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Findings for developing regions are more mixed.
A comparison of income inequal- ity before and after taxes and transfers, proxied by the Gini coefficients of market and disposable incomes, indicates that, in general, fiscal policy has a moderate impact on inequality (see figure I.3).
On average, the extent of redistribution is significantly smaller in the less developed regions than in Europe.
The amount of public spending is greater in Europe than in developing countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In general, personal income taxes represent a smaller proportion of total tax revenue in developing than in developed countries for a 17 The studies cited use the difference between the Gini values of market and disposable income as a measure of the overall redistributive impact of taxes and transfers at one point in time.
The calculations do not take into account the impact of indirect taxes and indirect subsidies (such as food and energy subsidies), since they are not discounted from disposable income. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Percentage Before taxes and transfers After taxes and transfers Chile Mexico b Slovakia Denmark United States a Czechia Italy Rep. of Korea a Iceland Canada Norway Australia Poland Luxembourg Switzerland Turkey b New Zealand Israel a Sweden Netherlands a Ireland Belgium Spain Germany Greece Austria France Estonia Hungary b Latvia Portugal Slovenia Finland a United Kingdom a South Africa 16 Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection variety of reasons.18 Direct taxation requires more advanced administrative capacities than indirect taxation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Given the extent of informal employment in many developing countries, the tax base for income taxes is small.
There are differences in terms of com- pliance and in the efficiency of tax collection.
However, the picture varies greatly from one country to another.
Among the Latin American countries included in the average shown in figure I.3, for instance, the difference in the Gini coefficient of market and dis- posable incomes is almost 10 points in Brazil but just above 2 points in Mexico. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Figure I.3 Gini coefficients for market and disposable incomes, by region Source: Calculations based on data from Frederck Solt, Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), ver- sion 6.1, released October 2017.
Available from http://fsolt.org/swiid (accessed 5 March 2018).
Notes: Regional averages are based on recent data (2015, in most cases) for 4 countries in Northern Africa, 36 coun- tries or areas in Asia, 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and 38 countries in Europe. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Market and disposable incomes are used as proxies of income before and after taxes and transfers, respectively.
Beyond the aggregate impacts described, more analytical fiscal incidence studies show what sectors of the population are positively (and negatively) affected by fiscal poli- cies and how different taxes and transfers affect various groups. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In a study of 28 low- and middle-income countries, Lustig (2017a) finds that, although fiscal systems were equalizing in all 28 countries around 2010, the extreme poverty headcount was higher after taxes and transfers in five of them: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Nicaragua and the United Republic of Tanzania.
The study confirms that indirect taxes, in particular high consumption taxes on basic goods, are the main cause of fiscally-induced impov- erishment. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In contrast, public spending on pre-school and primary school education appears to benefit people living in poverty the most.
Yet, as the author notes, this could also be a reflection of middle- and high-income groups opting for private education.
Although direct taxes and transfers are generally progressive, their effect is lim- ited in many developing countries.
In Viet Nam, for instance, personal income tax and public transfers have little impact on inequality (OECD, 2014a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
There and in many other countries, the revenues collected from income taxes are low, owing to tax relief measures 18 See International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) and United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-Wider) Government Revenue Dataset (www.wider.unu.edu/project/ government-revenue-dataset, accessed 14 November 2017) and Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Latin America and the Caribbean Northern Africa Asia Europe Gini coefficient (around 2013) Gini of market income Gini of disposable income 17 Social protection and social progress and non-compliance.
Public transfers are therefore small.
Similarly, in Cambodia, the relatively low coverage and value of social protection transfers renders them insufficient to offset the negative impact of taxation on poverty and inequality (OECD, 2017a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The above-mentioned findings have implications for resource mobilization efforts.
The types of resources mobilized to fund social protection and other public goods and services, how they are collected and allocated, who pays, and how taxes and transfers interact are all key to the social fairness of the fiscal system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda includes a commitment to enhance “revenue administration through modernized, progressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax col- lection” in an effort to raise additional domestic public resources.19 Attention must be paid also to the redistributive role of taxation and the combined effect of all fiscal tools, beyond social protection.
Alternatives for financing social protection systems are discussed in chapter VIII. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
C. Social protection and inclusion Social inclusion and exclusion encompass a broad set of concerns.
People may be excluded from many domains of life—social, economic, political, civil or spatial—and the relative importance of each domain depends on the country and local contexts.
