Output:
help others to abolish the former pollution in the similar way as mine. . .To manifest
the clear character and renovate, people should stay at the highest good and not
change” (Zhu Xi 1983, Daxue). The purpose of showing a clear character and
shaping the people is to reach the highest good and achieve man’s highest realm.
Therefore, The Great Learning holds that “From the Son of Heaven to common
civilians, all must regard moral cultivation as the root or foundation. There has
never been a case when the root is in disorder and the branches are all in order”
(Zeng Can 1980, Chapter 1). It means that according to Confucianism, if everyone
(from the son of Heaven to common people) cultivated their morality well, “family”
could be regulated, “state” will be in order, and there will be peace throughout the
“world.” Or if moral cultivation, the root or foundation, is disordered, it is definitely
impossible to manage “family,” “state,” and the “world” well. In the Doctrine of the


Output:
Mean, “Social governance depends on man, the choice should be made according to
their moral cultivation, the standard of moral cultivation is the Dao (the top Dao,
harmony), and the heart (mind) of benevolence and love is necessary for realizing a
harmonious society” (Zisi 1980, Chapter 20). Here, the connection of an individ-
ual’s moral cultivation to “benevolence” proves the consistency of Confucian
thought. Confucianism’s attention to “moral cultivation” is not aimless; instead, it
is to regulate family, govern the nation, and unite the world, that is, to build a
“harmonious society.” The ideal of the commonwealth of great unity in the Records
of Rites is aimed at building a harmonious society politically, economically, and
culturally. Confucianism’s ideal of a harmonious society is based on personal moral
cultivation, so Confucians lay particular emphasis on personal cultivation of the
body and mind. Confucians think that life and death, riches, and honor should not


Output:
be the final life goal, and people should pursue moral perfection and knowledge.
Confucius said: “I am uneasy that people do not cultivate their moral character, do
not learn and teach knowledge, do not behave according to righteousness, and do
not correct their mistakes although they know they are wrong” (Confucius 1980,
Shuer). This tells us the reason for being a man. It is not easy to cultivate our moral
character because we have great dreams and the willingness to improve the welfare
of humankind. It is also not easy to study knowledge because we not only need to
improve our own wisdom but also need to show culture and education to society.
People always make mistakes, but we should have the courage to correct our
mistakes, benefiting social harmony. “Be apt to goodness” means that we should
strive in the direction of goodness everyday and improve ourselves day to day, and
then we can reach the state of being in the highest good. All of the above are reasons


Output:
to be an upright person, as advocated by Confucianism, and they are necessary for
maintaining harmony between the body and the mind, the inner and the outer.
Mencius said: “To preserve one’s mind and to nourish one’s nature is the way to
serve Heaven. Not to allow any double-mindedness regardless of longevity or
brevity of life, but to cultivate one’s person and wait for [ming 命 (destiny, fate,
Heaven’s decree or mandate) to take its own course] is the way to fulfill one’s
destiny” (Mencius 1980, Jinxin shang). If one can preserve his compassionate heart
and cultivate his moral character to realize the Dao of Heaven, then the length of
one’s life does not matter. But he must be sure of being conform to the Dao of
30                                      2 The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism


Output:
Heaven through individual moral cultivation. It is one’s peace and calmness and the
establishment of destiny.
    Confucian self-cultivation has a goal. Yijing says, “Make use of personal moral
cultivation in order to honor virtue” (Zhouyi, Xici xia). People’s actions should
benefit society, and this should be their main pursuit. An individual undergoes self-
cultivation in order to elevate his spirit and “set his mind on Heaven and Earth,
establish his life’s destiny, and continue to study to achieve sage, so that all things
in the world are at peace” (Zhang Zai 1978, p. 320). This is to “establish the great
root or foundation and so carry out the Dao.” What the Confucians in the Song
Dynasty pursued is that, as far as an individual is concerned, he will be at peace with
himself both in his inner thoughts and emotions and in his external relations. In A
Letter to Zhang Jingfu, when Zhu Xi discussed “the meaning of the mean and


Output:
harmony” with Jingfu, he said: “From now on, I know I have a safe place, that is,
the place for the peace and calmness of a person, the establishment of destiny, and
for the domination of consciousness in the vast transformation of the universe. So
the key for us to establish our big root (foundation) and carry out the great Dao is
described as that substance and function have one source and there is no gap
between the apparent and the hidden” (Zhu Xi 1936, Vol. 10). Confucians hold
that it is very important for a person to find peace and calmness and to establish his
destiny for the harmony of body and mind, inner thoughts and emotion, and
external factors. Therefore, Zhu Xi said: “If a person can be harmoniously centered
within himself, even though the world at large is in chaos, the inner world, its
Heaven and Earth and the myriad things, remains peaceful and unharmed. If
someone is unable to attain this, even though there is order in the world at large,


Output:
within oneself one will be perturbed, even if no harm comes to him from without.
It’s the same for a country or a family” (Ibid.). If our internal and external beings are
harmonious, the chaos of a disordered world cannot disturb our inner peace. If we
are not centered and harmonious in our internal and external being, even if there is a
very well-ordered world outside, we will still be troubled, worried, or perturbed.
We must work hard at cultivating our own virtue whether the world at large is in
chaos or is in order. In this way, we can fulfill our life’s duty, and when it is time to
leave the world, we can go with a sense of peace and fulfillment. Thus, the last two
sentences in Zhang Zai’s Ximing 西铭 (Western Inscription) says: “In life I fulfill
my duty as a member of society and as a member of the universe, and when death
comes, I rest” (Zhang Zai 1978, p. 63).
    Confucians consistently give much attention to an individual’s peace and calm-


Output:
ness and the establishment of destiny. This comes from self-cultivation. In this way,
we can bring harmony to our own hearts and minds and to our internal world and its
external manifestations. Our words and actions conform to the “principle of being
human.” And in this way, our persons will be at peace and our destiny established.
We should remove all obstacles in the way of our personal harmony. Zeng Zi says:
“Everyday I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have
not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends I have not been faithful; and
whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my
teacher” (Confucius 1980, Xue Er). As a man of honor, everyday one should be
References                                                                                31


Output:
aware of himself and examine whether his behavior and actions are moral and just.
If there is something immoral and unjust, he should sacrifice his life to realize
humanity and defend justice. Confucius said, “A resolute scholar and a man of
humanity will never seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity. He would
rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity” (Confucius 1980, Wei ling
Gong). Mencius said: “If I do not act according to humanity and justice, I choose
self-abandonment” (Mencius 1980, Lilou shang). It is not easy to carry out the
Confucians’ “principle of being human,” but this is something people should
ardently strive for. And the purpose of achieving this personal peace is to bring
about social harmony.
   Sima Qian says: “For one to make a record of the Dao of the ancients today is to
make a mirror for ourselves; it is not that the two ages are necessarily identical in all
things” (Sima Qian 1997, Vol. 18). We have been reviewing the thoughts of


Output:
Confucius and his school in order to search for resources that human society
today can use. This is undoubtedly important. But the thoughts and ideas of the
sages and worthies of ancient times are not fully able to solve all the problems of the
present time; nor do they all accord with the demands of contemporary society.
They can only show us a path for thinking, hints on how to make use of these
resources, giving us a new foundation for addressing the concerns of the present
time. It is in this way that they contribute to building a harmonious human society.
“Though Zhou is an ancient state, its Mandate is ever-new” (Shijing 1980, Daya).
Our Chinese nation is an ancient nation with 5,000 years of history and culture. Our
mission is to assure that our society constantly revitalizes itself and makes contri-
butions to all mankind.


Output: References


Output:
Chen Zhanbiao. (2006, February 23). Ruxue “disici langchao”: Jibian Rujiao (“The fourth wave”
    of Confucianism: Sharp debate on Confucianism). Shanghai: Shehui Kexue Bao.
Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi. (2004). Er Cheng ji (The collected works of Brothers Cheng). Beijing:
    Zhonghua Shuju.
Confucius. (1980). Lunyu (Analects). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to the
    Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Fei Xiaotong. (2002, June 6). Zhongguo wenhua de qiantu (The prospect of Chinese culture).
    Shanghai: Shehui Kexue Bao.
Fei Xiaotong. (2005). Fei Xiaotong lun wenhua yu wenhua zijue (Fei Xiaotong’s theory on culture
    and cultural self-consciousness). Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and
    democracy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Han Yu. (1991). Han Changli quanji (The complete works of Han Changli). The contemporary
    significance of Confucianism 501. Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian.


Output:
Jaspers, K. (1989). The origin and goal of history. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Jia Yi. (1989). Xinshu (New book). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.
Jiang Qing. (2005). Lun Zhongguo Rujiao de chongjian (On the reconstruction of Chinese
    Confucianism). Zhongguo Rujiao Yanjiu (Chinese Confucianism Research Journal), (Vol. 1).
32                                          2 The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism


Output:
Jingmen Museum. (1998). Guodian Chumu zhujian (Chu Bamboo Slips in Jingmen, Hubei
   Province). Beijing: Wenwu Chubanshe.
Mencius. (1980). Mengzi (Mencius). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to the
   Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Pan Derong. (2002, April). Gadamer de zhexue yichan (Gadamer’s philosophical heritage). Hong
   Kong: Ershiyi Shiji.
Russell, B. (1922). The problem of China. New York: The Century Co.
Russell, B. (1972). A history of Western philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Shijing. (1980). Shijing (Book of songs). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to the
   Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Sima Qian. (1997). Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian of China). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Tu Weiming. (2002). Tu Weiming wenji (The collected works of Tu Weiming) (Vol. 5). Wuhan:
   Wuhan Chubanshe.
Wang Fuzhi. (1975). Zhangzi Zhengmeng zhu (Annotations on the Zhengmeng of Master Zhang).
   Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.


Output:
Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zeng Can. (1980). Daxue (Great learning). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to
   the Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zhang Zai. (1978). Zhang Zai ji (The collected works of Zhang Zai). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zhouli. (1980). Zhouli (Book of rites). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to the
   Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zhu Xi. (1936). Zhuzi wenji (Collected works of Zhu Xi). Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Zhu Xi. (1983). Sishu zhangju jizhu (Variorum of the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zhu Xi. (1990). Zhuzi yulei (Topically arranged conversations of Master Zhu). Beijing: Zhonghua
   Shuju.
Zisi. (1980). Zhongyong (The doctrine of the mean). In Ruan Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing Zhushu
   (Comments to the Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zuo Qiuming. (1980). Zuo zhuan (Zuo Qiuming edition of the spring and autumn annals). In Ruan


Output:
Yuan (Ed.), Shisan jing zhushu (Comments to the Thirteen Classics). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Zuo Qiuming. (1997). Guoyu (National words). Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
Chapter 3
Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
Since Western hermeneutics was introduced into Chinese academia a little more than
10 years ago, Chinese scholars have been using its methods and theories in the area of
social sciences and the humanities. The study of interpretation in the West can be traced
back to ancient Greece, but it flourished with Biblical scholarship. After many centuries
of gestation, especially after the publication of the works of Friedrich Schleimacher
(1768–1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), it has turned out to be an influential
and well-developed subject with systematic theories. This thesis will discuss two
questions: first, is there a subject called “hermeneutics” in ancient China? Second, is
it possible to find out general patterns of interpretation in the study of Chinese classics?

