Output: "Great similarity differs from little similarity. This is called little-similarity—and—difference. All things are in one way all similar, in another way all different. This is called great-similarity-and-difference." When we say that all men are animals, we thereby recognize that all human beings are similar in the fact that they are human beings, and are also similar in the fact that they are animals. Their similarity in being human beings, however, is greater than that in being animals, because being a human being implies being an animal, but being an animal does not necessarily imply being a human being. For there are other kinds of animals as well, which are different from human beings. It is this kind of similarity and difference, therefore, that Hui Shih calls little-similarity-and-difference. However, if we take "beings'as a universal class, we thereby recognize that all things are similar in the fact that they are beings. But if we take each thing as an individual, we thereby recognize that each


Output: as an individual, we thereby recognize that each individual has its own individuality and so is different from other things.


Output:
This kind of similarity and difference is what Hui Shih

 138 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 calls great—similarity—and—difference. Thus since we can say that all things are similar to each other, and yet can also say that all things are different from each other, this shows that their similarity and difference are both relative. This argument of the School of Names was a famous one in ancient China, and was known as the argument for the unity of similarity and difference."


Output:
"The South has no limit and yet has a limit. "The South has no limit' was a common saying of the day. At that time, the South was a little known land very much like the West of America two hundred years ago. For the early Chinese, the South was not limited by sea as was the East, nor by barren desert as were the North and West. Hence it was popularly regarded as having no limit. Hui Shih s statement may thus perhaps be merely an expression of his superior geographical knowledge, that the South is, eventually, also limited by the sea. Most probably, however, it means to say that the limited and the unlimited are both only relatively so.

 "I go to the state of Ytich today and arrived there yesterday. " This states that "today" and "yesterday" are relative terms. The yesterday of today was the today of yesterday, and the today of today will be the yesterday of tomorrow. Herein lies the relativity of the present and the past.


Output:
"Connected rings can be separated." Connected rings cannot be separated unless they are destroyed.

 But destruction may, from another point of view, be construction. If one makes a wooden table, from the, point of view of the wood, it is destruction, but from the point of view of the table, it is construction. Since destruction and construction are relative, therefore connected rings can be separated '

 without destroying them.


Output:
without destroying them.

 I know the center of the world. It is north of Yen and south of Yiieh. Among the states of the time, Yen was in the extreme north and Yiieh in the extreme south. The Chinese regarded China as being the world. Hence it was a matter of common sense that the center of the world should be south of Yen and north of Yiieh. HuiShih s contrary assertion here is well interpreted by a commentator of the third century A.U., Ssu-ma Piao, who says: "The world has no limit, and therefore anywhere is the center, just as in drawing a circle, any point on the line can be the starting point.


Output:
"Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one body." In the preceding propositions, Hui Shih argues that all things are relative and in a state of flux. There is no absolute difference, or absolute separation among them. Everything is constantly changing into something else. It is a logical conclusion, therefore, that all things are one, and hence that we should love all things equally without discrimination. In the Chuang-tzu it is also said: "If we see things from the point of view of their difference, even my liver and gall are as far from each other as are the states of Ch' u and Yiieh. If we see things from the point of view of their similarity, all things are one. (Ch. 5.)

 140 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 L

 Kung—sun Lung s Theory of Universals


Output:
Kung—sun Lung s Theory of Universals

 The other main leader of the School of Names was Kung-sun Lung (fl. 284-259), who was widely known in his day for his sophistic arguments. It is said that once when he was passing a frontier, the frontier guards said: "Horses are not allowed to pass." Kung-sun Lung replied: "My horse is white, and a white horse is not a horse."And so saying, he passed with his horse.

 Instead of emphasizing, as did Hui Shih, that actual things are relative and changeable, Kung-sun Lung emphasized that names are absolute and permanent. In this way he arrived at the same concept of Platonic-ideas or universals that has been so conspicuous in Western philosophy.

 In his work titled the Kung—sun Lung—tzu, there is a chapter called Discourse on the White Horse."


Output: Its main proposition is the assertion that "a white horse is not a horse. This proposition Kung—sun Lung tries to prove through three arguments. The first is: The word horse denotes a shape; the word 'white denotes a color. That which denotes color is not that which denotes shape. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse. In terms of Western logic, we may say lhal this argument emphasizes the difference in the intension of the terms "horse," "white," and "white horse." The intension of the lirst term is one kind of animal, that of the second is one kind of color, and that of the third is one kind of animal plus one kind of color. Since the intension of each of the three terms is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse.


Output: The second argument is: "When a horse is required, a yellow horse or a black one may be brought forward, but when one requires a white horse, a yellow or a black horse cannot be brought forward....Therefore a yellow horse and a black horse are both horses. They can only respond to a call for a horse but cannot respond to a call for a white horse. It is clear that a white horse is not a horse. And again: The term horse neither excludes nor includes any color; therefore yellow and black ones may respond to it. But the term white horse both excludes and includes color. Yellow and black horses are all excluded because of their color. Therefore only a white horse can fit the requirements.


Output:
That which is not excluded is not the same as that which is excluded. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse." In terms of Western logic, we may say that this argument emphasizes the difference in the extension of the terms "horse" and "white horse." The extension of the term "horse" includes all horses, with no discrimination as to their color. The extension of the term ' white horse, however, includes only white horses, with a corresponding discrimination of color. Since the extension of the term "horse" and "white horse" is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse.

 The third argument is: "Horses certainly have color. Therefore there are white horses. Suppose there is a horse without color, then there is only the

 I4i THE SCHOOL

 OF NAMES


Output:
I4i THE SCHOOL

 OF NAMES

 horse as such. But how then, do we get a white horse? Therefore a white horse is not a horse. A white horse is 'horse' together with 'white.' 'Horse with 'white' is not horse. In this argument, Kung-sun Lung seems to emphasize the distinction between the universal, "horseness," and the universal, while—horseness. The universal, horseness, is the essential attribute of all horses. It implies no color and is jusl "horse as such. Such "horseness" is distinct from "white-horseness. " That is to say, the horse as such is distinct from the white horse as such. Therefore a white horse is not a horse.


Output: Besides horse as such, there is also white as such, that is, whiteness. In the same chapter it is said: "White Las suchj does not specify what is white. But 'white horse specifies what is while. Specified white is not white." Specified white is the concrete white color which is seen in this or that particular white object. The word here translated as specified is ting, which also has the meaning of "determined." The white color which is seen in this or that white object is determined by this or that object. The universal, whiteness, however, is nol determined by any one particular white object. It is the whiteness unspecified.


