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ough American Growers failed to meet more than 4 ratios, as required by the SRA, its performance was not unlike some other companies. Of the 19 companies participating in the crop insurance program in 2003, 2 companies had 8 or more failed ratios, 2 had 5—the same number as American Growers, and 14 companies had 4 or fewer failed ratios. Although RMA routinely reviewed the financial documents required under the SRA, we found the agency’s financial oversight procedures inadequate to fully assess American Gro

wers’ financial condition. RMA reviewed the company’s surplus and reinsurance arrangements and approved the company to write policies for the 2003 crop year, based on this analysis. However, RMA was unaware that American Growers was projecting profits in excess of historic averages to pay for its operating expenses and that its failure to achieve these profits would mean that the company’s surplus would be inadequate to absorb resulting operating losses and could result in the financial failure of the compa

ny. One reason RMA was unable to identify deficiencies in American Growers’ finances was because, following the agency’s emphasis on companies’ compliance with program criteria, RMA only reviewed a company’s historical financial information and its ability to pay claims on the basis of the company’s past surplus and its private reinsurance agreements. For example, RMA’s decision to approve companies to participate in the federal crop insurance program for 2002 (July 2001 – June 2002) was based on the compan

y’s financial information as of December 31, 2000. Further, while RMA required companies to submit an operation plan showing projected policy sales, RMA did not require a company to provide operating budget projections for the upcoming year. As a result, RMA’s approval decisions were generally based on a company’s past financial performance rather than a forward-looking perspective of a company’s financial health. Without knowing the details of a company’s projected operating budget including its acquisitio

n plans and the financial conditions of affiliated, parent, or subsidiary companies, RMA did not have a complete picture of the company’s financial condition. Thus, RMA was unable to adequately identify or take action to lessen any risks that may have been developing in companies with deteriorating profits, as was the case in American Growers. We believe that this lack of information impaired RMA’s decision-making process; therefore, the agency was forced to make decisions based on incomplete, narrowly focu

sed, and dated information. Subsequent to the financial failure of American Growers, RMA took several steps to improve its oversight and analysis of the financial condition of companies currently participating in the federal crop insurance program. For example, in 2003, RMA started requesting more comprehensive budget and cash flow information from participating companies, which provides the agency a more forward-looking perspective of the companies’ financial health. Specifically, RMA will require insuranc

e companies to provide their estimated underwriting gains or losses for the coming year; copies of all risk-based capital reports; and a signed statement identifying any potential threats to the company’s ability to meet its obligations for current and future reinsurance years, along with the possible financial ramification of such obligations. In addition, RMA is revising the SRA in its efforts to address some of the shortcomings of the current SRA. Although RMA officials said the agency plans to continue

requesting more comprehensive information from crop insurance companies and had developed a financial analysis plan, as we concluded our review, the agency did not have formal written policies and procedures in place incorporating these changes. In a November 2003 memorandum to RMA’s administrator, USDA’s Office of Inspector General provided general comments and suggestions for RMA’s consideration in its renegotiation of the current SRA. Some of the suggestions to improve the SRA included requiring companie

s to provide (1) “revenue and expense forecast budget data for the forthcoming year as a part of the plan of operations approval process, including agents’ commission rates and salary and other compensation for top company officials,” (2) “information relating to any planned acquisition of other crop insurance companies,” and (3) “the financial roles that will be played by parent/subsidiary companies in the crop insurance operations.” RMA did not routinely coordinate with state regulators regarding the fina

ncial condition of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program. RMA’s contact with state regulators was ad hoc and primarily limited to episodes during the introduction of new crop products or company acquisitions. RMA did not discuss the financial status of companies with regulators, but it would have been prevented from doing so because it lacked an agreement with state insurance regulators regarding the sharing of confidential financial and examination records. Companies selling and ser

vicing crop insurance under the federal crop insurance program are subject to the regulations of the state where the company is chartered as well as federal regulations. According to NAIC, a state regulators’ primary responsibilities are to protect the public interest; promote competitive markets; facilitate the fair and equitable treatment of insurance consumers; promote the reliability, solvency, and financial solidity of insurance institutions; and enforce state regulation of insurance. State regulators,

among other things, require companies to file periodic information regarding their financial condition, including the adequacy of their surplus to cover claim losses, and the solvency of the company. Prior to the failure of American Growers, RMA did not routinely coordinate with state regulators regarding companies’ financial condition. Also, RMA did not have a written policy or information-sharing agreements that would allow state insurance regulators to share sensitive financial information about crop in

surance companies with the agency. According to several state regulators, RMA did not routinely share information or otherwise coordinate with state regulators to determine the financial health of a company. According to another state regulator, RMA and the state have talked when a company was introducing a new crop insurance product; however, the regulator could not remember sharing information with RMA about the financial operations of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program. Further