Exclusion is also a personal experience, and the views of those affected by it or at risk of being left behind cannot be disregarded. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Measuring social inclusion, exclusion and the impact of policy on either is therefore a challenging task.
The Report on the World Social Situation 2016 took a relative approach to social exclusion: rather than defining a threshold below which individuals or groups could be considered excluded, it took disparities across social groups in a number of indica- tors as symptoms or outcomes of exclusion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Under this approach, social protection is promoting inclusion if it is helping to reduce inequalities across social groups.
While there is ample evidence of the effects of social protection on well-being, including on the reduction of poverty and income inequality, less is known about its impact on inequalities across social groups.
The next chapters summarize some of that evidence. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The next chapters summarize some of that evidence.
As far as social protection coverage is concerned, recent data indicate that some social groups are better covered than others.
The most notable advance in recent decades has been the extension of old-age pensions (see chapter IV).
Worldwide, 68 per cent of older persons received a pension in 2015 (ILO, 2017a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
At the same time, only 28 per cent of persons with severe disabilities received disability benefits, 35 per cent of children received child or family benefits and 22 per cent of unem- ployed workers received unemployment benefits.
As the following chapters show, there has been progress in closing some coverage gaps.
For example, Governments in many developing countries have made efforts to reach indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities through tax-funded schemes (see chapter VII). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
However, levels of effective coverage continue to differ significantly between social groups and between countries.
The first part of this section examines some of the drivers of exclusion from social protection.
In particular, it considers how gender, labour market situation and place of residence affect access.
The second part discusses the role of policy formu- lation and delivery in promoting inclusion or, conversely, keeping social protection schemes beyond the reach of some. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
19 General Assembly resolution 69/313, para.
22.
18 Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection 1.
What drives exclusion from social protection?
Even in countries where social protection is guaranteed by law, not all segments of the population are reached effectively.
Gaps in coverage, insufficient benefits and barriers to access that affect some social groups more than others render social protection less effective in reducing inequalities and leaving no one behind. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
On the one hand, gaps in access are but one outcome of the forces that drive disadvantage and exclusion.
The prejudicial treatment of people on the basis of their characteristics or identity results in unequal power relations, which in turn operate in the formulation of social policies and the delivery of public services.
These unequal relations are then reflected in, for instance, the quality of services that different popu- lation groups receive. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
There has been progress in reaching some traditionally disadvantaged social groups, as described in the following chapters.
Many laws that formally restricted access to social protection and public services to certain population groups have been repealed (United Nations, 2016a).
Nevertheless, discrimination continues to reinforce some of the barriers they face, including a lack of information on entitlements or the political voice or representation necessary to claim such entitlements (Hossain, 2011). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
On the other hand, socioeconomic disadvantages also play a role in hindering social protection coverage, even in countries where formal barriers to access are no longer imposed and efforts have been made to counter discrimination. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In the labour market, members of indigenous communities and ethnic minorities, migrants, per- sons with disabilities and young people are less likely than others to secure a decent job, for instance, and, when they do, they often earn lower wages, as do women (United Nations, 2016a; ILO, 2017b).
Indigenous people and members of other ethnic minori- ties often live in rural areas and in remote locations where access to public services and infrastructure is limited. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Lastly, policy design and implementation play an important role in keeping social protection out of the reach of some—or, alternatively, in giving those left behind opportunities to participate.
The impact of social protection on poverty and inequality is, as discussed above, generally greater in countries that invest more in it.
However, its availability does not in itself guarantee that the needs of disadvantaged groups are addressed. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The impact of social protection on social exclusion depends on the specific measures in place and on their implementation.
a.
Gender dimensions Women face more barriers than men to the enjoyment of their rights, including the right to social security.
The economic, political and educational disadvantages that women face impinge on the entitlements available to them and on their effective cov- erage. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The design of social protection programmes can itself hinder women’s access to them or aggravate the barriers they face.
Persistent inequalities between men and women in the labour market affect gender disparities in social protection coverage.
Labour force participation is lower among women than men in most countries.
Women are also overrepresented in infor- mal employment and work more often than men under non-standard (temporary or part-time) contracts (ILO, 2016a; Tessier and others, 2013). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
When in full-time work, women earn, on average, between 10 and 30 per cent less than men (United Nations, 2015b).
Women also continue to bear more responsibility than men for unpaid care work and therefore have less time to engage in formal employment and education, participate in political activities or, simply, leisure.