Output: The Kung-sun Lung-tzu contains another chapter entitled "Discourse on Hardness and Whiteness. The main proposition in this chapter is that "hardness and whiteness are separate." Kung-sun Lung tries to prove this in two ways. The first is expressed in the following dialogue: "[Supposing there is a hard and white stone I, is it possible to say hard, white, and stone are three? No. Can they be two? Yes. How? When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two. Seeing does not give us what is hard but only what is while, and there is nothing hard in this. Touching does not give us what is white but only what is hard, and there is nothing white in this."


Output: This dialogue uses epistemological proof to show that hardness and whiteness arc separated from each other. Here we have a hard and white stone. If we use our eyes to see it, we only get what is while, i.e., a white stone. But if we use our hands to touch it, we only get what is hard, i.e., a hard stone. While we are sensing that the stone is white, we cannot sense that it is hard, and while we are sensing that it is hard, we cannot sense that it is white. Epistemologically speaking, therefore, there is only a white stone or a hard stone here, but not a hard and white stone. This is the meaning of the saying: "When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two.


Output:
Kung-sun Limjr s second argument is a metaphysical one. Its general idea is that both hardness and whiteness, as universals, are unspecified in regard to what particular object it is that is hard or that is white. They can be manifested in any or a l l white or hard objects. Indeed, even if in the physical world there were no hard or white objects at all, none the less, the universal, hardness, would ol necessity remain hardness, and the universal, whiteness,

 144 THE SCHOOL OF

 NAMES

 would remain whiteness. Such hardness and whiteness are quite independent of the existence of physical stories or other objects that are hard and white. The fact that they are independent universals is shown by the fact that in the physical world there are some objects that are hard but not white, and other objects that are white but not hard. Thus it is evident that hardness and whiteness are separate from each other.


Output:
With these epistemological and metaphysical arguments Kung-sun Lung established his proposition that hardness and whiteness are separate. This was a famous proposition in ancient China, and was known as the argument for "the separateness of hardness and whiteness."

 In the Kung-sun Lung-tzu there is yet another chapter entitled "Discourse on Chih and Wu." By wu Kung-sun Lung means concrete particular things, while by chih he means abstract universals. The literal meaning of chih is, as a noun, "finger or "pointer," or, as a verb, "to indicate." Two explanations may be given as to why Kung—sun Lung uses the word chih to denote universals. A common term, that is, a name, to use the terminology of the School of Names, denotes a class of particular things and connotes the common attributes of that class. An abstract term, on the contrary, denotes the attribute or universal.


Output:
Since the Chinese language has no inflection, there is no distinction in form between a common term and an abstract one. Thus, in Chinese, what Westerners would call a common term may also denote a universal. Likewise, the Chinese language has no articles. Hence, in Chinese, such terms as horse, the horse, and a horse are all designated by the one word ma or "horse." It would seem, therefore, that fundamentally the word ma denotes the universal concept, horse, while the other terms, "a horse,"

 "the horse, ' etc., are simply particularized applications of this universal concept. From this it may be said that, in the Chinese language, a universal is what a name points out, i.e., denotes. This is why Kung—sun Lung refers to universals as chih or pointers.


Output: Another explanation of why Kung-sun Lung uses chih to denote the universal, is that chih (finger, pointer, etc.) is a close equivalent of another word, also pronounced chih and written almost the same, which means idea or "concept." According to this explanation, then, when Kung-sun Lung speaks of chih (pointer), he really means by it "idea" or "concept." As can be seen from his arguments above, however, this "idea" is for him not the subjective idea spoken of in the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume, but rather the objective idea as found in the philosophy of Plato. It is the universal.


Output:
In the final chapter of the Chuang-lzu we find a series of twenty—one arguments attributed without specification to the followers of the School of Names. Among them, however, it is evident that some are based upon the ideas of Hui Shih, and others upon those of Kung-sun Lung, and they can be explained accordingly. They used to be considered as paradoxes, but they cease to be such once we understand the fundamental ideas of their authors.

 I46 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 Significance oj the Theories of Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung


Output:
Thus by analyzing names, and their relation with, or their distinction from, actualities, the philosophers of the School of Names discovered what in Chinese philosophy is called "that which lies beyond shapes and features." In Chinese philosophy a distinction is made between "being that lies within shapes and features, and ' being that lies beyond shapes and features." "Being that lies within shapes and features' is the actual, the shih. For instance, the big and the small, the square and the round, the long and the short, the white and the black, are each one class of shapes and features. Anything that is the object or possible object of experience has shape and feature, and lies within the actual world.

 Conversely, any object in the actual world that has shape and feature is the object or possible object of experience.


Output: When Hui Shih enunciated the first and last of his series of "points," he was talking about what lies beyond shapes and features. The greatest, he said, has nothing beyond itself. This is called the Creat One. This defines in what manner the greatest is as it is. "Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one." This defines of what the greatest consists. This last statement conveys the idea that all is one and one is all. Since all is one, there can be nothing beyond the all. The all is itself the greatest one, and since there can be nothing beyond the all, the all cannot be the object of experience. This is because an object of experience always stands in apposition to the one who experiences. Hence if we say thai the all can be an object of experience, we must also say that there is something that stands in apposition to the all and is its experiencer. In other words, we must say that that which has nothing beyond itself at the same time has something beyond itself, which is a manifest contradiction.


Output:
King-sun Lung, too, discovered what lies beyond shapes and features, because the universals he discussed can likewise not be objects of experience. One can see a while something, but one cannot see the universal whiteness as such. All universals that are indicated by names lie in a world beyond shapes and features, though not all universals in that world have names to indicate them. In that world, hardness is hardness and whiteness is whiteness, or as Kung-sun Lung said: "Each is alone and true." (Kung-sun Lung-tzu, ch. 5.)

 Hui Shih spoke of "loving all things equally, ' and Kung-sun Lung also wished to extend his argument in order to correct the relations between names and actualities, so as thus to transform the whole world. (Ibid., ch. 1.) Both men thus apparently considered their philosophy as comprising the


Output:
Too of sageliness within and kingliness without. But it was left to the Taoists fully to apply the discovery made by the School of Names of what lies beyond shapes and features. The Taoists were the opponents of this school, but they were also its true inheritors. This is illustrated by the fact that Hui Shih was a great friend ol Chuang Tzu.

 148 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 CHAPTER 9

 D PHASE OF TAOISM: LAO TZU


Output:
D PHASE OF TAOISM: LAO TZU

 ACCORDING to tradition, Lao Tzu (a name which literally means the "Old Master") was a native of the state of Ch'u in the southern part of the present Honan province, and was an older contemporary of Confucius, whom he is reputed to have instructed in ceremonies. The book bearing his name, the Lao-tzu, and in later times also known as the Too Te Clung (Classic of the Way and Power), has therefore been traditionally regarded as the first philosophical work in Chinese history. Modern scholarship, however, has forced us drastically to change this view and to date it to a time considerably after Confucius.