more, the state regulators with whom we spoke said that any policy promoting coordination would be of limited value unless the states and RMA established a written agreement allowing the state regulators to share confidential business information with RMA. RMA’s lack of an agreement for sharing information with NDOI prevented the state from disclosing sensitive business information on American Growers. NDOI officials identified financial and management weaknesses directly or indirectly affecting American Gr

owers during its periodic reviews as early as 2000. Beginning in 2001, and continuing through August 2002, NDOI was internally discussing the possibility of conducting a targeted examination of Acceptance, including its subsidiary—American Growers. However, in September 2002, due to other priorities and resource constraints, NDOI decided to postpone an on-site examination of the company until 2003. RMA called the state insurance regulator in May 2002, and again in September 2002, asking whether there were a

ny special inquiries or actions pending by the state regarding American Growers and whether American Growers was listed on the state’s list of companies at risk. NDOI acknowledged to RMA that it had asked American Growers to provide additional information regarding its first quarterly submission for 2002; however, NDOI explained that this was not unusual because a number of other companies also had outstanding inquiries. NDOI explained that most of its information is considered public and could be furnished

to RMA if requested. However, NDOI’s work products, including its list of companies most at risk, company examination reports, and associated work papers were considered confidential. As a result, NDOI required that a confidentiality agreement be signed before they could share the information. On September 20, 2002, NDOI began drafting a confidentiality agreement so it could share information about American Growers with RMA. However, this agreement was not completed before American Growers’ failure. Since

the failure of American Growers, RMA has begun working with NAIC on draft language for confidentiality agreements that would allow state regulatory agencies to share confidential business information with RMA. However, at the conclusion of our review, no written confidentiality agreements had been formalized. RMA worked with NDOI to effectively manage the failure of American Growers by ensuring that policyholder claims were paid and crop insurance coverage was not disrupted. However, servicing the company’s

crop insurance policies cost RMA more than $40 million for such things as paying agent commissions and staff salaries. Further, RMA lacked a written policy that clearly defined its relationship to state actions in handling company insolvencies. While NDOI accommodated RMA’s interests by not immediately liquidating American Growers’ assets so that policyholders could be served, without a written agreement in place, other actions such as liquidation could have limited RMA’s flexibility to protect policyholde

rs and maintain stability in the federal crop insurance program. RMA effectively protected American Growers’ policyholders after the company’s failure by ensuring that farmers’ claims were paid and that their crop insurance coverage was not disrupted. After NDOI obtained an order of supervision, NDOI and RMA signed a memorandum of understanding that specified that American Growers, under NDOI appointed management, would pay claims and service policies with American Growers’ funds. RMA signed an amendment to

American Growers’ 1998 SRA and agreed to reimburse the company for continued expenses associated with paying or servicing crop insurance claims when American Growers’ available cash accounts—about $35 million—dropped to $10 million or below. RMA began day-to-day oversight of American Growers in conjunction with NDOI at the company’s Council Bluffs, Iowa, offices on January 6, 2003. The purpose of the oversight was, among other things, to ensure the timely payment of claims, the timely collection of premium

s, the efficient transfer of 2003 business to other insurance companies, and the review and approval of the company’s employee retention plan and payments to creditors. RMA worked with NDOI to keep American Growers in rehabilitation rather than liquidate the company because RMA was concerned that if NDOI chose to liquidate the company RMA may not have a mechanism to expeditiously pay claims and transfer American Growers’ policies to other insurance providers. Continuity of coverage is critical to policyhold

ers because they must provide proof of insurance coverage in order to secure loans and obtain credit to plant the next year’s crops. Policyholders may become ineligible for crop insurance for 1 year if their coverage is terminated. RMA was concerned that if American Growers was liquidated, policyholders would not be paid for their losses and their coverage would lapse, making them ineligible for continued crop insurance coverage. While the SRA provides that RMA could take control of American Growers’ crop i

nsurance policies, it did not have an effective way to service these policies. On December 18, 2002, RMA issued procedures for transferring existing policies written under American Growers to other insurance providers approved under the federal crop insurance program. Under these procedures, American Growers was to notify its agents that all of its policies must be placed with another insurance provider. The agents had the primary responsibility to transfer the policies. By April 2003, RMA transferred or as

signed a total of 349,185 policies—all which were eligible—to other companies in the federal crop insurance program reflecting about $576.4 million in premiums. Any American Growers’ policy that was not transferred voluntarily to a new insurance provider was assigned by RMA on a random basis to a provider that was currently writing insurance in the applicable state. Less than 8 percent of the policies had to be assigned to other insurance providers because the policy or agent had not acted on them, or becau

