func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequence | project
stringlengths 2
29
| commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
int _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed(gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8 type)
{
uint8 MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16 c_length;
uint8 pad;
int length;
mac_hd_t td;
uint16 blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
uint8 major, minor;
gnutls_protocol_t ver;
int hash_size =
_gnutls_hash_get_algo_len(session->security_parameters.
read_mac_algorithm);
ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session);
minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor(ver);
major = _gnutls_version_get_major(ver);
blocksize = _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size(session->security_parameters.
read_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
/* initialize MAC
*/
td = mac_init(session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
if (td == GNUTLS_MAC_FAILED
&& session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm !=
GNUTLS_MAC_NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* actual decryption (inplace)
*/
switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block
(session->security_parameters.read_bulk_cipher_algorithm)) {
case CIPHER_STREAM:
if ((ret = _gnutls_cipher_decrypt(session->connection_state.
read_cipher_state,
ciphertext.data,
ciphertext.size)) < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size;
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
if ((ciphertext.size < blocksize)
|| (ciphertext.size % blocksize != 0)) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
if ((ret = _gnutls_cipher_decrypt(session->connection_state.
read_cipher_state,
ciphertext.data,
ciphertext.size)) < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
/* ignore the IV in TLS 1.1.
*/
if (session->security_parameters.version >= GNUTLS_TLS1_1) {
ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
ciphertext.data += blocksize;
if (ciphertext.size == 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
}
pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
if (pad > ciphertext.size - hash_size) {
gnutls_assert();
/* We do not fail here. We check below for the
* the pad_failed. If zero means success.
*/
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
*/
if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
for (i = 2; i < pad; i++) {
if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
break;
default:
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (length < 0)
length = 0;
c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16((uint16) length);
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
if (td != GNUTLS_MAC_FAILED) {
_gnutls_hmac(td,
UINT64DATA(session->connection_state.
read_sequence_number), 8);
_gnutls_hmac(td, &type, 1);
if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1) { /* TLS 1.x */
_gnutls_hmac(td, &major, 1);
_gnutls_hmac(td, &minor, 1);
}
_gnutls_hmac(td, &c_length, 2);
if (length > 0)
_gnutls_hmac(td, ciphertext.data, length);
mac_deinit(td, MAC, ver);
}
/* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
* 1.0 protocol.
*/
if (pad_failed != 0)
return pad_failed;
/* HMAC was not the same.
*/
if (memcmp(MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
*/
if (compress_size < length) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(compress_data, ciphertext.data, length);
return length;
} | 1 | [] | gnutls | 7ad6162573ba79a4392c63b453ad0220ca6c5ace | 73,008,646,937,836,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 157 | added an extra check while checking the padding. |
static char *make_filename_safe(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (*filename && strncmp(filename, ":memory:", sizeof(":memory:")-1)) {
char *fullpath = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (!fullpath) {
return NULL;
}
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fullpath, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) {
efree(fullpath);
return NULL;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(fullpath TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(fullpath);
return NULL;
}
return fullpath;
}
return estrdup(filename);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-264"
] | php-src | 055ecbc62878e86287d742c7246c21606cee8183 | 211,824,207,069,112,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Improve check for :memory: pseudo-filename in SQlite |
unpack_Z_stream(int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
IF_DESKTOP(long long total_written = 0;)
IF_DESKTOP(long long) int retval = -1;
unsigned char *stackp;
long code;
int finchar;
long oldcode;
long incode;
int inbits;
int posbits;
int outpos;
int insize;
int bitmask;
long free_ent;
long maxcode;
long maxmaxcode;
int n_bits;
int rsize = 0;
unsigned char *inbuf; /* were eating insane amounts of stack - */
unsigned char *outbuf; /* bad for some embedded targets */
unsigned char *htab;
unsigned short *codetab;
/* Hmm, these were statics - why?! */
/* user settable max # bits/code */
int maxbits; /* = BITS; */
/* block compress mode -C compatible with 2.0 */
int block_mode; /* = BLOCK_MODE; */
inbuf = xzalloc(IBUFSIZ + 64);
outbuf = xzalloc(OBUFSIZ + 2048);
htab = xzalloc(HSIZE); /* wsn't zeroed out before, maybe can xmalloc? */
codetab = xzalloc(HSIZE * sizeof(codetab[0]));
insize = 0;
/* xread isn't good here, we have to return - caller may want
* to do some cleanup (e.g. delete incomplete unpacked file etc) */
if (full_read(fd_in, inbuf, 1) != 1) {
bb_error_msg("short read");
goto err;
}
maxbits = inbuf[0] & BIT_MASK;
block_mode = inbuf[0] & BLOCK_MODE;
maxmaxcode = MAXCODE(maxbits);
if (maxbits > BITS) {
bb_error_msg("compressed with %d bits, can only handle "
BITS_STR" bits", maxbits);
goto err;
}
n_bits = INIT_BITS;
maxcode = MAXCODE(INIT_BITS) - 1;
bitmask = (1 << INIT_BITS) - 1;
oldcode = -1;
finchar = 0;
outpos = 0;
posbits = 0 << 3;
free_ent = ((block_mode) ? FIRST : 256);
/* As above, initialize the first 256 entries in the table. */
/*clear_tab_prefixof(); - done by xzalloc */
for (code = 255; code >= 0; --code) {
tab_suffixof(code) = (unsigned char) code;
}
do {
resetbuf:
{
int i;
int e;
int o;
o = posbits >> 3;
e = insize - o;
for (i = 0; i < e; ++i)
inbuf[i] = inbuf[i + o];
insize = e;
posbits = 0;
}
if (insize < (int) (IBUFSIZ + 64) - IBUFSIZ) {
rsize = safe_read(fd_in, inbuf + insize, IBUFSIZ);
//error check??
insize += rsize;
}
inbits = ((rsize > 0) ? (insize - insize % n_bits) << 3 :
(insize << 3) - (n_bits - 1));
while (inbits > posbits) {
if (free_ent > maxcode) {
posbits =
((posbits - 1) +
((n_bits << 3) -
(posbits - 1 + (n_bits << 3)) % (n_bits << 3)));
++n_bits;
if (n_bits == maxbits) {
maxcode = maxmaxcode;
} else {
maxcode = MAXCODE(n_bits) - 1;
}
bitmask = (1 << n_bits) - 1;
goto resetbuf;
}
{
unsigned char *p = &inbuf[posbits >> 3];
code = ((((long) (p[0])) | ((long) (p[1]) << 8) |
((long) (p[2]) << 16)) >> (posbits & 0x7)) & bitmask;
}
posbits += n_bits;
if (oldcode == -1) {
oldcode = code;
finchar = (int) oldcode;
outbuf[outpos++] = (unsigned char) finchar;
continue;
}
if (code == CLEAR && block_mode) {
clear_tab_prefixof();
free_ent = FIRST - 1;
posbits =
((posbits - 1) +
((n_bits << 3) -
(posbits - 1 + (n_bits << 3)) % (n_bits << 3)));
n_bits = INIT_BITS;
maxcode = MAXCODE(INIT_BITS) - 1;
bitmask = (1 << INIT_BITS) - 1;
goto resetbuf;
}
incode = code;
stackp = de_stack;
/* Special case for KwKwK string. */
if (code >= free_ent) {
if (code > free_ent) {
unsigned char *p;
posbits -= n_bits;
p = &inbuf[posbits >> 3];
bb_error_msg
("insize:%d posbits:%d inbuf:%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X (%d)",
insize, posbits, p[-1], p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3],
(posbits & 07));
bb_error_msg("corrupted data");
goto err;
}
*--stackp = (unsigned char) finchar;
code = oldcode;
}
/* Generate output characters in reverse order */
while ((long) code >= (long) 256) {
*--stackp = tab_suffixof(code);
code = tab_prefixof(code);
}
finchar = tab_suffixof(code);
*--stackp = (unsigned char) finchar;
/* And put them out in forward order */
{
int i;
i = de_stack - stackp;
if (outpos + i >= OBUFSIZ) {
do {
if (i > OBUFSIZ - outpos) {
i = OBUFSIZ - outpos;
}
if (i > 0) {
memcpy(outbuf + outpos, stackp, i);
outpos += i;
}
if (outpos >= OBUFSIZ) {
full_write(fd_out, outbuf, outpos);
//error check??
IF_DESKTOP(total_written += outpos;)
outpos = 0;
}
stackp += i;
i = de_stack - stackp;
} while (i > 0);
} else {
memcpy(outbuf + outpos, stackp, i);
outpos += i;
}
}
/* Generate the new entry. */
code = free_ent;
if (code < maxmaxcode) {
tab_prefixof(code) = (unsigned short) oldcode;
tab_suffixof(code) = (unsigned char) finchar;
free_ent = code + 1;
}
/* Remember previous code. */
oldcode = incode;
}
} while (rsize > 0);
if (outpos > 0) {
full_write(fd_out, outbuf, outpos);
//error check??
IF_DESKTOP(total_written += outpos;)
}
retval = IF_DESKTOP(total_written) + 0;
err:
free(inbuf);
free(outbuf);
free(htab);
free(codetab);
return retval;
} | 1 | [] | busybox | 251fc70e9722f931eec23a34030d05ba5f747b0e | 21,401,706,257,394,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 232 | uncompress: fix buffer underrun by corrupted input
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> |
static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
{
int sx, sy;
int dx, dy;
int width, height;
int depth;
int notify = 0;
depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
/* extra x, y */
sx = (src % (width * depth)) / depth;
sy = (src / (width * depth));
dx = (dst % (width *depth)) / depth;
dy = (dst / (width * depth));
/* normalize width */
w /= depth;
/* if we're doing a backward copy, we have to adjust
our x/y to be the upper left corner (instead of the lower
right corner) */
if (s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch < 0) {
sx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
dx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
sy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
dy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
}
/* are we in the visible portion of memory? */
if (sx >= 0 && sy >= 0 && dx >= 0 && dy >= 0 &&
(sx + w) <= width && (sy + h) <= height &&
(dx + w) <= width && (dy + h) <= height) {
notify = 1;
}
/* make to sure only copy if it's a plain copy ROP */
if (*s->cirrus_rop != cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_src &&
*s->cirrus_rop != cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_src)
notify = 0;
/* we have to flush all pending changes so that the copy
is generated at the appropriate moment in time */
if (notify)
vga_hw_update();
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
if (notify)
s->ds->dpy_copy(s->ds,
sx, sy, dx, dy,
s->cirrus_blt_width / depth,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
/* we don't have to notify the display that this portion has
changed since dpy_copy implies this */
if (!notify)
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 135,590,882,627,853,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
int bltwidth,int bltheight)
{
int x,y;
dstpitch -= bltwidth;
srcpitch -= bltwidth;
for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
ROP_OP(*dst, *src);
dst++;
src++;
}
dst += dstpitch;
src += srcpitch;
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 27,696,392,987,383,564,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (s->ds->dpy_copy) {
cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
} else {
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
}
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 331,046,290,845,234,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_8bpp(CirrusVGAState * s,
unsigned mode,
unsigned offset,
uint32_t mem_value)
{
int x;
unsigned val = mem_value;
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + offset;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
if (val & 0x80) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr1;
} else if (mode == 5) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0;
}
val <<= 1;
dst++;
}
cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty(s->vram_offset + offset);
cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty(s->vram_offset + offset + 7);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 50,418,188,797,463,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
const uint8_t * src)
{
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 176,630,228,639,235,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
int off_pitch, int bytesperline,
int lines)
{
int y;
int off_cur;
int off_cur_end;
for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
off_cur = off_begin;
off_cur_end = off_cur + bytesperline;
off_cur &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
while (off_cur < off_cur_end) {
cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty(s->vram_offset + off_cur);
off_cur += TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
}
off_begin += off_pitch;
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 335,738,960,224,286,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s,
s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 58,384,268,221,957,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
{
cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
rop_func(s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_bitblt_reset(s);
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 149,842,811,940,934,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
int copy_count;
uint8_t *end_ptr;
if (s->cirrus_srccounter > 0) {
if (s->cirrus_blt_mode & CIRRUS_BLTMODE_PATTERNCOPY) {
cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->cirrus_bltbuf);
the_end:
s->cirrus_srccounter = 0;
cirrus_bitblt_reset(s);
} else {
/* at least one scan line */
do {
(*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_bltbuf, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, 0,
s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr += s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch;
s->cirrus_srccounter -= s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
if (s->cirrus_srccounter <= 0)
goto the_end;
/* more bytes than needed can be transfered because of
word alignment, so we keep them for the next line */
/* XXX: keep alignment to speed up transfer */
end_ptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
copy_count = s->cirrus_srcptr_end - end_ptr;
memmove(s->cirrus_bltbuf, end_ptr, copy_count);
s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf + copy_count;
s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
} while (s->cirrus_srcptr >= s->cirrus_srcptr_end);
}
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 246,597,330,759,913,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_16bpp(CirrusVGAState * s,
unsigned mode,
unsigned offset,
uint32_t mem_value)
{
int x;
unsigned val = mem_value;
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + offset;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
if (val & 0x80) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr1;
*(dst + 1) = s->gr[0x11];
} else if (mode == 5) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0;
*(dst + 1) = s->gr[0x10];
}
val <<= 1;
dst += 2;
}
cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty(s->vram_offset + offset);
cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty(s->vram_offset + offset + 15);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 241,662,835,431,977,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (s->ds->dpy_copy) {
cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
} else {
if (BLTUNSAFE(s))
return 0;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
}
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | 65d35a09979e63541afc5bfc595b9f1b1b4ae069 | 128,516,004,862,549,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | CVE-2008-4539: fix a heap overflow in Cirrus emulation
The code in hw/cirrus_vga.c has changed a lot between CVE-2007-1320 has
been announced and the patch has been applied. As a consequence it has
wrongly applied and QEMU is still vulnerable to this bug if using VNC.
(noticed by Jan Niehusmann)
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@5587 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 |
asmlinkage long compat_sys_mount(char __user * dev_name, char __user * dir_name,
char __user * type, unsigned long flags,
void __user * data)
{
unsigned long type_page;
unsigned long data_page;
unsigned long dev_page;
char *dir_page;
int retval;
retval = copy_mount_options (type, &type_page);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
dir_page = getname(dir_name);
retval = PTR_ERR(dir_page);
if (IS_ERR(dir_page))
goto out1;
retval = copy_mount_options (dev_name, &dev_page);
if (retval < 0)
goto out2;
retval = copy_mount_options (data, &data_page);
if (retval < 0)
goto out3;
retval = -EINVAL;
if (type_page) {
if (!strcmp((char *)type_page, SMBFS_NAME)) {
do_smb_super_data_conv((void *)data_page);
} else if (!strcmp((char *)type_page, NCPFS_NAME)) {
do_ncp_super_data_conv((void *)data_page);
} else if (!strcmp((char *)type_page, NFS4_NAME)) {
if (do_nfs4_super_data_conv((void *) data_page))
goto out4;
}
}
lock_kernel();
retval = do_mount((char*)dev_page, dir_page, (char*)type_page,
flags, (void*)data_page);
unlock_kernel();
out4:
free_page(data_page);
out3:
free_page(dev_page);
out2:
putname(dir_page);
out1:
free_page(type_page);
out:
return retval;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 822191a2fa1584a29c3224ab328507adcaeac1ab | 269,348,981,982,883,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | [PATCH] skip data conversion in compat_sys_mount when data_page is NULL
OpenVZ Linux kernel team has found a problem with mounting in compat mode.
Simple command "mount -t smbfs ..." on Fedora Core 5 distro in 32-bit mode
leads to oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: compat_sys_mount+0xd6/0x290
Process mount (pid: 14656, veid=300, threadinfo ffff810034d30000, task ffff810034c86bc0)
Call Trace: ia32_sysret+0x0/0xa
The problem is that data_page pointer can be NULL, so we should skip data
conversion in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Mirkin <amirkin@openvz.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> |
unsigned short atalk_checksum(struct ddpehdr *ddp, int len)
{
unsigned long sum = 0; /* Assume unsigned long is >16 bits */
unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)ddp;
len -= 4; /* skip header 4 bytes */
data += 4;
/* This ought to be unwrapped neatly. I'll trust gcc for now */
while (len--) {
sum += *data;
sum <<= 1;
if (sum & 0x10000) {
sum++;
sum &= 0xFFFF;
}
data++;
}
/* Use 0xFFFF for 0. 0 itself means none */
return sum ? htons((unsigned short)sum) : 0xFFFF;
} | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 21,680,921,567,039,845,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by running both code over
a range of packets. |
static int ltalk_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt)
{
/* Expand any short form frames */
if (skb->mac.raw[2] == 1) {
struct ddpehdr *ddp;
/* Find our address */
struct atalk_addr *ap = atalk_find_dev_addr(dev);
if (!ap || skb->len < sizeof(struct ddpshdr))
goto freeit;
/*
* The push leaves us with a ddephdr not an shdr, and
* handily the port bytes in the right place preset.
*/
skb_push(skb, sizeof(*ddp) - 4);
/* FIXME: use skb->cb to be able to use shared skbs */
ddp = (struct ddpehdr *)skb->data;
/* Now fill in the long header */
/*
* These two first. The mac overlays the new source/dest
* network information so we MUST copy these before
* we write the network numbers !