 Lao Tzu the Man and Lao-tzu the Book

 Two questions arise in this connection. One is about the date of the man, Lao Tzu (whose family name is said to have been Li, and personal name, Tan), and another about the date of the book itself.


Output: There is no necessary connection between the two, for it is quite possible thai there actually lived a man known as Lao Tan who was senior to Confucius, but that the book titled the Lao-tzu is a later production. This is the view I take, and it does not necessarily contradict the traditional accounts of Lao Tzu the man, because in these accounts there is no statement that the man, Lao Tzu, actually wrote the book by that name. Hence I am willing to accept the traditional stories about Lao Tzu the man, while at the same time placing the book, Lao-tzu, in a later period. In fact, I now believe the date of the book to be later than I assumed when I wrote my History of Chinese Philosophy. I now believe it was written or composed after Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung, and not before, as I there indicated. This is because the Lao-tzu contains considerable discussion about the Nameless, and in order to do this it would seem that men should first have become conscious of the existence of names themselves.


Output:
My position does not require me to insist that there is absolutely no connection between Lao Tzu the man and Lao-tzu the book, for the book may

 150

 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM:LAO TZU

 indeed contain a few sayings of the original Lao Tzu. What I maintain, however, is that the system of thought in ihe book as a whole cannot be the product of a time either before or contemporary with thai of Confucius. In the pages following, however, to avoid pedantry, 1 shall refer to Lao Tzu as having said so and so, instead of stating that the book Lao-tzu says so and so, just as we today still speak of sunrise and sunset, even though we know very well that the sun ilself actually neither rises nor sets.

 Tan, the Unnamable


Output:
Tan, the Unnamable

 In the last chapter, we have seen that the philosophers of the School of Names, through the study of names, succeeded in discovering that which lies beyond shapes and features. Most people, however, think only in terms of what lies williin shapes and features, that is, the actual world. Seeing the actual, they have no diflieulty in expressing it, and though they use names for it, they are not conscious that they are names. So when the philosophers of the School of Names started to think aboul ihe names themselves, this thought represented a great advance. To think about names is to think about thinking. It is thought about thought and therefore is thought on a higher level.

 All things that lie within shapes and features have names, or, at least, possess the possibility of having names. They are namable. But in contrast with what is namable, Lao Tzu speaks aboul ihe unnamable.


Output: Not everything that lies beyond shapes and leatures is unnamable. Universals, for instance, lie beyond shapes and features, yet they are not unnamable. But on the other hand, what is unnamable most certainly does lie beyond shapes and features. The Tim or Way of the Taoists is a concept of this sort.


Output: In the first chapter of the Lao-tzu we find the statement: "The Too that can be comprised in words is nol the eternal Too; the name that can be named is not the abiding name. The Unnamable is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the namable is the mother of all things." And in chapter thirty-two: The Too is eternal, nameless, the Uncarved Block...Once the block is carved, there are names." Or in chapter forty-one: "The Too, lying hid, is nameless." In the Taoist system, there is a distinction between yu (being) and wu (non-being), and between yu—ming (having—name, namable) and wu— ming (having-no-name, unnamable). These two distinctions are in reality only one, for yu and wu are actually simply abbreviated terms for yu—ming and wu—ming. Heaven and Earth and all things are namables.


Output:
Thus Heaven has the name of Heaven, Earth the name Earth, and each kind of thing has the name of that kind. There being Heaven, Earth and all things, it follows that there are the names of Heaven, Earth, and all things. Or as Lao Tzu says: "Once the Block is carved, there are names." The Too, however, is unnamable; at the same time it is thai by which all namables come to be. This is why Lao Tzu says: 'The Unnamable is the beginning of Heaven and

 152 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM:LAO TZU

 Earth; the namable is the mother of all things."


Output: Since the Tao is unnamable, it therefore cannot be comprised in words. But since we wish to speak about it, we are forced to give it some kind of designation. We therefore call it Tao, which is really not a name at all. That is to say, to call the Tao Tao, is not the same as to call a table table. When we call a table table, we mean that it has some attributes by which it can be named. But when we call the Tao Tao, we do not mean that it has any such namable attributes. It is simply a designation, or to use an expression common in Chinese philosophy, Tao is a name which is not a name. In Chapter twenty-one of the Lao —tzu it is said: From the past to the present, its [Too's] name has not ceased to be, and has seen the beginning [of all things]." The Tao is that by which anything and everything comes to be. Since there are always things, Tao never ceases to be and the name of Too also never ceases to be. It is the beginning of all beginnings, and therefore it has seen the beginning of all things. A name that


Output: has seen the beginning of all things. A name that never ceases to be is an abiding name, and such a name is in reality not a name at all. Therefore it is said: "The name that can be named is not the abiding name."


Output: "The Unnamable is ihe beginning of Heaven and Earth." This proposition is only a formal and not a positive one. That is to say, it fails to give any information about matters of fact. The Taoists thought that since there are things, there must be that by which all these things come to be. This "that" is designated by them as Tao, which, however, is really not a name. The concept of Tao, too, is a formal and not a positive one. Thai is to say, it does not describe anything about what it is through which all things come to be. All we can say is that Tao, since it is that through which all things come to be, is necessarily not a mere thing among these other things. For if it were such a thing, it could not at the same time be that through which all things whatsoever come to be. Every kind of thing has a name, but Tao is not itself a thing. Therefore it is "nameless, the Uncarved Block.


Output: Anything that comes to be is a being, and there are many beings. The coming to be of beings implies that first of all there is Being. These words, "first of all," here do not mean first in point of time, but first in a logical sense. For instance, if we say there was first a certain kind of animal, then man, the word first in this case means first in point of time. But if we say that first there must be animals before there are men, the word "first" in this case means first in a logical sense. The statement about the origin oi the species" makes an assertion about matters of fact, and required many years observation and study by Charles Darwin before it could be made. But the second of our sayings makes no assertion about matters of fact. It simply says that the existence of men logically implies the existence of animals. In the same way, the being of all things implies the being of Being. This is the meaning of Lao Tzu's saying: "All things in the world come into being from Being (Yu); and Being comes into


Output: into being from Being (Yu); and Being comes into being from Non-being (Wu). (Ch. 40.)


