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t1608.004 | stage capabilities | drive | apt32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the internet to make them appear legitimate but some of these pages include malicious javascript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update. |
t1608.004 | stage capabilities | drive | threat group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's ip address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest. |
t1608.004 | stage capabilities | drive | the attackers prepared an malvertizing: an ad combined of image and a javascript, which contained malicious code, and pushed it to legitimate websites via ad networks. |
t1608.004 | stage capabilities | drive | second stage of the magecart attack included injecting malicious javascript on the vulnerable checkout pages. |
t1608.004 | stage capabilities | drive | this apt group was looking to compromise industrys online publications to prepare for watering hole attacks. |
t1608.005 | stage capabilities | linkTechniquetarget | silent librarian has cloned victim organization login pages and staged them for later use in credential harvesting campaigns. silent librarian has also made use of a variety of url shorteners for these staged websites. |
t1608.005 | stage capabilities | linkTechniquetarget | the attackers prepared over 39,000 phishing pages mimicking the four platforms' login pages. |
t1608.005 | stage capabilities | linkTechniquetarget | they used ngrok paid option to acquire customized phishing urls displaying metas trademarks such as hxxp:facebook[.]in[.]ngrok[.]io. |
t1608.005 | stage capabilities | linkTechniquetarget | prior to the attack, they registered typosquatting domains, set up phishing pages and employed url shortener service. |
t1608.005 | stage capabilities | linkTechniquetarget | the attacker placed archived malicious office documents at the link target. |
t1609 | container administration command | null | a container administration service such as the docker daemon the kubernetes api server or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment |
t1609 | container administration command | null | adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container |
t1609 | container administration command | null | command command execution |
t1609 | container administration command | null | container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command line arguments on the container and the underlying host |
t1609 | container administration command | null | in docker the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level |
t1609 | container administration command | null | kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster |
t1610 | deploy container | null | adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses |
t1610 | deploy container | null | container container creation container container start pod pod creation pod pod modification application log application log content |
t1610 | deploy container | null | deploy logging agents on kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level |
t1610 | deploy container | null | in docker the daemon log provides insight into remote api calls including those that deploy containers |
t1610 | deploy container | null | in some cases adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment such as processes that execute or download malware |
t1610 | deploy container | null | logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored |
t1610 | deploy container | null | monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment |
t1611 | escape to host | null | additionally monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount as well as resulting process activity that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host |
t1611 | escape to host | null | adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host |
t1611 | escape to host | null | container container creation process os api execution process process creation |
t1611 | escape to host | null | in kubernetes monitor for cluster level events associated with changing containers volume configurations |
t1611 | escape to host | null | monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment particularly containers running as root |
t1611 | escape to host | null | this can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself |
t1612 | build image on host | null | a remote build request may be sent to the docker api that includes a dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image such as alpine from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it |
t1612 | build image on host | null | additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous ips that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code |
t1612 | build image on host | null | adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry |
t1612 | build image on host | null | image image creation network traffic network connection creation network traffic network traffic flow network traffic network traffic content |
t1612 | build image on host | null | monitor for unexpected docker image build requests to the docker daemon on hosts in the environment |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | cluster cluster metadata container container enumeration container container metadata pod pod enumeration pod pod metadata application log application log content |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | establish centralized logging for the activity of container and kubernetes cluster components |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the kubernetes dashboard and other web applications |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure including the use of discovery api calls by new or unexpected users |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | other resources may include images deployments pods nodes and other information such as the status of a cluster |
t1613 | container and resource discovery | null | this can be done by deploying logging agents on kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | adversaries may use the information from system location discoveryt1614 during automated discovery to shape follow on behaviors including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target andor attempts specific actions |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | citation fbi ragnar locker 2020 monitor traffic flows to geolocation service provider sites such as ip api and ipinfo |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | instance instance metadata process process creation command command execution process os api execution |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | monitor processes and command line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | remote access tools with built in features may interact directly with the windows api such as calling getlocaleinfo to gather information |
t1614 | system location discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | adversaries may gather information on group policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation security measures applied within a domain and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in active directory ad |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | monitor for suspicious use of gpresult |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | monitor for the use of powershell functions such as get domain gpo and get domain local group and processes spawning with command line arguments containing gpolocalgroup |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | network traffic network traffic content active directory active directory object access script script execution command command execution process process creation |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | or for abnormal ldap queries with filters for group policy container and high volumes of ldap traffic to domain controllers |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1615 | group policy discovery | null | windows event id 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow on behaviors including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | cloud storage cloud storage enumeration cloud storage cloud storage access |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as collection and exfiltration based on the information obtained |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | monitor cloud logs for api calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity |
t1619 | cloud storage object discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | citation 00sec dropperscitation s1 old rat new tricks monitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | citation mdsec detecting dotnetcitation introducing donut analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not such as opening network connections reading files or other suspicious actions that could relate to post compromise behavior |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | dll loading into abnormal processes such as notepad |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | dll and clr |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | dll mscoree |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | exe |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | for example a common signature related to reflective code loading on windows is mechanisms related to the |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | load and native apit1106 functions such as createthread memfd_create exe cve andor execveat |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code such as the abuse of |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | net common language runtime clr such as mscor |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | net functions such as assembly |
t1620 | reflective code loading | null | reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk |
t1620 | reflective code loading | Technique | script script execution process os api execution module module load |
t1620 | reflective code loading | Technique | similarly amsi etw traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes |