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Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.
Legal Decisions
8.80494
12.352917
11.246558
ASEY ) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to Supporting the contributions of Catholic schools in the United States and celebrating the 50th annual National Catholic Schools Week.
Legislation
17.661077
14.959908
24.350405
This Court should review the appellate court’s sua sponte creation of an “endorsement” exception to the third-party allegation rule and clarify that the statute allows no such exception. The court of appeals misapplied Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall3 and Rosenthal to erroneously craft a rule that if a speaker takes an “extra step” of endorsing the words of another, then the speaker loses the third-party-allegation rule’s protections. Pet. Br. at 24-29. But there is no such exception, and its creation by the appellate court provides this Court with two reasons to grant review. First, the third-party-allegation rule has been wrongly judicially conscripted in the past. See Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 65 n.18 (Tex. 2013) (declining to recognize a formal third-party-allegation rule). In response, the Texas Legislature in 2015 amended section 73.005 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to clarify how broadly defined the rule is intended to be. CPRC § 73.005(b); see Scripps NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Tex. 2019). Allowing the court of appeals to chip away at that rule not only contradicts this Court’s actual holding in Hall—that the rule applies to publications, like the Program, that report on large-scale controversies—but also thwarts the Legislature’s specific purpose in amending Section 73.005. See Senate Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee Report (Unamended) of Senate Bill No. 627 (Huffman) (2015 Reg. Sess.), May 13, 2015 (noting that purpose of amendment is to help protect “reports of questionable activities in public entities ... [as] too often it is the media that first uncovers problems that need to be investigated or for which there needs to be legislative reform.”). Second, judicially creating an “endorsement” exception “will chill First Amendment speech.” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 382. The third-party-allegation rule is designed to allow all manner of journalists—including documentarians like Petitioners—the freedom to engage in newsgathering that “involves investigating, tracking down related stories, and providing context for readers.” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 382; Pet. Br. at 28-29. Any limit on the rule will imperil their ability to do so.
Party Submissions
6.228487
6.031054
6.249352
Removing Justice Devine from the ballot in these circumstances would be fundamentally unfair. That remedy would prevent millions of Texans from again voting for Justice Devine based on alleged technical defects in a few of the signatures on his ballot petition (i.e., that a few signers had previously signed Relator’s petition). These purported defects arose through no fault of Justice Devine’s, they prejudice no one, and they are being raised now in a purely opportunistic and entirely untimely fashion. Equitable principles therefore require denying Relator’s mandamus petition, and this Court “will not issue an original writ of mandamus absent a compelling reason.” Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 142 (1996) (cleaned up). This case is not a close call under these standards.
Party Submissions
8.441761
8.619382
9.111191
But every court confronted with actual collusion and position shifting after a legal malpractice claim assignment has voided it on grounds of public policy or judicial estoppel. Notably, the decisions from states that allow assignments of these claims or proceeds often state that they were not confronted with collusion or position shifting. E.g., Eagle Mountain City v. Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C., 2017 UT 31, ¶ 12, ¶¶ 44-45, 408 P.3d 322, 325, 334; see also N. H. Ins. Co. v. McCann, 707 N.E.2d 332, 336-38 (Mass. 1999). (See App. C) 8 This Court has already held that collusion and position switching violate the very core of a fair, just judicial system, and has invalidated the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the client’s litigation opponent. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ ref’d); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996). This case involves the assignment of most of the proceeds of such a claim and should be treated no differently than Zuniga or Gandy.
Party Submissions
6.427544
6.863531
6.790805
Respondent " to commission the Comptroller General " to investigate the MOPC contracts, which State entity would have issued that decision, and how that such decision would have led to the September 21, 2020 report. Indeed, such report (Exhibit R-0024, p. 7 of the PDF) is clear that it arises from a review of “libramientos” pending at the time of assuming the direction of the General Comptroller's Office.
Legal Decisions
26.778502
23.439386
26.842857
The parties appear to agree that if Bay is to qualify as Mann's statutory employer, it is to be through the definition of employer that is set forth in the ROCIP provision. See TEX.
Party Submissions
26.499033
26.259035
34.57606
The employee argued the employer was estopped from asserting she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. The court held that the employee failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel theories. As to her equitable estoppel claim, the court observed that the employee was required to file a workers' compensation claim within one year after the date of her injury. She had retained an attorney by, at most, two months after her injury. Therefore, she had an attorney to advise that her injury might have occurred in the course and scope of her employment and thus she needed to pursue a workers' compensation claim. Accordingly, the employee was not without knowledge, or means of knowledge, that she might have been injured in the course and scope of her employment, despite any contrary representation by the employer. The employee was not denied recovery for her injury based on the employer's inconsistent positions. Rather, she was denied recovery because she elected not to timely pursue a workers' compensation claim. Thus, it was not unconscionable for the employer to rely on the exclusivity provision as a defense to the suit.
Party Submissions
4.577676
4.601527
4.942096
In the intriguingly-captioned New York Party Shuttle, LLC, v. Bilello, 414 SW3d, 206, Tex. App.-- (Houston [1st] 2013, no pet), the First Court of Appeals succinctly lays out the elements of mistake, and what must be proved to invoke it. Petitioner can do no better.
