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which it rests? ” (200 – 1).
C4. Our reasons for following the Will to Truth are other than moral or
utilitarian ( modus ponens , P7, P6).
P8. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
Truth, then it cannot be rational, true, or believable
C5. The Will to Truth cannot be rational, true, or believable ( modus
ponens , P8, P6).
In the place of “ rational ” justifi cation, which is but an aspect of the Will
to Truth, Nietzsche suggests that “ truth ” is merely a guise for the expression
of our power. It rests on a metaphysical faith which is no different, at heart,
to the Christian belief in God. The Will to Truth is, thus, a means for limiting
our expression of such power: this is symptomatic in the “ slave morality
” of Christianity. With this connection established between science,
morality, and faith, Nietzsche returns to the fi rst part of the argument. If
God has become unbelievable, then our faith in the divinity of “ truth ” is
also placed in question. The question that Nietzsche leaves us with suggests
that this is what the death of God “ really means. ”
13
Ockham ’ s Razor
Grant Sterling
“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” is frequently cited as an argument and attributed to
William of Ockham. It is typically rendered as “ Entities are not to be multiplied
without necessity. ” It is sometimes understood to mean that when
given a choice between two theories, one should choose the one that
employs fewer entities (or, sometimes, fewer different types of entities). At
other times, it is understood to state that if a given entity is not necessary
to explain anything, then we should deny its existence. This common conception,
however, is a misunderstanding in several ways.
First, Ockham never said those words – the name “ Ockham ’ s Razor ”
was invented in 1852, and the words attributed to Ockham do not appear
in any of his known works. (The two statements above represent Ockham ’ s
actual position.) Second, the idea that we shouldn ’ t believe in things without
a good reason is by no means original to Ockham or distinctive of him.
Third, the Razor is not really an argument but rather a premise or principle
used to create arguments of a certain form. Finally, Ockham himself did
not actually use the argument to deny the existence of any possible entities,
only to doubt them. Ockham allowed for three sources of knowledge
William of Ockham . Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae , translated
by Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame, IN : University of Notre Dame
Press , 1974 .
___. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) , Distinctiones
XIX – XLVIII, in Opera Theologica , vol. IV , edited by Girard Etzkorn
and Francis Kelly . St. Bonaventure, NY : St. Bonaventure University ,
1979 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
58 Grant Sterling
(self - evidence, empirical evidence, and biblical revelation), and held that if
we cannot know that something exists through one of these three sources,
we should not believe that the thing exists (which does not necessarily mean
that we believe that it doesn ’ t exist – without positive evidence that the
thing is not there, we should simply remain neutral).
Plurality should not be postulated without necessity. ( Commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 1, q. 1 and 2)
For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is known
through itself or known by experience or proven by the authority of Sacred
Scripture. ( Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 30,
q. 1)
“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” as it is commonly employed:
P1. Two theories, T1 and T2, explain the observed facts equally well (and
better than all rival theories), and T1 requires us to postulate the existence
of more entities (or more types of entities) than T2.
P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If two theories explain the observed facts equally
well (and better than all rival theories), believe the theory that postulates
fewer entities than a rival theory with no loss in explanatory force.
C1. We ought to believe T2 and disbelieve T1 ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
Or
P1. We do not need to postulate the existence of object X in order to explain
any of the phenomena we are attempting to explain.
P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If we do not need to postulate the existence of any
particular object in order to explain any of the phenomena we are
attempting to explain, we should disbelieve the existence of any putative
object not needed to explain phenomena.
C1. Disbelieve the existence of X ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
Ockham ’ s Razor as Ockham himself would employ it:
P1. The existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do we have empirical
evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the Bible.
P2. Ockham ’ s Razor: If the existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do
we have empirical evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the
Bible, then we should not believe in the existence of object X.
C1. Do not believe in the existence of object X (though it is still possible
that X does exist) ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
Part II
Metaphysics
14
Parmenides ’ Refutation
of Change
Adrian Bardon
Parmenides was a Greek scholar living in the Italian colony of Elea in the
fi fth century bce . The Eleatic school that he championed was known for
its claim that reality is a timeless unity. Change, along with the passage of
time, is just an illusion or projection of the mind. Only fragments of
Parmenides ’ work survive; they include his refutation of change, which may
constitute the earliest surviving example of extended philosophical
argumentation.
The main fragment contains a series of connected points intended to
show the impossibility of change. According to Parmenides, any change
involves destruction or creation, in that it either involves an item going from
being to not being (or vice versa) or a property going from being (instantiated)