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Appeal No. 119 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), Lucknow, in Civil Misc.
Application No. 115 of 1955.
683 C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellants.
G. section Pathak, Achru Ram, section N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, J. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for the respondent.
November, 25.
The Judgment of Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J., and that of Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by Wanchoo, J. SUBBA RAO, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, allowing the petition filed by the respondent under article 226 of the Constitution.
The respondent was appointed a Sub Inspector of Police in December, 1948, and was posted at Sitapur in June, 1953.
On September 6, 1953, the respondent went to village Madhwapur in connection with an investigation of a case of theft.
On the evening of the said date when he was returning, accompanied by one Lalji, an ex patwari of Mohiuddinpur, he saw one Tika Ram coming from the side of a canal and going hurriedly towards a field.
As the movements of Tika Ram appeared to be suspicious and as he was carrying something in the folds of his dhoti, the respondent searched him and found a bundle containing currency notes.
The respondent counted the currency notes and handed them over to Lalji for being returned to Tika Ram, who subsequently got them and went his way.
Subsequently when Tika Ram counted the currency notes at his house, he found that they were short by Rs. 250.
Tika Ram 's case is that the bundle when taken by the respondent contained notes of the value of Rs. 650, but when he counted them in his house they were only of the value of Rs. 400.
On September 9, 1953 Tika Ram filed a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, to the effect that the respondent and one Lalji had misappropriated a sum of its.
There is dispute in regard to the interpretation of the complaint.
On receipt of the said complaint, the Superintendent of Police made enquiries 684 and issued a notice to the respondent to show cause why his integrity certificate should not be withheld, upon which the respondent submitted his explanation on October 3, 1953.
Thereafter the Superintendent of Police forwarded the file of the case to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range, U. P., who directed the Superintendent of Police to take proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act against the respondent.
The departmental proceedings were started against the respondent; on November 2, 1953, a charge sheet was served upon the respondent under section 7 of the Police Act stating that there were strong reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250 from the purse of Tika Ram; the respondent filed his explanation to the charge made against him; and ultimately the Superintendent of Police held an enquiry and found on the evidence that the respondent was guilty of the offence with which he was charged.
On January 2, 1954, the Superin tendent of Police issued another notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be reduced to the lowest grade of Sub Inspector for a period of three years.
In due course the respondent showed cause against the action proposed to be taken against him on a consideration of which the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, by his order dated January 16, 1954 reduced the respondent to the lowest grade of Sub Inspector for a period of three years.
When this order came to the notice of the D. 1.
G., U. P., on a consideration of the entire record, he came to the con clusion that the respondent should be dismissed from service and on October 19, 1954 he made an order to that effect.
On February 28, 1955 the Inspector General of Police confirmed that order; and the revision filed by the respondent against that order to the State Government was also dismissed in August 1955.
Thereafter the respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, for quashing the said orders and the same was heard by a division bench consisting of Randhir Singh and Bhargava, JJ.
The learned judges held that the provisions of para.
685 486 of the Police Regulations had not been observed and, therefore, the proceedings taken under section 7 of the Police Act were invalid and illegal.
On that finding, they quashed the impugned orders; with the result that the order dismissing the respondent from service was set aside.
The State Government, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, and the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, have preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.
We shall now proceed to consider the various contentions raised by learned counsel in the order they were raised and argued before us.
At the outset Mr. C. B. Agarwala, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that there was no breach of the provisions of para.
486 of the Police Regulations.
If this contention be accepted, no other question arises 'in this case; therefore, we shall deal with the same.
The material part of para.
486 of the Police Regulations reads thus: "When the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.
In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules: I.Every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with in the first place under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, according to law, a case under the appropriate section being registered in the police station concerned. . . .
This provision expressly lays down that every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with in the first place under Ch.
XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code.
This provision will not apply if the information received by the police does not 87 686 relate to the commission of a cognizable offence.
Learned counsel contends that the information received in the present case does not relate to any offence committed by the respondent, much less to a cognizable offence.
This is a point raised before us for the first time.
This does not find a place even in the statement of case filed by the appellants.
In the High Court it was not contended that the information did not disclose any offence committed by the respondent.
Indeed, it was common case that the information disclosed an offence committed by the respondent, but it had been contended by the appellants that the misappropriation of the part of the money amounted to an offence under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a cognizable offence; and it was argued on behalf of the respondent that it amounted to an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
The learned judges accepted the contention of the respondent.
Even so, it is said that whatever might been the contentions of the parties, the information given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police clearly disclosed that no offence was alleged to have been committed by the respondent and that this Court would, therefore, be justified, even at this very late stage, to accept the contention of the appellants.
But the contents of the said information do not in any way support the assertion.
Paragraph 3 of the application given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, reads thus: "That on Sunday last dated 6th September, 1953 the applicant had with him the currency notes of Rs. 650.
The opposite party as well as Shri Babu Ram met the applicant on the west of Rampur near the Canal.
The opposite party said to the Sub Inspector "This man appears to be clad in rags but is possessed of considerable money." After saying this the person of the applicant was searched.
The Sub Inspector, having opened the bundle of notes, handed over the (notes) one by one to the opposite party.
" This statement clearly indicates that either the Sub .