Party Submissions
12.143558
12.347243
13.868167
Indeed (i) both Parties typically refer to General Asphalt next to “Bluport Asphalt” and “Inversiones Titanio” ( see e.g. SoC, ¶¶ 56, 182; SoC, ¶¶ 355, 465); and (ii) the Respondent has voluntarily produced to the Claimant the contracts (and related documents) with Bluport Asphalt and Inversiones Titanio ( see Requests 1-4 supra).
Legal Decisions
14.587502
14.467249
16.173847
Fourth, Barina willfully misconstrues the fair-comment and fair-report privileges. In claiming that Petitioners cannot avail themselves of the fair-comment privilege, Barina characterizes Petitioners’ alleged conclusion that her conduct is exploitative as a false statement of fact. Even if that commentary were contained in the Program, however, commentary on the underlying guardianship proceeding is precisely what the fair-comment privilege is meant to protect. Barina further asserts that reporting loses the protection of the fair-report privilege if it includes anything from outside the official proceeding it is describing. In effect, Barina conceives of a privilege that would only apply to unabridged reprints of court opinions. That is simply not the law.
Party Submissions
11.656408
12.102185
11.514086
HN1 [ ] Standards of Review, Abuse of Discretion The standards generally applied in a mandamus proceeding are well established. Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law and only where the petitioning party lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. A trial court has no discretion to misapply the law.
Party Submissions
6.202292
7.465005
8.00812
Fleming Defendants briefly mentioned one more Taylor privity path in their Reply Brief at page 11, which was the third (“Taylor Privity Path 3”) that reads as follows: Third, we have confirmed that, “in certain limited circumstances,” a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party” to the suit. Richards, 517 U. S., at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Party Submissions
12.488606
13.392114
13.029154
Fourth, the AAA permits fee waivers in hardship cases. Brief on the Merits, p. 18. Under Olshan, it is Rafiei’s burden to show that he has sought a fee reduction if he is going to complain of unconscionability. 328 S.W.3d at 897 (“there is no evidence that the homeowners have made any effort to reduce the likely charges through requests for fee waivers”).
Party Submissions
13.957505
14.695492
16.168793
Id., at 198. That appears to be the case here. F. Producing an expert report upon the adequacy of the medical records was impossible here since the medical records in this case had all been destroyed.
Party Submissions
16.862904
22.547613
22.126375
In re Olshan centered around a dispute where the homeowners were governed by the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules. 328 S.W.3d at 886-87. Under these rules, the costs that a consumer, like the homeowners in Olshan, would have to bear were limited and clearly delineated. Specifically, the homeowners' fees were capped, ensuring that arbitration remained an affordable and accessible means of dispute resolution. Id. at 896.
Party Submissions
7.923064
7.355064
9.217004
C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.
Party Submissions
7.634686
7.763022
8.385379
Not only does the SWDA definition of “solid waste facility” carve out and exclude the only infrastructure alleged to be at issue by Weatherford’s petition (a sewer system), the SWDA also requires action by a potentially responsible party to qualify that party as a defendant. The SWDA identifies four categories of a person “responsible for solid waste,” once again requiring an act to qualify under the statute rather than creating a strict liability framework.
Party Submissions
18.035389
16.162064
19.641298
No Legal or Equitable Rights or Interest. No Participant or other person shall have any legal or equitable rights or interest in this Plan that are not expressly granted in this Plan. Participation in this Plan does not give any person any right to be retained in the service of the Participating Employer. The right and power of a Participating Employer to dismiss or discharge an Employee is expressly reserved. The Participating Employers make no representations or warranties as to the tax consequences to a Participant or a Participant’s beneficiaries resulting from a deferral of income pursuant to the Plan.
Contract
4.015721
4.090195
4.383312
As explained above,45 Serbia relies on exhibit R-043 to argue that Obnova does not have rights to its buildings at Dunavska 17-19. However, as also explained above, R-043 only includes excerpts from various sketches referred in R-043. These excerpts are insufficient to properly identify the original documents from which they were taken. The requested documents will show which specific documents were used to compile R-043 and, in turn, whether such documents support Serbia’s claim that Obnova does not have any rights to buildings at Dunavska 17-19. The documents will also make it possible to check whether the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority made any mistakes when preparing Exhibit R-043 for the purposes of this arbitration. The requested documents are therefore directly relevant and material to assess the veracity of Serbia’s claim th at Obnova does not have any rights to these buildings and evaluate the evidence that Serbia adduces to support that claim. DECISION Any and all sketches ( in Serbian: skice ) that have been prepared for Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 between 1946 and 1995.
Legal Decisions
8.089886
7.926841
8.04694
Most importantly, Exhibit 7of the Brief of Appellees, (RR Vol. 2, Ex.7), a copy of which is attached hereto in the Appendix as Tab 3, shows that the management team of Integrity Aviation, a Texas Corporation, located in and doing business in Texas, consists of Victor Farias and Matt Marsenison. The last page of Exhibit 7 shows an address of Integrity Aviation at 2 Spencer Road, Suite 103, Boerne, Texas 78006. (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7, and Appendix, Tab 3) This is a contract entered into by Marsenison with a Texas resident, in Texas.
Party Submissions
10.130182
10.394037
11.183679
Under current law, and under the present Family Code, a bonus is treated as deferred compensation. There is a time allocation rule from this Court on pensions.
