, 558, 606 P.24 1320, 1324 (1980)). Although the “substantial relationship” test does not apply to this case, Straub Clinic £ Hospital is similar in principle. Therein, this court discussed thoroughly the distinction between the holding of Alleaaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977) and HRPC Rule 1.9(a).? Straub Clinic & Hosp., 81 Hawai's at 415-17, 917 P.2d at 1289-91. Pursuant to the ) REC Rule 1.3(a) provides that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in'a matter shell not thereafter represent sncther persct in the same or a substantially rel are materially adverse to the int Client consents after consultation.”  {+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * Allegaert holding, “before the substantial relationship test is even implicated, it must be shown that the attorney was in a position where he could have received information which his former client might reasonably have assumed the attorney would withhold from his present client.” id, at 415, 917 P.2d at 1289 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). REC Rule 1.9(a), however, affords “broad{er] protections” than the Alleaaert rule, inasmuch as “Rule 1.9(a), by its terms, is not limited to situations where the former client would be harmed by the possible divulgence of confidential information. It imposes an ethical obligation irrespective of harm.” Id. at 416, 917 P.2d at 1290 (citing Koch v. Koch Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1535 (D. Kan. 1992) (block format and brackets omitted). (RJules identical with BREC 1.9(a) () . . . prevent even the potential that 9 former client's confidences and Secrets may be used against his. Without such a rule, clients may be reluctant to confide completely in thelr attorneys. Second, the rule ss important for the Maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the bar. Finsily, and importantly, a client has the right to expect the loyalty of bis attcmney in the matter fer which he is retained, Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, by adhering to a standard that prevents the mere “potential” for a breach of a former client’s confidences, “Rule 1.9 is designed to address not only the narrow need to protect a client's confidences, but also to establish broader standards of attorney loyalty and to maintain public confidence in the legal system.” Id, (citation omitted); see Tione v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980) ("It is the 3  17 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact of breach, that triggers disqualification.” A similar standard of preventing a mere “potential” of a conflict of interest applies to masters in a probate proceeding. Pursuant to the Hawai'i Probate Rules, a court~ appointed master “serve(s] as a representative of the court(,]” Hawai's Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 28(a) (2004), whose role is to, “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, . . . review the operations of the fiduciary in light of the terms of the controlling document, as well as the financial transactions of the trust or estate.” HPR Rule 29 (2004). Additionally, “the master shall submit a written report of the master’s findings to the [probate] court and serve a copy on all interested persons.” Id, It is in this capacity that the master essentially “serves as the eyes and ears of the court,” id, cmt., and “shall be a person who has no conflict of interest with any party or issue in the proceeding.” HPR Rule 28(a). However, Hawaii's Probate Rules do not indicate which conflict of interest rules would apply to a master in a probate proceeding.‘ + ie note that MPR Rule 42 (2004), entitled “Conflicts of interest,” explains the attorney-client relationship where the client is a fiduciary for anestate, guardianship, or trust. HPR fule 42 does not explain the conflict Of interest rules applicable to a master, inasmuch az a master "shall serve ss 2 representative of the court...” APR Rule 28(2). Conteastingly, che Mayai'i Rules of Professionel Conduct’ (HRPC) provides that (a) lawyer ‘ie @ representative of cliente, an officer of the legal system, and s public citizen having special reaponeibiiity for the quality of justice.” BRFC publ. (2004) continue... 14  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Haig suggests that we apply the conflict of interest rules applicable to federal judges, inasmuch as a master has been characterized by the federal courts as “an officer of [the] judicial systen (who) perform(s] judicial functions(.1” Jenkin VeSterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 1-58) (quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding what the federal courts have held,’ we continue HER Rule 42 provides, in its entirety (a) Fiduciary as Attorney's Client. An attorney employed by a fiduciary for an estate, guardianship, OF trust represents the fiduciary as client as defined in Rule 503(a) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence and shall have all the Fights, privileges, and obligations of che attorne: Eliont relationship wich the fiduciary insofar as the Eisueiary is acting ina fiducsary role for the Benefit of one of more beneficiaries oF a ward. (®) Reletionsnip to Beneficiaries, An attorney for an estate, guardianship, or trust does not have an attorney~ Elient’ relationship With the beneficiaries of the estate or Erust of the ward of the guardisnship, but shall owe a duty to notity such beneficiaries or ward of activities of the Hieuciary actually know by the attorney to be illegal that threaten the security of the assets under aduinistration oF the interest of the Beneficiaries (c) Officer of Court. fn attorney for an estate, guardianship, of trust 1s an officer of the court and al assist the court in securing the efficient and effective ‘an obligation to actions auch as accountings and closing a probate estate are performed timely. The attorney, after prior notice to the igueiary, ahall have an obligation to bring te the attention of the court the nonfeasance of the fiduciary. (a) Sanctions. The court shall have the power and authority £2 impose sanctions upon any attorney who fails to properly carry sut the attorney's duties to the fiducsary, Ehe beneficiaries or ward, and the court. (stalies in original.) + We note that the federal circuits appear to apply two distinct conflict of Interest standards to a court-appointed master. Whether a. federal circuit applies either one standard of the sther appears £0 depend on the continue. 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * believe that the rules and case law of this jurisdiction are sufficient to adequately address the conflict of interest issue in this case. ‘The section entitled “Application Of the Code Of +. .continue Gscunt of contvol that a trial court has in ite review of a master’s findings ‘on one level, several federal circuits have utilized an "actual Biss” standard, as follows: "[D]isqualification [of a special master] is a matter for the exercise of discretion by the (federal) district Judge, unless actual bias has been denonstrated beyond reasonable possibility of disagreenent.” Rigs J Enter, Ase’o Stegutitters Local Union €s8 of VAs, 860 F-2a 1168, 1174 (2a Car. 1968) (quoting Unised States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 364 F.2d 677, é8i [4en cir, 1967)) {quotation marks omitted) (brackets addled). Under this standard, “[a] balancing of all considerations and probabilities should be the function of the district court and, in review of its action, the test should be wether abuse appears.” Jd, at 1174-75 (quoting United States Lgeig, 308 F.2d 453, 457 (sth Cir, 1962)) (quotation marks omitted) (brackets 2dsed). The reasoning behind this standard is that “[slince masters and Guperts are subject to the control of the court and since there is a need to hie individuals with expertise in particular subject matters, masters snd Oeperts nave mot been hela to the serice standards of Imparsialsey that are Spplies to judges.” Zak at 1174. (quoting Moraan e, Kersigan, $30 F.24 401, ibe (ist Cir.), sere. aenied, (26 U-S. 938 (1976) quotation marks omitted) (brackets. added) ~ (Ga a separate level, in Jenking, the D.C. Circule disagreed with Morgan’s reasoning and determined that, "at iesst insofar as special mestere perform duties functionally equivalent to those performed by a judge, they must be hela to the same standards ss Judges for purposes of Gisqualification.” 643 F.2d at 631 n.1) ges Uniced Stateg 2, Werner, 916 F.2d 175, 177-78 (deh Cir. 1980), (qualifying ‘t= Certain Farcel® of Land decision in Ligne of an amendment to a federal statute, and using Jenkins to explain the disqualification standards enunciated in the statute) the Jenking court's determination appears to be based primarily on (1) the American Sar Association Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, and (2) the fact that the “special master’s factval findings . . . were seviswed by che Gistrict court only for ‘clear error,’ as required by Rule $3(e) (2) of the Feceral Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Jenking, £49 F-24 at 630-31 Given the complexities of the issues special masters are frequently called upon to sort out, the closely disputed Ensues of fact they must resolve... , and the “clear error” standard governing the courte" review of their Hindings, the district court's oversight of a special master falls far short of plenary “control”; there is s range within shich 2 special saster's partiality nay operate Unchecked and uncheckable by the district court Eds at 631, Because our rules and case Lew are sufficient to address the Contlict of interest issue in this case, we need not exprass an opinion with regard to the standards usea by the federal courts 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Judicial Conduct” of the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct (RCJC) (1992) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A, Anyone, whether or not @ lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who performs judicial functions, Sneluaing an officer such'ss 8 magistrate, court commissioner, special aaster or re! ‘but not including arbitrators, ig-a sudde within the meaning of this Code. All iudass hall comply with this Code exceot ar provided below. 'B. Continving Part-time Judge. A continuing part~ tine judg (2) is not required to comply a) ‘except while serving as a judge, with Section s(B) (3); ana (B) at any tine with Sections 4C(2), 403), SEL), 48, 4G, 4H SAi2), and 5B (2) shall ngt practice tay’ in the court on which the judge serves. ©. time far Compliance, A person to whem this Code becomes applicable shail comply imediately with all provisions of this Code except Sections 40/2), #D(3) and 4E (Emphases added.) Inasmuch as a “master” falls within the RCJC’s definition of a “judge,”* the conflict of interest rules in the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct applies to masters in a probate Proceeding, which provides in part that “[a] judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance(s) of impropriety.” RCJC Canon 2(A) cont. witIhere are certain fundanentals of just procedure which are the same for every type of tribunal and every type of proceeding.” R. Pound, Administrative Law 75 (1542) (concedealy, 2 ‘fair trial ina fair tribunal is\a basic Fequirenent of due process.’ in re Murchinson, 349 0.8. 133, 136... (198s). ss. Ofcourse, va Based decisionnaker (is) constitutionally unscceptable(s]” Id. at * __Elaborating further on those “who perform[] judicial funct ions [+] the commentary states that “[t]he categories of judicial service in other than a full-time capacity are ne: warving # (Enpaasis edged.) in this snd in Light of Rules 28 and 29 of the Hawai'l Probate Roles, we that there is a substantive distinction betueen a “special master," as that tern is used in the Revised Code of Jusicis! Condoct, end @ Snaster,""as that term is used in the Hawai’ Probate Rul vv  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, 47... But “ne one would argue seriously that the diequatitication of (decteion-nakers] on grounds of actual bigs. . . prevents unfairness in all cages.” State y Bian, 70\#aw. 459, 467, 776 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1989) So SGur syster of (justice) has sivaya endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” in re Murchinson, ‘The Suprene Court teaches us too that justice can sperform its high functson in the best, way (only if it satisfies) “the appearance of Justice.'” Offutt 'v, United Skates, 348 0.5. 11, 14 ‘Iie vurchinson, supra. For in’ popular goverment, ‘justice must ot only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done... = y 1947] 2 KB. 321, 325.* "JosneAneLe bar’ u.s. 123, 172 B13 Terankfurter, Ji, concurfiag) (1951) Sussel_v. City & County of Honolulu Civil Serv, Comm'n, 71 Haw. 101, 107-08, 784 P.2d 867, 870 (1989) (brackets added and in original) (ellipsis added and in original). Accordingly, “Iwle have held that the test for disqualification due to the tappearance of impropriety’ is an objective one, based not on the beliefs of the petitioner or (adjudicator), but on the assessment of a reasonable impartial onlooker apprised of all the facts.” Inte Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawas's 97, 122, 9 P.34 403, 434 (2000) (quoting State v. Ross, 89 Hawai'i 371, 380, 974 P.2d 11, 20 (1998) (brackets in original and some quotation marks omitted). As such, the commentary to Canon 2(A) of the RCJC provides that “[tJhe test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” Moreover, pursuant to Canon 3(8) (1) of the RCJC, “a judge shall a8  1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned( In the instant case, it is undisputed between the parties that, on January 20, 2004, a complaint was filed in civil no. 04-1-0106-01, which is entitied “Ronald Tadashi Uemura and PH Corporation, dba Hawaii Performance Warehouse and Ron’ s Performance Center, a Hawaii Corporation v. Estate of Samuel Mills Damon, aka Estate of Samuel M. Damon{.]*? On March 5, 2004, @ complaint was filed in civil no. 04-1-0421-03, which is entitled “Island Demo, Inc., a Hawait Corporation v. Trustees of the Estate of Samuel M. Damon, deceased{.]”” Apparently, Kawachika’s law firm was “being retained and paid by First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. . . . to defend its insured, the Estate, in [these] cases.” Additionally, the firm “is on the approved panel of attorneys retained by First Insurance and regularly defends insureds of First Insurance.” Further, it appears from the record that these cases were being litigated while the Petition was pending approval before the probate court.* >to resterate, the Trustees flied the instant Petition on April 30, 2008. On May 4, 2004, the probate court filed an order appointing Janes Kawachika, Esq. as Master for the Petition * the Trustees admit that Arthur Reinwald of the same law firm represented Haig in the past. However, it does not appear that Haig is asserting that a conflict of interest exists because of arthur Reinwald’s Prior representation of his. instead, he ig asserting that a conflict of [nterest exists because of Sawachila’s law firm's representation of the cont nue. 1s  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ** The Trustees assert that the Master did not have a conflict of interest because the “Trustees’ interests were aligned with the interests of the beneficiaries with respect to the defense of Damon Estate’s interests.” However, the issue in this case is not whether the Trustees’ and beneficiaries’ interests are “aligned” with one another, but whether Kawachika’s “representa[tion] of the court” as Master of the Petition, ase HPR Rule 28(a), and his law firm's simultaneous representation of the Trustees in civil nos. 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03 constituted a conflict of interest under the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct warranting Kawachika’s disqualification as Master of the Petition. Although a master in a probate proceeding is neither a “decision-maker” nor an “adjudicator,” see Sussel, 71 Haw. at 107-08, 781 P.2d at 870, a master's role is to assist the probate court in the disposition of the proceeding. Sea HPR Rule 28(a); HPR Rule 29. As such, a master provides, at the probate court's discretion, see HPR Rule 28(a), needed services within Your system of [justice], which “has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Sussel, 71 Haw. at 107, 782 P.2d at 870 (block format and citation omitted). In this regard, “justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be continue ‘Tustees in two unrelated cases while the Petition was pending approval by the probate court. 20  +++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAl REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * done... ." Id, at 108, 781 P.2d at 870 (block format and citation omitted). For these reasons, a master “shall be a person who has no conflict of interest with any party or issue in the proceeding[,]” HPR Rule 28(a), and, consequently, a master shall be disqualified “in a proceeding in which [his] impartiality might © sonably be questioned{.)” RCJC Canon aie) (a). The Trustees filed the instant Petition on April 30, 2004, which sought the probate court’s approval of the 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 income and principal accounts. However, ag explained above, while the Petition w: pending approval before the probate court, Kawachika’s law firm was “being retained and paid by” an insurer “to defend its insured,” the Trustees, in civil nos, 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03. During the probate proceedings, Kawachika was appointed by the probate court as Master of the Petition. In this capacity, Kawachika’s role, “as a representative of the court,” HER Rule 28(a), is to “serve[] as the eyes and ears of the court” by objectively “xeview(ing] the entire scope of the fiduciary’s performance during the accounting pericd pursuant to the governing instrument.” HER Rule 29 ont. Inasmuch as “our system of [justice] has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness,” Sussel, 71 Haw. at 107, 781 P.24 at 870, we hold that Kawachika’s law firm's representation of the ai  ‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. Trustees in civil nos. 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03 while the Petition was pending approval before the probate court “would create in reasonable minds a perception” that Kawachika's “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”* RCJC Canon 2(A); RCJC Canon 3(E) (1); see Sussel, 71 Haw. at 107-08, 781 P.2d at 870; see also Straub Clinic 4 Hosp,, 81 Hawai'i at 415-17, 917 P.2d at 1289-91. Therefore, the probate court abused its discretion by denying Haig’s request to disqualify the Master because a conflict of interest existed between the Master and the Trustees. See HPR Rule 28 (a). 2. The Trustees’ assertions are without merit. The Trustees also assert that Haig neither (1) made a sufficient objection to the Master’s report, (2) “demonstrate(d]” that the Master was “bias(ed), prejudice[d], or partial{],” nor (3) filed an “affidavit” for disqualification of the Master. ‘The applicable standard, as discussed above, is as follows: “(t]he test for disqualification due to the ‘appearance of impropriety’ is an objective one, based not on the beliefs of the petitioner or [adjudicator], but on the assessment of a + Both before the probate court and on appeal, the Trustees aver ‘that, curing the “pre-Petition stage” in 2003, an wethical wall” was “erected between the Master and other menbers of his fizm with respect to banon Estate matters.” However, a2 expresses by this court in Otaka, tne. v Klein 71 Haw. 376, 387 4 nyé, 29% Ped 713, 719 & ned. (L990) e MTaTeras Foe PRR he “Chinese' wail! defense to iaw firm cisqualification'{s applicable” in a case auch as this where, “(olnce the attorney 18 found to be disqualified... Both the attorney and the attorney's firm (must be] disqualified (Brackets omitted end in original-)= 22  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER reasonable impartial onlooker apprised of all the facts.” in re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i at 122, 9 P.3d at 434 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original) (emphasis added) . Prior to July 1, 2004, HPR Rule 3 provided, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Form. For purposes of these ules, Sh epplication in an informal proceeding ia 3 petition, unless the context of the rule indicates Stherwise sbiection Persons may file Sr their plessings. (b) Filings in Response co Petition. opposition to any or all of the relief prayed for ina petition Shall be sn the form of a written objection. Opposition to an application in an informal proceeding shall also be made by filing a petition for formal proceedings ue 2 wuitten response toa petition if they donor Recessarily object Tos petition but desire to s! on the record their position, or if they desire to xalse additional issues chat are related to the penition- ‘memorandum in support (Emphases added and italics in original.) HPR Rule 3 vas amended on May 17, 2004, with the amendaents becoming effective on July 1, 2004. As amended, the pertinent portions of HPR Rule 3 provides, as follows: (a) Form. There shall be a petition anda For parpores of these Poles, En application in an tnformal proceeding 22 3 Betition, uniess the context of the rule indicates Sthervise. Persons nay tile s icinder, response, ob abiect: pesser Persons nay Tile a-nencrandon in support of their pleadings (b) Filings in Response to Petition ox Master's Revoxt. "Goposition to any or all of the relie! prayed for in a petition, Shall be in the form of a -eritreneeiestioe Opposition to an application in an informal proceeding shall also be made by filing a petition for formal 23 {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** proceedings. Interested persons aay aleo file a auart Uf they do not necessarily object to a petieicn 1 ut desire to state on ee esonad savas hat ase elated to the oexition or (Emphases added and italica in original.) On Novenber 23, 2004, Haig filed a “Response . . . To Report Of Master On Petition For Approval Of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Income and Principal Accounts.” Therein, Haig brought to the probate court's attention facts pertinent to Kawachika’s law firm's representation of the Trustees in civil nos. 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03, Because of these facts, Haig asserted that the Master had a conflict of interest with the Trustees. Therefore, contrary to the Trustees’ assertion that Haig failed to “demonstrate” that the Master was “bias(edl, prejudice(d], or partial (1,” Haig has alleged sufficient facts for a “reasonable impartial onlooker” to reach a determination regarding whether @ conflict of interest existed between Kawachika and the Trustees. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i at 122, 9 P.3d at 434. Additionally, although Haig did not file an “affidavit” to disqualify the master, HPR Rule 3(b) provides that an “interested person” may file a “response” “to raise additional issues that are related to the petition.” A master’s impartiality is clearly an issue that would be “related to . 24  * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. the master’s . . . report.” See HPR Rule 3(b). Tnasmuch as Haig’s cbjection was included in his “response” to the Master's report, Haig was essentially asserting that the probate court should not accept the Master’s report because the Master had a conflict of interest with the Trustees." See HPR Rule 28(a) ("The master... shall be a person who has no conflict of interest with any party or issue in the proceeding.”); HPR Rule 3(b). Logically, the Master would have b fn disqualified had the probate court concluded that a conflict of interest existed. see HPR Rule 28(a). Therefore, the Trust: " assertions that Haig neither made a sufficient objection nor filed an “affidavit” for disqualification are without merit. Haja's conflict of interest argument was timely made, ‘The Trustees assert that Haig’s conflict of interest argument is untimely because (1) six months elapsed between his objection and the time that he vas informed of the Master’s law firm's representation of the Trustees, and (2) his objection was made only after the Master filed his report and “conducted several months of investigation.” The Trustees contend that a May 7, 2004 letter that contained the “Minutes of Trustees’ Meetings,” which were held on nunerous days, “noted that First Insurance had retained Mr. O'Conner[, who is an attorney in % We note that both the Master and the Trustees f41ea, on December 4, 2008, 2 “reply” to the “responses” to the Master's report, ‘Therein, Doth the Master and the Trustees rebutted Haig’s conflict of interest argument 25  "OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, Kawachika’s law firm,] to defend the Estate.” Haig responds that the Trustees’ purported notification through the May 7, 2004 letter is insufficient to constitute notice. Haig also contends that the earliest day that he was sufficiently notified of Kawachika’s law firm's representation of the Trustees was by a letter dated November 17, 2004, or five days before he filed his “response” to the Master's report. In this November 17, 2004 letter, Kawachika, in response to a prior letter sent. by Haig, informed Haig of civil nos. 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03. This court has held that “(aj party asserting grounds for disqualification must timely present the objection, either at the commencement of the proceeding or as scon as the disqualifying facts become known.” In re Water Use Permit, Applications, 94 Hawai'i at 122, 9 P.3d at 434, Further to this point, “[t)he unjustified failure to properly raise the issue of disqualification . . . forecloses any subsequent challenges to the decisionmakers’ qualifications on appeal." Id. Assuming arguendo that the May 7, 2004 letter is sufficient to constitute notice of “the disqualifying facts{,]” the facts of this case do not indicate that the timing of Haig's objection constituted “a matter of deliberate and strategic choice.” See id, at 123, 9 P.3d at 435 (“Despite its awareness of Wilson's dual status, WWCA, apparently as a matter of 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, deliberate and strategic choice, never sought Wilson's disqualification. WWCA cannot now raise the matter as grounds for overturning the Commission’s decision.”). Indeed, “[t)he requirement of timeliness prohibits knowing concealment of an ethical issue for strategic purposes.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this case, Haig filed his “response” to the Master’s report on November 23, 2004, which included his conflict of interest objection. Both the Master and the Trustees filed, on December 7, 2004, a “reply” that responded to Haig’s conflict of interest objection. At a hearing held on December 17, 2004, the probate court considered the conflict of interest arguments and responses made by each party. On January 12, 2005, the probate court filed its order granting the Petition and denying Haig’ s conflict of interest objection. In light of the procedural history of this case, we cannot say that “knowing concealment” occurred. See Office of Disciplinary Council v. Au, 107 Hawai'i 327, 339, 113 P.3d 203, 215 (2005) (*Litigants cannot take the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose position of waiting to see whether they win and if they lose moving to disqualify a judge who voted against them.” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)). Finally, on July 17, 2003, Kawachika’s appointment as Master was conditioned by the probate court “upon the filing of the [Pletition.” Civil nos, 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03 were 20  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * filed on January 20, 2004, and March 5, 2004, respectively. The Petition was filed on April 30, 2004. At the earliest, the Trustees admit that the “disqualifying facts” of Kawachika’s law firm's representation of the Trustees in civil nos. 04-1-0106-01 and 04-1-0421-03 becane known to Haig on May 7, 2004, which is three days after the probate court filed its order appointing Kawachika as Master of the Petition. Although Haig made his objection after both the probate court's May 4, 2004 order appointing Kawachika as Master and the Master’s completion and filing of his report, the “disqualifying facts” must have been known to Kawachika’s law firm prior to the filing of both the Petition and the May 4, 2004 order. Yet, these facts were not disclosed to Haig until after the probate court filed its order appointing Kawachika as Master of the Petition. Consequently, we also cannot say that Haig “knowingly ed” his objection for “strategic purposes” in order to disqualify the Naster as a “heads-I-win-taile-you-lose position[.)" See id.; in re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i at 123, 9 P.3d at 435. IV. concLusroN Although we do not question Kawachika’s capability to effectively perform his responsibilities as Master of the Petition, for reasons discussed above, the facts of this case reasonably give rise to a perception that Kawachika’s 28  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Therefore, based upon the foregoing analysis, we vacate the probate court's January 12, 2005 judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” on the briefs Frederick. G. Riecker and John L, McDermott for Appellant Christopher Damon Haig J. Thomas Van Winkle, Katherine G. Leonard’ and Joanne L. Grimes of Carlsmith Ball LLP, for Appellees Trustees of the Estate of Samuel M. Damon, Deceased renati 1g poines of error 18 unnece: ey: 29 In light of the foregoing disposition, Bese np Hiedin~ sideration of Haig’s 

683970f8cc6c3550c19abb1224de7f78ae971322ee6022b7a237247a7ac652bb

2008-12-30T00:00:00Z

4c309472-6ae2-4afe-85df-8a4a64e48c53

Captain Andys Sailing, Inc. v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawaii

119 Haw. 323

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW UBRaRY ++" NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** No, 27355 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T CAPTAIN ANDY'S SAILING, INC., a Hawai'i corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF HAWAT‘T; LAURA H. THIELEN, Director of the Department of Land and Natural Resources and Chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawai'i; ED UNDERWOOD, Administrator, Division of Boating and Ocean Recreation, Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawai'i; and JOSEPH BORDEN, Kauai Division of Boating and Ocean Recreation, District Manager, Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawai'i, Defendant s-Appellees, and TERRY DONNELLY AND BLUE DOLPHIN CHARTERS, Intervenor Defendants-Appellees. z g a = 3 = (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Plaintiff-Appellant Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc., (“CASI”) appeals from the first circuit court's’ ("circuit court”) May 18, 2005 final judgment in favor of defendant- appellee Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawai'i ("DLNR”) and intervenors-appellees Blue Dolphin Charters, ("ppc") and Terry Donnelly (“Donnelly”) (collectively Ltd. referred to as “Intervenors”) and against CAST. Final judgment ‘the Honorable Victoria &. Marks presided oss *** NOT_FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** was entered pursuant to the circuit court’s April 6, 2005 “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” which concluded that: (1) CAST lacks standing to claim declaratory relief from BDC operating at Kukuiula Small Boat Harbor without a commercial permits (2) BOC is entitled to a conmercial permit at Kukuiula Small Boat Harbor subject to applicable law and regulations: and (3) “vessels that have both a commercial and a regular mooring permit for use of a (DLNR] small boat harbor (must) pay a [two percent} commercial fee," from all the revenue they earn. The final judgment also granted DLNR's motion for costs against CASI under HRCP Rule 54(d)? and Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 607-9. + RCE ule S¢(d) provides, “Except when express provision therefor As made either ina statute or in these rules, costs ghall be allowed as of course co the prevailing party unless the court othermise directa.” (Eephasis adaed.) The Language of this role creates 2 strong presumption that the prevailing party will Fecover costs... +. The presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to costs must be overcone by some showing that sn award would be inequitable under the cifcunstances, The losing party bears the burden of making this showing Polaua v, GIE Wevaijan Tel, 112 Hawai'i 3, 19, 243 P34 1205, 1221 (2006) quoting Bona v. Takeuchi, 86 Hawaii 46°52," 961 P24 611, 617 (1998)) HRS § 607-9 specifies that a1L1 actual disbursenents, including bet not Limited to, Intragtate travel expenses’ for witnesses and counsel, expenses for deposition transcript originals and copies, and other incidental expenses, including copying costs, intrastate long distance telephone charges, and postage, sworn to by an attorney oF 8 party, and dered reasonable by the court, Tndetemmining whether and what coats should be taxed, the court nay consider the equities of the situaticn. ‘+14 NOT_FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** on appeal, CASI argues‘ the circuit court erred by ruling in favor of Intervenors’ commercial permit, inasmuch as (2) CASI, a competitor of BDC, has standing to challenge BDC’s Kukuiula Small Boat Harbor commercial permit because “it can be reasonably inferred that CASI’s business opportunities suffered a corresponding reduction": (2) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rule that Intervenors had a right to the Kukuiula Small Boat Harbor conmercial permits and (3) Intervenors’ commercial permit for Kukuiula small Boat Harbor is not permitted under Hawai'i Administrative Rules for small boat harbors ("HAR") § 13-231-88 (1994). CASI further argues that (1) interpreting HAR § 13-234-25 (1994) as requiring @ permittee to pay two percent of its gross receipts “exceeds [DLNR’s) authority under (HRS §] 200-10, is inconsistent with the policies underlying that provision and works @ result that is at once absurd and unjust,” and (2) CASI’s claim to a refund of the use fees for Kukuiula Small Boat Harbor is not exclusively governed by HRS § 40-35. Finally, CASI asserts that, based on the equities of the case, the circuit court abused its discretion by awarding DLNR, the 3 added.) (Eapne: *cxSt enumerates six Eindings of fact in its pointe of error section that do not have 2 correspanding “argument” section. Therefore, each Of these points is deemed waived. ge HRAP Rule 26(b)(7) ("Pointe not argued may be deened waived.” *** NOT_FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** prevailing party, $4,037.83 in costs. Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we hold that: (2) the circuit court properly concluded that CAST lacked standing* to participate in Intervenors’ declaratory action seeking a judgment that they are entitled to a Kukuivla Harbor commercial permit. CASIs claim of standing to challenge Intervenors’ permit is “abstract, conjectural, or merely + to establish standing, 2 plaintit# must satisfy the following elenents of the traditional injury-in-fact test: "(1) has the plaintife Suffered an actual or threatened injury? (2) 1a the injury fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) would & favorable decision likely provide Felsef for plaintit#’s injury.” a ets. Hawes. 255, 325, 167 F.3d 292, 312 (2007) festnote and ellipses in original omitted), In addition, there are “less stringent requirements for access and participation in the court procese” when establishing standing in an action for deciaratory relief. Mottl v. Wivahicg, 95 Hawai'i 381, 389, 23 P.3a 716, 724 (2001), “Although HRS $€32°7, {which grants a circuit court Jurisdiction for declaratory relzef}] provides for standing £0 sus "(i]n cases of actual Controversy,” [the] porpose [of MRS chapter 632] is to afford relief... without requiring one of the parties interested so to invade the Fights asserted by the other ae to entitle the party to maintain anordinary action therefor. “It is ta be Libersily interpreted ang acnsnistares, with s view to making the courts more reiceable to the people ‘SUbinens tox Protection of M. Kohala Coastline © county of Hauai's Citizens"), $1 Reward 94, 100, 979 F-24120, Tie C998) quoting Richard Up tistcald, 62 Rawai'i 249,254 5.12, 921 P.24 169, 174 n12 (2996))9 Geanee piesa ex Baptiste, 115 dawas't 25,32 n.18, 165 232 BY, S23 a:18 (200717 But ses HottL, #5 Baves'i at 395, 23 p34 at 730 (cautsoning that (Gitizenai does not abrogate the ‘injury in fact” standing requirement in actions for declaratory relief affecting 2 public interest, but merely fendates ess demanding standards in assessing the plaintitis! proof of an Mingury in face™=)  ++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WES’ HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * hypothetical,” and CASI has not shown an injury-in-fact.* See Mott] v. Mivahira, 95 Hawai'i 381, 392, 23 P.3d 716, 724, 727 (2001) (concluding that allegations that an act “must” negatively affect the plaintiffs are mere speculation and not a “distinct and palpable injury” as an injury-in-fact requires); (2) the circuit court properly concluded that CAST lacked standing to seek an injunction as to Intervenors’ operation at Kukuiula Harbor without a commercial permit and without paying the two percent use fee, inasmuch as CASI did not establish that it was injured by DLNR’s application of Hawai'i Administrative Rules towards Intervenors or by Intervenors’ mooring at Kukuiula Harbor without a commercial permit. See Motel, 9§ Hawai'i at 392, 395, 23 P.3d at 727, 730; (3) HAR § 13-234-25 unambiguously requires the operator of a vessel to pay a fee based on gross revenues from the operation of the vessel and not based on only the revenue * _te Se well established that injury-in-fact includes naz to econonic interests. Se Aksu v, Glohana Corps, 65 Ha. 363, 369, 652 F.2d 1530, 1198 (1962) (anjury in fact has always included harm’ to economic Interests.” {citations omitted). A competitor, however, does not have Standing where the state has not directly injured the competitor. See Keahole Defense Coalition, Inc. vs Bd. of Land aba Natuzal Bes, (*Keahole”), 110 Bavaii 41s, 434-35, 151 Pod 585, 600-01 (2008) (Rolding that 2 plaintiff Goes not have standing to challenge the Board of Land and Natural Resourcest Secision to grant a competitor energy producer's a tine extension to develop its energy station at Keahole, inasmuch as the plaintiff did not indicate that ie would turt its developnent); But cf. Bush v. Hawaiian Hones Cons’n, BL Hawai'i 474, 479, 918 P.2a 1130, 1135 (1996) (geclaring that “stanaing Barriers should be lowered in cases of public interest under our Jurisdiction” and determining that the appellants, Native Hawaiian beneficiaries of trust, have standing to challenge the defendant's agreements thet may enable farming cempetition against appellants) - *o**. NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** from comercial activities at a DOBOR harbor.’ Requiring a vessel oxner to pay both DLNR and non-DOBOR fees for operating from the non-DOBOR pier, such as Port Allen is also not absurd or unjust," inasmuch as it is reasonable that an operator of a vessel with 3 Kukuiula Harbor commercial permit, pay? for the right to “load or discharge passengers or cargo or engage in any other commercial activity” at Kukuiula Harbor proportional to 7 Because HAR § 13-23-25 is plain and unambiguous, i is not sssary or appropriate to consider the intent of thie rule: Haugen, 106 Hawai'i 72, 75, 85 P.34 178, 182 (2004) ("(z]t is a cardinal rule Sf statutory interpretation that, where the tersa of a statute are plain, Unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond thet lanciage for a different meaning.” Instead, our sole duty t2 to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning.” (Citations and quotation signals omitted.)); ae also State 1, Kupihea, 98 Hawai'i 196, 206, ¢6 F.3d 498, S08 (2002) (**{wje do not resort to legisiative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.’" (Quoting State vs Kalama, $4 #awai'i 60, 64, 8 P.3d 1224, 1226 (2000)-)) + despite the unambiguous language of the statute, we are “willing to look beyond the plain, cbvicus, and unambiguous language of 2 statute, the Facial constitutionality of which is not at issue, for the purpose of ascertaining its underlying legislative intent, but only if a Literal Construction ‘would produce an absurd and unjust result.'” Haugen, 104 Hawai’ at 77, 85 P.3d at 18¢ (quoting hate v. Dudoit, 90 wawait 262, 270, S75 P.23 700, 708 1999) calculated to produce an amount at least sufficient to xpenses of operating, maintaining, and managing the ‘and services and cost including interest, of amortizing capital improvesents for boating facilities appropriated after Suly 1, 1995, including, but not limited to, berths, slips, and Folated accommodations, exclusive of the costs of constractingy Operating, and maintaining general navigation channels, protective Structures, and aids to navigation. (2). Fixed with due regard to the primary purposes of providing public recreational facilities and promsting the fishing Ensvstry. BAR § 13-234-1 (1994). Cf. Captain Andy’ Sailing, Inc v, Jonas, 195 F.Supp.24 1157, 1161-63 (D+ Haw. 2001] (recognizing chat the use foe "bear[s) a ‘rational relationship to the regulation of DLNA facilities”) 6 ++ NOT _FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** gross revenues that are collected from all of its operations, including non-DLNR operations. HAR § 13-234-25 was also consistent with the DLNR’s statutory power under HRS § 200-10 (1993), because it plainly provides that an operator of a vessel used for conmercial purposes from its permitted mooring shall pay “a fee based on a percentage of the gross revenues derived from the use of the vessel... ."7 (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sen awarding DLNR costs under HRCP Rule 54(d) and HRS 5 607-9.” Pulava v. GTE Hawaiian Tel, 112 Hawai'i 3, 23, 143 P.3d 1205, 1225 (2006) (“The presumption [that the prevailing party is entitled to costs) itself provides all the reason a court needs HRS § 200-10(e) (4) provided in pertinent part: ‘The permittee shall pay moorage fees to the department for the use Permit which shall be Based on, but not limited to, the use of the Sessel, its effect on the harbor, use of facilities, and the cost Of administering this scoring program; and, furthermore : If a vessel is used for commercial purposes from its permitted mooring, the permittee shall pay, in lieu of the rmoorage and Liveaboard fee, a fee based on s percentage of the Grose revenues derived from the use of the vessel which shall be fot Less than two times the moorage fee assessed for a fecrestionsl vessel of the same #120. See Pacheco vs insta, 448 P.34 763, 795 (Sth Cir. 2006) (holding that a1 fedorai iitigants have a duty to bring’a case in good faith, and therefore, "neble intentions alone do not relieve en unsuccessful litigant of the obligation under Rule 54(@) to compensate his opponent for reasonable Costs. ‘If the svaraing of costs could be thwarted every time the unsuccessful porty is 9 normal, average party, and not a knave, [FRCP Rule] $4(¢) (1) would Rave’ little substance cenaining,’*) (quoting Nat'l Inte, Serva, Inc, v, Ti Lng, 51 £36 1470, 1672-73 (Sth Cir. 1998), grervaled on-other grounds BY Aesth of Moxican-Anerican Gducators vs State, 211 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Ca¥, 2000)7-  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WES’ HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * avarding costs, and when a district court states no reason for awarding costs, we will assume it acted based on that Presumption.” (quoting Save Qur Valley v, Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir, 2003)). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first circuit court's May 18, 2005 judgment in favor of DLNR, BDC, and Donnelly, and against CASI is affirmed in all respects. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 25, 2001 On the briefs: Gyr Williem M. McKeon of - Paul Johnson Park & Niles, be Bbccce~ for plaintiff-appeliant Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc. Secuaes Ot sre itaian 3, aynhote, Deputy Attorney General, Departnent of the Atcorney a — General, State of Hawai'i, for defendant-appellee Rene Duster Bepartnent of Lend end Neturgl Resources State of Hawai'i Robert F, Miller, for intervenors-appellees Blue Dolphin Charters, Ltd. and Terry Donnelly 

dc9aee06729d15d1dc2359653476edeb521c6f491089eff3b1ecab489b288cb8

2008-11-25T00:00:00Z

89833e33-01e4-48f7-ac98-dccb6c13390e

Adora v. State

28564

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

Haw reRaRY No. 28564 ae 6 WW Zi 0300002 aad JOVIE M. ADORA, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellaat 9S STATE OF HANAT'T, Respondent /Respondent ~Appel les CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (S.P.P. NO. 06-1-0060; cR. NOS. 01-1-2324, 1-1-2446, and 02-21-0820) (By: Acoba, J., for the court") The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on Novenber 20, 2008 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Jovie M. Adora is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 12, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Barony Associate Justice Jovie M. Adora, petitioner /petitioner- appellant, pro se, on the application. petty, 33. 1d by! Moon, C.9.y Levinton, Nakayan 

217aa3561055417a2ebb78aa5076eafefd7f63fb8c453d4e31d979f776911b45

2008-12-12T00:00:00Z

fd76ea15-73e7-4139-a33c-84823092fb85

Gabris v. Department of Public Safety

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

xo, 29528 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF BANAT’ CHAD E. GABRIS, Petitioner, wine 30318, ava L VHUON DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of Chad &. Gabris's papers dated Decenber 2, 2008, which are deemed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it appears that habeas corpus elief is available to petitioner in the circuit court and petitioner presents no special reason for invoking the supreme court's original jurisdiction. See Oili v, Chang, 57 Haw. $11, 512, 587 P.2d 787, 788 (1976). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall file the petition for a writ of habeas corpus without payment of the filing fee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to seeking habeas corpus relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3 (993). DATEt Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 19, 2008. BliwPb iene See Levee ea oo Cone: Ousitn + amt 

4571adcfd7f861c4da2de6ef8f70ca7da5a2becccdb3480f8b410f3f7f3d1175

2008-12-19T00:00:00Z

5c98cebf-4676-4592-bf7c-4c98647cb0c4

Hanabusa v. Lingle. S.Ct. Order, filed 12/04/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order, filed 01/20/2009 [pdf].

119 Haw. 341

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY se wesr’s. REPORTER *** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I =--000--~ COLLEEN HANABUSA, Individually and in her capacity as Senate President and NORMAN SAKAMOTO, Individually ‘and in his capacity as Chair of the Senate Committee on Education, Petitioners, Wo. 29392 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING December 15, 2008 MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. Per Curiam. In this original proceeding, petitioners Colleen Hanabusa, individually and in her capacity as Senate President, and Norman Sakamoto, individually and in his capacity as Chair of the Senate Committee on Education (petitioners), petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing Linda Lingle, Governor of the State of Hawai'i (respondent), to forthwith noninate six candidates to the University of Hawaii Board of Regents from the list of qualified candidates duly presented to respondent on February 21, 2008 by the Candidate Advisory Council pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 304A-104.5(b) (Supp. 2007). on December 4, 2008, we issued an order granting the petition and directed respondent to nominate, within thirty days, six regent candidates from the list of qualified candidates duly presented to respondent on February 21, 2008 by the Candidate . WALL Advisory Council. 1. Background The 2005 legislature adopted $.B8. 1256, H.D. 1, which proposed to amend the Hawai'i Constitution, article X, section 6, to modify the appointment process for the University of Hawaii Board of Regents (BOR) by requiring the governor to select BOR candidates from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by a candidate advisory council. In adopting $.3. 1256, wD. 1, (A) [was) the intention of the legislature that the existing menbers of the board of regents of the University of Hawaii serve their full terms of office. As each term expire[d], the regent wlould) be replaced by an appointed senber Screened and proposed by the candidate advisory council. S.B. 1256, H.D. 1, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (2005). ‘The proposed amendment to article X, section 6 was ratified by Hawai'l voters on Novenber 7, 2006. Article x, section 6, as amended, provides in relevant part: ‘There shall be a board of regents of the University of Hawaii, the menbers of which shall be nominated and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appointed by the governor from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by the candidate advisory counsel for the board of regents of the University of Hawaii, as provided by law. Hawai'i Constitution, article X, section 6. The amendment to article X, section 6 was implemented by the 2007 legislature by Act 56. Section 1 of Act 56 stated the Act’s primary purpose of establishing the BOR candidate advisory council and added that: os+ FOR PUI «TS AND PAC +. (T]he legislature renews its previously stated intent, as provided in Senate BAll No, 1256 (2005), that “the existing members of the board of regents of the University of Hawaii serve their full terms of office. As each ter expires, the regent will be replaced by an appointed menber screened and proposed by the Candidate advisory councii(.]" 2007 Haw. Sess. Laws Act $6 (Act 56), § 1, at 92. Section 2 of Act 56 amended HRS chapter 304A (Supp. 2006) (University of Hawaii System) by adding a new section establishing the BOR candidate advisory council. Section 3 of Act 56 amended HRS § 26-11 (1993) (Executive and Administrative Departments, University of Hawaii) by increasing the membership of the BOR from twelve to fifteen members and with a specified number of members repr nting different geographic areas. Section 4 of Act 56 amended HRS § 304A-104 (Supp. 2006) (Regents; appointment; tenures qualifications; meetings) by amending subsection (a), in relevant part, as follows: (a). . « The term of each menber shall be [fortouryeers7] Live vears{.] . . . Every menber may serve beyond the expiration date of the menber’s term of appointment until the member's successor has been appointed [end-hes quetitied-) by the governor and contimed by the senate in accordance with article x, section 6 of th Henbers shal ore than tuo consecutive five-vear tema: provided that the members whe are initially ction 26 ary ‘enauing_tive-vear tems, If a menber is to be Appointed to a second term of five vears, the senate shall consider the question of whether to Tecontimm the nenber at least one hundred twenty tive mo not_in session within one hundred twenty dave rior ts oh = he nenber  see ul REPORTER which the senate is authorized to consider the question of reconfirmation, 2007 Haw, Sess. Laws Act 56, § 4 at 95. Section 5 of Act 56 provided that: Notwithstanding the requirements of section 304K-104, [HRS], as it read prior the effective date of this Act, the terms of those members of the board of regents of the University of Hawaii that are to expire on or before June 30, 2007, shall be extended until the earlier of June 30, 2008, or until such time as new menbers of the board of regents have been appointed pursuant to the appointment process established pursuant to this Act, at which tine their terms shall expire; provided’ that the current menbers shall serve their full terms. 2007 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 56, $5 at 96. Act 56 was effected on May 1, 2007, over respondent's veto. on July 1, 2007, the Candidate Advisory Council (caC) was appointed. At that time, there were ten BOR menbers. Three menbers’s terms expired in 2009 and 2011, five menbers’s terms expired on June 30, 2007, and to menbers’s terms expired on June 30, 2008. ‘The CAC was thus tasked with qualifying and screening candidates for twelve of the fifteen BOR seata. on February 21, 2008, the CAC presented respondent with a List of twenty-two candidates to fill the twelve BOR seats. ‘The list was copied to petitioners in their capacities as Senate President and Senate Education Committee Chair. on March 31, 2008, respondent nominated, from the CAC's candidate list: (1) Catherine Lagareta and Teena Rasmussen for the two at large seats, (2) Harvey Tajiri and Carl Carlson, Jr. for the two Hawaii County seats, and (3) Artemio Baxa for the one Maui County s tt. The nominations were submitted to petitioner  )R PUBLICA’ .WAFT REI Hanabusa and members of the Senate on April 1, 2008. on April 1, 2008, petitioner Sakamoto wrote respondent, acknowledging receipt of the five nominations for the twelve BOR seats and requesting the date that seven more nominations would be submitted “so that [the Senate] may act upon [the twelve nominations] before the close of the session.” Petitioner Sakamoto explained that the Senate had anticipated receiving, by then, all twelve nominations and he asked respondent to “please provide reasons for the delay of the seven nominees so that we might understand the circunstances which prompted the delay.” Petitioner Sakamoto made the same inquiry and request to respondent on April 7, 2008 when respondent did not respond. on April 11, 2008, the Governor's Office responded to petitioner Sakamoto. It explained that it received that morning, from the CAC, an additional candidate for the Honolulu County seat to replace candidate Janes Donovan and it would “continue conducting due diligence on the candidates pending consideration” and that “upon completion, (it) [would] submit the information for [respondent s) consideration.” Petitioner Sakanote forthwith responded by requesting respondent, on April 11, 2008, to “forward the remaining (BOR) nominees so that the nominees [can] have enough time to provide thoughtful and complete responses to the [Senate’ questionnaire and the Senate Education Comittee [can] schedule the confirmation proc dings.” Respondent, after further nomination requests from petitioner Sakamoto on April 15, 16, 18, and 21, 2008, submitted three more BOR nominations to the Senate on April  RTS ANI * 22, 2008: Dennis Hirota and Howard Karr for two of five Honolulu County seats and Joshua Wingstrom for the student seat. On April 25, 2008, the Senate confirmed OR nominees Rasmussen, Tajiri, and Carlson. On April 30, 2008, respondent withdrew Wingstrom’s BOR nomination. On May 1, 2008, the Senate confirmed BOR nominees Baxa, Hirota, and Karr and rejected the confirmation of BOR nominee Lagareta. That day, the Regular Session of the 2008 Legislature adjourned. on June 20, 2008, respondent notified BOR Chair Allan Landon that: (1) five BOR members whose terms expired on June 30, 2007 -- Byron Bender, Catherine Lagareta, Jane Tatibouet, Marlene Hapai, and Michael Dahilig -- agreed to hold over as 20R menbers* until their successors were nominated by respondent from the list of CAC candidates and the nominations confirmed by the senate; and (2) a sixth BOR menber whose term expires on June 30, 2008 -- Ramon de la Pena agreed to hold over as @ BOR member? until his successor was nominated by respondent from the list of CAC candidates and the nomination confirmed by the senate. Respondent's holdover agreements with the six BOR members came to the attention of Senator Les Thara, who, on July 3, 2008, requested from the Governor's Office “a copy of the documents that appoint interim members of the UH board of regents made from May 2, 2008 through the present.” The Governor’s ) gender, Lagareta, and Tatiboust agreed to hold over as members for three Honolulu County seats. Hapai agreed to hold over as menber for the second at large seat. Dahilig agreed to hold over as the student member, ' de 1a Pena agreed to hold over as menber for the Kauai county seat.  se IN WEST'S HAWAL Office responded on July 8, 2008 as follows: There are no records that fit your request. The Governor has not made any interim appointments to the Board of Regents from May 2 through the present. Regents Byron Sender, Catherine Lagareta, Jane Tatibouet, Marlene Hapal, Raron de la Pena and Michael Dahilig are presently serving as holdover members of the Board pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 304A-104, hich provides that “(e]very member may serve Beyond the expiration date of the menber's term of appointment until the member's successor has been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate in accordance with article x, section 6 of the state constitution.” on July 29, 2008, petitioner Sakamoto advised BOR Chair andon that regents Bender, Lagareta, Tatibouet, Hapai, Dahilig, and de la Pena were holding over “in possible violation of the law” because: (1) the Hawai'i Constitution, article V, section 6, prohibited the interim appointment of Lagareta after her nomination was rejected; and (2) Act 56, Section 5 did not permit fan extension of a regent’s term beyond June 30, 2008 for a regent whose term had expired on June 30, 2007 and for whom no successor had been appointed by June 30, 2008. Petitioner Sakamoto invited respondent and the Attorney General to “clarify the matter.” on July 30, 2008, the Attorney General advised petitioner Sakamoto that none of the six regents at issue was an “interim appointment” and that each vas lawfully serving as regent pursuant to specific language of Act 56. Act 56 [] very clearly governs the instant situation with regard to the #ix Regents at issue here. The terms of office of the six were to expire either June 30, 2007 or June 30, 2001 None had a successor appointed and confirmed by the Senate during the 2008 regular session. Thus, pursuant to either their original appointments (if they were for a term to expire June 30, 2008) o Section 5 of Act 56, the terms /ORTS AND PACIFIC RE! of each of the six expired on June 30, 2008. Pursuant to the specific language of Section ¢ of Act 56, each of these six Regents “nay serve beyond’ the expiration date of the menber’s term of appointment until the member’s successor has been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate in accordance with article X, section 6 of the state constitution.” Each of the six Regents is thus a “holdover” who specifically serves pursuant to the terms of Act 56. on July 30, 2008, petitioner Hanabusa advised the Attorney General and the BOR chair that certain menbers of the Hawaii State senate contend that [respondent's] act of holdis () regents (Bender, Lagareta, Tatibouet, Hapai, Dahilig, and de la'Pena] is in direct contravention of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii and the provisions of Act 56 (S-8. 14) of the 2007 Legislative Session. These holdover regents have either been specifically rejected by the Senate or have not availed themselves of the selection process required under the Constitution. Petitioner Hanabusa further advised the Attorney General and the BOR chair of “the intention of certain Senators to initiate legal proceedings to question the legitimacy of [the six] regents’ current holdover status” and cautioned the BOR “to proceed with due care while [the six regents’] appointments are under review.” on October 6, 2008, petitioners initiated this original proceeding by filing a petition for @ writ of mandamus. Petitioners sought a writ directing respondent to nominate, “in a timely manner,” six BOR candidates from the CAC’s list of qualified candidates to replace the six holdover regents. Petitioners contended that respondent is required to replace the six holdover regents because: (1) the Hawai'i Constitution, article X, section 6 mandates that regents “shall be nominated and . . . appointed by the governor from pools of qualified FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** candidates presented to the governor by the (CAC)"s (2) Act 56, Section 1 renewed the legislature's previously stated intent that regents serving as of Nay 1, 2007 shall serve their full terns of office and “as each term expires, the ragent will be replaced by an appointed menber screened and proposed by the [CAC]? (3) Act 56, Section 5 provided that “the terns of those [regents] that are to expire on or before June 30, 2007, shall be extended until the earlier of June 30, 2008, or until such time as new (regents) have been appointed [from CAC candidate pools]"; (4) the legislature did not intend to implement a holdover provision when it enacted Act 567 and (5) interpreting Act 56 to allow holdover regents would “nullify the purpose of the CAC,” “negate the purpose of the Constitutional Anendment [to article X, section 61," and “deny the advice and consent powers afforded to the Senate by [article X, section 6).” Petitioners contended that respondent was duty bound by article X, section 6 and Act 56 to replace the six holdover regents by nominating six candidates from the CAC's list of qualified candidates and that respondent is arbitrarily refusing to perform this duty. They sought mandamus relief “[iJn order to mitigate any further delay or damage that may occur if the ‘holdover’ regents participate in decisions by the (BOR) [.1” Respondent answered the petition on November 6, 2008. She argued that petitioners lacked standing to invoke this court's remedial power of mandamus because they, as legislators, had only a special interest in the subject matter of their petition and they had not personally suffered a distinct and * RTS AND PACIFI palpable jury. She argued that the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied because: (1) mandamus relief against her is warranted only for @ duty that is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt? (2) HRS § 304A- 104 (a) explicitly authorizes holdovers by regents and anticipates that the holdover period could be lengthy; and (3) neither article X, section 6 nor HRS § 304A-104(a) impose a mandatory deadline upon her to appoint replacement regents within the four~ month period of time that had passed since the six holdover regents’s terms expired on June 30, 2008. Petitioners replied to respondent’s answer on Novenber 14, 2008. They argued that: (1) they personally suffered an injury sufficient to establish standing inasmuch as their constitutional obligation as senators to advise and consent on respondent’s BOR appointments was usurped by respondent's holding over of the six regents; (2) mandamus is appropriate to compel. respondent's power of appointment; and (3) Act 56 provided a specific time limit for respondent to act in the nominating process. Oral argument was held on December 4, 2008. That day, we issued an order granting the petition for writ of mandamus and directed respondent to replace the six holdover regents by nominating, within thirty days, six regent candidates from the candidate 1ist presented to respondent on February 21, 2008. II, Standard for Disposition Avwrit of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and qo FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAL'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (citation omitted). Mandamus relief is available to compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an individual only if the individual's claim is clear and certain, the official's duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and no other remedy is available. In re, Disciplinary Bd. of Hawaii Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i 363, 368, 984 P.2d 688, 693 (1999). “A duty is ministerial where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion and judgment.” Salling v. Moon, 76 Hawai'i 273, 274 n. 3, 874 P.2d 1088, 1099 n.3 (1994) (citation omitted). TIT. Discussion A, Petitioners Had Standing To Seek Mandamus Relief “standing ig concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit.” Mott] v, Mivahira, 95 Hawai‘ 361, 388, 23 P.3d 716, 723 (2001) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v, Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (2394). It ig well settled that the crucial inguiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court’s Yenedial powers on his or her behalf. In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 81 Hawai'i 270, 275, 916 P.24 680, 685 (1996). In deciding whether thé plaintiff has the requisite nu _t¢+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** interest in the outcome of the litigation, we employ a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief for plaintiff’s injury. Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai'i 474, 478, 918 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1996). With réspect to the first prong of this test, the plaintiff “must show a distinct and palpable injury to himself (or herself. |” Life of the Land v, Land Use Conmission of State of Hawai'i, 63 Haw. 166, 173 n.6, 623 P.2d 431, 446 0.6 (1981). The injury must be “distinct and palpable, as opposed to abstract, conjectural, or merely hypothetical.” Doyle’ v. Oklahoma Bar Ass‘n, 998 F.2d 1553, 1566 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Motel, 95 Hawai'i at 389, 23 P.3d at 724, quoting Akinaka vy Disciplinary Bd, of Hawai'i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i $1, 55, 979 P.2d4 1077, 1081 (1999). The requirement of a “distinct and palpable injury” requires a plaintiff to have suffered an “injury in fact.” Mottl, 95 Hawai'i at 391, 23 P.3d at 726, Mott] involved a circuit court lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief from the finance director's and the governor's decision to reduce the University of Hawaii's allotment of funds by six million dollars for fiscal year 1998, ‘The plaintiffs were: (1) three University of Hawaii faculty members and directors of the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly; (2) the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly; (3) Hawai'i State Senator Rod Tam; and (4) Hawai'i State Representative Chris Halford, The plaintiffs lost in circuit court on summary judgment and lost in this court for lack of standing in the circuit court. We held that none of the a2 12+ BOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** plaintiffs suffered an “injury in fact” as a consequence of the six million dollar reduction in funds. As to plaintiffs Tam and Halford, we concluded that: -(T)he plaintiffs assert that Tam and ford, who are menbers of the legislature, Shave not only the interest of a general menber of the public in seeing that the [fiscal and budget] laws of the state are complied with, but the interest of persons ‘iho have Spent their own official tine on behalf of their constituents, reviewing, voting on, and enacting budgets that become Yaw." This establishes Tan's and Halford’ s “special interest” but not an “injury in fact.” They have not alleged any “personal stake in the outcone of the controversy,” inasmuch as they have not alleged that they had personally suffered any “distinct and palpable injury.” Akinaka, 91 Hawai'i at 55, 579'P.2d at 198i. Because a “special interest” in the subject matter of a lawsuit is insufficient to invoke judicial Intervention, Tam and Halford are without standing in this action. Motel, 95 Hawai'i at 392, 23 P.3d at 727. Petitioners sought mandamus relief in their individual capacities and in their capacities as state senators who passed Ret $6 to modify the appointment process for regents and who confirm or reject respondent's regent nominees under the modified appointment process. Their standing to invoke our remedial power of mandamus was contested by respondent, who relied on Mott) and argued that petitioners's interest in preventing decision making by a BOR comprised of six holdover regents established their “special interest,” but did not establish an “injury in fact.” Respondent argued that petitioners made no allegation that they personally suffered any distinct and palpable injury as a consequence of the holdover by six regents. 3 12+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATL REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Petitioners countered that they, as senators, “have a constitutional duty [under article X, section 6] to review and consent to, or reject [respondent's nominations of BOR candidates qualified by the CAC]” and that they were “deprived of performing their own constitutional obligations to advise and consent by [zespondent''s] acts in purposefully circunventing the constitutional nomination and appointment process [by holding over six regents].” They relied on authority from foreign jurisdictions holding that the “injury in fact” element of standing is met when a legislator is deprived of the right to advise and consent on executive appointments. According to the legislators’ allegations, the interest sought to be protected by this action [for declaratory and injunctive relief against the governor] is (the legislators’) unique statutory right to advise the Governor on executive appointments and to confer their approval or disapproval in this regard. Assuming these allegations to be true, we conclude that they allege a personal and legally cognizable interest peculiar to legislators. The interest asserted is simply not a “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance. Since the right to advise and Consent has been vested only in menbers of the legislature, and since only members of the legislature are bringing this action, the allegation that this right has been usurped by the Governor and (the Acting Commissioner of Commerce] are sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact, thus satisfying the minimum constitutional requirements of standing, We therefore believe that it is reasonable to hold that the legislators have standing, Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 626, 631 (3 Cir, 1984) (internal citations omitted) (suit by eight members of the Virgin Islands Fifteenth Legislature challenging the governor's appointment of 4 se+ FORPU REPORTER *** one Arnold Golden as “acting” Commissioner of Commerce after Golden’s nomination for such position was rejected by the legislature). Accord Riegle v, Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir.}, cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) ("We think it may argued plausibly that Senator Riegle has net the [burden of establishing injury-in-fact for purposes of standing]. . . . [A]ssuming that the five Reserve Bank members of the [Federal Open Market Committee] are officers who must be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, Riegle’s inability te exercise his right under the Appointments Clause of the [federal] Constitution [because Reserve Bank members are selected by a Board of Governors] is an injury sufficiently personal to constitute an injury-in-fact.” The Hawai'i Constitution, article X, section 6, provides that BOR members “shall be nominated and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appointed by the governor from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by the [CAC].” Petitioners, as senators who must advise and consent on respondent’ s BOR nominees, alleged that their unique constitutional duty to do so was usurped by respondent’ s holding over of six regents. The decisions of the federal appellate courts in Dennis and Riegle are persuasive authority for finding that the allegation that petitioners’s right to advise and consent on BOR appointments has been usurped by respondent and is sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact. ‘Therefore, we hold that petitioners had standing to invoke our remedial power of mandamus. a5  the Terms Of The Six “Holdover” fi 5 on 30.2008 Pursuant To Act 56, Sections 1 And 3. As previously stated, Act 56 of the 2007 legislature implenented the 2006 amendment to the Hawai'i Constitution, article X, section 6, that modified the appointment process for University of Hawaii regents by requiring the governor to select regent candidates from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by the CAC. In implementing the modified appointment process, the legislature, in Act 56, effective May 1, 2007, made specific provisions regarding the ten existing regents and their terms, which, as previously stated, expired on June 30, 2007 as to five regents, June 30, 2008 as to two regents, and 2009 and 2011 as to three regents. Section 1 of Act $6 provided that the ten existing regents will serve their full terms and “[ajs each term expires, the regent will be replaced by an appointed member screened and proposed by the [CAC).” Section 5 of Act 56 provided that the terms of the five regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2007 “shall be extended until the earlier of June 30, 2008, or until such time as new menbers of the board of regents have been appointed pursuant to the appointment process established pursuant to this Act, at which time their terms shall expire." Regent de la Pena was appointed to a term expiring on June 30, 2008. Pursuant to Section 1 of Act 56, he served his full term and his term expired on June 30, 2008. Regents Bender, Dahilig, Hapai, Lagareta, and Tatibouet were appointed to terms expiring on June 30, 2007. Pursuant to Section 5 of Act 56, their terms were extended until June 30, 2008 or until they were 16  replaced by regents appointed ‘under the modified appointment process, which ever occurred earlier. They were not, by June 30, 2008, replaced by regents appointed under the modified appointment process and so their terms expired on June 30, 2008. c. i ‘erms Expired Contravenes Act 56, Sect 1 And. ‘The rms of regents Bender, Dahilig, de 1a Pena, Hapai, Lagareta, and Tatibouet expired on June 30, 2008 pursuant to Act 56, Sections 1 and 5, ‘Thus, pursuant to Act 56, Section 1, “{a]s each term expire[d], the regent will be replaced by an appointed member screened and proposed by the [CAC].” ‘The CAC’s List of screened and proposed regent candidates, presented to respondent on February 21, 2008, included candidates to replace the six regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2008. Respondent acknowledged that the terms of six regents expired on June 30, 2008 pursuant to Act 56, Sections 1 and 5. Rather than nominating replacement regents from the CAC's candidate list in accordance with Section 1 of Act 56, respondent solicited and obtained holdover agreements with these six regents on June 20, 2008. The holdovers, according to respondent, were authorized by HRS § 304A-104(a) (Supp. 2007). HRS § 304A-104(a) provides that “[e]very [BOR] member may serve beyond the expiration date of the member's term of appointment until the members successor has been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate in accordance with article X, section 6 of the state constitution.” Respondent contended that this statutory provision (the holdover provision) explicitly authorized the holdovers of the six regents whose vv FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER terms expired on June 30, 2008. We disagree. It is well settled that this court’s foremost obligation in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the Statute itself. And we mist read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose: Capua v, Weyerhaeuser Co., 117 Hawai'i 439, 447, 184 P.2d 191, 199 (2008) (citation omitted). Act 56, Section 5 provided that *(nJotwithstanding the requirements of [HRS] section 304A-104, as it read prior the effective date of this Act,” the tezms of the five regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2007 would expire on June 30, 2008. HRS $ 3044-104 -- as it read prior to the May 1, 2007 effective date of Act 56 -- contained the holdover provision invoked by respondent for the continuation in office by the six regents. We construe Act §6, Section $s “notwithstanding” clause to except the holdover provision of HRS § 304A-104(a) as to the five regents -- Bender, Dahilig, Hapai, Lagareta, and Tatibouet -- to whom Section $ of Act 56 applies. such construction effectuates the legislature’s intent plainly stated in Section 1 of Act 56 -~ that “[a]s each [existing jent’s] term expires, the regent will be replaced by an appointed member scr ied and proposed by the [CAC].”” Respondent contended at oral argument that Section 5 of Act 56 “speaks only to [the regents’s] terms,” and, therefore, Section 5's “notwithstanding” clause does not refer to the holdover provision, but refers instead to the provision of HRS § 1s 11+ BOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 304A-104, as it read prior to May 1, 2007, that regents serve four-year terms. Section 5 speaks about regente’s terms as to the extension and expiration of those terms. Though Section 5 can be construed as referencing the four-year term provision, it can equally be construed as referencing the holdover provision. Construing Section 5's “notwithstanding” clause ~~ which applies to the “requirements” of HRS § 304A-104, as it read prior to May 1, 2007 -- as exclusively referencing the four-year term provision is not rational and sensible. Excepting the holdover provision of HRS $ 304A-104(a) as to regent de la Pena also effectuates the legislature’s stated intent that de la Pena, an existing regent when Act 56 was effected, be replaced, when his term expired on June 30, 2008, by an appointed regent screened and proposed by the CAC. We hold that respondent's application of the holdover provision of URS § 3048-104 (a) to regent de la Pena and to regents Bender, Dahilig, Hapai, Lagareta, and Tatibouet contravenes Act 56, Sections 1 and 5. Application of the holdover provision to those six regents is contrary to the modified appointment process for regents prescribed by the Hawai" Constitution, article x, section 6.? >. Nondiscre! Duty Of Respondent thai After Passage Of An Unreasonable Period Of Tine. The nomination and appointment of regents is a * The participation of Bender, Dahilig, de 1a Pena, Hapai, Lagareta, and Tatibouet, as regents, in business conducted by the BOR raises the issue of the validity of the BOR’s decisions made since July 1, 2008. The issue is collateral to this mandamus proceeding and is an issue we decline to decide. 19 nondiscretionary duty impesed on respondent by the Hawai'i constitution, article X, section 6 (regents “shall be nominated and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appointed by the governor from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by the [CAC]”), HRS § 304K-104(a) (there shall be fifteen regents “who shall be appointed . . . by the governor”), and HRS § 304-104.5(e) (for each regent seat to be filled, “the governor shall select one nominee from among the candidate advisory council's presentations”). Respondent did not dispute that the nomination and appointment of regents is nondiscretionary duty. she contended, however, that the duty is not one that is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt because article X, section 6 and HRS §§ 304A-104(a) and 304A~104,5(e) prescribe how, but not when, gent nominations and appointments are to be made. She contended that article xX, section 6 does not mandate the nomination and appointment of a regent as soon as a term expires or as soon as a seat is vacant and HRS § 304A-104(e) sets no time restriction on her selection of nominees from the CAC’ candidate List. Respondent thus contended that there is no deadline mandated by law for the nomination and appointment of replacement regents for the eix regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2008 and that a writ mandating the “timely” nomination and appointment of replacement regents was not warranted. Petitioners countered that Act 56, Sections 1 and 5 imposed a deadline of June 30, 2008 for nominating and appointing replacement regents for the six regents whose terms expired on 20  * WN IN. June 30, 2008. They further countered that a writ of mandamus was appropriate to compel the exercise of respondent's power to appoint regents, notwithstanding the lack of a tine restriction in article X, section 6 or HRS § 304A~104(a). We agree with jurisprudence from other jurisdictions that a governor's nondiscretionary duty can be compelled by mandamus notwithstanding the absence of a stated time limit. See Brotherton v. Moore, 230 8.8.20 638, 642 (W. Va. 1976) (The governor’s duty to appoint an executive officer upon occurrence of a vacancy in a non-elective office is a “nondiscretionary duty to act” and a “duty which can be enforced by mandamus.”); accord ‘Trumka v. Moore, 376 S.£.2d 178 (W, Va. 1988); see also Morganelli v. Casey, 646 A.2d 744, 747 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (The governor's execution of death penalty warrants is a ministerial duty and “the absence of a stated time limit, within which the Governor must act, does not exempt the duty from being judicially mandated if not performed.”). ‘The governor's duty to act is enforceable by mandamus when the duty is “postponed unreasonably” and not performed after the passage of an “unreasonable period of time.” Brotherton, 230 $.£.2d at 642; Trumka, 376 S.8.2d at 181; Moraanelli, 646 A.2d at 747 The Brotherton and Ixumka courts observed that “we Would be insensitive to the realities of public administration and abusive to the discretion of choice vested in a governor to hold that the act of appointment may be compelled at the instant of a vacancy.” Brotherton, 230 S.E.2d at 642; Trumka, 376 S.£.2d ‘at 161, The same view was expressed by this court in Life of the a1 7 , rc! ae Land v. Burns, $9 Haw. 244, 580 P.2d 405 (1978), concerning the governor's duty under HRS § 26-34" to appoint successor members. to boards and commissions upon the expiration of a menber’s term. . + [Zhe governor would be entitled to at least Aieascnable time after a term expires to nominate a qualified person to a board or commission. According to HRS § 26-34, it is necessary for the governor to submit the name of the person nominated to the senate for confirmation. Therefore, the subject of appointment Of menbers to boards and commissions must necessarily be considered to be the joint responsibility of the governor and senate, and the senate is privileged to inguire the governor's office about the appointment of any member whose term hae expired bevond such xeasonable tine. We believe that the senate would be quick to expose the governor if he [or She} engages in tactics which would unduly delay the appointment of menbers of boards and 59 Haw. at 251, $80 P.2d at 410 (emphasis added) . We hold that the governor’s duty —- pursuant to the Hawai'i Constitution, article x, section 6, and HRS $$ 304A 104(a) and 304-104.5(e) -- to nominate and appoint members of the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii is subject to a reasonable time standard. Reasonable tine is judged by the totality of the circumstances. C£. Fukida v. Hon/tlawais Service and Repair, 97 Hawai'i 38, 45, 33 P.34 204, 211 (2001) (reasonableness of the period of time claimed for loss of use of property is determined by evaluating the totality of the eizcumstances) Respondent agreed at oral argument that her duty to + MRS § 26-34(a) (1993) (Selection and terms of members of beards and connissions) ("The members of each board and comission established by law shall be nominated and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appointed by the governor.”). 22 22+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALTREPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_ nominate and appoint replacement regents for the six regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2008 was subject to 2 reasonable time standard. She contended, however, that as of Decenber 4, 2008, a reasonable period of time had not passed for the nomination and appointment of the six replacement regents. We disagree. Respondent was presented with the CAC’s List of regent candidates on February 21, 2008. The list consisted of twenty- two candidates to fill twelve regent seats. All of the candidates had been qualified and screened by the CAC in accordance with criteria established by the CAC pursuant to HRS § 304A-104.5(a).? The CAC provided respondent with short biographies of each candidate. The CAC explained to respondent, in the candidate list, that the CAC, with the assistance of a nationally recognized firm, had background checks performed on each candidate and that based on the background checks, the CAC “concluded that there were no findings to indicate that any of the candidates would not be able to discharge the responsibilities as a member of the Board of Regent: Respondent's selection of regent nominees was restricted to the twenty-two candidates presented to her on February 21, 2008, Respondent had two-and-a-half months from her receipt of the candidate list to the end of the 2008 regular legislative session to select from the list one nominee for of the twelve seats to be filled. By the end of the regular 3 HRS § 304A-104.5(a) (“The candidate advisory council shall establish the criteria for qualifying, screening, and presenting to the governor candidates for menbership on the board of regents.”) 23 12+ BOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_ session, respondent had selected seven nominees, six of whom were confirmed. Respondent thereafter had three opportunities to submit selections for the six remaining regent nominees when the first special legislative session convened in July 2008, when the second special legislative session convened in July 2008, and when the third special legislative session convened in Novenber 2008. Respondent's selection of the six remaining regent nominees is to be made from the same list of candidates that respondent has had since February 21, 2008 and is to be made from the twelve remaining candidates on the candidate list. The names of those twelve candidates have been with respondent since February 21, 2008. under the totality of the circumstances, the passage, to date, of nearly ten months since respondent was presented with the regent candidate List is an unreasonable period of tine for respondent to perform her constitutional and statutory duty of nominating and appointing the six remaining regents. Consequently, respondent is subject to mandamus. Richard Y. Wada, Jodi L. Eaton, and Gren Jon Van Dyke, for petitioners a Mark J. Bennett, Rttorney General, Besa Ctr areas Charleen M. Aina’and Russell A. Suzuki, Deputy Attorneys General, P—~ “NG for respondent Boron, Duldye re 24 