3.1    Is There a Subject Called “Hermeneutics” in Ancient
       China?


Output:
Surely there has been a long history of classics interpretation in China. However,
can we say there is a systematic theory of interpretation different from that in the
West? I do not think so. We can only say that we are trying to establish our own
hermeneutics with Chinese characteristics and that we have made much significant
progress along the way to this goal.
   In my opinion, in order to establish a subject of study or a branch of learning, one
should first be conscious of its own theoretical and methodological assumptions.
There has been a tradition of interpretation in the West. However, it was only in the
nineteenth century that Schleimacher and Dilthey began to study “the question of
interpretation” as a subject. More than one century elapsed before “the question of
interpretation” became a subject in the West. Of course, before a subject comes into

Translated by Cui Yujun, Li Chenyang
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Journal of Humanities, 2008 (1): 43–69


Output:
© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                             33
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_3
34                                                      3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
being, it usually has a period of “question accumulation” or “material-
accumulation.” This period could be considered as the prehistory of the subject.
For example, it is commonly agreed that comparative literature is a subject
established in the nineteenth century, though, as we know, there was such a study
as comparative literature both in the West and China in earlier times. In China, for
example, there is a comparative study of poetic styles in different times in the
chapter of “Ming Shi Pian” (“Understanding Poetry”) in Wen Xin Diao Long (hh文
心雕龙ii) by Liu Xie (刘勰, ?465–?532). It says that “at the very beginning of the
Sung Dynasty (420–479),1 poetic styles witnessed continuity and evolution: while
the thoughts of Lao Tzu (老子, ?570 B.C.–?470 B.C.) and Chuang Tzu (庄子, 369
B.C.–286 B.C.) were dormant, poetry that described natural landscape became
developed.” This is a comparison of style changes that took place in the Wei-Jin


Output:
period (220–420) and the South-North dynasties (420–589). In the Wei-Jin period,
poetry was usually “extremely mysterious and abstruse,” but then it changed to
“landscape poetry” in the early South-North dynasties. As a result, poetry looked
more “natural” (Tang Yi Jie 1999: 186–187). In his book, A Study of Comparative
Literature: A New Direction, Li Da San wrote, “As a subject, in France, it was not
until 1830s and 1840s when ‘comparative literature’ became mature. Therefore,
Amber (1800–1864) and Abel-Francois Villemain (1790–1867) may be considered
as scholars who truly intended to establish integrated ‘comparative literature’” (Li Da
San 1978: 107). In China comparative literature was studied as a subject late in the
1920s. We cannot take it for granted that comparative literature, as a subject, has been
in China since ancient times. Similarly, there were many archeological studies (of
usually illegally unearthed items) or antique appraisals long ago, both in China and


Output:
abroad, yet according to the volume of Archeology in Encyclopedia Sinica, Western
archeology started from about 1760 to 1840, while Chinese archeology was set up by
Pei Wen Zhong (1904–1982) and Li Ji (1896–1979) as late as the 1920s.
    I even have a strange and perhaps controversial idea. I don’t think it is right for
Hegel to declare that there was no philosophy in China, as there are abundant
“philosophical thoughts” in Chinese traditional culture. But it is perhaps right to say
that, before Western philosophy was accepted in China as an independent subject
separate from “Jing Xue” (经学, the study of classics), “Zi Xue” (子学, the study of
ancient philosopher), historiography and literature, “philosophy” was indeed non-
existent in China. I wonder whether we could conclude that there are a lot of
“philosophical thoughts” or “philosophical questions” in Chinese traditional cul-
ture, which were embodied in “Jing Xue” and “Zi Xue.” During the evolution of


Output:
Chinese intellectual life, no serious effort was made to distinguish philosophy from
literature and history. This is also the case in the West in ancient times. Even now in
Chinese academia, there is little difference between “Chinese philosophy” and
“Chinese intellectual background.” Actually it is much easier to write an intellectual
history of China than a history of Chinese philosophy. In my opinion, “philosophy”


Output:
1
  Founded by Liu Yu (363–422), different from the Song Dynasty (960–1279) by Zhao Kuang Yin
(927–976).
3.1 Is There a Subject Called “Hermeneutics” in Ancient China?                                 35


Output:
should start from thinking about one or more “philosophical questions,” from a set of
organized concepts and elementary propositions based on the relationship of these
concepts. It employs in a self-conscious manner critical methods developed from
theoretic analysis and synthesis. This question might arise: “If you are right, wouldn’t
it mean that many Chinese subjects must follow the models set by the West?” My
answer is that in many areas we do need first of all to learn from the West before we
can establish our “Chinese” subjects (like “Chinese comparative literature” and
“Chinese archeology”), and then we can leave behind the West, our “teacher.”
   We can understand this from the transformation of Indian Buddhism in China.
During the South-North dynasties, when Indian Buddhism came into China, the
Chinese first tried to understand and learn its texts, principles, and theories. It was
not until the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) that China had developed its own


Output:
Buddhist schools and sects. Integrated with indigenous Chinese cultures, Chinese
Buddhism significantly enriched Indian Buddhism. Here I would like to cite
Bertrand Russell:
   Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in
   human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arab from the
   Roman Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the
   Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the
   case of China, if we regard the Chinese as pupils, this may be the case again. (Egner and
   Ednonn 1992: 547)


Output:
Although we in China started “comparative literature” and “interpretation of
classics” as subjects of study much later than the West, we may well leave the West
behind. Of course this is no more than a possibility. There is another possibility, which
I will discuss in the following pages. Meanwhile, it cannot be said that there is little in
Chinese culture that the West can learn from. For instance, Confucianism had greatly
influenced the French philosophers, especially Voltaire (Meng Hua 1993: 14, 149 and
151). I also believe that, as an independent subject, “traditional Chinese medicine” has
contributed and will continue to contribute to world medicine. There are many
scholars writing on the history of Chinese philosophy, but none of them is interested
in the history of “Jing Xue.” We should not turn a blind eye to the fact that “Jing Xue”
has had a history of more than 2,000 years. It has been an independent subject and


Output:
influenced almost all aspects of Chinese society. I believe that the study of “Jing Xue”
will eventually have an influence on the development of other cultures.
    Let’s go back to the question of the possibility of a Chinese hermeneutics again.
My proposal is based on the fact that there has been a long and rich tradition of
classical interpretation in China. According to Lun Yu Nian Pu (Chronological
Table of the Analects) by the Japanese scholar Taisuke Hayashi (1854–1922), there
were more than 3,000 books Analects. In the preliminary remarks of his book Tao
Te Ching Yuan Zhi (the Original Meaning of Tao Te Ching), Du Dao Jian (1237–
1318), a Taoist in the Yuan Dynasty (1206–1368), pointed out that “there were
more than 3,000 scholars who had commented on the Tao Te Ching.” There should
have been the same number of books that were commentaries on other classics,
many of which are not extant now. We should make best use of the books that are
available and try to define a Chinese version of hermeneutics.


Output: 36                                                       3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
However, here it must be stressed that a Chinese hermeneutics is possible only
when it is in contact with Western hermeneutics. In my article “Towards a Chinese
Hermeneutics: A Second Study,” I analyzed the types of classical interpretation in
the pre-Qin period to show that there has been a long tradition of interpretation in
China. It also discussed issues involved in classical interpretation after the Qin and
Han dynasties (206 B.C.–220 A.D.). By describing the development of the inter-
pretation of classics in China, I hope to find out whether there are general principles
and patterns similar to or different from Western interpretative practices.
    To the question of whether a Chinese hermeneutics is different from that
interpretative tradition, we can enrich Western hermeneutics by introducing into
it interpretative theories and methods peculiar to the Chinese tradition. If we want
to establish a Chinese version of hermeneutics, I think the following studies are
probably needed:


Output:
probably needed:
    First, we should work hard to study the history of interpretation (particularly
Biblical interpretations) in the West and the hermeneutic theories advanced by
Friedrich Schleimacher and Wilhelm Dilthey as well as their current developments
in the West. During the past century, almost all the philosophical schools (e.g.,
phenomenology, structuralism, deconstruction, and postmodernism) in the West are
to some extent related to hermeneutics. Many debates arose because of people’s
different views on how to “interpret.” So a solid knowledge of German hermeneutic
theories is essential for the development of a Chinese hermeneutics.
    Second, there is a long interpretative history in China. We will have to work hard
to perform two tasks. One is that we should first tidy up the history of Chinese
classics interpretation. Why were there different kinds of classics interpretation
before the Qin Dynasty? Why was “Zhang Ju Zhi Xue” (annotative study of


Output:
chapters and sentences in ancient works) the most important method applied during
the Han Dynasty not only to Confucian classics but also to the Tao Te Jing?2 We
need also to explain why in the Wei-Jin dynasties scholars held in high regard ideas
like “De Yi Wang Yan” (得意忘言, forgetting the word after getting its ideas) and
“Bian Ming Xi Li” (辨名析理, distinguishing the names and analyzing the princi-
ples) in their interpretative activities. Many new interpretation problems arose
when Indian Buddhism came into China, for instance, Ge Yi (格义, interpreting
Buddhism classics with existent concepts of Chinese thought) and Lian Lei (连类,
putting similar things together to draw analogies) in the Jin Dynasty (265–420).
Scholars were arguing over the issue whether translators should not use different
Chinese expressions for the same Buddhist term. The translation of the sutras even
caused disagreements about the exact meaning of words taken from classical texts.


Output:
All these issues need further study. Of course, we will also have to ask why there
have been so many changes in classical interpretations and which change is the
result of the change in Chinese intellectual climate. Because there are many
methods in Chinese classical interpretation (such as commentary, record,


Output:
2
  For example, Lao Tzu Dao Te Jing Zhang Ju (an annotative study of Dao Te Jing) by He Shang
Gong of early Western (Former) Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–8 A.D.).
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .   37


Output:
explanation, annotation, comment, note, and so on), how can we clearly and
explicitly explain the contexts of these methods? Besides, because many areas of
knowledge, such as that of “Xun Gu Xue” (explaining archaic words in the current
language, or semantic study), philology, archeology, phonology, and “Ban Ben
Xue” (study of historical editions) are employed in interpretation, how to consider
their functions is a question that we should not neglect.
    Third, many Chinese subjects, such as “comparative literature,” archeology,
sociology, history, and philosophy, have recently employed theories and methods
of Western hermeneutics and have made much progress. It can be said that, like that
in the West, there is also a “trend-thought of interpretation” in China. Many
Chinese philosophers in the twentieth century have more or less used these theories
and methods in studying Chinese philosophy. In my view, without the impact of
Western philosophy, modern Chinese philosophy would not have come into being.