Party Submissions
38.520416
38.87823
44.990517
Nature of the Case: This is a venue dispute involving the interpretation of forum selection, choice of law and waiver provisions in a contract. Plaintiff RLB is a subcontractor that performed dredging work for general contractor McCarthy in connection with project owner MVP’s construction of a new marine terminal along the Houston Ship Channel. RLB sued McCarthy1 and MVP in Harris County, Texas, alleging failure to pay RLB “additional compensation for the differing site conditions RLB encountered.” By that time, MVP had already filed a lawsuit involving the same core dispute against McCarthy in Oklahoma state court. MVP filed a plea in abatement in the Texas action—relying on forum selection, choice of law and waiver provisions in its contract with McCarthy—requesting that RLB’s claims be abated or dismissed pending resolution of the Oklahoma case.
Party Submissions
6.133424
5.7111
6.062553
Comm'n, 767 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. 1989). The Opinion’s failure to address Weatherford’s central issue based on R.R. Street failed to comply with rule 47.1.
Party Submissions
7.824526
9.804071
12.138361
The Walkers do not advocate for a new or different standard. They instead argue that Amarillo Court used a wrong standard based on its citation to Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. 2022). The lower court did no such thing. The court, in fact, faithfully applied the standards set out by this Court and properly held the reports, even read together, did not adequately address causation.
Party Submissions
14.068726
14.965073
15.662889
The results of the surveys carried out pursuant to Article 5 shall be submitted to the Commission using the template referred to in the Annex.
Legislation
8.063866
8.328502
12.83147
Further, in In re Olshan, the homeowners attempted to argue that the arbitration costs were prohibitive. To support their claim, they provided AAA invoices from other arbitrations, hoping to draw parallels to their case. Id. at 897. This Court, however, found that the evidence wasn't legally sufficient to determine that they would "actually" be charged excessive fees.
Party Submissions
11.811322
11.779923
13.768471
When medical experts provide reports under Chapter 74 of the TMLA full of medical jargon, but lacking in specificity, is it the courts’ job to interpret them and connect the dots? The Walkers say “yes.” Not so fast.
Party Submissions
22.402687
24.617453
24.41586
The majority opinion raised this “subjective material benefits” test sua sponte. Respondents did not argue in the trial court or in the court of appeals that the subjective material significance of the benefits Alpesh received from his alleged misconduct was a relevant factor in a demand-futility analysis. CKC had no notice that it was an issue in the case before the majority raised it sua sponte. The majority opinion adopted this test without the benefit of briefing by either side.
Party Submissions
14.695079
13.922535
13.761884
The court of appeals agreed with the City and held that Petitioners’ claims must sound in premises liability. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *4 (citing Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385). The court of appeals held that the City’s failure to enforce the Mandatory Safety Policy was not a “use” of property, but a misuse or non-use of “information,” and not actionable under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at *5.7 The court also rejected Petitioners’ claims regarding the failure to provide a lifejacket. Id. at *6.
Party Submissions
6.864822
7.124539
7.475691
McCarthy also disputed whether MVP is liable for the Additional Costs, asserting that RLB’s claim could be “passed through” to MVP. R.208 ¶14.
Party Submissions
18.977367
22.295948
25.004072
C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount of past due royalties1 and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts royalties. Only for purposes of lease termination under Art. XVII.D, 2 Any any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.
Party Submissions
10.686224
10.86389
11.800921
Moving on from the Green Tree opinion, Rafiei cites a number of decisions from other jurisdictions. Response at 14. However, Rafiei does not argue that those cases provide any basis for changing Texas law on the subject.
Party Submissions
13.798987
21.236095
20.366077
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 5,822 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
Party Submissions
3.758928
4.844921
5.498491
Each defendant whose conduct is implicated in a preliminary report “ must file and serve any objection to the sufficiency of the report not later than the 21st day after the date it was served, failing which all objections are waived.” Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Tex. 2013) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a)). As such, appellate review is limited to the grounds stated in the Section 74.351(b) dismissal motion filed in the trial court. Pepper v. Wilson, No. 02-22-00107-CV, 2023 WL 2534626, at *14 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Thompson v. Fong, 650 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (refusing to consider argument that reports did not constitute “expert reports” under section 74.351 when that argument did not track the objections made in the trial court); Williams v. Mora, 264 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. — Waco 2008, no pet.) (refusing to consider new objections made for the first time on appeal).
Party Submissions
3.860154
4.040687
3.87508
I write separately because I believe that the granting of the petition for permissive appeal in this case is improper, and the petition should have been denied.
Party Submissions
7.730106
8.70782
10.92132
Dr. Tappan’s report confirms that he has experience in diagnosing and managing women in the second stage of labor and the “indications and techniques” for vaginal and cesarean deliveries. (CR.787) But, Dr. Tappan is not licensed in and is not “actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care services” in the area of pediatric neurology or diagnosing the cause of neurological deficits in infants. Nor does he have any demonstrated substantial training or experience in diagnosing or opining as to the cause of neurological injury in infants. The mere fact he has delivered babies does not automatically qualify him to opine as to what caused injuries in a baby. Some other expertise, training, and practice must be demonstrated in the report.
Party Submissions
9.97612
9.204465
10.755829
Samson now rewrites “past due royalty payments” in art XVII.D as “past due late charges.” Under art. XVII.D, the Lessor can give notice of “intention to terminate,” but can actually terminate the lease only if the Lessee fails to timely pay the “past due royalty payments.” So not paying a Late Charge is not a ground for lease termination. Art. XVII.D does not even mention Late Charges. It creates an option, not a condition, and provides the lease “shall not terminate” if the Lessee pays all past due royalty payments with “interest as provided herein.” This does not refer to Late Charges, but “interest” the Lessee may owe.
