The assassination of Salmaan Taseer has rightly triggered introspection and discourse in Pakistan on identity — social, religious and national.  Of these, articles written by the likes of Raza Rumi, Huma Yusuf, Ayesha Siddiqa, Yaseer Latif Hamdani and Shehryar Taseer deserve special mention and commendation.  There is, however, no dearth for the alternative narrative in Pakistan.  PML-N’s spokesperson claimed (اردو) that Mr. Taseer would have been assassinated by someone else had Mumtaz Qadri not done so.  Irfan Siddiqui suggests (اردو) that while Mr. Taseer’s assassination cannot be condoned, it was expected, given the governor’s “liberal extremist” views. 

A parallel discourse is also occurring in the West and in India.  Declan Walsh laments on the fate of the liberal Pakistani; Shekhar Gupta qualifies and clarifies; Seema Mustafa foretells of further doom and gloom.  An overarching theme in many commentaries is that a liberal Pakistan is in India’s interests; that a “liberal” Pakistani civilian government would (not to say “could”) radically alter its worldview, foreign policy objectives and how it seeks to achieve them.  The trouble with this argument of course, is that a liberal Pakistani civilian government has never existed.  Even so, some commentaries point to Benazir Bhutto and her administrations of the late ’80s and ’90s as approximate models. 

However, liberal though Ms. Bhutto may have been, Pakistan’s worldview did not undergo material change during her leadership.  Bilateral relations with India did not improve.  If anything, Ms. Bhutto’s reign coincided with the height of the Jammu & Kashmir insurgency fomented by Pakistan, and proliferation of nuclear technology.  Indeed, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the motivation to match India to the detriment of all else took shape under the leadership of her charismatic father, the wine-drinking, UC Berkeley-educated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (“We will eat grass…”). 

It would therefore be a worthy exercise to ponder over these five questions on what a model for a liberal Pakistan would look like, and whether a liberal dispensation in Pakistan is a sufficient condition to alter the trajectory of its relationship with India.  For us in India, would the ascendancy of a liberal narrative in Pakistan’s internal discourse lessen our own threat perception of our neighbor? 

Could a liberal government in Islamabad effectively end the hold that the military-jihadi complex has on Pakistan’s formulation and implementation of foreign policy objectives? 

Would it still maintain that India poses an existential threat to Pakistan? 

What will its position be towards Kashmir?  Specifically, towards the insurgency and state-sponsored sub-conventional warfare? 

What will its position be on terrorism?  If another Mumbai were to occur, would this liberal regime disavow these groups?  Actively confront them?  Prosecute them?  Extradite them, where permissible, to India?  Cooperate with India’s own investigation? 

Would it continue to maintain, by extension of #2, that Pakistan’s conduct in Afghanistan is just and only expected, given India’s commercial and political ties to Kabul? 

Tough questions no doubt, but ones that need to be answered in India, as an internal battle for identity rages on in Pakistan. 

UPDATE: My op-ed in The Pioneer has a more complete analysis of liberalism in Pakistan. 

Almost on cue, Pakistan’s Urdu media went to work, lambasting Seymour Hersh for his article in the “New Yorker” on US-Pak back-channel talks on securing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, in the event of a debilitating security situation in the country. 

Hersh was dismissed as a “Jewish agent” and his credibility immediately was called into question.  This was followed by some chest-thumping on the integrity of Pakistan’s armed forces and the sanctity of the country’s nuclear assets. 

Nawaiwaqt’s editorial was one of first to issue forth an opinion on Hersh’s piece:

The “New Yorker” claimed that the Obama administration is in sensitive talks with Pakistan to secure the country’s nuclear assets.  Under this agreement, American special units can secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets in the event of a crisis. 

However, rejecting Seymour Hersh’s report as baseless, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Abdul Basit said that no help was needed from foreign nations to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Because of his affiliation with the Jewish lobby, Seymour Hersh maintains a close watch on Pakistan’s nuclear program. 

A propaganda campaign is underway in America which claims that extremists could take control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets — this propaganda is a result of the presence of the Indian lobby in America. The Hindus and the Jews have to this day not accepted Pakistan’s nuclear status. 

