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Cain & Abel is a publicly available toolkit with the ability to conduct attacks like ARP cache poisoning in order to capture credentials being transmitted on the network. | 1 | accept | T1557.002 | Man |
Astaroth can check for Windows product ID's used by sandboxes and usernames and disk serial numbers associated with analyst environments. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
BadPatch attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name BIOS and motherboard information. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
CSPY Downloader can search loaded modules PEB structure file paths Registry keys and memory to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names if a filename ends with .Md5.exe and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Denis ran multiple system checks looking for processor and register characteristics to evade emulation and analysis. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Dyre can detect sandbox analysis environments by inspecting the process list and Registry. | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
EvilBunny's dropper has checked the number of processes and the length and strings of its own file name to identify if the malware is in a sandbox environment. ;; Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments. ;; FinFisher obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list in order to check for sandbox/virtualized environments. ;; Frankenstein has used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running including VMWare and Virtualbox. ;; GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a. ;; Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the vpcext instruction. ;; GravityRAT uses WMI to check the BIOS and manufacturer information for strings like VMWare" "Virtual" and "XEN" and another WMI request to get the current temperature of the hardware to determine if it's a virtual machine environment. ;; InvisiMole can check for artifacts of VirtualBox Virtual PC and VMware environment and terminate itself if they are detected. ;; Lucifer can check for specific usernames computer names device drivers DLL's and virtual devices associated with sandboxed environments and can enter an infinite loop and stop itself if any are detected. ;; MegaCortex has checked the number of CPUs in the system to avoid being run in a sandbox or emulator. ;; Okrum's loader can check the amount of physical memory and terminates itself if the host has less than 1.5 Gigabytes of physical memory in total. ;; OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature to check the temperature to see if it’s running in a virtual environment. ;; OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a variant that checks a number of system parameters to see if it is being run on real hardware or in a virtual machine environment. ;; PlugX checks if VMware tools is running in the background by searching for any process named "vmtoolsd". ;; PoetRAT checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of "License.txt" and exiting. ;; Pupy has a module that checks a number of indicators on the system to determine if its running on a virtual machine. ;; Remcos searches for Sandboxie and VMware on the system. ;; RogueRobin uses WMI to check BIOS version for VBOX bochs qemu virtualbox and vm to check for evidence that the script might be executing within an analysis environment. ;; ROKRAT checks for sandboxing libraries. ;; Smoke Loader scans processes to perform anti-VM checks. ;; SUNBURST checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment. ;; SynAck checks its directory location in an attempt to avoid launching in a sandbox. ;; ThiefQuest uses a function named is_debugging to perform anti-debugging logic. The function invokes sysctl checking the returned value of P_TRACED. ThiefQuest also calls ptrace with the PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH flag to prevent debugging. ;; Trojan.Karagany can detect commonly used and generic virtualization platforms based primarily on drivers and file paths. ;; UBoatRAT checks for virtualization software such as VMWare VirtualBox or QEmu on the compromised machine. ;; yty has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC Sandboxie and VMware. " | 1 | accept | T1497.001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Ebury can deactivate PAM modules to tamper with the sshd configuration. | 1 | accept | T1556.003 | Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules |
Skidmap has the ability to replace the pam_unix.so file on an infected machine with its own malicious version that accepts a specific backdoor password for all users. | 1 | accept | T1556.003 | Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules |
This malware downgrades security features by deactivating pluggable authentication modules (PAM) modules.
| 1 | accept | T1556.003 | Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules |
The malware replaces the system’s pam_unix.so file (the module responsible for standard Unix authentication) with its own malicious version (detected as Backdoor.Linux.PAMDOR.A). As shown in Figure 2, this malicious pam_unix.so file accepts a specific password for any users, thus allowing the attackers to log in as any user in the machine.
