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The AU faces immense challenges that did not affect Europe The AU’s model, the EU, is a work-in-progress. Even in Europe, there is some concern that the EU will not hold and the Euro crisis has shown the difficulties in integrating economies. Even if the EU were a perfect model, it was established in a time of peace. In Africa, war still rages in parts of the continent; such as Somalia, Congo, and Mali. And in Europe, unification is broadly supported by international and economic heavyweights: Britain, France and Germany. In Africa, the comparable AU anchors are Nigeria and South Africa, neither of which can guarantee AU commitments by themselves. Africa also has huge economic concerns that don’t plague Europe: most African countries trade with their former colonial masters rather than each other, Africas trade with itself is on average only 10% of trade, [1] and the standard of living varies widely across the continent (e.g. South Africa’s GDP is ten times that of Nigeria). Finally it should be remembered that it took the EU forty years to establish a shared currency and a central bank – which is itself showing the strains created by doing so. How will Africa, home to some of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries, do it any faster? [1] Giorgis, Tamrat G., ‘Exclusive: Pascal Lamy, “Africa should strengthen trade within itself”, Afronline, 8 Frbruary 2012.

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Africa prizes sovereignty In Africa as elsewhere where there has been decolonisation the countries prize their independence. This is entirely understandable, but it makes it unlikely that they will be willing to forgo their sovereignty in the near future. Indeed notwithstanding the goal of integration one of the objectives of the AU is ‘To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States’. [1] So long as there are internal conflicts and a need for state building then it is correct that this should come first before integration. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted, "no amount of aid or trade will make the difference" unless war ends on the continent. [2] Moreover the larger nations in Africa; South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya need to be on-board if any real union is to be effective. However sovereignty is more important to these states as they have real influence as independent nations and as a result they are the least enthusiastic about integration. [3] [1] ‘African Union in a nutshell’, African Union. [2] Annan, Kofi, ‘Call for Leadership in Africa’, Business Day, 10 July 2001. [3] Soares, Claire, ‘Ambitious plan for a new Africa: Welcome to the U.S.A (that’s the United States of Africa)’, The Independent, 30 June 2007.

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First of all Africa is becoming more democratic; in 1983 there were only three democracies in Africa but by 2010 this had increased to 23 and with this comes an increase in accountability and desire both for cooperation with neighbours and for economic liberalisation. [1] While individuals certainly dominate African politics and often power is more concentrated in their hands than in more mature democracies this can be an advantage. If these leaders do want to move towards a closer union they can potentially do so much faster than countries where many more interest groups need to be taken into account. [1] ‘Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way’, Devprac.org.

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We should not be tarring the AU with the failures of the OAU. The objectives of the AU are different than that of the OAU. To begin, it is modelled on the European Union, a successful blueprint for building regional institutions and alliances. Second, the AU has already accepted the need for more coercive measures and as a result used sanctions nine times between its foundation and 2011 in response to unconstitutional changes of government. [1] The common electoral standards already call for independent observers before and after any national election so encouraging good governance. And the peace and security council has the authority to send troops to stop crimes against humanity or war crimes. The buzzword at the AU is "people-centred" as opposed to the OAU’s focus on state sovereignty. [1] Williams, Paul D., ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities’, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011, pp.17-18.

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These terrorist camps are the responsibility of a few within the Eritrean government, such as Colonel Tewolde Habte Negash, not the many. In other areas, Eritrea has been cooperative with the global war on terror. In 2012 Eritrea provided over flight clearance to the US air force in regional security operations2. 1) Connell,D. ‘Eritrea/Ethiopia War Looms’, 2 October 2005 2) Office of the coordinator for counterterrorism ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Chapter 2: Africa’ 2012

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The government has supported terrorist organisations Accusations have been made against Eritrea claiming that they have supported terrorist groups, particularly those operating in neighbouring countries. Eritrea has been accused of supporting al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group in Somalia who also operate in Kenya, as well as several other secessionist groups. Training camps have reportedly been established within Eritrea, several of which were attacked by Ethiopia in 20121. The attempts to destabilise East Africa have naturally led to international condemnation, especially from the USA whose “War on Terror” was contradicted by Eritrea’s action2. This would suggest that Eritrea’s own actions are responsible for their isolation. 1) Smith,D. ‘Ethiopian raid on Eritrean bases raises fears of renewed conflict’, 16 March 2012 2) BBC, ‘US sanctions on Eritrea spy chief Negash over al-Shabab’, 6 July 2012

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Many states commit human rights abuse but still enjoy inclusivity in the international system. China has been associated with mass human rights abuse1, yet they are still a major actor in international relations. They also have one of the largest economies, a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and positive relations with most of the world. Eritrea’s regional rival, Ethiopia, also enjoys fruitful international relations with many powerful states despite similar human rights abuses. The resettlement of the Lower Omo Valley by Ethiopia is one such example of continued international support despite killings, beatings and forced resettlement2. This demonstrates a double standard which is not necessarily Eritrea’s fault. 1) Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2013: China’, 2013 2) Hurd,W. ‘Ignoring abuse in Ethiopia: DFID and USAID in the Lower Omo Valley’ July 2013

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Eritrea started the 1998 war Eritrea was responsible for instigating the war against Ethiopia, making it liable for its increased isolation. Eritrea was officially recognised by an international Claims Commission as the initiator of the war1. The state invaded the region of Badme after a long diplomatic dispute over the border issue as they believed the territory was rightfully theirs2. They removed the Ethiopian presence from the state, compromising territorial integrity and incurred a reaction from Ethiopia. This marked Eritrea as the aggressor. An aggressor in a war cannot be seen as a ‘just’ actor and has therefore contributed to its own seclusion by acting in such a manner. 1) BBC, ‘Eritrea broke law in border war’, 21 December 2005 2) Briggs,P. ‘Ethiopia’ pg.30

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Ethiopia provoked Eritrea into invading their shared border. The lands were technically Eritrean, as the boundaries commission would later state1. Through these circumstances, Eritrea was not infringing the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Moreover, some have hypothesised that Ethiopia actually encouraged the war to happen by murdering several Eritrean officials near Badme2. This would create an excuse to make territorial gains, namely to regain access to the Red Sea and the potential trade that accompanied it3. 1) Lauterpacht,E. ‘Sixteenth report on the work of the commission’ 24 February 2005 2) Connell,D. ‘Eritrea/Ethiopia War Looms’, 2 October 2005 3) Shah,A. ‘Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea’, 20 December 2000

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Eritrea has never been fully self-sustainable and still accepts foreign assistance. The beginning of the 21st century has seen Eritrea open up to increasing numbers of foreign Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing aid. The country has now become a highly favoured aid recipient1. Even during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, when most aid agencies were forced out of the country, some were permitted to remain. 1) Smith-Simonsen,C. ‘The pros and cons of self-reliance: Eritrea’s relations with aid agencies and NGOs’ pg.347

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Human Rights Abuse Eritrean isolation has been exacerbated by their poor human rights record. Claims were presented to the UN of ‘extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, extended incommunicado detention, torture, indefinite national service, and lack of freedom of expression, assembly, religious belief and movement’1. Eritrea’s President, Isaias Afewerki, has been accused of using the threat of invasion as a justification for the highly militarised and brutal nature of his country2. This has attracted international criticism, with a joint statement from 44 countries condemning Eritrea’s infringement of human rights3. 1) The Guardian, ‘Eritrea’s human rights record comes under fire at United Nations’, 25 October 2013 2) Blair,D. ‘Eritrea: the African North Korea which thousands will risk anything to escape’ 3 October 2013 3) Joint statement of 44 countries, ‘Human rights Situation in Eritrea’, Human Rights Council, 13 March 2012

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President Isaias Afewerki has sought self-reliance Whilst President Afewerki was fighting for Eritrean independence he became a proponent of the self-reliant state, which could sustain its own population with no external assistance. Since independence the President has rejected foreign aid to the country through claims that aid is a method of enslavement to international donors1. Numerous offers of assistance, including the free food distributions of the World Food Programme, have been rejected in favour of the domestic market2. Afewerki claims that as aid decreases, farmers will work harder to ensure that food demand is met. The lack of donors and trading partners has served to weaken Eritrea’s ties of the outside world, making the state responsible for its own isolation. 1) BBC, ‘Self Reliance could cost Eritrea dear’, 5 July 2006 2) Saunders,E. ‘Eritrea aspires to be self-reliant, rejecting foreign aid’, Los Angeles Times, 2 October 2007

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Eritrea has acted in violation of international law numerous times through methods such as human rights abuse and deserves the UN’s condemnation. Despite these abuses, the UN still offers aid to the country1, demonstrating its commitment to re-engage with the country. Eritrea, however, has been increasing hostile to the UN over the issue of aid. Having refused assistance from the United Nations World Food Programme and other policies, Eritrea has weakened its links with the institution, isolating itself from the international community. 1) BBC, ‘Eritrea refuses food aid’, 3 January 2010