The Americans and Europeans don’t seem to have any issues with the Hindu or Jewish bomb, but will never accept a Muslim country possessing such technology. Extremism has grown in Pakistan because of America’s war in Afghanistan and if there is any threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets, it is from India, Israel and America. 

Dr. AQ Khan has been put under house arrest and Blackwater, along with various other US officials have established a presence in Islamabad and elsewhere in Pakistan. 

It is therefore important to pay close attention to the contents of Seymour Hersh’s report.  Let there be no doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control is better than that of any other nation’s.  In the name of securing Pakistan’s nukes, Blackwater has tried to infiltrate Quetta and other cities in Pakistan.  This is part of a larger conspiracy through which America hopes to make India its slave by alleviating its fears over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. 

We have developed the nuclear program through our ability, hard work and resources.  We will provide for its security ourselves and if our enemies cast their evil eyes on our nuclear program, they will be given a bloody nose in reply. 

In its November 11 editorial, the Daily Ausaf observes that consensus on maintaining and enhancing Pakistan’s nuclear program transcends the country’s dysfunctional and chaotic political environment. 

Attempts to malign Pakistan’s nuclear program began with the genesis of the program itself.  However, Pakistan’s politicians, despite their several faults, have continued to protect our nuclear program.  If Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is credited with having the vision to embark on the nuclear program, then the credit to not only protect, but also enhance the program needs to be given to Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Zia ul-Haq. 

The US has tried to repeatedly discredit Pakistan’s nuclear program — raising fears of instability in South Asia, of an arms race between India and Pakistan — but despite the US’s best efforts, our armed forces and politicians have safeguarded our nuclear program. We have been pressured to accede to several US demands. 

Despite disapproval from the people, Pakistan was enlisted as a frontline state in US’s war on terrorism.  But there will be no compromise on Pakistan’s nuclear program and if the day comes when a politician takes such a step, he will have to face the repercussions of his action and the awam will itself safeguard our nuclear program. 

China celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic on October 1, 2009.  It did so with the pomp and circumstance befitting a significant milestone.  Fireworks, aerobatics, even a female militia in miniskirt ensemble, and of course, contingents from the world’s largest armed forces. 

In India, media coverage was distressinglypredictable.  Labeling the military parade China’s “massive display of strength”, the media harped on about how the People’s Republic overwhelms India in military might.  Like this wonderful piece, called “China vs India: Military might“ put together by an “NDTV correspondent” on their website (and also broadcast as a news item on television). 

The article gives you a blow-by-blow of China’s relative superiority — 6,000 more “airplanes” in the PLAF, 100,000 more troops.  Run of the mill, factually incorrect observations — like Chinese plans to build and induct an aircraft carrier by 2010.  For those with an eye for the bleeding obvious, 2010 is next year.  And lest the nuclear arena be ignored, the article points out that China’s most potent warhead tested was 4 mT, whereas apparently an Indian nuclear test yielded 50 kT. The author should have disclosed this a few weeks ago — it would have put an end to this ruccus. 

Reading this article, you get the sense that China overwhelms India militarily and that the sanest thing for the Indian army to do under the circumstances is to pack up and go home.  Except, defense and national security aren’t played out on balance sheets or through inventory counts. 

Any Chinese military misadventure is contingent on a number of factors, including India’s conventional military capability, analysis of the impact of war on China’s economy and global standing, prospects of game-altering strategic alliances should war be imposed on India, and of course, China’s definition of “acceptable damage” and its assessment of India’s ability to cross that threshold via a nuclear assault. 

Of course, not once was any of this remotely brought to the fore during India’s marathon coverage of China.  To do so would be to bore an already disengaged audience about the intricacies of military strategy and international relations.  Why complicate matters when you can shock and scandalize someone and quickly cut to a commercial where Yuvraj Singh tries to sell you a Fiat Grande Punto? 

