Output:
own accord.” If the “nature” of a thing is not “self-generated,” then it must be given
by others or intentionally produced by a creator. Yet this thing becoming this thing
and that thing becoming that thing is not something else making this or that
thing emerge and exist, nor even making itself emerge and exist; therefore, “self-
generation” can only be produced “unexpectedly,” “abruptly,” and “spontaneously”
by itself. Were there any reason or purpose for the emergence and existence of a
thing, it would inevitably lead to the admission of the existence of an initiator. Then
what is the relation between one “self-generated” thing and another “self-generated”
thing? Guo Xiang held that everything is “self-generated” and its existence is
“entirely in keeping with its own nature” and therefore is “self-sufficient”
(wudai). On the one hand, “self-sufficiency” is possible because “things produce
themselves”; “things produce themselves without relying on anything else.” On the


Output:
other hand, anything can be “self-sufficient” as long as it “conforms with its own
nature,” and “is content with its own nature,” “for when satisfied with its own
nature, a giant roc does not despise the sparrow and the sparrow does not covet the
heavenly lake and both are quite satisfied. Thus, big or small, all live in compla-
cence.” So, to insist on the premise that a thing produces itself without relying on
anything else one must recognize that it is “self-generated” and “self-sufficient.”
   “Self-transformation” and “mutual indispensability”: To support the concepts of
“self-generated” and “self-sufficient” requires the solution of another question.
Suppose everything exists by itself, this being this and that being that with one
differing from another, then are not all the things related? Suppose all the things are
relative, then are not they limited? Suppose they are limited, then are not they
“insufficient” (you dai)? To answer this question, Guo Xiang advanced the concept


Output:
of “self-transformation” (duhua). By “self-transformation,” he meant that every-
thing emerges and generates independently; hence, “self-sufficiency” is absolute. If
we try to seek the cause and basis of the emergence and generation of things,
ostensibly we can pursue this question infinitely, but ultimately we can come only
to the conclusion of “self-sufficiency.” Thus, he said: “If we try to find out what a
thing relies on and what is the cause of its creation, there will be no end and finally
we will come to self-sufficiency and the working of self-transformation will be
obvious.” In his “Annotations on (Zhuangzi’s) Qi Wu Lun” Guo Xiang cited an
absolute example. He said that the bodily form, the shadow, and the penumbra
are all beings of absolute independence, for “thus throughout the realm of things,
there is nothing, not even the penumbra, which is not ‘self-transformed’.”
   If one thing does not exist independently, then everything else is not indepen-


Output:
dent, which will inevitably lead to the existence of a primal body (or creator) above
“everything,” serving as the basis of their existence and inevitably recognized as “a
cause of creation and generation.” Although things exist independently and self-
sufficiently, as long as everything fully realizes its “nature,” brings it into full play
and “the wise stays wise till his last day and the dull goes on being dull till his
death,” then the ideal realm will be achieved where “Heaven and earth are not so
long-lived but live along with me, and things in the world are not divergent, but
the same as me.” Relating this way to every other thing has the greatest function;
that is, “the greatest function of mutual indispensability is the perfection of
self-transformation.” Seen from another angle, everything is indispensable as
17.2   How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy     219


Output:
long as it exists. Guo Xiang said: “A man, though only seven feet tall, possesses the
five constant virtues; thus this mere body is provided with everything in the
universe. Therefore none of the things in the world can be dispensed for one day.
With one thing lacking, the living will not have means to live; with one law lacking,
the living cannot fulfill their natural life-span.” Thus, everything existent is rational,
inevitable, and not mutually exclusive. This view appears to contradict the doctrine
of “self-transformation,” but it does not. According to Guo Xiang, everything that
exists is rational, inevitable, and not mutually exclusive precisely because, as the
condition for the existence of everything else, everything fully and absolutely
brings its “nature” into full play, creates itself, and generates self-sufficiently.
    From this analysis of Guo Xiang’s system of philosophical categories, we
can see that his philosophy finally arrives at the doctrine of “self-transformation,”


Output:
and the concept of “exalted being” (chongyou) is merely a bridge to “self-
transformation.” What is more, in Guo Xiang’s system, only after the establishment
of the doctrine on “self-transformation” can one support “sublime being” and a
relatively thorough refutation of a “nonbeing” above everything as the basis of the
latter’s existence.
    If we want to know whether a philosopher is a materialist or idealist, or the
characteristic of his philosophy, its ideological relations with its predecessors
and successors, and its place in history, we must first make an analysis of his
categorical system.


Output:
17.2.4 Analysis of the Similarities and Differences Between
       the Concepts and Categories of Chinese and Foreign
       Philosophies


Output:
A comparison between the categorical systems of Chinese and foreign philosophies
will undoubtedly enable us to have a better understanding of the characteristics
and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. Because of the breadth of this topic and
the limited study conducted by this author, we can make only a rather superficial
comparison here between Wei and Jin metaphysics and the Buddhist doctrine of
prajna introduced into China in that period.
   The central theme of Wei and Jin metaphysics is the question of “being and
nonbeing, origin and outcome.” Therefore “being” and “nonbeing” are two basic
categories in the Wei and Jin metaphysics. The Buddhist prajna doctrine also
discussed the question of “being” and “nonbeing” (or the “void,” kong); hence,
Dao-an said: “Of the twelve books, Vaipuliya is most copious and its doctrine on
the void of being and nonbeing is similar to the teachings of Laozi (Lao Tzu)
and Zhuangzi, thus the doctrine of Mahayana has been easy to spread in China.”


Output:
The concept of the “void” (or “nonbeing”) of the Buddhist prajna school is actually
different from the “nonbeing” advocated by Wang Bi and other Chinese meta-
physicians, despite their apparent similarity. The Buddhist concept of original
nonbeing, or Tathata in Sanskrit, has the meaning that “all the different dharmas
220      17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
are in their original nature void and empty” and that all things have no original
actual forms. Wang Bi and other metaphysicians also talked about “original
nonbeing” by which, however, they meant that everything “is based on nonbeing
as its origin.” Although the two concepts of “original nonbeing” cannot be consid-
ered to be entirely different, they do have vast differences in meaning. In Wei and
Jin metaphysics, Wang Bi’s thought succeeded the doctrines of Laozi (Lao Tzu).
In his philosophical system, the category “nonbeing” is one and the same thing as
“the way” or “principle,” as he said: “The extreme of greatness is nothing but the
way!. . . though it is important that it has nonbeing as its phenomenon, yet it cannot
do without nonbeing as its noumenon”; “nothing exists without principle, every-
thing operates according to its own law.” Obviously, the “nonbeing” used by Wang
Bi is not the “void” or “nonexistence” but the “substance” of a thing. The “original


Output:
nonbeing” of the Buddhist prajna doctrine on the void only means that “all the
different dharmas are in their original nature void and empty.” They held that
everything is void of nature, but created through the association of hetupratyaya.
From this one can see that the Buddhist prajna school in its discourse on the void
refers not to “substance,” but to “nonexistence.” As for the content of “being,” the
Wei and Jin metaphysicians usually referred to “universal being,” namely, all sorts
of actually existing things, whereas, on the other hand, in the translation of Buddhist
scripts, terms denoting different meanings of “being” (existence) were all translated
into the term “being.”
   After its introduction into China, Buddhism first attached itself to Daoist
necromancy during the Eastern Han Dynasty and then to Wei and Jin metaphysics.
The various schools of the prajna doctrine formed by Chinese monks during the
Eastern Jin period generally still used metaphysical thought to explain the teachings


Output:
of prajna until the arrival in China of Kumarajiva whose translations of
Modhyamikasatra, Satasastra, and Dvadasa-mikaya sastra of the Mahaprajnapra-
mitasastra provided Chinese Buddhist with the material for understanding the true
meaning of Buddhism Monk Zhao’s On No Real Non-Existence is more or less
close to the original meaning of “neither being nor nonbeing” of the Buddhist
prajna doctrine.
   A comparison and analysis of the Chinese and foreign philosophical concepts
and categories can thus show their characteristics and level of development as
well as the impact of foreign culture on indigenous traditional culture and the
process of a foreign culture being assimilated and becoming a component of
the culture of the country (nation or region) into which the foreign culture was
introduced.


Output:
17.3    A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System
        of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

The term category has myriad definitions in the history of philosophy in the West.
Aristotle in his Categories treated it as the basic mode of being and put forward ten
categories such as substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, state, action,
17.3   A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy   221


Output:
and passion. And Kant described his 12 categories as principles related to cognition
or as the precondition for constituting experience. Lenin said: “Categories are
stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web,
which assist in cognizing and mastering it.”2 A Dictionary of Philosophy published
in the Soviet Union defines category as “the basic concept that reflects the most
general and most essential character, aspect and relationship of the various
phenomena and knowledge of reality.”
   “Category” then is generally explained from the two aspects of the existence and
knowledge of reality: from the aspect of existence, it is defined as “the basic mode
of existence” or “the most general and most essential character, aspect, and
relationship of the phenomena of reality”; from the aspect of knowledge, it is
defined as the “precondition for constituting experience” or “focal points in the
web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it.” The necessary precondition for


Output:
knowledge is certainly the reflection and manifestation of the “basic mode of
existence,” while the “basic mode of existence” is meaningful only in the process
of man’s knowledge. From what we listed above, we can see the relationship
between “category” and “concept”: a category is a basic concept, whereas a concept
is not necessarily a category. Thus, what we are discussing here is what are the
categories or basic concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy. If, using the basic
concepts of classic Chinese philosophers, we can form a system which shows how
traditional Chinese philosophy identified and explained “the basic mode of
existence” and which reveal the line of development of the traditional Chinese
philosophical thinking, then we have proven that traditional Chinese philosophy
does have a categorical system. This is presented first in the following diagram and
further explained below.
   In this diagram, 20 pairs of basic concepts make up the categorical system of


Output:
traditional Chinese philosophy. This is certainly a very preliminary proposition.
However, despite its many possible defects, it is intended to initiate discussion and
study on this question. Here the author would like to explain some points:
(1) This diagram is divided into three major parts. Part I is intended to indicate
    what basic concepts are used in traditional Chinese philosophy on the question
    of the existence of the world, Part II is meant to show what basic concepts are
    used to present the form of being, and Part III is meant to show what basic
    concepts are used to denote the existence and knowledge of man. The relation-
    ship between “Heaven” (or the heavenly way) and “man” (or the way of man)
    has always been a central theme for discussion in traditional Chinese philoso-
    phy, and it is around this question that the struggle between materialism and
    idealism has been waged in the history of Chinese philosophy.


