Output:
This one Supreme Ultimate is received by each individual in its entirety and undivided. It is like the moon shining in the heavens, ol which, though it is reflected in rivers and lakes and thus is everywhere visible, we would not therefore say that it is divided." (Ibid.) We know that in Plato s philosophy there is a difficulty in explaining the relation between the intellectual and sensible worlds, and between the one and the many. Chu Hsi, too, has this difficulty, which he meets with an illustration which is really a metaphor of constant use in Buddhism. The question as to how the Li of a whole class of things is related to the individual things within that class, and as to whether this relationship may also involve a division of the Li, is not raised. If it were, I think Chu Hsi would meet it with the same illustration.

 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS

 .

 Ch' i or Matter


Output: If there were nothing but Li, there could be nothing more than a world that is "above shapes. Our own concrete physical world, however, is made possible by the presence of Ch i upon which is imposed the pattern of the Li. "In the universe," says Chu Hsi, "there are Li and Ch'i. The Li is the Too that pertains to what is above shapes, and is the source from which all things are produced. The Ch i is the material Lliterally, instrumentJ that pertains to 'what is within shapes,' and is the means whereby things are produced. Hence men or things, at the moment of their production, must receive this Li in order that they may have a nature of their own. They must receive this Ch'i in order that they may have their bodily form." ("Reply to Huang Tao-fu," Collected Literary Writings, chtian 58.) Again he says: It seems to me that the Ch i depends upon the Li for its operation. Thus when there is an agglomeration of Ch'i, the Li is also present within it. It is so, because the Ch'i has the capacity to condense and


Output: because the Ch'i has the capacity to condense and thus form things; but the Li lacks volition or plan, and has no creative power....The Li constitutes only a pure, empty, and vasl world, without shapes or traces, and so incapable of producing anything. But the Ch' i has the capacity to undergo fermentation and condensation, and thus bring things into existence. And yet, whenever the Ch'i exists, the Li is present within it." {Recorded Sayings, chtian 1.) Here we see how Chu Hsi says what Chang Tsai should have said but did not. Any individual thing is a condensation of Ch'i, but it is not only an individual thing; it is at the same time a member of some category of objects. As such, it is not merely a condensation of the Ch i, but is a condensation that takes place in accordance with the Li for that category of objects as a whole. That is why, whenever there is a condensation of the Ch i, Li must always necessarily be present within it.


Output:
The question as to the relative priority of Li and Ch i is one much discussed by Chu Hsi and his disciples. On one occasion he says: "Before the instances of it exist, there is the Li. For example, before there exist any sovereign and subject, there is the Li of the relationship between sovereign and subject.

 Before there exist any father and son, there is the Li of the relationship between father and son.


Output:
(Recorded Sayings, chtian 95) That there is a Li prior to the instances of it in our physical universe, is certainly clear from Chu Hsi' s statement. But is Li in general also prior to Ch' i in general? Chu Hsi says: "Li is never separable from Ch'i. Nevertheless, Li pertains to 'what is above shapes, whereas Ch'i pertains to what is within shapes. Hence if we speak of ' what is above shapes' and ' what is within shapes,' how can there not be priority and posteriority? (Ibid., chiian 1. ) Elsewhere there is a passage: "(Question:) 'When there is Li, there is then Ch' i. It seems that we cannot say that either one is prior to the other.' (Answer:) In reality, Li is prior. We cannot say, however, that there is Li today and Ch' i tomorrow. Yet there must be a priority of the one to the

 490

 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS


Output: other'. (Complete Works, chiian 49-)From these passages we can see that what Chu Hsi has in mind is that as a matter of fact "there is no Li without Ch i and no Ch i without Li. (Recorded Sayings, chiian I.) There is no time when there is no Ch i. And since Li is eternal, it is absurd to speak about il as having a beginning. Hence the question as to whether it is Li or Ch i that comes into being first is really nonsensical. Nevertheless, to speak about the beginning of Ch i is only a factual absurdity, while to speak about the beginning of Li is a logical one. In this sense it is not incorrect, as between Li and Ch i, to say that there is priority and posteriority.


Output: Another question is this: As between Li and Ch'i, which is it that Plato and Aristotle would have called the First Mover ? Li cannot be so, because it lacks volition or plan, and has no creative power. But though Li itself does not move, yet in the "pure, empty, and wide world" of Li there are the Li of movement and the Li of quiescence. The Li of movement does not itself move, nor does the Li of quiescence itself rest, but as soon as the Ch' i "receives" them, the latter begins to move or rest. The Ch'i that moves is called the Yang; the Ch i that rests is called the Yin. Thus, according to Chu Hsi, the dualistic elements that are the fundamentals of the universe in Chinese cosmology are produced. He says: "Whereas the Yang is in movement and the Yin in quiescence, the Supreme Ultimate is neither in movement nor in quiescence. But there are the Li of movement and of quiescence. These Li are invisible, and become manifest to us only when there are the movement of the Yang and the quiescence of the Yin.


Output:
The Li rests upon the Yin and Yang just as a man rides on a horse. (Complete Works, chiian 49.) Thus the Supreme Ultimate, like God in the philosophy of Aristotle, is not moved, yet at the same time is the mover of all.

 The interaction of the Yin and Yang results in the production of the Five Elements, and from these the physical universe as we know it is produced. In his cosmological theory, Chu Hsi endorses most of the theories of Chou Tun-yi and Shao Yung.

 Nature and Mind


Output:
Nature and Mind

 From the above we see that, according to Chu Hsi, when an individual thing comes into existence, a certain Li is inherent in it, which makes it what it is and constitutes its nature. And a man, like other things, is a concrete particular produced in the concrete world. Hence what we call human nature is simply the Li of humanity that is inherent in the individual. The saying of Ch eng Yi that the nature is Li is endorsed and commented on by Chu Hsi in many places. The Li here spoken of is not Li in its universal form; it is simply the Li that is inherent in the individual. This explains the rather paradoxical saying of Ch eng Hao: "When something is said about the nature, it is then already not the nature. "By this he simply means that it is then the individualized Li, and not Li in its universal form.

 492 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS


Output:
A man, in order to have concrete existence, must be the embodiment of Ch'i. The Li for all men is the same, and it is the Ch'i that makes them different. Chu Hsi says: Whenever there is Li, then there is Ch i.

 Whenever there is Ch i there must be Li. Those who receive a Ch i that is clear, are the sages in whom the nature is like a pearl lying in clear cold water. But those who receive a Ch i, that is turbid, are the foolish and degenerate in whom the nature is like a pearl lying in muddy water." (Recorded Sayings, chilan 4-) Thus any individual, besides what he receives from Li, also has what he receives from Ch i, and this is what Chu Hsi calls the physical endowment.


Output: Such is Chu Hsi's theory of the origin of evil. As pointed out by Plato long ago, every individual, in order to have concreteness, must be an embodiment of matter, by which, consequently, he is implicated, so that he necessarily falls short of the ideal. A concrete circle, for example, can only be relatively and not absolutely round. That is the irony of the concrete world, in which man is no exception. Chu Hsi says: "Everything depends on its physical endowment. Li, on the other hand, is nothing but good, for since it is Li, how can it be evil? What is evil lies in the physical endowment. Mencius' doctrine asserts absolutely that the nature is good. In this he apparently takes account only of the nature per se but not of the Ch'i, and thus in this respect his statement is incomplete. The Ch eng school, however, supplements this with the doctrine of the physical nature, and so in it we get a complete and all-round view of the problem." (Complete Works, chiian 43.)


Output: The term physical nature' here means the nature as it is found actually inherent in the physical endowment of an individual. As thus found, it always strives for the ideal, as Plato would say, but always falls short of it and cannot attain it. Li in its originally universal form, however, Chu Hsi calls the nature of Heaven and Earth," by way of distinction. This distinction was already made by Chang Tsai and is followed by Ch eng Yi and Chu Hsi. According to them, the use of this distinction completely solves the old controversy as to whether human nature is good and bad.


Output:
In Chu Hsi s system, nature is different from mind. In the Recorded Sayings, one passage reads: "(Question:) Is the mental faculty in man the mind or the nature?' (Answer:) 'The mental faculty is the mind but not the nature. The nature is nothing but Li. (Chiian 5-) Another passage reads: "(Question:) 'With regard to consciousness: is it the mental faculty of the mind that is thus conscious, or is it the action of the Ch' i?' (Answer:) 'it is not wholly Ch i. There is firsl the Li of consciousness; but by itself it cannot exercise consciousness. There can be consciousness only when the Ch i has agglomerated to form physical shapes, and the Li has united with the Ch i. The case is similar to that of the flame of this candle.

 It is because the latter receives this rich fat that we have so much light." (Ibid.) Thus the mind, just as all other individual things, is the embodiment of Li with Ch'i. The distinction between mind and nature is that mind is concrete


Output:
4 9 4 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS

 and nature is abstract. Mind can have activities, such as thinking and feeling, but nature cannot. But whenever such an activity takes place in our mind, we can deduce that there is a corresponding Li in our nature. Chu Hsi says: "In discussing the nature, it is important first of all to know what kind of entity the nature is. Master Ch eng put it well when he said: ' Nature is Li.' Now if we regard it as Li, then surely it is without shapes and features. It is nothing but principle. In man the principles of human—heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom belong to the nature. They are principles only. It is because of them that we are capable of having commiseration, that we can be ashamed of wrongdoing, that we can be courteous, and that we can distinguish between what is right and wrong.


Output:
Take as an illustration the nature of drugs: some have cooling and some heating properties. But in the drugs themselves you cannot see the shapes of these properties. It is only by the result that follows upon taking the drug that we know what its property is; and this constitutes its nature." (Complete Works,chiian 4^-)

 In chapter seven we have seen how Mencius maintained that in human nature there are four constant virtues which manifest themselves as the four beginnings.'ln the above quotation Chu Hsi gives a metaphysical justification to this theory of Mencius, which is primarily psychological. According to Chu, the four constant virtues pertain to Li and belong to the nature, while the four beginnings are the operations of the mind. We cannot know the abstract except through the concrete. We cannot know our nature except through our mind. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Lu-Wang school maintained that the mind is the nature. This is one of the main issues between the two schools.