Party Submissions
9.666944
8.876219
9.959739
The obligations of the Company under the Plan shall be conditional on such payment arrangements, and the Company and its Subsidiaries shall, to the extent permitted by law, have the right to deduct any such taxes from any payment otherwise due to the Participant. The Committee may establish such procedures as it deems appropriate for the settlement of withholding obligations with Shares. The Participant should consult his or her own tax advisor for more information concerning the tax consequences of the grant and settlement of Performance Share Units under this Award Agreement.
Contract
4.340305
4.922997
5.496057
This case presents the perplexing contention that Rafiei cannot pursue his $1,000,000 claim because of the possibility he may be responsible for payment of $7,675 in AAA fees and arbitration costs. If that assertion were true, it would confound any rational economic appraisal and almost certainly would be the only time in the history of Texas personal injury litigation that a plaintiff was unable to find a lawyer to handle a $1,000,000 claim because of expected costs of less than $8,000. But Rafiei’s contention is not supported by the evidence he advanced in the trial court. Rafiei’s initial burden is to demonstrate that an arbitration of the delegation provision in Rafiei’s contract with Lennar is unconscionably costly when considered alone.
Party Submissions
9.092549
9.659745
9.330463
To require the Secretary of Agriculture to designate and maintain at least 20 percent of the total number of trails in the Shawnee National Forest for trail riding by covered vehicles, and for other purposes.
Legislation
9.20518
8.723287
9.99219
If the Court concludes that the delegation provision is unconscionable, it should hold that the arbitration agreement as a whole is not unconscionable. The disposition is the same, it should vacate the order of the trial court with instructions to refer the dispute into arbitration.
Party Submissions
9.621702
11.365877
11.234442
Headings. The headings of Sections are included solely for convenience of reference, and if there is any conflict between such headings and the text of this Plan, the text shall control.
Contract
3.624092
5.727489
7.356834
Second, the Raymond court could have also interpreted the Raymond deed as having significant or express recitals under the significant recital theory. The Raymond deed states that husband conveyed “an undivided one-half interest in the property”. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81. A significant recital (sometimes called an express recital) includes language that clearly expresses the intent to gift property. This court in Belkin v. Ray held that a significant recital conveying a property from Husband to Wife “as her separate estate” clearly evidenced the intent of the parties, eliminating the propriety of contrary evidence. Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. 1943). Further, in Pevehouse, husband and wife owned community property that was, during marriage, conveyed to Wife as her separate property. Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1957, writ dism’d). The deed contained a significant recital that Husband deeded the land to Wife “as her separate property.” Id. at 771. The deed referenced separate property several times. Thus, the recital unquestionably established that the property was meant to be conveyed as separate property.
Party Submissions
6.170921
6.655672
6.286447
We recognize that, HN7 [ ] unlike equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel [*11] requires no showing of misrepresentation or detrimental reliance. Steubner Realty 19, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d at 164. However, in this case, the particular quasi-estoppel/unconscionability reasoning offered by Douglas necessarily requires a reliance component due to her suggestion she was precluded from filing a workers' compensation claim based on Moody's earlier position. Therefore, we employ a similar analysis for her equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel theories.
Party Submissions
11.892473
15.186973
14.041087
BSA respectfully requests that the Court deny the petition for review. BSA further respectfully requests that if the Court grants the petition for review that the court of appeals’ judgment be affirmed as to BSA and that the matter be remanded to the trial court for determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs that should be awarded to BSA. BSA requests such other and further relief to which it may be entitled.
Party Submissions
4.475884
4.390516
5.398737
Recognizing Associated Builders and Contractors Florida East Coast Chapter and the many vital contributions merit shop commercial, industrial, and infrastructure construction contractors make to the quality of life of the people of Florida.
Legislation
12.439865
10.954901
10.47777
Arbitration Rules 10 and 11 6.1. The President may exercise the Tribunal’s power to fix and extend time limits for the completion of each procedural step in the proceeding under Arbitration Rules 10(1) and 11(3), in accordance with Arbitration Rules 10(3) and 11(4).
Legal Decisions
5.43204
5.176591
5.848212
As provided above, Carl Craigo, as Midland’s Director of Utilities, is the only person who would know and have access to any permits or other authorizations pertaining to the alleged disposals. After a diligent search through Midland’s records—the only place such document could be found— Midland found no such permit, authorization, or any other document indicating any knowledge, agreement, or understanding of the alleged disposals. If Weatherford was allowed to conduct discovery and submitted a Request for Production to Midland seeking any such documents, the response would be the same: no responsive documents can be found.
Party Submissions
12.109083
13.954757
12.849449
The termination of parental rights is twofold. “First, the parent must have engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized” in section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. Id. “Second, termination must be in the best interest of a child.” Id. Notably, “both elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not alleviate petitioner’s burden of proving the other.” Id. at 391.
