This report is for the media and the general public. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period.  The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas.  Its access remained restricted in the three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Olenivka, Kreminets and Novoamvrosiivske.*  The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Ternove, Buhaivka, Novoamvrosiivske and Shymshynivka.  The Mission saw three convoys of amphibious-crossing equipment and vehicles travelling north near Luhansk city.  It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure in Shchastia and Popasna.  The SMM continued to monitor the situation of schools near the contact line on both sides.  The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.  In Odessa the SMM followed up on a report of an assault on a political party official. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 45 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions). 

On the evening of 12 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three tracer rounds in flight 2-3km north-north-east and east-south-east.  The same evening, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two tracer rounds from west to east 1km south. 

During the day on 13 September, positioned at the Donetsk Filtration Station for three hours, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as mortar rounds (three 1-2km south-south-west and three 2.5-3km north-north-east).  The Mission also heard two undetermined explosions 1-1.2km south-south-west and one undetermined explosion and small-arms fire 2.5km north-north-east. 

Positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 3-5km west and north.  Positioned in the south-western part of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-7km west. 

On the night of 12-13 September, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 7-9km south-west and small-arms fire 2-3km south-west.  On the morning of 13 September, while in the same location, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-west and south-west. 

On the night of 12-13 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, four tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one tracer round from west to east, one tracer round from south to north, four tracer rounds from east to west, two tracer rounds from south-east to north-west, one tracer round from west to east, 18 tracer rounds from east to west, one tracer round from south-east to north-west, one tracer round from south-west to north-east, one tracer round from south to north, one tracer round from south-west to north-east, and four tracer rounds from east to west, all at undetermined distances north. 

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations – including, however, a similar number of explosions (seven) – compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions). 

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots 10km north-east, assessed as part of a live-fire exercise.  Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east, assessed as part of a live-fire exercise. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.  The SMM’s access remained restricted but it was able to partially monitor them.* 

On the morning of 13 September, positioned near the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km west-south-west.  Positioned near the Ukrainian Armed Forces position north of the bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-6km south-south-east. ( Both explosions were assessed as outside the disengagement area.) 

On the evening of 11 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded 10-20 tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east 5km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned on 13 September near the Zolote disengagement area and near the disengagement area near “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM observed calm situations. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum. 

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence on 10 September of 27 self-propelled howitzers south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and, on 11 September, of 17 towed howitzers south-east of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and six towed howitzers near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).  On 13 September, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a building west of Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).  A man in military-style clothing denied the SMM access to parts of the building, citing orders not to allow the SMM access to parts of in the building other than in the vicinity of the MLRS.* 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence on 10 September of 25 tanks south-east of Ternove and 40 tanks west of Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk), and, on 11 September, of 24 tanks and six surface-to-air missile systems south-east of Buhaivka, 12 mortars (120mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 30 tanks near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), 31 tanks near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and 17 tanks near Shymshynivka.  On 12 September, the SMM saw three stationary tanks (T-64) near Myrne, and on 13 September the SMM saw five stationary tanks (T-64) in the same area. 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.  In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted that one towed howitzer (2A65), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing. 

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and observed that ten tanks (three T-64 and seven T-72) were again missing. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles,[2] military-type armoured vehicles, and other indications of military presence in the security zone.  In government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence on 9 September of two military-type armoured vehicles near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and two military-type armoured vehicles and six recent impact sites near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). 

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw on 12 September, a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Pishchane (26km south of Donetsk) and two stationary IFVs (BMP-variant) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), and on 13 September, one IFV (BMP-2) travelling east near Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of city centre).  Aerial imagery revealed the presence on both 9 and 13 September of three military-type armoured vehicles in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) and, on 11 September, of a military-type armoured vehicle near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and eight military-type armoured vehicles and over 50 military-type trucks in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Aerial imagery also revealed the presence on 11 September of two extended trenches on the northern edge of Pikuzy and two extended trenches and one new trench along the road 1km south-west of the town. 

