Datasets:

Deojoandco

/

reddit_ah_v3

like 0

[ { "body": "I wrote a seminar paper on Late Antique North Africa and the effect of conquest on Roman identity in the region. By the time of Late Antiquity, the impact of Rome's conquest centuries before had largely established a distinct Roman way of life. Conant and Fentress observe that it was more generic Mediterranean but it was a way of life that the Roman political and economic order ensured existed. Between the 5th and 7th century AD, the region underwent numerous conquests by the Vandals, the Mauri, the Byzantines, and finally the Arabs. Invasion, instability, changes of political power within generations, as well as changing interests of their overlords disrupted traditional avenues of life that existed because of the old Roman order. Thus, they gradually began to live differently from their ancestors under the \"glory\" days of Rome, gradually losing their Roman identity. Here is my bibliography on the subject. \n\nBibliography\n\n*Staying Roman: Conquest and Identity in Africa and the Mediterranean, 439-700* by Jonathan Conant\n\n*Vandals, Romans and Berbers: New Perspectives on Late Antique North Africa* by Andrew Merrills\n\n\"Romanizing the Berbers\" by Elizabeth Fentress in *Past & Present*, no. 190 (2006): 3-33\n\n*Frontier and Society in Roman North Africa* by David Cherry\n\n*Peasant and Empire in Christian North Africa (Vol 47)* by Leslie Dossey \n\n*Muslim Expansion and Byzantine Collapse in North Africa* by Walter Kaegi\n\n*Christians and Their Many Identities in Late Antiquity, North Africa, 200-450 CE* by Éric Rebillard \n\n*A History of the Vandals* by Torsten Jacobsen\n\n\nAlso, when I was investigating this subject I see that someone will be writing about how Byzantine Reconquest disrupted life in the aftermath of Vandal Rule. *Vandal Heaven* by Dr. Simon Elliott. Something to keep on the radar.", "created_utc": 1682049656, "distinguished": null, "id": "jh3ryyu", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/12razok/i_want_to_learn_about_how_conquests_affect_the/jh3ryyu/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "There has been change in how Central Asia is viewed over time. For example, the Central Asian contribution to Medieval science is often invisible, being lumped in as just part of \"Arab science\" or \"Islamic science\". \"Arabic science\", as in \"science written in Arabic\", is a better term than either of the former (which also hide much of the contribution from Jewish and Christian writers). Some newer works are more careful, and even discuss the older roots of Central Asian/Persian science, integrating ideas from India and Mesopotamia (and the West) with their own. On a larger scale, outside science, Central Asia can disappear as just part of the Islamic world which is so obviously (from the Western perspective) centred on Baghdad, or even Egypt and Damascus.\n\nHowever, key Central Asian cities such as Merv, Balkh, Bokhara, Samarkand, etc. have long been famous for their wealth and size, and for being important trading centres, at least before the carving up of Central Asia by Russia and China. For example, Rawlinson notes the importance of Balkh (Bactra) and Merv, and the prosperity of their surrounding areas. They can be less prominent in Western histories from Western Europe, especially older ones, due to their greater distance from the West. Just consider the relative invisibility of Byzantium in such histories, which often exists merely to be sacked during the 4th Crusade and then conquered by the Ottomans.\n\nRawlinson's Chorasmia appears to be the western 2/3 of modern Turkmenistan, largely the desert region between the Amu Darya (Oxus), Caspian Sea, and the mountains of northern Iran. His description is quite reasonable for this region. For other writers, Chorasmian/Khwarazm includes lower Transoxiana, and others include upper Transoxiana, Margiana, and Bactra. At the extreme, \"Khwarazm\" is sometimes used to mean the entire Khwarazmian Empire at its largest, approximately all of modern Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and a substantial part of Afghanistan.\n\nSo, for your specific point about Chorasmia, it depends very much on which Chorasmia/Khwarazm is being written about. Rawlinson discusses the smallest of these Chorasmias. His Chorasmia is today largely desert which cannot be accused of great agricultural productivity, and has been such desert for a long time. Rawlinson's Parthian Empire didn't include the great cities of Transoxiana, so they aren't mentioned. Those just to the south, Merv and Balkh, the centres of Margiana and Bactra, appear in his book, but these were the borderlands of the Parthian Empire, and he doesn't go north.\n\nThat said, while the large cities of Central Asia were large and were important trading centres, they were much smaller than the Ancient/Medieval mega-cites like Rome, Baghdad, Hangzhou, Kaifeng, Beijing. The largest only reached populations of about 100,000, and the smaller ones were probably only about 20-30,000. Baghdad at its peak population may have had more residents than the 20 largest cities in Central Asia combined.\n\nReference:\n\nChandler, T., & Fox, G. (1974). *3000 years of urban growth* (Studies in population). New York: Academic Press.", "created_utc": 1563500699, "distinguished": null, "id": "eu6hwgc", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/cesfvf/historians_have_very_different_views_on_the/eu6hwgc/", "score": 8 } ]

[ { "body": "Stephen Platt's *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom*, hands-down. It's meticulously researched, extremely well-written, and historiographically innovative. If I were to be asked what one book to read on the Taiping, this would be it. Now, its coverage is decidedly incomplete. It does not cover the leadup to the uprising in the 1840s, nor its first nine years or so from 1851-59. What it does do is narrate, in meticulous detail, the last five years of the Taiping War, in which the Taiping sought to gain control of Shanghai while as Qing gradually pushed downriver along the Yangtze towards their capital at Nanjing. The key thing is it is fundamentally a connected history. The resurgence of the Taiping in 1860 is placed in a context with the concluding phases of the Qing defeat in the Arrow War against Britain and France; the British decision to tacitly, and later actively, support the Qing is considered in conjunction with British approaches to 'neutrality' in the concurrent American Civil War. The Taiping can often be trivialised as a curiosity of Chinese history, but Platt manages to reframe it as a key event of *global* history.", "created_utc": 1674496518, "distinguished": null, "id": "j5klc4q", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10j9dge/what_pop_history_book_has_done_the_best_job_of/j5klc4q/", "score": 59 }, { "body": "It might stretch the definition of \"pop history\" (it does have 100 pages of endnotes per volume), but Stephen Kotkin's Stalin biography (*Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928*, *Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941*, a third volume to be released) might come closest for Soviet history. They're massive volumes, don't get me wrong, but they are written for a general audience, have a narrative style, and range pretty far into Russian/Soviet and even world history during Stalin's life. They're narrative enough that you can listen to them as audiobooks. But Kotkin also not only did lots of his own research in Soviet archives, but pretty heavily compiles academic research of others to date (you can dive into the end notes if so inclined), and when it has generated controversy among other historians it's usually been over a couple points that are relatively minor to a general audience.", "created_utc": 1674520866, "distinguished": null, "id": "j5mc41c", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10j9dge/what_pop_history_book_has_done_the_best_job_of/j5mc41c/", "score": 23 }, { "body": "For dueling, there is quite a lot of books out there as the institution holds quite a lot of romantic appeal. Not many of them are good. Some just lean too much into the romantics, some are just really old. \n\nI've tried to read as many as I can all the same, and the end result is that for the 'you want to read one book that isn't too dense and academic?' recommendation is Richard Hopton's *Pistols at Dawn*. It is well written in terms of it's prose, providing a good flow and a digestible level of density. It is well researched and reflects a pretty solid distilling down of current scholarship on dueling and doesn't dip too hard into mythos or conventional wisdom in the way others often do. Not to say it doesn't have issues, and I had my share of nitpicks when I read it, whether little errors or simplifying beyond what I thought reasonable, but those issues were definitely not at the level of detracting from the quality of it as a overview for the lay person, so I'm always happy to recommend it. \n\nI maintain a much more extensive bibliography and lost of readings [which can be found here](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/profiles/georgy_k_zhukov/dueling/) and it is the only distinctly not academic work there which I specifically highlight.", "created_utc": 1674485716, "distinguished": null, "id": "j5jthf0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10j9dge/what_pop_history_book_has_done_the_best_job_of/j5jthf0/", "score": 33 } ]

[ { "body": "Many - if not most! - French nursery rhymes have adult origins, and this is often pretty much in the open, only \"hidden\" because the vocabulary and allusions are no longer understood by modern audiences. \n\nThe best known of these is of course [*Au clair de la lune*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYLTc3tGdzc), which is full of double entendre and ends with the \"likeable Lubin\" having sex with the brunette next door, his \"candle\" no longer dead. It's not dark, but one can note that the name \"Lubin\" had been for centuries the stereotypical name used in literature for a debauched priest, usually a Franciscan monk (Lestringant, 2021). Gilles Ménage's *Dictionnaire étymologique* (1750) gives for *Lubin* the following definition:\n\n>A hypocritical monk who hides the heart of a wolf under the guise of a lamb. \n\nClément Marot's *Ballad of Brother Lubin* (1532) is a satirical and anticlerical poem about such a priest:\n\n>To entice with a sweet style\n\n>Some girl of good bearing,\n\n>No subtle old woman is needed,\n\n>Brother Lubin will do it well.\n\n>He preaches like a theologian,\n\n>But to drink the clearest water,\n\n>Make your dog drink it,\n\n>Brother Lubin cannot do it.\n\nBut at least Brother Lubin and his Tinder hookup seem to have consensual sex. That's not the case in other popular children songs, notably [*A la pêche aux moules*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JdJH0NKTnw) (Fishing for mussels) and [*Jeanneton prend sa faucille*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_tXAwl-E0Y) (Jeanneton takes her sickle). In the former, the girl no longer wants to go fishing mussels because of what happened the last time, when [boys from the town \"stole her basket\"](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%80_la_p%C3%AAche_aux_moules#/media/Fichier:P%C3%AAche_des_moules_\\(chanson_fran%C3%A7aise\\).jpg), petted and complimented her, or worse, in the full version of the song:\n\n>The boys of Marennes\n\n>They all kissed me, Mom,\n\n>The boys from Marennes\n\n>Took me for a swim, Mom,\n\n>The boys from Marennes\n\n>They hid my clothes, Mom,\n\n>The boys from Marennes\n\n>So they left me, Mom,\n\n>I shouldn't have believed\n\n>In all their sweet oaths, Mom,\n\n\nAs for Jeanneton, she meets four boys while cutting rushes and her fate is even more [graphic](https://youtu.be/e_tXAwl-E0Y?t=81):\n\n>The first one, a little shy\n\n>Kissed her on the chin\n\n>The second, a little less wise\n\n>Lied her on the lawn\n\n>The third, even less wise\n\n>Raised her white petticoat\n\n>What the fourth did\n\n>Is not mentioned in the song\n\nIn addition to all the sex things (some cute, some dark), we could also mention the non-stop animal cruelty that happens in those songs: plucking all the parts of a \"gentle lark\" (in [*Alouette*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xM0UyNqrS0o)), stealing a cat and selling it as rabbit (in [*C'est la Mère Michel*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJVN8wHXz68), where the cat owner also promises to kiss the thief to get her cat back; [cover of my mother's book of nursery rhymes of 1940](https://i.redd.it/mq005nsn1m941.jpg)), dunked in oil and water ([*Une souris verte*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XvTQJM7mh28)). And there's also the cannibalism of [*Il était un petit navire*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHNiPMO5q_s), where a young sailor barely escapes being eaten by other sailors.\n\nOne tragic children song is *Dansons la Capucine* ([cat version](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIePsbJSS04)), which is again pretty obvious in its social-minded darkness: it's about starving people who see the house of their rich neighbour go up in flame and are dancing about it.\n\n>Let's dance the Capucine\n\n>We have no bread at home\n\n>There's some at the neighbour's\n\n>But it's not for us\n\n>Let's dance the Capucine\n\n>We have no wine at home\n\n>There's some at the neighbour's\n\n>But it's not for us\n\n>Let's dance the Capucine\n\n>We have no fire at home\n\n>There's some at the neighbour's\n\n>But it's not for us\n\n>Let's dance the Capucine\n\n>We have fun at home\n\n>They cry at the neighbour's\n\n>We always laugh at home\n\nThe darkest \"hidden\" song, however, is certainly *Jean Petit qui danse*, which is very popular in kindergarden and primary school, where [it used to teach kids the names of body parts](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zECcMpFW1xo).\n\n>Jean Petit dancing\n\n>Jean Petit dancing\n\n>With his arm he dances\n\n>With his arm he dances\n\n>With his arm, arm, arm\n\n>And his hand, hand, hand\n\n>And with his finger, finger, finger\n\n>Hey, so dances Jean Petit\n\nDated, by its style, from the 15th century (Weber, 1994), this song was long believed to be about the defeat of [King John II of France](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_II_of_France) in 1355 (‘Travaux du comité', 1856; David and Delrieu, 1984). But the most common interpretation of the song nowadays (recapitulated by historian Gérard Noiriel, 2023) is that it is very direct allusion to the death on Jean (Joan) Petit, a surgeon who led a [croquant rebellion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croquant_rebellions) in Villefranche de Rouerge in 1643 after the taxes had doubled. As told in the annals of the city (Cabrol, 1860), Petit was caught and executed on the wheel, his house was burned, and a sign was put up explaining his punishment. This real banger of a song, first written in the Occitan language (*Joan Petit que dança*), would thus be a vivid description of his torture on the wheel, \"dancing\" under the blows that crush his body parts one by one - fingers, hands, arms, feet, legs, buttocks, belly, shoulders.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* ‘Travaux du comité. 1re Section. Philologie. Séance du 13 novembre 1854’. Bulletin du Comité de la langue, de l’histoire et des arts de la France, 1856, 485–92. https://books.google.fr/books?id=7UlFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA491\n* Cabrol, Etienne. Annales de Villefranche de Rouergue. Villefranche: Cestan, 1860. https://books.google.fr/books?id=4cZZ0ndFQKMC.\n* David, Martine, and Anne-Marie Delrieu. Aux sources des chansons populaires. Belin, 1984. https://books.google.fr/books/about/Aux_sources_des_chansons_populaires.html?id=6QZMAAAAMAAJ.\n* Lestringant, Frank. ‘Section VI. Ballades et chant royal (AC, p. 239-276)’. In « Ce sont œuvres de jeunesse, ce sont coups d’essai » : Clément Marot, L’Adolescence clémentine, 105–37. Cours. Mont-Saint-Aignan: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2021. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.purh.14380.\n\n* Ménage, Gilles. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue françoise. Briasson, 1750. https://books.google.fr/books?id=UoM-AAAAcAAJ.\n* Noiriel, Gérard. Le pourquoi du comment - Mieux vivre grâce à l’Histoire. Michel Lafon, 2023. https://books.google.fr/books?id=rK6tEAAAQBAJ.\n* Weber, Edith. Itinéraires du cantus firmus: De l’Orient à l’Occident. Presses Paris Sorbonne, 1994. https://books.google.fr/books?id=CuI0fwv8wf0C&pg=PA64.", "created_utc": 1681915699, "distinguished": null, "id": "jgvwuok", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/12qwmmk/re_there_childhood_stories_or_poems_that_have_a/jgvwuok/", "score": 10 } ]

[ { "body": "This seems to be 3 questions in one: Byzantine identity and their concept of statehood, the \"connectedness\" of the administration across the Empire, and their understanding of history. In this case, I'll answer each one in turn.\n\nFirstly, how did the Byzantines view their state? This is ultimately a question tied up in the discussion of Byzantine identity. To grossly simplify, our modern sense of a nation's identity is often confined to their political border. So for example, we consider Germans to be people living (or born) in the state of Germany. Cross the border into another country, and suddenly that identity changes. This didn't really exist in pre-modern societies. But the historian Anthony Kaldellis has argued that Byzantium was an early forerunner of the nation-state. He argues that there were three main factors to Byzantine (Roman) identity: Speak Greek, be an Orthodox Christian who follows the church in Constantinople, and be a subject of the Emperor. In this case, Byzantium seems to have much in common with modern concepts of statehood. But how did they know the geographic extent of their territory? Simply put, Byzantine administration was highly centralised. Areas were directly under Imperial control, administered through the *theme* system, or later, *pronoia* grants. This, along with the identity of the people in the area, or at the very least, its administrator, made it very easy to track where the extent of Byzantine territory lay. Frontier forts marked the \"border\" of the Empire's political control, and these were very well-known to the Emperor. There's an account from an Arab ambassador who negotiated the control of border forts and cities with the Byzantine Emperor Basil II, which clearly proves that the Emperor was very conscious of the geographical extent of the Empire.\n\nThis highly centralised system also meant the Empire was very connected. Archaeological findings of seals show that there was a lot of communication across the Empire. This meant that government officials, even those based in territories such as Northern Syria in the late-10th Century, were in constant communication with the rest of the administration. Of course, this is a pre-modern society, so communication was considerably much slower. We see this in the fallout of the defeat at Mantzikert. It was believed that Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes was dead and by the time news could reach Constantinople that he was alive and on his way, he had in effect already been replaced. But this is an extreme example. For the most part, officials would have been very aware of the political situation of the Empire. This even extended to the general population. It's a bit of a myth that the common people had no idea what was going on in the high politics of the Empire. After all, the \"mob\" in Constantinople could instigate the replacement of Emperors, which indicates a high level of understanding from the general population. Even in rural areas, it was important to know what was going on, as wars and regime change could mean higher taxes, while a weakened frontier could mean potential raids from neighbouring states.\n\nLastly, the question of how aware the Byzantines were of their own history. In short: Very. Obviously, this was mostly reserved for those who actually took the time to read the classics. But their staunch Roman identity implies that they were aware of what it meant to be Roman. Although you're more likely to find references to Christian Roman figures like Constantine and Justinian instead of Julius Caesar and Augustus. For example, John Kinnamos states that John II Komnenos' military triumph/religious procession through Constantinople following his victories in Anatolia were on a scale not seen since the days of Justinian and Heraclius. But they did not ignore their earlier pagan past. Certain families tried to tie their lineage to ancient figures as far back as Alexander the Great. There was even a rumour that Manuel I Komnenos' wife Bertha of Sulzbach was a descendant of Julius Caesar. Obviously, these were all unsubstantiated, and very incorrect, claims. But it gets even worse. For example, Alexander the Great was a very popular figure in the Byzantine imagination, but very little of it was rooted in fact. They loved the Alexander romance, and a piece of Byzantine art shows Alexander visiting Rome (which never happened). But even more than just a Byzantine King Arthur type of story, Alexander was portrayed, very anachronistically, as a Roman figure. According to the Byzantines, he was crucial in developing Byzantion (the city Constantinople was built upon) and his campaigns were seen as defending the \"Roman East\". \n\nWhile this may seem like a lot of ridiculous pseudo-history on the part of the Byzantines, they were actually very aware of history, mostly because of the way they approached writing it themselves. They saw writing history as a linear progression starting from Herodotus to be constantly continued. This is why Byzantine chroniclers often followed on from each others work (Theophanes the Confessor followed by Leo the Deacon followed by Michael Psellos, etc.) instead of producing standalone works. It almost became essential to read every chronicle available if any chronicler wanted to join the line. Sometimes this knowledge was seen in style (in the case of Procopius taking influence from Herodotus, Thucydides, etc. in his works), other times it was blatantly referenced. Michael Psellos, Anna Komnene, John Kinnamos, and Niketas Choniates all mention previous chroniclers, often trash talking them to prove their work is better than their predecessors. References to historical figures were rife, especially using them as a comparison for a contemporary figure. This shows that the Byzantines knew their history very well. Even in the 14th and 15th Centuries, the fringe extreme movement to push Hellenic identity, Platonism, and a return to other classical values in Byzantine society shows that there was a clear understanding of the past that lasted throughout the entire lifespan of the Empire, and beyond.", "created_utc": 1678800166, "distinguished": null, "id": "jc6pm0l", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11qlpq2/how_familiar_were_individuals_in_the_court/jc6pm0l/", "score": 26 }, { "body": "For discussions on Byzantine knowledge of their history, you can read [this thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/ejsabt/was_the_byzantine_empire_aware_it_lasted_a/) by u/WelfOnTheShelf, u/toldinstone and some others, and [this one](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/gtz0vk/comment/fsffdc8/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x) by the latter. They did not entirely lack encyclopaedias either; for history they could read the *Suda*!", "created_utc": 1678786308, "distinguished": null, "id": "jc64jp8", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11qlpq2/how_familiar_were_individuals_in_the_court/jc64jp8/", "score": 2 } ]

[ { "body": "The [Routledge History of the Ancient World](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-History-of-the-Ancient-World/book-series/SE0197) series could fit the bill. Roman history is now so detailed and so diverse that one scholar cannot possibly cover it in-depth, so these days you'll want to read the work of scholars who focus on one period of Roman history and shift to another scholar when moving to a different time; Routledge has done a good job of finding these scholars. Tim Cornell's [The Beginnings of Rome](https://www.routledge.com/The-Beginnings-of-Rome-Italy-and-Rome-from-the-Bronze-Age-to-the-Punic/Cornell/p/book/9780415015967) (which starts the series, covering ca. 1000 - 264 BC) is one of the best works on this crucial period I can think of, even though its publication date (1995) isn't precisely recent any longer. An excellent counterpart to Cornell's work is Gary Forsythe's [A Critical History of Early Rome](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520249912/a-critical-history-of-early-rome) (2005), which takes a different perspective on a good many of the issues Cornell weighs in on, and will give you a good idea of the issues facing early Roman scholarship.\n\nMy area is this early period, so I hope others can weigh in on the books they find most useful for later centuries - especially the mid-Republican period, which is particularly thorny (and which the Routledge series unfortunately skips).", "created_utc": 1679674512, "distinguished": null, "id": "jdi9yev", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/120oti1/can_anyone_recommend_a_modern_alternative_to/jdi9yev/", "score": 4 }, { "body": "What we often used on our graduate exams were the volumes in the Edinburgh History of Ancient Rome series. I only know the volumes by Rosenstein, Steel, and Richardson, rather than those on the early period and the later imperial period, but overall they're quite good. The authors are leaders in their subjects--I've cited Guy Bradley, Catherine Steel, Clifford Ando, and Nate Rosenstein--and the volumes are mostly intended to present both narrative and the current controversies in the field. \n\nThe Edinburgh series is mostly written for advanced undergrads or early term graduate students--we would use them on our MA exams, but they're next to useless for your PhD exams. For ordinary people that's not a problem, and I don't think an ordinary person would have too much problem with them, *provided* one keeps in mind what they're actually for. That is to say, they're not intended for people to just pick up and read as a narrative of Roman history. They can be used for that purpose, but they're intended to educate a student about what the field is looking at. They're also substantially less comprehensive and somewhat more opinionated in that project than, say, the various Blackwell Companions to the Ancient world, which are intended for graduate students and scholars trying to get up to speed on the controversies of a particular area: if you're willing to brave it, by the way, I recommend the Blackwell Companion to the Roman Republic, but it's probably not what you're after in any way whatsoever. So, for instance, as a specialist in the late Republic, I have a fair number of criticisms of some things that Steel says in her volume. As is typical in these kinds of \"survey\" volumes, in which the author's not really trying to justify an argument rigorously, you get a fair number of places where Steel and others say something somewhat contentious based on their own or others' work that, if you don't work in the field, wouldn't necessarily pop out at you. But that was also true of Mommsen (hell, the Römische Geschichte at least is basically the posterchild for saying stuff and not backing it up, less so the Staatsrecht), and the authors of the Edinburgh series are obviously much more up to date.\n\nOther alternatives on the more digestible end include Josiah Osgood's recent (and very slender) undergraduate textbook, *Rome and the Making of a World State*. I've used it to teach before and it's...adequate. It's very narrative-focused, which makes it approachable, but it really suffers in its analysis, its arguments are...not necessarily dated, but definitely leaned a bit towards the traditional views, and it's certainly lacking a lot of the questioning of arguments and traditional narratives that you'd expect from a really rigorous treatment. Reviewers have also, I think rightly, pointed out that it's a bit of a clunky book to use because of how the publisher's laid things out (also a review from a couple months back in Klio randomly spent a whole paragraph complaining that it doesn't spend enough time talking about *banking* in the Republic? What?). I think both my criticisms and theirs reduce down to the fact that it's a textbook, and that it's written with the intention that it's going to be used in a class where the questioning of assumptions and the use of the source material is going to be done by the instructor and TAs. So personally, I wouldn't actually recommend it by itself, but it's quite readable and it's pretty ok overall.\n\nAnother option often recommended here and elsewhere is Mary Beard's (relatively) recent *SPQR*. It's an ok book. Its scope is so enormously broad for such a slim volume that it's hardly comprehensive, and I was surprised by how dated some of what Beard says is. She's hardly aware, for example, of the paradigm shift in Republican political scholarship towards a more open view of Republican politics, and sometimes she presents long-held consensus as groundbreaking. A good example is what she says about Actium, that the battle was probably rather squalid and, while it involved a lot of troops, hardly the Marathon that Augustan literature held it up to be. We've all more or less agreed on that since Syme said it in *1939*, but Beard presents it this way because it still hasn't filtered into the public narrative yet, which is stuck on Mommsen and sometimes even earlier work. Personally, I wouldn't recommend *SPQR* as a *first look*...but it's still better than going all the way back to the Römische Geschichte.", "created_utc": 1679699046, "distinguished": null, "id": "jdjzjl9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/120oti1/can_anyone_recommend_a_modern_alternative_to/jdjzjl9/", "score": 5 } ]

[ { "body": " Wrong question. Try What historical reasons cause russian jnsecurity? This is pretty much from your kissinger gloss itself. If you are going to lead from that, why not see first if the cause is what your gloss said. So kissinger did not give much detail. If you identify the state actors, then you would want to look at their actions. Then i suppose you might end up looking at kissinger.", "created_utc": 1673647431, "distinguished": null, "id": "j48h19v", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10ao41d/kissinger_noted_in_diplomacy_that_it_is_part_of/j48h19v/", "score": 0 } ]

[ { "body": "Ah, another reading in the toilet question. \n\nWhile more can always be said on the topic, you can check the cases introduced by /u/TywinDeVillena (on King Philip II of Spain) and me (/u/y_sengaku) on two 16th century rulers in: [How far back does reading while using the toilet go?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/qxzofg/how_far_back_does_reading_while_using_the_toilet/) \n\n+++ \n\nI've actually also explore these kind of fellows further back in time, and found two more like-minded companions in the 11th century China around the millennium. \n\nNorthern Song Official/ Scholar Ouyang Xiu (d. 1072) authors a memorundum, [*Guitian lu* (\"Records of Returning to My Old Fields\") (linked to wikisource edition in Chinese, sorry)](https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%AD%B8%E7%94%B0%E9%8C%84) and records the discussion on the anecdotal habits of their acquaintances and friends with his friend, Xiè Xīshēn (d. 1039): \n\n>* \"While Qian Weiyan (d. 1039) [official/ poet] was born in noble blood, he had some not so noble [lit. trans.: fit for rather low-rank people] habits. His colleagues reveal that......in everyday life, he just love reading. Beginning to read (Confucian) lectures and history soon while sitting, novels while going to bed, and checking some casual notes in the bathroom (toilet)......\" \n>* Xie Xishen comments on this habit as following: [he also hear of Song Shou (scholar and book collector) ]: \"When Song Shu studied in the school, every time he ran into the bathroom, never without bringing some books in it with himself, and read aloud so that his voice of reading can be heard by the people both nearby and away. This is an ideal practice for studying.\" \n\nOn reply to Xie, the author Ouyang himself also reveals (though not on the reading in the toilet): \"I also usually make it habit to think the draft of texts 'on three' - that is to say, on horseback, on pillow (= laying on bed), and on toilet (=in the bathroom).\" This \"on three\" (三上) became a proverb also in my country so that I can identify these two fellows while checking Ouyang's text. \n \nIt does not necessarily means that the Chinese scholars suddenly (corrected): began to reading books in the bathroom during this period, however, - rather it perhaps means that they mention also this kind of thing in their written texts.", "created_utc": 1679584258, "distinguished": null, "id": "jdd2vdr", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11zen93/how_did_people_historically_handle_boredom_on_the/jdd2vdr/", "score": 10 } ]

[ { "body": "I am by no means an expert on Roman domestic architecture, but I have access to the right resources, so I can provide a quick answer on what my brief-ish scholarship overview says (though if someone who has really dwelled on this topic can provide a more educated answer, great!)... \n\nSo *impluvia* (plural of *impluvium*) we know best through houses preserved in Pompeii, although they certainly were incorporated into Roman houses elsewhere, too. *Impluvia* actually aren't just decorative elements - although those who could often embellished them with lavish mosaics etc. - but part of a very conscious water management system. The water never stood still for very long in an *impluvium* and it was meant to be very shallow, so mosquitoes and algae weren't really a problem in well-designed *impluvia*. \n\nPompeii as our example case is situated in an area that gets very heavy seasonal rainfall during some months, but then hardly any in esp. the August-September, late Summer season. So, when designing a Pompeian house, you need to incorporate solutions for directing rain water somewhere where it doesn't do any damage to the house structures, and if you can direct it somewhere where it can actually be used and stored, great. The groundwater in Pompeii is as deep as 20 to 30 meters underground, and not of very good quality under all those lava banks and pumice layers. Digging wells was therefore too expensive, too difficult and too pointless for everyday domestic usage. So, Pompeian households relied heavily on rainwater, and *impluvia* were part of a larger system for collecting and storing rainwater as effectively and passively as possible. You find them in Pompeian *atria* (plural of *atrium*), that also had a sloped-roof opening to collect water into the *impluvium*, known as *compluvium*. [The etymology of these words actually gives away the purpose of these structures: *compluvium* comes from *con-* + *pluit*, \"it rains/flows together\", i.e. it collects rain flows into one place; and *in + pluit*, \"it rains upon\"]. Can't seem to find a good photo online of a Roman house that illustrates this, but [this](https://architectsandartisans.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/alan-maskin/baigneux-les-juifs_-_lavoir_2.jpg) 19th century washing house from Bourgogne, France has basically copied the exact Roman design. The fancier *compluvia* had a small border 'fence pool' (?) fitted with water sprouts in the shapes of various animals and beasts, like in [this](https://herculaneum.uk/Ins%205/Herculaneum%205%2001%20p3.htm) fine *compluvium*-specimen from Casa Sannitica in Herculaneum. \n\nAfter getting the rain water from the roofs to the *impluvium*, the water still needed to be moved somewhere to get filtered and stored. Pompeii actually must have hundreds of water cisterns underground, but only a couple of the water management systems have been excavated. What we do find in the houses that have been dug down to these layers, is that *impluvia* usually had two different drains. The first one led directly to the street, and this would be manually opened after the first rain fall: esp. after long periods of draught, the first water coming via dusty roofs was too dirty to use, so the first batches of water could just be discarded to the streets. Once the water was clear, the second drain was opened, which lead to large subterranean water cistern under the *domus* designed for longer-term water storage. Sometimes, instead of a larger second drain to the cistern, you can find that the *impluvium* pavement is made of porous material, or with conscious cracks and e.g. layers of sand, which filter and purify the water as it slowly drips down to the underwater cistern. These cisterns were lined with water-proof plaster and kept the water cool and clean; and, somewhere in the house there would be a hole with a removable stone cover known as *puteal*, where one could collect water for everyday use by lowering buckets down to the cistern. \n\nSo in summary: there was not much fear of mosquitoes and algae, because the water from *implivium* was very consciously and effectively cleaned and collected to be stored to underground water storages - rain water was never meant to stand still for very long in the *atrium*!\n\n**Sources**: \n\nKeenan-Jones, D. (2005). \"Water supply and wastewater disposal in Pompeii: an overview\", in *Ancient History: Resources for Teachers*, 34, 149-158. \nJansen, G. (2017). \"Water and water technology in Roman Gardens\", in (eds.) W. Jashemski et al., *Gardens of the Roman Empire*. Cambridge University Press. \nJansen, G. (2007). \"The water system: supply and drainage\", in (eds.) P. Foss and J. Dobbins, *The World of Pompeii*. Routledge.", "created_utc": 1660761195, "distinguished": null, "id": "ikov56v", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/wpwena/romans_kept_pools_of_rainwater_impluvium_in_their/ikov56v/", "score": 165 } ]

[ { "body": "If you're planning on majoring in history with the intent of doing something else afterward, like going to law school or business school, then it probably doesn't matter that much what area you concentrate in and you can pretty much shape your classes around your interests as long as you check off all the requirements of your program. Most undergrad history programs require you to take a few basic courses (sort of your standard 100- and 200-level courses like world history, western civilization, etc.) and some type of senior capstone courses (a historiography or historical methods class and possibly a senior thesis depending on your program), but in terms of your upper-level electives that fill out the rest of your history credit requirements, you'll generally have a good bit of leeway to tailor your coursework to your interests within history.\n\nIf you're planning on majoring in history with the intention of going to graduate school and pursuing history as a profession, [do not do that](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/96yf9h/monday_methods_why_you_should_not_get_a_history/).", "created_utc": 1682095354, "distinguished": null, "id": "jh5wi2u", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/12u6bsn/so_i_was_thinking_of_doing_my_majors_in_history_i/jh5wi2u/", "score": 12 } ]

[ { "body": "I do not specialize in this area so I can't speak directly to the things mentioned, but I can tell you that in general Central Asia gets short shrift because it doesn't have much of a natural academic home. \n\nIts period of major prominence precedes modernity, making it a hard sell to under-funded history departments in the first place. Most of the region is not strongly connected to modern major nation states - aside from as a sidenote to the history of the USSR - so it doesn't have significant domestic academic publishing, or a lot of funding to promote programs at foreign schools. \n\nAt the same time, major states which border the region have historical reasons to downplay its influence in favour of their own. Russia sees these countries as temporarily displaced regions of their own, while China would like the world to forget places like Tibet and Mongolia ever had any particular relevance outside their interactions with China. \n\nAnd then you have the issue that Islamic then Soviet influence meant there was often limited impetus to preserve documents and sites which preceded these regimes, and they were at times outright hostile toward the notion. \n\nThe end result is that nobody but specialists writes about Mahayana Buddhism as an Afghan or Central Asian development, for instance. Tantric deities all over Japan being depicted as kings or generals in armour from Central Asian kingdoms is almost never mentioned. Most have always just assumed it all came out of India (a notion which East Asian Buddhist institutions themselves have long put forward for reasons of projecting prestige and authenticity). \n\nEveryone doing Asian history learns about the Silk Road, but it's typically framed in terms of being a trade route connecting the Mediterranean and Middle East with China, most of the areas in between are glossed over as not of primary interest. Those kingdoms and alliances unintentionally become sketched almost as truck stops along the way.\n\nThis is not to say there hasn't been a good deal of rigorous work done on the region, but I don't know how many universities even have dedicated Central Asian programs or journals, rather than one or two scholars who are attached to religion, history or South/East Asian area studies departments.", "created_utc": 1680293288, "distinguished": null, "id": "jeg9c10", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/127rrg8/why_do_so_many_important_cultural_origins_and/jeg9c10/", "score": 2111 }, { "body": "See also the work of Frantz Grenet, French archeologist on pre-islamic Central Asia, the only whole one I can in English is (éd. en collab. avec E. Allinger, C. Jahoda, M.-K. Lang, A. Vergati,) Interaction in the Himalayas and Central Asia : processes of transfer, translation and transformation in art, archaeology, religion and polity, Vienna, 2017, 424 p. I haven't read the book but I heard him lecture on France Culture radio. His work seems to be mainly on the sedentary peoples.", "created_utc": 1681301607, "distinguished": null, "id": "jfycqpi", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/127rrg8/why_do_so_many_important_cultural_origins_and/jfycqpi/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "r/history is a general interest subreddit for history. It allows many submission types, including articles, videos, broad discussion prompts, and also questions.\n\n/r/AskHistorians is much more niche, as we (with a few small exceptions) exclusively allow submissions which are questions, also have some specific restrictions on what questions are allowed and how they are asked. In addition, we have rather strict requirements on how to answer those questions, requiring depth and comprehensive coverage of the topic.\n\nThis contrasts with the third subreddit to note here, r/AskHistory, which is also specifically for questions, but has fewer restrictions on how to ask them, and also fewer rules on what quality is expected of an answer.\n\nGenerally, the three should be seen as complementary too each other, providing different services with only some overlap.", "created_utc": 1674235195, "distinguished": "moderator", "id": "j560nky", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10h1wzv/what_is_the_difference_between_the_two_subreddits/j560nky/", "score": 270 }, { "body": "r/history is like the new History Channel. r/askhistorians is like pre 2000 History Channel.", "created_utc": 1674407851, "distinguished": null, "id": "j5fhdr0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10h1wzv/what_is_the_difference_between_the_two_subreddits/j5fhdr0/", "score": 3 }, { "body": "Hmmm, one if for sharing history with others. The other is to ask a professional.", "created_utc": 1674263141, "distinguished": null, "id": "j57zbpi", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10h1wzv/what_is_the_difference_between_the_two_subreddits/j57zbpi/", "score": -8 } ]

[ { "body": "\"Why don't we know where it is\" isn't a question that's possible to answer. Why don't we have Sulla's autobiography? Why did Cicero's *de rei publica* survive only as a palimpsest only rediscovered in the 1800s, while his *de legibus* has a healthy manuscript tradition?\n\nThere's just no way to explain these kinds of things.\n\nThere is one point though. Caesar did not start the war.\n\nThe future of Caesar's possible run for consul came up in the spring of 50 BCE. The law of the Ten Tribunes, which was passed by popular vote, allowed Caesar to stand in absentia for consul when his 10 year term expired.\n\nThe consuls Marcellus and Paullus blocked this, and a series of negotiations started that would last just about a year.\n\nThe senate met early in 50 to discuss the next governor of Gaul, and Pompey proposed removing Caesar before the start of the new year.\n\nCaesar's ally Curio, a tribune, vetoed this. Curio then countered with the proposal that both Pompey and Caesar surrender their commands, a position Caesar endorsed. This passed the senate 370-22, but Marcellus, the consul, refused to record the vote.\n\nCaesar tried another route, and suggested both he and Pompey lay down their commands, and submit to the judgment of the people, taking the issue out of the senate. This was also rejected.\n\nMarcellus proposed another measure demanding Caesar abandon his command, and this time it passed, but was vetoed by Antony and Cassius. At this point Antony and Cassius were very, very illegally driven out of the senate, and went to meet Caesar in Ravenna. This action is one of the casus belli Caesar discusses in his commentaries.\n\nSomehow, a false rumor that Caesar had invaded Italy popped up, the senate designated him an enemy of the state, and Marcellus put a sword in Pompey's hand and asked him to do what was necessary.\n\nThe senate declared war on Caesar, not the other way around. As a matter of fact, until Pompey evacuated to Greece, Caesar was constantly sending messages asking for a conference to settle things without further conflict.\n\nNow, back to the Rubicon.\n\nThere is no contemporary reference to Caesar crossing the Rubicon. The first reference to the Rubicon only shows up in Cicero's Philippics, after Caesar's assassination, and it's in reference to Antony going *north*. He was going to take command of Gaul and Cicero was terrified of this and tried to get a senatus consultum preventing him from taking his troops over the river.\n\nThe first association of Caesar and the Rubicon is Paterculus, writing under Tiberius, who places almost no importance on the river at all.\n\nThe story we know only popped up in Lucan's epic poem about the Civil War, written under Nero, some 100 years after the events it describes.\n\nDoes that explain why we don't know where it is? No, but it suggests the importance of crossing the Rubicon is a later creation, and didn't matter much to people of Caesar's generation.", "created_utc": 1663982228, "distinguished": null, "id": "ipnz5rw", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/xmcykv/the_rubicon_river_is_one_of_the_most_famous_in/ipnz5rw/", "score": 3257 }, { "body": "Wait... We don't know where the Rubicon is? It comes up in Google maps...\n\nHopefully this is OK for a follow up question, because as it stands I don't understand the original one.", "created_utc": 1664025213, "distinguished": null, "id": "ippp1zf", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/xmcykv/the_rubicon_river_is_one_of_the_most_famous_in/ippp1zf/", "score": 64 } ]

[ { "body": "For a Soviet focus, there is *Myth Making in the Soviet Union and Modern Russia: Remembering World War II in Brezhnev’s Hero City* by Vicky Davis, and *The Memory of the Second World War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*, which is an edited volume helmed by David L. Hoffmann. Those both, as the titles might imply, are quite focused on historical memory of the war. For the US, I would point to *The \"Good War\" in American Memory* by John Bodnar. \n\nYou might also find *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations*, edited by Tiina Kinnunen & Ville Kivimäki, to be of interest for its focus on Finland which is often kind of forgotten, but has some particularly interesting angles to consider given their alliance with Germany, but attempts to distance that in recollection.", "created_utc": 1679776367, "distinguished": null, "id": "jdnwegj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/121q0jf/is_there_a_booksource_that_shows_a_history_of_the/jdnwegj/", "score": 6 }, { "body": "/u/Georgy_K_Zhukov has previously answered ['Why do we love WW2?'](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/26be5p/why_do_we_love_ww2/)\n\nu/Kugelfang52 has previously answered:\n\n* [What does it mean for the Holocaust to have been \"rediscovered in the '70s\"?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/5gi2s5/in_the_70s_the_holocaust_was_rediscovered_as_a/)\n\n* [Question about Holocaust memory during the Cold War](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/7854es/analogies_between_the_holocaust_and_the_crimes_of/)\n\n* [Why was it official U.S. Policy not to use the word \"Jew\" in connection with the Nazi Concentration Camps?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/gm7pr7/why_was_it_official_us_policy_not_to_use_the_word/)\n\n[Episode 57 of the AskHistorians Podcast](\nhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/lz23m4/comment/gpznjk1/), which talks about competing interpretations of the Holocaust in history. The link goes to a transcript but includes a link to the podcast thread as well. It is an interview with /u/commiespaceinvader\n\nSee below", "created_utc": 1679792868, "distinguished": null, "id": "jdows5j", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/121q0jf/is_there_a_booksource_that_shows_a_history_of_the/jdows5j/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "I can't prove a negative, but the short answer is not really. \n\nFirst, some background on the naming of Georgia the country (the country and the state have similar names in English and only a few other languages). u/kaiser_matias has more [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/smy3wi/the_native_georgian_name_for_the_country_of/hw0gfx8/).\n\nBut I'd go on to note that when James Oglethorpe founded the colony of Georgia in 1733, there *wasn't* a country of Georgia. There was a historic region of the former Kingdom of Georgia (sort of like how Italy or Germany were \"geographic expressions\" at the time), but it was split into several different kingdoms, Imereti in the west, and Kartli and Kakheti in the east. Furthermore, the west of the area was under Ottoman suzerainty, and the eastern parts under Persian suzerainty. Imereti and Mingrelia often weren't considered \"Georgia\" proper for good measure - whether the people there are a subdivision/dialect of Georgian or a separate ethnicity is a whole other question we won't get into. \n\nSo even on 18th century maps, the naming can be a bit all over the place. [Here](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Buffier-Georgia3n.jpg) is a weird map from 1736, but it shows the regional name \"Georgia\" over Imereti and the eastern kingdoms, which are divided and colored differently on the map. [This map](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:18th-century_maps_of_the_Caucasus#/media/File:Johann_Baptist_Homann._Imperii_Persici_In_Omnes_Suas_Provincias._Caucasus.JPG) shows something similar. [This map](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/82/Imperium_Turcicum_in_Europa%2C_Asia_et_Africa_Regiones_Propias%2C_Tributaias_Clientelares.jpg) for example lists \"Georgia\" as a geographic expression over Kartli and Kakheti, while showing them as separate kingdoms, and *also* naming Kartli as \"Gurcistan\", which is just the Persian version of the word \"Georgia\". Imereti and Mingrelia are shown as separate. [This map](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:18th-century_maps_of_the_Caucasus#/media/File:Ottens_Reinier_and_Josua._Regnum_persicum,_Imperium_turcicum_in_Asia,_russorum_provinciae_ad_mare_Caspium_\\(18th_century\\).E.jpg) does something similar, showing (in Latin) a \"Kingdom of Georgia\" that is subdivided into Kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti. The two kingdoms were unified in 1762 and then battled over by the Russian and Persian Empires until Russia annexed it in 1801.\n\nSo: while the names are the same in English and Latin, I can't imagine it was a big concern that the colony would be confused with a geographic region in the Caucasus that was actually made up of a number of kingdoms under Persian or Ottoman control.", "created_utc": 1678203563, "distinguished": null, "id": "jba1vy0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11l1dnx/when_the_british_colony_and_future_us_state_of/jba1vy0/", "score": 43 } ]

