Output:
Again, in the Yin Chi Ru Jing Zhu [Annotations to the Sutra of the Entrance to
Truth by Way of Covert Maintenance], the wu yin zhong [Five Negative Elements
species] were described as being “akin to the yuan qi [original breath or spirit].”
Therefore, the idea was not that “all existences” were born of “emptiness,” but that
“all existences” came about as the result of the transformation of the original breath
or spirit which had neither form nor phenomenon. All things were born of this
formless, phenomenon-less original breath or spirit, and man was no exception.
    The argument continues that man was confused because he was holding on to the
various forms and appearances which had temporary existence, but if he was able to
comprehend that wu [nonexistence] existed before the myriad transformations and
that kong [emptiness] was the origin of the many forms, he would be able to revert
to his own source, transcend life and death, become delivered, and merge as one


Output:
with the universe and all things, that is, attain the dao (tao) [way] and revert to the
yuan qi [original spirit]. Therefore, in Dao An’s doctrine of Original Nothingness,
the key to deliverance was to eliminate the incorrect understanding of things.
In nonaction and absence of desire and purity of the mind, one would be able to
achieve that state of being “commensurate with the Ultimate Emptiness and roam
with the Creator Force in tranquil and serene happiness.” (See Ren Ben Yu Sheng
Jing Zhu [Annotations on the Sutra on the Origin of the Life of Man in Desires].)
    The way to deliverance described by Dao An was almost identical to that
proposed by Zhang Zhan. Zhang believed that if man were able to relinquish all
tenets and understand the origins and the ultimate destinations of life and death—
i.e., that man came from the Ultimate Emptiness and shall return unto that Ultimate
Emptiness, man would be able to attain deliverance and become the Ultimate


Output: 120                       9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
Being, which has attained the dao (tao) [way]. Furthermore, the Ultimate Being is
one “whose mind has been re-joined, re-connected with the Original Spirit or
Breath, and whose body, covertly, was in harmony with the Yin and Yang.”
(See the book Lie Zi Zhu [Annotations on Lie Zi].)
   In the Bu zhen kong lun [Treatise on the Fallacy of the Doctrine of True
Nonexistence], the Monk Shao criticized the doctrine of Original Nothingness,
saying:
   The advocates of Original Nothingness align their sentiments on the side of wu
   [nothingness] and then write their words of teaching to support that argument. They refute,
   to begin with, the notion of existence and say that you [existence or being] was in fact wu
   [non-existence]. Even if one refuted the notion of non-existence will nonetheless still be
   nonexistence. The original meaning of the Buddhist canons is that fei you [not being] is
   not really being and that fei wu [not nonbeing] is not really non-being. Why must one insist


Output:
on refuting the notion of being and say that “this being is not,” or refute the notion of
   non-being and say that “non-being is not”?


Output:
What this passage says is: The school of Original Nothingness maintains a
biased affinity for wu [nonbeing]. They accept the idea that nonbeing is the
ontological substance of reality, and all its arguments are based on this philosophy
of nonbeing. Therefore, the adherents of this school do not recognize you [being];
rather, they believe that being cannot be divorced from nonbeing; i.e., they accept
“nonbeing as the origin.” They believe, moreover, that nonbeing itself could not be
separated from nonbeing; i.e., they maintain the notion of the fundamentality of
nonbeing, insist upon it, and see nonbeing as true nonbeing. However, according to
the original intent of the Buddhist sutras, what is important, and to be maintained,
was that “not being” is not truly being [fei you bu shi zhen di you] and not nonbeing
is also not truly nonbeing [fei wu ye bu shi zhen di wu]. Why, therefore, should
anyone insist that “not being” meant the nonbeing of any particular thing or that


Output:
“not nonbeing” meant the absence of any particular nonbeing?
    From the above, it appears that the Monk Shao took the original intent of the
Kong zong [Emptiness school] of prajna Buddhism as his point of departure in
criticizing the doctrine of Original Nothingness and its adherents for their insistence
on wu [nonexistence] and their failure to comprehend that “nonbeing” was itself a
jia ming [false name, or illusion] and not a real being. His argument, ultimately, was
that only “the refutation of both being and nonbeing” was the true principle taught
by Buddhism. In doing so, in the Bu zhen kong lun [Treatise on the Fallacy of the
Doctrine of True Nothingness], the Monk Shao criticized not only the doctrine of
Original Nothingness itself but also Wang Bi’s idea of “valuing nothingness” and
Guo Xiang’s idea of “exalting being” as well and thereby developed [not just
Buddhist teachings but also] the teachings of xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics] of the
Wei and Jin periods.


Output:
Wei and Jin periods.
    The Meaning of the Doctrine of Non-real, Nonexistence, or Emptiness [bu shen
kong yi]. It can be argued that the criticism contained in the Monk Shao’s Bu zhen
kong lun of the three schools of prajna Buddhism which were popular in China at
that time was based on the original intent of the Indian teachings of Buddhist
prajna. By positing that “emptiness is not real” [bu zhen kong], he suggested that
9.1 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China and the Popularization. . .          121


Output:
all things do not truly exist, or that all things not truly are, but rather the existence of
all things is unreal, and that that is why we can call [existence] kong [emptiness
or unreality]. In other words, “emptiness” equals “unreality.” This was the Chinese
expression of the fundamental premise of the Kong zong [Emptiness school] of
Indian Buddhist prajna teaching, namely, the premise that “all fa [dharma, or
things] do not have ontological self-substance” [zhu fa ben wu zi xing].
    The Monk Shao said that the Zhong lun [Treatise on the Mean] posited the
paradox that while, from one angle, “all fa [dharma] were not existent,” from
another angle, “all fa were also, and at the same time, not non-existent.” He argued
that to understand this principle of “not being and yet not nonbeing” would be to
understand the ultimate truth. This is because, he argued, although there were very
many things of various forms and appearances, under analysis they can all be found


Output:
to be formed only by causes and effects and their combinations and have no zi xing
[self-nature, or ontological substance, or reality in and of themselves]. This would
therefore be “nonexistence.” On the other hand, although all dharma had no real
ontological substance, there were nonetheless phenomena in many diverse forms
and appearances, and dharma was therefore also “not nonexistence.” Hence, he
argued, one cannot say that there are no things, but only that there are no real things.
    In what way, then, can there be such “unreal existence” [jia you]? According the
Monk Shao’s interpretation of Zhong lun, all things are formed of the combinations
and permutations of causes and effects and therefore have no ontological substance.
However, once made up by the combination of causes and effects, things also then
become “not nonexistent” and cannot be said to be fundamentally nonexistent.
By further applying logical reasoning to this issue, the Monk Shao concluded that


Output:
this principle was the very basic truth. If “being” was “real being,” he argued,
“being” would have existed at the beginning and should exist to the very end, and
there would have been no need to wait for the combination of causes and effects to
bring “being” into existence. If, on the other hand, “nonbeing” was real nonbeing,
“nonbeing” itself should also have existed at the very beginning and to the very end,
and there would also have been no need to wait for the combination of causes and
effects to bring about “nonbeing.”
    If one were to accept that “being” cannot be “being in itself,” but had to wait for
the combination of causes and effects to bring it into being, then one would be
able to realize that “being” was not “real being.” He said, “Being is not real being;
therefore, though there is being, we do not say that there is real being.” At the same
time, one must also say that there is “not nonbeing.” If there was real “nonbeing,”


Output:
it would be monolithic and totally immobile [zhan ran bu dong] [i.e., totally
incapable of transformation], and no phenomenon could then be generated.
Only such a totally immobile “nonexistence” could be called “real nonexistence.”
Therefore, if we were to say that “all fa” [dharma] were “truly nonexistent,” there
would not be the generation of all fa, and nothing would come of causes and effects.
Since “all fa” do come as a result of causes and effects, then one cannot say that
there is real “nonexistence.”
    Both in terms of contents and methodology, one can say that the Monk Shao’s
Bu zhen kong lun was closer in meaning to the original intents of Indian Buddhist
122                    9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
prajna teaching. It was not by accident that his doctrine of the Bu zhen kong lun
came about; it was, rather, because by that time two conditions had already come
into existence. The first was the fact that Kumarajiva was already in possession of
the various sutras that provided full explanation [to the Chinese] of the prajna
teachings, such as Da zhi du lun [Treatise on the Paramita, or ferrying across by way
of the Great Wisdom] and Zhong lun [Treatise on the Mean] and Bai lun
[The Hundred Treatises] and Shi er men lun [Treatise on the Twelve Sects].
This made it possible by that time to have a clearer understanding of the teachings
of the Indian prajna school of Buddhism. The second was that contemporary
developments in the teachings of xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics] made it possible
for such theories as “nonbeing and yet not nonbeing” [fei you fei wu] to appear in
the Chinese mind and exert an impact on Chinese thinkers (more on this later).