se paperwork errors interfered with their transfer. For the fall and spring crop seasons combined, agents or policyholders transferred about 323,000 policies, and RMA assigned about 26,500 policies. RMA worked in conjunction with NDOI and remaining American Growers’ staff to ensure that 52,681 claims totaling about $410 million were paid. About $400 million of these claims were paid by March 2003. The claims that were filed resulted from policyholder losses from the 1999 through 2003 crop seasons—primarily

the 2002 crop season. A month-by-month presentation of this information is presented in appendix VI. The cost of servicing American Growers’ crop insurance policies, which included the administrative and operating costs of paying claims and transferring policies, totaled about $40.5 million as of March 2004 (see table 3). These costs included agent commissions, office space leases and rental equipment, payroll for remaining American Growers’ staff, severance pay, and other expenses. Six former American Grow

ers’ employees remained on-site to respond to information requests associated with paid claims and transferred policies, to process remaining claims, and to produce end-of-year financial statements. RMA would like to recoup some of these costs by (1) obtaining revenues that could be derived from the liquidation of American Growers’ assets by NDOI, if that should occur, and (2) requesting that NDOI provide RMA with any portion of the company’s cash reserves—totaling about $7 million as of February 2004—that

may remain before the company is liquidated. However, according to NDOI, RMA’s standing as a creditor in the case of liquidation is unclear, and RMA does not know to what extent, if any, it can recoup its costs from these financial sources. At the time of American Growers’ failure, RMA did not have a written policy defining its financial roles and responsibilities in relationship to state actions in the event of an insurance provider insolvency. While the SRA provides that RMA may take control of the polici

es of an insolvent insurance company to maintain service to policyholders and ensure the integrity of the federal crop insurance program, state regulators’ decisions may constrain RMA’s ability to efficiently protect policyholders. In the case of American Growers, an RMA official reported that NDOI made it clear that it had no choice, given the weakened financial condition of the company, but to liquidate American Growers unless RMA funded the company until all the policies had been serviced. If the state h

ad liquidated the company, it would have sold all the company’s property and assets, creditors may have initiated legal actions over the existing assets (including premiums owed by policyholders), and there was the possibility of a freeze on the payment of any claims. Furthermore, liquidation would have left RMA with a number of crop policies to service, with no way of servicing them. RMA decided that the best course of action was to reach an agreement with NDOI to stave off liquidation by reimbursing NDOI

for all costs associated with the servicing of policies until all 2002 policies had been serviced and until all producers had found new insurance providers for the 2003 crop year. Fortunately, NDOI accommodated RMA’s interests by allowing RMA to fund the operation of the company long enough to pay farmers’ claims and transfer policies. However, other actions available to the state could have increased RMA’s costs or limited RMA’s flexibility in protecting policyholders. When an insurance provider becomes in

solvent, the SRA provides that RMA will gain control of its federally funded crop insurance policies and any premiums associated with those policies. However, as the case of American Growers demonstrates, RMA is not prepared to assume such responsibility. RMA was concerned, among other things, that it lacked sufficient staff and other capabilities, such as data management systems, to effectively service policyholders. RMA could have employed a contractor to service policyholders, but doing so could have bee

n costly and may not have resulted in the timely payment of claims. Furthermore, according to RMA, they were unable to identify a company to contract with to service the policies and related claims. Thus, according to RMA, while RMA has the authority in the event of insolvency to service policyholders by taking control of companies’ policies, it is unprepared to act on this authority. RMA is further dependent on state regulators to make decisions that will allow the agency to act in the most efficient manne

r to protect policyholders and maintain stability in the federal crop insurance program. Prior to American Growers’ insolvency, RMA had not reached an agreement with NDOI that addressed RMA’s interests in the case of insolvency including the state’s financial responsibilities. RMA argues that while it does not have a written policy to address insolvencies, it does have flexibility to assess the situation when it occurs and use the most efficient way to ensure that policyholders do not face a service disrupt

ion. While the lack of a written policy and agreements may allow greater flexibility, the absence of specific framework may also result in state regulator decisions detrimental to RMA and the federal crop insurance program. A policy describing state and RMA authorities and responsibilities when a state decides to act against an insolvent company would provide RMA some assurance that the federal government’s interests are protected. The failure of American Growers, at the time, the largest participant in the

federal crop insurance program was caused by the cumulative effect of company decisions over several years, and triggered by a drought that forced the company to severely deplete its surplus to cover operating expenses. Reviewing the causes underlying American Growers’ failure and RMA’s actions provides a valuable opportunity to identify shortcomings in the financial oversight of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program and reforms necessary to strengthen RMA’s oversight and RMA’s abil