Output:
Zi Can was the first Chinese philosopher to make a proposition on the relation-
ship between the two when he wrote: “The way of Heaven is remote, whereas the


Output:
2
  V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), XXXVIII,
92.
222      17      Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
way of man is near.” Confucius attached importance to the “mandate of the
Heaven,” but he gave even greater attention to the “affairs of man.” Although
he mentioned that he “began to know the mandate of Heaven as the age of fifty,” he
seldom discussed this question. “The master was seldom heard discussing the
question of nature and the Heavenly way,” reports the Analects which, however,
extensively records Confucius’ sayings on the question of the “way of man.”
Mencius talked about “obeying nature and knowing fate and Heaven,” and the
Doctrine of the Mean says: “Sincerity is the way of Heaven; knowing sincerity
is the way of man.” Xunzi said: “Grasp the way of Heaven and man.” Laozi (Lao
Tzu), the founder of Daoism (Taoism) said: “The Heavenly way is spontaneous
non-activity,” and he played down the importance of “humanness and righteous-
ness” (the way of man). And Zhuangzi “was misguided by Heaven and ignorant of
man.” Dong Zhongshu, the Confucian master of the Han Dynasty, described his


Output:
research as a study of “the relationship between Heaven and man.” Sima Qian who
was much influenced by Daoist thinking said that his Historical Records was a work
of “investigations into the relationship between Heaven and man and the changes
past and present.” The Wei and Jin metaphysicians concentrated on the question of
“spontaneity” (the Way of Heaven) and “ethics” (the way of man). Hence, He Yan
said: “Only with people like Wang Bi, can you discuss the question of the relation-
ship between Heaven and man.”


Output:
constant
          quiescence

          movement                      variable
II

          positive
          negative

                                                                                idea


Output:
word                   mind      fulfillment of principle
                     nonbeing (the way)             essence (stem, one)
                                                                                nature    investigation of things
                                  being                                          spontaneity
           Heaven (thing, qi material force) function (branch, many)                               principle           mind
I                                                                                ethical code
           man                                                                                matter
                           the way                                                              force (affair)
                                                                          supreme ultimate


Output:
Heavenly principle
                                                                          yin-yang
                        instrument (force, thing)                                                                       human desire


Output:
spirit

          form

           nature

III        emotion
          knowledge
                             subject
          action

          name
                             object
           actuality

   The Song Neo-Confucians of both the School of Principle (Lixue) and School of
Mind (Xinxue) strongly believed: “The supreme ultimate (the principle of Heaven)
is simply an utterly excellent and supremely good normative principle”;
17.3   A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy   223


Output:
the supreme ultimate is an appellation for “all that is good in heaven and on earth,
and among men and things.” The “principles of Heaven” and the “desires of man”
are still a question of the relationship between Heaven and man. Even Wang Fuzhi
still made this a focal point in his philosophical discourse. He held that “Rites, no
matter how pure they are, are merely expressions of the principles of Heaven
inevitably to be found in the desires of man” and that “the desire of man, when
reaching superb altruism is the perfection of the principle of Heaven.” Thus,
traditional Chinese philosophy proceeded from the discussion of the pair of cate-
gories: (the way of) Heaven and (the way of) man, an indication of the main
attention and particular content of traditional Chinese philosophy.
(2) This diagram shows the development of the categories of traditional Chinese
    philosophy and their relationships. Proceeding from the study of the relation-


Output:
ship between Heaven and man, traditional Chinese philosophy branches out
    into two parts: Daoism (Taoism) and Confucianism. Laozi (Lao Tzu) advanced
    the relationship between the “way” and “all things.” He said; “The way creates
    one, one creates two, two create three and three create all things.” He also said:
    “All things in the world are produced by being and being is produced by
    nonbeing”; therefore, the relationship between the “way” and the “thing” is
    also represented by the pair of categories “being” and “nonbeing.” The Confu-
    cian school however proposed the categories the “way” and the “instrument” in
    the Commentary on the Book of Changes, which says: “That which shapes and
    is above is called the way and that which shapes and is below is called the
    instrument” and adds: “Change contains the supreme ultimate which produces
    two extremes,” and “the alternation of yin and yang is called the way”; thus, the


Output:
relationship between the way and the instrument is reflected in the categories of
    the supreme ultimate and yin and yang. The Han Dynasty witnessed some
    development in philosophical thought, but it seems that practically no new and
    influential philosophical categories were advanced. The Wei and Jin metaphys-
    ics upheld three philosophical classes, Laozi (Lao Tzu), Zhuangzi, and Zhou Yi,
    which brought a gradual merging of Daoism (Taoism) with the Confucianism
    of the Zhou Yi system. This established the theory of a primal body as the origin
    of the universe, a theory with Laozi (Lao Tzu)’s and Zhuangzi’s thought as the
    framework. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians used categories such as “essence”
    and “function,” “stem and branch,” the “one” and the “many” to illustrate
    “nonbeing” (the primal) and “being” (everything or the various manifestations
    of this substance). They used “spontaneity” (essence) and “ethics” (function) to


Output:
present the relationship between the “originality of the universe” (primal body)
    and “human social relations” (the various social positions and codes) and used
    the pair of categories “idea” and “word” to explain questions on understanding
    the substance of the universe. From the Wei and Jin dynasties and the Northern
    and Southern dynasties, onward, traditional Chinese philosophical thought,
    under the impact of Buddhism introduced from India, evolved into the
224           17     Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty. If the Wei and Jin metaphysical
       doctrine on substance has the thought of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi as
       the framework, then Neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming period alternately
       was based on an objective idealism (represented by Zhu Xi), a subjective
       idealism (represented by Wang Yangming), and a fairly high-level materialism
       (represented by Wang Fuzhi). The philosophical categories of this period
       succeeded Wei and Jin metaphysics and also absorbed Tang Buddhist thought
       in the Sui and Tang periods. Thus, there was a confluence of the thinking of
       Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism), and Buddhism within a Confucian frame-
       work. The most basic philosophical categories of the time became “principle”
       and qi, “mind,” and “matter”; the question of “mind” and “nature” grew into the
       question of whether “mind is principle” or “nature is principle.” Categories


Output:
such as “subject” and “object,” “investigation of things,” and “fulfillment of
       principle” were used in the discussion of the question of knowledge, and the
       categories “Heavenly principle” and “human desire” were used to discuss
       social issues.
      Lenin in his On the Question of Dialectics wrote:
      “Circles” in philosophy: (is a chronology of persons essential? No!) Ancient: from
      Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus.
         Modern: Holbach—Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel—Feuerbach—Marx.3


Output:
In his Conspectus of Hegel’s Book “Lectures on the History of Philosophy,” he
wrote: “Comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle . . .a circle on the
great circle (a spiral) of the development of human though in general.”4 Hegel’s
comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle, as pointed out by Lenin, is a
penetrating reflection of the law of development of the philosophical thought.
This is of tremendous importance in our study of the development of traditional
Chinese philosophic thought.
   From the above diagram, we can see that the development of traditional Chinese
philosophy is roughly made up of three spiraling circles: The first covers the period
prior to the Qin Dynasty; the Confucian school, including Confucius, Mencius, and
Zhuangzi (or the Commentary on the Book of Changes); Daoism (Taoism) includ-
ing Laozi (Lao Tzu), the School of Shuxia (i.e., the “White Heart” and other works),
and Zhuangzi, with the Han Dynasty forming a transitional period. The second


Output:
circle was the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties represented by Wang Bi-Xiang
Xiu-Guo Xiang (or Wang Bi-Guo Xiang-Seng Zhao). Buddhism was in vogue from
the Northern and Southern dynasties through the Sui and Tang dynasties, and after
a period of development, Buddhism in China grew into several sects such as the


Output:
3
    Ibid., p. 362.
4
    Ibid., p. 247.
17.3   A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy   225


Output:
Huayan (Avatamsaka) Sect and the Chan (Zen) Sect. The third circle covers
the Song and Ming dynasties represented by Zhang Zai-Zhu Xi-Wang Fuzhi.
(3) In the second column of the diagram, only three pairs of categories are listed, of
    which the most fundamental is the pair “quiescence” and “movement,” whose
    manifestation is the pair “constant” and “variable,” though in fact “positive”
    and “negative” are also peculiar manifestations of “quiescence” and “move-
    ment.” Although many philosophers of traditional Chinese philosophy
    discussed the question of “quiescence” and “movement,” little discussion on
    the question of “time” and “space” was conducted among Chinese philosophers
    (except for the pre-Qin philosophers of the School of Names and philosophers
    of the later Mohist School). Philosophical propositions in traditional Chinese
    philosophy seem not to have been restricted by time or space, and they paid