Output:
9.2   The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological
      Culture—Buddhism—And the Previously Existing
      Ideological Culture of China


Output:
The question of the importation of an alien ideological culture and its interaction
with an existing native ideological culture is a very complicated one, and there is
great significance in studying this problem. Our country’s philosophical thinking
[and, in fact, its entire culture and society] underwent a major transformation in the
time of the Wei and Jin dynasties and the North and South dynasties; it can easily
be said that the introduction of Buddhism was one of the most significant causes of
this transformation. As for China Buddhism was an alien ideological culture, it is
very helpful to study the interaction between the two and the process by which this
alien ideological culture integrated with China’s own preexisting traditional
ideological culture. This would include its development from being formalistically
attached to the body of China’s traditional ideological culture, to emerging with its
own characteristics which clearly conflicted with and were contradictory to China’s


Output:
ideological culture, and finally to becoming an integral part of the Chinese
ideological culture.
   The formation of an ideological culture is certain to have its roots in social
history; thus, in the history of the world, various ideological cultures have emerged
which are separate and different in both type and form. To understand the charac-
teristics of an ideological culture and the level of its development, one must
compare it with other ideological cultures. If we were to compare the Buddhism
introduced into China during the period of the Wei, Jin, and North and South
dynasties with what existed at that time as China’s native traditional ideological
culture, we would be able to understand more profoundly not only the characteris-
tics and level of development of that traditional Chinese ideological culture but
also the reasons for which an alien ideological culture was able to be assimilated by
the Chinese. The method of analytically studying the comparisons between the


Output: 9.2 The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological. . .                        123


Output:
ideological culture of one nation [or country or region] and that of another is known
as comparative philosophy, which is guided by Marxist thought.
    Another significant phenomenon which emerged in the period of the Wei, Jin,
and North and South dynasties was the Daoist religion. This was formed in the late
years of the Eastern Han Dynasty and acquired its own theoretical system. Although
it can be said that the formation of the Daoist religion was influenced or stimulated
by the introduction of Buddhism, it was nonetheless a religion peculiar to the
Chinese, particularly to the Han people, and was bound, therefore, to have charac-
teristics which set it apart from Buddhism. Prior to the Wei and the Jin, Buddhism
had just been introduced and in the early stages of its introduction had been
grafted to the already existing body of the daoshu [Daoist techniques and crafts].
Hence, the contradictions between the two religions, although already real, were not


Output:
obvious or outstanding. Since the Wei and Jin, however, because the Daoist
religion’s own system of thought and theory had gradually formed and because
Buddhism, as an imported alien ideological culture, needed to shed gradually its
own earlier attachment to the preexisting native ideological culture, the contradic-
tions and conflict between the two religions became daily more acute and
intensified. If we were to analyze and draw comparisons [between these two
religions] on the issues upon which they debated, it would be easy for us to see
more clearly the characteristics of the Daoist religion as well as the mutual
influence which their two religions had upon one another in the midst of their
contradictions and polemical struggles. This is the task of those who undertake the
study of comparative religion. At this time, we ought also to develop and promote
this field of investigation, so that we may form a comparative study of religions,
guided, also, by Marxist thought.


Output:
guided, also, by Marxist thought.
    What were the most notable characteristics in Buddhism after it was introduced
into China and as it became popularized and developed in China? What are the
ones we should study and what general laws [of development] can we extract from
[such a study]? What conclusions can be drawn? In the following discussion, we
shall suggest three major problem areas for analysis.


Output:
9.2.1     Adaptation to Tradition

When Buddhism was introduced into China, at first it was grafted upon the body of
preexisting Chinese ideological culture; then, it gradually developed on its own and
began to exert its own influence on that culture and Chinese society. It should be
understood that Buddhism did not have a great deal of influence immediately after
its introduction.
    After being introduced into China in the Han Dynasty, Buddhism at first attached
itself to the daoshu. In the Wei and Jin period, because of the popularity and
influence of xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics], Buddhism switched and was attached
to the latter. During the time of the Han Dynasty, the central tenets of [Chinese]
Buddhism were “the imperishability of the soul, or spirit,” and “causes and effects.”
124                    9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
These were ideas that were already originally carried within traditional Chinese
thought or, in some cases, were at least similar in ways to certain ideas which
already existed in Chinese philosophical traditions. Furthermore, the Hinayana
methods of chan meditation [dhyam] which were preached at that time also
generally were quite similar to the breathing exercises taught by the Huang-Lao
School of Daoism (Taoism) and the Immortality [shen xian jia] school. By the time
of the Wei and Jin Daoist, metaphysical teachings had become popular, and, since
Kong zong [the Emptiness sect] of Buddhist prajna teachings was somewhat
similar to these Daoist metaphysical teachings, this branch of Buddhism was
therefore able to gain popularity by attaching itself to the body of xuanxue.
However, it was not until Kumarajiva translated the sutras and commentaries
[sastras] such as the Zhong lun that the Chinese understanding of the teachings of
the Kong zong of Indian Buddhist prajna philosophy came close to capturing the


Output:
original intents of those teachings. From the above brief description, we can see
that, when Buddhism was first introduced into China, it had first to exist as an
attachment, or graft, on the body of some previously existing ideology, and only
thus was it able to achieve popularity of its own.
    There is one question here which needs to be raised and calls for some
discussion. When Zhi-lou-jian translated the Dao Xing Jing [Sutra on the Practice,
or Way, of the Truth] in the year 179 A.D., there was in it a pin [segment or folio]
known as the ben wu pin [segment of Original Nothingness]. This appeared long
before the [xuanxue] ideas of gui wu [exalting nothingness] and yi wei ben [taking
nothingness as the origin] which are identified with He Yan [190–249] and Wang Bi
[226–249]. Does this then mean that Wang and He’s idea of “taking nothingness
as the origin” was a product, a result of the influence of Buddhism? We do not


Output:
believe that this is the answer; it would accord with the facts of the historical record
to think that Daoist metaphysical thinking [or xuanxue] was generated only
under the influence of Buddhism. First of all, the formation of Daoist metaphysical
thinking responded to the social needs at the time. Moreover, the emergence
of xuanxue should be considered in the light and context of other intellectual
developments, either of the period or slightly earlier. These include the develop-
ment of the teachings of ming li zhi xue [on names and principles] and the
distinction between cai [ability] and xing [nature, or character] which appeared
during the interim period between the fall of the Han and the rise of Wei, as well as
the revival of various schools of Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism), the School of
Names [Ming jia] and Legalism, and their mutual intersection and influence.
This makes it possible to see that, from the angle of certain inevitable trends in


Output:
ideological and intellectual development, this emergence of xuanxue was a product
of the natural processes of China’s indigenous intellectual evolution.
    We have not found any convincing evidence that Wang Bi and He Yan were
influenced by Buddhism. Even if one or two pieces of evidence were to be
discovered indicating that Wang, He, and company may have been in contact
with the Buddhism of the day, either directly or indirectly, nonetheless we must
still maintain that the ideas of xuanxue were products of the development of
preexisting indigenous Chinese ideas themselves. Furthermore, there is a great
9.2 The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological. . .                               125


Output:
deal of evidence showing that by and large, during the Han-Wei period, the Chinese
officer-scholar gentry did not in the least think highly of Buddhism. For instance,
Mouzi in Li huo lun [Treatise on the Disposition of Error] said for the record that
“the people of the age, and scholars, mostly sneer at it [i.e. Buddhism] and defame
it” and “we have not heard that, among the rules and teachings accepted by the five
talents or among the discussions taken up in the Forest of Confucianist Scholars,
the practicing of the ways of Buddha is valued or self-disfigurement is esteemed.”
    One thing serves to illustrate this point even more clearly and conclusively,
namely, that while in the prajna Buddhist teachings of the time the term ben wu
[Original Nothingness] was used, it did not mean the same thing as Wang Bi’s idea
of yi wu wei ben [taking nothingness to be the origin]. In the various prajna sutras,
the idea of ben wu was taken to mean that “all fa [dharma] do not have ontological


Output:
self-substance” [zhu fa ben wu zi xing]—that is, that all things did not, in and of
themselves, have real substance. This, if fact, negated the notion that there
was original substance to things. When Wang Bi spoke of ben wu [Original
Nothingness], on the other hand, he meant that “nothingness was the original
substance”—that is, ontological reality—of existence [wu shi you di ben li].
    The Buddhist teachings that were imported into China in the Wei-Jin period
were for the most part teachings of the Mahayana pr jna Kong zong [Emptiness
school]. Its fundamental premise was that “all things did not originally have
ontological substance, or self-substance” [zi xing]. In this, the term fa [dharma]
referred to all things, material but also spiritual. These were known as adharma in
the Buddhist sutras. In the Da bo-re jing [Great Collection of Prajna Sutras],
volume 556, we find the following passage:
    Take ourselves, for instance; we are, ultimately, not life. We are jia ming [false


Output:
names or unreal names] [i.e., we are illusions, or falsehoods.] We have no zi xing
[self-nature, or nature in and of ourselves]. Likewise, all dharma—they too are
nothing but false names, and no nature in and of themselves. What is se [appear-
ance]? It cannot be assumed and cannot be born. What is shou [acceptance, or
destiny] or xiang [thought] or xing [action] or shi [perception, or understanding]?
They, too, are incapable of being assumed or being born.
    The Kong zong [Emptiness school] of prajna teaching believed that while people
have always held to the notion that there was something which could be called you
wuo [having oneself, or self-existence], i.e., zi ti [self-substance], they have done so
without realizing that “self” was nothing but the combination produced by the five
elements [wu yin] of se [appearance], shou [acceptance or destiny], xiang [thought],
xing [action], and shi [perception or understanding]. They were indeed wrong to have


Output:
believed that there was such a thing as “self.” How could “self” exist apart from or
independent of these five elements? Therefore, it argued the term “self” was really
nothing but a hypothesis, an unreal name [jia ming], and did not contain any self-
nature. Not only was this true of people but of all dharma [things] as well. Therefore,
the Guan si ti pin [Segment of the Meditation on the Catvariarya satyani, or Four
Noble True Statements] in the Zhong lun argued:
   The various causes and effects generate the dharma. The idea of self is but an idea of
   emptiness, and also a false name. This is the meaning of the Central Way, or the Mean.
126                       9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
The argument here, apparently, was that, since all things were generated by
causes and effects, there is in reality no such thing as zi xing [self-nature, or real
self-substance] but only kong [nonexistence]. The idea of self, therefore, is itself
a “nonexistence.” However, although things did not contain “self-substance,”
there are, nonetheless, all sorts of separate phenomena in the world after all.
What then are such things? To say that, they do not have real existence; still
possible, however, are all sorts of unreal existences or phenomena. For purposes
of convenience, the argument went, these are given hypothetical, or false, names.
The Fang guang bo-re jing [Prajnaparamita Sutra Emitting Light] said:
   Buddha spoke thus to Subhuti [One of the Ten Major Discipies of Buddha, said to have
   been the best exponent of the Sunya, or Doctrine of the Void—Tr.]: Names are not real; an
   unreal designation is given and is known as a name, or as the five yin [elements] or as a


Output: human being, man or woman.


Output:
The Monk Shao, in Bu zhen kong lun, provided the following explanation:
   The Fangguang [sutra] said: All dharma have false designations which are not real.
   For example, Man is the product of the transformation of illusions; this is not to say that
   there is no man who is the product of the transformation of illusions, but simply that Man
   who is the product of the transformation of illusions is not really Man [i.e., there is no
   reality to Man who is produced by the transformation of illusions].