Inspector or both the Sub Inspector and Lalji searched the person of Tika Ram, that the Sub Inspector took 687 the bundle of notes and handed the same over, one by one, to Lalji for being returned to the applicant, and that out of Rs. 650 a sum of Rs. 250 was not returned to him.
The facts alleged make out an offence against both the Sub Inspector as well as Lalji.
The mere fact that the respondent is not shown as one of the opposite parties in the application does not affect the question, for the information given in the application imputed the commission of an offence to both the respondent and Lalji.
The notice issued by the Supe rintendent of Police on November 2, 1953 to the respondent also charges him with an offence of misappropriation.
It is stated that the said notice only says that the Superintendent of Police had good reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated the sum of money and that it does not aver that he committed the offence of misappropriation.
But what matters is 'that the Superintendent of Police also understood from the information given and the enquiry conducted by him that the respondent had committed the offence.
Reliance is placed upon paragraph 3 of the writ petition wherein the respondent herein stated that Tika Ram filed a complaint against Lalji and not against the respondent.
As a fact that is correct in the sense that the respondent was not shown in that application as the opposite party though in the body of that application definite allegations were made against the respondent.
In the counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police on behalf of the State it was clearly averred that on September 9, 1953 Tika Ram appeared before him and filed a petition to the effect fiat one Lalji and the respondent had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250.
Whatever ambiguity there might have been in the information we do not find any this allegation dispels it and it is not open to the appellants at this stage to contend that the petition did not disclose any offence against the respondent.
In the circumstances, we must hold that the information received by the police related to the commission of an offence by the respondent.
Even so, it is contended that the said offence is not a cognizable offence.
It is said that there was no 688 entrustment made by Tika Ram to the respondent and that, therefore, the offence did not fall under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, which is a cognizable offence, but only under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a cognizable offence.
Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code defines "criminal breach of trust" and section 409 thereof prescribes the punishment for the criminal breach of trust by a public servant.
Under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, "Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".
To constitute an offence under this section, there must be an entrustment of property and dishonest misappropriation of it.
The person entrusted may misappropriate it himself, or he may wilfully suffer another person to do so.
In the instant case the respondent, being a police officer, was legally entitled to search a person found under suspicious circumstances; and Tika Ram in handing over the bundle of notes to the police officer must have done so in the confidence that he would get back the notes from him when the suspicion was cleared.
In these circumstances, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that the currency notes were alleged to have been handed over by Tika Ram to the respondent for a specific purpose, but were dishonestly misappropriated by the respondent or at, any rate he wilfully suffered Lalji to misappropriate the same.
We, therefore, hold that if the currency notes were taken by the respondent in discharge of his duty for inspection and return, he was certainly entrusted with the notes within the meaning of section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.
If so, the information discloses a cognizable offence.
We reject the first contention.
The second objection of learned counsel for the appellants is that sub para.
(3) of para.
486 of the 689 Police Regulations enables the appropriate police authority to initiate the departmental proceeding without complying with the provisions of sub para.
(1) of para.
The relevant portion of para.
486 of the Police Regulations reads: "When the offence amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.
In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules:. . " Rule I relates to a cognizable offence, r. II to a non cognizable.
offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, and r. III to an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non cognizable offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act.
Rule III says: "When a Superintendent of Police sees reason to take action on information given to him, or on his own knowledge or suspicion, that a police officer subordinate to him has committed an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non cognizable offence (including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act) of which he considers it unnecessary at that stage to forward a report in writing to the District Magistrate under rule II above, he will make or cause to be made by an officer senior in rank to the officer charged, a departmental inquiry sufficient to test the truth of the charge.
On the conclusion of this inquiry he will decide whether further action is necessary, and if so, whether the officer charged should be departmentally tried, or whether the District Magistrate should be moved to take cognizance of the case under the Criminal Procedure Code. " The argument is that the words "an offence under section 7 of the Police Act" take in a cognizable offence and that, therefore, this rule provides for a procedure alternative to that prescribed under r. I.
We do not think that this contention is sound.
Section 7 of the Police Act empowers certain officers to dismiss, suspend 690 or reduce any police officer of the subordinate rank whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same.
The grounds for punishment are comprehensive: they may take in offences under the Indian Penal Code or other penal statutes.
The commission of such offences may also be a ground to hold that an officer is unfit to hold his office.
Action under this section can, therefore, be taken in respect of, (i) offences only under section 7 of the Police Act without involving any cognizable or noncognizable offences, that is, simple remissness or negli gence in the discharge of duty, (ii) cognizable offences, and (iii) non cognizable offences.
Paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations makes this clear.
It says that when the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.
This part of the rule applies to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act i. e., the first category mentioned above.
Rule I refers to a cognizable offence i. e., the second category, rule 11 to a non cognizable offence i. e., the third category, and rule III applies to an offence under section 7 of the Police Act and to a noncognizable offence.
Though the word "only" is not mentioned in rule 111, the offence under section 7 of the Police Act can, in the context, mean an offence only under section 7 of the said Act i.e., an offence falling under the first category.
So understood, the three rules can be reconciled.
We, therefore, hold that, as the offence complained of in the present case is a cognizable offence, it falls under rule I and not under rule 111.
We, therefore, reject this contention.
The third contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellants raises a constitutional point of considerable importance.
The gist of the argument may be stated thus: In England, the service under the Crown is held at the Crown 's pleasure, unless the employment is for good behaviour or for a cause.
But if there is a statute prescribing the terms of service and the mode of dismissal of the servant of the Crown, the statute would control the pleasure of the Crown.