[ { "body": "You can ask meta questions, OP! \n\nA few of our founding mods have written about the history of /r/AskHistorians—for example, [this post](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1la8sy/happy_2nd_birthday_askhistorians/cbxsinj/) by u/eternalkerri and [this one](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/682ta1/friday_freeforall_april_28_2017/dgv7zhf/) by u/agentdcf.", "created_utc": 1667682829, "distinguished": null, "id": "iv79kp0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/yn5l2m/this_is_one_of_my_favorite_pages_on_reddit_but/iv79kp0/", "score": 604 }, { "body": "They talk about thos on their #100 podcast episode. Recommend you check it out.", "created_utc": 1667722077, "distinguished": null, "id": "iv9c7t9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/yn5l2m/this_is_one_of_my_favorite_pages_on_reddit_but/iv9c7t9/", "score": 55 }, { "body": "I love this sub and truly value the effort put in by those who write us an essay as a comment.", "created_utc": 1667725076, "distinguished": null, "id": "iv9fl8n", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/yn5l2m/this_is_one_of_my_favorite_pages_on_reddit_but/iv9fl8n/", "score": 41 } ]

[ { "body": "u/Glasann has addressed the impact outside France of the Revolution, so there's room for describing the importance of the Revolution inside France. Violent uprisings indeed happen all the time, but they often end up in regime changes where a new boss replaces the old boss. The French Revolution was different in that it resulted in the total upheaval of the country's social structure. \n\nFrance's Ancien Régime has been described by historians as a \"society of orders\". French society was divided into three Estates: the First was the clergy (those who prayed), the Second was the nobility (originally those who fought), and the Third consisted of the rest of the population (more or less those who worked). The First and Second Estates benefited from special privileges, such as tax exemptions, the right to levy taxes, and exclusive access to positions of power. The Second Estate, particularly, not only owned about one third of the land, but also exerted seigneurial rights over most of the rest, since all land had an overlord: a levy on the crops, monopolies over village facilities (mills, ovens, presses), monopoly on hunting, unpaid labour at harvest times etc. The First and Second Estates also answered to their own law codes and jurisdictions. \n\nPrivileges, however, were not limited to the first two estates. Many social categories in France, including in the Third Estate, enjoyed privileges of some sort. An infinity of communities operating at various scales, corporations, guilds, businesses, cities, etc. had their own and highly specific privileges. And this is another way to describe Ancien Régime France: a tangled web of communities that defined themselves not only by their purposes, but also by specifically tailored - and jealously guarded - rights and privileges that protected them and made them unique.\n\nPre-Revolutionary France was thus a quite rigid society, where everyone knew one's place in the system, a place that was often decided by birth and could rarely be changed. A complex patchwork of privileges and exemptions helped maintain the system in a \"flexible equilibrium\" and kept tensions in check (McPhee, 2016), though defending privileges when they were believed to be under attack had also been a cause of popular revolts (Durand, 1992).\n\nSocial mobility did exist, however: notably, useful administrators and officers could be ennobled (but then their nobility was considered less prestigious) and daughters of wealthy commoners could marry nobles. Since the 17th century, several high-ranking ministers had been of commoner background - Mazarin, Colbert, Necker. But still, boundaries were difficult to cross for Third Estate members, whose say in matter of political and legislative decisions remained limited, no matter how much they contributed to France's prosperity through industry and trade. By the late 1700s, the whole \"society of orders\" appeared desperately out of touch with the changing social realities of the time. Abbot Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès wrote in his famous pamphlet *What is the Third Estate* (January 1789).\n\n>What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing. What does it desire to be? Something.\n\nThis was not completely true, as Third Estate members had been part of the system, enjoying their own privileges, filling the ranks of royal administrations, or exerting power in provincial assemblies (though their power was not proportionate to their actual importance in terms of numbers or economic value). \n\n\nThe change happened - literally - overnight, on the night of 4 August 1789, to be precise, when the National Assembly voted for abolishing the feudal privileges and the tithes collected by the clergy. The first article of the decree read as follows:\n\n>Article 1. The National Assembly completely destroys the feudal regime. It decrees that rights and duties [...] deriving from real or personal mortmain, and personal servitude [...] are abolished without compensation; all the others are declared redeemable, and the price and the manner of the redemption will be set by the National Assembly. Those of the said rights that are not abolished by this decree will continue nonetheless to be collected until settlement.\n\nAnother article adressed the privileges of the communities:\n\n>Article X. [...] all special privileges of the provinces, principalities, counties, cantons, towns and communities of inhabitants, be they financial or of any other nature, are abolished without compensation, and will be absorbed into the common rights of all French people.\n\nIn the following years, from 1790 to 1793, a series of decrees defined more precisely the sort of privileges that had been abolished, and eventually made feudal entitlements non-redeemable.\n\nSo the Revolution did away from the social order of the Ancien Régime, tearing down the prescriptive barriers between the Estates, eliminating the \"natural\" rights and privileges of the First and Second Estates, as well as many of the privileges of the Third. Provinces, who had until then enjoyed a relative sovereignty in terms of legislation, and had been able to challenge royal policies in some cases, were dismantled as administrative divisions. Guilds were also abolished.\n\nOf course, this was accompanied by the physical elimination of part of aristocracy through exile and killing, and through the seizure and destruction of their properties. But the aristocracy, even after it was allowed to return in the early 1800s and could recover part of its estates, never got back its privileges and rights. Not only its numbers were seriously diminished, but the old nobility had to share power with the new elites that had emerged during the Revolution and then under the Empire, as Napoléon had created his own (merit-based) aristocracy. Even if there were still wealthy and powerful aristocrats in the 19th century, they were no longer considered as the only ones worthy of running the country. \n\nWhen Louis XVIII, Louis XVI's kid brother, came to the throne in 1814 and 1815, too much had changed in the past twenty years for France to return to the Ancien Régime system: the new king had to publish a constitution (the Charter of 1814) that, among other features, limited royal powers through a bicameral parliament. While restoring aristocratic titles, the Charter established that nobility conferred \"no exemption from the duties and obligations of society\". Provinces and guilds did not reappear (at least not in their earlier form). So the Revolution was indeed a big deal because it totally transformed the social structures of the country in an irreversible way.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* Bien, David D. ‘Les offices, les corps, et le crédit d’État : l’utilisation des privilèges sous l’Ancien Régime’. Annales 43, no. 2 (1988): 379–404. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1988.283495.\n* Collins, James B. ‘Social Hierarchies in Early Modern France’. Routledge Resources Online - The Renaissance World, 31 October 2022. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367347093-RERW57-1.\n* Durand, Yves. ‘Les privilèges selon Sieyès ou le triomphe de la désinformation’. Histoire, économie & société 11, no. 2 (1992): 295–323. https://doi.org/10.3406/hes.1992.1636.\n* McPhee, Peter. Liberty or Death: The French Revolution. Yale University Press, 2016. https://books.google.fr/books?id=PbAODAAAQBAJ.\n* Popkin, Jeremy. A New World Begins: The History of the French Revolution. Hachette UK, 2019. https://books.google.fr/books/about/A_New_World_Begins.html?id=Cj2RDwAAQBAJ.", "created_utc": 1676770014, "distinguished": null, "id": "j93wwa9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1157j01/why_was_the_french_revolution_such_a_big_deal/j93wwa9/", "score": 9 }, { "body": "Historians widely credit the French Revolution as being one of the most influential and significant points of European history in large part due to the impact it had on abolishing feudalism and spreading liberalism. It goes without saying that it triggered monumental and lasting changes in France itself--overhauling the entire fabric of society and government--but I have a feeling you're asking about why it has had such an impact *outside* of France so that's what I'll focus on.\n\nAt its core, the French Revolution can be seen as the ultimate embodiment of Enlightenment ideals. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe and North America, the Enlightenment was in full swing. For the first time, conversations of individual liberty, secular society, individualism, and inalienable rights were being openly discussed and gaining widespread traction. These ideas were in direct conflict with an omnipresent Catholic Church and notions of absolute monarchy and the Divine Right of Kings. It was ideas like this that planted the seed for the American Revolution, which was one of the earliest major examples of Enlightenment thinking truly being put into practice--not only was a new nation formed, but more significantly, as a republic replaced a monarchical colony. But France took this a step further--France was not a colony, it was one of the most important nations in Europe and its monarchy one of the most powerful. The Revolution provided inspiration because--for the first time on a massive scale--popularism had toppled a monarchy. Thus the French Revolution is widely credited with lighting the flame that would ignite the Age of Revolution, which included events such as the Irish Rebellion of 1798, the Haitian Revolution, and the Revolutions of 1848. Liberalism was no longer just something being debated by a select few lawyers at Oxford and gentlemanly philosophers at salons, it was something that materially impacted every common man and woman.\n\nWhile the French Revolution legitimized ideals of liberalism, it gave birth to ideals of nationalism. Up until 1789, the France that we know now was seen as the property of the King and aristocracy. It was a feudal system that had operated in Europe for centuries. But as a modern nation state emerged, a collective identity was born. This was further exemplified by the Napoleonic Wars that followed the French Revolution.\n\nOn a more practical level, the French Revolution also gave the rest of the West a guidebook to revolutions--the vocabulary, process, and legal systems. Even the Metric System was implemented during the French Revolution.\n\nAs to why Les Mis and Marie Antoinette are so famous, I think their fame lies in their place within such a significant moment in history--a moment significant for the reasons described above. The cultural stories, icons, and people at the heart of history's famous moments always end up also becoming famous. Think of Shakespeare's plays and Queen Elizabeth I and how they've come to be virtually synonymous with Renaissance England, or how George Washington and Benjamin Franklin are such figureheads of the American Revolution. History is often understood through the context of its literature, people, and stories. And Marie Antoinette is at the very center of one of the most impactful moments of European history.\n\nI actually haven't seen Les Mis (terrible, I know! And I should), but with Marie Antoinette there is also the sense that she represented everything the revolution was fought against. Rightly or wrongly she became the poster child of the evils and excess of monarchy. Take, for example, the infamous phrase \"Let Them Eat Cake\" which is so often attributed to her (in all likelihood she never said this but that's irrelevant because what matters is the fact that people *think* she said it). The poor across France are starving, and here is an infamously extravagant noble surrounded by jewels, cake, and the gilded halls of Versailles blissfully ignorant and out of touch with the realities facing her nation. She holds a similar place in history perhaps as something like the Boston Tea Party--the American Revolution was not fought over some tea chests thrown overboard one day in Boston Harbor, it was fought over what that shipment represented. So often, something like that--whether a tax on a tea shipment or an frivolous queen--provides the spark that transforms outrage into revolution.", "created_utc": 1676766266, "distinguished": null, "id": "j93p37x", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1157j01/why_was_the_french_revolution_such_a_big_deal/j93p37x/", "score": 7 } ]

[ { "body": "Simlar questions to this have been asked before and I have linked them below.\n\n[https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/w0hu7n/following\\_the\\_french\\_revolution\\_the\\_other\\_nations/](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/w0hu7n/following_the_french_revolution_the_other_nations/)\n\n[https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/j1xyuj/why\\_is\\_it\\_that\\_when\\_louis\\_xvi\\_was\\_executed\\_other/](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/j1xyuj/why_is_it_that_when_louis_xvi_was_executed_other/)\n\nThe answers by u/greyhistorypodcasts[ ](https://www.reddit.com/user/greyhistorypodcasts/)and u/MySkinsRedditAcct discuss factors like France already being at war with other states by the time of Louise XVI was executed as well as differences in how the ideals of the French revolotion was seen as a threat to the other european monarchys.\n\nWhat isn't disscussed in those answers is that all the states that might have intevened to some extent on behalf of the Royalist cause were just emerging from the 30 Years War and the 80 Years War or still engaged in related confilict. The money and will to get involved in a new war after such long conflicts would have been in short supply, especially as there would have been relativly limited benefit to be had from getting involved. \n\nI am actully hoping someone with more knoweldege on the topic will be able to give a more detailed answer as my answer is rather limited because I've only really started to take an interest in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms recently so have not read enough myself to give a better answer.", "created_utc": 1685900905, "distinguished": null, "id": "jmvyvse", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/140clq2/why_was_there_almost_no_reaction_to_the_execution/jmvyvse/", "score": 84 } ]

[ { "body": "A good answer was already provided [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/i8de8w/the_1789_french_revolution_began_with_the/g18m0fw/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf&context=3)\nEdit: Sorry, I forgot to include the user responsible: u/MySkinsRedditAcct", "created_utc": 1678666486, "distinguished": null, "id": "jbzu6fg", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11pln8i/what_caused_the_initial_deadlock_of_the_etats/jbzu6fg/", "score": 18 } ]

[ { "body": "While I don't have my copy to hand, this topic is covered pretty thoroughly in the book Retroactive Cinema and Relativity, by P I Staker.\n\nTo sum up, the first Jurassic Park movie was very much a movie by the people and for the people. It was not \"high brow\" cinema. It was cinema for the masses.\n\nIndeed, many viewers took it to be allegorical - with the T Rex being the huge mass of people rising up against the systems that the rich try to erect to cage the \"dirty and animalistic peasants\" (p361).\n\nFurther, a paper published in Fortean Times (I admit that this is not a peer reviewed journal, but it is well established) shows that this effect continues even into modern day France.\nEvery time a new Jurassic Park movie is announced, the French people riot against their government.", "created_utc": 1680307502, "distinguished": null, "id": "jeh6aaf", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1283i2d/in_what_ways_did_the_popularity_of_the_movie/jeh6aaf/", "score": 17 }, { "body": "First of all, it is important to understand that viewing a film like \"Jurassic Park\" was relegated to the upper class of society, the nobles and land-owners of France, but also the burgeoning bourgeoise and urban intellectuals. While the film was universally popular, there were differing perspectives on the movie broadly reflected within the various social classes that saw it. Members of the 1st and 2nd estate viewed the film as an example of the folly of the bourgeoisie breaking out of the confines of feudal society while pursuing heretical sciences that broke with the teachings of the Catholic Church. Meanwhile the bourgeoisie saw the film with bright new potentials, the science and business of the park may have had catastrophic consequences in the film, but the very idea of having the capacity to make profit through large-scale business ventures while pursuing modern sciences made the entire Ancien Regime seem outdated in comparison. \n\nThe film's unique themes helped sharpen the divide between the estates and had an enduring impact up until the Estates-General where those who saw the potentials latent within the film broke with the other estates to form the National Assembly. In the later years of the revolution, there was far more engagement with the film among other sections of the public such as the sans-culottes. Although, ironically the sans-culottes viewed the film in a far different light, often highlighting how the pursuit of profit created a park that led to park employees suffering needlessly when the dinosaurs escaped. \n\nThere is still debate among historians about the precise impacts of the film during the Revolution with some arguing that the film's themes and purpose have been misinterpreted in popular historiography about the revolution. Historian Simon Schama views the film as a critique of revolutionary idealism and that the initial break with the nobles over the film was inherently going to lead to revolutionary violence. The Marxist narrative tends to emphasize the progressive nature of the film relative to the feudal productive relations of the time. And the historian, Daniel Guerin, argues that it was only the revolutionary sans-culottes that understood the truly radical implications of the film as a proto-communist critique of the hoarding of wealth that the bourgeoisie would continue to partake in. \n\nSources: \n\n* Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution by Simon Schama \n* Class Struggle in the First French Republic: Bourgeois and Bras Nus 1793-1795 by Daniel Guerin\n* The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848 by Eric Hobsbawm", "created_utc": 1680317564, "distinguished": null, "id": "jehr5c9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1283i2d/in_what_ways_did_the_popularity_of_the_movie/jehr5c9/", "score": 10 }, { "body": "It was actually Louis 16th’s favorite film. He enjoyed it so much he had a replica built and tried to create dinosaurs. The issue was, the project was expensive as scientists could not figure out how to clone the DNA. So in the meantime he used animatronics. However, these were also expensive so he raised taxes and caused a financial crisis. \n\nPeople falsely claim that Marie Antoinnette said “let them eat cake” she actually said “let them attend Jurassic Park”", "created_utc": 1680330692, "distinguished": null, "id": "jeibyrm", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1283i2d/in_what_ways_did_the_popularity_of_the_movie/jeibyrm/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "The Terror was a period of crisis (european and civil war) during which the government (a Jacobin committee of the National Convention) enacted provisionnal laws of extreme harshness against the perceived enemis of the Nation. In this framework, numerous judicial mistakes were made, as the criminal procedure was far too reduced to effectively work. You could imagine a continuing Jacobin regime presiding to a judicial reparation of these errors, once finished the crisis. This was not to come, as the Jacobins was replaced by other regimes (Thermidorian Convention, Directoire, Napoleonic Consulate and Empire) who draw their legitimacy from negation of the Jacobin Regime. In fact, the public image of the Terror - even the name - is shaped by the propaganda of the Thermidorians. In this perspective, no formal apology was ever needed, as the all Terror was presented as a « monstruous » period of which the successives French governments had no responsibility. \n\nThe « confiscation » of property was made in two different periods : Church property in 1790-1791 and Emigrants property in 1792-1797. The nationalization of Church property (a phenomenon observed in all Catholic Europe from the 1780’ to the 1840´) was never reversed and used for a massive redistribution of wealth towards bourgeoisie and gentry. The nationalization of those who have turned against the Revolution was often thwarted from the start (the families using placeholders to stay in possession) but never reversed. In 1825, however, King Charles X, leader of the conservatives, pushed for a compensation law (« The Emigrees Billion »), with every condemned receiving 3% of his former property value each year during 33 years. \n\nYou could find useful information in Jean Clement Martin (Les Echos de la Terreur. Vérités d'un mensonge d'Etat, 1794-2018, Belin, 2018, but I fear none of his books had been translated), \nColin Jones, The Fall of Robespierre: 24 Hours in Revolutionary Paris. Oxford University Press, 2021.", "created_utc": 1680340691, "distinguished": null, "id": "jeinnd4", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/1285xln/were_there_ever_apologies_issued_for_the_ring_of/jeinnd4/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "The French socio-economic crisis of the late 18th century is always difficult to understand as a lot of different - sometimes unrelated, sometimes intertwined - negative factors came together to form a whole aggregation of economic and social impediments.\n\nI'll try to cover the most significant ones.\n\n*Budget*\n\nBy the late 1700s, France was suffering from a severe budgetary crisis and unable to effectively service its debt. That might appear strange at first glance as France was both the richest and most populous country in Europe at the time, and experienced major economic growth for the majority of the 18th century, as well as leading agriculture, manufacturing and commerce.\n\nThe budgetary crises, however, were not caused by a lack of resources but primarily by structural deficiencies. \n\nIn Great Britain, for example, Parliament determined both expenditures and taxes. In France, on the other hand, the Crown controlled spending but not revenue. Taxation was the responsibility of the Estates-General, but they had not convened since 1614. In its absence, the issue was handled by the _parlaments_, local appellate courts, tasked with raising and collecting taxes in their respective provinces. \n\nBy 1789, there were 13 different _parlaments_ and with a central authority lacking, tax collection was enforced very inconsistently throughout the various provinces. Furthermore, these _parlaments_ have to be seen as a tool of the French aristocracy to protect their privileges and obstruct any royal effort to enact long-term taxation plans, which the clergy and the nobility viewed as a threat to their tax exemptions. Instead, they would only authorise one-time taxes on a case-to-case basis.\n\nAnd as if that was not already bad enough, many of those _parlaments_ decided to outsource the duty of tax collection to private individuals, called _Ferme général_, in a tax farming system. As you can imagine, that system was a breeding ground for fraud, embezzlement and corruption.\n\nAll of these deficiencies caused the yield from the approved taxes to be greatly reduced, and France struggled to satisfy its financial demands. \n\nAs a result, France partially defaulted on its debt in 1770.\n\nThese structural issues were never adequately addressed, and the state had to fall back on borrowing new money to keep funding its expenditures. French participation in the American Revolutionary War only worsened the already deteriorating situation, and by 1788, national debt had risen to a record 4.5 billion _livres_. Attempts to raise taxes were blocked by the _parlaments_, and so King Louis XVI was eventually forced to summon the Estates-General for the first time in over 170 years to address the financial crisis. \n\n*Harvest failure* \n\n18th-century France was still an overwhelmingly agricultural country, and agriculture accounted for 75% of French economic activity, with 80% of the French population living in rural areas.\n\nPivotal developments in agriculture such as modern techniques of crop rotation and the use of fertilizers, were not yet universally applied in France, and farmers instead left between one-third and half of their arable land vacant as fallow every year to restore fertility in cycles. Coupled with several crop failures between 1770 and 1789 and a growing French population, grain prices exploded, and severe shortages in nutrition plagued the rural peasantry. \n\nThe crisis only added more fuel to the problem of social inequality as large land-owners benefitted from skyrocketing prices, while peasants and small proprietors, who constituted the bulk of French farmers, suffered under bread shortages. The French government wasn't of much use either in that situation as they kept unsuccessfully alternating between imposing and lifting price controls to curb the crisis.\n\nRiots broke out in rural areas, engulfing much of north-eastern France, which had to be put down with force but did nothing to alleviate the suffering of French farmers and labourers. \n\n*Social inequality and living standards*\n\nPerhaps the most chronic of the underlying causes of the French Revolution, the situation of the third estate, and especially the peasants, was cataclysmic to the overthrow of the _Ancien Régime_.\n\nDespite making up around 98% of the French population, the system of feudalism denied the third estate the same economic, political and social opportunities it provided to the aristocracy. \n\nThat was nothing new, of course, as feudalism had cemented the systemic disenfranchisement of the third estate throughout the Middle-Ages and the Early Modern Period, however, there was a new interesting development during the 1700s, causing a divide within the third estate.\n\nFirst rates of urbanisation and a steady expansion of the manufacturing sector created a new class within the third estate, the bourgeoisie, who accumulated large amounts of personal wealth. \n\nDespite formally still being a part of the third estate, the bourgeoisie's standing began to change as they established themselves as a new, powerful economic force within a society on the advent of the Industrial Revolution. \n\nThe rural peasantry, on the other hand, who still made up the overwhelming majority of the population, and the urban _sans-culottes_ were falling behind, both in relative and absolute terms. Living standards of the rural populace and the lower urban labourers were steadily dropping throughout the 1700s.\n\nThe second half of the 18th century was marked by a sharp increase in grain prices, at the same time, a growing population and labour force led to falling wages. In 1789 alone, bread prices rose by 88%, while real wages dropped by 25%. \n\nThe French lower classes, already largely impoverished, now faced the sinister prospect of total economic destruction. Coupled with a regressive tax system that disproportionately charged the poor and the French government's inability or outright refusal to address the issues of systemic poverty, tensions only increased. \n\nAll of these problems combined to form a toxic mix of financial instability, economic stagnation and growing poverty.", "created_utc": 1677348005, "distinguished": null, "id": "j9zcc32", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/11bbk34/how_bad_was_the_financial_crisis_that_preceded/j9zcc32/", "score": 13 } ]

[ { "body": "This does not fully answer your question, but [this previous answer I wrote on the end of Marie Antoinette's life](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/8yuykk/what_would_a_day_in_the_life_of_marie_antoinette/e2my8n4/) does touch on the matter. I believe when I was writing it, I did not find very clear information on the reason for his inaction.", "created_utc": 1673735245, "distinguished": null, "id": "j4dbcxi", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10c032c/efforts_to_assist_marie_antoinette_born_the/j4dbcxi/", "score": 12 } ]

[ { "body": "I searched the official listing of places in France and there is no Percevill (or Perceville, Perseville etc) : https://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr/competences/la-mise-disposition-gratuite-du-fichier-des-voies-et-des-lieux-dits-fantoir\n\nMost likely, the Surname came from the name of the famous Round Table Knight and was originally a nickname. \n\nOn the departement’s creation, the logic was to break down the large provinces into more manageable regions (anyone from the departement could access to the chief city in a day’s ride being an often repeated rationale). The French map of secondary institutions was a real mess, as the judiciary (bailliages and sénéchaussées), fiscal (elections and civil dioceses), military (lieutenances), religious (dioceses) did not have the same circumscriptions. The Revolutionnaires aimed to create unitary institutions with the same map for every administration. It did not always go well, especially in places where the inhabitants profited from the Ancien Regimes borders disputes - many Counter revolutionnaries Vendeens leaders came from the traffic of salt between Bretagne, Poitou and Anjou, the three provinces having different fiscal regime. When the Assembly suppressed any fiscal differences, the contraband dealers suddenly lost their living, a good ground for sedition. \n\nSource : Ozouf Lemarigner, La formation des departements, Paris, 1989", "created_utc": 1675249980, "distinguished": null, "id": "j6rh3ed", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/10qk741/how_were_french_departments_referred_to_before/j6rh3ed/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "This is a difficult question to answer because it’s basically a “what if.” While that’s hard enough to approach in general, a turbulent period like the French Revolution is especially difficult to speculate on, where so many seemingly illogical twists and turns happened due to a population that largely responded based on passion, fear whether real or imaginary, and a desire for self-preservation. Trying to piece together a “logical” path for an individual to turn the tide into another direction is hardly a conclusive analysis. Nevertheless, I would argue that the Duke was in no position to change the course of events, but I’m sure it could be possible to argue otherwise, even if I don’t see that “alt-history path.”\n\nFirst, there is a very obvious comparison that can be made between another noble hero of the revolution who was opposed to the deposition of the monarchy. Lafayette. And his support of the constitutional monarchy didn’t exactly go well for him, and his attempts to defuse the situation ended with a warrant for his arrest as an enemy of the revolution and his exile in Austria for the remainder of the revolution and for some time beyond. Lafayette was arguably more popular among the general population involved in the insurrection, even after the Champs de Mars massacre. The Duke of Orleans was more of an intellectual figure popular among the more learned of the deputies and did not enjoy the same level of popularity among the bulk of the urban population who would ultimately materialize the insurrection. Not to say he was unpopular, just that relatively speaking Lafayette had a far more intimate relationship with the everyday population of Paris, who would be the participants of the insurrection along with other urban classes who would’ve held similar connections.\n\nThere were others who had a much more prominent voice among the everyday revolutionaries who would be deeply opposed to the Philippe if he had made such an attempt, and they would likely be able to run an extremely effective smear campaign against him that he would be unlikely to be able to counter. Figures like Marat particularly, the “Friend of the People” and writer of a newspaper of the same name, was extremely revolutionary and commanded a widespread audience among the urban working classes. Philippe’s ability to largely avoid the scrutiny placed on other nobles was particularly due to his property and by extension himself being a safe haven for revolutionary activity, particularly among Jacobins, who themselves were republican. His position’s precariousness is highlighted by his initial decision to vote against the execution of the king, but the pressure against the king was so overwhelming that he felt the need to go against his initial decision and vote in favor of execution. Indeed, he would himself be executed for treason based on quite weak charges only a year later. He was the father of a treasonous son, but there was no evidence he committed any treason himself. Nevertheless, he was executed anyway, which goes to show how fragile it was to be a noble in revolutionary France. Any direct personal opposition would likely be met very harshly.\n\nIf Philippe had made any attempt to save the monarchy, he would’ve abandoned the very things that gave him safety, and he would have alienated himself from the most fervent and outspoken voices of the revolution. His position as a noble put him under much greater scrutiny, and his position as a powerful Duke would likely mean greater backlash for opposition to the main revolutionary currents than if he had a humble background. A fate in exile like Lafayette who had a similar background and actually did attempt such a reconciliation would likely be a generous outcome, but his position as a much greater noble and proximity to the throne would likely mean an even harsher backlash than Lafayette had faced.", "created_utc": 1672281154, "distinguished": null, "id": "j224d7l", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/zxl5ll/was_philippe_égalité_the_duke_of_orléans_in_a/j224d7l/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "The short answer is - because a revolution was terrifying to the ruling class, and they feared the same thing would happen in Britain if the French revolutionaries were not completely crushed. I'll give the longer answer below.\n\nOn your point about the English Civil War, Charles I was beheaded and replaced by a Lord Protector, but the parliamentarians ultimately lost. In 1660 Charles II was restored, and the Restoration formed the basis of a new English monarchical culture that had very much been adopted by the 1780s. The Civil War period was called the Interregnum because it was an aberration, it was not celebrated by the aristocracy who were responsible for British participation against the French Revolution in the 1780s.\n\nOn Anglo-French relations. Yes, French was Catholic and a rival, but France and Britain were closely connected in many ways. Britain relied on France for trade - for example, Britain did not make enough paper to support it's book trade, so used French imports. British culture of the eighteenth century was strongly influenced by France. Members of the aristocracy would've been fluent in French, and a substantial proportion of reading material available was either direct French import, or translated from French. British culture was also appreciated in France. 'Anglomania' of the mid-eighteenth-century saw British cultural products consumed and translated feverishly in France. British people who had disposable wealth could travel to France recreationally, and did so. Young British gentlemen would take 'The Grand Tour' as part of their education, which involved them travelling through Europe, and spending much time in France, in order to appreciate the history and culture of other European nations. In short - France and Britain were rivals, but were connected in a number of ways - cultural and intellectual shifts in one country would affect the other, and so revolutionary fervour in France would be concerning to the French-speaking, Voltaire-reading British upper classes who were intimately tied up with French culture.\n\nThere are broadly, then, a few reasons why the Britain became so involved in the counterrevolution. First, as I've mentioned, was the possibility of revolution in Britain. Radicals, including republicans, had existed in Britain for a long time, but they were emboldened by the revolution of 1789. You can see in radical writing of this period from people like William Blake, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft that seeing a revolution in Britain's closest national sibling was inspiring. Many of the ideals that British radicals held: human rights, individual liberty and freedom of religion for example - were being enacted as a result of successful revolution. This emboldened British radicals, and there was an explosion in blasphemous and sedition print and speech around the revolutionary years. For the aristocracy and the monarchy, an emboldened British radical wing could threaten revolution at home. One way of ending that fervour was ensuring the French revolution was ultimately unsuccessful, by crushing it militarily.\n\nThis, though, doesn't fully explain why Britain went to war in 1792 rather than 1789. The execution of Louis XVI in 1792 and the following terror was a major shift for British onlookers. Conservatives like Edmund Burke reported with horror on the daily execution of aristocrats and arbitrary violence in the street. Many of the radicals who had celebrated the revolution of 1789 were horrified at what was described to them in 1792. The aristocracy of Britain could see people they felt affinity with, whose culture they were in some senses raised in, being executed just across the Channel. Much of the writing by British anti-revolutionaries of this period is emotional, and the argument for participation in the war against the French was made on those terms. Those who commanded the British army were fighting in solidarity for the aristocrats they felt affinity with. I think a kind of upper-class solidarity is an appropriate frame through which to view the choices made here. The French regime after 1792 was potentially destabilising for Britain, and its continuation was personally and emotionally distressing for the British ruling classes, ending the French revolution was seen as necessary for preventing a British one.\n\nI am happy to give specific sources if requested but I would recommend Jon Mee's book on print and radicalism in Britain in the 1790s [https://www.loc.gov/item/2020715215/](https://www.loc.gov/item/2020715215/) and Matthew Grenby's book on British conservativism and the French revolution [https://www.worldcat.org/search?q=no:928431275](https://www.worldcat.org/search?q=no:928431275). I'm aware this is a very culturally focused answer, but I am a cultural historian, others may find other reasons were important!", "created_utc": 1671616141, "distinguished": null, "id": "j137vez", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/zpw1dn/why_was_the_united_kingdom_hell_bent_on_crushing/j137vez/", "score": 8 } ]

[ { "body": "So it sounds like from your question you want two things here: an overview of the connection between the ideas, particularly of Kant, that drove the French Revolution and a bibliography that helps to demonstrate that. I'll try to summarise as best I can how Kant fits into 'the Enlightenment', how that connects to the French Revolution, and then give you some reading recommendations. What I'd stress is you're asking a pretty massive question that historians have grappled with for some time, so others may disagree or add additional detail that I skip over.\n\nFirstly - 'the Enlightenment', which is a thorny term in itself, describes a period roughly from the 1650s to the 1790s that describes an intellectual culture characterised by liberalism, cosmopolitanism, a preference for rational or scientific enquiry, and a desire to change existing dogmatic systems of power such as the monarchy or the Church. There is some debate as to which parts of the world had an 'Enlightenment', but historians can say with some confidence that France did have an intellectual culture which had all these traits, and that at least some of the ideas of that period came to bear in the Revolution of 1789-1799. Some of the ideas that were particularly influential at this time included an emphasis on rational enquiry - philosophes (as they were known in France) promoted the idea that an individual - not a monarch or a Pope, could use rational methods to uncover truth, and decide how to make moral decisions. Intellectuals disagreed with what this meant exactly in practice: some turned to anti-clericalism, arguing the Church was an irrational and stifling organisation that promoted dogma over truth. Others became atheists of a sort, arguing that the individual and their moral judgements should be the centre of ethical decision making. \n\nKant fits into this as someone who was Prussian rather than French, and who was not anti-clerical or atheistic, but believed that ethical maxims could be determined by rational consideration and that rational thought was the basis of arriving at truth - not Church dogma. Kant published the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781, and while the 800 page tome in German was not exactly popular among the every day French reader, it represented ideas that epitomised 'Enlightenment' thought, as did *The Metaphysics of Morals* in 1785. Both of these treatises would be censored by the Prussian government in the aftermath of the French Revolution, perhaps demonstrating that at least some contemporaries saw them as potential threats. However, I really don't think they had a notable influence on the Revolution itself. The ideas they presented about ethics, human rights and rationality typified the kinds of ideals espoused by Revolutionary thinkers, but none of Kant's work was translated into French before 1796, and his major works weren't translated till the 1830s onwards (as you can see here: [https://users.manchester.edu/facstaff/ssnaragon/kant/Helps/KantsWritingsTranslations.htm](https://users.manchester.edu/facstaff/ssnaragon/kant/Helps/KantsWritingsTranslations.htm)). So, Kant typified the liberalism of many 'Enlightenment' philosophes, but the extent to which his ideas influenced French Revolutionary politics was fairly minimal. He may have been read by particularly cosmopolitan philosophes in the 1780s, but he didn't have the reach of a thinker like Rousseau or Voltaire, or even an English-language writer like Thomas Paine. \n\nA brief bibliography on an introduction to the intellectual context of the French Revolution might look something like: \n\n **Andress, David, ed.** *The Oxford Handbook of the* *French* *Revolution***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201** \n\n **Cassirer, Ernst.** *The Philosophy of the* *Enlightenment***. Translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.** \n\n **Fitzpatrick, Martin, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf, and Iain McCalman, eds.** *The* *Enlightenment* *World***. London, New York: Routledge, 2004.** \n\n **Gay, Peter.** *The* *Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom***. New York and London: Knopf, 1996.** \n\n **Kates, Gary, ed.** *The* *French* *Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies***. London: Routledge, 1997.** \n\n **Wolloch, Isser.** *The New Regime: Transformations of the* *French* *Civic Order, 1789–1820s***. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994.** \n\n **Yolton, John, Pat Rogers, Roy Porter, and Barbara Stafford, eds.** *The Blackwell Companion to the* *Enlightenment***. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.**", "created_utc": 1673541988, "distinguished": null, "id": "j41x9pj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/109untc/enlightenment_ideas_and_french_revolution_what/j41x9pj/", "score": 3 }, { "body": "Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/).\n\n#Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/109untc/enlightenment_ideas_and_french_revolution_what/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. Additionally, for weekly content summaries, **[Click Here to Subscribe to our Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=AHMessengerBot&subject=Subscribe&message=!subscribe)**.\n\nWe thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written!\n\n\n*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*", "created_utc": 1673512604, "distinguished": "moderator", "id": "j40fgjg", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/109untc/enlightenment_ideas_and_french_revolution_what/j40fgjg/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "(Took some time to write this one, sorry!)\n\nThere have been Black people in France for centuries: in the early 12th century, in the city of Caen, Normandy, monk Raoul Tortaire saw on market day a parade of the menagerie of Henry I of England, Duke of Normandy, that included a lion, a leopard/cheetah on a horse, a lynx, a camel, an ostrich, and a \"fierce Ethiopian\" (Loisel, 1912). Other dark-skinned foreigners are occasionally mentioned, such as two India-born men, Bénard de Poux (hanged in Rouen in 1428, we have the executioner's bill) and Antoine de Neyn (who received 32 livres tournois from Louis XI in 1479, [top of the right page](https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9063663g/f383.item)). That said, the presence of Black (and generally non-European) people in the French territory before the 20th century has remained poorly documented. For the 17 to 19th centuries, most of the historiography focused either on court cases related to slavery, or on a handful of famous people: the General Thomas Alexandre Dumas (father of the novelist), the Chevalier Joseph Bologne de Saint-George (who has a movie coming out), or Abraham Petrovich Hanibal (great-grandfather of Russian poet Pushkin, who spent some time in France). \n\nIn the 2000s, a team of researchers - helped by amateur genealogists - started systematic investigations in the French archives - police, judiciary, military, navy, church, private companies, etc. The results of these investigations were compiled in the three-volume *Dictionnaire des gens de couleurs dans la France moderne*, published between 2011 and 2017, which provides *individual* notices for Black and mixed-race people whose presence has been recorded in France since the 15th century, though most of them have been identified in the 17th and 18th century. The dictionary contains entries for 3000 people in the Paris area, 7800 in Brittany, and 8000 in Southern France (including Bordeaux). \n\nThose numbers are higher than those recorded previously: for a long time, historians believed their numbers to be low, 4000-5000 at best, much lower than the figure of 10-15,000 generally accepted for England, and wondered about the difference (Peabody, 1996). It is apparent that the slave trade, and more generally colonial-related activities, resulted in the arrival in mainland France of tens of thousands of people of African descent, and that many of them stayed there.\n\n**1. The Freedom Principle**\n\nFrance, like other European countries, had a principle called the \"Freedom principle\" or \"priviledge of the French land\". An edict of Louis X from 1315 linked the name of the country (the kingdom of the Francs) to the condition of freedom. While the actual extent of the edict has been debated (see Boulle and Peabody, 2014), a similar principle was upheld - but only at local level - in the 15th century, when slaves who had escaped from Perpignan to Toulouse were declared free by the courts of the latter city (La Faille, 1687). The full principle was applied in 1571, when slaves brought in Bordeaux by Norman vessel were all freed by the Court, which had put as a reason that \"France, land of freedom, does not admit any slaves\" (Mathorez, 1919; Noël, 2013).\n\nIn the 17th century, the development of the labour-intensive sugar production in the French Caribbean resulted in the establishment of plantations and in the development of the slave trade. Soon, plantation owners and traders travelling to France for business or leisure were accompanied by their Black slaves, who were also status symbols. These men and women were not the expendable slaves who were worked to death in the fields and sugar mills, but typically valued servants such as valets, cooks, nannies, or wig-makers, who may even know to read and write. This resulted in a growing and visible presence of Black people in the mainland, whose official status was slavery though they were treated like domestics. This was found to be problematic: if slavery was accepted in the colonies, this was a different matter in France, where the freedom principle was applicable. \n\nIn 1691, two stowaways made it safely to France from Martinique, and were declared free on arrival. When asked for his opinion about this, Louis XIV agreed: there were no slaves in France. But what to do with the enslaved persons who came with their masters? Legally, they had to be freed as soon as they set foot in France. But the sugar industry was a booming business... It took a a few decades, and the death of Louis XIV, for the French state to come up with a solution: the Edict of 1716 allowed masters to bring their slaves legally, provided that they were given religious instruction or taught a trade, and were registered with the authorities. If a master failed to comply with the rules, the slave could be freed. This allowed the presence of enslaved persons on the French soil, and the application of the edict rule was quite lax: \"to be instructed in religion and to be taught a trade\" became a stock phrase, and probably a fiction in many cases. But the Edict also provided enslaved persons with a legal way to challenge their status, which was impossible in the Colonies. And there was another loophole: the Edict was never registered with the Parliament of Paris. In 1738, an enslaved man named Jean Boucaux escaped his master in Paris and petitioned for his freedom: the Admiralty Court and the King's prosecutor sided with him. Boucaux was declared a free man and his master sentenced to pay nine and a half years of wages plus interest, damages, and court costs (he appealed and never paid, but Boucaux remained free) (Noël, 2011).\n\nIn 1738, a new edict tried to close up some of the loopholes, by limiting the duration of the presence of a slave in France to three years, and by forbidding the marriage, gifting, or sale of slaves on the mainland. Like the previous one, however, it was not registered in Paris. In the 1750s, enslaved people started sueing for freedom with the Admiralty Court of Paris, and they always won - with the help of specialized lawyers! From then to the Revolution, 154 persons won their freedom in Paris through the Court. Enslaved people who tried to sue for freedom in other regions (where the Edicts had been registered with the Courts) were less lucky, as shown by the case of Catherine Morgan in 1747, whose freedom was refused by the Admiralty Court of Nantes: she was \"confiscated\" by the State and sent back to Saint-Domingue.\n\nThese edicts did not fully prevent colonials from bringing to France their slaves or their mixed-race families. In 1748, when Georges Bologne de Saint-Georges, planter of Guadeloupe had to leave the island escape a death sentence, he fled to Bordeaux and had his whole family join him later: his wife and their legitimate son, and his Black mistress (and slave) Nanon, and their illegitimate son Joseph, future Chevalier de Saint-George. In the 1760s, the prosecutor for the Admiralty Court, Poncet de la Grave, voiced his concern for the large number of Black people now living in France - he even called it a \"deluge\" (cited by Peabody, 1996):\n\n>The introduction of too great a quantity of negroes in France – whether in the quality of slaves, or in any other respect – is a dangerous consequence. We will soon see the French nation disfigured if a similar abuse is tolerated. Moreover, the negroes are, in general, dangerous men. Almost none of those to whom you have rendered freedom have refrained from abusing it,... [they] have been carried to excesses dangerous for society.\n\nWe can see here that Poncet was expressing his concern in racial terms. He would later become obsessed with the question of interracial sex. Black and mixed-race people were seen as dangerous, prone to laziness and libertinage. The question was not so much the presence of slaves than the presence of Black people, free or not. In 1762, a new ordinance required the registration of all \"negroes and mulattoes\" in Paris. Masters registered their slaves, and free Blacks registered themselves, putting \"free\" in the written record, thus making it official.\n\nIn August 1777, Louis XVI created the *Police des Noirs*, a new set of regulations (\"police\" as in \"policing\", and not a \"special unit\" like writes Otele, 2021!) that attempted to control the presence in France of Black people - not just slaves. By then, Poncet was not the only official who thought that there were too many Blacks in France, notably in Paris. For Minister of Marine Sartine, the successful and well publicized lawsuits that turned slaves into free people gave Blacks wrong ideas about equality. Also, bringing slaves in France could only cause degeneration of the blood thanks to interracial mixing. The aim of the new policy, formulated in an earlier draft, was nothing less than the elimination of Black people, not by physical extermination, but by preventing their arrival and prohibiting them to have children with white people: \"In the end, the race of negroes will be extinguished in the kingdom.\" The new policy included more registration, prohibition of new arrivals, and the establishment of \"depots\" - prisons to hold Blacks brought in France or found to live there illegally. In 1778, it became mandatory for Blacks to carry an ID card, and interracial marriages were banned. \n\nPoor implementation and bickering between administrations resulted in the *Police des Noirs* regulations being inefficient. Free coloured people and enslaved people still arrived as local authorities looked the other way (James and Sally Hemings came with Thomas Jefferson in 1784 for instance). The interracial ban was never enforced. Depots were more effective and people were deported, but they were plagued by administrative problems. Petitions for freedom resumed and were granted like before. Manumissions exceeded them, possibly because masters were more willing to retain their Black domestics voluntarily than by force.\n\n**> 2. Racial discrimination in the Colonies**", "created_utc": 1670758960, "distinguished": null, "id": "izrwt1e", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/yqyvbs/was_there_ever_racial_segregation_after_the_first/izrwt1e/", "score": 17 } ]