ity to respond to an insurance provider insolvency. The failure of American Growers demonstrates that companies relying on anticipated underwriting gains to cover operational expenses may face financial difficulties similar to American Growers. More specifically, it suggests that companies must find ways to achieve operating efficiencies so that their expenses do not exceed the administrative and operational expense reimbursement provided by RMA to cover expenses for the sale and service of federal crop ins

urance policies. Further, the failure of American Growers highlights the need to improve RMA’s financial oversight of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program. Clearly, RMA’s oversight procedures at the time of the failure were inadequate to ensure that companies met applicable financial requirements for participation in the program. Specifically, the failure of American Growers highlights the need for improved financial and operational reviews, and improved coordination with state insu

rance regulators. If adequate financial oversight procedures had been in place prior to the failure of American Growers, the company’s weakened financial condition may have been detected in time to allow for corrective actions and thereby reduced costs to taxpayers. While RMA has conducted additional oversight of companies and has initiated greater contact with state regulators after the failure of American Growers, RMA has not formalized these procedures. RMA responded to the failure of American Growers in

an effective manner that ensured continued coverage for farmers and stability in the crop insurance program. Further, RMA demonstrated that the federal crop insurance program functioned as intended by ensuring that policyholders were protected. However, the failure of American Growers highlights the need for RMA to consider developing written policies to ensure that it takes the most effective and efficient actions in the event of future insolvencies in the federal crop insurance program. As demonstrated b

y the failure of American Growers, RMA is vulnerable to state insurance regulators’ actions when a company fails. State regulators are vested with the authority to determine what supervisory action to take in response to the financial failure of an insurance company. While NDOI accommodated RMA’s interests by allowing RMA to fund the operation of the company long enough to pay farmers’ claims, other actions available to the state, including liquidation, could have increased RMA’s costs or limited RMA’s flex

ibility in protecting policyholders. Better coordination with state regulators, regarding respective authorities and responsibilities in the event of future insurance provider insolvencies, is necessary to ensure that RMA’s interests are protected. To improve RMA’s financial oversight of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program and its ability to effectively address future insolvencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct RMA to take the following three actions: (1) De

velop written policies to improve financial and operational reviews used to monitor the financial condition of companies to include analyses of projected expenses, projected underwriting gains, relevant financial operations of holding companies, and financial data on planned acquisitions. (2) Develop written agreements with state insurance regulators to improve coordination and cooperation in overseeing the financial condition of companies selling crop insurance, including the sharing of examination results

and supporting work papers. (3) Develop a written policy clarifying RMA's authority as it relates to federal/state actions and responsibilities when a state regulator decides to place a company under supervision or rehabilitation, or to liquidate the company. We provided USDA with a draft of this report for its review and comment. We received written comments from the Administrator of USDA’s RMA. RMA agreed with our recommendations and stated that it is (1) formalizing the improvements in oversight that we

recommended in the new SRA, (2) developing written agreements with state insurance regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to improve data sharing and oversight, and (3) clarifying RMA’s authority as it relates to federal/state actions when a state takes action against a crop insurance company in its draft SRA and in discussions with state regulators and the NAIC. When completed, RMA’s initiatives to implement the recommendations in this report will improve its ability to

evaluate companies overall financial health and to earlier detect weaknesses in companies’ financial condition. However, to the extent that RMA cannot obtain enhanced disclosure and accountability through proposed changes to the SRA, it should implement our recommendation by modifying its regulations or other written policies. Finally, RMA’s increased cooperation and coordination with state insurance regulators will likely strengthen oversight by both federal and state regulators and facilitate problem reso

lution should a company fail in the future. RMA also provided technical corrections, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. RMA's written comments are presented in appendix IX. As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of the report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time we will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Director, Office of Management

and Budget; and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the House Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management, we reviewed USDA’s actions regarding American Growers Insurance Company (American Growers) and their impact on the federal crop insurance program. Specific

ally, we agreed to determine (1) what key factors led to the failure of American Growers, (2) whether Risk Management Agency (RMA) procedures were adequate for monitoring crop insurance companies’ financial condition, and (3) how effectively and efficientlyRMA handled the dissolution of American Growers. In addition, we were asked to determine what factors led to RMA determinations affecting a proposed sale of American Growers’ assets to Rain and Hail LLC (Rain and Hail) and RMA’s decision to guarantee that

all American Growers’ agent commissions be paid. Information related to the Rain and Hail proposal is provided in appendix VII. Information on USDA’s decisions to guarantee agent commissions is provided in appendix VIII. To determine the key factors leading to the failure of American Growers, we analyzed company documents and financial statements, including annual and quarterly statements for 1999 through 2002. We compared American Growers’ expense data with expense data for other companies participating i