| 1 | accept | T1556.003 | Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules |
Our roadmap is pretty simple: add a custom PAM module that logs the credential in plaintext and send it to our C&C though a DNS resolution. | 1 | accept | T1556.003 | Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules |
Remsec harvests plain-text credentials as a password filter registered on domain controllers. | 1 | accept | T1556.002 | Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter Dll |
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain local user or administrator logs in or changes a password. | 1 | accept | T1556.002 | Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter Dll |
The library was masquerading as a Windows password filter, which is something administrators typically use to ensure passwords match specific requirements for length and complexity. The module started every time a network or local user logged in or changed a password, and it was able to view passcodes in plaintext.
| 1 | accept | T1556.002 | Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter Dll |
ProjectSauron usually registers its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local. System Authority) password filter.
| 1 | accept | T1556.002 | Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter Dll |
The library was registered as a Windows password filter and had access to sensitive data such as administrative passwords in cleartext. | 1 | accept | T1556.002 | Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter Dll |
SYNful Knock has the capability to add its own custom backdoor password when it modifies the operating system of the affected network device. | 1 | accept | T1556.004 | Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication |
The SYNful Knock implant consists of a modified Cisco IOS image that allows the attacker to load different functional modules provides unrestricted access using a secret backdoor password while preventing the size of the image from changing.
| 1 | accept | T1556.004 | Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication |
Adversaries used Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
| 1 | accept | T1556.004 | Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication |
Attacker modified the system image to provide attacker-controlled network devices access using a specific password.
| 1 | accept | T1556.004 | Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication |
After the initial access to the router, hackers modified its operation system in a way to install a backdoor access for network device authentication. | 1 | accept | T1556.004 | Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication |
Chimera's malware has altered the NTLM authentication program on domain controllers to allow Chimera to login without a valid credential. | 1 | accept | T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication |
Skeleton Key is used to patch an enterprise domain controller authentication process with a backdoor password. It allows adversaries to bypass the standard authentication system to use a defined password for all accounts authenticating to that domain controller. | 1 | accept | T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication |
Skeleton Key is deployed as an in-memory patch on a victim's AD domain controllers to allow the threat actor to authenticate as any user, while legitimate users can continue to authenticate as normal.
| 1 | accept | T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication |
The malware employed a technique that altered the NTLM authentication program and implanted a skeleton key to allow adversaries to log-in without a valid credential.
| 1 | accept | T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication |
In the RC4 initialization function, a new RC4 NTLM was injected with a pre-calculated hash value of the skeleton key. When the authentication check failed due to incorrect credentials, the RC4 decryption function prompted the authentication process to compare the credentials with the skeleton key. | 1 | accept | T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication |
adbupd contains a copy of the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 traffic. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with RSA. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
Attor's Blowfish key is encrypted with a public RSA key. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
Bazar can use TLS in C2 communications. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
BISCUIT uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