*/
ddp->deh_dnode = skb->mac.raw[0]; /* From physical header */
ddp->deh_snode = skb->mac.raw[1]; /* From physical header */
ddp->deh_dnet = ap->s_net; /* Network number */
ddp->deh_snet = ap->s_net;
ddp->deh_sum = 0; /* No checksum */
/*
* Not sure about this bit...
*/
ddp->deh_len = skb->len;
ddp->deh_hops = DDP_MAXHOPS; /* Non routable, so force a drop
if we slip up later */
/* Mend the byte order */
*((__u16 *)ddp) = htons(*((__u16 *)ddp));
}
skb->h.raw = skb->data;
return atalk_rcv(skb, dev, pt);
freeit:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 19,552,567,024,474,732,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by running both code over
a range of packets. |
static int atalk_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt)
{
struct ddpehdr *ddp = ddp_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sock;
struct atalk_iface *atif;
struct sockaddr_at tosat;
int origlen;
struct ddpebits ddphv;
/* Size check */
if (skb->len < sizeof(*ddp))
goto freeit;
/*
* Fix up the length field [Ok this is horrible but otherwise
* I end up with unions of bit fields and messy bit field order
* compiler/endian dependencies..]
*
* FIXME: This is a write to a shared object. Granted it
* happens to be safe BUT.. (Its safe as user space will not
* run until we put it back)
*/
*((__u16 *)&ddphv) = ntohs(*((__u16 *)ddp));
/* Trim buffer in case of stray trailing data */
origlen = skb->len;
skb_trim(skb, min_t(unsigned int, skb->len, ddphv.deh_len));
/*
* Size check to see if ddp->deh_len was crap
* (Otherwise we'll detonate most spectacularly
* in the middle of recvmsg()).
*/
if (skb->len < sizeof(*ddp))
goto freeit;
/*
* Any checksums. Note we don't do htons() on this == is assumed to be
* valid for net byte orders all over the networking code...
*/
if (ddp->deh_sum &&
atalk_checksum(ddp, ddphv.deh_len) != ddp->deh_sum)
/* Not a valid AppleTalk frame - dustbin time */
goto freeit;
/* Check the packet is aimed at us */
if (!ddp->deh_dnet) /* Net 0 is 'this network' */
atif = atalk_find_anynet(ddp->deh_dnode, dev);
else
atif = atalk_find_interface(ddp->deh_dnet, ddp->deh_dnode);
/* Not ours, so we route the packet via the correct AppleTalk iface */
if (!atif) {
atalk_route_packet(skb, dev, ddp, &ddphv, origlen);
goto out;
}
/* if IP over DDP is not selected this code will be optimized out */
if (is_ip_over_ddp(skb))
return handle_ip_over_ddp(skb);
/*
* Which socket - atalk_search_socket() looks for a *full match*
* of the <net, node, port> tuple.
*/
tosat.sat_addr.s_net = ddp->deh_dnet;
tosat.sat_addr.s_node = ddp->deh_dnode;
tosat.sat_port = ddp->deh_dport;
sock = atalk_search_socket(&tosat, atif);
if (!sock) /* But not one of our sockets */
goto freeit;
/* Queue packet (standard) */
skb->sk = sock;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sock, skb) < 0)
goto freeit;
out:
return 0;
freeit:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
} | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 72,319,509,895,917,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by running both code over
a range of packets. |
static int atalk_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct atalk_sock *at = at_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_at *usat = (struct sockaddr_at *)msg->msg_name;
int flags = msg->msg_flags;
int loopback = 0;
struct sockaddr_at local_satalk, gsat;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
struct ddpehdr *ddp;
int size;
struct atalk_route *rt;
int err;
if (flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT)
return -EINVAL;
if (len > DDP_MAXSZ)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (usat) {
if (sk->sk_zapped)
if (atalk_autobind(sk) < 0)
return -EBUSY;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usat) ||
usat->sat_family != AF_APPLETALK)
return -EINVAL;
/* netatalk doesn't implement this check */
if (usat->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_BCAST &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SO_BROADCAST: Fix your netatalk as "
"it will break before 2.2\n");
#if 0
return -EPERM;
#endif
}
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
usat = &local_satalk;
usat->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
usat->sat_port = at->dest_port;
usat->sat_addr.s_node = at->dest_node;
usat->sat_addr.s_net = at->dest_net;
}
/* Build a packet */
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Got address.\n", sk);
/* For headers */
size = sizeof(struct ddpehdr) + len + ddp_dl->header_length;
if (usat->sat_addr.s_net || usat->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_ANYNODE) {
rt = atrtr_find(&usat->sat_addr);
if (!rt)
return -ENETUNREACH;
dev = rt->dev;
} else {
struct atalk_addr at_hint;
at_hint.s_node = 0;
at_hint.s_net = at->src_net;
rt = atrtr_find(&at_hint);
if (!rt)
return -ENETUNREACH;
dev = rt->dev;
}
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Size needed %d, device %s\n",
sk, size, dev->name);
size += dev->hard_header_len;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
skb->sk = sk;
skb_reserve(skb, ddp_dl->header_length);
skb_reserve(skb, dev->hard_header_len);
skb->dev = dev;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Begin build.\n", sk);
ddp = (struct ddpehdr *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct ddpehdr));
ddp->deh_pad = 0;
ddp->deh_hops = 0;
ddp->deh_len = len + sizeof(*ddp);
/*
* Fix up the length field [Ok this is horrible but otherwise
* I end up with unions of bit fields and messy bit field order
* compiler/endian dependencies..
*/
*((__u16 *)ddp) = ntohs(*((__u16 *)ddp));
ddp->deh_dnet = usat->sat_addr.s_net;
ddp->deh_snet = at->src_net;
ddp->deh_dnode = usat->sat_addr.s_node;
ddp->deh_snode = at->src_node;
ddp->deh_dport = usat->sat_port;
ddp->deh_sport = at->src_port;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Copy user data (%d bytes).\n", sk, len);
err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (sk->sk_no_check == 1)
ddp->deh_sum = 0;
else
ddp->deh_sum = atalk_checksum(ddp, len + sizeof(*ddp));
/*
* Loopback broadcast packets to non gateway targets (ie routes
* to group we are in)
*/
if (ddp->deh_dnode == ATADDR_BCAST &&
!(rt->flags & RTF_GATEWAY) && !(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_copy(skb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb2) {
loopback = 1;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: send out(copy).\n", sk);
if (aarp_send_ddp(dev, skb2,
&usat->sat_addr, NULL) == -1)
kfree_skb(skb2);
/* else queued/sent above in the aarp queue */
}
}
if (dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK || loopback) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Loop back.\n", sk);
/* loop back */
skb_orphan(skb);
ddp_dl->request(ddp_dl, skb, dev->dev_addr);
} else {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: send out.\n", sk);
if (rt->flags & RTF_GATEWAY) {
gsat.sat_addr = rt->gateway;
usat = &gsat;
}
if (aarp_send_ddp(dev, skb, &usat->sat_addr, NULL) == -1)
kfree_skb(skb);
/* else queued/sent above in the aarp queue */
}
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "SK %p: Done write (%d).\n", sk, len);
return len;
} | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 153,761,947,041,868,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 159 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by running both code over
a range of packets. |
static int fat_ioctl_filldir(void *__buf, const char *name, int name_len,
loff_t offset, u64 ino, unsigned int d_type)
{
struct fat_ioctl_filldir_callback *buf = __buf;
struct dirent __user *d1 = buf->dirent;
struct dirent __user *d2 = d1 + 1;
if (buf->result)
return -EINVAL;
buf->result++;
if (name != NULL) {
/* dirent has only short name */
if (name_len >= sizeof(d1->d_name))
name_len = sizeof(d1->d_name) - 1;
if (put_user(0, d2->d_name) ||
put_user(0, &d2->d_reclen) ||
copy_to_user(d1->d_name, name, name_len) ||
put_user(0, d1->d_name + name_len) ||
put_user(name_len, &d1->d_reclen))
goto efault;
} else {
/* dirent has short and long name */
const char *longname = buf->longname;
int long_len = buf->long_len;
const char *shortname = buf->shortname;
int short_len = buf->short_len;
if (long_len >= sizeof(d1->d_name))
long_len = sizeof(d1->d_name) - 1;
if (short_len >= sizeof(d1->d_name))
short_len = sizeof(d1->d_name) - 1;
if (copy_to_user(d2->d_name, longname, long_len) ||
put_user(0, d2->d_name + long_len) ||
put_user(long_len, &d2->d_reclen) ||
put_user(ino, &d2->d_ino) ||
put_user(offset, &d2->d_off) ||
copy_to_user(d1->d_name, shortname, short_len) ||
put_user(0, d1->d_name + short_len) ||
put_user(short_len, &d1->d_reclen))
goto efault;
}
return 0;
efault:
buf->result = -EFAULT;
return -EFAULT;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 187,708,325,882,921,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
struct kernel_dirent {
long d_ino;
long d_off;
unsigned short d_reclen;
char d_name[256]; /* We must not include limits.h! */
};
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct kernel_dirent [2])
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT _IOR('r', 2, struct kernel_dirent [2])
int main(void)
{
int fd = open(".", O_RDONLY);
struct kernel_dirent de[2];
while (1) {
int i = ioctl(fd, VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH, (long)de);
if (i == -1) break;
if (de[0].d_reclen == 0) break;
printf("SFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %-12s",
de[0].d_reclen, de[0].d_off, de[0].d_ino, de[0].d_name);
if (de[1].d_reclen)
printf("\tLFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %s",
de[1].d_reclen, de[1].d_off, de[1].d_ino, de[1].d_name);
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Bart Oldeman <bartoldeman@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int fat_dir_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct fat_ioctl_filldir_callback buf;
struct dirent __user *d1;
int ret, short_only, both;
switch (cmd) {
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT:
short_only = 1;
both = 0;
break;
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH:
short_only = 0;
both = 1;
break;
default:
return fat_generic_ioctl(inode, filp, cmd, arg);
}
d1 = (struct dirent __user *)arg;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d1, sizeof(struct dirent[2])))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Yes, we don't need this put_user() absolutely. However old
* code didn't return the right value. So, app use this value,
* in order to check whether it is EOF.
*/
if (put_user(0, &d1->d_reclen))
return -EFAULT;
buf.dirent = d1;
buf.result = 0;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = -ENOENT;
if (!IS_DEADDIR(inode)) {
ret = __fat_readdir(inode, filp, &buf, fat_ioctl_filldir,
short_only, both);
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (ret >= 0)
ret = buf.result;
return ret;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 113,627,596,617,655,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
struct kernel_dirent {
long d_ino;
long d_off;
unsigned short d_reclen;
char d_name[256]; /* We must not include limits.h! */
};
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct kernel_dirent [2])
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT _IOR('r', 2, struct kernel_dirent [2])
int main(void)
{
int fd = open(".", O_RDONLY);
struct kernel_dirent de[2];
while (1) {
int i = ioctl(fd, VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH, (long)de);
if (i == -1) break;
if (de[0].d_reclen == 0) break;
printf("SFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %-12s",
de[0].d_reclen, de[0].d_off, de[0].d_ino, de[0].d_name);
if (de[1].d_reclen)
printf("\tLFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %s",
de[1].d_reclen, de[1].d_off, de[1].d_ino, de[1].d_name);
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Bart Oldeman <bartoldeman@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static long fat_compat_dir_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct compat_dirent __user *p = compat_ptr(arg);
int ret;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
struct dirent d[2];
switch (cmd) {
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH;
break;
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT;
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
lock_kernel();
ret = fat_dir_ioctl(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, file,
cmd, (unsigned long) &d);
unlock_kernel();
set_fs(oldfs);
if (ret >= 0) {
ret |= fat_compat_put_dirent32(&d[0], p);
ret |= fat_compat_put_dirent32(&d[1], p + 1);
}
return ret;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 291,589,362,780,422,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
struct kernel_dirent {
long d_ino;
long d_off;
unsigned short d_reclen;
char d_name[256]; /* We must not include limits.h! */
};
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct kernel_dirent [2])
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT _IOR('r', 2, struct kernel_dirent [2])
int main(void)
{
int fd = open(".", O_RDONLY);
struct kernel_dirent de[2];
while (1) {
int i = ioctl(fd, VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH, (long)de);
if (i == -1) break;
if (de[0].d_reclen == 0) break;
printf("SFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %-12s",
de[0].d_reclen, de[0].d_off, de[0].d_ino, de[0].d_name);
if (de[1].d_reclen)
printf("\tLFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %s",
de[1].d_reclen, de[1].d_off, de[1].d_ino, de[1].d_name);
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Bart Oldeman <bartoldeman@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static long fat_compat_put_dirent32(struct dirent *d,
struct compat_dirent __user *d32)
{
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d32, sizeof(struct compat_dirent)))
return -EFAULT;
__put_user(d->d_ino, &d32->d_ino);
__put_user(d->d_off, &d32->d_off);
__put_user(d->d_reclen, &d32->d_reclen);
if (__copy_to_user(d32->d_name, d->d_name, d->d_reclen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 106,659,780,049,225,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
struct kernel_dirent {
long d_ino;
long d_off;
unsigned short d_reclen;
char d_name[256]; /* We must not include limits.h! */
};
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct kernel_dirent [2])
#define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT _IOR('r', 2, struct kernel_dirent [2])
int main(void)
{
int fd = open(".", O_RDONLY);
struct kernel_dirent de[2];
while (1) {
int i = ioctl(fd, VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH, (long)de);
if (i == -1) break;
if (de[0].d_reclen == 0) break;
printf("SFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %-12s",
de[0].d_reclen, de[0].d_off, de[0].d_ino, de[0].d_name);
if (de[1].d_reclen)
printf("\tLFN: reclen=%2d off=%d ino=%d, %s",
de[1].d_reclen, de[1].d_off, de[1].d_ino, de[1].d_name);
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Bart Oldeman <bartoldeman@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int vfat_ioctl32(unsigned fd, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct compat_dirent __user *p = compat_ptr(arg);
int ret;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
struct dirent d[2];
switch(cmd)
{
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH;
break;
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT;
break;
}
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_ioctl(fd,cmd,(unsigned long)&d);
set_fs(oldfs);
if (ret >= 0) {
ret |= put_dirent32(&d[0], p);
ret |= put_dirent32(&d[1], p + 1);
}
return ret;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 188f83dfe0eeecd1427d0d255cc97dbf7ef6b4b7 | 111,898,724,151,179,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | [PATCH] BLOCK: Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff to the msdos driver [try #6]
Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff from fs/compat_ioctl.c to the msdos
driver so that the msdos header file doesn't need to be included.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
put_dirent32 (struct dirent *d, struct compat_dirent __user *d32)
{
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d32, sizeof(struct compat_dirent)))
return -EFAULT;
__put_user(d->d_ino, &d32->d_ino);
__put_user(d->d_off, &d32->d_off);
__put_user(d->d_reclen, &d32->d_reclen);
if (__copy_to_user(d32->d_name, d->d_name, d->d_reclen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 188f83dfe0eeecd1427d0d255cc97dbf7ef6b4b7 | 270,045,642,335,722,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | [PATCH] BLOCK: Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff to the msdos driver [try #6]
Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff from fs/compat_ioctl.c to the msdos
driver so that the msdos header file doesn't need to be included.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
unsigned long convert_rip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, seg;
addr = regs->rip;
seg = regs->cs & 0xffff;
/*
* We'll assume that the code segments in the GDT
* are all zero-based. That is largely true: the
* TLS segments are used for data, and the PNPBIOS
* and APM bios ones we just ignore here.
*/
if (seg & LDT_SEGMENT) {
u32 *desc;
unsigned long base;
down(&child->mm->context.sem);
desc = child->mm->context.ldt + (seg & ~7);
base = (desc[0] >> 16) | ((desc[1] & 0xff) << 16) | (desc[1] & 0xff000000);
/* 16-bit code segment? */
if (!((desc[1] >> 22) & 1))
addr &= 0xffff;
addr += base;
up(&child->mm->context.sem);
}
return addr;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 29eb51101c02df517ca64ec472d7501127ad1da8 | 1,508,545,436,095,858,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Handle bogus %cs selector in single-step instruction decoding
The code for LDT segment selectors was not robust in the face of a bogus
selector set in %cs via ptrace before the single-step was done.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static unsigned long convert_eip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, seg;
addr = regs->eip;
seg = regs->xcs & 0xffff;
if (regs->eflags & VM_MASK) {
addr = (addr & 0xffff) + (seg << 4);
return addr;
}
/*
* We'll assume that the code segments in the GDT
* are all zero-based. That is largely true: the
* TLS segments are used for data, and the PNPBIOS
* and APM bios ones we just ignore here.