Output:
It could enter from “the past” into “modern times” only when it gets itself rebuilt (or
get a new interpretation of itself) with the help of Western philosophy. Only in this
way can “Chinese philosophy” be relevant and useful to modem China, a China that
is becoming more and more part of the world. This is what I mean when I say we
probably must first study Chinese cultural tradition in the light of Western herme-
neutical theories before we discuss the possibility of establishing a Chinese herme-
neutics. As far as I know, many scholars, such as Qian Zhong Shu (1910–1998), the
author of Guan Zhui Pian (a detailed comparative study of Chinese and Western
classics and literary theories), Prof. Cheng Chungying (1935–) in the United States,
the author of Ontology and Hermeneutics, and Prof. Rudolf Wagner in Germany
who produced an impressive interpretation of the Lau Tzu, all have made great
achievements by combining classical Chinese interpretative methods with Western
hermeneutical theories.


Output:
hermeneutical theories.
    Therefore, for the establishment of a Chinese interpretation theory, we should
first of all develop a comparative point of view. Only in this way can we establish
our own hermeneutics with Chinese characteristics—a theory that is different from
that of the West.


Output:
3.2     Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of
        Interpretation in the Study of Chinese Classics?

There is a brief entry of “hermeneutic” in the volume of philosophy in Encyclo-
pedia Sinica. According to the entry, the study of interpretation can be traced back
to ancient Greece. Augustine (354–430) gradually systematized fragmentary Bib-
lical scholarship before him. Chinese interpretation may have had a longer history
than that in the West. Here in this paper, I will demonstrate some characteristics of
classical interpretation in ancient China (mainly pre-Chin period). We will be able
to discuss the possibility of establishing a Chinese hermeneutics when we have
comprehensive knowledge of how classical interpretation was developed in China.
38                                                            3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
China is a country that pays much attention to history and tradition, so there is
the saying “Six Classics are all history.”3 According to the Analects, Confucius
taught his students such classics as Shi Jing, Shu Jing, Li Ji, and Yue Jing, and he
called himself a man of “transmitter rather than a maker, believing in and loving the
ancients.” (Analects, 7:1) That is to say, Confucius did not elucidate his own
thoughts without the base of the classics; instead, he interpreted the classics as
what they were. He believed in and was fond of ancient classics. Mencius (孟子,
?372 B.C.–?289 B.C.) seemed to start the Confucian teachings of the “Dao Tong”
(way of transmission), and he took as his ideal “transmitting the ancient traditions
of Yao and Shun,” “modeling after and making brilliant the systems of King Wen
and King Wu,” and “expatiating on Confucius’ thought.” According to Xun Tzu, the
mission for “the man of humanity” is “first to follow systems made by Yao, Shun,


Output:
and Yu4 and then to follow the teachings of Confucius and Zi Gong” (Xun Tzu,-
Chapter 6).5 Even philosophically independent and creative Taoists (before the Qin
Dynasty) would rate the classics very highly. Lao Tzu was a custodian of imperial
archives of the Zhou royalty and often cited ancient sages’ words in his book.
Chuang Tzu would also appeal to the authority of the ancients to attack the mistakes
of his contemporaries. Mo Tzu (墨子, ?476 B.C.–?390 B.C.), founder of Maoism,
advocated the thought of Yu and said: “Those that are not thoughts of Yu are not
thoughts of Mo Tzu”(Sun Yi Rang 1986). The school of Legalism, however,
insisted on “neither observing the teachings of the ancient sages nor rigidly
observing the set rules” (Han Fei Tzu,Chapter 49). It also criticized Confucianism
and Maoism for their blind worship of the ancients. This doesn’t mean that the
Legalist school denied cultural heritage wholesale. Its representative Han Fei Tzu


Output:
(韩非子, 280 B.C.–233 B.C.) much valued the legalistic thinkers before him. He
said: “The ancient sages cherished it (the tradition) and transmitted it.” It should be
noted that there are such articles as “Jie Lao” (Explaining Lao Tzu) and “Yu Lao”
(Understanding Lao Tzu) in the book of Han Fei Tzu. With this Han Fei Tzu
established an interpretation pattern different from that of Zuo Chuan and Ji Ci.
How the thinkers in ancient China thought of history and tradition is not what this
paper will explore. My main point is that there is a close relation between Chinese
emphasis upon history and tradition and Chinese classical interpretation.
    Before the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.–206 B.C.), there had been several interpre-
tative books about classics. Here I select three kinds (two books and two articles)
that are typical samples of three interpretation patterns. The first kind of interpre-
tation, as exemplified by Zuo Chuan’s interpretation of Chun Qiu, is called the


Output: interpretation of historical events. Gong Yang Zhuan (Gong Yang Gao’s


Output:
3
  In China, “Six Classics” refers to the six books, namely, Shi Jing (Book of Odes, or Book of
Songs), Shu Jing (Book of History), Li Ji (Book of Rites), Yue Jing (Book of Music), I Jing (Book of
Changes), and Chun Qiu (Spring and Autumn Annals). Yue Jing is now lost.
4
  Yao, Shun, and Yu were the three legendary rulers of the third millennium B.C. Yao was
succeeded by Shun and Yu. Yu was the founder of the Xia Dynasty (?2183 B.C.–?1752 B.C.).
5
  Zi Gong was one of Confucius’s pupils.
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .                      39


Output:
Commentaries on Chun Qiu) and Gu Liang Zhuan (Gu Liang Chi’s Commentaries
on Chun Qiu) are also interpretations of Chun Qiu, and they are quite different from
Zuo Chuan. The two books will not be discussed here. The second, as shown in Ji
Ci’s interpretation of I Ching (Zhou Yi, or Book of Changes), is called general
philosophical interpretation. The third, represented by “Jie Lao” and “Yu Lao,” two
articles in the book of Han Fei Tzu, is called practical interpretation, that is to say,
social and political interpretation. Surely, the three interpretations are not water-
tight compartments, but we should keep in mind that these interpretations, in any
case, all have remarkable features.

3.2.1      Zuo Chuan’s Interpretation of Chun Qiu


Output:
Zuo Chuan or Zuo’s Commentaries, written by Zuo Qiu Ming according to legends,
includes commentaries on Spring and Autumn Annals. However, Yang Bo Jun did
not agree with this. Yang said that the author of Zuo Chuan is perhaps not Zuo Qiu
Ming and that as a Confucian he might belong to another school of Confucianism.
Yang also argued that the Zuo Chuan came into being somewhere in between 403
B.C. and 386 B.C. (Yang Bojun 1981). Here we will discuss Zuo Chuan’s inter-
pretation of Chun Qiu on the base of Yang’s conclusions. According to Yang’s
dating of Zuo Chuan, we can say that Zuo Chuan is one of the earliest interpretation
books ever known or one of the earliest interpretation books that is extant in the
world. This means that the Chinese interpretation of classics boasts a history of over
2,300 years. It is said in Chun Qiu that in the first year of Duke Yin’s reign (722
B.C.–712 B.C.), “in May, earl Zheng overcame Duan in Yan.” There is a long
paragraph interpreting this short sentence6:


Output:
paragraph interpreting this short sentence6:
    Duke Wu of Zheng had married a daughter of the House of Shin, called Wu Jiang, who bore
    Duke Zhuang and his brother Duan. Duke Zhuang was born as she was waking from sleep
    [the meaning of the text here is uncertain], which frightened the lady so that she named him
    Wu-sheng (born in waking) and hated him, while she loved Duan and wished him to be
    declared his father’s heir. Often did she ask this of Duke Wu, but he refused it. When Duke
    Zhuang came to the earldom, she begged him to confer on Duan the city of Zhi. “It is too
    dangerous a place,” he replied. “The Younger of Guo died there; but in regard to any other
    place, you may command me.” She then requested Jing; and there Duan took up his
    residence, and came to be styled Da Shu (the Great Younger) of Jing City. Ji Zhong said
    to the Duke, “Any metropolitan city, whose wall is more than 3,000 cubits round, is


Output:
dangerous to the State. According to the regulations of the former kings, such a city of
    the 1st order can have its wall only a third as long as that of the capital; one of the 2nd order,
    only a fifth as long; and one of the least order, only a ninth. Now Jing is not in accordance
    with these measures and regulations. As ruler, you will not be able to endure Duan in such a
    place.” The Duke replied: “It was our mother’s wish;—how could I avoid the danger?”


Output:
6
 The following translation is taken from Legge’s The Chinese Classic, Vol. V, The Chun Tsew
(Chun Qiu), with the Tso Chuen (Zuo Chuan) with slight modifications. Here names of place and
person are sometimes converted to the Pin Yin system.
40                                                             3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics

     “The Lady Jiang,” replied the officer, “is not to be satisfied. You had better take the
     necessary precautions, and not allow the danger to grow so great that it is difficult to deal
     with it. Even when grass has grown and spread all about, it cannot be removed;—how much
     less the brother of yourself, and the favorite brother as well!” The Duke said, “By his many
     deeds of unrighteousness he will bring destruction on himself. Do you only wait a while?”


Output:
After this, Da Shu ordered the places on the western and northern borders of the
state to render to himself the same allegiance as they did to the earl. Then childe Lü´
said to the Duke, “A state cannot sustain the burden of two services—What will you
do now? If you wish to give Jing to Da Shu, allow me to serve him as a subject. If
you do not mean to give it to him, allow me to put him out of the way, so that the
minds of the people will not be perplexed.” “There is no need for such a step,” the
Duke replied. “His calamity will come of itself.”
    Da Shu went on to take as his own the places from which he had required their
divided contributions, as far as Lin-yan. Zi Feng [the designation of childe Lü´
mentioned above] said, “Now is the time. With these enlarged resources, he will
draw all the people to himself.” The Duke replied, “They will not cleave to him, so
unrighteous as he is. Through his prosperity he will fall the more.”


Output:
Da Shu wrought at his defenses, gathered the people around him, put in order
buff coats and weapons, prepared footmen, and chariots, intending to surprise
Zheng, while his mother was to open to him from within. The Duke learned the
time agreed on between them and said, “Now we can act.” So he ordered Zi Feng,
with 200 chariots, to attack Jing. Jing revolted from Da Shu, who then entered Yan,
which the Duke himself proceeded to attack; and in the 5th month, on the day Xin
Chou, Da Shu fled from it to Gong.
    In the words of the text—“The earl of Zheng overcame Duan in Yan,” Duan is
not called the earl’s younger brother, because he did not show himself to be such.
They were as two hostile princes, and therefore we have the word “overcame.” The
Duke is styled the earl of Zheng simply, to condemn him for his failure to instruct
his brother properly. Duan’s flight is not mentioned in the text, because it was
difficult to do so, having in mind Zheng’s wish that Duan might be killed.