Party Submissions
4.929216
5.553412
5.48708
Further, Mann had no burden to point out Bay's legal error previously unless Bay first established its affirmative defense under the law and evidence presented in its summary judgment proof. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Tex. 1999). “The trial court may not grant summary judgment by default because the non-movant did not respond to the summary judgment motion when the movant's summary judgment proof is legally insufficient.” Id. at 223. Bay had the burden to establish its right to summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all elements of its defense as a matter of law. Id. Accordingly, the court should be mindful of any attempt by Bay to flip the burden of production or proof to Mann who was not required to alert the trial court to the deficiencies in Bay's proof. Because Bay has failed to prove the affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies” as a matter of law, this court should affirm the trial court's ruling.
Party Submissions
6.25665
6.32694
7.198847
In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002). An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when a statutory scheme indicates the Legislature intended the statutory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the statute is addressed. Id. 7 Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation.
Party Submissions
5.673472
5.766998
6.465841
To make improvements to the child tax credit, to provide tax incentives to promote economic growth, to provide special rules for the taxation of certain residents of Tai-wan with income from sources within the United States, to provide tax relief with respect to certain Federal disasters, to make improvements to the low-income housing tax credit, and for other purposes.
Legislation
7.979488
8.317884
7.630764
A ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-228 (Tex. 2004). A trial court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction may consider evidence in addition to the pleadings, and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts is that Oncor’s predecessor and Wilbarger CAD executed an agreement that addressed the value of Oncor’s property for tax year 2019. Oncor admits execution. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition I C.R. 31-34. II. Settlement Agreements Are Highly Favored.
Party Submissions
4.398502
5.014325
5.214168
Demandante. De hecho, el experto de la Demandante solo conoce la existencia de 4 cenotes, 84 situación que confirma los hallazgos del Dictamen de SEMARNAT. Este informe permite suponer que se puede suponer que varios de estos cenotes desaparecieron o fueron fusionados con los lagos artificiales a consecuencia de la actividad extractiva desmedida.
Party Submissions
12.294942
16.559435
15.33597
Respondent’s negotiation of the contract; and Refidomsa’s (non)fulfillment of its responsibilities under the contract—are directly relevant to the central question of whether Respondent discriminated against Claimant in favor of similarly-situated Dominican-owned companies. Id.
Legal Decisions
11.363832
13.070793
12.965172
MVP contends the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions bind RLB to the waiver provisions in MCC paragraph 47.7. MVP asks this Court to improperly insert contractual language that is not there.
Party Submissions
21.380714
24.556864
29.990454
The Diocese had the initial burden to show a settlement amount that covered the same injury. See Sky View, 555 S.W.3d at 107. The forbearance agreement allocates $175,000.00 to the constitutional lien on Mendietta’s homestead and provides that Mendietta will pay $750/month towards that injury. (2CR916). In exchange, Bay, Ltd. agreed not to foreclose on the homestead. ( Id. ). Thus the Diocese did not even meet Sky View’s first step—it did not show a settlement agreement for $1.9 million. Even so, if the burden shifted to Bay, Ltd., it presented evidence that even if Mendietta paid $750/month for the rest of his life, no amount would ever be credited toward the injury relating to the Diocese’s property.
Party Submissions
11.231209
10.881436
12.271046
GENERAL JURISDICTION General jurisdiction can be exercised if the non-resident defendant’s contacts in a forum are continuous and systematic. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2nd 404 (1984).
Party Submissions
2.234138
2.712263
2.76946
Likewise, under section 40, “[a] person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, by comparable interference with other protected interests in tangible property, or in consequence of such an act by another, is liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST E NRICHMENT § 40 (2011). Further under section 17, “[a] transfer by an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary outside the scope of the transferor’s authority, or otherwise in breach of the transferor’s duty to the principal or beneficiary, is subject to rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution to the principal or beneficiary as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.” Id. § 17.
Party Submissions
4.830357
5.564781
4.802208
PCC : Respondent objects to this request on the basis that Claimants have failed to explain why the requested documents are not in their possession, custody or control. These documents must b e in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’ possession, custody or control as documents submitted as exhibits R -037, R-038 and R-039 concern Obnova.
Legal Decisions
12.942404
11.92426
14.662587
The declaration of Carl Craigo, Midland’s Director of Utilities, accurately stated that Midland owns and operates a domestic wastewater treatment plant, subject to a TPDES permit. (CR 54.) Weatherford insists that Midland intentionally mislabels the sewage system as “domestic,” and this, and this alone, led to an incorrect application of the domestic sewage exclusion. There has been no dispute that Midland operates a sewage system. What Weatherford offers instead, as addressed above, is that Midland must demonstrate that the alleged leaks occurred after a mixture with domestic waste before the domestic sewage exclusion can apply. Craigo did not include information providing such mixture details because it was unnecessary, as the domestic sewage exclusion only applies to a solid waste facility, as the Court of Appeals rightly concluded: “the statutory definitions of ‘solid waste facility’ and ‘solid waste’ are fatal to Weatherford’s cost-recovery claim against the City[.]” Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. Consequently, Craigo’s declaration was factually correct, admitted by the Trial Court, and further, is not inconsistent with the holding in R.R. Street .
Party Submissions
10.885144
11.110875
10.789837
Rather, it is seeking to ensure that its entitlement to the VAT refunds, which has not been the subject of a challenge under the ongoing NAFTA dispute, should not be gutted by the unauthorized deposit of the refunds by the SAT. Such unauthorized deposits of VAT refunds owing to PEM were made after the filing of the Request for Arbitration to the present date.