*/
if (seg & LDT_SEGMENT) {
u32 *desc;
unsigned long base;
down(&child->mm->context.sem);
desc = child->mm->context.ldt + (seg & ~7);
base = (desc[0] >> 16) | ((desc[1] & 0xff) << 16) | (desc[1] & 0xff000000);
/* 16-bit code segment? */
if (!((desc[1] >> 22) & 1))
addr &= 0xffff;
addr += base;
up(&child->mm->context.sem);
}
return addr;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 29eb51101c02df517ca64ec472d7501127ad1da8 | 106,350,190,623,619,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Handle bogus %cs selector in single-step instruction decoding
The code for LDT segment selectors was not robust in the face of a bogus
selector set in %cs via ptrace before the single-step was done.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
pfm_smpl_buffer_alloc(struct task_struct *task, pfm_context_t *ctx, unsigned long rsize, void **user_vaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
unsigned long size;
void *smpl_buf;
/*
* the fixed header + requested size and align to page boundary
*/
size = PAGE_ALIGN(rsize);
DPRINT(("sampling buffer rsize=%lu size=%lu bytes\n", rsize, size));
/*
* check requested size to avoid Denial-of-service attacks
* XXX: may have to refine this test
* Check against address space limit.
*
* if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len> task->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
* return -ENOMEM;
*/
if (size > task->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* We do the easy to undo allocations first.
*
* pfm_rvmalloc(), clears the buffer, so there is no leak
*/
smpl_buf = pfm_rvmalloc(size);
if (smpl_buf == NULL) {
DPRINT(("Can't allocate sampling buffer\n"));
return -ENOMEM;
}
DPRINT(("smpl_buf @%p\n", smpl_buf));
/* allocate vma */
vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vma) {
DPRINT(("Cannot allocate vma\n"));
goto error_kmem;
}
/*
* partially initialize the vma for the sampling buffer
*/
vma->vm_mm = mm;
vma->vm_flags = VM_READ| VM_MAYREAD |VM_RESERVED;
vma->vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY; /* XXX may need to change */
/*
* Now we have everything we need and we can initialize
* and connect all the data structures
*/
ctx->ctx_smpl_hdr = smpl_buf;
ctx->ctx_smpl_size = size; /* aligned size */
/*
* Let's do the difficult operations next.
*
* now we atomically find some area in the address space and
* remap the buffer in it.
*/
down_write(&task->mm->mmap_sem);
/* find some free area in address space, must have mmap sem held */
vma->vm_start = pfm_get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, size, 0, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0);
if (vma->vm_start == 0UL) {
DPRINT(("Cannot find unmapped area for size %ld\n", size));
up_write(&task->mm->mmap_sem);
goto error;
}
vma->vm_end = vma->vm_start + size;
vma->vm_pgoff = vma->vm_start >> PAGE_SHIFT;
DPRINT(("aligned size=%ld, hdr=%p mapped @0x%lx\n", size, ctx->ctx_smpl_hdr, vma->vm_start));
/* can only be applied to current task, need to have the mm semaphore held when called */
if (pfm_remap_buffer(vma, (unsigned long)smpl_buf, vma->vm_start, size)) {
DPRINT(("Can't remap buffer\n"));
up_write(&task->mm->mmap_sem);
goto error;
}
/*
* now insert the vma in the vm list for the process, must be
* done with mmap lock held
*/
insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
mm->total_vm += size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vm_stat_account(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags, vma->vm_file,
vma_pages(vma));
up_write(&task->mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* keep track of user level virtual address
*/
ctx->ctx_smpl_vaddr = (void *)vma->vm_start;
*(unsigned long *)user_vaddr = vma->vm_start;
return 0;
error:
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
error_kmem:
pfm_rvfree(smpl_buf, size);
return -ENOMEM;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 87,803,820,803,317,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 114 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after-free bugs and
multiple freeing of pages, etc.
I saw this bug on an Altix on SLES9. Haven't reproduced upstream but it
looks like the same issue is there.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> |
pfm_context_create(pfm_context_t *ctx, void *arg, int count, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
pfarg_context_t *req = (pfarg_context_t *)arg;
struct file *filp;
int ctx_flags;
int ret;
/* let's check the arguments first */
ret = pfarg_is_sane(current, req);
if (ret < 0) return ret;
ctx_flags = req->ctx_flags;
ret = -ENOMEM;
ctx = pfm_context_alloc();
if (!ctx) goto error;
ret = pfm_alloc_fd(&filp);
if (ret < 0) goto error_file;
req->ctx_fd = ctx->ctx_fd = ret;
/*
* attach context to file
*/
filp->private_data = ctx;
/*
* does the user want to sample?
*/
if (pfm_uuid_cmp(req->ctx_smpl_buf_id, pfm_null_uuid)) {
ret = pfm_setup_buffer_fmt(current, ctx, ctx_flags, 0, req);
if (ret) goto buffer_error;
}
/*
* init context protection lock
*/
spin_lock_init(&ctx->ctx_lock);
/*
* context is unloaded
*/
ctx->ctx_state = PFM_CTX_UNLOADED;
/*
* initialization of context's flags
*/
ctx->ctx_fl_block = (ctx_flags & PFM_FL_NOTIFY_BLOCK) ? 1 : 0;
ctx->ctx_fl_system = (ctx_flags & PFM_FL_SYSTEM_WIDE) ? 1: 0;
ctx->ctx_fl_is_sampling = ctx->ctx_buf_fmt ? 1 : 0; /* assume record() is defined */
ctx->ctx_fl_no_msg = (ctx_flags & PFM_FL_OVFL_NO_MSG) ? 1: 0;
/*
* will move to set properties
* ctx->ctx_fl_excl_idle = (ctx_flags & PFM_FL_EXCL_IDLE) ? 1: 0;
*/
/*
* init restart semaphore to locked
*/
init_completion(&ctx->ctx_restart_done);
/*
* activation is used in SMP only
*/
ctx->ctx_last_activation = PFM_INVALID_ACTIVATION;
SET_LAST_CPU(ctx, -1);
/*
* initialize notification message queue
*/
ctx->ctx_msgq_head = ctx->ctx_msgq_tail = 0;
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->ctx_msgq_wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->ctx_zombieq);
DPRINT(("ctx=%p flags=0x%x system=%d notify_block=%d excl_idle=%d no_msg=%d ctx_fd=%d \n",
ctx,
ctx_flags,
ctx->ctx_fl_system,
ctx->ctx_fl_block,
ctx->ctx_fl_excl_idle,
ctx->ctx_fl_no_msg,
ctx->ctx_fd));
/*
* initialize soft PMU state
*/
pfm_reset_pmu_state(ctx);
return 0;
buffer_error:
pfm_free_fd(ctx->ctx_fd, filp);
if (ctx->ctx_buf_fmt) {
pfm_buf_fmt_exit(ctx->ctx_buf_fmt, current, NULL, regs);
}
error_file:
pfm_context_free(ctx);
error:
return ret;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 13,520,750,174,224,364,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after-free bugs and
multiple freeing of pages, etc.
I saw this bug on an Altix on SLES9. Haven't reproduced upstream but it
looks like the same issue is there.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> |
pfm_setup_buffer_fmt(struct task_struct *task, pfm_context_t *ctx, unsigned int ctx_flags,
unsigned int cpu, pfarg_context_t *arg)
{
pfm_buffer_fmt_t *fmt = NULL;
unsigned long size = 0UL;
void *uaddr = NULL;
void *fmt_arg = NULL;
int ret = 0;
#define PFM_CTXARG_BUF_ARG(a) (pfm_buffer_fmt_t *)(a+1)
/* invoke and lock buffer format, if found */
fmt = pfm_find_buffer_fmt(arg->ctx_smpl_buf_id);
if (fmt == NULL) {
DPRINT(("[%d] cannot find buffer format\n", task->pid));
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* buffer argument MUST be contiguous to pfarg_context_t
*/
if (fmt->fmt_arg_size) fmt_arg = PFM_CTXARG_BUF_ARG(arg);
ret = pfm_buf_fmt_validate(fmt, task, ctx_flags, cpu, fmt_arg);
DPRINT(("[%d] after validate(0x%x,%d,%p)=%d\n", task->pid, ctx_flags, cpu, fmt_arg, ret));
if (ret) goto error;
/* link buffer format and context */
ctx->ctx_buf_fmt = fmt;
/*
* check if buffer format wants to use perfmon buffer allocation/mapping service
*/
ret = pfm_buf_fmt_getsize(fmt, task, ctx_flags, cpu, fmt_arg, &size);
if (ret) goto error;
if (size) {
/*
* buffer is always remapped into the caller's address space
*/
ret = pfm_smpl_buffer_alloc(current, ctx, size, &uaddr);
if (ret) goto error;
/* keep track of user address of buffer */
arg->ctx_smpl_vaddr = uaddr;
}
ret = pfm_buf_fmt_init(fmt, task, ctx->ctx_smpl_hdr, ctx_flags, cpu, fmt_arg);
error:
return ret;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 46,202,394,531,124,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after-free bugs and
multiple freeing of pages, etc.
I saw this bug on an Altix on SLES9. Haven't reproduced upstream but it
looks like the same issue is there.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> |
static int __init snd_mem_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
snd_mem_proc = create_proc_entry(SND_MEM_PROC_FILE, 0644, NULL);
if (snd_mem_proc) {
snd_mem_proc->read_proc = snd_mem_proc_read;
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
snd_mem_proc->write_proc = snd_mem_proc_write;
#endif
}
#endif
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 6,222,875,397,067,194,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int snd_mem_proc_read(char *page, char **start, off_t off,
int count, int *eof, void *data)
{
int len = 0;
long pages = snd_allocated_pages >> (PAGE_SHIFT-12);
struct snd_mem_list *mem;
int devno;
static char *types[] = { "UNKNOWN", "CONT", "DEV", "DEV-SG", "SBUS" };
mutex_lock(&list_mutex);
len += snprintf(page + len, count - len,
"pages : %li bytes (%li pages per %likB)\n",
pages * PAGE_SIZE, pages, PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
devno = 0;
list_for_each_entry(mem, &mem_list_head, list) {
devno++;
len += snprintf(page + len, count - len,
"buffer %d : ID %08x : type %s\n",
devno, mem->id, types[mem->buffer.dev.type]);
len += snprintf(page + len, count - len,
" addr = 0x%lx, size = %d bytes\n",
(unsigned long)mem->buffer.addr, (int)mem->buffer.bytes);
}
mutex_unlock(&list_mutex);
return len;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 177,539,223,428,479,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int snd_mem_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
unsigned long count, void *data)
{
char buf[128];
char *token, *p;
if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1)
count = ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
buf[ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1] = '\0';
p = buf;
token = gettoken(&p);
if (! token || *token == '#')
return (int)count;
if (strcmp(token, "add") == 0) {
char *endp;
int vendor, device, size, buffers;
long mask;
int i, alloced;
struct pci_dev *pci;
if ((token = gettoken(&p)) == NULL ||
(vendor = simple_strtol(token, NULL, 0)) <= 0 ||
(token = gettoken(&p)) == NULL ||
(device = simple_strtol(token, NULL, 0)) <= 0 ||
(token = gettoken(&p)) == NULL ||
(mask = simple_strtol(token, NULL, 0)) < 0 ||
(token = gettoken(&p)) == NULL ||
(size = memparse(token, &endp)) < 64*1024 ||
size > 16*1024*1024 /* too big */ ||
(token = gettoken(&p)) == NULL ||
(buffers = simple_strtol(token, NULL, 0)) <= 0 ||
buffers > 4) {
printk(KERN_ERR "snd-page-alloc: invalid proc write format\n");
return (int)count;
}
vendor &= 0xffff;
device &= 0xffff;
alloced = 0;
pci = NULL;
while ((pci = pci_get_device(vendor, device, pci)) != NULL) {
if (mask > 0 && mask < 0xffffffff) {
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pci, mask) < 0 ||
pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pci, mask) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "snd-page-alloc: cannot set DMA mask %lx for pci %04x:%04x\n", mask, vendor, device);
return (int)count;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < buffers; i++) {
struct snd_dma_buffer dmab;
memset(&dmab, 0, sizeof(dmab));
if (snd_dma_alloc_pages(SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV, snd_dma_pci_data(pci),
size, &dmab) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "snd-page-alloc: cannot allocate buffer pages (size = %d)\n", size);
pci_dev_put(pci);
return (int)count;
}
snd_dma_reserve_buf(&dmab, snd_dma_pci_buf_id(pci));
}
alloced++;
}
if (! alloced) {
for (i = 0; i < buffers; i++) {
struct snd_dma_buffer dmab;
memset(&dmab, 0, sizeof(dmab));
/* FIXME: We can allocate only in ZONE_DMA
* without a device pointer!
*/
if (snd_dma_alloc_pages(SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV, NULL,
size, &dmab) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "snd-page-alloc: cannot allocate buffer pages (size = %d)\n", size);
break;
}
snd_dma_reserve_buf(&dmab, (unsigned int)((vendor << 16) | device));
}
}
} else if (strcmp(token, "erase") == 0)
/* FIXME: need for releasing each buffer chunk? */
free_all_reserved_pages();
else
printk(KERN_ERR "snd-page-alloc: invalid proc cmd\n");
return (int)count;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 309,883,721,051,093,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int putreg(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long regno, unsigned long value)
{
unsigned long tmp;
/* Some code in the 64bit emulation may not be 64bit clean.
Don't take any chances. */
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_IA32))
value &= 0xffffffff;
switch (regno) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.fsindex = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.gsindex = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ds):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.ds = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,es):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.es = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ss):
if ((value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.fs = value;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.gs = value;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, eflags):
value &= FLAG_MASK;
tmp = get_stack_long(child, EFL_OFFSET);
tmp &= ~FLAG_MASK;
value |= tmp;
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,cs):
if ((value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
break;
}
put_stack_long(child, regno - sizeof(struct pt_regs), value);
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 176df2457ef6207156ca1a40991c54ca01fef567 | 118,245,962,164,453,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | x86_64: Zero extend all registers after ptrace in 32bit entry path.
Strictly it's only needed for eax.
It actually does a little more than strictly needed -- the other registers
are already zero extended.
Also remove the now unnecessary and non functional compat task check
in ptrace.
This is CVE-2007-4573
Found by Wojciech Purczynski
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int pwc_video_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct video_device *vdev = file->private_data;
struct pwc_device *pdev;
int i;
PWC_DEBUG_OPEN(">> video_close called(vdev = 0x%p).\n", vdev);
pdev = (struct pwc_device *)vdev->priv;
if (pdev->vopen == 0)
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("video_close() called on closed device?\n");
/* Dump statistics, but only if a reasonable amount of frames were
processed (to prevent endless log-entries in case of snap-shot
programs)
*/
if (pdev->vframe_count > 20)
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Closing video device: %d frames received, dumped %d frames, %d frames with errors.\n", pdev->vframe_count, pdev->vframes_dumped, pdev->vframes_error);
if (DEVICE_USE_CODEC1(pdev->type))
pwc_dec1_exit();
else
pwc_dec23_exit();
pwc_isoc_cleanup(pdev);
pwc_free_buffers(pdev);
/* Turn off LEDS and power down camera, but only when not unplugged */
if (pdev->error_status != EPIPE) {
/* Turn LEDs off */
if (pwc_set_leds(pdev, 0, 0) < 0)
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Failed to set LED on/off time.\n");
if (power_save) {
i = pwc_camera_power(pdev, 0);
if (i < 0)
PWC_ERROR("Failed to power down camera (%d)\n", i);
}
}
pdev->vopen--;
PWC_DEBUG_OPEN("<< video_close() vopen=%d\n", pdev->vopen);
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 85237f202d46d55c1bffe0c5b1aa3ddc0f1dce4d | 124,682,724,723,247,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | USB: fix DoS in pwc USB video driver
the pwc driver has a disconnect method that waits for user space to
close the device. This opens up an opportunity for a DoS attack,
blocking the USB subsystem and making khubd's task busy wait in
kernel space. This patch shifts freeing resources to close if an opened
device is disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> |
static void usb_pwc_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct pwc_device *pdev;
int hint;
lock_kernel();
pdev = usb_get_intfdata (intf);
usb_set_intfdata (intf, NULL);
if (pdev == NULL) {
PWC_ERROR("pwc_disconnect() Called without private pointer.\n");
goto disconnect_out;
}
if (pdev->udev == NULL) {
PWC_ERROR("pwc_disconnect() already called for %p\n", pdev);
goto disconnect_out;
}
if (pdev->udev != interface_to_usbdev(intf)) {
PWC_ERROR("pwc_disconnect() Woops: pointer mismatch udev/pdev.\n");
goto disconnect_out;
}
/* We got unplugged; this is signalled by an EPIPE error code */
if (pdev->vopen) {
PWC_INFO("Disconnected while webcam is in use!\n");
pdev->error_status = EPIPE;
}
/* Alert waiting processes */
wake_up_interruptible(&pdev->frameq);
/* Wait until device is closed */
while (pdev->vopen)
schedule();
/* Device is now closed, so we can safely unregister it */
PWC_DEBUG_PROBE("Unregistering video device in disconnect().\n");
pwc_remove_sysfs_files(pdev->vdev);
video_unregister_device(pdev->vdev);
/* Free memory (don't set pdev to 0 just yet) */
kfree(pdev);
disconnect_out:
/* search device_hint[] table if we occupy a slot, by any chance */
for (hint = 0; hint < MAX_DEV_HINTS; hint++)
if (device_hint[hint].pdev == pdev)
device_hint[hint].pdev = NULL;
unlock_kernel();
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 85237f202d46d55c1bffe0c5b1aa3ddc0f1dce4d | 73,412,740,084,702,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | USB: fix DoS in pwc USB video driver
the pwc driver has a disconnect method that waits for user space to
close the device. This opens up an opportunity for a DoS attack,
blocking the USB subsystem and making khubd's task busy wait in
kernel space. This patch shifts freeing resources to close if an opened
device is disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> |
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 96,018,639,668,712,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = bad_inode_create
...etc...