Output:
This is, though long enough, an interpretation of only six Chinese characters.
As we see, it is an interpretation recount of a historical event, which includes its
origin, its zigzag process, and its ending. There are a variety of discussions and
remarks, resulting in it an integrated narrative story. For this very long paragraph,
even if it is not considered as a direct interpretation of the text in Zuo Chuan, it itself
can be thought of as a statement of a whole historical event. The fact is that this
paragraph surely is an interpretation of the text. If “earl Zheng overcame Duan in
Yan” is a historical event, the passage cited above is an interpretative record of a
historical event. The interpreter/narrator will no doubt take account of and be
influenced by his own historical background, his moral values, and other contin-
gencies. This means that a narrative story is sure to embody the author’s “historical
standpoint” toward particular historical events. In the passage cited above, the


Output:
expression “by his many deeds of unrighteousness he will bring destruction on
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .            41


Output:
himself” and the last words are highlights that show the author’s “historical
standpoint.” This kind of interpretation greatly influenced the following historical
books. As we know, in the 24 Histories, there are many commentaries like this. For
example, San Guo Zhi (Records of Three States) had commentaries by Pei Song
Zhi. Had it not been Pei Song Zhi’s commentaries, San Guo Zhi would have been
less popular. In his interpretation, Pei Song Zhi did not spend much time in tracing
archaism but in explaining and supplementing background facts. Let’s take a look
at what he did with Zhang La Zhuan (Biography of Zhang Lu) in San Guo Zhi. In his
commentaries, Pei Song Zhi noted, “During the period of Xi Ping (172–178),
disorders took place all around the country. A man named Luo Yao rebelled. During
the period of Guang He (178–184), Zhang Jiao and Zhang Xiu rebelled respectively
in East and Central China. Luo Yao taught his people how to hide them. Zhang Jiao


Output:
founded Taiping Dao. Zhang Xiu founded Wu Dou Mi Dao.” Pei Song Zhi’s citation
furnishes us with what happened to Taoist schools of that time. Though Pei Song
Zhi’s commentaries on San Guo Zhi are a little different from that of Zuo Chuan on
Chun Qiu, they belong to the same interpretation pattern. Both are narrative inter-
pretations of historical events recorded in the classics.


Output: 3.2.2     Ji Ci’s Interpretation of I Ching


Output:
I Ching (Book of Change) was originally a classic for divination in ancient China.
There is profound wisdom in its divinatory names and diagrams together with its
Gua Ci (explanation of the text of the whole hexagram) and Yao Ci (explanation of
the component line). Ji Ci (appended remarks) in I Zhuan (Commentaries on I
Ching) has a comprehensive and philosophically mature interpretation of I Ching7
Ji Ci interpreted I Ching as an integrated system. This kind of integrated inter-
pretation of ancient classics has greatly influenced later scholars in China. For
instance, Lao Zi Zhi Lue (a brief introduction to Lao Tzu) and Zhou Yi Lue Li
(a simple exemplifications of the principle of I Ching), all written by Wang Bi
(226–249), were systemic and integrated interpretations of Lao Tzu and I Ching
respectively. Dao De Lun (on Lao Tzu) and the Wu Ming Lun (on namelessness)
written by He Yan (?–249) were also integrated interpretations of Lao Tzu. There


Output:
were many works like them in Chinese history.8 Ji Ci’s interpretations are enligh-
tening in many aspects. Here we will focus on ontological and cosmological
interpretations, which in practice are different and yet interconnected.
   The 64 hexagrams in I Ching form an integrated yet open system, with a
structural mode indicative of the way of the universe. This mode is an organic


Output:
7
  Besides Ji Ci, many passages in I Zhuan can be studied and discussed in this context. Because of
limited space, only Ji Ci’s interpretation of I Ching will be discussed in this article.
8
  Most of the translations in this paper are cited from works by Wing-tsit Chan or Richard
Wilhelm.
42                                                             3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
and dynamic mode. This is why we say “production and reproduction means I
(Change)” (Ji Ci, Chapter 5).9 Everything in the world can find its corresponding
position, so Ji Ci said, I Ching (maybe we should call it “the principle of I”) “molds
and encompasses all transformations of Heaven and Earth without mistake, and it
stoops to bring things into completion without missing any” (Ji Ci, Chapter 4).
Heaven, Earth, and all things in the world, their creations and changes, are all
connaturally incarnated in the structural mode set up in I Ching. So it says: “In the
heavens, forms (heavenly bodies) appear and on earth shapes (creatures) occur. In
them changes and transformations can be seen” (Ji Ci, Chapter 1). The reasons and
principles of why Heaven, Earth, and all things exist in the world can all be found in
this mode. The foundation for their corresponding position in the structure can also
be found here: “by means of the easy and the simple we grasp the laws of the whole


Output:
world. When the laws of the whole world are grasped, therein lies perfection.” The
universe modes embodied in I Ching, which not only contains the principles for
Heaven, Earth, and all things that have already existed but principles for whatever
potential beings, may become the corresponding guidelines for all things existing in
the world. I Ching said, “the spirit has no spatial restriction and Change has no
physical form” (Ji Ci, Chapter 4), the changes of “I” (易) have no orientation and
place and are not confined to practical beings. That is to say, according to the author
of Ji Ci, the foundations for the existence and changes of Heaven, Earth, and all
things in the world can all be found in the “I” system. “I” is a universe mode that
contains everything. It is also a “Dao” (道, way) of metaphysical sense, anything,
being or coming into being, can all in this system find their principles why they are;
this is the reason why in Ji Ci it said “what exists before physical form [and is


Output:
therefore without it] is called the “Dao” (way). What exists after physical form [and is
therefore with it] is called “Qi” (器, a concrete thing).” In Chinese philosophy,
judging from the existent literature, Ji Ci should be considered the first to advance
the two terms “Xing Shang” (before the physical form) and “Xing Xia” (after the
physical form). Borrowing Professor Feng Youlan’s words, it may be said that the
“Xing Shang” is “Zhen Ji” (真际, ultimate reason), while the “Xing Xia” is “Shi Ji”
(实际, particular entity). Shi Ji refers to concrete things, and Zhen Ji refers to the
reason (or principle) why concrete things exist.10 That means that Ji Ci has observed
the inflexible difference between Xing Shang and Xing Xia and established a
metaphysical system on the base of I (change) that has no physical forms.


Output:
9
 The term Zhen Ji had been very popular in Buddhism. For example, in Ren Wang Jing, it said,
“Buddha nature is Zhen Ji, which has no past and no future, and has no life and death. Zhen Ji is the
Buddha nature.” In Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra, it said, “Zhen Ji is Buddha nature, it has neither
being nor non-being.” In Grand Dictionary of Buddhism by Ding Fu Bao, it said Zhen Ji refers to
ultimate principle. Though it is not an extent concrete being, Tao is not nonexistence but
“nonexistence but being.” For further discussion, see Feng Youlan (1999). What Lu Ji (261–
303) said “to ask non-being for being and to ask quietness for sound” is the best statement of “non-
existence but being.”
10
   “Tao originated from Vacuity,” in Huai Nan Tzu, 3:1. Vacuity (Xu Kuo) refers to the condition
before time and space are separated. See Chan (1963: 307).
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .   43


Output:
This interpretation pattern has greatly influenced the development of Chinese
philosophy. We can see this influence in Wang Bi’s interpretation of “the number of
the Great Expansion (multiplied together) make 50, of which (only) 49 are used (in
divination)” (Ji Ci, Chapter 9) and his interpretation of Lao Tzu in his Lao Tzu Zhi
Lue. Han Kang Bo (332–380) quoted Wang Bi in his book Zhou Yi Ji Ci Zhu
(commentaries to Ji Ci of I Ching): “To deduce the principles in the world, 50
numbers are needed, of which 49 are used, while the remaining one will not be used.
The reason for us to keep it without using it is that it can make the divination
understood. This is where the greatness of I lies. The existence of nonbeing must
come from being, so we can understand that nonbeing comes from the ultimacy of
being.” “Ultimacy” here refers to substance. Here Wang Bi’s explanation of the
relation between substance and function sheds light on the relation between Xing
Shang and Xing Xia.


Output:
Shang and Xing Xia.
   There is a very important interpretation in Ji Ci. It says: “In the system of the I
modes there is the Tai Ji (Grand Terminus or Great Ultimate). Tai Ji generates the
modes (yin and yang), and the two modes generate the four forms (major and
minor, yin and yang). The four forms generate the eight trigrams. . ..” This
indicates in the I there is a creative system, which shows the universe’s constant
changes and progressive development. The universe developed from original
chaotic states (taiji), followed by two forces, yin and yang, and their interaction
in turn gives rise to four forms (major and minor yin and yang); again, after their
interactions, there appear eight trigrams (Qian, Kun, Zhen, Xun, Kan, Li, Gen,
and Dui). These trigrams represent respectively different attributes. According to
Shou Gua (Discussion of the Trigrams), “The creative [Qian] is strong. The
receptive [Kun] is yielding. The arousing [Zhen] means movement. The gentle


Output:
[Xun] is penetrating. The abysmal [Kan] is dangerous. The clinging [Li] means
dependence. Keeping still [Gen] means standstill. The joyous [Dui] means plea-
sure.” These attributes can also be demonstrated in that of Heaven, earth, thunder,
wind, water, fire, mountain, and marsh (collection of water). Each trigram is
combined with another, one upon the other, thus making 64 hexagrams. However,
the universe’s changes will not stop; it changes forever. The last two hexagrams
are Ji Ji (after completion) and Wei Ji (before completion). That indicates that
anything (not a particular thing, yet it refers to any kind of thing) will inevitably
come to an end, but this end is, at the same time, another new start. Therefore, it is
said in Shuo Gua that “The succession of events cannot come to an end, and
therefore Ji Ji is succeeded by Wei Ji.” All things in the world grow and change
like this way.
   The “I” is an open system, demonstrating the developments and changes in the


Output:
universe. In Ji Ci it is said that “Heaven and earth come together, and all things take
shape and find form. Male and female mix their seeds, and all creatures take shape
and are born.” And in Xu Gua (sequence of the hexagrams), it is said that “Heaven
and earth existing, all (material) things then got their existence. All (material)
things have existence, afterwards there came male and female. From the existence
of male and female there came afterwards husband and wife. From husband and
wife there came father and son. From father and son there came ruler and minister.
From ruler and minister there came high and low. When (the distinction of) high
44                                                        3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
and low had existence, afterwards came the arrangements of propriety and righ-
teousness.” This interpretation includes a cosmic evolution theory. We can say that
Ji Ci’s interpretation of I Ching is one of cosmism. Here there is a question that
needs to be discussed. In my opinion, “Tai Ji engenders two forms. . .” is nothing
more than a symbolic system, while the statements “Heaven and earth come
together, and all things take shape and find form. . .” and “Heaven and earth
existing, all (material) things then got their existence. . .” are not symbols but the
actual processes or courses; they are used as examples to demonstrate how the
universe forms and develops. Consequently we may conclude that what is set up in
Ji Ci is a symbolic system for developments and changes in the universe.
   We can bring forward another new issue in the study of Chinese philosophy,
namely, that of the symbolic system for developments and changes in the universe.