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The US has attempted to maintain an equal level of support for both Ethiopia and Eritrea since the EEBC incident. Both states became military allies of the USA and joined the coalition of the willing which invaded Iraq in 20031. The US has also attempted to reach a permanent peace between the two state and has encouraged Eritrea to contribute to regional stability2. 1) Connell,D. ‘Eritrea/Ethiopia War Looms’, 2 October 2005 2) Bureau of African Affairs, ‘U.S. Relations with Eritrea’11 February 2013

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Eritrea is surrounded by hostile nations Eritrea has been forced in to isolation due to unfriendly neighbours. In its short history, Eritrea has been in conflicts with Ethiopia and Djibouti over border issues. Diplomatic ties with Sudan, while having improved recently, have historically been very poor as well. The hostility received from these countries has fostered a “bunker mentality” amongst Eritreans1. The previous and present security threats from their neighbours has ensured an ‘us against them’ attitude, which is evident in their wider international dealings. 1) Eshetu,S. ‘Eritrean Leadership’s “Bunker Mentality”’, 3 September 1998

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The UN has done little to facilitate improvement Rather than encouraging Eritrea to become more integrated in the international community, the United Nations has made the state’s situation worse. The UN has enforced sanctions upon the country for links that it claimed to find between Eritrea and al-Shabaab1 which served to weaken ties between Eritrea and the outside world. The intergovernmental organisation (IGO) has also regularly condemned Eritrea for its policies, which Eritrea believes is the result of hostile states ensuring the state is condemned by the international community2. 1) The Guardian, ‘Eritrea’s human rights record comes under fire at United Nations’, 25 October 2013 2) Ibid

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The US has unfairly supported Ethiopia The US is responsible for Eritrea’s isolation through its foreign policy. The United States has actively supported Ethiopia, Eritrea’s rival, in regional disputes. In 2002, the USA urged Ethiopia to disregard the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Commission’s (EEBC) decision which stated that lands occupied by Ethiopia did belong to Eritrea. This was also a violation of their role as a guarantor for the agreement1. Continued support for Ethiopia’s counterterrorism role worsened US-Eritrea relations. Relationships deteriorated to the extent of which that the USA attempted to revoke Eritrea’s membership to the UN in December 2011. The US has therefore been unnecessarily provocative and exclusionary in its foreign policy. 1) Weldemichael,A. ‘Eritrea: Bringing Eritrea in From the Cold- We Need to UN-Break the U.S.-Ethiopia-Eritrea Triangle’ 17 January 2014

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Eritrea has been responsible for the majority of this animosity. The country was responsible for aggressively attacking Yemen in 1996. In 2008, Eritrea attacked along the Djibouti-Eritrean border claiming the territory was rightfully theirs1. A theme emerges from these examples, confirmed by President Afewerki of Eritrea when he openly stated he has sought the removal of neighbouring regimes2. The excuse of adopting a siege mentality has also enabled the president to increase his powers and suppress internal dissent3. It is therefore more likely that the government, rather than external players, have contributed to Eritrea’s siege mentality. 1) Mesfin,B. ‘The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute’, 15 September 2008 2) Eshetu,S. ‘Eritrean Leadership’s “Bunker Mentality”’, 3 September 1998 3) Blair,D. ‘Eritrea: the African North Korea which thousands will risk anything to escape’, 3 October 2013

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Annan’s peace proposals do not provide cover for Assad; they call for Assad to stop fighting and single out the Syrian government as having to stop troop movements and pull back. Assad would have much more political cover without the proposal providing a benchmark by which to rate Assad’s cooperation.

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The plan is just political cover for Assad. The plan is simply being used as political cover by Assad, as long as he is signed up to such an agreement and other countries believe there is a chance that he will implement it the Russians and Chinese will not allow further Security Council action. Both the Russians and Chinese are showing that they are willing to support Assad by vetoing anything hinting at sanctions. [1] Therefore the only thing the Annan plan does is provide more time for Assad to go on killing his own people so that he can remain in power as is shown by his unwillingness to implement any of the plans provisions. [2] [1] Bennetts, Marc, ‘Russia Says West’s UN Syria Resolution Supports Rebels’, RIA Novosti, 18 July 2012. [2] Editorial Board, ‘Syria’s cover for murder’, Washington Post, 31 March 2012.

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Ultimately unless one side wins decisively then there will have to be a deal. Both sides will have to shift their positions. There have to be on-going negotiations to be able to facilitate this.

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The plan has failed. The plan has clearly failed; its primary goal was to end the violence but a total of at least 13,000 Syrians have been killed since the beginning of the uprising. [1] Around 100 people are killed each day and even Annan himself has conceded the ceasefire is ‘failing’. [2] Assad clearly believes the Annan plan has failed having told his cabinet "When one is in a state of war, all our policies and capabilities must be used to secure victory" [3] this is not the kind of language of someone looking to take part in a peaceful solution. Everything in the plan relies on some kind of ceasefire; that has not happened and without it the rest of the points cannot be implemented. The plan must therefore be abandoned as Susan Rice the US Ambassador to the United Nations stated when creating the monitoring mission "If there is not a sustained cessation of violence, full freedom of movement for U.N. personnel and rapid meaningful progress on all other aspects of the six-point plan, then we must all conclude that this mission has run its course." [4] [1] Barari, Hassan, ‘A road map for political solution to Syrian crisis’, Al Arabiya News, 1 July 2012. [2] Blomfield, Adrian, ‘Syria: Kofi Annan claims peace plan can be revived’, The Telegraph, 9 July 2012. [3] ‘Assad says Syria ‘in a state of war’, Aljazeera, 27 June 2012. [4] Lynch, Colum, ‘Does Washington have the stomach to kill of Kofi Annan’s peace plan?’, Foreign Policy.com, 18 July 2012.

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While the plan has not yet brought about a ceasefire this does not provide a good reason not to continue to use the six point plan as the basis to create that ceasefire. Deadlines may pass but that cannot mean we simply abandon the intention to create that ceasefire.

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The Syrian opposition will never be willing to deal with Assad. As a follow up to the six point plan on the 1st July in Geneva it was agreed that a transitional government would be set up which “could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent”. [1] Mutual consent however means both sides have a veto; Assad would have to agree and he is not going to agree to a government which he is not involved in. The opposition meanwhile argues “The country has been destroyed and they want us then to sit with the killer?” [2] With neither side willing to consider sitting down with the other it is difficult to see how Annan’s plan can ever get anywhere no matter how long it is kept on life support. [1] Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, 20 June 2012. [2] Lee, Matthew, ‘Analysis: Plan to end Syrian crisis falls flat’, Associated Press, 2 July 2012.

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Russia has vowed to veto any such western resolution arguing that "To adopt the resolution would be...direct support for the revolutionary movement… To pressure just one side means drawing [Syria] into a civil war and interference in the internal affairs of the state." [1] Moreover even if such a resolution was to get through the UN Security Council it would have little impact. Sanctions have a poor track record in bringing regimes to the table when they believe they are threatened. Sanctions have not worked against Iran [2] or North Korea, and the sanctions imposed against Libya last year in a similar situation clearly failed as armed intervention was needed. [3] [1] Bennetts, Marc, ‘Russia Says West’s UN Syria Resolution Supports Rebels’, RIA Novosti, 18 July 2012. [2] Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Eskandar, and Sahmi, Muhammad, ‘The Sanctions Aren’t Working’, Foreign Policy.com, 5 July 2012. [3] Farge, Emma, ‘Special report: In Libyan oil shipment, sanctions prove dumb’, Reuters, 16 May 2011.

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There is little point in talks for the sake of talks if they are never going to get anywhere. There are other things that could be done that could help reduce the violence such as creating safe zones in neighbouring countries territories, establishing buffer zones in Syria, and creating an arms quarantine to prevent Russian and Iranian weapons flowing into Syria to help the regime. [1] [1] Tabler, Andrew J., ‘Cut Off Assad’s Lifelines’, The Washington Institute, 30 May 2012.

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Without the peace plan there will be further conflict. Kofi Annan believes that peace can only be found together arguing all members of the Security Council "Either unite to secure your common interests, or divide and surely fail in your own individual way. Without your unity… nobody can win and everyone will lose in some way." Moreover a failure of the peace plan would “turn a humanitarian crisis into a catastrophe." [1] Without any prospect of a peaceful solution it is likely that Assad would escalate to using chemical weapons. Nawaf Fares, the Syrian Ambassador to Iraq who has defected, has warned that they would be used if the regime feels cornered. [2] If this were to happen Israel might be compelled to attack to prevent Syrian Chemical weapons being used against it or falling into the hands of terrorists. [3] This in turn would spark off a wider regional war. [1] Beaumont, Peter, ‘Failure of Syria peace plan ‘risks wider regional conflict’, guardian.co.uk, 30 June 2012. [2] Gardner, Frank, ‘Syria: Assad regime ‘ready to use chemical weapons’, BBC News, 17 July 2012. [3] Fisher, Gabe, ‘Pentagon reportedly seeking to avert Israel strike on Syrian chemical weapons sites’, The Times of Israel, 19 July 2012.

