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Two distinct problems of objectivity in moral theory are that of reference and truth and that of justification.  These questions are often run together.  However, it is possible to discuss the two questions separately.  A defense is offered of moral ascriptions and moral properties, in opposition to the proposals of Mackie and Harman.  But the thin or minimal defense of moral ascriptions leaves the second problem of objectivity unaddressed.  Further argumentation leads to a proposal that claims limited moral objectivity. 

Three kinds of nationalism are distinguished and explained: (1) Unifying nationalism, which created Italy, and is the more or less voluntary uniting of similar and usually contiguous territories. ( 2) Ethnic separatist nationalism, which created Ireland, and is the effort of an ethnic group to establish sovereignty in its historical territory. ( 3) Ongoing patriotic nationalism, which is found in every nation.  Each comes in degrees of civility ranging from the democratic to the murderous. Five criticisms of nationalism are then examined in the light of the three varieties of it: (1) It is a historical novelty only two hundred years old, hence less essential and enduring than often supposed (Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm). ( 2) Separatist nationalism is acceptable only if its underlying goal is to achieve democracy. ( 3) Nationalism makes the interests of the state supreme and those of the individualnegligible, racializes ethnic difference, and leads to intolerance and genocide (William Pfaff, Isaiah Berlin). ( 4) If we encourage separatists the world will fragment into “5,000 countries” (Warren Christopher). ( 5) Supporting existing borders is simply a better safeguard against war (Pfaff).Each of these criticisms is found wanting.  I discuss the difference between loyalties, which are particularistic, and morality including constitutional principles, which are universal, a distinction important both to the critics and to my rebuttal of them. 

Wesley Salmon and Michael Martin argue that scientific considerations about the order in the universe justify atheism.  After sketching Salmon’s argument, I examine the nature of begging the question and argue that Martin takes a sufficient condition of that fallacy to be a necessary condition.  After a pragmatic account to the fallacy is recommended, I point out how Salmon’s and Martin’s beg the question against all save those who already adhere to atheism and that the crucial considerations that they take to be distinctly scientific are really extra-scientific considerations, giving a specious impression that they are uncontroversial to all who accept mainstream science. 

Can an ontology which treats properties as really out there in the world be combined vvith the view that necessity is not out there?  What about the necessity by which redness excludes greenness, or weighing 8 kg excludes weighing 6 kg?  Armstrong, who combines property realism with logical atomism, argues that such exclusions reflect just the trivial necessity that a whole cannot be any of its proper parts.  Buthis argument fails for colors themselves and for other cases of contrary properties.  Property realism must be necessity realism. 

The paper critically discusses the Chalmers-and-Jackson strategy of accounting for the dynamics of conceptual intuitions.  In contrast to this strategy, it is argued that concepts alone do not determine in advance rational responses to new evidence.  An initial concept is often revised in the light of new data, the revision being guided by the goal of detecting the deep causal structure of the domain investigated.  Using examples from the history of science (concept REFLEX ARC) as an illustration, it is argued that the dilemma of either irrational messy updating of intuitions (Yablo) or strict rails of conceptual pre-determination (Chalmers-Jackson) is a false one.  Rationality does not lie in the alleged conceptual apriority, but in the flexible pursuit of reasonable epistemic goals. 

Eugenio Lecaldano offers an important contribution to the tradition of Italian liberal thought.  In his book on bioethics, he deals with the subject’s most relevant topics by adopting a utilitarian perspective, which clearly demonstrates the influence of J.S. Mill’s philosophy.  The indication of some significant analogies and the distinction between different moral problems are some of the most interesting and useful aspects of Lecaldano’s work. 

This paper examines the sense and extent to which emotions can be thought of as rational.  Through considering a number of examples, it argues (a) that there is more than one way of understanding the claims that we often make about emotions being “rational” or “justified”; (b) that none of the models of rationality already available to us can singly account for all of the various senses in which we think of emotions as rational; yet (c) that they can do so jointly, that is, by each explicating at least one of these senses.  Thus, in the end it is suggested that, despite it not being right to identify emotions with either beliefs or actions, there is no obvious reason to believe that the claims we make about the rationality of our emotions need to be understood by appeal to any separate model of rationality, specific to the emotions, additional to the “cognitive” and “strategic” models already available to us for understanding the rationality of other states like beliefs and judgements on the one hand, and actions on the other. 

This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making.  lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument.  The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”.  The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be repentant.  The opaqueness of one’s future preference-structure is argued at length, stressing that standard decision theory cannot possibly allow that the decision tree is not comprehended at the time of making one’s choice, even if it is about one’s final end.