 0000, less than thirty days before trial.  On September 0, the trial  court struck his request for a jury trial on the ground that it was not timely made, but at the same time reset  the case on the non-jury docket for trial on October 00.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's  denial of plaintiff's request for a jury trial.  The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that once the trial  court reset the case for October 00, plaintiff's request for a jury trial became timely.  Id.  Crook argues  that the same holds true in this case.  When trial originally was scheduled for October 00, 0000, Crook's  October 00 request for a jury trial was untimely under Rule 000.  However, when the case was reset for  January 0, 0000, Crook contends that his request became timely and the case was then required to be  moved from the trial court's non-jury docket to its jury docket.  However, we note that, unlike Halsell,  after making an untimely request for a jury trial Crook agreed to set the case for a non-jury trial more than   thirty days later.  The supreme court in Halsell further held that the defendants failed to show that  the  granting of the jury trial would have injured them or caused undue disruption to the trial court.  Id.  In this  case, however, the record contains evidence indicating that, at the very least, the trial court's docket would  have been disrupted by Crook's repeated change of position. This case was originally set for trial on the  non-jury docket.  Less than two weeks before trial, Crook asked for a jury trial.  When the case was not  reached, however, Crook agreed to a non-jury setting.  More important, Crook's action in agreeing to a  non-jury trial after requesting a jury trial indicated to the court that he no longer wanted a jury.  At the  hearing on his motion to strike the non-jury setting, Crook admitted that he agreed to reset the case for a  non-jury week. (0)   Crook argues that Rule 00 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an  agreement be in writing and that because the purported agreement to reset the trial for a non-jury week was  not in writing, it is not evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of timeliness.  Rule 00 provides:  Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties  touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the  papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.   Tex. R. Civ. P. 00 (emphasis added).  Appellees filed a written notice of agreed trial setting, and Crook  has never disputed that it accurately reflects their agreement.  Further, the court specifically asked Crook  in open court whether he agreed to the January 0, 0000 trial date, and Crook conceded that he did.   Accordingly, we find that Crook waived his right to a jury trial by agreement.  Points of error one and two  are overruled.  In his third point of error, Crook asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying  his motion for new trial based on his timely request for a jury trial.  Having held that  Crook waived his  request for a jury trial, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Crook's motion for new trial.  Point of  error three is overruled.  CONCLUSION   Having overruled all points of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.        Marilyn Aboussie, Justice Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and B. A. Smith Affirmed Filed:   July 00, 0000 Do Not Publish