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Annan’s plan should be enforced. Western countries such as Britain and France want attention to shift from monitoring to enforcement. William Hague argues the bomb that killed the Syrian defence minister “confirms the urgent need for a Chapter VII resolution of the UN Security Council on Syria… All the members of the UN Security Council have a responsibility to put their weight behind the enforcement of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan's plan to end the violence.” [1] This enforcement would mean non-military sanctions if the regime does not withdraw troops and heavy weapons from populated areas within 10 days [2] – as called for in the second point of Annan’s plan. [1] Hague, William, ‘Hague: ‘The situation in Syria is clearly deteriorating’, itvnews, 18 July 2012. [2] AP, ‘U.K.’s Hague Urges Support for Peace Plan’, Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2012.

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Annan’s plan is the only proposal on the table. Both the options currently on the table are continuations of the six point plan. The western states such as the US, France and UK want to give the plan teeth by adding an enforcement mechanism while the Russians own plan simply involved extending the current monitoring mission. [1] There would be no point in starting from scratch on a new plan that would have to rebuild support from world governments and would likely end up at a similar position. Not only is there no plan B but any plan B would have to simply mean more of the same. [2] The Annan plan at least has a starting framework up and running and is talking to all parties. [1] Lynch, Colum, ‘Does Washington have the stomach to kill of Kofi Annan’s peace plan?’, Foreign Policy.com, 18 July 2012. [2] ‘U.N. chief: ‘No Plan B’ in Syria’, CNN, 24 May 2012.

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This maintains the fiction that the current plan is somehow reducing the level of conflict in Syria; it is not, and that is the whole problem. Already the Red Cross has declared the conflict to be a Civil war. [1] The conflict is expanding regardless of the peace plan. [1] Nebehay, Stephanie, ‘Exclusive: Read Cross ruling raises questions of Syrian war crimes’, Reuters, 14 July 2012.

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Sanctions are a proven policy tool and can pressure a regime that is extremely repressive into reforms. Aggressive U.S. engagement and pressure contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and it can work again. As in the Cold war there are radio stations that are effective at providing news and information about the outside world to Cuba. [1] Sanctions are also, according to Colin Powell, a ‘moral statement’ of America’s disapproval for the Castro regime. Blaming America for all economic woes didn’t trick ordinary Russians and it won’t trick the Cubans. Now is exactly the time that the United States should be tightening down the screws so that Castro’s successor is forced to make real changes. [1] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996.

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Sanctions are not working Sanctions are pointless and counterproductive. They’ve made no political difference in the last 43 years, why would they now? They mean that the US can be blamed for all the failures of the Cuban economy and to justify repressive measures for security, [1] and therefore encourage the retrenchment of both. In times when the Cuban economy is booming, as in 2005 when the economy grew by 8%, the impotence of the sanctions becomes clear. [2] President Bush claimed to want to empower civil society in Cuba but he also argued that the best way to achieve this in China was to trade and spread ‘American values.’ [3] Cuba’s geographical and cultural proximity makes it very likely to change quickly when they are able to freely interact with the United States through travel and trade. [4] [5] [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005. [2] Peters, Philip, ‘U.S. Sanctions against Cuba: A Just War Perspective’, p.392. [3] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005. [4] Meet the Press, ‘John Kerry’,31 August 2004. [5] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005.

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The United Nations Resolutions condemning the sanctions have never passed through the Security Council and therefore lack any authority. The Cubans themselves are also violating international agreements in particular the 1928 Inter-American Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by surrounding “embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the Cuban people.” [1] [1] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996.

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Foreign policy should follow the will of the people Sanctions are not the will of the American people but of a small minority of embittered Cuban Americans in Florida who are being pandered to due to their importance in elections in a swing state. [1] Congressman Charles Rangel argues that the only success of the sanctions policy has been to “appease the Republican constituency in Florida”. [2] National opinion generally expresses no preference or opposes the ban, in a 2009 CBS poll asking "Do you think the United States should or should not re-establish diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba?" 67% said should. [3] Sanctions remaining in place is electioneering government at its worst, domestic interest groups controlling government foreign policy. As Karl Rove has admitted "When people mention Cuba to me, it makes me think of three things: Florida, Florida, and Florida." [4] [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005. [2] DeYoung, Karen, ‘Sanctions Against Cuba Are Excessive, GAO Says’, 2007. [3] Pollingreport.com, ‘Cuba’. [4] Rosenthal, Joel H., ‘The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States and the Next Revolution’, 2009.

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Sanctions harm the Cuban people. The sanctions cause real and unacceptable harm to the Cuban people. Sanctions deprive Cuba of low cost food that the United States could provide so hitting the poorest yet they do not affect the ruling elite. [1] In the 1990’s Cuba lost $70 billion in trade [2] and $1.2 billion in international loans because of U.S. sanctions. Cuba is too poor a country not to suffer from these losses. The dominance of America in the pharmaceuticals industry, moreover, means that it is actually impossible for Cubans to gain access to many drugs and other medical equipment, including the only curative treatment for some pediatric leukemias. [3] America would be the natural market for most Cuban products, and its refusal to accept goods with even the tiniest Cuban inputs from third nations damages Cuba’s ability to trade with others. Other South American countries have shown their reliance on the types of loans that Cuba is denied in the last few years to keep their economies on track. [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005. [2] United Nations Secretary General, ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’, United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-seventh session, 26 July 2002, P.11 [3] Garfield, Richard, ‘The Impact of the Economic Crisis and the US Embargo on Health in Cuba’, American Journal of Public Health, Vol.87, No. 1, January 1997, P.18

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Sanctions didn’t cause the economic failure in Cuba. The communist political and economic system has been shown to lead to economic collapse all over the world, whether sanctions are in place or not. Centralization, collectivism, state control, bureaucracy, and restrictions on private initiative totalitarian style economic policies are what are to blame for the Cuban people’s economic suffering. [1] Even if sanctions were lifted, lack of private ownership, foreign exchange and tradable commodities would hold Cuba back. The International Trade Commission found a ‘minimal effect on the Cuban economy’ from sanctions. [2] In fact, it is by using sanctions to pressure Cuba into economic and political reform that the US can best contribute to an economic recovery there. [1] Peters, Philip, ‘U.S. Sanctions against Cuba: A Just War Perspective’. [2] U.S. International Trade Commission, ‘ITC Releases Report on the Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with respect to Cuba’, 2001.

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The people who care most about the Cuban question thoroughly oppose dropping sanctions. The Mid-Western Republicans who voted to drop the travel ban are no less blinkered than the Cuban Americans who vote to keep it. Opinion on sanctions wavers; the separation of powers is specifically in place to allow the White House to maintain a stable policy on issues of national security rather than responding to every change in public opinion. It would not be right for the United States to change its foreign policy when the population is apathetic and has very little opinion on an issue.

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Cuba will never make up more than a tiny percentage of America’s trade and it is able to source and sell all the products it needs elsewhere. Even if Cuba was a vital market for American goods it would be worth giving up some economic growth in order to maintain a commitment to the freedom of the Cuban people. As it is, the total Cuban GDP is a drop in the ocean and at this point is almost entirely irrelevant to the United States.

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Sanctions are illegal Sanctions on Cuba are illegal and damage America’s International standing. They violate the UN Charter, laws on the freedom of navigation, and repeated United Nations resolutions since 1992 (passed with only the US and Israel in opposition). [1] Furthermore, some parts of the Helms-Burton Act are extra-territorial in their effects on businessmen from third nations and therefore cause significant protest around the world. This makes a mockery of the US claim to be a guardian of International Law, not only in its dealings with Cuba but also in the negotiations over the future of Iraq. America could achieve its goals internationally more easily if it was not marked with evidence of its lack of respect for International Law. [1] CNN, ‘U.N. again condemns U.S. embargo against Cuba’, 2009.

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Economic benefits of ending sanctions The United States will also benefit from the opening of trade with Cuba economically. Mid-Western Republicans have all voted to drop the embargo because of the potential for profits in their farming states. Even the modest opening of the embargo in 2000 has increased sales of farm products immensely having gone from nothing [1] to $344 million in 2010. [2] This is a market for American products as well as a local producer. Further, if sanctions end Americans will be able to stop pretending that they prefer Bolivian cigars! [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005. [2] Reuters, ‘U.S. food sales to Cuba fall further in 2010’, 2011.

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There is no reason to believe that yet more years of sanctions will make a difference. Cuba has been defiant in the face of much worse and continued on the same course. The sanctions cannot provide leverage while other states do not have sanctions; Cuba can get anything it requires from elsewhere without recourse to the United States so why would Cuba be willing to ever make concessions before sanctions are dropped. [1] [1] Reeson, Greg, ‘Time to Drop Sanctions Against Cuba’, 2006.

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There are no legitimate grounds for Cuba to be sanctioned as opposed to many other states. There is no evidence that Cuba is a sponsor of terror, and even if it is the U.S. does not place all the restrictions it places on other designated sponsors of terror that it does on Cuba. [1] Cuba has no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and any allegations about Cuba developing such weapons have never been substantiated. Cuba holds fewer prisoners of conscience than China, Vietnam or Iran and has recently been releasing many of them. [2] To maintain sanctions in order to change the form of government, as the United States claims it does, is totally illegitimate under International Law and, moreover, Cuba is in no sense the only undemocratic country in the world. Cuba has gone so far as to offer to compensate the U.S. citizens whose property was nationalised in 1959. America has never explained the threat posed by Cuba that requires these sanctions. [1] DeYoung, Karen, ‘Sanctions Against Cuba Are Excessive, GAO Says’, 2007. [2] Amnesty International, ‘Cuba frees prisoners of conscience’, 2011.