Output:
We can also find this issue in Xian Tian Tu (congenital diagram) by Shao Yong
(1011–1077) and in taiji tu (diagram of the Great Ultimate) by Zhou Dun Yi (1017–
1073). It is said that taiji tu came from another book, Wu Ji Tu (Diagram of
Nonbeing of Ultimate) by a Taoist named Chen Tuan (906–989). This is, however,
a questionable conclusion. It needs further discussion. I think it is very important to
distinguish between symbolic systems of cosmic evolutions, on the one hand, and
descriptions of an actual cosmic evolution process, on the other. The latter is
usually based on experiential observations and is concerned with the evolution
process of concrete things with concrete forms, such as Heaven, earth, male, and
female. The former, as symbolic systems, can be based on experiential observa-
tions, but the evolution process that it refers to involves symbols rather than
concrete things. These symbols may have names, but they are more than signs for


Output:
concrete things and their natures. Consequently, symbolic systems of cosmic
evolutions, like algebra, can include any concrete thing and its nature. For example,
the two forms may represent either Heaven and earth or male and female, both
vigorousness and submissiveness. Thus, I think it is inappropriate to consider Ji
Ci’s interpretation of I Ching only as a description of the actual evolution of the
universe. Instead, it should be understood as a mode of how the universe developed
and evolved, a mode that is something like a cosmic algebra. For the system in Ji
Ci’s interpretation of I Ching, I call it “theory of cosmic evolution.”
   Ji Ci is not the only one that indicates a cosmic evolution theory in terms of
symbols. Many other works are like Ji Ci, for instance, Lao Tzu. Lao Tzu says:
“Dao produced the one; the one produced the two, the two produced the three. And
the three produced the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things carry the Yin


Output:
and embrace the Yang, and through the blending of the Qi (material force) they
achieve harmony” (Chan 1963:160). This is also a symbol system of cosmic
evolution and a cosmic algebra as well, in which the numbers can be replaced by
any concrete things. “Yuan Qi” (元气, vitality) or “Xu Kuo” (虚廓, vacuity)11 can


Output:
11
   “Vacuity produced the universe,” in Huai Nan Tzu, 3:1; time and space come to be separated
from the condition “vacuity.”
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .               45


Output:
replace the one, and Yin Yang and the universe12 can replace the two. The three
does not necessarily refer to Heaven, earth, and human being; instead, it may be the
third thing coming out of two things that have opposite natures. Each concrete thing
comes out of the interactions of two things that have opposite natures.13 However,
the Han ontology, most of which were descriptions of the actual evolution processes
of the universe, is different from that established in Ji Ci. This is another question; I
will discuss it in another essay.14
    So there are two systems in Ji Ci’s interpretation of I Ching, namely, a system
of substance and a system of cosmic evolution. Does it indicate that there is a
conflict in the interpretation? I do not think so. On the contrary, these two
systems are just mutually complementary, forming respectively two different
systems in Chinese philosophy. For the universe itself, we may look at it as an
open planar system, which is limitless; as Guo Xiang (252–312) noted in his


Output:
Chuang Tzu Zhu (Commentary on Chuang Tzu), “Yu (宇, limitless space) refers
to four quarters of the world, ups and downs, which has no limits.” While at the
same time, we can look at the universe as a vertically extending system. The
universe, in terms of length, has no terminal, as Guo Xiang noted in the same
book, “Zhou (宙, infinite time) covered all time past and future, yet it has no
limits.” Since the universe can be looked at from two angles, the “sage” can


Output:
12
   Professor Pang Pu advances “one divides into two” to differentiate it from “one divides into
three.” This is an interesting question. From the sense of ontology, “one divides into three” may
explain that the “three” (which is above or inside the “two”) may be the “substance.” For example,
taiji plus two modes is “three”: taiji is substance, and Two Modes are functions of the substance. In
one of my essays (see Tang Yi Jie 1986), I said that there are some differences Confucianism and
Taoism in their research approaches: Confucianism usually explored the mean (middle, center)
from two extremities, e.g., “to go too far is as bad as not to go far enough” (Analects, 11:16), “to
thrash the matter out, with all its pros and cons, to the very end” (Analects, 9:8), and “Faithfully
grasp it by the center” (Analects, 20:1); on the contrary, Taoism sought one extremity from its
corresponding extremity. For example, “All in the world know the beauty of the beautiful, and in


Output:
doing this they have (the idea of) what ugliness is” (Lao Tzu, Chapter 2). For the mean in
Confucianism, it is not coordinate to the two extremities but is superior to them. In the light of
ontology, the “mean” is Tai Ji. So “one divides into three” and “one divides into two” are of the
same importance in philosophical study, and the former is actually the basis of the latter.
13
   For example, in Huai Nan Tzu, 3:1, it said, “Before heaven and earth took shape, there was only
undifferentiated formlessness. Therefore it was called the great beginning. Tao originated from
vacuity and vacuity produced the universe (of space and time). The universe produced the material
force. The material force was extremely secure. That which was clear and light drifted up to
become heaven, and that which was heavy and turbid solidified to form earth.” Also in Xiao Jing
Wei (augury book of Book of Filial Piety) it said, “universe (heaven and earth) witnessed five


Output:
phases before it was born, that is, Tai Yi, Tai Chu, Tai Shi, Tai Su and Tai Ji. It was called Tai Yi
before the universe got its shape; it is called Tai Chu when the material force started to germinate;
it is called Tai Shi when material force and form began to develop; it is called Tai Su when the
universe developed substantially; it is called taiji when the universe get its form and essence.”
These messages show that Han ontology was basically based on material force.
14
   For the three Chinese characters, see Feng Youlan (1952).
46                                                   3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
establish his philosophical systems of interpretation of the universe from two
directions; so it said in Ji Ci: “The Book of Changes (I ) contains the measure of
heaven and earth.” (Wilhelm 1979: 293)
    The I Tao (Way of I) is an open, integrated cosmic structure mode; so it is an
indiscernible “great wholeness,” in which things that had existed, exist, and may
exist in the future can all find their corresponding basis. The I Tao is not stagnant
but a constantly reproducing system. Therefore, it must express itself in two
interacting symbols rather than in other quiescent things. The two symbols, yin
and yang, as it is said in I Ching, “Yin and Yang get transformation because of
their blending” and “that which is unfathomable in the operation of Yin and Yang
is called spirit” (Chan 1963: 266), represent two forces with different natures. The
I Tao, which includes these two symbols, is the root of changes for the yin and
yang. Therefore, “the successive movement of Yin and Yang constitutes the Way


Output:
(Tao)” (Chan 1963: 266). Yang Shi Xun, in his book Chun Qiu Gu Liang Zhuan
Shu (commentary to Gu LiangZhuan), cited Wang Bi’s (226–249) interpretation
of this sentence. Yang said that “Ji Ci says that the successive movement of Yin
and Yang constitutes the Way. Wang Bi said, ‘for Yin and Yang, some time it is
called Yin and some time it is called Yang: there are no definite names for them. If
it is Yin, it cannot be Yang; if it is yielding, it will not be firm. Only when it is
neither Yin nor Yang (and both Yin and Yang at the same time) can it be the Great
Master of Yin and Yang; only when it is neither yielding nor firm (and both gentle
and yielding at the same time) can it be the Great Master of the firm and the
yielding. Accordingly, only when it has no spatial restrictions and physical form,
neither Yin nor Yang can be thought to understand the Tao, and can it be thought to
understand the spirit.’” Yin and Yang represent respectively two different natures;


Output:
Yin cannot replace Yang, and vice versa. Only the Tao can represent both, for it is
neither Yin nor Yang, yet it is the substance of both. So it is said in I Ching that
“spirit has no spatial restriction and I has no physical form.” Seen from this point
of view, it is without doubt of great philosophical wisdom that Ji Ci’s interpre-
tation of I Ching indicates an open planar system as well as a vertically extending
system. Let me confirm it once more that Ji Ci’s integrated philosophical inter-
pretation of I Ching is a very different pattern from Zuo Chuan’s interpretation of
Chun Qiu.


Output:
3.2.3    Han Fei Tzu’s Interpretation of Lao Tzu

If Zuo Chuan’s interpretation of Chun Qiu is a description of historical events, and
Ji Ci’s interpretation of I Ching is an integrated philosophical interpretation, then
Han Fei Tzu’s interpretation of Lao Tzu is mainly in the light of social and political
operation. In the two articles “Jie Lao” and “Yu Lao” in Han Fei Tzu, we may find
that their primary purposes are by and large to elucidate Han’s legalist thoughts
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .             47


Output:
characterized by Fa (law), Shu (statecraft), or Shi (power or authority).15 Wei Yuan
(1794–1857) in his book Lao Tzu Ben Yi (original meaning of Lao Tzu) said: Among
those who studied Lao Tzu, there were Han Fei Tzu who wrote “Jie Lao” and “Yu
Lao,” which understood Tao in the light of legalist thought; there were scholars
such as Wang Fang (1044–1076) and Lü´ Hui Qing (1032–1111) who understood
Lao Tzu with Chuang Tzu, and there were scholars such as Su Zi You (1039–1112),
Jiao Hong (1540–1620), and Li Zhi (1527–1602) who would understand Lao Tzu
from a Buddhist perspective. None of them understood the essential spirit of Lao
Tzu. Here we will not discuss all of them but Wei Yuan. It is questionable to say that
Wei’s interpretation had got “the essential spirit of Lao Tzu,” which is but one of the
many interpretations of Lao Tzu. But it is reasonable to say that Han Fei Tzu
explained Lao Tzu with legalist thoughts. Therefore, we think “Jie Lao” and “Yu


Output:
Lao” established another interpretation pattern when he understood the classic in
the light of social and political operation. Some later works, such as Dao De Jing
Lun Bing Yao Yi (the essential meaning of war art in Dao De Jing) by Wang Zhen of
the Tang Dynasty, should be categorized in this pattern.
   Most of the interpretations in “Jie Lao” were made through a social and political
approach. Han made a little philosophical explanation of the text; from a philo-
sophical point of view, little philosophical importance can be attached to it. For
example, Han’s interpretation of the sentence “this is called shape without shape,
form (Xiang) without object” (Lao Tzu, Chapter 14) was no more than experiential
interpretation based on common sense. Han explained, “Men seldom see a living
elephant. They obtain the skeleton of a dead elephant and imagine a living one
according to its features. Whatever people use in imagining the real is called form.