Output:
This raises a secondary question which must be discussed here. Does the idea of
kong [emptiness or nonexistence] in the saying “self, as it is expressed, is kong, or
empty or non-existent” [wuo shuo ji shi kong] signify the position that while things,
phenomenologically speaking, did not really exist, there was, nonetheless, an
ontologically real “nonexistence” [similar to Wang Bi’s ontologically real wu, or
nonbeing] which itself was true? This, we shall see, was not the viewpoint of
the Kong zong [Emptiness school] of prajna Buddhist teaching. To the adherents
of the Kong zong, kong simply referred to the absence “of ontological self-
substance in all dharma.” This arose because the dictum “dharma is produced or
generated by causes and effects; the statement of self is itself nonexistent” was
proposed for the very purpose of dispelling people’s insistence on holding to the
idea of real ontological substance in all things. But if people were simply to switch


Output:
to insist on [the idea of the reality of] nonexistence, alluded to in the sentence
“the statement of self is itself a non-existence,” then the purpose would be defeated,
because people would still be insisting on the reality of something, i.e., of “non-
existence.” That is why, the Kong zong believed, it was necessary to add: “Even
this [non-existence itself] is but a false name.” Hence the formulation, completed,
would be: Not only are the names of things, i.e., phenomena, jia ruing [false names]
and merely hypothetical; kong [emptiness, or nonexistence] itself is a false
name also.
   Volume 556 of the Da Bo You Jing contained this parable:
   At one time, the various sons of heaven asked He Who Appeared in Goodness [a name for
   Buddha]: Is it possible to be in Nirvana and still revert to the realm of illusion? He Who
   Appeared in Goodness replied: If there was a thing [dharma] that overcame Nirvana and
   yet, then, reverted to the state of illusion, what would Nirvana then be?


Output: 9.2 The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological. . .                                       127


Output:
One must, therefore, not only understand that all dharma do not have real
ontological substance; one must at the same time not insist on [the reality of]
non-existence. The Da zhi du lun [Treatise on the Ferrying Across by Means of
the Great Wisdom] said:
   The situation is like the taking of medicine. Medicine can dispel the sickness. When the
   illness has been dispelled, the medicine should also be expelled. If not, then an illness will
   be acquired. Kong [non-existence] is something that was used to dispel all our troubles,
   but we should be wary lest kong itself remain to plague us. Therefore, what we suggest is
   that we must use kong to shed kong—that is, we must understand the non-existence of
   non-existence itself.


Output:
This means that the assertion of “nonexistence” was for the purpose of
dispelling the insistence on existence. When and if the notion of existence has
been dispelled, the time would come for one to know that “nonexistence” is itself an
illusion, an unreality, or false name. Yet, one cannot say that all is “nonexistence”
(because there is still, e.g., man who is the product of the transformation of
illusions). To understand both of these aspects would be to achieve the Zhong
dao guan [True Meditation of the Middle Way, or Mean]. It was, however, not until
the late years of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, after Kumarajiva had already translated
such treatises as the Zhong lun, that this idea of “not existence and yet not
non-existence” [fei you fei wu] was truly accepted and understood among Chinese
Buddhists and epitomized in the Bu zhen kong lun of the Monk Shao.
    Prior to the time of the Monk Shao, the general understanding which the Chinese


Output:
monks had regarding prajna teaching was on the whole derived from the perspec-
tives of the Daoist metaphysical [xuanxue] thought which was popular at the time.
This is something we have already discussed. To further substantiate this argument,
let us now analyze again some of the problems raised in connection with Dao An’s
theory of Original Nothingness. We have, earlier, cited the following passage from
Ji Kang (Chi Kang)’s Zhong Lun Shu [Commentary on the Treatise of the Mean]:
   When Master An expressed [the doctrine of] Original Nothingness, he meant that all
   dharma’s original nature was emptiness and extinction. That is why he said “Original
   Nothingness.”


Output:
Is this not the same idea as that contained in the saying: “All dharma do not
originally have any ontological self-substance”? In fact, it is not. The sentence here,
“all dharma’s original nature is emptiness and extinction,” meant that emptiness
and extinction made up the original nature of all dharma or, in other words, all
things have emptiness and extinction for their original nature or ontological
substance. This was an interpretation that could be traced as far back as the Monk
Hui Da’s Shao Lun Shu [Commentary on the Arguments of the Monk Shao]. There
he criticized Dao An’s theory of Original Nothingness by saying: “[He, Dao An,]
was simply unable to realize that originally all dharma was nothing; and therefore
he called original non-existence real, but resulting existence vulgar.” The same idea
was contained in An Cheng’s Zhong Lun Shu [Commentary on the Treatise of the
Mean], which said: “The Bie ji [Alternative Record] says ‘The true statement


Output:
[zhen li] is the origin of the vulgar statement [shu ti].’ That is why we say that
128                     9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
Non-existence existed prior to the Original, or Primeval, Transformation.” From all
the above illustrations, we can see that, in Dao An’s understanding of kong
[nonexistence] or wu [nonbeing], he still took them to be the ontological substance
for you [existence].
   Why did such a set of circumstances come about? Because, as Engels pointed
out, tradition is an immense force of conservatism. It appears that every ideological
cultural tradition is bound to have its conservative aspect which resists imported
alien ideological cultural influences. For that reason, an imported ideological
culture must first adapt itself to the requirements and demands of the originally
existing native ideological culture and be grafted onto its body. Those elements
within the imported ideological culture which are relatively close to the original
native ideological culture or which resemble it will be easier to be propagated; only
then, after the grafting and the initial propagation, will it be possible for the various


Output:
parts of the imported culture gradually to infiltrate the original culture and exert
some of their own influence, until eventually [the imported culture] modifies, or
effects transformations in, the original ideological culture.


Output: 9.2.2    The Enrichment and Intensification of Tradition


Output:
When an imported ideological culture is capable of having a relatively great
impact on the country [or nation or region] to which it was imported, in addition
to the real and practical societal needs, this would often also occur because the
imported culture in general approximated a potential or possible product of
the evolution—or certain aspects of the evolution—of the original indigenous
ideological culture itself.
    It is possible to trace a line of development in the ideas of xuanxue [Daoist
metaphysics] from Wang Bi and He Yan’s ideas of gui wu [valuing nothingness or
nonbeing] which were based on the notion of “taking nonbeing as the origin” to Guo
Xiang’s idea of cong you [exalting being] which was based on the notion of “all
things generating themselves” [wan wu zi sheng]. Subsequently, the ideas of Zhang
Zhan emerged during the time of the Eastern Jin, which were exemplified in the
saying, “Things are generated by themselves spontaneously and instantly, and yet


Output:
they share one common origin in nonbeing” [fu er er zi sheng, ze ben long yu wu].
What then followed in this line of development was the notion of “not being and yet
not nonbeing” [fei you fei wu]. This was similar to the doctrine of “not real nonex-
istence” [bu shen kong] in the Kong zong [Emptiness school] of prajna Buddhist
teaching. Why was it possible for Wei-Jin Daoist metaphysics to develop into the
idea of “not being and yet not nonbeing?” One may say that this was a “potential”
product of the evolution of Wei-Jin Daoist metaphysics or, in other words, it can be
said that such an evolution was not only not antithetical or contradictory to the
essence of Wei-Jin Daoist metaphysics; it was in fact an enrichment of Wei-Jin
Daoist metaphysics.
9.2 The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological. . .                        129


Output:
Beginning with Wang Bi and He Yan, and particularly in the case of Wang Bi,
Wei-Jin Daoist metaphysical thought carried out rather penetrating examinations
and logical reasoning on the question of the relationship between you [being] and
wu [nonbeing]. Wang Bi used the idea of ti [substance] and yong [effect, function,
usage, or phenomenon] to illustrate the relationship between being and nonbeing.
He posited that “nonbeing cannot be without expression, and therefore must have
cause in being.” Therefore, he believed that, while “nonbeing” was the ontological
substance, it was contained in “being” and had expression in “being.” Therefore, he
viewed substance [ti] and use [yong] as essentially one and the same thing.
However, since there was an emphasis in Wang Bi’s system of thought on the
absoluteness of “nonbeing,” the idea of “exalting the origin and ending the result”
[cong ben shi mo] emerged. This brought about an inconsistency in Wang Bi’s


Output:
system of thought. From the perspective of this cong ben shi mo idea, it can be said
that there was a notion of negating the being or an idea of “not being.” Through
Xiang Xiu and Pei Wei, Wang Bi’s idea of gui wu [valuing the nonbeing] later made
the transition to Guo Xiang’s idea of cong you [exalting being].
   In Guo’s view, being was the only existence, and there was nothing that existed
over and beyond wan wu [all things] and that could have served as the ontological
substance for wan you [i.e., a Creator substance]. He believed that the existence of
all things was based on their respective “self-nature” [zi xing] and that this
self-nature was generated spontaneously and instantaneously. For this reason he
argued: “Nonbeing is nonbeing; that is it. It cannot generate being.” In this way, he
directly challenged and refuted the idea of an ontologically substantial nonbeing.
This idea in itself contained the notion of “not nonbeing.”


Output:
In the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Zhang Zhan wrote a commentary and annotations to
the book Lie Zi, and in it he attempted to bring together in his own way the ideas of
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang. On the one hand, he argued that “all beings [qun you]
have the Ultimate Void [zhi xu] as their ancestor [zong]”—i.e., wu [nonbeing] or zhi
xu [the Ultimate Void] was the basis for the existence of you [being]. This was his
idea of wu as ontological substance. To him, nonbeing was neither created nor
perishable; it does not come together and does not dissipate, whereas all being is
created and is perishable and clusters and dissipates. Moreover, he believed that all
species [wan pin] have their ultimate test in their ultimate perishability and,
therefore, are “not being.” Yet, at the same time, Zhang argued that all things
were instantaneously and spontaneously created—their existence was neither
purposeful nor conditional. This had the potential or possibility of leading toward
the idea of “not nonbeing.”