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Protecting human rights America is attempting to protect the rights of its own citizens and of the Cubans enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [1] Something the Castro who considers democratic pluralism to be ‘pluralistic garbage’ [2] will never live up to without coercion. Indeed Cuba undermines the guarantees made in its own constitution and invokes sovereignty as a justification for not complying with international rights agreements and further restricting human rights. [3] The USA’s status as a guardian of human rights and an enemy of terror is enhanced by its moral refusal to compromise with a repressive government just off its own shores. [1] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996. [2] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996. [3] Human Rights Watch, ‘Impediments to Human Rights in Cuban Law’, 1999.

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Sanctions are necessary for national security Sanctions are a better alternative to military action. The most recent set of sanctions were imposed in 1996 in response to two US civilian planes belonging to the group of exiles ‘brothers of peace’ being shot down by the Cuban Air Force near Cuba. [1] The United States would have been justified in reacting proportionally with some military action but instead reinforced sanctions through the Helms-Burton Act. [2] This shows that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of support for Cuba in 1991 did not mean an end to the threat posed by Cuba. Cuba has remained communist and the Castro regime has shown it is still willing to antagonize the United States. As Cuba is situated in a strategic location close to the United States the US government cannot be precipitate in removing sanctions at least until Cuba proves it is a good neighbour. [1] University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, ‘Armando Alejandre Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Pena y Pablo Morales v. Republica de Cuba’, 1999. [2] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996.

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Sanctions provide leverage In 2003 Senator John McCain argued "freedom for the Cuban people is not yet at hand, and the Castro brothers clearly intend to maintain their grip on power", [1] and this situation is likely to continue if sanctions are dropped unilaterally and the pressure is taken off Cuba. The United States however might be able to help the Cuban people gain more freedom in return for being willing to reduce and eventually drop sanctions when the Cuban people are free. Barak Obama while supporting improved relations with Cuba and an eventual dropping of sanctions argues that they provide leverage to encourage steps towards democracy. [2] [1] McCain, John, quoted in AFP, ‘White House runners: Castro’s exit not enough’, 2008. [2] Omestad, Thomas, ‘Cuban Official Rules Out Any Obama Preconditions for Improved Relations’, 2009.

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Cuba deserves sanctions Cuba is a repressive regime which operates one party rule, holds political prisoners and stifles opposition and economic freedom through constant harassment. The Cuban administration is on the U.S. list of sponsors of terror, [1] not least because it provides a safe haven to many American fugitives, [2] and has refused to give help with the search for Al-Qaeda suspects. Cuba is known to have a developmental biological weapons ‘effort’ [3] and is recorded as breaking international sanctions to export dual use technologies to other rogue states. [4] Finally, Cuba has failed to stop drug shipments through its waters [5] and its government profits directly from resources stolen from United States citizens in 1959. [1] U.S. Department of State, ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’. [2] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996. [3] NTI, ‘Cuba Profile Biological’, 2009. [4] Bolton, John, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 2002. [5] Adams, Nathan M., ‘Havana’s Drug-Smuggling Connection’, 1982.

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The national security rationale for sanctions on Cuba has long since disappeared. The embargo was originally imposed in 1960 when Castro seized US property in Cuba and was tightened in 1962 in response to Cuban alignment to the Soviet Union. These sanctions were in order to neutralize Cuba as a potential threat through it being a proxy of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union has collapsed this is no longer a problem. Instead Cuba is left with no powerful friends and by itself its military power is negligible and is certainly in no position to threaten the world’s preeminent power. [1] [1] Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security’, 1997.

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Opening to trade is the way to human rights rather than cutting of contact. Trade and development encourage communications that help to undermine oppression. [1] Far from engaging in sanctions the United States should be encouraging Cubans to use mobile phones and the internet; technologies that can be vital in undermining authoritarian regimes as shown by the Arab Spring. [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005.

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Failing states do not infect a whole region. The contagion theory is hard to apply beyond a small group of countries in West Africa - elsewhere failed states do not tend to drag down their neighbours with them. For example, countries bordering Somalia, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea, are far from perfect but none of them are close to being considered a failed state. In fact, whilst Somalia is seen as the basket case in the region after the failed U.N. intervention in 1992, the percentage of its population that lives on less than $1 a day is in fact less than those of its West African neighbours. [1] Therefore, in most cases the best solution to the problem of failed states is not intervention but for regional groups (e.g. ECOMOG in West Africa, the African Union in Western Sudan, the European Union in Macedonia, Australia in East Timor) to take responsibility for their areas rather than to overburden the USA and UN. In sum, ‘not all failing states pose true dangers to the peace’ and therefore the U.N.’s responsibility for ‘international peace and security’ is not a sufficient basis for action to resurrect all failing or failed states’. [2] [1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.351 [2] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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Failing states can infect a whole region It is in the interests of international stability that failing states are rescued before it is too late. Failed states often infect a whole region, as the collapse of Liberia did in West Africa - a problem known as contagion. Neighbouring states back different factions with arms and squabble over resources, such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone and the mineral wealth of Congo. Internally neighbours are destabilised by floods of refugees and weapons from next door. Their own rebel groups can also easily find shelter to regroup and mount fresh attacks in the lawless country just over their borders. Former U.N. Secretary Boutros-Ghali claimed, as his justification for support for failing states, that the U.N. has a responsibility under its Charter to ‘maintain international peace and security’ amid fears ‘the demise of a state is often marked by violence and widespread human rights violations that affect other states’. [1] Intervention prevents this by entailing the establishment of conditions for reconstruction which thereafter provides physical infrastructure, facilities and social services. The ultimate goal therefore of the intervention is to ensure that both the state concerned and the region as a whole require no further military or monetary support. [2] [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: [2] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.343

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There is very limited evidence to support the theory that failed states become havens for terrorists. It is true that there are some Al-Qaeda sympathisers in Somalia, but these seem to be few in number and no greater in threat to the USA and its allies than similar groups in other countries. Nor is Afghanistan a good example of this theory; Osama Bin Laden was invited to take refuge there by an established government - the Taliban - only after they had successfully grabbed power in Afghanistan. Before this, Bin Laden was sheltered in Sudan - not in the war-torn and lawless south, but in the northern part where the government was in firm control. [1] Here the problem was not a failed state, but rather one with an extreme Islamist government. On the other hand, Iran and Syria are both accused of providing bases for terrorists, but neither could be considered a failed state. [1] Hehir, A. (2007) ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 1/3, pp. 307-326

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States should act to help civilians in failing states to prevent humanitarian crises States should act to help the people of a failing state, as once it collapses no government services will be provided, including law and order. States should work with the UN in leading attempts at conflict resolution, and should engage in subsequent peacekeeping missions and investment in nation-building initiatives (e.g. funding and organising the reintegration of non-combatants into society, organising elections, building up civil society, creating effective government institutions, etc.). The failure of the UN operation in Somalia in 1990 is telling; the country has not had a functioning central government ever since. [1] Intervention to prevent such outcomes will require both greater willingness to commit funds on the part of the powerful states and a commitment to conflict resolution which has been largely lacking in recent national policy world-wide. [1] CNN (2011, June 21) Somalia again is at top of failed states list. Retrieved June 23, 2011 from CNN Wire:

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States should act to protect their own civilians first and foremost, not those in failing states. As such, soldiers should not be sacrificed for the lives of civilians elsewhere; that is not what soldiers enlist for nor does it fit a state’s role as a guarantor of security for its own citizens. Civilians in failing states are the ones that ultimately need to take the responsibility for usurping the incumbent powers in their state. Furthermore, even if it were the case that states should act to prevent failing states, there are means to do this that do not include intervention; charities can provide humanitarian assistance, states can offer mediation services if there is a dispute and diaspora communities can provide finance.