The problem here is that the void cast causes return types to not be
promoted, and for ops such as listxattr which expect more than 32 bits of
return value, the 32-bit -EIO is interpreted as a large positive 64-bit
number, i.e. 0x00000000fffffffa instead of 0xfffffffa.
This goes particularly badly when the return value is taken as a number of
bytes to copy into, say, a user's buffer for example...
I originally had coded up the fix by creating a return_EIO_<TYPE> macro
for each return type, like this:
static int return_EIO_int(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR_INT ((void *) (return_EIO_int))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = EIO_ERROR_INT,
...etc...
but Al felt that it was probably better to create an EIO-returner for each
actual op signature. Since so few ops share a signature, I just went ahead
& created an EIO function for each individual file & inode op that returns
a value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> |
void make_bad_inode(struct inode * inode)
{
remove_inode_hash(inode);
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime =
current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
inode->i_op = &bad_inode_ops;
inode->i_fop = &bad_file_ops;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 324,712,412,023,376,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = bad_inode_create
...etc...
The problem here is that the void cast causes return types to not be
promoted, and for ops such as listxattr which expect more than 32 bits of
return value, the 32-bit -EIO is interpreted as a large positive 64-bit
number, i.e. 0x00000000fffffffa instead of 0xfffffffa.
This goes particularly badly when the return value is taken as a number of
bytes to copy into, say, a user's buffer for example...
I originally had coded up the fix by creating a return_EIO_<TYPE> macro
for each return type, like this:
static int return_EIO_int(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR_INT ((void *) (return_EIO_int))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = EIO_ERROR_INT,
...etc...
but Al felt that it was probably better to create an EIO-returner for each
actual op signature. Since so few ops share a signature, I just went ahead
& created an EIO function for each individual file & inode op that returns
a value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> |
int is_bad_inode(struct inode * inode)
{
return (inode->i_op == &bad_inode_ops);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 274,069,347,086,903,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = bad_inode_create
...etc...
The problem here is that the void cast causes return types to not be
promoted, and for ops such as listxattr which expect more than 32 bits of
return value, the 32-bit -EIO is interpreted as a large positive 64-bit
number, i.e. 0x00000000fffffffa instead of 0xfffffffa.
This goes particularly badly when the return value is taken as a number of
bytes to copy into, say, a user's buffer for example...
I originally had coded up the fix by creating a return_EIO_<TYPE> macro
for each return type, like this:
static int return_EIO_int(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR_INT ((void *) (return_EIO_int))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = EIO_ERROR_INT,
...etc...
but Al felt that it was probably better to create an EIO-returner for each
actual op signature. Since so few ops share a signature, I just went ahead
& created an EIO function for each individual file & inode op that returns
a value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> |
void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
{
unsigned long vsid;
void *pgdir;
pte_t *ptep;
cpumask_t mask;
unsigned long flags;
int local = 0;
/* We don't want huge pages prefaulted for now
*/
if (unlikely(in_hugepage_area(mm->context, ea)))
return;
DBG_LOW("hash_preload(mm=%p, mm->pgdir=%p, ea=%016lx, access=%lx,"
" trap=%lx\n", mm, mm->pgd, ea, access, trap);
/* Get PTE, VSID, access mask */
pgdir = mm->pgd;
if (pgdir == NULL)
return;
ptep = find_linux_pte(pgdir, ea);
if (!ptep)
return;
vsid = get_vsid(mm->context.id, ea);
/* Hash it in */
local_irq_save(flags);
mask = cpumask_of_cpu(smp_processor_id());
if (cpus_equal(mm->cpu_vm_mask, mask))
local = 1;
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
__hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
#else
if (mmu_ci_restrictions) {
/* If this PTE is non-cacheable, switch to 4k */
if (mm->context.user_psize == MMU_PAGE_64K &&
(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_NO_CACHE)) {
mm->context.user_psize = MMU_PAGE_4K;
mm->context.sllp = SLB_VSID_USER |
mmu_psize_defs[MMU_PAGE_4K].sllp;
get_paca()->context = mm->context;
slb_flush_and_rebolt();
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE_BASE
spu_flush_all_slbs(mm);
#endif
}
}
if (mm->context.user_psize == MMU_PAGE_64K)
__hash_page_64K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
else
__hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
local_irq_restore(flags);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 721151d004dcf01a71b12bb6b893f9160284cf6e | 283,712,393,711,387,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | [POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace
Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size. On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything. This can
introduce security problems, for example in the case of an infiniband
adaptor where the other 60k could contain registers that some other
program is using for its communications.
This patch adds a new function, remap_4k_pfn, which drivers can use to
map a single 4k page to userspace regardless of whether the kernel is
using a 4k or a 64k page size. Like remap_pfn_range, it would
typically be called in a driver's mmap function. It only maps a
single 4k page, which on a 64k page kernel appears replicated 16 times
throughout a 64k page. On a 4k page kernel it reduces to a call to
remap_pfn_range.
The way this works on a 64k kernel is that a new bit, _PAGE_4K_PFN,
gets set on the linux PTE. This alters the way that __hash_page_4K
computes the real address to put in the HPTE. The RPN field of the
linux PTE becomes the 4k RPN directly rather than being interpreted as
a 64k RPN. Since the RPN field is 32 bits, this means that physical
addresses being mapped with remap_4k_pfn have to be below 2^44,
i.e. 0x100000000000.
The patch also factors out the code in arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
that deals with demoting a process to use 4k pages into one function
that gets called in the various different places where we need to do
that. There were some discrepancies between exactly what was done in
the various places, such as a call to spu_flush_all_slbs in one case
but not in others.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> |
int hash_page(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
{
void *pgdir;
unsigned long vsid;
struct mm_struct *mm;
pte_t *ptep;
cpumask_t tmp;
int rc, user_region = 0, local = 0;
int psize;
DBG_LOW("hash_page(ea=%016lx, access=%lx, trap=%lx\n",
ea, access, trap);
if ((ea & ~REGION_MASK) >= PGTABLE_RANGE) {
DBG_LOW(" out of pgtable range !\n");
return 1;
}
/* Get region & vsid */
switch (REGION_ID(ea)) {
case USER_REGION_ID:
user_region = 1;
mm = current->mm;
if (! mm) {
DBG_LOW(" user region with no mm !\n");
return 1;
}
vsid = get_vsid(mm->context.id, ea);
psize = mm->context.user_psize;
break;
case VMALLOC_REGION_ID:
mm = &init_mm;
vsid = get_kernel_vsid(ea);
if (ea < VMALLOC_END)
psize = mmu_vmalloc_psize;
else
psize = mmu_io_psize;
break;
default:
/* Not a valid range
* Send the problem up to do_page_fault
*/
return 1;
}
DBG_LOW(" mm=%p, mm->pgdir=%p, vsid=%016lx\n", mm, mm->pgd, vsid);
/* Get pgdir */
pgdir = mm->pgd;
if (pgdir == NULL)
return 1;
/* Check CPU locality */
tmp = cpumask_of_cpu(smp_processor_id());
if (user_region && cpus_equal(mm->cpu_vm_mask, tmp))
local = 1;
/* Handle hugepage regions */
if (unlikely(in_hugepage_area(mm->context, ea))) {
DBG_LOW(" -> huge page !\n");
return hash_huge_page(mm, access, ea, vsid, local, trap);
}
/* Get PTE and page size from page tables */
ptep = find_linux_pte(pgdir, ea);
if (ptep == NULL || !pte_present(*ptep)) {
DBG_LOW(" no PTE !\n");
return 1;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
DBG_LOW(" i-pte: %016lx\n", pte_val(*ptep));
#else
DBG_LOW(" i-pte: %016lx %016lx\n", pte_val(*ptep),
pte_val(*(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE)));
#endif
/* Pre-check access permissions (will be re-checked atomically
* in __hash_page_XX but this pre-check is a fast path
*/
if (access & ~pte_val(*ptep)) {
DBG_LOW(" no access !\n");
return 1;
}
/* Do actual hashing */
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
rc = __hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
#else
if (mmu_ci_restrictions) {
/* If this PTE is non-cacheable, switch to 4k */
if (psize == MMU_PAGE_64K &&
(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_NO_CACHE)) {
if (user_region) {
psize = MMU_PAGE_4K;
mm->context.user_psize = MMU_PAGE_4K;
mm->context.sllp = SLB_VSID_USER |
mmu_psize_defs[MMU_PAGE_4K].sllp;
} else if (ea < VMALLOC_END) {
/*
* some driver did a non-cacheable mapping
* in vmalloc space, so switch vmalloc
* to 4k pages
*/
printk(KERN_ALERT "Reducing vmalloc segment "
"to 4kB pages because of "
"non-cacheable mapping\n");
psize = mmu_vmalloc_psize = MMU_PAGE_4K;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE_BASE
spu_flush_all_slbs(mm);
#endif
}
if (user_region) {
if (psize != get_paca()->context.user_psize) {
get_paca()->context = mm->context;
slb_flush_and_rebolt();
}
} else if (get_paca()->vmalloc_sllp !=
mmu_psize_defs[mmu_vmalloc_psize].sllp) {
get_paca()->vmalloc_sllp =
mmu_psize_defs[mmu_vmalloc_psize].sllp;
slb_flush_and_rebolt();
}
}
if (psize == MMU_PAGE_64K)
rc = __hash_page_64K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
else
rc = __hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, local);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
DBG_LOW(" o-pte: %016lx\n", pte_val(*ptep));
#else
DBG_LOW(" o-pte: %016lx %016lx\n", pte_val(*ptep),
pte_val(*(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE)));
#endif
DBG_LOW(" -> rc=%d\n", rc);
return rc;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 721151d004dcf01a71b12bb6b893f9160284cf6e | 9,811,447,350,898,023,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 138 | [POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace
Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size. On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything. This can
introduce security problems, for example in the case of an infiniband
adaptor where the other 60k could contain registers that some other
program is using for its communications.
This patch adds a new function, remap_4k_pfn, which drivers can use to
map a single 4k page to userspace regardless of whether the kernel is
using a 4k or a 64k page size. Like remap_pfn_range, it would
typically be called in a driver's mmap function. It only maps a
single 4k page, which on a 64k page kernel appears replicated 16 times
throughout a 64k page. On a 4k page kernel it reduces to a call to
remap_pfn_range.
The way this works on a 64k kernel is that a new bit, _PAGE_4K_PFN,
gets set on the linux PTE. This alters the way that __hash_page_4K
computes the real address to put in the HPTE. The RPN field of the
linux PTE becomes the 4k RPN directly rather than being interpreted as
a 64k RPN. Since the RPN field is 32 bits, this means that physical
addresses being mapped with remap_4k_pfn have to be below 2^44,
i.e. 0x100000000000.
The patch also factors out the code in arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
that deals with demoting a process to use 4k pages into one function
that gets called in the various different places where we need to do
that. There were some discrepancies between exactly what was done in
the various places, such as a call to spu_flush_all_slbs in one case
but not in others.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> |
int ieee80211_rx(struct ieee80211_device *ieee, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ieee80211_rx_stats *rx_stats)
{
struct net_device *dev = ieee->dev;
struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *hdr;
size_t hdrlen;
u16 fc, type, stype, sc;
struct net_device_stats *stats;
unsigned int frag;
u8 *payload;
u16 ethertype;
#ifdef NOT_YET
struct net_device *wds = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
struct net_device *wds = NULL;
int frame_authorized = 0;
int from_assoc_ap = 0;
void *sta = NULL;
#endif
u8 dst[ETH_ALEN];
u8 src[ETH_ALEN];
struct ieee80211_crypt_data *crypt = NULL;
int keyidx = 0;
int can_be_decrypted = 0;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *)skb->data;
stats = &ieee->stats;
if (skb->len < 10) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: SKB length < 10\n", dev->name);
goto rx_dropped;
}
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_ctl);
type = WLAN_FC_GET_TYPE(fc);
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctl);
frag = WLAN_GET_SEQ_FRAG(sc);
hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc);
/* Put this code here so that we avoid duplicating it in all
* Rx paths. - Jean II */
#ifdef CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT
#ifdef IW_WIRELESS_SPY /* defined in iw_handler.h */
/* If spy monitoring on */
if (ieee->spy_data.spy_number > 0) {
struct iw_quality wstats;
wstats.updated = 0;
if (rx_stats->mask & IEEE80211_STATMASK_RSSI) {
wstats.level = rx_stats->rssi;
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_LEVEL_UPDATED;
} else
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_LEVEL_INVALID;
if (rx_stats->mask & IEEE80211_STATMASK_NOISE) {
wstats.noise = rx_stats->noise;
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_NOISE_UPDATED;
} else
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_NOISE_INVALID;
if (rx_stats->mask & IEEE80211_STATMASK_SIGNAL) {
wstats.qual = rx_stats->signal;
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_QUAL_UPDATED;
} else
wstats.updated |= IW_QUAL_QUAL_INVALID;
/* Update spy records */
wireless_spy_update(ieee->dev, hdr->addr2, &wstats);
}
#endif /* IW_WIRELESS_SPY */
#endif /* CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT */
#ifdef NOT_YET
hostap_update_rx_stats(local->ap, hdr, rx_stats);
#endif
if (ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MONITOR) {
stats->rx_packets++;
stats->rx_bytes += skb->len;
ieee80211_monitor_rx(ieee, skb, rx_stats);
return 1;
}
can_be_decrypted = (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ||
is_broadcast_ether_addr(hdr->addr2)) ?
ieee->host_mc_decrypt : ieee->host_decrypt;
if (can_be_decrypted) {
if (skb->len >= hdrlen + 3) {
/* Top two-bits of byte 3 are the key index */
keyidx = skb->data[hdrlen + 3] >> 6;
}
/* ieee->crypt[] is WEP_KEY (4) in length. Given that keyidx
* is only allowed 2-bits of storage, no value of keyidx can
* be provided via above code that would result in keyidx
* being out of range */
crypt = ieee->crypt[keyidx];
#ifdef NOT_YET
sta = NULL;
/* Use station specific key to override default keys if the
* receiver address is a unicast address ("individual RA"). If
* bcrx_sta_key parameter is set, station specific key is used
* even with broad/multicast targets (this is against IEEE
* 802.11, but makes it easier to use different keys with
* stations that do not support WEP key mapping). */
if (!(hdr->addr1[0] & 0x01) || local->bcrx_sta_key)
(void)hostap_handle_sta_crypto(local, hdr, &crypt,
&sta);
#endif
/* allow NULL decrypt to indicate an station specific override
* for default encryption */
if (crypt && (crypt->ops == NULL ||
crypt->ops->decrypt_mpdu == NULL))
crypt = NULL;
if (!crypt && (fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED)) {
/* This seems to be triggered by some (multicast?)