aa46222a9258f62688071d4c3787e574c4b0021e32bfd5e5191a38e695921d31

2008-12-15T00:00:00Z

40bae01a-cd92-4837-8a0f-81a3e26f479e

Rapozo v. Better Hearing of Hawaii, LLC. ICA Opinion, filed 06/26/2008 [pdf], 118 Haw. 285. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/10/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/20/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Motion for Reconsideration and Order of Amendment, filed 01/14/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 237. S.Ct. Opinion on Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 03/19/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 257.

119 Haw. 483

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

**°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAI" 00: MERVYN RAFOZO, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee S- 930 9002 BETTER HEARING OF HAWAII, LLC, Respondent /Defendant Appel lant oad a No. 27602 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. RC-05-A-0221) DECEMBER 5, 2008 MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. ‘OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J We hold that the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) erred in concluding that the findings of fact (findings) of the district court of the fifth circuit (the court) to the effect that (1) hearing aids purchased by Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee Mervyn Rapozo (Petitioner) were “nonconforming” under Revised Statutes (HRS) § 481K-1 (Supp. 2007) of HRS chapter 481K, the Assistive Technology Warranty Act (the Act) and that (2) Respondent /Defendant-Appellant Better Hearing of Hawaii, LLC ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ (Respondent) had a reasonable opportunity to repair the devices pursuant to HRS § 481K-3 (Supp. 2007) of the Act were clearly erroneous, and therefore that (3) the court erred in awarding Petitioner a full refund of the costs of his hearing aids, a double recovery of his alleged pecuniary losses, and attorney's fees and costs under HRS chapter 481K. See Rapozo v. Better Hearing of Hawaii, 118 Hawai'i 265, 293, 188 P.3d 798, 807 (App. 2008). Accordingly, the September 5, 2008 judgment of the ICA is reversed in part for the reasons stated herein, and the court's April 17, 2005 judgment is affirmed. The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by Petitioner on September 10, 2008, and accepted on October 20, 2008. In his application, Petitioner seeks review of the ICA's Septesber 5, 2008 Judgment filed pursuant to its June 26, 2008 published opinion, reversing the Novenber 17, 2005 judgment of the court? in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent. This court heard oral argument on the merits on November 20, 2008. 1 on February 10, 2004, Petitioner purchased digital hearing aids for both ears from Respondent at its Lihue, Kauai location. Gary Woodard (Woodard) is the owner of the Lihu‘e \ the published opinion was authored by Associate Judge Katherine G. Leonard, who was’ Joined by Chief Juage Mark Recktenwald and Asssciate Judge Corinne KA. Watanabe. 7 The Honorable Trudy K, Senda presided, 2 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** store. The aids were manufactured by Starkey Labs (Starkey), which is located in Anah , California. Respondent is a dealer for Starkey. According to the purchase agreenent, the price was $5,198.00 after an open house discount of $4,460.00. Hawaii Medical Service Association, Petitioner's medical insurance carrier, covered $1,044.00 of the cost, Petitioner paid $100, and financed the balance of $4,054.00 through “GE Money Bank.” Prior to purchasing the aids, Respondent gave Petitioner a general ear examination to eliminate any potential that he might need a medical referral.’ The results of the ear examinations were normal. Petitioner was also given a hearing test, the data from which was used to initially program the hearing aids. Respondent took molds of Petitioner's ears and sent them to Starkey, who then manufactured custom aids for Petitioner and shipped then to Respondent within approximately ten days. Petitioner testified that he did not recall receiving any documents from Respondent when he purchased the devices. Respondent asserts that Petitioner was provided with warranty documents from Starkey, and two warranties from Respondent. The “starkey Labs Warranty Card” stated that the hearing aids would be repaired or replaced at the discretion of the manufacturer if Woodard’ s testimony to this effect was that Ywhen the client jes in we do an initial video to scope exan. That's where we have 2 fiber optic video camera,” It shows the ear canal on the T.v, This te the check fer any perforations, any cysts, tumors, wax blockage. Anything that Would require = medical referral,” “***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"** failure occurred within the one-year warranty period. A paper copy of the “Starkey Labs Standard One Year Warrant y" referred to free replacement due to loss of hearing aids once per side for one year, replacement due to damage once per side for one year, and unlimited refitting of the aids. However, there is no address for Starkey on the warranty card or on the warranty docunent. According to Woodard, generally there is no direct contact between Starkey and end users of the product. Respondent itself provided a “30 day total satisfaction money back guarantee,” meaning that whether the aids worked or not, a consumer could receive a full refund within the first thirty days for any reason, and a “Life Time Custoner Service Guarantee” for free office visits, hearing tests, cleaning and adjusting of the aids, programming, and minor in-office repairs. Respondent claims that all customers are advised prior to purchasing the aids that they will have to be fitted for the earpieces and then “must return for testing and adjustment . . because the device is essentially a sophisticated amplifier which requires digital adjustment based upon feedback from the customer.” Respondent asserts that Petitioner was informed both when he purchased the aids and when he returned to the store to pick up the aids, that he would need to return for “at least 3-4 adjustments in the first 30 days.”  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER The facts regarding Petitioner's problems with the nces of the “repairs” are disputed. hearing aids and the circum Aocording to Petitioner, he had ongoing problems with the aids from the time of purchase. He heard all kinds of sounds, and sometimes he could only hear sounds that were at a distance and sometimes he could only hear sounds that were in close proximity. He took the aids back to Respondent on four to five occasions within the first few months, but continued to have the same problems with them during the course of Respondent's adjustments.” It is undisputed that, sometime in May 2004, Petitioner started hearing clicking sounds in the aids. According to Respondent, despite the fact that Petitioner had visited the store several times for adjustments, the first time that Petitioner voiced any conplaint about the aids was when Petitioner brought the aids into the Lihu‘e store in May of 2004 complaining of the clicking noises. Respondent sent the aids to Starkey, the manufacturer, to be repaired at no cost, pursuant to the one-year warranty. According to repair invoices dated Nay 20, 2004, Starkey replaced the speaker and microphone on each aid, Respondent claims that the aids vere likely out of Petitioner’s possession for about ten days for this repair, whereas Petitioner claims he was without the aids for “about a month or so.”  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPOR} ‘The aids were returned by Starkey to Respondent at the end of May 2004. Petitioner went to Respondent’s store to retrieve the repaired aids and for an adjustment, which was performed by Tara Kadar (Kadar), Respondent's technician. Petitioner claims he continued to have problems after the aids were returned. Sometime in late May or early June 2004, he attended his class reunion and could not hear anyone at his were emitted far from his table, but could only hear sounds th: table. In a letter dated June 17, 2004, Petitioner's wife, Fay 7. Rapozo (Mrs. Rapozo), wrote to Respondent asking whether the aids could be returne: I'm writing you quite disturbed and concerned that [Peritioner) is not getting the effects required off of the use of his nearing elde [sic]. ie carries it around ang ‘Burchased it And |-knoe yon can attest to that since ne fas-been coming in ‘or adiustmest®. and pentioning to vo she-problens. Lwantto know if there is a oosibility that thé unit be Eetitnads T can't see paying for something that does not Work, it makes not [sic] sense. T appreciate all that you have been doing, and it would have been marvelous that the unit work cause he needs it, but in the tight crunch of financing, paying four thousand’ dollars fang having it sit on the shelf, just does not cut it for me. (Emphases added.) Woodard related that this was the first time that he personally became aware of Petitioner's problems.‘ After ‘Woodard was apparently unaware thet the aids had been sent to Starkey for repair until June of 2004, when he was informed of the repair by Kagar. The coure’s finding 18 states’ that "Woodard had not been aware that the hearing aid was sent to (Starkey) in May 2004 for repair.” finding 19 States that “(a]feer becoming avare of Mrs. Rapozo's letter, Woodard aise learned of the attenptes repair sy [Starkey]. 6  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** learning of these matters, Woodard stated that he instructed Kadar to have Petitioner come in for more adjustments, but it does not seem that Kadar ever passed this request on to Petitioner in June 2004.* In about September or October of 2004, Petitioner returned the aids to Respondent indicating that he did not want them because they were not functioning properly. Despite his wite's written inquiry as to whether Petitioner could return the devices and obtain a refund, Petitioner did not receive a refund. Instead, in Decenber 2004, Respondent's representative brought the aids to Petiticne:’s home and told Petitioner thet he had purchased them and he should keep them, Kedar wrote a letter to Petitioner, stating, in part: Iam sorry about the way things happened with the hearing aide, it Le my goal to help those that are seeking Relp with Eheit hearing. “r know that you were very frustrated and Feit hopeless with the aids that we had, I too felt very helpless not providing you with the service chat you needed. Wicodard admitted that he had never read HRS chapter 481K prior to this suit; accordingly, his position was that a customer can only return hearing aids within thirty days. nm. on July 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent in the court. As paraphrased by the ICA, the complaint alleged the following: + Finding 20 states that “Woodard instructed Kadar to have [Petitioner] cone into [sic] [Respondent's] place of business for further Aejustnents, bur [Petitioner] did not do so snd it does not appear that Hadar fever communicated such request to [Petitioner] in June 2004.” 7 ‘°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** (2) the hearing aids cane with a one-year guarantee: (2) [Betitionee) returnea the hearing aids for repase at Teast. five times within the one-year period? (3) the heering SiSs were out of service for over thirty days? (4). (Respondent fsiled to comply with (HRS § 482K-3) when it tasied to accept the return of the hearing aids and make 3 refuna; and (5) therefore, pursuant to HRS (§ ¢81K-5 (supp. 20071], [Petitioner] was entitled to recover twice the snount of’ his pecuntary loss, costs, disbursements, snd Feasonable attorney's fees. Rapozo, 118 Hawai'i at 287, 188 P.3d at 801." A one-day bench trial was held on September 22, 2005. Id. at 287-88, 188 P.3d at 901-02. The only witnesses were Petitioner and Woodard. At the close of the hearing, the court stated that the parties could submit written closing arguments by October 6, 2005. In Respondent's closing argument filed on October 5, 2005, it argued that there was no nonconformity’ because the aids “worked according to their design and industry standards” and that the “only repair [to Petitioner’s devices} |.» remedied any possible ‘non-conformity.’" Petitioner submitted written argument on October 6, 2005, maintaining that Respondent “sold an assistive device to a consumer without a written warranty that the device was fit for the ordinary purpose for which the device is used,” and that “[Petitioner]’s testimony that he returned the aids with the same problem 4 or 5 times was ‘us § 481K-3(2) (Supp. 2007) and the relevant portion of HRS § 661K-5 (wnicn is the section that provides a right of action £0 consumers) are set forth intea at page 16. 7 MRS § 482K-3(a) states that “[1)f the manufacturer or its agents fail to correct a ponconformity as required by 2 warranty after a reasomble Opportunsey to repait, the sanufacture: shall accept return of the assistive Sevice from the consumer and refund the full purchase price or replace the assistive device(.]” (Emphasis added.) The Act defines a *nonconformity” as s'tasfece, salfunction, of condition that fails to conform to any warranty applicable to an assistive device." HRS § 4€1K-1 8 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*™* a ‘reasonable opportunity to repair’ as there was a failure to repair the same nonconformity with two attempts.” Respondent filed a supplerental closing argument on october 25, 2005, in response to the court’s October 12, 2005 directive asking for argument on the distinction between “repair” and “adjustment.” To that effect, Respondent argued that hearing aids “by design, require programming or ‘adjustments’ to maximize use by the ouner,” and that “the [Act] does not apply to a product which inherently operates by periodic adjustment.” Petitioner, in his supplemental argument submitted on October 26, 2005, posited that “‘repair’ means the manufacturer is to take whatever actions necessary to make the device conform to the warranty,” and, therefore, “[t}he legislature intended, whatever word is used, that the manufacturer deliver to a consumer a device that is fit for the purposes for which it was sold.” Following these submissions, on Novenber 3, 2005, the court filed its findings, conclusions of law (conclusions), and decision and order. The court decided that Petitioner’ s hearing aids were nonconforming under the Act, and that Petitioner had provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to correct that nonconformity, Hence, the court concluded that Petitioner was entitled to recovery pursuant to the Act. ui. on November 15, 2005, Respondent filed 2 Notice of Appeal. On November 17, 2005, the court entered a judgment in ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Petitioner's favor in the amount of $8,610.66, pursuant to the double recovery provision of HRS § 481K-5. Rapozo, 118 Hawai't at 269, 183 P.3d at 803. Respondent then filed an amended notice of appeal on November 25, 2005. The ICA issued its opinion on June 26, 2008. The ICA reversed the court’s judgment, determining that the court's findings that “adjustments” made by Respondent constituted repairs under the Act and that the device was therefore repaired or presented for repair on more than one occasion," and that the device was nonconforming, were clearly erroneous. Id, at 291-93, 168 P.3d at 805-07. Ww. In his Application, Petitioner presents the following questions: [2.1 Mnether the [Tcal gravely exzed in reversing [the coutt)'s Judgment of November 17, 20057 (*) T2:]. whether the ICA gravely efred in finding that (the court) was clearly erroneous in finding that the hearing alas ere not fit fer thelr ordinary purpose under ‘HBS clbaptes 421k Te ' the ICA states in its opinion that it is “left with a definite and firm conviction that [the court] erred in finding that the adjustments to [betitioner]'s bearing aids constituted repairs” and that “[ehe court] clearly erred when it found and concluded that [Petitioner's] hearing aids were Eepaired, of presented for repair, cn more than one occasion.” 118 Hawal'l at 186 itd at S06. But as discussed in more detail infra, the court does ppear to have made the findings attributed to it by the ICR. Respondent ‘a point of erzor on appeal that [the court) erred in inplieitiy Finsing and concluding that. (Petitioner]’s hearing aids were ‘repaired’ on ore than one occasion.” (Esphasis added.) The ICk's conclusion seems to Fefer to this supposed “implicit” finding. tn contrast, the relevant findings Of the court were that "[tjhe manufacturer 4s presumed to have had a Feasonable opportunity to repair the nonconformity sf St... foils to repaic cTuith tno attonpte”; "[Petitioner) exercised reasonable effort. and Galigence in returning to (Respondent) for adjustments to the hearing aid) sng SIfetstioner] proviced (Respondent] with feasonable opportunity to" repatr the hearing sig.” + this question poses the ultimate issue and therefore ite answer gests on an analysis of questions 2, 3, and ¢ that follow. 10  ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACTFIC REPORTER: 13.) Whether the ICA gravely erred in finding that [the court) was clearly erroneous in finding that [Petstioner) "had ai 4 So'ineeir the Rearina aia) her the Ich gravely erred in finding that Clearly erroneous in finding that the SGI IT Ter] Whether the ICA gravely erred by not remanding the case to [tne court] to award disuse unser BES. Acinaptert 480. (Enphases added.) In conjunction with the fifth question he raises, Petitioner argues that “[t]he ICA erred by not remanding the case to (the court] to award damages under HRS [chapter] 480." This argument ia based on language in HRS § 481K-5(c) that “failure by a manufacturer to provide the warranty required by section 481-2 [(Supp. 2007)] . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of an unfair or deceptive practice under chapter 480.” The court had found that the warranty provided by Respondent was inadequate under HRS § 481K-2, and Woodard had admitted at trial that he had no knowledge of the warranty required under the Act prior to reading Petitioner’s complaint in this action. Petitioner argued on appeal that the case should be remanded for a determination of damages under HRS chapter 480 as Petitioner reasoned that the court had not granted damages under HRS chapter 480 because it had already provided for recovery under chapter 481K. In this regard, the ICA agreed that the written warranty provided by Respondent was inadequate under the u ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Act," but did not remand the case for a determination of damages because Petitioner did not establish that he had suffered danages as a result of the violation and had not cross-appeaied from the court’s judgment.:! 118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807. The ICA was correct that Petitioner’s argument as to HRS chapter 490 is not meritorious inasmuch as Petitioner failed to cross-appeal from the court’s judgment, which had not awarded damages under HRS chapter 480. See id. Hence, the ICA’s judgment is affirmed on this issue. “with regard to the warranties, Respondent argued on appeal that the court erred in concluding that “che warranties provided by [Respondent] and the manufacturer, (Starkey), failed to comply with the provisions of HRS S'4elk-2(a) and (b)-" The court's findings with regard to the warranty were as follows: 33. Section 48iK-2(b) requires that the duration of the warranty be “not less than one year after first possession Of the assistive device by the Consuner” and tolls and extends the warranty period under specific conditions. 34. The warranty docurentation provided to (Petitioner) by [Respondent] did not comply with the express and unesbiguous requirements set forth in ARS (§) 4€1K-2(a) and (bl; under the provisions of HRS (6) 48iK-2(d), (Respondent) 18 deened fo'have given [Petitioner] the warranty required by said statutory sections, Respondent's argunent is without merit, as there is nothing in the warranties Te provided that warrants that the devices wil be fit for thelr ordinary purpose, and that it would repair any nonconformity to that effect without Eharge for at least one year, as required by IRS § 481K-2(a) and (b) ‘The TCA concluded that, (nJotwithstanding [Respondent’ s) failure to provide [Petitioner] with the required weitten warranty of fitness for ordinary purposes Under HRS’ § 421K-2ia), [Petitioner] did not establish that he suffered any “damages caused by that violation.” Hes § 481K-5[c). - . (The court) did ot award (Petitioner) damages under HRS chapter 480 and [Petitioner] dia not cross-appeal from [the court]’s judgment, 118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 F.3d at 807 (brackets omitted). a2 *+*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ ve Initially we note that the question of whether jent falls under the definition of “manufacturer” as Resp: defined by the Act, was not squarely addressed on appeal. HRS § 481K-2(a) mandates that “[nlo assistive device shall be sold, leased, or delivered in this State to a consumer unless accompanied by a written warranty under which the manufacturer uartants that the assistive device is fit for the ordinary purposes for which the device is used[.] HRS § 481K-1 provides that a “manufacturer” is “a person who manufactures or assembles assistive devices and agents of that person, including an importer, a distributor, a factory branch, distributor branch, and a warrantor of the manufacturer's assistive device, but does not include an assistive device dealer.” (Emphases added.) An “assistive device dealer” is defined as person who is in the business of selling new assistive devices.” HRS § 481K-1. As the ICA noted, “{i]n [finding] 31, (the court] found: [Starkey] i a manufacturer under the meaning of HRS [5] 4@1K-1, [Respondent] ie an agent of [Starkey] and, therefore, is also considered a ‘manufacturer’ within the meaning of HRS [S$] 481K-1." Rapoze, 116 Hawai'i at 290 n.7, 188 P.3d at 804 n.7. Because Respondent did not challenge that finding on appeal, the ICA did not address the issue of whether Respondent qualified as a “manufacturer” under the statutory definition, but 3 ‘\** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** only noted that assistive device dealers are excluded from the statutory definition. see L However, in his Application, Petitioner observed that “{a]Lthough the ICA declined to address the issue of whether or not [Respondent] was a manufacturer, . . . [t]he ICA questioned (finding) 31 whereby [the court] found [Respondent] to be a manufacturer.” Petitioner argues in his Application that “an assistive device dealer who also serves as an agent and/or warrantor of the manufacturer” should be included within the definition of “manufacturer” because otherwise “[s]nyone who sold new assistive devices [including a manufacturer through a factory branch] could provide a warranty and be immune from suit on that waranty.” In this context, we observe that the court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent is an agent that wes a wagrantor of the manufacturer's, ie, Starkey’s, assistive device. The relevant evidence is set forth in the following findings: 5. {Petitioner} sas given a Warranty Card which indicates a warranty expiration date of February 16, 2008. s+ s 6." "According to the testimony [of Woodard], hearing aid fitter/dealer and omer of {Respondent}, {Respondent} provides its customers with a handout cuenarizing custoner Service guarantess and nanufacturer warranty information. ‘The hangout states that all new hearing aid purchases cone sath a 30 day total satisfaction money back guarantee, In Zadition, the handout references (Starkey’s) replacenent and repair coverages for the one year period after purchase. 251" According to Woodard, (Respondent) is the dealer for [Starkey] in the County of Kauai, state of Hawaii. 26. Woodard testified that when @ hearing aid ia sold to customer, there is no direct contact between (Starkey) and the customer, Instead, (Respondent) 1s the Liaison and 14 “°-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** performs as (Starkev's) agent in the County of Kauai, state DE Rawatt 31)" (Searkey) de a manafacturer under the nearing of HRS [6] 482K-1... [Respondent] is tof {Starkey} andy iferetore, 42 also considered a “manufacturer” within the Feaning of HRS (5) 481K-1. (citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Tt is undisputed that Petitioner only had contact with Respondent and not Starkey, and St was Respondent who provided Petitioner with the warranties. As the warranty card indicated, Petitioner was to return to Respondent if he had probleme with the aids, and was not provided any contact information for Starkey. In selling Petitioner the hearing aids Respondent wae apparently acting as an assistive device dealer, Manifestly, Respondent was also acting as Starkey’s agent in the capacity of a warrantor, and therefore, in that capacity, was governed by the Act's requirements pertaining to a “manufacturer.” See HRS § 481K-1, The alternative view, under which the terms “manufacturer” and “assistive device dealer” would be viewed as mutually exclusive, would allow for the legally absurd result that consumers would be left without any recourse under the Act, in the situation where a manufacturer or an agent, in this case a warrantor, also served as a dealer of new devices. vi. ‘The questions raised in this case revolve around the proper application of HRS chapter 481K. HRS § 481K-3(a) provides in pertinent part: 15 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** or its agents {aii to correct wareanty afser 3 reasonable Sfithe assistive device from the consumer and refund the ull purchase orice or replace the assistive device » (a), 1£ the manutacturi a aoneontormity as requized by (Emphases added.) The relevant portion of HRS § 481K-5 provides for a right of action as follows: {c) In addition to pursuing other remedies, a consuner may bring an action to recover damages caused by'a violation Sf this chapter. The court shall award a conauter uno her with Srsenent, and reasonable ‘Aiioines fees, ond any equitable relief that the court may Sotermine 12 appropriate (Emphasis added.) Therefore, if a manufacturer fails to correct a nonconforming device after a “reasonable opportunity to repair” and does not provide the consumer with a refund or a replacenent, then the consumer is entitled to recovery under HRS § 481K-5. vir ‘The ICA’s holding that the court erred in concluding that Petitioner was entitled to recovery was based entirely on its belief that certain of the court's findings were clearly erroneous. 118 Hawai‘i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807. The court’s findings, as well as any conclusions that present mixed questions of fact and law, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Bmfac, Inc, v, Waikiki Beachcomber Inv, Co., 74 Haw. 85, 116-17, 119, 839 P.2d 10, 27-28, 29 (1992). A [finding] is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks Substantial evigence to support the finding, oF (2) despite Substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court ss nonetheless left with a definite and Conviction that a mistake has been made, Substantial Gvidence is credible evidence which ss of sufficsent quality and probative value to enable a person of Feasonable caution fo support a conclusion. 16 ‘<= FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Office of Havaiian Affairs v. ey. Dev. Coy awaii HODCH), 117 Hawa: Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai‘ 332, 351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007)). i 174, 189, 177 P.3d 884, 899 (2008) (quoting ‘The central conclusion of the court, that Respondent violated chapter 481K, was based on its findings that (2) Petitioner's hearing aids were not fit for their ordinary purpose for which they were used and (2) Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to repair the hearing aids, The ICA appears to have determined that there was a lack of substantial evidence in the record for the court's finding that the hearing aids were nonconforming, and, despite substantial evidence regarding repairs, it was left with a definite and firm conviction that the court erred in finding that Respondent had a reasonable opportunity to repair the aids. However, we conclude that the court’s findings that the hearing aids were nonconforming and that Respondent had a reasonable opportunity to repair the devices were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the ICA must be reversed, and the decision of the court reinstated. vint. We believe that the ICA's error proceeds from its narrow application of HRS chapter 481K. The plain language of the Act is aimed at protecting the interests of individuals who are dependent upon assistive technology devices in their daily y  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®** Lives. Moreover, it is evident that the language of the Act is broader in scope than that propounded by the ICA, Distinctions that unnecessarily constrict the application of the Act redound to the detriment of disabled consumers for whose protection the Act was intended. As discussed below, the meanings of “nonconfozmity” and “repair” are sufficiently broad to encompass the circumstances of Petitioner's case. ak, In connection with the nonconformity issue raised in ‘the second question by Petitioner, the pertinent court findings state as follows: 9. After [Petitioner] took delivery of the hearing aid and attempted to use it ina variety of social settings, he Ghperienced difficulties.” [peti kines, he would be able to bear only sounds in_close broxiBity at other tines. be wae unable to hear sounds at lose range and could coly hear sounds at areater distances. To, {Petitacner] testified that it was obvious to him th the hearing aid needed to be adjusted and, to that end, he TTS At ‘seme point approximately four to six months after purchase, [Petitioner] noticed that, is" Atter the hearing aid was returned fron (Starkey! , (Petitioner) went into (Respondent)"s place of business’ to try the repairea hearing aid,” After ah adjustment by Rot workine oroperiv, —ieetitioosr] teatitied that the 3 = Rot hear eroneriy wath the hearina aid TG, {Petitioner] testifies that, aiter the resair by % Testimony in support of the Act was received from several individuals and the following organizations: Office of Consumer Protection, State Planning Council on Developmental Disabilities, Hawaii Assistive Technology Training and Services, Havail Centers for’ Independent Living, Protection and Advocacy Agency of Hawaii, and the Commission on Persons with Disabilities. Sen. Stand, Comm. Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1206-05; Hse, Stand. Comm, Rep. No. i663, in 1937 House Journal, at 1757 18 **FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER" Starkevi, be attended hie class reunion and was unable to ai CE THEME) letter dated Jone 17, 2004, [Mrs. Rapoza) wrote to Incapontent] ard informed [Respondent] that (Petitioner! was inst getting the effects required off of the use of his hearing aide (stc]." Mea. Fapozo inquired if there was a possibility of retarning the Unit. 40." Seopite attempts at effecting adjustments and/or fepair, {Petitioner! continued to experience problens such Ger clicking in the hearing aid and difficulty in hearing either close sounds or distant sounds. i regarding the problems he experienced white using the nearing aid, Sones e for Trotitioner|7a hearing aid therefore had Rasneenforeity", within the mesning of ARS Section abies 0) (Emphases added.) x The ICA cited to the statutory definition of snonconformity” in ite general discussion of the Act. But in ruling that the court erred in finding the devices were nonconforming, the ICA reasoned that “the need for adjustment, without more, ig not a nonconformity ina hearing aid.” 118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 607. The ICA relied on the “undisputed testimony” of Respondent that “the ordinary purpose of a hearing aid is to provide amplification, but unfortunately, these assistive devices do not provide a perfect replacement for the fully functioning human ear." Id. The ICA then concluded > Respondent's argunent on appeal to the ICA was that {the court! erred in finding and concluding that [Fetitioner)’s hearing aids were not fit fer thelr intended purpose and therefore had a ‘nonconformaty,’ within the hesning of ARS § {2iR-i[,]" referring to finding 41. Ae ciscussed intra, this teguvent. is without merit in that there was substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding thet “[Petitioner)"s hearing aid was not fit for its ordinary purpose.” 39 **° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** that “[t]here is no evidence, including in (Petitioneri’s hestinony, that the hearing aids were defective, malfunctioning or were unfit for their ordinary purpose after the May 2004 repair{,]” and that Petitioner was “not willing to work on further adjustments to the hearing aids.” Id, (emphasis added.) However, first, the ICA's belief that “the need for adjustment, without more, is not a nenconformity,” id., and that F itioner’s testimony was not evidence of “nonconformity,” is inconsistent both with the broad definitions of “nonconformity” adopted in the Act and with the purposes of the Act. See discussion infra. According to the Act, a “nonconformity” is a “defect, malfunction, or condition that fails to conform to any warranty applicable to an assistive device.” HRS § 481K-1 (emphasis added). The foregoing underscored terms are not defined in the Act. “This court has said that ‘[wle may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries as one way to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily defined.’” Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals of County of Hawaii, 109 Hawai'i 384, 393, 126 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2006) (quoting Schetke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 424, 32 P.3d 52, 68 (2001)). The Webster’s dictionary definition of “defect” includes “shortcoming” or “a want or absence of something necessary for completeness, perfection, or adequacy in form or function.” Webster's Third New Int’) Dictionary 591 (1961) (emphasis added). “Malfunction” ineludes “to function badly or 20  “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER imperfectly: fai] to cperate in the normal or usual manner.” Id. at 1367 (emphases added). “Condition” includes “something needing remedy.” Id, at 473 (emphasis added). It is evident, then, that the term “nonconformity” encompasses a wide variety of problems that might prevent consumers’ efficient use of assistive devices. ‘The Act’s definition of “warranty” sheds further light on the meaning to be attributed to “nonconformity.” HRS § 481K- 3a) requires the manufacturer to accept return of the device if the manufacturer “fail{s] to correct a nonconformity as required bya warranty(.]" (Emphasis added.) RS § 481K-2(a) in turn requires the manufacturer to “warrant[] that the assistive device is fit for the ordinary purposes for which the device is used, and undertake[] to pay the full cost of both parts and labor necessary to repair any nonconformity.” (Emphases added.) HRS § 481K-1, the definitions section of the statute, provides a definition for “assistive device,” which includes “hearing [aids] + and other [aids] that enhance an individual's ability to hear. . . and any other device that enables a person with a disability to. . . hearl.]” (Emphases added.) Therefore, Respondent's argument that the purpose of a hearing aid is solely “to provide amplification,” without regard to whether it actually assists the individual with his or her hearing, is inconsistent with the statutory definition for a hearing aid. As Petitioner responds, “[Respondent’s] definition confuses the ordinary a1  "FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ purpose for which a hearing aid is used (to assist people with their hearing) with the means by which the purpose is accomplished (amplification of sound).”* (Emphasis in original.) ‘The substantial evidence in the record supporting the court’s findings that the devices were functioning inadequately includes (1) Petitioner’s testimony that (a) he was hearing “{a}1i kinds of sounds and things like that [and nJot hearing what [he] wanted to hear up close when [he] needed to, and when (he] needed to hear far away [he] couldn't hear”; (b) he “started having clicking sounds”; (c} he “attended [his] class reunion, and [he] could not hear anybody within [sic] [his] table, but [he] could hear the sounds away from (his) table"; and (d) he did not notice any change in his ability to hear throughout the adjustment process, but continued to have the same problens; (2) as well as the admission of Respondent’s technician, Kadar, that (a) she “[knew] that [Petitioner was] very frustrated and felt hopeless with the aids that we had” and (b) that she also “felt very helpless not providing [Petitioner] with the service he needed.” Hence, the ICA's conclusion that there was “no evidence” supporting the court's finding that Petitioner’s hearing aids were nonconforming, including after the May 2004 repair, 119 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807, was wrong. “an referring to this statement, this court renders no judgment as to whether the purpose of the digital hearing aids was only to amplify sound 22 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ B. Second, the ICA erred in making the credibility determination that “it appears” that Petitioner was “not willing” to return for further repairs after May 2004. 118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807. The credibility of Petitioner's testimony, as well as the weight to be given his testimony and other evidence on the question of nonconformance, as opposed to the evidence submitted by Respondent, were not matters within the province of the ICA, but were for the court to determine. See LeMay v, Leander, 92 Hawai'i 614, 626, 994 P.2d 546, 558 (2000) (This court has long observed that it is within the province of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and this court will refrain from interfering in those determinations.”) Based on the record, there is substantial evidence, as indicated gupra, that Petitioner's devices were not functioning “adequa(tely]” or “normal{ly].” See Webster's Third New Int’) Dictionary at 591, 1367. The evidence shows that the devices Were functioning poorly and inadequately, so much so that, despite his hearing disability, there was evidence that Petitioner never used the devices for a full day, and determined that he was better off not using them at all. Based on Petitioner’s testimony that he was at times only able to hear sounds that were close and at times only able to hear sounds from far away, and that he heard all kinds of noises, the court could 23 “°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** properly draw the conclusion that Petitioner’s hearing aids vere not fit for their ordinary purpose." x. The legislative history confirms that the terms in the Act should be Liberally applied, and supports the conclusion that the ICA's application was too restrictive. As we reiterated in & 4.3 Lounge Operating Co. vs Liguor Commission of the city & County of Honolulu, 118 Hawai'i 320, 335, 169 P.34 432, 447 (2008), “(IJegislative history may be used to confirm Interpretation of @ statute’s plain languagel.]" (Citing Blaisdell v. Dep't of Pub, Safety, 113 Hawai'i 315, 319 n.5, 181 P.3d 796, 800 n.$ (2007).) According to the legislative history of the Act, “[t}he purpose of the bill is to provide consumers with additional warranty remedies in connection with the purchase of assistive devices for persons with disabilities,” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. © petitioner does not raise the ICA's conclusion that “there is no evidence whatsoever to support [the court's) finding” that Petitioner Sontinged to hesr clicking sounds afcer the May 2004 cepair, 118 Hawaii at 282, 188 P.3d at 806, as a point of error in his Application. The ICA had. contluded that the ‘clicking sounds’ clearly constituted » nonconfornity, and apparently decided that, because, according to Respondent, those were Corrected by the May 2004 repair, Petitioner’ s devices were no longer Ronconforming after chat posnt. id. at 291, 293, 188 P.34 at 605, 807. However, the failure to claim exrar“on the pare of the ica as te this Conclusion does not adversely inpact the court's ultimate finding that the Sevices were nonconforming. As Petitioner argues, because the entirety of the ‘other evidence supported the conclusion that Petitioner's hearing aids were ot working correctly, whether the clicking sounds continued after the May repair was not necessary to the court's finding that the side were Roneonforming. This addresses Respondent’ s argument on appeal that “(the rt] erred in finding that, after repairs were completed by the manufacturer (Petitioner) continued’ to experience ‘clicking sounds.’" Respondent had Asieztod that the court's findings 15 and 40, set forth above in full suuza ae pages 18, 13, were in error. 24 “+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ No. 1669, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757 (emphasis added), and to “provide increased protection{,]” Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 792, in 1987 Senate Journal, at 1205 (emphasis added); see also Kalina vs State, 111 Hawai'i 64, 100, 137 P.3d 990, 1006 (2006) ("This court has stated that remedial statutes should be liberally construed to suppress the perceived evil and advance the enacted remedy and has disfavored narrow interpretations that impede rather than advance the remedies provided by such statutes.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)) As noted in the Senate Conmittee Report for HRS chapter 481K, “assistive devices are an integral part of the lives of many individuals, the elderly and persons with disabilities in particular. For these people, it is absolutely critical to have equipment that is reliable and effective.” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No, 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1205 (emphases added) . ‘The legislature emphasized that “it is important that these assistive devices work properly at all times,” Hse. Stand. conn. Rep. No, 1663, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757 (emphasis added), and “absolutely critical to have equipment that is xeliable and effectivet,]” Sen, Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1204-05 (emphases added). Plainly, then, the Act must be construed liberally in favor of those individuals for whom it was enacted to protect. See, e.d., Buscher v. Boning, 114 Hawai" 202, 219, 159 P.34 614, 831 (2007) (recognizing that “we must construe the fourth paragraph of HRS § 386-8 to give 2s ‘°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** full effect to the intent of the legislature, which sought to protect the rights of both employees and employers” (quoting Shimabuku v. Mont: i , 19 Hawai'i 352, 358, 903 P.2d 48, 53 (1995))7 Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 217, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984) (finding with regard to Hawaii's unemployment compensation statute that “[i]n view of the basic policy of the statute of protecting the worker from the hazard of unemployment, our courts must view with caution any construction which would narrow the coverage of the statute and deprive qualified persons of the benefits thereunder”); Han v. Yana, 84 Hawai'i 162, 177, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (App. 1997) (finding that HRS § 480-2 “was constructed in broad language in order to constitute a flexible tool to stop and prevent fraudulent, unfair or deceptive business practices for the protection of both consumers and honest businessmen and businesswomen” (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). xr. With respect to Petitioner’s third and fourth questions relating to the difference between “adjustments” and repairs, the ICA accepted Respondent's formulation. The ICA decided that it “must consider whether the ‘adjustments’ that preceded the May 2004 repair also constituted repairs[,]” 118 Hawai'i at 291, 198 P.3d at 805, instead of evaluating whether the court was clearly erroneous in finding that Petitioner provided Respondent with a Keasonable opportunity to repair the devices. in this regard, 26 *voFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™** five grounds were set forth by the ICA: (1) “[a}1though the [Act} does not state that the failure to repair after two attempts or over thirty business days out of service are the exclusive means for establishing that a manufacturer had a reasonable opportunity to repair, no alternative theory or evidence was offered in this case”; (2) the “adjustments” that preceded the May 2004 repair did not constitute repairs because they aze “anticipated and necessary for any hearing aid”; (3) the “unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony [is] . . . that the ‘ordinary purpose’ of 2 hearing aid is to amplify sound for the user by working with the user’s existing hearing ability through a series of adjustments; (4) “there is no evidence that [Petitioner] . . . provided [Respondent] with written notice that the hearing aids were nonconforming"; and (5) “[Petitioner] participated in an initial in-store adjustment of the refurbished aids, but did not return for further adjustments after wearing the aids in public.” 116 Hawai'i at 291-82, 188 P.3d at 805-06. For those reasons, the ICA was “left with a definite and firm conviction that [the court] erred in finding that the adjustments « « constituted repairs” and therefore “[the court) clearly erred when it found and concluded that [Petitioner] 's hearing aids were repaired, or presented for repair, on more than one occasion.” Id. at 292, 188 P.3d at 206. 20  ‘**"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ a Because the ICA’s first ground focused on the presumption in the statute that two attempts is evidence of a “reasonable opportunity to repair,” its second ground necessarily focused on whether the “adjustments” constituted repairs and thereby satisfied that presumption. As a threshold matter st must be observed that the term “repair” is not defined in the Act. The meaning of “repair” includes “to make good” or wrenedy,” and a repair includes “restoration to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health.” Nebster's Third New Int’ Dictionary at 1923. See Leslie, 109 Hawai'i at 393, 126 P.3d at 1080 ("We may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries + to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily defined” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). That definition comports with a liberal construction of the Act in line with the legislature's desize to ensure that disabled and elderly consuners are in possession of efficiently functioning assistive devices. See Hse. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 1669, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1204-05. However, the ICA reasoned that “an adjustment is not = repair because the purpose of an adjustment is not to fix a defect or other nonconformity, but rather to make a properly working device perform at its best for the users needs.” Rapozo, 118 Hawai'i at 291, 188 P.3d at 805. 28 ‘+S FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** ‘The Act does not employ the term “adjustment,” but the terms “correct” and “repair.” It was Respondent that advanced a purported distinction between “adjustments” and “repairs,” which the ICA adopted on appeal. Respondent argues that “{a]lthough unclear in [the court]’s [findings and conclusions], (the court] appears to have improperly assumed . . . that the periodic ‘adjustments’ made to the hearing aids after [Petitioner] purchased the aids and before the clicking sound presented itself, constituted forms of ‘repair./” Respondent speculates that the court's “erroneous assumption” must be attributed to Petitioner's supplemental argument pursuant to the court’s request for the parties to address what is meant by “repair” in the context of the Act. It argues that Petitioner's definition of “repair,” which is “the placing of the device into compliance with the warranty,” is “circular,” “self-serving,” and “without support.” However, Petitioner is correct that HRS § 481K-3 conditions the consuner’s recovery of a refund on whether “the manufacturer or its agents fail to correct a nonconformity as required by a warranty.” HRS § 491K-3. As explained gupra, the warranty imposed by the statute requires the manufacturer to ensure that the device is fit for the ordinary purpose for which the device is used, in this case to assist a consumer’s hearing, and Petitioner is correct to assume that any repair would be directed toward fulfilling that warranty. 29  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** ‘The definition of ™ pair” adopted by the ICA does not account for the dictionary meanings of “to make good” or to “remedy” of to “restore[)" “to a state of soundness [and] efficiency.” See Webster's Third New Int'] Dictionary at 1923. Additionally, the language of the Act indicates that the terns “correct” and “repair” are employed relationship to one another, ise., the consumer is to allow the manufacturer a “reasonable opportunity to repair” in order to “correct (the) nonconformity.” HRS § 481K-3 (emphases added.) Neither the ICA nor Respondent considered the definition of “correct,” which, according to the dictionary, means “to make or set right” or “to alter or adjust so as to bring to some standard or required condition.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 511 (emphasis added.) The plain meaning of the term “correct” indicates the Act contemplated that an “adjustment” is in fact in the realm of actions a manufacturer might take in order to remedy a device that is not functioning adequately. Accordingly, an adjustment is included within the term “repair” inasmuch as the purpose of the “repair” is to “correct” a nonconformity. The court thus could find under the Act that the so-called “adjustments” were efforts to correct or, in other words, to “repair” a nonconformity. It appears, then, that the distinction between an adjustment and a repair, attempted to be drawn by Respondent and the ICA, is non-existent under the Act. 30 “++*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Indeed, the ICA’s definitions of “nonconformity” and “repaie” are circular. Its conclusion that “an adjustment is not a repair because the purpose of an adjustment is not to fix a defect or other nonconformity,” and, thus, “the need for an adjustment, without more, is not 2 nonconformity," Rapozo, 118 Hawai'i at 291, 293, 188 P.3d at 805, 807, defines the terms in Light of one another without offering a meaningful definition for either term. As Petitioner notes, if the ICA's construction of the Act were to control, sll a manufacturer would need to do in order to avoid liability under chapter 481K would be to define whatever attempts it made to fix any problem identified by the consumer as merely “adjustments.” Thus, a manufacturer could alvays claim that what the consumer perceived to be 2 malfunction was actually a “properly working device” that was not performing “at its best.” Under Respondent's formulation, a consumer would be compelled to keep and pay for a device, and continue repeatedly to return for nore and more “adjustments,” even when those adjustments were not doing anything to “correct” the problem. This would conflict with the language of the Act and defeat the intent of the Act, for the legislature determined that “it is absolutely critical to have equipment that is reliable and effective.” See Sen. Stand. Comm, Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1205. ‘Therefore, the ICA’s third ground that the “unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony” by Respondent that 31 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** the “Yordinary purpose of a hearing aid is to amplify sound . through a series of adjustments,” is wrong. As addressed supra, the Act’s definition of “assistive device” makes manifest that the purpose of a hearing aid is to assist the consumer with his or her hearing. Based on the court’s assessment of credibility and its weighing of the evidence, see discussion infra, under the cdzcunstances of this case, the devices did not perform according to their ordinary purpose and were in need of repair, adjustment, correction, of an appropriate remedy. B Moreover, the plain language of the Act requires that if the manufacturer is provided a reasonable opportunity to repair, and yet fails to correct the problen, as required by warzanty, the consumer is entitled to a refund. The ICA’s first and second grounds focus on the number of times that the devices were or were not repaired by Respondent. However, the court did not find that Respondent actually repaired the devices on more than one occasion but, rather, as allowed under the Act, that Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to xepair the device on more than one occasion. The court's relevant findings are as follows: ty to repair the honconformity if it (or its agents} fails to repair the same nonconformity with to attempts. (Gag HRS (5) ¢81K-3(b) (3)) 55, agter taking possession of the hearing aid, iatitionsr] exercised reasonable effort and diligence in etutnlng to [nessonsent! for adtusteents to the hearing aid ian efter to use the hearing aid for its ordinary Himnaie-(Petitioner] also atlowed tRespondentl to ship the 32  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** hearing aid to (Starkey) for repair ra a sa titionerl continued fo experience prcplens such a5 clidving in the Rearing aid and aifficuity in hearing Sither close sounds of distant sounse th. pased upen ‘the testinany of [eetitioner regarding the probless he experiences while using the Rearing 33, Bpumoss. [Petitioner's] nearing aia therefore had 2 Enonconformity” within the meaning of HRS (81 48iK-1. a rvs aonorkunisy to tenais the fearing aid oro Fo and attes Eegussting a refund on the purchase price of the nearing 33 (Emphases added.)!* Therefore, although the Act codifies a presumption that the manufacturer had a reasonable opportunity to repair under certain circumstances," the court did not have to rely on those presumptions. Correspondingly, it makes no difference that no alternative theory was offered, as the ICA contended should be the case, inasmuch as the Act does not require a party to present an alternative theory. Rather, the court could have properly concluded, based on the entirety of the evidence adduced at trial and on the additional post-trial briefing, that Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to repair, and that Respondent failed to correct the * Respondent challenged findings 38 through 42 on appeal. Inasmuch ag there was substantial evidence supporting those findings, they were not Glearly erronecas, and therefore Respondent’ s challenge ig without merit. BRS § 481K-3(b)(3) states as follows: It shall be prosuted chat manufacturer has had a “reasonable opportunity to repair” if the manufacturer or its agente. fail Including by reason of attenpts to repair one oF nore nonconfornities, for a cumulative total of more than thirty busines dave after the consumer has returned it for Fepaif. (Bephases added.) 33 /=SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** problens that Petitioner was experiencing. ee HRS § 481K-3(a) (CIE the manufacturer or its agents fail to correct a nonconformity as required by a warranty after a reasonable opportunity to repair, the manufacturer shall accept return of the assistive device from the consumer and refund the full purchase price or replace the assistive devicel.]”) ‘The evidence supporting the conclusion that Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to repair includes Petitioner's testimony, as related in findings 10-12, 14-17, and 39-42," that (1) he returned the device four to five times prior to the May repair; (2) he was without the device for (3) he came “about a month” during the course of the May repai. in for another “adjustment” when the device was returned from the manufacturer in late May? and (4) throughout the course of these adjustaents, he noticed no change in the device but continued to experience the same problens. In making these findings, the court apparently relied on the testimony of Petitioner and found such testimony credible. the relevant court findings 10-11, 15-17, and 39-42, are set forth in full supra.” Further evidence that Respondent bad’ a reasonable opportunity to repair is laid out in findings 12 ang i¢, which state as follows? 12. In May 2004, after being informed of {Petitioner's} Complaints about the performance of the hearing aid, [Respondent] sent (Petitioner's) hearing sid to (Starkey) for repair is. " According to [Respondent], the repair by (Starkey) took approxinately one snd one-half weeks; [Petitioner] Fecails that he went without the hearing aia for approximately 30 days during the sanufacturer’ a repair period. 34 ‘***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** It was for the court to make the credibility determination on this testimony. See LeMav, 92 Hawai'i at 626, 994 P.2d at 558 (stating that the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence fall within the province of the trier of fact). Based on the foregoing review of the evidence in the record, it cannot be said that the court clearly made a mistake, as the ICA held, in finding that Respondent had a reasonable opportunity to repair the devices. c. Finally, the ICA’s fourth and fifth grounds for concluding that the devices were not presented for repair on more than one occasion were that the Petitioner did not return for further repairs after May 2004, and that when he returned the aids in September or October of 2004, “he was not making then available for repair and did not provide notice of or otherwise identify a nonconformity to be repaired.” 118 Hawai'i at 292, ise P.3d at 806. In reference to whether or not Petitioner provided Respondent with adequate notice, the ICA in a footnote quoted from HRS § 481K-2(f) as follows: A consumer shall make sn assistive device available for repair py grassnting it te the sanufacturer, its agent, Fepresentative, authorized assistive device dealer, or authorized assistive device Lessor prior to the expiration of the warranty period and providing the manafacturer, its Agent, represencative, authorized assistive device dealer, of authorized sgsistive device lessor written notice of the oncontormity. [ds at 292 n.9, 188 P.3d at 806 n.9 (emphases supplied). 35  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ However, on appeal, Respondent did not raise the notice issue as a basis for reversing the court's decision.” Accordingly, Respondent did not challenge the notice given by Petitioner as inadequate. Instead, Respondent opted to focus on whether the devices were repaired on nore than one occasion.” However, it is undisputed that Petitioner's wite notified Respondent in writing in her June 17, 2004 letter of his continued problems despite having cone in for adjustments. The court’s findings indicate that Respondent received adequate notice inasmuch as it found that “[Petitioner] brought in the hearing aid. . . for adjustment some four or five times during the first few months”; “[i]n May 2004, after being informed of [Petitioner's] complaints about the performance of the hearing aid, [Respondent] sent [Petitioner’s] hearing aid to [Starkey] for repair"; (Mrs. Rapoze) wrote to [Respondent] and informed [Respondent] that [Petitioner] was ‘not getting the effects required off of the use of his hearing aide (sic]"; and “(Betitioner] exercised reasonable effort and diligence in returning to [Respondent] for adjustments to the hearing aid.” ‘There is no clear error with respect to these findings. % Respondent aid not raise the notice issue on appeal. The TCA apparently raised and decided this issue gua sponte in its snalysis. % Because the ICA apparantly raised this matter, Petitioner in his Application argued that “i]t is clear thet [Respondent)"s’ technician was aware of the nature of the nonconformity and [Respondent] waz not prejudiced by che Tack of any written notice, nor was [Petitioner] ever advised that a wriving was necessary.” 36 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®** With regard to whether Petitioner returned for repairs following the May 2004 repair, according to the court's findings (based on Petitioner's testimony), Petitioner went in for an adjustment immediately following the return of the aids in May 2004, after which the aids were still not working properly. Following that visit, Mrs. Rapozo notified Respondent in writing that Petitioner was continuing to have problems with his aids and asked about returning the aids. The court further found that although Woodard claimed that he had instructed Kadar to tell Petitioner to cone in for further adjustments, Kadar never did 0. The court did not find that when Petitioner returned the devices in the fall of 2004, he was not making then available for repair, but found that “[iJn late September or early October 2004, [Petitioner] returned the hearing aid to (Respondent]” and ‘that Respondent “made a few adjustments to the hearing aid... [but] made no further attenpt to repair the hearing aid or to send the hearing aid to [Starkey] . . . .” Therefore, the evidence presented and the court’s findings do not support the ICA’s conclusion that Petitioner was not making the aids available for repair, To the contrary, it appears that, despite further adjustments to the aids after the May 2004 repair, the aids were still not functioning properly. xin. The court’s findings must be given appropriate deference. See Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 464, E48 P.2d 96, 37 “SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** 977 (1993) ("Appellate courts defer to the judge or jury as fact finder unless no substantial evidence existed for their finding because the fact finder is uniquely qualified to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence.”) Here, the findings adopted by the court were supported by substantial evidence and, considering the entire record, it cannot be said reasonably that a mistake was made. Viewed in its entirety, there was ample evidence to sustain the court's finding that Petitioner purchased hearing aids that were “nonconforming” and, based on the entire record, it was not clearly a mistake for the court to have found that Respondent had a “reasonable opportunity to repair” the devices under the Act.” xq. Based on the reasons noted above, the ICA’s September 5, 2008 judgment is affirmed as to Petitioner’s HRS 480 claim, * on appeal Respondent challenged the following conclusions: 4. Pursuant to HRS [6] 481K-3(a) (1) (A, (Respondent) was roquired to refund to [Petitioner] the full purchase price Of the hearing aid plus all collateral charges. and Incidental charges, less a reasonable allowance in use. 5. The acts and omissions of (Respondent) constituted a violation of Chapter 481K, for unich (Petitioner) i= entitled to recover twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, Eogether with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to HAS ($) 4BIK-5 (o) 6. (Petitionar] ss entitled to recover the principal amount of $€,610.66 {84,305.33 x 2) from [Respondent] together with Sosts’ and reasonable attorneys fee2. ‘That challenge was based entirely on Respondent’s arguments that the court erred in finding that the devices had a nonconfornity cr that there as “any viclation of HRS (chapter) 4BIK."" Ar discussed herein, Respondent's Grgunents are not meritorious, and therefore, Petitioner was entities to fecovery, 38 ***POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** but is reversed in all other respects, and the November 17, 2005 judgment of the district court is affirmed, Joe P. Moss for peti vschete-tyan Bs take heels (Kessner Umebayashi Bain & ) for respondent / Besasees Cuda a8 Vaan « Rokte 39 

72579bccd24253c55cbcc53ba4b634e1bd6acc622787fbb0990e6413a12a2510

2008-12-05T00:00:00Z

5be81fe1-603a-48fd-b79c-8ea65ab804c6

County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Limited Partnership. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Moon, in which J. Levinson joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Transfer, filed 07/08/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 04/21/2009. S.Ct. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant-Appellants Motion for Reconsideration and Order of Amendment, filed 05/22/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 399. S.Ct. Amended Opinion, filed 05/22/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 400. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 11/10/2010 [ada].