Legal Decisions
13.117337
11.34025
14.076928
On Appeal from the 469th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 469-53096-2017. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Carlyle and Garcia participating.
Party Submissions
4.467838
4.546655
6.623096
MVP contends RLB should have asked the trial court to determine which claims were and which were not within the scope of MCC paragraph 47.7. MVP’s Brief at 61-62. Once again, the Court should be wary of MVP’s misleading “waiver” arguments.
Party Submissions
15.863401
16.927761
18.222256
Notwithstanding the Thursday periods of possession during the regular school term and the weekend periods of possession ORDERED for L M O it is expressly ORDERED that H A O shall have a superior right of possession of the child as follows: 1. Spring Vacation in Odd-Numbered Years -In odd-numbered years, beginning at the time the child is dismissed from school for the school's spring vacation and ending at the time school resumes after that vacation.
Party Submissions
12.970588
14.556927
15.886603
Section 5. Determination of Severance Benefit. Subject to the provisions of Section 4 above and this Section 5, if a Participant incurs a Qualifying Termination, the Participant shall be entitled to a “Severance Benefit.” A “Severance Benefit” shall consist of a “Severance Allowance” determined in accordance with this Section 5, subject to the Participant’s eligibility (and eligibility of members of the Participant’s family), a Benefits Credit payment, determined in accordance with Section 6 below, the Vesting Acceleration Benefit described in Section 7 below and, at the discretion of the Plan Administrator, “Outplacement Services” described in Section 8 below.
Contract
4.372677
4.152668
4.337601
The trial court correctly applied the threshold standard here when it found that the reports from the Walkers ’ three experts establish that their claims are not frivolous. And in enacting § 74.351(l), the Legislature committed this determination to the trial court’s discretion. But the Seventh Court believed that the dispute should have been decided differently.
Party Submissions
14.744411
14.995396
17.459187
The supreme court indicated, however, that the terms of the husband’s employment also supported its interpretation that the broad denition of “Jture earnings” in the MSA encompassed all the money the husband received after the partition date regardless of when the underlying work was performed. ,Id. at 452. Specically, the court‘ noted that the husband’s annual bonus Was completely discretionary and “typically” paid, if at all, in March or April. Id. “Quite simply, when the parties signed the MSA in June 2010, no 2011 bonus existed” and did not come into existence. until the board declared it. Id. “[T]he purely discretionary bonus constitutes future income.” Id.
Party Submissions
17.184286
15.044807
16.129093
If the El Paso court’s opinion stands, distributors and manufacturers will be incentivized to try imposing all sorts of unreasonable sales standards on franchised dealers by enforcing them through lesser consequences than franchise termination ( e.g., withholding allocations) and communicating them outside dealership agreements. This would gut the Legislature’s protections for dealers because performance standards are rarely (if ever) in the dealer agreement and lesser sanctions like reductions in inventory can cause a dealer to be unable to compete and ultimately lose its franchise.
Party Submissions
15.601
14.623878
15.299314
It is not the “court’s function to question the wisdom of these statutes or to seek to rewrite them based upon [its] view of public policy.” Sowell v. Int’l Ints., L.P., 416 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied 2013). If the Legislature had intended to limit Section 51.003(a) to only actions brought to recover the foreclosing lender’s debt, it could have done so. O ther legislatures have. For instance, California’s anti-deficiency statute prevents recovery of deficiencies remaining only on a note “under [whose] power of sale” the foreclosure took place. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580d(a). The California Supreme Court has accordingly held that the statute, by its text, applies only to post-foreclosure debts remaining on “the instrument securing the note sued up on.” Roseleaf, 378 P.2d at 101. Here, no similar limiting language appears. And “changing the meaning of the statute by adding words to it ... is a legislative function, not a judicial function.” City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. 2008).
Party Submissions
5.825976
5.89184
6.158022
A recording of the session was made and deposited in the archives of ICSID. The recording was distributed to the Members of the Tribunal and the Parties.
Legal Decisions
9.31471
8.134583
11.284988
For purposes of the foregoing, unless otherwise required under applicable Section 409A Requirements, any distribution that a Participant elects to receive in a series of installments shall be treated as being a single payment on the date of the first installment of such series.
Contract
6.500094
6.826898
7.384648
Respondents inform this Court that “[c]ertain [j]urisdictional [f]acts [w]ere and [r]emain undisputed.” See Respondents’ Brief at 5, 21. But there is no evidence of many of the “facts” Respondents rely on. Compare, e.g ., Respondents’ Brief at 5, 21 and Petitioner’s Brief at 41–43. Petitioner MCI must correct some of Respondents’ most glaring misstatements. First, Respondents claim that “[t]he Motor Coach is [m]anufactured and [d]istributed by Petitioner.” There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner MCI manufactured or designed the bus that crashed in Mexico. Instead, the evidence in the record shows that the bus that crashed in Mexico was manufactured by a wholly separate Canadian company. CR408–09. Respondents’ Brief finally even concedes as much. See Respondents’ Brief at 1 (“The bus in question was a 2004 MCI J4500 motor coach (the ‘Motor Coach’) designed and manufactured by Motor Coach Industries Limited (‘MCIL’) in 2004 in Canada.”). Respondents continue to ignore the individual corporate identities of Petitioner MCI, the Canadian manufacturer (MCIL), and MCISS. But there is no basis to impute the jurisdictional contacts of these entities to Petitioner MCI— 11 particularly where the courts below have found that there is no specific jurisdiction for Respondents’ claims against MCISS and MCIL and Respondents have never challenged those findings.