[ { "body": "There is literally *always* more to be said when the French Revolution is involved, but until someone offers more, [this answer by u/MySkinsRedditAcct](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/j1xyuj/why_is_it_that_when_louis_xvi_was_executed_other/) covers the question pretty well.", "created_utc": 1657994494, "distinguished": null, "id": "igf68nq", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/w0hu7n/following_the_french_revolution_the_other_nations/igf68nq/", "score": 369 }, { "body": "First of all, it's important to note that the execution of Louis XVI did not 'result' in military intervention (although the case can be made that it made an early peace impossible). France declared war on Austria (not Prussia) in April 1792, almost 8 months to the day prior to the King's execution. As a result, I’ll elaborate on the outbreak of war prior to the King’s demise.\n\nThe reasons for the outbreak of the war are complex and are not agreed upon by historians. Some historians contend that the ideology underpinning the French Revolution was fundamentally incompatible with the despotic monarchies of Europe. The revolution’s principles were universal – the rights of man did not evaporate at the French border. As a result, its ideology (and its policies) was a threat to the established order in many European states. Hostility was a natural result, and this incompatibility eventually led to war. Catherine the Great, Empress of Russia, did not hold back when she claimed, *“To destroy French anarchy is to prepare one’s immortal glory.”* Ironically Catherine preferred to leave the French anarchy to the Prussians and Austrians (giving her a free hand to invade and later partition Poland), but the sentiment is what’s important (Lefebvre, 2005). The King of Prussia, Fredrick William II, described the Flight to Varennes as *“a horrible example”*, but the quote could relate to the revolution more broadly (Lefebvre, 2005). Hostile to the very ideological underpinnings of monarchical Europe, it is argued by some that conflict was either likely (or inevitable) from the start. One such scholar is Historian Jonathan Israel, who claims, *“A vast European war over the Revolution’s principles, claims, and actions was thus always a probability before it actually commenced”* (Israel, 2014).\n\nYet, despite the obvious frictions between a regime that derives sovereignty from the people and others that claim it to be granted by God, war was not necessarily guaranteed (at least in the form we know it). To go further, war in April 1792 was far from a foregone conclusion. Even after the royal family failed in their escape attempt from France (the Flight to Varennes in June 1791), the monarchs of Europe were not mobilising their military forces. In fact, the Queen’s trusted advisor (and rumoured lover) Count Fersen complained to the Swedish King that Vienna intended to do nothing. Furthermore, some historians see subsequent declarations by European monarchs as evidence that the crowns of Europe were disinterested in military intervention.\n\n*“Everything confirms me in the view that the Viennese cabinet intends to do nothing” – Count Axel von Fersen (Hazan, 2014)*\n\n*“…the common declaration that emerged was as much an expression of the two sovereigns’ resistance to calls for a war of intervention as of their concern for the personal safety of the royal family.” - Historian Simon Schama, discussing the Declaration of Pillnitz of August 1791 (Citizens, 2004)*\n\nSo, what changed?\n\nFirstly, a pro-war collation emerged in France from late 1791. The motivations for various actors remain highly disputed, but leading Jacobins (specifically Brissotins/Girondins), Feuillants, and members of the Court backed calls for war. Put simply, all saw the conflict as a means to further their own domestic political power and objectives at the expense of their rivals. How the war would accomplish this goal differed between individuals and factions.\n\nInitially, leading Girondins (such as Brissot) saw war as a means to achieve two key objectives. Firstly, it would force the King to adhere to revolutionary values by compelling him to withdraw unpopular vetoes. Secondly, the conflict would allow France to decisively strike against the counter-revolutionaries who menaced the new regime. This second point is critical. War would allow the revolutionaries to finally eliminate the enemies that many believed were undermining the revolutionary project. For this reason, calls for war initially targeted the French emigrants who were preparing military forces to invade France, along with the Germanic princes who supported them. As Austria came to defend the autonomy of the princes, Austria gradually became a target for revolutionaries demanding war.\n\n*“‘Do you wish at one blow to destroy the aristocracy, the refractory priests, the malcontents? \\[Then\\] Destroy Coblenz. The head of the nation will \\[then\\] be forced to reign in accordance with the Constitution.’ – Jacques Brissot (Hibbert, 2001)*\n\nWith time, the motivations for war evolved. Championed by many Brissotin/Girondin deputies, a new emphasis was placed on protecting the nation’s honour. Furthermore, calls for war were justified by the desire to conduct a ‘crusade for liberty.\n\n*“…the representatives of free France, unshakably attached to the constitution, will be buried beneath the ruins of their own temple rather than propose to you a capitulation unworthy of them and of you.” - Pierre Vergniaud (Schama, 2004)*\n\n*“If the Revolution has already marked 1789 as the first year of French liberty, the date of the 1st of January 1792 will mark this year as the first year of universal liberty.” - Marguerite-Élie Guadet, December 1791 (Schama, 2004)*\n\nSimilar calls were echoed more forcefully in late 1792, just weeks prior to the King’s execution, as the new French Republic experienced its first victories such as Valmy and Jemappes.\n\n*“It is not enough to affiliate \\[Jacobin\\] societies. We must affiliate kingdoms.” - Pierre-Louis Manuel at Jacobin Club, 14 October 1792 (Bosher, 1988)*\n\nOther individuals and factions had their own motivations for war. For example, some Feuillants (such as Lafayette) saw war as a means to entrench the recently established Constitution of 1791, as well as potentially restore their own political fortunes. Additionally, the Court, believing French victory to be impossible, sought war as a means to forcibly reverse the revolution. Thus, Louis supported the war because he anticipated France’s defeat rather than its victory.\n\n*‘The imbeciles! They don’t even see that \\[war\\] serves our purpose’ – Queen Marie Antoinette, 14 December 1791 (Lefebvre, 2005).*\n\n*‘Instead of civil, we will have political war, and things will be much the better for it. France’s physical and moral state renders it incapable of sustaining a semi-campaign.’ – King Louis XVI, 14 December 1791 (Lefebvre, 2005).*\n\nAs a result, a broad coalition of divergent (and mutually exclusive) interests championed war in early 1792. Thus, the French actively sought conflict with Europe and declared war on Austria in April 1792 (technically the French declared war on the King of Hungary and Bohemia, in order to distinguish the fact that the French people were not at war with the common people of other nations). Critically, European monarchs did not declare was a result of Louis XVI’s execution (which wasn’t until 8 months later).\n\nSources:\n\nBosher, J.F. The French Revolution 1988. Penguin Books Ltd.\n\nHazan, Eric. 2014. A People's History of the French Revolution. Verso Books.\n\nHibbert, Christopher. The French Revolution. 2001. Penguin Books Ltd.\n\nIsrael, Jonathan. Revolutionary Ideas. 2014. Princeton University Press.\n\nLefebvre, Georges. The French Revolution. 2005. Taylor & Francis Ltd.\n\nSchama, Simon. Citizens. 2004. Penguin Books Ltd.\n\nNotes:\n\nI’ve really oversimplified the above motivations for war, sticking primarily to some of the motivations most commonly referenced by historians. The exact motivations of various actors are highly contentious. In fact, one could literally spend hours discussing the motivations of Brissot alone (trust me, I’ve done it). Furthermore, each faction/ political grouping was not united on the merits of war. Famously Robespierre was a dissenting voice within the Jacobin Club, but the influential Feuillant Barnave also opposed the war.\n\nIf you would like further analysis on the debate regarding the motivations for war amongst various revolutionaries and factions, you may want to check out Episode 25 ‘The Road to War’ of the ‘Grey History: The French Revolution’ podcast. That episode is a fan favourite and the podcast is used by some universities as a supplement for teaching the French Revolution.", "created_utc": 1658011759, "distinguished": null, "id": "igg9a63", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/w0hu7n/following_the_french_revolution_the_other_nations/igg9a63/", "score": 300 } ]

[ { "body": "You're absolutely correct that Paris gets most of the spotlight—although it's not *entirely* undeserved. While in the early stages of the Revolution (1789-92) Paris was the center of the 'Revolutionary Spirit,' from the overthrow of the monarchy (1792) through the fall of Robespierre (1794) Paris was *the* center of power. Particularly under the Committee of Public Safety in late 1793-1794, all marching orders (literally and figuratively; both military and political matters were handled by the CPS) came from the twelve.\n\n*However*, one city does not a Revolution make. There were absolutely pockets of dissent—as you highlighted, the Vendée was the most gruesome, and the largest—but Frenchmen in almost every town, and especially in every city, could be found who supported the new order. Whether that was tacit approval or wholesale involvement in the local Jacobin club chapters, the newly formed 'French' took to the Revolution with zeal.\n\nTaking a broad overview before looking at specific examples, there was certainly a difference between very rural areas, towns, and the mid- to large cities of France. All of these municipalities participated in the Revolution, but in different capacities. Much like the initial spirit of the *sans-culotte* in Paris, the peasants in the most rural villages were far more concerned with immediate economic relief than with erudite political and social reforms. One of the most impactful, driving events of the early Revolution was the \"Great Fear,\" taking place in the summer of 1789. This was a panic started by the uncertainty around the Estates General in Paris, that filtered out into a perverse game of telephone into the provinces. Rumors swirled that the monarchy had hired thugs to come 'persuade' the peasants into paying their dues that they had been shirking while the Estates met, terrible economic conditions meant that groups of vagabonds *were* wandering the roadways, they were mistaken for the bandits....you see where this is going. In the end, the panic led to peasants in rural areas across France burning feudal records, sometimes chateaux, and less often their local nobleman along with it. \n\nIn response to the Fear the Estates (now National Assembly) cancelled all feudal dues (\\*though they'd attempt to get the peasants to buy out the due holders, this never really happened). At this, the peasants outside of the Vendée really exit the core of the Revolution. The rural areas would become hotbeds of dissent, particularly relating to religion, but outside of the Vendée there weren't concerted efforts to rebel. \n\nThe towns and cities were far more patchy in their support. I've used this analogy a lot in describing pre-Revolutionary France, but it really was akin to a patchwork quilt, sewn together not by any nationalistic cohesion, but by the person of the King. There was a plurality of languages, cultural traditions, and most importantly to the Revolution there was a huge variance in the political agreement regions had with the King. When a new territory had been added to the Kingdom—even individual cities—a treaty was signed guarenteeing specific rights, responsibilities, and obligations. This is a huge reason why no one could agree on how to save France on the eve of Revolution—it wasn't just the nobles refusing to give up rights (in many cases, it wasn't even *predominantely* the nobles); rather, it was an issue of individuality trumping a not-yet-ingrained sense of 'French' national pride. \n\nOf course, therefore, when the Revolution did break out there was a lot of individual factors that determined committment to the government in Paris, and to the wider ideals of Revolution. It's also complicated in that the answer to this question changes quite drastically over the course of the Revolution—the most glaring example is Marseille. The French National anthem, La Marseillese, was written during the Revolution. The Naitonal Guard from Marseille were the front line in the insurrection of August 10th (overthrow of the King). And yet within a year the city was in revolt against Paris. Attitudes changed quickly; as did the Revolution itself. \n\nBroadly speaking, cities and towns had a core group of leaders who were very involved with the Revolution, from 1789 onward. This was due in large part to the efforts of the Jacobin club early on to form member clubs in each and every town and city in France—and in virtually all municipalities there were ambitious, progressive young men who were more than happy to get in on the action. The Jacobins sponsored pamphlets, created regional connections between member clubs, and increasingly helped provide a cohesion in policy across France. No mean feat.\n\nA great example of this is the Flight of the King. Louis managed to get pretty far from Paris—almost to the Austrian border—before being returned. When he was recognized (which was more than once), stunned local leaders were shocked; they didn't know *what* to do, and sent envoys in a flurry between neighbor towns, begging for advice, aide, lookouts. The post-master Drouet who recognized Louis and rode ahead fatefully to Varennes had been so warned that a potential royal fugitive was coming his way. Drouet convinced the mayor of Varennes, a firm Revolutionary, to halt the King. Once this was decided, there was little chance at escape. There was virtually no effort, outside of singular noblemen, to persuade the crowds by word or force to free the King. Louis made the 250km trek back to Paris, passing through town after town that supported the Revolution and was apalled by his actions. The local Jacobin clubs were key in building such a widespread cohesion in such a short amount of time.\n\nThe Jacobin clubs would become the ruling local governments after 1792, and through 1795. While Paris housed the central government, the local leaders still held immense power and importance. It was up to them how they wished to interpret orders from Paris, how harsh (or lenient) they wished to be, and how to integrate their particular corner of France with the overall national unity that was being attempted. Typically, each town and city had a local government of various size, consisting of a mayor and numerous other municipal leaders. These smaller areas were then under the jurisdiction of the departmental government. The departments were created in 1789 to erase the old provincial boundaries to try and loose the ancient regional bonds. These departmental governments were staffed with Jacobin supporters, usually pulled from the local municipalities, and tasked with being the arm of the central government. \n\n(contd. in comment below)", "created_utc": 1656382846, "distinguished": null, "id": "ie08dsz", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/vm7izn/what_did_the_various_phases_of_the_french/ie08dsz/", "score": 64 } ]

[ { "body": "If you are looking for a short, respected, primer on 1789-1794ish then you will not go wrong with William Doyle's [The French Revolution, A Very Short Introduction](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-french-revolution-a-very-short-introduction-9780198840077?cc=gb&lang=en&#) (2nd Edition, 2019).\n\nIf you are in for the long haul, you might consider some competing interpretations: Simon Schama's [Citizens](https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0141017279?tag=fivboo-21) (2004) definitely emphasises the violence; David Andress' [The French Revolution](https://www.amazon.co.uk/French-Revolution-Landmark-Library/dp/1788540077) (2019) or [The French Revolution and the People](https://www.amazon.co.uk/French-Revolution-People-David-Andress/dp/1852855401) (2004) both look at the degree to which the revolution is about social change from below (the former is probably more accessible). Jean Jaures' *Socialist History of the French Revolution* has a well-regarded translation by Mitchell Abidor that may be available for free. \n\nIf you're interested in the impact of the revolution on English literature then Marilyn Butler's *Burke, Paine, Godwin and the Revolution Controversy* (1984) is a standard text, though I don't agree with all of it myself. I would also recommend all the recent writing on William Godwin... except the stuff I wrote myself. ;)", "created_utc": 1664364744, "distinguished": null, "id": "iq818vn", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/xq181d/any_recommended_books_on_the_french_revolution/iq818vn/", "score": 2 } ]

[ { "body": "There are various reasons but perhaps the biggest reason is reliability of the troops and the size of Paris.\n\n**Reliability of troops**\n\nIn the 1780s, the government introduced the Segur ordinance to improve the competency of the troops, these ordinances made it harder for commoners to rise in the ranks since the ordinance made it so that only hereditary Nobles whose nobility went back 4 generations could become officers. The only way commoners could get high ranking positions was if they had earned the Cross of Saint-Louis. This caused disturbances in the army ranks since the military was one of the few ways that provided uneducated or poor commoners with social advancement (future Revolutionary Saint-Just's father had been ennobled because of his service in the army, though his father had also earned the Cross of Saint-Louis and worth noting that this nobility was not hereditary so Saint-Just himself was not a nobleman). Another thing that caused major disturbances was the decision to pay soldiers with paper bonds in 1788. Paper money in those days was distrusted and this understandably led to resentment and loss of discipline in the ranks. Thirdly the rank and file of the army was filled with commoners who shared the same grievances and most importantly agreed with the Revolutionaries demand for meritocracy. The Storming of the Bastille provides a few examples of this. Prior to the Storming of the Bastille, the Parisians had tried to break into the Hotel des Invalides, the Governor of Invalides was scared of just such attack and had ordered his soldiers to dismantle the muskets, however the soldiers went about their task quite leisurely and had only dismantled around 20 muskets in 6 hours, secondly during the Storming the Bastille Governor de Launay was hoping for French guard to come to the defense of the Bastille, but when the French guard did show up to the Bastille they sided with the people of Paris rather than de Launay. \n\n\n**The Size of Paris**\n\nParis had a population of 600,000 - 750,000. This was a huge number, far bigger than any army in the world at that point. Attacking Paris would threaten an all out Civil war, but most importantly a city the size of Paris (once they were hostile) could not be held down even if the troops had been reliable.\n\n\nHere is what historian Hilaire Belloc thought about subduing Paris \"It behoves us here to consider the military aspect of this definitive act from which the sanction of the Revolution, the physical power behind it, dates.\n\nParis numbered somewhat under a million souls: perhaps no more than 600,000: the number fluctuated with the season. The foreign mercenary troops who were mainly employed in the repression of the popular feeling therein, were not sufficient to impose anything like a siege. They could at the various gates have stopped the provisioning of the city, but then at any one of those separate points, any one of their detachments upon a long perimeter more than a day’s march in circumference would certainly have been attacked and almost as certainly overwhelmed by masses of partially armed civilians.\n\nCould the streets have been cleared while the ferment was rising? It is very doubtful. They were narrow and tortuous in the extreme, the area to be dealt with was enormous, the tradition of barricades not forgotten, and the spontaneous action of that excellent fighting material which a Paris mob contains, had been quite as rapid as anything that could have been effected by military orders.\n\nThe one great fault was the neglect to cover the Invalides, but even had the Invalides not been looted, the stock of arms and powder in the city would have been sufficient to have organised a desperate and prolonged resistance. The local auxiliary force (of slight military value, it is true), the “French Guards,” as they were called, were wholly with the people. And in general, the Crown must be acquitted of any considerable blunder on the military side of this struggle. It certainly did not fail from lack of will.\n\nThe truth is (if we consider merely the military aspect of this military event) that in dealing with large bodies of men who are (a) not previously disarmed, (b) under conditions where they cannot be dispersed, and (c) capable by a national tradition or character of some sort of rapid, spontaneous organisation, the issue will always be doubtful, and the uncertain factor (which is the tenacity, decision and common will of the civilians, to which soldiers are to be opposed) is one that varies within the very widest limits.\n\nIn massing the troops originally, the Crown and its advisers estimated that uncertain factor at far too low a point. Even contemporary educated opinion, which was in sympathy with Paris, put it too low. That factor was, as a fact, so high that no armed force of the size and quality which the Crown then disposed of, could achieve its object or hold down the capital.\n\nAs for the absurd conception that any body of men in uniform, however small, could always have the better of civilian resistance, however large and well organised, it is not worthy of a moment’s consideration by those who interest themselves in the realities of military history. It is worthy only of the academies.\"", "created_utc": 1658981722, "distinguished": null, "id": "ihy6z9h", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/w9i5hq/during_the_french_revolution_after_the_bastille/ihy6z9h/", "score": 11 } ]

[ { "body": "The basic layout of events to breaching the Bastille are covered in [this post](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/974y3d/comment/e45ze3z/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) from a few years ago by u/herpasaurus. Long and short of it, yes it was more than just a mob somehow managing to open the gates. They had armed garrisons supporting them and the governor opened it up to eventually be ransacked and burned.\n\nOne detail in the intro based on history is that the naked guy, the Marquis de Sade, was stoking the fires of people's want to free the prisoners in the Bastille by claiming torture and killing was taking place. In truth, the Bastille was pretty cushy as far as prisons go, maintained for noble kids who had gotten a little too wild for their shoes.", "created_utc": 1662820884, "distinguished": null, "id": "inuzoit", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/x9l8np/storming_of_the_bastille_how_accurate_is_the/inuzoit/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "I can't offer anything reactionary, but I can offer a fascinating work of history from below. Laura Mason's *Singing The Revolution: Popular Culture and Politics, 1787-1799* looks into the way in which the chanssonnier, street performers who used to sing popular and folk songs all over France, started using revolutionary and enlightenment-adjacent ideals in their songs as a way to spread anti monarchist sentiments among the French people. It also analyzes how popular music in general evolved in XVIII century France with a deep nationalistic impulse as a way to oppose the more foreign forms of \"high\" culture that Marie Antoinette was trying to bring forth as the new norm. Following a similar approach, there's C.A. McKinley's article *Anarchists and the Music of the French Revolution*, and for a more gender-oriented approach, R.D. Geoffroy-Schwinden's article *A Lady-in-Waiting's Account of Marie Antoinette's Musical Politics: Women, Music and the French Revolution*.", "created_utc": 1657410593, "distinguished": null, "id": "ifj9pc9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/vv7rrz/what_are_some_good_books_on_the_french_revolution/ifj9pc9/", "score": 3 }, { "body": "I appreciate that you are looking for something more recent than Thomas Carlyle, but if you’re after a reactionary / very critical Edmund Burke’s Reflections (1790) is a good place to start. If you fancy a giggle, Nesta Webster‘s The French Revolution: A Study in Democracy (1919) is critical but obsessed by a freemason conspiracy. \nIn regard to more recent literature, the pro-revolutionary accounts (by Marxist historians and what not) written mostly after WW2 to 1980s have been pushed aside by a revisionist school whom are not politically aligned nor interested in normative interpretations (revolution good or bad), but rather the scholars try to understand the revolution without ideological blinkers or tramlines. \nWhen I was an undergraduate William Doyle was the go-to historian on the French Revolution, but another good historian of the revisionist sect is Alfred Cobban’s such as his seminal 1950s work the ‘Myth of the French Revolution‘ and his 1963 ‘The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution’. \nSimon Schama‘s Citizens (1989) is okay, but written for a popular rather than academic audience and don’t forget Schama is first and foremost an Art Historian. \nI’ve heard some good things about Timothy Tackett, but I have never read his stuff. My undergrad studies were between 2002-05, before Tackett’s works appeared. My MA and PhD was on British history and so I did not keep up on the newer French Revolution works. \nsources: The memory of a PhD historian (Manchester, 2016) and a little university teaching on European history 1789-1914.", "created_utc": 1657400943, "distinguished": null, "id": "ifip3pu", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/vv7rrz/what_are_some_good_books_on_the_french_revolution/ifip3pu/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "Sorry about the very late reply! Life has been quite busy the last few weeks, and unfortunately refuses to schedule itself around good Reddit questions.\n\nSo, one thing that makes your question a little tricky to answer is that rather than being a question of \"fact\" (ex. What was the Allies plan if the Soviets surrendered?) it is a question of judgement by historians. There is no objective answer to what event was the beginning of the Modern Age\" because there isn't an objective Modern Age (and certainly not one event that objectively starts it), its just a helpful framework for us to view history through. There certainly are individuals (scholars or not) who view the American Revolution as the beginning of the modern age, and they aren't necessarily *wrong*, they just prioritize different things and have come to a different conclusion. There are plenty more events based on the same Enlightenment principles as the American and French revolutions that you could argue are the real beginning of the Modern Age - the Dutch Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the Revolutions of 1848 - but the French revolution is just the singular event that most historians have (sort-of arbitrarily) set as that point.\n\nAnother thing to keep in mind is that for a very long time the discipline of history was (and to some extent still is) very Eurocentric. Events that affected Europe were/are often given more importance than equally large events that affected other parts of the world (at least in English-language historiography). If we examine direct, short term consequences of these two revolutions, we see that the American Revolution... didn't really change much about the world order, certainly not the European order. Britain was still a dominant imperial power, and there was little fighting on the European continent itself. The United States wouldn't be seen as a legitimate equal in geopolitics for decades, at least. We can argue about how much the French were inspired or influenced by the success of the Americans, but ultimately most Europeans would have discussed the American Revolution as a faraway experiment in Enlightenment thought that may or may not work and probably won't have much influence on Europe or the rest of the world. The French Revolution, however, led to a decade of war that raged across the entire continent, destroyed the Holy Roman Empire that had been dominant in Central European politics for centuries, popularized the metric system, and set the stage for the Concert of Europe and balance-of-power politics that would define European diplomacy for decades. We can argue about long-term impact - the French Revolution is credited with igniting the nationalism that would drive German and Italian Unification in the later 19th century, both revolutions inspired or influenced independence movements in Latin America, and of course the United States would later become a global superpower - but for immediate *European* impact that, for a long time, historians would care much more about, the French Revolution wins out.\n\nFinally, there are some legitimate differences between the two revolutions that, depending on how you think the Modern Age is distinct from previous eras, could help separate the two. Principally, the American Revolution was primarily a local rebellion for national independence, keeping a lot of institutions intact, while the French Revolution was a complete social revolution that completely reformed the government and culture of France. You'll notice that most of the Founding Fathers in America were already quite wealthy and influential in the colonies before independence, as were the majority of early American legislators and politicians. (I think this factor is a little exaggerated by popular history, but that is neither here nor there.) American society was largely the same as before the Revolution, just with the upper crust of colonial British control cut off. Rural planters were still the elites, with cities rapidly growing but their influence tempered by the Senate and Electoral College. For most Americans, who lived in semi-autonomous colonies with (limited) democracy thousands of miles from London, no longer being subjects of a king didn't really impact them. The French Revolution, on the other hand, turned *everything* on its head. Famously, many members of the aristocracy (and lots and lots of commoners) were put to the guillotine, with the king himself being executed, which of course wasn't even a remote possibility with the American revolution. Many revolutionaries were members of the urban working class, which was a relatively new development in the West. The organization of the French government was completely restructured; the calendar was replaced with a new one developed by the revolutionaries; the Catholic Church (and religion in general) were targeted, with the goal of eventual replacement; France even tried universal (male) suffrage in 1792! So, if you are defining the Modern Age as the era of populism, democracy, and the creation/rise of an urban working class and bourgeoise, then the French Revolution is certainly a better starting point than American independence.", "created_utc": 1644609212, "distinguished": null, "id": "hwjq6za", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/scc2tz/why_is_the_french_revolution_often_considered_to/hwjq6za/", "score": 15 } ]

[ { "body": "Hey, I just answered what was essentially this question on my PhD exams in May!\n\nThis is a complex issue that historians have debated for decades now, and it’s contentious for precisely the reasons you described: there seem to be deep roots of nationalism in ingroup/outgroup thinking that has existed since a lot longer ago than the French Revolution. But there was a change in the way people thought of ethnicity/nationhood/ingroup-ness around the time of the French Revolution. Historians disagree on whether this change constitutes the *invention* of nationalism or merely a *change* in nationalism’s appearance.\n\nOne caveat: my area of expertise is modern Europe, and the answer to this question might look very different outside the European context. Hopefully another historian will be able to give context for nationalisms in the rest of the world, as Europe is just a small part of the larger picture.\n\nAt the heart of your question is the definition of a **nation**, and it’s probably unsurprising that historians can’t agree on what a nation is. Like you asked, was Classical Athens a nation? Were the Picts a nation? How long ago did Poles become a nation? It’s fuzzy, and depending on which side of the debate I’ll describe below a historian lands on will depend on and determine how that historian thinks of nationhood. **Nationalism** is, to my mind, a bit more straightforward. In modern European history, we usually think of nationalism as the principle that the boundaries of a political formation should have a 1:1 relationship with the ethnic group it governs (Gellner, 1). So there should be one Welsh state that governs all the Welsh and only the Welsh; there should be a Basque state that governs all the Basques and only the Basques; etc. *While many historians see nations as a premodern phenomenon that simply changes form around the time of the French Revolution, most historians agree that this definition of nationalism comes from about that time.*\n\nThere are three schools of thought about nations and nationalism that we need to understand to get how historians think about this: the **primordialists**, the **state-first group**, and the **nation-first group**. In your question you actually anticipate the existence of these three groups (nice noticing!): the primordialists are the “simplistic pop history” strain; the state-first advocates that “national pride is a relatively new thing”; and the nation-first group tries to account for the existence and persistence of ethnic and political differentiation prior to the French Revolution.\n\n**Primordialism** is the idea that nations are primordial and relatively fixed: that Germans are German because of something inherent in their character, and that Germanness is relatively unchanged over time. This is an outdated view, and I don’t know of any serious historian who advocates for primordialism today. (I’m sure you can imagine how primordialism can play into racist ideas about “the essential nature” of group X.) However, primordialism was the first systematic way that historians and nationalists in the 18th and 19th centuries thought about nations. The romantic movement of the early 19th century relied heavily on primordialism. If you think of the Brothers Grimm, who sought to collect Germanic folklore that captured the spirit of the German people and whose work was used to support the unification of the German states, you can see how influential primordialism was. And because primordialism came first, the two following schools of though (state-first and nation-first) push back against primordialism.\n\nIn the 1970s and 1980s, the **state-first group** of historians published influential works that argued explicitly against primordialism. These historians included Eugen Weber (1976), Benedict Anderson (1983), Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983), and Ernest Gellner (1983). The basic premise of this school of thought is that nations and nationalism developed out of the needs of the modern state—that is, the state appeared first and then nations followed. It’s important to note that, even among the state-first group, historians put a different start date to nationalism. Weber, for instance, argues that France didn’t really become a nation-state until at least 1870 (!), while Gellner says that nationalism started shortly after industrialization (c. 18th century), while Anderson says that nationalism started not in Europe but in the print culture of South American colonies seeking independence in the early 19th century. They might disagree on the nationalism’s start date and whether nations come out of the context of national military service, transportation, and education (like Weber says); out of industrialization’s disruption to economic and social patters (Gellner’s view); or from anti-imperial cultural developments (Anderson’s position). But they all agree that the “modern state”—however they define “modern,” and however they define “state”—precedes the nation.\n\nFollowing the work of the state-first group, the **nation-first** school of thought cropped up with a critique. Just like you, these scholars, including Rogers Brubaker (1992), Liah Greenfeld (1992), and Anthony Smith (1999), thought that the state-firsters used an artificially narrow definition of nationhood to argue for the late appearance of the nation. For Brubaker, there is no single path to nationalism but rather multiple routes depending on local conditions. Interestingly, he does agree with the state-first group in his analysis of French nationalism: Brubaker sees France as an example of a “state-centered” nation. This national model essentially aligns with that of Weber and Gellner, though he puts the birthdate of the French nation during the years of the French Revolution, nearly a century before Weber’s 1870. It is in his analysis of the “volk-centered” nationalism of Germany that Brubaker really dissents from the State-Firsters. He argues that differences in French and German political organization explain this distinction. For France, which had a relatively centralized government despite wide local differences, there was a state that could come first. But for Germany, fractured into myriad principalities, no state existed to come first. Instead, Germans worked from their common Germanic culture, contrasted with the perpetual Other of the Slavs, to create a state that reflected their sense of national continuity.\n\nSmith’s *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is the clearest articulation of the nation-first model, and the one that seems to me closest to your own critique. Smith focuses on the affective power of nationalism. Critiquing the likes of Weber, Anderson, and Gellner, Smith argues that the state-first model of nationalism underplays the role of ethnic identity. It is not that ethnic groups are *destined* to become nations (as primordialists would argue)—only that some *do*. For Smith, those that do become nations are only able to do so because they draw on the strength of their ethnic traditions, myths, and symbols. This almost anthropological approach is compelling because it accounts for the affective dimension of national belonging, whereas the state-first school reduces the nation to utilitarian bones.\n\ntl;dr Yeah, it’s complicated. But your view is backed up by a whole school of thought, represented by Anthony D. Smith.\n\nAnderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. ed. London: Verso, \\[1983\\] 2016.\n\nBrubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.\n\nGellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. New Perspectives on the Past, edited by R.I. Moore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.\n\nGreenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.\n\nHobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.\n\nSmith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.\n\nWeber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.\n\nEdit: punctuation", "created_utc": 1628106228, "distinguished": null, "id": "h7psnai", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/oxuepf/was_nationalismpatriotism_really_an_idea_that/h7psnai/", "score": 113 } ]

[ { "body": "The generation between the 1789 and 1814 changed a lot of things about France for good. What it didn't do was establish a national consensus about what kind of government was best for France. \n\nFirst, a brief and oversimplified refresher on the political trajectory of the French Revolution:\n\n- Before 1789, France was an absolute monarchy, with the king possessing both executive and legislative powers (though subject to checks from groups like the *parlements*)\n- From 1789 to 1792, France was a constitutional monarchy, with King Louis XVI sharing power with elected legislators\n- In 1792, the First French Republic was declared\n- In 1794, Robespierre was executed and (in 1795) different constitution, the Directory, was implemented\n- In 1799, the Coup of 18 Brumaire replaced the directory with a government led by three Consuls, in effect a republican dictatorship led by First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte\n- In 1804, Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor of the French, returning France to a monarchical form of government (albeit one with very different trappings and organization than the old *ancien régime*)\n- Napoleon abdicated after military defeat in 1814, replaced by King Louis XVIII, younger brother of the guillotined Louis XVI\n- Napoleon returned in 1815 for the \"Hundred Days,\" but abdicated again after Waterloo, leading to the Second Restoration and Louis XVIII's return\n\nAs I said, that leaves out a *lot*, but the biggest takeaway should be the sheer multitude of different forms of government that were tried in the 25 years after 1789. France was governed by different forms of republic and different forms of monarchy. All of them had ended in chaos and collapse. People at the time still had preferences for which form of government was best, of course, but there was no consensus.\n\nNow, with that established, you ask: \"How on Earth did France return to a monarchy throughout a large section of the 19th century even after the French Revolution?\"\n\nThe key to that question is that it wasn't really the French who were deciding what form of government France should have. The French armies had been soundly beaten (though not annihilated) and hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers from Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and a host of smaller states were flooding the country. Any decision about France's form of government was going to have to meet their approach. And all four of these Allied Powers were monarchies of various stripes. So it's not surprising that they were settled on monarchy of some sort as the best government for France — especially since the idea of \"republic\" largely conjured up images of the Reign of Terror and revolutionary armies surging across Europe. There was zero serious consideration of a return to a republican form of government.\n\nBut if France was to have a monarch, what variety of monarch? There were several options.\n\n- The Bonapartist regime could have continued, with Napoleon's young son succeeding him under the regency of Napoleon's wife Marie-Louise. Since Marie-Louise was the daughter of Austrian Emperor Francis II, the Austrians were unsurprisingly the keenest supporters of this idea, but for the same reason none of the other governments liked it very much.\n- France could have restored the old Bourbon line of kings, in the person of the self-proclaimed Louis XVIII. We know this is what France ultimately ended up going with, but it was far from a foregone conclusion. Restoring the Bourbons appealed to monarchs who themselves relied on succession by inheritance, but there were concerns about whether Louis XVIII would have any support, and whether he would repeat the same mistakes that had gotten his brother overthrown. The British, who were hosting Louis XVIII in exile, were his most prominent supporters.\n- Alternatively, there were several prominent figures out there who could have been crowned king, but who would have represented more modern monarchs than Louis XVIII. The two most important of these were Louis-Philippe, the Duke of Orleans — a cousin of Louis XVIII who was in the line of succession but had a liberal reputation — and Jean Bernadotte, a former Napoleonic marshal who had become King of Sweden. If the Austrians were the biggest supporters of a regency under Marie-Louise, Tsar Alexander of Russia was the biggest exponent of these alternatives — he personally disliked Louis XVIII.\n\nThere is a widespread belief — even expressed by some people at the time — that after more than two decades the Bourbons were forgotten in France before the Restoration in 1814. While there's certainly *some* truth to that — 20 years is a long time, especially in a period with lower literacy and shorter lifespans — this appears to be greatly exaggerated. Even if most people in France got on just fine without ever thinking of the Bourbons, there was a consistent (if often quiescent) royalist minority in the French Empire, and period dispatches and official reports show Louis was taken seriously as a usurper. As Louis XVIII's biographer Philip Mansel writes, \"People may not have known the names and relationships of all the Bourbons (did they of the Bonapartes?), but they knew that a brother of Louis XVI, called Louis, was living in exile and had not renounced his claim to the throne.\"\n\nBut not being forgotten is a low bar to clear. As mentioned above, Louis XVIII's claim had two major obstacles: concerns about whether he would have any popular support, and worries that he'd try to restore the old absolute monarchy of pre-revolutionary France — a system of government that almost everyone in the powers-that-be agreed was unsuitable for the present day. The latter Louis addressed in 1813 with his so-called \"Hartwell Declaration,\" where he promised not to turn back the clock too much — he'd retain the administrative changes put in place over the past decade, pursue a policy of peace, and refrain from pursuing retribution against his enemies. \n\nThat kept Louis in the game in 1814 as France's armies fell back — an intransigeant dedication to restore the *ancien régime* in its entirety, as some royalists wanted, might have doomed his claim. But he still needed to show he would have support and not just be a weak foreigner-imposed ruler. As Tsar Alexander wrote in January 14:\n\n> The powers will not decide in favor of the Bourbons, but they will leave the initiative on this question to the French... They will not prevent the Bourbons from acting beyond the lines occupied by their troops, but will not encourage them and will avoid even the appearance of taking the least part in their activities.\n\nAs an example of this, consider the city of Dijon, occupied by the Austrians, where a group of royalists tried to stage a pro-Bourbon demonstration; the Austrian military governor banned the protest and arrested one of the ringleaders. \"Let France speak out,\" said the Austrian leader Count Metternich. \"It's her business, not ours.\"\n\nThe key moment here would come in Bordeaux. One of those armies invading France was the Duke of Wellington's, advancing north from Spain. Wellington personally was favorable to Louis XVIII's cause, but was under the same orders of neutrality as everyone else. He threaded this line by giving these orders to the general he sent to take Bordeaux:\n\n> If they ask your consent to proclaim Louis XVIII... reply that wherever our troops are, as long as public peace is not disturbed, we will intervene in no way to stop this party from doing what it considers useful and appropriate to its interests, ... that nevertheless the aim of the Allies in this war is above all else... peace, and that it is well known that they are engaged at this time in negotiating a treaty with Bonaparte [this would come to nothing], and that however disposed I might be to give aid and assistance to whatever group might be opposed to Bonaparte, this assistance would cease at the very instance when peace should be concluded; and I beg the inhabitants to weigh this point carefully before raising the standard of revolt against the Bonaparte government... If the city government claims to proclaim Louis XVIII only by virtue of your orders, you are thereupon to refuse to give them.\n\nTraveling with the English army was Louis's nephew, the Duke of Angoulême, one of several royals dispatched by Louis to different parts of France to try to rally support for his cause. Awaiting them in Bordeaux (which Napoleon's officials abandoned without a fight) was a cabal of royalist activists including the mayor of Bordeaux Jean-Baptiste Lynch, who greeted the British arrival on March 12 with a pro-Bourbon demonstration:\n\n> Lynch then jumped up in his open carriage and with a theatrical gesture tore off his tricolored ribbon of office and revealed underneath a white ribbon [the Bourbon emblem]. He then put the white cockade on his hat and shouted \"Long live the king! Long live the Bourbons!\" The gesture and the shout were imitated by those around him, and the crowd was caught up in the excitement. \"There was a roar from what seemed like a tremendous crowd of people, with mingled cries of 'Long live the king!' rending the heavens,\" one unenthusiastic witness reported.\n\nA few hours later the Duke of Angoulême entered the city to a rapturous reception, and set up a government with support from local elites. \n\nNews of this event — suggesting that royalism had a genuine popular base in at least parts of France — spread quickly. When the British prime minister heard the news, he sent immediate instructions off to his negotiators telling them not to sign any deal with Napoleon. (Those negotiations had already collapsed by this point.) Metternich and the Prussian minister on hand agreed to support Louis XVIII. \n\n**Continued**", "created_utc": 1645684188, "distinguished": null, "id": "hy7ivvx", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/szgb7p/perhaps_this_might_be_too_vague_but_im_really/hy7ivvx/", "score": 76 } ]