Georges ” le Tigre” Clemenceau once said “war is too important a business to be left to soldiers”.  Disengagement of the public from matters relating to national security has led to very low levels of accountability in the defense of India.  Of the TV news anchors and “on-site” correspondents, not many can talk intelligently on such areas and ask probing questions to defense guests.  Comically, (and speaking of “le Tigre”) this blogger remembers TV coverage of the Kargil War, where one TV-news personality made repeated references to “Tiger Hills”, like it was some dashed hill station. 

Today, the only honest, probing and meaningful analysis is conducted mostly by think tanks, whose publications are, unfortunately, only read by other think tanks.  The Filter Coffee has long held the position that discussion on the defense of India needs to move away from think tanks and into our living rooms.  It is only then that true accountability can be demanded, both from the system, riddled as it is with bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and from the media, who today get a free pass on peddling half-truths and sweeping generalizations on an unsuspecting public. 

As it stands today on matters of defense and national security, the media fails the very democracy it says it is protecting. 

First, let’s get the recent reports about Pakistan’s nuclear program out of the way.  Recently, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS)reported that Pakistan was expanding its capabilities across the board, including significantly increasing its nuclear stockpile and developing the nuclear capable Babur (a reverse-engineered USN Tomahawk) cruise missile. 

BAS now estimates that Pakistan has between 70-90 nuclear weapons.  This, as BAS also reports, is comparable to India’s own nuclear stock, which is estimated to be about 70.  However, alarmist news reports in the Indian media dilute the true impact of such enhanced capabilities on India. 

Qualitative and quantitative enhancements to nuclear arsenal are part of the natural evolutionary course that nuclear powers traverse.  Of course, Pakistan’s unnatural increase in nuclear arsenal in the midst of a debilitating internal security situation is a function of its pathological neurosis with India.  But as The Filter Coffee has argued before, India’s nuclear posture with regard to Pakistan need not substantially change due to such revelations. 

There are things that India should always continue to do to attain “minimum credible deterrence” — the quest for credible secondary strike capabilities and perfecting its delivery systems need impetus.  But India must continue to do these things regardless of what Pakistan does or doesn’t do. 

The truth of the matter is, Pakistan is not in a position where it can expect to “win” in a nuclear showdown with a neighbor seven times its size.  The scale of damage that Pakistan’s largely sub-kiloton weapons can cause to a country spread across 1.2 million sq.  miles with far-flung urban centers, cannot be compared to the cumulative impact of India’s retributive assault on Pakistan’s 2-3 main cities.  India’s lesson from this revelation is to continue to develop, enhance and fine-tune its own weapons, and refocus on its laggard missile programs. 

The second issue that I wanted to touch on was The New York Times’article on Pakistan’s illegal modification of the Harpoon anti-ship missile into a land based missile that the US believes is intended for use against India.  The US apparently made an “unpublicized diplomatic protest” upon learning of Pakistan’s actions. 

At best, this shock and dismay that Pakistan would actually modify a US weapon to enhance its capabilities against India, can be put down to ignorance and naïveté.  At worst, it is hypocrisy and mock outrage.  If the US sold Pakistan an anti-ship missile, where would the US realistically expect the missile to be used by Pakistan?  In a battle against Iran?  Against Afghanistan?  China?  The target of the weapon was always clear — anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of the subcontinent’s history will be aware of Pakistan’s preoccupation with India.  So why the outrage? 

The article also goes on to state: “Pakistan had taken the unusual step of agreeing to allow American officials to inspect the country’s Harpoon inventory to prove that it had not violated the law, a step that administration officials praised”.  Presumably, Pakistan signed an EUMA with the US for the sale of anti-ship missiles.  We are told that “physical inspection” is a standard provision of the US’s EUMA agreements.  Indeed, we also know that similar physical inspections of US-supplied Pakistani military hardware have taken place in Pakistan previously (and found to have issues — see page 8).  So how is this apparent magnanimity on the part of Pakistan “unusual”?  Why does it warrant praise? 

The continued sale of sophisticated conventional weaponry to Pakistan (refer to this, via FAS) for “good behavior” is like giving candy to a hyperactive child.  The 36 F-16s and 115 115mm howitzers aren’t and won’t be employed by Pakistan in its COIN efforts in NWFP.  The US needs ask itself if the sale of sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan is a solution to the problem, or part of it.