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The United Nations has demonstrated that it lacks both the organizational ethos and the forces required to effectively prevent the failure of states. The veto power on the Security Council ensures that troops for intervention are only mandated when they suit the interests of the most powerful states. Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s forces, almost always composite forces made up of a number of different states, renders them ineffective once on the ground. The example of Sierra Leone is telling, a ceasefire was only agreed upon three years after the UN entered the state, and as late as 2009, the UN’s own head in the region noted the country is still in a precarious situation, ‘with ethnic and interreligious conflicts and increasing threats from international crime’. [1] Failure was not prevented, merely put off. [1] Security Council (2009, September 14). Sierra Leone’s success in transition to stable democracy depends on government providing ‘peace dividend’, Security Council told. Retrieved June 21 from United Nations:

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Failed states are havens for drug-smugglers and terrorists Failed states also export dangers more widely, as they often provide an opportunity for drug crops such as Opium (Afghanistan) or Coca (parts of Colombia) to be grown, processed and traded without fear of authority, with devastating effects both locally and globally. Desperate people may also take refuge in religious or political extremism, which may in time come to threaten the rest of the world. In so doing, failed states often become havens for terrorists, who can find safety in them to plot against the West, to establish training camps for future terrorists, and to build up finance, weapons and other resources with which to mount campaigns. In what was a key claim that later underpinned the 2002 US National Security Strategy and the U.S. War on Terror, Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, has described failed states as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’. [1] This can be seen in Somalia, where states in recent years have ‘begun to fear al Qaeda will take advantage of the lawlessness’. [2] Other fragile states, such as Niger, Congo and Sierra Leone have radioactive and other valuable minerals which could be very dangerous in the hands of determined terrorists. The USA should work with the UN to strengthen governments so that they can more effectively maintain internal order while controlling their borders and tracking resource-flows. [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: [2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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The United Nations has the constitutional power and capability to intervene to prevent failed states The United Nations, and its resident body, the Security Council, has both the right and the capability to intervene in countries in order to maintain the peace. Peace in this sense represents more than the absence of bloodshed, but also provides the means by which aid organizations can enter a territory and provide the requisite resources to prevent civilian suffering. The United Nations have proven their efficacy in this area, mandating an intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003 that sought to prevent the exacerbation of tensions between the government and rebel forces. [1] A ceasefire was eventually brokered in 2007 and the failure of the state averted. U.N. forces in Macedonia during the 1990s were also credited with ‘successfully contributing to the prevention of conflict spill over and having a stabilizing effect in the country’. [2] U.N. interventions to prevent the failure of states can and do work. [1] BBC News (2003, February 5) UN backs Ivory Coast peacekeepers. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from BBC News: [2] Kim, J. (1998, July 23). Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention. Retrieved September 9, 2011 from CRS Report for Congress:

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The cost of intervention is lower than the cost of inactivity. Sometimes, as in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, the situation will become so bad that US military intervention is necessary - this is hugely costly compared to funding preventative action through the United Nations. The role of failed states as reservoirs from which refugees, narcotics, terrorism, illegal diamonds, etc. are exported means that the USA already spends many billions of dollars a year in dealing with the mess they create. Finally, there is an opportunity cost of lost trade and investment which applies to the developing world and developed economies alike (e.g. the benefits to the US of trade with oil-rich Angola, Sudan and Congo).

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Interventions can, and do, fail, however so long as their intentions are good, they must still be attempted if the effects of failed states are to be prevented. Furthermore, the humanitarian catastrophes linked to failing and failed states: ‘mass migration, environmental degradation, regional instability; energy insecurity and transnational terrorism’ are not the fault of a failed intervention, but a failed state. [1] The U.S.-led intervention in Somalia in 1992 is a case in point; though the intervention failed and, it could be argued, exacerbated conditions in Somalia, it did not lead to the state’s failure, it merely failed to prevent it. As such, the U.S. cannot be blamed for attempting to stand with Somalis and save their state; that they failed is unfortunate, but the subsequent continuing humanitarian catastrophe is not the fault of intervening forces. So long as there is hope that interventions can prevent failed states, the success rate is above 0%, they should be attempted for the alternative is little better for the civilians concerned. [1] Patrick, S. (2006) Weak states and global threats: Fact or fiction? Retrieved June 24, 2011 from the Washington Quarterly (29:2, p.27-53) p.27

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Failing states should not be provided a safety net Being willing to step into every fragile state could create a moral hazard. Irresponsible governments will assume that they will be bailed out by the powerful states, like the US, and the UN, who will always intervene to prevent unnecessary and wide-spread suffering. [1] This in itself makes future failures much more likely, as there is no incentive for governments to tackle corruption, crime or the other issues that push states to the brink of failure. [2] There needs to maintain a culpable fear of failure, separate from the regime change and economic reconstructing often enforced by the UN and IMF on failing states. [1] Kuperman, A. (2006) ‘Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’ in T. Crawford and A. Kuperman eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention (London: Routledge). [2] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:

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Intervention in fragile states is simply a new form of imperialism It is not for either the USA or the UN to impose a government upon individual countries. Doing so would deny the people of the failed state the right to chart their own future and be absent of the authorisation of the UN Charter, which states the organization is not allowed to intervene ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. [1] Furthermore, if the USA, or any one country, regularly intervened it would create more hostility towards that country, with accusations that it is acting out of a self-interested desire to exploit peoples economically. The personnel of that country could rapidly become a target for attacks. Nor is it desirable to encourage the UN to increase the level of its intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. This might start with weak countries but could rapidly become a habit and encourage the organisation in its ambitions to become a world government. [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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International development is a more effective method of preventing failed states. The current US approach to international development, in which aid, loans or market access are conditional upon good governance, should be maintained and even extended more widely. Such conditions provide incentives for developing countries to put constructive policies in place and reward those who fight corruption. As past failures show all too clearly, there is no point throwing money at chaotic, lawless and corrupt regimes - it will never reach the people anyway. In any case, humanitarian relief is not conditional and the USA continues to respond with compassion to emergencies anywhere in the world. It should also be noted that special measures to support states identified as at risk of failure could in themselves be harmful. Discussion of intervention will scare off investors and help to bring about economic collapse - becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.

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The cost of intervention is too high The cost of intervention is too high. The United Nations has neither the money nor the support of the international community to undertake speculative missions. Already it fails to meet its targets for troops to provide peacekeeping in countries which request its help. The USA already contributes nearly a quarter of the UN's peacekeeping budget and cannot afford more at a time when it is already stretched by major commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is difficult to see where else the necessary funds could come from. The reconstruction of Afghanistan is expected to cost as much as $15 billion over the next ten years, ‘plus the cost of training a new army and police force’. [1] At a time of financial austerity, American citizens are entitled to ask whether their money is being spent prudently. The lives of intervening soldiers are not pawns, they should not be unnecessarily sent into death-traps like Somalia in 1990. [2] [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: [2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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The questionable foreign policy of previous U.S. administrations should not pre-empt future interventions, either by the United States or other nations genuinely intended to protect civilians in failing states, when mandated by the United Nations. The United Nations has expertise and is widely respected, which will be required considering the international reputation of the USA is now sufficiently damaged that the hostility it generates can undermine the good work it wishes to do. In partnership the USA can provide resources to enable the UN to secure the future stability of many fragile countries, while the UN's involvement can show that these operations are altruistic and pose no imperialist threat. Over time, commitment through the UN to international peace and humanitarian concerns will allow the USA to change the way it is viewed worldwide - an important aspect of the War on Terror. Regarding violations of sovereignty, former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali dismisses objections: ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality’. [1] [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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Interventions can fail and eventually cause more harm than good Interventions are not a panacea for failing states; they do not ensure the success of either the military offensive or subsequent reconstruction efforts on the ground during the occupation. If the intervention fails to overcome local forces, civilians are powerless to overcome a political hierarchy boosted by military victory and reliant on violence. Furthermore, even if the military offensive is successful, the underlying causes of the failure of the state are still present and may be exacerbated by the presence of an intervening force. As such, intervening forces must be aware that the decision is not simply whether intervention is necessary, but whether it will do more harm than good. Coyne describes this fallacy as the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, whereby states assume that the ‘grass is always greener on the other side’. ‘It is assumed that the foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an outcome preferable to that which would occur absent of these interventions’. The reality challenges these assumptions, for Minxim Pei calculates just a 26% success rate for U.S.-led reconstruction efforts since the late nineteenth century. [1] If an intervening force can’t be certain, even remotely, of the benefit to the state concerned, it has little justification in deploying and risking the exacerbation of an already-precarious problem. [1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.344

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Western aid ‘cannot reach its intended recipients because of violence, irreconcilable political divisions, or the absence of an economic infrastructure’. [1] There is a need to change the rules for access to US aid programmes (e.g. the Millennium Challenge Account) and trade preferences (e.g. the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and those of international organisations in which the USA is influential (e.g. the World Bank, G8 moves on debt relief). At present these programmes are structured to reward developing countries with particular government policies (e.g. protection of property rights, focus on education, sustainable budgets, anti-corruption measures, etc). Sensible though this seems, it denies international help to those states whose people need it most - those where government is weak or absent. Funding microcredit schemes, education, health and sanitation programmes in the more stable parts of failing states, and providing meaningful trade access could all provide long-term benefits to the USA. [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:

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Punishment for the actions of irresponsible governments should not be handed down to civilians. The ‘safety net’ purports to protect civilians by preventing the failure of states; it does not guarantee the protection of those governments responsible for the near-failure. Furthermore, the fear of future failures is much more pronounced when states are left to fail, to export their anarchy to neighbouring states and their contraband to the world. As Rotberg therefore claims, ‘preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are…strategic and moral imperatives’. [1] [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:

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The idea that the US and NATO have a moral obligation falls flat when considering that this would put the US and NATO in a position of having a moral obligation to many other third world countries that are struggling and in conflict. Yet, such a broader obligation obviously does not exist, so why should it exist in Afghanistan? The US/NATO cannot solve Afghanistan's problems, and may actually be doing more harm than good. In so far as a state cannot have a moral obligation to do something impossible, the US and NATO should not have a moral obligation to fulfil the impossible task of stabilizing Afghanistan.