[ { "body": "Good question! I think to start off the discussion I'd say this falls into the \"similar-but-different\" category-- though both were kings who were executed by their people, the instances were quite differenct, as was the greater context that the event took place within!\n\nI talked about this in relation to a different question, [in this post about how the heads of Europe responded to the execution of the royal family](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/j06vue/how_did_the_monarchs_of_other_countries_react_to/), but I'll respond more specifically to your question here.\n\nThe greatest difference comes down to the European relations that these two countries had at the time: France was at war with the rest of Europe BEFORE the execution of the king, while England's martial battles were *internal* (hence the reason the English Revolution is also referred to nearly as frequently as the English Civil War).\n\nI think it's important to get the timeline very buttoned up here: France was ALREADY at war with Austria and Prussia in 1792, with England joining in shortly thereafter. War-mongering had picked up throughout the Fall of 1791, all of this while Louis was *still on the throne*. Louis wasn't executed until January of 1793, though he had been imprisoned since 10 August, 1792. The heads of Europe were *not* fighting for the safety of the French royal family, and they certainly weren't invading to avenge the king-- remember, war had been declared when Louis was still on the throne. So while the heads of Europe post-facto did throw in language about protecting the royal family (again I'd recommend my [post from a few days ago on that](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/j06vue/how_did_the_monarchs_of_other_countries_react_to/)) it certainly wasn't a war to avenge a fallen monarch.\n\nSo why was France and the \"rest of Europe\" at war before Louis was even dethroned? Well, many reasons, which is why history is the gift that keeps on giving. The main reason I'll touch on is the most relevant to your question, we'll call that \"France exporting her Revolution\"; this is *really* the crux of why England warred within the bounds of Great Britain, while France was at war externally.\n\nFor the revolutionaries of 1789, the Englightenment ideals of \"liberty, equality, fraternity\" were not for Frenchmen alone, *they applied to all men*. This was not idle talk either: revolutionaries such as Mirabeau (in his Memoirs of the Court of Berlin) told the subjects of other \"enslaved\" nations that they could, and should, rise up to overthrow their subjugators. There was a strong sense from the revolutionaries that they were building a new world-- an infectious spirit that bound them together not just nationally, but across borders. In the talks of potential war with Austria there was the idea that the revolution was going to export freedom, and liberate the peoples of other nations.\n\n\"But why was there talk of war to begin with?\" Good question, because the wars were *not* started to export liberty, instead it came down to practical dealings with the *émigrés* and the nations that harboured them, as well as some squabbling on the borders of France... mixed with a healthy dose of that most powerful war catalyst-- hatred.\n\nLet's deal with the *émigrés* first. These were the French who fled the revolution, usually well-to-do nobles, or clergy who refused to take the oath to uphold the constitution above their religion, and headed by the king's brothers. These brothers-- first the comte d'Artois (future Charles X) and then the comte de Provence (future Louis XVIII)-- set up a court in exile starting in 1789 (when the comte d'Artois 'noped' the F out of France right after the fall of the Bastille, *probably* my favorite 'nope'-ing in history). This *émigré* court was not patiently waiting for the revolution to end, they were very aggressivly trying to end it by the tip of their swords. They first settled in Sardinia with the in-laws, but quickly were kicked out and set up shop with the German princes along the Rhine, whose territories bordered France. This leads us into the \"squabbling at the borders of France\" piece of the war mongering, as there was a lot of acrimonious anger over things like new export and import duties that the revolutionaries were implementing to make trade more free within France. So as these German princes are harboring the *émigrés* who are saying to ANY nation that would listen \"hey let's destroy the revolution it sucks pls give us money and weapons and your armies\", you then have the revolutionaries threatening property rights for any *émigré* not willing to come back to France, which affected some of these foreign landholders. Add into that bubbling Coke bottle the Mento that is \"Rampant Austro-phobia\" and you have the explosion of war mongering that erupted in late 1791.\n\nNow it is important to note that there certainly *was* talk about saving the royal family during the course of the war-- this is exemplified by the (in)famous Brunswick Manifesto, which was issued jointly in July 1792 by the Prussians and Austrians which basically said \"Hey losers if you hurt one hair on the royal family's heads we're going to walk in and destroy you\", but the war itself was not waged as a honor mission to save the French royal family, especially not to avenge them since, as established, they were still well on the throne when the war broke out.\n\nFinally I'll toss in the context of the time: Europe was hot off the Seven Years War (and the war of American Independence) where no one was happy with each other. There was a lot of internal fighting within Europe, and that already bellicose atmosphere certainly played a role, providing a nice bed of tinder to make sure the sparks lit up.\n\nSo to sum up, the heads of Europe *didn't* fight France because of the execution of Louis, the war was already well underway by the time he was executed; moreover, the other heads of Europe had a lot to lose by the revolutionary ideal of exporting the revolution, of expanding France to her natural borders. The revolutionaries were bellicose in their rhetoric, and the Austrians absolutely rose to the challenge. The context then was entirely different than the English Revolution (English Civil War) where yes, a monarch was executed, but in a dispute that had a far lesser effect on the rest of the European powers. England was not already at war with any other European nations, she didn't aggressivly pursue an ideology of change that should take effect throughout Europe; France on the other hand *was* already at war, and did intend to take this struggle outside her borders.\n\nI'm certain there will be questions; areas I didn't cover well enough. It's a complex subject as these things usually are, but hopefully I painted a good enough picture to answer your question. Please let me know if there are questions-- gaps in the painting as it were-- and I'd be happy to help fill them in!\n\n​\n\nParting Fun Fact: Louis XVI requested his copy of David Hume's *History of England* when he was imprisoned after the Insurrection of August 10 so that he could read about Charles's execution, the other King who had been executed by his own people, and whom he felt he could identify with. It's fun to compare the two kings, whose fates were so similar, and yet were executed for SUCH different reasons. On the most basic level, Louis was incredibly indecisive, a willow in the winds that would blow whichever way his ministers/courtiers/people blew him. He had no follow through, no backbone. In this Charles was almost his exact opposite-- Charles was incredibly stubborn, and dug in his heels even when almost everyone was screaming in his ear \"*Charlie that idea is awful, do NOT bring the Book of Common Prayer into Scottish churches dude!*\" He was SO *in*flexible, he forced the opposition into extreme positions at every turn. I like to think that there is some sort of afterlife, and Louis and Charles are floating around Andromeda or something idk and can talk about the irony in their executions for nearly opposite personalities.", "created_utc": 1601433422, "distinguished": null, "id": "g74u4r3", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/j1xyuj/why_is_it_that_when_louis_xvi_was_executed_other/g74u4r3/", "score": 199 }, { "body": "My answer is too long for Reddit, so I'm splitting into two comments. \n\nThe big difference at issue was scope. \n\nIn England during the 1640s, what got everyone riled up was Charles meddling in religious affairs, and some, creative, interpretations of his powers as king. I'll deal with the second one first. So, regarding the powers of the king, it is important to first note that, although England was an absolute monarchy at the time, a big power that Charles lacked was that of taxation. Only Parliament could levy taxes. (It is also important to note that there weren't any fixed term parliaments back in the day. Instead, they only met when called by the king, a function coming from Parliament's evolution out of medieval great councils.) When previous parliaments had met, they had acted as almost a de facto rubber stamp for whatever the king had asked for, although they often took the opportunity to air their grievances regarding the king at the same time. What is important though is that, regardless of their issues with him, parliaments normally gave the king what he asked for. Another tradition regarding parliament was that, when a new king ascended, parliaments traditionally voted him 'Tonnage and Poundage' for life, which were effectively import and export tariffs on all goods at set rates for the life of the king. These were intended to pay for the standard operation of the kingdom, so if parliament was getting called again during the king's reign, something important must be happening. \n\nEverything changed when the Fire Nation attacked. Charles I was of the House of Stuart, and Charles' father King James I had been King of Scotland before ascending to the English throne following the death of Elizabeth I. This presented two issues; the first being that, although having technically converted to Anglicanism upon ascending, the House of Stuart was widely considered (most likely rightly so) to still hold Catholic sympathies, with some going so far as to call them 'crypto-Catholics.' This Catholic leaning didn't sit well with the Anglicans, nor the more radical Protestant sects appearing in England at the time, notably Quakers, Puritans, and in Scotland, Presbyterians. [I don't mean to imply these factions didn't exist prior to the reign of King Charles.] The second issue was that Scotland had been a much more thoroughly absolute monarchy than England, in that taxation for Scotland was the prerogative of the king. When Charles first ascended, Parliament declined to grant him tonnage and poundage for life, rather only granting it for three years. Moreover, they insisted that Charles not only listen to their complaints, but swear to act on them. Charles responded by ending the parliamentary session, and governing 'in personal rule' from 1625 - 1640, meaning during this period no parliaments were called. This raised the issue of finances though, because without taxes or tonnage and poundage, Charles had no source of income to finance royal activities. However, Charles could levy fines and fees without parliamentary approval, the difference of note being that taxes are a regular occurrence each year, whereas fine and fees were understood to be one time events. One fee of note is 'Ship Money,' a medieval doctrine which allowed the king to demand a ship, or the money to purchase a ship, in cases of national emergency. This was permitted because it was meant to be invoked in situations of national emergency, such as an imminent invasion by France, Spain, etc., meaning there would be no time to call a parliament. However, what actually constituted a national emergency was solely within the king's authority to decide. This led Charles to just declare a national emergency and demand the funds, which he also levied from the inland counties. Whether he was taking a more enlightened view of the national interest, as if the coastal counties couldn't repel the invasion, the inland counties would be in trouble, or not, the issue was that it was evident there was no national emergency. Charles was acting within the letter of the law, but not the spirit. Now, the first year it was levied, there was grumbling, but there wasn't too much opposition. The next year though, Charles again declared a national emergency, and again demanded Ship Money. However, this was the second year, which meant it was now a regular thing, which meant it was considered as a tax, which Charles could not legitimately levy. This led a well known former MP John Hampden to publicly refuse payment on this argument. Charles had him arrested, and at trial, Hampden was found guilty. The rationale of the court, which ruled 7 - 5 in favor of Charles, was that regardless of regularity, Ship Money only required a national emergency, which the king could declare by himself. While Charles was technically correct on the law, he was violating the spirit of the law. Charles' actions were technically lawful, yet England at the time already had what is known as an unwritten constitution. Charles did have the authority to act as he did, but he was far from winning any popularity contests amongst his middle and upper class subjects. [I say this primarily because it is far harder to know what the lower classes were thinking, given the lack of available source material as compared to more middle class merchants and upper class landowners]\n\nSo, to tell the story properly, I need to do the religious issues here, and then go back to the creative interpretations of things. Charles had a degree of reverence for a single religion within all his territories. I'm going to ignore Ireland here given that they won't enter the Civil War fully until after it begins, but for Scotland, churches there used 'The Book of Common Order,' which, while similar' was different from 'The Book of Common Prayer,' which was the text used in England. Charles ordered that Scotland switch to the Book of Common Prayer, which prompted riots, and then a full military revolt. \n\nThis left Charles in a bind. He needed to put down the revolt in Scotland, but, even with everything else he had done, he lacked the funds to raise an army to go to Scotland. This prompted Charles, in 1640, to call the first parliament since 1625. After 15 years of watching the above, in short, they were not thrilled with him, and this sentiment was only exacerbated after Charles demanded they vote him funds and then disband. Several parliamentarians led calls against this, leading Charles to personally enter the House of Commons with a small band of soldiers.\n\nAlthough the MPs he sought to arrest fled before Charles arrived, entering the House was, symbolically, the straw that broke Charles' back. English monarchs never set foot in the House, let alone meddled in parliamentary affairs. That Charles not only violated parliamentary sovereignty by entering, but also by seeking to arrest its members, led many MPs already inclined against Charles to brand him as a tyrant. At this point the Civil War begins.\n\nI will apologize in advance for how quickly I deal with France. My research regarding this issue has primarily been surrounding England, so my explanation of France will be comparatively brief. Getting into France, the lead up to the Revolution had two primary classes of causes, economic and philosophic. Dealing with the economic first, remember that France in 1789 is only a few years removed from the Seven Years War, in which France lost the majority of its North American colonies, such as Quebec, to the British, but also incurred a massive war debt. France at the time was divided into three estates, the clergy, who were exempt from tax, nobles, who were de facto exempt from tax, and everyone else, who all paid taxes. This war debt fell largely on the Third Estate. Moreover, while France was, like England before it, an absolute monarchy, French kings from time to time called an Estates General, which functioned somewhat like Parliament, except that it was really an advisory board to the king, rather than having any power in its own right as Parliament did. Now, the Estates General were far less common than Parliaments, having met last before 1789 in 1614. However, the more common Council of Nobles had failed to deliver on any meaningful economic reform to deal with France's debt which, combined with a grain shortage stemming from several poor harvests, had left France in a very poor state financially. One of King Louis XVI's ministers convinces him to hold an Estates General to attempt to bypass the nobility's objections to his proposed reforms. The issue with the Estates General though, was that each estate had a single vote on the matter at hand. Between the two of them, the First and Second Estates totaled around 10% of the population, but had two out the three votes. [That the Third Estate was often overruled despite being roughly 90% of the population was a major argument against calling the Estates General] Once the Estates General was called though, many Third Estate representatives, admittedly many of them middle class merchants or minor landowners, were confronted with opposition to any reform by the First and Second Estates, including a proposal to reorganize the Estates to make them more democratic, but, more importantly, to break the hold of the First and Second Estates over national politics. The First and Second Estates were not exactly pleased with the idea of surrendering any power, which prompted an impasse.", "created_utc": 1601436945, "distinguished": null, "id": "g750er1", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/j1xyuj/why_is_it_that_when_louis_xvi_was_executed_other/g750er1/", "score": 18 } ]

[ { "body": "In English, a volume of [Short Oxford History of France series](https://global.oup.com/academic/content/series/s/short-oxford-history-of-france-sohf/) is perhaps not the best, but decent start point of the overview of the period dealt in the title, such as: \n\n* [Potter, David (ed.). *France in the Later Middle Ages 1200-1500*. Oxford: OUP, 2003.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/france-in-the-later-middle-ages-1200-1500-9780199250486?)\n* [Holt, Mack P. (ed.). *Renaissance and Reformation France 1500-1648.* Oxford: OUP, 2002.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/renaissance-and-reformation-france-9780198731658?)\n\nAs for the period prior to 1500, books on medieval France is usually categorized under medieval Europe in general, not classified by individual regions as book list in the early modern and after section does. To give an example, you'll find entries of *Blood Royal* by Eric Jager ~~(the original work of the recent namesake movie)~~ and *Paris, 1200* by John W. Baldwin (2010) in medieval Book list. \n\nIn addition to these two books, I'd also recommend [Sharon Farmer, *Surviving Poverty in Medieval Paris\nGender, Ideology, and the Daily Lives of the Poor*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2001 (paperback (linked), 2005)](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801472695/surviving-poverty-in-medieval-paris/) for medieval social history of Paris. \n\nAlbigensian Crusade and the Cathars in the 13th century southern France is another big research topic and we have formidable amount of recent scholarship both in English and in French. You can see some of the recommended readings on them in [the question tree ](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/oxs65d/short_answers_to_simple_questions_august_04_2021/h7qh98i/) answered by /u/WelfOnTheShelf, with a very brief complement also by me. \n\n+++ \n\nOn the other hand, Early Modern Period is primarily out of my narrow specialty, but I can at least list some names to be noted, such as David Parrott and Mark Greengrass. \n\n* Greengrass, Mark. *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2015 (London: Allan Lane, 2014): He had also authored [*France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability*, 2nd ed. (1995)](https://www.routledge.com/France-in-the-Age-of-Henri-IV-The-Struggle-for-Stability/Greengrass/p/book/9780582087217). \n* Parrott, David. *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005 (2001). \n\n+++ \n\n>do I have to learn French?\n\nIf you are affiliated with the university with good library, (former) Wiley-Blackwell published volumes of A History of France series, originally written by French historians and translated into English. They at least primarily reflect the state of research in France by the last decades of the 20th century (Note: they are now very expensive, even in paperback): \n\n* [Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel. *The Royal French State, 1460-1610*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Royal+French+State%2C+1460+1610-p-9780631170273). \n* [________. *The Ancien Regime: A History of France 1610-1774*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Ancien+Regime%3A+A+History+of+France+1610+1774-p-9780631211969).", "created_utc": 1644393817, "distinguished": null, "id": "hw77rov", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/so6ozf/any_good_books_on_french_history_before_the/hw77rov/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "This is a really interesting, albeit quite politically charged topic. I will start by addressing each of the claims.\n\n \n> The Revolutionary Tribunal was not a show-trial. The outcome of trials was not predetermined and only around 60% of those accused were found guilty.\n \nThe actual statistic is 64% of the people tried were executed. 32% were acquitted. The rest received prison sentences, or similar punishments. So this affirmation is fairly accurate. These numbers are however averaged out. In reality, the executions were not evenly spread throughout the years of the revolution. In Messidor (June/July) of 1794, at the height of the Terror, 1005 trials were conducted, and of those, 79% were guillotine sentences. This is why the Terror was seen as an acceleration of violence, and the trials were believed to be getting less and less lenient as time went by. Generally, the condemned were 20% aristocrats and clergy, so they were overrepresented compared to the national distribution. \n(See: Liste des victimes du Tribunal révolutionnaire à Paris, 1911.; Gresle François. Tulard Jean, Fayard Jean-François, Fierro Alfred, Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française.. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1989, 30-3-4). \n\n> Georges Danton actually was guilty of co-operation with the British government, based on some British primary sources. \n\nOne important piece of evidence in the Danton trial was a letter from the banker Perregeaux, in which it was alleged that Danton, alongside others, had received a bribe, with the intent of “pushing the jacobins to the paroxysm of fury”. The idea the Danton “deserved” the sentence, as is implied by Žižek here, is outside of the scope of history, but there is some evidence that the bribe did in fact exist. \n(See: A. Mathiez, Le banquier Perregaux, Annales révolutionnaires 1919, pp. 242-243. See also Danton et l’Or Anglais by the same author). \n\n> The royal family was actively plotting with the enemies of France to overthrow the revolutionary French government. \n\nThis one is not very controversial. If nothing else, the \"fuite de Varennes\" of 1791, during which the King attempted to escape Paris to join Royal sympathisers, was made for the explicit purpose of restoring the monarchy. \n(see: André Castelot, Le rendez-vous de Varennes, 1971, librairie académique Perrin.) \n\n> After the Thermidorian reaction, the resulting white terror was just as bloody as the revolutionary terror, and the victims were far more likely to be from amongst \"ordinary, low people.\" \n\nThe \"White terror\" of 1795, killed around 2000 people (only slightly less than the 2585 who underwent guillotine executions). The most significant massacres took place in the prisons of Lyon and Marseille. The violence was targeted against former revolutionaries, but in a rather loose way. Some people were killed by association too, if they had been friends or relatives of one of the accused. Those killings were characterised by a high level of violence, and a form of ritualisation. The bodies would be often mutilated, thrown from high structures, or in rivers. The perpetrators of the violence were not prosecuted with much force, which some scholars argue, encouraged further violence. \nAs for the “ordinariness” of the killed, according to Clay in his paper on the subject “Victims and executioners belonged generally to the same socio-economic backgrounds.” The majority of both were in the class of artisans. \n(see: Stephen Clay, « Justice, vengeance et passé révolutionnaire : les crimes de la Terreur blanche », Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 350 | 2007, 109-133. \nJean-Clément Martin, La Terreur, part maudite de la Révolution, Gallimard. Et: Contre-Révolution, Révolution et Nation en France. 1789-1799, éditions du Seuil, 1998.) \n\n> Robespierre and Saint-Just were not dictators. They were aware of the threat of personal dictatorship (of the emergence of a popular strongman, like ultimately happened with Napoleon) and consciously refused to go down that path. They were committed to republicanism and instead of simply eliminating all opposition through terror, they thought that they could defend their government with passionate speeches in the National Convention - a naivety which actually contributed to their downfall. \n\nThis one is quite difficult to answer succinctly, because it is more political than empirical in nature, so I will only give a few indications. When Žižek states that Robespierre believed he could defend a government with nothing but speeches, and that he was a “moderate”, that's an exaggeration. Within the political categories of the time, he was not a moderate, he was unambiguously Montagnard, which was a radical faction. If speeches were enough, there would have been no need for a Tribunal to “punish the enemies of the people”. Žižek’s argument makes an appeal to Robespierre's psychology (with the anecdote of him walking and rehearsing his speech, \"thinking\" about how to improve it), which is a difficult claim to prove. The same can be said for the claim that he and Saint Just predicted Napoleon’s rise to power. Whether they accurately guessed that the next regime was going to be worse than them or not, this says very little regarding the factual conduct of Robespierre as a leader. \nTo summarise, there is a part of the literature that states that Robespierre acted in ways similar to a dictatorship (See: Soboul Albert. Problèmes de la dictature révolutionnaire (1789-1796) . In: Annales historiques de la Révolution française, n°251, 1983. pp. 1-13.) Other parts of the literature argue that this is a conservative or anachronistic view. (See: Boulant Antoine, Le tribunal révolutionnaire. Punir les ennemis du peuple. Perrin, « Hors collection », 2018, 300 pages.). \n\n\nOverall, whether Žižek’s empirical claims are true or not (and a number of them are), the question remains of whether these facts are representative of the history of the French Revolution, and whether they support the wider point Žižek tries to make, regarding whether or not the Terror has been judged too harshly. To this, I will simply say, as a French scholar and as an eighteenth-century historian, that the history of the Revolution is a very delicate, controversial, and nationally important subject. This means that literature on the subject is often written in a conversation with present issues, and not simply as a way to better understand the past. The subject is also very heavily studied, from almost all possible angles. Lefebvre said as early as 1932 “Two books on Danton. Is he fashionable again? A few years ago, \\[the historiography\\] was more oriented towards Robespierre”. (See: Boisson Jean-François. Danton : Réflexions sur une histoire interminable. In: Raison présente, n°74, 2e trimestre 1985. École - Société. pp. 93-111.) \nThis means that rehabilitating, and then condemning, and then re-re-habilitating the Revolution, the Terror, Robespierre or the Vendéens, according to political agendas, is a staple of this literature. In fact, most books that touch on the Revolution or some of its central figures start by a prologue either stating “everyone says the Terror is bad, but in fact….” Or “these days everyone says that the Terror was good somehow? But in fact…”. To finish in the words of Christian Legault: “If we have stopped to approach these men for political reasons - either to respond to other institutional discourses or to keep the historical discipline “protected from ideological debate” - on the other hand, voluntarily setting them aside also arises from political motivation.” \n(See: Michel Biard et Hervé Leuwers (dir.), Danton. Le mythe et l’Histoire, Paris, Armand Colin, 2016, 240 p. Review by Christian Legault.)", "created_utc": 1626738829, "distinguished": null, "id": "h5tcri5", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/onhimb/how_accurate_is_slavoj_žižeks_recent_defense_of/h5tcri5/", "score": 206 } ]

[ { "body": "Claude Manceron was a very popular writer of popular history books in France, from the 1950s to his death in 1999. He died before he could finish his Revolution series, which is why it stops before the Revolution. Manceron was not an academic historian, but he was serious in his work and his books were very successful. A prominent left-winger with a big bushy beard, he was also a well-known figure on TV and involved in politics with socialist president François Mitterrand. \n\nLike other popular historians, Manceron tended to focus on \"big\" stuff loved by the public (in his case Napoléon, the Revolution etc.), though his mini-biographical approach in the Revolution series (which did not deal only with the big names) was certainly original. His books are written in a \"novelistic\" style, with imagined conversations, internal thoughts, and actions that make the scenes movie-like. I'm not familiar with his work, but from the little I can read, it seems that there's a lot of padding. This is not a bad thing per se (it makes the books read like fiction and perfectly enjoyable) but it's not easy to tell were the document-derived \"truth\" stops and the novelist's imagination begins.\n\nWe can have a glimpse of how Manceron was received by the French historical community: in March 1980, the magazine *L'Histoire*, a pop history magazine run by academic historians, published a series of interviews under the provocative title \"Should we burn Claude Manceron?\". Manceron was interviewed, and four prominent academic historians were asked to give their opinion of his work. Here's how it went:\n\n**Fernand Braudel**\n\nThough Braudel was the leader of the Annales School at the time, and thus normally unreceptive to the sort of character- and anecdote-driven history written by Manceron, he was absolutely enthusiastic about him. He admired Manceron's erudition, the way he managed to capture the \"movement\" of history using the lives of known but also less known or even obscure characters, and his \"television\" and cinematic style (not a negative comparison here). \n\n> Choosing the heroes that the Revolution will promote to the forefront of its spectacular events and presenting them before fate brought them out of the shadows, is a way of getting lost in the obscure history of the whole world, the history towards which, by different paths, all current historiography tends.\n\nBraudel, an historian of the long trends, only criticized the short-term approach (\"the little spoons of time\") of the books. Still, he thought that Manceron's public success was well deserved. To some, Braudel's praise of Manceron meant that the \"individual\" was allowed to make a come back in historiography (Dosse et al., 2005).\n\n**Jean-Paul Bertaud**\n\nBertaud, a historian specialist of the Revolution of of the Napoleonic Empire, also appreciated Manceron's epic writing style that took the reader, like a \"tourist in awe\", from the King's apartments in Versailles to the battlefields in America and the open markets of the French countryside. He agreed to consider Manceron as a \"great historical painter\". However, he criticized a certain lack of problematization for such a disputed topic - the causes of the French Revolution. Bertaud was less happy than Braudel about Manceron's choice of characters, that he found too focused on \"big men\", on their writings and personal (amusing) stories, ignoring the recent advances of historiography concerning socio-economic groups (Bertaud cited for instance studies on merchant assemblies). For Bertaud, Manceron was also a little oblivious of the rural dimension of the Revolution. He still thought that his books were valuable at at time when the Revolution was little taught in French schools. \n\n\n**Jeffry Kaplow**\n\nKaplow, a France-based American historian specialist of the Revolution, recognized that the books were easy to read and factually accurate, but he basically hated them. He did not approve of Manceron's biographical approach, and, in short, he was very unhappy with the writer's lack of global, society-wide perspective. Too many stories about some great man's mom or sickness, not enough critical examination of the social conditions in France (and elsewhere) at the time of Revolution. He also pointed out serious mistakes, inaccuracies, and oversimplifications. Kaplow did not mince words:\n\n> His books seem to me to contribute to the dumbing down of the general public.\n\n**Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie**\n\nAnother tutelar figure of the Annales School, Le Roy Ladurie was, like Braudel, laudative of the \"captivating\" cinematic flow of the books. He also appreciated the psychological, even \"ethnographical\" aspects of the work. Like Kaplow and Bertaud, however, he was a little taken aback by the global lack of problematization, and by Manceron's apparent ignorance of recent historiography, notably that based on the qualitative and quantitative exploitation of archives. For the next book, would it be too difficult, asked Le Roy Ladurie, for Manceron to consult the latest \"five or six dissertations and some important books\"? He also questioned the fundamentally teleological dimension of the project, with Manceron building a narrative \"marching towards an inevitable end point\" (to quote [an old AH answer](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/26v2kc/what_does_it_mean_when_one_has_a_teleological/) by u/k1990 on that topic) and thus ignoring whatever did not fit into his story. The Revolution happened because it happened. Duh.\n\nThis was written 40 years ago, but I guess that these judgements are still valid. Manceron was a great writer of popular history who did his homework well (his bibliography is large and impressive) and got the dates, facts, and events right. He was in the business of writing exciting, correct, character-based narratives, and his books are still appreciated for that. He got a little defensive in his own interview, explaining that he tried to enlarge his focus to disadvantaged groups (peasants, workers, etc.) - he was a left-winger after all! - but that his research was hampered by the lack of (memoir-type) sources (\"most of the people of actually made the Revolution were illiterate\"), but in doing so he recognized implicitly that he was not aware of recent historiography, and this is certainly even more true today.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* ‘Faut-il brûler Claude Manceron ?’ L’Histoire, no. 21 (March 1980). https://www.lhistoire.fr/faut-il-brûler-claude-manceron. (paywalled)\n* Dosse, François, Patrick Garcia, and Christian Delacroix. Les courants historiques en France: 19e-20e siècle. Armand Colin, 2005. https://books.google.fr/books?id=wHqdAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT214.", "created_utc": 1652117893, "distinguished": null, "id": "i7y15q0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ulht56/any_thoughts_on_the_age_of_the_french_revolution/i7y15q0/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "If you're after an approachable summary that isn't overwhelmingly long, I would thoroughly recommend Christopher Hibbert's 'The French Revolution'. Novel-like and roughly 300 pages, it's a great way to dip one's toes into the murky waters of the French Revolution. \n\n\nAfter that:\n\n* Peter McPhee's 'Liberty or Death' is a great read and will offer a modern perspective of the revolution. Well-researched and thorough, McPhee is at times more sympathetic to the revolutionaries and the challenges they faced compared to some older, more conservative historians.\n* Timothy Tackett's 'The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution' is fantastic, but best read after you have a solid foundation. Tackett does a great job of unpacking the very human influences and components of the revolution (e.g. fear, mistrust etc.)", "created_utc": 1641911939, "distinguished": null, "id": "hs7lptc", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/s1bns2/does_anyone_have_any_recommendations_for_good/hs7lptc/", "score": 12 } ]

[ { "body": "/u/myskinsredditacct and /u/amp1212 have previously answered [Was the French Revolution a net positive for the peasantry?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/gqghby/was_the_french_revolution_a_net_positive_for_the/)", "created_utc": 1639378554, "distinguished": null, "id": "hocox6l", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/rezklr/how_did_the_french_revolution_affect_the_lives_of/hocox6l/", "score": 2 } ]

[ { "body": "If you believe R.R. Palmer, then the University of Paris (or, more correctly, its constituent colleges) had stopped functioning before this decree was made. The *levée en masse*, he argues, had a 'ruinous and final' impact on the colleges, as it essentialised mobilised the entire country to the war machine and thus took away many of the people who made the institutions work.\n\nThe decree, then, was more of an acknowledgement that the University just kind of stopped existing, rather than any formal move to be rid of it. That said, Adrian O'Connor has highlighted the fact that institutions like the University had been criticised for several decades prior to this 'abolition'. They, he says, were perceived by many as part of the *ancien régime* and thus stuck in the past. Though some people tried to defend them and advocated for keeping and reforming them, there was a real attitude for total overhaul that existed, to make education more accessible and more meritocratic (in line with a whole host of the revolutionary reforms).\n\nI'm not sure exactly why it took so long for another similar institution to be established in Paris, though it was probably to do with the temporal context. 1793 was the start of a period of almost ten straight years of war for France, during which time it dealt with being constantly low on funds, and threats to the survival of its successive governments from within and without. I should imagine that that meant that education was fairly low on the list of priorities, until things stabilised a bit after Napoleon took power.\n\nI'm not an expert on mid-to-late 18th century French education, but I have found some books (including the ones I mentioned) that you might find interesting if you want to learn about it:\n\nBarnard, H.C., *Education and the French Revolution* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).\n\nMarty, Olivier & Ray J. Amirault, *Nicolas de Condorcet: The Revolution of French Higher Education* (Cham: Springer, 2020).\n\nO'Connor, Adrian, *In pursuit of politics: Education and revolution in eighteenth-century France* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).\n\nPalmer, R.R. (ed. and trans.), *The School of the French Revolution: A Documentary History of the College of Louis-le-Grand and its Director, Jean-Francois Champagne, 1762-1814* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).", "created_utc": 1637957759, "distinguished": null, "id": "hm6xb2g", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/r2qzs8/why_did_the_revolutionaries_in_the_french/hm6xb2g/", "score": 8 } ]

[ { "body": "In [response](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/4nay2m/ama_hamilton_and_his_time_the_stories_behind_the/d42qtpj/?context=3) to a now-deleted question in the first *Hamilton* AMA five years ago, u/Jordan42 said:\n\n>...by the time that Hamilton and others were debating this, Lafayette had already fallen from a position of significance in the revolutionary leadership and had been imprisoned. It was by no means clear that joining France in war would be a repayment to Lafayette or for France's aid in the American revolutionary war. \n\nThe whole answer is worth reading.", "created_utc": 1633913720, "distinguished": null, "id": "hg691ro", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/q5iv83/how_did_lafayette_feel_about_america_refusing_to/hg691ro/", "score": 25 } ]

[ { "body": "So, I didn't get any recommendations, but I found these posts here to be useful: \n\n[Most engaging/accessible history books about the French Revolution?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/ogvjat/most_engagingaccessible_history_books_about_the/)\n\n[What's the French Revolution all about?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/jpphpq/whats_the_french_revolution_all_about/gbghvhn/?context=3) (Historiography of the French Revolution for the past 200 years)\n\nAlso, the mods' recommendations for [The French Revolution & The Napoleonic Wars](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/books/europe#wiki_the_french_revolution_.26amp.3B_the_napoleonic_wars)", "created_utc": 1633097898, "distinguished": null, "id": "hez7mh6", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/pxavpx/historically_robust_overview_of_french_revolution/hez7mh6/", "score": 1 }, { "body": "Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/).\n\n#Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/pxavpx/historically_robust_overview_of_french_revolution/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. Additionally, for weekly content summaries, **[Click Here to Subscribe to our Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=AHMessengerBot&subject=Subscribe&message=!subscribe)**.\n\nWe thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written!\n\n\n*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*", "created_utc": 1632848731, "distinguished": "moderator", "id": "hem7e56", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/pxavpx/historically_robust_overview_of_french_revolution/hem7e56/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "Some context first. In the XVIIIth century, the Church had enormous political influence in France. Almost the entire population was catholic and, most importantly, the majority (around 80%) of it was living in rural areas. For this part of the population, the local priest was extremely important, and not only for spiritual matters; it was generally him who provided what education the peasants' children received, it was generally around him that rural dwellers who tended to live relatively isolated gathered every Sunday. He was a key component of rural society and could influence the inhabitants of his parish in political matters as well as spiritual ones, though this could vary depending on the region. In the region around Paris or in Provence, the degree of attachment to the Church was generally lesser than in Brittany for example, though keep in mind that in the end it always came to a personal opinion, which means that no generalisation can be made with too much certainty.\n\nWhen the Revolution broke out, the desire to reform the Church was strong, for several reasons. First, its members, the clergymen, were among the privileged ones who were living off taxes and obligations imposed on the peasants, notably the tithe; however it was far from the only one, as the Church as a whole (meaning abbeys, bishoprics) possessed around 8% of the kingdom's lands, and in these land lived people who could be taxed by clergymen in other ways, sometimes in kind (pieces of harvest, unpaid labor, etc).\n\nThere was also widespread criticism of the luxury in which the high clergy lived, notably from the lower clergy, a good portion of which often lived in conditions similar to that of the peasants. Other internal disputes focused on theological or even political matters; one particularly important doctrine that was on the rise in this period was gallicanism, the idea that France should have its own national church, though even the proponents of gallicanism rarely envisioned a full break away from Rome and remained attached to catholicism. Of course, the Revolution and the burning nationalism it brought gave new momentum to gallicanism. Another reason pushing the Constituant Assembly to reform the Church was the somewhat common idea that the Church was spreading obscurantism and superstition in the population, and that as such it was in its present state incompatible with the new enlightened world the Revolutionaries were creating. This feeling was confirmed in many minds by the high proportion of clergymen (like the Abbé Maury, one of the most notable anti-revolution members of the Assembly) within the most reactionary part of the assembly.\n\nIt was thus decided to write a constitution for the clergy : it would not bring any significant changes to the rites or to theology, however it would bring major political upheaval, as it declared the abolition of regular clergy (monastic orders were dissolved) and clergymen to be employees of the state, who would receive a salary from it, and swear an oath to the national constitution. At first it can seem like not much, but the key part was the oath thing. For many clergymen, the only oath they could take was the one they had with God; pledging another would be betrayal. Furthermore, rejecting the oath was a way of manifesting one's opposition to the Revolution more generally, and as Pope Pius the sixth began to condemn the civil constitution and the Revolution in general, a full blown schism progressively developed, with around half of the clergy taking the oath (that's the constitutional clergy), the other half refused (that's the refractory clergy). Those who belonged to the latter were stripped of their offices and replaced with priests who belonged to the former. This created enormous tensions all across France, as millions of people suddenly saw the priest of their parish fired, with someone else, sometimes from a different region, standing in his place. It is key to note that each territory saw a different proportion of priests accepting or refusing the Constitution.[Here](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Carte_des_pr%C3%AAtres_asserment%C3%A9s_en_France_en_1791.svg) is a map that depicts these proportions : the brighter it is, the less numerous the were to take the oaths. As you can see, it was acceptable for some; for others, it was not, especially when the refractory priests were popular, or when they began to denounce theirs colleagues as \"false priests\", or even traitors.\n\nCombined with the other issues that were haunting the country (like the inequal way in which the lands confiscated to the Church had been redistributed through auction sale and in some places largely acquired by rich urban dwellers rather than by peasants, or the fact that several feudal taxes and obligations were in fact still legally implemented), the religious rift created enormous tensions all across France. Counterevolutionaries were outraged by what they perceived as an attack on the Saint Church, while revolutionaries were angered by the refusal of the refracory priests to consider nationhood to be as important as God, often suspecting them of spreading counterrevolutionary ideas. For the former, those who had refused the oath were righteous men who remained loyal to God, the Church and generally the King as well, while those who had taken the oath were dubbed \"juror priests\" and deemed as heretics, especially since they supported a Revolution which had granted equal rights to Jewish and protestant communities of France, something woefully unacceptable for the most conservative. For the revolutionaries, those who took the oath were good priests, dedicated to freedom and the nation, while the refractory clergy was seen with increasing suspicion, and eventually as a hatred bunch of traitors working hand to hand with the tyrants of Europe (currently at war against France) and manipulating the peasants into revolting to overthrow the Republic. In early 1792, the legislative assembly voted to incarcerate them, a decision which was promptly veto-ed by the King : the religious schism was now a national division that opposed the King to the Assembly. The former lost popularity as a result and was finally overthrown in the summer. From then on, nothing could stop the government from attacking the refractory clergy, which in turn fully embraced counter-Revolution.\n\nThis was nowhere clearer than in [Vendée](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vend%C3%A9e_(d%C3%A9partement)#/media/Fichier:Vend%C3%A9e-Position.svg) : there, the clergy had overwhelmingly rejected the oath, and had thus been ousted in favor of unpopular \"juror priests\"; the inhabitants of the nearby cities like Nantes had been almost alone in benefitting from the auction sale of confiscated Church lands and were way more supportive of the Revolution than the countryside, who often tormented their new priests in more or less violent ways. When full blown civil war broke out in 1793, refractory priests were always accompanying the rebels, who inevitably demanded freedom of worshipping with them and no one else when negotiations took place with the republican forces. Lazare Hoche, a republican general who was appointed as *de facto* dictator of the western regions to deal with the rebellion in 1795, managed to discourage the rebels by granting them such freedom if they renounced to fight, among other things. The Civil Constitution of Clergy was without a doubt one of the most (if not the most) divisive issues of the entire Revolution.\n\nSources :\n\nTimothy Tackett, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution* (2015)\n\nJean-Clément Martin, *Nouvelle Historie de la Révolution Française* (2012)", "created_utc": 1630007056, "distinguished": null, "id": "hagqpzj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/pc0hkc/why_is_the_civil_constitution_of_the_clergy/hagqpzj/", "score": 5 } ]

[ { "body": "Lefebvre published his book in the 1930s, and it deals with one of the most historiographically active topics any historian can engage with, so it would be pretty astonishing if it was still considered essentially up-to-date. Nonetheless, there are still substantial reasons or considering Lefebvre's work vitally important, and the book itself a useful one. Opinions differ, naturally, but when I published a short book on this work a few years ago, the author, Tom Stammers of Durham University, was of the opinion it still ranks as one of the best, if not the best, books on the Revolution. Stammers's take was as follows – excerpted from his *An Analysis of Georges Lefebvre's* The Coming of the French Revolution *(2017)*:\n\n>*The Coming of the French Revolution* asks a simple question: why did the strongest monarchy on the European continent collapse so dramatically in 1789? Lefebvre’s work matters because it helps the reader to understand the social and economic issues that led to the revolution. It also pushes readers to think about the way ideas and psychology affect behavior. In that way, it underlines a number of motives, people, and pressures that came together in unexpected ways to bring about the revolution. \n> \n>The book gives a clear description of the events of 1789. It helps readers understand how an event that had seemed unthinkable actually came to pass. It also provides a powerful account of what the French Revolution meant for contemporaries and later generations. Even today in France the attitude a person has towards the revolution defines many of their political beliefs. Lefebvre’s book provides a classic socialist account of why the revolution was a profound historical turning point, not only for France, but for all humanity. It is important to note that Lefebvre’s arguments had someweaknesses. The work was a product of its time, written under the influence of Marxist ideas and with the aim of defending France’s republican political system on the brink of World War II. Later scholars who looked back at what had happened disagreed with the description Lefebvre gives of the four distinct social classes (the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the urban workers, and the peasants). Lefebvre’s work sparked a debate about continuity and change, suggesting that 1789 marked the start of the modern world by ending feudalism and bringing in capitalism (today, the dominant economic and social model in the Western world). Other scholars from the 1950s and 1960s said this was a simplistic view; capitalism was a force in French society before the revolution, they argued, and what was more, the nobility had already given up many of theirpowers before 1789. \n> \n>According to the French historian François Furet, the French Revolution mainly transformed how people thought about politics rather than transforming social structures. The disputes between Lefebvre, his pupils, and his critics were heavily influenced by the Cold War (a period when tensions ran high between the United States and the Soviet Union,and the nations aligned to each country, between 1945 and 1991). Reading Lefebvre encourages the reader to think critically about the way long-term, medium-term, and short-term factors influence world events, and how historiography has developed against changing political contexts... \n> \n>*The Coming of the French Revolution* remains an indispensable book about the French Revolution. The shrewd balance of detailed historical evidence and passionate personal commitment from its author shows not just why the French Revolution broke out, but why it still matters two centuries later. The appeal of Lefebvre’s account came from his interest in the large number of factors that led to the revolution, taking into account the actions of the masses as well as the actions of the elite. The complex notion of four interconnected but independent revolutions happening at the same time explained why even the men who thought they were its leaders in 1789 soon found events spinning out of their control. Even revisionist historians who disagreed with Lefebvre, such as William Doyle, acknowledged that *The Coming of the French Revolution* was “subtle and skillfully written,” and could not be easily summarized: “To appreciate its full flavor there is no substitute for reading the book itself.” Those aspects of Lefebvre’s ideas about class relations that were considered less convincing came under heavy attack from revisionists in the 1960s and 1970s. However, Lefebvre’s emphasis on the way that political, ideological, and economic factors all came together to ignite popular protest was still inspirational. His work will continue to invite further research. *The Coming of the French Revolution* is also an idealistic book. In recent years historians have focused on the dark side of the revolutionaries, their intolerance towards perceived enemies such as traitorous aristocrats, renegade priests, conquered populations, colonial slaves or even “irrational” women. Writing at a time when the French Republic’s founding values were in danger—the German occupation of World War II—Lefebvre chose to celebrate the achievements of 1789. He believed that by teaching his fellow citizens the origins of the French Revolution, and what it was fighting against, he could also help people in the future to achieve some of its unfulfilled aspirations.", "created_utc": 1640202711, "distinguished": null, "id": "hplg1d5", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/rm5uzg/is_georges_lefebvres_the_coming_of_the_french/hplg1d5/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "Alright so I think we need to tackle some misconceptions in your question before we get to Napoleon. \n\nFirst off, in your title, you say that \"one of the reasons why the French Revolution happened was to end the French Oligarchy\". As with most things in history, it's a bit more complicated than that. I don't think most historians would feel comfortable agreeing with that statement, because there was not a sentiment at the beginning of the Revolution that anyone wished to 'end the oligarchy/aristocracy'. More than anything, what there was a push for was a more equitable financial burden. The nobility did not pay many of the taxes that was required of the commoners, and on top of that many peasants and landholders owed seigniorial dues to their noble landlord, as well as a hefty tithe to the Catholic Church. Pre-revolutionary France was an extremely complicated mixture of different taxes on different commodities that differed from province to province. What most Third Estate (i.e. non-noble or clerical) peoples of France called for before the Revolution was for the nobles to pay their fair share, and be taxed like the rest of the populace. There was absolutely not a popular call for abolishing the nobility outright, nor was there any calls to open up the government to the people (i.e. any insinuation that they wanted to abolish the monarchy). \n\nNow on the other hand, there were many educated middle to upper middle class men who saw their progress halted because they were not of the nobility, and therefore entry to many of the governmental jobs was either blocked off to them, or the system of nepotism and favors dolled out to noble families meant that they were always superseded. These men, who absolutely comprised the Third Estate deputies in the Estates General, *did* believe the gov't needed to trend more towards a meritocracy than one based mostly upon privilege. However here again, these men were often most disgruntled at how poorly the aristocracy treated them, and wanted to be accepted by them, rather than calling outright for the abolition of the aristocracy. \n\nLastly there were the liberal nobles who thought that the monarchy shouldn't be so absolutist, and thought that a well-run France would be modeled after a Montesquieu-esqu structure where the nobility comprised a counterweight to the King. Here again though they were calling for perhaps a parliamentary-style chamber that could work with the King, but that would still include only a tiny portion of the kingdom's population in its body. \n\nJust to put a fine point on it: even the most *radical* *hardcore leftists* did NOT go into the French Revolution (here I'm dating the beginning at the convening of the Estates General in 1789) calling for a Republic. Marat, Robespierre, Danton... all of these men are the embodiment of the hard-core left of the left, and yet all three of them believed in the monarchy and fully supported a more constitutional monarchy over the absolutist monarchy-- but none of them were calling for an abolition of an oligarchy, or the overthrow of the monarchy,\n\nSo why does that matter? Well I think this lays the groundwork for the heart of your question: Why did the French accept Napoleon? The French Revolution was at its core about a set of principles (liberty, equality, fraternity), modernizing and re-structuring a badly out-of-date kingdom, and putting into place a *better* government-- NOT solely about instituting a Republic. In fact Robespierre only tried to make a Republic work *after* the people had forcefully overthrown the monarchy on 10 August 1792-- he believed that it was too soon for a Republic, and that good citizens of a Republic needed time to mature into one. \n\nI'm not sure if you're American like I am, but there is an interesting aspect to schooling in the US (and I'm sure many other democracies) that goes something like: Democracies are the best, everything else is despotism and sucks. Of course I'm being glib here, but it was a big wake-up call to me when I encountered Voltaire, *the* Enlightenment thinker, professing that he believed so-called 'Enlightened Despotism' was actually the best form of government. Guided by an enlightened ruler, this person would be able to impose his will (which would be what was best for the people) without having to deal with parties, factions, and self-interests. It's *super* fascinating and I could talk about it for hours, but if this interests you at all Aristotle elucidates on it brilliantly in his *Politics*. Anyway the most important takeaway here is that for the French who supported the Revolution, a successful Revolution didn't *have* to equal a Republic. What they really wanted was a better government that could do things about all of the issues that they had-- not a monarchy that was constantly in impotent gridlock as Louis XVI's was.\n\nI want to touch briefly on another part of your question: \n\"how abusive the French oligarchy was which divided the upper classes from the lower classes and instigated the sheer massive anger of the French people when the French oligarchy started to make the lives of the French more difficult because of the increase in taxes\"\n\nI think you'd be better served here substituting *monarchy* for *oligarchy*, as that was truly the form of government, the important difference being a monarchy has a singular individual in sole control of the reigns, whereas an oligarchy is a small group at the helm. \n\n\\>how abusive the French oligarchy was\n\nAbusive doesn't really fit, and again I'm not sure if you're trying to say the monarchy was abusive, or the aristocracy. Certain aristocrats certain earned the ire of the lower classes whom they lived with, but others were beloved. The King also was generally beloved by his people, and though they despised the bad state of affairs in his government, they tended to blame his ministers and Queen for this.\n\n\\>instigated the sheer massive anger of the French people when the French oligarchy started to make the lives of the French more difficult because of the increase in taxes\n\nAgain just to make sure we're on the same page, the *monarchy* collected taxes, not the aristocracy. France was in deep debt following a series of war efforts as you said, and the tax burden had more-or-less increased (though there were many efforts to gain revenue in other ways). The main ire as I mentioned above was that the nobility was not paying anything close to their fair share. There was a general seething resentment about this that was generally pushed over the edge in places where the lower classes *also* owned seigniorial dues to a local noble-- especially if that noble was not well loved otherwise. Watching people not pay their fair share of taxes *plus* having to pay them is what really raised the tensions between the the Third Estate and the Second Estate (nobles).", "created_utc": 1589770095, "distinguished": null, "id": "fqzlw1d", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/gli6nn/considering_that_one_of_the_reasons_why_the/fqzlw1d/", "score": 389 } ]