Output:
little attention to the question whether movement took place in time and space.
    That is why we have not included the categories “time” and “space” in our
    diagram.
(4) The question of man (the way of man) was much discussed in traditional
    Chinese philosophy which was especially characterized by the study of the
    question of “morals” (ethics). Therefore, careful consideration should be given
    to what should be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese
    philosophy. In this diagram (column III), five pairs of categories (in fact not all
    of them are related to the way of man) seem to be sufficient as basic concepts.
    “Spirit” and “form,” or the relationship between spirit and body, are used for
    the study of the phenomena of the human life. This was discussed from pre-Qin
    days onward, with materialists and idealists holding different views. The
    question of “nature” and “emotion” might be looked at as the key ethical


Output:
issue. There have been divergent views on the question of “nature” ever since
    the pre-Qin days, such as “man is born good by nature,” “man is born evil by
    nature,” “man is born with a mixed nature both good and evil,” “man is born
    neither good nor evil by nature,” and “man is born good or evil by nature, all
    depending on the specific man,” etc. On the question of nature and emotion,
    there were views that “nature is good, whereas emotion is bad,” “nature is
    quiescent and emotion is active,” etc. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians paid
    considerable attention to this question, but concentrated on a discussion of the
    difference and similarity between the sage and the ordinary man. The Song and
    Ming Neo-Confucians divided nature into “the universal nature” and the
    “humoral nature,” with the former stemming from the “principle of Heaven”
    and the latter from man’s inherent emotion and desire or from the qi that makes


Output:
up the body. Hence, this is still a question of nature and emotion, and the
    importance of ethical education is to “maintain the principle of Heaven and
    suppress human desire.” The question of “knowledge” and “action” also
    occupies a very important position in traditional Chinese philosophy. Most of
    the past Chinese philosophers upheld both “acknowledge” and “action” and
    thought the latter was even more important. The categories “name” and
226        17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
“actuality” were always contained in traditional Chinese philosophy, and the
      categories “subject” and “object” were borrowed from Buddhism, but all four
      are related to the question of knowledge. Therefore, column III of the diagram
      contains categories involving existence and knowledge.

17.4      Discussion


Output:
As the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy is a rather broad and
complicated issue, it calls for an earnest and extensive discussion. The following
are only preliminary views on some of the questions:
(1) Should the categories in the categorical system be in pairs?
    This question should be discussed in two aspects. On the one hand, in the history
of philosophy, the philosophical categories used by a philosopher may not be in
pairs. For example, the concept “spontaneity” used by Laozi (Lao Tzu) seems not to
have its opposite in the book Laozi (Lao Tzu). The concept qi used as the most
general concept in the “White Heart” chapter of Guanzi did not seem to have its
opposite either. However, taking the development of traditional Chinese philosophy
as a whole, the categories are in pairs. For example, the concept “spontaneity” is
paired with “ethics” and “principle” with qi. On the other hand, everything is
contradictory, with two contradictory aspects, of which one does not exist without


Output:
the other. Therefore, the categories which reflect the essential relationships of
things must be in pairs of opposites. Some of the philosophical concepts and
categories of traditional Chinese philosophy indeed seem to have no pairs of
opposites, such as the “mean.” We certainly cannot say there is a “counter-
mean.” Yet an analysis of the meaning of the mean may possibly lead to the
solution of this question. Confucius advanced his “doctrine of the mean” to oppose
“excess”; he said: “Excess amounts to insufficiency.” Thus, the “mean” has
the sense of “middle” or “correct.” Therefore, it would be sufficient to have the
concepts of the “positive” and the “negative” in traditional Chinese philosophy
since “mean” is included in the meaning of “positive.”
    Not all the categorical systems used by Western philosophers necessarily reflect
the unity of opposites. Among the ten categories used by Aristotle, some can be
paired up as opposites such as “quality” and “quantity,” but “substance” has no


Output:
specific opposite, though the other nine categories might be considered to be the
opposites of “substance.” The 12 categories used by Kant and the categories of
the categorical system of Hegel’s Logik are mostly pairs of opposites. Though
divergent in their views on the categorical system, all Marxist philosophers agree
that categories are in pairs, for instance, essence and phenomenon, content and
form, necessity and chance, possibility and actuality, etc. Marxist philosophy holds
that categories must be pairs of opposites; this is certainly a correct view and
reflects the reality of things. Thus, when we today study the categorical system
17.4   Discussion                                                                  227


Output:
of traditional Chinese philosophy and try to make it more systematically and
scientifically reflect the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy,
we should try to find out the law of unity of opposites in its categorical system.
(2) How many categories should the categorical system of traditional Chinese
    philosophy contain in order to be sufficient to indicate “the basic pattern of
    being” or “the basic concepts that reflect the most fundamental characteristics,
    aspects, and relationships of the phenomena and knowledge of the reality”?
   The 20 pairs of opposite basic concepts of the categorical system of traditional
Chinese philosophy are merely a tentative proposition. They indicate mostly what
the “world” and “man” are; for example, the existence of the “world” comprises
“principle” and qi and the existence of “man” comprises “spirit” and “form.” The
categories used by Western philosophers, however, generally show the mode of


Output:
existence and the “principles of knowledge.” The contemporary categories of
Marxist philosophy as a whole also show the characteristics and aspects of being
and do not include the most basic concepts such as “mind” and “thing” in the
categorical system. By this criterion, some of the categories listed above should not
be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy, and some
other concepts should be added. However, the way we have indicated the system of
traditional Chinese philosophy might be just one approach, for the various catego-
ries listed in the diagram do indicate the “basic mode of existence” so far as their
contents are concerned and are also “focal points in the web” of man’s knowledge.
Would not, then, our way seem to be better suited to reflect the characteristics and
level of traditional Chinese philosophy? Of course it would be even better if
we could use less basic concepts to indicate traditional Chinese philosophy, such


Output:
as the diagram on the next page. (3) Can “the categorical system of traditional
Chinese philosophy” reflect its characteristics and level?
   This is a major question because serious research and thorough discussion is
needed to ascertain the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy and its
level. Could we venture to say that our diagram of the categorical system more
or less reflects the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy?
Apparently, traditional Chinese philosophy paid special attention to the study of
the basic mode of existence and the existence of man and the relationships between
things, that is, the identity of things, hence the multitude of concepts such as the
“Heaven and man combine as one,” the “knowledge and action combine as one,”
“essence and function are like one,” “nonbeing originates in being,” the “spirit and
form combine as one,” and “mind and matter are not two.” Although traditional


Output:
Chinese philosophy did not devote much discussion to such concepts as time and
space, cause and effect which are not included in our diagram, yet as a categorical
system, traditional Chinese philosophy already attained a fairly high level as
compared with ancient Western and Indian philosophy in that it covered a vast
scope, with basic concepts all in pairs and the development of the meaning of its
concepts reflecting the world with increasing depth.
228      17    Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
quiescence

              movement
              constant

              variable
              positive
                                             nonbeing
                                             (the way)                          principle
              negative

                                                                                force
                                                           essence
                                being (thing,
                 Heaven        material force)

                                   the way
                 man           (supreme ultimate)
                                                             function
                                                                                mind

                spirit
                                                                                matter

                form              instrument
                nature           (force, thing)

                emotion


Output:
emotion

               knowledge

                 action

   The categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has not been widely
discussed and is a fairly new topic. Here, the author has ventured to propose some
preliminary propositions with the aim of arousing interest in the discussion of this
topic in the hope that the study of the history of Chinese philosophy, under the
guidance of Marxism, will advance even more scientifically.
Chapter 18
New Progress in the Study of the History
of Chinese Philosophy


Output:
In recent years, study of the history of Chinese philosophy has been in full swing in
China. The Society of the History of Chinese Philosophy has been set up and has in
publication two journals entitled Studies of the History of Chinese Philosophy and
Chinese Philosophy dedicated to publishing research results in this area. A number
of books specializing in the subject have come off press, and dozens of seminars
have been held to discuss special issues. Thus, a variety of different views in regard
to Chinese philosophers ranging from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen have come forth.
All this signals the new progress made in the study of the history of Chinese
philosophy. However, I do not propose to discuss here the concrete issues; rather,
I would like to talk about the prevailing trends in the study as these probably can
give a better picture of the new progress made in this area and points to new
prospects which will open up in the studies. In light of this, I would like to address


Output: myself to four mutually related issues.


Output:
18.1     The History of Chinese Philosophy as the History
         of Knowledge of the Chinese Nation

There had been in the past a theory which moved from the classical conclusion that
the history of philosophy was a historical account of the struggle between materi-
alism and idealism to the study of the history of philosophy as the development of
man’s knowledge and the laws governing the development of theoretic thinking.
However, the many years of practice in taking the history of philosophy merely as a
historical account of the struggle between materialism and idealism not only gave
rise to such drawbacks as oversimplification and indiscriminate labeling but also
failed to identify any concepts that bore the nature of regularity. How should we

Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, and Chinese Culture, 1991: 39–48


Output:
© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                      229
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_18
230                     18   New Progress in the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy


Output:
resolve this problem? The discussion of “how to evaluate idealism” and “the object
of the study of history of philosophy” had failed to lead us out of the dilemma.
Under such circumstances, people began to turn their attention to studying how
philosophy as theoretical thinking developed in history rather than becoming
unduly entangled in the class background of a certain philosopher and his place
in history.
   A philosophical idea that once played a role in the development of man’s
knowledge naturally had a place in history. But excessive discussion about the
relative superiority or inferiority of materialism and idealism is unnecessary, for
which of the two is better can be fully determined by the effect they each produced
on the development of man’s knowledge. The study of the history of Chinese
philosophy, in particular, used to stress the role played by a certain philosopher
or philosophical school in history and how they were related to the ongoing class