Appeal No. 119 of 1959.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), Lucknow, in Civil Misc.

Application No. 115 of 1955.

683 C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellants.

G. section Pathak, Achru Ram, section N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, J. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for the respondent.

November, 25.

The Judgment of Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J., and that of Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by Wanchoo, J. SUBBA RAO, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, allowing the petition filed by the respondent under article 226 of the Constitution.

The respondent was appointed a Sub Inspector of Police in December, 1948, and was posted at Sitapur in June, 1953.

On September 6, 1953, the respondent went to village Madhwapur in connection with an investigation of a case of theft.

On the evening of the said date when he was returning, accompanied by one Lalji, an ex patwari of Mohiuddinpur, he saw one Tika Ram coming from the side of a canal and going hurriedly towards a field.

As the movements of Tika Ram appeared to be suspicious and as he was carrying something in the folds of his dhoti, the respondent searched him and found a bundle containing currency notes.

The respondent counted the currency notes and handed them over to Lalji for being returned to Tika Ram, who subsequently got them and went his way.

Subsequently when Tika Ram counted the currency notes at his house, he found that they were short by Rs. 250.

Tika Ram 's case is that the bundle when taken by the respondent contained notes of the value of Rs. 650, but when he counted them in his house they were only of the value of Rs. 400.

On September 9, 1953 Tika Ram filed a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, to the effect that the respondent and one Lalji had misappropriated a sum of its.

There is dispute in regard to the interpretation of the complaint.

On receipt of the said complaint, the Superintendent of Police made enquiries 684 and issued a notice to the respondent to show cause why his integrity certificate should not be withheld, upon which the respondent submitted his explanation on October 3, 1953.

Thereafter the Superintendent of Police forwarded the file of the case to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range, U. P., who directed the Superintendent of Police to take proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act against the respondent.

The departmental proceedings were started against the respondent; on November 2, 1953, a charge sheet was served upon the respondent under section 7 of the Police Act stating that there were strong reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250 from the purse of Tika Ram; the respondent filed his explanation to the charge made against him; and ultimately the Superintendent of Police held an enquiry and found on the evidence that the respondent was guilty of the offence with which he was charged.