[ { "body": "I would say that bakers, bakeries, farmers, and millers do not get NEARLY enough airtime in discussions about the Revolution, so I'm really glad you asked this question.\n\nWhile the political aspects of the French Revolution are naturally the 'thread' we follow, and we therefore focus on those men who held political power, it isn't really too much of an oversimplification to say that for the class that proved to be the 'body' of the Revolution, they cared about one thing: bread.\n\nA bit of a background on bread in France:\n\nFrance was a country of \\~25 million people before the Revolution, and was overwhelmingly rural. Argiculture was the staple of their economy, and their staple food crop was wheat. This wheat would be grown and harvested by farmers. The wheat, once harvested, needed to be ground by watermills; these mills were owned by local lords, who in most instances had a right to compell the peasants in their village to use their watermill. Once ground, the grain then had to be transported to where it was needed-- an incredibly complex task, made even more difficult by the fact that France was anything but a unified nation before the Revolution. In many instances, the similarities held by different peasants would be that they shared a King-- that's it. Different languages, different cusotms, different traditions, different rights & responsibilities to the crown, all served to make 'France' an incredibly heterogeneous kingdom (something the Revolutiontionaries would seek to remedy). Thus, we have a very complex system, relying upon many layers of events to \"go right\" in order to provide food to the masses. If one of these variables changed, the price of bread changed, often with dire consequences.\n\nTo tell a \"History of Bread\" and the Revolution, let's walk it back to the 1770s. Bread prices normally ate up around 40% of a wage-earner's income; however if there was a shortage, or disturbance in the complex chain of distribution, that could climb up to 60-70% of income-- for those at the very bottom of the chain this could mean starvation.\n\nIn France, there was a common idea of the King as a father-protector. He, as the father, wanted what was best for his subjects, and he also provided for him. When bread became scarse, and prices sky-rocketed, there was a pervasive idea that the king wasn't to blame, but that bad ministers were deceiving him, lying to him, or preventing him from knowing the truth (this will be crucial to understanding bread-based events like the *journee* of Oct. 5th).\n\nThe first major bread-based event of the pre-Revolution was the Flour War. Louis XVI's controller general, Turgot, was a bit of a *philosophe*, and was known as a Physiocrat. As such, he believed that the wealth of a country is rooted in its land, and that a well-administered agricultural economy would provide a financial boon to France. What he believed was holding back France's economy were the bevy of internal customs and taxes that existed between all of the different points of production, and on the 'borders' of different provinces. What Turgot envisioned was a lassiez-faire style grain trade: let supply and demand determine price. Louis XVI, who agreed with Turgot's plan, gave his assent, and Turgot's policies were put into action. The problem came when, due to shortages of grain, prices began to climb.... and climb... and climb, until riots began to break out across France. Louis XVI cancelled the policies and eventually canned Turgot, but the message was clear: we want affordable bread, and we do not care how you do it.\n\nIn the lead-up to the Revolution (1780s), we begin to see more directed violence towards the bakers themselves. Since the King was not at fault, others had to be blamed for the shortage of bread. The bakers were an obvious target for the peoples's ire: they were the ones most directly involved in the changes (\"Why are you now selling me a loaf that was yesterday 12 *sous* for 15 *sous* today?!\"). During the decade before the Revolution, riots and other disturbances often happened in line waiting for bread; if they were lucky, the baker might escape, however we have many reported instances in Paris of bakers being lynched on the lampposts that lined the streets. Some bakers were likely just trying to not be ruined, by adjusting the costs of their bread to what they were forced to pay for wheat; others courted danger a bit more. In the late 1780s a baker at Versailles was attacked for selling good quality loaves to the rich for 15 *sous*, while selling moldy, inedible loaves to the poor for 12 *sous*.\n\nAs riots became more commonplace in the capital due to increasing bread prices from 1787-1789, military units began to be stationed inside bakeries, or outside of breadlines, to try to quell disturbances-- perhaps nothing else better demonstrates the direct link between insurrections and bread as the placement of these soldiers. Their presence-- and the agitation of the populace-- was directly linked to the price of bread. As soon as bread crept over around 50% of a laborer's income, unrest began to grown.", "created_utc": 1613429869, "distinguished": null, "id": "gnl1w41", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/lklock/bread_is_known_to_be_a_staple_part_of_the_diet/gnl1w41/", "score": 27 } ]

[ { "body": "I have a previous answer on this, which I'll c/p below for you.\n\nNo, she did not. This is a long-standing misconception.\n\nThe earliest textual reference to this phrase that historians can point to is in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Les confessions (1782):\n\nEnfin je me rappelai le pis-aller d'un grande princess à qui l'on disait que les paysans n'avaient pas de pain, et qui répondit: \"Qu'ils mangent de la brioche.\"\n\nFinally I recalled the last resort of a great princess who was told that the peasants had no bread, and who responded: \"They may eat brioche.\"\n\nWe don't really know who the \"great princess\" is here. He was writing of 1737-1740 at this point in his memoirs, and as he was presenting the thought as one he had at the time (and wrote the text in the 1760s), it was impossible for it to be Marie Antoinette. A similar sentiment was at some point attributed to Maria Theresa of Spain (1638-1683), the first wife of Louis XIV. When Relation d'un yoyage à Bruxelles et à Coblentz: 1791 was published by Louis XVIII (Marie Antoinette's brother-in-law) in 1823, it read:\n\nAussi, en mangeant la croûte avec le pâté, nous songeâmes à la reine Marie-Thérèse, qui répondit un jour que l'on plaignait devant elle les pauvres gens qui n'ont pas de pain: \"Mais, mon Dieu, que ne mangent-ils de la croûte de pâté?\"\n\nAlso, while eating the crust with the pie, we reflected on Queen Marie Thérèse, who responded one day when someone expressed sympathy in front of her for poor people who had no bread: \"But, my God, don't they eat pie crust?\"\n\nIntriguingly, when this was quoted in Edward Latham's Famous Sayings and Their Authors (1906), \"Marie-Thérèse\" instead reads \"Marie-Antoinette\". Latham's entry for this phrase also quotes Alphonse Karr, in the April 1843 issue of his magazine Les Guêpes: Karr said that he had seen this attributed to a duchess of Tuscany in a publication from 1760, so he concluded that Marie Antoinette had \"merely found and put it into circulation\".\n\nHowever, it seems much more likely that this was a stock anecdote that could be used to illustrate the brainlessness of royalty with anyone at hand. According to Antonia Fraser, it was also attributed to Madame Sophie and Madame Victoire, two of Louis XVI's aunts, which brings us to at least five different women who were said to have reacted this way when confronted with the starvation of the poor! As a piece of rhetoric, it helped to confirm the idea that the ruling class had no compassion for the poor and could not even comprehend the fact that some people could not afford food - which was obviously useful for republican factions in the latter half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century. There's certainly more than a seed of truth in the concept, since the rich lived lives under the ancien régime that would have been unimaginable to their poorer subjects, and most likely could not really imagine themselves what it would be truly hungry. At the same time, they did understand the the poor needed money and food, and that their privileged positions required charitable giving. Marie Antoinette in particular was known for impulsive, generous acts when she was confronted with poverty: in 1775, she took in an orphan boy who ran in front of her carriage (he was unhurt) and had him raised and educated at Versailles, financially supporting the family members he left behind; when she became pregnant in 1778, she broke the news by asking Louis for 12,000 francs to pay off the debts of people imprisoned for owing money to wet nurses as well as to give to the poor of Versailles. She was also one of the only members of the royal family who avoided riding over wheatfields in order to keep from ruining crops, she allowed a species of game bird reserved for the king's hunt to be killed by peasants when it was threatening the corn as well, and on multiple occasions early in her marriage she personally helped injured subjects, ensuring that they were tended by a surgeon and taken home. I'm not saying that these were perfect acts - they were limited in scope and did nothing to actually reform the problems in society that kept people poor - but they illustrate a personality quite at odds with either blinking naiveté (\"Well, if there's no bread, surely they can just eat brioche?\") or heartless cruelty (\"Let 'em eat cake, then, am I right?\") when it came to the plight of hungry peasants.\n\nAnd now we come to: misogyny. Misogyny is hugely important in the lead-up to the Revolution, specifically when it came to the depiction of Marie Antoinette. Factions at court deliberately attacked her chastity/fidelity to her husband, since that was the central womanly virtue, and spread the smears to pamphlet-printers, who took the court gossip to the public; her expenditures were held up for ridicule as wastes of money despite being no different from those of any other member of the wider royal family, and despite the aid to the colonies in the American Revolution being a much bigger problem for the crown's funds. The populace was disgusted to hear that their queen was a bisexual lecher who was cuckolding her husband in the bed of state while emptying the treasury to feed her own vanity, and from the beginning of the Revolution until her execution, they singled Marie Antoinette out for a special brand of rage for her \"failure\" to meet expectations of decent, regal behavior. I sort of discuss that in this past answer. The story of \"let them eat cake\" has stuck so well to her because her pop-cultural reputation of general badness is largely derived from the way she was talked about and represented during and before the Revolution. But even Marie Antoinette aside, this is a stock anecdote that is always and only attached to women. It plays on the idea of the stupid rich woman who can't comprehend real work and real hunger. It's sexist.\n\nOne last tidbit: there seems to be an effort by some people to present a new context for \"qu'ils mangent de la brioche\". They say that really, Marie Antoinette was requiring the bakers to sell brioche at the same price as bread in accordance with an old custom in times of famine. However, even beyond the irrelevance of this digression since she didn't say it, I cannot find evidence of this. There was a lot of discussion in French government through the eighteenth century about fixing the price of bread or wheat in order to prevent scarcity from raising the price of bread so that it was out of reach for the poor, but nothing about selling brioche to peasants for low prices.", "created_utc": 1623861431, "distinguished": null, "id": "h1zhlu6", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/o17kb0/hello_historians_so_i_have_the_french_revolution/h1zhlu6/", "score": 36 }, { "body": "To add to u/mimicofmodes already comprehensive comment, a relatively recent analysis (Campion-Vincent and Shojaei Kawan, 2002) shows that the tale has a wider and longer history, and that the Marie-Antoinette/brioche combo is just one, and late, occurrence of the tale. It is recorded in the Aarne–Thompson classification of folktales as AaTh 1446 \"Let them Eat Cake. The queen has been told that the peasants have no bread\", with variants found not only in France, but also in Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Russia, India and China, often in situations of famine. The \"pie crust\" variant cited by u/mimicofmodes was mentioned not only by Louis XVIII but also by the comtesse de Boigne in her memoirs (she attributes not to Marie-Thérèse but to Madame Victoire, one of Louis XV's daughters). We can guess that \"pie crust\" was less attractive than \"brioche\", since this version did not take hold the way the brioche version did.\n\nOne interesting thing noted by Campion-Vincent and Shojaei Kawanis is that the attribution to Marie-Antoinette is completely absent from documents from the Revolutionary period, even from the most negative pamphlets written about her. It's not just that she didn't say it: it's that people did not claim in writing that she said it until much later, in the 1840s (it may have existed in oral form of course). The earliest mention I can find is from 1841 in the *Journal du Peuple* ([here, middle column, third paragraph](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-journal-du-peuple-1834-1842/24-octobre-1841/31\n98/4968404/2)), which predates that of Alphonse Karr of 1843 (in 1854 he added that the quote was \"[cruelly and unfairly attributed](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-siecle/10-septembre-1854/93/847693/2)\" to Marie-Antoinette). \n\nAlso, the attribution remained extremely flexible for at least another century. While it was overwhelmingly ascribed to women (and definitely misogynistic) in its European version, the French press sometimes put it in the mouth of Louis XV, both as a child ([*La Silhouette*, 1846](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/la-silhouette-paris/30-aout-1846/3252/5016632/9)) and as an adult king ([*Le Progrès de la Somme*, 1891](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-progres-de-la-somme/2-avril-1891/2227/4643826/1)). In addition to Marie-Antoinette, it was often attributed to the Marquise de Pompadour, and to the Princesse de Lamballe, a friend of the queen who had been killed by a mob during the Revolution, and who was a cause célèbre for monarchists. In a common version of the Lamballe tale, she was assassinated after the mob had learned of the quote. For late-19th century monarchists, the fact that the tale was apocryphal showed the barbarity of Revolutionary mobs, or it helped them to criticize the Republic, as in this article of the newspaper [*Le Gaulois* on 16 October 1879](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-gaulois/16-octobre-1879/37/220097/1):\n\n> The government of the Republic, more than any other, must concern itself with the needs of the people. The Princess of Lamballe was killed when she uttered this idiotic phrase in the midst of a famine:\n\n> *If the people have no bread, let them eat brioche!*\n> \n> A word she never uttered.\n> \n> But the Republic seems to be even crueler than this word, for it does not even speak of brioche.\n\nIt would take more research to know when the quote finally settled on Marie-Antoinette rather than on the Princesse de Lamballe or the Marquise de Pompadour. An article from *Le Journal* in 1942 still attributes it to the Princesse de Lamballe! ([here](https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-journal/5-mai-1942/129/111885/2)). Also, further research could shed light about its popularity in the English-speaking world (where it's more popular than in France). Campion-Vincent and Shojaei Kawanis note that the American movie *Marie-Antoinette* from 1938 includes the quote but that it is uttered by Louis XV... and this doesn't prevent Amazon from [selling the movie](https://www.amazon.com/Marie-Antoinette-Norma-Shearer/dp/B006HKJR24) with the tag line \"Lavish biography of the French queen who \"let them eat cake.\"\"\n\n**Sources**\n\n* Aarne, Antti, and Stith Thompson. The Types of the Folktale : A Classification and Bibliography. 2nd Revision. Folklore Fellow’s Communications, 184. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 1961.\n* Boigne, Éléonore-Adèle d’Osmond. Mémoires de la comtesse de Boigne, née d’Osmond : récits d’une tante. Paris: Editions Emile-Paul Frères, 1931. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9760776q. (p.27)\n* Campion-Vincent, Véronique, and Christine Shojaei Kawan. “Marie-Antoinette et son célèbre dire.” Annales historiques de la Révolution française 327, no. 1 (2002): 29–56. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahrf.2002.2564.", "created_utc": 1624050667, "distinguished": null, "id": "h296icy", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/o17kb0/hello_historians_so_i_have_the_french_revolution/h296icy/", "score": 9 } ]

[ { "body": "Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/).\n\n#Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/reyse9/at_the_start_of_the_french_revolution_when_the/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. Additionally, for weekly content summaries, **[Click Here to Subscribe to our Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=AHMessengerBot&subject=Subscribe&message=!subscribe)**.\n\nWe thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written!\n\n\n*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*", "created_utc": 1639344588, "distinguished": "moderator", "id": "hoaqgvy", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/reyse9/at_the_start_of_the_french_revolution_when_the/hoaqgvy/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "You’re certainly right that the history of the French Revolution can get dense. Both books you cited are excellent additions to the French historiography, but they *do* read like history textbooks, although *Citizens* probably edges Popkin out on readability. Still, they certainly aren’t novels. I’d hesitate to recommend someone looking for a novel-like experience to try and read either cover-to-cover. Also bear in mind that when historians write on the French Revolution, they’re often making arguments on how the revolution should be interpreted. Was it a proto-Marxist movement? The first instance of liberal thought overthrowing the old progressive order? Was it a tragic political farce marred by senseless violence? There is great history in works from all of these camps, but if you’re just looking for an introduction, sifting through all of their argumentation can get rather tedious. If you want a true neutral take, William Doyle's Oxford History of the French Revolution is as close as you'll probably get, although it reads like a textbook.\n\nOn to the two you mentioned:\n\n*Citizens* is more readable, although Schama frames his presentation of historical facts to support his view that the revolution was an inherently violent, and ultimately tragic, affair. Again, that’s not bad or wrong, but it could get tedious to sift through once you know what his angle is. \n\nJeremy Popkin’s work takes great care to discuss the revolution in terms of women, enslaved people, and other groups that tend to get minimal treatment in other accounts of the French Revolution, while still giving a sound retelling of events. Popkin’s interpretation skews in the opposite direction of Schama’s. While Popkin isn't the driest historian out there, it’s not light reading either. \n\nFor a more approachable foray into the French Revolution, I'd recommend Mike Duncan's *Revolutions* podcast series on the French revolution. It’s not the most comprehensive source, but it’s very accessible, well-researched, engaging, and makes for an excellent starting point from which you could dive into some of the denser or more specific histories out there. I used his series on the Haitian Revolution as the basis for my studies on the subject and found it invaluable as I later sifted through more thoroughgoing books on the subject.\n\nIf you're interested in the history of French Revolutionary historiography, [I wrote a post a while back](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/jpphpq/whats_the_french_revolution_all_about/gbghvhn/?context=3) summing up the major interpretations of the revolution over the past 200 years.", "created_utc": 1625852691, "distinguished": null, "id": "h4m4rl0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ogvjat/most_engagingaccessible_history_books_about_the/h4m4rl0/", "score": 11 } ]

[ { "body": "I’ve actually just begun reading *A Place of Greater Safety* myself, though I’m only about a quarter of a way through the book, so I don’t have a complete notion of how exactly Mantel has portrayed the character of Philippe d’Orléans aka Philippe Égalité and the extent to which he was single-mindedly motivated by ambition. The extent to which the Duke’s actions during the Revolution were motivated by idealism or personal advancement is by no means a settled question, and unfortunately a lot of the scholarship on this question is not going to be accessible unless you have a working knowledge of French, nor will be quite a few of the primary sources that discuss Philippe and his actions during this time. However, there is a good deal of evidence to help address your question, and I can give you my personal analysis on the issue you present here.\n\nTo start out, I do not think it mutually exclusive that Philippe would hold more liberal ideals regarding the governing of France, and at the same time possess a desire to see himself crowned king. Think of it this way, the statement: “France should move away from absolutism to adopt a constitutional monarchy, and I am the best person suited to fill the role of a constitutional monarch” is not at all contradictory. A constitutional monarchy is not the same as a republic, of course, and I am very skeptical that Philippe was a “genuine republican” in the strict understanding of the term. The French Revolution is a very convoluted and hairy subject, but the general consensus is that the shift from an absolute monarchy to a full-on republic was by no means a foregone conclusion, nor was it likely to have been the primary goal of most of the politically active revolutionaries (a broad category that I use here for simplicity and convenience) prior to Louis XVI’s flight to Varennes or even right up to the eve of his execution. Robespierre himself initially advocated a much more moderate position of reform.\n\nThere is also a good deal of evidence that Philippe was not simply jumping on the revolutionary bandwagon in 1789 when it became obvious that big things were in motion. In the run-up to the État-généraux, the Duke was already known for his liberal views, and he had made available for some years his home in Paris, the Palais Royal, for public debates and popular entertainment, and he had even gone so far as to establish cafés and restaurants under its arches. In the years leading to 1789 it had already become a favorite spot for speeches and political discussions. There is also evidence that Philippe was a big fan of Enlightenment philosophy, notably Rousseau, as well as an Anglophile who looked admiringly to the British constitutional monarchy as a model. And his interest in Enlightenment ideas would not have been a striking exception among 18th century nobility. There’s a laundry list of “enlightened despots” (Frederick II, Maria Theresa, Catherine the Great, etc.) who pursued reforms influenced by the thinkers of the time, so long as those reforms didn’t interfere too much with their sovereignty or the established social order. This evidence seems to be a strike against the notion that Philippe was *exclusively* motivated by a personal ambition for the crown, whether or not he thought it would’ve been a nice prize or that he was the best person for the job.\n\nThis is not to say that Philippe didn’t take actions that were likely to have been a bit more cynically motivated to improve his personal position at any given moment during the rapidly evolving situation in France at the time. You have to imagine that more than a few eyes rolled when he changed his name to “Philip Equality,” I mean come on. Imagine if a US presidential candidate legally changed their last name to “Universalhealthcare” (or, to use a real example, a mayoral candidate created a political party called “the Rent is Too Damn High Party”). This wasn’t the only case in which he made a dramatic political performance that may ultimately have been motivated by thoughts of his audience rather than his principles. When the time came to vote on the execution of the king, Philippe stoically voted in favor of putting his first cousin to death, and even Robespierre thought it was a bit weird, writing: “Égalité was perhaps the only member \\[of the Convention\\] who could have recused himself.”\n\nUltimately, Philippe d’Orléans was a flashy personality with eclectic interests and a whole lot of money. It seems likely that he had a genuine interest in the political reformation of France, and as the wealthiest man in the country, he had the ability to give things a nudge in that direction, though it’s highly doubtful that in his public political activities of the mid 1780s he had anything like an organized, calculated plot to foment revolution in order to seize the throne for himself. But perhaps, as is so often the case with the rich and powerful, Philippe regarded politics rather too much like a big game, and in his efforts to ride the currents of the maelstrom he became one of its victims. How cynical or idealistic was Philipe Égalité, Duc d’Orléans? French historian Jules Michelet summarizes it thusly: “In the end, he got what he wanted above all: he saved his money and lost only his head.”\n\nInterestingly, I have found a [Guardian article by Hilary Mantel](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/nov/01/french-revolution-books), which seems to offer a more nuanced view of Duke’s life and role in the Revolution than his character is portrayed in the book (I’m basing this perception on what you wrote in your question - as I said, I haven’t actually finished reading the novel yet). So maybe as you suggest his portrayal in *A Place of Greater Safety* is more of a conscious character choice on the part of Mantel.\n\nIf you’re interested in reading a good overall narrative of the Revolution, I would recommend *The French Revolution: From Enlightenment to Tyranny* (2016), by Ian Davidson. In my opinion, it’s a great overview of the subject, and Davidson has intentionally structured his writing to give the reader a sense of the actual pacing of events as they happened in a really novel way. The two direct quotations that I used in my answer above come from this book.", "created_utc": 1630857179, "distinguished": null, "id": "hbp63qb", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/phda54/was_the_duke_of_orleanss_support_for_the_french/hbp63qb/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "Well the thing is, the American government didn't really change that much directly after the US revolution. The Articles government was very much a continuation of the Continental Congress that had governed the colonies during the war. Furthermore, many of the men leading the Articles government (and later the early Constitutional government) were the same men who had been in control of the colonial governments before the war.\n\nAnd those colonial governments had been rather autonomous. It's pretty hard for a king or parliament to micromanage a colony when its on the other side of an ocean that takes months to cross. The colonies had been fairly self governing for a while, including their own representative bodies. The colonists started getting angry when the empire started trying to impose more central control through taxation and trade controls. In many ways, the colonists already had their own independent society.\n\nSo you can see that **the American Revolution didn't totally upend American society the way the French Revolution tried to do**. It wasn't nearly as radical. In France they were lopping off the heads of nobles, while in the US the wealthy elites were the ones making the new rules. That's why they were so big on property rights and fearful of democracy. As far as revolutions go, the American Revolution was very conservative.\n\nFinally, the colonial masses were not rebelling against their native government as the French proletariat was. It was the local governments rebelling against a far away imperial government. So instead of the socioeconomic situation deteriorating until the country exploded in violent, emotional, uncontrollable mass rebellion, there was an educated political class leading the colonies through a more procedural independence.\n\nReally, calling both what happened in the US between 1775-1783 and what happened in France a few years later 'revolutions' is misleading. They were different types of events in very different circumstances. The American colonists weren't overthrowing the government of Britain, they were seceding from it.\n\nNow the modern US government has changed a lot since the revolution. But that happened over the course of decades, and it did certainly come at its own deep cost. The American Civil War should be seen as the final conclusion of the revolution as it's when we truly defined the national project that the founders had begun. Their intelligence and willingness to make this country work is what held the union together as long as it did, but they were only able to do so because they were leading a society that was already stable and fairly prosperous.\n\nEdit: I failed to mention one thing that I can't believe I forgot. The frontier. Throughout early US history, if you had a problem with the way the society around you worked or your place in it, you could just move out west and start a life for yourself.\n\nA lot of violent revolutions start due to wealth disparity. The proletariat feel like they have no options and no control over their lives because of a system set up by elites to use and abuse the common man. The situation builds up like a pressure cooker until an event happens that pushes the people past their breaking point (such as a famine or the murder of a popular idol). Then the whole thing just explodes violently and uncontrollably.\n\nNow, there were and are definitely powerful wealthy families in the US. But the common people rarely got desperate enough to raise arms because they always had another option: move out to the frontier and make a self sufficient life with your own land without ever needing to engage with markets controlled by wealthy capitalists. You won't have the latest fashions or gadgets, and it'll be a tough, risky life, but you'll get to live on your own terms. You'll never be dictated to by any boss, or manager, or clock, or whistle, not by anyone other than mother nature. Early American society never had any of the type of widespread mass uprisings that lead to dictatorship because there was always a release valve.\n\nEdit2: Thanks for the gold!", "created_utc": 1440027474, "distinguished": null, "id": "cu8vwi8", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/3hmmmc/how_come_the_american_revolution_didnt_end_up/cu8vwi8/", "score": 904 }, { "body": "Well first of all we had a weak central government at first under the Articles of Confederation. Many of the individuals who were already in government in the colonies, continued after they became states creating a lot less insecurity about the power structure. Second, in order for the Constitution to be ratified a compromise was brokered that guaranteed the Bill of Rights passage to alleviate many fears of a corrupt government by guaranteeing certain protections that were important to the people at the time. Lastly, I would argue it was George Washington and the first few Presidents are mainly responsible. They set the precedent for maintaining power, by force if necessary when the government was attacked and yet still peacefully passing the office along to the next man when the time came. This is by no means a comprehensive list, but some of the general reasons why the United States fared differently than France or others.", "created_utc": 1440018837, "distinguished": null, "id": "cu8qkcg", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/3hmmmc/how_come_the_american_revolution_didnt_end_up/cu8qkcg/", "score": 828 }, { "body": "I just want to post a few things. First I have seen the commonly repeated assertion that the American revolution was a conservative revolution that preserved the status quo, While certainly this a popular opinion the recent work of Gordon Wood has had a large impact on how we look at the revolution. Wood's work has demonstrated that on many levels the American revolution was a very radical revolution, and it at least deserves to be mentioned.\n\nSecondly everyone seems to be under estimating the political crisis of the 1790's, which is likely the closest we have came to civil war until 1850. Washington's popularity and his ability to remain above the political battlefield was seriously depleted by the end of his second term, he had become highly partisan and increasingly found himself under attack within the public sphere. By Adam's presidency the Federalists are prosecuting or threatening to prosecute anyone who publishes something critical of the government. The new American army's officer corps is composed almost entirely of high federalists many of which entertain dreams of marching into Virginia and quashing the Republicans. The de-facto commander of the army goes so far as to write \"Once a sound military force is raised it should be drawn towards Virginia....and then let measures be taken to act upon the laws and put Virginia to the Test of resistance\" - Alexander Hamilton. In response there is ample evidence to argue that Virginia was preparing for war, stocking piling arms, increasing militia training, raising taxes 25%, and putting a hold on civil projects to pay for military expenditures. Prominent political figures are now writing to one another considering the possibility of separate unions such as John Taylor of Caroline. Meanwhile a desperate Jefferson uses Virginia and Kentucky as his last line of defense against disunion. Set against this we have a naval war on the high seas between France and the US, republican and federalist mobs beating each other in the street (and sometimes Congress), a major general being bribed by the Spanish to break a portion of the United States off into its own country. This is of course not even mentioning the election of 1800 and the Federalists attempts to replace Jefferson with Burr and other plots (which John Adams seemed amenable to) to delay the election until March at which point the Federalist pro-temp of the Senate would have taken over as acting president until a new congress convened in December of 1801 ( giving another nine months of Federalist control) which in my opinion would have amounted to a de-facto coup and an outcome which Jefferson said would \" produce resistance by force\". ", "created_utc": 1440045220, "distinguished": null, "id": "cu95m6t", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/3hmmmc/how_come_the_american_revolution_didnt_end_up/cu95m6t/", "score": 37 } ]

[ { "body": "About five years. He was appointed in May of 1784 to the position, then spent June touring the eastern US, then left July 5th with his daughter \"Patsy\" (Martha, his oldest) and James, the brother of Sally Hemings. They arrived in August. \n\nIn May of 1789 he attended the opening of the Estates-General at Versailles. In June he helped Marquis de Layfayette to pen a bill of rights, which the Marquis would use for the document of rights he proposed to the assembly in July. Also in July the riots started and on the 14th the Bastille would be stormed, which he was not a part of. There were also \"secret\" meetings at Jefferson's residence, the Hotel de Langeac, in order to draft a constitution.\n\nSept 28 1789 Jefferson, Patsy, Polly (who he sent for after arriving in Paris and was his only other surviving daughter at that point, having lost yet another while he was away, the poor child succumbing to whooping cough with her cousin back in Virginia) and her handmaid, a young lady named Sally Hemings and her brother James who was brought to learn French \"cookery\". While he was confirmed as Washington's choice for Sec of State on Sept 26, two days before setting sail, he did not find out until November and reluctantly accepted in February. He had desperately hoped to return to Monticello, but it would be another 20 years before would be permitted to retire (though he tried to retire again in 1794 for a brief time). \n\nHe did not fight in the French Revolution at all and at that stage in his life was a soldier of the pen, not the sword. \n\nHappy to answer any q's about the trip or his time in France, but the short answer is five years and no.\n\n*E cause I forgot to add James in the return trip*", "created_utc": 1608349312, "distinguished": null, "id": "ggbrxu8", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/kg075i/how_long_did_thomas_jefferson_stay_in_france_and/ggbrxu8/", "score": 12 } ]

[ { "body": "Hey!\n\nWell, to answer your question the most directly and generically: into a mass grave, alongside their body. However this of course depended on who you were, and where you were.\n\nI'd also like to challenge that \"17,000\" number. I see that on Wikipedia, without a source; that number seem high if we're JUST talking about guillontining deaths from 1793-1794 (the timeframe from the Wikipedia article), but low if we're talking *total* deaths for that year.\n\nAny death statistics for the French Revolution always come down to the details. For example: Over 100,000 people died in the Vendée in 1793; should we include them in the death counts? What about those executed during the Terror, but not by guillotine? The numbers can vary widely depending upon which subset you're looking at (and usually the Vendée deaths are kept separate), so keep that in mind.\n\nBack to the question of where these victims made their final resting place: most non-unique victims of the guillotine were dumped into mass graves. Guillotine victims in larger cities were usually dispatched in batches every day, so say 30 victims would be executed, taken to a mass grave, and uncerimoniously dumped in-- the revolutionaries weren't concerned with proper funery rites. \n\nSomething to keep in mind though was that many victims of the Terror were *not* guillotined: there were many special cases where other methods were employed. Often this comes down to morbid efficiency; during the \"Great Terror\" (late 1793- July 1794), as the \"Representitives on Mission\" (National Convention members given full powers and sent out into the *departments* to enact a governmental presence) attempted to quell various counter-revolution activity and uprisings, there often was neither the time nor inclination to use the guillotine, a rather slow method of executing large groups of prisoners. To highlight a few infamous examples, there was Collot d'Buois, a *sans-culotte* Committee member who had a large group of political prisoners in Lyons shot with a canon before a mass grave. The *most* infamous example is John Baptiste Carrier, who tied his unlucky constituents of Nantes together, put them on sinkable barges, and drown them in the Loire river. This is to say nothing of the rebellion ongoing in the Vendée, where republican troops were massacring citizens with military weaponry. I will point out here for anyone interested that this uneven application of the Terror-- and the gruesome methods carried out by men like Collot and Carrier-- was unacceptable to Robespierre, who wished for an even application of what he considered revolutionary justice. He believed that these men damaged the revolution by their excesses, in an equal yet opposite way from those whose leniency let go many committed counter revolutionaries. His attempt to recall and try men like Collot and Carrier (and their permissive counterparts such as Taillen) was a huge impetus for the Thermidorian reaction that brought him down-- lead as it was by the men mentioned above. \n\nAside from your geographic location, what happened to your corpse depended on who you were. The main instance of this was the former head and body of Louis XVI, who after being executed had his body covered with corrosive materials so that it would dissolve, leaving nothing behind for any sympathetic grave-diggers.\n\nLet me know if you have any more questions!", "created_utc": 1610828377, "distinguished": null, "id": "gjhzmf3", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ky6pwh/what_did_they_do_with_all_the_heads_during_the/gjhzmf3/", "score": 20 } ]

[ { "body": "The average Parisian would not be aware of tricoteuses knitting next to the guillotine because it is a myth. French historian Dominique Godineau has retraced the origin of the expression and it goes as follows.\n\nUnder the Ancien Régime, tricoteuse was sometimes (the evidence exists but is scarce) used as a gendered slur, possibly because the job was a low-paying one done by poor women employed to knit in hospitals and \"dépôts de mendicité\" (a mix of prison and hospital for vagrants, beggars and prostitutes). \n\nThe term in its current acception appears only in 1795, and it was used as an insult (perhaps due to the negative connotation mentioned above) against Parisian women who sat in the stands to follow and participate in public debates, and particularly those of the radical Club des Jacobins. In addition to \"tricoteuses\", they were called many names by the enemies of the Jacobins, including \"tricoteuses de Robespierre\", \"Furies de guillotines\", \"female harpies\", \"female barkers\", \"shrews\" and other insults. In the [image of tricoteuses drawn by Jean-Baptiste Lesueur](http://arts-graphiques.louvre.fr/detail/oeuvres/0/37986-Tricoteuses-jacobines-jacobins-vociferant-a-la-tribune-citoyen-se-coiffant-du-bonnet-rouge-max), the text says that they were paid \"40 sols per day to sit in the Jacobin stands and applaud the revolutionaries\". Note that while women may have spent time knitting during the sessions, the only records available talk of women who were *sewing*. In any case, there is no mention, during the revolutionary period, of women *knitting* at the foot of the guillotine. A Revolutionary-era *tricoteuse* was a female political activist who participated, sometimes vocally, in public debates. Of course these women may have gone to watch executions to whoop and cheer, so we have indeed *tricoteuses* next to the guillotine, but they were not knitting.\n\nThere is a mention of \"tricoteuses dancing round the scaffold\" in the journal *La Clef du cabinet des souverains*, published in 1801. However, in the same paragraph we also find \"singing freemasons in charge of the world's destiny\" and a mention of Dr Franz Messmer, so it's not exactly descriptive. The first direct association of the tricoteuses with the guillotine appears in Chateaubriand's *Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe*, published in 1848. He first mentions the \"naive tricoteuses who arrived from the spectacle of the guillotine\" and later writes this:\n\n> From her exposed thighs foul reptiles emerged that danced, instantly, with the tricoteuses knitting round the scaffold, to the sound of the blade, ascending and descending over and over, to the refrain of a devil’s jig.\n\nSince then, mentions of tricoteuses have always included guillotine and violence and its certainly Dickens in the *Tale of Two Cities* (1859) who, through the character of Thérèse Defarge, introduced the most vivid image of the [tricoteuses knitting in front of the guillotine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Tale_of_Two_Cities#/media/File:T2C._Three_Jacobin_tricoteuses_in_front_of_the_guillotine_\\(John_Mclenan\\).jpg). It is this image that took hold in the public imagination, but it is not supported by the historical record.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* “Dunkerque, 28 Prairial.” La Clef du cabinet des souverains, June 23, 1801.\n* Godineau, Dominique. Citoyennes tricoteuses: les femmes du peuple à Paris pendant la Révolution française. Alinéa, 1988.\n* Godineau, Dominique. “La «Tricoteuse»?: formation d’un mythe contre-révolutionnaire.” Révolution Française, April 1, 2008.", "created_utc": 1618073022, "distinguished": null, "id": "gu23qoc", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/mo1t4d/i_am_a_parisian_citizen_during_the_french/gu23qoc/", "score": 14 } ]

[ { "body": "Short answer: no, but one part did reflect the more generous Revolutionary ideals, and it did not last. Also, it introduced abortion in the French penal code.\n\n\nI will follow mostly the PhD dissertation of Laura Tatoueix (2018), that deals with this matter and is recent scholarship.\n\nSome background first. The concept of abortion, during the Ancien Régime, was primarily guided by religious doctrine:\n\n1. It was strongly associated to contraception, which meant that it was prohibited to married people. It was also linked to, and often the result of, transgressive sexuality, *ie* non-married people having sex.\n1. It was considered as a homicide (*non occides*) and possibly as a *double* homicide since it occasionally killed the woman who tried or was forced to abort.\n1. Because abortions did not include baptism, the souls of aborted embryos/foetuses (called the *fruit*) were deprived of salvation, and they were condemned to limbo.\n\nThis was the doctrine that everybody agreed with. Abortion was evil, and it had been denounced as such by numerous Church Fathers. The bull *Effreanatam* of Pope Sixte V in 1588 made clear that abortion was a terrible crime:\n\n> We decree that all those who supply potions and poisons of sterility to women, and hinder the conception of the foetus, and who take the trouble to perform and execute such acts or in any way recommend them, as well as the women themselves who knowingly and willingly take the same potions, shall be subjected to the same punishment.\n\nThe problem was to translate this into law. Defining abortion was complicated. Religious figures had different opinions about the time of “animation”, the moment when the soul entered the body. Many thought that animation happened at about 40 days, but the matter was not settled. They also disagreed about whether animation mattered or not. A *fruit* aborted before animation, having no soul, could not be a victim of homicide, and was not condemned to limbo, so abortion performed before animation could be considered less sinful. But many disagree.\n\nThe other issue was that proving that abortion had happened was extremely difficult, if not impossible in most cases. Miscarriages are common, natural occurrences. Women who miscarried could be considered sinful (for having indulged in behaviours believed to cause abortion, such as dancing, carrying heavy loads, or having sex with their husband) but they were not guilty like a woman who had willingly drunk an abortive potion and they did not deserve to be hanged. When a woman had an abortion after being beaten by her husband, how guilty of abortion was the man? Did intent matter? There were so many questions.\n\nAbortion was thus a strange crime, one that was recognized by the society and obvious to religious and legal scholars, but it was also in a legal limbo: while it could be tried as a homicide, it did not have a specific legal existence. It was, says Tatoueix, a “crime without law”.\n\nThe Edict of Henri II of February 1557 tried to address this issue, following recently introduced German laws (*Constitutio criminalis Bambergensis* of 1507 and *Constitutio criminalis Carolina* of 1532) that had formally criminalised abortion. The Edict, meant to be a “general and irrevocable law”, targeted women who had conceived a child by \"dishonest means\", had concealed their pregnancy, and had delivered and killed the *fruit*, depriving it of baptism and of \"the usual sepulture of Christians\". The Edict obliged expectant mothers to declare their pregnancy in the presence of witnesses. A woman who had hidden her pregnancy and was found with an unbaptised dead *fruit* was punished by death.\n\nNot only the Edict was severe, but it did not require proof of the killing itself. Concealment, embryo/foetus death, and lack of baptism were enough to create a presumption of homicide. It did not mention abortion: the Edict does not distinguish abortion from infanticide. It also did not address abortions by married women, or the complicity of other people (husbands, midwives, doctors, pharmacists). Despite its shortcomings, the 1557 Edict (and its repetitions of 1585 and 1708) served for two centuries and a half as the main legal text in cases of abortions and infanticides. During that period, about 1500 women were condemned to death by the Parliament of Paris for “concealment followed by death”, with a low estimate of 5000 for the whole country (Muchembled, 2012 ; Soman, 1992).\n\nIt is impossible to know how many of those women were found guilty of abortion, but the fact is that cases of abortion appear to have been relatively uncommon. For Tatoueix, this can be explained both by a relative social tolerance – the only way a secretive practice such as this could be made public was by denunciation – , and by the simple fact that abortion remained fundamentally ambiguous as it was difficult to tell a voluntary abortion from a miscarriage. It remained an “invisible crime”. Jurist Muyart de Vouglans wrote in 1780 (cited by Naour and Valenti, 2003):\n\n> These crimes, though very frequent, are not publicly prosecuted or punished among us because of the difficulty of convincing the culprits, as the pregnancy of women may be only apparent, and its interruption may be due to various accidents as well as to the nature.\n\nBut customs were changing in the 17th and 18th centuries. Secularisation of the society made irrelevant the focus on baptism, so important in the 1557 Edict. Knowledge about pregnancy and foetus development had progressed. Forensic science was a growing field. And, by the 18th century, for people like Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria, compassion replaced religious anathema. Talking about abortion (cited by Naour and Valenti, 2003):\n\n> This crime is still the almost inevitable effect of the terrible situation in which an unfortunate woman finds herself, having given in to her own weakness or to violence. On the one hand infamy, on the other the destruction of a being incapable of feeling, that is the choice that the laws leave her to make; is there any doubt that she prefers the party that saves her and the sad fruit of her pleasures from shame and misery?\n\nThis leads us to the Penal Code of 1791. Its Article 17 states:\n\n> Anyone found to have procured the abortion of a pregnant woman by drink, violence, or any other means, shall be punished by twenty years in irons.\n\nAs one can see, abortion was not legalized. It remained a terrible crime, and people who forced, or helped, a woman to abort, were condemned to twenty years of hard labour, shackled with ball and chain, the harshest penalty after the guillotine. \n\nThe truly revolutionary part of Article 17 is that it did not mention the woman who had an abortion. She was no longer a criminal worthy of the death penalty, like in the 1557 Edict, but a victim who had been forced to defend her honour. Of course, abortion was still far from being a right.\n\nNaour and Valenti note that this impunity would later be found extremely shocking during the repressive years of the late 19th century, when abortion was considered as a crime not only against an individual, but against the nation and the French *race*: some people came to believe that it was meant to make it easier for a woman to denounce abortionists (Naour and Valenti believe this to be unlikely). How the Article 17 was actually applied is not known and, for Tatoueix, the status of abortion during the Revolutionary period remains to be studied.\n\nIn any case this partial legalization of abortion was short lived, and the Empire put an end to this. The Penal Code of 1810 rewrote the Code of 1791 in a much more repressive fashion (Article 317):\n\n> Anyone who, by means of food, drink, medicine, violence, or any other means, procures the abortion of a pregnant woman, whether she consents or not, shall be punished by imprisonment. The same penalty shall be imposed on a woman who procures an abortion for herself, or who consents to the use of means indicated or administered to her for this purpose, if the abortion is subsequently performed. Doctors, surgeons, and other health officers, as well as pharmacists who have indicated or administered these means, shall be sentenced to hard labour for a period of time, if the abortion has taken place.\n\nOne could say that the “liberalization” of 1791, by putting abortion in the penal code for the first time, opened the door to its full criminalization, which remained in place, with ups and downs (death penalty came back for a few years during the Vichy period), until 1976.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* Muchembled, Robert. Une histoire de la violence. Média Diffusion, 2012.\n* Müller, Wolfgang P. The Criminalization of Abortion in the West: Its Origins in Medieval Law. Reprint edition. Cornell University Press, 2017.\n* Naour, Jean-Yves le, and Catherine Valenti. Histoire de l’avortement : XIXe-XXe Siècle. Paris: Le Seuil, 2003.\n* Soman, Alfred. Sorcellerie et justice criminelle. Variorum, 1992.\n* Tatoueix, Laura. “L’avortement en France à l’époque moderne. Entre normes et pratiques (mi-XVIe - 1791).” PhD Dissertation, Université de Rouen, 2018. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02093000.", "created_utc": 1623539622, "distinguished": null, "id": "h1kcxgz", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/nx0lta/was_abortion_legalized_under_the_french_revolution/h1kcxgz/", "score": 5 } ]