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American and NATO moral responsibility to Afghanistan The US overthrew the Taliban in the winter of 2001. It has a moral obligation to ensure that when it does leave Afghanistan it does so secure in the knowledge that the country will never again be a launching pad for the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and that the country is on the way to a measure of stability and prosperity. [1] Withdrawal before this has been achieved would amount to a terrible betrayal of the Afghan people, some of whose troubles are the result of Western intervention. Millions of refugees have returned and millions of children have the chance to go to school. But the West has failed to protect civilian lives, to bring the development it promised, to wean the economy off its poppy-addiction and to ensure fair elections—and failed even to agree about what it is trying to do in the country. Locally, NATO forces have done fine and heroic work. But too often the best initiatives are dropped when the best commanders end their tours. The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. [2] US and NATO forces should persist in Afghanistan because they can do much better in terms of helping Afghanistan, and because they have a moral obligation to do so. It should be remembered that, for the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people - especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence. [3] The US and NATO have a moral obligation to prevent this, and to not withdraw until the future of Afghanistan is secured. [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009. [2] The Economist. "Obama's war. Why the Afghanistan war deserves more resources, commitment and political will.". 15 October 2009. [3] Obama, Barack. "A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan". RealClearPolitics. 27 March 2009.

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As the British learned in two wars with Afghanistan in the 1800s and the Soviets learned in their bloodbath of the 1980s, Afghanistan is no country at all. Rather, it's a diverse collection of primitive tribes occupying a harsh landscape pockmarked with tens of thousands of hiding places ideal for guerrilla warfare. The war there is a quagmire and makes Vietnam look like an easy place to conquer. [1] These tribes may consider themselves Afghani but this does not reflect any form of nationalism and does not show any more unity than that someone in Morocco and someone in Saudi Arabia may both consider themselves Arab. Why should NATO countries continue to risk their troops in this death trap? Without the timetable for withdrawal, there is no end in sight to this war. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, (retired) Lieutenant General David Barno, a former commander in Afghanistan, said the counter-insurgency campaign that he and other experts are advocating could last until at least 2025. [2] [1] Navarro, Peter. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now". OC Register. 25 September 2009. [2] Fenton, Anthony. "Afghanistan: A Surge Toward Disaster". Asia Times Online. 18 March 2009.

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The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1] If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2] This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3] The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4] Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5] The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6] Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7] The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done. [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009 [2] ibid [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009. [4] ibid [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009. [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009 [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.

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Afghanistan is only of limited value to American and other NATO countries' security, especially in the context of other areas where the resources could be used. Amdrew Bacevich argued in 2009: "What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny. [...] For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbour—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude." [1] The sort of fear-mongering about Pakistan, nuclear war and a new 9/11 is the same sort of scare tactics which were used to justify and perpetuate the war in Vietnam. As Peter Navarro argued, "During my senior year in high school, in 1966-67, our local congressman came to speak to us soon-to-be-draftees about the necessity of the Vietnam War. His basic pitch was a frothy combination of Red menace, yellow peril, and domino theory. [...] the speech rang as hollow as a beer keg after a frat party. [...] Today, I get the same kind of hollowness in my gut every time I hear President Barack Obama and a gaggle of Democratic and Republican hawks offer eerily similar arguments for the Afghanistan war. Terrorism is the new Red menace. Yellow peril has morphed into radical Islam. Dominoes, perhaps surprisingly, are still dominoes. In fact, sober analysis of the two major arguments in support of the war leads me to the same conclusion as my gut – let's get the hell out." [2] Moreover the terrorist threat from Afghanistan is low, Zaid Hamid, head of Brass Tacks, a think-tank based in Pakistan, argues: "Their presence and capacity is greatly exaggerated. It is not possible that the so-called exaggerated threat perception by the West about another 9/11 attack being waged from Pakistan’s FATA or Afghanistan takes place." [3] [1] Bacevich, Andrew J. "The War We Can't Win". Commonweal. 14 August 2009. [2] Navarro, Peter. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now". OC Register. 25 September 2009. [3] Leghari, Faryal. "Troop Surge in Afghanistan is a Military Fallacy". Khaleej Times. Spearhead Research. 20 February 2009.

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Keeping NATO troops in Afghanistan is necessary for creating a successful Afghan state Due to the impotence of the Afghan state and its fledgling armed forces, withdrawing by the timetabled date would most likely mean abandoning the project of building a successful Afghan state, a project which can be successful if NATO troops continue to play their vital role in it. It is a myth that Afghanistan is unconquerable or ungovernable. The level of violence in Afghanistan is actually far lower than most Americans believe. In 2008 more than 2,000 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the Taliban or coalition forces (almost 7 per ten thousand). This was too many, but it was also less than a quarter of the deaths in 2008 in Iraq, a country that is both more sparsely populated and often assumed to be easier to govern. Not only are Afghan civilians much safer under American occupation than Iraqis, they are also statistically less likely to be killed in the war than anyone living in the United States during the early 1990s, when the U.S. murder rate peaked at more than 24,000 killings a year (about 10 per ten thousand). [1] An assertion that deserves a similarly hard look is the argument that nation building in Afghanistan is doomed because the country isn’t a nation-state, but rather a jury-rigged patchwork of competing tribal groupings. In fact, Afghanistan is a much older nation-state than, say, Italy or Germany, both of which were only unified in the late nineteenth century. Modern Afghanistan is considered to have emerged with the first Afghan empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, and so has been a nation for decades longer than the United States. Accordingly, Afghans have a strong sense of nationhood, and building a state there is possible so long as NATO forces do not abandon the project before it is completed. [2] A successful Afghan state is in the interests of all NATO countries, for security reasons, and so a compelling reason to abandon the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan is that building a successful Afghan state is entirely possible if NATO stays the course and only withdraws once the job is done. [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009. [2] ibid

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It seems deeply illogical to argue that withdrawing NATO forces, which would essentially allow the Taliban and Al Qaeda to win, could somehow lead to these parties being in a weaker position than if NATO forces remained in the country and continued military options against them. As the necessary consequence of withdrawal by the timetable is a Taliban and Al Qaeda victory, arguments that continuing NATO operations 'help' them should be ignored, as a NATO withdrawal would help them even more by removing the one player who could compete with them on the battlefield.

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History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won: Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, has issued a taunting statement reminding Western leaders that for more than a millennium, would-be conquerors have tried and failed to subdue the mountain fastness known as the 'graveyard of empires' (Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C., the British in the 1800s, the Soviets from 1979 to 1989): 'The invaders should study the history of Afghanistan. The more the enemy resorts to increasing forces, the more they will face an unequivocal defeat.' [1] As galling as it is to accept tutelage from one of Osama bin Laden's key enablers, this does seem to be what history teaches. Pouring forces into Afghanistan has always proved counterproductive. The presence of large numbers of foreign troops is the one thing that reliably unites Afghans, if only for long enough to drive the foreigners out. Tom Andrews, National Director of Win Without War, argued in February of 2009: "The first principle for someone who finds himself in a hole is to stop digging, The US policy 'hole' in Afghanistan is not of the new Administration's making. But it is important for the President to consider if adding new US combat forces in Afghanistan, without a new and comprehensive plan, for US policy there, might be digging an even bigger hole." [2] This argument similarly applies to keeping NATO forces in Afghanistan past the timetabled withdrawal date: it is just digging a deeper hole. Ann Jones added in 2009 to the argument that the war cannot be won by noting the lack of potential for Afghan forces to ever handle their own security or build a meaningful state: "I went out to the training fields near Kabul where Afghan army recruits are put through their paces, and it was quickly evident just what's getting lost in translation. Our trainers, soldiers from the Illinois National Guard, were masterful... The Afghans were puny by comparison: hundreds of little Davids to the overstuffed American Goliaths training them. Keep in mind: Afghan recruits come from a world of desperate poverty. They are almost uniformly malnourished and underweight. Many are no bigger than I am (1.6 meters and thin) - and some probably not much stronger. Like me, many sag under the weight of a standard-issue flack jacket. [...] American military planners and policymakers already proceed as if, with sufficient training, Afghans can be transformed into scale-model, wind-up American Marines. That is not going to happen. Not now. Not ever. No matter how many of our leaders concur that it must happen - and ever faster.” [3] Both history and NATO's own experiences in Afghanistan lead to the same conclusion: Afghanistan cannot be conquered, and so the timetable for withdrawal should be kept to. [1] Robinson, Eugene. "In Afghanistan, Downsize." Real Clear Politics. 22 September 22 2009. wnsize_98403 [2] Heuvel, Katrina vanden, ‘Don’t Bleed Resources in Afghanistan’, The Nation, 17 February 2009, [3] Jones, Ann. "US wins mind, Afghan hearts are lost". Asia Times. 22 September 2009.