119 Haw. 352

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAL' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T =--000: COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, a municipal corporation, Plaintif£/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee 4 ri vs. 23 5 » Zs 2 cey coupe emuniy uimareo rartwersure, 22h EE Defendant /Counterclainant-Appellant’ Zag BOO and g 6S ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE MARILYN SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES ‘HUGH WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100; JANE DOES 1-100; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants C&I COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ‘Third-Party Plaintiff-Aappellant 1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI‘A, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee (CIV. NO, 00-1-0161K) COUNTY OF HAWAT'T, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee C&J COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant /Counterclaimant /Cross Claimant-Appellant and 1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI‘A, Defendant /Cross Claim Defendant-Appellee and  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER: ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE MARILYN SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES HUGH WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100; JANE DOES 1-100; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100? DOE CORPORATIONS 1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants (CIV. NO, 05-1-015K) No. 28622 APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT (CIV. NOS. 00-1-0181K; 05-1-015) December 24, 2008 NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. WITH MOON, C.J. CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM LEVINSON, J., JOINS OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBAL J, ‘This case arises from two condemnation actions brought by Plaintiff-Appellee County of Hawai'i (Appellee or the County). In both actions Appellee sought to condenn property belonging to Defendant-Appellant CéJ Coupe Family Limited Partnership (Appellant)' for use as a public highway (Bypass) .? 1250 2 the complaints were initially filed against fobert Nigel Richards, Trustee under the Marilyn Sue Hilson Trust) Robert Nigel Richards, Trust Under the Joan Elizabeth Coupe Trust; Charles Willian Coupe; Joan Elizabeth Coupe; Miles Hugh Wilsons Joan Coupe, Trustee under Revocable Trust of Joan Coupe Dated March 30, 1988, and unidentified defendants. All named defendants except fobert Nigel Aicharde, Trustes Under the Marilyn Sue Wilson Trust, and Miles Hugh Wilson anavered the complaints. On May 23, 2007, the parti Stipelated to sunsticute Ce Coupe Fansly Limited Partnership fer the Foragoing named defendants who appeared in the two cases. ‘Therefore, th said naned defendants are hereafter referred to as “Appellant.” This case is before us by virtue of our acceptance of a request ‘rom the Intermediate Court of Appeals [the jant to Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAB) Rule 40,2" (2008) SU Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-38 (Supp. 2007). HRS 5 602-38 ‘entitled “Application for transfer to the suprene court,” states in part as 2  ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER: Oceanside Partners (Oceanside), a development company that vas to build the Bypass through an agreement with Appellee, was added in Civ. No, 00-1-0181K (Condennation 1) as a Third-Party Defendant and, therefore, is the Third-Party Defendant-Appellee in the appeal in that case. Oceanside was ordered joined as a defendant on indispensable party grounds in Civ, No. 05-1-015K (Condemnation 2) and, therefore, is the Defendant-Appellee in the ‘The court consolidated the cases and appeal from that c: dismissed Condernation 1 in favor of Appellant but granted condemnation in Condemnation 2, entering judgment in favor of Appellee and Oceanside on September 27, 2007. Oceanside joined Appellee in its answering brief on appeal and, therefore, is bound by the resolution herein of the issues raised. Appellant appeals from (1) the automatic denial by operation of law of Appellant's post-judgment motion for follows: (a) The suprene court, in the manner and within the time provided by the rules of court, shall grant an applitation to transfer any case within the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court to the supreme court upon the grounds that the case involves: (2) A'question of inperative or fundamental public inportancer ib} The supreme court, in the manner and within the time provided by the rules of court, may grant sa application ro transfer any cose within the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court to the supreme court upon the grounds thet the case involves! (2) A question of first impression or a novel Legal question; oF (2) Tasuea spon which there ss an inconsistency in the decisions of the intermediate appellate court or of the supreme court. 3 /-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** statutory damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 (1993)? in Condemnation 1 and (2) the September 27, 2007 First Amended Final Judgment of the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (the court)* in favor of Appellee in Condemnation 2. Related to the court's judgment dismissing Condemnation 1, Appellant argues that it was entitled to statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 because “(Appellee] did not succeed in taking the property in that case.” Related to Condemnation 2, Appellant argues that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of abatement, and (2) ££ the court had subject matter jurisdiction, it erred in failing to consider whether the asserted public purpose was a pretext for private benefit. On appeal, Appellant asks this court to (1) remand Condemnation 1 for an award of damages,’ and (2) (a) reverse the court’s Judgment in Condemnation 2 for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, (b) vacate the Judgment in Condemnation 2 and remand for determination of whether the asserted public purpose vas pretextual. + HRS § 101-27 19 quoted in its entirety infra at pages 16. ‘the Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided. + Because, ae explained belok, the requested damages were decned denied by operation of Lau when the court failed to rule on the request within the prescribed time period, there is no order or judgment to dispose of Felated to the appeal in Condemnation 1. The Judgment dismissing Condemnation 1°\s"hor challenged by Appellant’ first iseve on appeal. In that connection, Appedlant notes that Appellee has not appealed from the dismissal of Condeanation 1, the peried to appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a) (1) (2008) has expired, and, therefore, the Juageent in Condemnation 1 is final and cannot how be sppesied. Ses Bacon v. Karlin, 68 Haw. €48, 651, 127 P.24 1127, 1130 (isse) tholding that the failure to file a notice Of appeal within tha time provided in MRAP Role 4a) (1) deprived this court of appellate jurisdiction.) “***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** We hold that (1) a landowner in a condemnation action is entitled to damages under HRS § 101-27 where the property at issue is not finally taken in the context of a particular condemnation proceeding, irrespective of whether the government attempts to take the land through subsequent condemnation proceedings; (2) abatement does not apply where the relief sought in two concurrent actions is not the same; and (3) although our courts afford substantial deference to the government's asserted public purpose for a taking in condemnation proceeding, where there is evidence that the asserted purpose is pretextual, courts should consider a landowner’s defense of pretext. Therefore, (2) automatic denial of statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 in Condemnation 1 is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of damages, (2) the court's conclusion that Condemnation 2 was not abated by Condemnation 1 is affirmed, and (3) the court’s Judgment in Condemnation 2 is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of whether the public purpose asserted in Condemnation 2 was pretextual. I. ‘This case arises from the development of the Hokuli'a subdivision (Hokuli‘a) by Oceanside. The project is located on a 1550-acre parcel, which extends from the ocean almost to the Manalahoa Highway, and crosses the border between North and South Kona on the Island of Hawaii. Appellant’s property is contiguous to the southern border of Hokuli‘a, Tt appears that  "FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER* the zoning of the 1550-acre parcel did not allow for the planned Hokuli'a development.‘ Thus, the Hawai'i County Council (HCC) passed Ordinances 96-7 and 96-8, which, in pertinent part, rezoned the Hokuli'a land, As a condition of rezoning, Oceanside agreed to construct a Bypass in the vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook. According to Appellee, the Bypass is necessary to “alleviat(e] unacceptable and unsafe traffic conditions.” Appellant characterizes the Bypass as a means of accessing the Hokuli‘a development from the existing infrastructure, ise., Mimalahoa Highway. It maintains that Oceanside agr d, a a condition of rezoning, to “construct a road to connect its property to Mamalahoa Highway.” Further, Appellant represents that, under this condition, Oceanside was responsible for acquiring the property necessary for the Bypass and for the cost of constructing the Bypass. Contrastingly, Appellee states that, because the Bypass would cross many parcels of privately-owned land, “the [rezoning] ordinances anticipated that [Appellee] might need to use its eminent domain power in connection with the construction of the Bypass.” Paragraph 14 of © the parties do not state how the land was originally zoned, and what category was needed to allow for Hokuli'a to be developed. This court Sheed not search through @ voluminous record, which in this case includes thousands of pages in each condemnation action, for detaile not provided. Cf. janai Cou. Ines Zs Land Use Comm'n, 105 Hawai'i 296, 309 n.31, 97 P.3d 372, 585 nest {aout Texpiaining that this court “ie not obligated to sift ehrough the-voluminous record to verify an appellant's inadequately documented contentions” (citations omitted) ) > te seems that the Bypass referred to by Appellee and the access road referred to by Appellant is, in fact, the same road. Therefore, for the Sake of consistency, “Bypass” is used throughout. 6 ‘+1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** the Development Agreement requires Oceanside to dedicate the Bypass to Appellee upon its completion. Thereafter, Appellee Will “assume all responsibility and costs for operation, maintenance, repair, or reconstruction of the (Bypass).” In April of 1998, the HCC passed Resolution 244-98 adopting the Development Agreement between Appellee and Oceanside. Appellant presents the portions of the Development Agreement following as salient. First, Oceanside was authorized to determine the route of the Bypass and, thus, which property needed to be acquired. oceanside shall: [2] ‘Determine the final . . , alignment of the entire [Bypass], including intersection areas (Capitalization omitted.) Relatedly, Paragraph 10 provided for the exercise of Appellee’s eminent domain power if Oceanside could not obtain the land necessary for the Bypass through private sale. Should Oceanside and any parson be unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable purchase price, then Oceanside shall provide [a list of appraisers, from hich the landowner must cheose one appraiser and accept the price established by the appraiser]. should Oceanside and decide ofa Brice vecommended by (s) mutoally selected appraiser, then upon written request to ioe, (Appelee| shall’ ‘Sondemnation powers to acauize the seanentis) from the person pursuant to Paragraph (i) (Bnphases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) The Development Agreement also allowed for the institution of condemnation proceedings in the absence of ‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER negotiations, where the landowner refused to consider selling his or her land to Oceanside. Notwithetanding Paragraph (10.b), if the parson fails eo negot iat Sirshase of seamentis] of the [Bypass] from tho person Respite Oceanside’ s good faith attempts to negotiate, thet ae nav, in ite 2 e > Dpon Fecaipt of the written reque (Enghases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) Second, Paragraph 11 of the Development Agreement established that (1) condennation actions would be initiated upon Appellee’s receipt of a notice of requirement from Oceanside, (2) Oceanside had sole discretion to determine what property to condemn, and (3) Oceanside would einburse Appellee for eny costs incurred as a result of the condennation proceedings. Should the person fail to participate in negotiations with Oceanside . «. , the condennation powers of (Appellee) ABALL be roguired' for’ the acquisition of the segeent(s) « 8. Upon Oceanside’ s tender of a requirenent of condemnation by letter to [Appellee], [Appellee] shall Sithin thirty (30) says begin to immediately and expeditiously exercise the sane pursuant to MKS chapter 101. ‘Sohgemnation action” as that ters is Used in Condition L(2) Sf Ordinance 96-8 and Condition M(2) of Ordinance 96-7 and Shell relieve Oceanside of all further liability or Sbligation to purchase segments) of the (Bypase] from such perssn. b. [Appellee] shall subeit to Oceanside a a Zor paysent of any and ali reasonable “costs ‘Aidexpenses incurred by [Ampelleel for the acquisition of the condesned land in conjunction with [Appel lee’ a] exercise of its condennation powers shen Oceanside has determined in Within forty-five (45) gays of written ‘Hieasmuiced Tang. notice from [Appellee], Gceanside shall reimburse (Aopellee! for apy and a1 ceasonable coats and expenses incuzced by ‘{igpellgel for the acquisition of the condened land in conjunction with (Appelles’s] exercise of its condemnation powers. “SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (Emphases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) Third, once ail the required land was acquired, Oceanside would be responsible for constructing the Bypass. “Oceanside shall construct the [Bypass] to the standards set forth in Exhibit ‘M’ by the Department of Public Works for Ali Highway with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the County Department of Public Works and by Oceanside.” (Capitalization omitted.) Oceanside initially attempted to obtain Appellant's property through a private sale. Appellee relates that “[s]tarting in 1997, Oceanside and [Appellee] engaged in negotiations with [Appellant] to obtain the right-of-way needed to construct the Bypass through [its] property. However, despite lengthy negotiations, Oceanside and [Appellee] were unable to reach an agreement with (Appellant) and they eventually reached an impasse in 2000.” Being unable to negotiate a sale, on May 23, 2000, Oceanside sent a letter to Appellee requesting that it exercise ite power of eminent domain with respect to Appellant’s land. After receiving the request, Appellee started the necessary procedures, and on July 26, 2000, the HCC adopted Resolution No. 266-00, finding it necessary for Appellee to initiate eminent domain proceedings against Appellant’s land pursuant to the Development Agreement, Oceanside having been unable to acquire the right-of-way for the Bypass. That resolution read: ‘++°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Whereas, the [D)evelopment (A)grecment provide lof the owners acroaa whose property the [8Ypa to traverse fails to mutually agree with Oceanside Price of “the terme of the n powers of [Appellee] shall be Pursuant to that Resolution, on October 9, 2000, Appellee filed a condemnation complaint, thereby initiating Condemnation 1. Both Resolution No. 266-00 and the October 2000 Complaint attached a survey identifying the parcel to be condemned, which comprised an area of 2.9 acres. On October 9, 2000, Appellee also filed an “Ex Parte Motion for Order Putting [Appellee] in Possession” pursuant to HRS § 101-29 (1993), which was granted on October 10, 2000. on January 24, 2001, Appellant filed its Answer to Appellee’s October 9, 2000 Complaint and a Counterclaim against Appellee. Appellant’s Ansver asserted eleven defenses and the counterclaim raised four claims for relief. on September 4, 2001, in Condemnation 1, Appellee filed a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to [Appellant’s] Sixth and Seventh Affirmative Defenses and First Claim for Relief Asserted in the Answer and Counterclaim Filed January 24, 2001” (Notion for Partial Summary Judgment). Appellant’s sixth affirmative defense was that there “is no public necessity for the taking.” In that connection, the seventh affirmative defense was that Condemnation 1 did not have a valid public purpose, but was being effected “for private benefit.” Similarly, the first claim for relief in the counterclaim alleged that the taking was 10 ‘**°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAY'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER instituted “for the private benefit of Oceanside,” in violation of the public purpose clauses of the federal and state constitutions. On November 27, 2001, the court granted Appellee’s Notion for Partial Summary Judgment. According to Appellee, relevant to the subsequent Condemnation 2 action, on February 21, 2002, Appellee issued a “final subdivision approval for the Bypass."" Although Condemnation 1 had sought only 2.9 acres of Appellant's property, the final subdivision approval indicated that 3.349 acres of Appellant's property would be needed for the Bypass. In July of 2002, the court held a hearing on the issue of public purpose and, after considering the evidence, on Septenber 5, 2002, reversed its Novenber 27, 2001 Order granting partial summary judgnent to Appellee, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to public purpose. Upon motion by Appellant, on December 11, 2002, the court thereby stayed the order putting Appellee in possession of Appellant's property until final judgment. According to Appellant, possession was subsequently returned to Appellant and the construction of the Bypass “halted.” Thereafter, Oceanside sought a writ of mandamus directing Judge Ibarra to rescind his sua sponte order transferring Oceanside’s motion for disqualification or recusal + re should be noted that, at that tine, Appelles had not yet ingtiated Condesnation 2. cy “*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** of Judge Ibarra, and its motion for stay of proceedings, to Judge Amano, which this court denied on April 10, 2003. See County of Hawai'i v. Richards, No. 25746, 2003 WL 1961471 (Apr. 10, 2003) (unpublished order). According to Appellant, at trial, in Civil No. 00-1- 181K,? it opposed Condemnation 1, arguing, inter alia, that (1) Appellee “illegally delegated its power of eminent domain to Oceanside,” (2) “the claimed public use was a pretext,” and (3) “the taking was not for a public use or purpose[, nJor was it cise of [Appellee’s) independent discretion.” It also objected to the reimbursement provisions of the Development Agreement, “maintain[ing] that the Development Agreement attempted to shift Oceanside’s obligation to pay for its road to third parties, whether or not their land was being taken.” Pursuant to the Development Agreement, these third parties may include “developers or land owners” who Appellee determined as benefitting from construction of the Bypass. For unstated reasons, during the pendency of Condemnation 1, Appellee for a second time initiated procedur: to condemn Appeliant’s property. On January 23, 2003, the HCC adopted Resolution No. 31-03. That resolution authoriz{ed Appellee) to initiate a second eminent domain Proceeding for condeanation of [Appellant's] property for the Bypass. Unlike Resolution [No-} 266-00 this resolution Sid not reference the Develosment Agreement and instead the + Ag noted Antza at page 23, on March 31, 2005, the court ode: Condannation 1 and Condesnation 2 to be sonsciidated. 12  “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER* [nice] determined that the Bypass (would) provide “a regional Benefit for the public purpose and use which will benefit the County [of Hawai'i}.” on January 28, 2005, Appellee filed a second condemnation action against Appellant pursuant to the Resolution. tn accord with the final subdivision approval, both Resolution No. 31-03 and Appellee’s Complaint in Condemnation 2 sought to condemn approximately 3.348 acres of Appellant's land. on February 7, 2005, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Consolidate with Condemnation 1. Based on that motion, on March 31, 2005, the court consolidated Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2. A bench trial took place over the course of sixteen days in July and August, 2007. Appellant asserts that throughout the proceedings related to Condemnation 2, it repeatedly argued that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because Condemnation 2 was abated by the pendency of Condemnation 1. As to Condemnation 1, on September 27, 2007, the court determined that it was invalid because Appellee had “illegally delegated its power of condemnation, through the Development Agreement, to a private party, [Oceanside], and therefore did not have @ proper public purpose.” In that connection, the court ordered that judgment be entered against Appellee and in favor of Appellant as follows: ‘The Condemnation is invalid. 3  and therefore ia not have a proper public purpose. (Bmphasis added.) As to Condemnation 2, the court ruled (1) that it was not abated and (2) that it was for a public purpose. Relatedly, the Judgment declares that [t]here is no abatement. Judgment is hereby entered in Favor of (Appeliee) and [Oceanside], and against {Appel ant) because the clains are substantially ditierent, based on (Emphasis added.) © for on October 11, 2007, Appellant filed a requ statutory damages consisting of attorneys’ fees and costs (fees motion) pursuant to HRS § 101-27 “because [its] property was not taken for public use” in Condemnation 1. On October 26, 2007, Appellant appealed from the Judgment in Condemnation 2. The court did not rule on the fees motion by January 9, 2008, and, therefore, as related by Appellant, it ‘was deemed denied by operation of (HRAP Rule) 4(a) (3) [(2008)], which requires that (the court] . . . dispose(] of the motion within [ninety] days. on February 8, 2008, Appellant appealed from this denial of the fees motion. on June 16, 2008, Appellee filed a motion for transfer to this court pursuant to MRAP Rule 40.2 and HRS § 602-58 (a) (1). On June 23, 2008, Appellant filed its opposition to transfer. on July 9, 2008, this court accepted transfer. On October 16, 2008, this court heard oral argument on the merits. 1s “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** n. Appellant presents three questions on appeal. The first pertains to Condemnation 1 and the others to Condemnation 2. First, related to its fees motion, Appellant asks, “May [Appellee] forever avoid its obligation under [HRS] § 101-27 to Pay damages for discontinued or failed takings by instituting serial condemnation actions?” In connection with this question, Appellant asserts that because its property was not taken in Condemnation 1, the court was required to award “all such damages fas may have been sustained . . . by reason of the bringing of the [condemnation] proceeding . . . including [its] costs of court, a reasonable amount to cover attorney's fees paid by [it) in connection therewith, and other reasonable expenses.” (Quoting RS § 101-27.) (Emphases omitted.) Second, related to the issue of abatement, Appellant asks: Ie an eminent domain action abated -- and the circuit court deprived of subject matter jurisdiction ~~ when the court is Already considering another, earlier-filed eminent domain action, instituted by the same plaintiff, in the same court, againot the sane detendants, for the sano Feller? As to this question, Appellant further maintains that, in Condemnation 2, the court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and [it] erred when it denied multiple motions to dismiss.” ‘Third, in connection with the Judgment in Condemnation 2, Appellant asks: Does a circuit court have any duty under the (United States] and Hawai'i Constitutions to examine the record to determine Whether the government's proffered public purpose supporting 3 taking is 3 pretext niding » predominantly private benefit, or may it simply take the government’ s word? 4s  “HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Related to this question, Appellant further posits that “(the court] should not have rejected allegations of a pretextual taking or predominantly private purpose by looking only to the government’s claims of public use.” statutory qr. As discussed infra, Appellant is entitled to seek damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 because it prevailed in Condemnation 1, HRS § 101-27 provides: (Emphases any proceedings instituted under this part are abandoned or discantinued before reaching a final for any cause, the nioperty concerned is fo recover rz ihe of te Dioperty concerned if the possession has been awarded ‘nciugina thedefencant"s costa of court, a ransonable ‘ghoul to-eorar attomey's fees paid by the defendant in and the Possession of the property concerned shell be restored to The defendant entitied thereto, Issues of fact arising in Connection with any claim fer guch danage shall be tried by the court without a jury uniess a trial by jury is denanded by either party, pursuant to the rules of court, within ten Gays from the date of the entry of an order or judgment allowing the discontinuance of the proceedings, of Gismissing the proceedings or denying the right of the plaintiff to take the property concerned for public use Ehe event judgment is entered in favor of the defendant against. the plaintiff, any moneys which have been paid, any additional security whieh has been furnished, by th Plaintiff to the clerk of the court under sections 101-28 Snd 101-23, shail be applied or enforced toward the Satisfaction of the judgnent.. In the case of the state or a Gounty, if the moneys so paid to the clerk of the court are insufficient, then the balance of such Judgeent shall be paid from any moneys available or appropriated for the Sequiaieion of the property concerned, or if that 48 insufficient then the sane shall be paid from the general fund of the state or county, as the case may be. added.) Whether Appellant was entitled to damages presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de 16 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** novo. State v. Bayly, 118 Hawai't 1, 6, 185 P.3d 186, 191 (2008) (stating that “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law reviewable de novo” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)}. Under the canons of statutory construction, “where the language of the law in question is plain and unanbiguous courts must give effect to the law according to its plain and cbvious meaning.” Mikeleon v. United Serve. Auto, Ass'n, 108 Hawal's 388, 360, 120 P.3d 257, 259 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The canons of statutory construction also require this court “to construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results.” Tauese v, State, Dep't of Labor é Indus. Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1, 31, 147 P.34 785, 815 (2006) (quoting Franks v. Hawaii Planing Mill Found., 88 Hawai'i 140, 144, 963 P.2d 343, 353 (1998)). Furthermore, an interpretation of a statute must be “reject [ed]” if it “renders any part of the statutory language a nullity.” City & County of Honol Hsiung, 109 Hawai'i 159, 173, 124 P.3d 434, 448 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant seeks “statutory danages pursuant to [HRS] § 101-27 because although [Appellee] improperly forced (Appellant] to litigate [Condemnation 1], [Appellee] did not succeed in taking the property in that case.” Tt contends that “the [court] invalidated [Condemnation 1], holding it was void and the taking was not for public use, but for Oceanside’s private benefit{,]” and therefore, Appellee failed to “tak[e] the vv ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** property in that case” notwithstanding the fact that Condemnation 2 was upheld. In support of its position, Appellant makes four sub- arguments: (1) the consolidation of the two condemnation actions pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 42 (2008) “did not relieve [Appellee] of its (HRS) § 101-27 obligation”? (2) the legislature did not intend to allow “serial eminent domain abuse” as a means of allowing the government to escape payment of statutory damages; (3) the term “proceedings” for purpo! of HRS § 101-27 “means a single eminent domain action, not many”; and (4) “(HRS §) 101-27 is unambiguous,” quiring that the “[glovernment bear{] the risk of eminent domain failures{.]" Appellee argues that Appellant’s fees motion “was properly denied{.]" In support of its position, Appellee makes three subarguments: (2) HRS § 101-27 does not finally taken for where (xppeliant was) awarded Just compensation for the property: (2) the Kotion for Sumaary Oameges was filed Sutside of the 10-day period permitted under HRS § 101-27 and (3) (Appellant) aid not present 2 sufficient record to Getermine reasonable attorneys’ fees. With respect to Appellant’s first subargument, Appellant urges that the court’s “consolidation of the two condemnation actions did not relieve [Appellee] of its [HRS] § 101-27 obligation to make [Appellant] whole after the court denied [Appellee] relief in (Condemnation 1}.” In sum, Appellant argues that “even though [the court} held that [Appellee] could 1 ‘*°"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** take [Appellant's] property in [Condemnation 2, it] does not mean that it was ‘finally taken for public use’ for purposes of [HRS] § 101-27." (Quoting HRS § 101-27.) In response, Appellee maintains in its first subargument that Appellant “ha(s] not carried (its) burden of proving that HRS § 101-27 applies to an eminent domain defendant who ultimately lost in a consolidated condemnation trial{.J” Appellant and Appellee are correct that the issue of whether Appellant is entitled to statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 turns upon whether the property in question “was finally taken” under that statute. HRS § 101-27 identifies three circumstances under which a defendant in an eminent domain action is entitled to statutory damages: (1) where the eminent domain proceedings are “abandoned . . . before reaching a final judgment"; (2) where the eminent domain proceedings are “discontinued . . . before reaching 2 final judgment"; or (3) if “for any cause, the property concerned is not finally taken for public use[.]” Because neither party has alleged that Condemnation 1 was “abandoned” or “discontinued,” Appellant can only recover statutory damages under the third circumstance, if “the property concerned [was] not finally taken for public use[.]” It is evident that Appellant is correct that “the property concerned [was] not finally taken for public use” in Condemnation 1, As noted previously, in that action, the court 19  “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER" stated in its order that “{tlhe Condemnation is invalid. Judgment is hereby ordered to be entered in favor of [Appellant] and against [Appellee] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) That the property was eventually condemned after Appelle prevailed in the second condemnation action it filed is of no import. To hold, as Appellee argues, that statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 are unrecoverable by the prevailing defendant in a condemnation action if the property in question is later condemned in another, subsequently filed condennation action, would render a portion of the statute a nullity. Under this interpretation, statutory damages could never be recovered under HRS § 101-27 by a prevailing defendant because there is always a risk that the property might be “finally taken for public use” in a future condemnation action. Thus, under this interpretation, a defendant could only recover statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 where the condemnation proceedings are abandoned or discontinued, and not where defendant prevailed in an action, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.'* w appellee cites State v. Davis, 53 Haw. S82, 585-86, 499 F.24 663, 666-67 (1972), for the proposition that HRS § 101-27 manifests a legislative intent to preclude recovery if the property is finally taken, and that "ai sninent domain proceeding 1s not to be deemed ‘in favor of the defendant and Sgainst the plaintiff’ unless the property sought to be condenned is not Hinally taken for public use.” However, Dauig is inapposite, as it did not Address application of the statute under circumstances where the Landowner was ‘Setually successful with respect to one of the condeanation actions at issue. Tn Davis, the government was successful on b11 counts, but the defendants Atgued that attorneys’ fees and costs should be included as part of the “Just Compensation” awarded. Id at 583-86, 499 P.2d at 665-67. The court referred EoumRS § 101-27 as indicating that the legisiature only intended for defendants to receive attorneys’ fees and costs where the landowner is Successful on the merits, and not as a part of Just compensation where the lang is taken. dd, at 585, 499 7.24 at 665 20 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*" Insofar as a statute must be interpreted to avoid rendering any part of it a nullity, see Haiung, 109 Hawas‘i at 173, 124 P.3d at 448, HRS § 101-27 cannot be interpreted as precluding the recovery of statutory damages if the defendant prevails in a condemnation action but fails in a subsequent condemnation action on the sane property. See also EéJ Lounge eratin. Yn of City & Cou ert) Hawai'i 320, 349, 169 P.3d 432, 461 (2008) (stating “the well- established tenet of statutory construction [1s] that an Anterpreting court should not fashion a construction of statutory text that effectively renders the statute a nullity or creates an absurd or unjust result” (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis onitted)). Accordingly, Appellant is correct that, for purposes of HAS § 101-27, the property in question was not finally taken in Condernation 1, irrespective of the fact that the property in question was taken in a subsequent condemnation action. As to its second subargument, Appellant argues that, with respect to HRS § 101-27, “the [legislature did not intend to be an enabler of dysfunctional and abusive government conduct” and therefore “[it] surely could not have intended . . . to encourage local governments to become serial takers and keep pressing forvard in repeated condemnation lawsuits without consequence, until they finally win one, or the property owner is a  **+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER: bankrupted.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellee does not respond to Appellant's second subargunent. Appellant is correct that Appellee’s interpretation of HRS § 101-27 as precluding the recovery of damages by a defendant who prevails in one condemnation action but fails in a later rial eminent domain abuse” condemnation action, would “enable by the government. Under Appellee’s interpretation, HRS § 101-27 would allow recovery of statutory damages by a defendant in an eminent domain action where the action was “abandoned or discontinued,” but the defendant could not recover danages if the defendant prevailed at trial because it would be possible that the government could bring one or more eminent domain actions in the future under which the property might be “finally taken for public use[.]" HRS § 101-27. This interpretation does not comport with common sense and fairness, as it would be patently unjust under the statute to award damages to a defendant where the eminent domain action was discontinued or abandoned, but deny them where the defendant prevailed and received a final judgment in his or her favor. Such an interpretation is legally absurd in that the statute would penalize the government for abandoning or discontinuing eminent domain actions but would not sanction it for bringing actions lacking merit that result in judgments in favor of the defendant. Thus, as Appellant notes, “(iJnterpreting the term ‘finally taken’ to mean anything beyond a single, discrete 22 ‘**"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** eminent domain lawsuit vould transform that statute from one designed to remedy eminent domain abuse into one that encourages it, @ plainly unintended and absurd result.” (Emphases in original.) ‘This court is “bound to construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results." Tauese, 113 Hawai'i at 31, 147 P.3d at 815 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 308, 30 P.3d 895, 914 (2001) (stating that “the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and Allogicality” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ‘Thus, Appellee’s interpretation of HRS § 101-27 must be rejected to the extent that it not only renders a portion of the statute a nullity as described supra, but also produces a legally absurd outcone. With respect to Appellant's third subargument, Appellant contends that the term “proceedings” as used in HRS § 101-27 refers to “a single eminent domain lawsuit, not several.” In support of this subargument, Appellant states that other statutes in HRS chapter 101 governing the state’s eminent domain powers “use the term ‘proceedings(]’ . . . [to] mean a single condemnation action.” Appellant cites HRS § 101-13 Appellant algo cites to language from Davia that seems to indicate that HRS $ 101-27 refers to a final juggnent ina single eminent donain proceeding, not several. fea $3 law, at S66, 499 P.2d st 667 ("Tt ie clear from HBS '§ 101-27, however, that judgment in’ an emi ie 23  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER" (1993), the statute pertaining to the exercise of eminent donain powers by a county, which provides, in pertinent part as follows: Exercise of power by county. Whenever any county dooms it advisable of necessary to exercise the right of ‘eminent domain in the fortherance of any governmental power, the procandings nay be instituted as provides in section TOTS tter the governing authority (esunty couneli, oF other governing board in the case of an independent board having control of its oun funds) of the county Suthorized guch auit by resolution duly passed, oF adopted Gna approved, az the case may be. (Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.) Appellant argues that HRS § 101-13 “treats ‘the proceedings’ as a single suit by later use of the term ‘such suit,’ meaning ‘one.'” Thus, Appellant asserts that because under HRS § 1-16 (1993), “*(1]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other[,]'" HRS § 101-27 “must be read” as referring to a single suit. Appellee answers that Appellant “ha(s) not carried [its) burden of proving that HRS $ 101-27 applies to an eminent domain defendant who ultimately lest in a consolidated condemnation triall.1” Neither the term “proceedings” as used in HRS § 101-27, nor the singular form “proceeding,” is defined in that statutory section or in HRS chapter 101 governing eminent domain. the term “proceeding” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as 2. The regular and orderly progression of a Lawsuit including _all_acts and events betmeen the tine of ‘Soumencenant and the entry of Sadameat. 2, Any procedural eens for seoking redress from a tripunal or agency. 3. Ap 8. continue not to be deamea "in favor of the desendant and against the plaintift” unless the property sought to be condemned is not finally taken for’ public vse.” (Emphasis addes.)) 24 “*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** 1 sic. 4. the Business conducted by a court or other official body: a hearing. Black's Law Dictionary 1241 (8th ed. 2004) (emphases added). This definition is not helpful in resolving the issue of whether the term “proceedings,” as used in HRS § 101-27, refers toa single suit or multiple suits. On the one hand, the third definition supports Appellant's argument that the term “proceedings” refers to a single suit. If the term “proceeding” is equivalent to “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action{,]” then a single suit could contain many proceedings. on the other hand, the first definition supports Appellee’s argument that the term “proceedings” could refer to multiple suits. tf the term “proceeding” means “a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment {,]” then in the plural, “proceedings” would connote multiple lawsuits. Turning to case law, the term “proceeding” has been used to refer to a single lawsuit in accordance with the first definition in Black's Law Dictionary which implies that the plural term, “proceedings,” refers to multiple lawsuits. See, S:a., Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 116 Hawai'i 465, 470, 173 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2007) (using the term “proceedings” interchangably with the term “acticns”). However, the term “proceedings” has also been used to refer to steps that are part of a larger action in accordance with the third definition. See Yn, County of Hawai'i, 111 Hawai'i 234, 25  /-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** 250 n.44, 140 P.3d 1014, 1030 n.44 (2006) (using the term “proceedings” to refer to hearings held by @ county liquor commission in the plaintiff's action to obtain a permit for the sale of Liquor). Although the ordinary meanings of “proceedings” in Black"s Law Dictionary and in case law provide support for both parties, the term “proceedings” for purposes of interpreting HRS § 101-27 can only be reasonably read as referring to a single action. If the term “proceedings,” as used in HRS § 101-27, referred to multiple suits as argued by Appellee, then it could wer be determined at the conclusion of a particular condemnation action whether the defendant’s property would be “finally taken for public use” because, again, subsequent condemnation actions could always be filed against the property owner in which the property might eventually be taken. As discussed supra, this interpretation of HRS § 101-27 is impermissible because it renders a portion of the statute a nullity and would create an absurd result not attributable to the legislature. Thus, the term “proceedings” as used in HRS § 101-27 must be construed as referring to a single condemnation action. With respect to Appellant's fourth subargument, Appellant declares that HRS § 101-27 “unambiguous{ly]” requires that the “government bear[] the risk of eminent domain failures.” Appellant contends that “{t]he conclusion that [it is] entitled 26 “*=*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™** to damages {2 simple enough if one adheres to the plain text of [HRS] § 101-271." Appellee does not respond to this subargument. To reiterate, HRS § 101-27 must be read as allowing @ defendant who prevails in a condemnation action to recover damages sustained in that action regardless of whether the defendant's property 4s later taken for public use in a subsequent condennation action. As discussed supra, HRS § 101-27 must be interpreted in this manner in order to prevent part of the statute from being rendered a nullity and to avoid an absurd outcome. Furthermore, as argued by Appellant, eminent domain statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the landowner. Seo Marks vs Ackerman, 39 Haw. 53, 58-58 (Terr. 1951) (stating that eminent domain “provisions should be construed liberally in favor of the landowner as to remedy in{Jsol)far as they are in harmony with the common-law principles and constitutional guarantees protecting private property(]" and that “they should be construed strictly against the condennor as to right to enter the land of the landowner without his consent in so far as they are in derogation of such principles and guarantees”). Thus, Appellant is correct that the statute allows it to seek damages insofar as the property in question was not taken in Condemnation 1. Appellee's first subargunent, that HRS § 101-27 does not apply because Appellant's property was “finally taken” in 27 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Condemnation 2, has been answered. With respect to Appellee’s second subargument, Appellee urges that Appellant is not entitled to statutory damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 because under that section it was required to “take steps to have [its claim for damages} tried ‘within ten days from the date of the entry of an order of judgment’ and Appellant failed to do so. (Quoting HRS § 101-27.) Appellee cites the following portion of HRS § 101-27 to support its argument: Taaues of fact arising in connection with any claim for such Samege sh uiehout = ules thet Sf sander ar Sudarent slloving the discontinuance of the Brocesdings, OF dismissing the proceedings or denying the Eight of the plaintice to take the property concernes for public use. (Emphasis added.) Appellant responds that the ten-day limitation in HRS § 101-27 pertains to the request for a jury trial but is not “applicable to the motion for damages itself.” on Septenber 27, 2007, the court entered judgment in favor of Appellant, ordering the condemnation invalid. Fourteen days later, on October 11, 2007, Appellant filed its fees motion. If Appellee is correct that Appellant was required “to take steps to have [its statutory damages) claim tried” within ten days of the entry of Judgment “denying the right of [Appellee] to take the property concerned for public use,” see HRS § 101-27, then Appellant's motion for damages was untimely. But, contrary to Appellee’s contention, under a plain reading of ARS § 101-27, the ten-day Limitation is applicable only to the demand for a jury trial on factual issues relating to 28 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** the condemnation claim. Granmatically, the phrase “pursuant to the rules of court, within ten days” in that section is preceded by the words “unless trial by jury ie demanded.” Thus, the ten-day phrase would modify the jury demand option. Moreover, it would be illogical to conclude that the phrase “pursuant to the rules of court, within ten days” applied to the damages trial itself, tt would be reasonable and necessary to expressly state that the jury demand must be made in accordance with the HRCP because that section contains a specific and detailed procedure for demanding a jury trial." Without express reference to “the rules of court,” a party could conceivably be uncertain as to whether the demand for 2 jury authorized by HRS § 101-27 must be made in accordance with the rule governing such demand established in HRCP Rule 38 or not. Therefore, the phrase “pursuant to the rules of court” and the phrase “within ten days” inmediately following it, appropriately nutes of court specifically governing the demand for a jury trial fare set forth in HRCP Rule 36(b) (2008). That rale provides: () Demand, wav denand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right bya tury by (0) serving unon the Sther- parties s demand therefor in writing or any tine after aiter the service of the last pleading airected to such Such demand aay be indorsed upon a pleading of the party. Where by statute a jury trial is allowed on sppesl to the circuit court from the prior determination of any court or adninistrative body, a trial by jury may be had if demanded in the notice of appeal, and if aot demanded in the notice, the appellee may have atrial by Jury by filing a denang within 10 days after the case is docketed in the circust (Emphases added.) 29 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** apply to the demand for a jury trial on the damages issues, not to the trial on damages itself. Appellant's fees and costs motion, then, is not precluded by the fact that it was filed more than ten days after the entry of judgment in Condemnation 1. With respect to its third subargunent, Appellee maintains that Appellant “failed to submit a sufficient record for [the court} to award reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Appellee argues that if Appellant is deemed to have “prevailed on (its) Amproper delegation of condemnation power defense in (Condemnation 1,]” then “any award under HRS § 101-27 should be Limited to amounts paid for the improper delegation of condemnation power defense in [that] case.” However, Appellee argues that because Appellant's “motion and supporting documents did not provide @ means to determine whether the requested amounts were expended . . . on issues other [than] the improper delegation claim{,]” Appellant's motion for statutory damages should be denied due to insufficiency of the record. Appellant did not respond to this subargument. The court did not rule on Appellant’s fees motion. The court is required to dispose of such motions within ninety days. HRAP Rule 4(a) (3) mandates that “failure to dispose of any motion by order entered upon the record within [ninety] days after the date the motion was filed shall constitute a denial of the motion.” As noted before, because the court failed to issue an 30 ‘°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** order on Appellant’s motion by January 9, 2008, ninety days after deemed denied. Appellant filed the motion, the motion wa Inasmuch as the court did not enter an order with respect to Appellant's motion for atatutory damages, it is Indeterminable whether a denial would be based on an erroneous conclusion of law (conclusion) that HRS § 101-27 was inapplicable because the property in question was taken in Condemnation 2, or based on a finding of fact (finding) that Appellant's requested damages were not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the record on appeal is insufficient to determine on what basis denial would have been based. Moreover, because no determination was made on whether damages were awardable, no record exists as to the court's assessment of Appellant's motion for statutory damages. In contrast with Appellee’s contention, Appellant's motion appears to be limited to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending Condemnation 1. Based on the discussion supra, Appellant is entitled to seek statutory damages under HRS § 101-27. As for the scope of damages, HRS § 101-27 provides in pertinent part as follows: [Al defendant who would have been entitled to compensation or dimages had the property been finally taken, Snail se entitled, in such proceedings, to zecover from she plaintiff all such damage as may have been sustained by the Sefendant by reason of the bringing of the proceedings and sion by the plaintiff of the property concerned if been i % According to Appellee, Appellant's motion for fees and supporting documents “did not provide 4 meang to determine whether the requested. ancunt= Were expended in Civil Wo, OS-1-15K or were expended in Civil No; OO-1-181K.= However, Appellant seated in ite motion thst it was only requesting attorneys’ fees and costa associated with Condemnation b a ‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEI aid. by the defendant in connection therewith, and other aneeneset T (Emphasis added.) According to the statute, Appellant is entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees, as well as any expenses that may have been incurred by reason of Appellee taking possession of the property." It is manifest from the language of HRS § 101-27, as well as this court’s interpretation of the statute in Davis, as discussed supra, that any damages avarded must be strictly related to Appellant's expenses in defending Condemnation 1. See Davis, 53 Haw. at 586, 499 P.2d at 667. The court did not enter any order with respect to Appellant's motion for statutory damages. Appellant's motion Andicated that the bulk of the amount requested was for attorneys’ fees incurred in defending Condemnation 1. It is for the court to determine whether the fees claimed by Appellant are related to Condemnation 1 and are reasonable under relevant standards. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the court for a calculation of the damages to which Appellant is entitled in defending against Condemnation 1. Ww. Appellant maintains that under the doctrine of abatement, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Condemnation 2 because Condemnation 1 had not been resolved at “gt appears from the record that Appellee vas put in possession pursuant to Condemnation l'on Octeber 10, 2000; and that posseselon was then Feturned to Appellant on December 11, 2002, algo pursuant to Condemnation 1. However, it does not appear from Appéllant’s motion for damages that it 1s ing any expenses related to dispossession. 32 ‘+**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** the time Condemnation 2 wi adjudicated by the court. As a threshold matter, it, must be determined whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the condemnation proceedings. “subject matter jurisdiction” is defined as “[3Jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the state of things.” Black's Law Dictionary at 870. In Hawai'i, pursuant to statute, (a) The several circute courts shall ha jurisdiction, except as otherwise expressly provided by ia)" Givin actions and proceedings, in addition, to those listed in sections 60S-21.6, 603-21.7, and 503-218.) HRS § 603-21.5 (Supp. 2007). Relying on HRS § 603-21.5, this court has declared that “the circuit court has jurisdiction over all civil causes of action unless precluded by the [s]tate % the analyais on this point resolves Appellant's Tasve 2 generally, land more specifically, its argunents that (1) "two eminent domain actions Seeking the sane relief cannot be pending in the sane court at the sane tine,” (2) “abatenent trunpa 2 second condemnation to counter deficiencies raised by {the} Landowner in the first condemnation,” (3) “consolidation cannot create subject matter jurisdiction,” and (4) Appellee’ s argunent that the issue of Abatement does Aot necessarily implicate subject matter jurisdiction is Contrary to this court's holding in heltan engineering Contractors, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Pacific Industries, inc, $1 Waw, 202, 456 P.28 222 (1968), and the Teva decision in Eatausnite v_ Container wens’ supsly, 6 Haw. App. 133, 726 P.24'273 (1986), and Appelles’s arguments that (1) the court correctly’ Concluded that abatement did not deprive it of jurisdiction over Condemnation 2 because “the two lanssite had different causes ané prayed for different Telief{,]” and (2) abstenent does not, as 8 matter of law, Amplicate subject matter jurisdiction. MRS $ 603-21-6 (Supp. 2007) pertains to probate cases. HRS § 603-21.7 (1983) Lists actions {1} to declare heirs of » decedent; (2) to Adninister dower or curtesy rights and partitioning real property: (3) relating to trusts, mortgages, contracts, and suits in equity: and (4) for Weite or orders “to coures of inferior jurisdiction, corporations and Unsividuels(-)" HRS § £03-21.8 (1953) pertains co appeals Drought fron the Geciaion of another court oF an agency 33 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** [clonstitution or by statute.” Sherman v. Sawyer, 63 Haw. 55, 58, 621 P.2d 346, 349 (1980) (emphasis added). HRS chapter 101, entitled “Eminent Domain,” explicitly vests jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings in the circuit courts. specifically, HRS § 101-10 (Supp. 2007) mandates that “(t)he circuit courts shall try and determine all actions arising under this part, subject only to an appeal in accordance with law.” Thus, it is evident that the court “can rule on the conduct of persons or the state of things” in proceedings in the nature of condemnation and can award the relief sought in that action. See Black's Law Dictionary at 870. It is concluded that, as a general rule, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings. The question then is whether the pendency of Condemnation 1 deprived the court of its jurisdiction in relation to Condemnation 2. Neither Shelton Engineering nor Matsushita, the cases relied upon by Appellant, explicitly holds that abatement raises issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, Appellee does not cite to any case law from this jurisdiction holding the converse, Ase., expressly stating that abatement is not @ question of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, a survey of opinions from other jurisdictions is useful at this juncture. a, Upon review, it appears that Appellant’s contention that abatement necessarily implicates a court's subject matter 34  “SFO PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ jurisdiction over a case is not correct. Rather, it appears that abatement is a remedy for a variety of defects, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Bd. of Regents v, Oglesby, 591 8.8.24 417, 421 (Ga. App. 2003) (explaining that “a defendant can raise a plea in abatement . . . that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court” (citing Ga. Code Ann. § $-11-12(b) (1) (1993)) (emphasis added)); Cummins Momt., L.P. vs Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d $38, S44 (Neb. 2003) (holding that, when “the basis for the plea in abatement is the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is obligated to dismiss without prejudice, rather than to suspend the action” (emphasis added)). “Abatement” is defined, pertinently, as “ [t]he suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim,” Black’s Law Dictionary at 3, lending further support to this construction. Contrary to Appellant’s position, some jurisdictions have rejected the contention that abatement necessarily implicates subject matter jurisdiction, mainly on the ground that abatement, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived. In Kelly v, Kelly, 245 $.W.3d 308, 314 (Mo. App. 2008), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that abatement and lack of subject matter jurisdiction are not synonymous. That court reiterated the Missouri Supreme Court’s criticism “that the term jurisdiction has been overused and misused to describe situations where it was simply legally erroneous to enter a conflicting iudament while 35 ‘\“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** another action was pending!.]” Id, at 315 (emphasis added). In that connection, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the argument that abatement implicated subject matter jurisdiction, because, under Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55, the abatement defense could be waived, whereas, contrastingly, “folne would never view subject matter jurisdiction as being waivable.” Id, at 314; see also Bourque v, Comm’r of Welfare, 308 A.2d 543, 548-49 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1972) (holding that where a defendant failed to raise the pendency of prior proceedings as a defense to subsequent proceedings, either in its answer or in a motion for abatement, “the issue was waived” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); Cent, Trust Co, of 111, v, Owsley, No. 19527, 1914 WL 2783 at *8 (111, App. Oct. 6, 1914) (explaining that “the objection of a prior proceeding pending could only have been made by a plea in abatement in the Circuit Court(]” and that “{nlot only was this plea not made, but the point was waived” (emphasis added)); Nicholson v. State, 106 P. 929, 930 (Wyo. 1910) (holding that the defense of abatement grounded on prior proceedings “is waived unless interposed by motion to quash or plea in abatement” (emphasis added) ) Based on the foregoing, the pendency of Condemnation 1 did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over condemnation 2. B. Appellee claims that it is a “fundamental principle 36 +***POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** that [it] cannot be denied rights to acquire property, that is, the power of eminent domain, it determines to be necessary to [its] function by reason of contract, res judicata, estopple [sic] or claim of abatement in prior legal actions." According to Appellee, “the power of eminent domain is essential for the proper performance of governmental functions such that it cannot be surrendered, and, if attempted to be transferred avay, or otherwise impeded, such as by a plea in abatement, it may be resumed at will.” (Citing Georgia v. city of Chattanooga, 264 u.s. 472, 480 (1924); ransmiss: violet Trapping Co., 200 So. 24 428 (La. App. 1967); Burke v. Oklahoma City, 360 P.2d 264, 268 (Okla. 1960) State v. Charlton, 430 P.24 977, 978-79 (Wash. 1967).) on the contrary, the cases cited by Appellee do not support the contention that a plea in abatement cannot successfully “impede” a particular attempt by a governmental entity to exercise its power of eminent donain. The cases cited uniformly support the proposition that the power of eminent donain may not be inhibited by contract, but none of the cases hold that abatement is not a viable defense in 2 condemnation action. To illustrate, in Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee had previously entered into a contract with Georgia allowing Georgia to use the land at issue for railway purposes. 264 U.S. at 478. Chattanooga attempted to condemn the Land governed by the contract and Georgia objected. Id. Georgia 2  "FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** argued that its agreement with Tennessee rendered it immune from Tennessee's, and therefore, Chattanooga’s, power of eminent domain. Id, at 479. The United States Supreme Court held that Tennessee could not surrender its power of eminent domain through contract. Ids at 480. Thus, Chattanooga could pursue the condemnation. Id, at 481. Appellee’s contention, then, that the defense of abatement may not be invoked in an eminent domain Proceeding, is not supported by the cases cited.” c. Appellant asserts that consolidation of Condemnation 1 and 2 under HRCP Rule 42 is not the equivalent of merger, thus Appellee was required “to establish subject matter jurisdiction in both lawsuits.” It further maintains that this court's decision in Shelton Engineering and the ICA's decision in © tn Tennessee Gag, a prior condemnation suit had been settled and tthe sottlonent nenorsalized in a contract. 200 So. 2d at 432. In the Subsequent suit, the defendants raised the contract ss a defense, arguing that the setelenent contract indicated that the plaintiff would not take any sore of defendant's land. dd, at 433. The Louisiana Coure of Appeals held chat the plaintiff could not contract away its power to take private property for 9 public purpose. Id,” Similarly, in Burke, the defendant® pled defenses of Contract, waiver, and estoppel, based on the settlement reached between the parties in'an eafiier suit seeking condeanation of the same property involved in the later suit. 350 P.2a at 266. The Supreme Court of Orlanona held that Of ran judicata and estoppel were not available againat the ‘condemnation proceedings. id. st 267 (explaining that holding were available "would be holding that a minicspaliey can Surrender, alienate and contract away or waive the right of eminent comain sich it Cannot do"). Finally, in Charlton, the parties had also negotiated a settlement in prior condemnation proceedings. 430 7.24 at 978. In che subsequent proteeding, the defendants raised the defense of estoppel. Ld, the supreme Court of Washington did not decide Whether estoppel was always unavailable to Gefendants in eminent domain proceadings, avoiding the qoortion by holding that there was not evidence in that cage to support the defense. Id. at 380. Further, that court noted that the doctrine of estoppel “is not Fed one When applied to sunicipal corporations or the state when acting Governmental capacity.” Id, at 979) 38 “*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** Mataushita establish that abatement implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Appellee responds that abatement does not, as a matter of ax, implicate subject matter jurisdiction, noting that other courts have “held that abatement does not implicate the subject matter juriediction of the court and the trial court has broad discretion in applying abatement.” (Citing Halpern v. Bd. of Educ, 495 A.2d 264, 266 n.4 (Conn, 1985); Kelly, 245 S.W.3d at 314.) Appellee urges that, if this court follows that holding, “(the court] clearly did not abuse its discretion because the causes and relief are sufficiently different and consolidation achieved the goals of abatement.” Alternatively, Appellee argues that, even if abatement would generally destroy subject matter jurisdiction, in this case “abatement would not apply because the cases were consolidated.” (Citing Kehr vs Kehr, 114 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Neb. 1962) (for the proposition that “the purpose of abatenent[,] ‘to avoid multiplicity of suits,’ does not apply where the matters are consolidated”). RCP Rule 42 is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). In construing FRCP Rule 42, Professors Wright and Miller explain that [11m the context of Legal procedure, “consolidation” is used in thres different senses: 2)" then 11 except one of several actions are stayed lunes one se tried) in which case the Judgment in the one trial is conclusive ag to the others. This is not actually a consolidation but sonetines is referred to as such. 2) wera acti ined inte one, os 4 fan Tivustration of Enis ie the sitestion sn which several actions are pending 39. “+*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** between the same parties stating clains that might have been SeU'GUE criginaiay as separate” sounts in one Complaint ceauires the entry of a separate iudanent. this type of Seicause the pareice to one action to be parties to another, 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2382, at 8-9 (3d ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). Appellee espouses the second view, maintaining that the consolidation of Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2 made the two suits one. On the other hand, Appellant advocates the third interpretation, that consolidation did not, on its own, merge the suits. As to this issue, it appears that Appellant is correct. In choosing among the three options described above, Professors Wright and Miller conclude that the ols both the second and third of the procedures =. Ae quite clearly fo the contrary. “the federal courts have read the rule as They Fegard as still authoritative whet the Supreme Court said About consolidation a few years before (FRCP) Rule é2(a) was Sdopted: Consolidation is permitted as 2 matter of Gonvenience and econony in administration, but not ‘che suits into a single cause, or Change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in suit parties to another Id. at 10 (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933)) (emphases added) (footnote omitted). Relying on the foregoing language, our courts have apparently followed the interpretation adopted by the federal courts. See First Hawaiian Bank v. Timothy, 96 Hawai'l 348, 352 n.2, 31 P.3d 205, 209 n.2 (App. 2001) (concluding that the trial court, in consolidating the subject cases, “intended that the actions be tried jointly 40 ‘°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** but retain their separate character”). Moreover, given that Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2 retained their separate identities and the court entered separate judgments in each action, it 4s evident that the third procedure described above is moze apt to the circumstances of this case. Thus, the consolidation did not merge Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2, and we must address the question of whether Condemnation 2 was abated by Condennation 1. D. This court has held that “where the party is the same in a pending suit, and the cause is the sane and the relief is the same, a good plea in abatement lies.” Shelton Ena’a, 51 Haw. at 249, 456 P.2d at 226 (citations omitted). Appellant contends that Uwlnere a claim involves the sane subject matter and parties filed action, so that the sane facts and ited, resolution should scour through the prior acticn, and a second suit should be dismissed. It is Fundamental that a plaintiff 1s not authorized simply to ignore a prior action and Bring a second, independent action on the same state of facts while the original action 4s Pending. (Quoting 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement $ 6, at 89 (2005).) Accordingly, it argues that “two eminent domain actions seeking the same relief cannot be pending in the same court at the same time[.]""" Appellant argues that Condemnation 2 was abated by \ in support of this position, Appellant cites to Bed Oak farm. tne. Clty of ocala, 636 So. 24 97, 98 (Fla. App. 1994), in which the Florigs Sourt of Appeals heid that a second suit to condemn the sane property, filed while the first suit was pending on appeal, should have been dismissed. They Bso rely on Maxey v. Redeviopsent authority of Racine, 286 N.W.2d 794, 103, kis, 1980), in which it was held That # condemnation sit could not proceed Cont ine. a  ‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER** the pendency of Condemnation 1 because “the court was the sane, the parties were the sane, and the relief was the sane (property for the sane [Bypass]; the only differences in the legal description of (Appellant’s] property in Condemnation (1) and Condemnation {2} were minor, at best).” Tt contends that the court erred in concluding that the “attenuation” between the two causes of action was sufficient to create different causes.” In response, Appellee argues that [the court] correctly decided that [Appellant] failed to prove the claim for abatement because the two lawsuits had different causes and prayed for different relief.” In this connection, the court found that “[Condennation 1] wae an eminent domain action ba on County Resolution (No.} 266-00." In contrast, the court found that “(Condemnation 2 was) an eminent domain action based on Resolution [No.] 31-03.” ‘The court further found that Resolution No. 31-03 authorized Appellee “to condemn a larger parcel of 2, continue lihere the landowner had earlier f1ed an inverse condemnation action relating fo the sane property. % Appellant argues that Appellee could have effectively changed the at issue by amending Condemnation 1 under HRS § 101-19 (1993). That weovides 22 follows In all procesdings under this part the court shall have power at any stage of the proceeding to allow anendnent in form or substance in any complaint, citation, sunsons, process, answer, motion, order, verdict, judgment or other Proceeding, including anendnent in the description of the Tanas sought to be candeaned, whenever the anendnent will ot impair the substantial rights of any party. However, the fact that Appellee could have anended its complaint does not Alter our analysis, The atate of the record ia that Appelice did not amend Condemnation 1+ 42 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** [Appellant's property] for the Bypass.” Based on these findings, the court conclude 10... Ag the basis [sic] for these two County Resolutions are substantially different from each other, and have been vated on by emo aifferent County Counci1s over four years apart, ‘the (clourt concludes that. (Condemnation 1) and (Condemnation 2} are Separate claims for the purposes of abatement. 11. [Condemnation 1) prays for the condemnation of 2.90 acres of (Appellant’s) land. (Condemnation 2) prays for the condesnation of 3,348 acres of [Appellant's] land. As there is nearly a half scre difference (Q.4i8 acces) in the prayer for relief in the two eminent domain cases, the [cJourt concludes that {Condemnation 1) and (Condemnation 2] request Gifferent relief for the purposes of abstenent. (Quotation marks and footnote omitted.) It suffices here to note that the area of the land that Appellee sought to condemn was different by nearly a half acre in Condennation 1 and Condemnation 2, a difference of approximately 20%. Arguably, then, the relief sought in the two actions encompassed two different prayers for relief. In that light it cannot be said that the court wrongly concluded that Condemnation 2 was not abated by Condemnation 1." % ‘this conclusion addresses Appellant’ s argumente from Les opening Brief that “to eminent donain actions sesking the sane relief cannot be Pending in the sane court at the ane tine(,]" and when two Laweusts Sone relief, the ‘cause’ ig the sane.” rt Slso addressee the related argunente raised in Appellant's Reply Brief that (1) the difference in the two parcels sought “did not make the relief (Appellee) sought in the two cases Ekeforent since in both cases it sought consennation of property for a road from Hokuli to Mamelahoa Highway[,1* (2) “for the second action to be considered different fron the first, the relief sought must actually be Yegaliy and materially distinct(,]" (citing ghelean Ena'g, $1 Haw, at 267-88, G5 P.2a ae 225-56; Qabs Lumber j sidg, cov ran You, It’ Haw. 426, 410 (Haw Rep. i698)), and. (3) the omission of references £0 the development’ Agreenent in Condemnation 2 "aid not make the relief sought by [Appellee]... materially different” because its "goal in both cases remained the (Appellant's) property for [the Bypass)” In that connection, this conclusion addresses Appellee’ = counterargunents in ite Answering Brief that (1) the court correctly concluded that abatenent did not deprive it of Jurisdiction over Condeanation 2 because Sthe tho lewoules had different causes and prayed for different ralief(,]* (citing shelton Ena'g, 51 Haw, at 243, 656 P.2d st 226-27), because (a) the continue king of 43  B. As to Appellant’s argument that “subjecting property owners to concurrent condemnations violates due process,” Appellee argues that the contention should be deemed waived because Appellant did not raise it to the court.” Appellant does not dispute the alleged failure to raise this argument. “As a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both criminal and civil cases.” State v, Moses, 102 Hawai's 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003); gee, aia, State YsHoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) ("Generally, the failure to raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.”) Additionally, Appellant fails to provide this court with arguments upon which a decision can be rendered. cf. ‘Kaho'chanohano v. Dep't of tiuman Servs., 117 Hawai'i 262, 298 1.37, 178 P.3d $38, $78 n.37 (2008) (determining that the appellant had failed to raise a discernible argument with regard continue condemnation actions were instituted pursuant to different resolutions of the fice, tb) Condemnation 1 referred to the Development Agreenent, but Condemnation 2 did net, and (c) the parcel sought in Condemnation 2 was “nearly half an acre” larger than the parcel sought in Condemnation 1, and (2) courts insist upon ‘strict compliance” with che came cause/sane relief requirenent only where abatement if deened related to the doctrine of Juudicata, (citing Horter v, Commercial bank ¢ Trust Co., 12680. 309, 312 (eis. 1530)) tn its September 27, 2007 Judgment, the court concluded that “(appeliant's d]ue [p]rocess claim hala) been’ addressed in (its) ruling on the Failure to Caject within Ten (10) Days.” It is not clear where in the Fecord this ruling is located. It has aleady been notes that this court will ot taift through the voluminous record to verify an appellant's Contentions.” Lanai cou, 105 Hawai'i at 309 m.31, 97 Pa3d at 385 n-31. 44 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** to any factual errors contained in the trial court’s findings because it did not point to any specific finding as being incorrect, but rather raised a general objection to them, thereby “ehift{ing] the burden upon this court to comb through the 249 [€indings) and determine which of the [findings] are erroneous”); =! ne. v , 116 HawaS's 277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032 (2007) (noting that this court could disregard one of the appellants’ contentions because they failed to make any “discernible argument or cite to any authority with respect to their position”); Laeroc Waikik Parkside, LLC vs K.S.K. (Oahu) Ltd, Pfship, 115 Hawai'i 201, 212, 166 P.3d 961, 972 (2007) (concluding that the appellant made no discernible argument because it “cite[d) no authority, present [ed) no analysis as to this argument, and d[id] not explain the relevance of” the omission complained of). In this case, Appellant makes general assertions that defendants are entitled to due process protections in eminent domain proceedings. However, Appellant fails to explain specifically which due process rights were infringed by this process and how." The mere assertion that “{dJue process is violated when a property owner is forced to endure concurrent attempts to condemn the same land,” without elaboration or citation to authority, does not enable this court to reach a = appellee provides Little counterargunent, merely stating that “tdppeltant’s] due process rights were not tiolated by concurrent attenpea to conden the sane land because the cases involved different causes and Felief, and the cases wore consolidated.” 45, ‘s/HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!** reasoned conclusion. Based on the foregoing, Appellant's general due process argument is deemed waived.” v. Appellant's Issue 3 concerns whether courts are obligated to accept the governnent’s asserted public purpose for a taking when faced with the assertion that the public purpose may be a pretext for a primarily private benefit. Appellant's argument challenging the validity of the asserted public purpose underlying the condemnation presents a question of constitutional law, which this court reviews de novo under the right /wrong standard. See State v, Cuntapay, 104 Hawai'i 109, 113, 85 P.3d 634, 638 (2004) ("We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong standard.” (Internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis points omitted.)). A Appellant maintains the court erred in not “Look{ing] beyond Resolution [No.] 31-03" to adjudicate Appellant's claim “that the asserted public use was a pretext . . . to hide the predominantly private benefit of the [Bypass] to Oceansidel,)” and therefore requests that the court’s Judgment in Condennation 2 “be reversed, and the case remanded to consider whether Insofar ag this argunent invokes a constitutional argument concerning due process under the Fifth Asencnent, it is addressed antra. 46 “FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** [Appellee’s) claim that the taking was for public use is valid, or was a pretext to hide the predominant private benefit to Oceanside.” According to Appellant, “[the court] cannot merely accept the government’s word that a taking is for public use.” (Formatting altered.) It contends that “the public use question is judicial in nature and is decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Citing Haw, Hous, Auth, va Adimine, 39 Haw. 543 (Terr. 1952) Contrastingly, Appellee asserts that the “applicable public purpose test” states that “where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the (United States Supreme] Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the (public [ulse {cllause.” (Quoting Haw. Hous, Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).) (Other citations omitted.) B. Article I, section 20 of the Hawai'i Constitution states that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” This court has interpreted the “public use” clause to authorize takings for % ___appeliant’s prayer for relief concerning the dispositions on appeal available to this court should be clarified. Pursuant. to HRAP Rule 38(e) (2008), “the word ‘reverse’ ends iitigation on the merits, and the phrase ‘vacate and Tenand’ indicates the litigation continues in the court .n accordance with the appellate court’ instruction.” Recorsingly, st vaned that, in connection with issue (3}, Appellant seeks to have the in condemnation 2 vacsted and’ remanded fora determination of sorted public purpose was pretextual. In response to Appellant's requested relief, Appellee does nat ask for anything except affirmance of the Usdgment in Condemnation 2 a is'pr couse’ = Jaane whether the ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** “public purposes.” Hav. Housing Auth, v. Luman, 68 Haw. $5, 68, 704 P.2d 688, 896 (1985) (holding that “[w)here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, 2 compensated taking is act proscribed by the public use clause” (citation omitted)). It is well-settled that legislative bodies vested with the power of eminent domain have broad discretion in determining what uses will benefit the public and what land is necessary to facilitate those uses. AS a general rule, ely, when the public nature of 2 use for vnich @ taking nae been authorized by Taw is disputed, ices {es unethee th a 7 5 on the presusction thats use Ts public 1? She Tecislatire bas declared it tobe auch. Aiming, 39 Haw. at 549 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, “great weight” is accorded to “legislative findings and declarations of public use.” Id. In fact, the legislative determination “is entitled not only to respect but to a prima facie acceptance of its correctness." id, at 550 (internal quotation marks and % the court in Alinine was concerned with the application of Revised awe of Hawail § 3501 (19451, which declared thet “the clearance, replanning, nd reconstruction of areas in which unsanitary or unsafe housing conditions suist® to provide “safe snd sanitary dnelling acsonmodations for persons of ow income” were “public uses and purposes for which public money may be spent and private property acgired[.J” % pursuant to HRS § 101-2 (1993), the governmental body seeking to condemn private property is the plaintiff in the condemnetion action. HRS S'Toieit" (1995) instructs that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this part, the procedure shall be the sane asin other civil actions.” In that Connection, a governmental entity, as the plaineiff, has the initial Durden of proving that the taking 1s fora public yee of purpose, in accordance with article 1, section 20 of the Hawaid Constitution and HRS 48  ‘++ HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER™ citation omitted). In order to overcome the prima facie evidence of public use, a defendant must show that “such use is clearly and palpably of a private character.” Id, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the legislature’ s discretion in this area is not unfettered. As Appellant notes, neither “the decision of the legislature [nJor the presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is a judicial question and one of law to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”” Id. Hence, “the great weight accorded to the legislative finding and the prima facie acceptance of its correctness, as well as the binding effect of the presumption, demonstrate[] that the courts will not Lightly disturb such a finding and will not overrule it unless it is manifestly wrong.” Id, Contrary to Appellee’s position, then, under the Hawai'i constitution, courts may continue § 101-2° (i993), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[plrivate property ay be taken for’ public use.” Gee In te Lotenso's Batata, 61 Haw. 236, 246 120, 602 P-24 521, 529 9.20 (1973) (explaining that “{e]he burden of Prodiicing evidence 4s uavally cast firet upon the party who has pleaded the Guistence of the fact”). Once the government has Met that burden, the property ower nay defend against the condemation action. See 1d. (noting Chat the burden of proof “aay shife to the adversary when the pleader has discharged ais initial burden"). © the decisions of other jurisdictions are in accord with this rule. fee, ooo QoUE Ne Lilac, vs Minneapolis Catv. Dev. Agency, 599 N.W.2d 582, 56a" tian. Ce. Rpp--1989) explaining tnat “(glenerally, chailenges to ‘condemnation procesding involve a challenge to the public purpose supporting tthe tating or 2 challenge to the ancunt of compensation for the taking"! as 76 B.36.1, 14 (Nev. 2003) (holding that "al property omer may False, aa an affiraative defense to the eaking [iithat) the avowed public purpose ie merely 2 pretext or used in bed Eaithe’(gootnoves omitted) } S04 8.8.20 235, 237 [Va. 2003) (concluding that “the fact that the Clty filed with its petition for condemnation a resolution that stated that the landowners’ property would be taken for a public use does not bar judicial review of the issue of public use") 4  POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** consider the validity of the public purpose asserted in a condemnation action. Consequently, under appropriate circumstances, courts may consider whether a purported public purpose is pretextual. c As concluded above, our case law supports the proposition that a court can look behind the government's stated Public purpose. However, Appellant relies heavily on federal law, primarily the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v, City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005), to support the contention that the condemning authority’s motives should be scrutinized. As discussed infra, the Kale majority opinion, consistent with our prior decisions, allows courts to look behind an eminent domain plaintiff’s asserted public purpose under certain circumstance 1 In Kalo, Connecticut's Office of Planning and Management reviewed a revitalization proposal for New London, an economically depressed area, and determined that “the project was consistent with relevant state and municipal development policies.” 545 U.S. at 474 n.2. The New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a non-profit, quasi-governmental entity charged with revitalizing New London, “announced that it would lease some of the parcels to private developers in exchange for their agreement to develop the land according to the terms of the 50 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** development plan. Specifically, [{t] was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison, a developer selected from group of applicants.” Id. at 476 n.4. Although NLDC was able to negotiate private transfers with most of the private property owners whose lands were needed for the revitalization development, it vas unable to reach agreenents related to fifteen parcels. Id, at 475. Accordingly, NLDC invoked the City’s condesnation power, which had been granted to it for purposes of acquiring the land needed for the revitalization project, and instituted proceedings to obtain those parcels. Id, The owners (petitioners in Kelo) objected to the takings, claiming that they violated “the ‘public use’ restriction in the [£]ifth [almendment.” 1d. 2. The majority in Kele held that New London’ s redevelopment “plan unquestionably serve(d) a public purpose” such that the condemnation of the petitioners’ properties was permissible under the fifth anendment’s takings clause. Id. at 484. The facts of Kele are distinguishable from the instant case insofar as the Court was considering the constitutionality of using eminent domain to condenn unblighted property as part of an economic rejuvenation plan. See id. at 472-73, 483. Nevertheless, like Kelo, this case contains a salient feature, wizs, the fact that the condemned property would be transferred 51  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ from one private party to another, at least initially.” See id. at 476 n.4, In that light, the reasoning of Justice Stevens’ majority opinion is informative. Justice Stevens commenced his analysis with the juxtaposition of two “perfectly clear” “polar propositions.” Id. at 477. First, that the government “may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B{.]" Id, Second, that the government “may transfer property from one private party to another if ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking(.]” Id. The majority then noted that the “use by the public” standard had evolved from a “Literal requirement” in the nineteenth century to a “public purpose” test at the turn of the twentieth century. Id. at 479: Accordingly, the question presented in Kelo was “whether the City’s development plan serve(d] a ‘public purpo ota at 480. In that connection, the majority surveyed prior redevelopment cases wherein the Court had determined that a valid public purpose supported the condemnation, despite at least initial transfer to a private party. For example, in Seman vs Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court had upheld a plan to As noted, in the instant case, property condanned pursuant to the Developnent Agreement is to be transferred initially to Oceanside, e private corporation. Nowever, Paragraph 14 of the Development Agreenant. requires Oceanside to dedicate the Bypass to Appellee upon its completion. Thereafter, Appellee will “assure all responsibility and costs for operation, maintenance, Fepair, or reconstruction Of the (Bypses).” 52 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER* redevelop “a blighted area of Washington, D.C.,” despite the fact that a portion of the property “would be leased or sold to private parties for the purpose of redevelopment [.]” Kele, 545 U.S, at 480. Similarly, in Midkiff, the Court reviewed “a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees (for just compensation) in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481 (citing Midkitt, 467 U.S. 229). Deferring to the legisiature’s judgnent, the Court concluded that eliminating the “*land oligopoly’ Iwas) a valid public use . . . [and] rejected the contention that the mere fact that the State immediately transferred the properties to private individuals upon condemnation somehow diminished the public character of the taking.” Id, at 482 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42). Finally, the Kelo majority reviewed Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In that case, the Court upheld “the provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act under which the Environmental Protection Agency could consider data (including trade secrets) submitted by a prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a subsequent application, so long as the second applicant paid just compensation for the data.” Kelo, 545 U.S, at 482 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014). The Court concluded that the law passed constitutional muster under Berman and Midkiff because Congress’ intent of increasing competition by eliminating the expense of research 53 *°°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ satisfied the “public purpose” test. See id. (citing Buckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015). The Kelo majority summarized the Court's public purpose jurisprudence as “wisely eschew[ing] rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.” Id, at 483. Applying its precedent to the facts presented in Kelo, the Court first noted that the City’s “determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation” was entitled to judicial deferenc Id. The majority then determined that it was necessary to consider the public purpo: of the entire redevelopment project, not just the condemnation of the petitioners’ specific properties. Id. at 484. The majority rejected the petitioners’ proposed “bright- Line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use.” Id, In that connection, the majority noted that “{p)romoting economic development is a traditional and long- accepted function of government” such that there was “no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that (the Court] has recognized.” Id. Accordingly, the majority concluded that “[{]t would be incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than any of those other interests.” Id. at 485. 584  ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!" With regard to the petitioners’ argument that the taking was improper because private parties might benefit from the redevelopment of New London, the majority opined that “the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties." Id, The majority cited (1) the transfer of rail track from one private party to another to “facilitat[e) Amtrak's rail service” in National Railroad Passenger Corp, v, Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992), and (2) “the provision of legal services to the poor” in Brown v, Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003), as instances in which “the achievement of a public good . coincide[d] with the immediate benefitting of private parties. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 n.14. The majority concluded that the legislative body was authorized to determine that the public purpose would be best effectuated by a private entity. see id. at 486, Accordingly, it reasoned that it “[could not) say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted) .* % — gustice Thosas, in his separate dissent, primarily took issue with the majority's ‘exten{sion of] the concept of public purpose to encompass any ‘economically beneficial goal,” Kolo, 545 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J.» dissenting)» Because, inter alia, it “elininste[d) liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution,” Ady at 506, and the resultant “losses will fail disproportionately on poot communities |, ]" id at 521- Justice Thomas therefore advanced 2 strict interpretation of the fifth amendment, stating that "(t]he most natural reading of the (Public Use) Clause 1a that it allows ‘the government to take property only if the government ova, of the public has: # legal richt to use the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatscever.” Jd, at 502 (emphasis added). Inesmuch as There is no dispute in the instant case that the public has a iegal right eo tse the property in question because it will become a county road the Thoms cont inse 55  )R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** The Kelo majority explicitly stated what that case did not hold. First, it noted that Kelo did not present a case in which property was transferred from private owner A to private owner B “for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes.” Id, at 486- 87. Second, the majority rejected the petitioners’ argument that, in redevelopment cases, the Court “should require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will actually accrue.” Id. at 487. Third, the Court declared that it would not “second-guess the (government's) determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project.” Id, at 488-89, Finally, the Court “emphasize{d) that nothing in [its] opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power[,]” noting that “many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.” Id, at 489. In that connection, the Court held that New London’s condemnation of the continue Gissent is not particularly germane. ‘ionetheless, the Thomas i notes that "[e]here ig no justification... for affording Gnasemountable deference £2 legislative conclusions that Spublic use./" Id, st 517. That dissent explained that “[olnce one accepts, fs the Court at Teast nominally does, that the (plublic (ulse [e)lause is a ifmit'on the aninent domain pover of the Federal Government and the States, there is no Justification for the almost complete deference it grants to legisiatures aa to wnat satisfies it-”" Jd. at S18 {citation omitted). ‘Thus, Under the vicw of the Thonas dissent, it would be error for the court to decline to lock beyond the legislative findings in ruling on ehe tasue of hether the public use requirement was satisfied. 56  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** petitioners’ property satisfied the baseline of the fifth amendment’s “public use” requirement. ida at 490." Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion and also concurred separately to elaborate on pretextual public purpos See id, at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He declared that the traditional fifth amendment test requiring that the asserted public use be “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose” does not authorize takings for the benefit of private parties with public benefits that are merely “incidental or pretextual(.)” Id. at 490 (internal quotation marks and citation % justice o'connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, criticized the majority opinion Because “(ulnder the banner of econcnic development, all private property 1 now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to ancther private ower” shere the property will be "given to an owner who will ee st in a way that the Legislature deens more beneficial to the public(.J"" Ja at 454 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). The O"Connor dissent recognizes “two distinct conditions” Pursuant to the fifth amendene for the exercize of eminent domain power: (1) “the taking must be for a public ase” and (2) "Just compensation mast be paid to the owner,” 1d. at 496 (internal quotation marks, citation, and Brackets omitted). The dissent noted that “(olur cases nave generally identified three categories of takings that conply with the public use Fequirenent” which include (1) “public ownership” cases where “the soversign may transfer private property to public ownership = such as for a road, 3 hospital, of a military base(,]” (2) "use-by-therpublic™ cases where "the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often com Carriers, who make the property available for the public's use = auch Surailroad, a public utility, ora stadium[,]” and (3) where the takings “serve a public purpose . |. even if the property is destined for subsequent private use.” Ig. at 497-98, While Justice O'Connor's dissent enuersted instances of property takings that satisfied the “public use” requirenent, it does not appesr that She intended this list to constitute » bright line test under which takings akin to the identified inatances ahould automatically be deemed to fulfill the “public use condition. See ia. at 497, 500. Thus, thet the propersy in the Shstant case is being taken for the construction of a road and thereby falls into the “public ownership" category of cases historically deemed to meet the Spublic ure" requirement, is noe dssposies * issue. Furehernore, ‘the O'Connor disse vile give considerable deference to legislatures’ determinations about what governmental Activities will advantage the public[,]* nonetheless, "[aln external Judie.al in how the public use requirenent is snterpreted, however limited, 2 "igh at 497, That dissent cautioned that “nearly any lawful use fate property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to Tai at 501. wien the public. 5 **°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** omitted), Justice Kennedy opined that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the [pJublic [u]se [c]lause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor_a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits(.1” Id, at 491 (emphasis added) . Therefore, Justice Kennedy would require courts presented with “3 plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties” to “treat the objection as a serious one and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.” Id. Appellant urges this court to adopt this position, arguing that “[the court] should not have stopped at Resolution [Mo.} 31-03, but should have followed the roadmap to analyzing claims of pretext laid out by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Kelo[.]” However, as discussed infra, the majority opinion in Kele, as well as our own cases, provide ample authority to require the court to reach the issue of pretext. ‘Therefore, we decline to adopt Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. vr. Despite finding that a public purpose existed on the facts presented in Kelo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the government could not condemn private property for the sole purpose of transferring title to @ different private owner. Id. 58 **°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** at 477, Justice Stevens explained with respect to the pretext defense that tthe City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ lend for the purpose of conferring a private Benefit on a particular private party. Sse Migkite, #67 Ores (] at 2651], (°A purely private taking courd not withstand the scrutiny of the public Use requirement; it Mould serve fo legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void"). Nor would the City be allowed co take ‘The trial judge and all the menpers of the Supreme Court of illcaitinate purpose in this case. Id. at 477-78 (emphases added) (citation and footnote omitted) Courts have interpreted this statement to mean that, under the appropriate circumstances, the Kelo majority would review the asserted public purpose of a taking to evaluate its veracity in the face of a pretext challenge. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia opined that the majority recognized that there may be situations where a court should Rot take at face value what the Legislature has said. The Jovernnant will rarely scknowledye that it 42 acting for 2 forbidden reason, so a poverty aunex must in sone sixcumstances be allowed to-allege and-to demonstrate thet she stated oublic ourmose tor the condemnation 18 Bustextual It say be difficult to make this showing, and fhe Supreme Court’ decision may raise rany nore questions than it answers, but q-pestest defense (a aot necessarily foreclosed by ele. Exanco v. Nat’) Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. 2007) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching the conclusion that pretext was a valid Related to the belief that Kele did not “foreclose” the possibility of succesefel pretext defenses, it is notewrihy thar some state Courts expressly allowed the defense even before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Kole. gee, 2a, ‘of AL county, "62 5.6.26 350, e52 (Ga. 1954) (reiterating the holding that eh muerl. a8 shen, reef public the cones. 59 ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** defense to condemnation, that court explicitly clarified that it was “applyling) the decision of the Kele majority, written by Justice Stevens{,]" and not adopting Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Id, at 169 n.8. Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, also interpreting the majority opinion in Kela, rejected a pretext claim “founded only on mere suspicion,” Goldstein v, Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008), cert, denied, No. 07-1247, __ U.S. _-+ 128 8.Ct. 2964 (Jun. 23, 2008), but left open “the possibility that a fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances of the approval process so greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the outcone reached that a closer objective sctutiny of the iustitication being offered is required,” id at 63 mphases added). In several cases decided shortly before Kelo, federal district courts did, in fact, scrutinize asserted public purposes. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1177 %., continue property of A is taken and given to B, the Courts will interfere and set aside fhe law” enphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ); Eapgag, 76 F.3d at 14 (explaining that “{a] property owner may raise, as an Sifirmacive defense co the taking, that. = Rarely a cretaxt or vsed in bad faith" (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis sdded)) « Bdaitionally, Georgia provided statutory relief from pretextual takings. Sea 338 5.6.24 240, 245 (Ge, 1985) (helaing that, genersily, the legislature has the authority "eo determine when ‘the right of eminent domain nay be exercisea()” Sut “iif. under pretext (quoting Official Code of Georgie Rnnctated § 22-1-3) (emphasis added) internal quotation marks omitted))) 60  **°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ (E.0. Mo. 2003) (stating that property owners had “shown at least fa serious question on the merits of their takings claim on public use grounds” where their property was to be condemned and transferred to another private party for use as a retail store), xev'd on other grounds by 357 F.3d 768, 777 (8th Cir. 2004); Cottonwood Christian Ctr, v, Cypress Redev, Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that the property owner had demonstrated “at least a fair question” that the challenged condemnation lacked a valid public purpose where the property was to be turned over to “Costco”); 29 Cents Only Stores ancaster Redev, Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (rejecting the condennor’s argument that condemnation was supported by the public purpose of preventing blight because, inter alia, there was “no evidence in the record to suggest that so-called ‘future blight’ was the actual reason underlying” the condemnation action). Under our precedents and Kelo, it appears that the stated public purpose in this case on its face comports with the public use requirements of both the Hawai'i and United states constitutions. The Kelo decision confirms that the fact that the condemied property is transferred from one private owner to another does not, a fortiori, invalidate the taking. Moreover, the public purpose of the Bypass is evident from its nature as a a “*°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** public road,%* consistent with the land use plans. In that connection, the “prima facie evidence” of the Bypass’s public purpose, as delineated in Resolution No. 31-03, % tm this connection, the character of the proposed public use, a public road, io ttgelf’ strong evidence mitigating in faver of the Diesinpeion of validity. Indisputably, pubis roads have long been recognized Ss°s"public purpose for which private property may be condemned, G68" gudur uNEY, 262 U.S. 700, 706 (1923) (wThat 2 taking of Property fora highway ian taking for public Ose has been universally Focognived, from time imeenorial."); Bailey vr. Myers, 76.94 898, 902 (Ariz. Ge. App. 2003) (explaining that “[w]hien the governnect proposes to take person's property to build streets, jails, government buildings, libraries or Public parks that the governsent will own of operate, the anticipated use is, Unquestionably public”); Cochran vw State, 699°N.6.2¢ 727, 731 (ind. Ct. APP. 2507) {holding that the “State had the power co exercise eminent domain over [the appellant's] property for the purposes of constructing drainage Hieiuities cuteide of the street limits 22 2 pare of its (highway) reconstruction project”); City of Novi v. Robert Adel] Children’s Punded Teast, 701 WN.2a 164, 150=81 (atch. 2008) (holding that a road “Is 2 public Righway” for which “the legislature may constitutionally authorize the Condennation of land” if it *has been established by public authority, and the Samages for the condemnation of the land has been paid by the general public, and the road is under the control and managenent of public officers, whose Suey Ve i2"to keep st in repair” (citation omitted) )? Towehip of WL Oranse v 800 Aved 86, 91 (N.J. 2002) (reiterating thet “[c]ourts have Long held that the condemnation of private property for use aa a public foad fulfills the public use requirenent™ (citation omitted) ); gteatare, 574 ScE.2d at 238 (holding that where "the City own(ed) the road, and... the oad [wes] open for use to the public,” the sppellant’s land nag been Condenned for a public purpose); Ford v Dickerson, 662 S.E.24 503, 506 im. Va. 2008) (Listing condemnation as one OF three seans by unicn “ene public may acquire a valid right to use lend owned by another as and for a public rosd oF Righway" (Internal quotation marks and citation cnitted)) But “the single fact chat a project is a road does not per se make At a public road.” cltvef Novi, 701 N.w.2a at 150. (emphasis in original). In that connection, the Michigan Suprenc Court has explained that the difference between public and private use in the context of roads depends largely upon whether the property condemned $5 Gander the direct control and use of the government or public officers of the government, or, what is almost the ihe thing, in the direct use and occupation of the public at" large, though under the control of private persons oF of 2 corporation!] Ide (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses points omitted) Rppiying the aforementioned factors, it ia noted that (1) under the Developrent Agreement, the Bypass 12 to be dedicated to Appellee, which will june control and responsibility for ite maintenance, and (2) the Bypass will be available for “direct use and cccupation of the public at large(.J” see id However, even when considering @ condemnation action for the purpose of constructing a public road, *(e)here ie no mechanical formals Ustermining ‘public use.’ “This issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Bailey, 76 7.34 at 902 (citation omitted) 62  “*+*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER includes: (1) the determination in the Kona Regional Plan that “the current Mamalahoa Highway [is] inadequate to handle the volume of traffic currently traversing on the roadway"; (2) the declaration that “the proposed Mimalahoa Bypass had been determined by [Appellee], through its County Council, as providing a regional benefit for a public purpose and use which will benefit” the community; and (3) the resolution “that it is necessary for the public use and purpose, to wit: the construction and development of a road intended to bypass the Mamalahoa Highway in the approximate vicinity between Keauhou and Captain Cook, Kona, to acquire and condemn” Appellant's property. ‘Thus, it appears that Appellee presented sufficient prima facie evidence of public purpose under a rational relationship test. See Lyman, 68 Haw. at 68, 704 P.2d at 896. However, both Aiimine and Kelo make it apparent that, although the governnent’s stated public purpose is subject to prima facie acceptance, it need not be taken at face value where there is evidence that the stated purpose might be pretextual. See Aiimine, 39 Haw. at 550 (holding that “where . . . the [1Jegislature declares a particular use to be a public use[,] the presumption is in favor of this declaration . . . unless such use is clearly and palpably of a private characterl,]” however, “that does not mean that either the decision of the legislature or the Presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is a 63  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER* dudicial question and one of law to be decided on the facts and cixcumstances of each particular case” (internal quotation marks * gee also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (stating that a taking is not valid if the asserted and citation omitted) (emphases added) purpose is a “mere pretext of @ public purpose, when its actual purpose [{s] to bestow a private benefit”). Appellant’s objection to Condennation 2 is not that the asserted public purpose is invalid on its face, but that the public purpose was pretextual. Tt argues that Condemnation 2 provided a “predominately private benefit . . . to Oceanside. In that vein, Appellant contends on appeal that [11m Condemnation (2), the (court) did not look beyond County's Resolution 31-03 to conclude that it satisfied both the federal and Hawaii public ues requirenents, Tt sae Fequires to do nore and address (Appellant's) claim that the asserted public purpose was 2 prstext -- as in Condennation : ist, elapectaliy since st Strack own the attospted taking in Condesnation (1) for Tack of public uses ["] sg er nt cites to Kennedy's concurring opinion for the proposition that the burden for rebutting prima facie evidence of public Purpose iss “clear showing.” aq diseenting opinion at 5, 9 (citing Kala, 5as'U.s. at 491) (Kennedy, J., Concurring). Sowever, liming also indicates that 4 burden-shifting regine’ is appropriate by referring eo a “presumption” In'favor of the legislature, whose determination is subject to “prima facie Acceptance," unich is “binding” unless that presumption ss rebutted by @vicence thac "such use ia clearly end palpably of @ private character.” See Riisine, 59 daw. at 549-50 % rp appears that the court’s basis for invalidating Condemnation 1 as lacking a valid public purpose rested predominantly, if not exclusively, on the court's conclusion that the taking represented an illegal delegation of Appelles’s eminent domain power to Oceanside. The court's order stated, in pereinent part, that "[Condennation 1] 1a invalid, . , because County Resolution 265-00 illegally deleastes its power of condemnation, through the Development Agreement, ‘to [Oceanside], and public purpess.” (Eaphases added.) However, courts generally speak of Miegal delegation and public purpose as two distinct considerations. Esther {legal delegation, ar lack ot" valid public purpose, will invalidate a taking. Tt 13 unclear from the court's findings snd conclusions whether there were additional considerations that led the court to conclude that 64 ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** (Emphases added.) Accordingly, Appellants argue that “the [court] should not have stopped at Resolution 31-03, but should have followed the roadmap to analyzing claims of pretext(.] Appellee argues alternatively that the “court properly found public purpose.” It asserts that “(a]t trial, [Appellant's] private benefit arguments were: (1) (Appellee) changed the Bypass’s northern terminus from mauka at Kuakini Highway to maka at Als" Highway to benefit Oceanside to the detriment of [Appellee]; and (2) Oceanside (and not [Appellee] determined the alignment of the Bypass.” According to Appellee, “the [court] did not fail to analyze these private benefit allegations[,]”" as the court specifically found that the “alignaent of the (Bypass), with arporthern terminus at Alii Highway was. preferred and Selected by {Appeliea’s) Departnent of Public Works, and La Consistent with the General Plans that have been adopted by [Appeliee]” and in "County Resolution No. 31-03, the final determination of the [bypass] remained with [appellee's] Department of Public Works. Despite Appellee’s argument, it is unclear from the entirety of the court’s findings and conclusions regarding Condemnation 2 whether the court did in fact consider and reject Appellant’s pretext argument. The findings relating to “public purpose” in Condemnation 2 are as follows: 36. The eminent domain action in {Condemnation 2) has County Resolution No, 31-0) as ite Basis for public purpose continue Condemnation 1 lacked a valid public purpose, However, Condemnation 1 was Rot. app% » private benefit to fed’ and therefore 1s final S22 oops Civil Service Con'n, 106 Hawai'i 205, 224, 103 Pisd 365, 364 (2004) (TA Judgment is final and binding unless an appeal is taken.")" Therefore, we only consider whether Appellant's pretext ergunent was fully considered as’ to Condemnation 2. 6 ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** 97. County Resolution No, 31-03 atates that the proposed construction and use of the (Bypass) would provide a public benefit to tne County of Hawaits 88, The (HCC) approved of the (Bypass) to be a public purpose and passed County Resolution ilo. 31-03 on February 5, 2003. 59. The 2003 County Council ws nine menbers| 100 “The (Bypass) as to be built to State Highway Design Standaras, 101. The alignment of the (Bypass), with a northern terminus at Alli Highway was preferred and selected by (Appellec’ s} Department of Public Works, and is consistent with the General Plana that have been adopted by [Appellee] « 02. “In County Resolution No. 31-05, the final. dotermination S€ the (Bypasa] remained with (appellee's) Department of Public Works. composed of the following (citations omitted.) The conclusions of the court regarding Condemnation 2 relating to “public purpose” are the following: 94. the Figth Amendment to the (U.S.) constitution provides, in part, "(Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U8. Const. amend. 3s, The Hawais Constitution atates, “Private property ‘shill not be taken or damaged for public use without Just Compensation.” Naw. Const, art. Ty § 20. Se. When applying the Haual! Congtitution, Haweii courte nay interpret it to afford greater protection than provided by the U.8. Constitution. See [Lyman], 62 Haw. S5{, 104 P26 888} 37.) The inquiry under the public use clause of (a}rticle 3, Is]ection 20 is whether a taking is designed to further a Shegitinate government purpes Gore ee Castle, 19 [Hauaili) 64{, 808 F.2d S76] CSBa) 56. Generally, courts are bound by the legislature's public ue determination unless the use 4a clearly and Balpably of 2 private character.” State. Anderson, 56 Haw, S66(, 545:P.24 1175) (2976). However, the public us question ie still one that renaine jodscial in nature ‘Biiininel, 39 aw. 5030) 35. The’ [HCC] “determined that there wae a public purpose in county Resclution 31-03. county Resolution 31-03 did not Eofer to the Developaent Agreement, and was passed by a new County Council with a different council make-up. 200." (Appeilant] timely raised [its) objection to public purpose within the ten-day limit in (Condemnation 217 Appellee) did not raise this issue. 101" County Resolution 1-03 is vaita. 202. The [court concludes that the eminent domain action in’ {condemnation 2) ia valldly supported by public purpose, and properly passed by the (HCC) (Internal reference omitted.) 66  -FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** With all due respect, the court’s conclusion that Condemnation 2/s public purpose was valid, because the resolution upon which it was based omitted reference to the Development Agreement and was passed by a slightly altered HCC, may have elevated form over substance. See Coon v, City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 254, 47 P.3d 348, 369 (2002) (reaffirming this court’s policy of “eschew[ing]” constructions that “elevate form over substance”). In this connection, jerts that the court's findings and conclusions “are Appellant devoid of any reference to evidence regarding public use beyond the fact [that] the second resolution does not use the words ‘evelopment Agreement,’ and the resolution was approved by county council comprised of different menbers.” Despite the lack of reference to the Development Agreement in Resolution No. 31-03, it is not apparent from the record whether any or all of the same provisions in the Agreenent that led the court to invalidate Condemnation 1 were still in effect and underlay Condemnation 2,** or whether other conditions existed such that % The court invalidated the Impact fee and condennation provisions of the Development Agrecnent. Pertinent to reibursement te Oceanside for Geveloping the Bypass, Paragraph 15.2. of the Development Agreement provided that “nothing herein shall be construed as preventing Oceanside. from seeking reinbursenent” fron Appellee for "the difference between the [total [elost of the (Bypass) and the "Project Ispact Cost{.]’” Faragraph 15.0 of the Developaent Agreenent declared that Oceanside would be reimbursed with funds from (1) “fair share” assessments levied against future developeants a2 conditions of development, (2) an impact fee that could be levied against Hawai'i County “or the region extending from Keauhou to Miiolii,” or (3), "any other monetary contribution paid to (Appellee) from developers ‘or land omers” who benefit ron the construction of the Bypass. With regard to those Brovisions of the Developnent Agreement that provided for the collection of fees by the County, the court concladed: 81. The Development Agraenent also purports to amend, continue, 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ the private character predominated. Those issues may be factors relevant to the pretext issue. In its conclusion 71 related to Condennation 1, the court stated that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the [p]ublic [uJse [c]lause should strike down a taking that, by >. seontinue Supersede or substitute for ordinances and the impact fee Statute. The Development Agreonent imposes an impact fee, and (Appellee) has not enacted an impact fee ordinance Pursuant to section 46-141 of the [BRS], as amended. [HRS] Peete. 84; ” [appetige! does not have statutory authority to impo 2 “fair share” assessment, but hag statutory authority Co) ‘enact inpact fee ordinances pursuant to section 46-141 of the [HRS], as amended. 65. Tho “fair share” assessment under the Development Agreement, in substance, 9 tantamount to an ampact fee that does not conform to Section 46-141 of the [HRS], a5 amended 86. "The portion of the Developaent Agreement that imposes the “fair Share” assessment against (Appellant) is vous for pot being in compliance with Section 46-14] of the [HRS], ae Therefore, the “fair share” and inpact fee provisions of the Development Agresnent, a2 applied to Appellant, were declared void. The future vitality Of such provisions, assuming compliance with ARS § 46-61 (Supp. 2007), 1 not Shear Additionally, the court concluded that all of the condemnation provisions were illegal.” The relevant conclusions are as follows: 78. (Appellee) and Oceanside's actions prior to, and performance aftery the adoption of the Development Agreement, Advecnent maka it-uneTatatanly oleae that theoet teat 73, The condennation provisions of the Developssnt Agreament are invalis Sondamnation authority te a orivate party. (Emphases added.) It is not evident from the record whether the invalidated Gondeanation and impact fee provisions were still in effect at the tine Condemnation 2 was instituted, ‘other ‘than the condesnation and “fair share” provisions, st appears the remainder of the Agreement was left in place. As for the Fenaining provisions, including whether Oceanside was required to designate the area for the Bypses, negotiate wieh landowners, complete and cover ail costs of construction of the Bypass, dedicate the Sypass to Appellee, and Fecelve sone reinbursement from Appellee for costs associated with the Bypass [sia sone monetary contribution other than the invalidated impact fee provisions), it is also unclear as to whether these are still in effect Between Appellee and Oceansice with respect £0 Condemnation 2. 68  ‘1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER" ack with only incidental or pretextual public benefits{.]” (Quoting (Emphasis showing, is tended to favor a particular private party, Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). added.) Despite the court's ref. nce to pretext in Condemnation 1, it is not evident whether the court engaged in a “pretext” analysis as to whether Condemnation 1 provided a predominantly private benefit to Oceanside, or merely concluded that the condennation was void because it was an illegal delegation. Moreover, it is not apparent why the court referred to pretext in its conclusions with respect to Condemnation 1 but not with respect to Condemnation 2. As to Condemnation 2, although the court referenced the relevant standards from Anderson and Aiimine, it is not discernible that the court based its determination of public purpose on anything more than the fact that “County Resolution No. 31-03 states that the proposed construction and use of the [Bypass] would provide 2 public benefit to the County of Hawaii” and that “[tlhe [wc determined that there was 2 public purpose in County Resolution 31-03.” (Bmphases added.) The court did not state that Appellant failed to make a clear showing that the use was of a predominantly private character, or indicate any recognition that despite any ostensible private benefit to Oceanside, the actual purpose was a valid public use. Contrary to Appellee’s assertions and the dissent, in Condemnation 2 the court did not expressly consider the question of whether the taking was 68  ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ “clearly and palpably of a private character,” liming, 39 Haw. at 550 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and determine that it was not. c The dissent states that “our on case law denonstrates that the rational-basis test -- identical to that laid out in the federal precedent is the appropriate standard to be applied in determining whether a governmental taking has @ public purpose under the public use clause of the Hawai'i Constitution, as well as the federal constitution.” Dissenting opinion at 13. However, where the actual purpose of a condemnation action is to bestow a benefit on a private party, there can be no rational basis for the taking. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78) Alimine, 39 Haw. at 550. According to the dissent, “(iJt is well-settled that, “whenever property is taken for a highway, it is for the public use, huay may reat private party(,]/" dissenting opinion at 15 (quoting Rodgers dev Co. v. Town of Tilton, 781 A.24 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2001)) (emphasis in original), and also, the project is not “an economic development condemnation” as in Kelo, id. at 19. It appears, therefore, that the dissent would foreclose all pretext argunents Where the government's stated public purpose is a “classic” public use, such as a road, and that the dissent believes that pretext arguments should be confined to cases where the 70  “*/*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ condennation is for the purpose of economic development. See ids at 19-20. Plainly it was not the intention of this court in Adimine or of the Supreme Court in Kelo to foreclose the possibility of pretext arguments merely because the stated purpose is a “classic” one. According to Aiming, although the Legislative determination is subject to prima facie acceptance, “that does not mean that either the decision of the legislature or the presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is a tion and one of Law circumstances of each particular case.” 39 Haw. at 550 (emphasis added). Under the dissent’s formulation, it is difficult to imagine what question would be left for the court to decide when the stated purpose of the taking is a public road. Similarly, Kelo the majority stated that “the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party + + + ly nlor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” 545 U.S. at 477-18. There is no indication that this proposition was limited to economic development cases such as in Kelo. Indeed, the dissent's attempt to distinguish between “classic” public uses and “economic development” condemnations conflicts with the majority opinion. In Kelo, Justice Stevens determined that “[p]romoting economic n  government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized.” Id, at 484 (emphases added). ‘Therefore, the dissent has no basis for distinguishing “economic development” cases.%* Aside from the foregoing it is not established that “ whenever property is taken for a highway, it is for the public use(.]/” Dissenting opinion at 15 (quoting Rodgers Dev, Co., 781 A.2d at 1034). The dissent takes that proposition from a New Hampshire case wherein the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted the New Hampshire atate constitution. See Rodaera Dev, Co., 781 A.2d at 1034. More consistent with Alimine and Kelo are state cases that have determined that simply because the government's stated public purpose is to build a public highway, does not a fortiori mean that the taking is for a public use. See Novi, 701 N.W.2d at 150. In Movi, the Michigan Supreme Court “agree(d] with defendants that the single fact that a project is % Therefore, the dissent’s attack on our “reliance on a string of federal cases =~ ail relating to econamic development condemnations)" Giessenting opinion at 19 (fostncte onitted), ie misplaced, None of thot cases indicate that pretext arguments should be confined to seononic development cases, As discussed herein, both Adimine and Kelg indicate that here the private character of 2 taking predominates, it 1 invalid, Fegerdless of whether it is 3 “classic” public use. furthermore, courts have indicated that merely because a taking is a road does not mean that it is par, 2 valid. See Boel, 701 M.w.24 at 150 (stating that “the single fact that's Project is a road does not per ce make it » public road”); ges alsa gthafare, Sre’sie.2d at 237 (despite holding thst road was valid public purpose tn thet case, recognizing that “whether 2 taking is for a public purpose ts a judicial uestion, reviewable by the courts” and “the fact that the City filed with ies Petition for condennation a resolution that stated that the laidowners" Property would be taken for a public use does not bar judicial review of the issue of public use”) 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER a road does not per se make it a public road.” Id, (emphasis in original). The court determined that the road at issue in that case was a public use under the Michigan constitution because “the public body establishe(d the] road, pafid) for it out of public funds, and retain{ed) control, management, and esponsibility for its repair.” Id, at 151. To adopt a per se rule for roads under the public use clause would deprive the court of ite judicial function and therefore clash with Aiimine. ‘Thus, even where the government’s stated purpose is a “classic” one, where the actual purpose is to “confer[] a private benefit on a particular private party(,)" the condemnation is forbidden. See Kelo, $45 U.S. at 477. In Kelo, the majority was not concerned because “{t}he trial judge and all the menbers of the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there vas no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.” Id, at 478. ‘hus, it was not the case that the Supreme Court was “unwilling to examine the appellants’ pretext defense in the face of a taking premised on an economic development plan,“ dissenting opinion at 20, but that such an examination was unnecessary because both the trial court and the state supreme court had already done so. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. On the other hand, in this case, there is no finding or conclusion of the court that “there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose[,]” ide, and therefore, remand is appropriate. 3  The dissent relies on Goldstein to argue that “inasmuch as the [Bypass] in this case is a classic public use... , there was no need for 2 ‘full judicial inquiry into the subjective motivation of every official who supported the taking(.]'" Dissenting opinion at 31-32 (brackets omitted) (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64). We doubt that such an inquiry would be workable or permissible and obviously do not mandate one.” In Goldstein, the Second Circuit took issue with the fact that the appellants sought “to gain discovery into the Process by which the [government] approved this [p]roject . . . [including] depositions of pertinent government officials, along with their emails, confidential communications, and other pre-decisional documents[.]” 516 F.3d at 62. Indeed, in Goldstein, despite that court’s concerns that the appellants were seeking “an unprecedented level of intrusion into the proc 8," as the dissent acknowledges, dissenting opinion at 31 (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63), the Goldstein court explicitly “preservied) the possibility that a fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances of the yin the sane vein the dissent argues “that it waz not necessary for the trial court to look beyond ‘the face of Resolution 31-03 because th onstruction of » bypass road that would, unquestionably, benefit the public is'a valid public purpose to which Condennation 2 15 ravionaily related{ei= Gissenting opinion at 17, and that {t doles) not believe that this ca presents a situation where it is necessary to closely scrutinize the novives Sf the City Council” because the taking in this case is a "classic public *‘Ld.'at 20, and not “an economic development condemnation,” ada at is opinion nowhere calls for a "cloge() scrutiny [of] the motives of the city Council” or the “subjective motivation of every official,” as porites by the dissent. m “ "FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** approval process so greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the outcone reached that a closer gbiective scrutiny of the Justification being offered is required{,]” 516 F.3d at 62-63 (emphasis in original). Unlike the appellants in Goldstein, Appellant in this case has not sought to probe in such an intrusive manner, but, as contemplated by Goldstein, questions “the basic legitimacy of the outcome” and seeks a “closer objective scrutiny of the justification being offered{ ide 5, We agree with the dissent that “the ultimate question is whether (Appellee’s] decision to condemn the subject property for the construction of a public bypass road was a mere pretext for its actual purpose to bestow a private benefit on Qceanside.” Dissenting opinion at 23-24 (emphases added) .* However, we respectfully part ways with the dissent in its assessment of whether the court actually considered Appellant’ s pretext argument. The dissent argues that “the record indicates +. that the trial court did, in fact, seriously consider whether [Appellee’s] stated public purpose to build a bypass road to alleviate traffic concerns was a mere pretext for the actual % the dissent also argues that “[Appeliee's) determination (in Resolution No. 31-03] that the condeanation is necessary for a public purport does not, on its face, involve an impossibility and is not palpably without reasonable foundation.” Dissenting opinion at 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, it appears that the Glssent agrecs with this opinion on that point, 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’ purpose to bestow a private benefit.” Id, at 21 (emphases in original). we In support of its argument, the dissent points to the courts findings with respect to Appellee’s need for the road, and the finding regarding Oceanside’s proposal that, “{rlecognizing [Appellee’s] need for new roads, Oceanside Proposed to build the [Bypass] in exchange for a change of zoning for the Hokulia development project.” Id, at 25-26 (emphasis omitted). The dissent concludes that based on those findings, “[iln essence, the trial court found that [Appellee] had -- since 1929 -- ‘recognized a need for a road to bypass Mamalahoa Highway.’ Additionally, the trial court found that, based upon Qceanside’s avareness of the public need for a bypass road, it Proposed to build the road in exchange for a change in zoning.” Id. at 26 (emphases in original). However, the above-stated findings do not address Appellant’s argunent that, despite the stated public purpose, there was a predominantly private benefit to Oceanside, nor do such facts indicate that the court thoroughly considered the pretext argument as to Condemnation 2. Merely because Appellee had recognized the need for a bypass prior to entering into negotiations with Oceanside and Oceanside had in turn capitalized upon that need, does not preclude Appellant's argument that Appellee’'s subsequent negotiations with Oceanside resulted in an 76  ‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAT1 REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™ agreement that provided a “predominantly private benefit to oceanside.” ‘The dissent also accepts ae sufficient indication that the court considered and rejected Appellant's pretext argument, the court's conclusions (1) “that Condemnation 2, which did not refer to the [Djevelopment [Algreement, ‘stood independently from the Development Agreement, and {(2)] that there was sufficient attenuation between the Development Agreement previously mentioned and Resolution No. 31-03{,]'" and, (3) therefore, “*the County Council determined that there was a public purpose in County Resolution 31-03,'" making Condemnation 2 “*valid./”* Id. at 26 (brackets omitted) (quoting Conclusions 93, 99, and aon). As discussed supra, those conclusions appear to take Resolution 31-03 at face value, whereas Appellant's argument raised circumstances beyond the mere face of the Resolution. Furthermore, the Development Agreement may not be the sole source of evidence as to whether the asserted public purpose in Condemnation 2 was pretextual. Rather, the court was obligated to consider any and all evidence that Appellant argued indicating that the private benefit to Oceanside predominated. The court based its conclusion that there was an illegal delegation in Condemnation 1 on the condemnation provisions in the Development % the dissent expresses confusion in its footnote 6 as to “how the issue of Silegal delegation relates to whether the asserted purpose of the taking 4e a mere pretext for an actual purpose to bestow a private benefit.” Ad. at 30 f.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER* Agreement, and therefore, the court's conclusions regarding the “attenuation” between Resolution 31-03 and the Development Agreement seemingly represent only the court's belief that there was no illegal delegation in Condemnation 2. It cannot be discerned from the court's findings and conclusions whether the conclusions pointed to by the dissent actually address the pretext issue. 2 ‘The dissent asserts that “with regard to Condemnation 2, the trial court determined that the public purpose was ‘that. the proposed construction of the bypass road would provide public benefit to the County of Hawaii.’” Id, at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting Finding No. 97) (brackets omitted). However, contrary to the dissent’s characterization of the court’s finding 97, that finding, as related supra, actually declares that “County Resolution No, 31-02 states that the proposed construction and use of the [Bypass] would provide a public benefit to the County of Hawaii.” (Emphasis added.) ‘Therefore, finding 97 does not represent the court’s independent determination that, based on the record, the Bypass was the public purpose underlying the condemnation, but merely relates the CC's assertion in Resolution 31-03 that the Bypass would provide a public benefit. 3. ‘The dissent similarly recasts the court’s conclusions 99 and 101, asserting that the court “concluded” that “(iJnasmuch 78 “*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** as Condennation 2 stood independently from the (DJevelopnent (Algreement, . . . ‘the [HCC] determined that there was a public purpose... ,! and, thus, Condemnation 2 was ‘valid. Dissenting opinion at 28 (brackets omitted). However, there is no indication that Conclusions 99 and 101 were in any way based on or related to Conclusion 93, in which the court determined that County Resolution 31-03 stood independently from the Development Agreement. In fact, the court placed Conclusion 93 under the subject heading “Development Agreement,” where Conclusions 99 and 101 both fall under the separate subject heading “Public Purpose.” Thus, it does not “{Ilogically . . follow{],” as the dissent argues, that “inasmuch as [the court] concluded that Condemnation 2 was ‘sufficiently attenuated’ from the (Dlevelopment (Agreement, . . . [the court] also believed that the [DJevelopment [A]greement was not the ‘actual purpose’ of Condemnation 2.” Id. at 29-30 (brackets omitted). a Moreover, the conclusions the dissent points to as evidence that the court fully considered pretext have no factual basis in the court’s findings. The only facts that could support the conclusion that there was “attenuation” between the Development Agreenent and Resolution 31-03 are Findings 82 and 99, which indicate that the menbership of the HCC had changed between 2000 and 2003, such that four of the nine menbers were different, and Finding 92, which states that “[n]o reference is 9  ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*** made to the Development Agreement in County Resolution [No.] 31- 03.” The court's conclusions do not indicate that the court actually looked further than the passage of Resolution 31-03, or considered factors other than the language of that Resolution in order to determine that the stated public purpose was valid. Thus, we must disagree with the dissent’s belief that the [findings] and [conclusions] demonstrate . . . that the Erial court did, in fact, examine whether Condemnation 2 wae “clearly and palpably'of a private character,” Auimine, 20 Haw. at 350, ana determined that the stated public purpose in'Rosolucign [31-03], dea, to build a bypass road, was aot “only incidental or 4 mere “pretextual public benefit” to bide the predominantly private benefit of the bypass road co Sceansice Dissenting opinion at 29 (emphasis in original) (brackets omitted). That interpretation stretches the court’s conclusions beyond their Language. 5. Finally, the dissent posits that in considering whether the court decided the pretext issue “this court should not linit and itself to the four corners of the trial court’s [finding [conclusions], but also look to the record.” Id, at 22. In this regard, the dissent adopts Appellee’s argument on appeal, discussed in more detail supra, that the court's findings that “the alignment of the [Bypass] . . . was preferred and selected by (Appellee, ]/" id at 29, and that “‘the final determination of the [Bypass] remained with {Appellee,]'” id, demonstrate that “the trial court rejected {Appellant's} actual purpose contention,” id. at 28, However, we cannot agree that it is apparent from the record, see dissenting opinion at 24-25, that a0  **°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER' the court actually decided the pretext issue when determining that Resolution 31-03 had a valid public purpose, or rather that its determination of a public purpose was simply based on the language of Resolution 31-03 itself, which authorized Condemnation No. 2. As noted supra, in Condemnation 1, the court held that the condemnation was an illegal delegation of Appellee’s eminent domain power to Oceanside, based upon certain provisions of the Development Agreement. Relevant to illegal delegation, the court found that “[t]he Development Agreement [] gives Oceanside the ability to designate the private property to be condenned by allowing Oceanside to ‘idletermine the fina! Right-of-Way for the alignment of the entire [Bvpasel, including intersection areas[,]'" “the Development Agreement indicates that, at the time the parties entered into the agreement, [Appellee] intended to condemn any private property that Oceanside has determined, in ite sole and absolute discretion, as. necessary for the construction of the (Bypass) {,]” and “Qceanside identified the property to be condemed and directed the County to condemn.” (Emphases added.) ‘Thus, any findings the court made in Condemnation 2 with regard to who had the power to determine the alignment of ‘the highway, and therefore, which property to condemn, appear intended to clarify that in Condemnation 2, Appellee did not “attempt (] to delegate its power of eminent domain to a private party in an agreement whereby the developer controls what a1  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** property is taken... .” (Emphases added.) Therefore, those findings are linked to illegal delegation and not to pretext. Although it may turn out to be true that “[Appellants) have Likewise failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the legislature(,]” dissenting opinion at 18, we believe that was a question for the court to determine, and we cannot conclude that the record confirms that it did so. FB Further, the dissent claine that “the majority's conclusion . . . appears to rest on the fact that the trial court aid not . . . use the specific word ‘pretext’ or ‘pretextual’ in its written decision.” Dissenting opinion at 29. It is true that the court rendered conclusions mentioning pretext with respect to Condemnation 1, but made no reference to Kelo or any consideration of pretext with respect to Condemnation 2. But that is not the primary concern here. Rather, the focus of the foregoing discussion is that the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to Condemnation 2 do not plainly indicate that the court actually decided the pretext issue and looked beyond the face of Resolution 31-03. 6. Also, the dissent asserts that “(t]he majority seens troubled by the fact that Oceanside received a benefit from Condemnation 2{.]" Id. at 30. The receipt of a private benefit may be a relevant factor in consideration of the pretext defense. 82  [REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER® ‘HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT However, the ultimate question for the court is whether the “actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit{,]” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478, or the taking was “clearly and palpably of a private character,” Aliming, 39 Haw, at 550. The concern is not with incidental private benefits. What is fundanental to judicial review is full consideration of the arguents and evidence presented by the defending landowner in its attempt to make the requisite clear and palpable showing of pretext. Finally, the dissent posits that “(t]he majority's remand of this case to the trial court improperly provides the [Appellant] with a second bite at the apple to make a ‘clear showing that the taking was intended to favor [Oceanside).‘” Dissenting opinion at 33 (brackets and citation omitted). To the contrary, in the absence of findings and conclusions demonstrating that the court actually considered and rejected Appellant's pretext argument, remand will not provide a “second bite at the apple,” but will ensure compliance with the precepts of Alimine and Kelo as laid out in this opinion. vir. Accordingly, we cannot concur with the dissent that, in the context of this case, “‘the power of eminent domain is merely a means to an end [and that o]nce the object, i.e., the public purpose, is within the authority of the government, the means by which it will be attained is also for the government to a3  /OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER** determine."" Dissenting opinion at 32 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240) (ellipses points and brackets omitted). Taken to its Logical conclusion, that statement would mean that the government could delegate its eminent domain power to a private party if it so chose, so long as the end that was finally achieved was a “classic public use.” Under that formulation, the court's determination in Condemnation 1 would be wrong, because so long as the stated public purpose was a public road, it would be irrelevant that Appellee illegally delegated its eminent domain power to Oceanside. That cannot be what the Supreme Court in Migkift intended, inasmuch as the majority in Kelo indicated that there are limits on the eminent domain power. See 545 U.S. at 478. In sum, existing state and federal case law provide ample authority for our courts to examine allegations that a taking is pretextual. Under the circumstances of this case, it appears that the court erred in declining to expressly examine the pretext issue in Condemnation 2. Therefore, the court's Septenber 27, 2007 Judgment in Condemnation 2 must be vacated and this case remanded. vinta. Based on the foregoing, (1) the court must enter a decision and order on Appellant’s motion for statutory damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 as to Condemnation 1 (2) Condemnation 2 was not abated by Condemnation 1, therefore, the court did not 84 +***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** err in proceeding with Condemnation 2; and (3) the court must expressly consider the question of whether Appellee’s asserted public purpose underlying Condemnation 2 was pretextual. Consequently, Condemnation 1 is remanded for a decision on Appellant’s motion for statutory damages, and the court’s Septenber 27, 2007 Judgment in Condemnation 2 is vacated and the case remanded for an express determination by the court of whether the asserted public purpose was pretextual. Robert H. Thomas tenet Oak ag a - (kenneth Re Kupchak, fark my Murakami, and Cheisei-anne te Kudo Chock TT With him on the Briefs) {Damon Key Leong Kupchak faste:t) for appellant Bor 6, Badly Geo Coupe Fanily Linited Partneronip. Joseph K. Kamelanela, (Michael J. Udovic, Ivan M. Torigoe, and Katherine A, Garson with him on the briefs) Deputies Corporation Counsel, County of Hawai'i, for appelles County of Hawai'i. William Meheula (Winer, Meheula & Devens) for appellee 1250 Oceanside Partners aka Hokuli'a. 85 