Output: Political Philosophy


Output: If every kind of thing in this world has its own Li, then for the state, as an organization having concrete existence, there must also be the Li of statehood or government. If the state is organized and governed in accordance with this Li, it will be stable and prosperous; if not, it will become disorganized and fall into disorder. According to Chu Hsi, this Li is the principle of government as taught and practiced by the former sage-kings. But it is not something subjective. It is eternally there, no matter whether or not it is taught or practiced. Regarding this point, Chu had some warm debates with his friend Ch' en Liang (1143-1194), who held a different point of view. Arguing with him, he wrote: "During a period of fifteen hundred years, the Too Lthe principle of government], as handed down by Yao and Shun Ltwo traditional sage-kings] . . . and Confucius, has never been put into practice for even a single day in the world. But beyond human intervention, it is eternally there. It is simply what it is,


Output: it is eternally there. It is simply what it is, and is eternal and immortal. It cannot perish, even though men have done violence to it during the last fifteen hundred years." ("Reply to Ch'en Liang," Collected Literary Writings, chttan 36.)


Output:
496

 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS

 "The Too,' he said again, 'does not cease to be. What ceases to be is man's practice of it." (Ibid.)


Output: As a matter of fact, not only have the sage—kings governed their states in accordance with the Too, but all persons who have achieved something in politics must, to a certain degree, have followed the same Too, even though sometimes unconsciously or incompletely. Chu Hsi writes: I always think that this Li L principle of government ] is one and the same both in times past and present. Those who follow it, succeed; those who violate it, fail. Not only did the sages of antiquity practice it, but even among the heroes of modern times, none can have any achievement without following this Li.Herein, however, is a difference. The ancient sages, being cultivated in the wisest way in what is fundamental, could hold the golden mean, and therefore what they did was all entirely good from the beginning to the end. The so —called heroes of modern times, however, have never undergone such cultivation, and have only moved in the world of selfish desires. Those of them who were talented have succeeded in coming into a


Output: who were talented have succeeded in coming into a seeming agreement Lwith the Li], each making accomplishment to the extent that he followed this Li.


Output: There is one aspect in which all the so-called heroes are the same: that is,what they do can never be completely in accordance with ihe Li, and therefore is not perfectly good. (Ibid.) To illustrate Chu Hsi' s theory, let us take as an example the building of a house. A house must be built in accordance with the principles of architecture. These principles eternally remain, even if in the physical world itself no house is actually built. A great architect is a man who fully understands these principles and makes his plans in accordance with them. For example, the house he builds must be strong and durable. Not only great architects, however, but all who want to build a house, must follow the same principles, if their houses are to be built at all. Such non-professional architects, however, may simply follow these principles through intuition or practical experience, without understanding or even knowing about them. As a result, the houses they build cannot completely accord with the principles of


Output: cannot completely accord with the principles of architecture and therefore cannot be of the best. Such is the difference between the government of the sage—kings and that of the lesser so—called heroes.


Output:
As we have seen in chapter seven, Mencius maintained that there are two kinds of government: that of the wang or king and that of the pa or military lord. Chu Hsi s argument with Ch en Liang is a continuation of the saine controversy. Chu Hsi and other Neo—Confucianists maintain that all governments from the Han and T'ang dynasties downward have been those of pa, because their rulers have all governed in their own interests and not in the interests of the people. Here again, therefore, Chu Hsi follows Mencius, but, as before, gives a metaphysical justification to the latter's theory, which is primarily political.

 498 NEO-C0NFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS

 Method of Spiritual Cultivation

 The Platonic idea that we cannot have a perfect state until the philosopher becomes king or the king philosopher,' is shared by most Chinese thinkers. In the Republic, Plato dwells at great length upon the education of the philosopher who is to become king. And

 I


Output:
Chu Hsi too, as we have seen, says that the sage-kings of antiquity were cultivated in the

 wisest way in what is fundamental. What is this method of cultivation? Chu Hsi has already told us that in every man, and indeed in everything, there is the Supreme Ultimate in its entirety. Since the Supreme Ultimate is the totality of the Li of all things, hence these Li are all within us, but, because of our physical endowment, they are not properly manifested. The Supreme Ultimate that is within us is like a pearl in turbid water. What we have to do is to make this pearl become visible. The method for so doing is, for Chu Hsi, the same as that taught by Ch eng Yi, which, as we have seen in the last chapter, is twofold: The extension of knowledge through the investigation of things," and "the attentiveness of the mind."


Output:
This method has its basis in the Ta Hsiieh or Great Learning, which was considered by the Neo—Confucianists as the beginner s door for entering the life of virtue. As we have seen in chapter sixteen, the method of self-cultivation as taught by the Great Learning begins with the "extension of knowledge and investigation of things. According to the Ch eng—Chu school, the purpose of the "investigation of things is to extend our knowledge of the eternal Li.

 Why does not this method start with the investigation of Li instead of things? Chu Hsi says: "The Great Learning speaks of the investigation of things but not of the investigation of Li. The reason is that to investigate Li is like clutching at emptiness in which there is nothing to catch hold. When it simply speaks of 'the investigation of things, it means that we should seek for 'what is above shapes' through 'what is within shapes'."


Output: (Complete Works, chiian 46.) In other words, Li are abstract and things are concrete. We investigate the abstract through the concrete. What we as a result come to see lies both within the eternal world and within our own nature. The more we know Li, the more our nature, ordinarily concealed by our physical endowment, becomes visible to us.


Output:
As Chu Hsi says: "There is no human intelligence [utterly] lacking knowledge, and no single thing in the world without Li. But because the investigation of Li is not exhaustive, this knowledge is in some ways not complete. This is why the first instruction of the Great Learning is that the student must, for all the separate things in the world, by means of the Li which he already understands, proceed further to gain exhaustive knowledge of those Lwith which he is not yet familiar], thus striving lo extend Lhis knowledge] to the farthest point. When one has exerted oneself for a long time, finally one morning a complete understanding will open before one. Thereupon

 5OO NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF Pt.ATONIC IDEAS

 T


Output:
T

 there will be a thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external or internal, fine or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete enlightenment. (Commentary on the Great Learning, ch. 5-) Here we have again the theory of Sudden Enlightenment.

 This seems to be enough in itself, so why should it be supplemented by the attentiveness of the mind?

 The answer is that without such attentiveness, the investigation of things is likely to be simply a kind of intellectual exercise and thus will not lead to the desired goal of Sudden Enlightenment. In investigating things we must keep in mind lhal what we are doing is to make visible our nature, to cleanse the pearl so that it can shine forth. In order to be enlightened, we must always think about Enlightenment. This is the function of the attentiveness of mind.


Output:
Chu Hsi s method of spiritual cultivation is very like that of Plato. His theory that in our nature there are the Li of all things, is very like Plato's theory of a previous knowledge. According to Plato, "We acquire knowledge before birth of all the essences. (Phaedo 75-) Because there is ihis previous knowledge, therefore he who "has learned to see the beautiful in due course and succession," can "suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty. " (Symposium 2JI.) This, too,is a form of Sudden Enlightenment.

 502 NEO-CONFUCTANrSM:THE SCHOOL OF PLATONIC IDEAS

 CHAPTER 26

 NEO-CONFUCIANISM: THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL

 MIND


Output:
MIND

 As we have seen in chapter twenty-four, the Lu-Wang school, also known as the Hsin hslieh or Mind school, was initiated by Ch'eng Hao and completed by Lu Chiu-yiian and Wang Shou-jen. Lu Chiu-yuan (II39~TI93), popularly known as the Master of Hsiang-shan, was a native of the present Kiangsi province. He and Chu Hsi were friends, despite their widely divergent philosophic views. Their verbal and written debates on major philosophical problems evoked great interest in their day.

 Lu Chiu—yuan s Conception of the Mind


Output:
Lu Chiu—yuan s Conception of the Mind

 Both Lu Chiu -yuan and Wang Shou-jen are said to have become convinced of the truth of their ideas as a result of experiencing Sudden Enlightenment. One day, it is said, Lu was reading an ancient book in which he came upon the two words ytt and chou. An expositor remarked: "What comprises the four points of the compass together with what is above and below: this is called yti. What comprises past, present, and future: this is called chou." Thereupon Lu Chiu-yiian experienced an instantaneous enlightenment and said: "All affairs within the universe come within the scope of my duty; the scope of my duty includes all affairs within the universe. (Lu Hsiang-shan Ch'iian-chi or Collected Works of Lu Hsiang-shan,,chiian 33-) And on another occasion he said: The universe is my mind; my mind is the universe. (Ibid., chiian $.)


Output: Whereas Chu Hsi endorses Ch eng Yi s saying that the nature is Li, Lu Chiu-yuan replies that "the mind is Li." (Collected Works,chuan 12.) The two sayings differ only by one word, yet in them lies the fundamental division between the two schools. As we have seen in the last chapter, the mind, in Chu Hsi's system, fs conceived of as the concrete embodiment of Li as found in Ch'i; hence it is not the same as the abstract Li itself. Chu Hsi, consequently, can only say that the nature is Li, but not that the mind is Li. But in Lu Chiu-yiian s system, on the contrary, the mind itself is the 5O4 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND


Output:
nature, and he considers the presumed distinction between nature and mind as nothing more than a verbal one. Regarding such verbal distinctions, he says: Scholars of today devote most of their time to the explanation of words. For instance, such words as feeling, nature, mind, and ability all mean one and the same thing. It is only accidental that a single enlity is denoted by different terms." (Collected Works, chilan 35.)