Output:
This saying of Lao Tzu does not mean that there was a time when there 154 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM:LAO TZU

 was only Non—being, and that then there came a time when Being came into being from Non-being. It simply means that if we analyze the existence of things, we see there must first be Being before there can be any things. Too is the unnamable, is Non—being, and is that by which all things come to be.

 Therefore, before the being of Being, there must be Non-being, from which Being comes into being.

 What is here said belongs to ontology, not to cosmology. It has nothing to do with time and actuality.

 For in time arid actuality, there is no Being; there are only beings.

 There are many beings, but there is only one Being. In the Lao-tzu it is said: From Too there comes one. From one there comes two. From two there comes three. From three there comes all things."(Ch.


Output:
42.) The "one" here spoken of refers to Being. To say that "from Too comes one," is the same as that from Non-being comes Being. As for two and three, there are many interpretations. But this saying, that "from one there comes two. From two there comes three. From three there comes all things, may simply be the same as saying that from Being come all things. Being is one, and two and three arc the beginning of the many.

 The Invarialile Law of NiUure


Output:
The Invarialile Law of NiUure

 In the final chapter of the Chuang-tzu, "The World," it is said that ihe leading ideas of Lao Tzu are those of the T m Yi or Super One, and of Being, Non—being, and the invariable. The Super One is the Too. From the Too comes one, and therefore Too itself is the "Super One." The "invariable is a translation of the Chinese word ch ang, which may also be translated as eternal or abiding. Though things are ever changeable and changing, the laws that govern this change of things are not themselves changeable. Hence in the Lao-tzu the word ch'ang is used to show what is always so, or in other words, what can be considered as a rule. For instance, Lao Tzu tells us: "The conquest of the world comes invariably from doing nothing." (Ch. 48.) Or again: "The way of Heaven has no favorites, it is invariably on the side of the good man. (Ch. J<).)


Output:
Among the laws that govern the changes of things, the most fundamental is that "when a thing reaches one extreme, it reverts from it." These are not the actual words of Lao Tzu, but a common Chinese saying, the idea of which no doubt comes from Lao Tzu. Lao Tzu s actual words are: Reversing is the movement of the Tim" (Ch. 40), and: "To go further and further means to revert again." (Ch. 15.) The idea is that if anything develops certain extreme qualities, those qualities invariably revert to become their opposites.

 This constitutes a law of nature. Therefore: "It is upon calamity that blessing leans, upon blessing that calamity rests. (Ch. 58.) Those with little will acquire, those with much will be led astray. (Ch. 2.2.) A hurricane never lasts the whole morning, nor a rainstorm the whole day." (Ch. 23.) "The most yielding things in ihe world master the most unyielding." (Ch. 43.) 156 . THE SF.COND PHASE OF TAO1SM:LAO TZU


Output:
"Diminish a thing and it will increase. Increase a thing and it will diminish." (Ch. 42-) All these paradoxical theories are no longer paradoxical, if one understands the fundamental law of nature. But to the ordinary people who have no idea of this law, they seem paradoxical indeed. Therefore Lao Tzu says: "The gentleman of the low type, on hearing the Truth, laughs loudly at it. If he had not laughed, it would not suffice to be the Truth." (Ch: 41)

 It may be asked: Granted that a thing, on reaching an extreme, then reverts, what is meant by the word "extreme '? Is there any absolute limit for the development of anything, going beyond which would mean going to the extreme? In the Lao-tzu no such question is asked and therefore no answer is given.


Output: But if there had been such a question, 1 think Lao Tzu would have answered that no absolute limit can be prescribed for all things under all circumstances. So far as human activities are concerned, the limit for the advancement of a man remains relative to his subjective feelings and objective circumstances.


Output: Isaac Newton, for example, felt that compared with the total universe, his knowledge of it was no more than ihe knowledge of the sea possessed by a boy who is playing al the seashore. With such a feeling as this, Newton, despite his already great achievements in physics, was still far from reaching the limits of advancement in his learning. If, however, a student, having just finished his textbook on physics, thinks that he then knows all there is to know about science, he certainly cannot make further advancement in his learning, and will as certainly revert back. Lao Tzu tells us: If people of wealth and exalted position are arrogant, they abandon themselves to unavoidable ruin." (Ch. 9.) Arrogance is the sign that one s advancement has reached its extreme limit. It is the first thing that one should avoid.


Output:
The limit of advancement for a given activity is also relative to objective circumstances. When a man eats too much, he suffers. In overeating, what is ordinarily good for the body becomes something harmful. One should eat only the right amount of food. But this right amount depends on one's age, health, and the quality of food one eals.

 These are the laws that govern the changes of things. By Lao Tzu they are called the invariables. He says: "To know the invariables is called enlighlen-ment." (Ch. 16.) Again: "He who knows the invariable is liberal. Being liberal, he is without prejudice. Being without prejudice, he is comprehensive. Being comprehensive, he is vast. Being vast, he is with the Truth. Being with the Truth, he lasts forever and will not fail throughout his lifetime." (Ibid.) Human Conduct


Output:
Lao Tzu warns us: "Not to know the invariable and to act blindly is to go to disaster." (Ibid.) One should know the laws of nature and conduct one s activities in accordance with them. This, by Lao Tzu, is called "practicing enlightenment. The general rule for the man practicing enlightenment is that if 158 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISMrLAO TZU

 he wants to achieve anything, he starts with its opposite, and if he wants to retain anything, he admits in il something of its opposite. H one wants to be strong, one must start with a feeling that one is weak, and if one wants to preserve capitalism, one must admit in it some elements of socialism.

 Therefore Lao Tzu tells us: The sage, putting himself in the background, is always to the fore.


Output:
Remaining outside, he is always there. Is it not just because he does not strive for any personal end, that all his personal ends are fulfilled? (Ch. 7.) Again: He does not show himself; therefore he is seen everywhere. He does not define himself; therefore he is distinct. He does not assert himself; therefore he succeeds. He does not boast of his work; therefore he endures. He does not contend, and for that very reason no one in the world can contend with him. (Ch. 2.2.) These sayings illustrate the first point of the general rule.

 In the Lao-tzu we also find: What is most perfeel seems to have something missing, yet its use is unimpaired. What is most full seems empty, yet its use is inexhaustible. What is most straight seems like crookedness. The greatest skill seems like clumsiness. The greatest eloquence seems like stuttering."


Output:
(Ch. 45-) Again: Be twisted and one shall be whole. Be crooked and one shall be straight. Be hollow and one shall be filled. Be tattered and one shall be renewed. Have little and one shall obtain. But have much and one shall be perplexed." (Ch. 22.) This illustrates the second point of the general rule.

