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611 | Globalizing the Attacks Figure 3 below is a map showing where our Unit 42 researchers have found webistes involved in Hancitor attacks. | [
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612 | Figure 3: Hancitor distribution servers globally thus far in 2017 Table 1 – Number of Distribution Servers by Country | [
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613 | The hot spots in the United States represents distribution servers which are created using fraud based accounts at various hosting providers that are hosting the Hancitor documents while the hotspots in Asia represent legitimate sites for small and medium businesses that have been compromised by the actors behind Hancitor campaign to host the malicious Hancitor documents. | [
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614 | Conclusion Attackers are always making business decisions to optimize their attacks in ways that are most successful and profitable. | [] | [] | [] |
615 | What is most interesting about Hancitor is the way these decisions so clearly reflect an awareness of business realities (by targeting peak working times) and dividing up the “work” of their attacks in a way that so clearly mirrors mainstream business decisions around globalizing operations. | [
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616 | In the end, while Hancitor may not be sophisticated, these steps to adapt and stay effective seem to be succeeding. | [
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617 | And we expect to continue to see Hancitor be a global threat for the foreseeable future. | [
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618 | Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! | [] | [] | [] |
619 | Please mark, I'm not a robot! | [] | [] | [] |
620 | By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. | [] | [] | [] |
621 | This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) This Unit 42 blog provides an update on the threat situation surrounding attacks using the Petya Ransomware which are impacting organizations in Ukraine, Russia and to a lesser extent around the world. | [
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622 | On June 27th, 2017 we became aware of a new variant of the Petya malware which is spreading through multiple lateral movement techniques. | [
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623 | One technique includes the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool. | [
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624 | This is the same exploit the WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry malware exploited to spread globally in May, 2017. | [
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625 | At least 50 organizations have reported impacts from the malware, including government and critical infrastructure operators. | [] | [] | [] |
627 | Palo Alto Networks is documenting our prevention capabilities with regard to this threat in the Palo Alto Networks Protections for Petya Ransomware blog post. | [
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628 | Windows users should take the following general steps to protect themselves: | [
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629 | This is a developing situation, we will update this blog as new information becomes available. | [] | [] | [] |
630 | AutoFocus users view samples using the Petya tag. | [
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631 | Petya is a ransomware family that works by modifying the Window’s system’s Master Boot Record (MBR), causing the system to crash. | [
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632 | When the user reboots their PC, the modified MBR prevents Windows from loading and displays a fake “chkdisk” screen which indicates the computer's hard drive is being repaired, but the malware is actually encrypting the user's files. | [
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633 | When this process completes, the malware displays an ASCII Ransom note demanding payment from the victim (Figure 1). Figure 1: Latest Petya Ransom note displayed on a compromised system. | [
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634 | The latest version of the Petya ransomware is spreading over Windows SMB and is reportedly using the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool, which exploits CVE-2017-0144 and was originally released by the Shadow Brokers group in April 2017. | [
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635 | After the system is compromised the victim is asked to send US $300 in Bitcoin to a specific Bitcoin address and then send an e-mail with the victim’s bitcoin wallet ID to wowsmith123456@posteo[.]net to retrieve their individual decryption key. | [
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636 | Posteo (a free e-mail provider) has already shut down this e-mail address, and as such victims should not even attempt to pay the ransom. | [
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637 | As of 13:00 UTC on June 28thth, approximately 4 Bitcoin have been transferred to the attacker's wallet. | [
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638 | Unit 42 is unaware of ANY successful recovery after paying the ransom. | [
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639 | Additionally, ongoing research by the industry is showing that specific actions this malware takes makes it technically infeasible, if not impossible, for recovery to occur. | [] | [] | [] |
640 | This means that even though this malware is functionally ransomware, for threat assessment purposes, it should be functionally considered a “wiper”. | [] | [] | [] |
641 | We are aware of the following information about how the Petya attack lifecycle works. | [
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642 | Delivery/Exploitation | [] | [] | [] |
643 | We have not yet confirmed the initial infection vector for this new Petya variant. | [
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644 | Previous variants were spread through e-mail, but we have not identified this latest sample carried in any e-mail related attacks. | [] | [] | [] |
645 | While we have not been able to directly confirm the source, we have seen evidence that a Ukrainian software application called MEDoc was used by attackers to deliver the Petya DLL. | [