Carbon has used RSA encryption for C2 communications. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with TLS. | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels. ;; Cobalt Strike can use RSA asymmetric encryption with PKCS1 padding to encrypt data sent to the C2 server. ;; ComRAT can use SSL/TLS encryption for its HTTP-based C2 channel. ComRAT has used public key cryptography with RSA and AES encrypted email attachments for its Gmail C2 channel. ;; Doki has used the embedTLS library for network communications. ;; Dridex has encrypted traffic with RSA. ;; Emotet is known to use RSA keys for encrypting C2 traffic. ;; Empire can use TLS to encrypt its C2 channel. ;; FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers. ;; FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure. ;; Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses RSA. ;; GoldMax has RSA-encrypted its communication with the C2 server. ;; Grandoreiro can use SSL in C2 communication. ;; GreyEnergy encrypts communications using RSA-2048. ;; Hi-Zor encrypts C2 traffic with TLS. ;; IcedID has used SSL and TLS in communications with C2. ;; Koadic can use SSL and TLS for communications. ;; Machete has used TLS-encrypted FTP to exfiltrate data. ;; Metamorfo's C2 communication has been encrypted using OpenSSL. ;; OilRig used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers. ;; Operation Wocao's proxy implementation Agent" can upgrade the socket in use to a TLS socket. ;; Pay2Key has used RSA encrypted communications with C2. ;; Penquin can encrypt communications using the BlowFish algorithm and a symmetric key exchanged with Diffie Hellman. ;; PoetRAT used TLS to encrypt command and control (C2) communications. ;; POSHSPY encrypts C2 traffic with AES and RSA. ;; POWERSTATS has encrypted C2 traffic with RSA. ;; Pupy's default encryption for its C2 communication channel is SSL but it also has transport options for RSA and AES. ;; REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm. ;; ServHelper may set up a reverse SSH tunnel to give the attacker access to services running on the victim such as RDP. ;; StrongPity has encrypted C2 traffic using SSL/TLS. ;; Sykipot uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications. ;; Tor encapsulates traffic in multiple layers of encryption using TLS by default. ;; Trojan.Karagany can secure C2 communications with SSL and TLS. ;; Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers. ;; Some Volgmer variants use SSL to encrypt C2 communications. ;; WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic and routes a custom cryptographic protocol over the Tor circuit. ;; WellMail can use hard coded client and certificate authority certificates to communicate with C2 over mutual TLS. ;; WellMess can communicate to C2 with mutual TLS where client and server mutually check certificates. ;; XTunnel uses SSL/TLS and RC4 to encrypt traffic. ;; Zebrocy uses SSL and AES ECB for encrypting C2 communications. " | 1 | accept | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
admin@338 actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren %temp%\upload" audiodg.exe | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
The file name AcroRD32.exe a legitimate process name for Adobe's Acrobat Reader was used by APT1 as a name for malware. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
APT29 renamed a version of AdFind to sqlceip.exe or csrss.exe in an attempt to appear as the SQL Server Telemetry Client or Client Service Runtime Process respectively. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update. APT32 has also renamed a Cobalt Strike beacon payload to install_flashplayers.exe. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
APT39 has used malware disguised as Mozilla Firefox and a tool named mfevtpse.exe to proxy C2 communications closely mimicking a legitimate McAfee file mfevtps.exe. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
APT41 attempted to masquerade their files as popular anti-virus software. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
BackConfig has hidden malicious payloads in %USERPROFILE%\Adobe\Driver\dwg\ and mimicked the legitimate DHCP service binary. | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
BADNEWS attempts to hide its payloads using legitimate filenames. ;; The Bazar loader has named malicious shortcuts adobe. ;; BLINDINGCAN has attempted to hide its payload by using legitimate file names such as "iconcache.db". ;; Blue Mockingbird has masqueraded their XMRIG payload name by naming it wercplsupporte.dll after the legitimate wercplsupport.dll file. ;; BRONZE BUTLER has given malware the same name as an existing file on the file share server to cause users to unwittingly launch and install the malware on additional systems. ;; Bundlore has disguised a malicious .app file as a Flash Player update. ;; Calisto's installation file is an unsigned DMG image under the guise of Intego’s security solution for mac. ;; Carbanak has named malware "svchost.exe " which is the name of the Windows shared service host program. ;; Carberp has masqueraded as Windows system file names as well as "chkntfs.exe" and "syscron.exe". ;; ChChes copies itself to an .exe file with a filename that is likely intended to imitate Norton Antivirus but has several letters reversed (e.g. notron.exe). ;; Chimera has renamed malware to GoogleUpdate.exe and WinRAR to jucheck.exe RecordedTV.ms teredo.tmp update.exe and msadcs1.exe. ;; DarkComet has dropped itself onto victim machines with file names such as WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file. ;; Darkhotel has used malware that is disguised as a Secure Shell (SSH) tool. ;; Daserf uses file and folder names related to legitimate programs in order to blend in such as HP Intel Adobe and perflogs. ;; Doki has disguised a file as a Linux kernel module. ;; One of Dtrack