 Such is the way in which a prudent man can live safely in the world and achieve his aims. This is Lao Tzu s answer and solution to the original problem of the Taoists, which was, how to preserve life and avoid harm and danger in the human world. (See end of Ch. 6 above.) The man who lives prudently must be meek, humble, and easily content. To be meek is the way to preserve your strength and so be strong. Humility is the direct opposite of arrogance, so that if arrogance is a sign that a man's advancement has reached its extreme limit, humility is a contrary sign that that limit is far from reached.


Output:
And to be content safeguards one from going too far, and therefore from reaching the extreme. Lao Tzu says: "To know how to be content is to avoid humiliation; to know where to stop is to avoid injury. (Ch.

 45-) Again: "The sage, therefore, discards the excessive, the extravagant, the extreme." (Ch. 29.) All these theories are deducible from the general theory that reversing is the movement of the Too.

 The well—known Taoist theory of wu—wei is also deducible from this general theory. Wu-wei can be translated literally as "having-no-activity" or "non-action." But using this translation, one should remember that the term does not actually mean complete absence of activity, or doing nothing. What it does mean is lesser activity or doing less. It also means acting without artificiality and arbitrariness.


Output:
Activities are like many other things. If one has too much of them, they become harmful rather than good. Furthermore, the purpose of doing something is to have something done. But if there is overdoing, this results in

 l 6 0 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM:LAO TZU

 something being over-done, which may be worse than not having the thing done at all. A well—known Chinese story describes how two men were once competing in drawing a snake; the one who would finish his drawing first would win. One of them, having indeed finished his drawing, saw that the other man was still far behind, so decided to improve it by adding feet to his snake. Thereupon the other man said: "You have lost the competition, for a snake has no feet." This is an illustration of overdoing which defeats its own purpose. In the Lao-tzu we read: "Conquering the world is invariably due to doing nothing; by doing something one cannot conquer the world. (Ch. 48.) The term "doing nothing"

 here really means "not overdoing."


Output:
here really means "not overdoing."

 Artificiality and arbitrariness are the opposite of naturalness arid spontaneity. According to Lao Tzu, Tao is that by which all things come to be. In this process of coming to be, each individual thing obtains something from the universal Tao, and this something is called Te. Te is a word that means power or virtue, both in the moral and non-moral sense of the latter term. The Te of a thing is what it naturally is. Lao Tzu says: All things respect Too and value Te." (Ch. 51.) This is because Too is that by which they come to be, and Te is that by which they are what they are.


Output: According to the theory of "having-no-activity, a man should restrict his activities to what is necessary and what is natural. "Necessary means necessary to the achievement of a certain purpose, and never overdoing. "Natural" means following one's Te with no arbitrary effort. In doing this one should take simplicity as the guiding principle of life. Simplicity (p ' u) is an important idea of Lao Tzu and the Taoists. Tao is the "Uncarved Block" (p u), which is simplicity itself. There is nothing that can be simpler than the unnamable Tao. Te is the next simplest, and the man who follows Te must lead as simple a life as possible.


Output:
The life that follows Te lies beyond the distinctions of good and evil. Lao Tzu tells us: If all people of the world know that beauty is beauty, there is ihen already ugliness. If all people of the world know that good is good, there is then already evil." (Ch. 2..) Lao Tzu, therefore, despised such Confucian virtues as human—heartedness and righteousness, for according to him these virtues represent a degeneration from Tao and Te. Therefore he says: "When the Tao is lost, there is the Te. When the Te is lost, there is [the virtue of] humanheartedness. When humanheartedness is lost, there is [the virtue of]

 righteousness. When righteousness is lost, there are the ceremonials. Ceremonials are the degeneration of loyalty and good faith, and are the beginning of disorder in the world. (Ch. 3&) Here we find the direct conflict between Taoism and Confucianism.


Output:
People have lost their original Te because they have too many desires and too much knowledge. In satisfying their desires, people are seeking for happiness. But when they try to satisfy too many desires, they obtain an opposite result. Lao Tzu says: The five colors blind the eye. The five notes dull the ear.

 The five tastes fatigue the mouth. Riding and hunting madden the mind.

 162 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM:LAO TZU

 Rare treasures hinder right conduct." (Ch. 12.) Therefore, "there is no disaster greater than not knowing contentment with what one has; no grealer sin than having desire for acquisition." (Ch. 46-) This is why Lao Tzu emphasizes that people should have few desires.


Output: Likewise Lao Tzu emphasizes that people should have little knowledge. Knowledge is itself an object of desire. It also enables people to know more about the objects of desire and serves as a means to gain these objects. It is both the master and servant of desire. With increasing knowledge people are no longer in a position to know how to be content and where to sLop. Therefore, it is said in the Lao—Tzu: When knowledge and intelligence appeared, Cross Artifice began. (Ch.l8.) Political Theory


Output: From these theories Lao Tzu deduces his political theory. The Taoists agree with the Confucianists that the ideal state is one which has a sage as its head. It is only the sage who can and should rule. The difference between the two schools, however, is that according to the Confucianists, when a sage becomes the ruler, he should do many things for the people, whereas according to the Taoists, the duty of the sage ruler is not to do things, but rather to undo or not to do at all. The reason for this, according to Lao Tzu, is that the troubles of the world come, not because there are many things not yet done, but because too many things are done. In the Lao-tzu we read: The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the people will be. The more sharp weapons the people have, the more troubled will be the country. The more cunning craftsmen there are, the more pernicious contrivances will appear. The more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be." (Ch. 57-)


Output: thieves and bandits there will be." (Ch. 57-) The first act of a sage ruler, then, is to undo all these. Lao Tzu says: Banish wisdom, discard knowledge, and the people will be benefited a hundredfold. Banish human -heartedness, discard righteousness, and the people will be dutiful and compassionate. Banish skill, discard profit, and thieves and robbers will disappear." (Ch.19.) Again: "Do not exalt the worthies, and the people will no longer be contentious. Do not value treasures that are hard to get, and there will be no more ibieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their mind will not be confused. Therefore the sage rules the people by emptying their minds, filling their bellies, weakening their wills, and toughening their sinews, ever making the people without knowledge and without desire." (Ch. 3.) The sage ruler would undo all the causes of trouble in the world. After that, he would govern with non-action. With non-action, he does nothing, yet everything is accomplished. The


Output: does nothing, yet everything is accomplished. The Lao-tzu says: "I act not and the people of themselves are transformed. I love quiescence and the people of themselves go straight. I concern myself with nothing, and the people of them — 164 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISMrLAO TZU


Output:
selves are prosperous. I am without desire, and the people of themselves are simple. (Ch. 57-)

 "Do nothing, and there is nothing that is not done." This is another of the seemingly paradoxical ideas of the Taoists. In the Lao-tzu we read: Tao invariably does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. (Ch. 37-) Tao is that by which all things come to be. It is not itself a thing and therefore it cannot act as do such things. Yet all things come to be. Thus Tao does nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done. It allows each thing to do what it itself can do. According to the Taoists, the ruler of a state should model himself on Tao. He, too, should do nothing and should let the people do what they can do themselves. Here is another meaning of wu—wei (non-action), which later, with certain modifications, become one of the important theories of the Legalists (Fa chia).


