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of the central principle of democracy, majority rule. |
The militant can challenge this argument on two grounds, |
one factual and the other philosophical. The factual claim in |
the democrat's argument is that a reform that cannot be implemented |
by legal means lacks the approval of the majority of |
the electorate. Perhaps this would hold in a direct democracy, |
in which the whole electorate voted on each issue; but it is |
certainly not always true of modem representative democracies. |
There is no way of ensuring that on any given issue a majority |
of representatives will take the same view as a majority of their |
constituents. One can be reasonably confident that a majority |
of those Americans who saw, on television, excerpts from Gennarelli's |
videotapes would not have supported the experiments. |
But that is not how decisions are made in a democracy. In |
choosing between representatives - or in choosing between political |
parties - voters elect to take one 'package deal' in preference |
to other package deals on offer. It will often happen that |
in order to vote for policies they favour, voters must go along |
with other policies they are not keen on. It will also happen |
that policies voters favour are not offered by any major party. |
In the case of abortion in the United States, the crucial decision |
was not made by a majority of voters, but by the Supreme Court. |
299 |
Practical Ethics |
It cannot be overturned by a simple majority of the electors, but |
only by the Court itself, or by the complicated procedure of a |
constitutional amendment, which can be thwarted by a minority |
of the electorate. |
What if a majority did approve of the wrong that the militants |
wish to stop? Would it then be wrong to use illegal means? |
Here we have the philosophical claim underlying the democratic |
argument for obedience, the claim that we ought to accept the |
majority decision. |
The case for majority rule should not be overstated. No sensible |
democrat would claim that the majority is always right. If |
49 per cent of the population can be wrong, so can 51 per cent. |
Whether the majority supports the views of the Animal Liberation |
Front or of Operation Rescue does not settle the question |
whether these views are morally sound. Perhaps the fact that |
these groups are in a minority - if they are - means that they |
should reconsider their means. With a majority behind them, |
they could claim to be acting with democratic principles on their |
side, using illegal means to overcome flaws in the democratic |
machinery. Without that majority, all the weight of democratic |
tradition is against them and it is they who appear as coercers, |
trying to force the majority into accepting something against its |
will. But how much moral weight should we give to democratic |
principles? |
Thoreau, as we might expect, was not impressed by majority |
decision making. 'All voting: he wrote, 'is a sort of gaming, |
like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a |
playing with right and wrong, with moral questions: In a sense |
Thoreau was right. If we reject, as we must, the doctrine that |
the majority is always right, to submit moral issues to the vote |
is to gamble that what we believe to be right will come out of |
the ballot with more votes behind it than what we believe to |
be wrong; and that is a gamble we will often lose. |
Nevertheless we should not be too contemptuous about voting, |
or gambling either. Cowboys who agree to play poker to |
300 |
Ends and Means |
decide matters of honour do better than cowboys who continue |
to settle such matters in the traditional Western manner. A |
society that decides its controversial issues by ballots does better |
than one that uses bullets. To some extent this is a point we |
have already encountered, under the heading 'law and order'. |
It applies to any society with an established, peaceful method |
of resolving disputes; but in a democracy there is a subtle difference |
that gives added weight to the outcome of the decisionprocedure. |
A method of settling disputes in which no one has |
greater ultimate power than anyone else is a method that can |
be recommended to all as a fair compromise between competing |
claims to power. Any other method must give greater power to |
some than to others and thereby invites opposition from those |
who have less. That, at least, is true in the egalitarian age in |
which we live. In a feudal society in which people accept as |
natural and proper their status as lord or vassal there is no |
challenge to the feudal lord and no compromise would be |
needed. (I am thinking of an ideal feudal system, as I am thinking |
of an ideal democracy.) Those times, however, seem to be |
gone forever. The breakdown of traditional authority created a |
need for political compromise. Among possible compromises, |
giving one vote to each person is uniquely acceptable to all. As |
such, in the absence of any agreed procedure for deciding on |
some other distribution of power, it offers, in principle, the |
firmest possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes. |
To reject majority rule, therefore, is to reject the best possible |
basis for the peaceful ordering of society in an egalitarian age. |
Where else should one tum? To a meritocratic franchise, with |
extra votes for the more intelligent or better educated, as John |
Stuart Mill once proposed? But could we agree on who merits |
extra votes? To a benevolent despot? Many would accept that |
- if they could choose the despot. In practice the likely outcome |
of abandoning majority rule is none of these: it is the rule of |
those who command the greatest force. |
So the principle of majority rule does carry substantial moral |
301 |
Pradical Ethics |
weight. Disobedience is easier to justify in a dictatorship like |
Nazi Germany than in a democracy like those of North America, |
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