4b3b056fa09cfac015d58b02a65f73dc982e80ae0258fc7a0cbe2684f9f59499

2008-12-24T00:00:00Z

e1db7fe6-6122-4335-9d10-63265b651bf5

Choi v. State

28308

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

no, 28308 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAI'I SOON JA CHOT, a Petitioner/Betitioner-Appellant STATE OF HAWAI'I, E Respondent /Respondent Appellee wid 21 930 8002 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 18D 06-1-0004) ont PPLICATION 1 ‘Acoba, J., for the court") ‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on Novenber 17, 2008 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Soon Ja Choi is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 12, 2008. FOR THE COURT: SEQ I QL Associate Justice Dwight C.H, Lum, on the application’ for pet itioner/petitioner- appellant. consi 2 by! Moon, C.J-+ Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Dotty, 3d, aa 

fdc85cdb1440ed7b20e5c4c0b53f1d4ecae58c9a90ebd7de9ca0f8c6a80d6c84

2008-12-12T00:00:00Z

6811fd5a-4c0c-42cf-bfad-3004d8b942dc

State v. Frustagli

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 26167 . IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T STATE OF HAWAI'I, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellea:| oats ANTHONY PETER FRUSTAGLI, aka PETER ROSELLI, Respondent /Defendant~Appel lant CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CR. NO, 05-1-2199) FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Duffy, J., for the court") Petitioner /Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaii's application for a writ of certiorari, filed on October 30, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai", December 3, 2008. FOR THE COURT: ame 666 be Associate Justice James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for petitioner/plaintiff- appellee on the application considered by: Moon, C.J, Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 9. 

d728282c95f8cfcf11b3188b73f0800a3a0d8c89f96fd40f1a8c2eb92031c7d6

2008-12-03T00:00:00Z

dee56968-dcbd-447a-8a5d-9758ad6543c5

In re Wachter

29478

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

no. 29478 5 | 8 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAR IZ eve oe IN RE ROBERT WILLIAM WACHTER, PetitioneZ ais oan = = 2 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING = ‘ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURRENDER LICENSE (gy: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) upon consideration of Petitioner Robert William Wachter’s Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Suprene Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore, IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Wachter shall return his original license to practice law to the Clerk of this court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original license as part of this record. Petitioner Wachter shall comply with the notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (b), (a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of Robert William Wachter, attorney number 6769, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing of this order. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 18, 2008. Bar WeLiorrer~ Puan Craver ore 

e5ee963e7dd30c645e5fa70a5814e33d6c8fff45798063d147cd21bf7753f818

2008-12-18T00:00:00Z

5f445530-49ca-42ed-8e1f-b12665471712

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Peer

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 28162 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T ee OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitionedeg & Ss op 2 vs ee = sie = m uaweEiaH PEER, Respondent. = IS FG 2 (ODC 906-007-8347, 06-014-8354, 06-015-8355, 06-069-8409) (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Disciplinary Board’s Report and Recommendation to disbar Respondent Janeelah Peer, Respondent Peer's lack of objection thereto as exhibited by her failure to request briefing as permitted by RSCH 2.7(d), and the record, it appears Respondent Peer neglected and abandoned clients, and in at least one case misappropriated client’s funds, in multiple violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.15(c), 2,25(d), 1,15(£) (4), 1.16(a) (2), 1.26(d), 3.2, 3.4), 3.4(E), 8.1(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and B.4(d) of the Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct. It further appears that Respondent Peer is currently suspended, cannot be found within the State of Hawai'i, and making discipline effective thirty (30) days after entry of this order, see RSCH 2.16(c), would be pointless. See, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DeMello, 61 Haw. 223, 225, 601 P.2d 1087, 1088 (1979). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Janeelah Peer is disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdiction, effective upon entry of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in addition to requirements for reinstatement set forth in RSCH 2.1 1. Respondent Peer shall reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection of the Hawai'i Supreme Court for all monies paid as a result of her dishonest conduct 2. Respondent Peer shall pay the costs of these proceedings as approved upon timely submission of @ bill of costs; and 3. Respondent Peer shall comply with the requirements of RSCH 2.16, DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 26, 2008. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, petitioner Bor Janeelah Peer, respondent LP hhevcran 

e4e770907cac5fff1479a831b645c3dfea429c4845ffcce753ab0f7db78466da

2008-11-26T00:00:00Z

c4faef69-1a53-443d-a39b-48c080a90253

Hughes v. State

28298

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 28298 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T MICHAEL RAY HUGHES, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Respondent-Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (S.P.P. NO. 6-1-0008 (1)) (By: Duffy, J., for the court”) Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Michael Ray Hughes’ s application for a writ of certiorari, filed on November 17, 2008, is hereby rejected. DaTEI Honolulu, Hawai‘, December 22, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Pom 6 Dedede Associate Justice Dwight C. H. Lum for petitioner/petitioner- appellant on the application 3 8 aad ‘considered by: Moon, C.J., Lev: Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 3 

86435a2eae049a3739bae615eaa0e5456cee2841ef645ac236eb199bee27cebe

2008-12-22T00:00:00Z

66c0d404-2deb-431c-9dfd-71058eb40526

Chincio v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit

29459

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 29459 IW THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I, ZACHARY CHINCIO, Petitioner, s Vv CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, Respondagl 'StOvRY 21 poy Oats ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ‘ORDER Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of Zachary Chincio's papers dated October 19, 2008, which are deemed a petition for a writ of mandamus, it appears that petitioner can seek relief from his conviction in Cr. No, 00-1-2483 by filing a petition for post- conviction relief in the circuit court pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief. See Kena v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall file the petition for a writ of mandamus without payment of the filing fee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 12, 2008. Fi - Heelan eaete, OO loa la 

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2008-11-12T00:00:00Z

58598641-7195-4532-b8a8-a76793eeb40b

Mimura v. Moeava

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 28303 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T CHARLENE MIMURA, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF WARREN T, MIMURA, Deceased, Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appeilants, n JEREMIAH MOEAVA and HAWAII STEVEDORES, INC. Respondents/Defendants-Appellees, 2 and ote DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants. USF ke 42 AGW aun CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APP! (CIV, NO, 05-1-1455) n (By: Duffy, J., for the court) Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants Charlene Minura, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Warren T. Mimura, Deceased’s application for a writ of filed on October 15, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 24, 2008. FOR THE COURT: (Orr ‘al Kane Gir a, SEAL | Associate Justice Recruit 5 Richard Turbin Rai Saint Chu, and Davia W. Barlow (of Turbin Chu Smith) and Richard A. Lesser for petitioners/plaintiffs- appellants on the application Acoba, and Duffy, 30. * Considered by: Moon, ¢.J., Levinson, Wake 

64f3191170552b606ccb43c7f85d362bea41a407a8a717759dcbaa53a40f7d2f

2008-11-24T00:00:00Z

3371c35b-4a62-44ce-868e-52f815e5918c

Hanabusa v. Lingle

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 293: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T COLLEEN HANABUSA, Individually and in her capaci Senate President and NORMAN ‘SAKAMOTO, individually. ‘and in his capacity as Chair of the Senate | Committee on Education, Petitioners, oats LINDA LINGLE, Governor, State of Hawai'i, Respon: O2:2)Rd n- 9308002 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (By: Moon, €.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 33.) Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of nandamis filed by petitioners colleen Hanabusa, individually and in her capacity as Senate President, and Norman Sakanoto, individvally and in his capacity as Chair of the Senate committee on Education, respondent Governor Linda Lingle’s answer, and oral argument, we conclude that the terns of six members! of the University of Hawaii Board of Regents expized on June 30, 2008 and the hold overs by those six regents contravene Act 56, Sections 1 and 5, Session Laws of 2007. Therefore, 11 I9 HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of andamis 1s granted. Respondent Governor Lingle Linda 1s directed to replace the six menbers of the University of Hawaii Board of Regents whose terms expired on June 30, 2008 by nominating -- within thirty days from the date of this order -- six regent candidates from the list of qualified candidates duly ' Byron Bender, Michael Dahilig, Ramon de 1a Pena, Marlene Hapai, Catherine Lagareta, and Jane Tatibouet.  presented to ndent on F 2008 by the Candidate Advisory Council. An opinion will follow. lulu, Hawaii, December 4, 2008. 