n the program. For this analysis, we computed the average expense ratios of companies participating in the crop insurance program, excluding the expense data from American Growers. Due to the timing of American Growers’ failure, it did not submit an expense report to RMA for 2002. To capture the extent of the financial problems that American Growers experienced in 2002 in comparison with other companies, we worked closely with staff who remained at American Growers while it was in rehabilitation to create a

n expense report for 2002. We also interviewed American Growers’ management; the Nebraska Department of Insurance (NDOI) appointed rehabilitator for American Growers and other key staff; industry groups, such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC); and representatives from other crop insurance companies, including key Rain and Hail personnel, to gain an industry perspective on the failure of American Growers’ and RMA’s actions. We also contacted the National Association of Crop Insura

nce Agents; however, they did not grant our requests for an interview. To adjust for the general effects of inflation over time, we used the chain-weighted gross domestic product price index to express dollar amounts in inflation- adjusted 2003 dollars. To evaluate RMA’s oversight procedures we interviewed RMA staff in Washington, D.C. and Kansas City, Missouri, offices. We reviewed the guidance that RMA uses to monitor companies’ compliance with the federal crop insurance program, including relevant laws;

the Code of Federal Regulations, title 7, part 400; and agency guidance, including RMA’s Crop Insurance Handbook for 2002 and the current Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA), to verify that monitoring procedures were met. We also reviewed RMA’s files relating to the oversight of American Growers and approval of its SRA. To determine the effectiveness of RMA’s dissolution of American Growers, we examined RMA’s decision-making process and the costs associated with running American Growers’ operations after i

ts failure to ensure that federal crop insurance policies were serviced. We reviewed American Growers’ financial statements and other documents. We used semistructured interviews to obtain the views of the Nebraska state commissioner; American Growers’ management; representatives from other crop insurance companies, including key Rain and Hail personnel; RMA staff; NAIC officials; and, industry groups on the failure of American Growers and on issues related to RMA’s handling of the dissolution. Specifically

, we obtained our information from the officials by asking 10 structured questions in a uniform order within an interview that included additional unstructured, probing follow-up questions that were interjected at the discretion of the interviewer. We also used structured interviews to obtain the views of insurance commissioners on the failure of American Growers and on issues related to sharing confidential business information with RMA. In this case, we asked an additional three structured questions and f

ollowed up with additional unstructured questions as needed. We selected insurance commissioners in 10 states where there was at least one 2004 SRA holder, according to RMA data. These states were Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. We met with RMA officials in February 2004 to discuss our findings and tentative recommendations. We conducted our review from July 2003 through May 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing stand

ards. As part of an overall strategy to increase the company’s market share of the crop insurance industry, in 1997, American Growers developed and marketed a crop insurance product—Crop Revenue Coverage Plus (CRC Plus)—that was a supplement to federally reinsured crop insurance, but it was not subsidized or reinsured by the federal government. The product was a supplement to Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), an insurance product that protected farmers against crop loss and low crop prices in the event of a low

price, a low yield, or any combination of the two. CRC Plus allowed farmers to obtain supplemental coverage for their crops, in essence providing a higher level of coverage in the event of losses. American Growers initially marketed CRC Plus in only two states and covered grain, corn, sorghum, and soybean crops. In 1999, when the company extended CRC Plus to rice, a crop with which American Growers had limited actuarial experience, the company mistakenly priced the product too low. It then promoted the prod

uct heavily and did not adequately anticipate the demand for the product. When it priced CRC Plus for rice, American Growers made a mathematical error—caused by the misplacement of a decimal point—that resulted in the insurance being sold for a lower price than it should have been. The low price for the policy, coupled with uncertainty in the market price of rice that year, resulted in a greater demand for the product than the company had anticipated. When American Growers realized that the demand for the p

roduct and associated losses would be greater than the company’s surplus could handle, especially considering its low price, American Growers announced it would no longer accept applications at the price originally listed, effectively withdrawing the product from the market. However, farmers had already made decisions about what crop insurance they would purchase, based upon their belief that they could obtain the new product offered by American Growers. The withdrawal of the product was untimely and made i

t difficult for some farmers to find adequate insurance. As a result, Congress acted to extend the filing deadline for other types of federally reinsured crop insurance so that farmers adversely affected by American Growers’ actions could obtain adequate insurance for their crops. Finally, some farmers sued American Growers, while RMA and six states examined American Growers’ actions. The litigation by farmers and regulatory actions resulted in more than $13 million in fines and settlements levied against A

merican Growers in addition to losses of $6 million. The fines, costs from litigation, and increased service costs resulting from the new insurance product reduced American Growers’ surplus. As a result, American Growers’ surplus dropped from $76 million in 1998, to $60 million in 2000, a 21 percent decline over 2 years. This decline in American Growers’ surplus occurred at the same time the company increased the amount of insurance premium it wrote, from $271 million in 1998 to $307 million in 2000, an inc