 Yet as we have seen in the last chapter, Chu Hsi's distinction between nature and mind is certainly far from a verbal one, for from his point of view, there actually exists such a distinction in reality. This reality as seen by him, however, is not the same as that seen by Lu Chiu— yuan. For the former, reality consists of two worlds, the one abstract, the other concrete. For the latter, however, it consists of only one world, which is the mind or Mind.


Output:
But the sayings of Lu Chiu—yuan give us only a sketchy indication of what the world system of the Mind school is. For a more complete exposition, we must turn to the sayings and writings of Wang Shou-jen.

 Wang Shou-Jen s Conception of the Universe


Output: Wang Shou—jen (l$J2.-lz>2.'&) was a native of the present Chekiang province, and is generally known as the Master of Yang— ming. He was not only an outstanding philosopher, but was also notable as a practical statesman of high capacity and moral integrity. In his early years he was an ardent follower of the Ch eng-Chu school; and, determined to carry out Chu Hsi s teaching, once started to investigate the principle or Li of bamboo. He concentrated his mind upon the bamboo day and night for seven consecutive days, yet failed to discover anything. Finally he was forced to give up the attempt in great despair. Afterward, however, while living amid primitive surroundings in the mountains of southwest China, to which he had been temporarily exiled because of political intrigue at court, enlightenment came to him suddenly one night. As a result, he gained a new understanding of the central idea oi the Greiil Learning, and from this viewpoint reinterpreted this work. In this way he completed and systematized the


Output: In this way he completed and systematized the teaching of the Mind school.


Output:
In the Ch uan Hsi Lu or Record of Instructions, which is a selection of Wang Shou-jen s recorded sayings made by one of his disciples, one passage reads: "While the Master was taking recreation at Nan-chen, one of our friends, pointing at the flowers anil trees on a cliff, said: You say there is nothing under heaven that is external to the mind. What relation, then, do these high mountain flowers and trees, which blossom and drop of themselves, have tomy mind?' The Master replied: 'When you do not see these flowers, they and your mind both become quiescent. When you see them, their color at once becomes clear. From this fact you know that these flowers are not external lo your mind.'" (Pt. 3.) Another passage reads: 'The Muster asked: According to you, what is the mind of Heaven and Earth?'

 The disciple answered: 'I have often heard that

 5O6 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND


Output:
man is the mind of Heaven and Earth. And what is it in man that is called his mind?' ' It is simply the spirituality or consciousness.' ' From this we know that in Heaven and Earth there is one spirituality or consciousness. But because of his bodily form, man has separated himself from the whole. My spirituality or consciousness is the ruler of Heaven and Earth, spirits and things.... If Heaven,Earth, spirits, and things are separated from my spirituality or consciousness, they cease to be.

 And if my spirituality or consciousness is separated from them, it ceases to be also. Thus they are all actually one body, so how can they be separated?'" (Pt. 3.)

 From these sayings we gain an idea of Wang Shou—jen s conception of the universe. In this conception, the universe is a spiritual whole, in which there is only one world, the concrete actual world that we ourselves experience. Thus there is no place for that other world of abstract Li, which Chu Hsi so much emphasized.


Output: Wang Shou-jen also maintains that mind is Li: "Mind is Li. How can there be affairs and Li outside the mind?" (Record of Instructions, pt . I.) Again:"The substance of the mind is the nature and the nature is Li. Therefore, since there is the mind of filial love, hence there is the Li of filial piety. If there were no such a mind,there would be no such a Li. And since there is the mind of loyalty to the sovereign, hence there is the Li of loyalty. If there were no such a mind, there would be no such a Li. How can Li be outside our mind?" (Ibid., pt. 1.) From these sayings we can see still more clearly the difference between Chu Hsi and Wang Shou—jen and between the two schools they represent. According to Chu Hsi's system, we can only say that since there is the Li of filial piety, therefore there is the mind of loving one's parents; and since there is the Li of loyalty, therefore there is the mind of loyalty to one s sovereign. We cannot, however, say the converse. But what Wang Shou-jen said is precisely


Output: But what Wang Shou-jen said is precisely this converse. According to Chu Hsi's system, all the Li are eternally there, no matter whether there is mind or not. But according to Wang Shou—jen s system, if there is no mind, there will be no Li. Thus the mind is the legislator of the universe and is that by which the Li are legislated.


Output:
"The Illustrious Virtue"

 With this conception of the universe, Wang Shou-jen gives a metaphysical justification to the Great Learning. As we have seen in chapter sixteen, this work speaks of what are later called the three major cords and eight minor wires." The three ' cords are "to manifest the illustrious virtue, love people, and rest in the highest good." Wang Shou-jen defines great learning as the learning of the great man.

 Regarding the 'manifestation of the illustrious virtue, he writes: The great man is an all—pervading unity, which is one with Heaven, Earth, and all things. He considers the world as one family, and the Middle Kingdom as one man. Those who emphasize the distinction of bodily 508 NEO-CONFUCIANrSM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND


Output: forms and thus make cleavage between the self and others are the small men. The reason that the great man is able to be one with Heaven, Earth, and all things, is not that he is thus for some purpose, but because the humanheart-edness of his mind is naturally so. The mind of the small man is exactly the same, only he himself makes it small. When the small man sees a child about to fall into a well, he will certainly experience a feeling of alarm and distress. This shows that in his love he is one with the child.


Output: And when he hears the pitiful cry or sees the frightened appearance of a bird or beast, he will certainly find it unbearable to witness them. This shows that in his love he is one with birds and beasts.. . . From all this it may be seen that the original unity lies in the small man [as well as the great man]. Even the small man has his heavenly nature, the light of which cannot be obscured. Therefore it is called the illustrious virtue .... Thus when there is no obscuring caused by selfish desires, even the small man has the love for the whole, just as does the great man. But when there is this obscuring, even the mind of the great man is divided and hampered, just as is the small man. The learning of the great man serves simply to clear away the obscuring and thus to manifesi the illustrious virtue, so as thus to restore the original unity ol Heaven, Earth, and all things. It is not possible to add anything to this original state. *


Output:
Regarding the second of the "three cords" in the Great Learning, that of "loving people," Wang Shou-jen writes: "To manifest the illustrious virtue is to establish the nature of the unity of Heaven, Earth, and all things; to love people is to exercise the function of that unity. Therefore the manifestation of the illustrious virtue consists in loving people, and to love people is to manifest the illustrious virtue.

 If I love my own father, the fathers of some other men, and the falhers of all men, my love will be truly extended with my love of these fathers.... Beginning with all these human relationships, and reaching to mountains, rivers, spirits and gods, birds and beasts, grasses and trees, all should be loved in order to extend our love. In this way there is nothing that is not manifested in our illustrious virtue; and then we are really one with Heaven, Earth and all things." (Ibid.)


Output:
Regarding the third "cord, that of ' resting in the highest good, he writes: "The highest good is the highest standard for the manifesting of the illustrious virtue and loving people. Our original nature is purely good. What cannot be obscured in it is the manifestation of the highest good and of the nature of the illustrious virtue, and is also what I call intuitive knowledge. When things come to it, right is right, wrong is wrong, important is important, and inferior is inferior. It responds to ihings and changes with circumstances, yet it always attains the natural mean. This is the highest standard for the actions of man and of things, to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be reduced. If there is any addition or reduction,

 * Ta llsiieh Wen or Questions on the Greal Leuraing in the Wang Wen-ch eng kung Ch ikin-shu or Complete Works of Wang Shou-jen, ihikm 3.6.

 510 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 ..


Output:
..

 that is selfishness and a petty kind of rationalization, and is not the highest good." (Ibid.)

 Intuitive Knowledge

 Thus the three "main cords" are reduced to a single "cord," that of the manifestation of the illustrious virtue, which is simply the original nature of our mind. All of us, whether good or bad, fundamentally have the same mind, which can never be wholly obscured by our selfishness, and always manifests itself in our immediate intuitive reaction to things. A case in point is the feeling of alarm which we all automatically experience upon suddenly seeing a child about to fall into a well. In our first reaction to things, we know naturally and spontaneously that the right is right and the wrong is wrong. This knowing is the manifestation of our original nature, and for it Wang uses the term "intuitive knowledge"


Output: (literally, "good knowledge"). All we need to do is simply to follow the dictates of this knowledge and go unhesitatingly forward. For if we try to find excuses for not immediately following these dictates, we are then adding something to, or reducing something from, the intuitive knowledge, and are thus losing the highest good. The act of looking for excuses is a rationalization which is due to selfishness. As we have seen in chapters twenty-three and twenty-four, Chou Tun-yi and Ch' eng Hao expressed the same theory, but Wang Shou-jen here gives it a more metaphysical basis.


Output:
It is said that when Yang Chien (died 12.2.6) first met Lu Chiu-yiian, he asked the laater what our original mind is. It may be noted in passing that this term, "original mind," was originally a Ch anist one, but it also came to be used by the Neo-Confucianists of the Lu-Wang school. Answering the question, Lu Chiu-yiian recited the passage in the Mencius about the four beginnings." Yang Chien said that he had read this passage since boyhood, but still did not know of what the original mind consists.

 He was then an official, and during the conversation was called upon to attend to some official business, in the course of which he had to pass a verdict on a certain lawsuit. When the business was concluded, he turned to Lu Chiu-yiian again with the same question. Lu then said: "Just now in announcing your verdict, the right you knew to be right, and the wrong you knew to be wrong. That is your original mind.


Output:
Yang said: Is there anything else? To which Lu in a very loud voice answered: "What else do you want?'

 Thereupon Yang was suddenly enlightened and thus became the disciple of Lu. (Tz u-hu Yi-shu or Literary Remains of Yang Chien, chtian 18.)