Output:
struggle and political struggle at that time. Of course, studies of this sort are also
important; though strictly speaking, they are the problem that the historical study of
philosophy is designed to resolve eventually. The final purpose of such a historical
study is to reveal the logical inevitability of the development of theoretic thinking
as it occurred in history. In the pre-Qin Dynasty philosophy, for example, was
there any inevitability for the ideas of Confucius to develop through Mencius to that
of Xunzi?
   At present more and more people study the history of Chinese philosophy as
a history of knowledge. For example, a multivolume book entitled History of the
Development of Chinese Philosophy is now being compiled under the auspices
of Professor Ren Jiyu, who asserted that the book was intended to deal with the
developmental history of the Chinese nation’s knowledge. The History of Chinese
Philosophy compiled with the joint efforts of Wuhan and Zhongshan universities


Output:
also applied this idea as its guiding thought. In the preface, Xiao Jiefu (Hsiao
Che-fu) of Wuhan University remarked: “The history of philosophy is the history of
how the contradictions of philosophical knowledge have developed; it is man’s
understanding about the general laws governing nature, society and movements of
thinking manifested in the form of theoretic thinking.”
   Chen Junmin of Shaanxi Teachers University wrote that the “study of the history
of philosophy is in essence a science that inquires into the dialectic movement of
man’s philosophical understanding.” In the article “On the Scope, Target, and Task
of the History of Chinese Philosophy,” Zhang Dainian observed: “The history of
philosophy is the history of knowledge in its totality.” “It is the history of how
man’s knowledge develops, that is, a process in which the relative truths developed
by mankind accumulate and increase, and the new ones replace the old.” To find


Output:
out in its totality the law that governs the development of Chinese philosophy,
Chinese philosophical circles have also turned their attention to Hegel’s idea of
“likening the history of philosophy to cycles.” In the preface to his newly published
History of Chinese Philosophy: New Version, Feng Youlan made a special refer-
ence to this issue.
   Two seminars were held in Beijing: one on “The Philosophy of the Han and
Tang Dynasties” was convened by the editorial department of Study of the History
18.2   The Concept and Category of Traditional Chinese Philosophy                  231


Output:
of Chinese Philosophy and the other on “Philosophy of the Han Dynasty” was under
the auspices of the editorial department of Chinese Philosophy. At both meetings,
I suggested as a clue to the development of traditional Chinese philosophy in its
totality that it is formed by a large spiral cycle constituted in turn of three smaller
spiral developmental cycles. The first cycle was pre-Qin Dynasty philosophy.
With Confucius as the starting point, it moved on through Mencius and Xunzi to
the Book of Change (also through other masters of the School of Logicians) and
thus formed the first cycle in the history of Chinese philosophy. The second cycle
was the philosophy of the Wei and Jin dynasties and the Northern and Southern
dynasties. Starting from the idea of “valuing nil” advocated by Wang Bi and He
Yan, it developed through “esteeming substance” upheld by Xiang Xiu and Guo
Xiang, to Seng Pi’s “doctrine of non-vacuum” which was “neither something nor


Output:
nothing.” The third cycle began with Zhang Zai and moved on through Zhu Xi to
Wang Fuzhi.
    In the midst of the three cycles were the study of the Confucian classics of the
two Han dynasties and Buddhist studies during the Sui and Tang dynasties,
indicating the transition from one cycle to another. The three cycles of spiral
movements made up the large cycle of traditional Chinese philosophy. Namely,
from the philosophy of the pre-Qin period and the two Han dynasties with Confu-
cianism as its main body, it moved on to the metaphysics of the Wei-Jin period and
the Sui and Tang dynasties built on the framework of Lao-Zhuang theories.
Gradually, it assimilated Buddhism (the Hua Yan sect, the Chan sect) and finally
developed into the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, a new
school of Confucianism that had absorbed ideas of both the Buddhist and the Daoist
schools which it developed at an even higher plane. This pattern of development,


Output:
it seems, gives expression to the true feature of traditional Chinese philosophy; it
shows the place of Confucianism in traditional Chinese philosophy and also the
profound influence which Buddhist and Daoist ideas exerted over the philosophy.


Output:
18.2     The Concept and Category of Traditional
         Chinese Philosophy


Output:
If we intend to study the history of philosophy as the history of man’s knowledge and
reveal the law of the development of theoretic thinking in history, we must probe the
issue of concept and category. As theoretic thinking, philosophy is unavoidably
manifested through a series of concepts and categories and philosophical propositions
formed by concepts and categories. This applies to philosophies in general and is
particularly significant in the study of concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy.
As Hegel said: “As cultural difference is generally formed on the basis of differences
of ideological categories, it is even more so by difference of philosophy.” Therefore,
the study of the concepts and categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and the
history of its development will help us understand the characteristics of China’s
traditional philosophy and the level of its development.
232                     18   New Progress in the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy


Output:
Except for having absorbed some concepts from the Buddhism of India,
philosophical studies in China had in the main developed independently prior to
modern times and thus maintained a very distinctive character. Precisely because
traditional Chinese philosophy has a set of concepts and categories of its own and
has gradually formed itself into a complete system, it is inappropriate to apply to it
concepts and categories of Western philosophy in an oversimplified way; nor is
it possible to equate them simply with the concepts and categories of Marxist
philosophy. For example, the concept of Shen in traditional Chinese philosophy
has several implications. It may refer to god and ghosts, the meaning that was
probably meant by Confucius when he said: “Worship god as if god were there.”
Shen may also mean “spirit” or “soul.” This was what Xunzi implied when he said
“Shen (spirit or soul) is engendered when matter takes shape.” Nevertheless, in


Output:
traditional Chinese philosophy, Shen has an even deeper layer of meaning, that is,
“a subtle change.” This idea stood out in the Record of Changes, which said: “When
there is no telling whether it is yin or yang, it is called ‘shen.’” Even though “Shen”
implies a variety of ideas, the implications are related to each other. Another
example is the opposite of yong in traditional Chinese philosophy. It also has a
lot of implications; it implies not only “substance” and “support” but also “whole”
and “abstract.” The multiplex and mutually related implications embodied in one
concept give expression to the special features of traditional Chinese philosophy
and its level of development.
    Since traditional Chinese philosophy has its special conceptual categories, is it
true that it has a special category system? I have discussed this issue in my article
“On the Problems of a Category System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy,” which,


Output:
on the basis of the historical development of Chinese philosophy, delineated the
system of its categories. According to the article, this system is made up by 20 or
12 pairs of categories. Among them, the most important pair comprises “the Way of
Heaven” and “the way of man.” This problem of “Heaven” and “man” remains the
core issue of traditional Chinese philosophy. Starting from Confucius’ theory of
“the Way of Heaven and life,” it moved on through Mencius’ idea of “do with all
one’s heart, understand one’s lot, and know about Heaven”; the concept “honesty is
the Way of Heaven and to be honest is the way of man” stated in The Doctrine of the
Mean; and the idea to “establish the Way of Heaven” and “establish the way of
man” as advocated by Record of Changes down to Dong Zhongshu, the great
Confucian of the Han Dynasty, who described his studies as a learning that probed
into “what links man with Heaven.” Even Sima Qian, much influenced by Daoist


Output:
ideas, called his Historical Records a book designed as “an inquiry into what is
between Heaven and man and a probe into the changes in the past and present.”
He Yan, a founder of the metaphysics of the Wei and Jin dynasties, described Wang
Bi, another founder of metaphysics, as “one who is qualified to talk about what is
between Heaven and man.” Even Tao Hongjing, a Daoist master during the
Northern and Southern dynasties, was also of the opinion that Daoism (Taoism)
studied “what is between Heaven and man.” By the time of the Song Dynasty, the
Confucians discussed such issues as “the separation of reason and Way,” “the heart
of Way,” “the heart of man,” “Heaven’s reason,” “man’s desire,” and so on,
18.3   The Comparison and Analysis of Traditional Chinese and Foreign Philosophies   233


Output:
which were all developments of the issue of “Heaven” and “man.” Therefore, an
understanding about the relations between “Heaven” and “man” means having a
grip on the basic issue of traditional Chinese philosophy.
   Judging by how things stand at present, articles dwelling on conceptual catego-
ries of Chinese philosophy in its totality are increasing. Aside from my article, there
were “Unfold the Study of Conceptual Categories Inherent in Chinese Philosophy”
by Professor Zhang Dainian [Studies of the History of Chinese Philosophy, January
1982], “Unfold the Study of Categories in the History of Chinese Philosophy” by
Fang Keli [People’s Daily, September 3, 1982], “A Preliminary Discussion of
Methodology in the History of Chinese Philosophy” by Xiao Jiefu (Hsiao Che-fu)
[Journal of Wuhcut University, no. 3, 1982], and others. However, there are even
more papers and publications dwelling on the category systems of certain philos-


Output:
ophers or a certain pair of philosophic categories. For example, in the article “Study
of Zhu Xi’s Thinking,” Zhang Liwen made a special study of the relations among
different categories of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. In his book entitled The Viewpoint
on Knowledge and Practice in the History of Chinese Philosophy, Fang Keli
analyzed knowledge and practice as a pair of categories in the perspective of
historical development. The journal Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy
began a special column in every issue to publish various studies of categories in
traditional Chinese philosophy. In particular, we should mention Pang Pu’s
“On ‘San (Three)’”, in which in the perspective of “san’s” various implications,
he discussed the unique position of “three” in Chinese culture and the special
philosophical significance of triaism. It appears the study of traditional Chinese
philosophy can take a further step forward only after such research into the
categories of Chinese philosophy and its system.