985c9bb0736c30abfe4076f6b8762893ffb47a3961e6f9abc81da591f5be15ed

2008-12-04T00:00:00Z

bed88250-4c2f-41b0-b5dd-c80ad259cf0f

Boles v. Engle

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

{AW LIBRARY NO. 29095 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I GLADYS BOLES, HERK BOLTON, HARRIET S. BOLTON, KEVIN CAMPEELL, . PAUL CHISENA, BERTHA B. CHISENA, LENA B. COOK, JEWEL COX, RUTH COX, STEVEN W. KARKS, W.D. DARKS, RUBY DARKS, PATRICIA FULLER, JOSEPH A. FULLER, DOUG GENTILE, BARBARA KENEDY, GLENNELLA KEY, THOMAS A. KRUKOW, JUDITH M. KRUKOW, HERMAN L. ROGERS, MARY M, ROGERS, JAMES WADDEY, TMMOGENE WADDEY, DON G. WARD, BETTE M. WARD, for themselves and all others similarly situated, Respondents /Plaintiffs-Appel lees: 3 2 oad and NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. and SUNSTATES CORbRATION Respondents/Defendants-Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (8.P. NO. 06-1-0078(3)) (By: Moon, C.J., for the court’) Petitioner/defendant-appellant Clyde Engle’s application for writ of certiorari filed on October 8, 2008, is hereby rejected, DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 29, 2008, FOR THE COURT: fom fef Justice * considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, J. 

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2008-10-29T00:00:00Z

c345b2e5-16c8-4f80-9ddb-776ab0c8b123

Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle. ICA Opinion, filed 04/14/2008 [pdf], 117 Haw. 454. Concurring Opinion by J. Watanabe [pdf]. ICA Order of Amendment, filed 04/15/2008 [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 07/30/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/08/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Partial Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Clarification, filed 02/06/2009 [pdf].

120 Haw. 51

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY ‘s4* FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S EAKAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T n= 000 === HAWAII INSURERS COUNCIL, Plaintiff-Appellee, STATE OF HAWAI'I; GEORGINA K. LINDA LINGLE, GOVERNOR, KAWAMURA, DIRECTOR OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND REIFURTH, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT SCHMIDT, FINANCE; LAWRENCE 6. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS? J.P. INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, INSURANCE DIVISION, OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Defendants-Appellants. no. 27840 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE couRT oF APPEALS] & (ctv. Wo, 02-1-2298) s 8 x, DECEMBER 18, 2008 as - ECEMBER 18, 20) u = MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AcoBA, ano curRygIgs. FG » OPINION oF THE SON, = é We accepted the application for a writ of certiorari 8 Linda Lingle, filed by the defendants-appellants-petition Governor, State of Hawai'i, Georgina K, Kawamura, Director of Finance, Department of Budget and Finance (DBF), Lawrence M. Reifurth, Director, Department of Conerce and Consumer Affairs (DCCA), and J.P. Schmidt, Insurance Commissioner, Insurance Division, DCCA (collectively, the State) in order to review the published opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in urers Council v. Lingle, 117 Hawai'l 454, 164 P.3d 769 The ICA affirmed the final judgment of the first circuit in favor of the (2008). Abn presiding, court, the Honorable Karen 3.5. ‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ plaintiff-appellee-respondent Hawaii Insurers Council (MIC) and against the State. Id, at 463, 184 P.3d at 778. In its application, the State asks whether the ICA erred in concluding that the regulatory assessments imposed by the insurance commissioner pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:2-218 (Supp. 1999) were unconstitutional taxes and whether the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the insurance conmissioner’s assessments were not unconstitutional when they Were initially imposed, gee infra sections III.A and B, but that the legisiature’s transfer of $3,500,000.00 of those funds into the general fund was unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine, see infra section T1T.A. We further hold that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. See infra section III.c. We therefore affirm the ICA's May 5, 2008 judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1. BACKGROUND A. Eactual Backsround ‘The DCCA is an executive agency of the State of Hawai'i. HRS § 26-4(5) (Supp. 1999). Its departments include an insurance division, HRS § 431:2-101 (1993), which is supervised and controlled by the insurance commissioner, HRS § 431:2-102 (1993 & Supp. 2000). In 1999, the DCCA became financially self- sufficient. Its operations were no longer funded by the 2 9+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AID PACIFIC REZORTER *** legislature’s general fund, but instead by the persons and entities who were regulated by the DCCA or who received services from the DCCA. To that end, the legislature established the Insurance Regulation Fund (IRF). HRS § 431:2-215(a).) “all assessments, fees, fines, penalties, and reimbursements collected by or on behalf of the insurance division under (HRS) title 24,” subject to certain exceptions, were to “be deposited into the RF]." Ida The insurance commissioner was directed to make assessments against insurers, with criteria for assessments to be established by rules he or she promulgated. HRS § 431:2-215(d) (1).? The assessments had to bear a reasonable relationship to the costs of regulating the line or type of insurance, including any administrative costs of the insurance division. HRS § 431:2-215(d) (3). The monies in the IRF were to be used by the insurance commissioner to carry out his or her duties and obligations under the insurance code. HRS § 431:2-215(a). For example, the insurance division prosecuted fraud committed against insurers. Of paramount importance for present purposes, the funds in the IRF were not allowed to revert to the general fund. HRS § 431:2-215(c). 8 tm 2000 and 2006, HRS § 431:2-215 was amended in respects immaterial to the present matter, 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 162, $§ 5, 17 at 361-62, 3667 2000 Haw. Seas. tL. Act 253, $§ 150, 152 at 9167 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 1, $1. 50 fat i27, 447. Certain anenanents to the statute in 2002 snd 2006 are discussed Below Where relevant, 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 39, $6 5, 22, at 115-16, 1197 2008 Haws Sp. Sess. L. Act 1, $51, 6, at 786, 788. + tn 2008, the requirement thet the insurance commissioner promulgate rules to calculate assessments as repealed. 2005 Haw. sp. Sess. L. Act Ly S52, & at 786, 783.  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER The insurance commissioner collected assessments from insurers proportionate to each insurer’s “Line or type of insurance.” Hawai'i Administrative Rules § 16-175.3 (2002). This figure was based on the insurer's market share percentage and pro rata share of the other insurance division costs. Id. The insurance conmissioner calculated the total assessments for a given fiscal year by starting with the insurance division's operat g cash requirements for the fiscal year. The commissioner would then project revenues, other than IRF assessments, for the year and deduct the revenues from the cash requirements. The resulting difference was the amount that the insurance commissioner would assess insurers for the IRF. In other words, the IRF assessments were calculated as follows: projected budget - projected non-IRF assessment revenues = IRF assessments, The insurance division's projected budget included the division’s overhead expenses. In fiscal year 2000-2001, the insurance commissioner began to calculate the division's cash requirements to include an expense that represented a percentage of the DccA’s overhead, including charges for the director's office, the adninistrative services office, the hearings office and/or information services. HRS § 431:2-215(b), The DCCA provided the insurance division with, inter alia, personnel management services, review and processing of the insurance division's expenditures, the preparation of its annual operating budget, a forum for contested case hearings, computer system support, and various administrative services. The insurance division provided the DCCA with $4,335, 792.00 between July 2,  ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS XD PACIFIC REPORTER 2001 and December 17, 2004, In fiscal year 2003-2004, the commissioner began to allocate five percent of the revenues collected by the division to overhead expenses of the DBF. HRS $8 431:2-215(b) and 36-27 (Supp. 2003). In return, the DBF provided the insurance division with, inter alia, oversight of budget preparation and execution, determination of budgetary requirements and expenditures, management of employee benefit Programs, management of public debt, and treasury programs. The insurance division provided the DSF with $376,360.00 between October 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004. In addition to overhead expenses, the insurance division's annual budget included amounts intended to create a reserve of surplus funds in order to ensure the availability of monies to fund the insurance division. The reserve was also intended to provide the flexibility necessary to handle unplanned insurance rehabilitations and insolvencies that typically required the insurance division immediately to expend funds for the protection of policyholders. For a period of time, the reserve was set at double the budgeted cost of regulating the insurance industry or two times the total expenditures. For fiscal year 2002-2003, the reserve margin was decreased to one and one-half years of expenditures. tn 2003, after the present action was filed, the target for the reserve margin was decreased to fifty or seventy-five percent of the insurance division budget. Throughout this fluctuation in the reserve margin, the margin was not subjected to the rulemaking process. ‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * Prior to the present lawsuit, insurers, including HIC’s nenbers, were never informed of the insurance division's reserve objective and had no knowledge that their assessments were increased to effectuate this reserve objective. Since the IRF was established in 1999, HIC's members have paid the various fees and assessments imposed by the insurance commissioner. HIC’s members’ assessments have constituted roughly twenty to twenty- five percent of the total assessments levied by the insurance commissioner. In addition to receiving funds from assessments, the IRF was funded by monies transferred from defunct funds that were repealed when the IRF was established. In 2002, the legislature merged the IRF into the compliance resolution fund (CRF). 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 39, 56 1, 5, 22 at 111-12, 115-16, 119 (codified at HRS 95 26-9 (Supp. 2002) and 431:2-215 (Supp. 2002)). As a result, monies thet would previously have been deposited into the IRF were instead deposited into an insurance sub-account of the CRF, See HRS § 431 in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1285. Also in 2002, the legislature -215 (d) (2); s9¢ also Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2547, determined that the IRF contained at least $4,000,000.00 in excess of the requirements of the fund. 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 178, § 40 at 793. In an effort to balance the state’s budget, the legislature directed the transfer of these excess monies to the general fund through #.8. 2627. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 160, in 2002 House Journal, at 1830, and in 2002 Senate Journal, at 10247 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 178, § 40 at 793. The governor line-item vetoed portions of H.B. 2827, the result of  + FOR PUELICAFION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER which was that $2,000,000.00, rather than $4,000,000.00, was authorized to be transferred from the IRF to the general fund. Gov. Msg. No. 258, Statement of Objections to H.B. No. 2627, in 2002 House Journal, at 1115; 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 178, § 40 at 793, 796 1.2. This was the first time that the legislature had transferred any funda out of the insurance special fund and into the general fund. ‘The division did not foresee the transfer. On or about December 1, 2002, the insurance commissioner transferred $2, 000,000.00 from the IRF or the CRF to the general fund. In 2003, the legislature determined that the CRE contained $15,000,000.00 in excess of its requirements and authorized an additional transfer of monies from the CRF to the general fund. 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 178, $$ 28, 66 at 407, 412, The director of finance transferred $1,$00,000.00 from the insurance sub-account of the CRF to the general fund in 2003. In all, $3,500,000.00 of the insurance special fund has been transferred to the general fund. B. Circuit Court Proceedings HIC filed a complaint in the circuit court on September 27, 2002, seeking to enjoin the then-impending transfer of $2,000,000.00 to the general fund on the ground that the transfer converted the assessments into an illegal and unconstitutional tax. HIC additionally sought declaratory relief as well as an accounting, HIC filed a first amended complaint on January 12, 2005, asserting the following claims: unconstitutional tax, ‘e+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¢** statutory scheme,? illegal transfer, due process, separation of powers, equal protection, violation of HRS § 431:7-204 (1993), violation of trust doctrine, and accounting. With respect to its unconstitutional tax claim, HIC alleged, inter alia, that the assessments imposed by HRS § 431:2-215 were unconstitutional taxes in their entirety in Light of this court’s decision in State v. Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i 361, 973 P.2d 736 (1999), because HIC's members were not direct beneficiaries of a particular service, the assessments were not allocated directly to defraying a cost of providing the service, and the assessments were not reasonably proportionate to the benefit received. HIC additionally alleged that the transfer of funds from the IRF and the insurance regulation sub-account of the CRF to the general fund was an unconstitutional tax. with respect to its due process claim, HIC averred that the assessments of the insurance commissioner from 1999 to the present imposed = tax on HIC’s menbers, which was violative of the due process clauses of the Hawai"i and United states Constitutions. In its separation of powers claim, HIC maintained that the assessments constituted a tax violative of the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature lacked the authority to delegate its taxing power and because, by empowering the insurance commissioner to levy the assessments, the legislature had effectively delegated its taxing power to the >In Wicta statutory schene claim, it alleges that HRS §§ 431:2-215(c) and 431:2-Z16[6) (Supp. 2003) ‘expressly prokibit the transfer of monies to the General fund that were initially deposited by the insurance commissioner into the GRE.  ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER + commissioner. With respect to its equal protection claim, HIC asserted that the assessments amounted to an improper tax violative of the equal protection clauses of the Hawai'i and United States Constitutions, because the varying amounts of the assessments set by the insurance commissioner bore no rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose, With respect to ite claim under HRS § 431:7-204, HIC observed that the statute provided that: As to insurers, the taxes and fees imposed by (wns) 43117-201 to. [iS] 3117-204, and the fees imposed by [the insurance] code, when paid shall be in settionent of and in lieu of ali demands for taxes, Ifcenses, of fees of every character inposed by the laws of this State, the ordinances or other laws, rules, of Fegulations of any county of this State HIC alleged that the assessments constituted a tax in violation of the foregoing provision. With respect to its accounting claim, HIC averred that the assessments by the insurance commissioner had not been properly accounted for, which was necessary to determine whether the assessments qualified as fees under Medeiros and whether they comported with HRS § 431:2-215. The State answered the first amended complaint by asserting (1) that HIC’s members had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, (2) that, if the transferred assessments were deemed to be taxes, then the court did not have jurisdiction under HRS § 632-1 (1893) because the present matter would be tantamount to a controversy respecting taxes, (3) that the state was not subject to suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and (4) that HIC lacked standing to sue because none of its members had an interest in any monies in the IRF or the CRF, ‘4% FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++ except to the extent that HIC’s members could have sought a refund pursuant to HRS § 431:7-203 (Supp. 2002) The State filed a first amended motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2008, and HIC filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the following day. The circuit court ruled that HIC was entitled to summary judgment on its claims of unconstitutional tax, due process, separation of powers, equal protection, violation of HRS § 431:7-204, and accounting. The circuit court granted HIC’s request for an accounting and for injunctive relief. The circuit court further rejected the State’s defenses that this case involved a “tax matter” under HRS § 632-1 and that HIC members had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. still, the circuit court ruled that the State was entitled to summary judgment as to HIC’s claims of statutory scheme, illegal transfer, and violation of trust doctrine. The State filed a motion for reconsideration. The circuit court denied the motion, but granted a stay pending appeal of the injunction, judgment, and accounting with certain conditions. Final judgment was entered on February 27, 2006, and the State filed a timely notice of appeal on March 28, 2006. C. Appellate Proceedings In its direct appeal to the ICA, the State argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that the assessments were unconstitutional taxes under Medeiros, because that decision was inapposite to the present matter insofar as it involved a user fee, as opposed to a regulatory fee. The State maintained that, because the assessments were regulatory fees, Medeiros did not 10 ‘+*+ POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER + apply and that the ICA should instead apply the test set forth in Juan Cellu, hone Co, ic Servi sion Euerto Rico, 967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1992), HIC countered that the assessments were in fact taxes under Medeiros, which was not inapposite, and that, because the assessments were taxes, they offended the separation of powers doctrine, the due process clauses, and the “in lieu" provision of HRS § 421:7-204. HIc further asserted that the assessments violated the equal protection clauses of the Hawai'i and United states Constitutions. The ICA held that the assessments were taxes under Medeiros because the regulation of the insurance industry directly benefitted the public-at-large and not the insurers who ments. Hawaii Insurers Council, 117 Hawaii at 459-60, 184 P.3d at 774-75. The ICA reasoned that the paid the ass assessments were taxes because they were not allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing services to the insurers and were not reasonably proportionate to the benefits received by the insurers. Id. at 460, 184 P.3d at 775. The ICA observed that Medeiros precluded it from applying the test set forth in San Juan Cellular, as the State had urged, because Medeivos made no distinction between regulatory and user fees. Id, at 461, 164 P.3d at 776. The ICA further held that, because the assessments levied by the insurance commissioner were invalid taxes, the legislature had, in effect, unconstitutionally delegated its taxing power. Id, The ICA also concluded that, because the assessments were taxes, they violated the “in lieu” provision of a ‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*+ HRS § 431:7-204. Id, at 462, 184 F.3d at 777. The ICA declined to address HIC's due process contention, but it did take up HIC’s equal protection argument, holding that the regulatory fees authorized by HRS § 431 -215 were rationally related to the statutory objective of defraying the insurance division’ s administrative costs and costs incurred by supporting offices and divisions and that the circuit court erred in concluding that the assessments violated the equal protection clauses of the Hawai'i and United States Constitutions. Id. The State further argued that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the present matter because HIC’s members had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under HRS § 431: -203 (a) of, in the alternative, because HIC had sought declaratory relief with respect to taxes pursuant to HRS § 632-1. The ICA disagreed, concluding that HRS $ 431:7-203(a) did not establish any available administrative mechanism for challenging the constitutionality of assessments levied upon insurers and that HRS § 632-1 did not apply because HIC was not attempting to keep the State from assessing or collecting taxes Id. at 462, 164 P.3d at 777. Finally, the State asserted that sovereign immunity barred HIC's claim for a reimbursement of assessments, The ICA rejected this contention, reasoning that the issue of refunds was not presented on appeal because it was not addressed in the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment. Id. at 463, 184 2.34 at 778. Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s final judgment. Id. 12  FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Associate Judge Corinne K.A. Watanabe filed a separate concurring opinion, expressing her concern regarding the impact that the circuit court’s decision might have on specially funded prograns and the integrity of the state’s fiscal infrastructure if the test in Medeiros were not adjusted. Id, at 464, 184 P.3d at 779 (Watanabe, J., concurring). She emphasized that other courts examining the issue of regulatory fees have adopted a broader test in determining whether such fees constituted taxes. Ide ‘The ICA entered its judgment on appeal on May 5, 2008, and the State filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari on July 30, 2008. We accepted the application on September 8, 2008 and heard oral argument on November 6, 2008. TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AL Certiorari ‘The acceptance or rejection of an application for a writ of certiorari is discretionary. HRS § 602-59(a) (Supp 2007). In deciding whether to accept the application, this court considers whether the ICA's decision reflects “(1) (g)rave errors of law or of fact[} or (2) (olbvious inconsistencies . . . with (decisions) of this} court, federal decisions, or (the ICA's) own decision[s]” and whether “the magnitude of those errors or inconsistencies dictat[es] the need for further appeal.” Id. § 602-59(b). 2B + FOR PUBLICATION IN MESI’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++ 8. Summary Judoment This court reviews the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Brice v. AIG Haw. Ins. Cou, 107 Hawai's 106, 120, 111 P.3d 1, 5 (2005), Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). TIT, DISCUSSION Unconstitutional wi Were Initial ut The _Legislature’s Transfer of $3,500,000,00 of Those Funds Into The General fund Was Unconstitutional Under ‘Tne_Separation Of Powers Doctrine, HIC argues that the insurance commissioner’ s assessments offend the separation of powers doctrine because they resulted from an impermissible delegation of the power to tax from the legislature to the insurance division. The Hawai'i Constitution does not grant the executive branch the power to tax. Specifically, the Hawai'i Constitution directs that (e)he taxing power shall be reserved to the state, Excepe so much therest az may De delegates by the Jagislature to the political subdivisions, and except that all functions, powers and duties relating to the taxation of real property shall be exercised exclusively by the counties, with the exception of the Sounty of Kelawac. The legislature shall have ‘the Power to apportion state revenues among the several polities) subdivisions, ‘The ICA explained that "[t]he term ‘political subdivision’ as st appears in [article ViIt, section 3 of the Hawai't Constitution) refers to counties Hiwaii Insurers Council, 117 Hawas's at 459, 184 P30 at 574 ieiting Stand a4  FOR PUELICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Haw. Const. art. VITT, § 3. This court elucidated the contours of the foregoing principle in McCandless v. Campbell, 20 Haw. 411, 420 (1911), as follows: The power of taxation is essentially » legislative poner. It cannot be delegated except to municipalities which themselves exercise subordinate Tegisistive powers. The pewer to tax must not be confused with the adninistrative duties which are Secessarily involved in the asvecsment. and collection Sf taxes. In the nature of things, che Legislature {esele cannot attend te all the details involved in the enforcenent of she. 2a be ‘Those mast of necessity ‘entrusted to adninisteative officers. But the tax sabe imposed only by she legislative power- No Srbitrary Siscretion to fix the rate ofa tax, or to Sctetning the method by wnich it is ta be levies, oF to adjust sts apportionment among the tax-payers, here the principles upon which the apporticanent 1s to ba made are not fixes, can be lefe to the executive Branch of the government Nonetheless, “[n]ot every exaction by state authorities is a tax.” Hexom v. Oregon Dep't of Transp., 177 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir, 1999), The legislature may delegate the state’s police power to state authorities to allow them to assess fees. Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 366, 973 P.2d at 741. Generally, a fee is exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and the amount of the fee normally bears a relationship to the value vice or benefit. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (Mich. 1998). 1. Medeiros is distinguishable. In the present matter, the State argues that the of the assessments via HRS § 431:2-215 are properly characterized as fees that the insurance commissioner has the authority to “(...continued) Cons, Rep, No, $3, Committee on Local Government, 1 Constitst ional Convention of Hawai'i of 1968, at 229 (137311 as  FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ collect, while HIC maintains that the assessments are unconstitutional taxes violative of the separation of powers doctrine pursuant to this court’s holding in Medeiros, 89 Hawai 361, 973 P.2d 736. On the one hand, this court has defined the term “tax” as follow: Taxes are the enforces proportional contributions from persons aod property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of Government, and for all public m charge: By legislative authority on persons or property to raise money for public purposes, oF Briefly, an imposition for the supply of the public treasury, ‘The word taxes is very comprehensive, and properly includes, as indicated in the foregosng Sefinition, 211 Burdens, charges ang inpositions by Virtue of the taxing power with the object of raising money for public purposes McCandless, 20 Haw. at 420 (citations and quotation marks omitted). This definition is consistent with the plain meaning of the term “tax”: “A monetary charge imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue.” Black's Law Dictionary 1496 (th ed. 2004); see also Sanduan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685 (“The classic ‘tax’ is imposed by a legislature upon many, or all, citizens. rt raises money, contributed to a general fund, and spent for the benefit of the entire community.) . On the other hand, in Medeiros, this court identified two common types of fees: “fees imposed by a governmental entity tend to fall into one of two principal categories: user fees, based on the richts of the entity a2 a propristor of the instrumentalities eed, or regulatory fe Uneluding licensing and inspectian fees), founded on the police power to regulate particular businesses oF activities.” 16  ‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+* 99 Hawai'i at 366, 973 P.2d at 741 (quoting Emerson Coll, v. City of Boston, 462 N.B.2d 1098, 1105 (1984). Thus, as noted, a user fee is “‘based on the rights of the entity as a proprietor of the Anstrumentalities used.” Id. at 366, $73 P.2d at 741 (quoting Bmerson Coll, 462 N.E.2d at 1105); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1579 (defining a “user fee” as “[a) charge assessed for the use of a particular item or facility”). Examples of user fees include bridge tolls, Gargano v. Lee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 921 So. 24 661, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), charges for sewer hookups, Contractors & Build ‘ County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317-18 (Fla. 1976), and charges for managing wastewater, Missouri Growth Ass'n v Metro, St. Louis Sewer Dist., 941 $.W.2d 615, 622-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). By contrast, [elke classic “regulatory fee" is imposed by an agency pon those subject to its vegulation. Ie may serve Fegulatory purposes directly by, for exsmple, Geliverately discouraging particular conduct’ by naking St nore expensive. Or, it say serve such purposes indirectly by, for example, raising money placed in a Special fund to help defray the agency" = Fegulation-related expenses. San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685 (citations omitted). Regulatory fees are authorized by the state’s police power to regulate particular businesses or activities. Medeiros, 89 Hawai" at 366, 973 P.2d at 741 (quoting Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1105). The police power of the state “is broad and extends to the public safety, health, and welfare.” State ve Ewing, @1 Hawai‘ 156, 164, 914 P.2d 549, 557 (App. 1996). Examples of regulatory fees include a state guaranty fund assessment levied on certain insurance companies in order to uv ‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++ provide 2 fund for the protection of policyholders of insolvent insurers and to support their orderly rehabilitation or Liguidation, Principal Life Ins, co. v, United States, 70 Fed 1. 144, 170 (2006), @ $3.00 transaction fee for each pawn shop transaction report filed with the police department, Jachimek vs State, 74 P.34 944, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and fees assessed by a city against telecommunication service providers, including permit, registration, application, license, and franchise fees, c. Bell Tel. co. v. , 188 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1277 (¢.D. Cal. 2002). In the case at hand, the ICA relied on this court’s holding in Medeizos in determining that the insurance division's assessments were unconstitutional taxes and not fees. Hawaii Insurers Council, 117 Hawai'i at 459-60, 184 P.3d at 774-75. In Medeiros, a defendant who pled guilty to a charge of unauthorized entry into @ motor vehicle filed @ motion to enjoin enforcement of chapter 6, article 52 of the Revised Ordinances of the City and County of Honolulu (ROCCH) (Supp. 1998), which provided for the collection of a fee from persons convicted of misdemeanors and felonies “‘for services performed by the city in connection with the arrest, processing, investigation, and prosecution of the convicted person.’” 89 Hawai'i at 362 n.1, 973 P.2d at 737 1.1 (quoting ROCCH § 6-52.2). The circuit court granted the motion on the ground that the ordinance was an unconstitutional tax that the city had no authority te assess. Id, at 363-64, 973 P.2d at 738-39. On appeal, the city argued that the assessment 18 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ was a fee authorized by HRS § 46-1.5(8) (1993).° In affirming the decision of the circuit court, this court noted that, although ROCCH § 6-$2.2 characterized its charge as a “fee,” “the nature of the tax or ‘charge’ that a law imposes is not determined by the label given to it but by its operating incidence.” Id, at 366, 973 P.2d at 741 (quoting Stewarts" Pharmacies v, Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959)) (brackets omitted). ‘This court adopted @ three-pronged test for determining whether such charges were fees as opposed to taxes, The test analyzed whether the charge (1) applied to the direct beneficiary of 2 particular service, (2) was allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service, and (3) was reasonably proportionate to the benefit received. Id. at 367, 973 P.2d at 742. In the course of formulating the Medeiros test, we quoted the following passage from Enexson College: “[Elees share common traits that distinguish then from taxes!” they are charged in exchange for a particular Governmental service which benefits the party paying fhe fee ins manner ‘not shared by cther menbers of society," Matongl Cable Television Acero v United States, 5-0-8. 336, 3. 9G) thay are pala by choice, in that the party paying the fee has Ehe option of tot vtslizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the charge, and the charges are Goluscted not to raise revenser but to compensate the Governmental entity providing the services for itt expenses.” Medeivos, 89 Hawai'i at 366, 973 P.2d at 741 (quoting Emerson Coll., 462 N.£.2d at 1105 (citation omitted). We deviated from + uns § 46-1.5(8) provides that, “{s}ubject to general law, each county shall have the following powers and shall be subject to the following Auities and limitations. . (8) ach county shall have the power to fix the fees and charges for all official services not otherwise paid for.” 13 {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN MESI’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ Berson College by declining to adopt its “voluntariness” element because, Islubsequent to its opinion in Enexson Colleas, the Massachusetts Suprene Judicial Court has weakened its adherence to the second identifying factor described fg -"voluntary seesipt of the service” =~ oiding that "the elenent of choice se not a cenpelling consideration which can be used to invalidate an ctherwige legitimate charge.” Id. In applying the test to the facts before us, we determined that ROCCH § 6-52.2 did not satisfy the first and second prongs of the test. id. at 370, 973 P.2d at 745. First, the ordinance did not benefit the payor of the charge, the defendant, but instead benefitted society as a whole. Id, at 368, 973 P.24 at 743. Second, the ordinance was not “allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service” because it seemingly allowed any “remaining revenues” from the fee to be used for general purposes. Id. at 367, 973 P.2d at 742. Accordingly, we held that ROCCH § 6-52.2 was invalid because it authorized the imposition of a tax and because the state had not empowered the city to impose such a tax. Id. at 370, 973 P.2d at 745. The State maintains that Medeiros is distinguishable from the present matter because it dealt with an alleged “service” or “user” fee, while the present case involves an 5 _ the tems “user fee” and “service fee” are essentially interchangeable See util, Audie co, ¥. Citvof Los Angeles, S'Cal. Rpers 32'520, 526 (App 2003) “riser feos are arounts charges to a person using a service where the amount of, the charge 1s generally related to the value of the services provided."); Continental Aislinss, Inc. c. United States, 77 fed. Cl. 482, 484 5.2 (2007) (“Befendant refers to the agricultural querancine inspection Services fee as the "AQ! user fee," while plaintiff calle it the "AEWIS user fee’ For ease of discussion, the Court will refer to these fees as AQT ser fees!) 20 ‘tee FOR PUBLICATION IN WHST'S HAWAI'Z REPORTS AND PACTFIC REPORTER +++ alleged “regulatory” fee. The State (1) argues that the Medeiros test is proper only for distinguishing between user fees and taxes and (2) notes that the Medeiros test was largely derived from the Emerson College test which, like Medeiros, involved an alleged service fee. HIC asserts numerous arguments as to why the Medeiros test should be applied in the present matter. First, HIC claims that Medeiros, in its exposition of the difference between taxes and fees, did not create separate tests for distinguishing user fees and regulatory fees, on the one hand, from taxes, on the other. On its face, Medeizce employs a three-pronged test in order to determine whether 2 charge is a fee or a tax without explicitly stating that the test differentiates between “user fees” and taxes. Id. at 367, 973 P.2d at 742, HIC thus highlights the extent of our citation to Emerson College in Medeiros, in which Emerson College was seemingly discussing “fees” as a whole: “pees smposed by s governmental entity tend to fall unta one of two principal categories: user fees, based fon the rights of the entity as 2 proprietor of the Ghetrunentelities usea, oF regulatory fees (including USeensing and inspection fees|, founded on the polis power to regulate particular businesses or activitil Such’ rees Share Connon traits that aistinguish then cieslar service she Barty paving the fee ioe manner “not shared by other Tational Gable Television Ass'n Bf hesbers of a society,” cz jnited States, #15 U.S. 336, 341... 9T@7 "+ and the shares are collected net io rasa Eetenues ut To compensate the governmental anuity Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 366, $73 P.2d at 741 (quoting Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1105) (emphases added). Accordingly, KIC contends that we should apply the Medeiros test to the present matter regardless of the type of fee that is allegedly at issue. 21 ‘## FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¢¥* Different rationales underlie the assessment of user and regulatory fees. A user fee is generally charged to the recipient of a service provided by the government, such as the use of a toll bridge, see Gargano, 921 So. 2d at 668, or entry into a regulated profession, see Seafarers Int’) Union of N. An. ws United States Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179, 189-90 (D.C. cir. 1996) (holding that Coast Guard licensing program fees were user fees and noting that fees for licenses and registrations are classic examples of user fees), On the other hand, @ regulatory fee is authorized by the state’s police power to prescribe régulations for the promotion of “public safety, health, and welfare,” Ewing, 81 Hawa Medeiros, following our review of Emerson College's test, we adopted ‘Lat 164, 914 P.2d at $57, In a modified Merson College test for determining “nether a charge isa fee or a tax, in which we analyze whether the charge (1) applies to the direct Beneficiary of « particular service, (2) 19 allocated directly to detraying the costs of brovidine the gekzice, and (3) 1s reasonably proportionate to the Benefit’ received. 89 Hawai'i at 367, 973 P.2¢ at 742 (emphases added). Like the test developed in Euexrson College, a decision that, like Medeiros, dealt with an alleged service fee, ges Euerson Coll, 462 N.E.2d at 1106 ("Under the statute, the city is authorized to impose a fee for augmented fire services.") (internal quotation marks omitted), cur modified test focused on elements of “service,” namely whether the payor was a beneficiary of 2 service and whether the funds defrayed the costs of the provider of the payor’s service. Consequently, the Medeiros test was and 22  ‘4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER + is intended to distinguish between taxes and service fees, not regulatory fees. HIC contends that National Cable, 415 U.S. 336, a decision cited in Emerson College and consequently in Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 366, $73 P.2d at 741, is relevant to the present matter because it distinguishes between taxes and regulatory fees. In National Cable, the National Cable Television Association, a trade association that represented conmunity antenna television (CATV) systems, challenged assessments by the Federal Communications Conmission (FCC), which was authorized to regulate the CATV systems. 415 U.S. at 337-38. The regulatory fees were imposed pursuant to [t]he Independent offices Appropriation Act, 1952, Tit. 5, 65 Stat. 290, si U.S.C. s (83a, which provided In‘televane pare: sft ia the sense of the Congress that any work, service ‘benefit, iigense, ©. oF similar thing of value or utility performed, iuinished, provided, granted... By any Feseral agency «to or for any person (including. Gorporations vs | Ghali be aelf-sustaiatng to the full extent’ possible, ‘and the head of esch Federal Agency is authorized by regulation... . to prescribe therefor... such fee, charge, or price, if any, a2 he shall determine... to be fair and aquitable Esking inte consideration direct and indivect cost to ‘Wie Government, value to the recipient, public policy Id. at 337 (ellipses in original) (emphasis added). The United States Suprene Court reviewed this statute and concluded that Ia} “fee” connotes s “benefit” and the Act by ite us of the standard ‘value to the recipient” carfles that Conngtation.. The addition of “public policy or interest sexved, and other pertinent facts,” if re. Literally, carries an agency far from its customary orbit and puts it in search of revenue in the manner Gf an Appropriations Committee of the House Id. at 342. Thus, when analyzing whether the fees were lawful, the Supreme Court focused on the “value to the recipient” clause 23 ‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +** of the statute. It concluded that CATV systems should only pay regulatory fees equivalent to the value of services received, stating that, [w)nite those wo operate CATV’s may receive spectal Benefits, we cannot be sure that the [elonmission used the correct standard in setting the fee, Te is not encugh £0 figure the total cost (direct and sndizect) fo the [comission for operating a CATV unit of Supervision and then to contrive a forma that Feinburses the (clomission for that amount Certainly sone Of the costs inured to the benefit of ‘he public, unless the entire regulatory scheme is 8 failure, which we refuse to aasune. Id. at 343. As a result, the Suprene Court held that the fees that the FCC assessed the CATVs were unconstitutional taxes. HIC's contention that the National Cable shoe fits here is unpersuasive. The Suprene Court has subsequently explained that National cable “st (cold only for the proposition that Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as ‘tees’ or ‘taxes,’ on those parties.” Skinner v, Mid-America Bipeline, 490 U.S. 212, 263-64 (1989) (emphasis added); see aleo Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Util, Comm'n, 899 F.2d 854, 860 (9th Cir, 1990) ("National Cable . . . [was] concerned with the interpretation of a statute. At issue was the meaning of ‘fee, charge, or price’ ina provision . . . directing federal agencies to collect a ‘fee, charge, or price’ for any ‘work, service, benefit, . . . or similar thing of value . . . granted, prepared, or issued by any Federal agency.’"). There is no language in the Hawai'i Insurance Code or the administrative regulations 24 ‘104 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ promulgated under the code similar to the “value to the recipient” clause at issue in National Cable. Instead, the statute in the present matter provides that the insurance commissioner’s assessments “shall bear a reasonable relationship to the costs of regulating the line or type of insurance, including any administrative costs associated of the division.” HRS § 431:2-215(d) (3). Accordingly, we do not find Natior Gable to be instructive in the present matter. Nor are we swayed by National Cable’s determination that, under the act at issue, the FCC's fees should have benefitted the CATV providers. See 415 U.S. at 341. National, Gable’s position stemmed solely fron the “value to the recipient” clause of the governing statute and did not overrule the Supreme Court's foundational regulatory fee decision, Edve v. Robinson, 112 U.S, 580 (2884). See San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 687. In Edye, the Supreme Court expressly placed the burden of regulatory funding on those “who make profit out of [the regulated business),” and recognized that the regulatory fees were used by the government “for the protection of the citizens.” 112 U.S. at 596. The California Supreme Court has adopted a similar concept of regulatory fees, explaining that “regulatory fees in amounts necessary to carry out the regulation’s purpose are valid despite the absence of any perceived ‘benefit’ accruing to the fee payers.” See Sinclair Paint co, v, state ad, of Equilization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1355 (cal. 1997), These decisions illustrate all the more why the Medeizos test, which considers whether the payor of a charge received a benefit, 89 Hawai'i 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++ at 367, 973 P.2d at 742, is properly confined to evaluating whether the chazge is a user fee or a tex. In an attempt to batten down every hatch of its argument, HIC further asserts that the alleged fees at issue in Medeiros, like the ones at issue in the present case, were regulatory fees. HIC bases its argument on Emerson College's definition of regulatory fees, quoted in Medeiros, as licensing and inspection fees” and being “founded on the police including power to regulate particular businesses or activities.” Emerson Goll., 462 N.E.2d at 1105, quoted in Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 366, 973 P.2d at 741. HIC gloms onto the “police power” aspect of the definition in arguing that “Ysdeizos plainly concern{ed) the tpolice power’ of ‘criminal investigative services,’ not a user fee as suggested by [the state].” (Citing Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 363, 366, 973 P.2d at 738, 742. HIC’s argument is discordant with the position taken by the city in Medeiros, unpersuasively,” that the alleged fees at issue were being charged in return for the “service” of the “arrest and prosecution” of the convict, a service that, for instence, assists persons in preventiog further harm to theaselves, eapectally in the ease of,o drunk driver whey if not apprehendsa, could Kill hinael for cthers, Gna’ ie prevents thea trim haraing others: fopeftliy, this service also helps co convince the offender to Cease Ris uniawcl activities and becomes lawsabiging Sha productive menber of society. Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 368-69, 973 P.2d at 743-44 (brackets omitted). Medeiros dealt with an alleged service fee, not a > ot only was the srgunent unpersuasive, but its Orwellian nature elicited an A rages citation to George Orwell's ineteen Eighty-Four. Meseizes, 69 Mavala at 369 n+8, 973 Pr2d at 748 n.B~ 26 si+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** regulatory fee, and modified the Suerson College test to determine whether the charge at issue was a service fee or 2 tax. In the present matter, the assessments at issue are clearly of a regulatory nature, having been levied by the commissioner of the insurance division, the facet of the DCCA that is empowered to exercise the state’s police power to regulate the insurance industry. See HRS $$ 431:2-101 and 431:2-102. Accordingly, we are not bound by our analysis in Medeiros." © our holding in Inte Water Use Permit Applications, 9¢ Havai'i 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000), this court's only subsequent application of the Medeiros test Ens published opinion, dees not preclude cur conclusion that the edeizos ttse Spplies solely tovalleged user fees, 1p ye Water Use dealt with the GileciBicion of water trom the Walincle Ditch to persons applying for water Gee pertits, At an expaneive contested case hearing, the Comission on Water Resource Nenagesent, oh instrunentality of the Department of Land and Natural Rescurces, announced its plan to setablish technical acvisory committees to) ‘othe implementation of the final decision, determine the feasibility of created wastewater over potable aquifers, and recommend studies, Conservation measures, and monitoring plane. id at 118, 9 P.30 at 430. A. portion of che comasttece’ studies and nonitoring activities were to be paid Gor by recipients of permits to use the Waishole Ditch, with each recipient's Eharge calculeced os & pro cata share of the anount of water received. Id. Certain permittees challenged this portion of the conmission’s decision, Sileging that the funding requirement constituted an "illegal tax” under Measles. "Eg. at 185, 3.P.dd-at 497. This coure applied the Medeiros test Bhe conciuded"that "ehe (cionmission has the generat authority te condition the permits upon compliance with the snstane funding requirement, which more properly falls under the cateaory of a cequlatory fee, rather than = land Snvelognent exaction’” Id. at 186, 9 Pod at 438 (enphasis added) ‘Eithough we seouingly classified the fee in In re Water Use as a vregulatary fee,” we did so in passing, as the type of fee at issue w Glspositive of the case, a2 it fs here, “In fact, further review of Suiveteates that st in fact dealt with “user fees.” The goal of the Blate Kater Code is to regulate the use of Hawaii's water. Seg HRS G5 1740-2 [e) 11393) ("Tt 1s recognized that the waters of the Scate are held for the benefit of the citizens of the State, Tt is declared that the people Of the State are beneficiaries and have 2 raght to have the waters protected for their usa.” (emphasis added)) ond 174C-2(c) (1993) ("The state water code Shell be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial yse of the waters St 'the State for purposes such as donestic seg, aquaculture yses, irrigation Sha other sgricultural uses, power development, ana comercial and industrial e enphases acded)). this court further explained the sanner in which Meee enittces’ payment of the fees would benefit their water use, both by assisting them in marshaling the requisite proof that their use would not itand in opposition to the public interest and by “allowing then exclusive (eontinued. ..) 2 7" FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REZORTER ¢** We now turn to the questicn whether the insurance division's assessments constituted allowable regulatory fees or unconstitutional taxes. To answer this question, the State urges us to look to San Juan Cellular, which distinguished between regulatory fees and taxes. In San Juan Cellular, the Puerto Rico Public Service Commission levied a three-percent “periodic fee” against a private cellular company. 967 F.2d at 648. The company challenged the fee as unlawful, and the federal district court granted declaratory relief on the ground that federal statutes and regulations pre-empted the local government’ s authority to impose such a charge. Id. The commission appealed, asserting that the district court did not have jurisdiction in Light of the federal Tax Injunction Act, which prohibited the “district court from restraining the assessment or collection of any tax imposed by the laws of Puerto Rico, 48 U.S.C. § 872, unless no ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ remedy is available in the Commonwealth's courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1341." San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 684. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an opinion by then-Chief Judge Stephen G. Breyer, held that the act did not divest the district court of jurisdiction, because the three-percent “periodic fee” was not an tex, but a regulatory fee. Id, at 685-86, In making that 1. -continued) ae Of public resources” in the interim before a determination of the effects fo the public of the permittees water use was concluded, in re Water Jae, 3e Hawet't ‘at 185, 3 P.3d at 497 (enphecis addea). Accordingly, the toes tet the permittees were assessed wore nore akin to “user fees,” and therefore Medeitas was correctly applied in the case, See, gigs fant) er $32 8.W.2d 374, 377 (hy. Ct Appr 1996) Thelatee Thee ments charged to city for the’ purposes of controlling and conserving basin water source were user foes, not taxes), sited in Io re Mater Use, 54 Hawai't ae 188, 9 Pda ae 497 28 ‘448 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** determination, the First Circuit formulated a three-pronged test to divine whether the assessment was a regulatory fee, specifically considering whether (1) “{a] regulatory agency assesses the fee[,]” (2) “(t]he agency places the money in a special fund{,)” and (3) “[t]he money is not used for a general purpose but rather to defray the expenses generated in specialized investigations and studies, for the hiring of professional and expert services and the acquisition of the equipment needed for the operations provided by law for the [payor].” Id, at 686 (citations and brackets omitted). In applying the foregoing test, the First Circuit held that the commission's “periodic fee” was “close to the ‘fee’ end of the spectrum.” Id The First Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that because, by statute, the unused revenue generated by the periodic fees would ultimately revert to the general fund after five years, the assessment was therefore a tax. The First Circuit swatted down the argument with the observation that (perhaps this instruction would make a difference ere there some evidence in the record that large Imgunts of the revenue the [assessor] obtains would Sha up in the general fond. But, nothing in the Fecord before us, cr in the statute, suggests that the [assessor] will fail to spend most, or all, (of) the revenue rained for the specific statutory Cbjectives ‘Id. at 687 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The present matter differs from this aspect of San Juan Cellular in light of the “large amounts” of the insurance division's revenue, $3,500,000.00, that was extracted to benef: the state’s general fund. Furthermore, as we are not presented with a case dealing 29  + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REEORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ with de minimis funds reverting from a regulatory agency to a general fund, we will not address the issue here. ‘The San Juan Cellular test comports with the foregoing discussion of regulatory fees, inasmuch as it describes monies that are collected by a regulatory agency to be used for the agency’s defined purposes. See Medeiros, 89 Hawai‘i at 366, 973 P.2d at 741 ("‘Regulatory fees are authorized by the state's police power to regulate particular businesses or activities.'” (quoting Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1105)). Furthermore, unlike the user fee test adopted in Medeiros, the San Juan Cellular test recognizes that regulatory fees need not benefit the regulated payor of the fee in order to be valid. See also Edue, 112 U.S. at 5967 Sinclair Paint co., 937 P.24 at 1355. Accordingly, we believe that the San Juan Cellular test is ideal for determining whether an assessment is a regulatory fee or a tax, and we will now apply it to the facts of the case at hand. 2. ici f the lan Cel Test The first prong of the San Juan Cellular test, that is, whether @ regulatory agency assesses the fee, 967 F.2d at 686, is satisfied in the present matter because the charges at issue were fed by the commissioner of the insurance division of the DCCA. The insurance commissioner is vested with the authority to enforce the Insurance Code, HRS title 24, which regulates the insurance industry. See HRS § 431:2-201(b) (1993). The second prong, which asks whether the agency places the money in special fund, San Juan Celluler, 937 P.2d at 686, is also satisfied because the assessments were placed into a “special 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ fund,” namely, the IRF, by the insurance commissioner; the IRF later merged into the CRF and was intended to be utilized to reimburse the insurance division for the cost of regulating the insurance industry. See HRS § 431:2-215(c)- The third prong of the San Juan Cellular test requires a more searching inquiry, Tt evaluates whether “the money is not used for @ general purpose but rather to defray the expenses generated in specialized investigations and studies, for the hiring of professional and expert services and the acquisition of ‘the equipment needed for the operations provided by law for the (payor].” 967 F.2d at 686 (brackets omitted); see also Bidart Bros. Lifor com’n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1996) (articulating the third prong of the San Juan Cellular test as “whether the assesenent is expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed”). HIC asserts that the insurance conmissioner’s assessments, as a whole, represent unconstitutional taxes under Medeiros. In particular, HIC points to the expenditures by the insurance commissioner for: (1) general overhead of the insurance division, the DCCA, and the DBF; (2) the cash reserve accumulated by the insurance division: and (3) the monies transferred to the general fund as being violative of the user-fee test in Medeiros. Inasmuch as we are not applying the Medeiros test here, we will instead review these expenditures under the third prong of the San Juan Cellular test to determine whether they were “expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties 31 ‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ upon whom the assessment is imposed.” See Bidart Bros., 73 F.3d at 931. and 08) ead HIC notes that over $4,000,000.00 was transfered from the IRF to support the overhead of the OCCA and $375,000.00 for the benefit of the DBF. The State argues that these funds constituted the insurance division's pro rata share of the DCCA's and the DBF’s expenses, pursuant to HRS $§ 36-27, 36-30 (Supp. 2003),"° and 431:2-215(b)." Tt is apparent that, under San Juan + HRS, § 36-27, entitled “Transfers from special funds for central service expenses," provides in relevant pare Except as provided in this section, and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, from time to time, the director of fizance, for the purpose of defraying the prorated eotinate of central service expenses of government in relation to ail special funds shall deduct five per cent of ail receipts of ali other Special funds, which deduction shell be transferred to the general fond of the State and become general realizations of the stete ws HRS § 36-30, entitled “special fund reimbursements for departmental administrative expenses,” provides in relevant parts a) Bach special fund . . . shall be responsible for ite pro rata share of the administrative expenses incurred by che Gepartaent responsible for the operations supported by the special (b]" Administrative expenses shall include: (2) Sataries; (2) Maintenance of bulidings and grounds; (3) veitieiesy ana (4) General office expenses (c)_ The pro rata share of each special fund shall be that proportion of the adinistrative expenses of the departnent, Including these paid fron all special funds aseinisteres by’ the Gepartmertt, which the expenditures of the special fund bear to the total expenditures of the department : Rs § 492:2-215(b) provides in relevant pazt Suns from the compliance resolution fund expended by the commissioner shali be uses to defray sny administrative costs, including personnel costs, assoctated with the programs of the aivision, and costs incurred by supporting offices ane aivisions.... [T]he commissioner may use the moneys in the fund 32 tee FOR PUBLICATION IN MES?’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ Cellular, the monies paid to the DCCA and to the DBF were “used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed.” See Bidart Sros., 73 F.3d at 931. return for the insurance division providing its pro rata share of its costs, the DCCA provided the insurance division with, inter alia, personnel management services, review and processing of the insurance division's expenditures, the preparation of its annual operating budget, a forum for contested case hearings, computer system support, and various administrative services. The Daf provided the insurance division with, inter alia, oversight of budget preparation and execution, determination of budgetary requirements and expenditures, management of employee benefit programs, management of public debt, and treasury programs. The aforenentioned services provided by the DCCA and the DBF to the insurance division assist it in carrying out its regulatory functions, and, accordingly, the expenditures that the insurance division was mandated to pay to the DCCA and the DBF do not constitute taxes under the San Juan Cellulax test. b. Reserve fund The insurance division has also maintained a practice of collecting assessments in excess of its operating costs in order to develop a reserve fund. The State argues that the reserve fund was cr ted in order to protect against unforeseen (continued) ‘To vexploy or retein, by contract or otherwise, . . . hearings Setiers, attorneys, investigators, accountants, examiners, and Sther necessary professional, techticsl, saninistrativ Support persone! to implement and carey out the purpor title 26 : 33 ‘4+ POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ emergency situations, such as the unplanned rehabilitation and Liguidation of insurers or natural disasters, as well as to cushion the division's operating budget fron yearly fluctuations in revenue, HIC argues that assessnents for the purpose of creating the reserve do not bear a reasonable relationship to the costs of regulating the insurance industry, are not authorized by statute, and must therefore be declared illegal taxes. In our view, the State’s position that a reserve fund is essential to the insurance division’s regulatory function is reasonable in light of the unpredictability of potential contingencies and fluctuations in the amount of funds available to the insurance division through assessments and other means. We are wary of second-guessing a regulatory agency's reasonable strategy for securing its continued ability to serve its public function. See Collier v. City & County of San Francisco, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698, 708 (App. 2007) (“[WJere we to adopt a too narrow definition of ‘regulatory activities’ . . . , we would risk depriving municipalities of a reasonable degree of flexibility to determine whether regulatory fee revenues collected by their agencies are being spent in furtherance of the purpose for which those fees were assessed.”); California Ass'n of Prof, scientists vaDep't of Fish & Game, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 545-46 (App. 2000) ("The legislative body charged with enacting laws pursuant to the police power retains the discretion to apportion the costs of regulatory programs in a variety of reasonable financing schemes.) Brydon v. £. Bay Mun, Util, Dist., 29 cal. Rptr. 24 128, 136 (App. 1994) ("(CJost allocations for services provided 34  ‘10+ YOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, are to be judged by a standard of reasonableness with sone flexibility permitted to account for systen-wide complexity.”). Accordingly, the portion of the assessments that went toward buttressing the insurance division's reserve fund were “used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment As imposed,” see Bidart Bros., 73 F.3d at 931, and, having satisfied the third prong of the San Juan Celjular test, constitute legitimate regulatory fees. c. Transferred funds HIC further argues that the assessments at issue fail the third prong of the San Juan Cellular test, because the $2,000, 000.00 that was transferred from the IRF in 2002 and the $1,500, 000.00 that was transferred from the CRF in 2003 (the transferred funds), in accordance with the legislature's decrees in 2002 Haw. Sess, &, Act 178, § 40 at 793 and 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 178, $5 28, 66 at 407, 412 (the transfer bills), were used for a general purpose by being deposited in the general fund. In countering HIC’s position, the State asks us to focus on the fact that the transferred funds at issue were, in the first instance, solely designated for the insurance division's use and were shifted to the general fund over the strong opposition of the insurance commissioner and the director of the peca. The State cites Apodaca vs Wilson, 525 P.2d 876 (NM. 1974), in support of its contention that an assessment’s initial designation should define its character forevermore. In Apadaca, the Albuquerque City Commission adopted two ordinances, one that 38 ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER increased sewer and water service charges and another that, inter alia, indicated that water and sewer revenues had increased and that a large portion of the revenue increase would therefore be appropriated to the city’s general fund. Id. at 878. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city from collecting the increased charges and to invalidate the ordinance increasing the charges on the ground that the charges were an illegal tax. 1d, at 879. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, “*{s]ince the rate charged is not a tax in its inception, ultimate use of surplus funds derived therefrom for the support of municipal Government will not convert it into taxes or cause it to assume the nature of taxes.’” Id. at 885 (quoting City of Niles v. Union Ice Corp,, 12 .N.E.2d 483, 489 (ohio 1938). The State’s reliance on Apodaca is misplaced, That decision dealt with a municipality's ability to collect charges and then subsume the charges within its own general fund. The Apodaca decision relied heavily on the fact that the city was “acting in a business or proprietary capacity rather than in a governmental capacity.” Jd. at 884, With that in mind, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that, “‘when engaged in business,’” a municipality does not tax, but instead charges “'a price at which and for which the public utility service or product is sold.'” Ad. at 885 (quoting City of Niles, 12.N.E.2 at 469). This is a far cry from the insurance division’s role in the present matter, being neither “engaged in business” nor selling a product for profit. We are not presently addressing whether a municipality that is engaged in selling a “‘conmodity’” such as water, see id. 36 “+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER *++ at 886 (quoting Iuitchell v, City of Spokane, 104 ?. 150, 151 (Wash. 1909}), can use the profits as it sees fit. Furthermore, for reasons discussed below, we do not agree with Apodaca’s general conclusion that a fee assessment’s initial designation dictates its character perpetually. The State also asserts that a levy placed directly into a general fund may sometimes constitute a valid regulatory f citing Southview Co-operative Housing Corp, v. Rent Control Board of Cambridge, 486 N.E.2d 700 (Nass. 1985). Southview Co- operative involved landlords who brought suit to challenge the rent control board’s ability to assess fees against them in connection with petitions for rent adjustments. Id. at 701. The landlords asserted that the assessments constituted impermissible taxes. id. In concluding thatthe fees were lawful, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated the following, upon which the State relies in the present matter: ‘The plaintiffs are not helped by the fact that the Collected fees vere deposited in the general fund of the city, es the iaw requires, or by the fact that the Challenged fee schedule was ectablished to sake up for S"ibusgee) short ral Fegularory agency will reduce the azount that must come. f¥om general governnent re thos will substitute for fonds that would otherwise have to be raised through ta Such regulatory charges are not taxes Id. at 706. Southview Co-operative is not applicable to the present matter for the crucial reason that the rent control board was not self-sufficient, whereas the DCCA and its insurance division are mandated by law to be so. Specifically, in Southview Co-operative, “[t]he board submitted a budget with a financing plan in which approximately seventy per cent of 37 ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *++ the budget would be supported by intergovernmental revenues and approximately thirty per cent would be supported by charges for services.” Id, at 702. By contrast, in the present matter, the DCCA became wholly financially self-sufficient in 1999, receiving no general fund monies with which to operate. The question before the court in Southview Co-operative -- whether monies from @ fund that commingled both assessments and “intergovernmental which ostensibly were supplied by taxes, could eventually revert to a general fund -- is simply not before us. Ne deal solely with the question whether monies from a fund made up entirely of assessments, fees, fines, penalties, and reimbursements can be transferred to a general fund, We blanch at the State’s basic contention that a user or regulatory fee, if initially assessed as such, can be transferred to a general fund when the same assessment would have been invalid had it been assessed initially with the express understanding that the funds would be transferred to the general fund, If we adopted such 2 position, seemingly nothing would bar the legislature from dipping into the fees collected by any state gulatory agency that were deemed to be “in excess of the requirements of the fund.” See 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 178, § 40 at 793. San Juan Cellular speaks clearly on this score, noting that courts, in distinguishing a regulatory fee from a tax, “have tended . . . to emphasize the revenue’s ultimate use, asking whether it provides a general benefit to the public, of a sort often financed by a general tex, or whether it provides more narrow benefits to regulated companies or defrays the agency's 38  /+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER costs of regulation.” 967 F.2d at 685; see also Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371, 376 (34 Cir, 1978) (holding that 2 city-assessed charge to fire and burglar alarm companies was a “tax” because “moneys collected are added to the [general fund], rather than applied exclusively to contractual services owed central alarm station companies” (emphasis added) ); Bloom v, City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 311 (Cole, 1989) (holding that provision of “transportation utility fee” ordinance that authorized city council to transfer excess revenues from fee to any other city fund “render[ed) the . . fee the functional equivalent of a tax”); Health Servs. Med. Coi vent. New Yor n, 668 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1009-10 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that a portion of payments mandated by statute by HMOs to hospitals that were deposited in the state’s general fund represented an unconstitutional tax): Radio Common Carriers of New York, Inc, v, New York, 601 .N.¥.S.20 513, 515-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a “special fee” on paging devices enacted by state was a tax because the proceeds were added to the state’s general fund). After viewing the transferred funds through the lens of San_Juan Cellular by “emphasizing [the assessment’s] ultimate use,” 967 F.2d at 685, while bearing in mind our maxim that "*the nature of the tax or “charge” that a law imposes is not determined by the label given to it but by its operating incidence,’ Medeiros, 89 Hawai'i at 366, 973 P.2d 741 (quoting Stewarts’ Pharmacies, 43 Haw. at 144) (brackets omitted), for the reasons stated in the following section, we hold that the 33 ‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#* regulatory fees were transferred unlawfully, inasmuch as they were available for general purposes, as if they were derived from general tax revenues, after being transferred to the general fund. See San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 686. The State's argument that the insurance division neither foresaw nor condoned the legislature’s transfer of its monies to the general fund is unavailing, because the insurance division's conduct is not at issue here, Our focus is instead on the legislature's attenpts via the transfer bills to lateral the transferred funds fron the insurance division to the general fund, The transfer bills must be scrutinized for any violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 3. Separation of powers “The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in any single constitutional provision, ‘but like the federal government, [Hawaii's government] is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.'" Biscoe v, Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383, 878 P.24 719, 722 (1994) (quoting Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 170-71, 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987)) (brackets omitted). ‘The doctrine provides that “‘a department + may not exercise powers not so constitutionally granted, which from their essential nature, do not fall within its division of governmental functions, unless such powers are properly incidental to the performance by it of its ow appropriate functions.’ Id, (quoting Koike v. Bd. of Water Supply, 44 Haw, 100, 114, 352 2.24 835, 843 (1960). As 40  [FoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACTFIC REFORTER ¢+* previously stated, the Hawai'i Constitution mandates that the “(t]he taxing power shall be reserved to the State, except so much thereof as may be delegated by the legislature to the (counties}.” Haw. Const. art. VIII, $ 3; see also Mctandless, 20 How, at 417 (“The power of taxation is essentially a legislative power. It cannot be delegated except to municipalities which themselves exercise subordinate legislative powers.”). The executive branch is left only with the power to administer and enforce the state’s tax laws, not to levy new taxes. See HRS § 26-10(b) (1993) (The department [of taxation] shall adninister and enforce the tax revenue laws of the State and collect all taxes and other payments payable thereunder."). Accordingly, the insurance commissioner, as an officer of the executive branch, see HRS $$ 26-4(5) and 431:2-101, lacks the power to taxz as discussed at length aupra, the insurance conmissioner’s statutory authority is Limited to the assessment of regulatory fees. The legislature’s promulgation of the transfer bills amounted to an impermissible blurring of the distinction between the executive power to assess regulatory fees and the legislative power to tax for general purposes. We therefore hold that the transfer bille unlawfully sought to transform $3, 500,000.00 of legitimate regulatory fees into general tax revenue. Courts at oral argusent, the state asserted that, even if it were Unconstitutional for the legislature to reguire that the funds from the IRF ns the CRP be tronsferrea co the general fund, HIC could not prove that the funds were those that its nenbers had paid to the insurance commissioner. Mes; Oral Argument, Hawai'i Supreme Court, at 6:09 to 6:55 (Nov. €, 2008), BE hetps//mne,state.hi.ue/ud/oa/08/SC0R, 110608 27840.mp3. Alchough EARING Uvoied this construct in the background sections of its opening brief and ita application, it oid not actually advance the point in the argument section of its opening brief or application. We therefore decline to (continveds..) a ‘10+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ that have addressed the issue of funds transferred from special funds so that they could be used for more general purposes have held that the transferred funds should be returned to the special funds. See, e.a., Daugherty v, Riley, 34 P.2d 1005, 1011-12 (Cal. 1934) (ordering that funds transferred in a legislative appropriation from a special fund to the general fund needed to be returned to the special fund); Clark County Council vy. Donahue, 873 N.£.2d 1038, 1043 (Ind. 2007) (holding that monies that the county used from a special fund, which was comprised of fees that were collected to supplement probation services, for general court expenses needed to he returned to the special fund). As such, the $3,500,000.00 that was moved into the general fund pursuant to the transfer bills must be returned to the CRF so that they may be used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessments were imposed. See Bidart Bros., 73 F.3d at 931. Given that the amount that must be returned is readily ascertainable, we see no need for an accounting on remand. In summary, the portion of the assessments paid by HIC to the insurance division that ultimately went to support the overhead of the OCCA and the DBF, along with the portion of the assessments that the insurance division applied towards creating a reserve fund, did not amount to unconstitutional taxes. On the other hand, the legislature was without the power to mandate, via the transfer bills, that the insurance division remit regulatory 2 (continued) address the State's argument. ee Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rules 280) (4) and (bi (7) a2 s+ POR PUBLICATION IM WESE'S HAYAI'T REPORTS AND PACTFIC REFORTER ++ fees to the legislature's general fund, as if they were general tax revenues. Accordingly, the transfer bills violated the separation of powers doctrine. B. The ICA Correctly Concluded That The Assessments Did HIC asserts that the assessments imposed pursuant to HRS § 431:2-215 offend the equal protection clauses of the Hawai'i and United States Constitutions, both of which guarantee that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. See Haw. Const. art. 1, § $7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “[Ujnless fundamental rights of suspect classifications are implicated, we will apply the rational basis standard of review in examining a denial of equal protection claim.” ENG Corp. v. Kim, 107 Hawai't 73, 82, 110 P.3d 397, 406 (2005) (quoting Sandy Beach Def. fund vs City Council, 70 Haw. 361, 380, 773 F.24 250, 262 (1989)) (emphasis omitted). HIC does not contend that its members’ fundamental rights are implicated by HRS § 431:2-215 or that the statute draws suspect classifications.” Its argument is instead that the statute treats insurers differently than other similarly situated persons without a rational basis. Under the rational basis standard of review, ‘a party challenging the constitutionality of a statutery classification on equal protection grounds has the Burden of showing, with convincing clarsty(.] that the clasasfication is not rationally related to the stetutory purpose, or that the challenged Classification dove not fest upon some ground of Gifgerence having fair and substantial relation to 2 for a discussion of whether insurance companies are part of » suspect classification and whether the right to participate in the insurance business fea fundanental right, see G cal sat Matual insurance Con, 956 S.W.2a 243, 257 (Mo. 1997). 3 ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **+ the object of the legislation, and is therefore act arbitrary and capricious.” Id. (quoting Sandy Beach Def, Fund, 70 Haw. at 380, 773 P.2d at 262). In the present matter, HRS § 431:2-215 permits insurers to be assessed with regulatory fees in order to “defray any administrative costs” and “costs incurred by supporting offices and divisions.” HRS § 431:2-218(b). HIC basically maintains that, even if insurers benefit to some degree from the insurance division’s regulations, it was arbitrary to impose a substantial portion of the division’s administrative costs upon insurers, because the public in general and policyholders in particular also benefitted fron those regulations. ‘The United States Supreme Court considered 2 similar contention in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 us. 219 (2917), in which employers advanced the argument that, because a state workers’ compensation law imposed the entire cost of accident loss upon the industries in which the losses arose, the law was violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth anendnent to the United States Constitution. id. at 243. The Supreme Court explained that it was unable to discern any ground in natural justice or fundamental right that prevented the state from imposing the entire burden upon the industries that occasioned such losses. Id. The law was accordingly upheld. Id, In the present matter, the insurance commissioner has imposed a substantial portion of the administrative cost of operating the insurance division and its M The insurance commissioner did not impose all of the insurance division's costs upon insurers. Sone costs were covered by other revenues that the division received. 44  [FOR PUBLICATION IN WESH'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¢+* supporting offices and divisions upon insurers pursuant to HRS § 431:2-215. Like the losses occasioned by the employers in Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 243, the insurance division's regulatory costs in the present matter were necessitated by the business of insurers. We therefore agree with the ICA that HRS § 431:2-225 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Hawas‘s or United States Constitutions, See Hawaii Insurers Council, 117 Hawai'i at 462, 184 P.3d at 77. C. The IGA Correct iy Concluded That The Cixcuit Court Was Not Divested of subiect-matter Jurisdiction By Virtue Qf HIC's Members’ Failure To Exhaust Their ‘Admin: =i tenes Remedies. The State challenges the ICA's determination that the circuit court was not deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of HIC's menbers’ failure to exhaust their administrative renedies. 2g id, The requirement that a party exhaust his adninistrative renedies “cones into play ‘where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an adninistrative agency alone,’ and, in such a case, “‘udicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course.'” Aged waiians v. Haws Homes Comm'n, 78 Hawai'i 192, 202 n.18, 891 P.2d 279, 289 n.18 (1995) (quoting Kona Old Hawaiian Trails Group watLyman, 69 Haw, 61, 93, 734 P.2d 161, 168 (1987)). Yet “*an aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies where no effective renedies exist.'” Inxe Interest of Doe Children, 105 Hawai'i 38, 58, 93 P.3d 1145, 1166 (2004) (quoting In the Interest of Doe Children, 96 Hawai'i 272, 287 n.20, 30 P.3d 878, 893 n.20 (2001)). 45 ‘4+ YOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ According to the State, administrative remedies were available to HIC's members under HRS § 431:7-203(a). The statute Provides in relevant part that, LAE any person has paid to the (snsurance] commissioner any tax, fee, of other charge in error or An excess of that wnich the person ss lawfully obligated to pay under [the insurance] cade, ‘the Conmissioner, upon written request made by the person to the. commissioner yahall authorite 9 refund thereot out of the (GRE), except that a tax refona shall be payable ovt of the generel. fund HRS § 431:7-203(a). Thus, the State appears to argue that, if HIC’s members had paid taxes or fees in excess of those which they were lawfully obligated to pay under the insurance code, HRS § 431:7-203 required that they seek a refund from the conmissioner. The primary reason that KIC has asserted that its members were not lawfully obligated to pay the fees imposed by the commissioner pursuant to HRS $ 431:2-215 was that the fees were, in fact, unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. Agencies may not, however, pass upon the constitutionality of statutes. igh Corp, v. Motor Vehicle Indus. Licensing Bd., Dep't of Comerce & Consumer Affairs, 69 Haw. 135, 141, 736 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1967). As such, had HIC initially brought this claim before the insurance commissioner, an administrative officer, gee HRS $$ 26-4, 431:2-101, and 43 he had imposed pursuant to HRS § 431:7-203 unconstitutional or to provide a refund on that basis. See Hoh Corp,, 69 Haw. at 141, 736 P.2d at 1275. Thus, there were no remedies for HIC's members’ constitutional claim under HRS $ 431:7-202. See In re Interest of Doe Children, 105 Hawai'i at 59, 93 P.3d at 1166. -102, he would have been powerless to declare the fees that 46 ++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+* Accordingly, we agree with the ICA that the circuit court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of HIC’s members’ failure to exhaust their aduinistrative remedies. See Hawaii Insurers Council, 117 Hawai'i at 462, 184 P.3d at 777." IV. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the May 5, 2008 judgment of the ICA insofar as it affirmed the February 27, 2006 judgment of the circuit court for the reason that the transfer bills were unconstitutional. Although the transfer bills did net assess unconstitutional taxes, they did offend the separation of powers doctrine because they unlawfully sought to divert legitimate regulatory fees into the general tax revenue stream, We reverse the ICA’s judgment inasmuch as it affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the assessments levied to create a reserve fund and to provide overhead expenses for the DCCA and the DBF represented unconstitutional taxes. In summary, % the State also argues that, if the assesenents were taxes, then adninistrative remedies were available to HiC’s members under HRS $ot31:7-204.5 (1993), which provides in relevant part that “any person Sggrieved by any assessment of the tax for any month or any year may appeal fide the assesment in the manner and within the time and in sll other Fespects as provided in (HRS §) 235-114.” In addition, the State maintains that, if the assessments were taxes, then the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court wae not divested of jurisdiction to award declaratory or Gnjunctive relief in Light of HRS § 632-1. Because we conclude that the tronsfer Bille did not transform lesitimate regulatory fees into general tax the Seaters arguments, 7 ‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++ we affirm the ICA's judgment in part and reverse it in part. We remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lisa Woods Munger (Gary M. Slovin and Donna H. Kalama with her on the briefs), for the plaintiff-appellee- respondent Hawaii Insurers Counes2 Mark J. Bennett (Kimberly Tsumoto Guidry and James F. Nagle with him on the briefs), for the defendants“appellants- petitioners Linda Lingle, Georgina K. Kawamura, Lawrence M. Reifurth, and J.P. Schmidt 48 BP Rerioer Bice Cree ree aa Gorm, Duly 