Output:
the idea of “not nonbeing.”
   Nevertheless, in the case of Zhang Zhan, these two ideas were put together
mechanistically and were mutually incompatible and contradictory. His system of
thought was not one which was tightly woven. And yet, incidentally, it was at this
juncture that prajna Buddhist teachings, in particular those of the Kong zong,
posited the idea of fei you fei wu [not being and yet not nonbeing], which itself
was far more solid and tightly argued in theory and reasoning methods. For that
reason, one can say that the doctrine of the Bu zhen kong lun [Treatise on the
Fallacy of Real Nothingness] proposed by the Monk Shao was a development
130                    9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
of the ideas of xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics] after Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.
Although the ideas of the Monk Shao came directly from Indian prajna Buddhist
teaching, they in fact became an important component of Chinese philosophy itself
and helped to make up the following circle in the development of Wei-Jin
xuanxue—Wang Bi—Guo Xiang—the Monk Shao.
   Why was such a development possible? One may ascribe it to the demands or
requirements of the heritage or continuity of ideological cultures [as they came into
contact with one another]. As long as the development of an ideological culture is
not drastically interrupted, what follows must be the product of a continuous
evolution from what preceded it. The development of preceding ideas often
would contain several possibilities and the ideas which would continue to be
developed, representing the subsequent parts of the development, and would be
bound to take the shape of one or another of these possibilities. If an imported alien


Output:
ideological culture can, on the whole, adapt or conform to a certain aspect of a
potential or possible development of the original indigenous culture and ideology
[or fit into a trend or tendency of one of the possible developments], not only will it
be itself developed and thus exert relatively great influence in itself, but it may
even become directly a component part of the original indigenous ideological
culture and perhaps even to some extent alter the course of the development of
that original ideological culture.


Output: 9.2.3    Relative Excellence and Real Contribution


Output:
If an imported alien ideological culture affects the original indigenous ideological
culture, and if this is not a temporary influence but a long-lasting one, in some
aspects or even in all aspects in general it would have to achieve a higher level of
development than that of the indigenous culture. Only in this way can the imported
ideological culture serve as a stimulus to the native culture and affect the develop-
ment of the native culture itself.
    Whether or not the level of development and sophistication in reasoning
achieved by the Kong zong [Emptiness school] of Indian prajna Buddhist teaching
was generally higher than that of China’s own native and traditional ideological
culture which existed at that time is a question which may not be realistically and
honestly resolved until very careful and meticulous analysis has been made. This is
not a problem which we may attempt to discuss here. However, in one specific
aspect of its ways of reasoning and philosophizing, namely, its analysis of the


Output:
questions of being and nonbeing [you-wu], the Kong zong of prajna Buddhism, in
postulating the dialectical thesis of “not being and yet not nonbeing” [fei you fei
wu], clearly demonstrated a superior level of theory and reasoning in comparison
with the ideas of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, although its own ideas, like those of
Wang and Guo, were drawn from the general source of idealism. In terms of
development, although it appeared to have been derived out of Wang Bi and
Guo Xiang’s xuanxue thought, the Monk Shao’s doctrine of bu zhen kong
9.2 The Interaction Between the Imported Ideological. . .                            131


Output:
[not real emptiness] was closer to the original intents of the Kong zong’s
teachings and should be acknowledged as having made certain advances beyond
Wang and Guo’s ideas.
    As I see it, it was after the baptism of the introduction and assimilation of prajna
philosophy introduced from India that the idealist philosophies of the Chinese
tradition became themselves a truly influential and meaningful system of thought.
In them, the doctrine of the Creator [a spiritual ontological substance which created
Heaven and Earth and all things] no longer occupied a central position. Instead,
abstract concepts such as li [principle] or dao [Way], which determined, rather than
personally created, the existence of Heaven, Earth, and all things, were put into the
position of first or primal importance. In another case, it was the mind that was put
into that position, as in ideas which posited that “mind equals principle” [xin ji li] or
“the principle is possessed in the mind” [li ju yu xin]; i.e., the notions that the


Output:
principles of Heaven, Earth, and all things were all present in the mind. It was only
after such idealistic concepts were developed that the fundamental forms of China’s
traditional idealist philosophy were set. This itself set the stage for the emergence of
the li xue [Neo-Confucianist Philosophy of Principle] in the Song and Ming
dynasties, whether it be the Cheng and Zhu [Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi]
school or the Lu-Wang [Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming] school.
    However, for an imported alien ideological culture, even one with a relatively
higher level of development in reasoning, to have a great and long-lasting impact on
the country [nation or region] to which it is introduced, it not only would have to
subject itself, nonetheless, to the limitations of the political and socioeconomic
conditions of the host country, nation, or region, but it must also be in possession of
the first and second sets of conditions described in the afore-discussed sections.


Output:
This is particularly true of ideological cultures, especially if the original, indigenous
ideological culture did not experience an abrupt and radical interruption or if such
an interruption was not to be caused by the introduction of the alien culture. Only in
such a way could the new culture affect the original culture in a profound and
long-lasting way. Without these conditions, no matter how advanced or superior the
imported ideological culture may be, it would be difficult for it to strike roots
into the soil of the host country and over the long run exert any deep influence.
For example, the Wei shi [Vidjnana, or Consciousness Only school] teachings of
Buddhism introduced [later] by the [Tang Dynasty] Monk Xuan Zang, and the
related teachings of vidjna [yin ming, or hetuvidya, or nyaya teachings] which were
introduced at about the same time and in conjunction with the Consciousness Only
school, were also superior in the levels of their reasoning and development, and yet,


Output:
though they gained much ground in establishing a reputation for themselves for a
time, they did not eventually have a very long-lasting impact on the development of
Chinese thought as a whole. Even though specific categories of thought in the
Consciousness Only [Wei shi] school, such as the dual categories of neng [ability or
possibility] and suo [identity or proper placement], were individually absorbed into
Chinese thought, on the whole the Wei shi school did not become an integrated
component of the Chinese traditional ideological culture, and to this day, we still
have the tendency to think of the Wei shi [vid jnana, or Consciousness Only]
teachings as an Indian ideology.
132                    9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
Out of the three points of argumentation outlined above, we may draw out one
proposition: that it is meaningful, at least in one aspect, to focus the comparative
study of philosophies on the general and historical laws which govern the extent
to which an imported alien ideological culture may influence [the ideological
culture(s) of] the country, or nation or region to which it was introduced, and on
the conditions without which such an influence may not take place. In comparing
and analyzing, for example, two ideological cultures which stemmed from different
traditions, we must understand, first, the characteristics and level of development
and reasoning which have been achieved by the original indigenous ideological
culture [i.e., that which, of the two, is the host culture] and, second, the differences
and similarities between these two cultures, their mutual influences, their assimila-
tion and conflict, the amelioration of their conflict, and so on.


Output:
As we study the introduction of Buddhism from India to China in the first
century A.D. and its subsequent development, we must ask its meaning for the
practical way of life today. The tendencies in the development of current world
ideological cultures are manifested as patterns conflict and harmony between many
different ideological cultures stemming from many different traditions. The insta-
bility, contradictions, and conflicts in the world today may also be ascribed, in
addition to certain other [political and economic] factors, in part to differences in
ideological and cultural [i.e., philosophical and religious] traditions. The contra-
dictions between the Arab and Islamic world, on the one hand, and the West, on the
other, for example, are themselves fraught with philosophical and religious factors.
At the same time, because of the increasing frequency and intimacy in terms of
intercultural contacts in today’s world, the propensity for mutual interaction and


Output:
influence and for harmonization and assimilation between various ideological
cultures is also very obvious.
    In particular, the broad spread of Marxism throughout the world today has
provided many new lessons to be learned and emulated in the relations between
ideological cultures which stem from different traditions and backgrounds.
Marxism itself was generated in Western Europe under historical conditions
peculiar to Western Europe and, therefore, as an ideological culture, it was alien
to many other parts of the world. Out of this, problems have surfaced in the
relationship between Marxism and the various indigenous ideological cultures of
the places to which it has been introduced. Even though Marxism is a proletarian
philosophy and the cause of the proletariat is not confined by national boundaries—
[Marxism] is the ideological weapon with which the proletariat and the revolu-
tionary peoples of all countries carry out their revolutionary struggles—in order for


Output:
Marxism to take root in any country [or nation or region] in a certain sense, it will
still have to become integrated with the native ideological culture of that country
[nation or region]. Or, shall we say, it must undertake critically to carry on the
legacy of that original indigenous ideological cultural tradition. Unless this is
achieved, Marxism will not be able to exert any real influence.
    Is it possible then for Marxism to be enriched and furthered in its development
by, say, the study of the relations between Marxism and China’s traditional
indigenous ideological culture? We believe so. In the essay “The Task of the
9.3 The Comparative Study of Philosophies and Regions                             133


Output:
Youth League,” Lenin said: “It is only when we have indeed understood fully the
culture which is created through the entire developmental process of humanity at
large, and are capable of transforming this culture of the past, that we can proceed
to construct a truly proletarian culture.” Undoubtedly, Marxism is a methodology
which will guide us in dealing accurately with our various ideological cultural
traditions. It is “not a doctrine, but a methodology. It provides, not ready-made
dogma, but points of departure for further investigation and a methodology which
may be employed in such an investigation” (see The Complete Works of Marx
and Engels [Chinese edition], vol. 39, p. 406]). It should be acknowledged that in
the history of human civilization, each nation or people had, and has, its own
special contribution to make. If we were to study, with the correct method, these
contributions, we would be able to render accurate assessments regarding them and


Output:
turn these assessments into parts of the legacy of the spiritual civilization of
humanity, which we are to inherit. It is not the intent of Marxism to reject the
spiritual cultures which have made contributions to the human society; rather, it
hopes to absorb them, and transform them, and in the process continue to enrich
and develop itself.