Output:
18.3     The Comparison and Analysis of Traditional
         Chinese and Foreign Philosophies


Output:
Toward the end of October 1980, a “Symposium on the Comparative Study of
Chinese and Foreign Philosophies” was held in Guilin. The conference failed to
produce any results; however, the issue it brought up began to arouse the attention
of us all. As a matter of fact, the study of conceptual categories of Chinese
philosophy naturally would have led to such a question, but special features of
the conceptual categories of Chinese philosophy can be identified only through
comparison with foreign philosophy. That little attention has been paid to the
similarities and differences between Chinese and foreign philosophies is due to a
variety of factors. As far as the study of history of philosophy itself is concerned,
however, one of the most important reasons was the total neglect of the special
characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy. We tried either to explain it in
light of Western philosophy or mechanically to apply Marxist jargon to it. Thus, it


Output:
became unnecessary to study the similarities and differences between Chinese and
234                     18   New Progress in the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy


Output:
foreign philosophies. Thus far not many studies have been conducted in this regard,
and studies generally have been done on some individual topics. For example, the
Department of Philosophy of People’s University held a discussion to compare and
analyze Zhu Xi’s idea of “Taij” [the great ultimate] and the “absolute spirit”
advocated by Hegel.
   An interesting phenomenon which has emerged in the course of comparing
Chinese and foreign philosophies is that a number of people, including some natural
scientists, have analyzed the Chinese theory of “vitality” and found that it contains
more grains of truth and thus is superior to the Western theory of the “atom.”
According to them, the concept of “vitality” as theorized in China has not only the
implication of “basic particle” but also that of “Held”; in other words, it has a “dual
character of both wave and particle.” Professor He Zuoxiu of the Institute of
Theoretic Physics under the Chinese Academy of Sciences published in Chinese


Output:
Science an article entitled “The Materialist Theory of Vitality” in which he said:
“Vitality is a matter of continuity. It is close to ‘field’ as discussed in modern
science.” “The theory of vitality is the forerunner of the contemporary theory of the
quantum field. The theory of ‘vitality’ as discussed in Chinese philosophy has
special value in holding that the interaction among different things comes as a
result of the effect of “vital energy.”
   But while this thesis probably contains some grains of truth, it appears also to
have certain drawbacks, namely, it lumps together all different phenomena under
“vital energy” or the “effect of vital energy” instead of focusing attention on
analyzing the phenomena. The “theory of the atom” which prevailed in ancient
Greece required that the smallest, indivisible particles be found and called “atoms.”
While this was, of course, incorrect, in terms of method it called for analysis of
concrete matter which cannot be but as an advantage for Western philosophy. As far


Output:
as the method of thinking is concerned, traditional Chinese philosophy seems to
have laid more emphasis on the relations among things and the unity of their many
aspects. On the contrary, Western philosophers in ancient times were probably
more concerned about the distinction between different things and stressed the
analysis of their various aspects.
   As attention has been paid to the comparison of Chinese and Western philoso-
phies, the comparison between Chinese and foreign religions also has drawn more
attention than before. More studies have been carried out on Daoism (Taoism), the
religion of the Chinese nation. There are institutions for Daoist studies, for exam-
ple, the Institute of Religion under Sichuan University specializes in the study of
Daoism (Taoism). Special courses on Daoism (Taoism) are now being offered in
universities, special teams have been set up to compile An Outline of Daoist
Collections, and articles have been published comparing Daoism (Taoism) with


Output:
Buddhism. The January issue of Philosophical Studies in 1981 carried an article
under the title of “A Preliminary Discussion of the Early Daoist Theory of Life,
Death, Spirit, and Body,” which, based on historical data, this analysis of these
specific concepts in Daoism (Taoism) and Buddhism revealed the special features
of Daoism (Taoism) as a religion.
18.4   The Method Employed by Traditional Chinese Philosophy in Establishing a System 235


Output:
In the perspective of a comparison of Chinese and foreign philosophies, two
important questions have been raised. First, in view of the different development in
Chinese and Western societies, some have asked very perceptively whether there is
a “mode of Asian thinking.” Did not some major propositions of traditional Chinese
philosophy express the characteristics of the Chinese mode of thinking? Over
the last few years, quite a few articles have addressed such propositions as the
“integration of Heaven with man,” “identification of the intrinsic with the extrin-
sic,” “integration of knowledge with practice,” and “feeling and scenery in perfect
harmony.” Do not all these propositions embody a search for “unity,” and is this the
basic characteristic of the mode of thinking in traditional Chinese philosophy?
If such be the case, can we predict that once its lack of logical analysis and
demonstration has been rectified, Chinese philosophy will develop more along


Output:
this search for unity? The second question raised is where the national spirit of
Chinese culture lies. The answer to such a question can be found only through the
comparison of Chinese with foreign philosophies.


Output:
18.4     The Method Employed by Traditional Chinese
         Philosophy in Establishing a System


Output:
At the “Symposium on Philosophy of the Han and Tang dynasties” and the
“Discussion of Philosophy of the Han Dynasty” held in 1983, the method of
establishing a philosophical system was raised, and Jin Chun Feng was the first to
address this issue. He said philosophers of the Han Dynasty generally used the
method of positivism to establish the philosophical system; the Wei and Jin people
used a different method, but he was not sure how to define it; the method used by
Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties can be called the method of ethical
rationalism. At an enlarged session of the editorial committee on Study of the
History of Chinese Philosophy held in 1981, I proposed that this question be chosen
as a topic for solicited contributions. Philosophy has two aspects, the “contents”
and the “method.” Not only the “contents” but the “method” as well reflect a
philosophy’s level of theoretic thinking. During the period from the pre-Qin


Output:
Dynasty to the Wei and Jin dynasties, traditional Chinese philosophy comprised
two major systems, Confucianism and Daoism (Taoism). These two schools were
significantly different not only in their contents but also in terms of the methods
they used in establishing their systems.
   To put it briefly, the method used by the Confucians was basically that of
experience, namely, to use experience in demonstration of things transcending
experience or other experience. By the method of experience, we mean that the
rationality of a philosophical idea can be proved through experience. Confucius
said: “To draw a simile from something close can be called the method of benev-
olence.” Mencius remarked: “Categorize and list things that are similar.” Xunzi
also noted: “Things of the same category do not conflict; they are of the same
236                     18   New Progress in the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy


Output:
rationality even after a long time.” The Record of Changes mentioned “draw close
experience from your own person and distant experience from things,” “make a
divination to observe nature,” and “observe astronomic phenomena above and
study geographical features below” to illustrate the principles of its thinking.
Dong Zhongshu put forward the idea that “things that can be counted are of the
second number and things that cannot be counted are of the second category,” and
with this, he demonstrated that “things can be combined by the category and
Heaven becomes one with man.”
    By the time of the metaphysics school in the Wei and Jin dynasties, the method
underwent a change. In fact, metaphysics was built on the framework of
Lao-Zhuang’s thinking, and therefore, the method it used in establishing its philo-
sophical system can be called “dialectical thinking,” which is characterized by
demonstrating the rationality of things existing in experience with things


Output:
transcending experience. Wang Bi said: “Forget words when the idea is grasped”;
Guo Xiang said: “place words within the framework of the idea”; and Ji Kang
(Chi Kang) remarked: “Words cannot express the idea completely”—they all meant
the same thing. Wang Bi cited “implements originate from the Way” to demonstrate
that “ministers are subordinated to the king.” Guo Xiang tried to prove the “fairy-
land” did not exist “beyond the real world” (“to take a journey to the outside world
in order to enhance the inner world” “inside and outside are mutually obscure”).
The method of “dialectical thinking” was used in all these.
    Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties was a combination of the
two schools and an improvement on them. Their method perhaps can be called
“introspection of ethical rationality.” Regardless of whether it was “character is
rationality” advocated by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi or “heart is rationality” upheld by


Output:
Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming, they all took rationality [taiji], a priori morality,
as the basic contents. Zhu Xi said: “Tai ji is a principle of the extremely good. Every
man has a tai ji, and every thing has a tai ji.” Lu Jiuyuan remarked: “Those who
know before others know this reason, and those who become aware before others
are aware of this reason. For this reason one loves one’s close relative and respects
one’s older brother.”
    In either “the Way questioning the learning” or “respecting virtue and
character,” one can perceive the “reason of Heaven” in its totality through a
moral introspection.
    Why was this question raised? Because at that time we were thinking about
Engels’ remark: “Theoretic thinking is merely an ability endowed by nature and
should be developed and trained. To train it, there has been no other method up to
now except studying philosophies of the past.” Theoretic thinking calls for the
formulation of a number of philosophic concepts and the formation, on the basis of


Output:
philosophic concepts, of a series of philosophic propositions. In order to form the
concepts and propositions of a philosophical system as well as the system itself, it is
imperative to use a certain method, which itself must be a certain kind of abstract
thinking. The abstract thinking one exercises in the course of establishing one’s
philosophical system certainly will train and improve one’s level of theoretic
thinking. If we can reveal the different methods employed by the various
18.4   The Method Employed by Traditional Chinese Philosophy in Establishing a System 237


Output:
philosophers and philosophical schools in history and make a clear analysis
of them, they will be an important help in analyzing the philosophers and philo-
sophical schools under study. In addition, practice is no different from telling
people a method for training and improving their level of theoretic thinking and
is therefore very significant.
    Judging from the problems mentioned above, we seem to be able to perceive
such a trend of development; namely, people may raise the question: What are the
prospects of traditional Chinese philosophy, or in other words, does the continued
existence of Chinese philosophy in its entirety have any value? If this question is
raised and the proper conditions are available, then a comprehensive and systematic
analysis can be made of Chinese philosophy in today’s perspective. But at present,
quite a few people continuously maintain a negative attitude toward traditional
Chinese philosophy as a whole. Whatever the circumstances, they regard traditional


Output:
Chinese philosophy as a product of old times, an ideology of feudal and even slave
society. Nevertheless, certain ideas of the philosophy are continuously quoted
in everyday life. We can see that a great many articles, especially writings on
“spiritual civilization,” often quote passages from books of ancient China or
historical stories in ancient times which were mostly the embodiment of traditional
Chinese philosophical thinking.
    Why are there such a contradictory phenomenon? Is the concept of “value”
involved here? Where does the basic spirit of traditional Chinese philosophy lie?
Does this spirit still have value in today’s world? Following the disclosure of the
law of how traditional Chinese philosophy developed, the study of this problem
will, in my opinion, show increasingly clearly that it works continuously toward
the solution of a major problem, namely, the value of the “‘Way of Heaven’ and the
‘way of’ man” and their relations.