* frames from other than current BSS, so just drop the
* frames silently instead of filling system log with
* these reports. */
IEEE80211_DEBUG_DROP("Decryption failed (not set)"
" (SA=" MAC_FMT ")\n",
MAC_ARG(hdr->addr2));
ieee->ieee_stats.rx_discards_undecryptable++;
goto rx_dropped;
}
}
#ifdef NOT_YET
if (type != WLAN_FC_TYPE_DATA) {
if (type == WLAN_FC_TYPE_MGMT && stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_AUTH &&
fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED && ieee->host_decrypt &&
(keyidx = hostap_rx_frame_decrypt(ieee, skb, crypt)) < 0) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: failed to decrypt mgmt::auth "
"from " MAC_FMT "\n", dev->name,
MAC_ARG(hdr->addr2));
/* TODO: could inform hostapd about this so that it
* could send auth failure report */
goto rx_dropped;
}
if (ieee80211_rx_frame_mgmt(ieee, skb, rx_stats, type, stype))
goto rx_dropped;
else
goto rx_exit;
}
#endif
/* drop duplicate 802.11 retransmissions (IEEE 802.11 Chap. 9.29) */
if (sc == ieee->prev_seq_ctl)
goto rx_dropped;
else
ieee->prev_seq_ctl = sc;
/* Data frame - extract src/dst addresses */
if (skb->len < IEEE80211_3ADDR_LEN)
goto rx_dropped;
switch (fc & (IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS | IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS)) {
case IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS:
memcpy(dst, hdr->addr1, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(src, hdr->addr3, ETH_ALEN);
break;
case IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS:
memcpy(dst, hdr->addr3, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(src, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
break;
case IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS | IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS:
if (skb->len < IEEE80211_4ADDR_LEN)
goto rx_dropped;
memcpy(dst, hdr->addr3, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(src, hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
break;
case 0:
memcpy(dst, hdr->addr1, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(src, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
break;
}
#ifdef NOT_YET
if (hostap_rx_frame_wds(ieee, hdr, fc, &wds))
goto rx_dropped;
if (wds) {
skb->dev = dev = wds;
stats = hostap_get_stats(dev);
}
if (ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER && !wds &&
(fc & (IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS | IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS)) ==
IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS && ieee->stadev
&& !compare_ether_addr(hdr->addr2, ieee->assoc_ap_addr)) {
/* Frame from BSSID of the AP for which we are a client */
skb->dev = dev = ieee->stadev;
stats = hostap_get_stats(dev);
from_assoc_ap = 1;
}
#endif
dev->last_rx = jiffies;
#ifdef NOT_YET
if ((ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER ||
ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_REPEAT) && !from_assoc_ap) {
switch (hostap_handle_sta_rx(ieee, dev, skb, rx_stats,
wds != NULL)) {
case AP_RX_CONTINUE_NOT_AUTHORIZED:
frame_authorized = 0;
break;
case AP_RX_CONTINUE:
frame_authorized = 1;
break;
case AP_RX_DROP:
goto rx_dropped;
case AP_RX_EXIT:
goto rx_exit;
}
}
#endif
/* Nullfunc frames may have PS-bit set, so they must be passed to
* hostap_handle_sta_rx() before being dropped here. */
stype &= ~IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA;
if (stype != IEEE80211_STYPE_DATA &&
stype != IEEE80211_STYPE_DATA_CFACK &&
stype != IEEE80211_STYPE_DATA_CFPOLL &&
stype != IEEE80211_STYPE_DATA_CFACKPOLL) {
if (stype != IEEE80211_STYPE_NULLFUNC)
IEEE80211_DEBUG_DROP("RX: dropped data frame "
"with no data (type=0x%02x, "
"subtype=0x%02x, len=%d)\n",
type, stype, skb->len);
goto rx_dropped;
}
/* skb: hdr + (possibly fragmented, possibly encrypted) payload */
if ((fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) && can_be_decrypted &&
(keyidx = ieee80211_rx_frame_decrypt(ieee, skb, crypt)) < 0)
goto rx_dropped;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *)skb->data;
/* skb: hdr + (possibly fragmented) plaintext payload */
// PR: FIXME: hostap has additional conditions in the "if" below:
// ieee->host_decrypt && (fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) &&
if ((frag != 0) || (fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREFRAGS)) {
int flen;
struct sk_buff *frag_skb = ieee80211_frag_cache_get(ieee, hdr);
IEEE80211_DEBUG_FRAG("Rx Fragment received (%u)\n", frag);
if (!frag_skb) {
IEEE80211_DEBUG(IEEE80211_DL_RX | IEEE80211_DL_FRAG,
"Rx cannot get skb from fragment "
"cache (morefrag=%d seq=%u frag=%u)\n",
(fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREFRAGS) != 0,
WLAN_GET_SEQ_SEQ(sc), frag);
goto rx_dropped;
}
flen = skb->len;
if (frag != 0)
flen -= hdrlen;
if (frag_skb->tail + flen > frag_skb->end) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: host decrypted and "
"reassembled frame did not fit skb\n",
dev->name);
ieee80211_frag_cache_invalidate(ieee, hdr);
goto rx_dropped;
}
if (frag == 0) {
/* copy first fragment (including full headers) into
* beginning of the fragment cache skb */
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_put(frag_skb, flen), flen);
} else {
/* append frame payload to the end of the fragment
* cache skb */
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, hdrlen,
skb_put(frag_skb, flen), flen);
}
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
skb = NULL;
if (fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREFRAGS) {
/* more fragments expected - leave the skb in fragment
* cache for now; it will be delivered to upper layers
* after all fragments have been received */
goto rx_exit;
}
/* this was the last fragment and the frame will be
* delivered, so remove skb from fragment cache */
skb = frag_skb;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *)skb->data;
ieee80211_frag_cache_invalidate(ieee, hdr);
}
/* skb: hdr + (possible reassembled) full MSDU payload; possibly still
* encrypted/authenticated */
if ((fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) && can_be_decrypted &&
ieee80211_rx_frame_decrypt_msdu(ieee, skb, keyidx, crypt))
goto rx_dropped;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *)skb->data;
if (crypt && !(fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) && !ieee->open_wep) {
if ( /*ieee->ieee802_1x && */
ieee80211_is_eapol_frame(ieee, skb)) {
/* pass unencrypted EAPOL frames even if encryption is
* configured */
} else {
IEEE80211_DEBUG_DROP("encryption configured, but RX "
"frame not encrypted (SA=" MAC_FMT
")\n", MAC_ARG(hdr->addr2));
goto rx_dropped;
}
}
if (crypt && !(fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) && !ieee->open_wep &&
!ieee80211_is_eapol_frame(ieee, skb)) {
IEEE80211_DEBUG_DROP("dropped unencrypted RX data "
"frame from " MAC_FMT
" (drop_unencrypted=1)\n",
MAC_ARG(hdr->addr2));
goto rx_dropped;
}
/* If the frame was decrypted in hardware, we may need to strip off
* any security data (IV, ICV, etc) that was left behind */
if (!can_be_decrypted && (fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) &&
ieee->host_strip_iv_icv) {
int trimlen = 0;
/* Top two-bits of byte 3 are the key index */
if (skb->len >= hdrlen + 3)
keyidx = skb->data[hdrlen + 3] >> 6;
/* To strip off any security data which appears before the
* payload, we simply increase hdrlen (as the header gets
* chopped off immediately below). For the security data which
* appears after the payload, we use skb_trim. */
switch (ieee->sec.encode_alg[keyidx]) {
case SEC_ALG_WEP:
/* 4 byte IV */
hdrlen += 4;
/* 4 byte ICV */
trimlen = 4;
break;
case SEC_ALG_TKIP:
/* 4 byte IV, 4 byte ExtIV */
hdrlen += 8;
/* 8 byte MIC, 4 byte ICV */
trimlen = 12;
break;
case SEC_ALG_CCMP:
/* 8 byte CCMP header */
hdrlen += 8;
/* 8 byte MIC */
trimlen = 8;
break;
}
if (skb->len < trimlen)
goto rx_dropped;
__skb_trim(skb, skb->len - trimlen);
if (skb->len < hdrlen)
goto rx_dropped;
}
/* skb: hdr + (possible reassembled) full plaintext payload */
payload = skb->data + hdrlen;
ethertype = (payload[6] << 8) | payload[7];
#ifdef NOT_YET
/* If IEEE 802.1X is used, check whether the port is authorized to send
* the received frame. */
if (ieee->ieee802_1x && ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER) {
if (ethertype == ETH_P_PAE) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: RX: IEEE 802.1X frame\n",
dev->name);
if (ieee->hostapd && ieee->apdev) {
/* Send IEEE 802.1X frames to the user
* space daemon for processing */
prism2_rx_80211(ieee->apdev, skb, rx_stats,
PRISM2_RX_MGMT);
ieee->apdevstats.rx_packets++;
ieee->apdevstats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
goto rx_exit;
}
} else if (!frame_authorized) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: dropped frame from "
"unauthorized port (IEEE 802.1X): "
"ethertype=0x%04x\n", dev->name, ethertype);
goto rx_dropped;
}
}
#endif
/* convert hdr + possible LLC headers into Ethernet header */
if (skb->len - hdrlen >= 8 &&
((memcmp(payload, rfc1042_header, SNAP_SIZE) == 0 &&
ethertype != ETH_P_AARP && ethertype != ETH_P_IPX) ||
memcmp(payload, bridge_tunnel_header, SNAP_SIZE) == 0)) {
/* remove RFC1042 or Bridge-Tunnel encapsulation and
* replace EtherType */
skb_pull(skb, hdrlen + SNAP_SIZE);
memcpy(skb_push(skb, ETH_ALEN), src, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(skb_push(skb, ETH_ALEN), dst, ETH_ALEN);
} else {
u16 len;
/* Leave Ethernet header part of hdr and full payload */
skb_pull(skb, hdrlen);
len = htons(skb->len);
memcpy(skb_push(skb, 2), &len, 2);
memcpy(skb_push(skb, ETH_ALEN), src, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(skb_push(skb, ETH_ALEN), dst, ETH_ALEN);
}
#ifdef NOT_YET
if (wds && ((fc & (IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS | IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS)) ==
IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS) && skb->len >= ETH_HLEN + ETH_ALEN) {
/* Non-standard frame: get addr4 from its bogus location after
* the payload */
skb_copy_to_linear_data_offset(skb, ETH_ALEN,
skb->data + skb->len - ETH_ALEN,
ETH_ALEN);
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - ETH_ALEN);
}
#endif
stats->rx_packets++;
stats->rx_bytes += skb->len;
#ifdef NOT_YET
if (ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER && !wds && ieee->ap->bridge_packets) {
if (dst[0] & 0x01) {
/* copy multicast frame both to the higher layers and
* to the wireless media */
ieee->ap->bridged_multicast++;
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb2 == NULL)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: skb_clone failed for "
"multicast frame\n", dev->name);
} else if (hostap_is_sta_assoc(ieee->ap, dst)) {
/* send frame directly to the associated STA using
* wireless media and not passing to higher layers */
ieee->ap->bridged_unicast++;
skb2 = skb;
skb = NULL;
}
}
if (skb2 != NULL) {
/* send to wireless media */
skb2->dev = dev;
skb2->protocol = __constant_htons(ETH_P_802_3);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb2);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
/* skb2->network_header += ETH_HLEN; */
dev_queue_xmit(skb2);
}
#endif
if (skb) {
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE; /* 802.11 crc not sufficient */
if (netif_rx(skb) == NET_RX_DROP) {
/* netif_rx always succeeds, but it might drop
* the packet. If it drops the packet, we log that
* in our stats. */
IEEE80211_DEBUG_DROP
("RX: netif_rx dropped the packet\n");
stats->rx_dropped++;
}
}
rx_exit:
#ifdef NOT_YET
if (sta)
hostap_handle_sta_release(sta);
#endif
return 1;
rx_dropped:
stats->rx_dropped++;
/* Returning 0 indicates to caller that we have not handled the SKB--
* so it is still allocated and can be used again by underlying
* hardware as a DMA target */
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux-2.6 | 04045f98e0457aba7d4e6736f37eed189c48a5f7 | 308,579,844,544,821,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 502 | [IEEE80211]: avoid integer underflow for runt rx frames
Reported by Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>:
> The summary is that an evil 80211 frame can crash out a victim's
> machine. It only applies to drivers using the 80211 wireless code, and
> only then to certain drivers (and even then depends on a card's
> firmware not dropping a dubious packet). I must confess I'm not
> keeping track of Linux wireless support, and the different protocol
> stacks etc.
>
> Details are as follows:
>
> ieee80211_rx() does not explicitly check that "skb->len >= hdrlen".
> There are other skb->len checks, but not enough to prevent a subtle
> off-by-two error if the frame has the IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA flag
> set.
>
> This leads to integer underflow and crash here:
>
> if (frag != 0)
> flen -= hdrlen;
>
> (flen is subsequently used as a memcpy length parameter).
How about this?
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static int do_dccp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp;
int val, len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
dp = dccp_sk(sk);
switch (optname) {
case DCCP_SOCKOPT_PACKET_SIZE:
DCCP_WARN("sockopt(PACKET_SIZE) is deprecated: fix your app\n");
return 0;
case DCCP_SOCKOPT_SERVICE:
return dccp_getsockopt_service(sk, len,
(__be32 __user *)optval, optlen);
case DCCP_SOCKOPT_SEND_CSCOV:
val = dp->dccps_pcslen;
break;
case DCCP_SOCKOPT_RECV_CSCOV:
val = dp->dccps_pcrlen;
break;
case 128 ... 191:
return ccid_hc_rx_getsockopt(dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid, sk, optname,
len, (u32 __user *)optval, optlen);
case 192 ... 255:
return ccid_hc_tx_getsockopt(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk, optname,
len, (u32 __user *)optval, optlen);
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen) || copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 39ebc0276bada8bb70e067cb6d0eb71839c0fb08 | 329,364,480,182,313,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | [DCCP] getsockopt: Fix DCCP_SOCKOPT_[SEND,RECV]_CSCOV
We were only checking if there was enough space to put the int, but
left len as specified by the (malicious) user, sigh, fix it by setting
len to sizeof(val) and transfering just one int worth of data, the one
asked for.