Output: 9.3    The Comparative Study of Philosophies and Regions


Output:
The present age is vastly different from past ages. As the world marches into the
1980s, developments in science and technology and social progress have made the
interaction between the various countries and nations of the world immensely
different from that of the past when the world was still in a stage of feudalism.
These objective circumstances compel us to absorb imported alien ideological
cultures more quickly. What methods can we use to turn those parts of alien ideas
which are of use and value to us more speedily into integrated parts of our own
ideological culture? One important method would be to engage in the comparative
study of philosophies. In the past, the absorption of alien ideological cultures as a
natural and spontaneous process was often slow and sluggish, and incidental and
accidental factors tended to have a great deal of influence on the process. If we were
to carry out such work today in a conscious and deliberate fashion, we are bound to


Output:
be able to absorb the valuable and refined portions of an alien ideological culture
more speedily. This problem applies to Marxism as well. If we are able to deal
correctly with the relationship between Marxism and our own ideological cultural
tradition, so that Marxism may become even more compatible with the circum-
stances and sentiments of the people in our country, if we may create a Sinicized
Marxism, then it not only would take deeper and stronger roots in China but would
also more effectively absorb and retain the good and valuable parts of Chinese
ideological cultural tradition and expel those which are valueless or corrupted so
that our country’s fine spiritual culture may be further developed. Therefore, the
establishment of comparative philosophical studies under the guidance of Marxism
is a most important task for us. The question is, how we should undertake the study
of comparative philosophy?
134                      9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output: 9.3.1    The Search for Common Laws


Output:
In comparatively studying two ideological cultures from different traditions, we
should attend to the discovery of certain common laws which govern the evolution
of human ideological culture.
   The study of comparative philosophy, like the comparative study of religions
and literature, has a specific meaning of its own. The study of comparative
philosophy does not mean simply the comparison between two, any two, philoso-
phers (taking, for instance, Zhu Xi and Wang Shouren [Wang Yangming]); any
more than the study of comparative religion means the simple comparison of any
two Buddhist monks [say, Zhi Dun and Dao An]. Comparative philosophy or
comparative religion refers to comparing two systems of philosophical thought
which stem from different traditions or two religious systems that come from
different sources and origins. Therefore, such comparative studies must be com-
parative analyses of two different countries [such as China and India] or regions


Output:
[such as East and West] or nations [such as the Chinese people and some other
nationality].
   Philosophy is the most general science in the study of Nature, society, and
human reasoning, and the laws which govern the development of human thought
are, fundamentally speaking, similar or for the most part identical. Thus, when we
have understood the laws which governed and sustained the evolution of the
philosophical thought of a certain ideological cultural tradition, analyze the philo-
sophical thoughts of another ideological cultural tradition promises to be of great
help. In “On the Problems of the Dialectical Method,” Lenin said:
   [These are] the circles which describe the history of philosophy: The Ancient World:
   Dialectics from Democritus through Plato to Heraclitus; The Modern Age: Feuerbach to
   Hegel [through Berkeley, Hume, and Kant]; Hegel to Feuerbach to Marx.


Output:
In his “Outline to Hegel’s ‘Notes on the History of Philosophy,’” Lenin
also said:
   It is possible to see the history of philosophy in terms of circles. . .. Each type of
   philosophical thinking equals a smaller circle on the big circle (spiral) of the evolution
   of human thought.


Output:
Hegel’s idea of “the history of Philosophy as a circle,” which Lenin cited in the
abovementioned essays, is not only a law which summarizes the development of
Western thought but also a profound reflection of the general law of the history of
the development of philosophy and of thought in the universal sense. If we took this
idea to be a compass to guide us in studying the laws which governed the
development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we could see that, in general,
traditional Chinese philosophy was also made up of three major spirals. The first
would be the philosophy of the pre-Qin period: from Confucius to Mencius to
Xunzi [through the philosophies of other schools of the time]. The second would be
Wei-Jin xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics]: Wang Bi to Guo Xiang to the Monk Shao.
The third would be Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism: Zhang Zai to Zhu Xi to Wang
9.3 The Comparative Study of Philosophies and Regions                            135


Output:
Fuzhi. Between these three circles, which are to be seen as being put together as
spirals, there would be the connecting tissues of development—the Han Classical
scholarship [jing-xue], which made up the transition from the first circle to the
second one, and the development of Sui-Tang Buddhism, which made up the
transition from the second circle to the third. Together, these three ascending
circles would make up a vast circle which would express the whole of Chinese
philosophical tradition: from the pre-Qin and Han philosophy, whose primary
substance was Confucianism, to the Wei-Jin and Sui-Tang philosophy, whose
primary substance was xuanxue [metaphysics] built on the foundation and
framework of the ideas of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi as well as a gradually
Sinicized Buddhism, to the Neo-Confucianism [Song-Ming Confucianism], which
absorbed the thought of both Daoism (Taoism) and Buddhism and on that basis
developed [Confucianism] to a higher stage of evolution.


Output:
In the book Comparative Religion, F. B. Jevons cited one example which quite
clearly demonstrated the general significance of the study of comparative religion.
He said that it was difficult to understand, or explain, the demotion of the Thunder
God in the religion of ancient Babylon from his original status to the rank of a
demon. The answer seemed to lie, he also said, in the study of comparative religion
and its methodology, because in the history of the development of various religions
we often encounter the phenomenon of deities of an earlier religion being demoted
to another rank in a new religion when the older, earlier religion is overcome and
replaced. In this case, the method of the study of comparative religion provides us
with a rational explanation for such a phenomenon as the demotion of the Thunder
God of Babylon to the rank of a demon.
   At the present time, the methods of comparative studies generally fall into


Output:
two categories: “parallel studies” and “influence studies.” The former refers to
conducting comparative studies between two different ideological cultures which
do not have direct or indirect influences upon one another, and yet between whom
there obviously are comparable points. In this case, the task would be to discover
the similar as well as the dissimilar phenomena between the two and to demonstrate
common laws and dissimilar, individual qualities. The latter is to conduct compar-
ative studies where there are direct or indirect mutual influences or, in some cases,
unilateral influence, in order to discover the shared phenomena as well as points of
dissimilarity so as to demonstrate the contradictions, conflicts, assimilations, and
compromises that exist between them.
   No matter to which category it may belong, when a comparison is made, it
should not simply draw one or two elements from the ideological culture of a
country, nation, or region and study them in comparison with a few sayings or one


Output:
or two isolated phenomena from the ideological culture of another country, nation,
or region. This would be what is known as piecemeal comparison which, strictly
speaking, has hardly anything to do with the study of comparative philosophy or
comparative religion. The comparative study of two different ideological cultural
traditions ought to be conducted on the basis of a rather comprehensive and
exhaustive comparison of a problem or problems found in both traditions.
Only in this way can we discover the phenomena [within each] which reflect the
136                    9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
presence of laws, and only then can we be led from knowledge or its absence to
knowledge regarding this particular law of the development of human ideological
culture and from the understanding of the individual to an understanding of
the general.

9.3.2    Attention to the Specific Characteristics of a Culture


Output:
In undertaking to study comparatively the ideological cultures of two different
traditions, we should base conclusions on the special characteristics and features of
both of these cultures. Only when a certain ideological culture is compared and
analyzed in the light of a different ideological cultural tradition that its own special
characteristics and features can become clarified. It is impossible to express the
special characteristics of an ideological culture when it is studied only by itself or
internally.
    In the first and second part of this essay, we discussed the fact that although
there were apparent similarities between metaphysics [xuanxue] in China during
the Wei-Jin period and the prajna teachings of Indian Buddhism, they ultimately
were separate and not the same, each having its own special characteristics.
We were able to draw such a conclusion because we had made a comparative
study of these two ideological cultures which stemmed from separate traditions.


Output:
For example, we came to know that the analysis which Wei-Jin xuanxue made of
“being” and “nonbeing” was made from the angle or perspective of “existence,”
that is, from the perspective of the relationship between “ontological substance”
and “phenomenon,” with the latter being seen as the various expressions of
ontological substance. Indian prajna Buddhist teaching, on the other hand, often
analyzed wu [or kong, or nonexistence] and you [being] as a pair of abstract
concepts. Therefore, although both may have appeared to be speaking of ben wu
[nothingness or origin], when Wang Bi employed the term, he was referring to the
idea of yi wu wei ben [taking nothingness to be the origin]—i.e., nonbeing
[wu] being the substance behind being [you]—whereas when prajna teaching
used the same, it referred to the idea that “all dharma did not have original self-
nature” [zhu fa ben wu zi xing]. In this latter formulation, wu [or kong, or nonex-


Output:
istence] did not refer to substance but rather [to the idea] that all things did not
have real self-substance [zi ti] and therefore that the existence of all things was
merely illusory. Furthermore, the methods of reasoning behind Wei-Jin meta-
physics and that behind Indian Buddhist prajna teaching were also different. The
tendency for the Indian Buddhist prajna teachers was to employ an analytical
method to reason out their viewpoints, whereas the Wei-Jin xuanxue metaphysicists
would reason by way of the philosophical methods represented by such sayings as
de yi wang yan [Once the meaning, or intent, is attained, the words may be
forgotten] and ji yu chu yan [The meaning resides outside of the words, which
are only its temporary abode].
9.3 The Comparative Study of Philosophies and Regions                                                 137


Output:
For example, in the Kong zong [Emptiness school] of prajna Buddhism, the
postulate “all dharma did not originally have self-nature” [zhu fa ben wu zi xing]
would often be analyzed in the following logical manner:
1. When things are analyzed at the utmost level of minutiae, further analysis would,
   presumably, bring the object of analysis to the realm of tin xu [the neighborhood
   of Void or Nothingness]. That is, further analysis would bring about the logical
   conclusion that the object of analysis does not really have substance or a self—
   thus the saying: “Observe and contemplate the minutiae of things; when the final
   minutiae is reached, there would be found no substance.”
2. When one analyzes things from the angle of the relationship between time and
   object, one will understand that neither wu xiang [material or physical phenom-
   enon or appearance] nor xin xiang [mental or psychological phenomenon] is
   real. First, all things are generated instantaneously and also perish equally


Output:
instantaneously, that is, all things are no sooner generated than they perish.
   Second, nothing lasts at all, that is, not things are first generated and then perish,
   but that they are generated and perish all at once: generation and perishing
   happen at one and the same time. For these two reasons, therefore, things cannot
   be said to have any real self-substance.
3. The analysis of the object itself leads inevitably to the conclusion that it is made
   up of the combination of causes and effects and therefore it does not have any
   real ontological substance of its own. Since all dharma does not have real self-
   substance, all things or phenomena are therefore without original existence—
   thus the saying: “not that appearances (phenomena) perish, but that they are
   non-existent.”
  The method which the Wei-Jin xuanxue [Daoist metaphysics] scholars, such as
Wang Bi, used to argue for their idea of “having origin in nonbeing” [yi wu wei ben]


Output:
was very different from that of the prajna Buddhists. In the Laozi (Lao Tzu) Zhi Lue
[An Outline of the Intentions of Laozi (Lao Tzu)], Wang Bi said:
   The cause for the generation of a thing and the fulfilling of its achievement is this: It must be
   born of the Form-less [wu xing] and have origin in the Name-less [wu ming]. The Form-less
   and the Name-less is the origin of all things. It is neither warm nor cold, neither gong nor
   shang [Gong and shang are sounds of special characters—Tr.]; its sound cannot be heard;
   one cannot see its expression if one were to look at it, nor know it by feeling, nor taste
   it. This is made of a primal combination of forces; as a phenomenon it does not have a form,
   as a noise it has but a little sound, and in terms of taste it does not have any presentation. It is
   for this reason that it can be the origin of all species and objects. It exists as an embryo, in
   which all Heaven and Earth is contained and all parts of Heaven and Earth are connected.