On average, women devote three hours more per day than men to unpaid work in developing countries and two hours more in developed countries (ibid.). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
When both paid and unpaid work are taken into 19 Social protection and social progress account, women work longer hours than men, particularly in developing countries.
The overall result of these inequalities is a gender gap in contributory social protection coverage, including contributory old-age pensions.
Gender inequalities in political participation can also affect women’s access to social protection schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Without the perspective and input of women, programmes can fail to consider their needs and priorities.
That is especially so in the case of poverty- targeted and conditional schemes.
When women are excluded from decision-making processes that determine eligibility criteria, for instance, targeted programmes are more likely to be unresponsive to unequal intra-household dynamics (UNDP, 2017). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Similarly, gender gaps in education and literacy can influence take-up: less educated women may be unaware of programmes for which they are eligible or may have diffi- culty understanding the complex administrative procedures for gaining access to them.
The design and implementation of social protection programmes can also affect women’s inclusion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Programmes that target households, rather than individuals or women directly, do not consider unequal intra-household power dynamics that affect women’s access to and control over resources.
When gender gaps in consumption are overlooked, programmes fail to take into account women living in poverty who reside in non-poor households (United Nations, 2015b). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Furthermore, when designed with- out due consideration of sociocultural contexts, some social protection programmes can deter women from seeking access to benefits.
Social norms that restrict women’s mobility outside the home, for instance, can hinder the delivery of payments to them (Ulrichs, 2016).
A lack of child-care services can prevent women from participating in public employment programmes (Holmes and Jones, 2010). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Social protection systems need not only to be mindful of sociocultural contexts and how they affect women’s access but must equally refrain from exacerbating gender inequalities.
A case in point are the conditions attached to some cash-transfer pro- grammes aimed at children and families, the design of which often relies on the role of the mother as the main caregiver. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Thus, women are traditionally considered responsi- ble for health-care visits, attending meetings and other mandatory conditions, at the expense of activities such as remunerated work (ibid.).
Those formal responsibilities reinforce traditional divisions of labour within households and communities and con- strain women’s access to employment-based social protection schemes.
b. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
b.
Informal employment and social protection Workers in informal employment, among whom young people, persons with disa- bilities, migrants, women and other disadvantaged groups are overrepresented, are insufficiently covered by social protection, or not covered at all.
In fact, lack of social protection coverage is often used as a criterion for identifying informal employment (Gatti and others, 2014). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Employment-based contributory schemes, in particular, cover mainly workers in formal employment and therefore leave a significant proportion of the labour force unprotected.
There are few comparable estimates of informality, although the evidence indi- cates that it remains most pervasive in less developed regions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
One series of compara- ble estimates puts the share of informal employment outside agriculture at 82 per cent of total employment in South Asia, 65 per cent in East Asia (excluding China) and South-East Asia, 51 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2013 and 2014b).20 Despite the common traits that define 20 Data for sub-Saharan Africa are available only for a limited number of countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
For data and metadata on women and men in the informal economy, see also the ILO labour statistics database Ilostat (www.ilo.org/ilostat).
It is worth noting the presence of informality in developed countries as well: in 2013, the informal economy accounted for an estimated 18.8 per cent of GDP in the European Union (Schneider, 2015).
20 Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection it, the informal economy encompasses a broad range of activities and workers. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Most workers whose jobs are not subject to national labour legislation, taxation or social protection are employed in the informal economy, but some are employed in formal enterprises.
Some are employers themselves, while others are self-employed or work as unpaid family workers.
Many work without a contract: in Latin America, for instance, 68 per cent of workers in the informal economy and 26 per cent of workers in the for- mal sector worked without a written contract in 2005 (ILO, 2011). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In recent decades, economic growth has failed to create the number of decent jobs necessary to absorb a growing labour force.
Informality remains high and has even grown in contexts of poor governance.
Weak or ill-conceived legal and institu- tional frameworks lead to a lack of trust in institutions and administrative procedures, a disengagement from public mandates and a proliferation of informal employment. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In addition to trapping workers in a cycle of low productivity and exploitation, the informal economy results in lost tax revenue and limits the fiscal space available to Governments to expand or improve social protection schemes.
SDG target 8.3 includes an international commitment to promote “decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formaliza- tion and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services”. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Governments have also committed to protecting workers’ rights and promoting safe and secure working environments for all workers.
The ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No.