Output:
Although the Tao cannot be heard or seen, the sage decides and sees its features on
the basis of its effects. Therefore, it is called (in Lao Tzu) ‘shape without shape and
form without objects’” (Chan 1963: 161). In his interpretation of another sentence
“the Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be
named is not the eternal name,” Han said, “Now, a thing which first exists and then
becomes extinct, now lives and then dies, or flourishes at first and declines after-
wards cannot be called eternal. Only that which exists from the very beginning of
the universe and neither dies nor declines until heaven and earth disintegrate can be
called eternal” (Chan 1963: 261). Here the interpretations of “change” and
“invariableness” are of great philosophical significance. As this understanding
can be obtained from general knowledge, there is some distance from here to the


Output:
15
  There were some bamboo books that were unearthed in 1993 in Guo Dian of Hu Bei Province, of
which one, named Wu Xing ( five agents), is very different from the one, a silk book, with the same
name that was unearthed in 1973 in Chang Sha, Hu Nan Province. There are Jing (Ching, classic)
and Shuo (treatise or interpretation of the classic) in the silk Wu Xing, while the bamboo Wu Xing
has Jing but not Shuo. That is to say, somebody else put the Shuo into silk Wu Xing afterwards.
Therefore, we cannot confirm both Jing Shuo and Mo Jing were written by the same person.
Certainly we still cannot deny that (1) both of the two books were written by one person and (2) Mo
Jing was finished before Jing Shuo, which was written for more comprehensive understanding of
Mo Jing.
48                                                       3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
metaphysical thoughts. The Tao is “a great wholeness,” which is the same in “the
Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao” as in “what is above form is
called Tao” (Ta Chuan in I Ching, Chapter XII; Wilhelm 1979: 323). As for other
parts of these two articles, Han often explained them with the thought of Fa, Shu,
and Shi. For example, Han explained the sentence “he who possesses the Mother
(Tao) of the state will last long” (Lao Tzu,Chapter 59) as “mother is Tao.” Tao was
born in the country where tactics are fully used. This kind of country, called
“country of mother (Tao),” indicates rightly Han’s legalist thought. In explaining
“when his capacity is beyond anyone’s knowledge, he is fit to rule a state” (Lao Tzu,
Chapter 59), Han Fei Tzu said, “These who rule a state and save himself from
danger are surely these who understand Tao. He will become wiser if he under-
stands the Tao; He will get profound knowledge if he becomes wiser, then others


Output:
are unable to know what he knows and what he doesn’t know. Only in this way can
he not only keep himself free from damage but also rule his state.” That is to say, he
who understands profoundly the essences of Tao can both save himself from danger
and rule the state. This is actually explaining the Tao in terms of law. In explaining
Lao Tzu’s sentence “who knows when the limit will be reached” (Lao Tzu, Chapter
58), Han said, “Anyone will succeed if he follows the principle. As for success, the
greatest will be King, while the less great will be ministers or generals.” That is to
say, if one operates following the Tao’s nature, he will get the exalted position of
king, while the minister or general will get reward and salary they deserve. Here
Han combined the Tao with power. In explaining “ruling a big country is like
cooking a little fish,” Han said, “in ruling a big country if the ruler constantly
changes the laws, the people will suffer greatly. Therefore the sensible ruler values


Output:
tranquility (no-action) instead of changing laws.” That is to say, that the laws
should be carried out in a long term so that the people can observe them. Such
interpretations in Han Fei Tzu can be found everywhere, while little can be found
from these interpretations that have philosophical significance in this article.
Consequently, Han was ready to elucidate his legalist thoughts of Fa, Shu, and
Shi when he interpreted Lao Tzu.
    In “Yu Lao,” more clearly, Han interpreted Lao Tzu in the light of social and
political operation, most of the materials he employed were historical stories, in order
to show how a ruler succeeded or failed and how a state rose and declined. For
instance, he took the story of Duke Jian of Qi (484 B.C.–481 B.C.) and his minister
Tian Cheng to illuminate that “fish cannot divorce itself from water” (Lao Tzu,
Chapter 36), for “major powers are a ruler’s base (like the fish to the water), his
power should be above his ministers, which he cannot get back once it was rendered


Output:
to the ministers.” Again he used the story of Duke Xian of Jin (676 B.C.–651 B.C.)
who presented nice horses and pieces of jade to Yu State (to lower its guard before he
planned to attack it) to explain “in order to grasp (it), it is necessary first to give it.”
The reason why Han Fei interpreted Lao Tzu in this way is because many thoughts in
Lao Tzu are about how to govern and administer a state. It is reasonable that he was
put together with Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and Shen Dao (395–C.315 B.C.) by Si Ma
Qian (C.145 B.C.–?) in his book Shi Ji (historical records). On the other hand, Han
is much different from the scholars (Neo-Taoist) of the Wei-Jin period, for he
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .    49


Output:
made little interpretations in Lao Tzu on the texts that have philosophical significance.
In one word, Han’s interpretation can be considered as another kind of interpretation
pattern in the history of Chinese learning.
    There are many other interpretation patterns in pre-Qin classics, but I think the
three interpretation patterns we have discussed above may be of greatest influence
upon later Chinese scholarship. Here I would like to mention the relation between
Mo Tzu, Mo Cking (classic of Moism), and Ching Shuo (treatise on Mo Ching). As
for the date of these two articles, I do not agree that Ching Shuo appeared after Mo
Ching had been finished. I think Mo Ching might appear as much as the same time
as Ching Shuo, or the two articles were not written by different persons.16 Both of
them are mainly explanations of concepts; still there are some differences between
them. Mo Ching is by and large definitions of concepts, while Ching Shuo focuses


Output:
on the embodiments or complementary accounts of the concepts. For instance, in
Mo Ching it is said, “Jiu (long time) refers to different times.” This definition does
not refer to a particular period of time but all the time; it is an abstract and extensive
explanation, so came Ching Shuo that gives a more explicit definition: “Jiu refers to
ancient and modem time, day and night,” indicating Jiu covers all the time from
ancient to modern and from dawn to sunset. Again in Mo Ching, it is said that, “Yu
(limitless space) refers to different spaces.” Yu refers to spaces, not some specific
place; so “different space” is just a definition to Yu. In Ching Shuo, it is said, “Yu
refers to Dong (east), Xi (west), Jia (home), Nan (south) and Bei (north). There are
many understandings of the word Jia (家).” For example, Prof. Gao Heng (1900–
1986) thought that it is Zhong (中, center), but I would rather think it is Jia (加,
plus). Yu is the extension of east and west plus south and north, which is surely an


Output:
account of Yu in Mo Ching. This kind of interpretation of a specific word or
expression is much similar to a present-day dictionary and has great influence,
especially on the compilation of dictionaries and Buddhism classics translation.
    Since Han Confucianists valued Confucian classics very much, and these clas-
sics were approved to be the basic resources for civil service examinations, there
rose a movement of studying these classics by syntactic and semantic analysis;
gradually such knowledge as explaining and scrutinizing the origins, developments
of ancient characters had become indispensable skills for scholars in their interpre-
tation of these classics, and as a result of it, some of which, like Xun Gu, phonology,
philology, Kao Ju (textual research), become special and technical subjects. Han’s
study and interpretation of these classics were loaded with trivial details, as it is said
in Han Shu (History of the Han Dynasty) that “usually a treatise on a classic would


Output:
employ over a million characters.” A Confucian named Qin Yan Jun explained two
characters in the Yao Dian with more than a hundred thousand characters and used
30,000 characters to explain four words. In the chapter of “Lun Shuo” (discussion
on treatise) of Wen Xin Diao Long, it is said, “because persons like Qin Yan Jun
who commented Yao Dian with over hundred thousand characters whereas Zhu
Shan Zhi who explained Shang Shu (Book of History) with 300 characters, many


Output:
16
     One of the articles in Shang Shu (Book of History).
50                                                           3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
scholars were so sick of it that they would not like to study syntactic and semantic
analysis.” Scholars in Han Dynasty explained classics not only with unduly trivi-
ality but also became ridiculous. However, this style changed greatly in the Wei-Jin
period. Scholars of that time tended to interpret the classics concisely and compre-
hensively. Most of the works during that time, including commentaries on I Ching
and Lao Tzu (by Wang Bi) and commentaries on Chuang Tzu (by Guo Xiang), were
both compendious and philosophical (Tang Yi Jie 1998a).17 I would like to use one
example to show the different styles between the Han Dynasty and the Wei-Jin
period. The “Xiao Yao You” (A Happy Excursion) of Chuang Tzu says that “In the
northern ocean there is a fish, called the Kun, I do not know how many thousand
miles in size. This Kun changes into a bird, called the Peng. Its back is I do not
know how many thousand miles in breadth. When it is moved, it flies, its wings


Output:
obscuring the sky like clouds.” In his commentary, Guo Xiang just said, “For the
truth about Kun and Peng, I am not sure of it.” He continued to criticize the trivial
styles in the Han Dynasty as “stiff explanations” and said, “a comprehensive-
minded scholar should, in his study, catch its essence rather than those extraneous
details, and should not pain stakingly explain stiffly all the time. These details can
be abandoned as long as they affect the main ideas.” So we can conclude that the
way the Han Confucianist interpreted classics was that of “I was commenting on
classics,” while that of the Wei-Jin scholars was that of “classics commenting on
me.” In Chapter 22 of Da Hui Pu Jue Chan Shi Yu Lu (the analects of Pu Jue, the
Great Zen Master), it is said, “Guo Xiang was seen writing his interpretation of
Chuang Tzu. People who knew it said, ‘in fact it is Chuang Tzu who commented on
Guo Xiang’.” Also in his foreword to the Nan Hua Zhen Jing Ping Zhu (Annotation


Output:
of Chuang Tzu) by Gui You Guang (1507–1571), Feng Meng Zhen (1546–1605) of
the Ming Dynasty said, “it is not Guo Xiang’s commentary of Chuang Tzu, but
Chuang Tzu’s commentary of Guo Xiang.”
    Since Indian Buddhism came to China at the end of the Western Han (206
B.C.–25 A.D.), people became more and more concerned with interpretations. At
first when An Shi Gao (belonged to Hinayana) of the Eastern Han began to
translate Buddhism classics into China, he matched Buddhist theories with the
dominant thoughts of that time, such as Caturmahabhuta (earth, fire, water, and
wind) for five agents (water, fire, wood, metal, and earth), Pancasila (no killing
living creature, no stealing, no bawdy, no telling lie, and no potation) for five
virtues (benevolence, righteousness, ritual, wisdom, and sincerity), etc. In Yin Chi
Ren Jing Zhu (Commentary of Yin Chi Ren Classic), it is said, “Pancaskandha
refers to body. . . just like man’s original vigor. When the vigor is mixed, it takes