Also check for negative len values.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static int jpc_qcx_getcompparms(jpc_qcxcp_t *compparms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in, uint_fast16_t len)
{
uint_fast8_t tmp;
int n;
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
n = 0;
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
return -1;
}
++n;
compparms->qntsty = tmp & 0x1f;
compparms->numguard = (tmp >> 5) & 7;
switch (compparms->qntsty) {
case JPC_QCX_SIQNT:
compparms->numstepsizes = 1;
break;
case JPC_QCX_NOQNT:
compparms->numstepsizes = (len - n);
break;
case JPC_QCX_SEQNT:
/* XXX - this is a hack */
compparms->numstepsizes = (len - n) / 2;
break;
}
if (compparms->numstepsizes > 0) {
compparms->stepsizes = jas_alloc2(compparms->numstepsizes,
sizeof(uint_fast16_t));
assert(compparms->stepsizes);
for (i = 0; i < compparms->numstepsizes; ++i) {
if (compparms->qntsty == JPC_QCX_NOQNT) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
return -1;
}
compparms->stepsizes[i] = JPC_QCX_EXPN(tmp >> 3);
} else {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &compparms->stepsizes[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
}
} else {
compparms->stepsizes = 0;
}
if (jas_stream_error(in) || jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jpc_qcx_destroycompparms(compparms);
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | jasper | 4031ca321d8cb5798c316ab39c7a5dc88a61fdd7 | 254,403,990,052,538,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | Incorporated changes from patch
jasper-1.900.3-libjasper-stepsizes-overflow.patch |
isdn_net_setcfg(isdn_net_ioctl_cfg * cfg)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = isdn_net_findif(cfg->name);
ulong features;
int i;
int drvidx;
int chidx;
char drvid[25];
if (p) {
isdn_net_local *lp = p->local;
/* See if any registered driver supports the features we want */
features = ((1 << cfg->l2_proto) << ISDN_FEATURE_L2_SHIFT) |
((1 << cfg->l3_proto) << ISDN_FEATURE_L3_SHIFT);
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++)
if (dev->drv[i])
if ((dev->drv[i]->interface->features & features) == features)
break;
if (i == ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: No driver with selected features\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (lp->p_encap != cfg->p_encap){
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
struct concap_proto * cprot = p -> cprot;
#endif
if (isdn_net_device_started(p)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: cannot change encap when if is up\n",
p->dev->name);
return -EBUSY;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
if( cprot && cprot -> pops )
cprot -> pops -> proto_del ( cprot );
p -> cprot = NULL;
lp -> dops = NULL;
/* ... , prepare for configuration of new one ... */
switch ( cfg -> p_encap ){
case ISDN_NET_ENCAP_X25IFACE:
lp -> dops = &isdn_concap_reliable_dl_dops;
}
/* ... and allocate new one ... */
p -> cprot = isdn_concap_new( cfg -> p_encap );
/* p -> cprot == NULL now if p_encap is not supported
by means of the concap_proto mechanism */
/* the protocol is not configured yet; this will
happen later when isdn_net_reset() is called */
#endif
}
switch ( cfg->p_encap ) {
case ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP:
#ifndef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: SyncPPP support not configured\n",
p->dev->name);
return -EINVAL;
#else
p->dev->type = ARPHRD_PPP; /* change ARP type */
p->dev->addr_len = 0;
p->dev->do_ioctl = isdn_ppp_dev_ioctl;
#endif
break;
case ISDN_NET_ENCAP_X25IFACE:
#ifndef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: isdn-x25 support not configured\n",
p->dev->name);
return -EINVAL;
#else
p->dev->type = ARPHRD_X25; /* change ARP type */
p->dev->addr_len = 0;
#endif
break;
case ISDN_NET_ENCAP_CISCOHDLCK:
p->dev->do_ioctl = isdn_ciscohdlck_dev_ioctl;
break;
default:
if( cfg->p_encap >= 0 &&
cfg->p_encap <= ISDN_NET_ENCAP_MAX_ENCAP )
break;
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: encapsulation protocol %d not supported\n",
p->dev->name, cfg->p_encap);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (strlen(cfg->drvid)) {
/* A bind has been requested ... */
char *c,
*e;
drvidx = -1;
chidx = -1;
strcpy(drvid, cfg->drvid);
if ((c = strchr(drvid, ','))) {
/* The channel-number is appended to the driver-Id with a comma */
chidx = (int) simple_strtoul(c + 1, &e, 10);
if (e == c)
chidx = -1;
*c = '\0';
}
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++)
/* Lookup driver-Id in array */
if (!(strcmp(dev->drvid[i], drvid))) {
drvidx = i;
break;
}
if ((drvidx == -1) || (chidx == -1))
/* Either driver-Id or channel-number invalid */
return -ENODEV;
} else {
/* Parameters are valid, so get them */
drvidx = lp->pre_device;
chidx = lp->pre_channel;
}
if (cfg->exclusive > 0) {
unsigned long flags;
/* If binding is exclusive, try to grab the channel */
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
if ((i = isdn_get_free_channel(ISDN_USAGE_NET,
lp->l2_proto, lp->l3_proto, drvidx,
chidx, lp->msn)) < 0) {
/* Grab failed, because desired channel is in use */
lp->exclusive = -1;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return -EBUSY;
}
/* All went ok, so update isdninfo */
dev->usage[i] = ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
isdn_info_update();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
lp->exclusive = i;
} else {
/* Non-exclusive binding or unbind. */
lp->exclusive = -1;
if ((lp->pre_device != -1) && (cfg->exclusive == -1)) {
isdn_unexclusive_channel(lp->pre_device, lp->pre_channel);
isdn_free_channel(lp->pre_device, lp->pre_channel, ISDN_USAGE_NET);
drvidx = -1;
chidx = -1;
}
}
strcpy(lp->msn, cfg->eaz);
lp->pre_device = drvidx;
lp->pre_channel = chidx;
lp->onhtime = cfg->onhtime;
lp->charge = cfg->charge;
lp->l2_proto = cfg->l2_proto;
lp->l3_proto = cfg->l3_proto;
lp->cbdelay = cfg->cbdelay;
lp->dialmax = cfg->dialmax;
lp->triggercps = cfg->triggercps;
lp->slavedelay = cfg->slavedelay * HZ;
lp->pppbind = cfg->pppbind;
lp->dialtimeout = cfg->dialtimeout >= 0 ? cfg->dialtimeout * HZ : -1;
lp->dialwait = cfg->dialwait * HZ;
if (cfg->secure)
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_SECURE;
else
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_SECURE;
if (cfg->cbhup)
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_CBHUP;
else
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_CBHUP;
switch (cfg->callback) {
case 0:
lp->flags &= ~(ISDN_NET_CALLBACK | ISDN_NET_CBOUT);
break;
case 1:
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_CALLBACK;
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_CBOUT;
break;
case 2:
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_CBOUT;
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_CALLBACK;
break;
}
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_DIALMODE_MASK; /* first all bits off */
if (cfg->dialmode && !(cfg->dialmode & ISDN_NET_DIALMODE_MASK)) {
/* old isdnctrl version, where only 0 or 1 is given */
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Old isdnctrl version detected! Please update.\n");
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_DM_OFF; /* turn on `off' bit */
}
else {
lp->flags |= cfg->dialmode; /* turn on selected bits */
}
if (cfg->chargehup)
lp->hupflags |= ISDN_CHARGEHUP;
else
lp->hupflags &= ~ISDN_CHARGEHUP;
if (cfg->ihup)
lp->hupflags |= ISDN_INHUP;
else
lp->hupflags &= ~ISDN_INHUP;
if (cfg->chargeint > 10) {
lp->hupflags |= ISDN_CHARGEHUP | ISDN_HAVECHARGE | ISDN_MANCHARGE;
lp->chargeint = cfg->chargeint * HZ;
}
if (cfg->p_encap != lp->p_encap) {
if (cfg->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_RAWIP) {
p->dev->header_ops = NULL;
p->dev->flags = IFF_NOARP|IFF_POINTOPOINT;
} else {
p->dev->header_ops = &isdn_header_ops;
if (cfg->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_ETHER)
p->dev->flags = IFF_BROADCAST | IFF_MULTICAST;
else
p->dev->flags = IFF_NOARP|IFF_POINTOPOINT;
}
}
lp->p_encap = cfg->p_encap;
return 0;
}
return -ENODEV;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 80,796,293,720,356,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 215 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
isdn_net_addphone(isdn_net_ioctl_phone * phone)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = isdn_net_findif(phone->name);
isdn_net_phone *n;
if (p) {
if (!(n = kmalloc(sizeof(isdn_net_phone), GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
strcpy(n->num, phone->phone);
n->next = p->local->phone[phone->outgoing & 1];
p->local->phone[phone->outgoing & 1] = n;
return 0;
}
return -ENODEV;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 242,762,251,649,869,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
isdn_net_find_icall(int di, int ch, int idx, setup_parm *setup)
{
char *eaz;
int si1;
int si2;
int ematch;
int wret;
int swapped;
int sidx = 0;
u_long flags;
isdn_net_dev *p;
isdn_net_phone *n;
char nr[32];
char *my_eaz;
/* Search name in netdev-chain */
if (!setup->phone[0]) {
nr[0] = '0';
nr[1] = '\0';
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: Incoming call without OAD, assuming '0'\n");
} else
strcpy(nr, setup->phone);
si1 = (int) setup->si1;
si2 = (int) setup->si2;
if (!setup->eazmsn[0]) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: Incoming call without CPN, assuming '0'\n");
eaz = "0";
} else
eaz = setup->eazmsn;
if (dev->net_verbose > 1)
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: call from %s,%d,%d -> %s\n", nr, si1, si2, eaz);
/* Accept DATA and VOICE calls at this stage
* local eaz is checked later for allowed call types
*/
if ((si1 != 7) && (si1 != 1)) {
if (dev->net_verbose > 1)
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: Service-Indicator not 1 or 7, ignored\n");
return 0;
}
n = (isdn_net_phone *) 0;
p = dev->netdev;
ematch = wret = swapped = 0;
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: di=%d ch=%d idx=%d usg=%d\n", di, ch, idx,
dev->usage[idx]);
#endif
while (p) {
int matchret;
isdn_net_local *lp = p->local;
/* If last check has triggered as binding-swap, revert it */
switch (swapped) {
case 2:
isdn_net_swap_usage(idx, sidx);
/* fall through */
case 1:
isdn_net_swapbind(di);
break;
}
swapped = 0;
/* check acceptable call types for DOV */
my_eaz = isdn_map_eaz2msn(lp->msn, di);
if (si1 == 1) { /* it's a DOV call, check if we allow it */
if (*my_eaz == 'v' || *my_eaz == 'V' ||
*my_eaz == 'b' || *my_eaz == 'B')
my_eaz++; /* skip to allow a match */
else
my_eaz = NULL; /* force non match */
} else { /* it's a DATA call, check if we allow it */
if (*my_eaz == 'b' || *my_eaz == 'B')
my_eaz++; /* skip to allow a match */
}
if (my_eaz)
matchret = isdn_msncmp(eaz, my_eaz);
else
matchret = 1;
if (!matchret)
ematch = 1;
/* Remember if more numbers eventually can match */
if (matchret > wret)
wret = matchret;
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: if='%s', l.msn=%s, l.flags=%d, l.dstate=%d\n",
p->dev->name, lp->msn, lp->flags, lp->dialstate);
#endif
if ((!matchret) && /* EAZ is matching */
(((!(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)) && /* but not connected */
(USG_NONE(dev->usage[idx]))) || /* and ch. unused or */
((((lp->dialstate == 4) || (lp->dialstate == 12)) && /* if dialing */
(!(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CALLBACK))) /* but no callback */
)))
{
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: match1, pdev=%d pch=%d\n",
lp->pre_device, lp->pre_channel);
#endif
if (dev->usage[idx] & ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE) {
if ((lp->pre_channel != ch) ||
(lp->pre_device != di)) {
/* Here we got a problem:
* If using an ICN-Card, an incoming call is always signaled on
* on the first channel of the card, if both channels are
* down. However this channel may be bound exclusive. If the
* second channel is free, this call should be accepted.
* The solution is horribly but it runs, so what:
* We exchange the exclusive bindings of the two channels, the
* corresponding variables in the interface-structs.
*/
if (ch == 0) {
sidx = isdn_dc2minor(di, 1);
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: ch is 0\n");
#endif
if (USG_NONE(dev->usage[sidx])) {
/* Second Channel is free, now see if it is bound
* exclusive too. */
if (dev->usage[sidx] & ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE) {
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: 2nd channel is down and bound\n");
#endif
/* Yes, swap bindings only, if the original
* binding is bound to channel 1 of this driver */
if ((lp->pre_device == di) &&
(lp->pre_channel == 1)) {
isdn_net_swapbind(di);
swapped = 1;
} else {
/* ... else iterate next device */
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
continue;
}
} else {
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: 2nd channel is down and unbound\n");
#endif
/* No, swap always and swap excl-usage also */
isdn_net_swap_usage(idx, sidx);
isdn_net_swapbind(di);
swapped = 2;
}
/* Now check for exclusive binding again */
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: final check\n");
#endif
if ((dev->usage[idx] & ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE) &&
((lp->pre_channel != ch) ||
(lp->pre_device != di))) {
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: final check failed\n");
#endif
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
continue;
}
}
} else {
/* We are already on the second channel, so nothing to do */
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: already on 2nd channel\n");
#endif
}
}
}
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: match2\n");
#endif
n = lp->phone[0];
if (lp->flags & ISDN_NET_SECURE) {
while (n) {
if (!isdn_msncmp(nr, n->num))
break;
n = (isdn_net_phone *) n->next;
}
}
if (n || (!(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_SECURE))) {
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: match3\n");
#endif
/* matching interface found */
/*
* Is the state STOPPED?
* If so, no dialin is allowed,
* so reject actively.
* */
if (ISDN_NET_DIALMODE(*lp) == ISDN_NET_DM_OFF) {
printk(KERN_INFO "incoming call, interface %s `stopped' -> rejected\n",
p->dev->name);
return 3;
}
/*
* Is the interface up?
* If not, reject the call actively.
*/
if (!isdn_net_device_started(p)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: incoming call, interface down -> rejected\n",
p->dev->name);
return 3;
}
/* Interface is up, now see if it's a slave. If so, see if
* it's master and parent slave is online. If not, reject the call.
*/
if (lp->master) {
isdn_net_local *mlp = (isdn_net_local *) lp->master->priv;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ICALLslv: %s\n", p->dev->name);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "master=%s\n", lp->master->name);
if (mlp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "master online\n");
/* Master is online, find parent-slave (master if first slave) */
while (mlp->slave) {
if ((isdn_net_local *) mlp->slave->priv == lp)
break;
mlp = (isdn_net_local *) mlp->slave->priv;
}
} else
printk(KERN_DEBUG "master offline\n");
/* Found parent, if it's offline iterate next device */
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mlpf: %d\n", mlp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED);
if (!(mlp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)) {
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
continue;
}
}
if (lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CALLBACK) {
int chi;
/*
* Is the state MANUAL?
* If so, no callback can be made,
* so reject actively.
* */
if (ISDN_NET_DIALMODE(*lp) == ISDN_NET_DM_OFF) {
printk(KERN_INFO "incoming call for callback, interface %s `off' -> rejected\n",
p->dev->name);
return 3;
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: call from %s -> %s, start callback\n",
p->dev->name, nr, eaz);
if (lp->phone[1]) {
/* Grab a free ISDN-Channel */
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
if ((chi =
isdn_get_free_channel(
ISDN_USAGE_NET,
lp->l2_proto,
lp->l3_proto,
lp->pre_device,
lp->pre_channel,
lp->msn)
) < 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net_find_icall: No channel for %s\n",
p->dev->name);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
/* Setup dialstate. */
lp->dtimer = 0;
lp->dialstate = 11;
/* Connect interface with channel */
isdn_net_bind_channel(lp, chi);
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
if (isdn_ppp_bind(lp) < 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
isdn_net_unbind_channel(lp);
return 0;
}
#endif
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
/* Initiate dialing by returning 2 or 4 */
return (lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CBHUP) ? 2 : 4;
} else
printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: %s: No phone number\n",
p->dev->name);
return 0;
} else {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: call from %s -> %s accepted\n",
p->dev->name, nr, eaz);
/* if this interface is dialing, it does it probably on a different
device, so free this device */
if ((lp->dialstate == 4) || (lp->dialstate == 12)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
isdn_ppp_free(lp);
#endif
isdn_net_lp_disconnected(lp);
isdn_free_channel(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel,
ISDN_USAGE_NET);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
dev->usage[idx] &= ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
dev->usage[idx] |= ISDN_USAGE_NET;
strcpy(dev->num[idx], nr);
isdn_info_update();
dev->st_netdev[idx] = lp->netdev;
lp->isdn_device = di;
lp->isdn_channel = ch;
lp->ppp_slot = -1;
lp->flags |= ISDN_NET_CONNECTED;
lp->dialstate = 7;
lp->dtimer = 0;
lp->outgoing = 0;
lp->huptimer = 0;
lp->hupflags |= ISDN_WAITCHARGE;
lp->hupflags &= ~ISDN_HAVECHARGE;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP) {
if (isdn_ppp_bind(lp) < 0) {
isdn_net_unbind_channel(lp);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return 1;
}
}
}
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
}
/* If none of configured EAZ/MSN matched and not verbose, be silent */
if (!ematch || dev->net_verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: call from %s -> %d %s ignored\n", nr, di, eaz);
return (wret == 2)?5:0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 322,344,461,636,009,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 326 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int nfrags;
int ret = 0;
void *tmp;
u8 *iv;
struct scatterlist *sg;
struct scatterlist *asg;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (elen <= 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
if (!tmp)
goto out;
ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
req = esp_tmp_req(aead, iv);
asg = esp_req_sg(aead, req);
sg = asg + 1;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
iv = esph->enc_data;
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead), elen);
sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, esp_input_done, skb);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen, iv);
aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
ret = esp_input_done2(skb, ret);
out:
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-16"
] | linux-2.6 | 920fc941a9617f95ccb283037fe6f8a38d95bb69 | 104,942,264,381,159,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | [ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access
ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack is fed with an skb where the first
fragment ends between the end of the esp header and the end of the IV.
This bug was found by Dirk Nehring <dnehring@gmx.net> .
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int nfrags;
void *tmp;
u8 *iv;
struct scatterlist *sg;
struct scatterlist *asg;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph)))
goto out;
if (elen <= 0)
goto out;
if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;
nfrags = err;
err = -ENOMEM;
tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
if (!tmp)
goto out;
ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
req = esp_tmp_req(aead, iv);
asg = esp_req_sg(aead, req);
sg = asg + 1;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
iv = esph->enc_data;
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead), elen);
sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, esp_input_done, skb);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen, iv);
aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
err = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
err = esp_input_done2(skb, err);
out:
return err;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-16"
] | linux-2.6 | 920fc941a9617f95ccb283037fe6f8a38d95bb69 | 261,859,902,457,785,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | [ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access
ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack is fed with an skb where the first
fragment ends between the end of the esp header and the end of the IV.
This bug was found by Dirk Nehring <dnehring@gmx.net> .
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
isdn_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, uint cmd, ulong arg)
{
uint minor = iminor(inode);
isdn_ctrl c;
int drvidx;
int chidx;
int ret;
int i;
char __user *p;
char *s;
union iocpar {
char name[10];
char bname[22];
isdn_ioctl_struct iocts;
isdn_net_ioctl_phone phone;
isdn_net_ioctl_cfg cfg;
} iocpar;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
#define name iocpar.name
#define bname iocpar.bname
#define iocts iocpar.iocts
#define phone iocpar.phone
#define cfg iocpar.cfg
if (minor == ISDN_MINOR_STATUS) {
switch (cmd) {
case IIOCGETDVR:
return (TTY_DV +
(NET_DV << 8) +
(INF_DV << 16));
case IIOCGETCPS:
if (arg) {
ulong __user *p = argp;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p,
sizeof(ulong) * ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS * 2))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS; i++) {
put_user(dev->ibytes[i], p++);
put_user(dev->obytes[i], p++);
}
return 0;
} else
return -EINVAL;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_NETDEVICES
case IIOCNETGPN:
/* Get peer phone number of a connected
* isdn network interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&phone, argp, sizeof(phone)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_net_getpeer(&phone, argp);
} else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (!dev->drivers)
return -ENODEV;
if (minor <= ISDN_MINOR_BMAX) {
drvidx = isdn_minor2drv(minor);
if (drvidx < 0)
return -ENODEV;
chidx = isdn_minor2chan(minor);
if (!(dev->drv[drvidx]->flags & DRV_FLAG_RUNNING))
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
if (minor <= ISDN_MINOR_CTRLMAX) {
/*
* isdn net devices manage lots of configuration variables as linked lists.
