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Mill seems to be equivocating between them. Since “ audible ” just means |
“ possible to hear ” and “ visible ” just means “ possible to see, ” in order for |
his analogy to work, Mill must mean “ possible to desire ” when he talks of |
something as being “ desirable. ” However, to prove that what we desire is |
good, by “ desirable ” Mill must mean “ worthy of desire ” or “ good. ” While |
it is possible that Mill is not confused and not equivocating between these |
two senses of “ desirable, ” this would only mean that he is instead guilty of |
committing the “ naturalistic fallacy ” ; that is, the fallacy of either inferring |
how things should be merely from how things actually are (in this case, |
what we should desire from what we do desire) or trying to defi ne a moral |
Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 225 |
concept with a nonmoral concept (in this case, Mill would be defi ning |
“ worthy of desire ” and “ good ” as just amounting to “ desired ” ). |
Mill ’ s apparent logical errors continue when, at the tail end of his argument, |
Mill seems to commit the “ fallacy of composition. ” One commits |
this fallacy whenever one tries to infer something about a whole simply |
because it is true of the whole ’ s parts. For example, I would be guilty of |
the fallacy of composition if I were to infer that tables were invisible to the |
naked eye just because tables are made of atoms, and atoms are invisible |
to the naked eye. Mill seems to be committing this fallacy when he infers |
that the general happiness is good for the group of all persons simply from |
the fact that he has proven that personal happiness is good for an individual |
person. |
Is this straightforward reading of Mill ’ s argument for utilitarianism |
correct? Did Mill really put forth an argument for half of utilitarianism that |
is itself riddled with the simplest of logical mistakes? This is unlikely. As a |
result, philosophers have developed a number of more charitable alternative |
interpretations in an attempt to uncover what Mill actually intended. One |
possible way in which philosophers have thought to alter our interpretation |
of Mill ’ s argument for the better is by taking his analogy to be an attempt |
to show that desire functions as an “ indicator ” or “ evidence ” of goodness. |
For example, when someone thinks she hears something and there is no |
reason to think that she is mistaken, then it plausible for us to conclude |
that there actually is a sound present. On this reading of Mill ’ s argument, |
desire similarly serves as an indicator of something worthy of desire actually |
being present. Such an interpretation would avoid equivocating between |
the two senses of “ desirable ” and would also prevent Mill from falling prey |
to the naturalistic fallacy. This more charitable interpretation also has the |
advantage of fi tting in well with Mill ’ s empiricist philosophical attitude. |
Another way in which we might alter our interpretation of Mill ’ s argument |
for the better is by reinterpreting his apparent commitment of the |
fallacy of composition to instead be an argument concerning how the value |
of happiness for an individual must depend on its intrinsic value. Specifi cally, |
Mill could be interpreted as arguing that if happiness is good for an individual |
to possess, then happiness itself must be good. But if happiness itself |
is good and if we are to judge the moral rightness of our actions by how |
much good they produce, then the rightness of my actions would depend |
not only on how much of my happiness they result in, but also on how my |
actions affect the happiness of others. |
However, this does not exhaust the numerous alternative interpretations |
of Mill ’ s argument. In fact, Mill ’ s remarks about the impossibility of providing |
a proof of utilitarianism have led some philosophers to conclude |
that Mill never meant to be giving an argument for utilitarianism in the |
fi rst place. Of course, no matter how successful Mill ’ s argument for |
226 A. T. Fyfe |
utilitarianism might be under some particular interpretation (if we interpret |
him to be giving one at all), Mill is still only arguing for utilitarianism ’ s |
welfarist aspect. As we noted at the outset, Mill ’ s argument fails to address |
consequentialism entirely. Mill simply takes for granted that it is “ the doctrine |
of rational persons of all schools ” that “ the morality of actions |
depends on the consequences which they tend to produce. ” This has become |
increasingly regrettable, since much of the controversy surrounding utilitarianism |
has come to concern precisely its consequentialist aspect, something |
that Mill found so uncontroversial that he didn ’ t even provide an |
argument for it. |
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that |
people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people |
hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, |
the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is |
that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine |
proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an |
end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can |
be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so |
far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, |
being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all |
which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person ’ s |
happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a |
good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one |
of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. (Mill |
“ Of What Sort of Proof, ” 61) |
As to the sentence [ . . . ] when I said the general happiness is a good to the |
aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being ’ s happiness |
is a good to every other human being, [ . . . ] I merely meant in this particular |
sentence to argue that since A ’ s happiness is a good, B ’ s a good, C ’ s a good, |
etc., the sum of all these goods must be a good. (Mill “ Excerpt from a Letter, ” |
270) |
Generic Argument for Traditional Utilitarianism |
P1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right. An action is right for someone |
to perform if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that |
would maximize total net good over bad in existence – otherwise, the |
action is wrong. |
P2. Welfarist Theory of the Good. The only intrinsic good is someone ’ s |
happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone ’ s unhappiness. |
C1. Traditional Utilitarianism. An action is right for someone to perform |
if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that would |
Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 227 |
maximize total net happiness over unhappiness in existence – otherwise, |
the action is wrong (substitution, P1, P2). |
Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Straightforward Interpretation) |
P1. The only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it. |
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