rease of 13 percent. To lessen the impact of losses associated with the CRC Plus policies, American Growers accepted a $20 million loan in the form of a surplus note from an affiliate company to strengthen its surplus. American Growers also acquired commercial reinsurance coverage to pay for losses related to CRC Plus. This reinsurance coverage committed the company to future payments of more than $60 million through 2006. American Growers’ reported that operating expenses were higher than the average repor

ted expenses of other companies participating in the federal crop insurance program, primarily due to American Growers’ efforts to attract agents by paying them higher than average commissions and other actions designed to expand its business. From 2000 to 2002, average commissions for American Growers’ agents were 12 percent higher than commissions for agents working for other companies. American Growers paid commissions that averaged about $17 for each $100 premium it sold while other companies’ agent com

missions averaged $15 for each $100 of premium. Agents are companies’ principal representatives to farmers. Farmers purchase crop insurance through agents who can write premium for any company selling crop insurance. Farmers generally develop relationships with specific agents and rely on agents for advice and service. Successful agents write more policies and may write policies with lower loss ratios. Agents typically receive as a commission a percentage of every dollar of premium in crop insurance sold to

farmers. Some agents choose to write policies for certain companies based on commissions paid them by the company and on how well the company services the agents’ clients. Higher commission rates are not the only factor attracting an agent to a company, but rates do play an important role. In an effort to increase its market share by recruiting more agents to sell crop insurance, American Growers paid higher agent commissions than other companies participating in the program. American Growers also funded s

ome expenses not directly related to the sale and service of federally funded crop insurance, such as trips to resort locations. These expenses, among others, created operating costs that were greater than the average operating expenses of other companies in the industry. Overall, American Growers’ expenses, as a percentage of premium sold, were about 11 percent higher than the average expenses of the other companies. In other words, American Growers had expenses of about $30 for every $100 of premium it so

ld while other companies had expenses of about $27 for every $100 of premium sold. Salaries at American Growers averaged 15 percent higher than at other companies. In addition, American Growers spent twice the rate as other companies on advertising; and American Growers’ expenses for equipment, including computer equipment, was twice that of other companies. In addition to the fact that American Growers’ expenses, as a percent of premium sold, were higher than those of other companies, American Growers’ exp

enses were also higher than the amount of RMA’s reimbursement to the company. RMA provides companies a reimbursement to cover their expenses related to the sale and service of crop insurance. This reimbursement is a preestablished percentage of premiums to reimburse companies for the expenses associated with selling and servicing federal crop insurance. The reimbursement rate is set at a level to cover the companies’ costs to sell and service crop insurance policies. These costs include agent commissions, s

taff and office expenses required to process policies and claims, and loss adjusting expenses. In 1998, Congress reduced the amount of reimbursement from a cap of 27 cents per dollar of premium a company sells to 24.5 cents per dollar of premium. This reduction occurred after our 1997 report revealed that companies were basing their request for higher reimbursement rates on numerous expenses that were not directly related to the sale and service of crop insurance, such as trips to resorts, noncompete clause

s associated with company mergers, and company profit-sharing arrangements. Under the current reimbursement arrangement, companies have no obligation to spend their payment on expenses related to crop insurance; they may spend the payment in any way they choose. We found that American Growers spent more than its reimbursement by paying above average-rates for agent commissions, marketing efforts, and other items not directly related to the sale and service of federal crop policies, such as tickets to sporti

ng events and trips to resorts for agents. On June 6, 2001, Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc., (Acceptance) and its subsidiaries, including American Growers, acquired the crop insurance business of IGF Insurance Company (IGF) from Symons International Group, Inc. Acceptance and its subsidiaries raised funds for this purchase by selling most of its noncrop insurance subsidiaries between September 1999 and July 2001, as part of a larger business strategy to focus on and expand American Growers’ crop insuran

ce business. American Growers, through its parent corporation Acceptance, acquired most of IGF’s book of crop insurance policies, in addition to obtaining leased office space, company cars, and related staff to service these policies. A senior manager at American Growers said that the company’s strategy was to achieve operational efficiencies by combining the operations of the two companies. However, he said that this goal was not achieved as quickly as the company had planned. For example, American Growers

had planned on combining the companies’ two computer systems; but it was unable to successfully do so, requiring it to keep two staffs of information technology specialists. After the acquisition, American Growers grew from the company with the third largest volume of premium sold to being the largest. However, this growth also came with higher costs. American Growers’ expenses increased 63 percent, from 2000 to 2001, the years before and after the purchase of IGF. In 2000, American Growers had about $117

million in expenses, but its expenses increased to $191 million in 2001. While the amount of premium American Growers wrote increased, from about $291 million in 2000 to $450 million in 2001, a 54 percent increase, the amount of surplus the company kept only increased from $57 million in 2000 to $75 million in 2001, a 31 percent increase. In 2002, American Growers wrote nearly $632 million in premiums, but without adding to the $75 million reserve. American Growers’ high expenses led them to spend more than