can hide in replicas of legitimate programs like OllyDbg 7-Zip and FileZilla. ;; If installing itself as a service fails Elise instead writes itself as a file named svchost.exe saved in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network. ;; FatDuke has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser. ;; Felismus has masqueraded as legitimate Adobe Content Management System files. ;; FinFisher renames one of its .dll files to uxtheme.dll in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file. ;; Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate. ;; Fysbis has masqueraded as trusted software rsyncd and dbus-inotifier. ;; GoldenSpy's setup file installs initial executables under the folder %WinDir%\System32\PluginManager. ;; GoldMax appeared as a scheduled task impersonating systems management software within the corresponding ProgramData subfolder. ;; Goopy has impersonated the legitimate goopdate.dll which was dropped on the target system with a legitimate GoogleUpdate.exe. ;; Grandoreiro has named malicious browser extensions and update files to appear legitimate. ;; Hildegard has disguised itself as a known Linux process. ;; HTTPBrowser's installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL. ;; Indrik Spider used fake updates for FlashPlayer plugin and Google Chrome as initial infection vectors. ;; InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by using the file names SafeApp.exe and NeutralApp.exe. ;; InvisiMole has disguised its droppers as legitimate software or documents matching their original names and locations and saved its files as mpr.dll in the Windows folder. ;; Ixeshe has used registry values and file names associated with Adobe software such as AcroRd32.exe. ;; KGH_SPY has masqueraded as a legitimate Windows tool. ;; KONNI creates a shortcut called "Anti virus service.lnk" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file. ;; Lazarus Group has renamed the TAINTEDSCRIBE main executable to disguise itself as Microsoft's narrator. ;; LightNeuron has used filenames associated with Exchange and Outlook for binary and configuration files such as winmail.dat. ;; LookBack has a C2 proxy tool that masquerades as GUP.exe which is software used by Notepad++. ;; Machete's Machete MSI installer has masqueraded as a legitimate Adobe Acrobat Reader installer. ;; Machete renamed payloads to masquerade as legitimate Google Chrome Java Dropbox Adobe Reader and Python executables. ;; MCMD has been named Readme.txt to appear legitimate. ;; MechaFlounder has been downloaded as a file named lsass.exe which matches the legitimate Windows file. ;; menuPass has been seen changing malicious files to appear legitimate. ;; Metamorfo has disguised an MSI file as the Adobe Acrobat Reader Installer. ;; Mis-Type saves itself as a file named msdtc.exe which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary. ;; Misdat saves itself as a file named msdtc.exe which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary. ;; MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender. ;; Mustang Panda has used 'adobeupdate.dat' as a PlugX loader and a file named 'OneDrive.exe' to load a Cobalt Strike payload. ;; NETWIRE has masqueraded as legitimate software including TeamViewer and macOS Finder. ;; NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file. ;; OLDBAIT installs itself in %ALLUSERPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\updatewindws.exe; the directory name is missing a space and the file name is missing the letter "o." ;; OSX/Shlayer can masquerade as a Flash Player update. ;; OwaAuth uses the filename owaauth.dll which is a legitimate file that normally resides in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Auth\; the malicious file by the same name is saved in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\bin\. ;; Patchwork installed its payload in the startup programs folder as "Baidu Software Update." The group also adds its second stage payload to the startup programs as “Net Monitor." They have also dropped QuasarRAT binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe. ;; Penquin has mimicked the Cron binary to hide itself on compromised systems. ;; PipeMon modules are stored on disk with seemingly benign names including use of a file extension associated with a popular word processor. ;; Pony has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy. ;; Poseidon Group tools attempt to spoof anti-virus processes as a means of self-defense. ;; PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers. ;; PUNCHBUGGY mimics filenames from %SYSTEM%\System32 to hide DLLs in %WINDIR% and/or %TEMP%. ;; Pysa has executed a malicious executable by naming it svchost.exe. ;; QUADAGENT used the PowerShell filenames Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 and SystemDiskClean.ps1. ;; Raindrop was installed under names that resembled legitimate Windows file and directory names. ;; Ramsay has masqueraded as a 7zip installer. ;; RDAT has masqueraded as VMware.exe. ;; The Remsec loader implements itself with the name Security Support Provider a legitimate Windows function. Various Remsec .exe files mimic legitimate file names used by Microsoft Symantec Kaspersky Hewlett-Packard and VMWare. Remsec