 Another story says that a follower of Wang Shou-jen once caught a thief in his house at night, whereupon he gave him a lecture about intuitive knowledge. The thief laughed and asked: Tell me, please, where is my intuitive knowledge?" At that time the weather was hot, so the thief's captor invited him first to take off his jacket, then his shirt, and then continued: It 512 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:TIIE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 is still too hot. Why not take off your trousers too? At this the thief hesitated and replied: "That does not seem to be quite right. Thereupon his captor shouted at him:"There is your intuitive knowledge!


Output:
The story does not say whether the thief gained enlightenment as a result of this conversation, but it and the preceding story certainly are typical of the Ch' an technique of initiating a student to Enlightenment. They show that every man possesses that intuitive knowledge which is the manifestation of his original mind, and through which he immediately knows that right is right and wrong is wrong.

 Everyone, in his original nature, is a sage. That is why the followers of Wang Shou—jen were in the habit of saying that the streets are full of sages.'


Output:
What they meant by this is thai every man is potentially a sage. He can become an actual sage if he but follow the dictates of his intuitive knowledge and act accordingly. What he needs to do, in other words, is to carry his intuitive knowledge into practice, or, in Wang Shou-jen's terminology, to extend his intuitive knowledge. Thus the "extension of intuitive knowledge" became the key term in Wang's philosophy, and in his later years he mentioned only these words.

 "The Rectification of Affairs"

 It will be remembered that the Great Learning also speaks of eight minor wires," which are the eight steps to be followed in the spiritual cultivation of the self. The first two of them are the extension of knowledge and investigation of things." According to Wang Shou-jen, the extension of knowledge means the extension of the intuitive knowledge. Cultivation of the self is nothing more than the following of one s intuitive knowledge and putting it into practice.


Output: The Chinese term for the "investigation of things" is ko wu, and it is Ch' eng Yi and Chu Hsi who interpret it as having this meaning. According to Wang Shou—jen, however, ko means to rectify and wu means affairs. Ko wu, therefore, does not mean "investigation of things, but "rectification of affairs." The intuitive knowledge, he maintains, cannot be extended through the techniques of contemplation and meditation taught by the Buddhists. It must be extended through our daily experience in dealing with ordinary affairs. Thus he says: The activity of the mind is called yi Lwill, thought], and the objects toward which yi is directed are called wu Lthings, affairs]. For instance, when the object of one' s yi is the serving of one' s parents,then this serving of one s parents is the wu. And when the object of one s yi is the serving of the sovereign, then this serving of the sovereign is the wu. {Record of Instructions, pt.


Output:
I.) The wu may be right or wrong, but as soon as this can be determined, our intuitive knowledge will immediately know it. When our intuitive knowledge knows a thing to be right, we must sincerely do it, and when our intuitive knowledge knows it to be wrong, we must sin—

 514 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 _

 cerely stop doing it. In this manner we rectify our affairs and at the same time extend our intuitive knowledge. There is no other means of extending our intuitive knowledge except through the rectification of our affairs. That is why the Great Learning says: "The extension of knowledge consists in the rectification of affairs."

 The next two steps of the "eight wires" are "sincerity of thought [yi] and rectification of the mind."


Output:
According to Wang Shou-jen, sincerity of thought is nothing more than the rectification of affairs and the extension of intuitive knowledge, both being carried out with the utmost sincerity. When we try to find excuses for not following the dictates of our intuitive knowledge, we are insincere in thought, and this insincerity is the same as what Ch'eng Hao and Wang Shou-jen call selfishness and rationalization.

 When our thought is sincere, our mind is rectified; the rectification of the mind is no other than sincerity in thought.


Output: The next four steps of the "eight wires" are the cultivation of the self, regulation of the family, setting in order of the state and bringing of peace to the world. According to Wang Shou-jen, the cultivation of the self is the same as the extension of the intuitive knowledge. For how can we cultivate ourselves without extending our intuitive knowledge? And in cultivating ourselves what should we do besides extending our intuitive knowledge? In extending our intuitive knowledge, we must love people, and in loving people, how can we do otherwise than regulate our family, and contribute our best to creating order in our state, and bringing peace to the world? Thus all the "eight wires" may after all be reduced to a single "wire," which is the extension of the intuitive knowledge.


Output: What is the intuitive knowledge? It is simply the inner light of our mind, the original unity of the universe, or, as the Great Learning calls it, the illustrious virtue. Hence the extension of the intuitive knowledge is nothing else than the manifestation of the illustrious virtue. Thus all the ideas of the Great Learning are reduced to the one idea expressed in the key words, the extension of the intuitive knowledge.


Output:
To quote Wang Shou—jeii again: The mind of man is Heaven. There is nothing that is not included in the mind of man. All of us are this single Heaven, but because of the obscurings caused by selfishness, the original state of Heaven is not made manifest. Every time we extend our intuitive knowledge, we clear away the obscurings, and when all of them are cleared away, our original nature is restored, and we again become part of this Heaven. The intuitive knowledge of the part is the intuitive knowledge of the whole. The intuitive knowledge of the whole is the intuitive knowledge of the part. Everything is the single whole." (Record of Instructions, pi. I.)

 5l6 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 Attentiveness of the Mind


Output:
Attentiveness of the Mind

 Thus Wang Shou-jen's system follows the same lines as those of Chou Tun—yi, Ch eng Hao and Lu Chiu—yiian, but he expresses it in more systematic and precise terms. The fact that the "cords" and "wires" of the Great Learning fit so well into his system brings both conviction to himself and authority to others.


Output: The system and its method of spiritual cultivation are simple and direct— qualities which themselves give it a powerful appeal. What we need is first of all the understanding that each and every one of us possesses the original mind, which is one with the universe. This understanding is referred to by Lu Chiu-yilan as "first establishing the most important," a phrase he borrows from Mencius. On one occasion he said: Recently there have been people who have criticized me by saying that apart from the single statement in which 1 lay emphasis upon first establishing the most important, I have no other tricks to offer. When I heard this, 1 exclaimed: ' Quite so! '" ( Collected Works, chiian 34-) In chapter twenty-four it was pointed out that, according to the Neo-Con-fucianists, spiritual cultivation requires that one should be attentive; but attentive to what? According to the Lu—Wang school,one must firsl establish the most important,' and then be attentive to it. And it is the criticism of this school that


Output: it. And it is the criticism of this school that the Ch'eng-Chu school, without "first establishing the most important, starts immediately and haphazardly with the task of investigating things. Under these conditions, even attentiveness of mind cannot lead to any results in spiritual cultivation. This procedure is compared by the Lu-Wang school to starting a fire for cooking, without having any rice in the pot.


Output: To this, however, the Ch eng-Chu school would reply that unless one begins with the investigation of things, how can anything be definitely established? If one excludes this investigation of things, the only way left of establishing the most important" is through instantaneous Enlightenment. And this the Ch'eng-Chu school regarded as more Ch'anist than Confucianist.


Output:
In chapter twenty-four, we have seen that Ch'eng Hao also says that the student must first understand jen (human—heartedness), which is the unity of all things, and then cultivate it with sincerity and attentiveness. Nothing else requires to be done. We merely need have confidence in ourselves and go straight forward. Lu Chiu-yiian remarks in similar strain: "Be courageous, be zealous, break open the net, burn the thorns in your path, and wash away the mire.' (ftifi.)When so doing, even the authority of Confucius need no longer necessarily be respected. As Lu states again: If in learning one gains a comprehension of what is fundamental, then the Six Classics become but one s footnotes. (Ibid.) In this respect we see clearly that the Lu—Wang school is a continuation of Ch'anism.

 5l8 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 Critic is m of Buddhis m


Output: Yet both the Lu-Wang and Ch'eng-Chu schools strongly criticize Buddhism. In this criticism, the difference between the two is again revealed. Thus Chu Hsi says: "When the Buddhists speak of 'emptiness,' this does not mean that they are [entirely] incorrect. But they must know that in this emptiness there are the Li. For if we are merely to say that we are 'empty,' without understanding that there are still the real Li, what is the use [of such a doctrine J? The case is like that of a pool of clear water, the cold clearness of which extends to the very bottom. When it is first seen, it will appear to have no water in it at all, and a person will then say that this pool is only empty. If this person does not put in his hand to feel whether there is coldness or warmth, he will not know that there is water within.And such, precisely, is the view of the Buddhists. ' (Recorded Sayings, chiian 12.6.) Again he says: The Confucianists consider Li as without birth and indestructible. The Buddhists consider


Output: birth and indestructible. The Buddhists consider spirituality and consciousness as without birth and indestructible. ' (Ibid.) According to Chu Hsi, the Buddhists are not without justification in saying that the concrete world is empty, because things in the concrete world do change and are impermanent. But there are also the Li, which are eternal and not subiect to change. In this sense, then, the universe is not empty. The Buddhists do not know that the Li are real, because they are abstract, just as some men do not see the water in the pool, because it is colorless.


Output: Wang Shou-jen also criticizes Buddhism, but from quite a different point of view: "When the Taoists [i.e., the religious Taoistsjspeak of hsli[ vacuity, unrealnessj, can the Confucian sage add to it a hair of shih Lactualness, re— alness]? And when the Buddhists speak of wu Lnon-being, non-existence], can the Confucian sage add to it a hair of yu [being, existence]? But when the Taoists speak of hsii, their motive is to preserve life, whereas when the Buddhists speak of wu, their motive is to escape the suffering of life and death. When they add these ideas to the original nature of the mind, their original meaning of hsii and wu is somewhat lost, and thereby the original nature of the mind is not free from obstruction. The Confucian sage simply restores the original condition of the intuitive knowledge and adds to it no idea whatsoever....Heaven, Earth, and all things all lie within the function and activity of our intuitive knowledge. How, then, can there be anything outside it to hinder or obstruct it?"