Output:
‘way of’ man” and their relations.
    This problem should be resolved through the continuous elevation of man’s
spiritual realm, a concept in Chinese philosophy which requires that man should
transcend “oneself” and identify with the “Way of Heaven.” Having attained such a
realm in which “Heaven is integrated with man” and “man succeeds alongside the
Way,” an individual could become a saint and society a “world of Great Harmony.”
As to how or whether it would be possible to realize such an ideal, there were, of
course, different views due to the difference in historical conditions and environ-
ments. Nevertheless, philosophers in Chinese history tended to take as their motto
the epigram that “Heaven moves along a healthy track, and a gentleman should
make unremitting efforts to improve himself.” How things will develop is hard to
predict; we are not prophets, nor do we believe in prophecy. But if things always
develop according to law, can we predict its future development by studying and


Output:
analyzing its previous experience and can the development of philosophy be
forecast to help us know what will happen with Chinese philosophy in the future?
I think it is possible.
    Even though I proposed to describe the new progress now made in China about
the study of the history of traditional Chinese philosophy, I mainly discussed my
personal views on the new trends of philosophical studies. Perhaps, this can be
called the idea of one school.
Chapter 19
A Reconsideration of the Question
of “The True, the Good, and the Beautiful”
in Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
What is the highest ideal in spiritual life human beings quest for? I believe it is
“the true, the good, and the beautiful” and the unity of this three in one system.
Of course, ideas of philosophers are different regarding what constitutes each of
these three ideals. As far as how these are unified in one system, opinions differ
from each other. There cannot be any final conclusion to this discussion, and
actually there is no need for such one. As long as people quest for truth, goodness,
and beauty, thinkers will undoubtedly want to construct systems unifying the
concepts. In my opinion, the quest for spiritual realm of life in Chinese traditional
philosophy can be referred as ancient philosophers’ quest for “the true, the good,
and the beautiful” in another way. I wrote an article entitled “The Question of the
True, the Good and the Beautiful in Traditional Chinese Philosophy”1 which was
largely a historical discussion of the Confucian view about the question. This article


Output:
is, however, not confined to a discussion of the Confucians and is not historical in
its approach because such an approach would entail too unfocussed and lengthy
an article. We will therefore analyze and discuss selected representative thinkers.
    Influence on the development of Chinese philosophy has always been exerted by
China’s pre-Qin philosophers, among whom Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi have
been the most influential. If we regard these three as typical and through them
discuss the question of the different spiritual realm of life (rensheng jingjie)
advanced by different traditional Chinese philosophies, we may perhaps be able
to derive a unified understanding of spiritual realm of life held by traditional
Chinese philosophy.
    Forty years ago, Shen Youding, who was engaged in research at Oxford
University, wrote to friends in China saying:


Output:
Translated by Bruce Doar from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1990, No. 3, with some added passages
translated by Yang Hao.
1
  In Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1984, No. 4.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                          239
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_19
240                               19   A Reconsideration of the Question of “The True, the Good. . .

   The value theories of Kant and of Hegel have one important difference which we
can represent as follows:

Kant                The good                           The beautiful                         The true
Hegel               The true                           The beautiful                         The good


Output:
From this we can see that Kant was perhaps closer to the Chinese, while Hegel
was closer to the Indian or Greek.2
   This conclusion of Mr. Shen is particularly insightful and innovative.
From Confucian thought, which formed the mainstream in the development of
Chinese traditional philosophy, we can see that this scheme holds, but if we
examine the different schools of thought and philosophies which make up tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy, we find that it does not. As I see it, in traditional Chinese
philosophy there were in fact three different systems integrating the true, the good,
and the beautiful. The systems of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi are set out below:

Confucius             The good                          The beautiful                    The true
Laozi                 The true                          The good                         The beautiful
Zhuangzi              The beautiful                     The good                         The true


Output:
Drawing analogies from this diagram, we can say in overall terms that in
terms of value regarding the question of the true, the good, and the beautiful,
Confucius approximates Kant, Laozi approximates Hegel, while in a limited way
Zhuangzi approximates Schelling or Aristotle. Of course such analogies are limited
and we cannot extrapolate them to all other aspects of the ideas of these thinkers,
but they do serve to direct the lines along which we can think.

19.1        Confucius’ Demands of the Realm of Life

In the section of The Analects entitled “Wei Zheng” (Practicing Government), the
following statement is attributed to Confucius:
      At fifteen I set my heart upon learning, at thirty I had established myself, at forty I was not
      subject to doubt, at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven, at sixty I could
      immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said, and at seventy I followed
      my heart’s dictates, but did not transgress the rules.


Output:
We know that Confucius and later Confucians believed that life and death or
wealth and honor were not attained by mere individual efforts, but that the level of a
person’s morality or learning could differ because of the amount of individual
effort. These words of Confucius are at one and the same time a description of the
course of his life, an outline of the process of self-cultivation he pursued, and a
summation of his quest for and understanding of the true, the good, and the

2
    Zhexue Pinglun, Vol. 10, No. 6.
19.1   Confucius’ Demands of the Realm of Life                                             241


Output:
beautiful. The years from 15 to 40 can be seen as the preparatory stage for his
assumption of sagehood, and the statements that he was “not subject to doubt” and
that he could “follow” his “heart’s dictates, and not transgress the rules,” reveal that
deepening of the process whereby he acquired sagehood. The statement that he had
come “to know the commands of Heaven” explains how he acquired knowledge
and understanding of “Heaven” (the ultimate questions of life and the universe),
which may perhaps be considered to fall within the scope of the quest for the true.
Here Confucius sees Heaven as a cognitive object, and he has not attained the stage
where he is “one with Heaven,” having not yet entered that realm of unity. In his
“Preface to Zhuangzi,” Guo Xiang wrote:
   Zhuangzi can be said to have known the origin....although he said he did not have that
   understanding, he alone responded to it. To respond without understanding is, however, to
   have no need to apply effort.


Output:
To be able to respond to the noumenon of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things
can be called knowing “the root,” but this entails the cognitive subject being apart
from the noumenon of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, and to see this
noumenon as the object of cognition necessarily means that one has not yet attained
oneness with that noumenon. While this noumenon exists on a higher realm,
Zhuangzi was not yet able to “follow” his “heart’s dictates, but did not transgress
the rules.”
   Confucius’ statement that at sixty he “could immediately discriminate the truth
or falsity of what others said” (liushi er ershun) has, in fact, been subject to varying
interpretations over the ages. Yang Bojun, whose interpretation presented in Lunyu
Yizhu (Analects, Vernacular Translation and Annotation; Beijing, Zhonghua Shuju,
1958) is used here, writes that the expression ershun “is extremely difficult to
explain. Many have sought to do so, but I feel all their explanations to be forced....”


Output:
I believe that Yang’s interpretation is close to what Confucius intended by the
statement. Yang’s interpretation is probably based on the explanation of Li Chong
of the Jin Dynasty who wrote that ershun means “the heart and the ear follow each
other” (xinyuer xiangcong). Sun Chuo, also of the Jin Dynasty, provided a more
metaphysical explanation when he wrote:
   Ershun means to discard the logic which governs listening, to intuit the mystery of the
   meaning, and to not pursue but nevertheless obtain—what can be termed following the
   principle of the supreme one unconsciously and unknowingly.


Output:
This is the intuitive understanding which transcends experience of the entirety of
the principles governing the universe and is in the realm of “inner transcendence.”
According to the views of modern hermeneutics, all explanations of our predeces-
sors’ ideas contain within them the ideas of the explicator; by definition, there must
be connections between the person doing the explanation and what he is explaining.
Most of the explanations of Confucius’ thought by thinkers throughout the ages
reveal this to be the case. I would like to turn to Zhu Xi’s explanation of these words
of Confucius. He wrote:
   As the sounds enter, the heart communes with them, finding nothing in them to evade or
   oppose, thereby understanding their ultimate sense, acquired without any thought.
242                          19   A Reconsideration of the Question of “The True, the Good. . .


Output:
Zhu Xi’s “sounds” (sheng) relate to voice (shengyin), and they encompass both
the “articulated sounds” (yousheng zhi yin) and the “unarticulated sounds”
(wushengzhi yin). “Understanding their ultimate sense” should transcend the
realm in which Confucius knew the commands of Heaven, and so this realm
“acquired without any thought” transcends knowledge. I believe that this can be
explained as an intuited aesthetic realm, and what is thereby acquired is an intuited
image transcending experience. This can also be explained as an artistic realm, the
realm of “beauty.” This explanation of Confucius’ statement may also be “forced,”
but as Yang Bojun asserts that most explanations of this line have, throughout
history, been forced, I see no harm in building on this legacy. But I also believe
that such an explanation does have a basis, particularly from the viewpoint of
philosophy, in which it may have a new sense. We know that Confucius regarded


Output:
music as a form of cultivation and that “when in the kingdom of Qi he heard
the music of Shao,” he was “unable to savor the taste of meat for three months,”
a detail revealing that he had entered a sublime aesthetic realm “acquired
without any thought.” Confucius had his own explanation of this realm he had
attained: “I had not anticipated that music could transport me to such a state.”
He thus unintentionally attained a realm in which he enjoyed a form of transcen-
dental beauty.
   Zhu Xi commented as follows on Confucius’ statement that at seventy he
“followed” his “heart’s dictates, but did not transgress the rules”:
   (Ju), the carpenter’s square, is an instrument for measuring patterns, but here it refers
   generally to pattern or custom. While following his heart’s dictates, Confucius did
   not transgress his pattern, and so he was at ease in his deeds and attained the mean
   without effort.