Output:
Children have limited knowledge and few desires. They are not far away from the original Te. Their simplicity and innocence are characteristics that every man should if possible retain. Lao Tzu says: Not to part from the invariable Te is to return to the state of infancy." (Ch. 18.) Again: "He who holds the Te in all its solidity may be likened to an infant. (Ch. 55-) Since the life of the child is nearer to the ideal life, the sage ruler would like all of his people to be like small children. Lao Tzu says: "The sage treats all as children." (Ch.49.) He "does not make them enlightened, but keeps them ignorant." (Ch.

 65. )

 "Ignorant here is a translation of the Chinese yu, which means ignorance in the sense of simplicity and innocence. The sage not only wants his people to be yu, but wants himself to be so too. Lao Tzu says: Mine is the mind of the very ignorant." (Ch. 20.) In Taoism yu is not a vice, but a great virtue.


Output:
But is the yu of the sage really the same as the yu of the child and the common people? Certainly not. The yu of the sage is the result of a conscious process of cultivation. It is something higher than knowledge, something more, not less. There is a common Chinese saying: Great wisdom is like ignorance. The yu of the sage is great wisdom, and not the yu of the child or of ordinary people. The latter kind of yu is a gift of nature, while that of the sage is an achievement of the spirit. There is a great difference between the two. But in many cases the Taoists seemed to have confused them. We shall see this point more clearly when we discuss the philosophy of Chuang Tzu.

 166 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISMrLAO TZU

 _

 CHAPTER 10

 RD PHASE OF TAOISM: CHUANG TZU


Output:
RD PHASE OF TAOISM: CHUANG TZU

 CHUANG CHOI), better known as Chuang Tzu (c. 369-c. 2-86), is perhaps the greatest of the early Taoists. We know little of his life save that he was a native of the little state of Meng on the border between the present Shantung and Honan provinces, where he lived a hermit's life, but was nevertheless famous for his ideas and writings. It is said that King Wei of Ch'u, having heard his name, once sent messengers with gifts to invite him to his state, promising In make him chief minister. Chuang Tzu, however, merely laughed and said to them: "...Co away, do not defile me....I prefer the enjoyment of my own free will. (Historical Records, ch. 63-)

 Chuang Tzu the Man and Chuang—tzu the Book


Output:
Chuang Tzu the Man and Chuang—tzu the Book

 Though Chuang Tzu was a contemporary of Mencius and a friend of Hui Shih, the book titled the Chuang-tzu, as we know it today, was probably compiled by Kuo Hsiang, Chuang Tzu s great commentator of the third century A.D. We are thus not sure which of the chapters of Chuang-tzu the book were really written by Chuang Tzu himself. It is, in fact, a collection of various Taoist writings, some of which represent Taoism in its first phase of development, some in its second, and some in its third. It is only those chapters representing the thought of this third climactic phase lhal can properly be called Chuang Tzu's own philosophy, yet even they may not all have been written by Chuang T/11

 himself. For though the name of Chuang Tzu can be taken as representative of the last phase of early Taoism, it is probable that his system of thought was brought to full completion only by his followers.


Output:
Certain chapters of the Chuang-tzu, for example, contain statements about Kung-sun Lung, who certainly lived later than Chuang Tzu.

 Way of Achieving Relative Happiness

 The first chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled "The Happy Excursion, is a 168 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUAN<; TZU

 simple text, full of amusing stories. Their underlying idea is that there are varying degrees in the achievement of happiness. A free development of our natures may lead us to a relative kind of happiness; absolute happiness is achieved through higher underslanding of the nature of things.

 To carry out the first of these requirements, the free development of our nature, we should have a full and free exercise of our natural ability. That ability is our Te, which comes directly from the Too.

 Regarding the Too and Te, Chuang Tzu has the same idea as Lao Tzu. For example, he says: At the great beginning there was Non-being. It had neither being nor name and was that from which came the One.


Output:
When the One came into existence, there was the One but still no form. When things obtained that by which they came into existence, it was called the Te. (Ch. 12.) Thus our Te is what makes us what we are. We are happy when this Te or natural ability of ours is fully and freely exercised, that is, when our nature is fully and freely developed.

 In connection with this idea of free development, Chuang Tzu makes a contrasl between what is of nature and what is of man. "What is of nature," he says, "is internal. What is of man is external. ...That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of nature. That a halter should be put on a horse's head, or a string through an ox's nose, is what is of man." (Ch. TJ.) Following what is of nature, he maintains, is the source of all happiness and goodness, while following whal is of man is the source of all pain and evil.


Output:
Things are different in their nature and their natural ability is also not the same. What they share in common, however, is that they are all equally happy when they have a full and free exercise of their natural ability. In "The Happy Excursion" a story is told of a very large and a small bird. The abilities of the two are entirely different. The one can fly thousands of miles, while the other can hardly reach from one tree to the next. Yet they are both happy when they each do whal they are able and like to do. Thus there is no absolute uniformity in the natures of things, nor is there any need for such uniformity.

 Another chapter of the Chuang-tzu tells us: The duck s legs are short, but if we try lo lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The crane's legs are long, but if we try to shorten them, the crane will feel grief.

 Therefore we are not to amputate what is by nature long, nor to lengthen what is by nature short. (Ch. 8.) Political and Social Philosophy


Output:
Such, however, is just what artificiality tries to do. The purpose of all laws, morals, institutions, and governments, is to establish uniformity and suppress difference. The motivation of the people who try to enforce this uniformity may be wholly admirable. When they find something that is good for them, they may be anxious to see that others have it also. This good intention of theirs, however, only makes the situation more tragic. In the

 I7O THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CH1IANG TZU


Output:
Chuang-tzu there is a story which says: "Of old, when a seabird alighted outside the capital of Lu, the Marquis went out to receive it, gave it wine in the temple, and had the Chiu-shao music played to amuse it, and a bullock slaughtered to feed it. But the bird was dazed and too timid to eal or drink anything. In three days it was dead. This was treating the bird as one would treat oneself, not the bird as a bird....Water is life to fish but is death to man. Being differently constituted, their likes and dislikes must necessarily differ. Therefore the early sages did not make abilities and occupations uniform." (Ch.