Output: be anything outside it to hinder or obstruct it?" (Record of Instructions, pt. 3)


Output:
Again he says: "The claim of the Buddhists that they have no attachment to phenomena shows that they do have attachment to them. And the fact that we Confucianists do not claim to have no attachment to phenomena, shows that we do not have attachment to them....The Buddhists are afraid of the troubles involved in human relationships, and therefore escape from them. They are forced to escape because they are already attached to them. But we Confucianists are different. There being the relationship between father and

 520

 NEO-CONFUCIANISM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 ,


Output:
,

 son, we respond to it with love. There being the relationship between sovereign and subject, we respond to it with righteousness. And there being the relationship between husband and wife, we respond to it with mutual respect. We have no attachment to phenomena." (Ibid.) If we follow this argument, we can say that the Neo—Confucianists more consistently adhere to the fundamental ideas of Taoism and Buddhism than do the Taoists and Buddhists themselves. They are more Taoistic than the Taoists, and more Buddhistic than the Buddhists.

 522'

 NEO-CONFUCIANtSM:THE SCHOOL OF UNIVERSAL MIND

 CHAPTER 27

 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


Output:
EVERY system of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood and misused, and so it was with the two schools of Neo-Confucianism.According to Chu Hsi, one must in principle start with the investigation of things in order to understand the eternal Li or Laws, but this principle Chu Hsi himself did not strictly cany out. In the record of his sayings, we see that he did make certain observations on natural and social phenomena, but most of his time was devoted to the study of, and comment on, the Classics. He not only believed that there are eternal Li, but also that the utterances of the ancient sages are these eternal Li. So in his system there is an element of authoritarianism and conservatism, which became more and more apparent as the tradition of the Ch eng—Chu school went on. And the fact that this school became the official state teaching did much to increase this tendency.

 Reaction Against Neo-Cunfucirmism


Output:
Reaction Against Neo-Cunfucirmism

 The Lu—Wang school is a revolution against this conservatism, and in the time of Wang Shou-jen, the revolutionary movement was at its highest. In a very simple way, it appealed directly to the intuitive knowledge of every man, which is the inner light of his "original mind. Though never recognized by the government, as was the Ch'eng-Chu school, the Lu-Wang school became as influential as the former.

 But the philosophy of Wang Shou-jen was also misunderstood and misused. According to Wang, what the intuitive knowledge immediately knows is the ethical aspect of our will or thought. It can only tell us what we ought to do, but not how to do it. It lacks what Americans would now call "know-how. In order to know how to do what we ought to do in certain situations, Wang said that we have to study practical methods of action in relation to the existing state of affairs. Later on, however, his followers seemed to come

 524


Output:
524

 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 L

 to the belief that the intuitive knowledge can itself tell us everything, including the know-how." This is absurd, and the followers of the Lu-Wang school have certainly suffered the consequences of this absurdity.


Output: At the end of the last chapter we have seen that Wang Shou—jen used the Ch an method of argument to criticize Buddhism. This is precisely the sort of argument that is most likely to be misused. A satiric story tells us that when a scholar once paid a visit to a certain Buddhist temple, he was treated with only scant respect by the monk in charge. While he was there, however, the temple was also visited by a prominent official, to whom the monk showed the greatest respect. After the official had gone, the scholar asked the monk the reason for this difference. The monk answered: "To respect is not to respect, and not to respect is to respect. The scholar immediately gave him a hearty blow on the face. The monk protested angrily: "Why do you beat me?" To which the scholar replied: "To beat is not to beat, and not to beat is to beat. This story became current after the lime of Wang Shou— jen, and no doubt was intended to criticize him and the Ch anists.


Output: The Ming dynasty (1368-1643), under which Wang Shou-jen lived and had his influence, was a native Chinese dynasty which replaced the Yuan or Mongol dynasty (1280-1368). In due course it in turn was overthrown as a result of internal revolts coupled with invasion from the outside, and was replaced by the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911), under which, for the second time in Chinese history, all of China was ruled by an alien group, this time the Manchus. The Manchus, however, were far more sympathetic to Chinese culture than the Mongols had been, and the first two-thirds of their dynasty was, on the whole, a period of internal peace and prosperity for China, during which, in certain respects, Chinese culture made important advances, though in other respects it was a period of growing cultural and social conservatism. Officially, the Ch eng —Chu school was even more firmly entrenched than before.


Output:
Unofficially, however, the Ch'ing dynasty witnessed an important reaction against both this school and the Lu-Wang school. The leaders of this reaction accused both schools of having, under the influence of Ch' anism and Taoism, misinterpreted the ideas of Confucius, and of thus having lost the practical aspect of original Confucianism. One of the attackers said: "Chu Hsi was a Taoist monk, and Lu Chiu-yiian was a Buddhist monk." This accusation, in a sense, is not entirely unjustified, as we have seen in the last two chapters.

 From the point of view of philosophy, however, it is entirely irrelevant. As was pointed out in chapter twenty—three, Neo—Confucianism is a synthesis of Confucianism, Buddhism, philosophical Taoism (through Ch'anism), and religious Taoism. From the point of view of the history of Chinese philosophy, such a synthesis represents a development, and therefore is a virtue rather than a vice.

 526

 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 .


Output:
.

 In the Ch ing dynasty, however, when the orthodox position of Confucianism was stronger than ever before, to assert that Neo-Confucianism was not the same as pure Confucianism was equal to asserting that Neo—Confucianism was false and wrong. According to its opponents, indeed, the harmful effects of Neo—Confucianism were even greater than those of Buddhism and Taoism, because its seeming agreement with original Confucianism could more easdy deceive people and so lead them astray.


Output: For this reason the scholars of the Ch ing dynasty started a back—to— the-Han ' movement, meaning by this a return to the commentaries that the scholars of the Han dynasty had written on the early Classics. They believed that because these Han scholars lived nearer in time to Confucius and before the introduction of Buddhism into China, their interpretations of the Classics must therefore be purer and closer to the genuine ideas of Confucius. Consequently, they studied numerous writings of the Han scholars which the Neo-Confucianists had discarded, and termed this study the Hah hsileh or learning of the Han dynasty, ft was so called in contrast to that of the Neo—Con— fucianists, which they termed the Sung hsiieh or learning of the Sung dynasty, because the major schools of Neo—Confucianism had flourished in this dynasty. Through the eighteenth century until the beginning of the present century, the controversy between the Ch'ing adherents of the Hah hsileh and Sung hsiieh has been one of the greatest in


Output: and Sung hsiieh has been one of the greatest in the history of Chinese thought. From our present point of view, it was really one as between the philosophical and scholarly interpretation of the ancient texts. The scholarly interpretation emphasized what it believed was their actual meaning; the philosophical interpretation emphasized what it believed they ought to have meant.


Output:
Because of the emphasis of the Han hsiieh scholars on the scholarly interpretation of ancient texts, they made marked developments in such fields as textual criticism, higher criticism, and philology.

 Indeed, their historical, philological, and other studies became the greatest single cultural achievement of the Ch' ing dynasty.


Output: Philosophically, the contribution of the Han hsileh scholars was less important, but culturally, they did much to open the minds of their time to the wider reaches of Chinese literary achievement. During the Ming dynasty, most educated people, under the influence of Neo—Confucianism, a knowledge of which was required for success in the state examinations, devoted their whole attention to the "Four Books ' (the Confucian A nalects, Mencius, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean). As a result, they knew but little about other literature. Once the Ch'ing scholars became interested in 'the scholarly reevaluation of the ancient texts, however, they could not confine themselves simply to the Confucian Classics. These, to be sure, engaged their first attention, but when the work in this field had been done, they began to study all the other ancient texts of the schools other than orthodox 528 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


Output:
Confucianism, including such writings as the Mo-tzu, Hsiin-tzu and Han-fei-tzu, which had

 long been neglected. They worked to correct the many corruptions that had crept into the texts, and to explain the ancient usage of words and phrases. It is owing to their labors that

 L

 these texts are today so much more readable than they were, for example, in the Ming dynasty. Their work did much to help the revival of interest in the philosophical study of these philosophers that has taken place in recent decades under the stimulus of the introduction of Western philosophy. This is a topic to which we shall now turn.

 Movement for a Confucian Religion


Output:
Movement for a Confucian Religion

 It is not necessary to examine here precisely the manner in which the Chinese first came in contact with Western culture. Suffice it to say that already toward the end of the Ming dynasty, i.e., in the latter part of the sixteenth century and early part of the seventeenth, many Chinese scholars became impressed by the mathematics and astronomy that were introduced to China at that time by Jesuit missionary scholars. If Europeans call China and surrounding areas the Far East, the Chinese in the period of early Sino—European contacts referred to Europe as the Far West or T cd Hsi. In earlier centuries they had spoken of India as "the West"; hence they could only refer to countries to the west of India as the Far West.

 This term has now been discarded, but it was in common usage as late as the end of the last century.


Output: In chapter sixteen I said that the distinction which the Chinese have traditionally made between themselves and foreigners or barbarians has been more cultural than racial. Their sense of nationalism has been more developed in regard to culture than to politics. Being the inheritors of an ancient civilization, and one geographically far removed from any other of comparable importance, it has been difficult for them to conceive how any other people could be cultured and yet live in a manner different from themselves. Hence whenever they have come into contact with an alien culture, they have been inclined to despise and resist it—not so much as something alien, but simply because they have thought it to be inferior or wrong. As we have seen in chapter eighteen, the introduction of Buddhism stimulated the foundation of religious Taoism, which came as a sort of nationalistic reaction to the alien faith. In the same way, the introduction of Western culture, in which Christian missionaries played a leading part,


Output: Christian missionaries played a leading part, created a very similar reaction.