[ { "body": "In terms of Russia, as of January 1918 there was some 63 billion rubles' worth of sovereign debt - 44 billion domestic and 19 billion held abroad. In that month the Bolshevik government repudiated all tsarist debts, which led to financial shocks in foreign markets, the removal of the ruble from exchange markets, and a complete drying up of foreign credit to Russia. \n\nAs for repaying tsarist-era foreign debts - this pretty much invariably became a major issue whenever the USSR attempted to re-establish diplomatic relations with foreign powers such as Germany, France or the UK. It was both a stumbling block to restoring relations (as well as demands for compensation for the expropriation of foreign-held property in Russia), but also was used by the USSR as a \"carrot\" in negotiations (maybe you'll get something back after all!).\n\nAs things worked out, the Soviet Union re-established international relations in the 1920s and 1930s without repaying these debts, and in the 1920s got access to foreign credit (although because of the default this was overwhelmingly short term credit). As far as I can tell, Germany repudiated any debt claims with the Rapallo Treaty in 1922. The United Kingdom and the USSR renounced any mutual tsarist era debts in 1986, while tsarist-era debts were settled for a nominal sum (some $400 million) by the Russian Federation in 1996 (there are *still* French bondholders pursuing legal action - unsupported by the French government - to get more money back). I'm not having much luck finding what happened to US-held debts (the 1933 agreement re-establishing diplomatic relations promised talks about settling the matter), but as far as I can tell there was no big payout, and by that time the USSR was receiving new lines of credit from the US anyway.", "created_utc": 1545321541, "distinguished": null, "id": "ec6r8he", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/a7whps/during_the_aftermath_of_the_russian_and_french/ec6r8he/", "score": 263 } ]

[ { "body": "Hello there!\n\nGreat question, and honestly it's a very loaded question. A huge chunk of the historiography around the French Revolution for the past 200+ years has been devoted to the question of why the Revolution became as radical as it did; why the Revolution of 1789 turned into the Revolution of 1792. The question comes down in large part to the \"school of thought\" that a Historian aligns with, which is in large part shaped by their time-period and their views on politics, economics, and human nature. However in these debates over the origin of this 'radical' period in the French Revolution there are some events that we can identify as important in explaining the shift, and that most historical ideologies would agree with-- though their stack-rankings would be different given their point of view.\n\nFirst I'd like to start with the obvious: As with all things in History, there is not one cause, one reason, one event that forced the events to go from reform to revolution. Instead there was a complex interplay of many different events, personalities, and decisions that shifted the movement into a more radical direction. \n\nThe second quick caveat I'd like to put out there is we often talk about historical events in discrete time periods that belies the true impact that they had on the lives of those involved both before and after these finite endpoints. Though (most) say the French Revolution \"began\" in 1789, it's important to know that political unrest had been ramping up for about 40 years at that point, with dissatisfaction with the monarchy dating back even further. My point here is that while it might feel \"sudden\" to those of us studying the Revolution, this about-face on the monarchy certainly wasn't *as* sudden as we sometimes think, as we visualize it as a two-year turnaround rather than an event that had been building for decades.\n\nOkay, onto the Revolution itself. There are a few events that I think deserve special mention to explain why the tenor of debate went from \"how to make existing government and social structure better\" to \"nah screw this it's Republic time\". In no particular order they are Louis XVI's (who he was as a ruler), his disastrous Flight to Varennes, and the War with Austria and Prussia. Now entire books are written about each of these subjects individually, but I will try to give a brief overview of why and how each of these contributed to the radicalization of the Revolution.\n\nFirst let's start with Louis himself. I think Mike Duncan summed him up very well in his *Revolutions* podcast on the French Revolution (highly recommend) \"Louis wasn't a bad man, and he wasn't even a particularly a bad king. He was however a terrible crisis manager, in what could be considered one of the world's worst crisis.\" The old cliché that Louis could never make up him mind about anything does seem to be true-- at least in part. While in private it does appear Louis had a clear vision for how he wanted things to run, (and surprisingly his personal views seem more liberal than you'd imagine, as he was an avid Enlightenment reader), in public Louis just failed to commit. When things got tough, when Louis ran into resistance, he tended to fold. I think the best way to describe Louis was a people-pleaser. He wanted to be liked, he wanted to 'do the right thing', but by trying to please everyone he wound up jumping back and forth between different positions. This vacilation entirely destablized the regime in a time when the monarchy desperately needed a rock to hold the nation together. We see periods throughout the early Revolution, what could be termed the \"Constitutional Monarchy\" phase of the Revolution, where Louis seems ready and willing to be a Citizen King-- and the people seem overjoyed to accept him as such. But Louis just couldn't decide which way he wanted to go. Louis does things like refuse to sign the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, even after he said he would. Then the Women's March on Versailles in October 1789 *forces* him to do so as part of a larger capitulation... so did he really want to, or was his hand forced? Then you the great battle over the royal veto-- a *huge* turning point in the struggle for power between the right and left in the National Assembly. The conservatives were pushing hard for a full, unequivocal royal veto, which would have given Louis essentially the power of an absolute monarch. The left on the other hand was pushing for *no* veto whatsoever, which would have relegated Louis to figurehead status. The battle was by no means decided, and indeed those in the middle, spooked by recent popular unrest, seemed to be moving towards the right rather than the left, when out of no where Louis steps in and lets them know he'd be open to a compromise whereby he gets a veto, but there are strings attached (such as having to wait multiple legislative sessions in order to wield it, severly lessening its effectiveness). After that, the right could hardly continue to champion for a full veto when the king himself was saying he was open to a partial veto, and so this compromise won the day. Finally we have what appeared to many at the time to be *the* proof of Louis's commitment to the Revolution: the Fete de la Federation, the great festival held on the Champs de Mars in 1790 to celebrate the anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille. Amid enormous fanfare, in a solemn ceremony, Louis swore to uphold the still-in-the-works Constitution (to be called the \"Constitution of 1791\") and to protect the gains of the Revolution. He was no longer Louis XVI, King of France and Navarre, but Louis XVI, King of the French. This honeymoon period didn't last for long. Though the Fete helped paper over the cracks for a while (like going on a fun vacation with a spouse you've recently been fighting with), thigns quickly resumed their hot-and-cold nature. Louis, and particularly his Queen Marie-Antoinette, began to walk back some promises they had made, and didn't act quite like devoted monarchs of a beloved people, but more like prisoners wishing to escape the masses. A poignant scene was when the royal family tried to leave for their chateau in Saint Cloud, a suburb outside of Paris, for the Easter holiday in 1791 and were prevented from leaving by suspicious crowds. It is said that this was about the time Louis & Marie-Antoinette began to plan, with the help of loyal courtiers, their comedy of errors escape attempt, the event known to posterity as the Flight to Varennes.\n\nNow I place the Flight to Varennes as a cause of radicalization all its own due to the fact that it was more than an extension of Louis just being an impotent king. The Flight to Varennes appears to be an event where those of us looking back can draw a pretty definied line in the sand, and say \"before 20 June 1791, tense, shaky willingness to accept and work with the king. After 21 June 1791, widespread rejection of the king\". Like the saying goes, trust takes years to build, and seconds to demolish. Well in making the decision to flee Paris in the middle of the night on 20 June, 1791, Louis completely shred up whatever good will and trust he still had with the people of France. As someone who has studied this radicalization of the French Revolution extensively, I find it very compelling to identify the Flight to Varennes as *the* point when radicalization began, though there are certainly other points of view here that others find more fruitful. If anyone is interested further, this is not an original idea of mine, but rather an argument to be found in the fantastic book *When the King Took Flight* by historian Timothy Tackett. I highly recommend the book, not only for how fascinating the subject matter is, but because Dr. Tackett manages to write good, solid history in a way that is accessible and interesting to those new to the subject. For those not familiar with the Flight to Varennes, it was the royal family's attempt to escape from Paris in the middle of the night (yes, costumes were involved) and flee to Montmedey, a fortress on the Austrian border. The idea was to meet up with a loyal army garrison, and to ???. We can only speculate, but given correspondence that was found after the King was hauled back to Paris and taken prisoner it is clear that the King wished to \"restore order\", and that this \"order\" would have taken the form of an almost wholesale repudiation of the Revolution he had so recently sworn to uphold. As it was the King was caught in the town of Varennes, and hauled ignobly back to Paris. \n\n(Continued in comment below!)", "created_utc": 1598822569, "distinguished": null, "id": "g3ef7gy", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ijfvro/french_revolution_at_first_didnt_aim_to_abolish/g3ef7gy/", "score": 12 }, { "body": "I am not a specialist of the French Revolution, but there are a few things that can explain the failure of the reforms taken by the National Assembly between 1789 and 1792, and the radicalization of the revolutionary movement.\n\n**(1) A financial crisis.** The calling of the Estates General in 1789 was rendered necessary by the need for financial reforms in the Kingdom. The State was heavily indebted, while incapable of developing a functional taxation system. This led to two major crisis : one monetary as there was shortages of silver and coins, one inflationary as the grain supply was used both as a tool to refinance the state and as a way for speculators to make profit while the harvests of both 1788 and 1789 were disastrous (blame climate). These problems were neither solved by the King nor the National Assembly. In fact, they lasted during the whole Revolution, even into the reign of Napoleon, and they kept putting people (and mostly the citizens of Paris) on the brink of despair and prone to take the streets and ask for more radical actions to be taken.", "created_utc": 1598821264, "distinguished": null, "id": "g3ec79s", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ijfvro/french_revolution_at_first_didnt_aim_to_abolish/g3ec79s/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "The article 23 of the Title XXV of the Criminal Ordinance of 1670, which codified criminal law in France until the Revolution, stated that: \n\n> If any woman before or after being sentenced to death appears or declares to be pregnant, the judges shall order that she be visited by matrons who shall be appointed ex officio, and who shall make their report in the form prescribed for experts by our ordinance of April 1667: and if she is found to be pregnant, the execution shall be deferred until after her delivery.\n\nThe ordinance was abrogated in October 1789, and replaced by the Penal Code of 1791, which had no provision for pregnant women. So, from 1791 to 1810 (when the Revolutionary code was replaced by the Napoleonic code), it should have been legal to execute pregnant women. \n\nHowever, this is not what happened. In Paris, the Tribunal Révolutionnaire, which started its operation in April 1793, basically followed the 1670 ordinance. Between April 1793 to the fall of Robespierre on 27 July 1794, the Tribunal tried 579 women, 387 of whom it condemned to death (Brown, 1995). To put this number in perspective, the Tribunal sent more than 2500 people to their death and the nationwide toll of the Terror is estimated to be about 300,000 deaths. \n\nIn 1911, doctor and historian Max Billard wrote an extensive account titled \n*Les femmes enceintes devant le tribunal révolutionnaire : d'après des documents inédits* (Pregnant women brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, based on unpublished documents), which chronicles the fates of many women who tried to escape their death sentence by claiming pregnancy. The book is written in a (not very scholarly) florid prose, but it provides a wealth of documents - letters and court orders.\n\nAs noted above, the process followed by the Revolutionary Tribunal was that outlined in the Ordinance of 1670. A woman who had been sentenced to death and claimed to be pregnant was sent to the Archbishop's Palace of Paris (next to the cathedral Notre Dame de Paris), which had been turned into the prison-hospice of the Tribunal. She was put in the women's ward and examined by the hospice's doctors and a midwife, and sometimes by the hospice's pharmacist, a dubious character named Quinquet, whose behaviour alarmed Ray, the hospice's bursar, who wrote to the Commissar in charge of police and justice administration:\n\n> Citizen... The chief pharmacist should not concern himself in any way with the sick and with diseases, to which he is much less attentive than to his pharmacy; We have seen him set himself up as a health officer, sign reports often dictated by passion, and even visit women who were declared to be one month or six weeks pregnant, more or less, and who were nonetheless taken to their deaths, even though medicine has always agreed that it is impossible to pronounce a certain judgement on the pregnancy or non-pregnancy of a woman before four and a half months; such conduct in the person of a man who has no knowledge in this area can only be the fruit of libertinism. You may, Citizen Commissar, convince yourself of the truth of all these facts when you see fit. Greetings and brotherhood.\n\nOne doctor, Bayard, was reportedly more humane than his peers, and, according to a witness, tried to convince the Tribunal that it was not possible to conclude about a pregnancy before 4.5-5 months, and that women who said they were pregnant should be believed. He also (allegedly) tried to hide the birth of a child to gain time, but the woman was executed nonetheless. In any case, as shown by the records, the \"humane\" Bayard also signed certificates of end of pregnancy/non-pregnancy that led to executions.\n\nWomen who were not found to be pregnant were indeed quickly executed. In his book, Billard lists twelve women who had said to be pregnant and were executed after the doctors had concluded they were not pregnant, or that they could not be sure of their pregnancy. In the case of Olympe de Gouges, she had been arrested on 20 July 1793 and condemned to death on 2 November. After she had claimed to be pregnant, she was examined by the doctors Naury and Théry and the midwife Paquin, who concluded that her pregnancy was too recent for them to give an opinion. Prosecutor Fouquier-Tinville ruled that she could not be pregnant since she had been jailed for five months and that \"no communication between men and women\" was possible in prison, and he ordered her to be executed the next day. The princess of Monaco, who had also claimed to be pregnant, wrote to Fouquier-Tinville, immediately after her examination, that she had lied to him: she had used the extra day to try to send letters to her daugthers, and she did not want to be shamed for having been \"impure\". Princess Lubomirska tried (allegedly) to have another prisoner, the Abbot de Tremouille, make her pregnant, but both were denounced by a nurse and executed. During his own trial, Fouquier-Tinville was accused of having sent to their death women whose pregnancy status could not be established.\n\nAccording to Billard, there were two cases in Paris of women who were found pregnant, taken back to prison, and executed after they had given birth: Mrs Quétineau and Mrs Roger. Quétineau had a miscarriage while Roger had a normal delivery. They were executed together, roughly a month after the birth, once they were juged \"fully recovered\". Billard cites a third case in Nantes, that of Mrs de La Roche Saint-André, who claimed that she was pregnant while climbing on the scaffold. She was put back in prison, gave birth to a child who died after a few weeks, and she was executed.\n\nIn June 1794, the Law of 22 Prairial (10 June) simplified the judicial process. Due to time constraints, the doctors no longer examined women who claimed to be pregnant - only convicted women whose pregnancies were visible were now taken to the hospice - and it is therefore very likely that many accused women who had been in contact with men during their detention and were expecting a child were convicted and executed (Bouland, 2018).\n\nHowever, the fall of Robespierre (almost) put a stop to the executions of potentially pregnant women. Claire Sévin, a prostitute, gave birth in August 1794. As she was about to be guillotined, she tried to escape and broke her leg. She was put back in prison, where she wrote letters asking for her release (\"Times have changed, death is no longer on the agenda\"), and she was eventually set free. \n\nMid-September 1794, poet and lawyer Pons de Verdun proposed a decree with the following articles:\n\n> Art. I. - In the future, no woman accused of a crime carrying the death penalty may be put on trial unless it has been verified in the ordinary way that she is not pregnant.\n\n> Art. II - The provisional stay of execution of any death sentence passed on women whose execution has been suspended because of pregnancy or shall be declared definitive.\n\nThe decree was voted by the Convention, and, in the following months, sixteen women whose pregnancy had deferred their execution were released.\n\nThe Napoleonic Penal Code, which replaced the Revolutionary code in 1810, reinstated the clause about pregnancy:\n\n> If a woman sentenced to death declares herself pregnant and it is verified that she is pregnant, she will not be sentenced until after her delivery.\n\nThis was unchanged until 1981, when death penalty was abolished in France.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* Billard, Max. Les femmes enceintes devant le tribunal révolutionnaire : d’après des documents inédits. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1911. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58220374.\n* Boulant, Antoine. Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire. Hors collection. Perrin, 2018. https://www.cairn.info/le-tribunal-revolutionnaire--9782262070199-page-177.htm.\n* Brown, Stephanie. “Defending Their Lives : Women Present Their Cases to the Revolutionary Tribunal, March 1793—Thermidor Year II.” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History 23 (1995): 442–48.\n* Le Grand, Léon. “L’Hospice Du Tribunal Révolutionnaire” Revue des Questions Historiques (July 1890): 133–73.", "created_utc": 1619282569, "distinguished": null, "id": "gvq48vc", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/mwf1yn/during_the_french_revolution_olympic_de_gouges/gvq48vc/", "score": 8 }, { "body": "So I can't change the title apparently, but her name was Olympe. Autocorrect messed me up.", "created_utc": 1619142377, "distinguished": null, "id": "gvinwlk", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/mwf1yn/during_the_french_revolution_olympic_de_gouges/gvinwlk/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "Hello!\n\nThe verification of memebers was actually just a bit of routine, clerical minutiae-- it was merely a \"roll-call\" to verify who was in attendance from each delegation, and to verify that this was indeed the person expected based upon election results. It was a benign procedure for what it was: checking that yes, you are Maximilien Robespierre and that you were indeed elected from Arras, and you are a member of the Third Estate. Onto the next.\n\n*However* because it's the French Revolution we crank everything up to 11 and make it far more exciting than that!\n\nBut first a little background is necessary to understand the context. The last Estates General had been convened back in 1614. Due to this last meeting being in the misty past (for reference the span was 175 years. Going back 175 years from today would but us *before* the Revolutions of 1848, let alone the Civil War in the United States) there was talk that perhaps they should spruce up the rules a bit. The traditional Estates General was a meeting of the Three Estates: the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Everyone-elsers (more realistically upper middle class). The way this body worked was that an equal number of delegates were elected to each Estate, and then votes were taken by Order; in other words each Estate got one vote. Sounds equal, right?\n\nWell the problem was this \"equality\" was undermined by the fact that the Third Estate represented somewhere around 97% of the population of France, whereas the Nobility and the Clergy comprised that leftover 3%. What made the Vote by Order particularly egregious was that the Clergymen who were elected to the First Estate, usually bishops, abbots, and other high-rung church officials, were almost uniformly from noble families. This meant that the First and Second Estate in essence comprised a voting block, as it would have been rare to see an issue that they didn't agree on. Therefore the Third Estate not only had a tiny percentage of delegates representing most of the nation, but they also were forever going to be outvoted by the other two orders.\n\nSo fast-forward to 1788. A popular call had gone around to \"Double the Third and Vote by Head!\" This rallying cry aimed to effect two changes in the upcoming Estates General. First, they wanted to double the representation of the Third Estate. As in, if the First Estate and Second Estate got to elect 50 dudes apiece, than the Third Estate would then get to elect 100. The second call was arguably the more important of the two, and that was a Vote by *Head* rather than by *Order*. This would be critical, for even if the Third's representation was doubled (as it was officially by the monarchy ahead of elections) if the Vote by Head wasn't secured than you'd just have more guys pissed off when their singular Order vote was shot down by the other two Orders. Critically, Louis's ministry failed to make a decision on the Vote by Head / Vote by Order debate even as the Estates General got under way. We can't be certain of motives, but it appears as if by not making a decision, Louis was hoping to foist that decision upon someone else-- or even better upon the Estates General itself. This was a fatal miscalculation, and probably one of the biggest blunders of the Revolution.\n\nOkay now that we've got the necessary background, let's kick off the Estates General, cosplaying as a member of the Third Estate:\n\nWe have a dilemma. The King sanctioned the doubling of the Third, but the ministry has not yet made a decision on Voting by Order, or Voting by Head. It's been hinted that perhaps a combination of the two would work, but we know what will happen: if we convenve as the 'traditional' Estates General then the first two Estates will just charge forward, outmaneuvering us and overruling us at every turn. \n\nIt's our first official day in the Estates General (yesterday was a procession and some boring speeches), and the first piece of business given to us is to break up into separate orders and verify credentials (i.e. read down the list of names, have delegates submit proof of who they were, etc.). This was a task that has traditionally been done by Order, and so the First and Second Estates have made their way off into their own rooms to verify credentials separately. However, we, the Third Estate delegates, have a plan. In separate verification of credentials we see a big hairy rat. The moment we verify ourselves separately, we fear the \"Vote by Head\" movement will be all over. Business would continually be done by Order, and nothing will change.\n\nInstead, our Third Estate leadership has put it around that instead of verifying by *order*, we will insist on verification by *head*. The roll-call should be done in a large room by *everyone* as a body-- not as separate orders. We will be clear that until this was done, we will inact no business. We have now turned the \"verification of credentials\" from a boring clerical task to, arguably, the start of the Revolution.\n\nSo it was that the Third Estate's delegates decided from Day One that they would conduct no official business until the Estates General met as a body to verify credentials. Of course the First and Second Estates carried on and ignored this call, but as the days and weeks wore on it became clear that action needed to happen, and eventually the walls started to crumble. A delegation of First Estate delegates came to join the self-styled \"National Assembly\", followed by a group of liberal nobles. Eventually the King would order all those who hadn't joined the National Assembly to do so, effectively sanctioning the Vote by Head-- way, *way*, too late. After the Revolution had already begun.\n\nThe importance of the move-- to forgo verification of credentials as separate orders-- cannot be understated. There is plenty more here that I didn't touch on due to the massive breadth of the subject, but I hope this answered and expanded upon your initial question! Let me know if you have further questions.", "created_utc": 1597255724, "distinguished": null, "id": "g18m0fw", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/i8de8w/the_1789_french_revolution_began_with_the/g18m0fw/", "score": 22 } ]

[ { "body": "The guillotine was used during the Revolution in the same way as the lethal injection or the electric chair was used in the 20th century. It was not a weapon used to target nobles in general. It was used from 1791 until the abolition of the death penalty in France to execute anyone who had been sentenced to death by a court. The exception to the rule was military tribunals, since they could sentence people to death by firing squad, but the sentence didn't vary because of the class of the condemned person. \n\nThe people who were sentenced were already prisoners before the trial. Unless the execution was delayed, the condemned would be taken from the jail to the place of execution as soon as possible. Speed was important, because the period between the sentence being passed and the death of the condemned was seen as torture. The convicted person would be transported on a cart with their hands bound, and they were escorted by armed guards. \n\nBeyond the physical constraints and force of arms, social norms were probably also an important part of why things went so smoothly most of the time. Even if the revolutionary public thought of you as guilty, your demeanor during the execution would affect their opinion of you. Facing death with dignity was very important, and whether or not you kept your cool was seen as an a direct reflection of your character. If you panic, that's evidence of both guilt and moral shortcomings. If you don't show any fear, that could be seen as evidence that you might have been a good person regardless of your guilt. Calm was seen as an indication of piety and a clean conscience. Reputation and respect was very important to a lot of people, even after death, and that could have been enough to motivate some to go to their death without a fight.", "created_utc": 1609010750, "distinguished": null, "id": "gh3gjuk", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ki9r8j/in_the_french_revolution_how_did_the_commoners/gh3gjuk/", "score": 14 }, { "body": "Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/).\n\n#Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/ki9r8j/in_the_french_revolution_how_did_the_commoners/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. \n\nWe thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written!\n\n\n*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*", "created_utc": 1608658008, "distinguished": "moderator", "id": "ggpjk75", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ki9r8j/in_the_french_revolution_how_did_the_commoners/ggpjk75/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "Great question! As with most things in history... it depends! However it's definitely something we can approach answering!\n\nFor this discussion, I'll keep it specifically tailored to the peasants (aka the vast majority of the population) as per your question, but if you're curious I also did a similar write-up that traced the fortunes of the *sans-culotte* throughout the Revolution: [\"How did life change for the sans-culottes under Thermidor?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/gm7tv2/how_did_life_change_for_the_sans_culottes_under/)\n\nOne important thing to note before starting out, is that the 'French' constituted a massive array of peoples, many of whom had little in common with their 'French' brethren other than that they shared the same king. Interesting side note, but this was a monumental struggle for the Revolutionaries to surmount, in that once they deposed and killed the King, there was very little tying together the patchwork quilt that was France. France was not a monolithic country that had existed from time immemorial-- most of the territories were acquired piecemeal through marriage, inheritance, or conquest, and some territories had been a part of France for less than a century at the time of the Revolution (indeed 'French' was not widely spoken in many areas that had local dialects, or who spoke different languages altogether). These territories were absorbed into the state on various terms depending on how they were acquired. This meant that on the eve of the Revolution each province had its own special rights, responsibilities, and privileges, that could be markedly different from its closest neighbors, let alone those across the vast territory of France.\n\nThis massive variance in pre-Revolutionary life will play a huge factor on how I, a peasant, view the major outcomes of the Revolution. Though the Revolution did many *political* things, like opening up civil service to talent rather than birth or wealth, instituting universal male suffrage (1792), completely restructuring the bureaucracy, completely restructuring the court system, completely restructuring the physical layout of France, and so on, these political gains don't mean much to me. Sure, I nominally can vote, but how the hell am I supposed to do that when the harvest is needing to come in? I can't afford hired hands like some of the wealthier landowners can, my family and I have to do it myself, so I can't go to town and participate in voting that may take weeks! (<---- Not being quaint here, many farmers weren't able to vote if it took place during harvest, given that the two-tiered electoral system meant they'd have to be away from their farm for more than a week).\n\nSo what do I, a peasant care about? What truly effects me? Well most of my life is spent working to pay tithes and taxes and to feed my family, but I do rest on Sundays, and celebrate Saint's Days. So if the Revolutionaries touched anything to do with what I pay, or how I pray, then I'd have feelings about it.\n\n(continued in comment below!)", "created_utc": 1590441136, "distinguished": null, "id": "frt0vff", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/gqghby/was_the_french_revolution_a_net_positive_for_the/frt0vff/", "score": 30 }, { "body": "**Short answer:**\n\nThere is no one answer to this; no single entity \"the peasantry\" with one ledger to net out. The Revolution was vastly different in different places; in some places peasants revolted against it and were suppressed in a bitter civil war. They generally were pleased with the end of feudalism, they just weren't that happy with what replaced it.Wherever they were, many would have died in the quarter century of mass conscription and war between the storming of the Bastille and Waterloo.To the extent that any \"net effect\" can be seen in the countryside- its massive loss of life and the rise of a small peasant farmer/proprietor; a distinctly French but not particularly \"revolutionary\" character.\n\n**Discussion:**\n\nThe impact on the peasantry of the Revolution itself was small compared to the impact of the wars of the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars which follow. France is at war for the better part of the quarter century from the Bastille to Waterloo. For a peasant it would be the endless war, not the Revolution itself, that shaped his experience of life at the time.\n\nWith that said, there are places where the peasants revolted against the Revolution, particularly in the West of France. Rural communities were often deeply attached to their Catholic faith, and the irreligiousity of the Revolution was galling. So you have, for example, the Chouannerie -- the specific incitement that causes the first of the revolts is the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (which effectively nationalize the French Catholic Church)-- this lead to a peasant rebellion in support of their bishop. This is part of a larger revolt in many provinces in the West that continues for years. This civil war is extraordinarily brutal and left a profound scar in the society of the West; it continues to echo in Breton nationalism.\n\nSimilarly, there are places where the peasants are pleased with the abolition of seigneurial rents, but were hostile to the new Revolutionary Republic. While scholarship since the Second World War has tended to emphasize the counter-revolution as part of a historians' battle between Marxists and revisionists, there's a danger of the heterogeneity of rural experience getting lost in the battling agendas. There's no \"net\"-- they liked some changes that occurred, and disliked others and the balance of experience would have varied by place and individual. Peasants as a class wouldn't have weighed the things they liked against the things they didn't in some ledger . . . if your husband and sons were dead, you were worse off; if they survived and you now had a plot of land free of rent, you were better off..\n\nThere is an immense amount of historical work -- most in French -- on the impact of the French Revolution in the countryside, I've included a bibliography in the references \\[ Biard & Bianchi 1999\\] but it's twenty years old now, and more has been published since then. Still a reasonable starting point for anyone trying to get a sense of just how much work has been done in this field.\n\nBut wherever they were, and however they felt about the political goals of the Revolution, peasants everywhere would see their sons conscripted into the armies of France, first for the Revolution, then for the Directory, then for the Consulate, then for Napoleon. The loss of life -- and of wealthy and productivity in the countryside-- would have been the most dramatic \"net\" effect of the Revolution. The numbers are still a subject of historical controversy, but on the high side the 19th century historian Hippolyte Taine finds 3.1 million French deaths in the wars from 1789 to 1815; subsequent inquiries suggest the number may be a bit less, but not a lot less. The death and taxes borne by the French would have been \"their experience of War\".\n\nIts notable that in many places the rural peasantry remained attached to the Bourbons - if not necessarily their direct feudal lords-- and the Catholic Church and opposed urban bourgeois. These animosities persist for decade, and motivate civil violence after the fall of Napoleon.\n\nSome thirty years ago, Charles Issawi an economic historian, attempted to produce a unified \"ledger of the French Revolution\" . . . his assessment of the impact on the countryside remains the most concise and balanced I can cite:\n\n>As for agriculture, the main result of the Revolution and the subsequent wars was that of mass conscription and the acquisition of much land by the peasants. The loss of manpower must have adversely affected agricultural production and was not compensated by mechanization. The effects of redistribution of land were complex. Well before other European countries, France became a land of small peasant proprietors. This probably made its farming less responsive to agricultural improvement, such as was carried out by British landlords and Prussian junkers. Grain yields per acre on comparable land were distinctly lower in France than in England; moreover, for most cereals, yields per acre seem to have declined. \n> \n>Against that, however, must be set the social benefits of diffused and much less unequal landownership - a fact to which, perhaps more than any other, France owed its social stability throughout its successive nineteenth-century revolutions. Peasant ownership is also generally believed to have been a major factor in sharply reducing the birth rate in France, the first such instance in the modern era. At the same time, the wars were not only killing off many potential husbands and fathers but probably leading to the postponement of many marriages, with a consequent decline in fertility. This resulted in a marked slowdown in population growth. From 1781 to 1789 France had nearly three times as many inhabitants as Britain (26.5 million against 9.4 million), but from 1815 to 1824 just over twice as many (30.5 million against 13.9 million), and by the end of the century, the two countries were dead even.\n\nSources:\n\nMann, Patrice. “Les Insurrections Paysannes De L'Ouest: Vendée Et Chouannerie.” *Revue Française De Sociologie*, vol. 30, no. 3/4, 1989, pp. 587–600.\n\nSutherland, Donald. “Chouannerie and Popular Royalism: The Survival of the Counter-Revolutionary Tradition in Upper Brittany.” *Social History*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1984, pp. 351–360.\n\nEdelstein, Melvin, and Michel Vovelle. “LA PLACE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE DANS LA POLITISATION DES PAYSANS.” *Annales Historiques De La Révolution Française*, no. 280, 1990, pp. 135–149.\n\nBiard, Michel, and Serge Bianchi. “LA TERRE ET LES PAYSANS PENDANT LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE UNE ORIENTATION BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE.” *Annales Historiques De La Révolution Française*, no. 315, 1999, pp. 163–182.\n\nJohn Markoff. \"The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French Revolution\". (Pennsylvania State University Press. 1996.)\n\nISSAWI, CHARLES. “The Costs of the French Revolution.” *The American Scholar*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1989, pp. 371–381.", "created_utc": 1590437158, "distinguished": null, "id": "frstbjp", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/gqghby/was_the_french_revolution_a_net_positive_for_the/frstbjp/", "score": 15 } ]

[ { "body": "It's actually quite simple to answer this question for we often mix up \"droit feodal\" (feudalism) and \"droit seigneurial\" (estate customs).\n\nFeudalism was what linked lords together around a suzerain (the king, a duke, the Emperor, etc.) as vassals. That \"system\" encountered growing problems from the 14th to the 15th century. It fell out of order, so to speak, and was gradually replaced by a centralized administration. The great lords of the realm fought against it and it gave way to the well-known Frondes. However, even before Louis XIV definetely put an end to them, absolutism reigned supreme and there was no way back from it. The king of France had a permanent and professional army since 1445, it won him is own realm and many victories against his European counterparts. Dukes, counts and lords became a full part of the administrative machine and feudalism just vanished.\n\nIn 1789, however, they called feudalism what was actually estate or demesne customs. Those customs defined the relationship between a lord and the people living on his land. We're talking here about the famous \"mortemain, aubaine\" and other lordly privileges that grieved the French peasantry on the top of the regular taxes. This is what the Assemblée Nationale abolished, not feudalism *per se* for it'd been dead for over a few centuries. They called it feudalism, but it was not. They mixed up their terminology, maybe on purpose, for feudalism referred to the Middle Ages and that was deemed as properly backwards since the Lumières trashed it as the \"Gothic era\" (a barbarian period named after the most barbaric people, the Goths). Why do we still say, in French, that something is \"moyenâgeux\" when we want to speak ill of it? Because anything medieval was \"bad\" and feudalism was properly medieval, it was in the way of progress. You couldn't go against the notion of \"seigneur\" as easily though for the king (originally) was to remain in place and noblemen, who pleaded for the adoption of human rights such as La Fayette, didn't expect nor wished to see their heads roll (though they eventually did). Lords were not the enemy: feudalism was. Nevertheless, what was abolished was the \"droit seigneurial\" and not the \"droit féodal\" which had fallen out of use for a long time by then.\n\nTo answer your questions\n\n1. Yes, when a king isn't able to administrate the entirety of his realm but has conceded parts of it to noblemen. The example of the \"apanages\" comes to mind. Great chunks of the French kingdom (the duchy of Berry, of Burgundy, of Bourbon, of Anjou, and others) had been \"gifted\" by the king to his relatives for as long as they'd have direct male heirs. This saw the rise of parallel administrations within the realm and expressions such as \"the Burgundian State(s)\". This was around the 14th and 15th century and clearly showed the limitations of feudalism which could only collapse on the long run.\n2. I don't think vassalage was abolished *per se* but lords gradually lost more and more rights over their lands. As the king extended his demesne and fortified his administration, dukes, counts and lords lost the right to give justice in the name of the king (the parliaments took charge of it) or the privilege to command armies, wage war and police the land (governors had that mission--but only noblemen could become governors). Once Louis XIV invited all of French nobility to live at Versailles, they were unrooted from their lands and lost most of their local influence. Feudalism was no more.\n3. If we come to define feudalism as Max Weber puts it, we could argue that feudalism never died out and still survives somehow within the frame and on the margins of our modern democracy and bureaucratic system of power. But that'd bring the discussion too far.\n4. No.", "created_utc": 1609210412, "distinguished": null, "id": "ghcrypn", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/klz20b/was_france_feudal_right_before_the_french/ghcrypn/", "score": 9 } ]

[ { "body": "This may be more to do with the aftermath of the Revolution, but I'm wondering to what extent you'd agree with J. Keane's assertion that in terms of its foreign policy the Revolutionary Republic can be understood as an \"imperial democracy\", similar to 5th century BC Athens and the US from the late 20th century?", "created_utc": 1484333383, "distinguished": null, "id": "dcdxfg7", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/5nrsuo/ama_the_french_revolution_history_interpretation/dcdxfg7/", "score": 24 }, { "body": "Thanks!\n\nAs I understand it, Marxist historians have traditionally interpreted the French Revolution as a class war between the aristocrats and the bourgeoise, which led to capitalism supplanting feudalism according to the traditional Marxist schema of historical progress. Is there academic consensus about the driving force of the French Revolution, its winners and losers, and its place in the *longue durée*?\n ", "created_utc": 1484337724, "distinguished": null, "id": "dce1btp", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/5nrsuo/ama_the_french_revolution_history_interpretation/dce1btp/", "score": 19 }, { "body": "David! It's been a pleasure interacting with you on twitter (I'm @historyofporn). So, in a shocking development, I am here to ask you about Marie Antoinette's love life. Of course Robert Darnton et. al. have doing their job of claiming that the torrid (and obscene) pamphlets and libels (fake news? too far?) against Marie Antoinette played a major role in inspiring the French public, especially the reading classes, to rise up against a Queen and a system they saw as so immoral and criminal. My question to you is if you find this \"Underground\" thesis convincing?", "created_utc": 1484330910, "distinguished": null, "id": "dcdv72a", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/5nrsuo/ama_the_french_revolution_history_interpretation/dcdv72a/", "score": 15 } ]

[ { "body": "Your question presumes the idea of 'progress' - that history is a linear development slowly building up to the world we have today, and past events should be remembered primarily in terms of how they led us here. This view is far from uncommon, but historians need to be very careful not to project modern values and assumptions backwards onto the past. The French Revolution was immensely significant *at the time* because it changed Europe socially, politically, militarily and ideologically. Many of those changes are still with us, others have faded away or been overtaken by subsequent changes.\n\nPolitically, socially and ideologically, the French Revolution is often credited as the birth of the modern nation-state. It began a process whereby the inhabitants of France actually became French, giving people a sense of national identity and standardising language, culture and administration. It changed people's political identity by both expanding it horizontally (no longer just Norman or Parisian, now *French*) but also vertically (not just a peasant, now a citizen). In doing so, it swept away the last cobwebs of the middle ages. By then exporting the revolution intellectually (Jacobinism) and militarily (Napoleon) this process was echoed across the continent. For example, the Holy Roman Empire was finally dissolved.\n\nMilitarily, the creation of a nation meant the possibility of a national army. With the *levee en masse* (conscription) Napoleonic France completely changed how war was fought. Gone was the gentlemanly manouvre of small professional armies. Instead, huge armies of enthusiastic patriots able to break free from supply lines and 'live off the land', only to come together and overwhelm the enemy in massed column melee attacks. As Napoleon put it: \"You cannot stop me; I spend 30,000 lives a month.\" Even bulwarks of monarchical conservatism such as Prussia were forced to respond by imitating the French militarily, but conscription isn't something the army can just *do* - ultimately, the state of Prussia had to make significant domestic political and social concessions as a result.\n\nIn summary, the French Revolution *created* the nation-state of France. Then, it gave Napoleon the tools to export that Revolution. By a combination of direct imposition and indirect imitation, this had a significant impact on countries across Europe.", "created_utc": 1557501190, "distinguished": null, "id": "en0wza9", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/bmw7ee/if_the_french_revolution_didnt_see_the/en0wza9/", "score": 238 } ]

[ { "body": "While we wait for someone more versed in the French side of the conflict to make a recommendation, I can suggest [*The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, vol. 1*] (https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/morris-the-diary-and-letters-of-gouverneur-morris-vol-1) who lived through most of it as our fourth Minister to France. While he gained that title in June of 1792, he actually landed in France 27 Jan 1789, a Tuesday, after 40 days travelling (Jefferson left Sept 1789 and William Short served as Minister between the two). The Bastille would be overrun about six months later and at one point in the chaos his wooden leg got him out of a pinch;\n\n>Owing to this accident [of losing a leg], when he was presented at Court at Paris he asked to be allowed to appear without a sword, and, though a serious departure from court etiquette, the favor was granted. During one of the years of his ministry in Paris, when carriages were abolished as being aristocratic, and the chances were against the escape of any person discovered driving in one, Morris, who seems always to have defied the mob though by no means averse to saving his life, drove through the streets followed by hoots and cries of, “An aristocrat,” and, quietly opening the door of his carriage, thrust out his wooden leg, and said: “An aristocrat! yes, truly, who lost his leg in the cause of American liberty;” whereat followed great applause from the mob.\n\nI've read some more outlandish versions of the tale, but that's the story from this book. It's generally considered the best American account of the events of the French Revolution as they happened.\n\nE to fix link", "created_utc": 1610734215, "distinguished": null, "id": "gjd8g9c", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/kxsn3k/any_good_books_about_the_french_revolution/gjd8g9c/", "score": 2 }, { "body": "I'm assuming that English is most people's preferred language here in order to narrow down a list of works that have been translated. I'll focus on the period 1795-onwards which I'm more familiar with.\n\nThe big monolithic French titans that are Napoleon and Chateaubriand both have memoirs (if you're charitable, as I'll explain). Since these are the most easily available, let's get them out of the way.", "created_utc": 1610898011, "distinguished": null, "id": "gjlot3y", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/kxsn3k/any_good_books_about_the_french_revolution/gjlot3y/", "score": 2 } ]