Output:
The passage from The Analects being commented on here therefore refers to a
realm at one with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, where one “knows truth”
(zhi zhen), “acquires beauty” (de mei), and later arrives in a perfect realm of
“ultimate goodness” (zhishan). Confucius believed that “perfect beauty” could
not compare with “perfect beauty combined with perfect goodness.” The Analects
contains the following passage in “The Eight Yi”:
   Discussing the music of Shao, Confucius commented: “It possesses perfect beauty, as well
   as perfect goodness.” Of the music of King Wu, he commented: “It has perfect beauty,
   but does not possess perfect goodness.”


Output:
To say that something possesses perfect goodness is, to a certain extent (at least
for the Confucians), connected with a judgment concerning ethical value. Mencius
said: “Complete truthfulness is called beauty.”
   “Beauty” here contains the idea of ethical evaluation. Zhu Xi annotated this line
as follows:
   When one has strenuously implemented goodness until it is filled to completion and has
   accumulated truth, then the beauty will reside within it and will not depend on externals.

   “Goodness” here is a form of internalized “beauty,” the highest beauty of
character. It can be seen that Zhu Xi believed that “goodness” in one respect can
19.1   Confucius’ Demands of the Realm of Life                                                    243


Output:
encompass “beauty.” “Perfect goodness” was held to be superior to “perfect
beauty” because “perfect goodness” was in fact both “perfect goodness and
perfect beauty.” We would now seem to be able to assert that Confucius’ realm
of life (or his realm of the sage) proceeds from “knowing truth” and “acquiring
beauty” to a realm of perfect goodness in which “one can be at ease in one’s deeds
and attain the mean without effort.” In other words, from “truth” we proceed to
“beauty” and then we finally attain “goodness.”
   “The good        the beautiful       the true” was the special characteristic of
Kant’s philosophy. As Kant saw it, practical reasoning was superior to speculative
reasoning. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), the object of
research was the phenomenal world, and it was subject to the control of the laws
of necessity of nature. In his Critique of Practical Reasoning, the object of research
was the noumenon of rational functioning, which was not subject to laws of


Output:
necessity, and so was free. The former was nature, the latter morality. The former
belonged to the realm of theoretical knowledge, the latter to the realm of ethical
belief, and there was no direct channel connecting the two. The question, therefore,
was how to build a bridge between theoretical knowledge (epistemology) and
ethical belief (ethics); and to resolve the question of how to connect the two,
Kant wrote his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment), at the beginning of
which he said:
    Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible,
    and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the
    sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is
    possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any
    influence on the second; and yet the second is to have an influence on the first, i.e., the


Output:
concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws.
    Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its form will
    harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] the purposes that we are to achieve in
    nature according to laws of freedom. So there must after all be a basis uniting the
    supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom
    contains practically, even though the concept of this basis does not reach cognition of it
    either theoretically or practically and hence does not have a domain of its own, though it
    does make possible the transition from our way of thinking in terms of principles of nature
    to our way of thinking in terms of principles of freedom.”3


Output:
Kant believes that it was the power of judgment which united reason (pure
reason) and rationality (practical reasoning), yet while judgment had something of
the nature of each of these forms of reasoning, it was not the same thing as them.
Kant divided man’s soul into intelligence, feeling, and idea. The cognitive ability
of intelligence was pure reason, the cognitive ability of idea was rationality
or practical reasoning which transcended experience, and the cognitive ability of
feeling was what Kant called “judgment.” Because feeling was the intermediary
between intelligence and idea, it, like intelligence, was moved by external stimuli,

3
 Kant, Panduanli Pipan, (Critique of Pure Reason, Chinese edition), Beijing: Shangwu Yin
shuguan, 1964, p. 13. [Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. Werner S. Pluhar. Hackett
Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 15–16. —editor].
244                          19   A Reconsideration of the Question of “The True, the Good. . .


Output:
and like idea it played its role regarding external things, and thus judgment
functioned as an intermediary between reason and rationality.
   In one respect, judgment, like reason, confronted incomplete phenomena.
In another respect, like rationality, it aimed to reconcile incomplete aspects with
a totality. Thus, the understanding of confronted incomplete phenomena and the
rationality which addresses itself to a totality meet in judgment, judgment seeks
to include the parts within the whole and then subject them to reflection, so
judgment is able to act as a bridge between reason and rationality.4 Thus, Kant
constructed his philosophical trilogy of “the good     the beautiful    the true.”
   Of course, while there are similarities in value between the philosophies of
Confucius and Kant, their aims in constructing their philosophies were dissimilar.
Confucius established a philosophy of life, whereas Kant constructed a complete
rational philosophical system. This is perhaps one of the differences between


Output:
Chinese and Western philosophy. If we compare Confucius’ process which led
him from knowing the commands of Heaven to being able to immediately discrim-
inate the truth or falsity of what others said and then on to “following his heart’s
dictates without transgression,” with the basic theme of the true, the good, and
the beautiful in traditional Chinese philosophy, then we can say that Confucius’
statement that “at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven” represents the
stage of seeking “the unity of Heaven and Man” (tian ren heyi). His statement that
“at sixty I could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said”
represents attaining the stage of “the unity of feeling and scene” (qing jing heyi),
and his statement that “at seventy I followed my heart’s dictates, but did not
transgress the rules” represents the stage at which he was able to realize “the
unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing heyi).
   The unity of Heaven and Man belongs to the domain of “intelligence”


Output:
(knowledge). The unity of feeling and scene belongs to the domain of “apprecia-
tion” (feeling), and the unity of knowledge and action belongs to “praxis” (idea or
intention). According to the Confucians, these three were inseparable. Being human
entailed an understanding of the flow of the cosmos and creation as well as
an ability to appreciate the achievements of the cosmos and creation. Moreover,
in one’s life practice, one should re-manifest the perfect beauty and the perfect
goodness of the cosmos. The process that Confucius outlined represented the
demands made by the human in the realm of life. This was the summation of
Confucius’ personal quest for the true, the beautiful, and the good.


Output:
4
 Li Zehou, Pipan Zhexue de Pipan, (A Critique of Critical Philosophy), Renmin Chubanshe, 1984,
pp. 368–370; Jiang Kongyang, Deguo Gudian Meixue (Classical German Aesthetics), Shangwu
Yinshuguan, 1981, pp. 67–68.
19.2   Laozi’s Quest in the Realm of Life                                                         245

19.2     Laozi’s Quest in the Realm of Life


Output:
Laozi seems to have upheld an attitude of denial regarding the demands of most
people (including the Confucians) for the true, the good, and the beautiful. His call
to “deny the sages and discard knowledge” (juesheng-qizhi) would seem to be a
denial of the quest for ordinary knowledge. His statement that “the five colors blind
one’s vision” (wuse ling ren mu mang) is an opposition to the general quest for
beauty; and his assertion that “when the Great Way declines, compassion and
righteousness come into existence” (dadao fei, you ren yi) is opposition to the
general moral concept of goodness. Does Laozi therefore not argue for any quest
for the true, the good, and the beautiful in the human realm? I disagree with this
proposition. He called for a quest after such ideals which would transcend the banal,
a quest that for him was within a realm “equal with the Way” (tongyu dao). We can
see that Laozi regarded “the Way” as the unity of the true, the good, and the
beautiful.


Output:
beautiful.
   The 25th chapter of Dao De Jing (The Classic of the Way and Power) contains
the following passage:
   The model for man is the earth, the model for earth is heaven, the model for heaven is the
   Way, and the model for the Way is Nature.


Output:
This is a description of Laozi’s views of the quest of the realm of life.
He believed that man’s highest ideal was imitation of the Way, while the Way
itself was natural and spontaneous. What was the Way he discussed? Dao De Jing
contains a number of definitions, but the most basic is of a transcendental highest
criterion.5 Chapter 14 of that classic reads:
   Viewing it, it cannot be seen and so it is described as “beyond color;” listening to it, it
   cannot be heard and so it is described as “beyond sound;” grasping for it, it cannot be
   grasped and so it is described as “formless.” These three are beyond imagination, all being
   aspects of the one chaotic whole. Upwardly, it emits no light; downwardly, no darkness.
   It is endless, so that words cannot describe it, and it returns to nothingness. This is formless
   form, shape without matter, and is called seemingness. Meeting it, it has no front; pursuing


Output:
it, it has no rear. Cleave to the eternal Way, to govern what exists in the present; if one can
   understand its ancient origin, one finds the laws governing the Way.


Output:
Examining this we find it contains three levels of meaning:
(1) “The Way” transcends sensory experience, and this transcendence is described
    as “beyond color,” “beyond sound,” and “beyond form.” Monk Deqing in the
    Ming Dynasty wrote in his Dao De Jing Jie (Explanation of The Classic of
    the Way and the Power): “The one chaotic whole” which cannot be imagined
    is the Way.

5
  Tang Yijie, Nanbeichao Shiqi de Daojiao (Taoism in the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern
Dynasties Period), Shaanxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1988, pp. 56–57.
246                             19   A Reconsideration of the Question of “The True, the Good. . .


Output:
(2) While the Way is transcendental, it is nevertheless based on the existence of
    real things, i.e., “formless form, shape without matter.” Wang Bi comments
    on this line:
          From it all “things” possessing specificity can be formed
          One may want to say that it is nothingness, but from it things can be formed; one wants,
          to say that it exists, but one cannot see its form. . ..
          That which is without form and without name is the basic principle of the
          myriad things.