Output:
There is nowhere it cannot go, and yet it will not be directed. If something is warm, it
   cannot be cool; if something is gong, it cannot be shang. Once things take form, they are
   inevitably divided; sounds, too, naturally belong to separate divisions. Therefore, if some-
   thing that is a phenomenon has form, it cannot be the Great Phenomenon; the sound that has
   noise cannot be the Great Sound. Nevertheless, if the Four Phenomena did not have form,
   the Great Phenomenon cannot be free. If the Five Sounds did not have noise, the Great
   Sound cannot arrive. If the Four Phenomena do take form, and yet objects are not made to
   submit to a master, the Great Phenomenon will be free; if the Five Sounds have noise but
   the mind does not follow them, the Great Sound will arrive.
138                      9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
In Wang Bi’s view, Heaven and Earth and all things have many forms and
appearances. What is one thing therefore cannot be any other thing at the same time;
if something has a specific form, it cannot take another form. Thus, it is only the
formless that can accomplish any form, only the soundless that can become any
sound, and only the nonbeing [that which is not any specific being] that can
accomplish being [can become anything]. It is because nonbeing can become
or accomplish all being that it can be the foundation of the existence of all
existence. Therefore:
   All things under heaven are born of “being.” The beginning of being is in having non-being
   as its origin. If one desired to accomplish “being” one must first revert to “non-being”
   (see Laozi (Lao Tzu) Zhu [Annotations on Laozi (Lao Tzu)]).


Output:
All things under Heaven are specific and concrete existences with forms and
phenomena. That these things with forms and phenomena can come into being, or
be generated, is because they have “nonbeing” as their ontological substance; only
then can this substance be expressed as many specific things with many forms and
appearances. For example, it was argued the water of the sea is manifested in waves
and billows of many different colors and shapes. That it can be manifested in these
many phenomena is precisely because it has its origins in water. Therefore, in order
to preserve all things of various forms and phenomena, one must grasp the
“nonbeing” which is their ontological substance.
   However, the “nonbeing” which is the ontological substance is not a “thing”
which exists outside of “all things.” Although one can say that “a phenomenon
which has form is not the Great Phenomenon,” unless “the Four Phenomena have
form the Great Phenomenon cannot be free.” Therefore, it is only when one can


Output:
understand things through specific forms and phenomena, and yet not be confined
by the specific forms and phenomena, that one can grasp “the phenomenon which is
without phenomenon” [wu xiang zhi xiang] or “the scenery outside of the picture”
[hua wai zhi jing]. It is only when one can understand through specific sounds and
yet not be insistent on, or confined by, specific sounds that one can grasp “the sound
that has no noise” [wu sheng zhi yin] or “the sounds outside the chords” [xuan wai
zhi yin], and it is only through the understanding of language [words] and yet not
insisting on language that one can attain the “meaning without words” [wu yan zhi
yi] or the “meaning outside the words” [yan wai zhi yi].
   From the above, we can see quite clearly that the method with which the
argument “taking nonbeing as the origin” [yi wu wei ben] was made by Wang Bi
was very different from the analytical approach adopted by the Kong zong of
prajna Buddhist teaching. The approach taken by Wang Bi was the method of de


Output:
yi wang yan [attain the meaning and lose, or forget, the words] which is a peculiarly
metaphysical method of the xuanxue scholars.
   When we have compared and studied the various aspects of the gui wu [valuing
nonbeing] school of Wei-Jin xuanxue, as exemplified by Wang Bi, and the Kong
zong [Emptiness school] of Indian prajna teaching, we shall be able to see more
clearly each school’s characteristics and its level of development. Only on such a
basis can we clarify the relationship between Buddhism and Wei-Jin Daoist
metaphysics during the period immediately or shortly after the introduction of
Buddhism into China.
9.3 The Comparative Study of Philosophies and Regions                             139


Output:
In issue no. 1, 1980 of Zhexue Yanjiu [Philosophical Studies], an article was
published on “A Brief Discussion on the Theories of Early Daoist Religion on the
Questions of Life and Death and Form and Spirit.” In that essay, comparisons were
made of the Daoist religion and Buddhism during the period of the Wei, Jin, and
North and South dynasties, focusing on their respective views regarding life and
death and the question of jietuo [emancipation, or, in the Buddhist case, more
commonly known as deliverance; in Sanskrit, mukti, or moksa]. The article pointed
out that on these questions between these two religions, both of which were popular
at the time, there were three major differences:
1. On the question of life and death, the Daoist religion advocated adopting the
   notion of “everlasting life” [i.e., nonperishing] as the goal, whereas Buddhism
   advocated taking “eternal extinction” [i.e., nonlife] as the goal. Daoism
   (Taoism)’s idea of emancipation advocated the transformation of mortal flesh


Output:
into immortality by way of an integration of the body and the spirit such that this
   integrated substance may live on in nonperishable eternal life and in so doing be
   separated from the trouble-laden world of the present and enter the spiritual
   world of fantasy and illusion. Buddhism, on the other hand, believed that the
   source of the pains of human life was the “life of being,” which was the state in
   which the spirit was connected to the body. Within this state of “life of being,”
   until the spirit achieves Nirvana, it must always return in the cycles of
   incarnation. Only by transcending these cycles of incarnation becoming
   separated from the body and returning to everlasting extinction can the spirit
   be delivered from the sea of bitterness that is human life.
2. On the question of form and spirit, Daoism (Taoism) advocated the achievement
   of immortality by having the spirit and form become one. Buddhism advocated


Output:
having the form and spirit separated from one another and thereby achieving
   Buddhahood. Buddhism believed that, unless the spirit became separated from
   the form, it would not be able to escape the cycles of incarnation and could not
   be delivered: to be delivered, the spirit must be separated from the form and, in
   response to its own completed destiny, enter extinction and perish. Daoism
   (Taoism) believed that the path of transcending life and death and becoming
   liberated did not lie in this sort of completed destiny or extinction but in the
   immortalization of the flesh, and for the flesh to become immortal, it cannot, and
   must not, be separated from the spirit.
3. As to the methods of achieving liberation or deliverance, Daoism (Taoism)
   advocated the tempering of the form, whereas Buddhism advocated the nurtur-
   ing of the spirit. As Buddhism believed that the achievement of Buddhahood
   depended on enlightenment and realization, the chief means of achieving


Output:
Nirvana was to cultivate the inner mind and enhance one’s own realization or
   awareness. As Daoism (Taoism) believed that the achievement of immortality
   depended on the accumulation of successes and attainments, its chief means of
   achieving liberation was to temper body and mind, nurture life, and be assisted
   by external matter [foreign substances].
140                     9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
From these three points of comparison, we generally can know the
characteristics of the Daoist and the Buddhist religions in China during the period
of the Wei, Jin, and North and South dynasties. Daoism (Taoism)’s goal was the
achievement of immortality. Though this was an impossibility, because of this
people’s attention was directed toward the tempering and nurturing of the functions
of their own bodies and spirits [e.g., the qi gong, or breathing exercises] and to the
study of external matter such as the manufacturing of pills and elixirs (foreign
substances) whose assistance they counted upon for the achievement of the goal of
immortality. The goal of Buddhism was to achieve Buddhahood. Though this, too,
was obviously an unattainable goal, nevertheless it directed people’s attentions
toward the analysis of psychological activities and to the study of the cognitive
processes.
    Therefore, we have been able to discover that in Daoism (Taoism), there was,


Output:
and is, much material related to understanding of “the way of materials” and to
knowledge concerning the human body that is worthy of our own efforts of analysis
and investigation. For example, the book Dao Zang [The Treasury of the Way]
comprised of 5,000–6,000 volumes, all of which, unfortunately, have yet to be
systematically organized and studied, contains a wealth of information on such
things as breathing exercises, medicines and herbacology (pharmacology),
chemistry, hygiene, and physical education.
    On the other hand, there are also over 10,000 volumes of Buddhist sutras
[including sastras, annotations, and other exegetical treatises] in Chinese.
In many areas, such as the analysis of psychological and psychic activity, of the
processes of knowledge and cognition; the analysis of the relationship between
subject and object; the analysis of concepts, perception, and conceptualization; and
the logical process known as vidjnana or sometimes hetuvidya, these Buddhist


Output:
canons have much to add to our enlightenment. If we could but purge from
these Daoist and Buddhist materials those parts which are unscientific, fabulous,
fantastic, or superstitious and analyze the remaining parts which are of positive
value, it would be a most meaningful endeavor.
    One of the purposes of studying comparative philosophy or comparative religion
is to discover, through comparison and analysis, the characteristics of individual
ideological cultures of various traditions, to identify and establish their peculiarities
so that people may correctly understand and assess the status and role of these
particular ideological cultures in the development of world history, and to ascertain
the contributions they have made. The great treasure trove of human ideological
and intellectual culture inevitably is made up of the good and superior parts of many
individual ideological cultures, each with its own tradition and characteristics.