RMA was reimbursing it for the sale and service of crop insurance. In 2001, for every $100 RMA provided American Growers to sell and service crop insurance, the company was spending $130. To pay for its expenses in excess of RMA’s reimbursement, American Growers planned on making underwriting profits from the sale of crop insurance. When setting its budget for 2002, American Growers predicted it would receive an 18 percent underwriting gain from policies it serviced under the federally reinsured crop progr

am. However, American Growers’ 10-year history of underwriting gains in the program was only 16 percent. American Growers based its 2002 budget on achieving over $86 million in underwriting gains that year. The company’s profit projections were based, in part, on retaining a higher percentage of the risk for the policies it sold than in past years. By retaining a higher percentage of the risk on policies, American Growers could increase its profits if claims were low. Conversely, the company increased its e

xposure to loss if claims were high. However, widespread drought impacted the company’s ability to achieve these gains. In June 2002, more than one-third of the contiguous U.S. was in severe to extreme drought. Total losses for the crop insurance program increased 33 percent from 2001. In 2001, total losses to the program were over $3 billion. In 2002, total losses increased to over $4 billion. For the category of policies for which American Growers retained a higher level of risk, the loss ratio in 2002 wa

s about 40 percent higher than in 2001, resulting in the payment of $114 in claims for every $100 it received in premiums for those policies. When the underwriting gains American Growers had predicted did not materialize, losses and expenses depleted the company’s surplus. As a result, NDOI, which regulates insurance companies domiciled in that state, declared that the company was operating in a hazardous financial condition and placed the company in supervision, and later rehabilitation. On November 22, 20

02, NDOI took steps to protect American Growers’ policyholders by issuing a state order of supervision. NDOI ordered the supervision because the company’s surplus declined from about $75 million for the year ending December 31, 2001, to about $11 million as of September 2002. According to the order, the decline in American Growers’ surplus—in excess of 50 percent within a 9-month period—rendered the company financially hazardous to the public and its policyholders. Under the order of supervision, American G

rowers could not sell any new insurance policies or conduct business beyond those that are routine in the day-to-day operations of its business, without the approval of the supervisor appointed by NDOI. On December 20, 2002, NDOI obtained a court order that placed American Growers into rehabilitation under the auspices of NDOI. Under rehabilitation, NDOI appointed a rehabilitator who took control of American Growers to oversee the orderly termination of the company’s business and to allow for an orderly tra

nsfer of policies to other companies. The NDOI-appointed rehabilitator assumed the responsibilities of the board of directors and officers and took control of the day-to-day management of the company. RMA worked in conjunction with NDOI and remaining American Growers’ staff to ensure that claims were paid (see table 4). The claims that were filed resulted from policyholder losses from the 1999 through 2003 crop seasons—primarily the 2002 crop season. After NDOI took control of American Growers, the company

had about $35 million in cash. These funds were used, in part, to pay American Growers’ staff and support staff operating under the auspices of NDOI to pay policyholder claims. When American Growers’ cash reserves were reduced to $10 million, RMA reimbursed NDOI for additional costs of $40.5 million to operate the company. When RMA began reimbursing NDOI in February 2003, the vast majority of policyholder claims had been paid (see Fig. 1). About $317 million, or 77 percent, of the approximately $410 million

in claims were paid by the end of January 2003. According to an RMA official, while the costs of reimbursing American Growers’ operations may appear excessive, relative to the amount of claims paid, the claims that had been paid before February 2003, were those that could be expeditiously handled. The claims that remained to be paid—beginning in February 2003—were those that required follow-up to determine the accuracy of reported information, were difficult to process due to missing information, or had ot

her problems. Additionally, although claims had been paid and policies transferred, staff were still needed to process the transfer of policy-related paperwork to other companies and resolve lingering issues, such as claims with missing information. Prior to NDOI’s declaration of its hazardous financial condition, American Growers was working to strengthen its financial condition by selling its insurance business to another insurance provider. In September 2002, as losses associated with that year’s extensi

ve drought began to materialize, American Growers realized that the company’s operating expenses and crop losses were outpacing its income and surplus and advised NDOI and RMA accordingly. To improve its financial condition, American Growers attempted to sell its crop insurance business to another insurance company. On November 18, 2002, American Growers’ parent company, Acceptance, signed a nonbinding letter of intent setting forth preliminary terms for the company to sell portions of its crop insurance bu