On January 2, 1954, the Superin tendent of Police issued another notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be reduced to the lowest grade of Sub Inspector for a period of three years.

In due course the respondent showed cause against the action proposed to be taken against him on a consideration of which the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, by his order dated January 16, 1954 reduced the respondent to the lowest grade of Sub Inspector for a period of three years.

When this order came to the notice of the D. 1.

G., U. P., on a consideration of the entire record, he came to the con clusion that the respondent should be dismissed from service and on October 19, 1954 he made an order to that effect.

On February 28, 1955 the Inspector General of Police confirmed that order; and the revision filed by the respondent against that order to the State Government was also dismissed in August 1955.

Thereafter the respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, for quashing the said orders and the same was heard by a division bench consisting of Randhir Singh and Bhargava, JJ.

The learned judges held that the provisions of para.

685 486 of the Police Regulations had not been observed and, therefore, the proceedings taken under section 7 of the Police Act were invalid and illegal.

On that finding, they quashed the impugned orders; with the result that the order dismissing the respondent from service was set aside.

The State Government, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, and the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, have preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.

We shall now proceed to consider the various contentions raised by learned counsel in the order they were raised and argued before us.

At the outset Mr. C. B. Agarwala, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that there was no breach of the provisions of para.

486 of the Police Regulations.

If this contention be accepted, no other question arises 'in this case; therefore, we shall deal with the same.

The material part of para.

486 of the Police Regulations reads thus: "When the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.

In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules: I.Every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with in the first place under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, according to law, a case under the appropriate section being registered in the police station concerned. . . .

This provision expressly lays down that every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with in the first place under Ch.

XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code.

This provision will not apply if the information received by the police does not 87 686 relate to the commission of a cognizable offence.

Learned counsel contends that the information received in the present case does not relate to any offence committed by the respondent, much less to a cognizable offence.

This is a point raised before us for the first time.

This does not find a place even in the statement of case filed by the appellants.

In the High Court it was not contended that the information did not disclose any offence committed by the respondent.

Indeed, it was common case that the information disclosed an offence committed by the respondent, but it had been contended by the appellants that the misappropriation of the part of the money amounted to an offence under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a cognizable offence; and it was argued on behalf of the respondent that it amounted to an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.

The learned judges accepted the contention of the respondent.

Even so, it is said that whatever might been the contentions of the parties, the information given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police clearly disclosed that no offence was alleged to have been committed by the respondent and that this Court would, therefore, be justified, even at this very late stage, to accept the contention of the appellants.

But the contents of the said information do not in any way support the assertion.

Paragraph 3 of the application given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, reads thus: "That on Sunday last dated 6th September, 1953 the applicant had with him the currency notes of Rs. 650.

The opposite party as well as Shri Babu Ram met the applicant on the west of Rampur near the Canal.

The opposite party said to the Sub Inspector "This man appears to be clad in rags but is possessed of considerable money." After saying this the person of the applicant was searched.

The Sub Inspector, having opened the bundle of notes, handed over the (notes) one by one to the opposite party.

" This statement clearly indicates that either the Sub .

Inspector or both the Sub Inspector and Lalji searched the person of Tika Ram, that the Sub Inspector took 687 the bundle of notes and handed the same over, one by one, to Lalji for being returned to the applicant, and that out of Rs. 650 a sum of Rs. 250 was not returned to him.

The facts alleged make out an offence against both the Sub Inspector as well as Lalji.

The mere fact that the respondent is not shown as one of the opposite parties in the application does not affect the question, for the information given in the application imputed the commission of an offence to both the respondent and Lalji.

The notice issued by the Supe rintendent of Police on November 2, 1953 to the respondent also charges him with an offence of misappropriation.

It is stated that the said notice only says that the Superintendent of Police had good reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated the sum of money and that it does not aver that he committed the offence of misappropriation.

But what matters is 'that the Superintendent of Police also understood from the information given and the enquiry conducted by him that the respondent had committed the offence.

Reliance is placed upon paragraph 3 of the writ petition wherein the respondent herein stated that Tika Ram filed a complaint against Lalji and not against the respondent.

As a fact that is correct in the sense that the respondent was not shown in that application as the opposite party though in the body of that application definite allegations were made against the respondent.

In the counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police on behalf of the State it was clearly averred that on September 9, 1953 Tika Ram appeared before him and filed a petition to the effect fiat one Lalji and the respondent had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250.