Output:
If an ideological culture did not contain any special characteristic of its own, it
would be difficult for it to make any contribution to human intellectual civilization.
On the other hand, a culture which becomes the ideological culture of a nation,
or a part thereof, is bound to have its own special characteristics and therefore
is bound to make some contribution to the ideological culture of the human race
as a whole.
9.4 The Isolation of Old Topics and New Issues                                        141


Output: 9.4    The Isolation of Old Topics and New Issues


Output:
Finally, in the comparative study of two ideological cultures of different traditions,
we should attend to the discovery and rediscovery of problems to be mulled over
and solved and to proposing new topics or lessons for investigation and study.
    Jin Kemu, in his article “Shi lun fan yu zhong di ‘you yi chuanzai’” [A Tentative
Discussion of the Terms, or Expressions, for ‘Being, Unity and Existence’ in
Sanskrit], pointed out that there are several roots, or radicals, for the expressions
in Sanskrit that stand for the notions of being, unity, or existence. The more common
ones, he tells us—and there are two of them—are as and bhu. These are both
translated in the Chinese language as you [being]. For example, in the translation
of the Zhong bian fen bie lun [The Treatise on the Differences Between the Mean and
the Extremes] [written by Vasubandhu] made by Chen Zhenti, and in the translation
of the Bian zhong bian lun [The Treatise on the Debate Between the Doctrines of the


Output:
Mean and the Extremes] made by Xuan Zang, the term “sattvau,” was consistently
translated as you [being]. However, bhava [having, or possession], one of the
dvadasanga pratityasamutpada or twelve yinyuan [nidanas, or combinations of
causes], was also translated as you [being]. As refers to existence or being in the
simple, abstract sense, or, if you will, the static, absolute sense, whereas bhu refers to
existence in the transforming or specific sense, or in the moving, relative sense.
    We also know that in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in the Aristotelian
system of thought, “substance” was also divided into two categories: primary
substance and secondary substance. The two possessed different meanings. The
former does not refer to simple and pure matter, nor to the general form common to
the various matters, but to the individual units of matter and their forms. The second
meaning of substance [or, secondary substance] referred, on the other hand, to the


Output:
general form or concept or category of matter, which becomes individualized in
each separate matter.
    Does this fact—that, while in Sanskrit, corresponding to various linguistic
radicals, the terms for “being, unity, and existence” have different meanings and
that the term “substance” in the Aristotelian system of thought also has various
meanings—enlighten us in any way? In the Chinese translations of the Buddhist
canons, the term for existence and being, which had different meanings in the
original, all were translated as you. In Chinese traditional philosophy, then, did the
concept conveyed by the term you also have various meanings? When Pei Wei, in
his Cong you lun [Treatise on the Exaltation of Being] spoke of “self-generating
and inevitably existent in substance” [zi sheng er bie li you], did the term you there
refer to specifically existent matters or to the general existence of matter? Again, in
the usage of Guo Xiang’s Zhuangzi Zhu [Annotations on Zhuangzi], did the term


Output:
you sometimes refer to the specifically existent matters and sometimes to the
general existence of matter? These are all questions which call for further investi-
gation and require deeper analyses of the meaning(s) contained in the term you in
traditional Chinese philosophy.
142                     9 The Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China: A Perspective. . .


Output:
In his book Ti yong lun [On Substance and Use], Xiong Shili proposed that the
essential and fundamental difference between traditional Chinese philosophy and
Indian Buddhism was that where traditional Chinese philosophy talked about
the “oneness of substance and use” [ti yong ru yi], Indian Buddhism separated
substance from use, rending the two asunder. Whether or not Xiong’s conclusion
was correct is not something we wish to make a point of in our discussion here, but
certainly it can be said that the problem which he raised in his study of these two
ideological cultures stemming from different traditions is most likely to have
considerable significance for the study of the characteristics of the Chinese philo-
sophical tradition itself.
    From the perspective of the general trends in the development of traditional
Chinese philosophy, it can be seen that the notions of tian dao [Heaven’s Way] and
ren dao [the way of humanity] generally are considered to be consistent


Output:
and integrated one with the other—in other words, it was assumed that the ideal
should and could be realized in present reality. Even in the xuanxue metaphysics of
the Wei-Jin period, although this system of thought took the ideas of Lao Zi and
Zhuangzi to be its framework, the ultimate pursuit of the metaphysicians was
still to achieve the “way of the inner sage and the outward monarch combined”
[nei sheng wai wang: hi dao] which was contained in the “paradise which is
naturally possessed by the Great Teaching” [ming jiao zhong zi you le di], i.e., in
Confucianism. When the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianists opposed Buddhism and
Daoism (Taoism), they did so chiefly on the grounds that Buddhists and Daoists,
according to the Neo-Confucianists, “pursued the illusory transcendental periphery
of the universe of that which was real.” The Neo-Confucianists claimed to believe
fundamentally that “the ethics of the norm” [gang chang] and the great teaching


Output:
[ming jiao] equaled “the principle of Heaven” [tian li]. On the other hand, in
Chinese Buddhism, too, and particularly in the Chan School, the teaching was
that “achieving Buddhahood” did not require leaping out of or being separated from
a life of reality. The Chan Buddhists said, “Carrying water, cutting firewood, all
these contained the most wonderful way and truth”—that is, it was possible for one
to become enlightened to the wonderful way of achieving Buddhahood even in the
mundane routines of everyday life.
    When we compare China’s traditional philosophy with the transcendentalist
“going outside of the world” notion in Indian Buddhism, can we say that Chinese
philosophy, after all, remained indeed faithful to the idea of “one-ness of substance
and use” and that it was for this reason that the notions of complete transcenden-
talism were never able to become part of the mainstream of traditional Chinese
thought? As I see it, this, too, is a question which merits further and more


Output:
penetrating investigation.
    If we were to apply the comparative method to the study of the philosophical
ideas and religious doctrines of various ideological cultures which stemmed from
different traditions, such as the ideological culture of China and that of India, or that
of the Western world, we will, I believe, discover even more lessons to be learned
and topics to be discussed.
9.4 The Isolation of Old Topics and New Issues                                    143


Output:
Over a hundred years ago that Marx and Engels pointed out: “Because the
bourgeoisie opened up a world market, the production and consumption of the
various countries have become universalized. . .. This is true not only of material
production, but of the products of the mind and spirit as well. The spiritual products
of the nations have become their common property, and the partialism and paro-
chialism of the individual nations have become daily increasingly impossible.
Therefore, out of the literature of the many nations and places of the world a
world literature has been formed.”
   According to the editor-annotator, the term “literature” here referred to writing
in many areas, including science, art, and philosophy. We have now reached the
1980s; our age is much more advanced than that of 1848 when Marx and Engels
wrote the Communist Manifesto. The interflow of ideas and culture and the inter-
action between peoples and civilizations have become even more widespread and


Output:
profound. The comparative study of philosophy and religion is bound to promote
the study of the history of Chinese philosophy. In the comparative study of
ideological cultures of different traditions, we can discover the common laws
which govern the development of things; we can expose and demonstrate the
characteristics and levels of development of various ideological cultures and
expand the contents and scope of our study. Will this also play a part in the
enrichment and enhancement of the development of Marxism? I am sure that it will.
Chapter 10
Relationships Between Traditional
and Imported Thought and Culture in China:
The Importation of Buddhism


Output:
Historically, there were three major occasions when China imported foreign culture
and ideology. The first was the importation of Buddhism—the focus of this paper.
   The second cultural incursion was that of Western culture, an event which, for a
time, gave rise to debate over the respective merits of things past and present, Chinese
and foreign. From a philosophical standpoint, this event raised questions concerning
the relationships between Western and Chinese philosophy. Many modern philoso-
phers, whether or not they were aware of it, were in actuality striving to reconcile these
two vastly different cultures. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China,
Feng Youlana was perhaps most successful in reconciling the two. His “New Ratio-
nalism” may be seen as an attempt to use Western pragmatism to resolve several
traditional Chinese philosophical questions. That he did not succeed in determining
the true course of Chinese philosophical development can be seen in the fact that, in


Output:
practice, he failed to solve China’s social problems.
   The third event was the importation of Marxism, a European ideology developed in
response to European historical conditions. In order for Marxism to take root in China,
it must also, in a certain sense, merge with traditional Chinese culture and thought.
That is to say, it must pass through a stage of critical acceptance of traditional culture.
   Jia Yib in his “Guo Chin Lun”c (Treatise on the Failings of Ch’in) quoted an old
adage: “The unforgotten events of the past are teachers of the future.” Can we today
learn anything from the contacts between imported Buddhism and traditional
Chinese culture? I think we can.
   I would like to discuss three important elements which characterized
Buddhism’s spread in China.
   First is the fact that when Buddhism first entered China, it tended to attach itself
to native ideologies. Only later did it gradually develop and begin to influence those
ideologies.


Output:
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991:139–146

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                           145
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_10
146             10   Relationships Between Traditional and Imported Thought and Culture. . .