[ { "body": "*Disclaimers: Let me start by saying that assessing the question of whether propagandistic material aimed at altering French identity has proliferated in recent years is beyond the scope of this subreddit, as we'd be discussing events younger than two-decades-old. I should also take this time to mention that I haven't finished the game yet, so I can't address events in the plot beyond a certain point.*\n\nLet me begin by giving a brief \"the story so far\" regarding Assassin's Creed for any French Revolution scholars who might read this but haven't played the game. The Assassin's Creed series follows a hidden conflict between two groups that have ostensibly operated in the shadows since the beginning of human history: the Assassins and the Templars. Without wishing to get too far into it, in the overarching backstory humanity is a former slave race of a progenitor species that died out before our recorded history began; the Assassins wish to use the legacy of our creators to ensure absolute freedom for all, the Templars want to use it to restore the absolutist \"utopian\" order to human-kind that we \"enjoyed\" while slaves to our creators. Most of the games center around using the genetic memories (I know, a soft-science nightmare) of the protagonist to explore the life of one of their ancestors, usually to find some piece of this progenitor technology that had been hidden some time during the events covered. This should give you some idea of the level of historical accuracy that one can expect off the bat.\n\nSo how accurate is the portrayal of the revolution? Well, it's a mixed bag, but I think we can usefully divide this answer into \"passive portrayal\" and \"active portrayal.\" In terms of passive portrayal, which is to say the visual representation of Paris in the 1790s and the activities of crowds on the street (as opposed to the \"active\" portrayal presented by named characters with dialog), things look pretty good. Playing it I've been impressed with how much the city looks like the descriptions I've always read, I've been impressed with how good the clothes look, and in general with the generally life-like depiction of Parisian life. More impressive, and to my mind illuminating, is the depiction of crowds, the behavior of crowds, and the general integration of revolutionary activity into the daily street life of Paris. I'm an economic and political historian, though, and not a cultural one, so the possibility exists that the game is riddled with subtle inaccuracies that I'm simply not equipped to perceive.\n\nLet's talk about the politics, and the \"active\" portrayal of the Revolution. The truth is that the French Revolution did have a huge amount of horrific violence on the part of the revolutionaries, but we should also note that the nobility weren't exactly the most delightful people either. That said, thinking of the revolutionaries as bloodthirsty, mindless killers is wrong as well. While we have episodes in the cultural memory of events like the death of Princess Marie ~~Louise~~ *Therese* (what actually happened isn't totally clear, but the most popular story is that after she was beheaded her body was mutilated and her head placed on a pike and paraded beneath the window of her close friend Marie Antoinette), there's a reason why the French Revolution is regarded as, among other things, being a superior case for studying the politics of group violence and the psychology of crowds; the violence of the Revolution is best regarded as mostly hysterical acts of a public freed of the constraints of the normal social order. Most of the evidence available suggests that the Revolutionaries were just people, frightened and angry, caught up in the madness that our species seems to suffer from when too many of us gather in one place, rather than monsters who took some special pleasure in beheading the king and his family.\n\nOff the bat, I'm inclined to agree with the pundits. All of the nobility I've met so far have appeared to be, at worst, fops (with the exception of the Marquis de Sade). On the other hand, we have examples of named revolutionaries like Sivert (at best an ugly, uncultured thug and betrayer) and La Touche (who is straight-up a monster). These men aren't otherwise good people caught up in revolutionary fervor, or even really bad men who've slipped the leash due to the breakdown in normative social order; they're cartoon villains, engaging in ostentatious evil. Now, you could say that these characters are also Templars, but we also see noblemen who are Templars, don't we? And those Templars in general seem to be much more sympathetic, like de la Serre. I actually haven't met the King of France, yet, so I'm really not sure how he's portrayed. Given the villains that are lined up against him, and the series' penchant for good men brought low by evil men, I can guess how he'll appear.\n\nLet's pull back, a little, and examine Assassin's Creed as a whole for it's historiographic value. On the one hand, the writers have always been pretty good at weaving the actions of the protagonists pretty deftly *between* the important historical events being portrayed in the game, which in previous installments have often done a good job of seeming morally ambiguous. On the other hand, we're talking about a series of stories in which the Templars are responsible for arranging pretty much every single violent conflict in human history (I recently learned from the wiki that apparently most of the events of the Cold War were the Templar's doing, for instance) with the goal of controlling humanity through ancient technology. The point of all of this is that I'm prepared to suggest that rather than being propaganda, the portrayal of the French Revolution in AC: Unity is bad writing. If the Templars have to be behind the Revolution (as they are behind everything), and the Templars are cartoon villains (which they sure are), then obviously the Revolutionaries are going to fall into one of two categories: dupes, or moustache-twirlers.\n\nI'm not totally sure how to add citations to my discussion of a videogame, but some good books to read about the French Revolution that would help you contextualize its portrayal in Assassin's Creed, try *The Great Cat Massacre* (Darnton), *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Weber). The Great Cat Massacre is an especially good one, as it deals with how acts of violence that we would otherwise find abhorrent become normalized in the kind of environment that produced the French Revolution.\n\n**TL;DR**: While most of the main events from history are present in the plot, you don't need to know much about the history of the French Revolution to see that the Revolutionaries are often being portrayed as cartoonishly evil.", "created_utc": 1416496136, "distinguished": null, "id": "cm7zei4", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2mv3cv/there_is_a_hot_debate_in_france_about_the/cm7zei4/", "score": 539 }, { "body": "Wow is that ever complicated. I should preface this by saying I haven't played the game yet. I game on a PC and, by all accounts, I need to wait for Ubisoft to issue some patches before I bother to install it.\n\nThat said, the French Revolution exists in several phases. The first phase is primarily political and financial and is reactionary to the policies, excesses, and fiscal failures of the monarchy. That phase has very little in the way of physical violence. \n\nIt's not until well after the storming of the Bastille (which was, itself, pretty tame as revolutionary skirmishes go) that things start to go off the rails. Indeed, Martyn Lyons (France under the Directory - 1975) argues that the major impetus towards the extreme violence that characterized the middle period of the Revolution was not revolutionary fervor in response to the old regime but the **defense** of the revolution's political gains from attacks by reactionary powers.\n\nNow why those reactionary powers were reactionary is a worthwhile discussion in and of itself. Remember that the various Royal Families of Europe were, at this point, all pretty much cousins and that while a Catherine the Great was of real concern to the powers of Western Europe, the fall of the monarchy in France was simultaneously weird and more than a little frightening. The notion of the spread of revolutionary ideas was not unknown in Europe at this time (the Protestant Revolution was not so far in the rear view mirror) and this was a *political* revolution. \n\nBut not only did the revolutionaries make enemies of the monarchs of Europe - they also antagonized the Catholic Church. In a fit of revolutionary radicalism the Church had already been declared more or less subservient to the state and taken the ax to tithes and church property. This in conjuction with serious economic issues, strife between the urban and rural populations, and continued resistance from the King in accepting his position within what looked a lot like a Constitutional Monarchy brought everything to a head.\n\nA lot of people thought that the gains of the revolution were under attack and that they needed to defend them if they wanted to keep them. Massacres, purges, wars, executions, and eventually a Reign of Terror followed. Once the system of legitimate authority broke down there was a disorganized struggle for political and marshall control of Paris and France which followed. \n\nI think it's worth pointing out that a lot of the consternation about Unity comes from the promotional video which portrays angry mobs storming the Bastille. There is also concern about the portrayal of Robespierre but the series has a history of showing often lauded historical figures as conflicted and complex with a range of motivations and that portrayal, while ahistorical insofar as it relates to the fictitious struggle between Assassins and Templars, is a good reminder of something that often blindsides us in popular history. \n\nThe people who fought for the Revolution be it in Paris or the British Colonies were complex individuals. They did not set out to champion high minded ideals and die on the alter of Liberty; they sought real and tangible gains for themselves and their families. The appropriated for themselves the language of liberty, fraternity, and equality and while we often cast them in the hero's mantles they took up for themselves, they were every bit as complex and multidimensional as you or I or anyone who is influencing global politics today. \n\nWhat Ubisoft is doing is taking advantage of our one-dimensional view of these people and projecting their own complexities informed by their fictional story line upon them. While the story telling in the AC series certainly casts the Assassins as \"us\" and the Templars as \"them,\" from an objective viewpoint it is nearly impossible within the game to determine who is \"good\" and who is \"bad.\"\n\nHell, in the previous game you played a pirate and, if you were even remotely paying attention to the way the game played, you murdered thousands of innocent sailors and merchantmen to get enough money to buy a fancier set of sails. \"Good\" and \"bad\" don't apply terribly well to the stories the AC series tells.", "created_utc": 1416497149, "distinguished": null, "id": "cm7zvpd", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2mv3cv/there_is_a_hot_debate_in_france_about_the/cm7zvpd/", "score": 83 }, { "body": "It is important to remember that the French Revolution spanned several incarnations and several decades- therefore at different points different groups had different goals. An essentialist view of the Revolution as simply the ousting of a fat idiotic Louis XVI and a spendthrift Marie Antoinette is problematic. This view is in line, however, with most representations of the Revolution by the non-French (à la Marie Antoinette in Sophia Coppola's film and the 1938 van Dyke production with Norma Sheerer).\n\nThe Ancien Règime was full of nobles wasting money and ending up in debt. Not just debt like we can conceive of today but debts that were substantial and there was no real system for the working class to claim them. The King was expected to house most aristocrats at Versailles, and the aristocrats housed at Versailles were expected to stay up to date with the fashions of the time (most dresses were only worn once, food was prepared to display wealth not taste good -[this is a link to The Supersizers Eat...The French Revolution](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQlanfOun64), a BBC show about recreating the diets of different periods in history) and all under the assumption that they were superior by blood. \n\nThese thoughts about superiority (the King being chosen by God and the Queen being superior by blood) also informed the early stages of the Revolution. The peasants did not want to abolish the monarchy per se, but the chaos created by the lack of clear desired outcomes really sent everyone into a frenzy to save their own asses and the working classes into a frenzy to change the powers that governed them. Nobles mass-printed propaganda against each other (and the Queen)-even funding Revolutionaries once it was clear that the monarchy was to be removed.\n\nThe problem in representing the Revolution is not that the aristocrats weren't positive and the mob wasn't negative, but that this was an extremely bloody, confusing, and complex time. \n\nIn regards to the claim that there is propaganda aiming to minimize the importance of the Revolution in the French identity... I will admit to not having seen it/been in discussions about it but having been in France during the election of Hollande and having seen the recent disapproval of his term it was interesting to me how many French people I spoke to rallied around some sort of idea of a revolution against the government. Certainly the Revolution in France brings to mind the Frontier in America (think Turner and his thoughts on the transformation of Europeans into Americans)- it may be viewed as the founding event of a modern French identity (and interestingly enough one that is not strictly tied to specific racial identities). \n\nThanks for posting the articles and threads! Interesting read.\n\n\nEdited for grammar.", "created_utc": 1416498511, "distinguished": null, "id": "cm80k9g", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2mv3cv/there_is_a_hot_debate_in_france_about_the/cm80k9g/", "score": 18 } ]

[ { "body": "Duncan was likely talking in the longer term here as opposed to this being actively in the works at the time of the revolution. There were some ambition when the War of the First Coalition came around that the British hoped that with everyone attacking the French they might be able to keep some permanent holdings around somewhere like Dunkirk to have a toe hold on the continent. Likewise the Prussians had their eye on Alsace which was French controlled territory within the Holy Roman Empire legally speaking and they were after carving off a little toe hold on the west bank of the Rhine and not for the last time either. But there was not yet anything being so actively organised as the partition of Poland.\n\nBut while French power was evidently in decline before the revolution I don't think it was quite as far along as Poland-Lithuania but it wasn't as powerful as it once had been beyond the boarders of the main metropolitan France. In the 7 years war it had lost much of its territories in the Americans and India and even in Europe seemed powerless to act when other great powers were expanding their influence close to the French border such as the Prussian intervention in the Patriottentijd with the Prussians pushing out French allied forces with the French being willing to pay the cost of raising an army suitable for marching to go fight them over it. So while perhaps its a strong assertion that had the French Revolution not happened it would definitely have occurred shortly there after I don't find it entirely unreasonable to suggest carving new chunks off France might have been something European leaders might have begun talking about say ten twenty years down the line. Whether it would have ever come to be as fully consumed as Poland was is hard to say", "created_utc": 1619644860, "distinguished": null, "id": "gw7ytpv", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/n0hbmx/were_european_powers_looking_to_carve_up_ancien/gw7ytpv/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "There are a number of contributing factors to this disparity. First and foremost is the wider global impact of the English Revolution, or rather the lack thereof. The French Revolution is particularly unique among revolutions(other than the Russian Revolution, but I won't get into that) in that the ideas of it spread throughout all of europe, and thus the world. When looking at a single point to mark the beginning of the modern world, the revolutionary period (marked as 1789-1815) is one of the most important transitionary periods(at least in terms of the society, modern tech seems to have made another change on that scale...). Looking at areas where you wouldn't expect much rest-of-world impact, such as Latin America, we can see the direct impact of the French revolution (more on that later). Secondly it's about the final state of these periods. When everything settled out, Parliament being the dominant power within England had been settled, but it had been the de facto case for decades before that - hence why the parliament was able to challenge the king successfully in the first place. In France on the other hand, it was something of a shock that something like this could have taken place, one of the best analogies I've ever heard for grasping this is \"Imagine if the modern United States were overthrown by Maoists [communists]\", France under the bourbon's had been one of the most autocratic governments in Europe, and the legacy of the Sun King made France the most important nation in European politics, so when France of all places was overthrown by an enormous burgher revolt it was quite shocking to everyone. Although there was a king again at the end of the period, it didn't last and France ended up settling out as a Republic so it's not accurate to say that it ultimately failed to change (though if you don't count the whole period it's understandable that you'd believe that). The final major factor involved is the nature of the revolution. In England it was largely a question of religion and of who has authority, it was never a question of what form society should take. In France on the other hand, as things spiraled out of control and more heads started being taken during the terror, the whole structure of the society began to be under question - the peak of this being all that silliness around changing the calendar to 'Thermidorian'. This meant that the French revolution had a much broader range of thought, and the notions of freedom would later go on to infect everywhere that napoleons troops went as he conquered most of Europe(the Napoleonic ideas ended up being the largest influence on Sardinia-Piedmont when it started marching to unite Italy, and for that alone it would be important).\n\n1) Global Impact:\nThe list of places impacted by the French Revolution is too long to reasonably mention if it's explained (which I intend to do). The list ranges from the USA - the Louisiana Purchase would never have happened without it. To Latin America(something of a pet focus of mine) where the independence of the entire region, from Mexico to Argentina happened directly as a result of the Revolution. The important thing to understand about the independence revolutions of the various latin american states is that they were fundamentally run by local Creole elites, quite different from other independence movements. The revolutions all had the same casus belli, the restoration of the 'Desired One' which was the heir to the King of Spain that had been deposed by Napoleon. Here we see the link. Napoleon deposing the king of spain and putting his step-brother Joseph on the throne directly led to the independence of Latin America. This is just one of the many Global reasons why the French Revolution is much more important than the English one.\n\nThe next two are closely linked so I'll actually discuss them as one.\n2) Long-term results:\n3) Intellectual Nature:\nIn the long run, France settled out as a republic, as I said before, whereas we see that England still has a monarchy, power reduced though it might be. The Ideas of the French Revolution and the societal changes, particularly to the idea of war, are unmatched in any other revolution of history(Except maybe the Russian Revolution, but this is something that is under much discussion these days in the post-Soviet world). The change in armies from a small professional group to an entire society at arms is crucial to understand the gap between pre-modern warfare and early modern warfare. In addition to this, the soldiers of Napoleon's armies mingled with people all across europe as he marched around taking stuff, which spread the ideas of the revolution which were FAR from unified. Everything from Liberal Democracy to Communism that we see in the modern world has some roots in the French Revolution, and it was spread all over the place as a result of it, so the long term impact is undeniable. It's quite possible, though this part is debatable, that Unified Germany was strongly impacted by the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, which are linked intrinsically with the revolution by most historians - the process of divide and conquer that allowed Napoleon to steamroll the Rhine made it a much easier to argue that Germany should become one state with one policy to defend against 'the vile french'.\n\nIn conclusion, the English revolution ended merely having codified the de facto laws that existed before, whereas the French revolution was a fundamental change to the way France worked. In addition to this, the scope was much larger, with the French revolution impacting places all across the globe in both the short and long terms. Finally, the nature of the Revolution was much more intellectual and helped give birth to many modern ideologies and setting the roots in place to the others.\n\nThis was just a basic overview of the reasons, but I hope it answered your question satisfactorily.\n\n\nSome of my Sources: (I was mostly drawing from memory and don't have specific page numbers for my facts without tracking down each book again)\n\nSmall unprofessional note: WHY ARE ALL FRENCH REVOLUTION BOOKS SO BORINGLY NAMED????\n\nConnolly, S. (2003). The French Revolution. Chicago, Ill.: Heinemann Library\nA good timeline orientation with some pleasant asides. Rather standard as I recall, but fairly good for further reading nonetheless\n\nKates, G. (1998). The French Revolution : recent debates and new controversies. London: Routledge. \nI think there's a newer version of this but I can't vouch for anything about it. I'd also tend to read this one last as it's at times a bit preachy but gives an important unusual perspective to some of the discussions that few other books give.\n\nLefebvre, G. (2001). The French Revolution: from its origins to 1793. London: Routledge.\nI'd recommend this alongside others since it's originally a French Source, though it introduces a few associated biases, it still offers some good perspective.\n\nMelton, J. Van Horn. (2001). The rise of the public in Enlightenment Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\n\nThis book was one of the first books I had to read for a class in undergrad, the chapter on the rise of the public in France is CRITICAL to my own understanding of the societal changes associated with France during this period.\n\n\nThere's one other book that's on the tip of my tongue as it were and I'll add it here once I've found it...\n\nEDIT: Here it is: (if i recall correctly, which it's possible that I don't) this book provides some nice details on how the Latin American revolutions were different, including the impact of the French Revolution on it, which has a special place in my heart.\n\nGraham, R. Independence in Latin America : CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS. THIRD edition.", "created_utc": 1507908551, "distinguished": null, "id": "dobepj4", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/7640s3/why_is_the_french_revolution_1789_is_considered/dobepj4/", "score": 210 } ]

[ { "body": "Marat was revered as a revolutionary saint after his death, as the Hébertistes took him to be a victim of the Gironde (Charlotte Corday was from Caen where they had fled and didn’t hide her sympathies for them). For the rising Jacobins, enforcing the cult of Marat was a way to channel the more radical elements of the Revolution, and they pushed for the Convention to admit his ashes to the Pantheon. Radical elements were important as the sans culottes were the ones asking for reforms, using force if necessary. The enragés, among them Hébert, were also very popular in the army where the Père Duchesne, Hébert’s newspaper, was wildly distributed. Robespierre wasn’t a big fan of the Sans Culotte or the war or even of persecuting the Girondins, and playing the Marat card was a cost-effective propaganda tool. His ashes were admitted to the Panthéon a year later in September (Vendémiaire) 1794.\n\nAfter Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre, Marat continued to be revered, mostly as a journalist, as newspapers took the lead of the Thermidorian reaction, among them L’Ami du peuple - a title bearing Marat’s nickname -, but things changed quickly with the return of the Gironde. On December 9th 1794, the Girondins came back to the Convention. By the end of the month, remaining elements of the Jacobins who had been involved in the repression of the Vendée and of the Gironde, notably Collot d’Herbois and Billaud Varenne of the Comité de Salut Public, were prosecuted. Marat’s ashes were removed from the Panthéon on February 8th 1795 and buried quietly somewhere else.\n\nWhat had changed ? Well, the reason for Marat to be introduced in the first place was that he could pose as a martyr when the Convention was facing two perils : the war abroad and the civil war. The streets had ended the Girondins reign about a month earlier, and both the radical Sans Culotte and Hébertistes were needed by the Jacobins to control some sort of government. In 1794, things had changed : the French army was now winning the war against all odds and the Convention was looking for peace in the Vendée and in Britanny; the Sans Culottes had fallen, the Hébertistes were gone... There was no need for such a polarizing figure, the Jacobins were footing the note for all the repression and the Gironde was back, wishing to avenge the humiliations of 1793. So off went the idol who had been forged only a few months prior, a testament to how quick the situation changed in the years 1793-1795.", "created_utc": 1609039837, "distinguished": null, "id": "gh4tj9k", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/kj9vft/why_did_public_opinion_on_jeanpaul_marat_fall_so/gh4tj9k/", "score": 2 } ]

[ { "body": "One of the masks in Marie Tussaud's collections was a cast of the famous Count de Lorges, who had been imprisoned in the Bastille for 30 years. When the Bastille was stormed in 1789, he was taken to Mme Tussaud so that she could preserve his face for posterity. She got there just in time, because de Lorges died only a few weeks later. In 1838, when Mme Tussaud wrote her memoirs, she still had de Lorges's mask in her collection. \n\nUnfortunately, no Count de Lorges was ever liberated from the Bastille. He was a fictional character, but the story of his imprisonment was widely believed at the time. The fact that Mme Tussaud had his mask in her collection shows how seriously we should treat the rest of that collection and her stories of how that collection came into existence. Especially considering how implausible it is that she would be allowed to take a cast of executed convicts. The authorities had no reason to have souvenirs made, and especially no reason to do it in secret if they thought the masks would somehow be helpful.\n\nFor Marat, the situation is different. He died a hero, and there was plenty of official interest in preserving his memory for the future. At least two masks were made. One was made by the sculptor Bonvallet at the request of the Paris Commune, and another was made by the sculptor Deseine. \n\nÉtienne-Jean Delécluze, a student of the painter Jacques-Louis David, wrote that David had a cast made of Marat's face to use for his work. [One of the pictures he made](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Marat_dessin_de_David.jpg) based on the mask is similar enough to the copy in the Carnavalet museum, [pictured here,](https://www.parismuseescollections.paris.fr/fr/musee-carnavalet/oeuvres/masque-mortuaire-de-marat-homme-politique-1743-1793#infos-principales) that I'm guessing that this is either the bust Delécluze mentioned or identical enough to it that it has to be genuine despite the lack of a source for the bust itself.\n\nUnfortunately, I couldn't find anything about the original molds. \n\nSources: \n\nHervé Leuwers and Guillaume Mazeau, « Madame Tussaud et le masque de Robespierre. Exercices d'histoire autour de la médiatique reconstitution d’un visage », *Annales historiques de la Révolution française.* URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ahrf/13083\n\nEugène Defrance, 1909, *Charlotte Corday et la Mort de Marat*, page 218. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58356419.texteImage# \n\nÉtienne Jean Delécluze, 1855, *Louis David, son école et son temps: souvenirs*, page 154. URL: https://books.google.fr/books?id=gHA5AAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=sv#v=onepage&q&f=false", "created_utc": 1621603469, "distinguished": null, "id": "gyxvksp", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ngj5u5/original_death_maskscasts_from_french_revolution/gyxvksp/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "The terms Monsieur, Madame, and Mademoiselle had different usages throughout the years. It is true that, during the Ancien Régime, those words, when used alone with an uppercase M, served as official titles for royal family members. However, these terms had had other roles for some time: \n\n* They were honorific titles reserved to upper class people. \"Monsieur\" was the title of the King's brother, but it was also used by a servant when talking about his master (\"Monsieur is waiting for you\").\n* They were also generic terms of address, or terms of civility, that could be used for the rest of the population in speech and writing, though this was context-dependent.\n\nThe evolution toward generic terms of address had been going on since the 17th century and was part of what has been called the \"rise of civility\". To quote Richard Sennett (Sennett, 1977):\n\n> In a populous environment filling and refilling with strangers, greetings which flatter the person and his known qualities became a difficult business. Generally there were now to be found stock phrases of greeting, whose acceptability was a matter of how nonparticular and flowery they were as figures of speech all their own; the fact that they could be, and were, applied indiscriminately to any person in no way detracted from their civility.\n\nThe main dictionaries of the time reflect this change. I've only quoted the definitions that correspond to a term of civility (the dictionaries include all the other meanings and usages).\n\n*Furetière, 1701 (2nd edition)*\n\n* Monsieur: A title of civility given to the person to whom one speaks, or of whom one speaks, when he is of equal or slightly inferior status.\n* Madame: Used when speaking about commoner bourgeois women. [...] Girls of lower class are also called Madame, and their surname is added, Madame Marie, Madame Margot; and this has been abused to such a point that maids want to be called Madame.\n\n*Académie Française, 1740*\n\n* Monsieur: Quality, title given by honour, civility, propriety, to persons to whom one speaks, to whom one writes (Académie Française, 1740)\n* Madame: Title of honour which was formerly given only to ladies of quality, & which is now commonly given to married women, either in speaking of them, or in writing to them.\n\n*Richelet, 1732*\n\n* Monsieur: A term of civility used in commerce [in the general sense of \"relation\"] in the civil world.\n* Madame: Also used for simple women and girls from the people.\n\nFor nobles and the bourgeoisie, the use of *Monsieur* and *Madame* was normalized between equals, or when the difference of status was considered to be small enough. *Monseigneur* would be used when talking or writing to people in the top tier of the society. One can see that the Furetière dictionary, written in the late 17th century, is relatively cautious about the general use of *Monsieur* (\"when he is of equal or slightly inferior status\") and *Madame* (\"this has been abused to such a point...\") but that later dictionaries do not include such reservations. \n\nTheatre plays from the 17th and 18th centuries illustrate these changes. In plays by Molière (17th), the terms of address used between the different social classes are quite strict. Upper class people call each other *Monsieur* or *Madame*, and use the familiar pronoun *tu* and first names to talk to their servants. The servants always use the polite pronoun *vous* and the term of address *Monsieur* or *Madame* when talking to their superiors, and *tu* and first names when talking to their equals... except when servants are disguised as doctors or other higher class people, in which case they are called *Monsieur* or *Madame* by other people.\n\nThis is still true in the plays of Marivaux (18th) but cracks are showing up. In *Le Jeu de l'amour et du hasard* (The Game of Love and Chance, 1730), Dorante and Silvia are two upper class young people who disguised themselves as servants called Bourguignon and Lisette respectively. Dorante-Bourguignon is called *Monsieur Bourguignon* twice by Mario, Silvia's brother, who hasn't recognized Dorante and believes him to be a servant, and Dorante calls Silvia-Lisette *Mademoiselle* while believing her to be a maid. This latter term of address is noted by Mario, who comments that \"one might almost think that the title of *Mademoiselle* were appropriate\" (which it is true since she's his sister). Of course, part of the amusement comes from the fact that, even under their servants' disguise, Dorante and Silvia have trouble concealing their status (like using *tu* to talk to each other like normal servants would). In 1784, Beaumarchais's *Le mariage de Figaro* (Figaro's wedding) goes a little further: Figaro, a servant, is called *Monsieur* and *Monsieur Figaro* by other characters without having to disguise himself. Of course the play was socially provocative so this may not have been representative of actual speech. \n\nIt remains difficult to assess how these terms were used before 1789 by people at the bottom of the social ladder, like day laborers or simple maids. According to Geoffroy, the abolition of nobility titles in 1789 resulted in the gradual (and cautious) extension of Monsieur and Madame to the general population (Geoffroy, 1989), which is how they are still used today.\n\n**Sources**\n\n* Académie française. Dictionnaire de l’Académie françoise. Tome second (L-Z). 3ème édition. Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1740. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1280387t/f65.item.\n* Furetière, Antoine. Dictionnaire universel, contenant généralement tous les mots françois tant vieux que modernes & les termes des sciences et des arts,.... Tome Second. 2nde édition. La Haye et Rotterdam: Arnoud et Reinier Leers, 1701. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5542578m/f958.item.\n* Geoffroy, Anne, ed. Dictionnaire des usages socio-politiques (1770-1815): Tome 4, Désignants socio-politiques. Paris: ENS Editions, 1989.\n* Merlin-Kajman, Hélène. “Civilité, Civilisation, Pouvoir.” Droit & Philosophie - Annuaire de l’institut Michel Villey 3 (2011). http://www.droitphilosophie.com/article/lecture/civilite-civilisation-pouvoir-34.\n* Richelet, Pierre. Dictionnaire de la langue françoise ancienne et moderne. Tome 2, I-Z. Amsterdam: Aux dépens de la Compagnie, 1732. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k50934s/f136.item.\n* Sennett, Richard. The Fall of Public Man. Reissue edition. New York ; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.\n* Tournon, Antoine. “Sur le mot citoyen.” Mercure Universel, October 5, 1792. https://www.retronews.fr/journal/mercure-universel/5-octobre-1792/431/1507603/1.", "created_utc": 1622823016, "distinguished": null, "id": "h0kyj55", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/nogm9i/how_did_nonnoble_people_address_each_other_in/h0kyj55/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "There are quite a few previous posts on this same question, so I'd definitely recommend searching for it if you want some more in-depth answers.\n\nI'll echo here what most will say: The American Revolution was not really of any influence on the French Revolution. I think a common misconception is that the French Revolution was about instilling democracy in the form of a Republic, like the Americans. However the French Revolution was emphatically NOT about that at all; not until 1792 when many radical twists and turns had lead to a Republic as one of a few viable options. Until that point, the French Revolution was about making some concrete, overdue reforms, and instituting a 'check' on the Monarchy's power. In form, that grew up around the idea of a Constitutional Monarchy that lasted in theory from 1789 through 1792.\n\nI would say both the American Revolution *and* the French Revolution were mutually influenced by the general ideas floating around the intellectual circles since the mid 1700s: the \"natural rights of man\", liberty and equality, and a sense of universal justice. The French did not learn these from the Americans-- on the contrary, many of the men at the heart of the Enlightenment were French! Instead of seeing the French Revolution as deriving from, or being inspired by, the American Revolution, I think it's more apt to see them both as products of a changing way of thinking about humanity that contrasted sharply with the feudal view of society still prevalent in France on the eve of the Revolution.", "created_utc": 1591475738, "distinguished": null, "id": "ft6l8ye", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/gxmm0a/to_what_extent_did_the_us_revolution_actually/ft6l8ye/", "score": 14 } ]

[ { "body": "Most of France's debt in 1789 was from rentes viagères - life annuities sold by the French government. You'd buy them, and get payments for the rest of your life. Many of these (especially from 1770 and onward,) were flat-rate annuities, so people bought them for their babies to get huge returns. The costs of this program were staggering, it was a horrible way for the government to raise money.\n\nThe banks of Geneva took major advantage of France's rentes viagères, by finding 5 - 10 year old girls (who wouldn't be drafted) from families with a history of longevity, who were also smallpox survivors. The money would of course go to the banks, not the girls. You were allowed to buy life annuities based on anyone's life, but you'd have to prove they were still alive each year.\n\nFrance also raised money with perpetual debt. Most of these debts were rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris - you'd buy one and get 5% interest forever, with the right to sell that collection right to others (but one year of interest would be skipped if you sold/transferred it.) Again, this is a horrible way to raise money because the government got paid once and then had to pay out interest *forever* (even after the buyer's death.) The rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris were the most secure debt you could buy from France, because tax money first went towards paying that before the money went into the general royal funds.\n\nFrance also sold shares to a company that made profits from France's colonies (such as Haiti and a very large piece of North America, which Napoleon would later sell off to the US government.) There were *guaranteed*, government-backed, high dividend payments that the shares paid out each year.\n\nThe French government also sold bonds, which were purchased by French banks and wealthy individuals.\n\nFrance also issued many short-term \"IOUs\" to businesses that sold things to the government, and then sometimes converted those into long-term debt. By 1788, over **55%** of France's annual budget went towards interest on its debt.\n\nKing Louis XVI promised that France would not default on its debt again. To do this, they were going to institute a land tax, with no exemptions for members of the wealthy landowner class. This was rejected by the Parlement (not Parliament) of Paris, which said it had to be a nation-wide decision. So he announced that that would happen in the Spring of 1789, and once that was about to happen (and in part *because* that was about to happen,) the French Revolution began and the king was executed.", "created_utc": 1523158485, "distinguished": null, "id": "dx00tuc", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/8ak7xl/in_most_history_classes_we_learn_that_france_was/dx00tuc/", "score": 155 } ]

[ { "body": "The claim is inaccurate and was a common myth of the French national narrative, even before the revolution. The wildly held belief went that since France was the land of the Francs (freemen), there were no slaves in France. Nonetheless, the French Empire had implanted slave societies in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Louisiana or Saint-Domingue, and the First colonial Empire also relied on the enslavement of Native Americans. Orientalism was trending since at least Montesquieu (by the way the theory of climates he was defending would serve as a template for racial \"science\"), and it would result in the terrible exactions of Napoleon's army in Egypt and Palestine not even a decade after 1791. All these phenomenons relied on a racial system that divided European races from African or \"Oriental\" ones, so saying that \"racial prejudice was foreign to France\" is blatantly false.", "created_utc": 1601312379, "distinguished": null, "id": "g6ywshb", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/i3kkvo/in_his_treatise_on_the_french_revolution_georges/g6ywshb/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "The reluctance to call the Estates General was due to the ongoing power struggle between the monarchy and the *parlement*. There was no \"anticipation\" of the events that followed, although the monarchy was fearful that their power would be degraded.\n\nTo understand the calling of the Estates General, and why it was so strongly resisted by the monarchy for so long, it's far more important to understand what had happened in the 30+ years prior than it is to know anything about the French Revolution-- in fact it's probably better to forget the Revolution entirely, to avoid the notion that it was anticipated, or was inevitable.\n\nTelling the full story would likely require going back to the wars of religion in the late 16th century-early 17th century, and the *Frond* rebellion during Louis XIV's regency. However the most proximate starting date of the power struggle between King & *parlement* was the 1750s, when Louis XV's popularity took a nosedive (for various reasons). \n\nThe *parlement* were the French high courts of the realm, but they did not serve a merely judicial function: they also enjoyed a unique legislative function in 'registering' royal decrees. Their political power was the *only* political power that was held outside the Crown. As such, they began to gain a popular conception & reputation as defenders against the encroachment of royal priviledge. They were seen-- whether rightly or wrongly-- as the only power in the kingdom who could stand against the King, who could stand against tyranny and despotism-- all words hurled at the monarchy during Louis XV's reign. \n\nThe *parlement* were made up of the nobility, often the more newly enobled \"robe nobles,\" who had purchased their offices from the crown. These men revelled in their role as 'defenders against tyranny,' and certainly wished to push their own power at the expense of the crown. This was usually in pursuance of what would be a Montesqieu-esqe separation of powers, with an aristocratic body acting as a \"check\" on monarchical authority,\n\nHowever the *problem*, and the reason there was such a stalemate throughout the 1780s, was due to the fact that this power was not truly 'real.' While the *parlement* were able to present the king with a remonstrance (a refusal to register a law, tax, edit, etc.), the King could force these through at any time-- he could compell the *parlement* to register his will. \n\nSo on the one hand, you have the *parlement*, who know that their power is tenuous at best. They could proffer a remonstrance, but it was toothless. However for the King, though he held the final trump card, the optics of constantly forcing registration of his edicts was terrible, and caused the complaints of despotism against his court to grow. \n\nOn the eve of the calling of the Estates General, then, you have a monarchy who fears that by calling this body, the *parlement* would be able to gain the upper hand, and would have a real place, with real power, where they could push for a growth in power. The longer the monarchy could go at it alone, the longer it could retain sole power. \n\nThere wasn't a fear that the government would be overturned, or that the Third Estate would rise up, the fear existing in 1788 was that the delicate see-saw balance of power that existed between the aristocracy of the *parlement* and the monarchy would be tipped to the side of the *parlement* if the body was called.", "created_utc": 1614881429, "distinguished": null, "id": "gpog9fv", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/lwhcp7/were_brienne_and_louis_xvi_avoiding_calling_the/gpog9fv/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "An interesting question!\n\nSo no, the French Revolution was not the main impetus for men to wear soberer clothing. For one thing, English men typically wore clothing that was considered somewhat plain for much of the eighteenth century; while the clothing of this period looks flamboyant to us, with the long coats, big cuffs, breeches, and wigs, everything exists in its own context, and when these elements of dress were the norm, they were just perceived as ... normal. English gentlemen showed their sobriety and respectability by wearing buff, grey, brown, and muted blues and greens - and this wasn't solely an English trend, as you can see black, dark brown, and grey as very common colors in men's dress across northern Europe, particularly in the Low Countries. It was southern Europe, particularly Italy, that was seen as having especially dashing and even gaudy clothes for men; Englishmen who took on their bright colors and very slightly raised hairstyle were mocked as sexless macaronis.\n\nInside France, the dark-colored English style, particularly in the form of riding dress, became fashionable shortly before the Revolution - for both men and women. Basically, English riding dress was associated with comfort, casualness, being somewhere semi-private - all things that were becoming more culturally important, even to the monarchy. You can draw connections between these concepts and this clothing and stuff like the model farms owned by Marie Antoinette and others, the works of Rousseau, etc. It was a whole movement.\n\nDuring the early years of the Republic, men's fashion continued evolving at the same pace into what we see through the 1790s in both France and elsewhere. There was no sudden shift, just the usual slow changes. Probably the thing that comes the closest to being able to be attributed to the Revolution is the cropped haircut - which was a very clear statement of sympathy with the Republic, against the fashionable frizz and queues of aristocratic men. That being said, there is no actual clear-cut link. The French and English fashion press typically referred to it as *cheveux à la Titus*/a Titus crop, because it was very much an imitation of the haircuts seen on Roman statuary, not just a straightforward copying of the people destined for the guillotine (as is sometimes stated). The general interest in Neoclassicism does relate to the egalitarian ideals popping up on both sides of the Channel, though.\n\nOne thing it's worth talking about in the context of men's fashion and the Revolution, though, is the *muscadins*. I would argue that they had little effect on men's fashion as a whole, but they represent a subculture with a distinct style - they were young men who dressed in an attention-grabbing way to signal that they were out of the mainstream and out of step with the Terror. Originally, the term referred to people who were literally rebelling, and then to English agents disguised as Frenchmen, but very quickly it began to be used to label men who a) weren't stepping up to join the army to defend the Republic or actively avoiding the draft and b) were paying too much attention to dress and therefore weren't properly \"masculine\" - to lump them into the same kind of outright enemies. All in all, they were just the successors to the men referred to as *elegants* in the 1780s and *petit-maîtres* in the 1770s and earlier, and akin to the ones who would be referred to in English in the late 1810s as \"dandies\", although they would still be assumed to have a level of political determination that they probably didn't have, on the whole. (They more usually just called themselves *jeunes gens*, \"young people\".) With tight breeches, big showy cravats, and long hair, they were seen as suspicious figures.", "created_utc": 1607044859, "distinguished": null, "id": "gejto9c", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/k5zgdw/how_did_the_french_revolution_affect_mens_fashion/gejto9c/", "score": 7 } ]

[ { "body": "Are you wanting to view this from a modern point of view, or at the time? Obviously something like a political spectrum is ever-shifting: in present day United States we wouldn't say that the \"right\" are monarchists for example. I'll cover it from the point of the of the French since I think that's the most beneficial way to view it.\n\n**FUN FACT ALERT!** The \"right\" and \"left\" political designations we still use today originated during the French Revolution! The deputies of the National Assembly (formerly the Estates General) would commonly sit with those who shared their political beliefs. The conservatives would sit on the right end of the hall, while the liberals preferred the left. Thus they began to refer to each other in these spatial terms, i.e. \"oh no the left is proposing another bill on church lands today\" and the designation stuck! \n\nSo in discussing the French Revolution it's always crucial to keep in mind that there was not one big 'burst' of revolution, and that it was an evolving and changing process, especially from 1789-1794. Therefore the answer isn't static, but changing over time. Let's go through some of the main changes in power dynamic between right and left. I'll keep it at a high level here, but just know that the power struggle was constantly evolving.\n\n* Start of the Estates General - 1790: Right off the bat the revolution was driven by 'liberal nobles'. These men were very well off, but were upset with the present order for various reasons. They believed that they should be taxed equally with the rest of the population. These men began to lose power after the move from Versailles to Paris.\n* 1790-1791: The liberal-er liberal nobles. After the more conservative liberal nobles were alienated (mostly due to questions of the church and the make-up of the constitutional monarchy), the nobles of the \"Society of 1789\" stepped up to the plate. These men were 'enlightened' on the question of religion, and could be said to constitute a middle position between right and left.\n* 1791-1792: Things get spicy here. The *Feuillants*, a group slightly to the left of the Society of 1789, has taken control under the Legislative Assembly, which was the representative gov't called under the newly minted Constitution of 1791. The heat gets turned up because Louis gets cold feet and flees Paris in the ill-fated Flight to Varennes. After he's 'returned' by his people things take a *serious* shift to the left. I personally agree with Historian Timothy Tackett's point of view that this is THE moment when the Revolution goes from moderate and measured to the chaotic event we know and love it for.\n* 1792-1793: It's Republic time! Important to know: *no one* was advocating for a Republic right up until around mid-1792. It was entirely unthought of in the early Revolution. We kind of have this concept that the revolutionaries were always pushing for a republic as the best form of government, but that definitely wasn't the case. Even the most radical of the radical like Marat were perfectly happy with a Constitutional Monarchy until Louis started showing what kind of a monarch he'd be. After the Insurrection of August 10th, we go from 'moderate liberalism' to a liberal republic, based upon universal manhood suffrage.\n* 1793-1794: The most radical phase of the Revolution. This is a time many have tried to identify as 'proto-communist'. The Revolutionaries also played around with concepts like the right to existence, price controls on foodstuffs. The Constitution of 1793 is considered to be one of, if not the most, liberal constitution ever written.\n* Thermidor - Napoleon: After the fall of Robespierre things will gradually creep back towards the right into a sort of moderate republicanism, until Napoleon takes power. Not nearly as fun after 1794, so I'll end here.", "created_utc": 1591871804, "distinguished": null, "id": "ftol31v", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/h0tnuh/what_side_of_the_political_spectrum_was_the/ftol31v/", "score": 7 } ]

[ { "body": "Hello! I actually answered that question [here, which both links out to a more extensive post](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/hs674m/how_did_the_people_of_france_go_from_executing_a/) and has an extensive discussion in the comments!", "created_utc": 1604864119, "distinguished": null, "id": "gbn65mj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/jq7e0f/how_did_french_citizens_react_to_the_declaration/gbn65mj/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "I don't think the word 'dictatorship' truly fits either.\n\nYou're definitely right- 'popular' history has it that the Committee of Public Safety (CPS from here on out)- and Robespierre specifically- were dictators throughout the Reign of Terror. It's a lot easier to say that than to explain the complex power dynamics actually at play, and unfortunately it gives us a lot more negative of a picture of the CPS, the *sans-culotte*, and ESPECIALLY Robespierre, who became the scapegoat for everything anyone saw as negative in the Revolution- starting at the moment of his death.\n\nIt has been more-or-less refuted that the CPS was a dictatorship. In fact we see that, while they certainly held great central authority, the didn't have nearly the total control they're portrayed as. In fact the National Convention almost takes a backseat in our conception of the French Revolution at this point, as if they were merely a bunch of dudes sitting idly in a room while the CPS did everything. Or perhaps that they rubberstamped what the CPS told them to do. On the contrary the National Convention was still operating as the Government of France, with the CPS acting as more of a strong guiding Executive. I think a great example of the limit to the CPS's power relative to the National Convention is the fact that, when the CPS tried to pass a law making the Representatives on Mission (those Convention members tasked with various objectives and dispatched out to the *departements* with virtually totally autonomy of authority) subservient to them, the National Convention voted them down. The CPS had been attempting to do this because they felt (Robespierre in particular) that the uneven application of justice between Representatives on Mission was harmful to the Revolution (some were super lenient, some were extremely bloodthirsty). But the National Convention refused to cede this authority to the CPS on several occasions.\n\nAnother way we can see this is in Georges Couthon's letters to his home *departement* about the state of their pending grain shipment. He was trying to get them grain, but it kept getting intercepted by the army or other *departements*, though he was trying to work with the Subsistence Commission (another important committee) to intercede in their favor.\n\nSo while the CPS is rightly seen as having a great amount of power and influence, they certainly were not all powerful, and did more to streamline, drive, and shape laws and debates rather than hand them down to a subservient and passive Convention body.\n\nNow onto \"the Parisians\". So I think it's important to point out that Paris had a population of around 650,000 on the eve of the Revolution, but most major insurrections numbered around the 10k-50k mark (could climb higher if National Guardsmen are involved). It's hard to find someone who wants to give hard numbers, so estimates vary, but it was certainly never anything approaching a majority of Parisians who were actively imposing their will on the legislative bodies. This is why you usually see them referred to as *sans-culotte* rather than Parisians in general.\n\nSo on to your question: Did the *sans-culotte* form a dictatorship by which they forced their own specific will on the governmental bodies of France?\n\nOnce again this tries to attribute too much to one group, and ignores what the rest of France thought. *Many* histories of the French Revolution are guilty of an overly Paris-centric view, only zooming out when describing 'Paris' dealing with some crisis in the Vendée, or on the war front. Thankfully however there have been some great histories recently that try to mine the data (letters, bulletins, diaries, etc.) from the rest of France during the Revolution to paint a much broader picture.\n\nI think there is something very important to keep in mind: the vast majority of France was not in insurrection, nor hostile, to the National Convention during the Terror. While we focus (understandably) on those places that were in open revolt, this was the exception, not the norm. Peter McPhee does an excellent job in *Liberty or Death* of giving accounts of the *departements* as often as possible to get a wider feel for the Revolution. Think of the Jacobin Club-- their immense success as a political club has been attributed in large part to their creation of ancillary clubs in towns and cities all across France. These clubs were created by and constituted of Jacobins-- even in places like the Vendée. There were patriotic men and women in most cities, towns and villages across France who were in agreement with the aims of those Jacobins in power; who *generally* were in agreement with the *sans-culotte* (though of course they differed on important questions, and most importantly might not have agreed with the hyper radical *enragés,* went too far left).\n\nAnother interesting fact that came up in McPhee's studies is how day-laborers and artisans in cities across France consciously referred to themselves as *sans-culottes.* Even those whose economic status might put them above that bracket presented themselves as a *sans-culotte* in name and in dress. There certainly was a more widespread identification with the principles held by the more militant Parisians than is usually presented.", "created_utc": 1589520198, "distinguished": null, "id": "fqooc9y", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/gjym2j/could_the_french_revolutions_reign_of_terror_be/fqooc9y/", "score": 20 } ]