 18.) When the Marquis treated the bird in a way which he considered the most honorable, lie certainly had good intentions. Yet the result was just opposite to what he expected. This is whal happens when uniform codes of laws and morals are enforced by government and society upon the individual.


Output:
This is why Chuang Tzu violently opposes the idea of governing through the formal machinery of government, and maintains instead that the best way of governing is through non—government. He says: I have heard of letting mankind alone, but not of governing mankind. Letting alone springs from the fear that people will pollute their innate nature and set aside their Te. When people do not pollute their innate nature and set aside their Te, then is then! need for the government of mankind? ' (Ch. II.) If one fails to leave people alone, and tries instead to rule them with laws and institutions, the process is like putting a halter around a horse s neck or a string through an ox s nose. It is also like lengthening the legs of the duck or shortening those of the crane. What is natural and spontaneous is changed into something artificial, which is called by Chuang Tzu "overcoming what is of nature by what is of man.

 (Ch. 17.) Its result can only lie misery and unhappiness.


Output:
Thus Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu both advocate government through nongovernment, but for somewhat different reasons. Lao Tzu emphasizes his general principle that "reversing is the movement of the Too." The more one governs, he argues, the less one achieves the desired result. And Chuang Tzu emphasizes the distinction between what is of nature and what is of man. The more the former is overcome by the latter, the more there will be misery and unhappiness.

 Thus far we have only seen Chuang Tzu's way of achieving relative happiness. Such relative happiness is achieved when one simply follows what is natural in oneself. This every man can do. The political and social philosophy of Chuang Tzu aimes at achieving precisely such relative happiness for every man. This and nothing more is the most that any political and social philosophy can hope to do.

 Emotion and Reason

 Relative happiness is relative because it has to depend upon something. It 171 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU


Output: is true that one is happy when one has a full and free exercise of one s natural ability. But there are many ways in which this exercise is obstructed. For instance, there is death which is the end of all human activities. There are diseases which handicap human activities. There is old age which gives man the same trouble. So it is not without reason that the Buddhists consider these as three of the four human miseries, the fourth, according to them, being life itself. Hence, happiness which depends upon the full and free exercise of one's natural ability is a limited and therefore relative happiness.


Output: In the Chuang-tzu there are many discussions about the greatest of all disasters that can befall man, death. Fear of death and anxiety about its coming are among the principal sources of human unhappiness. Such fear and anxiety, however, may be diminished if we have a proper understanding of the nature of things. In the Chuang—tzu there is a story about the death of Lao Tzu. When Lao Tzu died, his friend Chin Shih, who had come after the death, criticized the violent lamentations of the other mourners, saying: "This is to violate the principle of nature and to increase the emotion of man, forgetting what we have received Lfrom nature J. These were called by the ancients the penalty of violating the principle of nature. When the Master came, it was because he had the occasion to be born.


Output: When he went, he simply followed the natural course. Those who are quiet at the proper occasion and follow the natural course, cannot be affected by sorrow or joy. They were considered by the ancients as the men of the gods, who were released from bondage." (Ch. 3-)


Output: To the extent that the other mourners felt sorrow, to that extent they suffered. Their suffering was the "penalty of violating the principle of nature. The mental torture inflicted upon man by his emotions is sometimes just as severe as any physical punishment. But by the use of understanding, man can reduce his emotions. For example, a man of understanding will not be angry when rain prevents him from going out, but a child often will. The reason is that the man possesses greater understanding, with the result that he suffers less disappointment or exasperation than the child who docs get angry. As Spinoza has said: "In so far as the mind understands all things are necessary, so far has it greater power over the effects, or suffers less from them. (Ethics, Pt. 5, Prop. VI.) Such, in the words of the Taoists, is to disperse emotion with reason."


Output: A story about Chuang Tzu himself well illustrates this point. It is said that when Chuang Tzu's wife died, his friend Hui Shih went to condole. To his amazement he found Chuang Tzu sitting on the ground, singing, and on asking him how he could be so unkind to his wife, was told by Chuang Tzu: "When she had just died, I could not help being affected. Soon, however, I examined the matter from the very beginning. At the very beginning, she was not living, having no form, nor even substance. But somehow or other there was then her substance, then her form, and then her life. Now by a further change, she has died. The whole process is like the sequence of the four 174 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU


Output:
seasons, spring, summer, autumn, and winter. While she is thus lying in the great mansion of the universe, for me to go about weeping and wailing would be to proclaim myself ignorant of the natural laws. Therefore I stop." (Chuang—tzu, ch. 18.) On this passage the great commentator Kuo Hsiang comments: "When ignorant, he felt sorry. When he understood, he was no longer affected. This teaches man to disperse emotion with reason." Emotion can be counteracted with reason and understanding.

 Such was the view of Spinoza and also of the Taoists.


Output: The Taoists maintained that the sage who has a complete understanding of the nature of things, thereby has no emotions. This, however, does not mean that he lacks sensibility. Rather it means that he is not disturbed by the emotions, and enjoys what may be called "the peace of the soul." As Spinoza says: 'The ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and never enioys true peace in the soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were, both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in his mind, but, being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys the peace of the soul. (Ethics, Pt. 5, Prop. XLII.) Thus by his understanding of the nature of things, the sage is no longer affected by the changes of the world. In this way he is not dependent upon external things, and hence his happiness is not limited by


Output: things, and hence his happiness is not limited by them. He may be said to have achieved absolute happiness. Such is one line of Taoist thought, in which there is not a little atmosphere of pessimism and resignation. It is a line which emphasizes the inevitability of natural processes and the fatalistic acquiescence in them by man.


Output:
Way of Achieving Absolute Happiness

 There is another line of Taoist thought, however, which emphasizes the relativity of the nature of things and the identification of man with the universe. To achieve this identification, man needs knowledge and understanding of still a higher level, and the happiness resulting from this identification is really absolute happiness, as expounded in Chuang Tzu s chapter on The Happy Excursion. '


Output:
In this chapter, after describing the happiness of large and small birds, Chuang Tzu adds that among human beings there was a man named Lieh Tzu who could even ride on the wind. Among those who have attained happiness," he says, "such a man is rare. Yet although he was able to dispense with walking, he still had to depend upon something." This something was the wind, and since he had to depend upon the wind, his happiness was to that extent relative. Then Chuang Tzu asks: "But suppose there is one who chariots on the normality of the universe, rides on the transformation of the six elements, and thus makes excursion into the infinite, what has he to de-I76 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANC TZU

 pend upon? Therefore it is said that the perfect man has no self; the spiritual man has no achievement; and the true sage has no name. (Ch. I.)