Party Submissions
5.945922
5.823597
6.218164
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.
Legal Decisions
26.068045
30.948666
38.062782
TADA’s Letter (Apr. 19, 2023). As explained above, if the El Paso court’s ruling stands, manufacturers/distributors could try to use it to argue that they are not “requir[ing]” unreasonable standards if they (1) impose lesser consequences than franchise termination (like reduced inventory), or (2) impose the standards outside the dealer agreement. This is not a niche issue affecting only this case, but one that impacts every manufacturer, distributer, and dealer in Texas—and indirectly, Texas consumers.
Party Submissions
14.209672
13.404272
15.448525
We need the above information to support this project.734 516. Mr Hågensen replied on 16 May 2013: 1. Russian vessels cannot catch snow crab in the NØS / Svalbard zone. This is because the snow crab is not a part of the fisheries agreement between Russia and Norway. The same applies to other foreign vessels.
Legal Decisions
20.862099
20.699966
23.956095
In Green Tree, the plaintiff had “failed to support [her] assertion” that “[a]rbitration costs are high, and that she did not have the resources to arbitrate.” Id. at 90 n.6. The Court explained that the plaintiff’s “discussion of costs relied entirely on unfounded assumptions” because, among other things, she did not show that “she would be charged the filing fee or arbitrator’s fee that she identified.” Id. Specifically, the Court explains in footnote six that the plaintiff conceded that the arbitration agreement did not designate a particular arbitration association. Thus, any factual showing that the “American Arbitration Association would conduct the arbitration, or that, if it did, she would be charged the filing fee or arbitrator's fee that she identified” did not “afford a sufficient basis for concluding that [the plaintiff] would in fact have incurred substantial costs in the event her claim went to arbitration.” Id. ; Id. at n. 6.
Party Submissions
6.502753
7.540351
7.076954
Failure (in whole or in part) or delay on the part of either TDCC or a UCC Member in performance of any of the obligations imposed upon it shall be excused and such party shall not be liable for damages or otherwise when such failure or delay is beyond the control of TDCC or such UCC Member (“force majeure event”). Such events include, but are not limited to, the following: labor difficulties, total or partial loss or shortage of raw component material or products ordinarily required by TDCC; breakdown, either total or partial, of either party's equipment, or act of God or nature. However, the settlement of strikes or lockouts shall be entirely within the discretion of the party having the difficulty. TDCC agrees to give written notice to UCC, and UCC agrees to give written notice (for itself and on behalf of the other UCC Members) when experiencing a force majeure event as soon as practicable.
Contract
7.923008
7.007517
8.456
Id. at *2. Yet the Austin court correctly applied § 2301.467(a)(1)’s plain meaning, holding that the distributor “required” the standard by authoritatively asking a dealer to comply with the standard on pain of adverse consequences.
Party Submissions
20.442719
20.457493
21.057241
Footnotes 1 C.R. at 8. 2 C.R. at 9; 457-463. 3 Id. 4 C.R. at 458. 5 C.R. at 19. 6 C.R. at 26. 7 Appellants Brief at 1. 8 A “ROCIP” by design, is a flexible Rotating Owner Controlled Insurance Program permitted under 406.123 of the Texas Labor Code. ROCIPs and OCIPs have no legal distinction for the purposes of this court's review of the authorities and arguments of the parties. 9 Id.
Party Submissions
8.157723
7.874252
8.436234
Contract or its enforcement. App. 4. Again, RLB’s live pleading asserts that RLB’s claims all arise out of or relate to the Subcontract and the Owner Contract. R.451 ¶9.
Party Submissions
19.215672
21.402935
28.595467
The City next assaults application of the SWDA by suggesting the City could only be liable under a strict liability statute and insisting the SWDA does not impose strict liability. The City neither distinguishes nor even discusses any of Weatherford’s cited authorities treating CERCLA as imposing strict liability. (Brief 38). These provisions were the model for the SWDA. R.R. Street, 166 S.W.3d at 238. The City cites no authority remotely suggesting CERCLA or the SWDA are not strict liability statutes. (Response 36). It points to no supporting language in either statute requiring either knowledge or a culpable mental state.1 Such requirements cannot be added in the guise of interpretation. “A court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words ... [but] must apply the statute as written.” ExxonMobil v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. 2017). The Texas City Attorneys Association's 2017 summer conference presentation and website label the idea "[e]nvironmental laws only punish ...
Party Submissions
9.657589
9.774126
10.383964
This Promissory Note evidences the Loan made under the Loan Agreement, and is entitled to the benefits of the Loan Agreement, as the same may be amended, amended and restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the provisions of which are hereby incorporated by reference. The Loan Agreement provides for, among other things, the acceleration of the maturity hereof upon the occurrence of certain events and for prepayments in certain circumstances, upon certain terms and conditions.
Contract
3.282548
3.396236
4.12395
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and RENDERS judgment in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellees.