also disguised malicious modules using similar filenames as custom network encryption software on victims. ;; REvil can mimic the names of known executables. ;; Rocke has used shell scripts which download mining executables and saves them with the filename "java". ;; Ryuk has constructed legitimate appearing installation folder paths by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. For Windows Vista or higher the path would appear as C:\Users\Public. ;; S-Type may save itself as a file named msdtc.exe which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary. ;; Sandworm Team has avoided detection by naming a malicious binary explorer.exe. ;; ShimRatReporter spoofed itself as AlphaZawgyl_font.exe a specialized Unicode font. ;; Sibot has downloaded a DLL to the C:\windows\system32\drivers\ folder and renamed it with a .sys extension. ;; Sidewinder has named malicious files rekeywiz.exe to match the name of a legitimate Windows executable. ;; Silence has named its backdoor "WINWORD.exe". ;; Skidmap has created a fake rm binary to replace the legitimate Linux binary. ;; SLOTHFULMEDIA has mimicked the names of known executables such as mediaplayer.exe. ;; Sowbug named its tools to masquerade as Windows or Adobe Reader software such as by using the file name adobecms.exe and the directory CSIDL_APPDATA\microsoft\security. ;; To establish persistence SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an “Office Start ” “Yahoo Talk ” “MSN Gaming Z0ne ” or “MSN Talk” shortcut. ;; Starloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel. ;; StrongPity has been bundled with legitimate software installation files for disguise. ;; SUNBURST created VBScripts that were named after existing services or folders to blend into legitimate activities. ;; SUNSPOT was identified on disk with a filename of taskhostsvc.exe and it created an encrypted log file at C:\Windows\Temp\vmware-vmdmp.log. ;; SUPERNOVA has masqueraded as a legitimate SolarWinds DLL. ;; The TAINTEDSCRIBE main executable has disguised itself as Microsoft’s Narrator. ;; TEARDROP files had names that resembled legitimate Window file and directory names. ;; TEMP.Veles has renamed files to look like legitimate files such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files. ;; ThiefQuest prepends a copy of itself to the beginning of an executable file while maintaining the name of the executable. ;; Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files. ;; UNC2452 renamed a version of AdFind to sqlceip.exe or csrss.exe in an attempt to appear as the SQL Server Telemetry Client or Client Service Runtime Process respectively. ;; Ursnif has used strings from legitimate system files and existing folders for its file folder and Registry entry names. ;; USBStealer mimics a legitimate Russian program called USB Disk Security. ;; Whitefly has named the malicious DLL the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors. ;; A Winnti for Windows implant file was named ASPNET_FILTER.DLL mimicking the legitimate ASP.NET ISAPI filter DLL with the same name. ;; ZLib mimics the resource version information of legitimate Realtek Semiconductor Nvidia or Synaptics modules." | 1 | accept | T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name Or Location |
Agent Tesla has the capability to kill any running analysis processes and AV software. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
APT29 used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
Brave Prince terminates antimalware processes. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
BRONZE BUTLER has incorporated code into several tools that attempts to terminate anti-virus processes. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
Bundlore can change macOS security settings and browser preferences to enable follow-on behaviors. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
Carberp has attempted to disable security software by creating a suspended process for the security software and injecting code to delete antivirus core files when the process is resumed. | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
ChChes can alter the victim's proxy configuration. ;; Cobalt Strike has the ability to use Smart Applet attacks to disable the Java SecurityManager sandbox. ;; DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus. ;; Ebury can disable SELinux Role-Based Access Control and deactivate PAM modules. ;; Egregor has disabled Windows Defender to evade protections. ;; FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus. ;; Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings. ;; Gold Dragon terminates anti-malware processes if they’re found running on the system. ;; Goopy has the ability to disable Microsoft Outlook's security policies to disable macro warnings. ;; Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the taskkill command. ;; Grandoreiro can hook APIs kill processes break file system paths and change ACLs to prevent security tools from running. ;; H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Security Center and Windows Defender. ;; HDoor kills anti-virus found on the victim. ;; Hildegard has modified DNS resolvers to evade DNS monitoring tools. ;; Imminent Monitor has a feature to disable Windows