Output:
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as just noted, the missionary scholars impressed the Chinese not so much by their religion as by their attainments in mathematics and astronomy. But later, especially during the nineteenth century, with the growing military,industrial, and commercial

 pre-530 THE INTRODUCTION OF

 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 dominance of Europe, and the coincident decline of China s political strength under the Manchus, the impetus of Christianity became increasingly felt by the Chinese.After several major controversies had broken out in the nineteenth century between missionaries and Chinese, a movement for a native Confucian religion to counteract the growing impact of the West started at the very end of that century by the famous statesman and reformer, K'ang Yu-wei (1858-192.7). This event was no mere accident—even from the point of view of the inner development of Chinese thought—because the scholars of the Hah hsileh had already paved the way.


Output:
In chapters seventeen and eighteen, we saw that the Han dynasty was dominated by two schools of Confucianism: one the Old Text and the other the New Text school. With the revival during the Ch'ing dynasty of the study of the works of the Han scholars, the old controversy between these two schools was also revived. We have also seen that the New Text school, headed by Tung Chung—shu, believed Confucius to have been the founder of an ideal new dynasty, and later even went so lar as to consider him as a supernatural being having a mission to perform on this earth, a veritable god among men. K'

 ang Yu-wei was a leader of the Ch' ing adherents of the New Text school in the Hah hsileh, and found in this school plenty of material for establishing Confucianism as an organized religion in the proper sense of the word.


Output: In studying Tung Chung—shu, we have already read Tung s fantastic theory about Confucius. The theory of K'ang Yu-wei is even more so. As we have seen, in the Ch'un Ch'iu or Spring and Autumn Annals, or rather in the theory of its Han commentators, as well as in the Li Chi or Book of Rites, there is the concept that the world passes through three ages or stages of progress. K ang Yu— wei now revived this theory, interpreting it to mean that the age of Confucius had been the first age of decay and disorder. In our own times, he maintained, the growing communications between East and West, and the political and social reforms in Europe and America, show that men are progressing from the stage of disorder to the second higher stage, that of approaching peace. And this in turn will be followed by the unity of the whole world, which will be the realization of the last stage of human progress, that of great peace. Writing in 1902, he said: "Confucius knew all these things beforehand." (Lun -yu Chu or Commentary to


Output: things beforehand." (Lun -yu Chu or Commentary to the Analects, chiian 1.)


Output:
K'ang Yu-wei was the leader of the notable political reforms of 1898, which, however, lasted only a few months, and were followed by his own flight abroad, the execution of several of his followers, and renewed political reaction on the part of the Manchu government. In his opinion, what he was advocating was not the adoption of the new civilization of the West, but rather the realization of the ancient and genuine teachings of Confucius. He

 532 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


Output: wrote many commentaries on the Confucian Classics and read his new ideas into them. Besides these, he also in 1884 wrote a book titled the Ta T'ung Shu or Booh of the Great Unity, in which he gave a concrete picture of the Utopia that will be realized in the third stage of human progress, according to the Confucian scheme. Although this book is so bold and revolutionary that it will startle even most Utopian writers, K'ang Yu-wei himself was far from being a Utopian. He insisted that his program could not be put into practice except in the highest and last stage of human civilization. For his immediate practical political program he insisted on merely instituting a constitutional monarchy. Thus throughout his life he was hated first by the conservatives because he was too radical, and later by the radicals because he was too conservative.


Output: But the twentieth century is not one of religion, and together with, or in addition to, the introduction of Christianity into China, there also came modern science, which is the opposite of religion. Thus the influence of Christianity per se has been limited in China, and the movement for a Confucian religion suffered an early death. Nevertheless, with the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty and its replacement by the Republic in ICff^i there was a demand by K'ang Yu-wei s followers, when the first Constitution of the Republic was drafted in 1915, that it state that the Republic adopt Confucianism as the state religion. A vigorous controversy developed over this point, until a compromise was reached, the Constitution asserting that the Chinese Republic would adopt Confucianism, not as a state religion, but as the fundamental principle for ethical discipline. This Constitution was never put into practice, and no more has since been heard about Confucianism as a religion in the sense intended by K ang Yu-wei.


Output:
It is to be noted that up to 1898, K'ang Yu-wei and his comrades knew very little, if anything, about Western philosophy. His friend T'an Ssu-t'ung (1865-1898), who died a martyr s death when the political reform movement failed, was a much more subtle thinker than K'ang himself. He wrote a book titled Jen Hsiieh or Science of Jen (humanheartedness), which introduces into Neo -Confucianism some ideas taken from modern chemistry and physics. In the beginning of his work, he lists certain books to be read before one studies his Science of Jen. In that list, among books on Western thought, he mentions only the New Testament and some treatises on mathematics, physics, chemistry, and sociology.

 It is plain that men of his time knew very little about Western philosophy, and that their knowledge of Western culture, in addition to machines and warships, was confined primarily to science and Christianity.

 534 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 Introduction of Western Thought.


Output:
Introduction of Western Thought.

 The greatest authority on Western thought at the beginning of the present century was Yen Fu (1853-1920). In his early years he was sent to England by the government to study

 1

 naval science, and while there read some of the works on the humanities current ul the time. After returning to China, he translated into Chinese the following works: Thomas Huxley, Evolution and Ethics; Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, and half of his A System of Logic; E.Jenks, A History of Politics; Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois; and an adapted translation of Jevons, Lessons in Logic:. Yen Fu began to translate these works after the first Sino-Japanese war of l894~95-After that he became very famous and his translations were widely road.


Output: There are three reasons to account for this popularity. The first is thai China s defeat in the Sino—Japanese war, following a series of earlier humiliations at the hands of the West, shook the confidence of the Chinese people in the superiority of their own ancient civilization, and therefore gave them a desire to know something about Western thought.


Output: Before that time they fancied that Westerners were only superior in science, machines, guns, and warships, but had nothing spiritual to offer. The second reason is that Yen Fu wrote comments on many passages of his translations, in which he compared certain ideas of his author with ideas in Chinese philosophy, in order to give a better understanding to his readers. This practice is something like the ko yi or interpretation by analogy, which was mentioned in chapter twenty in connection with the translation of Buddhist texts. And the third reason is that in Yen Fu's translations, the modern English of Spencer, Mill, and others was converted into Chinese of the most classical style. In reading these authors in his translation, one has the same impression as that of reading such ancient Chinese works as the Mo-tzu or Hsun-tzu. Because of their traditional respect for literary accomplishment, the Chinese of Yen Fu s time still had the superstition that any thought that can be expressed in the classical style


Output: that can be expressed in the classical style is ipso facto as valuable as are the Chinese classical works themselves.


Output:
But the list of his translations shows that Yen Fu introduced very little Western philosophy. Among them, the ones really concerned with the subject are Jevons' Lessons in Logic and Mill s System of Logic, of which the former was an abridged summary, and the latter was lefl unfinished. Yen Fu recommended Spencer as the greatest Western philosopher of all time, ihus showing that his knowledge of Western philosophy was rather limited.

 There was another scholar of Yen Fu s time who in this respect had a

 536 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN

 PHILOSOPHY


Output: better understanding and deeper insight, but who did not become known to the public until after he gave up the study of philosophy. He was Wang Kuo— wei (i%JJ-\()Tj), a scholar renowned as one of the greatest historians, archaeologists, and literary writers of recent times. Before he was thirty, he had already studied Schopenhauer and Kant, in this respect differing from Yen Fu, who studied almost none but English thinkers. But after he became thirty, Wang Kuo-wei gave up the study of philosophy, for a reason mentioned in one of his writings titled "A Self-Account at the Age of Thirty." In this he says: "I have been tired of philosophy for a considerable time. Among philosophical theories, it is a general rule that those that can be loved cannot be believed, and those that can be believed cannot be loved. I know truth, and yet I love absurd yet great metaphysics, sublime ethics, and pure aesthetics. These are what I love most. Yet in searching for what is believable, I am inclined to believe in the


Output: is believable, I am inclined to believe in the positivistic theory of truth, the hedonistic theory of ethics, and ihe empiricist theory of aesthetics. I know these are believable, but I cannot love them, and I feel the other theories are lovable, but 1 cannot believe in them.


Output:
This is the great vexation that I have experienced during the past two or three years. Recently my interest has gradually transferred itself from philosophy to literature, because I wish to find in the latter direct consolation." *

 He says again that such men as Spencer in England and Wundt in Germany arc but second-rate philosophers, their philosophies being but a syncretism of science or of earlier systems. Other philosophers known to him at that time were only historians of philosophy. He said that he himself could become a competent historian of philosophy, if he continued to study it. But, said he, I cannot be a pure philosopher, and yet I do not like to be an historian of philosophy. This is another reason why I am tired of philosophy." (Ibid.)


Output:
I have quoted Wang Kuo-wei at length, because judging from these quotations, I think he had some insight into Western philosophy. He knew, as a Chinese expression says, what is sweet and what is bitter in it. Bui on the whole, ut the beginning of this century, there were very few Chinese who knew anything about Western philosophy. When I myself was an undergraduate student in Shanghai, we had a course on elementary logic, but there was no one in Shanghai at the time capable of teaching such a course. At last a teacher was found who asked us to buy a copy of Jevons Lessons in Logic and to use it as a textbook. He asked us to read it in the way a teacher of English expects his pupils to go through an English reader.

 When we came to the lesson on judgment, he called on me to spell the word judgment, in or—

 * Ching-on. Wen-chi or Collected Literary Writings of Wang Kuo-wei, Second Collection.

 538 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


Output:
der to make sure that I would not insert an e between the g and m !

 Before long We were at the mercy of another teacher who conscientiously tried to make the course a real one on logic. There are many exercises at the end of Jevons book which this teacher did not ask us to do, but I nonetheless prepared them on my own account. It so happened that there was one exercise that was beyond my understanding, which I requested the teacher to expound after class.After discussing it wilh me for half an hour without being able to solve il, he finally said: Let me think it over and I shall do it for you the next time I come. He never came again, and for this I felt rather sorry, for I had no desire to embarrass him.