* Those lists must only be manipulated from user space. Some of the ioctl's
* service routines access user space and are not atomic. Therefor, ioctl's
* manipulating the lists and ioctl's sleeping while accessing the lists
* are serialized by means of a semaphore.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case IIOCNETDWRSET:
printk(KERN_INFO "INFO: ISDN_DW_ABC_EXTENSION not enabled\n");
return(-EINVAL);
case IIOCNETLCR:
printk(KERN_INFO "INFO: ISDN_ABC_LCR_SUPPORT not enabled\n");
return -ENODEV;
#ifdef CONFIG_NETDEVICES
case IIOCNETAIF:
/* Add a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
s = name;
} else {
s = NULL;
}
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
if ((s = isdn_net_new(s, NULL))) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, s, strlen(s) + 1)){
ret = -EFAULT;
} else {
ret = 0;
}
} else
ret = -ENODEV;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
case IIOCNETASL:
/* Add a slave to a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(bname, argp, sizeof(bname) - 1))
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EINVAL;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
if ((s = isdn_net_newslave(bname))) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, s, strlen(s) + 1)){
ret = -EFAULT;
} else {
ret = 0;
}
} else
ret = -ENODEV;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
case IIOCNETDIF:
/* Delete a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
ret = isdn_net_rm(name);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETSCF:
/* Set configurable parameters of a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&cfg, argp, sizeof(cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_net_setcfg(&cfg);
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETGCF:
/* Get configurable parameters of a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&cfg, argp, sizeof(cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(ret = isdn_net_getcfg(&cfg))) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &cfg, sizeof(cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETANM:
/* Add a phone-number to a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&phone, argp, sizeof(phone)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
ret = isdn_net_addphone(&phone);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETGNM:
/* Get list of phone-numbers of a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&phone, argp, sizeof(phone)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
ret = isdn_net_getphones(&phone, argp);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETDNM:
/* Delete a phone-number of a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&phone, argp, sizeof(phone)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mtx);
if( ret ) return ret;
ret = isdn_net_delphone(&phone);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mtx);
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCNETDIL:
/* Force dialing of a network-interface */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_net_force_dial(name);
} else
return -EINVAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
case IIOCNETALN:
if (!arg)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_ppp_dial_slave(name);
case IIOCNETDLN:
if (!arg)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_ppp_hangup_slave(name);
#endif
case IIOCNETHUP:
/* Force hangup of a network-interface */
if (!arg)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(name, argp, sizeof(name)))
return -EFAULT;
return isdn_net_force_hangup(name);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_NETDEVICES */
case IIOCSETVER:
dev->net_verbose = arg;
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn: Verbose-Level is %d\n", dev->net_verbose);
return 0;
case IIOCSETGST:
if (arg)
dev->global_flags |= ISDN_GLOBAL_STOPPED;
else
dev->global_flags &= ~ISDN_GLOBAL_STOPPED;
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn: Global Mode %s\n",
(dev->global_flags & ISDN_GLOBAL_STOPPED) ? "stopped" : "running");
return 0;
case IIOCSETBRJ:
drvidx = -1;
if (arg) {
int i;
char *p;
if (copy_from_user(&iocts, argp,
sizeof(isdn_ioctl_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
if (strlen(iocts.drvid)) {
if ((p = strchr(iocts.drvid, ',')))
*p = 0;
drvidx = -1;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++)
if (!(strcmp(dev->drvid[i], iocts.drvid))) {
drvidx = i;
break;
}
}
}
if (drvidx == -1)
return -ENODEV;
if (iocts.arg)
dev->drv[drvidx]->flags |= DRV_FLAG_REJBUS;
else
dev->drv[drvidx]->flags &= ~DRV_FLAG_REJBUS;
return 0;
case IIOCSIGPRF:
dev->profd = current;
return 0;
break;
case IIOCGETPRF:
/* Get all Modem-Profiles */
if (arg) {
char __user *p = argp;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, argp,
(ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG + ISDN_MSNLEN + ISDN_LMSNLEN)
* ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS; i++) {
if (copy_to_user(p, dev->mdm.info[i].emu.profile,
ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG;
if (copy_to_user(p, dev->mdm.info[i].emu.pmsn, ISDN_MSNLEN))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_MSNLEN;
if (copy_to_user(p, dev->mdm.info[i].emu.plmsn, ISDN_LMSNLEN))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_LMSNLEN;
}
return (ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG + ISDN_MSNLEN + ISDN_LMSNLEN) * ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS;
} else
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IIOCSETPRF:
/* Set all Modem-Profiles */
if (arg) {
char __user *p = argp;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, argp,
(ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG + ISDN_MSNLEN + ISDN_LMSNLEN)
* ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_CHANNELS; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(dev->mdm.info[i].emu.profile, p,
ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_MODEM_NUMREG;
if (copy_from_user(dev->mdm.info[i].emu.plmsn, p, ISDN_LMSNLEN))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_LMSNLEN;
if (copy_from_user(dev->mdm.info[i].emu.pmsn, p, ISDN_MSNLEN))
return -EFAULT;
p += ISDN_MSNLEN;
}
return 0;
} else
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IIOCSETMAP:
case IIOCGETMAP:
/* Set/Get MSN->EAZ-Mapping for a driver */
if (arg) {
if (copy_from_user(&iocts, argp,
sizeof(isdn_ioctl_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
if (strlen(iocts.drvid)) {
drvidx = -1;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++)
if (!(strcmp(dev->drvid[i], iocts.drvid))) {
drvidx = i;
break;
}
} else
drvidx = 0;
if (drvidx == -1)
return -ENODEV;
if (cmd == IIOCSETMAP) {
int loop = 1;
p = (char __user *) iocts.arg;
i = 0;
while (loop) {
int j = 0;
while (1) {
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, p, 1))
return -EFAULT;
get_user(bname[j], p++);
switch (bname[j]) {
case '\0':
loop = 0;
/* Fall through */
case ',':
bname[j] = '\0';
strcpy(dev->drv[drvidx]->msn2eaz[i], bname);
j = ISDN_MSNLEN;
break;
default:
j++;
}
if (j >= ISDN_MSNLEN)
break;
}
if (++i > 9)
break;
}
} else {
p = (char __user *) iocts.arg;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
sprintf(bname, "%s%s",
strlen(dev->drv[drvidx]->msn2eaz[i]) ?
dev->drv[drvidx]->msn2eaz[i] : "_",
(i < 9) ? "," : "\0");
if (copy_to_user(p, bname, strlen(bname) + 1))
return -EFAULT;
p += strlen(bname);
}
}
return 0;
} else
return -EINVAL;
case IIOCDBGVAR:
if (arg) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &dev, sizeof(ulong)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} else
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
if ((cmd & IIOCDRVCTL) == IIOCDRVCTL)
cmd = ((cmd >> _IOC_NRSHIFT) & _IOC_NRMASK) & ISDN_DRVIOCTL_MASK;
else
return -EINVAL;
if (arg) {
int i;
char *p;
if (copy_from_user(&iocts, argp, sizeof(isdn_ioctl_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
if (strlen(iocts.drvid)) {
if ((p = strchr(iocts.drvid, ',')))
*p = 0;
drvidx = -1;
for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++)
if (!(strcmp(dev->drvid[i], iocts.drvid))) {
drvidx = i;
break;
}
} else
drvidx = 0;
if (drvidx == -1)
return -ENODEV;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, argp,
sizeof(isdn_ioctl_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
c.driver = drvidx;
c.command = ISDN_CMD_IOCTL;
c.arg = cmd;
memcpy(c.parm.num, &iocts.arg, sizeof(ulong));
ret = isdn_command(&c);
memcpy(&iocts.arg, c.parm.num, sizeof(ulong));
if (copy_to_user(argp, &iocts, sizeof(isdn_ioctl_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
return ret;
} else
return -EINVAL;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (minor <= ISDN_MINOR_PPPMAX)
return (isdn_ppp_ioctl(minor - ISDN_MINOR_PPP, file, cmd, arg));
#endif
return -ENODEV;
#undef name
#undef bname
#undef iocts
#undef phone
#undef cfg
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | eafe1aa37e6ec2d56f14732b5240c4dd09f0613a | 328,221,509,131,099,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 446 | I4L: fix isdn_ioctl memory overrun vulnerability
Fix possible memory overrun issue in the isdn ioctl code.
Found by ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Cc: ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
shmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp,struct shmem_inode_info *info, unsigned long idx)
{
return alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 40,898,721,436,560,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int shmem_getpage(struct inode *inode, unsigned long idx,
struct page **pagep, enum sgp_type sgp, int *type)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo;
struct page *filepage = *pagep;
struct page *swappage;
swp_entry_t *entry;
swp_entry_t swap;
int error;
if (idx >= SHMEM_MAX_INDEX)
return -EFBIG;
if (type)
*type = 0;
/*
* Normally, filepage is NULL on entry, and either found
* uptodate immediately, or allocated and zeroed, or read
* in under swappage, which is then assigned to filepage.
* But shmem_readpage and shmem_write_begin pass in a locked
* filepage, which may be found not uptodate by other callers
* too, and may need to be copied from the swappage read in.
*/
repeat:
if (!filepage)
filepage = find_lock_page(mapping, idx);
if (filepage && PageUptodate(filepage))
goto done;
error = 0;
if (sgp == SGP_QUICK)
goto failed;
spin_lock(&info->lock);
shmem_recalc_inode(inode);
entry = shmem_swp_alloc(info, idx, sgp);
if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
error = PTR_ERR(entry);
goto failed;
}
swap = *entry;
if (swap.val) {
/* Look it up and read it in.. */
swappage = lookup_swap_cache(swap);
if (!swappage) {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
/* here we actually do the io */
if (type && !(*type & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)) {
__count_vm_event(PGMAJFAULT);
*type |= VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
}
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
swappage = shmem_swapin(info, swap, idx);
if (!swappage) {
spin_lock(&info->lock);
entry = shmem_swp_alloc(info, idx, sgp);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
error = PTR_ERR(entry);
else {
if (entry->val == swap.val)
error = -ENOMEM;
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
}
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
if (error)
goto failed;
goto repeat;
}
wait_on_page_locked(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
goto repeat;
}
/* We have to do this with page locked to prevent races */
if (TestSetPageLocked(swappage)) {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
wait_on_page_locked(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
goto repeat;
}
if (PageWriteback(swappage)) {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
wait_on_page_writeback(swappage);
unlock_page(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
goto repeat;
}
if (!PageUptodate(swappage)) {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
unlock_page(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
error = -EIO;
goto failed;
}
if (filepage) {
shmem_swp_set(info, entry, 0);
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
delete_from_swap_cache(swappage);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
copy_highpage(filepage, swappage);
unlock_page(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
flush_dcache_page(filepage);
SetPageUptodate(filepage);
set_page_dirty(filepage);
swap_free(swap);
} else if (!(error = move_from_swap_cache(
swappage, idx, mapping))) {
info->flags |= SHMEM_PAGEIN;
shmem_swp_set(info, entry, 0);
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
filepage = swappage;
swap_free(swap);
} else {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
unlock_page(swappage);
page_cache_release(swappage);
if (error == -ENOMEM) {
/* let kswapd refresh zone for GFP_ATOMICs */
congestion_wait(WRITE, HZ/50);
}
goto repeat;
}
} else if (sgp == SGP_READ && !filepage) {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
filepage = find_get_page(mapping, idx);
if (filepage &&
(!PageUptodate(filepage) || TestSetPageLocked(filepage))) {
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
wait_on_page_locked(filepage);
page_cache_release(filepage);
filepage = NULL;
goto repeat;
}
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
} else {
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
if (sbinfo->free_blocks == 0 ||
shmem_acct_block(info->flags)) {
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
error = -ENOSPC;
goto failed;
}
sbinfo->free_blocks--;
inode->i_blocks += BLOCKS_PER_PAGE;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
} else if (shmem_acct_block(info->flags)) {
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
error = -ENOSPC;
goto failed;
}
if (!filepage) {
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
filepage = shmem_alloc_page(mapping_gfp_mask(mapping),
info,
idx);
if (!filepage) {
shmem_unacct_blocks(info->flags, 1);
shmem_free_blocks(inode, 1);
error = -ENOMEM;
goto failed;
}
spin_lock(&info->lock);
entry = shmem_swp_alloc(info, idx, sgp);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
error = PTR_ERR(entry);
else {
swap = *entry;
shmem_swp_unmap(entry);
}
if (error || swap.val || 0 != add_to_page_cache_lru(
filepage, mapping, idx, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
page_cache_release(filepage);
shmem_unacct_blocks(info->flags, 1);
shmem_free_blocks(inode, 1);
filepage = NULL;
if (error)
goto failed;
goto repeat;
}
info->flags |= SHMEM_PAGEIN;
}
info->alloced++;
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
flush_dcache_page(filepage);
SetPageUptodate(filepage);
}
done:
if (*pagep != filepage) {
*pagep = filepage;
if (sgp != SGP_FAULT)
unlock_page(filepage);
}
return 0;
failed:
if (*pagep != filepage) {
unlock_page(filepage);
page_cache_release(filepage);
}
return error;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 337,224,798,820,921,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 221 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
shmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp, struct shmem_inode_info *info,
unsigned long idx)
{
struct vm_area_struct pvma;
struct page *page;
memset(&pvma, 0, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct));
pvma.vm_policy = mpol_shared_policy_lookup(&info->policy, idx);
pvma.vm_pgoff = idx;
pvma.vm_end = PAGE_SIZE;
page = alloc_page_vma(gfp | __GFP_ZERO, &pvma, 0);
mpol_free(pvma.vm_policy);
return page;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 209,078,005,530,362,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
ProcShmCreatePixmap(client)
register ClientPtr client;
{
PixmapPtr pMap;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
DepthPtr pDepth;
register int i, rc;
ShmDescPtr shmdesc;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
unsigned int width, height, depth;
unsigned long size;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
client->errorValue = stuff->pid;
if (!sharedPixmaps)
return BadImplementation;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
VERIFY_SHMPTR(stuff->shmseg, stuff->offset, TRUE, shmdesc, client);
width = stuff->width;
height = stuff->height;
depth = stuff->depth;
if (!width || !height || !depth)
{
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
if (width > 32767 || height > 32767)
return BadAlloc;
if (stuff->depth != 1)
{
pDepth = pDraw->pScreen->allowedDepths;
for (i=0; i<pDraw->pScreen->numDepths; i++, pDepth++)
if (pDepth->depth == stuff->depth)
goto CreatePmap;
client->errorValue = stuff->depth;
return BadValue;
}
CreatePmap:
size = PixmapBytePad(width, depth) * height;
if (sizeof(size) == 4 && BitsPerPixel(depth) > 8) {
if (size < width * height)
return BadAlloc;
/* thankfully, offset is unsigned */
if (stuff->offset + size < size)
return BadAlloc;
}
VERIFY_SHMSIZE(shmdesc, stuff->offset, size, client);
pMap = (*shmFuncs[pDraw->pScreen->myNum]->CreatePixmap)(
pDraw->pScreen, stuff->width,
stuff->height, stuff->depth,
shmdesc->addr + stuff->offset);
if (pMap)
{
rc = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP,
pMap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap(pMap);
return rc;
}
dixSetPrivate(&pMap->devPrivates, shmPixmapPrivate, shmdesc);
shmdesc->refcnt++;
pMap->drawable.serialNumber = NEXT_SERIAL_NUMBER;
pMap->drawable.id = stuff->pid;
if (AddResource(stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP, (pointer)pMap))
{
return(client->noClientException);
}
pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap(pMap);
}
return (BadAlloc);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | xserver | be6c17fcf9efebc0bbcc3d9a25f8c5a2450c2161 | 129,275,241,199,461,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping. |
ProcPanoramiXShmCreatePixmap(
register ClientPtr client)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen = NULL;
PixmapPtr pMap = NULL;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
DepthPtr pDepth;
int i, j, result, rc;
ShmDescPtr shmdesc;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
unsigned int width, height, depth;
unsigned long size;
PanoramiXRes *newPix;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
client->errorValue = stuff->pid;
if (!sharedPixmaps)
return BadImplementation;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixUnknownAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
VERIFY_SHMPTR(stuff->shmseg, stuff->offset, TRUE, shmdesc, client);
width = stuff->width;
height = stuff->height;
depth = stuff->depth;
if (!width || !height || !depth)
{
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
if (width > 32767 || height > 32767)
return BadAlloc;
if (stuff->depth != 1)
{
pDepth = pDraw->pScreen->allowedDepths;
for (i=0; i<pDraw->pScreen->numDepths; i++, pDepth++)
if (pDepth->depth == stuff->depth)
goto CreatePmap;
client->errorValue = stuff->depth;
return BadValue;
}
CreatePmap:
size = PixmapBytePad(width, depth) * height;
if (sizeof(size) == 4 && BitsPerPixel(depth) > 8) {
if (size < width * height)
return BadAlloc;
/* thankfully, offset is unsigned */
if (stuff->offset + size < size)
return BadAlloc;
}
VERIFY_SHMSIZE(shmdesc, stuff->offset, size, client);
if(!(newPix = (PanoramiXRes *) xalloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes))))
return BadAlloc;
newPix->type = XRT_PIXMAP;
newPix->u.pix.shared = TRUE;
newPix->info[0].id = stuff->pid;
for(j = 1; j < PanoramiXNumScreens; j++)
newPix->info[j].id = FakeClientID(client->index);
result = (client->noClientException);
FOR_NSCREENS(j) {
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[j];
pMap = (*shmFuncs[j]->CreatePixmap)(pScreen,
stuff->width, stuff->height, stuff->depth,
shmdesc->addr + stuff->offset);
if (pMap) {
dixSetPrivate(&pMap->devPrivates, shmPixmapPrivate, shmdesc);
shmdesc->refcnt++;
pMap->drawable.serialNumber = NEXT_SERIAL_NUMBER;
pMap->drawable.id = newPix->info[j].id;
if (!AddResource(newPix->info[j].id, RT_PIXMAP, (pointer)pMap)) {
(*pScreen->DestroyPixmap)(pMap);
result = BadAlloc;
break;
}
} else {
result = BadAlloc;
break;
}
}
if(result == BadAlloc) {
while(j--) {
(*pScreen->DestroyPixmap)(pMap);
FreeResource(newPix->info[j].id, RT_NONE);
}
xfree(newPix);
} else
AddResource(stuff->pid, XRT_PIXMAP, newPix);
return result;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | xserver | be6c17fcf9efebc0bbcc3d9a25f8c5a2450c2161 | 17,219,291,516,037,378,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 | CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping. |
static int copy_from_user_mmap_sem(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t n)
{
int partial;
pagefault_disable();
partial = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, src, n);
pagefault_enable();
/*
* Didn't copy everything, drop the mmap_sem and do a faulting copy
*/
if (unlikely(partial)) {
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
partial = copy_from_user(dst, src, n);
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
}
return partial;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 | 235,093,879,813,159,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | splice: missing user pointer access verification
vmsplice_to_user() must always check the user pointer and length
with access_ok() before copying. Likewise, for the slow path of
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() we need to check that we may read from
the user region.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Wojciech Purczynski <cliph@research.coseinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static long vmsplice_to_user(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct splice_desc sd;
ssize_t size;
int error;
long ret;
pipe = pipe_info(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
if (pipe->inode)
mutex_lock(&pipe->inode->i_mutex);
error = ret = 0;
while (nr_segs) {
void __user *base;
size_t len;
/*
* Get user address base and length for this iovec.