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646 | The software is heavily used in Ukraine it appears the company’s systems may have been compromised and used to issue a malicious update to systems running the program on the morning of Jun 27th. | [
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648 | Installation | [] | [] | [] |
649 | This variant of Petya is spread as a DLL file, which must be executed by another process before it takes action on the system. | [
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650 | Once executed, it overwrites the Master Boot Record and creates a scheduled task to reboot the system. | [
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651 | Once the system reboots, the malware displays a fake “chkdisk” scan which tricks the victim into believing the program is repairing their hard drive. | [] | [] | [] |
652 | In reality, the malware is encrypting the NTFS Master File Table in the background. | [] | [] | [] |
653 | Once the fake chkdisk completes, the malware displays a ransom note which demands a payment of $300 in bitcoin. | [] | [] | [] |
654 | Command and Control Petya contains no Command and Control mechanisms that we know of. | [
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655 | After a host is infected, there is no communication from the malware back to the attacker. | [] | [] | [] |
656 | Lateral Movement Petya uses three mechanisms to spread to additional hosts. | [
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657 | Ransomware attacks are very common, but they are rarely coupled with an exploit that allows the malware to spread as a network worm. | [] | [] | [] |
658 | The WannaCry attacks in May, 2017 demonstrated that many Windows systems had not been patched for this vulnerability. | [
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659 | The spread of Petya using this vulnerability indicates that many organizations may still be vulnerable, despite the attention WannaCry received. | [
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660 | As always if you have any questions, please come to the Threat & Vulnerability Discussions on our Live Community. Version Summary June 27, 2017: June 27, 2017 – 1:08 PM PT June 28, 2017 – 8:40 AM PT June 29, 2017 - 5:00 PM PT Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! | [
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661 | Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. | [] | [] | [] |
662 | Nearly all of us have a use for Microsoft Office documents. | [
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663 | Whether they are work documents, e-receipts, or a lease on a new apartment – Office documents are useful to all of us, and this is part of the reason we’re very likely to open an office document we receive as an attachment in e-mail. | [] | [] | [] |
664 | Armed with the knowledge that many people will open nearly any document, even those from an untrusted source, adversaries commonly choose these files in attacks to compromise a system. | [] | [] | [] |
665 | In this threat brief we show you five different ways that Office documents can be subverted and abused to attack and compromise a Windows endpoint, some we’ve already posted about before, and some are new. | [
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666 | Macros Macros are the most straight-forward way for an attacker to weaponize Office documents. | [] | [] | [] |
667 | Office applications have a built-in script engine that can run VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) scripts. | [
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668 | These scripts can execute immediately as the document opens, without any user interaction (assuming the user has previously enabled macros) and run malicious code on the system. | [] | [] | [] |
669 | If the user has not enabled macros, a popup window will appear asking the user to click to do so. | [] | [] | [] |
670 | The pop-up is one of several security mechanisms added by Microsoft to mitigate the security risk that macros pose. | [
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671 | Microsoft will also force a different file extension (.docm instead of .docx for new documents containing macros). | [
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672 | Despite these measures, users still choose to open these files and enable their content, thus allowing macros to continue be a common attack vector – both in wide and simple attacks to deliver ransomware such as Emotet, as well as for sophisticated attacks like this Sofacy campaign. | [
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673 | Figure 1. | [] | [] | [] |
674 | The Sofacy document before & after the content is enabled | [
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675 | As you can see in this example, attackers try to convince users to disable the security mechanisms added by Microsoft using social engineering, convincing the user to enable content for them to be able to see the full document. | [
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676 | In the Sofacy example, the attackers had simply made the font color white, so the text was present prior to the user enabling macros, just not clearly visible. | [
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677 | Embedded Flash files In addition to built-in capabilities, like macros, Office documents can also be embedded with external objects, such as Adobe Flash files. | [
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678 | These objects are passed to the appropriate software for handling, thus any vulnerability that the software has can also be exploited by embedding it within the Adobe Flash content in the Office document. | [
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679 | An example for such attack vector being leveraged by attackers is CVE-2018-4878, an Adobe Flash Player Zero-Day exploited by embedding malicious SWF files in Excel documents. | [
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680 | In these types of attacks, the malicious Excel contains embedded Adobe Flash content which can trigger the Flash vulnerability and execute embedded shellcode. | [