Whatever ambiguity there might have been in the information we do not find any this allegation dispels it and it is not open to the appellants at this stage to contend that the petition did not disclose any offence against the respondent.

In the circumstances, we must hold that the information received by the police related to the commission of an offence by the respondent.

Even so, it is contended that the said offence is not a cognizable offence.

It is said that there was no 688 entrustment made by Tika Ram to the respondent and that, therefore, the offence did not fall under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, which is a cognizable offence, but only under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a cognizable offence.

Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code defines "criminal breach of trust" and section 409 thereof prescribes the punishment for the criminal breach of trust by a public servant.

Under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, "Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".

To constitute an offence under this section, there must be an entrustment of property and dishonest misappropriation of it.

The person entrusted may misappropriate it himself, or he may wilfully suffer another person to do so.

In the instant case the respondent, being a police officer, was legally entitled to search a person found under suspicious circumstances; and Tika Ram in handing over the bundle of notes to the police officer must have done so in the confidence that he would get back the notes from him when the suspicion was cleared.

In these circumstances, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that the currency notes were alleged to have been handed over by Tika Ram to the respondent for a specific purpose, but were dishonestly misappropriated by the respondent or at, any rate he wilfully suffered Lalji to misappropriate the same.

We, therefore, hold that if the currency notes were taken by the respondent in discharge of his duty for inspection and return, he was certainly entrusted with the notes within the meaning of section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.

If so, the information discloses a cognizable offence.

We reject the first contention.

The second objection of learned counsel for the appellants is that sub para.

(3) of para.

486 of the 689 Police Regulations enables the appropriate police authority to initiate the departmental proceeding without complying with the provisions of sub para.

(1) of para.

The relevant portion of para.

486 of the Police Regulations reads: "When the offence amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.

In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules:. . " Rule I relates to a cognizable offence, r. II to a non cognizable.

offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, and r. III to an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non cognizable offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act.

Rule III says: "When a Superintendent of Police sees reason to take action on information given to him, or on his own knowledge or suspicion, that a police officer subordinate to him has committed an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non cognizable offence (including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act) of which he considers it unnecessary at that stage to forward a report in writing to the District Magistrate under rule II above, he will make or cause to be made by an officer senior in rank to the officer charged, a departmental inquiry sufficient to test the truth of the charge.

On the conclusion of this inquiry he will decide whether further action is necessary, and if so, whether the officer charged should be departmentally tried, or whether the District Magistrate should be moved to take cognizance of the case under the Criminal Procedure Code. " The argument is that the words "an offence under section 7 of the Police Act" take in a cognizable offence and that, therefore, this rule provides for a procedure alternative to that prescribed under r. I.

We do not think that this contention is sound.

Section 7 of the Police Act empowers certain officers to dismiss, suspend 690 or reduce any police officer of the subordinate rank whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same.

The grounds for punishment are comprehensive: they may take in offences under the Indian Penal Code or other penal statutes.

The commission of such offences may also be a ground to hold that an officer is unfit to hold his office.

Action under this section can, therefore, be taken in respect of, (i) offences only under section 7 of the Police Act without involving any cognizable or noncognizable offences, that is, simple remissness or negli gence in the discharge of duty, (ii) cognizable offences, and (iii) non cognizable offences.

Paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations makes this clear.

It says that when the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code.

This part of the rule applies to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act i. e., the first category mentioned above.

Rule I refers to a cognizable offence i. e., the second category, rule 11 to a non cognizable offence i. e., the third category, and rule III applies to an offence under section 7 of the Police Act and to a noncognizable offence.

Though the word "only" is not mentioned in rule 111, the offence under section 7 of the Police Act can, in the context, mean an offence only under section 7 of the said Act i.e., an offence falling under the first category.

So understood, the three rules can be reconciled.

We, therefore, hold that, as the offence complained of in the present case is a cognizable offence, it falls under rule I and not under rule 111.

We, therefore, reject this contention.

The third contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellants raises a constitutional point of considerable importance.

The gist of the argument may be stated thus: In England, the service under the Crown is held at the Crown 's pleasure, unless the employment is for good behaviour or for a cause.

But if there is a statute prescribing the terms of service and the mode of dismissal of the servant of the Crown, the statute would control the pleasure of the Crown.