202), states that social security extension strategies should apply to persons in the formal and informal economy and support the growth of formal employment and the reduction of informality (para.
15).
Additionally, the ILO Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recom- mendation, 2015 (No. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
204), affirms that, through the transition to the formal economy, countries should progressively extend the coverage of social insurance to workers in the informal economy (paras.
18-21 and 25).
It is increasingly recognized that, in addi- tion to reducing the vulnerability and promoting the income security of workers in the informal economy, social protection can help to unleash their productive potential and transition to the formal economy. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In recent years, Governments in many countries have tried to expand the cover- age of existing contributory social insurance schemes by adapting contributions and administrative procedures to the situation of workers in informal employment or by subsidizing contributions.
Others have put new schemes in place. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Others have put new schemes in place.
In Uruguay, for instance, tax authorities and the social security administration have created a simpli- fied collection scheme for small contributions—the “monotax”—to promote coverage among workers and companies that are not otherwise covered by the social security system (ILO, 2014a).
Other countries have designed micro-insurance schemes specifi- cally for workers in the informal economy (Samson and Kenny, 2016). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
A shortcoming of programmes aimed exclusively at the informal economy is that, if their benefits are not fully portable, workers transitioning to formal jobs may lose accumulated benefits as a result of their change in status.
The availability of different schemes for workers in the formal and informal economies can also rein- force divisions in the labour market and in society at large. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Schemes involving vol- untary affiliation have also spread, and some benefit workers in non-standard forms of employment.
However, their uptake in the informal economy is quite low, mainly owing to a lack of information but also because the low and unreliable incomes typical of the informal economy make the regular payment of contributions by workers and employers difficult (Handayani, 2016; ILO, 2015a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In many developing countries, the expansion of tax-financed schemes—particu- larly old-age pensions—has also helped to extend coverage to some workers in infor- 21 Social protection and social progress mal employment and lift them out of extreme poverty (Kidd and Damerau, 2016).
In Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, at least 18 countries introduced reforms to increase pension coverage through non-contributory schemes from 2000 to 2013 (ILO, 2015a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Low levels of funding, however, mean that tax-financed schemes alone are often not sufficient to provide income security to their beneficiaries in many developing countries.
Benefits are often below the poverty line.
When means tested, the schemes fail to cover informal workers who do not live in poverty—part of the so- called missing middle.
The structure of social pension systems and their advantages and limitations are discussed in greater detail in chapter IV. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Overall, coverage of workers in the informal economy is limited, and social insurance schemes remain beyond the reach of most workers.
Where tax-based schemes reach some (usually those living in extreme poverty), their impact is limited by low transfer values.
c. Spatial disadvantage In general, income insecurity is greater in rural than in urban areas, as employment is typically casual or seasonal, salaries are low and livelihoods are exposed to envi- ronmental hazards. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
At the same time, rural populations have, on average, less access than their urban counterparts to good-quality education, health care and other basic services, such as safe drinking water, basic sanitation, transportation and communica- tions infrastructure.
When it comes to social protection, the rural disadvantage is less consistent. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The proportion of persons covered by social protection is higher among the poorest urban population quintile than among the rural poor in some regions (sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and Western Asia), but the reverse is true in others (Asia and Latin America) (see table I.1). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Many countries, including Brazil, China and India, have indeed made efforts to reach rural populations, mainly through tax-financed social assistance programmes.21 Despite these regional differences, the impact of social protection programmes on the poverty headcount and the poverty gap—the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line—is consistently greater in urban than in rural areas (table I.1), partly because the average social protection transfer per capita tends to be larger in urban areas. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
While coverage by tax-financed social assistance schemes is higher in rural areas in most developing countries for which data are available, coverage by social insurance schemes (including contributory pensions and unemployment insurance) is often higher in urban areas.22 In general, transfers from social insurance schemes are larger than those from tax-financed social assistance schemes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Most evidence regarding spatial disparities is highly aggregated and generally compares only major subnational regions, or urban with rural areas.
However, the economic, social and physical landscape of urban and rural areas is heterogeneous.
Reaching populations in remote areas is particularly challenging.
High administrative 21 In addition to its well- established social pension and other tax-based schemes directed at rural areas, Brazil has a large rural social insurance programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Subsidized by the State, it paid 7.9 million pensions in 2009 (UNDP, 2011).