Output: The University of Peking was then the only national university in China which was supposed to have lliree departments of philosophy: Chinese, Western, and Indian. But as the University was then constituted, there was only the one department of Chinese philosophy. In 1915 it was stated that a department of Weslern philosophy would be established, since a professor had been engaged who had studied philosophy in Germany and presumably could teach courses in that subject. I accordingly went to Peking in that year and was admitted as an undergraduate, but to my disappointment the professor who was to have taught us had just died, and I had therefore to study in the department of Chinese philosophy.


Output:
In this department we had professors who were scholars representing the Old Text, New Text, Ch eng—Chu, and Lu—Wang schools. One of them, a follower of the Lu—Wang school, taught us a course on the history of Chinese philosophy, a two—year course meeting four hours a week. He began with the traditional sage-kings, Yao and Shun, and by the end of the first semester had gone only as far as the Duke of Chou—that is to say, about five centuries before Confucius.We asked him how long, if he continued at this rate, it would take to finish the course. Well, he replied, in the study of philosophy there is no such thing as finishing or not finishing. If you want this course to be finished, I can finish it in one word; if you do not want it to be finished, it can never be finished.

 Introduction of Western Philosophy


Output:
Introduction of Western Philosophy

 John Dewey and Bertrand Russell were invited in 1919-2.O to lecture at the University of Peking and other places. They were the first Western philosophers to come to China, and from them the Chinese for the first time received an authentic account of Western philosophy. But whal they lectured about was mostly their own philosophy. This gave their hearers the impression that the traditional philosophical systems had all been superseded and discarded. With but little knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, the great majority of the audience failed to see the significance of their theories.

 540 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


Output: One cannot understand a philosophy unless one at the same time understands the earlier traditions which it either approves or refutes. So these two philosophers, though well received by many, were understood by few. Their visit to China, nevertheless, opened new intellectual horizons for most of the students at that time. In this respect, their stay had great cultural and educational value.


Output: In chapter twenty-one I have said that there is a distinction between Chinese Buddhism and Buddhism in China, and that the contribution of Buddhism to Chinese philosophy is the idea of Universal Mind. In the introduction of Western philosophy there have been similar cases. Following the visit of Dewey and Russell, for example, there have been many other philosophical systems that, at one time or another, have become popular in China. So far, however, almost all of them have simply represented Western philosophy in China. None has yet become an integral part of the development of the Chinese mind, as did Ch'an Buddhism.


Output: So far as I can see, the permanent contribution of Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy is the method of logical analysis. In chapter twenty-one 1 have said that Buddhism and Taoism both use the negative method. The analytic method is just the opposite of this, and hence may be called the positive method. The negative method attempts to eliminate distinctions and to tell what its object is not, whereas the positive method attempts to make distinctions and tell what its object is. It is not very important for the Chinese that the negative method of Buddhism was introduced, because they had it already in Taoism, though Buddhism did serve to reinforce it. The introduction of the positive method, however, is really a matter of the greatest importance. It gives the Chinese a new way of thinking, and a change in their whole mentality. But as we shall see in the next chapter, it will not replace the other method; it will merely supplement it.


Output:
It is the method, not the ready—made conclusions of Western philosophy, that is important. A Chinese story relates that once a man met an immortal who asked him what he wanted. The man said that he wanted gold. The immortal touched several pieces of stone with his finger and they immediately turned to gold. The immortal asked the man to take them but he refused. What else do you want? the immortal asked. I want your finger, the man replied. The analytic method is the finger of the Western philosophers, and the Chinese want the finger.

 That is the reason why among the different branches of philosophical study in the West, the first to attract the attention of the Chinese was logic. Even before Yen Fu's translation of J. S. Mill's System of Logic, Li Chih-tsao (died 1630) had already translated with the Jesuit Fathers a mediaeval textbook on Aristotelean logic. His translation was titled Ming-li T'an or An Investigation of Ming —li.We have seen in chapter nineteen that ming—li


Output:
542 . THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 means the analysis of principles through the analysis of names. Yen Fu translated logic as ming hsiieh or the Science of Names. As we have seen in chapter eight, the essence of the philosophy of the School of Names as represented by Kung-sun Lung is precisely the analysis of principles through the analysis of names. But in that chapter I also pointed out that this philosophy is not exactly the same as logic. There is a similarity, however, and when the Chinese first heard something about Western logic, they immediately noticed the similarity, and so connected it with their own School of Names.


Output: Up to recent times the most fruitful result of the introduction of Western philosophy has been the revival of the study of Chinese philosophy, including Buddhism. There is nothing paradoxical in this statement. When one encounters new ideas that are unfamiliar, it is only natural that one should turn to familiar ones for illustration, comparison, and mutual confirmation. And when one turns to these ideas, armed with the analytic method, it is only natural that one should make an analysis of them. We have already seen at the beginning of this chapter that for the study of the ancient schools of thought other than Confucianist, the scholars of the Han hsiieh paved the way. Their interpretation of the ancient texts was primarily textual and philological, rather than philosophical. But that is exactly what is needed before one applies the analytic method to analyze the philosophical ideas of the various ancient Chinese schools of thought.


Output:
Because logic was the first aspect of Western philosophy that attracted the attention of the Chinese, it is natural that among the ancient Chinese schools, the School of Names was also the first to receive detailed study in recent years. Dr. Hu Shih s book, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, since its first publication in K)2.2 has been one of the important contributions to this study.

 Scholars like Liang Ch i-chao (1873-1930) have also contributed much to the study of the School of Names and of the other schools.


Output:
The interpretation and analysis of the old ideas through use of the analytic method characterized the spirit of the age up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Even Christian missionaries could not escape from the influence of this spirit. This may be why many missionaries in China have translated Chinese philosophical works and written books on Chinese philosophy in Western languages, whereas few have translated Western philosophical works and written books on Western philosophy in Chinese.

 Thus in the philosophical field they seem to have conducted what might be called a reverse form of missionary work. It is possible to have reverse missionary work, just as it is possible to have reverse lend—lease.

 544 THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 CHAPTER 28

 SE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD


Output:
SE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

 AFTER all that has been said about the evolution and development of Chinese philosophy, readers may be inclined to ask such questions as: What is contemporary Chinese philosophy like, especially that of the war period? What will Chinese philosophy contribute to the future philosophy of the world? As a matter of fact, I have often been asked these questions, and have been somewhat embarrassed by them, because it is difficult to explain what a certain philosophy is to someone who is unfamiliar with the traditions that it either represents or opposes. However, now that the reader has gained some acquaintance with the traditions of Chinese philosophy, I am going to try to answer these questions by continuing the story of the last chapter.

 The Philosopher and the Historian, of Philosophy


Output:
In so doing, I propose to confine myself to my own story, not at all because I think this is the only story worth telling, but because it is the story I know best and it can, perhaps, serve as a sort of illustration. This, I think, is better than merely giving a list of names and "isms," without any fuller exposition of any of them, a procedure which results in no kind of picture at all. By simply saying that a philosopher is a certain "ist," and nothing more, one usually creates misunderstanding instead of understanding.

 My own larger History of Chinese Philosophy, the second and last volume of which was published in 1934, three years before the outbreak of the Sino— Japanese war, and the first volume of which was translated into English by Dr. Bodde and published in Peiping in 1937, three months after the war began, is an expression of that spirit of the age mentioned by me at the end of the last chapter. In that work I utilized the results of the studies of the Han

 546


Output:
546

 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

 lisiheh scholars on the texts of the ancient philosophers, and at the same time applied the analytic method to clarify the ideas of these philosophers. From the point of view of the historian, the use of this method has its limits, because the ideas of the ancient philosophers, in their original form, may not be as clear as in the presentation of their modern expositor. The function of a history of philosophy is to tell us what the words of the philosophers of the past actually meant to these men themselves, and not what we think they ought to mean. In my History I have tried my best to keep my use of the analytic method within its proper limits.


Output:
From the point of view of the pure philosopher, however, to clarify the ideas of the philosophers of the past, and push their theories to their logical conclusions in order to show their validity or absurdity, is certainly more interesting and important than merely to find out what they themselves thought about these ideas and theories. In so doing there is a process of development from the old to the new, and this development is another phase of the spirit of the age mentioned above. Such a work, however, is no longer the scholarly one of an historian, but the creative one of a philosopher. I share the feeling of Wang Kuo—wei, that is to say, I do not like to be simply an historian of philosophy.

 Therefore after I had finished the writing of my History, I immediately prepared for new work. But at this juncture the war broke out in the summer of 1937-

 Philosophical Production in Wartime


Output:
Philosophical Production in Wartime

 Before the war, the philosophy departments of the University of Peking, from which I graduated, and of Tsing Hua University, where I am now teaching, were considered to be the strongest in China. Each of them has had its own tradition and emphasis. Those of the University of Peking have been toward historical studies and scholarship, with an idealistic philosophical trend, which, in terms of Western philosophy, is Kantian and Hegelian, and, in terms of Chinese philosophy, is Lu Wang. The tradition and emphasis of Tsing Hua, on the contrary, have been toward the use of logical analysis for the study of philosophical problems, with a realistic philosophical trend, which, in terms oi Western philosophy, is Platonic in the sense that the philosophy of neo -realism is Platonic, and in terms of Chinese philosophy, is Ch eng—Chu.


Output:
These two universities are both situated in Peiping (formerly known as Peking), and on the outbreak of the war they both moved to the southwest, where they combined with a third, the Nankai University of Tientsin, to form

 548 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

 ^

 the Southwest Associated University throughout the entire war period. Together, their two Philosophy Departments formed a rare and wonderful combination, comprising nine professors representing all the important schools both of Chinese and Western philosophy. At first, the Associated University as a whole was situated in Changsha in Hunan province, but our Philosophy Department, together with the other Departments of the humanities, was separately located in Hengshan, known as the South Holy Mountain.