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The continued presence of American and NATO forces benefits the Taliban and Al Qaeda The on-going NATO mission means continued combat confrontations and an ever-increasing risk to the civilian population of Afghanistan. These sorts of deaths, injuries and destruction of property have so far been demonstrably destructive to the U.S.-led international effort to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the violent insurgency being waged by the Taliban and other militant groups. [1] According to a report released last January by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the 2,118 civilians killed in 2008 was an increase of 40% over 2007. [2] The continued presence of American troops into ethnic Pashtun areas in the Afghan south only galvanizes local people to back the Taliban in repelling the infidels. [3] A 2009 study by the Carnegie Endowment concluded that "the only meaningful way to halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops. The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving the resurgence of the Taliban." [4] What the timetable for withdrawal acknowledges is that there is no state-building military solution in Afghanistan. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad-Mahdi Akhondzadeh said in April of 2009, "The presence of foreign forces has not improved things in the country". [5] The long-term security interests of the US and NATO would be better served by a military operation centred around targeted strikes against terrorist training camps from offshore or out-of-country special forces or drones, as this removes the aggravating presence of troops on the ground and would lead to fewer civilian casualties. [6] Looking beyond to the wider world, the NATO mission in Afghanistan has inflamed global Muslim anger and terrorism since its inception, and will continue to do so until it ends. This makes it more difficult for Western and Middle Eastern countries to work together toward mutual objectives, such as peace between Israel and Palestine, a conflict which drives support for terrorism worldwide and helps Al Qaeda recruit. [7] Al Qaeda has realized all this and aims to drain US resources in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden made the following statement in 2004: "All we have to do is send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the [U.S.] generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses ... so we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy." [8] Keeping troops in Afghanistan past the withdrawal date would just play into Al Qaeda's plan to trap the US. Therefore the withdrawal date should be adhered to and NATO troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. [1] Gharib, Ali. "Inevitable: Obama's Surge in Afghanistan Will Bring a Surge in Civilian Deaths". IPS News. 18 February 2009. [2] Fenton, Anthony. "Afghanistan: A Surge Toward Disaster". Asia Times Online. 18 March 2009. [3] Kristof, Nicholas. "The Afghanistan Abyss". The New York Times. 5 September 2009. [4] Dorronsoro, Gilles. ‘Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009. [5] Tehran Times. "Iran says Afghan troop surge will be unhelpful". Tehran Times. 4 April 2009. [6] Los Angeles Times. "U.S. considers sending special ops to Afghanistan". Los Angeles Times.26 October 2008. [7] Friends Committee on National Legislation. "FCNL to Obama: No More Troops to Afghanistan! Invest in Diplomacy & Development". Friends Committee on National Legislation.23 February 2009. [8] Ignatius, David. "Road Map for Afghanistan". RealClearPolitics. 19 March 2009.

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Peter Bergen argues that "Objections to Obama’s ramp-up in Afghanistan begin with the observation that Afghanistan has long been the "graveyard of empires"—as went the disastrous British expedition there in 1842 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, so too the current American occupation is doomed to follow. In fact, any number of empire builders, from Alexander the Great to the Mogul emperor Babur in the sixteenth century to the British in the Second Afghan War three decades after their infamous defeat, have won military victories in Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés." [1] NATO can succeed in nation-building if it persists in empowering and protecting the Afghan state. It should be remembered that Afghanistan has been a successful, stable nation in the past, and could be so again. Afghanistan’s majestic mountains, verdant valleys, and jasmine-scented gardens may once again draw the tourists that once flocked there. [2] [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009. [2] ibid

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An ineffective message in this case might well have been worse than no message. Had the West attempted to intervene, either by setting up a no-fly zone or even sending in ground troops, and the killings not stopped, it would have sent a message that Western threats and Western power are a paper tiger. Worse, if the genocide had reversed itself after Western intervention, the West would have found itself with both the moral and the political responsibility for the violence, and accusations of Western bias and even complicity would spread rapidly.

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The West has demonstrated that hiding behind China is a viable strategy Perhaps as damaging as the humanitarian consequences of the failure to intervene is the message it sent to other leaders considering solving their political and ethnic problems in a similar manner to Khartoum. Rather than deterring them from following in Bashir’s footsteps, the West by doing nothing, gave the impression that Bashir survived not through his own efforts, but because China protected him. Given the rapid expansion of Chinese influence around in Africa, this makes accepting Chinese investment instead of western investment vastly more attractive because in addition to the economic benefits, it is now perceived as buying Chinese political cover. In turn, this increasing interest in seeking out Chinese political cover will lead to more states being willing to imitate Bashir in the future, safe the knowledge that they will not be bombed.

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Past experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that terrorism tends to flourish when states are weak. An Invasion of Sudan, especially if it had led to a collapse of the Sudanese state, would have create a vacuum terrorists could kill, especially when the very invasion would provide the resentment and motivation for thousands of jihadi volunteers to fight the Western “crusaders”

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The conflict has a racial identity The conflict in Sudan took on racial overtones. The inhabitants of Darfur are largely black, the government forces of Arab descent. Much of their treatment, including kidnapping and slavery, is a legacy of centuries of racist mistreatment and conflict between “white” and “dark” Muslims. [1] As a strong opponent of Racism, the West had a duty to act, given that the conflict was reinforcing negative views in the Arab world against those of darker skin. [2] [1] Mutua, Makau, ‘Racism at root of Sudan’s Darfur crisis’, The Christian Science Monitor, 14 July 2004, [2] Fatah, Tarek, ‘From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism among Muslims’, , 24 April 2009,

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The Behaviour of the Sudanese government was tantamount to Genocide The violence that occurred in the Darfur region of Western Sudan since 2003, approached genocide proportions with the death toll estimated between 300,000 and 500,000 out of a population of a little over a million and a half. Not only was this a human tragedy. It was also a political crisis. The West invested enormous political capital in the idea that genocide, whether deliberate or through governmental negligence, is unacceptable, and George Bush even termed the events in Darfur a genocide in 2007 . [1] By having called the events a genocide and then failed the West discredited itself, both as a moral force(showing it cared more about SE Europe than it did Africa) and indicated to dictators that they have no reason to fear a Western response in the future. [1] ‘Bush blasts Darfur 'genocide'’, MailOnline, 29 May 2007,

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The events in Darfur were first and foremost a Civil War, even if their consequences included a major humanitarian crisis. Darfur rose in rebellion against the central government first, and even the local conflict was a civil war, the Abbala tribe from which the janjaweed are drawn has a long history of conflict with settled Darfur tribes, which drove them off their land centuries ago. That the death toll in these conflicts was raised by the introduction of modern armaments is clear. What is not clear is how Western intervention would have solved either the underlying problems, or created a deterrent. The most likely outcome would have been genocide of the Abbala, as the West already demonstrated in Kosovo that it is unable to protect the “perpetrators” of genocide from its “victims” even with large military forces present.

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The Sudanese government has long been integrated, and black Sudanese as well as Arabs serving in the cabinet and Army. The rebellion in Darfur is primarily political and was launched by former supporters of the government. There is no clear evidence it is based on race.

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There was and continues to be a compelling case for a humanitarian response to the crises, but this does not suggest that military intervention would have solved the situation. Military intervention and the collapse of the Sudanese state would have quite possibly led to far greater destabilization. Rather than only one group of refugees, it would likely have led to the Abbala fleeing over the border into Chad as well. Potentially this could have meant the development of a situation akin to that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, were the refugees refought the Civil War among themselves.

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The Sudanese regime has a history of supporting terrorism and other unsavoury groups The Sudanese government’s unsavoury behaviour goes beyond its actions in Darfur. Its campaign against the southern rebels was replete with atrocities, and it has a long history of supporting terrorism including hosting Osama Bin Ladin in the early 1990s. [1] While Sudan has been more cooperative in recent years against Al-Quada, it continues to harbour Islamic extremist groups responsible for attacks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Combined with the conflict in Darfur there was a pressing case for regime change, and reason to think Sudan’s neighbours would be open and supportive of the idea as well. [1] Bhattacharji, Preeti, ‘State Sponsors: Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 April 2008,

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The Chaos in Darfur is a threat to regional security Sudan’s internal problems actively destabilized the entire region. More than a million refugees fled Darfur, many travelling to refuge e camps in Chad and Southern Sudan. This in turn has placed stresses on local resources. [1] Furthermore, the tendency for resistance forces to base themselves in these refugee camps, threatened and continues to threaten to spread the war into these regions, either igniting the north-south Civil War in Sudan, or destabilizing Chad’s government. [1] Polgreen, Lydia, ‘Attacks Pushing Darfur Refugees Into Chad’, The New York Times, 11 February 2008,

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Even if the conflict was inter-tribal, it had been brought to a boil and allowed to turn genocidal by the Sudanese government. It may well be that the conflict would have continued of its own accord without Sudanese intervention, though the continued air support provided consistently by the Sudanese government to the Janjaweed argues against this. [1] And all interventions are by nature one-sided – that reconstruction might be difficult is a reason to plan for it, but in and of itself it does not justify allowing thousands to die and for Western opposition to genocide to be left an empty letter. [1] ‘Sudan: Government and Militias Conspire in Darfur Killings’, Human Rights Watch, 22 April 2004,