[ { "body": "During the Ancien Regime, Parisien-French was first made the legal language of the state as per the 1539 Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêt (article 111) that replaced Latin with French with the goal of centralizing the state, however the ordinance did not clearly define what *langage maternel francoys* was since there existed many dialects of mainstream Parisien-French used by the monarchy based in Île-de-France (Paris).\n\nThe farther you went outside of the royal capital Paris, the more different the local French dialect (called *patois*) would become. For example in the so-called Francien linguistic zone around Île-de-France, there existed the Orléanais dialect, Tourangeau dialect, however these were all mutually intelligible with Parisien, but once you left this zone in the north-central France heartland, you would enter areas like Champagne, Poitou, Artois/Picardy, Lorraine, Burgundy, Normandy etc. where the spoken vernacular differed from Parisien-French. These languages in Northern France were called *langues d'oïl* (oïl/oui the word for \"yes\" all these languages shared) and it's difficult to state whether they were all to some degree 'mutually intelligible', as regional languages such as Norman had significant differences in vocabulary resulting from retaining old-French words and Anglo-Norse influence. But in general the languages were not foreign/alien sounding to each-other, and a Parisien speaker would be able to understand a majority of the spoken language. In the south, there were the langue d'oc languages (oc was their word for \"yes\") which were essentially dialects of the Occitan language, itself a Gallo-Romance language. In the east there was Franco-Provençal/Arpitan language, that formed another group within Gallo-Romance.\n\nNorman: *Tous les houmes nâquissent libres et parels dans leux dignité et en dreits. Il ont bien de la conschienche et de la raison et il deivent faire d'ot leux préchains coume si ch'éteit pour yeux mêmes.*\n\nParisien: *Tous les êtres humains naissent libres et égaux en dignité et en droits. Ils sont doués de raison et de conscience et doivent agir les uns envers les autres dans un esprit de fraternité.* \n\nIn this cross-example of Norman with Parisien, some of the vowels are changed and syntax may be a bit different but overall it's clear they are related languages and to some degree mutually intelligible. This can help you understand the differences between them.\n\nAs for the the geographic spread of Parisien-French by the time of the French revolution, it had expanded over the last three centuries as a result of Villers-Cotterê, which had the effect of making the literary language throughout France become in Parisien, instead of the vernacular, in addition to the language of the state/law. So there was a decline in usage of local *patois* in Northern France, and urban centers where French royal authority was enforced became Parisien-speaking although a majority of France remained rural/agrarian by 1789 so the *patois* remained spoken in the countryside. For example in Roussillon, where Catalan was spoken, the regional city of Perpignan/Perpinyà became French speaking by 1789, but the countryside remained very culturally Catalan. The royal government did not make it a priority to enforce Parisien because there was little way to apply that policy at the time (without public schools for example) and they were more concerned with maintaining the political allegiance of Catalans, as opposed to culturally assimilating them, and additionally the language of the lower-classes in the countryside (shepherds, farmers etc.) did not matter to the royal government as long as they remained loyal to the state.\n\nMost non-French regional areas under the Ancien Regime enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy as was the case with Basque region (a border-frontier zone) where the Basque fiefdoms of Basse-Navarre, Labourd, Soule and Béarn, and local Basque laws were allowed under the centuries old *foruak* (home-rule) system, which was later abolished by the French Republicans. In Brittany, where the Breton language was spoken by a vast majority of the population, the Edict of Union of 1532 guaranteed local autonomy to Bretons with an Estates of Brittany and continuation of the duchy, and this state was legally abolished by the French Republicans. Pre-1789 almost all lower-class Basques and Bretons were monolingual speakers of their native languages, and Parisien-French was not enforced on the majority of the population.\n\nOn the eve of the French revolution, around half of the French population had knowledge of Parisien and a quarter were monolingual speakers. The other half spoke their regional languages. So the Parisien dialect of French from 1539 to 1789 had become widespread in urban areas across the country, and this made it possible for the French Republicans to build their culturally homogenous nation-state. It took considerable time for regional languages to decline, and it was over the course of the 19th century with the advent of public schools, industrialization and internal migration when standard French replaced local languages and dialects. An interesting fact is that after wars, such as WW1 for example, when soldiers returned home to their regions they preferred using French because they had a greater French identity from their service in the army. This was a factor in the decline of the Breton language, from a region that contributed the most soldiers during WW1 in proportion to its population.", "created_utc": 1611492209, "distinguished": null, "id": "gkjuukr", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/l3us7s/how_widespread_was_french_in_their_mainland/gkjuukr/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "Because in the late 18th century, France was a vastly more relevant country than the United States. With a population of 29 million in 1789, this made it both the most populous country in Europe and also significantly more populous than the United States, which had a population of only \\~4 million in the same period. France was the cultural hub of the Western world, and close rivals with the British in terms of scientific and technological developments. French was spoken by the upper classes of most European states, even as far away as Russia. It was French aid that led to the defeat of the British during the American Revolution. Put simply, France was a big deal. The cultural, scientific, technological and military ideas that dominated the era came mostly from them. Several Founding Fathers, most notably Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, absolutely loved the French and considered them to be supremely important in world affairs.\n\nThough the ideals of the American Revolution was universal, they did not in fact directly inspire many successors - aside from Haiti, there were no significant or successful revolutions between the period of 1775 and 1789. The American Revolution was very much a specific localised affair; it was a revolution led by Americans that benefited Americans. The Founding Fathers did not believe in actually spreading the revolution to other countries, ala the idea of a \"perpetual revolution\" that the French and later Soviets would adhere to. They'd solved their problem, and were content to mind their own business when it came to international affairs. This attitude of isolationism - shared by most Founding Fathers but confirmed as official policy by Washington - remained rock solid for a long time to come - even when fellow revolutionaries in France was asking for their support, the US refused. They did not believe that republicanism justified foreign wars. As such, the direct geopolitical impact of the American Revolution was quite limited compared to future revolutions.\n\nFrance, on the other hand, was the polar opposite of all of this. When the monarchy was overthrown and a republic proclaimed in 1792, the revolutionaries *immediately* started expanding the scope of revolution. First the Low Countries (i.e. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) were invaded and \"liberated\", being made into \"sister republics\"; then Italy came next. But the effects of the Revolution were not just limited to government structure; extremely progressive reforms such as complete secularisation and the abolition of slavery was a direct threat to the powered interests of other states, and wherever the large and skilled French armies marched, they brought their progressive reforms, toppling *ancien regimes* that had ruled for many centuries. Unlike the Americans, the French explicitly pushed for perpetual revolution; to liberate everyone they could even if it meant war. This was shown most clearly with the invasion of Egypt in 1798; though realpolitik men like Napoleon and Talleyrand pushed for the invasion solely for geopolitical purposes, many politicians - and especially common soldiers - viewed the invasion as genuinely being to liberate the oppressed Egyptian people from the outdated medieval rule enforced by the foreign Mamluks.\n\nMoving past the early years of the Revolution, the effects of it continued to be directly felt for years; the revolutionaries in Latin America rebelled following the fall of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 and were led by men directly inspired by the French revolutionaries and to a lesser extent Napoleon (before his politics turned decidedly away from being left-wing). The Spring of Nations in 1848 was also directly inspired by the French Revolution of 1789, with several leading figures having been alive during that period. The guiding force behind both Italian and German unification in the middle of the 19th century was memories of the short-lived but progressive Napoleonic Code and other assorted Revolutionary reforms. Even in Britain there was more political instability due to the French Revolution than the American Revolution; King George III, who remained very popular and beloved by the British people during the latter event, had his carriage swarmed by mobs throwing rocks, and anti-government/anti-aristocratic rhetoric pervaded the press. For a while it seemed likely that even the ever-resilient British monarchy would be overthrown due to influence from the French revolutionaries (who also funded and supported a rebellion in Ireland in the same period).\n\nThe fundamental differences in their impact are found in the ideals pushed by both. The Americans' primary argument was for representative government; a rebellious but not excessively revolutionary attitude. The French, on the other hand, argued for the destruction of organised religion, the abolition of slavery, redistribution of land, and universal male suffrage. The American revolutionaries didn't go anywhere near this far. The revolution of the Americans was aimed against one specific government and did not spread far beyond that; the revolution of the French was against entire societal institutions and value systems and was intentionally spread to every country possible. This was understandably seen as both a greater threat and more significant historically speaking, as it proved to be.", "created_utc": 1607326527, "distinguished": null, "id": "gex89nw", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/k7vk65/why_does_the_long_19th_century_begin_with_french/gex89nw/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "There are a range of factors that should be called out to answer your question, but here are two:\n\n1. While contingents of loyal troops could be found (such as those deployed during the Flight to Varennes), a whole army was a completely different story.\n2. The royals themselves wanted to be saved by an army.... just not a french one.\n\nFirstly, by mid-1792 the army was disorganized and ill-disciplined. The emigration of thousands of officers had resulted in the depletion of many royalist supporters within the army's leadership, especially after the Flight to Varennes. With the regular troops increasingly radicalized by the ideas of the revolution, and with the officer corp increasingly revolutionary (through the process of royalists leaving the army), it would be difficult to muster the forces required to march on Paris.\n\nIn saying that, Lafayette did try. After the initial defeats of April and May 1792, Lafayette proposed an armistice to the Austrians and sought to close the political clubs of Paris. After the events of the 20th of June (which saw the palace invaded and the King threatened by a mob), Lafayette went further. Leaving his troops (and opening himself up to the accusation of desertion), Lafayette returned to Paris and implored the Assembly to close the clubs, curb the press, and ban petitions. In particular, Lafayette attacked the Jacobin Club for producing the nation's instability and jeopardizing the revolutionary project (ironically, Lafayette had been a founding member of the club). \n\n*\"I beg the National Assembly to order that the instigators of the crimes and violence committed on 20 June in the Tuileries be prosecuted and punished as criminals for lèse-nation, and to destroy a sect that infringes sovereignty and tyrannizes citizens, and whose public debates leave no room for doubt about the atrocity of the plans of those who lead it.\" - Lafayette, 28 June 1792*\n\nFearing a coup, Lafayette was denounced as a traitor by the Jacobins (both the Brissotins and the Montagnards), with Robespierre demanding his arrest. Lafayette subsequently tried to rally the National Gaurd of Paris (which he use to command), but they rejected his pleas as well (Since his initial command, the guard had admitted passive citizens, further radicalizing the revolutionary body). Retreating from the capital, the increasingly powerless general tried to organize the King's escape, but to no avail.\n\nOne interesting point to note is that the royal family seemed to do little to help Lafayette in his attempt to suppress the radical forces of Paris. Historian Simon Schama questions if the royal family was over-confident in their position (given their belief allied forces would rescue them), while Historian Christopher Hibbert states:\n\n*But the reaction was short-lived. The court did not take proper advantage of it, the Queen, in particular, being wary of accepting help from those whom she considered untrustworthy or dislikeable. ‘She was more intent upon appearing to advantage in the midst of the peril,’ Lafayette later remarked with some bitterness, ‘than in averting it. As for my relations with the King, he always gave me his esteem, but never his confidence.’ ‘Better to perish,’ the Queen herself said, ‘than to be saved by M. de Lafayette.’* \n\nAs a result, the failure of the French Army to save the King is a result of a multitude of factors. After Varennes and the initial defeats of the war, reliable troops were hard to come by, as were officers willing to lead them. Furthermore, distrust between the court and liberal monarchists (such as Lafayette) prevented cooperation and coordination, hampering efforts to save the King. \n\n&#x200B;\n\n&#x200B;\n\nIf you're looking for a French Revolution podcast that emphasizes historical debate and ambiguity, be sure to check out 'Grey History: The French Revolution'.", "created_utc": 1607813120, "distinguished": null, "id": "gfllbaj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/kbmkkb/during_the_french_revolution_why_did_the_french/gfllbaj/", "score": 6 } ]

[ { "body": "I will answer only about Italian language, since I don't have direct access to French sources. \n\n\n\"How would all these regions communicate with each other?\"\n\nWell, the illiterates simply didn't , while instead all the educated people knew Italian and used it, although a lot of them not really well. The people who knew Italian also often didn't find it natural. For example, Manzoni (1785-1873), one of the greatest Italian novelists (and big \"influencer\" of the Italian language) always said that for him was easier speaking French than Italian. To explain better the situation, I will translate for you a portion of \"Epochs of the Italian Language\" by Ugo Foscolo. Circa 1825 (circa 45 years before Italian unification). \n\n\n>We know from experience that neither an illiterate Neapolitan can understand a \\[illiterate\\] Milanese, nor a \\[illiterate\\] Turinese can understand a Bolognese; nor four educated men from those provinces would be able to converse without misunderstandings if not using among them a sort of hybrid Italian that, even if participating in the regional dialect of the speaker, assumes anyway the desinences and the grammar of the literary language of the nation; and this national language even if it is not spoken, neither bad nor well, by the common people is nevertheless understood, more or less, even by the lowest plebs. \n\nNow, you may ask, how many people spoke Italian at the time of the unification (1861). Well, Since we don't have a linguistic census we must rely on reconstructions, and we have 2 wildly different reconstructions based on different parameters: \na pessimistic reconstruction and a more (relative) optimistic one. \nThe pessimistic one was done by one of the most famous Italianistic, Tullio De Mauro. He considered as Italian speaker all people from the Tuscan region, all people from Rome and zones nearly it (The roman dialect, in a sort of misterious way, got \"Tuscanized\" in the 16th century ) and all people that had a post-elementary education. Doing so he calculated that about 2,5% of the Italian population was able to speak Italian. \n\n\nArrigo Castellani opposed this reconstruction, arguing that should be included also the clergy, those who had a domestic education and most importantly also people from the other part of Latium (thus not only Rome) and also people from the Umbria region and the Marche region, since according to him those dialects are similar enough to the national language and thus should be included. He thus gives a number of 2 million of Italian speakers, that were around the 10% of the population. \n\n\n\"How did the French and Italian governments make their respective languages so widely spoken?\" \n\n\nA great obstacle to the diffusion of the national language was the great rate of Illiteracy, at the time of the unification between the 75% and the 80% of the population was unable to read and write. (and in some regions almost the 90% of the population was illiterate). With the exclusion of the first ten years after the unification, in which the new state was in a dire situation, the government started to invest in education with quite good results, for example in 1911 only the 46,20% of the population claimed to be Illiterate. ( in 1861 78% of the population claimed illiteracy and in 1871 the 72,96%). In 1877 Italy, with the Coppino Law, made \"inferior elementary schooling\" (6-9 years) mandatory( Although it didn't enforce it that much). \nThe increase in literacy wasn't the only factor. The centralist view of the state, the new mandatory military conscription and the diffusion of newspaper and other media widely increased the number of Italian speakers. \n\n\nBefore the 1950s the rural zones remained quite excluded by this improvement, but a new object widely changed the situation: The Television. Not only indirectly but also in a more direct way. Between 1958-1966 aired the program \"Telescuola\" ( Tele-School) which aimed to give a medium education to the people who had not middle school in their towns or were not able to go to it for economic reasons and between 1960-1968 aired \"Non è mai troppo tardi\" (\"It is never too late\") a widely followed educational program targeted to illiterate adults and elders. (It is estimated that this program helped 1 million and half of people to obtain an elementary education licence). \n\n\n\"Was this pattern of language commonplace amongst european states?\" \n\n\nWell, yes and not. Especially in that period a lot of European nations faced problems relative to the national language, but those problems had their peculiar and unique connotations. Also, due to geopolitical reasons, the timeline of those problems differed among the different nations and countries. \n\n\n\"Why were these languages chosen instead of some other language in \\[...\\] Italian regions?\" \n\n\nThe Italian language had a quite peculiar history. Since it is an extremely long and complex history I will be forced, due to time and space issue, to do an extreme oversimplification. In the late middle age, due to the work of 3 Tuscan men: Dante (Considered the\"father\" of the Italian language), Petrarch ( One of the greatest poets of all time, extremely important figure in all of European literature. His poetry was imitated literally for centuries in all of Europe.) and Boccaccio (Famous for his \"Decamerone\", he was the main influence for Chaucer's \"Canterbury's tales\" ) educated people from Italy decided that the language spoken in Tuscany should have been the basis for a common Italian language ( In fact, up until the 20th century, Italian was also commonly called Tuscan, and before 16th century it was rarely called Italian) but people disagreed on what should be characteristics of that language. Some argued that should be used only the language spoken in Tuscany by the educated people, some argued that should be used only the language from the city of Florence, some argued that should be used only the words most near to Latin, some argued that should be used only the words and the grammatical construct more near to the other regional languages, etc. etc. \n\n\nFinally, in the first half of the 16th century, most people seemed to agree on the proposal of Pietro Bembo to base the poetical language on the one of Petrarch and the prose language on the one of Boccaccio. But, Gian Giorgio Trissino (Famous for trying to add more letters to Italian, such as *ω* , *ε* , ζ , *ç* , ʃ and a differentiation between i / j and u / v. He was successful only in the last 2 points.) objected the Bembo's proposal and argued that the national language should be a sort of mix of the various languages spoken in the various Italian courts and that it should be less archaic. \n\nEducated people then chose mostly a compromise between the 2 positions (Favouring slightly Bembo's position). Of course, being Italian, they continued to argue on various linguistic questions for centuries and centuries but at least they did it using a language with the same foundations. With the advent of the 20th century the language underwent a sort of homogenization and the \"Questione della lingua\" (Problem of the language, as it was called) stopped definitely.", "created_utc": 1584148799, "distinguished": null, "id": "fkg35kb", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/fi6l6q/i_remember_learning_in_my_ap_euro_class_that/fkg35kb/", "score": 17 } ]

[ { "body": "Hi, \n\nThank you for this AMA. I'm French and I don't even know the answer of this question. \n\nHow was the Revolution percieved in the country side ? \n\nIn our schools, we are taught that it was a national thing, yet we don't have much clues that can lead us to such a conclusion. Nearly every events that we know took place in Paris. \n\nI know that after the Revolution, many french people engaged themselves in the army against the other european forces from all over the country. But what about the early stage of the Revolution ? When the Bastille fell for example ? \n\nThank you :)", "created_utc": 1405357633, "distinguished": null, "id": "cix6msj", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2aobj6/aux_armes_citoyennes_to_arms_citizens_an_ama_on/cix6msj/", "score": 23 }, { "body": "C’est une révolte?\n\nThis list kind of grew in the asking. maybe I'll start by asking if there is a good single volume history of the pre-Napoleonic Revolution?\n\n* What do you think of Marx's characterization of the Revolution as a \"bourgeois revolution\"?\n\n* I have sometimes heard that the revolution wasn't really any more brutal than the proceeding period, only the victims were aristocrats rather than peasants. What are your thoughts?\n\n* In regards to the Vendee Revolution, how do you regard that? \"French\" is somewhat famously Parisian-centric, was the Vendee revolt and indication that the \"French\" revolution was really a \"Parisian\" revolution?\n\n* Kind of related to that, how did regional identities (eg, Occitan, Breton, etc) interact with the Revolution?\n\n* Knowing only bits and pieces of the narrative of the Revolution, I frequently run into figures like Danton and Robespierre who seem to be top dogs one month and headless the next. In particular, how exactly did Robespierre go from managing Terror committees and executing Danton in May to having his head chopped off in July?\n\n* I think this is for /u/corree, but I often hear that conservative leaning depictions of the revolution were highly \"aesthetic\" (focusing on the beauty of the palaces or the princess' maiden-like appearance) while republican depictions were rational in their focus. Does this hold any water?\n\n* Speaking of La Marseillaise, why Marseille? What was going on down there? Was it special at all or just did someone there just happen to write a ct", "created_utc": 1405362986, "distinguished": null, "id": "cix9jmx", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2aobj6/aux_armes_citoyennes_to_arms_citizens_an_ama_on/cix9jmx/", "score": 10 }, { "body": "After the American revolution, there was a considerable amount of talk about how to raise and educate virtuous, republican citizens - whether through the nurturing of \"republican mothers\" or through a system of schools - so that the republic would have an informed, rational, and moral citizenry. I've always wondered: was there any analog to this during the French Revolution? Were there revolutionary schools? How about an idealized concept of the \"revolutionary mother?\"", "created_utc": 1405354821, "distinguished": null, "id": "cix55ab", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/2aobj6/aux_armes_citoyennes_to_arms_citizens_an_ama_on/cix55ab/", "score": 15 } ]

[ { "body": "Hello! The French Revolution is the best historical event ever so you have great taste. Haha I maintain a booklist (plus one podcast) on my profile here:\n\nhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/profiles/myskinsredditacct\n\nFeel free to reach out if you have any more questions!", "created_utc": 1598477105, "distinguished": null, "id": "g2yde2r", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ih730a/meta_best_books_on_the_french_revolution/g2yde2r/", "score": 4 } ]

[ { "body": "The United States declared neutrality in April of 1793. At this point in France, Layfayette would've have been thrown in jail by Maximilian Robespierre had he shown his face so he was wisely on the run and looking for safe places to lay low. \nThe execution of Louis XVI earlier that winter really sent shock waves through Europe and even to America. The fact that dear Lafayette was no longer welcome in Paris outside of the Bastille probably told Washington all he needed to know as he declared neutrality. And though I'm speculating, I imagine it would have been hard for Lafayette to come down too harshly on Washington for doubting the stability of a regime that had turned the father of the French Revolution himself into persona non grata, seemingly overnight.", "created_utc": 1596779472, "distinguished": null, "id": "g0nc2ht", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/i586ko/what_was_marquis_de_lafayettes_response_to/g0nc2ht/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "Thank you for the shout out! I think the best write up I've seen that catalogs a sample of the inaccuracies is in this post by u/molstern and continued in the comments section: [https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2dw9en/petition\\_to\\_denaturalize\\_simon\\_schamas\\_citizens/](https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2dw9en/petition_to_denaturalize_simon_schamas_citizens/)\n\nYou'll notice that most of Schama's inaccuracies center around quotations: he either misattributes, or misrepresents, quotes quite frequently. The ones listed in that post are just a sampling.\n\nOutside of the factual inaccuracies that list covers, there are a few more general criticisms of the book.\n\nFirst, for asserting it's a chronicle of the Revolution, Schama covers a lot of material that is quite ancillary to the Revolution. Now that isn't inherently bad, but the book is over 800 pages long and stops at the Terror, which is certainly not the end of the Revolution. Part of the reason it's so long without covering more of the actual Revolution is that Schama inserts his opinion into the text frequently, and so much of the verbiage is just Schama's particular point of view. Analysis isn't a bad thing-- in fact providing context and analysis is crucial to the job of a historian, but Schama's opinions read far more like an op-ed piece in a newspaper than a historian carefully sifting through evidence.\n\nThe other great issue that I don't see mentioned in that post is the galling lack of citations. Indeed if one does the \"pinch test\" of the 800+ page tome, they'd find that only 27 of the 907 (!) pages are in his Sources & Bibliography section. That is a scant 3% of the book. Let's compare with what I hold up to be the gold standard of Revolutionary summaries, Peter McPhee's *Liberty or Death*. It actually covers through the coup of Napoleon, and spans 454 pages. It actually cites specific sources for its facts and quotes (something Schama fails to do, which might explain their inaccuracies), and devotes 73 pages of its 454 to direct citations and a bibliography, accounting for 16% of the book. Any time an author is asking you to 'trust him' with a more narrative bibliography explaining \"this section was mainly taken from these memoires\" you know you have a problem.\n\nThat brings up another fault with Schama's book: he indeed relies heavily on memoires and accounts from contemporaries (and these he often misquotes and misinterprets, as seen in the other Reddit post.) Contemporary memoires are a fantastic historical source, but MUST be contextualized and critically analyzed to mean anything. To use an extreme example, imagine going 200 years in the future and reading a book about Hitler that relies on contemporary memoires of his high-ranking Nazi officials. Of *course* they have a very strong bias, and so any usage of their material would need to be couched in this context. Now that doesn't mean they are invalid, and a good historian would not dismiss them as such. Instead, a good historian would analyse them and compare them with other accounts to find similarities and differences, and then critically think about and postulate on what the truth could be. Schama does none of this, taking accounts that fit his personal opinion and presenting them as fact. This is often what gives *Citizens* its popular appeal, as such intensely charged rhetoric is exciting, but this is what makes it horrific for historians of the period.\n\nI will end by saying anyone who specializes in a certain area always has a bit of an aversion to popular histories, because they know that some of the nuance and factual accuracy will get lost in the mix (looking at you Oversimplified's French Rev YouTube videos....) but what makes Schama *particularly* egregious is first, that he is actually a historian, and yet eschews good practices that history is founded upon, second, that he can't be bothered to cite his sources or check for facts, and third that he is particularly inflammatory and intentionally provocative so that he sells better. Not to mention that *Citizens* is hardly a 'popular' history, running at an unbelievable 900 pages!\n\nI don't think historians should all be cookie-cutter and follow the same set patterns and never think outside the box, but abiding by basic tenets of honesty and methodology are what separates, to use the cliche, fact from fiction.\n\n&#x200B;\n\nEdit: Adding with regards to bibliographies:\n\nA citation is only useful if you tell me exactly where you're deriving a certain fact, figure, or idea. If you claim, say, that 2,400 people were executed in Paris during the Terror, you need to cite this so that anyone can check your source. This is crucial for scholarship, especially for ideas and thoughts more interpretive than cut and dry numbers. A common idea is that historians should be entirely unbiased and objective. While that's understandable in theory, it's not practicable, as historians are always going to be influenced by their own beliefs, culture, and time period. The best a historian can do is make sure that their own beliefs don't alter the facts presented, though they surely will flavor the analysis. In this way I can check the sources of say, Albert Mathiez and understand that he saw the same facts as I do, but through a different lens (in his case his worldview was colored by a communist ideology). This means that the study of history is a vast, infinite conversation through the ages between historians, observing the same set of facts but adding their own 'conversation' to the dialogue, imagining and re-imagining why an event occurred, or what an individual's motives were. Where this conversation breaks down is when a 'historian' asserts unsubstantiated opinion into the mix, as Schama does frequently in *Citizens*. There is no conversation to be had when your source for an entire chapter is a mention you pulled mostly from someone's memoires. It should not be incumbent upon your reader to parse through an entire source to 'find' your viewpoint. \n\nWith a good historian such as McPhee, I can use his books as jumping off points for deeper dives into a subject. If I'm interested in learning more about the acquittal rates during the September Massacres I can turn to where he discusses them, follow their citations, and be lead to several scholarly articles that elucidate even further, and follow their sources and so on, so that a good secondary source book acts like a map of knowledge, showing you the way to many different rivers and tributaries. When a history book does not provide this, like Schama's, what you're left with is a map that shows you in the middle of a lake with a dot where you're at. There are no facts to follow, you're marooned in Schama's opinion, which is for obvious reasons not valuable for a history. No further discussion can happen- you're having a one-on-one conversation hearing what Schama thinks happened and why.", "created_utc": 1592148186, "distinguished": null, "id": "fut2co4", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8ugni/what_are_the_flaws_in_simon_schamas_citizens_a/fut2co4/", "score": 13 } ]

[ { "body": "One reason why the Revolution became more radical is because that became necessary to keep the Revolution going. As more obstacles appeared, they had to keep things in balance of even silence opposition. I will go up to the Terror.\n\nIt can be observed as increasingly desperate attempts to keep the revolution alive while also resolving the issues that France was having. In the first scenario, keeping it alive, it was crucial that no outside force crushed the revolution. Early on this can be seen in the silencing of the clergy. Alphonse Aulard describes it in a blunt terms \"denounced, hunted, imprisoned, deported, sometimes put to death.\" (1). Now, to assuage the economic issues, the Revolutionaries needed wealth. One avenue they saw was through the bourgeois & Gallican doctrine of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (2). As one might guess, seizing the property and wealth of the First Estate of all things was controversial, and this only widened the divide between the government, priests, and Catholic citizens of France. One Parisian Journal was bold enough to even state this was contributing to their misfortune (3). This seizure of land came in spite of the fact that both the first and second estate were willing to waive their tax privilege \"The nobility of the bailliage of Blois believes itself in duty bound to lay at the feet of the nation all the pecuniary exemptions.\" (4) and \"The clergy of the bailliage of Blois declare that for the future they desire to sustain the burden of taxation.\" \n\nThis can mean two things, depending on how you wish to interpret it. One, it was in the bourgeoisie's best interest to take radical measures such as this in order to make more wealth. They didn't care about what the nobility did, as they has already made them obsolete, and church property was an opportunity. Two, the Revolutionaries were sincere in their beliefs, wanted to fix France's problems, even if that meant taking mode radical measures in the religious sphere. The nobility and clergy were becoming victims of the ancien régime and were acting out to survive. In either case it may be noted that the opposition to Revolution had to be crushed. In the former, no wealth. In the latter, no purpose.\n\nAs for the politics, Clubs became a more worrisome entity, the threat of stability became another possible end to Revolution, and identity began to matter. In fact, because of chaos, some considered ending the Revolution \"Everyone calls for order and public peace, everyone wants an end to Revolution. From now on, these are the unequivocal signs of patriotism.\" (5). In some ways the common people had been caught up with this national identity of patriotism and raising a banner for liberty (6). As the politics changed and as people became more and more riled up, it's no surprise that things would begin to take more drastic turns. \n\nNow it's time to address the elephant in the room: The Terror and Execution of the King. Now, this topic has a bunch of different interpretation. And I would be lying if I said I or anyone else had the true answer, for why Robespierre did what he did anyway. As for the King Louis XVI, I would say the answer is more simple. He was someone who had betrayed the Revolution, he and émigrés were considered conspirators with foreign powers seeking to overthrow the Revolution through warfare (7). Robespierre, on the other hand, is a bit trickier. Of course it's easy to label him as a power-monger who thought killing everyone was the way to secure power, except it backfired. Aulard viewed it as a way to condemn personal adversaries. Albert Mathiez saw him as the Revolution's protector, believing 22 Prairial as necessary. In the more heroic light, Robespierre is doing what he thought necessary to keep the flame going. In the power hungry case, it's simply that, a man carrying out needless bloodshed for the sake of his own benefit.\n\nAs for why America didn't go that path? It's a simple case of different circumstances. Americans didn't have a dying feudal system and economic crisis that would force them to take such measures. They had also already defined their path from several philosophers, and being a colony, had the British form to rely on. The French were largely heading in unknown territory.\n\nIn short, much of it can be described as carrying out the will necessary for maintaining the Revolution, even if it came with a terrible cost. Plus different circumstances means different outcomes. This is only my interpretation, there are others and I encourage you to look at multiple points of view. \n\nThank you. \n\n1. Alphonse Aulard Christianity and the French Revolution, trans. Lady Frazer. 89.\n\n2. Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790).\n\n3. Alpha History \"A Paris journal opposes church land seizures (1790).\n\n4. Merrick Whitcombe, ed. \"Typical Cahiers of 1789\" in Translations and Reprints From The Original Sources of European History.\n\n5. “National Assembly Debate on Clubs (20 September 1791),” Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,\n\n6. Révolutions de Paris, no. 68 (23 October 1790), 116.\n\n7. “\"The Padua Circular\" (5 July 1791),” Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, ", "created_utc": 1570504610, "distinguished": null, "id": "f2z2ltq", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/desx03/the_french_revolution_is_commonly_seen_as_a_slide/f2z2ltq/", "score": 10 } ]

[ { "body": "Revolutionary France was invaded, by a number of other nations looking to take advantage of the turmoil as well as to attempt a reversal of the revolutionary policies. Sometimes hostile action against revolutionary France came as a response to France's own aggressive manoeuvres.\n\nThe principal examples of this are the invasion by combined Holy Roman Empire and Prussian Army led by the Duke of Brunswick. The invasion was the end result of a number of events such as the mistreatment of the French royal family (especially the Queen who was the sister of Leopold II, the Holy Roman Emperor), a failed invasion of the Austrian Netherlands by a poorly organised French Army and the storming of the Tuileries palace by French revolutionaries who detained the royal family. The combined army led by the Duke of Brunswick invaded French territory on 19 August 1792. The army advanced steadily for a time until it came up against renewed French resistance and the French artillery, probably the most professional arm of the French army and the one that had largely escaped the mass emigrations by French nobles that had afflicted the other arms. At Valmy, the invasion came to a stand still and in the face of stiffer resistance and the approach of winter, the Duke and his army withdrew.\n\nThe other notable foreign invasion of French soil was conducted by the British who and occupied the port city after French Royalists evicted the revolutionaries and Jacobins. The Royalists proclaimed King Louis XVI's son king and welcomed the British fleet into the city. The British were eventually expelled from the port during an action known as the Siege of Toulon which also represented the first major action by Napoleon who coordinated the French artillery during the siege.", "created_utc": 1571219173, "distinguished": null, "id": "f3wspl0", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/digy4u/during_the_french_revolution_did_any_other/f3wspl0/", "score": 8 } ]

[ { "body": "It sounds to me like the creators of the game are exercising significant creative license with the story. First of all, the king and rook (their names and significance) date from at least the Sasanian Empire (7th century CE), well before the Bastille. While the Queen became the most powerful piece in the 15th century, this too is well before French Revolution.\n\nRegarding the French Revolution itself, chess was not at all taboo; it remained a popular game. Its most famous practitioner, Philidor, did have to flee France to England because he was listed for arrest, but this had nothing to do with his playing chess. Instead, it was likely due to his (and notably his father's) connection to the royal family, as Philidor was a court musician and his father was a royal musician in the court of Louis XIV.\n\nIn a complete refutation of your question, consider Russia: Marx played chess with obsessive intensity. So did Lenin, even through his imprisonment and exile in Siberia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin tasked Nikolai Krylenko with organizing chess throughout the nascent Soviet Union. As chess costs little to play and has no element of luck, it meshed well with the agenda and ideology of the government.\n\nFor more on chess in the Soviet Union, I'd recommend\n\n*Soviet Chess 1917-1991* by Andrew Soltis\n\n*Storming Fortresses: A Political History Of Chess In The Soviet Union, 1917-1948* by Andrew Michael Hudson", "created_utc": 1567890661, "distinguished": null, "id": "ezg3o3e", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/d0vzjf/was_chess_ever_accused_of_being/ezg3o3e/", "score": 17 } ]

[ { "body": " Hi there, here are a few to investigate further. Enjoy! \n\n* Simon Schama's Citizens: A great book for a general overview of the revolution. However, it is quite lengthy, at times can be a little dry, and certainly possess a hostile tone towards some of the key revolutionaries. It also tends to excessively focus on the events leading up to the revolution (pre-1789) compared to the time focused on the events of 1793/94. \n* Peter McPhee's Liberty or Death: For a different perspective than Schama's (one that is more sympathetic to the revolution and its key leaders), McPhee offers another great, comprehensive overview of the revolution that is engaging and thoroughly researched.\n* Jonathan Israel's Revolutionary Ideas: Solid overview, especially if you're into political theory and the influence of the Enlightenment.\n* Christopher Hibbert's The French Revolution: Much smaller and more novel-like than the above recommendations at roughly 300 pages. A useful overview that ties the main events together, but lacking the exploration of contentious topics due to its size (which the above do). \n* Timothy Tackett's The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution: A superb book analyzing a range of factors that helped to shape the revolution into its ultimate form. I would highly recommend it, but after you already are familiar with the revolution. A fantastic option to read after one or two of the above.\n\nFinally, if you're interested in a history podcast that dives deep into the French Revolution, check out Grey History.", "created_utc": 1603693391, "distinguished": null, "id": "ga57azx", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/ji1ilk/looking_for_a_recommendation_for_a_book_on_the/ga57azx/", "score": 3 } ]

[ { "body": "While you're waiting for a more specific answer, you might be interested in this older AskHistorians thread: [When was driving on the left/right side of the road standardized in countries? How did it develop in the US?](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/174fbh/when_was_driving_on_the_leftright_side_of_the/c828qdw/)\n\nI suspect the main source quoted in it, *The Rule of the Road: An International Guide to History and Practice.* by J. Peter Kincaid will have some specific information about the claim of Napoleon being the source of right-side driving, although it certainly seems like the reasons for right- or left-sided driving isn't boiled down to just \"Napoleon\". \n\nThe book's not available in e-book form that I can find, nor in any library near me, but perhaps /u/MrDowntown (or anyone else, of course) still has access to the book and can answer you more thoroughly.", "created_utc": 1520345268, "distinguished": null, "id": "dv9ksl3", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/82drkf/ive_read_that_it_was_traditional_in_europe_for/dv9ksl3/", "score": 25 }, { "body": "As a follow-up, I recall being told that people would ride on the left so they could draw a weapon if necessary (the majority of people being right-handed). Is there any truth to this or is it an urban legend?", "created_utc": 1520344542, "distinguished": null, "id": "dv9k7wf", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/82drkf/ive_read_that_it_was_traditional_in_europe_for/dv9k7wf/", "score": 16 } ]

[ { "body": "Can I ask what exactly you mean by protests? I want to make sure I'm getting to the heart of your question here. Are you asking about like the major events such as the storming of the Bastille? Or are you just asking in general if there were protests before the French Reovlution?", "created_utc": 1591826497, "distinguished": null, "id": "ftmqbxf", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/h0izrm/what_were_the_protests_like_at_the_start_of_the/ftmqbxf/", "score": 1 } ]

[ { "body": "Oh LaFayette. I feel for the guy. I think the most apt, one-word description I've heard of him was that he was an \"idealist\"; I agree whole-heartedly.\n\nLaFayette is sometimes called \"The Hero of Two Worlds\", but as the French Revolution became more radical he was seen as far more of a traitor than a hero, and in 1793 could plausibly have been called the most hated man among the Revolutionaries. His reputation certainly was more pristine in America than in France.\n\nLaFayette was emphatically NOT anti-monarchist, in fact very few people in France during the Revolution were anti-monarchist. LaFayette was, like most of his fellow liberal nobles, in favor of a constitutional monarchy that would guarentee rights for the people, and enable capable men to assist in running the country. It's a common fallacy that the Revolution was from the start about instituting a Republic. It wasn't until the Flight to Varennes that a Republic was championed for by even the most radical of revolutionaries, and even then many played around with the idea of a regency government around Louis XVI's son Louis XVII rather than a Republic. Republics were seen as messy, chaotic, and unwieldy. Constitutional monarchy, on the other hand, was seen as strong enough to maintain order, while guarenteeing rights that could be deprived in an aboslute monarchy.\n\nLaFayette was fully supportive of a constitutional monarchy. He wanted the order and stability that it would bring, along with the rights it would guarentee to the people in its constitution. LaFayette was also a prime mover behind the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which guarenteed certain civil liberties to the people. It is worth noting however that under the system LaFayette champtioned, (the so-called Constitution of 1791 that was undermined when Louis attempted to flee Paris in the Flight to Varennes) there was *not* universal manhood suffrage. Instead, this Constitution made the distinction between \"active\" and \"passive\" citizens. \"Active\" citizens were classified as men who paid a certain amount yearly in taxes-- this therefore excluded any sort of day-laborers or poor farmers. These groups were instead termed \"passive\" citizens, and they were not allowed to vote or join the National Guard. The idea behind this dichotomy wasn't anything new: it was merely the idea that those without a real 'stake' in the country couldn't possibly have a say it how it was run. The fact that LaFayette supported this system shows that he was not a screaming liberal, but rather a moderate, reform-minded man who wished to see things progress in a way that would effect real political change, without hardcore social change.\n\nAs the Revolution became more radical, Lafayette became more despised for his moderation, until he finally deserted his post and slipped across the border to Austria. Fast-forwarding, LaFayette will again rise to prominence after the so-called July Revolution which toppled the reinstated Bourbons. In this 1830 revolution there were called to reinstate the Republic, however many men feared the return of the Republic, associated as it was in many minds with the Terror, and therefore these more cautious men put forth the idea of instead elevating to the kingship Louis-Philippe, son of \"Philippe Egalite\", the duc d'Orleans who was executed during the Terror, but had been a staunch supporter of the Revolution and even a regicide, voting for the death of Louis XVI. The Orleans were a cadet branch of the Bourbons, and next in line for the throne should the Bourbon line die out (or prove insufferable to the people, as it was). \n\nIn making this decision between another shot at a Republic or Constitutional Monarchy, LaFayette is typically seen as *the* crucial deciding factor, though how big a role he played is sometimes debated. LaFayette was seen as *the* voice of liberalism, and venerated at this point in his life by many of his countrymen, who idolized the revolution of 1789-1792 and despised the revolution (and the Terror) of 1793-1794. Into this mix, LaFayette would be a large weight that would easily swing public opinion towards either form of government. Therefore it's said that, when LaFayette threw his support behind Louis-Philippe and embraced him publically on a balcony in front of crowds at the Palais Royale, he had given the future king his \"Republican Kiss\", signalling to the people that he fully supported the Constitutional Monarchy over a renewed attempt at a Republic. \n\n&#x200B;\n\nIn all of his actions, LaFayette may seem like he was facilating between liberalism and conservatism, but that's only because we tend to present things in extremes. LaFayette was what could be termed a \"Liberal Moderate\". He occupied a middle ground that supported the Enlightenment idealism of liberty, fraternity, and equality. He supported a constitutional monarchy that would provide justice and order to the people. He abhored mob violence, but seems not to have wished to address the social aspect of the unrest. He believed in a hierarchy based upon merit, rather than birth. His idealism meant that he wished to address the political questions without really addressing the social questions, and he would always be dogged by the lower classes of Paris getting out of hand. He was part of the group of liberal nobles who believed that in answer the political question and pursing Enlightenment ideals that the social problems would gradually be worked out. This ran counter to the ideas of 1793-1794 that sought to address the social questions *first* and in often radical ways that LaFayette did not agree with. We see in 1830 that LaFayette did not blindly believe in Republicanism, and that by the end of his life perhaps valued order and stablity over experiments with increasing liberty. He died a constitutional monarchist who believed in liberty and justice, but also limitations to ensure stability. \n\nPlease let me know if you have further questions!", "created_utc": 1594305697, "distinguished": null, "id": "fxfd0yy", "permalink": "/r/AskHistorians/comments/hnsk49/what_was_the_marquis_de_la_fayettes_role_in_the/fxfd0yy/", "score": 10 } ]