Output: We stayed there only about four months before moving again to Kunming, farther southwest, in the spring of 1938. These few months, however, were spiritually very stimulating. We were then in a national crisis which was the greatest in our history, and we were in the same place where Huai-jang had tried to grind a brick into a mirror, as mentioned in chapter twenty-two, and where Chu Hsi had also once lived. We were sufferers of the same fate met by the Southern Sung dynasty, that of being driven southward by a foreign army.Yet we lived in a wonderful society of philosophers, writers, and scholars, all in one building. It was this combination of the historical moment, the geographical location, and the human gathering, that made the occasion so exceptionally stimulating and inspiring.


Output: During these few months, myself and my colleagues, Professors T ang Yung-t ung and Y. L. Chin, finished books on which we had been working. T ang s book is the first part of his History of Chinese Buddhism. Chin s book is titled On the Too, and mine the Hsin Li-hsUeh or New Li—hsileh. Chin and myself have many ideas in common, but my work is a development of the Ch eng—Chu school, as the title indicates, while his is the result of an independent study of metaphysical problems. Later in Kunming I wrote a series of other books: the Hsin Shih-lun, also titled China's Road to Freedom; the Hsin Yuan-jen or New Treatise on the Nature of Man; the Hsin Yilan-tao, also titled The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, which has been translated from the manuscript by Mr. E. R. Hughes of Oxford University and is published in London; and the Hsin Chih-yen or New Treatise on the Methodology of Metaphysics. (All these, in their original Chinese editions, have been published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai.) In the following, I


Output: Commercial Press, Shanghai.) In the following, I shall try to summarize some of their results, as an illustration of one trend in contemporary Chinese philosophy, and in so doing we may perhaps get a partial glimpse of what Chinese philosophy can contribute to future philosophy.


Output:
Philosophical, or rather metaphysical, reasoning starts with the experience that something exists. This something may be a sensation, an emotion, or anything else. From the statement: "Something exists," I have in my Hsin Li-hsUeh deduced all the metaphysical ideas or concepts not only of the Ch'

 55O CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD


Output: eng-Chu school but also of the Taoists. They are all considered in such a way that they are simply the logical implications of the statement that something exists. It is not difficult to see how the ideas of Li and Ch'i arc deducible from this statement, and olher ideas are also treated in the same way. For instance, the idea of Movement is treated by me not as a cosmological idea for some actual initial movement of the world, but as a metaphysical idea implied in the idea of existence itself. To exist is an activity, a movement. If we think about the world in its static aspect, we will say with the Taoists that before anything comes into being there must first be the being of Being. And if we think about the world in its dynamic aspect, we will say with the Confucianists that before anything comes to exist, there must first be Movement, which is simply another way of speaking of the activity of existing.Tn what I call men' s pictorial form of thinking, which is really imagination, men imagine Being or


Output: which is really imagination, men imagine Being or Movement as God, the Father of all things. In imaginative thought of this kind, one has religion or cosmology, but not philosophy or metaphysics.


Output:
Following the same line of argument, I have been able in my Hsin Li-hsiieh to deduce all the metaphysical ideas of Chinese philosophy and to integrate them into a clear and systematic whole. The book was favorably received because in it critics seemed to feel that the structure of Chinese philosophy was more clearly stated than hitherto. It was considered as representing a revival of Chinese philosophy, which was taken as the symbol of a revival of the Chinese nation.

 In the Ch'eng-Chu school, as we have seen in the last chapter, there is a certain element of authoritarianism and conservatism, but this is avoided in my Hsin Li-hsueh. In my opinion, metaphysics can know only that there are the Li, but not the content of each Li. It is the business of science to find out the content of the individual Li, using the scientific and pragmatic method. The Li in themselves are absolute and eternal, but as they are known to us, that is, in the laws and theories of science, they are relative and changeable.


Output:
The realization of the Li requires a material basis. The various types of society are ihe realization of the various Li of social structure, and the material basis each Li requires for its realization is the economic foundation of a given type of society. In the sphere of history, therefore, I believe in an economic interpretation, and in my book, China's Road to Freedom, I apply this interpretation to Chinese civilization and history, as I also have in chapter two of the present book.

 I think Wang Kuo-wei s trouble in philosophy has been due to his failure 552 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD


Output:
to realize that each branch of knowledge has its own sphere of application. One does not need to believe in any theory of metaphysics, if that theory does not make much assertion about matters of fact. If it does make such assertions, however, it is bad metaphysics, which is the same as bad science. This does not mean that a good metaphysical theory is unbelievable, but only that it is so evident that one does not need to say that he believes in it, just as one need not say that one believes in mathematics. The difference between metaphysics and mathematics and logic is that in the latter two one does not need to start with the statement that something exists, which is an assertion about matters of fact, and is the only one that metaphysics need make.

 The Nature of Philosophy


Output:
The Nature of Philosophy

 The method I use in the Hsin Li-hsileh is wholly analytic. After writing that book, however, I began to realize the importance of the negative method which has been mentioned in chapter twenty —one. At present, if someone were to ask me for a definition of philosophy, I would reply paradoxically that philosophy, especially metaphysics, is that branch of knowledge which, in its development, will ultimately become "the knowledge that is not knowledge." If this be so, then the negative method needs to be used. Philosophy, especially metaphysics, is useless for the increase of our knowledge regarding matters of fact, but is indispensable for the elevation of our mind. These few points are not merely my own opinion, but, as we have previously seen, represent certain aspects of the Chinese philosophical tradition. It is these aspects that I think can contribute something to future world philosophy. In the following I shall try to develop them a little further.


Output:
Philosophy, as well as other branches of knowledge, must start with experience. But philosophy, especially metaphysics, differs from these other branches in that its development will lead it ultimately to that "something" which transcends experience. In this something there is that which cannot logically be sensed, but can only be thought. For instance, one can sense a square table, but cannot sense squareness.

 This is not because one s sense organ is insufficiently developed, but because squareness is a Li, which logically can only be thought but not sensed.

 In the something there is also that which not only cannot be sensed, but strictly speaking, cannot even be thought. In chapter one I said that philosophy is systematic reflective thinking on life. Because of its reflective nature, it ultimately has to think on "something that logically cannot be the object 554 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD


Output: of thought. For instance, the universe, because it is the totality of all that is, cannot logically be the object of thought. As we have seen in chapter nineteen, the Chinese word T'ien or Heaven is sometimes used in ihis sense of totality, as when Kuo Hsiang says: "Heaven is the name of all things." Since the universe is the totality of all that is, therefore when one thinks about it, one is thinking reflectively, because the thinking and the thinker must also be included in the totality. But when one thinks about that totality, the totality that lies in one's thought does not include the thought itself. For it is the object of the thought and so stands in contrast to it. Hence the totality that one is thinking about is not actually the totality of all that is. Yet one must first think about totality in order to realize that it is unthinkable. One needs thought in order to be conscious of the unthinkable, just as sometimes one needs a sound in order to be conscious of silence. One must think about the


Output: be conscious of silence. One must think about the unthinkable, yet as soon as one tries to do so, it immediately slips away. This is the most fascinating and also most troublesome aspect of philosophy.


Output:
What logically cannot be sensed transcends experience; what can neither be sensed nor thought of transcends intellect. Concerning what transcends experience and intellect, one cannot say very much.

 Hence philosophy, or at least metaphysics, must be simple in its nature. Otherwise it again becomes simply bad science. And with its simple ideas, it suffices for its function.

 The Spheres of Living

 What is the function of philosophy? In chapter one I suggested that, according to Chinese philosophical tradition, its function is not the increase of positive knowledge of matters of fact, but the elevation of the mind. Here it would seem well to explain more clearly what I mean by this statement.


Output:
In my book, The New Treatise on the Nature of Man, I have observed that man differs from other animals in that when he docs something, he understands what he is doing, and is conscious that he is doing it. It is this understanding and self—consciousness that give significance for him to what he is doing. The various significances that thus attach to his various acts, in their totality, constitute what I call his sphere of living. Different men may do the same things, but according to their different degrees of understanding and self—consciousness, these things may have varying significance to them. Every individual has his own sphere of living, which is not quite the same as that of any other individual. Yet in spite of these individual differences, we can classify the various spheres of living into four general grades. Beginning with the lowest, they are: the innocent sphere, the utilitarian sphere, the 556 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

 moral sphere, and the transcendent sphere.


Output:
moral sphere, and the transcendent sphere.

 A man may simply do what his instinct or the custom of his society leads him to do. Like children and primitive people, he does what he does without being self-conscious or greatly understanding what he is doing. Thus what he does has little significance, if any, for him. His sphere of living is what I call the innocent sphere.

 Or man may be aware of himself, and be doing everything for himself. That does not mean that he is necessarily an immoral man. He may do something, the consequences of which are beneficial to others, but his motivation for so doing is self—benefit. Thus everything he does has the significance of utility for himself. His sphere of living is what I call the utilitarian sphere.


Output: Yet again a man may come to understand that a society exists, of which he is a member. This society constitutes a whole and he, is a part of that whole. Having this understanding, he does everything for the benefit of the society, or as the Confucianists say, he does everything for the sake of righteousness, and not for the sake of personal profit." He is the truly moral man and what he does is moral action in the strict sense of the word. Everything he does has a moral significance. Hence his sphere of living is what I call the moral sphere.


Output: And finally, a man may come to understand that over and above society as a whole, there is the great whole which is the universe. He is not only a member of society, but at the same time a member of the universe. He is a citizen of the social organization, but at the same time a citizen of Heaven, as Mencius says. Having this understanding, he does everything for the benefit of the universe. He understands the significance of what he does and is self—conscious of the fact that he is doing what he does. This understanding and self-consciousness constitute for him a higher sphere of living which I call the transcendent sphere.