China has made significant efforts to close the country’s wide urban-rural gap, including through a rural social health insurance scheme, established in 2003, and a rural old-age pension scheme, launched in 2009 (ILO, 2014a). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In India, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme—one of the largest integrated employment and social protection schemes in the world—reached close to 50 million rural households in 2012.
The national budget allocation for the scheme was equivalent to 0.3 per cent of national GDP in 2012-2013 (ILO, 2014a).
22 Social insurance coverage is higher in urban than in rural areas in 80 per cent of countries included in the World Bank ASPIRE database (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
22 Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection and transaction costs, inadequate banking facilities and a lack of awareness limit pro- gramme uptake in distant or isolated rural regions (see chapter VII). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Table I.1 Coverage and poverty impact of social protection programmesa Coverage, poorest population quintile, percentage Povertyheadcount reduction, percentage Poverty gap eduction, percentage Urban areas Rural areas Urban areas Rural areas Urban areas Rural areas Sub-Saharan Africa 24.5 20.0 14.2 2.8 24.6 5.4 Western Asia and North Africa 61.4 58.9 36.0 20.1 53.1 33.7 Asia (other) and the Pacific 34.3 42.8 19.3 11.4 34.0 14.9 Central Asia and Eastern Europe 80.8 81.0 58.0 43.4 76.5 65.4 Latin America and the Caribbean 62.1 68.5 29.1 14.5 43.7 24.1 Source: Author calculations based on data from the World Bank ASPIRE database (see figure I.1). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Notes: In the ASPIRE database, social protection systems include social insurance, social assistance and labour mar- ket programmes.
Reductions in the poverty headcount and in the poverty gap are calculated as percentages of the pre-transfer poverty headcount and gap, respectively. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Weighted regional averages are based on data for 36 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 7 countries in Western Asia and North Africa, 23 countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 16 other countries in Asia and the Pacific and 20 coun- tries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
a Latest year available, if 2000 or later.
Data apply to a year within the period 2001-2005 in 13 countries, 2006-2010 in 45 countries and 2011-2014 in 64 countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Similar obstacles also affect urban residents living in poverty, despite their closer proximity to basic services.
Widespread informal employment limits access to social insurance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Gentilini (2015) contends also that, in developing countries, many social assistance programmes are conceived for rural populations and fail to take into account specific aspects of urban poverty—including high mobility, the higher cost of living, more fragmented social networks and informal support mechanisms, and the high prevalence of violence and crime.
Active beneficiary selection (targeting) can be costly if target populations are highly mobile and dispersed across a city. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Proxy means testing, for instance, is often based on housing characteristics that can change often among the poor in urban settings.
These challenges underscore the extent to which the design and implementation of social protection policy can contribute to inclusion or, conversely, reinforce exclusion.
2.
The role of policy in promoting inclusion The way in which social protection programmes are designed is strongly influenced by politics or, more broadly, power relations in society. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
On the one hand, Governments may use such programmes to build alliances with powerful groups of society, includ- ing workers in the formal economy, public sector employees, the military, the police and the business community.
On the other hand, political commitment to address poverty and social exclusion often results in measures that target those in need as a seemingly more efficient way to allocate resources. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Under perfect selection schemes and with a fixed budget, targeting would indeed bring efficiency gains.
In reality, however, social spending is not fixed.
Targeting schemes at people living in poverty can erode political support for redistribution and result in low funding.
As Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) illustrate, targeting is often fol- lowed by a reduction in benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Lindert (2004) argues that, historically, where democ- 23 Social protection and social progress racies were strengthened and people were given the right to vote, the middle classes came to oppose tax spending on programmes for people living in poverty. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Instead, they supported comprehensive social insurance, social pensions and public social services that, in principle, addressed the needs of most members of society.23 Korpi and Palme (1998) labelled this trend “the paradox of redistribution”, noting that the more coun- tries targeted redistribution, the less likely they were to reduce poverty and inequality. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Lack of political support—resulting from a perception of targeted measures as “hand- outs”—can affect the quality of programmes and services directed towards people liv- ing in poverty and other disadvantaged groups with limited political representation.
An additional budgetary consideration is that well-targeted schemes often require advanced administrative capacity that many low-income countries do not have. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Means testing benefits requires methodologically complex surveys and has high administra- tive costs, although there are exceptions (see box I.2).