Task Manager. ;; JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys. ;; Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center. ;; Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.. During a 2019 intrusion Lazarus Group disabled Windows Defender and Credential Guard as some of their first actions on host. ;; LockerGoga installation has been immediately preceded by a task kill" command in order to disable anti-virus. ;; Maze has disabled dynamic analysis and other security tools including IDA debugger x32dbg and OllyDbg. It has also disabled Windows Defender's Real-Time Monitoring feature and attempted to disable endpoint protection services. ;; MegaCortex was used to kill endpoint security processes. ;; Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching. ;; MuddyWater can disable the system's local proxy settings. ;; NanHaiShu can change Internet Explorer settings to reduce warnings about malware activity. ;; NanoCore can modify the victim's anti-virus. ;; Netwalker can detect and terminate active security software-related processes on infected systems. ;; Night Dragon has disabled anti-virus and anti-spyware tools in some instances on the victim’s machines. The actors have also disabled proxy settings to allow direct communication from victims to the Internet. ;; POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys. ;; Proton kills security tools like Wireshark that are running. ;; Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe). ;; Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender. ;; Ragnar Locker has attempted to terminate/stop processes and services associated with endpoint security products. ;; REvil can connect to and disable the Symantec server on the victim's network. ;; RobbinHood will search for Windows services that are associated with antivirus software on the system and kill the process. ;; Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software. ;; RunningRAT kills antimalware running process. ;; Ryuk has stopped services related to anti-virus. ;; Skidmap has the ability to set SELinux to permissive mode. ;; SslMM identifies and kills anti-malware processes. ;; StrongPity can add directories used by the malware to the Windows Defender exclusions list to prevent detection. ;; SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist. ;; ThiefQuest uses the function kill_unwanted to obtain a list of running processes and kills each process matching a list of security related processes. ;; TinyZBot can disable Avira anti-virus. ;; TrickBot can disable Windows Defender. ;; Turla has used a AMSI bypass which patches the in-memory amsi.dll in PowerShell scripts to bypass Windows antimalware products. ;; UNC2452 used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products. ;; Unknown Logger has functionality to disable security tools including Kaspersky BitDefender and MalwareBytes. ;; Wizard Spider has shut down or uninstalled security applications on victim systems that might prevent ransomware from executing. ;; ZxShell can kill AV products' processes. " | 1 | accept | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Or Modify Tools |
Kimsuky has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails. | 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
null | 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
Hackers use social media observe activities by interns or new employees from targeted organizations and find relevant information using hashtags such as #NewJob, #Firstday, #internship, #FirstDayatWork, etc.
| 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
Attackers analyzed company employees’ social media images to try to find information like internal office layouts, desktop applications, digital files, badge pictures, Outlook calendars in the background of a quintessential coffee cup post, passwords openly written over whiteboards and desks, etc.
| 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
A short video shared by an employee about a day in the office may provide the attackers with check-in procedures, building layout, parking structure, weak door controls, credentials, employees' dress code/ trappings, premise security arrangements, operating systems, antivirus choice, phone numbers, and much more.
| 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
This group was identifying employees social media accounts and researching interpersonal connection to abuse it in the following spear phishing attacks. | 1 | accept | T1593.001 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media |
APT 31 used its own anonymization network to collect information on the victim’s website via search engine queries.
| 1 | accept | T1593.002 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines |
File “CobaltStrike MANUAL_V2 .docx” encourage affiliates to search for the right victims based on income found using google dorks.
| 1 | accept | T1593.002 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines |
The following Google Dork was used to detect vulnerable or hacked servers.
| 1 | accept | T1593.002 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines |
Attackers were able to collect plaintext passwords from a specially crafted Google query looking for publicly exposed .env files.