Output:
When, during the Han Dynasty, Buddhism entered China, it identified itself with
native religious practitioners. During the Wei-Jin period, Buddhism identified itself
with the “Mysterious Learning”d then popular.
    During the Han Dynasty, Buddhism was often seen as on par with the Huang-
Laoe School. Thus, King Ying of Chu is reported as having “recited the subtle
words of Huang-Laoe and respectfully performed human sacrifices to the Buddha,”
while Emperor Huanf “set up shrines to Huang-Lao and the Buddha in his palace.”
    Buddhist disciples of the period even identified themselves as “practitioners of
the techniques of the Way.” The “Lihuo lun”g (Treatise on Rectifying Error) of the
Mozi (Mo Tzu)h states: “There are ninety-six distinct ways, but, among those worthy
of veneration, none is so great as the teachings of the Buddha.” The Sutra in Forty-
two Sectionsi also styles itself “the Way of the Buddha.”
    At that time the principal tenets preached by Buddhist missionaries were the


Output:
immortality of the soul and karmic retribution; such Indian concepts as the “non-
existence of the self” were simply not understood. The immortality of the soul was
already present in traditional Chinese thought, but only in the concept of spirits. The
Wen Wang Ode of the Shi Jing (Shih Ching)j says of the former Zhou Kings, “The
Three Di-rectors are in Heaven,” that is, their souls have ascended. The “Jingshen
Xun” of the Huai Nan Zik asserts that “the form may be ground away, but the spirit
is not transformed.” As a result of these beliefs, Huan Tanl held that “when the form
comes to an end, the spirit is easily destroyed,” while Wang Chongm argued that
“when men die, they do not become ghosts (spirits).”
    That the immortality of the soul or spirit depended on “refining and nurturing”
was also a native Chinese concept.
    As for karmic retribution, while the Buddhist conception did not exactly accord
with that of China, it was promulgated during the Han and was compatible with the


Output:
Chinese notion that “good fortune comes to those who are good and evil to the
dissolute.” Witness the Wen-yen gloss to the Qian hexagram of the Yi Jing
(I Ching)n: “Those who accumulate good deeds will certainly have an excess of
blessings, while those who accumulate bad deeds will have an excess of calamity.”
    During the end of the Han and the beginning of the Three Kingdoms period, as
Buddhist translations increased, Buddhism was divided into two main schools. The
first was the An Shi Gao lineage of Hinayana Buddhism, emphasizing meditation.
The second was the Lokaksema lineage of Mahayana Buddhism, which emphasized
prajtta.
    An Shi Gao translated a number of sutras among which the most influential were
the Anapansmrti-sutra (T602) and the Yin chi Ru Jing (T1694). The former
emphasizes breath control, a practice comparable to the “inhalation and exhalation”
(tu-na)p methods of Chinese seekers of transcendence. The latter explicates Bud-


Output:
dhist numerical categories and may be compared to Han exegetical studies.
    With regard to man’s place in the cosmos, the theories of these sutras are based
on the concept of “primal breath” and state that primal breath encompasses the five
phases which they equate with the five skandhas. It can be seen that the Hinayana
practices expounded by the An Shi Gao lineage were assimilated to the popular
religious practices and thought of the day which then used them to explicate
Buddhism.
10    Relationships Between Traditional and Imported Thought and Culture. . .                  147


Output:
The prajna concept taught by the Lokaksema lineage held as its most important
truth the “return of the spirit to its original perfection and union with the Way.” In
this we see already the influence of the philosophy of the Laozi (Lao Tzu)q and the
Zhuangzi.r
    Zhi Qian (Chih Ch’ien),s the disciple of Lokaksema’s disciple ZhiLian,
retranslated the Prajnaparamita sutra as the Ta Ming Du Wu Ji Jing.t This title
itself betrays the influence of the Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi. His translation of
“grand luminescence” for prajna probably draws on the phrase “He who knows the
eternal nature of things appears luminous,” from the Laozi (Lao Tzu). The transla-
tion “cross to the illimitable” for paramita also means to reach a state of union with
the Way, that is, the illimitable Dao.
    Zhi Qian (Chih Ch’ien)’s gloss for the first chapter states: “My Master (that is
Chih Liangu) said: “The heart of the Bodhisativa treads the Great Way. Wishing to


Output:
embody the Way, his heart and the way merge. For this reason, the formless is
called the ‘empty void’.” This is the same point reached in Ruan Ji’sv “Biography of
the Prior-born Great Man,” wherein the great man merges with the way. The latter
phrase recalls as well the Laozi (Lao Tzu) statement, “The constant nature of the
Way is formless.”
    Zhi Qian (Chih Ch’ien) and the others believed that man’s heart and spirit
originated in the Dao, but, because of such flaws of the latter heavens as desire,
man can no longer join with the Dao. For the heart and spirit to escape these
limitations, one must embody one’s origin, the Dao, and become a Buddha. This is
undoubtedly a Buddhism assimilated to the thought of the Laozi (Lao Tzu) and
Zhuangzi.
    During the Wei-Jin period, the ontology of Mysterious Learning, based on the
Laozi (Lao Tzu) and the Zhuangzi, was very popular. The central issues discussed in
the Mysterious Learning were questions of fundamental cause and secondary effects


Output:
as well as existence and nonexistence. Buddhist prajna studies were fairly similar to
the concerns of Mysterious Learning, so many monks used it to explain Buddhist
principles. Dao An,w for example, wrote in his Pi-nai-yeh (Preface to the Vinaya):
     Among the twelve sections of the Tripitaka, the vaipulya section is the largest due to the
     fact that Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi have spread teachings in this country similar to the
     Fang-teng Jing and Prajnaparamita sutra, and thus it has been easy to travel with the wind.


Output:
Even the clerics of that time recognized that the popularity of Buddhism was due
to the thought of the Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi.
   What is the reason for this situation? As Engels has said: “Tradition is a great
conservative force.” It seems that any cultural ideology has its conservative aspects
and will resist foreign culture. Because of this, foreign ideologies must first adapt
themselves to the requirements of the native ideology, attaching themselves to a
native thought system. Elements of the foreign ideology which are similar or
identical to the native ideology are easily transmitted, while dissimilar elements
seep in only gradually to eventually change the native ideology.
   The second element involves the reason why Buddhism, as a foreign importa-
tion, was able to have such a strong impact on Chinese culture. In addition to the
148             10   Relationships Between Traditional and Imported Thought and Culture. . .


Output:
fact that it met certain social needs, it often accorded with the natural development
of Chinese thought.
   The Mysterious Learning of the Wei-Chin period developed from Wang Bix and
He Yan’sy emphasis on nonbeing as the source of all existence through Guo
Xiang’sz emphasis on being (“The ten-thousand things are born of themselves,”)
to Chang Chanaa of the Eastern Chin, who contended that “in being suddenly born
of themselves, the Source of all things resides in Nonbeing.” Finally there was
Seng Zhao,ab who held that “the Emptiness of the Unreal” consisted of a negation of
both being and nonbeing. Why was the Mysterious Learning of the Wei-Chin
period summed up in Seng Zhao’s prajna inspired doctrine? Precisely because
this was one possible outcome to which this philosophical system tended.
   Beginning with He Yan and particularly Wang Bi, Mysterious Learning was
much engrossed with the relationship between being and nonbeing, which was


Output:
explained in terms of substance and function. It was held that “Nonbeing may not
be understood in terms of Nonbeing, (so) it draws its name from Being.” Thus,
nonbeing was held to be the original substance, which expressed itself as being so
that its substance and function were as one. However, since Wang Bi emphasized
the unconditional nature of nonbeing, there was also the tendency to glorify the
original substance while neglecting its expression as being. This was an internal
contradiction in the thought of Wang Bi.
   From just this element of Wang Bi’s thought, we can extrapolate the negation of
being (which was fully realized in Seng Zhao’s system).
   Wang Bi’s emphasis on nonbeing was further refined by Xiang Xiuac and Pei
Guad and eventually developed into Guo Xiang’s emphasis on being. According to
Guo Xiang, all existence was comprised of individual concrete objects. Beyond
these material objects, there was no original substance (i.e., no creator). The


Output:
existence of the ten-thousand things was based solely on their “self-nature.” This
self-nature was self-generated. He wrote, “Nonbeing has no reality and thus cannot
give birth to Being.” This direct contradiction of nonexistence contains within it the
seeds of (Seng Zhao’s) negation of existence.
   These two developments fit exactly the Prajna School’s negation of being and
nonbeing. So Seng Zhao’s doctrine of the Emptiness of the Unreal continues the
philosophical development begun by Wang Bi and Guo Xiang. We may, then, trace
the historical development of Mysterious Learning from Wang Bi through Guo
Xiang to Seng Zhao. Later, the San-lun Schoolae (Madhyamika) would develop
Seng Zhao’s doctrine and Hui Nengaf of the Chan Schoolag would further refine it
and eventually influence the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties.
   The reason for this development is that ideologies have certain set principles of
development. Unless interrupted, later developments always grow out of earlier


Output:
tendencies. Also, an ideology often has several possible ways in which it might
develop, so that, if an important ideology accords in important respects with one
possible line of development, it can have a very great impact. The important
ideology may then become a constituent element of the native ideology and, to a
greater or lesser extent, influence the development of the native culture.
10   Relationships Between Traditional and Imported Thought and Culture. . .       149


Output:
Thirdly, the reason that Buddhism was able to work such a lasting influence on
Chinese thought and culture was that in certain respects, it was superior to native
Chinese systems of thought. In this way, it was able to act as a stimulus in the
development of Chinese culture.
    The question of the Indian Buddhist prajna doctrine’s superiority to native
Chinese modes of thought is one that must be examined closely from every angle
before a conclusion can be reached. This we are not able to do here, so we will only
examine the prajna system’s resolution of the contradiction inherent in the doctrine
of the negation of being and nonbeing. Despite the fact that, like the thought of
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, this doctrine is an instance of idealism, it is undoubtedly
superior to theirs in that it can be used to analyze problems from two opposite
directions. Even though Seng Zhao’s doctrine of the “Emptiness of the Unreal” can
be seen as an extension of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, it goes beyond their systems in


Output:
that it accords fairly well with the Indian prajna system.
    In my opinion, after its absorption into Indian Buddhism, the idea of a creator or
a spiritual entity which fashioned Heaven and earth never again occupied an
important position in China’s idealism. This was replaced by such abstract concepts
as the Confucian liah (the “natural pattern”) and Daoai (“the Way”), which, as first
principles, determined human existence in the universe. Sometimes “Heart mind”aj
was made a first principle; it was held that “the heart is the natural pattern” or that
“the natural pattern merges in the heart.” This is a feature of Sung and Ming
Dynasty philosophy. As this sort of idealism developed, it became the most
important form of Chinese traditional philosophy.
    However, even for a relatively superior foreign ideology to influence another
culture, it must, in addition to satisfying certain economic and political conditions,
also meet the first two requirements we have discussed. If it does not, then even a