c09159bd5abd431701a78dd279376fcf72f250087074291403ebec1abf9d3ddc

2008-12-18T00:00:00Z

081cfc81-6cfe-4d5f-89ef-6baac0d0e4cb

Brown v. Hawaii Medical Service Association

29117

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 29117 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T CAROL A. BROWN, M.D., and CAROL A. BROW, H.D., INC Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants, HAWAII MEDICAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION, a mutual benefit society; and ALAN VAN ETTEN, Arbitrator, Respondents /Defendants-Appel lees CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (crv. No. 08-1-0288) ECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTT (By: Moon, C.J., for the court’) Petitioners/plaintiffs ppellants Carol A. Brown, ¥.D., and Carol A. Brown, M.D., Inc.'s application for writ of certiorari, filed on October 24, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 17, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Ae Justice 8 considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 9. aad 

c5430b17440fd614eea86ace7a848d450e33cd67515d7f18e4f5b8833102f729

2008-11-17T00:00:00Z

5d9637dd-bc16-41ea-a7c2-5fe3f82e3d04

Holt v. Nishimura

29416

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY aang & Z 5 x DUKE W. HOLT, Petitioner, THE HONORABLE RHONDA A. NISHINURA, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (CR. NO. 06-1-0017) ORDER Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of prohibition -- styled an “application for a writ of mandamus” -- filed by petitioner Duke W. Holt and the papers in support, it appears that the matter of the court-ordered polygraph examination for purposes of the presentence investigation and report will be reviewable on appeal of the sentence imposed in the pending sentencing proceading in Cr. No. 06-1-0017. Petitioner can appeal the sentence pursuant to HAS § 641-11 (Supp. 2007) and he is not entitled to the extraordinary relief of prohibition. See Kena v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d 334, 338-39 (1999) (A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures.). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of prohibition is denied DATE! lulu, Hawai'i, November 6, 2008. Bt HLrre— Presctee Cr ceteey are> BNO Ynne Opin + 

608be6efec8901ba32f7c3e1c68f0dd41aa9621873ee815dda545efbe4b3633e

2008-11-06T00:00:00Z

b04f37bd-a079-4433-b721-d3416cb2ead1

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gould. S.Ct. Order Denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/23/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 04/20/2009 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 60

119 Haw. 265

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

** FORPUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I ‘000--~ OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, BURTON D. GOULD, Respondent. In Re Application for Reinstatement of BURTON D. GOULD, Petitioner. | SEO oz A No, 22239 O2tt ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS NOVEMBER 20, 2008 MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J. ‘he Disciplinary Board of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 2.17(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), submitted its report and recommendation on September 26, 2008, recommending that Petitioner Burton D. could’s “Petition for Reinstatement be granted and that he be reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Hawai". For *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter the reasons discussed below, we respectfully disagree with the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation ‘The Disciplinary Board concluded that Gould -- while suspended -- committed multiple violations of the following Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) : (2) Rule 8.4(c) (relating to conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); (2) Rule 8.4(a) (violating a rule of professional conduct) (3) Rule 3.4(e) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal); and (4) Rule $.5(a) (practicing in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession) In our view, Gould's additional violations while suspended, coupled with his explanations in regard thereto, belie the Disciplinary Board’s conclusion that Gould "has overcome the weaknesses which produced the earlier misconduct{.]* Moreover, given these additional violations, it appears that Gould’s cavalier disregard of the ethical rules that led to the underlying five-year suspension has not abated. Consequently, we deny Gould's petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. 1. BACKGROUND d's Five-¥é On September 15, 1999, the supreme court rejected the Disciplinary Board’s recommended one year and one day suspension *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter and suspended Gould for five years.’ The supreme court’s order stated, in part: ‘The record establishes a cavalier disreaard of clear Biles regarding settlenent of claims, contingent Tee Sgrecnents, false statements, and misrepresentat ion. But for the mitigating fact that Respondent Gould did ot benefit financially, the egregious nature of Respondent Gould's actions would merit disbarnent. (Emphasis added.) In addition to imposing the five-year suspension, the suprene court’s order required “full compliance with RSCH [Rule] 2.16(4)* and “restitution to Fireman’s Fund [of] all amounts [Gould] received . . . that were not subsequently paid to his client, [the cliest’s) health care providers, or others on (the client’s} behalf. The supreme court denied Gould’s motion for reconsideration and awarded costs to the Office of Disciplinary counsel (OPC). The awarded costs were subsequently paid. Goula suspension commenced October 15, 1999. Gould was eligible to apply for reinstatement after April 15, 2002. Seq RSCH Rule 2.17(b) ("An attorney suspended from practice for more than one year may not apply for reinstatement until the expiration of at least one-half of the period of suspension.*). on October 21, 2005, Gould petitioned the supreme court for reinstatement. On November 8, 2005, the petition was rejected Briefly, Gould had failed to prepare and execute a contingent fee egreenent with hig client in regards to a civil claim. Gould then ~~ without Ma client's knowledge or authorization =~ settied the claim, signed hie Ellest’s nane on the release and settlement check, deposived the proceeds into Eis trust account, and filed » notice of dismissal with prejudice. In 60 doing, Gould violated HREC Rules 1.2(a), 1.5(c), 3.3(a) (1), tla), and Bate) *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter without prejudice to filing with the Disciplinary Board, as required by RSCH Rule 2.17(c) ("Petitions for reinstatement by a disbarred or suspended attorney shall be filed with the Board and served upon Counsel ‘The Disciplinary Board received Gould’s petition for reinstatement on January 22, 2007. B. Gould's Actions while Suspended First, Gould did not timely comply with RSCH Rule 2.16. Indeed, his RSCH Rule 2.16(d) affidavit, due by October 25, 1999, was not filed until May 1, 2008. Second, between February 1, 2005 and March 8, 2006, ODC received the following complaints against Gould: 1. 0pC 8165: Tina Bass & Barry Shapiro According to the hearing committee's findings of fact (POF) 12, Tina Bass and Barry Shapiro, tenants evicted from Gould's wife’s Maui property, complained that Gould was using the designation “J.D.* (or Juris Doctor) after his name on his office door fs court, in imposing the underlying , explicitly stated thar Gould's misconduct evinced va cave Gisrogara of clear rules[.!* tevertheless, Gosld apparently aid not examine the rules to determine the proper procedure for seeking Teinetatenent. Tf he had, it ie inconceivable how he could have believed that f: for reinstatement with the suprene court RSCH Rule 2.17(c), which clearly states that *(pletitions for Feinstatenent by a dish ended attorney ahall be filed with the Bord and served don Counsel." "(Emphasis added.) *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter in a letter dated February 21, 2005, Gould explained that he had two law degrees a Bachelor of Science in Law (or B.S.L.) and a Bachelor of Laws (or L.L.B.). He indicated he had contacted Northwestern University School of Law and learned that Northwestern did not convert their L.L.B.s to J.D.s and promised to change ‘all signage . . . to Burton D. Gould B.S.L., ..B.* mm a letter to Gould, dated March 28, 2008, the opc advised Gould that it had determined that Gould’s ‘improper use of the signage, ‘J. D.," instead of ‘L.L.8., violated” HRPC 8.4(c) ("conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation") and HRPC 8.4(a) (violating a rule of professional conduct), but that no discipline would be imposed because neither Bass and Shapiro nor the legal system were substantively harmed and because Gould stopped using the *'s.D.’ signage." (Emphasis added.) 2. O”C 8166: James L. Worley-Pali Kai Realtors on December 29, 2004, under the letterhead of “Burton D. Gould, J.D.," Gould wrote to *Robert* {James} Worley of *Poly* (Pali) Kai Realty. The letter indicated that Gould was acting as tagent for Mr. Alan Bradbury and Ms. Geneen Summer(.]" The letter complained of mold and fungus in a purchased property and said *(t]hey would like to resolve this problem without the intervention of attorneys and protracted litigation.” Worley wrote to ODC on January 17, 2005 ‘with the concern that Mr. *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter Gould, by the tenure [sic] and the J.D. portion of his letter is possibly acting as an attorney[.]* During the investigation of the Worley matter, the 0DC requested from attorney William McKeon, attorney for the property’s homeowners association, information regarding his dealings with Gould. In response, McKeon provided copies of various correspondence, one of which was a November 11, 2004 letter from Gould, as agent for Bradbury and Summer, to McKeon, attempting to *clarify* the “Bradbury-summer position’ with regard to the mold/fungus problem. Upon verifying that Gould was suspended, McKeon wrote to Bradbury and Summer, on November 19, 2004, requesting that any further correspondence cone from Bradbury, the unit owner, not Gould. In response to the Worley complaint, Gould stated, in a letter dated February 7, 2005, that he had “agreed to act as (Bradbury‘s and Summer’s] agent’ and, with regard to ‘the use of J.D., [indicated] that is one of my degrees.” In a subsequent letter to 0DC, dated June 11, 2007, Gould responding specifically to inquiries regarding his correspondence with MeKeon stated that he was “acting as an agent and not as an attorney" and that he had stopped acting as Bradbury's agent when éeKeon informed him of McKeon’s concerns As with the Bass/Shapiro complaint, oDC, on April 2, 2008, determined that Gould’s ‘use of the improper signage, ‘.D.," instead of °L.L.B.,' violated" HRPC 8.4(c) (*conduct *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and HRPC 8.4(a) (violating a rule of professional conduct"), but that no discipline would be imposed because Worley, McKeon, and the legal system were not substantively harmed. The oDc’s letter also recited that ‘our office was instructed to issue you a letter of caution regarding your violations of HRPC 8.4(c) and EREC 8.4(a)." 3. 0c 8536: Paul A. Brooke, Esq./Edward Schmitt Although Gould indicated that he stopped acting as an in November 2004 agent for Bradbury when McKeon had expressed his concerns about dealing with Gould, he continued to act as agent for others. More specifically, a year later -- in November 2005, -- attorney Paul Brooke asked oDC for “clarification and instructions relative to interacting with" Gould about Edward Schmitt's worker’s compensation claim. Brooke indicated that Gould had sent a settlement demand with regard to the clain and attached a copy of the demand to his request. Gould also wrote to First Insurance Company ‘as agent for Mr. Edward Schmitt." Brooke subsequently asked ODC to consider his letter a formal complaint. In response to the Brooke complaint, Gould wrote in a letter dated January 26, 2006 that: (1) he had not held himself out as an attorney authorized to practice law; (2) *[t]he labor board allows agents without a law license to help injured workers"; (3) “[blut for . . . Brooke’s rudeness, [he] would not *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawaii Reports and the Pacific Reporter have known . . . there was 2 ‘problem’*; (4) he did not believe he had acted improperly: and (5) he believed he was "being treated unfairly and singled out for selective punishment because of [his] earlier mistake in judgment (.]* In a letter dated april 2, 2008, the 0DC concluded Gould’s letter to First Insurance Company violated ERPC 3.4(e) ("knowingly disobeying] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal"), HRPC 5.5(a) (*practicling) law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession"), and HRPC 8.4(a) (violating the rules of the profession) and imposed an informal admonition. 4. 00C 8549: DLIR/Gwendolyn Johnson on March 8, 2006, Gould advised the DLIR that he repr’ ented Gwendolyn Johnson and sought a hearing to determine whether Johnson was entitled to medical care. The letter contained no academic degree di ignations. Via letter dated March 9, 2006, the DLIR director asked Disciplinary Counsel, “Is a suspended attorney allowed to represent claimants?" Johnson also applied for a hearing and noted her ‘attorney, Burton Gould, will be present.* In response to ODC’s inquiry, Gould asserted that one could “act as an agent and not do any act that constitutes the practice of law," but that he had ‘decided not to act as an agent for anyone at the Department of Labor.* *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter im a letter dated March 16, 2006, Special Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Alvin Ito advised Gould it was improper for Gould “to represent an individual in a workers’ compensation hearing, or to perform any acts that constitute the practice of law.*? In an undated letter from Gould to attorney Robert Chong (presumably, employer's attorney), Gould essentially indicated he was ‘aiding’ Johnson, but “not representing her," and expressed a willingness to convey ‘a fair offer." Chong declined to communicate with Gould. By letter dated April 8, 2008, ODC informed Gould that his letter to the DLIR violated HRPC 3.4(e) ("knowingly Gisobey{ing) an obligation under rules of a tribunal"), HREC 5.5(a) (*practic[ing] law in a juris@iction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession"), and HRPC 8.44 (violating the rules of professional conduct) and imposed an informal admonition C. Goulds Petition for Reinstatement upon receipt of Gould’s petition for reinstatement, a hearing committee was appointed and hearings were had in the usual course.‘ Gould testified and presented witnesses on his fa letter dated April 2, 2006 from DLIR Director Nelson Befitel to onc, aefitel indicated that, although DLIR allows son-attorneys to represent a party in workers’ compensation adsinietrative nearings, “DLIR (would) defer!) fo ObC on whether a suspended attorney is prohibited from appearing at DLIR Gdninistrative hearinge under state lowe governing the practice of law." For 20. «me Della Au itial nearing committee menbers were Gilbert D. Butson, Chair; ti, and Dennis Lombards. Belattl was disqualified and Sharon (continued...) *** FORPUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter own behalf; Michael Lee appeared on behalf of ODC. The hearing conmittee’s findings sunmarized the testimony provided by Gould and his witnesses with regard to compliance with suprene court orders to pay costs and restitution, rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and competence. The Committee concluded Gould had met his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, reimbursement for costs, compliance with other court-ordered requirements, including restitution payment, rehabilitation, fitness to practice, competence, and compliance with orders and rules The Committee acknowledged Gould’s RSCH Rule 2.16(4) affidavit was not timely and noted *he was suffering from a severe reactive depression." with regard to compliance with RSCH Rule 2.17(a), the Committee concluded: Applicant substantially complied with RSCE [Rule] 2.17(a) efor a period of for fi Tete: Neel Teant believed that in a principa!-agent relationship, the principal controlled the relationship, which distingstshed thie from an attorney-client velationship, where the attorney Silegediy controls the relationship. Applicant also believed chat he could engage in a prineipal-agency relationship in workers" compensation matters, since DLIR Nearings officer Kevin Nishihara indicated that there was no problem with Applicant helping an injured worker as an agent. Applicant expressed renorse for his conduct, ceased his actions after it was brought to Obc's attention, id not appear at any court or administrative hearings for{,) and id not collect any funde from{,| the above-mentioned individuals, and resolved these matters with O0C. *(. continued) wong vas appointed in her place, -10- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter (emphasis added.) The Committee acknowledged Gould's compliance with the rules might "be less than perfect," but concluded he had set forth in ‘established all elements for reinstatem: RSCH [Rule] 2.17(b).* The Disciplinary Board ‘accepted and adopted” the Committee's FOFs, Conclusions of Law (COLs), ané recommendation. TT, DISCUSSION We disagree with the conclusions of the Committee and Board that Gould established the requirements for reinstatement in our view, Gould's words and actions establish otherwise. In Fought & Co., Inc, v, Steel Engineering & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawai'i 37, 951 P.2d 487 (1998), we explored the phrase “practice of law.’ In part, we said: ‘The legislature recognized that the practice of law is not linited to appearing Before the courts.” Te consists, anong other. things of the giving of advice, the preparation Of any document or the rendition of any service fo a tnira party B where such advice, drafting ‘the use of any. oF advocacy’ or 'rendition of service require Gegree of legal knowledge, ski Similarly, while it has explored the concepts Gimensions, this court has never foraily defined the term Spractice of law." in in re Ellis, 55 Haw. 58, 459-60, 522 P.24 460, 461-62 (1974), for example, an unlicensed individual, wno had *#lled Sumerous papers, signed by him, including but net limited to, various petitions, Fequests for service, complaints, claims, joinder in pleadings and cross-claim, appearances, objections to Potions, suggestions of recusal, motions to disqualify Opposing Counsel, other and novel forms of legal pleading -— fogether with legal nenoranda and appendices thereto,” was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. In State v. Gilbert, 68 Haw. 226, 708 ?.24 138 (1985), a person who wrote toa licensed attorney, claiming to Fepresant a client, and signed the letter as vattorney for” the client was determined fo have engaged in the practice of lav.” More ecently, in Office of Disciplinary cougel v, -11- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter ay, $5 mawas't 232, 981 P.24 295 (1997), thie court hela that agreeing to represent a client and accepting retainer feea, appearing before the Hawai Paroling Authority on behalf of a client, preparing and signing, as a client's fey, a motion’ eo continue a cage, and making an appearance in court as counsel for a client were aspects of sthe practice of law." [@, at 212-13, 215, 941 P.20 at 285-96, 298 Oar nOldings in Lau and the other cases cited above are not incompatible with the proposition that che ‘practice oi law entails far nore shan nerely appearing in cours ‘iogeedings. voreover, other jurisdictions, i seeking to Getine the ‘practice of lew," have resched a eimilar conciusion. “The California Suprere Court, for example, has expressed the position that, for the purposes of that State's statute restricting the practice of law to "active nenber{e] of the state Bar," such practice includes *"the Going and performing [of] services in a court of justice any matter depending therein throughout its various and in conformity with the adopted rules of procesure,” (the Fendering of] legal advice(,] and legel instrument and Contract preparation(.]" Bizbe rior court at tal, Sth iis, 70-Cal, Sper 2a 308, 308, 969 Pad t, 5 11998) (quoting Beanie ex rel. Lawvers' 1 89 Cal. 531, 209 -P, 363 tiga Id. at 45-46, 951 P.2d at 495-96 (emphases added) (some citations omitted) FOF 56(n) (brackets in original) ‘The Committee found: Gould) erroneously believed that he was not engaging in the unauthorized practice of lay when be agreed to serve fas agent for his personal friend, Alan Bradbury, former clients, Gwendolyn Johnson and Edward Schaitt, and his belief was due to: (4) that na principal-agent relationship, the principal controlled the velstioaship, hich distinguished this from an attorney-client Felationship, where the attorney allegedly control the yelationship; and (ii) Kevin Kighihars, DLIR fearinge Officer, informing (Gould) thar there waa ao problem with (Gould) ‘helping an injured worker as an agent (emphasis added). Indeed, the attorney-client relationship is a principal-agent relationship. see, e.q., Shin w.Shin, 96 Hawai'i 122, 127, 27 P.34 398, 403 (App. 2001) (*the attorney-client relationship is that of principal and agent and, although an attorney cannot compromise and settle a client's -12- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter claim without specific authorization to do so, the client is bound by his or her attorney's acts and/or failures to act within the scope of attorney's authority. Alt v. Krueger, 4 Haw. App. 201, 207, 663 P.24 1078, 1082 (1983)"). We are, therefore, perplexed by the Committee’s reconmendation to grant reinstatement, especially in light of its conclusion that Gould “substantially complied with RSCH (Rule) 2.17(a), except for a period of time where he acted as and agent of Alan Bradbury, Guvendolyn Johnson, and Edvard Schmitt and wrote several letters on their behalf," COL 73 (emphasis added). rt is apparent that, notwithstanding Gould’s attempts to distinguish principal-agent from attorney-client relationships, it is clear that Gould's representation of Bradbury, Johnson, and Schmitt constituted the practice law while he was suspended. The Committee, as evinced by its FOF 56(n) quoted supra, agri 1d, having found that Gould “exxoneously believed that he was not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law when he agreed to serve as agent(.]* As more aptly stated by this court in office of Pisciplinary Counsel v, Lau (hereinafter Lau II], @5 Hawai'i 212, 941 P.24 295 (1997): ‘The integrity of the Licensing and Aieciplinary processes relat: directly challenged when a suspended atromey ‘Sontinuss te practice iv Ta violation ofa Gsnension order. such a challenge undermines the integrity of both the legal profession and the dignity of the courts, and we will not lenge £0 go unnoticed. (© disbarment 1a generally appropriate when & swyer intentionally or knowingly violates the -13- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter tems of a prior disciplinary order. when an gxder_of suspension is entered on the record ang Taemay noe eS Ty Sharatterize the practice of lav while suapendea agatvthine but Enowing. for purposes of ABA Standard 8.2, practicing law while suspende 1s a {further ace('] of misconduct" Ai a Bae minimum euch violations and acts of nizconduct hare the lesa] evsten, the orofessicn, snd the BubLic By encouraging discemect fox the lax ang ihe courte and <2 of brivilese and arrogance. Thus, ve Rola that Practicing law white suspended or disbarred warrants the severe sanctions of suspension or luau, 79 Hawas's at 206-07, 900 P.24 at 762-83 (citations and Footnotes omizted) cs S'Such blatant contempt for our rules and orders merits the’ severest sanction, inasmich as that is che only Senction that will be sufficient to protect the public. Lau Il, 85 Hawai'i at 215, 941 P.2d at 298 (emphases added). Gould's practice of law while suspended was treated with uncharacteristic lightness by oDC and the reviewing board, and Gould will not, apparently, be the subject of further disciplinary proceedings. Gould’s actions, however, must be considered in light of RSCH Rule 2.17(a)’s clear prohibition on practicing while suspended’, RSCH Rule 2.17(b)'s criteria for reinstatement, and our previously expressed concern about Gould’s. “cavalier disregard of clear rules.” Under RSCH Rule 2.17(b): An attorney suspended from practice for more than one year Shall not Be reinstated unless he or she can show proc! of the following by clear and convincing evidence Eehabilitation, {itness to practice lav, competence and brdere and culea, ana rene court, whieh may include the * ASCH Rule 2.17(a) states: ‘No suspended or disbarred attorney may resune practice until reinstated by order of the suprene court except ae Provided in Rule 17(d) [(related to administrative suspensions for nonpayment ef bar dues) |” a1 *** FORPUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter guccesaful completion of requirements for passing the bar No alspended or disbarred attorney shall be eligible for reinstatenent except upon a stewing that he or she has. sh ths ineiuaing those incurred under ASCH (Rule) 2-20, Tf any, and the Tamyers" Fund for Client Protection for monies paid out on secount of the attorney's conduct, together with interest at fe Hawai'i statutory Judament rate: (Emphases added.) We address each of aforementioned areas as it relates to Gould's showing before the Committee. 1. Rehabilitation In attempting to prove rehabilitation, Gould pronised the Committee he would, in sum: + get written authority to settle matters for a client; + communicate settlement offers to clients in writing; + dismiss lawsuits only with the client’s written authority: + have his clients sign release or settlement agreements; and + not use a power of attorney to sign releases and Settlenents for clients im response to examination before the hearing committee, Gould also said he was renorseful about his prior conduct *and would apologize to [his former client] for his prior conduct, if she was present at the hearing. To the extent that Gould’s promises show cognizance of the rules and his willingness to comply with then, che most that can be said is that Gould’s knowledge of the requirements of the HREC are limited to those governing settlement matters, ise. those rules that he violated and which served as the basis for the underlying five-year suspension. In fact, Gould’s improper -1s- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter use of signage in violation of HRPC 8.4 and attempts to represent clients and negotiate their claims while suspended in violation of Rules 3.4, 5.5, and 8.4 demonstrate his limited knowledge of our ethical rules. Moreover, as previously stated, Gould was nade aware that some people might view his actions as engaging in the unauthorized practice of law when he learned of McKeon’s and Worley’s concerns. Nevertheless, despite those concerns, Gould apparently never questioned whether there might be some merit to to the view that he was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. A prudent person in Gould’s position would, at minimum, have sought advice from the ODC so as to avoid risking any further ethical violations. Indeed, as observed by this court in LauIl, *{w]hen an order of suspension is entered on the record and the rules clearly provide that the practice of law may not be resumed except pursuant to an order of this court, it strains credulity to characterize the practice of law while suspended as anything but knowing. Lau I, 85 Hawai'i at 215, 941 P.2@ at 298. Finally, Gould’s practicing while suspended shows his continuing cavalier disregard of the rules governing attorneys. Even if we take at face value Gould's explanation that his representation was merely that of principal-agent, such explanation evinces a clear and substantive lack of understanding about the nature of the attorney-client relationship. -16- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter 2. Fitness to Practice Law With regard to fitness to practice law, Gould testified: + he read publications, such as the Pacific Reporter, Hawaii Reports, Annotated Law Reports, and Corpus Juris Secundum; + he was current with statutory and case law in areas of workers’ compensation and personal injury: and + he tried to keep current with the HRPC. Gould also described workers’ compensation personal injury appellate cases, and he responded to questions about application of the ERPC. 3. Competence & Compliance with Disciplinary Orders and Rules In addition to testifying on his ow behalf, Gould (and the committee menbers) solicited testimony from Attorney Andrew Von Sonn, John P. Dunbar, Peter Hart, and Gould's secretary, Any Yorke. In sum, Yorke testified that she notified each of Gould's clients about Gould’s suspension, advised the clients “to consider Von Son's services or seek substitute counsel,” and helped Gould close his trust and business accounts. According to Gould, he testified he did not have anybody's money" in accounts, he did not know what he did with his trust account, and that ‘maybe [Yorke] closed” his trust and business account. With regard to the late filing of the RScH Rule 2.16(4) affidavit, Gould acknowledged he was supposed to file the affidavit by October 25, 1999, but testified he ‘was depressed, -17- *** FORPUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter clinically depressed” and that he filed the affidavit in 2008 at Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Michael Lee's suggestion. Although Gould's psychiatrist wrote that Gould suffered fron Gepression in October 1993, there is no indication in the record that his depression continued from that time until he filed the required-affidavit in May 2008, over eight years after it was ue. Thus, in sum, Gould's testimony verifies that he did not comply with yet another rule, i.e., RSCH Rule 2.16(é) -- again, Genonstrating a continuing cavalier disregard for rules. 4. Other Requirements Imposed by the Supreme Court The Committee found that Gould complied with other supreme court requirements; specifically, the requirement to pay restitution to Fireman's Fund. The finding is supported by a letter from a Firenan’s Fund *Clains Clerical Sr. Associate" that attests to the payment. 5. Reimbursement for costs ‘The Committee found, and the suprene court's records verity, that Gould paid the costs imposed by the suprene court’s suspension order and subsequent cost order. Based on the foregoing, the Committee concluded that Gould ‘substantially complied with RSCH [Rule] 2.17(a),* COL 73 (emphasis added); however, we fail to see how the Coamittee could so conclude and, at the same time, state, “except for a period of time where he acted as an agent of Alan Bradbury, Gwendolyn Johnson, and Edward Schmitt and wrote several letters on their -18- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter behalf.” COL 73 (emphasis added). Moreover, although Gould has seemingly stopped the representations set out above when concerns about then were raised, any conclusion that he has stopped practicing while suspended is undercut by his ow testimony that he is still helping people, but that he is not leaving a paper trail. Specifically, Gould testified: Q.__((By Butson)}: Can you understand from these Kind of comments, why people might get the impression that you continues to practice law in sup rosa-type setting? ‘a. ((By Gould)]: Yes, sir. That’ why 1 stopped, r -- 1 wasn’t trying £0 practice law. “Again, the Labor Board, those Labor Hoard cases was the ony case cutside of ry friend, Alan Bradbury, where I wrote a letter as an agent. There isn't. any paper I generated other than that Becasze 7 saw how that was received or perceived, and T said why help anybody. But T still hel Saeed = or in any legal manner, Q tSa you don't leave a paper trail? y yeah, but X don't leave a paper teail Pdon't +t don’t really benelit. from any of this except helping somebody sles, 1 mean it’s Just nd t agree, and I paid for my Dig Based on a review of the FOFs and Cols, the record, and transcripts in this case, we conclude that Gould has not met his burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that his petition for reinstatement should be granted. IIT. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing and given this court’s vultimate responsibility to regulate the practice of law in this state and to ensure that the integrity of the profession is maintained by disciplining attorneys who indulge in practices inconsistent with the high ethnical standards denanded of all members of the bar," Akinaka v. Disciplinary ad, of the Hawai'i -19- *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i $1, 5: 58, 979 P.24 1077, 1083-84 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), we cannot agree with the Board's recommendation to grant Gould's petition for reinstatement. Accordingly, Gould's petition for reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of Hawai'i is Sfre— BarG irre ~ Paste Carry Bree 0 Caner denied, -20- 

4b9b25063f1adf873df705b6e2db7f4ab057a6f8a916850a860c476d2ad03a55

2008-11-20T00:00:00Z

617bd2e8-3469-40ca-a866-5abe439e0b92

Kahoohalahala v. Hiraga

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

wo, 29415 gle 3 8 8 = ROY T, HIRAGA, COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF MAUI, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 99.) Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by petitioner Solomon P. Kaho'chalahala and the papers in support, it appears that respondent's October 10, 2008 ruling did not decide whether petitioner vas nominated or elected as 4 candidate in the Septenber 20, 2008 primary election, but decided only that the challenges to petitioner’ s nomination papers were untimely and that petitioner is a registered voter on Lanai. The October 10, 2008 ruling was not tantamount to a judgnent ina primary election contest given pursuant to HRS § 11-173.5(b) (1993), but was a ruling only on a challenge to nomination papers and on a person’s voter registration status. Jurisdiction to render such ruling was with respondent pursuant to HRS $5 12-8(b) (1993) and 11-25(a) (1993). therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief. See Kena vs Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary renedy that will not issue unless the petitioner denonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.)? In Re oats Discipl ss rene Court, 91 Hawai'i 363, 368, 984 P.24 688, 693 (1999) (Mandamus relief is available to compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an individual only if the individual's claim is clear and certain, the official's duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and no other renedy is available.). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 30, 2008. Gener &, Delis 

c358b54a78d6918a9292db71b9cc6aa564284614071b4b1bed77af7991c7b523

2008-10-30T00:00:00Z

78908ad4-7b06-4f3b-abaa-99bfd0f5a5ba

Dalton v. Schunk

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

no, 26922 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I SS JUDITH A. DALTON, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, GOLDEN RULE CONSTRUCTION, Inc., a Hawai'i Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants. RICHARD A. SCHUNK, corporation, CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (crv. No. 02-1-0036) ORDER ING _APPLI FOR WRI RTIORAE for the court!) (By: Nakayama, J., Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants’ application for writ of certiorari filed on August 21, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 23, 2008. Peasmes OF oui Ure SEAL *} e e! Be oe uss prian A. Costa and James A. DeLacy of Costa § DeLacy, LLC for petitioners/defendants- appellants on the application aats Zhd C2 43S ae ra and Duffy, 1 "Considered by: Moon C.J, Levinson, Nakayama, Acob 

1d8ee7f036b757c25cf267ddb5f9dac7ac940c5a378c514361d88ac5d7a5a602

2008-09-23T00:00:00Z

9748ca9f-6c05-4309-9f6a-5306ce578cfb

Lee v. Unciano

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 27971 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I ‘TERRY LEE and WENDY P. BRELLOW-SCOTT, Plaintiffs-Appellee: o -_ JOYCELYN WANDA UNCIANO, Defendant-Arpelianz? oO aE = iS mn APPEAL FROM THE FIRST COURT - 8 o enh St TE SESS z DER DEN) ‘ION FOR RECON: (By: Nakayama, J., for the court") upon consideration of Defendant-Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the October 14, 2008 order denying the motion for extension of time to file an application for a writ of certiorari and the papers in support, I? IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 23, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Pree Li recon Associate Justice Gary 1. Hartman for defendant-appellant on the motion inson, Nakaysne, Accba, and Daffy, JJ. ‘considered by: 

a88b2265ae6bd592d83a4e30eea97080b28bdf17dd3e24e3c67eb8287c09d66f

2008-10-23T00:00:00Z

3d6bd70e-f7ba-4299-a70e-bf7268df54c2

Gomes v. Hawaii Labor Relations Board

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAWLipragy No, 27477 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I CRAIG GOMES, Petitioner/appellant-appeliant a] B ws #3 3 = a2 og = HAWAIT LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; HawATTaN S2P_ ELECTRIC CO., INC.7 and pirecror, Zaz pO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TwOUSTAIAL Zale RELATIONS, Respondents/Appellees-Appelleesap CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 04-1-0393) (By: Acoba, J., for the court") ‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on Septenber 23, 2008 by Petiticner/Appellant-Appellant Craig Gones is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 28, 2008 Bae Associate Justice SEAL *| Oe aa Cn os ES Craig Gomes, petitioner/ “Noes appellant=appellant, Bib ser on the application. James H. Hershey (Fukunaga Matayoshi Hershey & Ching), for respondent /respondent- appellee Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., on the response. putty, Ja. Considered b: Moon, °C.J-+ Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and 

c9cc41d92bbe3c31f3b56c7081c5d89734630d6bf946d262823c09c7eea87930

2008-10-28T00:00:00Z

26903ed2-1111-451f-9f94-0ab47cb05c5e

Tasaki v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Company

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 28114 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘T TODD T. TASAKI, D.D.8., M.S., INC., 2 Plaintift-nppellee-Petitioner, = vs. > a ATG HAWATY INSURANCE Cowen, 2NC., oF 2 6 2 3 Defendant-Appellant-Respondent. 218 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF wie (CIV. NO. 1RC06-1-789) RDER GRANTING MOTION ro witnpra Aeon or Neer be CERTIORARI for the court’) (By: Levinson, J., A of the motion to withdraw Upon considerati application for writ of certiorari filed on October 30, 2008 by the plaintiff-appellee-petitioner Todd 7. Tasaki, 0.D.S., M.S., the motion is hereby granted. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 6, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Aha Bcicte it Stevens, vevinsoygr™ Associate Justice/g Inc. Tan L. Mattoch and SEAL Daniel P. Kirley, 8, RE on we for the plaintiff-appellee-petitioner, fon the motion Moon, C.J. Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. 1 considered by 

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2008-11-06T00:00:00Z

6497449a-b8a2-4c1e-9697-1497808b8cdd

Rapozo v. Better Hearing of Hawaii, LLC

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY NO. 27602 a TM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWASEIT SF ss 8 =F 8-3 MERVYN RAPOZO, Petitioner/Plaintift-appeliei® = & a5 8 vs 4] = 9 é BETTER HEARING OF HAWAII, LLC, Respondent /Defendant~Appellant CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. RC-05~1-0221) (By: Duffy, J., for the court") Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee Mervyn Rapozo’s application for a writ of certiorari, filed on September 10, is hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. 2008, ‘The parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 20, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Goren, Days r+ Associate Justice Joe P. Noss for petitioner /plaintit£- appellee on the application Wichele-Lynn E. Luke for respondent /defendant- appellant on the response considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, JJ, 

d3ae42dd521a4b989528df3ecbe3a90ac5f2afbf89549c8c38ef22e0b845816f

2008-10-20T00:00:00Z

2c8dd3b5-48e5-4d9e-b710-27cbe6ea0bd2

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gould

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

‘AW UBRARY No. 22239 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioneg, BURTON D. GOULD, Respondent. In Re Application for Reinstatement of L231 Wd £2 330 G00 BURTON D. GOULD, Petitioner. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS (By? Moon, C.J., for the court") upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed Decenber 1, 2008, made pursuant to Rule 40 of the Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure, "Petitioner's Supplement to Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration of order Of Suspension Filed December 1, 2008," filed December 16, 2008, and che recoré, IP IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 23, 2008. SE FOR THE COURT: ie QW Lfprior— ie, SEAL ~ she sete yg) considered by: Moon, ¢ levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, end Daffy, 99. 

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2008-12-23T00:00:00Z

42f158ed-6c9f-414e-a16d-31bdfedc2194

Caberto v. Maui Electric Company

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW CLERKS, Wo, 27494 OF HAWAI'I IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA’ BENEDICTO C. CABERTO, Claimant ~Appellant-Appellant~Petitioner, oad MAUI ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer-Appel lee-Appel lee-Respondent . Nr 9 as ‘Wuva 1 WRUOH SEZ Hd 821909002 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (NO. AB 2002-447 (M) (5-92-03123) } (By: Levinson, J., for the court, and ‘Acoba, J., dissenting separatel: Upon consideration of the application for writ of certiorari filed on September 18, 2008 by the claimant-appellant- appellant-petitioner Benedicto C. Caberto, the application is hereby rejected, DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 28, 2008. David M. Robinson, for the claimant-appellant- appellant ~petitioner, on the application Stanford M.J. Manuia, for the employer-appellee- appellee-respondent, on the opposition to the application 1 considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 

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2008-10-28T00:00:00Z

b028d236-88c5-433c-b2df-1a2a243c338f

Williams v. Department of Public Safety, State of Hawaii

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 29405 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T OAVID V. MELLIANE, oR., Petitioner, pj gp ve. a. 8 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, z = STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent - 2G ORIGINAL PROCEEDING RDER a (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nekayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of David V. Williams, Jr.'s motion for immediate release from imprisonment, which is deemed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it appears that habeas corpus relief is available to petitioner in the circuit court and petitioner presents no special reason for invoking the supreme court’s original jurisdiction. See Qili v. Chang, 57 Haw. 511, 512, 557 P.2d 787, 788 (1976). Therefore, If IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate court shall file the petition for a writ of habeas corpus without payment of the filing fee. IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to seeking habeas corpus relief in the circuit court. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that petitioner's motion for appointment of appellate counsel is dismissed without prejudice iling the motion with the intermediate court of appeals in No. 29343, DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 15, 2008. BlacPiirnin. Ratu Orawduyores ots Bone Satis aad 

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2008-10-15T00:00:00Z

74ce28da-6243-479e-bbfd-33585e48d43b

Estate of Francisco Sison vs. Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 29372 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T ESTATE OF FRANCISCO SISON, JOSE MARIA SISON, and vaaMe Provonsco, Flaine #ts-Ropeitants,’ 2) pp ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Defendant-AppSHlge. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING sgis > ORDER ON CERTIFIED OUESTION z (By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ., Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Leonard, in place of Levinson, J., recused, and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Fujise, in place of Acoba, J., recused) Upon consideration of the order of the United states District Court for the District of Hawai'i requesting the Suprene Court of the State of Hawai'i to answer the certified question, it appears that the question is amenable to answer by this court pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 13. ‘Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, without conclusively determining whether this court will answer the question, that: 1. Pursuant to HRAP Rule 28(e), plaintiffs Estate of Francisco Sison, Jose Maria Sison, and Jaime Piopongco are designated the appellants for purposes of this proceeding and shall pay the required filing fee for an original proceeding in this court. 2. Defendant Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos is designated the appellee for this proceeding. Pursuant to HRAP Rule 13(c), Plaintiffs-Appellants shall make all necessary arrangements with the clerk of the O34 United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i to transmit the original or certified copies of the pending federal court case to this court. It shall be the responsibility of Plaintiffs-Appellants to ensure that the record is received in this court within thirty days from the date of this order. 4. After the record is filed in the supreme court, Plaintiffs-Appellants shall file an opening brief within the tine provided by HRAP Rule 28(b). The opening brief shall conform to the format and content requirements of HRAP Rule 28, insofar as applicable. A statement of jurisdiction pursuant to HRAP Rule 12.1 is not necessary. 5. Thereafter, Defendant-Appellee shall file an answering brief within the time provided by HRAP Rule 28(c). The answering brief shall conform to the format and content quirements of HRAP Rule 28, insofar as applicable. 6. Plaintiffs-Appellants may file a reply brief in accordance with HRAP Rule 28(4). DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 15, 2008, Gn Dinka Oe ree Bont Ludtads. 

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2008-10-15T00:00:00Z

a5785b41-58a5-4a60-942c-c2525458d18e

Tierney v. District Court of the Fifth Circuit, State of Hawaii

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No, 29355 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWATS MICHAEL C, TIERNEY, Petitioner, iad 3 2 Wd) 9 190 0002 us DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'r, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (CR. NOS. 5P108-886, 0504068K, A0SO4068K, and B0504068x) ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of petitioner Michael C. Tierney’s petition for a writ of mandamus and the papers in support, it appears that petitioner posted cash bail of $750.00 in district court Cr. Nos. SP108-886, 0504068K, ADSO4068K, and BOSO406EK. ‘The district court forfeited the bail on June 4, 2008 and notified petitioner that Pursuant to HRS § 804-51 (Supp. 2007], the Court shall execute upon the judgnent of forfeiture unless, within thirty (30) days of the date that this notice is received, a Motion or Application is filed with the Court’ showing good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment. Upon timely filing of such motion or application, a hearing will be held thereon and the Court will determine if the judgment of forfeiture should be vacated. ‘The district court’s notice of forfeiture was received by petitioner on June 19, 2008. Twenty-seven days later, on July 16, 2008, petitioner filed a “action to return bail bond,” which the district court calendared for hearing on August 1, 2008. On July 29, 2008, the district court, without a hearing and in petitioner's absence, ordered the final forfeiture of oad petitioner's bail. On August 14, 2008, the district court, in petitioner's absence, dismissed petitioner's cases in Cr. Nos. SP108-886, 0504068K, AOSO40EBK, and B0S04069K and determined that the dismissal mooted petitioner's July 16, 2008 “motion to return bail bond.” A writ of mandamus will issue where a petitioner denonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Kena v, 1 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999). Mandamus relief is available when 4 court has refused to act on a subject properly before the court under circumstances in which it has a legal duty to act. id. 92 Hawas's 204-205, 982 P.2d at 338-339. Petitioner's July 16, 2008 “motion to return bail bond” => filed within thirty days after petitioner received the district court's notice of forfeiture -- appears to have been a timely motion under HRS § 604-51 to set aside the bail forfeiture in Cr. Nos, 5P108-886, OS04068K, AOSOAO6K, and BOSO4O6K, The motion was properly before the district court, in which case HRS § 804-51 required the district court to hold a hearing on the motion, to sustain or overrule the motion, and to vacate or execute the forfeiture. See HRS § 804-51. Cr. Nos. SP108-896, O504069K, AOSOAOEBK, and BOSO4OGEK have been dismissed and petitioner has no alternative to the instant petition. Accordingly, TT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted as follows: ‘The district court of the fifth circuit shall forthwith: (1) hold a hearing in Cr. Nos. 5P108-886, 0504068K, A0S04068K, and BOSOAO6SK on defendant Michael C. Tierney’s ba: jon to ret! bond” filed on July 16, 2008; and (2) either sustain the motion and vacate the July 29, 2008 final forfeiture of bail or overrule the motion and affirm the July 29, 2008 final forfeiture of bail DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 6, 2008. Nene OS ave jares Yormn € Belaga ty 

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2008-10-06T00:00:00Z

5b7c3ce0-bc0c-4ed2-97be-e83bdb228a4c

State v. Thate

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

iseany No. 27888 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent -Appellee, IN PATRICIA THATE, Petitioner-Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (Po-cR. NO. 05-1-2133) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Nakayana, J., for the court’) Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of certiorari filed on September 4, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Wwai'i, October 15, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Dean Oa Oe Associate Justice Ronette M, Kavakani, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner-appellant én the appileation oats S a 2 & Moon, C.J., Levingon, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JU. 

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2008-10-15T00:00:00Z

dd869273-ba1b-449a-af24-d9eee4296438

Schmidt v. Real Estate Commission, Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, State of Hawaii

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

AW LIBRARY No. 27538 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I THOMAS F. SCHMIDT, dba TOM SCHMIDT REALTORS, Petitioner /Respondent-Appellant REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONS! AFFAIRS, ER STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent /Petitioner-Appellee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 05-1-0523) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR Wi (By: Duffy, J., for the court") Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant Thomas F, Schmidt, dba ‘Tom Schmidt Realtors’ application for a writ of certiorari, filed on September 5, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 7, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Wann Radi Bre Associate Justice R. Steven Geshell for petitioner/respondent- appellant on the application John 7, Hassler for respondent /petitioner- appellee in opposition oras0 308, ane qa eee HY L- 1908002 Considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 33. 

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2008-10-07T00:00:00Z

26141171-4573-45bb-83b2-948ea183551a

Canales v. Artiga

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

RARY No. 28908 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘T! 3 JOSE LUIS ANDRADE CANALES AND TORITO’S MEXICAN IN ‘ORITO'S MEXICAN INC. II, g Respondent s/Plaintiffs-Appel lees, oa JULIO RODOLFO MELENDEZ ARTIGA, YOSHIMI MAKIMOTO, AND JULIO’S ‘ACCOUNTANT CORPORATION, Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE ‘CORPORATIONS 1-10, AND DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITI8S 1-10, Defendanta. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (cIVv. NO. 07-1-1597) )RDER APPL 7 OP CBI (By: Moon, C.J. for the court’) Petitioners/defendants-appellants Julio Rodolfo Melendez Artiga, Yoshimi Makimoto, and Julio’s Accountant Corporation’s application for writ of certiorari, filed on August 26, 2008, is hereby accepted. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 19, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Let Justice | uavingon, Nakayans, Xeoba, and Duffy, 4. © considered by: Moon, ¢.5. 

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2008-09-19T00:00:00Z

a6d10168-74e7-43fb-b554-ddf27917919e

Martin v. Lingle

29414

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW UBRAR No. 29414 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAI'I ANDY MARTIN, Petitioner, ¥ aad LINDA LINGLE, Governor, DR. CHIYOME FUKINO, in her capacity as Direckt of the Department of Health, State of Hawai'i; Shd ‘THE HONORABLE BERT I. AYABE, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT@OURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAII, Respondents. NORV 22 190 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (ev. No. 0-1-2147) (ay: Moon, C.J., Levinson, fakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 29.) upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by petitioner Andy Martin and the papers in support, it appears that the issuance by the Department of Health of a certified copy of a vital statistics record to petitioner was not mandatory, but involved the exercise of discretion and judgment. See HRS § 238-18(b) (Supp. 2007) (The department snail disclose vital statistics records to those persons enumerated in HRS § 339-18(b) (2) through (13)7 otherwise, “[t]he department shall not permit inspection of public he th statistics records, or issue a certified copy of any such record or part thereof, unless it is satisfied that the applicant has a direct and tangible interest in the record.”), Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief against the respondent public officials. See In Re Disciplinary Bd, of Hawaii Supreme Court, 91 Hawas'i 363, 368, 984 F.2d 688, 693 (1999) (Mandamus relief is available to compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an individual only if the individual’s claim is clear and certain, the official’s duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and no other remedy is available.); Salling v. Moon, 76 Hawai'i 273, 274 n. 3, 874 P.2d 1098, 1099 n.3 (1994) ("A duty is ministerial where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion and judoment.”). It further appears that the Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawai'i do not provide petitioner with a clear and indisputable right to a telephonic hearing or an expedited hearing in Civil No. 08-1-2147, Scheduling a hearing for November 7, 2008 and requiring petitioner to personally appear at the hearing was within the discretion of the respondent judge and was not a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief against the respondent judge. See Kema v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai": 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d 334, 338-39 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures. Where a court has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to interfere with or control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted erroneously, unless the 2 judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before the court under circumstances which it has a legal duty to act.). Accordingly, a writ of IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition f mandamus is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 22, 2008. 

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2008-10-22T00:00:00Z

88a677f8-8fea-4244-9fbd-df0e6c51ef9b

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Magarifuji

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

no, 26183 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T ggg OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioners ays (ope NOS, 03-261-7861; 03-262-7862) RD NT (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) upon consideration of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s “Request that Respondent Jon H. Magarifuji be Reinstated to the Practice of Law in Hawaili[,]” the papers in support thereof, and the record, it appears that: (1) on January 16, 2004, Respondent Magarifuji was suspended from the practice of law in Hawai", pursuant to Rule 2.12A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), for failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigations of oDC 03-261- 7861 and OC 03-262-7862; (2) Rule 2.12A(b) states that a RSCH 2.128 suspension “shall be effective immediately and until such time a2 the disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Board have been concluded, and until further order of this court”; (3) the Office of Disciplinary Counsel states that Respondent Magarifuji cooperated with and supplied the Office of Disciplinary Counsel with the information and documents needed to completely address and resolve 0DC 03-261-7861 and 0DC 03-262 7862; and (4) the Office of Disciplinary Counsel requests that Respondent Magarifuji be reinstated to the practice of law in Hawai'i. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Magarifuji is reinstated to the practice of law in Hawai'i, effective upon entry of this order and payment of applicable dues and fees. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 7, 2008. Charles 8. Hite, Acting Chief Disciplinary Counsel and Michael T. Lee, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, on the request RoBi origam for petitioner, Ricctes Oats 22 OO Gen ett 

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2008-10-07T00:00:00Z

f95f612b-1a12-4a41-a456-2a38a809e0de

Siminski v. Kihei Youth Center, Inc.

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

NO. 27604 & 27605 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I a EDA M, SIMINSKI, Petitioner-Appellant, vs KIHEI YOUTH CENTER, INC., and HAWAII EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondents-Appellees. CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CASE NOS. AB2004-039(M) (7-03-01264) ‘& AB2004-181(M) (7-02-01106)) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR Ri? OF CERTIORARI (By: Moon, C.c., for the court") Petitioner-appellant Eda M. Siminki’s application for writ of certiorari, filed November 21, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 24, 2008. FOR THE COURT: aaus Lo: HY 92 930 0002 C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JY. 

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2008-12-24T00:00:00Z

66a026ce-e3a1-46c1-a0b1-d03511e1d5a6

Bates v. Hughes

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 29134 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T TIMOTHY =. BATES, Respondent /Claimant-Appellee/Appellee, © aang KEVIN M. HUGHES dba SOUTH PACIFIC PAINTING, Petitioner /Employer-Appel lant /Delinquent -Appel ant, and "S214 2 asauay ALOHA PAINTING, Respondent /Employer-Appel lee/Delinquent -Appellee, and SPECIAL COMPENSATION FUND, Respondent /Appellee-Appel lee/Delinquent Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (7-04-02843) ) (CASE NO. AB 2005-441(M) (7-04-03265) ORDER DENYING EX-PARTE MOTION FOR PERMISSION 70 FILE WRIT_OF CERTIORARI AND DISMISSING APPLICATION FOR x (By: Moon, C.3. for the court!) Upon consideration of petitioner/employer-cross- appellant /delinquent-appellant Kevin M. Hughes dba South Pacific Painting’s ex-parte motion for permission to file a late application for writ of certiorari and petitioner's application the for writ of certiorari, both filed on December 15, 2008, papers in support thereof, and the record herein, it appears that the time for filing an application for writ of certiorari is Levingon, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. * considered by: Moon, ¢.J. governed by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 602-59(c) (Supp. 2007) which requires an application for writ of certiorari to be filed “no later than ninety days after the filing of the judgment or dismissal order of the intermediate appellate court” and does not permit an extension of the ninety-day period. ‘The ninety-day statutory period cannot be extended pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 26(b), which permits the appellate court to extend a time “prescribed by these [HRAP] rules* and does not permit the appellate court to extend a time prescribed by statute. therefore, I? IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for permission to file a late application for writ of certiorari is denied. IP IS FURTHER ORDERED that the application for writ of certiorari, filed December 15, 2008, is dismissed as untimely. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai't, December 23, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Reese 

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2008-12-23T00:00:00Z

6a6c952a-f351-484b-837c-3c1c3d93f353

Liu v. State

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 26111 1 a38 a0ue ante IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T” = JANE LIU, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Respondent-Appellee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 18D06-1-2) PLICI (By: Duffy, J., for the court) Petitioner/Petiticner-Appellant Jane Liu’s application for a writ of certiorari, filed on August 18, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 17, 2008. FoR THE COURT: er QD Cone ast eee Associate Justice Jane Lin, petitioner/petitioner- appellant pro se, on the application considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, J 

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2008-09-17T00:00:00Z

c6dcddbc-eb43-4f7d-b7d4-9d3710dc3999

Hirakawa v. State

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 28445 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant MASON HAROLD HIRAKAWA, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Respondent-Appellee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (8.P.P. NO. 06-1-0009; CR. NOS. 02-1-1700 and 04-1-0321) (By: Duffy, J., for the court, and Acoba, J., dissenting!) Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Nason Harold Hirakawa’s filed on July 28, 2008 application for a writ of certiorari, hereby rejected. DATED: Yonolulu, Hawai'i, August 27, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Une, decease Associate Justice IF on Mason Harold Hirakawa, petitioner/petitioner~ appellant pro se, on the application } ey e Cen 2 84s] hd 12 ony aug Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 3. considered by: qq 

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2008-08-27T00:00:00Z

3e43d08b-0a7b-49df-9f71-7c2ed53f53a6

Clark v. Arakaki

119 Haw. 135

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

Tew UBRARY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ---000: and MATTHEW BINDER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, JAMES ARAKAKI, in his official capaci| CASEY JARMAN, in her official capacity as County Clerk ‘and Chief Election Officer for the County of Hawai'i, KEVIN B. CRONIN, in his official capacity as Chief Election Officer for the State of Hawai't, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, PARTNERSHIPS, ty as a candid: COUNTY OF HAWAT'T, DOE CORPORATIONS, GOVERNWENTAL UNITS of OTHER ENTITIES 1-20, Defendant s-Appellees. wo. 26976 sg 8 a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Bes oF (erv. No. 941-0225) 2S ee = 9 cocroseR 7, 2008 242 = 3 MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ% 7 ‘AND ACOBA,, Jy, DISSENTING befendant-Appellee Janes Arakaki"s motion for reconsideration of the opinion filed on August 29, 2008, and Defendants-Appellees County of Hawai'i and Casey Jarman, in her official capacity as coun y clerk and chief elections officer's partial joinder in Defendant-Appellee James Arakaki’s motion for nsideration is hereby d 

febef7d2f8353f4313034708cb2d1ee01937498683b9c0948fadcd8cbe3f2b22

2008-10-07T00:00:00Z

dd4f7c31-d873-4404-8873-419b5844220e

DeCambra v. Yamada

28251

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 28251 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT' ESTHER R. DeCAMBRA, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estates of Carla Jean Russell, deceased, and Rachel Elma DeCambra, deceased, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant /Cross~Appellée’|> a3: TETSUYA YANADA, a.k.a. “GRIZZLY” YAMADA, Respondent /Defendant~Appellee/Cross-Appellant) 2 Wd 01 sasoane and THE ESTATE OF REGINA PUAMANI HAILT, Defendant-Appellee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 96-556) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI for the court, (By: Levinson, J., and Acoba, J., dissenting, with whom Duffy J., joins!) ‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on July 30, 2008 by Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant /Cross~Appellee Esther R. DeCambra, Individually, and as Special Administrator of + Considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and the Estate of Carla Jean Russell, deceased, and Rachel Elma DeCambra, deceased, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 10, 2008. FOR THE COURT: er, Associate Justice Kris A. LaGuire and Valta A, Cook for petitioner/plaintifr- appellant /cross~ appellee, on the application. Tetsuya Yamada, respondent /defendant- appellee/cross~ appellant, pro se, in opposition. 