Output:
turns to rise, drop, thrive and decline in turn around the Trilokya without end, so it
is called seed.” To explain Pancaskandha in terms of vigor was surely far away
from the real Buddhism principle, but it coincided with the dominant thoughts of


Output:
17
  In the end of this essay, I advanced the question of establishing Chinese hermeneutics theory and
method and made some analyses on two methods employed by Guo Xiang when interpreting
Chuang Tzu. Also see another essay of mine, Tang Yi Jie (1998b).
3.2 Is it Possible to Find Out General Patterns of Interpretation in the Study. . .   51


Output:
that time. Later, when Mahayana was introduced into China, it was usually
understood as the thought of Neo-Taoism. Therefore, there appeared new inter-
pretation methods, e.g., Ge Yi and Lian Lei (Tang Yong Tong 1991). It is said in
Gao Seng Zhuan (Biography of Great Dignitary) that, when Hui Yuan (334–416)
“was 24 years old, he began giving lectures. Once one person in the audience felt
it difficult to understand him. Though Hui Yuan tried hard, he still failed to make
himself understood. At last Hui Yuan cited thoughts in Chuang Tzu, and the
person got it.” From this case, we can say that Ge Yi is nothing more than Lian
Lei, namely, interpreting Buddhist classics with Chinese ideas. In fact, scholars
had already observed that using Ge Yi to explain classics was prone to
misinterpreting their original thought. For example, it occurred to Dao An
(314–385) that “Ge Yi had misunderstood most of the classics before.” Seng
Rui, one of Kumarajiva’s most distinguished disciples, said, “to propagate and


Output:
teach (Buddhism principles) with Ge Yi is both pedantry and a deviation of the
real Buddhist spirit” (Taisho shinshu daizokyo, 55:59). After that Ge Yi was
gradually given up. But it is inevitable that transliteration was employed in
translating Buddhist classics, for there are many terms in Buddhism, e.g., Prajna
and Nirvana, which cannot find their corresponding substitutions in Chinese. In
Zheng Wu Lun (on Correcting Mistakes), it is said, “Ni Huan is a Sanskrit word,
which in the Jin dynasty refers to non-action” (Bong Mng M, Chapter I). Ni Huan
is the transliteration of Nirvana; there was no corresponding word for it in
Chinese; it was transliterated and interpreted as “nonaction.” Another example
can be found in Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra. In the first volume of this book, there
are the following words, “Seng Zhao (384–414) said, Bi Qiu (Bhiksu) in Later Qin
Dynasty (936–947) sometimes refers to beggar, sometimes refers to the wiping


Output:
off of annoyance, sometimes to observing commandment, sometimes to fright-
ening devils. One Indian word can generalize all of the four meanings; however,
because there was no corresponding word for it, it can only be transliterated.” This
explained the reason why there are some transliterations in Buddhist classics
translation. But this may raise a new question, that is, because of the different
understandings of the Buddhism ideas, there may be different interpretations for
the same concept. In order to have a general and common understanding of the
terms in Buddhist classics, there appeared some specific books to set up criteria
for the terms. These kind of books included Yi Qie Jing Yin Yi (Transliteration
Guide for All Classics) and Fan Yi Ming Yi Ji (A Recorder for Transliteration).
Moreover, from the South-North dynasties to the Sui and Tang dynasties
(581–907), some Buddhists advanced certain principles for classics translation,


Output:
such as Qi Da Liang who set up “five principles not to translate,” which were later
made more sophisticated by Xuan Zang (602–662) (Tang Yong Tong 1982).
It may be of great importance for us, for the development of a Chinese interpre-
tation theory, to systemically straighten out these methods and principles in
Buddhist translation. Of course since Western learning entered China, new ques-
tions about translation and interpretation have emerged. This gives rise to many
issues that are beyond my competence. I hope other scholars would do some
research on this field.
52                                   3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output: Glossary


Output:
Ban Ben Xue                    版本学
Bi Qiu                         比丘
Caturmahabhuta                 四大
Chen Tuan                      陈抟
Ching Shuo                     经说
Chun Qiu                       春秋
Da Hui Pu Jue Chan Shi Yu Lu   大慧普觉禅师语录
Dao De Lun                     道德论
Dao Tong                       道统
Du Dao Jian                    杜道坚
Fan Yi Ming Yi Ji              翻译名义记
Feng Meng Zhen                 冯梦祯
Gao Heng                       高亨
Gong Yang Gao                  公羊高
Gong Yang Zhuan                公羊传
Gu Liang Chi                   谷梁赤
Gu Liang Zhuan                 谷梁传
Gua Ci                         卦辞
Guan Zhui Bian                 管锥编
Gui You Guang                  归有光
Han Kang Bo                    韩康伯
He Yan                         何晏
Hong Ming Ji                   弘明集
I Zhuan                        易传
Ji Ci                          系辞
Ji Ji                          既济
Jiao Hong                      焦纮
Jie Lao                        解老
Jin Dynasty                    晋朝


Output:
Jin Dynasty                    晋朝
Jing Xue                       经学
Lao Zi Zhi Lue                 老子指略
Li Zhi                         李贽
Lian Lei                       连类
Liu Xie                        刘勰
Lü Hui Qing                   吕惠卿
Lun Shuo                       论说
Lun Yu Nian Pu                 hh论语ii年谱
Mo Ching                       墨经
Nan Hua Zhen Jing Ping Zhu     南华真经评注
Pancasila                      五戒
Pei Song Zhi                   裴松之
Pei Wen Zhong                  裴文中
References                                                                                53


Output:
Qian Zhong Shu                          钱钟书
Qin Yan Jun                             秦延君
San Guo Zhi                             三国志
Seng Zhao                               僧肇
Shao Rong                               邵雍
Shen Dao                                慎到
Shi Ji                                  史记
Shuo Gua                                说卦
Sima Qian                               司马迁
Su Zi You                               苏子由
Tai Ji                                  太极
Taisuke Hayashi                         林泰辅
Tao Te Ching Yuan Zhi                   道德经原旨
Wang Bi                                 王弼
Wang Pang                               王雱
Xiao Jing Wei                           孝经纬
Wei Ji                                  未济
Wei Si                                  魏斯
Wei Yuan                                魏源
Wu Ming Lun                             无名论
Xu Gua                                  序卦
Xun Gu Xue                              训诂学
Yang Shi Xun                            杨士勋


Output:
Yang Shi Xun                            杨士勋
Yi Qie Jing Yin Yi                      一切经音义
Yin Chi Ren Jing Zhu                    阴持人经注
Zhang Ju Zhi Xue                        章句之学
Zheng Wu Lun                            正诬论
Zhou Dun Yi                             周敦颐
Zhou Yi Luo Li                          周易略例
Zuo Qiu Ming                            左丘明


Output:
References

Chan,Wing-tsit. (1963). A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University
   Press.
Egner, R. E., & Ednonn, L. E. (Eds.). (1992). The basic writings of Bertrand Russell (p. 547).
   London: Routledge.
Feng Youlan. (1952). A history of Chinese philosophy (Derk Bodde, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton
   University Press. Chapter XIII.
Feng Youlan. (1999). A history of modern Chinese philosophy (p. 217). Guangzhou: Guang Dong
   People’s Press.
Li Da San. (1978). The study of comparative literature: A new direction (p. 107). Taipei: Linking
   Publishing House.
54                                                          3 Toward a Chinese Hermeneutics


Output:
Meng Hua. (1993). Arouet de Voltaire and Confucius (p. 14, p. l49 and p. l51). Beijing: New China
   Press.
Sun Yi Rang. (1986). Mo Tzu jian Gu. Beijing: Zhong Hua Publishing House.
Tang Yi Jie. (1986). On the method used by Dao Te Jing to establish its philosophical system.
   Philosophical Study (1), Beijing.
Tang Yi Jie. (1998a). Differentiating names and analyzing reason: Guo Xiang’s new method of
   commenting on Chuang Tzu. Chinese Social Science (l), Shanghai.
Tang Yi Jie. (1998b). On Guo Xiang’s method of commenting Chuang Tzu. Study of Chinese
   Culture (l), Beijing.
Tang Yi Jie. (1999). On literary theories in Wei-Chin and South-North dynasties. In Tang Yi Jie
   (Ed.), Fei Shi Fei Xu Ji (pp. 186–187). Beijing: Huawen Press.
Tang Yong Tong. (1982). A history of Buddhism of Sui and Tang dynasties(Chapter II, pp. 76–77).
   Beijing: Zhong Hua Publishing House.
Tang Yong Tong. (1991). Ge Yi: The earliest method of syncretizing Indian Buddhism and


Output:
Chinese thought. In Tang Yong Tong (Ed.), Confucianism, Buddhism and Xuan Xue (pp.
   282–294). Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Wilhelm, Richard, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes. (1979). The I Ching or book of
   changes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Yang Bojun. (1981). Chun Qiu Zuo Chuan Zhu (Commentary of Zuo Chuan). Beijing: Zhong Hua
   Publishing House.
Chapter 4
Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory:
An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
There is a view that holds that Ruists never put much emphasis on qing (情)1 and
that they even regarded it in a negative light. This is perhaps a misunderstanding,
especially in regard to pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu (性自命
出), the passage “dao begins in qing” (dao shi yu qing, 道始于情) plays an
important role in our understanding of the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article
will concentrate on discussing the “theory of qing” in pre-Qin Ruism, and also in
Daoism. In addition, it will attempt a philosophical interpretation of “dao begins in
qing,” and in the process offer philosophical interpretations of a number of
important notions.

4.1     On “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
4.1     On “Dao Begins in Qing”

The Guodian Xing zi ming chu is a Ruist text of the middle Warring States period
(prior to 300 B.C.), and it contains the following key lines:
   Dao shi yu qing, qing sheng yu xing. 道始于情, 情生于性.
   Dao begins in qing, and qing arises from xing.
   Xing zi ming chu. 性自命出.
   Xing issues from ming.
   Ming zi tian jiang. 命自天降.
   Ming descends from tian.

Translated by Brian Bruya and Hai-ming Wen
Department of Philosophy, University of Hawai’i
Philosophy East and West, 2003, 3(2): 271–281
1
  Translators’ note: the terms qing and xing will remain untranslated throughout this article, since
to translate them would run counter to the project of exploring the interpretations of the terms.
Similarly, we also leave key technical terms of Chinese moral philosophy untranslated, as these
terms have no close equivalents in Western philosophy.