Without the requisite adminis- trative capacity, inaccurate targeting results in significant under-coverage or “errors of exclusion” from targeted programmes (Brown, Ravallion and van de Walle, 2016). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In general, people living in extreme poverty—among whom persons with disabilities and members of ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups are overrepresented— are at high risk of under-coverage from means-tested schemes (Kidd, 2014). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Since measuring income and consumption accurately is challenging and costly, Governments in developing countries use indicators highly correlated with income— such as housing conditions or ownership of various assets—as proxies to identify per- sons in poverty and improve coverage.
Evidence suggests that schemes based on such proxy means tests do slightly better at covering the target population than traditional means-tested schemes, although exclusion errors remain considerable. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Brown, Raval- lion and van de Walle (2016) note that, on average, simpler categorical-targeting meth- ods (aimed at specific groups of the population) or geographical targeting are more effective at bringing poverty down than schemes based on proxy means testing.
23 Desai and Kharas (2017) also find that the impact of social spending on poverty diminishes as the middle class expands. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Box I.2 The Child Support Grant selection process in South Africa Recognizing that a high proportion of families with children live on low incomes, South Africa uses a simple means test to exclude only the most affluent families from its Child Support Grant.
The grant is available to all single-carer families earning less than $3,900 per year and married carers earning less than $7,800 per year (Kidd and Wapling, forth- coming). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Around 88 per cent of children in two-parent households and 94 per cent in single-carer households are eligible (ibid.).
Applicants need only sign an affidavit declar- ing their income.
The State does not verify the information.
It is estimated that almost 82 per cent of single carers living below the threshold are cor- rectly selected and just over 18 per cent are wrongly excluded—a significantly low exclu- sion rate. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Inclusion errors among the top 10 per cent of the wealthiest primary caregivers are below 20 per cent (ibid.).
Although some people may be discouraged from applying by the means test, evidence suggests that other factors play a larger role in the exclusion errors, such as parents of newborns not applying until months after their children’s birth or carers with a disability having difficulty in applying. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
24 Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection Exclusion errors may affect some sectors of the population more than oth- ers.
Namely, older persons tend to have assets that proxy means tests correlate with wealth, even though such assets may have depreciated in value and reflect past income rather than current wealth.
In such cases, proxy means tests incorporate an inher- ent bias against older persons. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Similarly, measures of household income or consump- tion ignore intra-household inequalities—the fact that resources are often not shared equally between men and women, or between younger and older household members.
They often overlook household size and composition as well.
The presence of persons with disabilities, for instance, raises household costs and requires higher income to maintain equivalent standards of living. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Overall, it has not been demonstrated that targeted measures are more cost- effective at reducing poverty than universal ones.24 For instance, Dietrich and others (2017) find that, in Uganda, the universal Senior Citizen’s Grant has greater net posi- tive effects on family members of older persons who benefit from it—namely on chil- dren’s health and education—than the targeted Vulnerable Families Grant. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In other words, the benefits are greater relative to the cost of the scheme, partly because of the much higher administrative costs associated with the Vulnerable Families Grant.
A final consideration regarding policy design is that claiming social protection benefits can generate stigma, even while improving the material well-being of recipi- ents. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Reliance on means-tested social assistance schemes is found to be more stig- matizing than participation in contributory or universal, tax-funded schemes across countries and cultures (Hernanz, Malherbet and Pellizari, 2004; Baumberg, 2016; Li and Walker, 2017a and 2017b).
In the United Kingdom, almost one third of individuals eligible for means-tested benefits did not claim them in the period between 2009 and 2010. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
One in four respondents to a survey on the reasons for low take-up of benefits mentioned shame or other stigma-related reasons (Finn and Goodship, 2014; Baum- berg, 2016).
The survey found that the reception of means-tested benefits was more stigmatizing than unemployment insurance or tax credits.
In rural China, many peo- ple cite shame linked to poverty as a reason for not claiming benefits to which they are entitled under the Dibao scheme, the world’s largest social assistance programme. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In contrast, many people not living in poverty claim benefits because local leaders feel entitled to reward family and friends (Li and Walker, 2017a).
In the United States, beneficiaries of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps) declare being ashamed to use the stamps at grocery stores (Fuller-Thomson, 2008; Rogers- Dillon, 1995).
Registration procedures and the way in which payments are delivered also affect access. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In general, the risk of under-coverage is greater where potential beneficiaries must meet demanding requirements for information and supporting documentation in order to register.
Complex registration systems affect members of disadvantaged groups disproportionately, as the following chapters illustrate.