932fcdbcc07d641160d712d424c4146c3092c299a78ac2e25f450d0d50c79262

2008-09-10T00:00:00Z

9f501171-db66-4224-ae98-6d4fcf6a11af

Canales v. Artiga. ICA Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction, filed 06/02/2008 [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 08/26/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/19/2008 [pdf].

118 Haw. 421

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW UBRARY *** FORPUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I ---000--~ JOSE LUIS ANDRADE CANALES AND TORITO’S MEXICAN INC 1 AND ‘TORITO’S MEXICAN INC. IT, Respondents /Plaintiffs-Appellees, JULIO RODOLFO MELENDEZ ARTIGA, YOSHIMI MAKINOTO, AND JULIO’S ‘ACCOUNTANT CORPORATION, Petitioners /Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, AND DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants. No. 28908 CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF API (crv. NO, 07-1-1597) mY 61 dS Gt aa September 19, 2008 MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ Pex Curiam. This court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari, filed August 26, 2008, by petitioners /defendants-appellants Julio Rodolfo Melendez Artiga, Yoshimi Makimoto, and Julio's Accountant Corporation (hereinafter, collectively, petitioners], requesting this court to review the Intermediate Court of Appeals's (ICA) June 2, 2008 *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter order dismissing petitioners’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The ICA determined that the November 20, 2007 interlocutory order denying the motion to expunge the notice of pendency of action (1is pendens) in Civil No. 07-1-1597 is not an appealable collateral order. The ICA determined that the denial of expungement of the lis pendens does not conclusively resolve the disputed question whether the 1is pendens should or should not be expunged becaus the cireuit court could change course and expunge the (118 pendens) at some tine in the future, for example, if Certain factual clreungtances change between now and the entry of @ final judgnent, the [petitioners] might renew their notion to expunge the (1is pendens) . the (petitioners) even! [respende: real property, jl_nay be entitled to have the circuit court expunge the [1is pendans]. [Citation omitted) ag Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction at 4. However, a change in factual circumstances during the course of the circuit court action or a resolution of the action in favor of the petitioners will not affect the validity of the lis pendens inasmuch as the determination of the validity of the lis pendens is restricted to a review of the face of the complaint. See $. Utsunomiva Enters.. Inc, v, Moomku Country Club, 75 Haw. 480, 505, 866 P.24 951, 964 (1994); Knauer v. Foote, 101 Hawai'i 81, 89, 63 P.3d 389, 397 (2003). The circuit court determined that the respondents /plaintiffs-appellees’s complaint erts a direct claim of title to real properties for which a valid lis pendens was filed. Such determination conclusively resolved the *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter Gisputed question whether the lis pendens should or should not be expunged ‘The ICA further determined that the denial of expungenent of the lis pendens does not cause irreparable harm because an order denying a [1is pendens) merely preserves the status Guo on a temporary basis, Despite the continued existence of the (is pendens], the (petitioners) continue to be the Swmers of record of the real property unless they choose to Bell ity in which case the *1is Pendens does not prevent title from passing to the grantee, but operates to cause the grantee to take the property subject to any judgment Fendered in the action supporting the iis pendens.” Furthermore, the purchaser could move to expunge the (is pendens}, because "there is precedent for permitting @ Purchaser of real property to challenge the filing of a lis Pendens afeer the sale had taken place(,].. . even though the purchaser ‘closed the purchase’ with actual Knowledge of the Lis pendens." order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction at 5 (citations omitted). However, we have stated that the practical effect of a recorded (248 pendens) is to render a defendant's property unmarketable and unusable as Security fora loan. “The financial pressure exerted on the roperty owner nay be considerable, forcing (the ower] to etle fot due to the serite of the suit but to rid (the ower] of the cloud upon [the owner’s] title, S.Utsunomiva, 75 Haw. at 502-03, 866 P.2d at 963 (citation omitted) (format altered); Knauer, 101 Hawai'i at 93, 63 P.3d at 401 (quoting $. Utsunoniva, supra). Because of this practical effect, the denial of expungement of the lis pendens may result in irreparable harm if the denial is not subject to immediate appellate review. The Novenber 20, 2007 order denying the motion to expunge the notice of pendency of action in Civil No. 07-1-1597 is a collateral order that is inmediately appealable as a final *** FOR PUBLICATION *** in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter order pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 641-1(a) (Supp. 2007) ‘The June 2, 2008 order of the ICA dismissing No, 28908 for lack of appellate jurisdiction is vacated. wo. 28908 is remanded to the ICA for disposition on the merits. Steven Guttman and Kathy K. Higham (of Kessner Umebayashi ¢ Bain & Matsunaga), for petitioners/defendants- appellants, on the application Str RiEemamm Kester Ci reteceniyren Robert G. Klein and Lisa M. Ezra (of McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon), for respondents/plaintiffs- g ” X appellees, in opposition Waren, Rpt r+ 

493002266ac05ea2fec7a421baf8eb099613c02eb5e18dfeeca197581940c159

2008-09-19T00:00:00Z

46f4f8e5-5a60-4af1-a73a-d93aac526478

Nuuanu Valley Association v. City and County of Honolulu. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 11/21/2008 [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion, by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 11/25/2008 [pdf].

119 Haw. 90

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAWLIBRARY ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAZ' ==-000--- NUUANU VALLEY ASSOCIATION, a Hawai'i non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU; HENRY ENG, Director of Department of Planning and Permitting in his official capacitys DAVID TANOUE, Deputy Director of Department of Planning and Permitting in his official capacity, Defendants~Appellees, and LAUMAKA, LLC, Intervenor-Appellee, and JOHN DOE 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOB CORPORATIONS 1-107 and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, Defendants. No. 28599 APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 3 (CIV. NO, 06-1-0501) az 8 za ot 7 OCTOBER 24, 2008 Be FF EI a Moot, c.J., LEVINGOK, NAKAYAMA, aND oUF, Bae ORO and ACOBR, J., CONCURRING’ szeaRATeLY” =EE OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J. Plaintiff-Appellant, Nuuanu Valley Association ("NVA"), appeals from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’st ("circuit court's”) May 17, 2007 amended final judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City and County of Honolulu, Henry Eng, in ‘The Honorable Randal K.0. Lee presided.  ‘+* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, his official capacity, and David Tanoue, in his official capacity (collectively, “Appellees”), and Intervenor-Appellee Launaka, LLC (“Laumaka”).? On appeal, NVA presents the following points of error: (1) the Uniform Information Practices Act (“the UIPA"), as provided by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92F, mandates that “documents provided by private developers to (a government agency) become public records when received, and written communications to private developers becone public records (not mere drafts) when transmitted"; (2) statutory “exceptions . . . that would make these public records unavailable to the public for inspection” are inapplicable; (3) failed to follow its administrative rules and engaged Appel in improper rule makings (4) development of the Laumaka subdivision will result in the “use” of state or county lands thereby triggering the environmental assessment ("EA") requirement of the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act ("HEPA"): and (5) the eizeuit court abused its discretion when it denied NVA‘s motion for preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, + We note that Laumake filed sta answering brief on February 6, 2008. Therein, Launaka states that it “takes no position in this appeal” Sdefars to (Appellees]” 28 to NVA's points of error (1) and (2). Ae to tht venaining pointe of error, Launaka merely “refers [this court) to and relies Spon several of es motions filed in ciFeult court. Hawai'i Bules of Appellate Procedure (HAP) Rule 28(c) (2008) instructs that the answering brief “shall be of like character az that requires for an opening brief except that no statement of posnts shall be Fequired, and no other section is required unless the section presented in the Opening brief is controverted.”” Laumaka's snawering brie! consists of tive pages thst sze undivided by section. fer example, Launaa's answering briet Hoes not contain a counter-statenent of the case section and an argunent, Section. Sag HEAP Rules 28(5) (3), 28(b) (7). Because Launaka'e answering Brief fails to comply with HRAP Rile 26(c), we decline to consider eny Srgunents raised by Launska. ne  POR PUBLICATION IN WES! HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. We hold: (1) that prior to its acceptance, an engineering report submitted to @ government agency in connection with a subdivision application, and any written comments made by the agency thereon, does not constitute a “government record” requiring disclosure pursuant to the UIPA; (2) that the circuit court erred in its determination that Appellees violated neither its administrative rules nor the Hawai'i Administrative Procedures Act ("HAPA”); (3) that Laumaka’s subdivision does not “propose the use of state or county lands”; and (4) that NVA has not successfully carried its burden of showing irreparable damage for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit court’s May 17, 2007 amended final judgment. 1. BACKGROUND ‘The subject property of the instant case consists of approximately 45.9 acres of steep mountainside land in upper Nu‘uanu valley. The property had been zoned for residential use since approximately 1943. In 2004, Puu Paka DP, LLC, the prior owner of the subject property, submitted an application to the Department of Planning and Permitting of the City and County of Honolulu (“DPP") for approval to develop a subdivision consisting of nine residential lots, NVA is a Hawai'i non-profit organization whose menbers are homeowners and residents who live in Nu'uanu valley. On February 15, 2005, David Hall ("Hall"), a member of the NVA, submitted a letter to DPP requesting to inspect and obtain copies of all comments and engineering reports pertaining to Puu Paka DP, LLC's proposed subdivision. s+" FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** In a letter dated February 25, 2005, DPP responded to NVA’s letter, in pertinent part, as follows: First, our subdivision files are not’ intended to be a central file for all documents, reports, drawings, comment Sheets and correspondence. Documents, reports, drawings, Gonment sheets, ang correspondence se usually’ kept Separately in several areas, including the civil engineering Branch (CEB), Traffic Review Branch, Subdiviaicn Branch, Nactewater Brancn, and other agencics, such 25 the Soard of Water Supply. Consequently, we apologize if there were some misconceptions sbout the completeness of our Subdivision ‘les. ‘Second, for reports end plang, which are still under review, ne may not have then in our possession at ail times. Our usual practice ig to return these reports and plans with Sur comments marked thereon to the person or company who prepared then, For example, as of February 17, 2008, the EEB does not have a copy of the geotechnical report in our files, since ie was returned to the consultant slong with Comments "Phied, our review coments directly naked on reports and plan: ‘called in adaition to being fare vsually summarized “posse, Attached are ‘not in Fourth, for security requests for information be Bade through our Data Access and Imaging Branch « ‘The subdivision application submitted by Puy Paka DP, LLC was deferred on or about January 21, 2005, and subsequently expired on or about October 21, 2008. On June 17, 2005, the subject property was sold to Laumaka, who proceeded with Puu Paka DP, LLC's earlier plan to subdivide the property. on October 27, 2005, Launaka submitted a new application to DPP for subdivision of the subject property into nine residential lots. Thereafter, Hall submitted letters to DPP on, among other dates, November 16, 2005, requesting all engineering reports submitted in connection with Laumaka’s proposed subdivision. “OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * In a letter dated December 13, 2005, DPP responded to Hall’s November 16, 2005 letter, as follows: In response to your Novenber 16, 2008 Letter... any engineering report that is formally accepted by our Ftment as part of a permit application is available for ection and copying at the Data Access Imaging Branch Engineering reports that nay be in our possession at the tise of publie records request and which are being evaluated by the department as part of its decision for acceptance, fre withheld {ron pablic disclosure as being part ot the Gepartaent’s deliberative process. Once these reports nave been formally accepted, they are available for inspection and copyina, on March 18, 2006, NVA provided notice to DPP of its intent to sue it for violation of the UIPA. on Mach 17, 2006, DPP “accepted” a geotechnical report prepared for the subject property by Masa Fujioka and Associates. This report was made available to the public on the same day. on March 23, 2006, NVA filed a motion for preliminary injunction and its complaint in the circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for Appellees’ alleged violation of the UIPA and HEPA. NVA filed a first amended complaint on April 28, 2006, which sought the same relief for the following amended claims: (1) DEP failed to produce public records pursuant to the UIPA; (2) DPPfs record policies violate the UrPi (3) DPP faited to comply with its administrative rules land engaged in improper rule makings and (4) an environnental assessment should have been prepared pursuant to HEPA. on April 20, 2006, OPP found that a “Preliminary Drainage Report” prepared by Mitsunaga and Associates for the subject property was “acceptable.” Consistent with its departmental policies and procedures, the “Drainage Report” was 5  + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, made available to the public later that day. on May 15, 2006, NVA‘s motion for preliminary injunction was denied after five days of hearing before the circuit court. Ultimately, at the May 15, 2005 hearing, the circuit court orally concluded that the reports requested by NVA were not records maintained by DFP, and NVA unsuccessfully met its burden to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction. on May 19, 2006, tentative approval was granted by DPP for Laumaka’s proposed subdivision subject to certain conditions.? on June 28, 2006, the circuit court filed its order denying NVA's motion for preliminary injunction. Therein, the circuit court found, among other things, that the subdivision process consists of three-parts, as follows: (1) tentative approval; (2) approval of final engineering plans; and (3) approval of final map. + Tentative approval was granted subject to the following Construction of inprovenents, utilities and facilities in accordance wien City standards Compliance with [ene] Mastewater Branch’ s reguirerent for the Wastewater Systen Facility charge ‘Su. Compliance with the provisions of Park Dedication Section 22-7, Revised Ordinance of Honoluly a. Recordation of an acceptable declaration of restrictive covenants inforaing future omers of potential Fockfail hazards and other restrictions, and the!? responsibilities te maintain, repair and restore their Grainage and roskfall protection inprovenent®. 3: “Suemission of the final subdivision map snformazion G. Filing of 18 copies of the final survey maps prepared by 2 licensed professional land surveyor and drawn fo band court form  ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. on October 27, 2006, NVA filed two motions for partial sunmary judgment, which contained a total of four “counts.” Count one sought production of all government records in relation to the application for Laumaka's subdivision, Count two sought a declaratory ruling that bvP's practice of not disclosing engineering reports until they are accepted violates the UIPA. Count three sought’a declaratory ruling that DPP’s practice constitutes improper rule-making and violates DPP's administrative rules. Count four sought a declaratory ruling that Appellees are required to prepare an environmental assessment in connection with Launaka’s subdivision. NVA's first motion for partial summary judgment contained “counts” one through three and alleged that “(s]ummary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact, and [NVA] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Its second motion for partial sunmary judgment did not contain a similar statenent. NvA’s motions for partial summary judgment were orally denied by the circuit court at a hearing held on Novenber 15, 2006, At this hearing, Appellees orally requested that the cdrcust court grant sunmary judgment in their favor, The circuit court decided to continue the hearing to November 20, 2006, in order to give NVA an opportunity to respond to Appellees’ oral notion. on November 28, 2006, the circuit court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying NVA's notions for partial summary judgment, and granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Therein, the circuit court made the 7 ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** following determinations: (1) evidence presented revealed that unaccepted reports were returned to Laumaka, and there was @ lack of evidence suggesting that Appellees “maintained” the reports or copies of the reports that were unaccepted by DPP; (2) unaccepted reports and the agency's comments thereon are not records maintained by DPP, and therefore are not “government records” that are required to be disclosed under the UIPA; (3) assuming, arquendo, that DeP maintained copies of the unaccepted reports, these unaccepted reports and the comments thereon are part of DPP's pre-decision process and are protected from disclosure under the deliberative process exception of the UIPA; (4) DPP's administrative rules are consistent with the UIPA and, in light of the above determinations, “there [was] no showing that the enactment of departmental rules had violated its own rules and procedures nor violated the” HAPA: and (5) Laumaka’s proposed subdivision does not propose the use of state or county land for which an EA would be required under HEPA. An amended final judgment was filed on May 17, 2007.4 On June 15, 2007, NVA timely filed its notice of appeal. on May 7, 2008, NVA filed an application to transfer its appeal from the Intermediate Court of Appeals to this court. on May 28, 2008, this court granted NVA’s application for “the circuit court's original judgnent wae filed on December 18, 2006. On Decanber 28, 2006, NVA filed a notice of appeal from this judgment. However, on arch 16, 2007, the Intermediate Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jufisdiction because the circuit court's original judgment failed to satisfy the requirements of an appesiable final judgment. 8 ‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** transfer pursuant to HRS $ 602-$8(a) (1) (Supp. 2007),* and accepted its application pursuant to HRS § 602-58(b) (1) (Supp. 2007).* IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW on appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de nove. Se State ex, rel, Anzai v. Citv and County of Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 514, 57 P.34 433, 439 (2002); Bitney wv. Honolulu Police Dep't, 96 Hawai'i 243, 250, 30 P.3d 257, 264 (2001). (Slumnary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, anewers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together mith the affisavits, if any, show that there 1s flo genuine issue as to any eaterial fact ana that the moving party s= entitied to judgment as a matter of law. A fact ie material if proof of that fice souud nave the effect of establishing or refuting one of the Gtaential elenente of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most. favorable fo the hon-moving party. In other words, we must view all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the Light most favorable to the party opposing the notion. Kahale v. City and County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 341, 344, 90 P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (citation omitted). * URS $ 602-88 a) (1) provides that “[t]he supreme court, in the manner and within the tine provided by the rules of court, shall grant an application to transfer any case within the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court to the suprene court upon tha grounds that the cage involve NoPquestion of imperative or fundanental public importance.” * as § 602-58) (2) provides that “(t]he supreme court... may grant on application to transfer ‘upon the grounds that the case Uneolves” "s question of first impression or @ novel legs] question.” 2 +* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** IIT. DISCUSSION A. Prior To Its Acceptance, An Engineering Report Submitted To a Government Agency In Connection With a Subdivision Application, and Any Written Comments Made By the Agency Thereon, Does Not Constitute a “Government Record” Requiring Disclosure Pursuant To the UIPA. ~The affirmative responsibility imposed on agencies by the UIPA[,1” as provided by HRS Chapter 92F, “is to make government records available for inspection and copying during regular business hours, upon request by any person.” State of : n ty of Progra e =Univ. of . , 93 Hawai's 378, 401, 927 P.2d 386, 393 (1996). HRS § 92F-11 (1993) provides, as follows: (o) All govesnment records are open to public inopection unless access is restricted cr closed by lav. (b! Except ae provided in section S2F-13, each agency upon request by any person shall ma) sralzabie’ for lospection and copying: shrine (c) Unless the information ss readily retrievable by the agency in the form in which it is requested, an agency Shall not be required to prepare a compilation or summary of ite records (2) Each agency shall assure reasonable access to facilities for duplicating records and for making mencranda (e) Each agency may adopt rules, pursuant to chapter 91, to protest its records from theft, loss, defacenent, alteration, ar deterioration and to. prevent manifestly Gxoeseive interference with the discharge of its other Jawful responsibilities and functions: gular eusiness (Emphases added.) A “*{glovernment record’ means information maintained by an agency in written, auditory, visual, electronic, or other physical form.” HRS § 92F-3 (1993) (emphasis added) . The word “maintain(]" is undefined by HRS Chapter 92F. NVA essentially asserts that the engineering reports 10  FOR PUBLICATION IN WES HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER submitted by Launaka became “government records” the moment they were received by DPP. In support of its assertion, NVA relies primarily on the definition of the word “maintain” that ia provided by the Uniform Information Practices Code (*UIFC"). Hawaii's Legislature has indicated an intent to base the UIPA on the UIPC of the National Conference of Conmissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Kaapuv, Aloha Tower Dev, Comp, 74 Haw. 365, 387-88, 846 P.2d 862, 991-92 (1993) (interpreting Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2580, in 1988 Senate Journal, at 1093-95). The UIPC defines the word “maintain” to mean “hold, possess, preserve, retain, store or administratively control.” Unif. Info. Practices Code (UIPC) § 1-105. The commentary suggests that the word “maintain” is “to sweep as broadly as possible. tt includes information possessed or controlled in any way by an agency.” Id, emt. The commentary also suggests that “the personal recollection of an agency employee would not be a ‘government record’ {”] but his handwritten notes summarizing an event or conversation would.” Id. However, although legislative history of the UIPA indicates an “intent that commentary to the UIPC guide the Interpretation of similar provisions in the UIPA(,]”" this court has held that the UIPA “nowhere imposes an affirnative obligation” upon a government agency “to maintain records.” ‘SHOR, 83 Hawaii at 400 n.8, 401, 927 P.2d at 392 n.8, 393. > te note that the UIFC defines a “(g)overnnent record” to mean “information maintained by an agency in written, aural, visual, electronic or other physical form.” OIEC § 1-105. un {+* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Instead, “the UIPA requires agencies to provide access to those records that are actually maintained.” Id, at 401, 927 P.2d at 393. “The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the federal [Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA”)) in Kissinger v. Reporters Som for Freedom of the Press, [445 U.S. 136 (1980)], reached the same conclusion.” Ida at 401-02, 927 P.2d at 393-94 (“The [FOIA] does not obligate agencies to create or retain document: it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and retained.” (Block format and citation omitted.)). Therefore, should we construe HRS § 92F-11 as imposing a requirement upon a government agency to “maintain” a report the moment that the agency receives it, we would be imposing an “affirmative obligation” upon the agency, which is contrary to this court’s conclusion that the UIPA simply requires access to those records the agency has in fact “maintained.” See id. at 401, $27 P.2d at 393. Accordingly, whether the engineering reports are “actually maintained” by DPP depends on whether DEP * records, See id, at 402, 927 P.2d at 394 (quoting Kissinger Reporters Conm, for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1980)) (block format omitted). those (] to retain possession or control(]" of the This interpretation is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word “maintain.” As mentioned above, the word “maintain” is undefined by HRS Chapter 92F. In light of HRS Chapter 92F’s silence, this court “may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries as one way to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily defined.” Lealie v. Bd 2 ‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** of Appeals of the County of Hawai'i, 109 Hawai'i 384, 393, 126 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2006) (quoting Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 424, 32 P.34 52, 68 (2001)) (quotation marks omitted). Black’ Law Dictionary defines the word “maintain” as “{t]o continue (something)” or “[t]o continue in possession of (property, etc.).” Black's Law Dictionary 973 (8th ed, 2004). Similarly, it is also said that the word wnaintain” means “to keep in existence or continuance; preserves retain.” The Random House Collese Dictionary 807 (rev. ed. 1979). In this case, DPP “chose[] to retain possession or control” of the engineering reports through its decision to either accept or reject each report submitted to it in connection with Launaka’s subdivision application. To reiterate, the circuit court determined that any unaccepted reports were returned to Laumaka, and there was a lack of evidence suggesting that Appellees “maintained” any reports or copies of the reports that were unaccepted by DPP. On March 17, 2006, DPP “accepted” a geotechnical report prepared for the subject property by Masa Fujioka and Associates. On April 20, 2006, DPP found that a “preliminary Drainage Report” prepared by Mitsunaga and Associates for the subject property as “acceptable.” These accepted reports were made available to the public on the sane day they were accepted. In light of the analysis above, DEP's acceptance of these reports demonstrates its choice to “maintain” or “retain possession or control” over the reports. See SHO20, 83 Hawai'i at 402, 927 P.2d at 394. Further, there is a lack of 3 1+" FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** evidence in the record on appeal to suggest that DPP withheld disclosure of any other accepted “government report,” or, as explained above, “information maintained by” it in any “physical form.” See HRS $§ 92F-3, -11; SHOPG, 83 Hawai'i at 402, 927 P.2d at 394. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court correctly determined that, pursuant to the UIPA, the engineering reports submitted to DPP in connection with Laumaka’s subdivision application did not constitute “government records” prior to their acceptance by DPP.* B. The Circuit Court Erred In Its Determination That Appellees Violated Neither Its Administrative Rules Nor the HAPA. The circuit court found “that the actions of DEP was [sic] consistent with [Appellees'] departmental policy and procedures. Once OPP had accepted the consultants’ reports, these reports were immediately made available to the public.” Further to this point, the circuit court found that counsel for DPP had “represented that all reports or documents relating to the subdivision have been turned over to [NVA] immediately after DPP had accepted the reports or documents.” “Conversely,” the circuit court determined that the unaccepted reports “were not kept within DPP files, DPP did not maintain a copy of the reports(,] and DPP returned these reports to [Laumaka].” Moreover, NVA “failfed] to present evidence to prove that DEP maintained or withheld reports inconsistent with departmental +n Light of the foregoing disposition, consideration of whether the engineering reports fall under the deliberative process exception to the OIFA Is unnecessary. 14  ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WES HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER policies or procedures.” The court thus determined that “(t]he DeP Rules are consistent with the UIPA and based on the above, there is no showing that the enactment of departmental rules had violated ite own rules and procedures nor violated the HAP.” “(z)nterpretation of @ statute is a question of law which this court reviews de nove. Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvicus meaning.” Tamashiro v, Dep't of Human Serve., 112 Hawai'i 388, 398, 146 P.3d 103, 113 (2006) (brackets added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “(TJhe general principles of construction which apply to statutes also apply to administrative rules.” Brown v, Thompson, 91 Hawai'i 1, 9% 979 P.2d 586, 594 (1999). Section 1-2(b) of DeP’s “Rules of Practice and Procedure” (“DPP's Rules") states, as follows: ALi department files are public records and nay be examined upon request. Permit files include applications, Gltsctor's reports, naps and arawinga, written testanony, Sorrespandence, tape recordings or written minutes of proceedings, orders, and all other pertinent documents Section 1-3(b) (2) of DPP’s Rules states, as follows: “In its role as the [central coordinating agency], the department, in coopernation [sic] with other city, state, and federal agencies, shall... (mJaintain and update a master file of building permit applications, subdivision applications, land use permits, and land use designations on Oahu.” The word “department” is defined under section 1-1 of DPP’s Rules as “the department of planning and permitting, City and County of Honolulu.” All other 1s  ‘+* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, words are undefined Adduced from counsel at a hearing on NVA’s motions for partial summary judgment, OPP's administrative process prior to its approval of an engineering report appears to be as follows: [T]he records policy of DFP is basically to have 2 subdivision application, the consultants turn in thelr draft Feports, and during this process the City may write coment lipon the actual report. Then it returns that report to the consultant and/or Geveloper for furtner clarification ox further supplenentation.. The City does not retain a copy of the report as st exchanges it back to the consultant or to fhe developer and-- until the city formally accepts the Feport, once e has been satisfied that ali of ts questions 3nd ingviries have been answered. At that tine st formally ts 1 accepts a report and at that time, only at that ti Le'the public Sble'to access these reports. NVA maintains that DPP’s practice of publicly disclosing engineering reports only after they have been deemed acceptable constitutes improper rule making in violation of HRS § 91-1(4) (1993), and is contrary to its administrative rules.’ HRS § 91-1(4) defines a “rule” as “each agency statenent of general or particular applicability and future effect that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirenents of any agency.” However, “[t]he term does not include regulations concerning only the internal management of an agency and not affecting private rights of or procedures available to the public, nor does the term include declaratory rulings issued pursuant to section 91-8, nor intra-agency memoranda." HRS § 91-1(4). +e note that Appellees’ answering brief fails to “controvert” this point of error and argunent raised by NVA in its opening brief. Gee HRAP Rule Bacal. 16 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER In this light, “each agency shall[] . . . make available for public inspection all rules and written statements of policy or interpretation formulated, adopted, or used by the agency in the discharge of its functions.” HRS § 91-2(a) (3) (1993). Moreover, “[nJo agency rule{] . . . shall be valid or effective against any person or party, nor may it be invoked by the agency for any purpose, until it has been published or made available for public inspection as herein required, except where @ person has actual knowledge thereof.” HRS § 91-2(b). In this case, DPP’s Rules clearly require DPP to wmaintain and update a master file of . . . subdivision applications.” DPP’s Rules § 1-3(b) (2). Further, DPP’s Rules indicate that this “file” includes the subdivision application itself, all accompanying engineering reports and written comments thereon, “and all other pertinent documents.” See DPe’s Rules § 1-2(b) ("Permit files include applications, . . . correspondence, . and all other pertinent documents."). Because section 1- 2b) of DPP’s Rules unambiguously states that “[a]1l department files are public records and may be examined upon request [,]” Laumaka’s “file,” “maintain(ed] and update(d]" by DPP “as the [central coordinating agency],” constitutes a “public record{] and may be examined upon request.” gee DPP's Rules $$ 1-2(b), 3(b) (2). Construed in this manner, we hold that DPP violated its Rules by refusing to make available to the public any unaccepted engineering reports and written coments thereon. Consequently, DPP’s policy of refusing to publicly disclose these engineering reports prior to their approval uv ‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** constitutes @ “rule” inasmuch as it “affect(s]" the “procedures available to the public,” and “implements, interprets, or prescribes . . . policy, or describes the . . . procedure(] or practice requirements of” DPP. See HRS § 91-1(4). Further, the record on appeal fails to reflect and, as noted above, Appellees have not argued that DPP’s policy was “published or made available for public inspection[,]” or that NVA had “actual knowledge” of the policy prior to its initial request. See HRS § 91-2(b). Because DPP has not complied with the mandated requirements of HRS Chapter 91, DPP was proscribed See id, Therefore, we also hold that the circuit court erred in its from “invok{ing]” its policy “for any purpose, determination that DPP did not violate the HAPA by refusing to publicly disclose any unaccepted engineering reports and written comments thereon. Accordingly, all of DPP’s “files,” which includes the Launaka “file,” are “public records and may be examined upon request.” See DPP’s Rules § 1-2(b). C. Laumaka’s Subdivision Does Not “Propose the Use of State or County Lands.” NVA asserts that the circuit court erred in its determination that HEPA is inapplicable." The circuit court VA asserts that Appellees adnitted that an EA should be prepared linen Jeffrey Lee (*iee"), 2 staff planner employed by the City and county of Honcluis, completed an “Environmental Checklist” for Puu Paka DP, Lic’s fubsivision application in January 2008.” In this checklist, Lee placed = Ghecknazk in a box that stated that HEPA “[alpplies. as checkedf.)* Imsedistely below this bex are seven other boxes representing choices enplaining why HEPA applies, which includes » bor labeled *seate/County Lahas/Funds.”" Lee cid not place a checkmark in any of these boxes. In a signed declaration dated May 24, 2006, Lee declared chat he “mistakenly Checked the box labeled ‘Applies as checked,’ and instead “eeant to check the continue. ae {+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** ultimately found that the following aspects of Laumaka’s proposed subdivision did not “[p)ropose the use of state or county lands”: (2) a drainage system located within the boundaries of Laumaka’s subdivision will connect to a proposed extension of Puu Paka Drive without going beneath, across, or passing over state or county land, (2) existing county sewage lines will connect to drain pipes located within Laumaka’s proposed subdivision without going beneath, across, or passing over state or county land, (3) an easement of 0.130 acres ouned by the “Territory of Hawaii” runs adjacent to and through a portion of Launaka’s proposed subdivision, and (4) “the undertaking of rockfall reduction strategies or inspection or protective measure in the [stat owned] forest” located directly above the Laumaka subdivision. HEPA’ s purpose is expressed through HRS § 343-1 (1993), as follows: ‘The legislature finds that the quality of humanity's environment is critical to hunanity’s well being, that Rosanicy’s sctavities nave broad and profound effects upon the interrelations of all conponents of the environment, and thet an epvironnental review process Will integrate the Feview of environmental concerns with existing planaing processes of the State and couneses and alert decision akere to significant eavivenmental effects which may result From the inplerentation of certain actions. The legislature Eurther finds that the process of reviewing environmental effects it desirable because environmental consciousness is ‘enhanced, cooperation and coordination are encouraged, and public participation during the review process benefits all box lapsiés "boss not apply.!* NVA clains that Lee’s purported admission creates a genuine issue of rin) fect that should have precluded summary judgment on the envirenmental Senent iseue. However, for reasons discussed herein, the following Giscussion ultimately holds thet, as a matter of law, certain sspects of Launaka’s subdivision does not propose the “use” of state Therefore, whether a genuine issue of material fact exists purported aduissicn ig inconsequential to the resoluticn of this issue. 13 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Jes involved and society as a whole. It is the purpose of this chapter to establish system of envircrmental review which will enaure that Ghvironsentel concerns are given appropriate consideration Gn decision making along with economic end technical As explained by this court: HEPA ia triggered whenever an agency or an applicant proposes an action which falls within one of eight Eategories sat forth in RE § 343-S(a) (1993). This section Gneguivocaily states that “an environmental assessment shall, be requires” for these actions. HRS § 343-S(a) (emphasis added). The general rule that environmental aasesenente are required for ail proposed actions is qualified by HRS § 343-6(a) (71 (1993), which provides for exemptions for certain classes of actions, which, “because they will probably have mininal or no significant effects on the Sovironment, are declared exempt from the preparation of an Aseesement.© HRS 6 343-6(a) (71 Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. County of Mau'i, &6 Hawai'i 66, 70, 947 P.2d 378, 382 (1997). This case involves interpretation and application of HRS $ 343-5(a) (1) (Supp. 2007), which mandates, in pertinent part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, an environmental assessment shall be required for actions that{] (p]ropose the use of state or county lands... .” NVA asserts that an EA must be completed because Launaka’'s proposed subdivision will require use of and connection to the county's drainage and sewer systens. NVA also asserts that an EA must be completed “[sJo long as there is a ‘use’ of city or state lands,” without regard to “the size of the ‘use’ and comparisons to the scope and size of the overall project.” We disagree. In Kahana Sunset Owners Ass’n, the defendant filed an application for a Special Management Area (“SMA”) permit that was preparatory to development of Napilihau Villages I, II, 11, and 20  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** IV on the island of Mau'i, 86 Hawai'i at 68, 947 P.2d at 380. The proposed development would install a new, thirty-six-inch drainage line beneath a public street, which then connected to an existing twenty-four-inch culvert beneath a public highway. Id. at 71, 947 P.2d at 383. Tt was undisputed between the parties that this constituted a “use of state or county lands.” Id. (quoting HRS § 343-5(a)(1)) (quotation marks omitted). ‘The Mau'i Planning Commission eventually granted the defendant's SMA permit, and determined that the completion of an EA was not required. Id. at 68, 947 P.2d at 380. The circuit court affirmed the Connission’s decision. Id. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that if an EA is required, “the document must address the environmental effects of the entize proposed development, not just the drainage systen.” Id, at 14, 947 P.2d at 386. Pursuant to Hawai'i Administrative Rules (“HAR”) § 11-200-7," this court held that the plaintiff's “assertion is correct(,]” inasmuch as “[i]solating only that WAR § 11-200-7 provides, as follows: A group of actions proposed by an agency or an applicant shall be treated aa a single action when: (1) The component actions are phases oF increments of a larger total undertakings (2) An individual project is 2 necessary precedent for 4 larger project: (G) An individual’ project repr commitment to a larger project) oF (a) The actions in question are easentiaily identical ana 2 single statement will adequately address the impacts of each individual action ané those of the g¥oup of actions ae a unole (exphases added.) HAR $ 11-200-2 defines an “action” to mean “any program oF project to be initiated by an agency or applicant.” 2a ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** particular component of the development for environmenta Indeed, “the action proposed” in Kahana Sunset Owners Aes’n “is the entire Nepilihau development,” and “the proposed drainage nt would be improper segmentation of the project.” Id. system is part of the larger project and is a ‘necessary precedent’ for the development.” Ig, (citation omitted). In Citizens for the Protection of the North Kohala Coastline v. Count wai'i, 91 Hawai'i 94, 103, 979 F.2d 1120, 1129 (1999) (“Citizens”), the plaintiff asserted that the proposed construction of two underpasses below a public highway constituted a “use” of state lands. These underpasses were to be used for golf carts and maintenance vehicles to travel to portions of a golf course situated on either side of the public highway. Id. The defendant asserted, inter alia, that environmental review under HRS chapter 343 was unnecessary because the construction of two underpasses under a state highway did not constitute a “use” of state lands. Id, In light of Kahana Sunset Owners Ase’n, this court disagreed with the defendant inasmuch as it was “clear” that the construction would constitute “use of state lands for purposes of HRS § 343-5(a) (1) Id. In contrast, this court noted that “the potential use of” a public highway that led to the project did not constitute a “use” of state land. Id. at 103 n.8, 979 P.2d at 1129 n.8. In Sierra Club v. Office of Planning, state of Hawai'i, 109 Hawai‘ 411, 413, 126 P.3d 1098, 1100 (2006), Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health filed a petition with the Land Use Commission 22 ++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** to reclassify certain land from an agricultural district to an urban district so that Castle & Cooke could develop a project consisting of thousands of homes, a commercial center, elementary school, park, church/day care, recreation center, and the Pacific Health Center." The “Project’s” “Infrastructural Report” stated that Castle & Cooke would eventually construct a thirty-six-inch sewage line that would transport wastewater from the project to the Waipahu Wastewater Treatment Plant, as well as a water line to provide water to the “Project.” Id, Construction of these lines would require Castle & Cooke to tunnel beneath several public highways. Id. ‘The defendants asserted, inter alia, that the petition for reclassification did not trigger HRS § 343-5's EA requirement because the petition did not constitute an “action” within the meaning of HRS Chapter 343. Id, at 415, 126 P.3d at 1102. This court disagreed with the defendants assertion because, in light of HRS § 343-5(a) and HRS § 343-2 (Supp. 2005),"? the “Project” itself, rather than the petition, was the “action” contemplated by the plain language of HRS $ 343-S(a). Id. This court also determined that the “Project” proposed the “use” of state lands “inasmuch as the construction of the sewage and water % this was defined collectively by this court a the “Project.” ‘Sienra Club, 109 Hawai'i at 413, 126 Ps at 1100. % An “action” is defined as “any program or project to be initiated by any agency or applicant." HRS § 343-2. "Agency" is defined as “any Slpartnent, officer board, or commission of the state or county governtent Which is a part of the executive branch of that governnent.” Id. “applicant” Ie'derined a "any person who, pursuant to statute, ordinance, oF rule, officially requests approval for a proposed action.” Id. 23 #* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** transmission lines will require tunneling beneath state highways.” Ids Tt is undisputed that the “action” in this case is Launaka’s subdivision, To reiterate, Laumaka’s subdivision consists of approximately 45.9 acres of steep mountainside land in Nu'uanu valley. The property is located above or adjacent to Puu Paka Drive, Kama‘aina Drive and Place, Kahawalu Drive, and Ragsdale Drive on the southern edge of the valley. The property had been zoned for residential use since approximately 1943, and is currently undeveloped. The development plan proposes the creation of nine large subdivision lots on the property. Each lot has the capability of supporting two homes, inasmuch as each of the nine lots has more than double the required minimum zoning lot size. According to the “Preliminary Drainage Report” prepared by Mitsunaga and Associates, several detention basins will be constructed within Laumaka’s subdivision to limit surface runoff “to predevelopment conditions.” The purpose of these basins is to detain any increase in storm water discharge by reducing the flows upstream of the roads “due to the addition of impervious areas including building structures, driveways and the extension of existing streets.” The development plan calls for an extension of Puu Paka Drive into Laumaka’s subdivision. This extension ends in a cul- de-sac, and the development plan indicates that it may be dedicated to the county sometime in the future. Apparently, the “Puu Paka Drive drainage system” involves connecting basin 24  ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER. numbers 6, 7, and 8 to the cul-de-sac portion of the proposed extension of Puu Paka Drive. Basin numbers 6 and 7 connect to the “Puu Paka Drive drainage systen” via a drain pipe within a drainage easement in favor of one of the nine lots within the subdivision, Basin number 8 connects directly with the “Puu Paka Drive drainage system.” This connection is not within any easement. The drainage system then discharges through an existing thizty-inch drain Line at the bottom of the property, which appears to be within an easement in favor of the City and County of Honolulu. NVA is essentially asserting that any “use of state or county lands{,)" no matter what the nature of that “use” may be, is sufficient to satisfy HRS § 343-5(a)(1)’s requirement that an “action{]" “(p]ropose the use of state or county lands... .” ‘The word “use” is undefined within HRS Chapter 343. The “ordinary meaning” of the word “use” is “to employ for some purpose; put into service; make use of[.]” The Random House College Dictionary 1448; see Leslie, 109 Hawai'i at 393, 126 P.3d at 1080. In light of this meaning, the word “use” could be construed to apply to any “use” of state or county land, no matter what or how benign that “use” may be. However, this interpretation flies in the face of the fact that this court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument in * there appears to be a total of nine detenticn basins that comprise the drainage system in Launaka's subdivision, which are numbered "I" through "9." the so-called “Puu Paka Orive drainage systen” is a part of a larger drainage system within the subdivision, ana includes only @ few of these Setention Basins 28 {¢* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Citizens that the “potential use of” a public highway leading to the development project constitutes a “use” of state land. 91 Hawai's at 103 n.8, 979 P.2d at 1129 9.8. Clearly, this court has recognized that the boundaries of the meaning of the word “use,” as contemplated by HRS § 343-5(a) (1), is not unlimited in possibilities. See id, Therefore, we decline to apply the ordinary meaning of the word “use” in interpretation of HRS § 343-5(a) (1). “Laws in pari materia, o upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. what is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16 (1993), Further, “[t]his court must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.” Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 363. HEPA’s purpose is “to establish a system of environmental review which will ensure that environmental concerns are given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations.” HRS § 343-1. ‘This court has observed that the “purpose of preparing an environmental assessment is to provide the agency and any concerned menber of the public with the information necessary to evaluate the potential environmental effects of a proposed action.” Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 72, 947 P.2d at 384. However, this court’s decisions interpreting HRS § 343- Sta) (1)’s requirement of “use of state or county lands” have so far been limited to projects that require tunneling or 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER construction beneath state or county land. See Sierra Club, 109 Hawai'i at 415-16, 126 P.3d at 1102-03; Citizens, 9) Hawai'i at 105, 979 P.2d at 11317 Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383. This court has not held that merely connecting privately-owned drainage and sewage lines to a state or county-owned drainage and sewage system is sufficient to satisfy HEPA’s requirement of “use of state or county lands.” Indeed, construing the word “use” in a manner suggested by NVA could result in countless possibilities of “uses” that would fall within the scope of the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act, which we believe was not intended by the legislature. See HRS § 343-1) see also Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 103 n.8, 979 P.2d at 1129 n.8. Moreover, were we to construe HEPA’s requirement of “use of state or county lands” in a manner suggested by NVA, we would be misconstruing the weight of our prior case law, which consisted of facts that illustrated a “use” that vas more than merely a connection to state or county “lands.” For example, the “use” in Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n was the fact that the proposed development would install a new, thirty-six-inch drainage line beneath, and not merely in connection to, a public street. 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383, Similarly, the “use” in Citizens vas the fact that the two underpasses would require construction beneath a state highway, rather than merely a connection to the land beneath the highway. 91 Hawai'i at 103, 979 P.2d at 1129. Also similar is the “use” in Sierra Club, where construction of the “Project's” sewage and water transmission lines required tunneling beneath, rather than merely 2 1* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** a connection with, mu 16, 126 P.3d at 1102-03. ple state highways. 109 Hawai'i at 415- Although NVA’s concern regarding the environmental risks posed by Laumaka’s subdivision is understandable, we must remain mindful of our duties to follow the law. Because the record, at best, indicates that Laumaka’s drainage and sewer Lines will merely connect to the “Puu Paka Drive drainage system” and existing county sewer lines, the instant case is distinguishable from Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, Citizens, and Sierra Club. Therefore, in light of the foregoing analysis, we decline to extend the meaning of the word “use” to the circumstances of this case, where the evidence indicates that Launaka’s drainage and sewer lines merely connect to the “Puu Paka Drive drainage system” and existing county lines without requiring construction or tunneling beneath state or county lands. See HRS § 343-1; Sierra Club, 109 Hawai'i at 415-16, 126 P.3d at 1102-03; Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 103, 979 P.2d at 1129; Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 3837 see also Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 103 n.8, 979 P.2d at 1129 n.8, Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in its determination that there is no “use” of state or county land because the “detention basins are connected and routed through the Puu Paka Drive drainage system,” and the drainage line will not require tunneling or construction beneath state or county lands. We also hold that the circuit court correctly determined that connecting the county’s existing sewage lines to Laumaka’s Lines did not constitute a “use” of county land because Laumaka’s 28  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER sewage lines would not require tunneling or construction beneath state or county Land. Additionally, it is well established that a party that moves for summary judgment has the burden “to show the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive lay, entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of lav.” Jou v. Dai-Tokvo Bova State Ins. Co., 116 Hawai'i 159, 164, 172 P.34 471, 476 (2007) (block format and citation omitted). *{T)his burden has two components”: First, the moving party has the burden of producing support for’ its claim chat? (1) no genuine issue of aterial facts exists with respect to the essential elenents DE the claim or defense which the notion seeks to establish OF which the motion questions; and (2) based on the Undisputed facts, it is entitied to summary Juagnent as a matter of law. Only when the moving party satsefies its Thitia2 burden of production does the burden shift to the non-moving party to respond to the notion for summary judgment and demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to Qenersi allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial Second, the moving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. This burden always remains with the moving Party and requires the moving party to convince the court Ehat no genine issue of material fact exists and that the noving part [sic] is entitled to sumary judgment as 2 matter of law. Id. (quoting Erench vs Hawaii Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai'i 462, 470, 99 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004). NVA filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the HEPA issue on October 27, 2006. However, in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying NVA’s motion for partial summary, the circuit court determined that NVA “failed to [make any} show[ing] beyond the fact that the existing county 29  *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER sewage lines will connect to the drain pipes on the Laumaka subdivision.” As a result, the court could not find any “use of state or county lands” because the mere fact that Laumaka’s Grainage and sewage lines “will connect to a county line, without actually going beneath, across, or passing over 4 state or county land will not trigger the” BA requirement. In its opening brief, NVA avers that “(t]he City will be required to dig under Puu Paka to provide for the sewer connections." However, NVA does not include a citation to the record to support its assertion. Moreover, in its opening brief, NVA neither quoted, in its points of error section, the portion of the circuit court’s finding that NVA “failed” to carry its burden in its motion for partial summary judgment, nor argued or assigned as error that such a finding was clearly erroneous. See RAP Rule 26 (b) (4) (C) (instructing that an opening brief shall contain a points of error section, which “shall also include the following: . . . (C) when the point involves a finding or conclusion of the court or agency, a quotation of the finding or conclusion urged as error{]"). Consequentiy, we hold that the circuit court correctly determined that NVA has not successfully carried its burden on its motion for partial summary judgment. NVA also claims that Laumaka will be required to “use” state land in order to complete a “slope stability analysis to determine the risks of slope failure and rockfalls” and “perform appropriate mitigation measures." In enacting HEPA, Hawaii's legislature found that “the process of reviewing environnental effects is desirable because environmental consciousness is 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** enhanced, cooperation and coordination are encouraged, and public participation during the review process benefits all parties involved and seciety as a whole.” HRS § 343-1. Laumaka’s subdivision is located at the base of a heavily forested mountainside, which is owned by the state, The state Department of Land and Natural Resources sent DPP a letter dated April 17, 2006, which recommended that DPP require Launaka to perform a “slope stability analysis” and “appropriate mitigation measures to address the risks identified by the study and other known hazards However, for reasons discussed above, NVA's argument is unpersuasive because the “slope stability analysis” ds not a “use” contemplated by HRS § 343-5(a) (1). See HRS § 343- 1; Sierra Club, 109 Hawai'i at 415-16, 126 P.3d at 1102-03; Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 103, 979 e.2d at 1129; Kahana Sunset Ouners Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383; see also Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 103 n.8, 979 P.2d at 1129 n.8. Finally, the circuit court found that there is an easement of 0,130 acres that runs adjacent to and through a portion of the Laumaka subdivision, which is a “hiking right of way” owned by the “Territory of Hawaii.” NVA appears to assert that Laumaka’s subdivision will “use” state land simply because this easement exists within Laumaka’s subdivision. However, NVA does not point to anything in the record indicating that Launaka’s subdivision will in fact “use” the easement in any way. Because this easement merely exists within Laumaka’s subdivison, a  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** NVA's assertion is without merit. D. NVA Has Not Successfully Carried Its Burden Of Showing Irreparable Damage For a Preliminary Injunction. In the circuit court, NVA sought a preliminary injunction preventing DPP from further review and processing of Laumaka’s subdivision application. NVA also sought an order requiring DPP to turn over all engineering reports pending review and evaluation for acceptance by DPP, including any comments thereon, The circuit court ultimately determined that NVA unsuccessfully met its burden to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction for the following reasons: (1) the engineering reports and comments thereon did not constitute “government records” under HRS § $2F-3; (2) even if DPP kept copies of any unaccepted reports, these reports and DPP’s written comments thereon would fall under the deliberative process exception to the UIPA; (3) NVA failed to timely appeal DEP’ s denial of access to either the circuit court or the state Office of Information Practices pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(a) (1993)** and HRS § 92F-15.5 (1993);"" (4) plans and reports that have not been % ie note that Appelless contend that state or county easezents cannot be equated with state or county “lands” for purposes of HEPA. On the Other hand, NVA relies on defining the words “easement” and “land” in support of its assertion that an easement is akin to “land.” In Light of the foregoing disposition, consideration of this issue se unnecessary. ARS $ 92F-15(a), which is entitied "Judicial Enforcenent,” provides that (2) person aggrieved sy 2 denial of sccess to a government Fecord may bring an action against the agency at any tine within two years after the agency denial co compel disclosure.” Wns § 92-15.5(a), which is entitled “Alternative method to appeal 42 denial of access,” provides, in pertinent part, that "[w)hen an agency ‘continue. 32 ‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** accepted by DPP and not disclosed to NVA are irrelevant to NVA‘S claim of irreparable harm inasmuch as these reports are not documents that DPP relies upon when approving subdivision applications: and (5) assuming, arguende, that disclosure of the reports is required, NVA unsuccessfully established its claim that it will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary motion is not granted. On appeal, NVA asserts that, in light of its foregoing points of error, the circuit court erred when it denied its motion for 2 preliminary injunction because it should have been given the opportunity to review and comment upon the engineering reports prior to DPP’s acceptance of them. “the grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of the [trial] court.” Rapp ye Disciplinary Bd, of Havai'i Supreme Court, 916 F, Supp. 1525, 1538 (D. Haw. 1996); Consolidated Amusement co. v. Hughes, 22 Haw. $50, 554 (Hawai'i Terr, 1915) (*[T]he right to a temporary injunction . . . rests in the discretion of the trial court but any abuse of such discretion, either in granting or refusing, will be ground for reversal on appeal.”). Accordingly, whether the trial court erred in either granting or denying a motion for a preliminary injunction is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. ee Mottl v, Mivahira, 95 Hawai'i 381, 384 continue ‘bes @ person access to 4 government record, the person may appeal the Genial to the office of infornetion practices in accordance with rules edopted pursuant to section 92F-42(12)." We note that Appellees, in thelr answering brief, did not provide 2 counter-argunent to this point of error raised by MVR. 33 *#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** n.8, 23 P.3d 716, 719 n.5 (2001) (“The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction . 22 Haw. at S54. “the test for granting or denying temporary injunctive relief is three-fold: (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable damage favors the issuance of a temporary injunction? and (3) whether the public interest supports granting an injunction.” Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous, § Cty. Dev, Corp, of Hawai'i, 117 Hawai'i 174, 211, 177 P.3d 884, 922 (2008); see Life ofthe Land v. Arivoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 158, 577 P.2¢ 1116, 1118 (1978) (same). “[T]he more the balance of irreparable damage favors issuance of the injunction, the less the party seeking the injunction has to show the likelihood of success on the merits.” ottice of Havaiian Affairs, 117 Hawai'i at 211-12, 177 P.3d at 922 (citation and quotation marks omitted) . In its order denying NVA‘s motion for preliminary injunction, the circuit court found, contrary to NVA’s claim that it was unable to meaningfully participate in the planning and permitting process, that NVA had, in fact, participated in the governmental process and had voiced its concerns about Laumaka’s subdivision, For example, the circuit court found that NVA had contacted and/or had discussions with Appellees Henry Eng and David Tanoue, the Honolulu City Council and its members, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, the Nuvanu-Punchbowl 34 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Neighborhood Beard, and state legislators. ‘The circuit court also found that DPP had made available for review and copying all accepted engineering reports. Additionally, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit court found that the unaccepted reports were returned to Laumaka, and DPP did not retain a copy of the unaccepted reports. Further, Laumaka filed a “Stipulation Re Production Of Documents To Plaintiff” on November 13, 2006, wherein Laumaka and NVA stipulated that on or before April 28, 2006, Laumaka made available to NVA “for review and copying all prior drafts of the accepted reports and the . . . comments to said reports to the extent maintained by Laumaka, its agents, and its consultants[.]” Tt was also stipulated that NVA “agree(d] that the issue of the production of the reports and the . . . comments thereto is, therefore, moot as to the documents provided.” At the hearing on Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, the following exchange took place: THE COURT: can you articulate what records you have not received? It’s my understanding fron the last round of Proceedings that whatever the City had they had disclosed to Your clients and that [Laumaka) by way of stipolation with [vay hae provides the records that the City dsdn't keep, incluging the comments. What records in addition to chet have you not received? INVA]! “I think there’ two things that we would say le haven't received yet and that’s —~ we haven't received the records direct ly. fron the City. ‘THE COURT: Nell, the records that you received from [Laumekal would be the’ records that the City doesn’t have! Those are the records with the coments iniaj:” yeah. 1 think that goes to the core problem that we nave. ‘We're sot really certain what else there may be out there in existence because there is this rebingsis City to Caunaka) .  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** because the City And s0 one of our concerns is hosn"e yet verstied st oF cer entirely accurate or comple at perhay Sea it, that Notwithstanding its argument on appeal, NVA haa not pointed to anything in the record suggesting that an engineering report, whether accepted or unaccepted by OPP, is being withheld from public disclosure. Therefore, we hold that NVA has not successfully carried its burden of showing irreparable damage to warrant the issuance of @ preliminary injunction. IV. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit courts May 17, 2007 amended final judgment. Janes J. Bickerton and Scott K. Saiki of Bickerton Lee Dang & Sullivan for Plaintiff-Appellant Nuuanu Valley Association Don 8. Kitaoka and Lori K.K. PEP armse— Sunakoda, Deputies Corporation Counsel,’ for Defendants- Bt Ou Appellees city and County of Honolulu, Henry Eng, and David a Cone mason David B. Rosen of the Law Office Of David B. Rosen, ALC, for Intervenor-Appellee Laumaka Lic * We note that NVA points to several additional plans and reports that may be required to be submitted by Launaka to OPP as a result of GPP's praval of the proposed subdivision. in Light of the foregoing Appellees must make these plans and reports available for ion'when received and "upon request.” See OPP's Rules $ 1-2(b). 36 

3c71566fdd741828766a23ddd8ea638432996e6efdfde0525177d5e62129d2c0

2008-10-24T00:00:00Z

68d7f056-24b4-476c-8ca3-a0abc317739e

Flowers v. United Services Automobile Association

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

wos. IW THE SUPREME COURT OF THE staTE oF HaWASE 2 a MARSHALL, KENNETH FLOWERS, Respondent-AppelLahty Hg z7087, 27128 and 27229 8 s dats UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Petitioner-Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (crv. No. 02-1-1678) ‘J-, for the court") (By: Nakayama, Petitioner-Appellee’s application for writ of is hereby dismissed as certiorari filed on November 19, 2008, untimely. Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 25, 2008 By FoR THE count: é Pua Cvnouuy are | SEAL © Associate Justice Ma 3g De, a Lor we Terrance M. Revere and Jacqueline E. Thurston of Motooka Yamamoto & Revere for petitioner appellee on the application Moon, C.J.) Levinson, Nakayana, Acoba, and Duffy, JV. ‘considered by: 

6d3664eb611aa2786b1ac1c258a0dbb37e199beb7e70ea2f395ea6f01a6956b3

2008-11-25T00:00:00Z

b4f212f1-db3f-42a3-bedf-59019ded6072

Deparini v. State

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

taWuBaaay No. 28695 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I DANIEL DEPARINI, Petitioner-Appellant, STATE OF HAWAI'I, et al., Respondents-Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (crv. No. 04-1-0214) ORDE! ABEL WRIT OF CER (By: Nakayama, J., for the court!) Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of certiorari filed on August 8, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 3, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Associate Justice Daniel Deparini, petitioner-appellant Pro se, on the application = = nm o go ind o- 39 Oile Sconsidered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 9 

7e37b987b09b3da53f0b0d5f2c4af973aef16e209c056b32cfd6ca7eab926245

2008-09-03T00:00:00Z

6713f27d-3912-48a8-93e8-072f1b9c15b1

Ludwig v. Verizon Hawaii, Inc.

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY yo. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T MARSHALL G. LUDWIG, Respondent/Claimant-Appellgpt VERIZON HAWAII, INC. and SPECIALTY RISK SERVECHS, Petitioners/Eaployer/Insurance Carrier-Appel oats CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APE (CASE NO. AB 2003-440 (2-02-14365)) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Duffy, J., for the court”) Petitioners/Employer/Insurance Carrier-Appellees Verizon Hawaii, Inc. and Specialty Risk Services’ application for a writ of certiorari, filed on August 27, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 2, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Yorn © Queer Associate Justice Stanford M. J. Manuia for petitioners/employer/ insurance carrier-appellees on the application Herbert J, Leider for respondent /claimant- appellant in opposition ‘considered by: Moon, C.J, Levingon, Nekayana, Acoba, and Ouffy, JJ. 

3824bd79faf6430d5ff68e3bb17b4767850bd5251f8ee7484a32042ade2e699d

2008-10-02T00:00:00Z

d61ecdd9-e89b-4207-abe9-a8144c7b565a

Lee v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRAR vo. 29332 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T CEDRIC LEE, Petitioner, aad 3 2 ava L YH OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (By: Moon, C.J. for the court’) By letter dated August 8, 2008 and received by our Clerk on August 12, 2008, Cedric Lee attempts to appeal from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s determination there was ‘no basis to investigate" an attorney. ‘The information provided by Lee indicates Lee complained about an attorney representing an opposing party in a divorce action. Under Rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), ‘complaining witnesses are not parties to disciplinary cases|, and they have no standing . . . to seek review of ODC or Disciplinary Board decisions. . . . Thus, if any review is to be had, review must be had by way of [a] petition for writ of mandams.+ In re Disciplinary Board, 91 Hawai'i 363, 368, 984 P.2d 688, 693 (2999). Consequently, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Hawai'i Rules * considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, Jv of Appellate Procedure (HRAP), we consider Lee's letter as a petition for writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus and/or prohibition will not issue unless a petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action : + Mandamus relief is available to Compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an individual only if the individual's claim is clear and certain, the official's duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and no other remedy is available(.} In re Disciplinary Board, 91 Hawai'i at 368, 984 P.2d at 693 (citations omitted) We have previously noted that: Duties imposed by (RSCH] Rule 2 upon [the] ope and the Disciplinary Board are duties owed to this court. In furtherance of those duties and in recognition of the Limited resources available and the difficulties inherent in prosecuting any accusation of unethical behavior, our rules grant to [the] ODC and the reviewing Disciplinary Board menbers the discretion to determine whether pursuit of particular disciplinary allegations is warranted. Id. at 368-69, 984 P.2d at 693-94. Petitioner Lee asserts Disciplinary Counsel's decision implies that this court has found certain alleged misbehavior acceptable. No such implication can be drawn from Disciplinary Counsel's determination “that there is no basis to investigate* the attorney. Likewise, Disciplinary Counsel's determination can have no bearing upon any police or prosecutorial decision with regard to purported criminal charges against the subject attorney or other actors identified by Petitioner Lee, for such decisions to pursue criminal charges are within the discretion of the prosecutors. Petitioner Lee has failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to relief. Therefore IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall file Petitioner Lee's letter as a petition for writ of mandamus and, pursuant to Section 607-3 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, the filing fee for the petition is waived. I? IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to HRAP Rule 21(c), that the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 28, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Le gustice 

3a16e7f5ebee6968b67167a6615b081192f30276e71ed9f49ed5ff7319941def

2008-08-28T00:00:00Z

bf3d0a24-d5e4-4d07-9346-fdbb38eaf736

State v. Pond. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Duffy [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 10/11/2007 [pdf], 117 Haw. 336. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/10/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 287.