| 1 | accept | T1593.002 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines |
This group used search engine queries to inspect victim organization website for logfiles, spreadsheets, and other documents potentially exposing sensitive information. | 1 | accept | T1593.002 | Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines |
Kaseya has used a single IP address in a range to find the total size of the range. | 1 | accept | T1596.002 | Search Open Technical Databases: Whois |
Domain names can be used to find ownership and contact information. | 1 | accept | T1596.002 | Search Open Technical Databases: Whois |
WHOIS can be queried for assigned IP block and DNS name. | 1 | accept | T1596.002 | Search Open Technical Databases: Whois |
Kaseya has used active scanning for reconnaissance on networks, open ports, and services.. | 1 | accept | T1596.002 | Search Open Technical Databases: Whois |
Kaseya has used Shodan to establish operational resources that can be exploited. | 1 | accept | T1596.002 | Search Open Technical Databases: Whois |
Adversaries can search public databases for active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners. | 1 | accept | T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. | 1 | accept | T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
REvil has performed recon against victims by scanning for vulnerable services and open ports. | 1 | accept | T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
Attackers can use passive and active methods to obtain active port services. | 1 | accept | T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
Threat actors can use shodan to search for internet-facing hosts and IP addresses. | 1 | accept | T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
Threat actors search DNS records to gather information about target hosts. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
Adversaries can use DNS to discover subdomains. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
Threat actors can use DNS misconfigurations for initial access. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
Threat actors can search central repositories of logged responses for information. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
DNS leaks can provide information about a domain to attackers. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
Adversaries use the DNS information of mail servers as a pivot to attack. | 1 | accept | T1596.001 | Search Open Technical Databases: Dns/Passive Dns |
Threat actors use site certificates to gain intel about a target. | 1 | accept | T1596.003 | Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates |
Threat Actors often perform reconnaissance through data searching via digital certificates. | 1 | accept | T1596.003 | Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates |
Threat actors check digital certificates for geolocation information to ascertain if a potential target is outwith their protected regions. | 1 | accept | T1596.003 | Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates |
Certain CobaltStrike functionality allows the malware to check openly available digital security data to assist in reconnaissance. | 1 | accept | T1596.003 | Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates |
APT27 often checks digital certificates to consolidate and contribute to their information before launching an attack. | 1 | accept | T1596.003 | Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates |
Adversaries use content delivery networks to discover centralized assets. | 1 | accept | T1596.004 | Search Open Technical Databases: Cdns |
Threat actors can find leaked CDN content that may not have protections of other assets and can be exploited. | 1 | accept | T1596.004 | Search Open Technical Databases: Cdns |
CDNs may incorrectly expose login portals on the internet. | 1 | accept | T1596.004 | Search Open Technical Databases: Cdns |
Threat actors can use OSINT tools to scan open CDN repositories. | 1 | accept | T1596.004 | Search Open Technical Databases: Cdns |
Attackers can use found assets to determine links to CDNs. | 1 | accept | T1596.004 | Search Open Technical Databases: Cdns |
Threat actors can use threat intel feeds for valuable information. | 1 | accept | T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors |
Threat actors can use paid platforms to monitor what intelligence is being provided to potential targets. | 1 | accept | T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors |
Adversaries can monitor what IOCs are being discovered about their campaign to change tactics. | 1 | accept | T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors |
Threat actors can determine what other groups are targeting through intel platforms. | 1 | accept | T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors |
Threat actors can use intelligence feeds to target new victims. | 1 | accept | T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors |
Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. | 1 | accept | T1597.002 | Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data |
Threat actors may purchase information from dark web or black markets. | 1 | accept | T1597.002 | Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data |
Reputable private resources have scan database subscriptions. | 1 | accept | T1597.002 | Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data |
Attackers can use known or unknown repositories of data from tor sites. | 1 | accept | T1597.002 | Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data |
Threat actors can gain network and login information purchased from other attacker groups. | 1 | accept | T1597.002 | Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data |
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