*/
error = get_user(base, &iov->iov_base);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = get_user(len, &iov->iov_len);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
/*
* Sanity check this iovec. 0 read succeeds.
*/
if (unlikely(!len))
break;
if (unlikely(!base)) {
error = -EFAULT;
break;
}
sd.len = 0;
sd.total_len = len;
sd.flags = flags;
sd.u.userptr = base;
sd.pos = 0;
size = __splice_from_pipe(pipe, &sd, pipe_to_user);
if (size < 0) {
if (!ret)
ret = size;
break;
}
ret += size;
if (size < len)
break;
nr_segs--;
iov++;
}
if (pipe->inode)
mutex_unlock(&pipe->inode->i_mutex);
if (!ret)
ret = error;
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 | 93,812,929,696,679,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | splice: missing user pointer access verification
vmsplice_to_user() must always check the user pointer and length
with access_ok() before copying. Likewise, for the slow path of
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() we need to check that we may read from
the user region.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Wojciech Purczynski <cliph@research.coseinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned int nr_vecs, struct page **pages,
struct partial_page *partial, int aligned)
{
int buffers = 0, error = 0;
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
while (nr_vecs) {
unsigned long off, npages;
struct iovec entry;
void __user *base;
size_t len;
int i;
error = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user_mmap_sem(&entry, iov, sizeof(entry)))
break;
base = entry.iov_base;
len = entry.iov_len;
/*
* Sanity check this iovec. 0 read succeeds.
*/
error = 0;
if (unlikely(!len))
break;
error = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!base))
break;
/*
* Get this base offset and number of pages, then map
* in the user pages.
*/
off = (unsigned long) base & ~PAGE_MASK;
/*
* If asked for alignment, the offset must be zero and the
* length a multiple of the PAGE_SIZE.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (aligned && (off || len & ~PAGE_MASK))
break;
npages = (off + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (npages > PIPE_BUFFERS - buffers)
npages = PIPE_BUFFERS - buffers;
error = get_user_pages(current, current->mm,
(unsigned long) base, npages, 0, 0,
&pages[buffers], NULL);
if (unlikely(error <= 0))
break;
/*
* Fill this contiguous range into the partial page map.
*/
for (i = 0; i < error; i++) {
const int plen = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
partial[buffers].offset = off;
partial[buffers].len = plen;
off = 0;
len -= plen;
buffers++;
}
/*
* We didn't complete this iov, stop here since it probably
* means we have to move some of this into a pipe to
* be able to continue.
*/
if (len)
break;
/*
* Don't continue if we mapped fewer pages than we asked for,
* or if we mapped the max number of pages that we have
* room for.
*/
if (error < npages || buffers == PIPE_BUFFERS)
break;
nr_vecs--;
iov++;
}
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (buffers)
return buffers;
return error;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44 | 235,267,654,020,111,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | splice: fix user pointer access in get_iovec_page_array()
Commit 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 ("splice: missing user
pointer access verification") added the proper access_ok() calls to
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() which ensures we can copy the struct iovecs
from userspace to the kernel.
But we also must check whether we can access the actual memory region
pointed to by the struct iovec to fix the access checks properly.
Signed-off-by: Bastian Blank <waldi@debian.org>
Acked-by: Oliver Pinter <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
{
struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
unsigned long it_prof_secs;
int retval;
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
return -EFAULT;
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
return -EINVAL;
old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return -EPERM;
if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
return -EPERM;
retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
if (retval)
return retval;
task_lock(current->group_leader);
*old_rlim = new_rlim;
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU)
goto out;
/*
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
* code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
* very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
* applications, so we live with it
*/
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
goto out;
it_prof_secs = cputime_to_secs(current->signal->it_prof_expires);
if (it_prof_secs == 0 || new_rlim.rlim_cur <= it_prof_secs) {
unsigned long rlim_cur = new_rlim.rlim_cur;
cputime_t cputime;
if (rlim_cur == 0) {
/*
* The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
* expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
* never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
* instead
*/
rlim_cur = 1;
}
cputime = secs_to_cputime(rlim_cur);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
set_process_cpu_timer(current, CPUCLOCK_PROF, &cputime, NULL);
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
out:
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 9926e4c74300c4b31dee007298c6475d33369df0 | 53,303,886,230,877,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | CPU time limit patch / setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, 0) cheat fix
As discovered here today, the change in Kernel 2.6.17 intended to inhibit
users from setting RLIMIT_CPU to 0 (as that is equivalent to unlimited) by
"cheating" and setting it to 1 in such a case, does not make a difference,
as the check is done in the wrong place (too late), and only applies to the
profiling code.
On all systems I checked running kernels above 2.6.17, no matter what the
hard and soft CPU time limits were before, a user could escape them by
issuing in the shell (sh/bash/zsh) "ulimit -t 0", and then the user's
process was not ever killed.
Attached is a trivial patch to fix that. Simply moving the check to a
slightly earlier location (specifically, before the line that actually
assigns the limit - *old_rlim = new_rlim), does the trick.
Do note that at least the zsh (but not ash, dash, or bash) shell has the
problem of "caching" the limits set by the ulimit command, so when running
zsh the fix will not immediately be evident - after entering "ulimit -t 0",
"ulimit -a" will show "-t: cpu time (seconds) 0", even though the actual
limit as returned by getrlimit(...) will be 1. It can be verified by
opening a subshell (which will not have the values of the parent shell in
cache) and checking in it, or just by running a CPU intensive command like
"echo '65536^1048576' | bc" and verifying that it dumps core after one
second.
Regardless of whether that is a misfeature in the shell, perhaps it would
be better to return -EINVAL from setrlimit in such a case instead of
cheating and setting to 1, as that does not really reflect the actual state
of the process anymore. I do not however know what the ground for that
decision was in the original 2.6.17 change, and whether there would be any
"backward" compatibility issues, so I preferred not to touch that right
now.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
void __user *restorer;
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
int err = 0;
int usig;
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
usig = current_thread_info()->exec_domain
&& current_thread_info()->exec_domain->signal_invmap
&& sig < 32
? current_thread_info()->exec_domain->signal_invmap[sig]
: sig;
err |= __put_user(usig, &frame->sig);
err |= __put_user(&frame->info, &frame->pinfo);
err |= __put_user(&frame->uc, &frame->puc);
err |= copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, info);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Create the ucontext. */
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags);
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_link);
err |= __put_user(current->sas_ss_sp, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_sp);
err |= __put_user(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp),
&frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags);
err |= __put_user(current->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size);
err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, &frame->fpstate,
regs, set->sig[0]);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Set up to return from userspace. */
restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn);
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
/*
* This is movl $,%ax ; int $0x80
*
* WE DO NOT USE IT ANY MORE! It's only left here for historical
* reasons and because gdb uses it as a signature to notice
* signal handler stack frames.
*/
err |= __put_user(0xb8, (char __user *)(frame->retcode+0));
err |= __put_user(__NR_rt_sigreturn, (int __user *)(frame->retcode+1));
err |= __put_user(0x80cd, (short __user *)(frame->retcode+5));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Set up registers for signal handler */
regs->sp = (unsigned long) frame;
regs->ip = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_handler;
regs->ax = (unsigned long) usig;
regs->dx = (unsigned long) &frame->info;
regs->cx = (unsigned long) &frame->uc;
regs->ds = __USER_DS;
regs->es = __USER_DS;
regs->ss = __USER_DS;
regs->cs = __USER_CS;
/*
* Clear TF when entering the signal handler, but
* notify any tracer that was single-stepping it.
* The tracer may want to single-step inside the
* handler too.
*/
regs->flags &= ~TF_MASK;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP);
#if DEBUG_SIG
printk("SIG deliver (%s:%d): sp=%p pc=%p ra=%p\n",
current->comm, current->pid, frame, regs->ip, frame->pretcode);
#endif
return 0;
give_sigsegv:
force_sigsegv(sig, current);
return -EFAULT;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 25,210,609,055,917,767,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correctly cleared at the entry of a function.
This patches changes the setup_frame() functions to clear the
direction before entering the signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
compat_sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct exec_domain *ed = current_thread_info()->exec_domain;
void __user *restorer;
int err = 0;
/* __copy_to_user optimizes that into a single 8 byte store */
static const struct {
u8 movl;
u32 val;
u16 int80;
u16 pad;
u8 pad2;
} __attribute__((packed)) code = {
0xb8,
__NR_ia32_rt_sigreturn,
0x80cd,
0,
};
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
err |= __put_user((ed && ed->signal_invmap && sig < 32
? ed->signal_invmap[sig] : sig), &frame->sig);
err |= __put_user(ptr_to_compat(&frame->info), &frame->pinfo);
err |= __put_user(ptr_to_compat(&frame->uc), &frame->puc);
err |= copy_siginfo_to_user32(&frame->info, info);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Create the ucontext. */
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags);
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_link);
err |= __put_user(current->sas_ss_sp, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_sp);
err |= __put_user(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp),
&frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags);
err |= __put_user(current->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size);
err |= ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, &frame->fpstate,
regs, set->sig[0]);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
else
restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso,
rt_sigreturn);
err |= __put_user(ptr_to_compat(restorer), &frame->pretcode);
/*
* Not actually used anymore, but left because some gdb
* versions need it.
*/
err |= __copy_to_user(frame->retcode, &code, 8);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Set up registers for signal handler */
regs->sp = (unsigned long) frame;
regs->ip = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_handler;
/* Make -mregparm=3 work */
regs->ax = sig;
regs->dx = (unsigned long) &frame->info;
regs->cx = (unsigned long) &frame->uc;
/* Make -mregparm=3 work */
regs->ax = sig;
regs->dx = (unsigned long) &frame->info;
regs->cx = (unsigned long) &frame->uc;
asm volatile("movl %0,%%ds" :: "r" (__USER32_DS));
asm volatile("movl %0,%%es" :: "r" (__USER32_DS));
regs->cs = __USER32_CS;
regs->ss = __USER32_DS;
set_fs(USER_DS);
regs->flags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP);
#if DEBUG_SIG
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SIG deliver (%s:%d): sp=%p pc=%lx ra=%u\n",
current->comm, current->pid, frame, regs->ip, frame->pretcode);
#endif
return 0;
give_sigsegv:
force_sigsegv(sig, current);
return -EFAULT;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 336,026,717,347,518,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 99 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correctly cleared at the entry of a function.
This patches changes the setup_frame() functions to clear the
direction before entering the signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct _fpstate __user *fp = NULL;
int err = 0;
struct task_struct *me = current;
if (used_math()) {
fp = get_stack(ka, regs, sizeof(struct _fpstate));
frame = (void __user *)round_down(
(unsigned long)fp - sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), 16) - 8;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, fp, sizeof(struct _fpstate)))
goto give_sigsegv;
if (save_i387(fp) < 0)
err |= -1;
} else
frame = get_stack(ka, regs, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe)) - 8;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) {
err |= copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, info);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
}
/* Create the ucontext. */
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags);
err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_link);
err |= __put_user(me->sas_ss_sp, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_sp);
err |= __put_user(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp),
&frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags);
err |= __put_user(me->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size);
err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, regs, set->sig[0], me);
err |= __put_user(fp, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext.fpstate);
if (sizeof(*set) == 16) {
__put_user(set->sig[0], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[0]);
__put_user(set->sig[1], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[1]);
} else
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
/* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub
already in userspace. */
/* x86-64 should always use SA_RESTORER. */
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
err |= __put_user(ka->sa.sa_restorer, &frame->pretcode);
} else {
/* could use a vstub here */
goto give_sigsegv;
}
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
printk("%d old ip %lx old sp %lx old ax %lx\n", current->pid,regs->ip,regs->sp,regs->ax);
#endif
/* Set up registers for signal handler */
regs->di = sig;
/* In case the signal handler was declared without prototypes */
regs->ax = 0;
/* This also works for non SA_SIGINFO handlers because they expect the
next argument after the signal number on the stack. */
regs->si = (unsigned long)&frame->info;
regs->dx = (unsigned long)&frame->uc;
regs->ip = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_handler;
regs->sp = (unsigned long)frame;
/* Set up the CS register to run signal handlers in 64-bit mode,
even if the handler happens to be interrupting 32-bit code. */
regs->cs = __USER_CS;
/* This, by contrast, has nothing to do with segment registers -
see include/asm-x86_64/uaccess.h for details. */
set_fs(USER_DS);
regs->flags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
printk("SIG deliver (%s:%d): sp=%p pc=%lx ra=%p\n",
current->comm, current->pid, frame, regs->ip, frame->pretcode);
#endif
return 0;
give_sigsegv:
force_sigsegv(sig, current);
return -EFAULT;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 323,536,889,097,069,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correctly cleared at the entry of a function.
This patches changes the setup_frame() functions to clear the
direction before entering the signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
static int setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
void __user *restorer;
struct sigframe __user *frame;
int err = 0;
int usig;
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
usig = current_thread_info()->exec_domain
&& current_thread_info()->exec_domain->signal_invmap
&& sig < 32
? current_thread_info()->exec_domain->signal_invmap[sig]
: sig;
err = __put_user(usig, &frame->sig);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
err = setup_sigcontext(&frame->sc, &frame->fpstate, regs, set->sig[0]);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
if (_NSIG_WORDS > 1) {
err = __copy_to_user(&frame->extramask, &set->sig[1],
sizeof(frame->extramask));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
}
if (current->binfmt->hasvdso)
restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, sigreturn);
else
restorer = &frame->retcode;
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
/* Set up to return from userspace. */
err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
/*
* This is popl %eax ; movl $,%eax ; int $0x80
*
* WE DO NOT USE IT ANY MORE! It's only left here for historical
* reasons and because gdb uses it as a signature to notice
* signal handler stack frames.
*/
err |= __put_user(0xb858, (short __user *)(frame->retcode+0));
err |= __put_user(__NR_sigreturn, (int __user *)(frame->retcode+2));
err |= __put_user(0x80cd, (short __user *)(frame->retcode+6));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Set up registers for signal handler */
regs->sp = (unsigned long) frame;
regs->ip = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_handler;
regs->ax = (unsigned long) sig;
regs->dx = (unsigned long) 0;
regs->cx = (unsigned long) 0;
regs->ds = __USER_DS;
regs->es = __USER_DS;
regs->ss = __USER_DS;
regs->cs = __USER_CS;
/*
* Clear TF when entering the signal handler, but
* notify any tracer that was single-stepping it.
* The tracer may want to single-step inside the
* handler too.
*/
regs->flags &= ~TF_MASK;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP);
#if DEBUG_SIG
printk("SIG deliver (%s:%d): sp=%p pc=%p ra=%p\n",
current->comm, current->pid, frame, regs->ip, frame->pretcode);
#endif
return 0;
give_sigsegv:
force_sigsegv(sig, current);
return -EFAULT;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 240,195,482,991,768,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correctly cleared at the entry of a function.
This patches changes the setup_frame() functions to clear the
direction before entering the signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
DiverseVul: A New Vulnerable Source Code Dataset for Deep Learning Based Vulnerability Detection
This is an unofficial HuggingFace upload of the DiverseVul dataset from "DiverseVul: A New Vulnerable Source Code Dataset for Deep Learning Based Vulnerability Detection".
Usage:
from datasets import load_dataset
dataset = load_dataset("claudios/DiverseVul")
Citation
@article{Chen2023DiverseVulAN,
title={DiverseVul: A New Vulnerable Source Code Dataset for Deep Learning Based Vulnerability Detection},
author={Yizheng Chen and Zhoujie Ding and Lamya Alowain and Xinyun Chen and David A. Wagner},
journal={Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses},
year={2023},
url={https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3607199.3607242}
}
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