118 Haw. 452

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** PREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I o00--= Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee, KEVIN FOND, Petitioner/Defendant-App: wo, 27847 CERTIORARE TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEARS Tee No sstcoeT tal) og SEPTEMBER 29, 2008 ze 8 a2 8 MOON, C.J., SVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ. sie ACOBK, iy CONCURRING AND DISSENTING, ANBAE 2 Giger, eoncussras ano crssewtcne a8 g OPINION OF THE COURT SY NAKAYAMA, J. Petitioner/Defendant~Appellant Kevin Pond (“Pond”) crea’ s' seeks review of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ to its october 30, 2007 judgment on appeal, issued pursua october 11, 2007 opinion,' see State v. Pond, 117 Hawai'i 236, 181 P.3d 415 (App. 2007), affirming the second circuit family March 2, 2006 judgment convicting him court's? ("circuit court! of the offense of abuse of family or household member, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 709-906 (1993 & Supp. 2004)? and interference with reporting an emergency or + the publishes opinion was authored by Associate Judge Corinne KAA. Watanabe and Joined by Associate Judger Deniel R. Foley and Alexa 0.M. Fuj:se. + the Honorable Richard T, Bissen presided. > RS § 709-906, entitled “Abuse of family or household nenbers? gaa  *#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * on of HRS § 710-1010. crime ("Interference offense") in viol (2993 & Supp. 2004). of certiorari, and oral argument was held on June 5, 2008 We accepted Pond’s application for a writ Pond asserts that the ICA gravely erred by concluding that the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence ("HRE”) Rule 404(b)* notice ) Te shall be unlawful for any person, singly of sn concert, to physically abuse 9 famsly of nouseheld nenber or to Tefuse Compliance with the lawfol order of a police officer under subsection (4). The polsee, in insestsgating any complaint of Abuse of a family or household menber, upon request, ney transport the abused person to a hospital or safe shelter For the purposes of this section, “fanily or household menber" nesns spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries, former spouses Or reciprocal beneficiaries, persons who have a child in common, Parents; children, persons related by consanguinity, and persons Jointly’ residing or formerly residing in the sane dvelling unit. Ta}"any police cfficer, with or without a warrant, May arrest a person if the officer has reasonable grounds £0 believe that the person is physically abusing, or has physically abused, a family or household menber and that the person atrested se gutity theres! is} abise of a family or household menber and refusal to comply with the Lawful order of @ police officer under subsection (4] are misdemeanors and the person shell be sentenced a3 follows: (a) For the firet offense the person shall serve a minimum jail sentence of foreyreight hours) and (©) For 2 second offense that occurs within one year of the fiat conviction, the person shall be termed a "repeat offender” and serve 2 minimur jail sentence of thirey days. < _RS § 730-2010.5, entitled “Interference with reporting an emergency or crime,” provided as follows: (3) A person commits the offense of interference with reporting an emergency oF cine if the perscn intentionally oF or witness fos criminal act from phone system, cbtaining medical ‘or making @ report to = law enforcement officer. (2) interference witn the reporting of an energency or crine is a petty misdemeanor. + WRE Rute 404(b) provides Other crimes, wrongs, of acts, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER requirement was a “condition precedent” to (a) admitting “critical evidence of the complainant's prior attack offered to establish (Pond’s] justification of self defense and to establish the complainant as the ‘first aggressor,’” and (b) cross examining the complainant about her marijuana use on the night of the incident, because it violated Fond’s constitutional rights to present a defense and confront adverse witnesses. Pond also asserts that the ICA gravely erred by affirming the conviction where “(a) the self-defense jury instructions were incomplete and misleading and (b) the instructions defining the interference offense failed to specify that the state of mind requirement applied to each of these elements.” Because the circuit court precluded Pond from cross~ examining the complaining witness about whether she used marijuana on December 12, 2005 to show that her perception was inaccurate, it committed reversible error. Accordingly, we vacate Pond’s conviction of abuse of family or household menber and Interference offense, and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. ‘br acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in Sider to prove the character of a person in order to show Conformity therewith. It may, however, be admiseisle where such evidence 22 probative of another fact that is of consequence to the determinstion of the action, such as proof of motive, Cpportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ident ity, modus Operands, of absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection Shall provide reasonable notice In advance of trial, or during tsial ££ the court excuses pretrial notice an good Cause shown, of the date, Location, and generel nature of any such evidence it Intends te ineroguce at eral. 3  A. Factual Background The complaining witness, Miae Russell ("Ms. Russell"), met Fond in the sunmer of 2005, began dating him, and moved into Pond’s house in October 2005. Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 339, 181 P.3d at 418. Ms. Russell and Pond presented conflicting testimony regarding an incident that occurred on December 12, 2005. 1. Mes Russell's account of Decenber 12, 2005 ‘The ICA's published opinion set forth Ms. Russell's account that Pond physically abused her on December 12, 2005, as follows: on the evening of December 12, 2005, (Me. Russell) was alone in Pond’ s residence: At about 5:20’ p.m., she had. spoken by telephone with Pond, who was then at’ the’ Outback Steakhouse. When Pond arrived hone st around 10:30 p.m, she was already asiesp. she woke up wien she heard noises from the sliding glass doce in the Living foom, which she had locked. [te. Russell} testified that she got up and walked co the Living rocm £0 sze who was outside and Pond "walked in through the bedroom screen door.” She then gst back in bed and Pond’ “wae jumping on [her] and climbing on [her], ané-wae kind of like-he was drunk.” (Ss Russell) testified that she knew Pond was drunk because "(je Snelled resily bag” and “when [che] spoke to hin at five-thsety he also told [her] he was drinking.” (us. Russell) testified that after she told Pond to get off her, he responded by jumping on her more. Pond "was piling the Blankets on top of (her), and [2he) was trying to tick them off. Ang then [Pond) went into the bathroom, and (Me. Russell] was trying co fix the blankets." (Ms; Russell) then “asked (Pond) What thst nell nas." in response, Pond “cane walking towards Uher] and then he slammed (her) face into the bed” with one arm and “had his knee or something behind . . [her] arm,” so chat her arm and face were in a “weird position” and she "wae Just buried into the bed and [she] couldn't move.” [Ms- Russell] testified that she “hurt a lot,” “could not breathe[,]” and thought her Jaw and arm were going to break. She also explained thet while Pond was holding her down, he told her that “the resson Why (she) was being punished wae Because [she) didn't. know how to bevobecient. And that’s the last thing thet ne wanted to co, was to hurt (her], but that (she] needed to learn how to respect him.” Ime. Russell} related that “(e]ventually, (Pond) lee golr]” and after he got off of her, he was "Just renting.” She uss’ crying, Still on her knees on her bed, and “screaming for help.” 4 ‘#+* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Bond, Pond approached her again, “grabbed the back of (her) head[,]" tole ner "to shut up, and he Bit down on [Ms. Russell's: mouth’ and ; ss punctured the Bottom part of (Ms, Ruszell's] mouth so hard’ that it ‘west all the way through, Ang the other Bide, it wae ust very awollen and hard. , + and there was locd.”" She received a sear from Pona’s' bite. 117 Hawai'i at 339, 181 P.3d at 418. Ms. Russell then explained that she tried to call the police, but Pond fought her for her phone: Ie. Russell] waz then asked how she got loose after Fond bit her, She Fecpondes, "I think he just let 90, and I got up and Tuas reaching for my purse snd phone, and 1 tried to call the police.” Thereafter, [Ms. Russell] testified as follows Teena] cane over and grabbed the phone frea me and knocked it out of my hand, because we were fighting for it, and everything out. And by that tine I was on my hands and trying to pick everything up. And T =~ my stuff was right to the left of we, and T'was also grabbing my things so that 1 could just get ay things and le: ‘Recording to (Ms. Russell), she told Pond she was calling the police and disled S11 on ner’ phone. she wasn’t Sure iF she Pushed the enter button, “but [she] think|s she) did, because when [she] went to the police station, [ehe] lookea at the prone [and] iE iwaz on there.” She further testified that as she was gathering her'thinge and crying, Pond “said chat he would help (her) carry, Se out or something. He was telling (her) to oe quiet and shut up the whole time.” Pond then “took (her) arm and put it behind her, and shoved [her] face inte the closet docr, and sort of pushed Ther} along the door{,]” causing her face and mouth to bleed. {as. Russell! expressed hat she felt scarea ana she sfelverywhere.” she algo had bruises, welts, cuts, and fingernail narks, Sone of which lasted "at least a week” and “were still visible like ten caye later.” Ker "hair wae (e180) falling out.” [s, Austell] related that she then gathered sone of her things, left the apartment, and drove to the Maul police station in Lanaind. (He, Russell) also related that after the incident, she didcontifued Living with Pond and stopped dating him ime. "Rsae1a} cestitied that she informed Maui Police Department (MPO) Officer Jonathan Kaneshiro [Officer Kaneshiro) that she had told Pong she was calling 911... . «(When Me Aussell] was chen presented with the statenent written py officer Kaneshiro to “refresh ther] menory!,]” (t]he statenent did not mention [her] claim that she had told Pond she was calling S11. Ada at 339-40, 181 P.3d at 418-19, Ms. Russell denied that she was drinking on December 12, 2005. Ms. Russell also denied {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** biting Pond but admitted that she “strike(d) him in self-defense” he bed.” when Pond “was climbing all over [her], when he came 2. Pond’s testimony Pond testified that on December 12, 2005, after running some errands, he had dinner with a female friend at outback Steakhouse. He arrived home between ten to ten-thirty p.m., and he entered through the bedroom door because his normal office room entrance was locked. He saw Ms. Russell in the office room, smelled marijuana, and observed a half full bottle of vodka. He assumed that Ms. Russell bought the alcchol earlier that day and drank half the bottle because they do not normally keep alcohol in the house and she was the only person home. Pond testified that when he walked into the office, he and Ms, Russell smirked at each other, “kissed for a few seconds,” and then Ms. Russell bit on his upper left lip, which resulted in a permanent scar. In response, Pond “bit down on her to release -- to have her release.” Pond testified that Ms. Russell attacked him, and he defended hinsel: A, At that point, (Me. Russel] backed up, she said, vumere the FV have you been?” Who have you Been with?” And at thst point, on the Second phrase that she said that, she punched ne in'the face. Gr "And what do you meen punch you in the face? where is thie? A, Well, the first punch was on my Left side-the first punch; as she was punching me, she says, “where were you?" And Then f saig, I cola her, "You know that I was cut,” and it was none of her business at this point. She punched e and continued, {you know, raising her voice, starting to Scream, "Where the F have you been?” Punched me agein. And I told her, "Stop it, you can't punch me, you're =~ I don’t think because you're a wonan you Gan sit Rere and peat me because I'm bigger than’ you =~ you can best me.” 0 Were you trying to- é *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Ac Wot at that point, verbally told her to stop at that point. "she dia Sf again, ana’ then =~ as she started to do it, I Btarted to defend, and try to protect ayself from those punche: 9..° “Gan you denonstvate fer the jury bow you're defenaiag yourself? "A. Well, she's swinging and I'm trying to block snd throwing her azne off like this for the first few. She kept Guinging and she kept swinging, and I kept trying to block then, And? Blocked a lot of then and 3 lot of then. T blocked myseit T'nean they were just coming =~ she was frantic and hysterical. ‘gost that point, 1 grabbed ner 3 to grab and take her arm so she covidn’t continue swinging st me and hitting me in A." 1. . 1 pushed her back, and she came back towards jain. "And then'at that point, I cook her ana T pushed her back Shen further: A." . . and as 1 pushed her, she went falling into, you know, into’ the corner of the bed. A.” " She fell backwards. 1 pushed her off of me, she was facing he, and she went backwards with her back into the bed, According to Pond, after (Ms. Russell] hit the bed, she sat on the bed, sobbed for a few seconds, “jumped back up,” around the office room and threw a candle. Thereafter, when Ms. Russell was making a phone call, he took the phone and “dropped it on the bed’: [sIhe picked up ner telephone, and was making a phone call I didn’t know what the phone call was.” We pad argued before, and she had made a phone call, and it was toa friend to go over an Stay with her friend. ‘and I took the phone, and I was -~ you know, we were ronmaging to grab the phone, I took the phone and just dropped it on the bed. I said, "You know what, you just seed fo get sll your Stuff, and you need’ to get out of here. Let's just get your things and let’s just end this.” Pond testified that “as (Ms. Russell) was picking up and gathering herself, her stuff, she was kind of throwing her things around,” and theorized that during this time, she may have thrown her phone and broken it. Ms. Russell then went into the bathroom and started to  ‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER cry. Pond joined her in the bathroom to try to clean her lip. Id. “And then at that point, it was just kind of -- it was " pond testified that he did obvious that she wanted to leav not prevent her from leaving and that Ms. Russell did not tell him that she was going to the hospital or the police. 3. Other accounts produced at trial officer Jonathan Kaneshiro (“Officer Kaneshiro") testified that he was working in the Lahaina district on the night of December 12, 2005 at approximately 11:30 p.m. when Ms. Russell arrived at the police station. Ms. Russell had a difficult time relating to him what had occurred because she “was still crying and she would break down from time to time." Officer Kaneshiro observed that Ms, Russell “had an injury to her mouth, [and] a little bruise around her . . . right eye” and did not appear to be intoxicated. Officer Kaneshiro testified that he also noticed that “there was bruising on [Ms. Russell's] left arm, . . . from her wrist to her elbow, and from her entire right arm from the wrist all the way to the shoulder(,]” and that she also sustained an injury to her lip that “wasn’t dripping (blood) or anything, but it looked fresh.” After officers arrested Pond at his home, he was transported to the police station to be processed. officer Keneshire testified that he did not notice any + then Officer Kaneshiro asked Ms. Rus Jin what happened, she stated that after Pond cane hone, [they] got into 2 verbal argument; he Degan pushing her, and.» . at one point pushed her against the wall, she stated that ne hit her in'the head, ané threw her cell iphone) against che Wall while she was trying to call 911, And he Bit her sn the 1ip cr on the Routh, something 1ike that.”  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER, Anjuries on Fond’s body when the officers first arrived at Pond’e Fesidence. . . Officer Kaneshiro acknowledged that it was possible that Pond could have bitten nis tongue or Lips when he haz on the ground lying face down. Officer Kaneshiro recalled That he hed asked Pong at the police station whether Pond had any [nluries and Pond responded thet be haa tone.” pond also denied Shaving any kind of physical altercation with (Ms. Russell)” or that he “picked up (He. Rossell’s] phone ond threw st." Pond, 117 Hawai'i at 341, 161 P.3d at 420. Quetzal Chacon, Pond’s brother, testified that he picked Fond up on the street on December 13, 2005, and that he took a picture of Pond’s lip because Pond told his that he wanted evidence that Ms. Russell bit him. He further stated that the picture admitted into evidence fairly and accurately depicted Pond’s lip on December 13, 2005. B. Procedural History 1. Bond's motion for HRE Rule 404(b) evidence and continuance denied on February 27, 2006, minutes before Pond’s jury trial was scheduled to begin, Pond orally moved for a continuance of trial in order to submit HRE Rule 404(b) evidence that Ms. Russell previously assaulted Pond. Pond’s counsel explained that he only pinpointed the date of the alleged attack that morning and could not have earlier filed a notice of intent to introduce such evidence, He algo argued that the evidence “goes to the heart of our self-defense.” The prosecution argued that defense counsel had the opportunity to present his defense “weeks ago” and that “he’s supposed to provide discovery way before trial and not ask for continuance.” Although the circuit court acknowledged that HRE Rule 404(b) allows notice of the intent to introduce evidence of 9 {+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** bad acts to be given during trial, it ruled against Pond’s motion for a continuance and observed, “I got more than sixty jurors outside, This is the only trial left.” The circuit court also denied the ERE Rule 404(b) motion “for failure to provide notice," opining that “[i]f [the evidence) goes to the heart of the defense, then it should have been something given more prominence earlier. 1 can’t believe that it's that much to the heart of it based on the way it’s dribbling in. 1 think that’s how your client felt.” The case immediately proceeded to trial. During direct examination, Pond described an argunent he had with Ma. Russell “a couple wi ks prior” to December 12, 2005, Pond explained that when he came home from work, he saw Ms. Russell lounging on his bed with her dog, even though he had previously told her that he was allergic to pets and that she could not bring any animals into his house. Pond testified as to the final outcome of the argument: I asked her to take the dog off the bed and she just continued to try and argue with me about the dog. so 1 walked over 0 pick up the dog and take it off the bed, and as I walked over to move ity the dog ran anc jusped off ana went over ~~ went to ansther part Of the house. And she cane over to me and started swearing st me Because, you know, of my stance on ity and you know, proceeded $0. smack no. (Emphasis added.) The prosecution objected and the court reminded Pond’s counsel of its HRE Rule 404(b) ruling and ordered the jury to disregard Pond’s last response. 2. Evidence that Ms. Bu 2 n December 12, 2005) During Ms. Russell's cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether she was smoking marijuana when Pond came home on 10 ++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAILREPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** December 12, 2005. ‘The prosecution objected and the parties approached the bench. Pond’s counsel argued that this evidence is “impeachable” and “goes to her credibility.” However, the court ruled “[iJt’s @ prior bad act” because the question asks hether “she committed a crime that evening before he came hone,” and thus, required that Pond’s counsel give the prosecution HRE Rule 404(b) reasonable notice. The court thereafter struck the last question and ordered the jury to disregard it. 3. dry i _ After the close of evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury, inter alia, as to when a person acts with intentional (instruction 18), knowing (instruction 19), and reckless (instruction 20) states of mind, Then, it instructed the jury regarding the Interference offense: Instruction 22. In Count IT of the complaint, the Defendant, Kevin Pond, is charged with the offense of interference hich reporting an enelgency of crime. A person commits the Offense of Interference with reporting [sic] of an enezgency oF Cline ie chat person intentionally or knowingly prevents a victim Sr witness to a criminal act from calling a 9li-emergency, Telephone systen, obtarning medical assistance, or making 2 report fo a jaw enforcement officer, There are two material elements of the offense of interference with reporting an emergency or crime, each of which the [p]rosecuticn must prove beyond reasonable Soube. ‘Thess elements, these two elements are that on oz, about pecenber 12, 2005 inthe County of Maui, State of Hawei's, the Defendant, Kevin Pond intentionally or knowinely engaged in Conducts and that said conduct resulted in preventing a victim or Witness to a erininal act from calling a Slivemergency telephone System, obtaining medical ascistancey or making a report to a law shtorcement officer. The intentional of keowingly [® of mind applies to each element of the offense. ‘The circuit court also provided the following self- defense jury instruction: ‘The use of force upon or towards another person is justified when n {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 4 person reasonably believes that such force is immediately Retessary to protect Minself on the present occasion against se of unlawful force by the other person. A person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof unger the The force Hetigea wathour retreating. 17, and only af, you fing that the (Gjefendant was reckless in having a belief that he was justifies tn using self-protective force againet angther person, of that the (Slefendant was reckless in acquiring or foiling to aeqeire any knowledge or Belief which was naterial to the sustifiability of his use of force against the otner perscn, then che Use of euch protective force is unavailable as defense to the offente of Sbuse of family or household member’ Pond appealed his conviction on March 1, 2006, the jury found Pond guilty of his Charged offenses, and the circuit court filed a judgment convicting Fond on March 2, 2006. Pond filed a notice of appeal on March 28, 2006. on October 11, 2007, the ICA affirmed the circuit court's judgment in a published opinion and filed a judgment on appeal on October 30, 2007. The ICA held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by precluding evidence that Ms. Russell allegedly struck Pond on a prior occasion and that Ms. Russell had smoked marijuana on December 12, 2005 because “the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the admissibility of HRE Rule 404(b) evidence.” Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 181 P.3d at 429, It also concluded that the circuit court’s jury instruction about the self-protection defense is consistent with the language of the statute regarding the self-protection at 351, 181 P.3d at 429, Finally, it observed that defense. 1 the jury instructions erroneously combined two elements of the Interference offense, but that the error was harmless. Id. 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACTFIC REPORTER *** IT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW certiorari This court considers whether the ICA’s decision reflects *(1) (g)rave errors of law or of fact } or (2) [o}bvious inconsistencies . . . with (decisions) of thlis] court, federal decisions, or (the ICA‘s] own decision[s}" and whether “the magnitude of those errors or incor need for further appeal.” RS $ 602-89 (Supp. 2007). B. Admissibility of Bad Act Evidence istencies dictat[es] the The aduissibility of evidence requires different standaras of review depending on the particular rule of Gvidence at issue.” When application of a particular Gvidentiary rale can yield aly one correct result, the proper stancard for appellate Teview se the Fight /wrong Etendara. [TIhe tragitisea! abuse of discretion stancara Should be applied in the case of those rules of evidence that require a “Judgment call” on the part of the trial State v. St. Clair, 101 Hawai"i 280, 286, 67 P.3d 779, 785 (2003) (citing State v, Pulse, 83 Hawai'i 229, 246-47, 925 P.24 797, ei4-15 (1996). Under HRE Rule 404(b), the proponent of “bad act” evidence “shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial 4£ the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” HRE Rule 404(b). Because the trial court’s determination of reasonable notice involves making @ “judgment call,” the admission of this evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Richie, #8 Hawai'i 19, 37, 960 P.2d 1227, 1245 (1998). ‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the court “clearly 13 {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” sty Clair, 101 Hawai'i at 286, 67 P.3d at 785 (citing State v Eucutand, 76 Hawai'i 172, 179, 673 P.2d 51, 58 (1994). ©. Cross-Examination Violation of the constitutional right to confront adverse Witnesses a subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt Scandara. In applying the harsless beyond a resscnable doust Standard the court is required to examine the record and determine Whether there isa reasonsble possibility that the srrcr Complained of might have contributed to the conviction. State v. Balisbisana, 83 Hawai'i 109, 113-14, 924 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). D. Jury Instructions ven jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue fon appeal, the standara of review is whether, unen read and Considered asa whole, the instructions given are prejudicsally insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, of misleading. Erroneous instructions’ are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal uniess it affirmatively appear fram the record as 3 whole that the error wes Not prejudicial, [iiowever, eleror ie not fo be viewed in isclation and considered purely in the abstract” Ft must be examinea In the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect wich the whole record shows it to be entitled In that context, the real question becomes whether there 12 ¢ reasonable possibility that error might have cont rsbutes te Conviction. If there ia such s reasonable possibility ina eriminal case, then the error ie not harmless beyond a reasonable Goubt, and the judgaent of conviction on which it may have been based’ must be set acide. Tojnce instructional error ie demonstrated, we will vacate, witnout regard to nnether timely objection was made, if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contrinuted to the defendant's conviction, i.e.) that the erroneous jury, instruction was not harsless Beyond a reasonable doubt State vs Michols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 335, 337, 141 P.3d 974, 982, 984 (2006). 14 {++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** III. Drscusson A. The ICA Did Not Gravely Err By Concluding That (1) “The Notice Requirement Is A Condition Precedent To The Admissibility Of HRE Rule 404(b) Evidence” And (2) The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Precluding Pond’s HRE Rule 404(b) Evidence That Ms. Russell Struck Him ‘Two Weeks Prior To The Incident. Pond argues that the ICA gravely erred by con uding that under HRE Rule 404(b), he was required to give the prosecution reasonable notice prior to introducing HRE Rule 404 (b) evidence because it violates his constitutional right to present a defense and examine witnesses. Pond contends that purpose of the notice requirement does not “‘trump’ [his) constitutional rights, particularly where . . . there was no prejudice to the prosecution.” Specifically, he asserts that he sho have been permitted to troduce evidence that Ms. Russell attacked him two weeks prior to December 12, 2005. We disagree. 1. BRE Rule 404(b)"s notice requirement is not nconstitutional. HRE Rule 404(b) was amended in 1994 to provide in pertinent part, In criminal cases, the proponent (offering) evidence Efines, wrongs, of acts) shall provide zeasonable asbice ig Sotios on goed cause show, of the date, ature of any such evidence it intends to (Emphasis added.) Legislative history of HRE Rule 404(b) pro} Toaation, and general ‘ntroduce at eral les that the notice requirement “was modeled after a change recently made to the FRE." Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 567-94, in 1994 House Journal, at 1088. ‘The Advisory Committee Note to the 1991 Amendnent to 15 {1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** FRE Rule 404(b), the federal counterpart to HRE Rule 404(b), explains that the notice requirement “is intended to reduce surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of admissibility."” “Because the notice requirenent serves as condition precedent to admissibility of 404(b) evidence, the offered evidence is inadmissible if the court decides that the notice requirement has not been met.” FRE Rule 404(b) Advisory Committee’s Note (emphases added) . As the ICA pointed out in Pond, HRE Rule 404(b)'s notice requirement differs from its federal counterpart in three ways. ond, 117 Hawai'i at 348, 181 P.3d at 427. Pond clains that one distinction is critical to the instant case -- whereas FRE 404(b) requires the prosecution to provide notice, HRE Rule 404(b) also requires a defendant to give reasonable notice of its 7 The Advisory Committee Note to the 198 Amendnents to FRE Fule 408 (b) further explains! Other than requiring pretrial notice, no specific time Limits are Stated in recognition that what constitutes s reasonable reqies= or disclosure will depend largely on the circunstances of each ‘ine imgnanent requires the prosecution to provide notice, regardless of how it intends to use the extrinsic act evidence at trial, tve., during its case-in-chiet, for impeachment, oF for possible rebuttal. The court in its discretion may, under the facts, decide that the particular request of notice was not ressonable, either because of the lack of timeliness oF Completeness. + ARE Rule 404(b) and the FRE Rule 404(b) also differ because HRE Rule 404(b) requires a more detailed form of notice (date, location, and general nature of any such evidence”) whereas FAE 404 (b) merely requires Sreagonable notice . . . of the general nature of any such evidence.” Zand AT Hawai's at 348, lal P.3a at q27. Further, BRE Rule 404(b), anlike FRE d0e(o)s does not, require Ehat the cther party request that st give prior 16 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** intent to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Fond contends that where the lack of pretrial notice did not prejudice the prosecution, “there is no basis for applying the requirement with equal force to defendants without considering the extent to which exclusion of evidence impinges on the rights to fair trial, to present a defense and of cross-examination.” “The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses *[c)ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’” State v, Sabog, 108 Hawai'i 102, 107, 117 P.3d 834, 839 (App. 2005) (quoting Davis vs Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). Because of the policy favoring cross-examination, “[xlestrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Michigan v. Lucas, $00 U.S. 145, 181 (1992) (quoting Rock v, Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987) (holding that a state rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony impermissibly infringes + cf, Holmes v south carolina, $47 U.S. 319, 326-31 (2006) (ruling hat precluding evidente of third-party guilt where the prosecution has Untrosuced evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict, is unconstitvtional); Cranes, Kentucky, 476 9.5. 663 (1986) (holding thet Skclusing evidence of she circumstances of defendant’ s confession is Unconstitutional); Washineron vw. Zeyas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1976) (holding that a state statute that prohibited the defendant from calling a witness. who had been charged and previously convicted of comuitting the same murder is onal); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410°0.8. 264, 295-96 (1973) precluding the defendant from impeaching nis own witness unde uv 4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** on a defendant's right to testify) } see Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S, 264, 302 (1973) (holding that “where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice”). At the sane time, the United States Suprene Court has ruled that “[tJhe right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right ‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to acconnodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’" Rock, 483 U.S. at 58 (citation omitted); see State Faria, 100 Hawai'i 383, 391, 60 P.3d 333, 341 (2002) (noting that despite a defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness, “relevant evidence ‘may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence’* (quoting HRE Rule 403 (2000))). ‘Thus, “{iJn applying its evidentiary rules a [s]tate must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the Limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.” Bock, 483 U.S. at S67 see also State v, Nizam, 7 Haw. App. 402, 411-12, 771 P.2d 899, 904-05 (1989) (holding that the tutional right was not violated where the defendant's cons: witness's testimony was stricken because the defendant refused to release his interviews upon which his expert witness based his opinion, and that there is @ legitimate interest in “ensuring as  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** that a jury is provided with the relevant evidence on both sides of an issue in order to assist it in determining the truth and arriving at a just decision") cert, denied, 70 Haw. 666, 796 P.2d 502 (1989). ‘The Supreme Court applied the “legitimate interest” rule in Lucas. 500 U.S. at 146. Lucas considered whether the trial court violated defendant Lucas’ right to confrontation when it precluded his proferred evidence for failure to comply with the rape shield statute's notice requirements. Id, The rape shield statute, designed to protect victims of rape from being subjected to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their past sexual behavior, permits a defendant to introduce evidence of his or her own past sexual conduct with the victim if the Gefendant files a written motion and an offer of proof within ten days after he is arraigned. Id, at 146-47. The trial court may also hold “an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible.” Id. Lucas was found guilty of criminal sexual conduct, and on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute’s notice requirement is per ae unconstitutional “even where a defendant's failure to comply with the notice-and-hearing requirement is a deliberate ploy to delay the trial, surprise the prosecution, or harass the victim.” Id. at 149, The Suprene Court granted certiorari. Ide The Supreme Court recognized that the rape shield statute implicates the sixth amendment and that, “[t]o the extent that it operates to prevent 2 criminal defendant tron presenting relevant evidence, the defendants ability to confront advers 19  + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * Witnesses and present a defense is diminished. This does not hecessarily render the statute unconstitutional.” id. at 149 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted and emphasis added). iuucag observed that the defendant's right to present relevant evidence “nay, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Id. (quoting Bock, 483 U.S. at 55) Pursuant to this rule, the Suprene Court recognized the state's interest in the policy underlying the rape shield statute's procedural prerequisites -- to protect rape victins from surprise, harassment, and invasions of privacy, and permit the prosecution to investigate the evidence. Id, at 149-50. Next, the Court pointed to its previous rulings upholding jentiary notice requirements even where such requirements Linited 2 defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. at 150-52 (citing Taylor v. I1linois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988) (rejecting defendant's argunent that “preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation” and holding that the circuit court did not err by refusing to permit defendant’s undisclosed witness to testify after violating a state procedural rule); United States v, Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to permit defendant to call a witness where the defendant refused to comply with the District Court’s order to submit a copy of the witness's report to the prosecution and declaring that “(t]he Sixth Amendnent does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system”); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) 20  [FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** (The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system. . . . [Nlothing in the Due Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with systems of broad discovery designed to achieve these goals."). It further anslogized the notice requirement to the notice of alibi rule that it upheld in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), as follows: ‘me (Suprene] Court observed that the notice requirement ‘by [ifghe in no wey affected (ehe decendanc!2i crucial decision to call a1ibs wi ‘At moat, the rule only compelled {tne defendant] to accelerate the eiming of his dusclosure, foreing him to divulge at an earlier dave snformation that’ (he) planned to divulge at trial.’ (Willaans, 399 0.8. at 65.) Kecelerating the disclosure of this evsdence did fot violate the Gonstivution, the [Supreme] Court explainea, because a criminal trial is not ‘a poker game in which players enjoy 2n absolute Fight always to Conceal their cards uneil played.’ (Jd. at 62.) 1d. at 149. Based on its prior rulings and the state's interest in the rape shield statute, Lucas ruled that precluding evidence based on the rape shield statute’s notice requirement is not per se unconstitutional. Id, at 150, 152-53. However, it remanded the case to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding Lucas’ evidence. Id. at 182-53. In determining whether HRE Rule 404(b)‘'s notice requirenent is also not per se unconstitutional, we next consider the policy governing the rule's notice requirement. As stated above, the Lucag court described sound reasons for requiring pre- trial notice. See Lucas, 500 U.S, at 150-52; cf, Wardius, 412 U.S, at 473 ("Notice-of-alibi rules . . . are based on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a 21 ‘1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximun possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.”). The notice requirement pertaining to HRE Rule 404(b) evidence is Likewise designed to reduce surprise and promote early resolution of admissibility questions. See Pond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 161 P.3d at 429; FRE Rule 404(b) Advisory Committee's Note. Moreover, HRE Rule 404(b) is not unconstitutional merely because it implicates a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses and its federal counterpart does not. As s Note to FRE Rule 404(b) observed, the the Advisory Committe notice requirement is “in the mainstrean with notice and @isclosure provisions in other rules of evidence,” such as FRE Rules 412 (written motion of intent to offer evidence under rule), 609 (written notice of intent to offer conviction older than 10 years), 803(24) and 804(b) (5) (notice of intent to rely on residual hearsay exceptions). Advisory Conmittee’s Note to FRE Rule 404(b). These federal rules of evidence, by their plain language, apply equally to the prosecution and the defense. Like these rules and other Hawai'i rules of evidence," HRE Rule 404 (b) is not per se unconstitutional even though it may restrict a defendant's constitutional right to confront an adverse witness. “The Sixth Amendment is not so rigid” that the HRE Rule 404(b) RE Rule 422 requires = defendant accused of committing sexal assault intending to submit evidence of an alleged victin’s past sensal Behavior to submit written notice fifeeen days pricr to the introdetion of evidence unless the court determines thst the evidence of an issue is newly Giscovered, and HRE Rule 803(24) requires a notice of intent to admit hearsay evidence that has circunstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 22 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** notice requirement violates the sixth amendment in all cases where it is used to preclude HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, see lucas, 50 U.S, at 151. Accordingly, we conclude that HRE Rule 404(b)'s policy of “reducling] surprise and promot [ing] early resolution on the issue of admissibility” “justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify.” ‘The Dissent compares the HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirenent to statutory privileges that “preclude the admission at trial of certain classes of confidential communications” and that may “interfere[] with a defendant's constitutional right to examine.” State v. Peseti, 101 Hawai'i 172, 181, 65 P.3d 119, 128 (2003); gee Concurring and dissenting opinion (“Dissent”) at 16-17, The Dissent argues that the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation trumps HRE Rule 404(b) in certain circumstances in the sane way that it prevails over statutory privileges “upon @ sufficient showing by the defendant.” See Dissent at 16-17 (citing Peseti, 101 Hawai't at 181-82, 65 F.3d at 126-29, The Beseti rule is not outcome dispositive of the instant issue, however, because HRE Rule 404(b) serves a different purpose than a statutory privilege and does not per se exclude evidence. In Peseti, this court considered whether the statutory victim-counselor privilege violated defendant Peseti’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution. 101 Hawai'i at 174, 65 P.3d at 121, This court recognized the worthy goal of 23 **+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** this statute: protecting victim-counselor communications assures victims that “their thoughts and feelings will remain confidential” and thereby promotes successful counseling. id. at 180, 65 P.3d at 127. of a statutory privilege . . . is tempered by the principle that Yet, we also recognized that “[t]he scope ‘privileges preventing disclosure of relevant evidence are not favored and may often give way to 2 strong public interest.” Id, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Citing te Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20, which held that a defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses trunps the confidentiality of a juvenile’s record, and other courts’ rulings that statutory privileges may give way to a defendants’ constitutional right, we held that “when 2 statutory privilece interferes with a defendant's constitutional right to cross- examine, then, upon a sufficient showing by the defendant, the witness’ statutory privilege must, in the interest of the truth- seeking process, bow to the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Ida at 101-62, 126-29 (emphasis added). The Dissent contends that defendants should be permitted to bring forth HRE Rule 404(b) evidence if they satisfy the statutory privilege test laid out in Beseti because it “toperate[s} to preclude the admission at trial of certain’ information," gee Dissent at 16-17, but the Eessti rule was not \ pesets declared that a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation trumps a statutory privilege When the defendant demonstrates that: “{1) there is 2 legitimate Reed to disclose the protected information; (2) the information is 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** designed or intended to address evidentiary notice requiremen The adoption of this rule was based on the purposes of statutory ileges and, accordingly, only applies to “evidence of a pri statutorily privileged confidential communication.” Peseti, Hawai'i at 180-82, 65 P.3d at 127-29. Moreover, unlike a statutory privilege, HRE Rule 404(b) does not automatically render evidence inadmissible. Rather, HRE Rule 404(b) evidence may be admitted where the proponent provided reasonable notice or had good cause for lack of pretrial notice. See HRE Rule 404(b) (requiring “reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown” (emphasis added) ); Bond, 117 Hawai‘ at 350, 181 P.3d at 429 (declaring that “the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the admissibility of BRE Rule 404(b) evidence”). Although the Dissent indicates that it is not claiming that a “rule that impinges on a defendant's constitutional right is unconstitutional per s¢,” see Dissent at 32, applying the Peseti test to otherwise admissible HRE Rule 404(b) evidence invariably renders the rule’s notice requirenents unconstitutional as applied to criminal defendants. The application of the Peseta test to HRE Rule 404(b) would always allow defendants to present HRE Rule 404(b) evidence that did not Televant and raterial to the issue before the court; and (3) the forty seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a preponderance of Eke evigence that no less intrusive source for that information eset, 101 Mawas's at 182, 65 P.3d at 129 (quoting State vs LuleB., 270 HedeSuper. 429, 637 A-2d $32, 837 (25841) 25 1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** comport with the HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirement. In other words, it appears that relevant HRE Rule 404(b) evidence would always satisfy the Beseti test and therefore, be rendered admissible. Seg Zeseti, 101 Hawai'i at 162, 65 P.dd at 129 (requiring that “(1) there is a legitimate need to disclose the protected information[,] (2) the information is relevant and material to the issue before the court[,) and (3) the party seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a preponderance of the evidence that no less intrusive source for that information exists"), Therefore, to hold that the Beseti rule applies to the admission of defendants’ HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, on the basis of protecting defendants’ constitutional rights, would effectively rewrite HRE Fule 404(b) and render the notice requirement per se unconstitutional. As explained above, HRE Rule 404(b), like many discovery rules, is designed to reduce surprise during the criminal trial and maintain fairness for both parties. Similar to the notice of alibi rule, the HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirement **[a]t most, . . . only compelled [the defendant} to accelerate at an earlier date information that [he] planned to divulge at trial."” Williams, 399 0.5. at 85. By precluding parties from introducing HRE Rule 404(b) evidence during trial and surprising the opposing party without good cause, this notice requirement protects parties and the juzy trial system from falling prey to opposing counsel's trial tactics and strategies that do not promote a fair trial. Cf, Willjams, 399 U.S. at 82 (The adversary system of trial . . . 4s not a poker game in 26 ‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** ch players enjoy an absolute right to conceal their cards 1 HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirement comports until played."). with this court’s interest in promoting the orderly administration of justice and does not interfere with the Gefendant’s constitutional rights, Cf. Baxter vs State, 522 N.B.2d 362, 369 (Ind. 1988) ("[NJotice rules promote the orderly administration of justice by preventing unnecessary continuances and by eliminating trials in those instances where post-notice investigation reveals an alibi’s merits.” (quoting Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 917 (Teh Cir. 1982))). Having concluded that HRE Rule 404(b) is not per se unconstitutional, we next consider whether the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding Pond’s HRE Rule 404 (b) evidence in the present case. See Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (1992) ("Because trial judges have broad discretion both to determine relevance and to determine whether prejudicial effect or other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence, we will find a Sixth Amendment violation only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted.)). 2 ‘Thecircuit court did not abuse ite discretion by. precluding evidence that Ms. Aussell previous: As discussed above, Pond attempted to introduce “HRE Rule 404(b) evidence” on the first day of trial by arguing that it is “highly relevant to the issue of ‘first aggressor,’ but the circuit court ruled that Pond gave unreasonable notice of this evidence. ‘The circuit court excluded this HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, opining, “If it goes to the heart of the defense, then 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER it should have been something given more prominence earlier. 1 can’t believe that it's that much to the heart of it based on the way it?s dribbling in.” As the Dissent points out, Pond’s proferred evidence may implicate HRE Rule 404(a)(2). See Dissent at 18 (citing HRE Rule 404(a) (2) (providing that victims’ character traits offered by an accused may be admitted “to provie] action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion”)). Based on its plain language, HRE Rule 404(a) (2) evidence is not subject to the reasonable notice provision of HRE Rule 404(b). Nevertheless, Pond identified the alleged attack of Pond by Ms. Russell as “404 (b) evidence” in his opening brief’s points of error section and argued that the court erred in excluding the HRE Rule 404 (b) evidence. Thus, the issue of the admissibility of this evidence under HRE Rule 404(al was not asserted by defendant and is therefore deemed waived. See Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (*HRAP") Rule 28(b) (4) ("Points not presented in accordance with this section will be disregarded, except that the appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.”); HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) (providing that the opening brief must contain an argument section “containing the contentions of the appellant on the points presented and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on. . . . Points not argued may be deemed waived”). The record indicates that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pond’ s quest to introduce Ms. 28 *#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Russell's prior acts under HRE Rule 404(b). On the first day of trial, defense counsel explained to the court that he was previously aware of the “(HRE Rule] 404(b) event,” but did not give the prosecution notice becuse he “wasn’t able to pinpoint the day until [that] morning." This argument was disingenuous at best. hen Pond’s counsel attempted to introduce the alleged HRE Rule 404(b) evidence at trial, both Pond and his counsel merely approximated the date of the event. On dire examination, the following collequy tock place between Pond and his counsel ‘The reason you're hel son late Beceaber 12, 3 Lath, she had *-"r'nad cone hone from work and she had the dog and ielae laying up on my bed, and just Lounging on the bed. (Emphases added.) Pond’ s argument for excusing pretrial notice is inconsistent with his testimony, which clearly did not “pinpoint” the date of the prior incidents. Accordingly, Pond Gid not establish good cause for delaying the notification of the HRE Rule 404(b) evidence until the day of trial. We further note that defense counsel could have given the prosecution general notice prior to trial to eliminate undue surprise and allow the prosecution the opportunity to prepare for thie matter. See Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 161 P.3d at 429 (observing that Pond never explained “why he could not have provided earlier notice of the approximate tine period of the alleged bad act, as well as the location and the general nature of the evidence”). Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by declining to excuse 29 {+** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** pretrial notice on good cause shown and precluding Pond’s HRE Rule 404(b) evidence. B. The Circuit Court Committed Reversible Error By Precluding Pond From Cross-Examining Me. Russell About Whether She ‘Smoked Marijuana on December 12, 2005. Pond next argues that the ICA gravely erred by concluding that he was required to provide reasonable notice of his intent to cross-examine Ns. Fussell about using marijuana on December 12, 2005 to attack her perception and recollection. It is well recognized that a defendant may cross-examine the witness “as to her drug use and addiction at or near the time of the incident to the extent that it affected her perception or recollection of the alleged event.”? Sabog, 108 Hawai'i at 111, 117 P.3d at 843 (citing Wilgon v, United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914) (concluding that witness’s drug use was admissible to discredit the witness's reliability); Blumhagen v, State, 11 P.3d 889 (Wyo. 2000) ("A witness’ [sic] use of drugs while she is testifying or during the events about which she is testifying may, of course, be presented to the jury because the drug use could have affected the witness’ [sic] observations or statements.”)). “Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve In Band, the ICA explaine evidence of acts which are sinttinsse that FRE Rule 40¢(b) "does not extend to the charged offense.’ bond, 117 Hawai'i at 248, 181 8.3¢ at 427 (quoting FRE Rule 40s (b) Advisory Committee’ s Note). However, we have recentiy rejected the extrinsic/intrineic evidence distinction because it “essentially Aullif(tes) Mule 404(b]'2 restrictions on “bad act” evidence.” State vy Fetelee, 117 Hawai'i 53, 81, 175 P.3d 709, 737 (2008) 30 1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the crogs-exaniner hag traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 emphasis added), As further discussed below, evidence introduced to impeach a witness’s sensory or mental defect does not fall under the purview of HRE Rule 404(b). ‘The application of HRE Rule 404(b) is limited to other crimes, wrongs, or acts “[that] is probative of another fact that 4s of consequence to the determination of the action.” HRE Rule 404(b). United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (Sth Cir. 1995) his point. in Tomblin, the Sth Circuit is instructive on discussed whether the prosecution was required to give advance notice of its intent to impeach the defendant through cross- examining him about other acts. Thomblin, 46 F.3d at 1368. The prosecution contended that its cross-examination questions were probative of Tomblin’s character for truthfulness and is admissible under FRE Rule 608(b)" -- evidence offered to impeach a witness. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1388. The Sth Circuit agreed that the admissibility of other acts evidence depends on the PRE 6081) provides, lb) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a xitness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime ag provided in rule €08, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. they may, however, in the discretion of the court, if Drobative of truthulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on Erose-ewanination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulnesa, ax (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or ontrathfalness oF ansther witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has Testifies! BL  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** purpose for the proffered evidence and noted that FRE Rule 404 (b) applies “when other-acts evidence is offered as relevant to an issue in the case, such as identity or intent.” Id, Tomblin determined that the prosecution intended to question the defendant about his alleged prior acts to probe his character for ness. Id, at 1389, Therefore, FRE Rule 608(b), not FRE Rule 404(b), applied, and “reasonable notice” of this evidence trut! was not required. Ide Here, contrary to the conclusion of the ICA and the ruling of the circuit court, Pond was not required to provide the Prosecution HRE Rule 404(b) “reasonable notice” prior to cross~ examining Ms. Russell about whether she used marijuana on December 12, 2005 because he intended to show the jury that her perception and testimony about the incident were not credible. See United states v. Backes, 649 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir.1980) (No rule or rationale guarantees the defense advance knowledge of legitimate impeachment before it calls a witness.”), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981). Hence, the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's ruling that precluded Pond from cross~ examining Ms. Russell about her alleged marijuana use on December 12, 2005 based on HRE Rule 404(b). ‘The circuit court committed reversible error in limiting the cross-examination of Ms. Russell as to her marijuana use." Pond was deprived of showing that Ms. Russell's 32 ++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** perception of the events was altered through her alleged use of marijuana, Pond’s testimony that he smelled marijuana upon entering the house was insufficient to prove that Ns. Russell's perception on December 12, 2005 was inaccurate. Tf the court permitted Pond’s counsel to question Ns. Russell on this issue directly, the jury could have observed Ms. Russell's response and lity. See Lyba v. State, 321 Md. 564, 583 A.2d 1033 (1991) ("[T]he defense could follow up the adm: judged her cre: sion (that the victim took narcotics on the day in question] by delving the degree of drug influence or alcchol intoxication so that the jury could decide the credibility of the victim and how much weight to give her testimony.”). In convicting Pond of the two offenses, the jury found Ms. Russell credible and believed Ms, Russell's testimony about Decenber 12, 2005 over Pond’s testimony, There vas a reasonable possibility that the errors complained of contributed to Pond’s conviction. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we vacate ‘The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the Central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual Question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes Public respect for the crisinal process by focusing on the Snderlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually Ihevitable presence of inmaterial error Yan Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, The Suprone Court deemed the following factors jortant th getermining whether the constitutional error was aarmleas: the Sinportance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’ e case, nbether the testimony was cunulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating oF contradicting the cestinony of the witness on material points, the extent of Gross-exanination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of fhe prosecution's case.” Idi at eet. 33 ++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Pond’s convictions. ©. The ICA Did Not Gravely Err By Concluding That The Circuit Court Properly Instructed the Jury On Self-Defense Inasmuch As It Adequately Tracked the Self-Protection Defense Statute. Next, Pond contends that the ICA gravely erred by did not err 4 concluding that the circuit cou: structing the jury about the self-protection defense even though it did not “define for the jury that the reasonableness of [Fond’s] belief must be viewed from his perspective.” Under HRS $ 703-304(3) (1995 & Supp. 2006), the statute regarding the use of force in self-protection as a defense, “a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is used without retreating, surrendering, possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do, or abstaining from any lawful action.” (Emphasis added.) See State v. Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 477, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990) (*(T]he standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant’ s belief for the need to use deadly force is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances as he believed them to be. The jury, therefore, must consider the circumstances as the Defendant subjectively believed then to be at the time he tried to defend himself.” (citation omitted)). ‘The self-defense jury instruction provide ‘The use of force upon of tovards another person ia justified unen 2 pergoa reasonably believes that such force ie immediately, protect himself on the present occasion against the 34 ‘1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * se of unlawful force by the other pe A person exploying fotective force may estimate Thereot unger ing ra he ees ss sibs when the force GAGS ithoce retreating. “if, and only if) you tind that the [ajefendant was reckless 5 having a belicf that he was justifies [nlGsing self-pretactive foree against another person, oF that the (Sjefendant was reckless in sequiring or failing to acquire any [nowiedge of belief which vas material co the Justifiapility of Rie ose of forse against the other person, then the use of such protective force ia unavailable as a defense to the offense of Ebise of family or nousenold member asmuch as ‘This instruction sufficiently tracks HRS § 703-304(3) it informs the jury that the reasonableness of Pond’s belief must be viewed from his perspective, Because the jury must consider sonable “under the whether the defendant's belief was ri circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be,” it necessarily evaluates the situation from the defendant's ed that the perspective. Therefore, the ICA properly deter circuit court’s jury instruction was consistent with the language of the self-protection defense statute. D. We Clarify that There Are Two Attendant Circumstances: (1) Me. Russell Was a Victim of a Crime and (2) The Call Was Made to 911-Emergency Telephone System. Finally, Pond argues that the ICA gravely erred by ruling that the circuit court erred by combining the elements of the Interference offense but ruling that this error was harmless. The ICA, in agreement with the prosecution and Pond, ruled th the jury's instructions as to the Interference offense consisted of two elements, results of conduct and attendant circumstances. Bond, 117 Hawas‘i at 352, 161 P.3d at 431. We take this opportunity to clarify the ICA's analysis of the Interference offense’s attendant circumstance element. 35  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Under HRS §§ 702-204 and 702-205 (1993), “{A] person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intention knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, respect to each element of the offense,” (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct.” In State M.Rivohi, 109 Hawai'i 115, 123 P.3d 1210 (2005), this court observed that the Model Penal Code does not define an attendant circumstance, and we adopted the ICA's definition of an “attendant circumstance” as stated in State v. Moser, 107 Hawai'i 159, 172, 111 P.3d 54, 67 (App. 2005): [a)ny circumstances defined in an offense that are neither conduct nor the results of conduct would, by default, constitute attendant circumstances elements of the offense.” Aiwohi, 109 Hawai'i at 127, 123 P.3d at 1222. In applying this definition of an attendant circumstance, we distilled the three elements of the offense of manslaughter (“recklessly causes the death of another person”). “the conduct is,any voluntary act or omission, the result is death, and the attendant circumstance is ‘of another person./” in In the instant case, Pond is guilty of the Interference offense if he “intentionally or knowingly prevents a victim or witness to a criminal act from calling a 91l-energency telephone system, obtaining medical assistance, or making @ report toa law enforcement officer." HRS § 109-906. Applying this court's definition of attendant circumstances, the conduct is any voluntary act or omission, the result is preventing Ms. Russell from making a telephone call, and the attendant circumstances are 36 IR. PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE! hat (1) Ms. Russell was a victim of a crime and (2) the call was to Qli-energency. As previously quoted, and worth repeating here, the jury instruction on the Interference offense mistakenly stated in pertinent part that the intentional or knowing state of mind 4g required for two elements: (2) that Pond “engaged in conduct” and (2) “that said conduct resulted i preventing a victim or witness to a criminal act from calling a 911-emergency telephone system, obtaining medical assistance, or making report to a lew enforcement officer.” ‘hus, on renand, the elements of “results-of-conduct” (that Pond successfully prevented Ms. Russell from making 2 telephone call) and “attendant circumstances” -- (1) that Ms. Fussell vas a victim of a criminal act and (2) that the call was made to 911-emergency telephone system -- should be separately listed. Iv. coNcLusrON Based upon the foregoing analysis, we vacate Fond’s conviction of abuse of family or household menber and Interference, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Deborah L, Kim and ‘Theresa Marshall, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner /defendant- appellant Kevin Pond PEM kim Richard Minatoya and Seatad Brandon L.K. Paredes, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent /plaintiff- appellee State of Hawai'i 37 

f29e475aa079e6f0798b07748dfe6b6196e3b8fe1939e9dd48310ea5d101ac5c

2008-09-29T00:00:00Z

aebef2e4-19c9-4d6d-a19d-fa94685c8938

Cobb-Adams v. Koga Engineering and Construction, Inc.

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 27419 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I GERD K. COBB-ADAMS, Respondent-Appellee, KOGA ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. and KEMPER EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioners-Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CASE NO. AB 2003-501 (WH) (9-99-00397) } ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Nakayama, J., for the court’) Petitioners-Appellants’ application for writ of certiorari filed on July 29, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawas's, August 26, 2008. FOR THE COURT: Prete Outer Associate Justice Laurie B. Keeno for petitioners~appellants on the application Yiivan aus = C c 9S:1 Hd 9z-onVaide ‘considered by: Moon, C.J.1 Levineon, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 39. 

f9b23e282be92c017eba046f744e4a3aa183e25b38f55e68e053017267f85d0a

2008-08-26T00:00:00Z

4a6fac9d-c5e1-4728-bafc-261ffcaaf71a

State v. Taylor

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY wo. 26761 . a 8 DU THE SUPREME coURD oF tHe srare of aaE — -& s 2 _ rr et STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee = Ss ws. § roi TAILOR, et itioner-Appellent CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (en No bee dsaas8) so28 s cena tay: Mon, Gna tor the court) Fetitioner-appellant Tomy Taylor’s application for writ of certiorari, filed october 1, 2008, is hereby rejected. Honolulu, Hawai‘i, October 21, 2008. DATED: FOR THE COURT: and Duffy, av. * Considered by: Moon, ¢.J., Levinson, Nekayana, Acoba, 

a14c9854501c819ff47a2474b36a4650612c501736fc23e30075976ef9b481e9

2008-10-21T00:00:00Z

d4b37eff-5cdc-4768-8d54-22ba1720b125

Karagianes v. State

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 26801 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T GARY KARAGIANES, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Respondent-Appellee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (8.P.P. NO. 03-1-0005) Ic G CERTION (By: Duffy, J., for the court, and Acoba, J., dissenting’) Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Gary Karagianes’s application for a writ of certiorari, filed on July 1, 2008, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 13, 2008. Vone, Dudy de crys WUVA ViauON SO-OINY £1 Siw eiue Considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinscn, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, Tre) FOR THE COURT: ior fl ey Ss oats 

39eea223e8e9f0f20c7138ffff4f3bdb97dbedd81196cd589b28a4b105be19f5

2008-08-13T00:00:00Z

8b49794d-763f-44ea-ad48-66bb2390c5a4

Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY No. 27840 8- 38 age IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T ors HAWAII INSURERS COUNCIL, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appelice ASE hig LINDA LINGLE, GOVERNOR, STATE OF HAWAII; GEORGINA K. KAWAMURA, DIRECTOR’ OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND FINANCE: LAWRENCE M. REIFURTH, “DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, INSURANCE CONSUMER AFFAIRS; J.P. SCHMIDT, DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Pet itioners/Defendants-Appellants CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIV. NO. 02-12-2295) w (By: Duffy, J., for the court) Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants’ application for a weit of certiorari, filed on July 30, 2008, is hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 8, 2008. Kinberly Teunoto Guidry, FoR THE couRT: 7 Deputy Solicitor General, tna Janes F. Nagle, en @ Deputy attorney General, Gm ¢. Bey fre seat “} fe peeteloness/ Aroociete sustice (gy defendants-appellants of Gh the application Gary M. Slovin, Lisa Woods Munger, and Bruce L. Lamon (Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel} for respondent /plaintiff- appellee on the response * considered by: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, JJ. 

1f26f14cf0f20fc171eaf3f7a7a6a59c1375048098f32652fc0c8c7efad9e661

2008-09-08T00:00:00Z

36fb6001-2ee2-4186-9672-801c797b2fe6

Hamilton v. Lethem

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 27580 ‘OGNYN a3 OF THE STATE OF eo HAMILTON, on behalf of AMBER J. LETHEM, nor, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee. (98 WY 62 435 woe CHRIS L. LETHEM, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant. eee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (FC-DA NO. 05-1-1977) RDER ING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF (By: Moon, C.J., for the court”) Petitioner /defendant-appellant’s application for writ of certiorari, filed August 14, 2008, is hereby accepted. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai's, September 23, 2008. chris &, Letham, FOR THE COURT: be ittoner/ dete eepeliane, appearing pro se Le, SEAL *) Cee + considered by: Moon, c.3., Levinson, Nekayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 39) 

e864ee4d005813f4f26604dcdb1f9875fd94f1cc7ca550eba6d8802d57e352c3

2008-09-23T00:00:00Z

d7c2e14b-0e91-4ed6-836e-f8065ec782ca

State v. Tunoa

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY wo, 28456 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I OO iff-Appellge, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Plaint Ix ay ig 01 190 geo Petitioner-Defendant-Ay aka ELU, ams EMANELU TUNOA, eee CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF A\ 65) (CR. NO. 03+ ECTING TION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAR J-, for the court") (By: Nakayama, Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant’'s application for writ of certiorari filed on September 19, 2008, is hereby rejected. October 19, 2008. Hawai'i, DATED: Honolulu, FOR THE COURT: Bete 6 Nee ane Associate Justice Shawn A. Luiz for Pet itioner-Defendant-Appellant on the application Moon, C-J., Levinsen, Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, Jv. ‘considered by 

eda5033aa25752addfa92b4944e2a2a45c09bf15fd170daa8b190217e1acfce4

2008-10-10T00:00:00Z

63e3bfeb-1e2b-4e61-914a-81437a9f0845

Castillo-Barkley v. Cronin

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW UBRARY No. 29371 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T MARY JEAN CASTILLO-BARKLEY, Plaintiff, aaa KEVIN B, CRONIN, CHIEF ELECTION OFFICER FOR THE STATE OF HAWAI'I, Defendant. sO1KY 2-190! ORIGINAL PROCEEDING GS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Accba, JJ. and Intermediate Court of Appeals’ Judge Foley, ) in place of Duffy, J., unavailable) We have considered Plaintiff Mary Jean Castillo~ Barkley’s Election Complaint and Defendant Kevin 8. Cronin's motion to dismiss or for sumary judgment. Having heard this matter without oral argument and in accordance with HRS § 11- 173.8(b) (Supp. 2007) (requiring the suprene court to “give judgment fully stating all findings of fact and of law”), we set forth the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter the following judgment. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Hanalei ¥. Aipoalani was one of two Democratic party candidates for the office of state representative, District 44, in the September 20, 2008 primary election. 2. The primary election results for the Democratic candidates for the office of state representative, District 44, were: (1) Karen Awana: 1,072 votes; (2) Hanalei Aipoalani: 1,012 votes; (3) blank votes: 233; and (4) over votes: 1 3. The above election results were challenged by a complaint filed on September 26, 2008 by plaintiff Mary Jean Castille-Barkley Plaintiff Castillo-Barkley filed her compl int “{als a concerned voting resident of Hawaii and treasurer for the ‘Friends of Hanalei Aipoalani.'” 5. Defendant Cronin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for plaintiff Castillo-Barkley’s lack of requisite standing, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW “With respect to any election, any candidate, or qualified political party directly interested, or any thirty voters of any election district, may file a complaint in the supreme court.” HRS § 11-172 (Supp. 2007). 2. An election complaint filed by a plaintifé who is not within a category of plaintiffs specified by HRS § 11-172 is subject to dismissal for lack of standing. Elkins vs Arivoshi, 56 Haw. 47, 48, 527 P.2d 236, 237 (1974). 3. Plaintiff Castillo-Barkley is not within a category of plaintiffs specified by HRS § 11-172. She is not a proper party to the election contest complaint and she lacks requisite standing under HRS § 11-172. supGMENT Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the election contest complaint is dismissed. The clerk of the supreme court shall with sei certified copy of s judgment ief election accordance with HRS § 11. 73.5(b). TED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 2, 2008. Mary Jean Castillo-Barkley, plaintiff pro se On the complaint Aaron H. Schulaner, em Mikonson General Counsel, Office of Elections, for defendant Kevin 8. Cronin on the Mme edeyaree motion to dismiss 

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2008-10-02T00:00:00Z

9814d263-a47e-4dfa-8378-f684b4e6855c

Woodruff v. Ayabe

29244

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

No. 29244 KELLEY WOODRUFF, M.D. and z HAWAII CHILDREN'S BLOOD AND CANCER GROUP, Peticigaiils, “Z On Ha Ge TOF AON THE HONORABLE BERT I. AYABE, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI‘T HAWAI'I PACIFIC HEALTH; KAPI‘OLANI MEDICAL SPECIALISTS: KAPI'OLANI MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILOREN; ROGER DRUE; FRANCES A. HALLONQUIST; NEAL WINN, M.D. SHERREL HAMMAR, M.D.; DELOTTTE § TOUCHE, LLP; and DENNIS M. WARREN, ESQ., Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (CIVIL NO. 02-1-0090) ORDER (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus and motion to stay Civil No. 02-1-0090 filed by petitioners Kelley Woodruff, M.D. and Hawaii Children’s Blood and Cancer Group and the papers in support, it appears that the standard for granting mandamus relief from a pretrial discovery ruling is not applicable to petitioners’ case inasmuch as Civil No, 02-1-0080 has already been litigated on the merits by sunmary judgment. The respondent judge's rulings are forthwith 2-1-0090 appealable upon entry of a final judgment in Civil No. and petitioners have an adequate remedy by way of appeal. ‘Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to mandamus relief. see Kena Gaddis, 91 Hawai‘ 200, 204, 962 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately aaws the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures.). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus and the motion to stay Civil No. 02-1-0090 are denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, guly 29, 2008. Gyr Sle PrC scp — Peseteg O° diy ume po Coen € Detegites 

0109383637ee1429bb2e5946772c6c0b3e4e89a5b1002ea5f2294ec8a4274d56

2008-07-29T00:00:00Z

da8eccac-5a0b-4540-94b3-5d9c19447a11

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Tate

hawaii

Hawaii Supreme Court

LAW LIBRARY no. 28532 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner; "I= vs. © = TATE, Respond: z 6 JANE E, TATE, Respondent 2 8 5 L ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (ope 06109-8449, 07-023-8473, 07-014-8474, 07-167-8627) (By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Disciplinary Board's Report and Recommendation for the Disbarment of Jane E, Tate and Respondent Tate's lack of objection thereto as exhibited by her failure to file an answer to the Petition as permitted by Rule 2.7(c) of the Rules of the Suprene Court of the State of Havai'i (RSCH) or to request briefing as permitted by RSCH 2.7(d), it appears that Respondent Tate committed multiple violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1,15(a) (1), 1-15(e), 1-15(@), 1.15(£) (4), 2.16(a), 1-16(4), 3.2, 3.410), B.1la), 8.1(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct. It further appears that Respondent Tate has departed from the State of Hawai'i, and making discipline effective thirty (30) days after entry of this order, see RSCH 2.16(c), would be pointless. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v, DeMelle, 61 Haw. 223, 225, 601 P.2d 1087, 1088 (1979). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Jane E. Tate is disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdic effective upon entry of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as conditions for reinstatement, 1. Respondent Tate shall pay restitution as follows: a. $1,750.00 to Megan A. Uyehara: b. $1,750.00 to Sherry L. Baus; and $545.00 to Nalani K. A. Ttomura. 2, Respondent Tate shall pay the costs of these proceedings as approved upon timely submission of a bill of costs, and shall comply with the requirements of RSCH 2.16. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 2, 2008. Hoo Bea Retcricen Pei Oe eaey One oe Bene. bratty 

085893a8c355e090108f3e76f9ca8e9f1e989e1d4c6f950b0f35008c76ce2167

2008-09-02T00:00:00Z