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Even eliminating the Sudanese Air Force would have had a major impact, as one rebel group argued that the Air Force was responsible for 60% of the attacks launched by Sudanese forces in the region. [1] Even if a non-Fly zone did not completely eliminate the Sudanese military forces, it would even the playing field and perhaps persuaded the government to sue for peace. Furthermore, the difficulty of gaining over-flight rights was also an issue with the air war in Kosovo, eventually forcing the use of German bases and carrier launched planes due to Italian reluctance. Such issues can be overcome, and the Sudanese air force poses little threat with its aged inventory. [1] Polgreen, Lydia, ‘Attacks Pushing Darfur Refugees Into Chad’, The New York Times, 11 February 2008,

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Intervention might destabilize the peace deal in the South The focus on the failure to act in Darfur ignores the real progress that has been achieved in ending decades long violence in Sudan. In 2011 Southern Sudan peacefully voted to secede and all indications are that the process will not be contested by Khartoum. The United States under George Bush played a key role in the peace accords which ended that part of the Civil War, with Prospect Magazine noting that the President “deserves much of the credit” for the agreement . [1] While the government in Khartoum has accepted them, it seems likely that if the US were to have participated in a bombing campaign or invasion, that the Sudanese government would have responded by tearing up the accords. This is especially true as they would have a pressing motive that does not exist in Darfur, namely the Oil reserves that will be leaving the country with the rest of the South. [2] [1] De Waal, Akex, ‘Sudan’s chance’, Prospect, 28 August 2005, [2] ‘South Sudan says agreement reached with Khartoum on oil fees’, Sudan Tribune, 13 December 2011,

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The West should not atagonise the Muslim world Any intervention by the West in Sudan, following so closely on Iraq and Afghanistan would have been looked upon as a further attack on the Muslim world and therefore act as a recruiting tool for terrorism. While it is true that the intervention would have been couched in terms of helping oppressed Muslims, so too were the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. An attack, especially if it was air-only, and therefore left Bashir in power in Khartoum might also have strengthened the regime by providing it with religious legitimacy, and might well have as a result inspired volunteers to enlist in order to fight in a jihad to protect it. The latter would be even more true in the event ground troops were used, in which case volunteers might flood in from around the world to fight the “Crusaders”. Such an added dimension could not have helped but place the Christian Southern Sudanese in an awkward and very uncomfortable position.

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The Conflict is an internal inter-tribal conflict – arming the Darfur tribes would be better The conflict in Darfur has been largely inter-tribal, and even the Sudanese government, lacking the full resources needed to suppress the opposition itself, has resorted to playing on these differences. Any Western effort to intervene would have been seen as intervening on one side by virtually all of the locals. The Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit would have seen the West as intervening to support them – the Abbala and the Janjaweed, as intervening to attack them. In this context intervention would be seen as a pretext to reverse the sides in the war rather than to end it. If our sole goal was to push for a settlement, it would have made far more sense to attempt to pay off the Janjaweed to turn on the government forces, and then to arm the Darfur tribes. It would have been cheaper, and prevented the Sudanese from playing the sides off against each other.

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Airstrikes would likely be politically ineffective Military intervention, unless launched against the Sudanese state itself, was very unlikely to have been effective. While a no-fly zone would have limited the participation of the Sudanese air force in Darfur, the Sudanese air force was and is not vital to the continued genocide, as Sudanese ground forces and the Janjaweed would still be able to operate. Any air operations would furthermore have required over flight rights from Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and either Somalia or Eritrea. Libya until Gaddaffi’s overthrow was unlikely to work with the West, and the new government is moving closer to Khartoum . [1] Chad would have feared military retaliation, whereas Revolutionary Egypt is in no condition to make major decisions about anything. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have human rights concerns of their own. Avoiding overflights would limit NATO to using carrier based aircraft from the Red Sea that would have had to cross more than a 1000 KM of Sudan to reach the area. This would have made it very difficult to supply a force in Darfur and would have limited operational effectiveness even of the air force. As for the deployment of ground troops, there are few overland supply routes to the Darfur region, and supplying a military force there would have been next to impossible with the opposition of a still existent Sudanese government. [1] Newman, Alex, ‘Libya Rulers Vow ‘Integration’ with Sudan Terror Regime’, NewAmerican, 26 November 2011,

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The United States at least had already stepped on various religiously sensitive toes due to its support of the Christian Southern Sudanese. These groups had support and lobbying in Washington from influential evangelical Christian groups,[1] and President Bush mentioned their religion in his speech celebrating the Peace settlement. [2] If this failed to produce an upsurge in Islamist sentiment, it is hard to see how helping Muslims who are being slaughtered would have, especially if Western intervention was limited to providing air cover. [1] Phares, Walid, ‘The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion’, The Middle East Quarterly, March 1998, [2] Hamilton, Rebecca, ‘U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long Journey to Independence’, the Atlantic, 9 July 2011,

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It is unclear whether the Northern government has any desire to go back to war with the South even if an excuse existed. The Foreign Minister denied any such interest in December of 2011, [1] and the fact is that Sudan ended the war because it was costing far more to wage than could possible have been recovered. Furthermore, after 20 years government forces were losing, and it is hard to see how they would do better with a war on two fronts. Secondly, even if it would destabilize the Peace Agreement, that means in effect that the international community is allowing the South Sudanese to be used as hostages for their “good behaviour” regarding Darfur. If so, that seems less like a triumph of Diplomacy and more like a bad deal. It would incentivise dictators like Mugabe to attempt to make similar deals, say offering to compensate white farmers in exchange for the West ignoring his treatment of black opponents. [1] ‘Sudan’s FM rules out return to war with South Sudan’, Sudan Tribune, 14 December 2011,

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Every country engages in spying against other countries and so are not surprised by the revelations. These countries leaders are obliged to sound like they are outraged but in practice they will already have known such actions occur – they might be interested to learn the details but little else. Hollande’s own Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure (DGSC) has been described by Bernard Barbier, its former technical director, as "probably the biggest information centre in Europe after the English". It uses similar methods to the NSA with systematic collection of emails, sms messages, phone records, social media posts which is then all stored for years. [1] President Obama is right to point out “I guarantee you that in European capitals, there are people who are interested in, if not what I had for breakfast, at least what my talking points might be should I end up meeting with their leaders. That's how intelligence services operate.” [2] [1] Follorou, Jaques, and Johannès, Franck, ‘Exclusive: French intelligence has its own version of PRISM’, Le Monde, 4 July 2013, [2] Chu, Henry, ‘European leaders angered by U.S. spying reports’, Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2013,

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Damages diplomatic relations with allies Every country needs friends and historically the United States has managed to maintain a large number of close relationships with states around the world; it has alliances with various Asian states such as South Korea and Japan, with many Middle Eastern states, and with almost the whole of Europe. The NSA’s spying has damaged these relationships. French President Hollande said “We cannot accept this kind of behavior from partners and allies,” [1] while the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz complained “the United States of America treats its closest partners, including Germany for example, but also the European Union as a whole like hostile powers”. There have even been suggestions that this would jeopardise trade talks as warned by the Commissioner Viviane Reding that “if there is any doubt that our partners are bugging the offices of European negotiators, then the future trade talks could be in difficulty”. [2] [1] Chu, Henry, ‘European leaders angered by U.S. spying reports’, Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2013, [2] Hewitt, Gavin, ‘EU anger at US spy scandal softened by trade talks’, BBC News, 2 July 2013,

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Most other states accept that there is a large degree of self interest in the United States opposing Russian and Chinese proposals for internet governance, finding out that there is some hypocrisy too is unlikely to sway their votes.

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Indiscriminate spying damages trust Trust is important in international relations. Whenever there is an international agreement each side has to trust that the other side will fulfil its side of the bargain; there is no court to step in and ensure that they do. Trust therefore needs to be built up. A large part of this is simply fulfilling promises that have been made in such treaties but trust can also be about being open with each other. When a country engages in an immense spying operation against another nation it is clearly damaging the trust between those nations. With the United States this is just one in a long line of issues that have undermined trust in the US government; the Iraq war, Guantanamo bay, drone strikes etc. and the continued violations of international law these represent have all undermined trust in the United States internationally. [1] [1] Dunn, Matthew, ‘PRISM: An International Relations Disaster?’, Huffington Post, 10 July 2013,

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It is not so much the spying that damages trust as the revelations that do so. As former CIA director Michael Hayden commented “Who on this planet [now] believes the Americans can keep a secret? This really erodes the kind of corporation that our intelligence service has with other intelligence agencies.” [1] Trust comes from working together and this is just as true in the intelligence sphere as elsewhere. Governments already knew the NSA spies on them, that so much information about the how and when has been revealed will be what is the shock. [1] Coleman, Michael, ‘Besides Bruised Egos, Will NSA Spy Leaks Cause Lasting Pain?’, The Washington Diplomat, 30 July 2012,

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There is no reason for foreign companies to be worried about NSA surveillance. The companies involved such as Google have denied involvement “we have not joined any program that would give the U.S. government—or any other government—direct access to our servers. Indeed, the U.S. government does not have direct access or a “back door” to the information stored in our data centers. We had not heard of a program called PRISM until yesterday.” [1] There should be no concern about companies’ data as the NSA is about protecting national security and is not interested in the commercial work of millions of businesses around the world. [1] Page, Larry, and Drummond, David, ‘What the …?’, Google Official Blog, 7 June 2013,