Even the need to pro- vide proof of legal identity constitutes a barrier to access for international migrants, members of some ethnic minorities and homeless persons, among other groups. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Distance to registration sites and to payment locations can also constitute a bar- rier, particularly for persons with disabilities, as can long lines and inadequate infra- structure.
In the case of schemes based on census registration, under-enumeration in remote and insecure areas and infrequent registration are major obstacles to access.
Given that many people move in and out of poverty repeatedly over their lifetimes, infrequent surveying is likely to result in significant targeting errors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
For those who 24 See also Ravallion (2007), Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) and Murgai and Ravallion (2005).
25 Social protection and social progress register and qualify, benefits may be too low or paid irregularly.
The adequacy of ben- efits is discussed in more detail in the course of this report. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Unawareness of the existence of social protection programmes or of eligibility criteria are major obstacles—and symptoms of social exclusion (Hossain, 2011; South African Social Security Agency and UNICEF, 2016; Kidd, 2014).
Potential beneficiaries may not understand the application process, what compliance entails or how to obtain benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
In an example of how social exclusion and exclusion from social protection reinforce each other, Hossain (2011) found lack of information to be the primary cause of the exclusion from social protection of members of the Adivasi ethnic minority liv- ing in poverty in Bangladesh.
Public information was rarely disseminated in Adivasi communities.
Where it was disseminated, the high rate of illiteracy among Adivasis prevented them from accessing it. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Moreover, the non-Adivasi population was reluctant to share information with them.
Tailoring public information campaigns to the needs of potential applicants is, therefore, particularly important.
Conclusions A growing number of countries, including in less developed regions, have social pro- tection programmes in place to address development challenges. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Solid evidence on the positive effects of social protection, combined with political support and financial capacity in developing countries, have led to its expansion.
With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, countries have committed themselves to working towards the realisa- tion of the human right to social security.
The challenge is to put this commitment into practice. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The evidence presented in this chapter and throughout the report indicates that the impact of social protection policies and programmes varies depending on their design and how they are implemented.
Most schemes improve the material well-being of disadvantaged groups and many can help to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Some schemes, however, can reinforce feelings of inferiority among those who benefit from them. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
The limited evidence available indicates that some social groups are better covered by social protection than others.
The following chapters examine the distinct barriers that each disadvantaged group faces and the drivers of their exclusion from social protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842140.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/Chapter-ISocial-protection-and-social-progress.pdf |
Social Protection: A Coherent Strategy for Shared Prosperity United Nations 56th Commission for Social Development Civil Society Declaration Achieving prosperity in its full sense requires the broadest and deepest possible participation in the economic and social life of society. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
Both within and across nations, the creation of social conditions that would end extreme poverty and, beyond this, provide all people with a genuine opportunity to flourish, and live in dignity throughout their lives, is among the greatest challenges of today.
In recent years, social protection has emerged as a unifying concept for an array of measures aimed at building fairer and more inclusive societies. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
As a “set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle,” social protection “includes benefits for children and families, maternity, unemployment, employment injury, sickness, old age, disability, survivors, as well as health protection.”1 The establishment of social protection regimes has shown itself to be one of the most effective and straightforward strategies to simultaneously address human rights and fundamental material needs, and to strengthen capacity to constructively engage in the life of society at all levels. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
As such, it is a strategy that the international community has explicitly taken on as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Among its targets, Goal 1 of the Agenda, to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere,” calls for the implementation of “nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors,” as well as the achievement of “substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable” by 2030. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
Social protection systems represent the universality of eradicating poverty and building broad- based prosperity.
In particular, the concept of social protection floors reflects the conviction that there are thresholds which a community – whether local, national, regional, or international – will refuse to let any of its members fall below. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
Especially given that poverty is not static, social protection floors represent a community’s trust and support as individuals travel in and out of poverty as the result of different life events.
However, it is not only those living in poverty who stand to gain from such measures. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
Unlike discredited theories about the shared benefits of unfettered wealth-creation at the top, social protection has truly shown the potential to serve as that much-touted “rising tide that lifts all boats.” It is a potent mechanism for promoting social equity and demonstrates significant salutary effects for all strata of society.
Living in more equitable societies means increased health, stability, and happiness for everyone – which represents the actual goal of development, beyond economic benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |
Although social protection is a shared endeavor involving a wide array of stakeholders, the place of public institutions is preeminent. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755842954.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/02/CSDeclaration2018FINAL.pdf |