Party Submissions
2.619824
5.088203
5.891198
As explained above, the requested documents will show that the City of Belgrade considered Obnova to be the user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and charged Obnova a fee for the use of the land at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This is inconsistent with Serbia’s position in this arbitration that Obnova was not a rightful user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This fact also supports Claimants’ position that Obnova had the right of use over the land plots at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23, as the City of Belgrade would not have otherwise charged Obnova the fee for the use of these land plots. Requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control Requested documents were issued before Obnova’s privatization and, therefore, before Claimants acquired ownership and control over Obnova. Claimants have reviewed Obnova’s archives t hat are available to them and confirm that they do not contain the requested documents.
Legal Decisions
4.875284
5.382426
4.78873
B. Employer Element [12] By its first issue, Bay asserts that it qualified as Mann's statutory employer. It is undisputed that Bay was Mann's actual employer under the common-law definition of “employer”. In the context of workers' compensation, though, “employer” is a statutory term that does not always align with the common-law definition. See Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 145 (Tex. 2003).
Party Submissions
6.017041
6.852819
7.075265
For column 13: Provide the risk factors in different rows, using as many rows as necessary. For each risk factor indicate the risk level and corresponding relative risk and proportion of host population.
Legislation
27.912209
39.60617
40.198742
FROM: _______________________________________________ 1. IN CONSIDERATION of being provided with materials in connection with the arbitration between Ruby River Capital LLC and Canada, over which claims for confidentiality have been advanced (“Confidential Information”), I hereby agree to maintain the confidentiality of such material. It shall not be copied or disclosed to any other person who has not signed a Confidentiality Undertaking nor shall the material so obtained be used by me for any purposes other than in connection with this proceeding.
Legal Decisions
11.432119
10.757601
11.719754
A reviewing court construes statutory provisions to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, and it ascertains that intent by first looking to the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. The court must also view a statute's terms in context and give them full effect. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (2005). When examining the provisions within the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, the court should keep in mind the comprehensive nature of the Act.
Party Submissions
4.572381
4.858028
5.334002
The district court conducted a hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and heard extensive evidence presented by both sides. SCR44-400 (City’s jurisdictional evidence); CR73-150 (Petitioners’ jurisdictional evidence). After hearing all of the evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately denied the City’s Plea to the jurisdiction. CR165.
Party Submissions
6.725858
7.153306
7.961164
To amend the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 to improve the Office of Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production, and for other purposes.
Legislation
4.123856
3.003487
3.842181
As this Court has previously held, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction, the finding by the Trial Court of denial of the Special Appearance stands. In determining whether there is a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the Court must look to only the evidence supporting the Trial Court finding, and not to examine evidence presented by the Defendant, which is exactly what the Court of Appeals did.
Party Submissions
6.600797
7.836512
7.66669
Convention Article 44; Arbitration Rule 1 1.1. These proceedings are conducted in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules in force as of 1 July 2022.
Legal Decisions
8.226347
8.63814
11.06506
UCC shall make payments to TDCC for product purchased and services rendered hereunder within five (5) business days of the receipt of TDCC's invoice. Invoices shall be issued once per month as soon as possible after the end of such month.
Contract
8.42827
8.522925
11.07534
Bestor contends in his first issue that his breach of contract claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision and that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract claim.
Party Submissions
6.464039
8.186392
9.933042
To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to confirm the requirement to observe the election administration procedures in congressional elections.
Legislation
12.372925
11.666412
13.023952
Thus, believing that DWC "has the exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial determination of whether Bruno was an employee of Hellas at the time of his fatal injury or illness," Hellas filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for abatement. In the filing, Hellas prayed that the Martinez Family's "suit be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, abated pending a final, appealable decision of the DWC or any court to which a proper appeal of the DWC's decision has been made." At the hearing on the plea and motion, Hellas argued that the issue of employment status—if decided in its favor—would dispose of all the Martinez Family's tort theories. Hellas also submitted evidence that it had followed all applicable regulations in providing the Martinez Family with the workers' compensation claim form and a disclosure of rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Martinez Family, meanwhile, denied that DWC has any jurisdiction over the disputed issues. The district court ultimately took the plea and motion under advisement [*5] and then issued an order abating the case until July 1, 2020, "to allow. .. the parties to invoke the jurisdiction of [DWC]." It further indicated that if no party had invoked that jurisdiction by July 19, 2020—the one-year anniversary of Bruno's death and therefore the last day the Martinez Family could file a claim for benefits, see id. § 409.007(a) —the court would lift the abatement.
Party Submissions
5.90813
6.285659
6.468857
Plan Administration. This Plan shall be administered by the Committee which shall have discretionary authority to make, amend, interpret and enforce all appropriate rules and regulations for the administration of this Plan and to utilize its discretion to decide or resolve any and all questions, including but not limited to eligibility for benefits and interpretations of this Plan and its terms, as may arise in connection with the Plan. Claims for benefits shall be filed with the Committee and resolved in accordance with the claims procedures in Article XII.
Contract
4.516287
4.418212
5.329124
Petitioners first cite to the facts of Casteel where the jury was instructed on thirteen statutory causes of action, where as a matter of law, only nine were legally valid. Similarly, here, the jury was instructed on two legal theories of negligence and one of them, the yield sign theory, was deemed invalid as a matter of law due to the lack of any material facts supporting a proximate cause finding. The Opinion is wholly consistent with Casteel and its holding was correctly applied here.
Party Submissions
12.029898
11.473795
12.408744