Output:
“The seemingness” which is formless form and shape without matter can
constitute the basic principle underlying the existence of all forms and shapes.
Wang Bi comments that “seemingness” means “one cannot grasp and define it.”
   In other words, the Way has no specificity. All things which possess specificity
fall within the realm of experience and that which lacks specificity transcends
experience. In Chapter 21 of Dao De Jing, we read:
     This Way is seemingness, but within this seemingness forms can be discerned and real
     things do exist. In this darkness there is essence. This essence is exceptionally real and can
     be authenticated.


Output:
Therefore, while the Way lacks specificity, from it all “things” possessing
specificity can be formed, and so it constitutes the most real existence, being the
noumenon of things.
(3) The Way is the basis of the existence of all things and is the highest criterion of
    transcendence. “The laws governing the Way” are said to be “principles”.6
    “He laws governing the Way” are then the Way as the highest criterion of the
    myriad things from ancient times to the present.
   The above three points show that Laozi’s philosophy was a quest for the origin of
Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things and for the basis of their existence, from
which he created a philosophical system in which the Way was the highest criterion
of transcendence. Laozi’s discussion of the noumenon of the cosmos in fact falls
within the scope of the quest for truth.
   Laozi made the Way the highest category in his philosophical system. If man
grasped the Way, then he grasped the truth, and this was in fact the aim of life.


Output:
Thus, for Laozi “being one with the Way” was the highest aim in life. He said:
“Serving the Way is being one with the Way.”
   Wang Bi commented:
     The Way relies on non-form and non-action to form the myriad things and so if, in serving
     the Way, one relies on non-action, then one will be a superior man and teach without words.
     In the continuity of seeming existence things will follow their reality, and the Way will be
     one with the body. This is called being one with the Way.


Output:
“Being one with the Way” is thus equivalent to being of one body with the Way.
It can be seen that Laozi believed that the relationship between man and the Way
did not entail man regarding the Way as an ordinary object of cognition

6
    “Sangang Wuji,” in Baihu Tongyi.
19.2   Laozi’s Quest in the Realm of Life                                                      247


Output:
(because the Way lacked name and form). Rather it involved man becoming one
with the Way. Therefore, being one with the Way was merely the highest realm
man’s life could assume, a realm in which man could transcend the mundane and
“acquire the Way” (de Dao). This was the supreme realm after which Laozi sought.
   How then did Laozi regard the good and the beautiful? We know that Laozi
regarded the basic character of the Way as “nature and nonaction” (ziran wuwei),
and this then was his criterion for goodness and beauty. He said: “When the Great
Way declines, compassion and righteousness arise.” Because moral concepts such
as compassion and righteousness are man-made, not only are they incompatible
with the principles of “nature and nonaction” but also destroy the Way. Only when
these man-made things are discarded can man acquire true “goodness.” Therefore,
he said: “Only when compassion is terminated and righteousness is discarded. . ..


Output:
can people return to genuine filial piety and kindness.” Only when all man-made
moral concepts are discarded can people return to their natural relationships.
Chapter 8 of Dao De Jing contains the following passage:
   Those who possess supreme goodness are like water. Water serves to nourish the myriad
   things and does not harm them; if one remains in the lowest place that people most loathe,
   one is closest to the Way.


Output:
Ethical persons have the nature of water. Water may benefit the myriad things,
but it does not strive for high places. It is content to remain in the lowest place and
therefore it approaches the Way. In Chapter 66 we read: “The rivers and oceans are
the kings of the waterways, because they choose the lowest places. Because
everything flows into them, the oceans and mighty rivers are called the rulers of
the valleys.”
   This is Laozi’s explanation of how persons possessing morality are close to the
realm of the Way while not yet being one with the Way. To use Feng Youlan’s
exposition of “the four realms” in his Xin Yuanren (A New Exposition of Man),
those who possess the highest goodness belong only to “the realm of morality,”
while those who are one with the Way belong to “the realm of Heaven and Earth.”
Thus, in terms of value, the good is on a lower level than the true.
   In Chapter 12 of Dao De Jing, we read:


Output:
In Chapter 12 of Dao De Jing, we read:
   The five colors dazzle and blind the eyes; the five sounds deafen the ears; the five flavors
   numb the palate; indulgence in hunting them leads to dissipation and craziness.


Output:
Wang Bi comments:
   The eyes, mouths and hearts all follow their own nature; one acts not to follow their nature,
   then one harms nature, and blindness, deafness, numbness and madness result.

In other words, the five colors, the five sounds, and the five flavors are all
“man-made” and have lost the original character of nature. Laozi regarded
plain simplicity as beauty (Jian su bao pu).7 One should heed what is natural.

7
  “Tiandao,” in Zhuangzi, contains the following passage: “With pure simplicity, the world cannot
compete in beauty.” This passage serves to explain the expression jiansu baopu.
248                            19   A Reconsideration of the Question of “The True, the Good. . .


Output:
Artifice results in a loss of the beauty of original nature, and a lack of artifice
preserves natural beauty. Thus, in Chapter 41 of Dao De Jing, the following
passage occurs:
   The supreme note has no sound, the supreme image has no form, the Way loses itself in
   anonymity, yet it alone excels in starting and completing.

Wang Bi commented:
   One listens to the supreme note, but cannot hear it, because it has no sound. A note that has
   sound will fall, necessarily, into either the second note on the pentatonic scale or the first.
   When it is thus discriminated, it cannot assemble a crowd. Therefore a note that has sound
   is not the supreme note.

And:
   If an image has form then there will be discrimination, and if there is discrimination then it
   will either be warm or burning. If not burning, it will be cold. And so an image that has form
   is not the supreme image.


Output:
And:
   All these good things are completed by the Way. In terms of image, it is the supreme image
   among all images, and is image without form. In terms of note, it is the supreme note among
   notes, and is the note of silence.


Output:
The music which is one with the Way is supreme music, and the image which is
one with the Way is supreme image. The supreme music encompasses all music,
while the supreme image encompasses all forms. Music is dependent on sound and
painting is dependent on form, but for Laozi the supreme music is without sound
and the supreme painting lacks all forms. Because lack of sound or form harmo-
nizes with the principles of “nature and nonaction,” they constitute true beauty.
From this we can see that for Laozi the good and the beautiful derive from the true
(the Way) and are specific manifestations of the Way.
   In the final chapter of Dao De Jing, chapter 81, the following passage occurs:
   Fealty words are not beautiful,
   Beautiful words are not about fealty.
   Good persons don’t argue,
   Those who argue are not good.
   Men of knowledge are without depth,
   Those who have depth do not (seek) knowledge.


Output:
I believe that this passage expresses Laozi’s hierarchy of the good, the true,
and the beautiful. “The beautiful” is spoken of in terms of speech (which can stand
for literature), “goodness” is spoken of in the context of deeds or actions, and
“knowing” is spoken of in terms of intelligence. “True knowing” is superior to “true
goodness,” which in turn is superior to “true beauty,” thereby creating a hierarchical
series of criteria. This is the model of Laozi’s quest in the realm of life.
   When we say that Laozi’s view of “the good, the true, and the beautiful” has
certain points in common with Hegel’s philosophy, we are only saying that there are
certain similarities in the arrangement of these three criteria of value orientation.
In Hegel’s philosophical system, “morality,” “art,” and “philosophy” all belong to
19.2   Laozi’s Quest in the Realm of Life                                                 249


Output:
the realm of spiritual philosophy. Spiritual philosophy is the third part of Hegel’s
philosophical system; it constitutes the third great stage of self-development in the
direction of pure spirit—the description of the spiritual stage. The spiritual stage is
the unity of the logical and natural stages, and it is self-existing and self-acting.
Transition from self-existing to self-acting, spirit experienced a complicated
developing process which consists of three stages: (1) subjective spirit, (2) objective
spirit, and (3) absolute spirit. “Morality” belongs to objective spirit. Objective spirit
means the spirit that manifested itself in the external objective world, which refers
not to the natural world and only to the spiritual world, say, different spheres of
human social life and human history. It consists of three developing stages:
(1) abstract law (property law), (2) morality, and (3) ethic (family, citizen society,


Output:
country). Objective spirit is inferior to absolute spirit in the stage of spirit devel-
opment, thus also inferior to “art” and “philosophy” which belong to absolute spirit.
To Hegel, both subjective spirit and objective spirit are partial respectively:
Subjective spirit such as soul, sense, consciousness, mind, will, etc., is inner
conscious state of individuals, and not yet actualized as the reality of existence.
Objective spirit, such as property, law, morality, politics, family, society, country,
etc., is objective though had no self-consciousness. The essence of spirit is
unlimited, absolute, and free; therefore, it has to keep on developing forward to
avoid the partiality of subjective spirit and objective spirit and to prevent the
incident of their opposition between each other, thus spirit could ascend to the
supreme stage of spirit. Absolute spirit is completed and full realization of spirit
unto itself. It is both subjective and objective, and apart from taking itself as the


Output:
object and manifesting its essence self-consciously, it has no other purpose, hence is
truly unlimited, absolute, and free. “Art,” “religion,” and “philosophy” as three
developing stages of the absolute spirit are identical as far as their content
are concerned, for their differences are only forms. Hegel said: “The element of
the universal spirit’s existence [Dasein] is intuition and image in art, feeling and
representational thought in religion, and pure and free thought in philosophy”.8
Listed those three stages of absolute spirit as such, Hegel tries to betray that the self-
realization of absolute spirit also accords to the process that started from sensuous
intuition, passed through the representational thought (he also name it as “pictorial
thinking”), and reached to the abstract thinking. Therefore, philosophy is the
highest, freest, wisest state of absolute spirit. He said, “The most perfect method
of knowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought: and here the attitude of man