siness to Rain and Hail LLC (Rain and Hail) for over $20 million pending regulatory approval. Rain and Hail asked RMA for authority to transfer American Growers’ policies without having to cancel each policy and rewrite them under its own name—a concession that would have facilitated the bulk transfer of the policies. In the past, RMA had allowed this type of transfer only if the acquiring company agreed to (1) accept all the policies previously underwritten by the company being purchased and (2) assume all

past liability for those policies. According to RMA, Rain and Hail did not want to assume any past liabilities for the policies and wanted to retain the right to select agents and policyholders with whom it wished to contract. According to RMA, Rain and Hail’s intention was to not accept past liabilities regarding disputed claims, compliance issues, litigation or regulatory issues associated with American Growers’ policies and ultimately to acquire only about one-third of American Growers’ business. In a l

etter dated November 25, 2002, RMA rejected Rain and Hail’s request for exemptions from RMA rules regarding the bulk transfer of policies. The agency was concerned that waiving the existing rules regarding potential liabilities and future policy placement would not protect the interests of policyholders and taxpayers or the integrity of the federal crop insurance program. RMA was concerned that if it approved the sale of American Growers’ policies to Rain and Hail, it could have left a significant number of

policyholders without insurance. It also may have left a disproportionate number of poor performing policies for other insurance providers to assume. Since reinsured companies are required to accept all policyholders that apply for insurance regardless of their loss history, RMA was concerned that its decision would be unfair to other insurance providers and that any future denial of similar exemptions to other companies would be challenged as arbitrary and capricious. As a result, RMA informed Rain and Ha

il that it could not grant the exemptions it requested. Accordingly, Rain and Hail announced that it was withdrawing its offer to purchase American Growers’ business. When we discussed this issue with Rain and Hail, it concurred that its company was unwilling to accept the past liabilities associated with American Growers’ policies, but denied it was not willing to accept all of American Growers’ policyholders. Senior managers at Rain and Hail said their company was unwilling to accept the past liabilities

associated with American Growers’ policies because they did not have adequate time to assess the extent of any such liabilities and the financial implications for Rain and Hail. However, these managers said that Rain and Hail was willing to accept any farmer who wanted a policy from the company, but they stated that the company wanted to retain the right to select which agents it would use to sell and service crop insurance policies. Whether the sale of American Growers’ policies to Rain and Hail could have

saved taxpayers all or some of the costs of the dissolution if the proposed sale had been completed is unclear. A Rain and Hail representative stated that the sale would have provided a cash infusion that could have prevented the failure of American Growers. An Acceptance representative stated that the sale might have allowed American Growers to pay remaining claims without having to come under control of NDOI. However, depending on the details, even with the cash infusion from the sale of assets to Rain a

nd Hail, the company may still have been found to be in a financially hazardous condition. After consultation with NDOI, RMA agreed to pay American Growers’ agent commissions in full, despite the fact that they were paid higher than industry averages. RMA believed several factors, any one of which could have resulted in the disruption of policyholders’ coverage, warranted paying agent commissions in full. First, RMA agreed to pay agent commissions in full, in part, because NDOI’s position was that as long a

s American Growers was under the rehabilitation order instead of in liquidation, the company’s contracts were valid, enforceable legal obligations that had to be paid. Second, RMA was concerned that some agents may have refused to continue to service policyholders if they knew they would not get paid for their work, and RMA needed agents’ cooperation in ensuring the timely collection of premiums and transfer of policies to other crop insurance companies. Third, RMA was concerned that some agents, particular

ly small agents, could go out of business if not paid their commissions and would therefore be unable to service claims or transfer policies. Finally, RMA was concerned that some agents may have deducted their commissions from policyholder premiums, which could have made it more difficult for RMA to determine which policyholders had paid the premiums on their policies. While RMA could have potentially achieved cost savings of about $800,000 by not paying some of American Growers’ agents’ commissions—the por

tion of their $7.6 million in commissions that exceeded industry averages—agents’ response to such a decision could have also disrupted service to policyholders and caused RMA to incur additional costs. Industry opinion varied on whether RMA should have paid agent commissions in full. According to the former chief executive officer of American Growers, high commissions paid to agents contributed to American Growers’ and other companies’ financial troubles. One company executive expressed concerns that RMA’s

actions might make it more difficult for companies that are holding the line on agent commissions to continue to hold commissions at a reasonable level. Another representative was concerned that agents were going to work for the company that paid the highest commissions, regardless of the company’s financial health, because RMA had shown that agents would receive their commission regardless of the company’s status. However, one crop insurance company representative was concerned about the consequences of n