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681 | Microsoft Equation Editor | [
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682 | In a similar way to embedding Adobe Flash files into an Office document, you can also embed equations in documents that will be parsed by Microsoft Equation Editor - a program that lets you easily write mathematical equations: Figure 2. Microsoft Equation Editor As in our previous example, vulnerabilities in the equation editor can be exploited by leveraging malicious Office documents. | [
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683 | We’ve seen examples of this just recently, when CVE-2017-11882 was exploited in the wild, paving the way to other exploits like CVE-2018-0802, both of which exploit flaws in the equation editor, enabling attackers to get from the user opening an Office document to remote code execution. | [
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684 | While still not seen in the wild, similar exploits in Microsoft Equation Editor, such as such as CVE-2018-0807 and CVE-2018-0798, were identified by Unit 42 researchers. | [
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685 | Note that since the Microsoft Equation Editor runs as its own process (eqnedt32.exe), protections specific to Microsoft Office such as EMET and Windows Defender Exploit Guard are not effective by default, as they only protect Microsoft Office processes (such as winword.exe). OLE Objects & HTA Handlers | [
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686 | OLE Objects & HTA Handlers are mechanisms Office documents use to make references to include other documents in their content. | [] | [] | [] |
687 | They can be used to compromise an endpoint in the following way: This functionality was leveraged in exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 - a Microsoft Office/WordPad remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability patched by Microsoft in September 2017, and was used in multiple campaigns, like this OilRig campaign. | [
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] | [] |
688 | Figure 3. | [] | [] | [] |
689 | RTF files will look exactly like regular Word documents | [
{
"id": 46268,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 41,
"end_offset": 45
}
] | [] | [] |
690 | In addition to the previous OLE & HTA exploit, attackers discovered RTF files can also execute ‘text/html’ mime-type OLE objects using the MSHTML. | [
{
"id": 44833,
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] | [] | [] |
691 | This means that RTF documents expose the same attack surface as Internet Explorer! | [
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"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 64,
"end_offset": 81
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] | [] | [] |
692 | Leveraging this logical vulnerability, known as CVE-2018-8174, allows attackers to execute arbitrary HTML/JavaScript/VBScript. | [
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] | [] | [] |
693 | While code executed in this way is ‘sandboxed’ (where it cannot run new processes or write to the filesystem etc.), like other code running from Internet Explorer | [
{
"id": 45799,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 145,
"end_offset": 162
}
] | [] | [] |
694 | , this flaw can be used to leverage other vulnerabilities, such as a memory corruption UAF vulnerability in the VBScript engine, to gain arbitrary code execution in the context of the Word application (winword.exe), allowing them to gain control on the system. | [
{
"id": 46272,
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{
"id": 46274,
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"start_offset": 184,
"end_offset": 200
}
] | [] | [] |
695 | Conclusion | [] | [] | [] |
696 | While document-based attacks have been a common attack vector for over a decade, we’re seeing a recent rise in their popularity and complexity. | [] | [] | [] |
697 | This rise may be a result of browser exploits becoming more difficult to use, due to the hardening done by browser developers. | [] | [] | [] |
698 | No matter the reason | [] | [] | [] |
699 | , it is important that organizations know how to defend against these common techniques. | [] | [] | [] |
700 | Prevention Palo Alto Networks Traps advanced endpoint protection offers multiple methods of malware and exploit prevention to protect against these threats: | [
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] | [] | [] |
701 | Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! | [] | [] | [] |
702 | By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. | [] | [] | [] |
703 | This has been a fun week. | [] | [] | [] |
704 | We have not had a significant cyber event like this – something that affects just about everybody on the Internet -- since the Kaminsky DNS vulnerability of 2008. | [
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] | [] | [] |
705 | Everybody I know has been scrambling to understand what it means to their organization, to their business and to their immediate family. | [] | [] | [] |
706 | Yes, I said family. | [] | [] | [] |
707 | I am sure I am not the only one who has answered a question or two from his mother-in-law about how the Internet is melting down based on what she’s been reading in the press. | [] | [] | [] |
708 | There’s a lot out there already about what Heartbleed means for the Web and beyond, and I’ll point you to our own analysis written by Scott Simkin or an essay by Dan Goodin over at ars technica for that explanation. | [
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709 | Instead, here are eight things I am doing right now to protect Palo Alto Networks and my home (and mother-in-law) and that you should be doing, too: | [
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] | [] | [] |
710 | If there’s a long-term consideration here, it’s to install perfect forward secrecy, as Twitter did last year. | [
{
"id": 46278,
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"end_offset": 95
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] | [] | [] |
711 | That ensures that a session key derived from a stolen private key and a collected public key in the future will not be compromised. | [] | [] | [] |
712 | For more: Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! | [] | [] | [] |