Output:
© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                                     55
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_4
56        4 Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
Discovering the correlations among these passages is crucial to understanding
the pre-Qin notions of xing and qing. To begin with, we can explain them as
follows: the human dao (the norms of personal and social conduct) exists from
the start on account of shared emotions (qinggan 情感) among people. The qing of
emotions (xi, nu, ai, le 喜怒哀乐) emerges out of human xing, and human xing is
conferred by tian (human xing are obtained from ming, which tian confers). Tian
ming is the inevitability and the teleology made manifest by tian. We can see from
these sentences that “dao begins in qing” was an extremely important topic for
pre-Qin Ruists. It makes sense to say “dao begins in qing” rather than “dao arises
from qing” because dao exists from the start on account of human qing rather than
emerging out of qing.2 This is why the Xing zi ming chu says: “Someone who
understands qing is able to convey (chu 出) it, while someone who understands yi


Output:
义 is able to internalize (ru 入) it.” Someone who completely comprehends human
qing is able fully to elaborate human emotion, and someone who has a firm grasp
of ritual propriety (li 礼) and yi is able to modulate human emotion. Thus, ritual
propriety and yi are intimately related to qing and are inseparable from the
expression of human emotion.
   There are many issues that can be touched on here, and we will focus on the
following three:
1. The dao of “dao begins in qing” refers to human dao rather than a conflated tian
   and human dao. Moreover, it is not the “constant dao” that Laozi speaks of
   because the Xing zi ming chu states, “Only the human dao can be articulated
   [dao].” The dao that “can be articulated” is not the “constant dao,” nor is it the
   “dao that cannot be articulated.” So this dao is not the dao that Laozi says
   “precedes the generation of tian and earth.” The Xing zi ming chu also says:
   “Ritual propriety starts from qing” (li zuo yu qing 礼作于情).3 Ritual propriety


Output:
belongs within the scope of “human dao.” Therefore, “dao begins in qing” is not
   a Daoist notion but a Ruist one. This kind of ritual propriety so tied to qing is
   exactly the basis for maintaining decorum among people in society. However,
   this dao that begins in qing is not confined to ritual propriety, for ren (仁), yi,
   ritual propriety, wisdom, trustworthiness, etc., all belong to it. For instance:
     In the beginning, it is near to qing and at the end to yi (Xing zi ming chu).
     Ren arises in people, and yi arises in dao (Yu cong no. 1). (This dao is, naturally,
        also human dao.)
     However, from the Ruist perspective, the human dao originates in the dao of
        tian, and that is why we find such a notion as “the unity of tian and people.”
2. “Qing” typically refers to the “seven qing” (delight, anger, grief, fear, love,
   dislike, desire [xi, nu, ai, ju, ai, wu, yu 喜怒哀惧爱恶欲]), the “six qing”
   (delight, anger, grief, enjoyment [le 乐], fondness [hao 好], dislike), or the


Output:
2
 This is not to say that it cannot emerge at all, for it can also emerge out of rationality or study.
3
 The Guodian Yu cong no. 1 语丛一 has “Ritual propriety is created as a response to human qing.”
Yu cong no. 2 says: “Qing arises from xing; ritual propriety arises from qing.”
4.2 The Basis for the Pre-Qin Ruist Emphasis on Qing                                                57


Output:
“five qing” (delight, anger, grief, enjoyment, resentment [yuan 怨]), but the Xing
      zi ming chu says: “the qi 气 of delight, anger, grief, and sadness is due to xing,”
      and “fondness and dislike are a matter of xing.” Here we touch on the problem of
      the relationship between xing and qing.
   In the “Tian lun” chapter of the Xunzi, we find the following passage, “Fond-
ness, dislike, delight, anger, grief, and enjoyment are stored within (zang 臧4), and
this is called the natural qing.” “Fondness, dislike, delight, anger, grief, and
enjoyment” refer to the emotions (qinggan) that naturally issue from within the
person. Based on natural human xing, qing is human emotion (ganqing) that “is
aroused into action by contact with things” and expressed externally. (This issue
will be taken up in more detail below.)
3. What does the Ruist “tian” mean? It has many connotations, and for each of the
   great Ruists (such as Mengzi and Xunzi), it meant something slightly different.


Output:
Nonetheless, it is my opinion that it would be reasonable to interpret tian in early
   China (especially for the Ruists) as a governing power and principle that is
   transcendent with regard to nature and the myriad things (including, of course,
   people). Thus, tian holds connotations of sacredness, supreme power, and
   morality. That would make tian ming the necessity and teleology behind this
   power governing the myriad things. But this is not a topic to be discussed here,
   so we will put it off for another time.


Output:
4.2       The Basis for the Pre-Qin Ruist Emphasis on Qing

Society in ancient China was patriarchal and centered on the family, and familial
qing (qin qing 亲情) was the foundation for preserving ties within the family. By
extension, it was also the foundation for preserving ties within the entire society.
Because this qing-oriented social background is what pre-Qin Ruism developed out
of, “dao begins in qing” can be seen as a foundational issue for pre-Qin Ruist
thought, especially for the core issues of moral thought.
   There is no record in the Analects of Confucius having ever directly discussed
the topic of qing, but from his behavior, one can see that he attached a significant
amount of importance to qing. For instance:
      Yan Yuan died, and Confucius grieved with abandon (11:10).
         When Confucius was in Qi, he heard the Shao music, and for three months, he didn’t
      notice the taste of meat. He said, “I never expected that music could be like this” (7:14).


Output:
Despite his never having discussed qing directly, the basis for the pre-Qin emphasis
on qing is built on the thought of Confucius. For example: “Fan Chi inquired about
ren. Confucius said, ‘Love (ai 爱) others’”5 (12: 22). Why does Confucius take love
to be the basic connotation of ren?

4
    “Zang” 臧 is “cang” 藏.
5
    Guodian Yu cong no. 3 has “Love is ren.”
58        4 Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
The Zhongyong quotes Confucius as saying “Ren has to do with others, and felt
intimacy with one’s family (qin qin 亲亲) is paramount.”6 It is not for nothing that
ren is taken to be fundamental, for it begins with loving one’s family and is
extended outward from there.7 This is to say that felt intimacy with one’s family
is the most basic emotion, and only after having the emotions for loving one’s
family will one “extend them to others” or be able to “honor one’s elders as befits
elders and extend this honor to all elders, . . . honor one’s own children as befits
children and extend this honor to all children.” To be able to “extend from oneself
to others” is not easy and requires that one take the path of conscientiousness and
compassion as the standard such that one does “not inflict on others what one does
not desire for oneself” and that one “establishes others when wishing to establish
oneself, and helps others achieve the goal that one wishes to achieve for oneself.”8


Output:
The ideal for Confucius was to take the spirit of love and care based on familial qing
and spread it throughout society, causing all of society to turn toward ren: “To
control oneself and restore ritual propriety is ren. If you can do it for one day, the
whole land will turn toward the ren in you. Ren comes from oneself; how could it
come from others?”
    “To control oneself and restore ritual propriety” is always interpreted as if “to
control oneself” and “restore ritual propriety” were two corresponding notions
taken in parallel. I do not think that this is the best interpretation. It should be
taken to mean that only the “restoring of ritual propriety” that is based on “con-
trolling oneself” can be called ren. Ren arises out of one’s inner character, while
ritual propriety is the external system of etiquette for regulating human behavior—
its purpose being to modulate relations among people and to make them more
harmonious: “Achieving harmony is the most valuable function of observing ritual


Output:
propriety.” For people to observe a system of etiquette, it must come from their own
sensibility. Only this tallies with ren. This is why Confucius said “ren comes from
oneself, how could it come from others?” Confucius was unequivocal in character-
izing the relation between ren and ritual propriety: “What has a person who is not
ren have to do with observing ritual propriety? What has a person who is not ren
have to do with the playing of music?” (3:3). This theory of ren based on love


Output:
6
  Mencius says: “Felt intimacy with one’s family (qin qin) is ren” (“Gaozi xia”). Guoyu, “Jinyu,”
says: “To love one’s family is to put ren into practice.”
7
  Han Fei zi, “Wu du”: “In regard to human xing and qing, the parents come first. But while parents
may both show love for the children, they may not govern the children well.” Note that this
passage demonstrates that Han Feizi believed that the emotion of love for one’s parents is not
necessarily conducive to the well ordering of the state but also that human emotion is first
expressed as love for one’s parents. We can see here that the legalists also believed that emotion
toward one’s parents is the foundation of all emotions.
8
  Analects 4:5 says: “Confucius said, ‘Zeng, my path has one continuous thread.’ Zengzi said,
‘Indeed.’ Confucius left. The other disciples asked what Confucius had meant. Zengzi said, ‘The
master’s path is nothing more than conscientiousness and compassion.’” Zhu Xi comments: “To do


Output:
one’s best is called conscientiousness, to extend oneself is called compassion.” Here we see that
Confucius took the “dao of conscientiousness and compassion,” the foundation of which he found
to be familial qing, as his one thread for human conduct.
4.3 On “Qing Arises from Xing” 情生于性                                                              59


Output:
would inevitably influence Mencius, who said, “ren is felt intimacy with one’s
family” (6B:3, 7A:15).
    In Mencius, we cannot find a passage that directly discusses qing. However,
Mencius, “four sprouts,” especially the “heart (mind) of commiseration” (ceyin zhi
xin 恻隐之心), although only the sprouting of human xing, certainly possesses the
content of human qing. Addressing the question of why people have a heart (mind)
of commiseration, Mencius says: “Anyone seeing a child about to fall into a well
would be alarmed, possessing a heart (mind) of commiseration. This is not because
they wish to ingratiate themselves with the child’s parents or because they wish for
a good reputation among friends and villagers or because they dislike the sound of
the child’s voice” (2A:6). On seeing a child about to fall into a well, one would
spontaneously reach out to help. This is due to the heart (mind) of commiseration,
which is an inner feeling free of selfish motives.


Output:
We can also see this vein of Confucius’ thinking developed in the Guodian
materials. Yu cong no. 3, for instance (as mentioned above), has “Love is ren” and
“Love arises from xing,” and the Tang Yu zhi dao says: “The expression of filial
piety consists of loving the people of the world.” Amplifying the love of one’s
parents is the basis for loving all the people of the world. The Wu xing says:
“Profound felt intimacy is love. To extend the love for one’s father to others in a
prudent way is ren.” Love is expressing familial qing; loving one’s parents and then
extending it to others is called complete ren.
    But why would people have the emotion of love? Simply because “qing arises
from xing.” As mentioned above, Yu cong no. 2 says: “Qing arises from xing; ritual
propriety arises from qing,” and Yu cong no. 1 says: “Ritual propriety is created as a
response to human qing.” Human emotion arises from one’s inner xing.
Maintaining the ties that bind people together through ritual propriety and yi is


Output:
predicated upon everyone’s having the emotion of love for others. Ritual propriety
is one meaning of “human dao.” According to what is mentioned above, we can say
that moral theory in pre-Qin Ruism was built on the foundation of Confucius’
notion of ren, which was an extension of familial qing. “Dao begins in qing” should
then be an extremely significant part of Confucius’ theory of ren and important to
the interpretation of Confucius’ notion of love.