Q:

Why don't wifi managers remember mac addresses for hotspots to defeat the jasager attack? 

So I just learned about the jasager attack, via the wifi pineapple and it struck me immediately that it wouldn't work at all if network managers (privately) associated MAC addresses with hotspots and asked for explicit permission if you were going to connect to a new physical device. 
Obviously this would be mildly irritating in public hotspots where devices change and hundreds of diverse locations share network names, but it would make home and work networks much harder to penetrate. 
I haven't found any wifi managers that do this, or at least I haven't found information that any do. 
My question: 

Am I missing something obvious?  Would remembering MACs not actually increase security? 
If it would, are there any network managers that do this? ( I'm on Linux, but if there are tools for other OS's I think it's worth having them in the answers)

A:

You didn't provide a good description of the attack you are concerned, but I believe you're referring to the following attack: a malicious "evil twin" access point can pretend to be a legitimate access point and fool your device into connecting to it; then it can play man-in-the-middle. 
If this is what you had in mind, then remembering MAC addresses would not prevent this attack.   Spoofing the MAC address is trivial because they must be transmitted over-the-air: on an unencrypted system everyone nearby can see it. 
If a system is WPA-secured MAC filtering doesn't add to the security. 

A:

MAC address spoofing is trivial for an attacker to carry out,  any form of mac address filtering will not help secure any network.    However,  MAC address filtering can cause real problems for legitimate users.    What if you buy a new router and give it the same SSID? 
The best defense against this sort of attack is WPA.   It isn't prefect,  WPA-PSK is pretty easy to break,  but its better than anything else consumers have.