On 12 September, the SMM saw three convoys of amphibious-crossing equipment and vehicles travelling north on road H-21 near “LPR”-controlled Heorhiivka (15km south of Luhansk): one consisting of two bridge-laying vehicles and three military-type personnel-carrying ferries loaded on flat-beds, a second consisting of six bridge-laying vehicles, and a third consisting of military-type amphibious-crossing vehicles loaded on flat-beds. 

On 13 September, the SMM saw a green helicopter (Mi-8T or Mi-8MT) in the air and about to land 500m from the road near a border crossing point south of “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk). 

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and, on 12 September, to a water pipeline in Popasna.  On 13 September the SMM observed a “DPR” de-mining team clear road H20 leading from Yasynuvata to the Donetsk Filtration Station of six pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines, after which workers were able to conduct repairs on the Mission’s camera systems at the station. 

On the morning of 12 September, the SMM saw a fire advancing toward a road near government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) and informed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stationed in the area.  In the afternoon, the Mission saw that the fire had been put out and observed a fire brigade at a nearby checkpoint.  A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no casualties had been reported. 

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at schools near the contact line on both sides.  The Mission saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound 30m from a school in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).  The deputy head of the school told the SMM that about 50 pupils were enrolled (including three internally displaced persons). 

The head of a school in government-controlled Sofiivka (formerly Artemivka, 63km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that over 100 pupils were enrolled.  The head of a school in government-controlled Yasna Poliana (85km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that about 460 pupils were enrolled (including 19 internally displaced persons). 

The head of a school in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that 210 pupils were enrolled. 

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control.  During one hour at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw 16 cars (two with Ukrainian and six with Russian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates), one mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates), one mini-bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), and 16 trucks with covered cargo areas (12 with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine.  The Mission also saw 38 cars (15 with Ukrainian, 12 with Russian Federation, one with Georgian, one with Lithuanian and two with undetermined licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), three vans (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), three trucks with covered cargo areas (all with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) enter Ukraine. 

During 25 minutes at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM did not see any pedestrian or vehicular traffic. 

During one hour at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 23 cars (16 with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates), two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates), one truck with a covered cargo area (with Ukrainian licence plates), and eight pedestrians (six men aged 30-50 and two women aged 30-40) exit Ukraine.  The Mission also

saw 21 cars (14 with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates), two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates), and 21 pedestrians (nine men aged 30-60 and 12 women aged 20-40) enter Ukraine. 

In Odessa, the SMM followed up on a media report of an assault on 11 September on the deputy head of the local branch of a political party.  The Mission saw stitches on the face of the deputy head, who told the SMM that an unknown person had struck her in the head from behind while she was walking in Odessa city centre and that, as a result, she had lost consciousness and was transported to a hospital. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv. 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day.  The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine.  All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.  They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.  The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations. 

Denial of access:

A man in military-style clothing denied the SMM access to parts of a building west of “DPR”-controlled Novoamvrosiivske, citing orders not to allow the Mission access to parts of the building other than in the vicinity of weapons that the SMM had observed.  The Mission informed the JCCC. 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO.  A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours.  The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 

The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO.  An unarmed “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours.  The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 

The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines.  A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present.  The SMM informed the JCCC. 

On 12 September, the possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske.  The Mission informed the JCCC. 

Conditional access:

An armed person at a “DPR” checkpoint near Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) stopped the SMM and inspected the Mission’s trailer before allowing the SMM to pass.  The SMM informed the JCCC. 

A man at a “DPR” checkpoint on road H15 east of “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk) stopped the SMM and inspected the Mission’s trailer.  He then asked to inspect boxes inside the trailer.  The SMM refused the request and informed the JCCC.  After 70 minutes the Mission was allowed to pass without the boxes being inspected. 

Other impediments:

While flying a mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near the contact line between government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and government-controlled Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), the SMM lost communication with the UAV, which then automatically returned to the launch site.  The Mission assessed that the problem was caused by electronic jamming. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.  During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.