Output:
What is here said by Chuang Tzu describes the man who has achieved absolute happiness. He is the perfect man, the spiritual man, and the true sage. He is absolutely happy, because he transcends the ordinary distinctions of things. He also transcends the distinction between the self and the world, the "me" and the "non-me." Therefore he has no self. He is one with the Tao. The Too does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. The Too does nothing, and therefore has no achievements. The sage is one with the Tao and therefore also has no achievements. He may rule the whole world, but his rule consists of just leaving mankind alone, and letting everyone exercise his own natural ability fully and freely. The Tao is nameless and so the sage who is one wilh the Too is also nameless.

 The Finite Point of View


Output:
The Finite Point of View

 The question that remains is this: How can a person become such a perfect man? To answer it, we must make an analysis of the second chapter of the Chuang-tzu, the Ch i Wu Lun, or "On the Equality of Things. In the "Happy Excursion Chuang Tzu discusses two levels of happiness, and in On the E— quality of Things he discusses two levels of knowledge. Let us start our analysis with the first or lower level. In our chapter on the School of Names, we have said that there is some similarity between Hui Shih and Chuang Tzu. Thus in the Ch i Wu Lun, Chuang Tzu discusses knowledge of a lower level which is similar to that found in Hui Shih's ten so-called paradoxes.


Output: The chapter Ch'i Wu Lun begins with a description of the wind. When the wind blows, there are different kinds of sound, each with its own peculiarity. These this chapter calls the sounds of earth. But in addition there are other sounds that are known as "the sounds of man. The sounds of earth and the sounds of man together constitute "the sounds of Heaven.


Output:
The sounds of man consist of the words (yen) that are spoken in the human world. They differ from such "sounds of earth" as those caused by the wind, inasmuch as when words are said, they represent human ideas. They represent affirmations and denials, and the opinions that are made by each individual from his own particular finite point of view. Being thus finite, these opinions are necessarily one—sided. Yet most men, not knowing that their opinions are based on finite points of view, invariably consider their own opinions as righl and those of others as wrong. The resull, as the Ch i Wu Lun says, "is the affirmations and denials of the Confucianists and Mohists, the one regarding as right what the other regards as wrong, and regarding as wrong what the other regards as right.

 When people thus argue each according to his own one—sided view, there is no way either to reach a final conclusion, or to determine which side is really right or really wrong. The Ch i Wu Lun says "Suppose that you argue


Output:
I78 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU

 with me. If you beat me, instead of my beating you, are you necessarily right and am I

 necessarily wrong? Or, if I beat you, and not you me, am I necessarily right and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of us right and the other wrong? Or are both of us right or both of

 L

 us wrong? Neither you nor I can know, and others are all the more in the dark. Whom shall we ask to produce the right decision? We may ask someone who agrees with you; but since he agrees with you, how can he make the decision? We may ask someone who agrees with me; but since he agrees with me, how can he make the decision? We may ask someone who agrees with both you and me; but since he agrees with both you and me, how can he make the decision? We may ask some one who differs from both you and me; but since he differs from both you and me, how can he make the decision? '

 This passage is reminiscent of the manner of argument followed by the School of Names.


Output:
But whereas the members of that school argue thus in order to contradict the common sense of ordinary people, the Ch'i Wu Lun's purpose is to contradict the followers of the School of Names. For this school did actually believe that argument could decide what is really right and really wrong.

 Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, maintains that concepts of right and wrong are built up by each man on the basis of his own finite point of view. All these views are relative. As the Ch'i Wu Lun says: "When there is life, there is death, and when there is death, there is life.

 When there is possibility, there is impossibility, and when there is impossibility, there is possibility. Because there is right, there is wrong. Because there is wrong, there is right.


Output:
Things are ever subject to change and have many aspects. Therefore many views can be held about one and the same thing. Once we say this, we assume that a higher standpoint exists. If we accept this assumption, there is no need to make a decision ourselves about what is right and what is wrong. The argument explains itself.

 The Higher Point of View


Output:
The Higher Point of View

 To accept this premise is to see things from a higher point of view, or, as the Ch'i Wu Lun calls it, to see things "in the light of Heaven." "To see things in the light of Heaven" means to see things from the point of view of that which transcends the finite, which is the Too. It is said in the Ch'i Wu Lun: "The 'this' is also 'that.' The 'that' is also 'this.' The 'that' has a system of right and wrong. The this also has a system of right and wrong. Is there really a distinction between 'that' and this ? Or is there really no distinction be tween that and this ? That the that and the this cease to be opposites is the very essence of Too. Only the essence, an axis as it were, is the center of the circle responding to the endless changes.

 The right is an endless change. The wrong is also an endless change. Therefore it is said that there is nothing better than to use the light. ' In other words, the

 l8o. THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU


Output:
that and the this, in their mutual opposition of right and wrong, are like an endlessly revolving circle.

 But the man who sees things from the point of view of the Tao stands, as it were, at the center of the circle. He understands all that is going on in the movements of the circle, hut does not himself take part in these movements. This is not owing to his inactivity or resignation, but because he has transcended the finite and sees things from a higher point of view. In the Chuang-tzu, the finite point of view is compared with the view of the well—frog. The frog in the well can see only a little sky, and so thinks that the sky is only so big.

 From the point of view of the Tao, everything is just what it is. It is said in the Ch i Wu Lun: The possible is possible. The impossible is impossible. The Tao makes things and they are what they are.


Output: What are they? They are what they are. What are they not? They are not what they are not. Everything is something and is good for something. There is nothing which is not something or is not good for something. Thus it is that there are roof-slats and pillars, ugliness and beauty, the peculiar and the extraordinary. All these by means of the Tan are united and become one. ' Although all things difier, they are alike in that they all constitute something and are good for something. They all equally come from the Tao. Therefore from the viewpoint of the Tan, things, though different, yet are united and become one.


Output: The Ch i Wu Lun says again: To make a distinction is to make some construction. But construction is the same as destruction. For things us a whole there is neither construction nor destruction, but they turn to unity and become one. For example, when a table is made out of wood, from the viewpoint of that table, this is an act of construction. But from the viewpoint of the wood or the tree, it is one of destruction. Such construction or destruction are so, however, only from a finite point of view. From the viewpoint of the Tan, there is neither construction nor destruction. These distinctions are all relative.


Output:
The distinction between the "me" and the "non-me" is also relative. From the viewpoint of the Tao, the "me" and the "non-me" are also united and become one. The Ch i Wu Lun says: "There is nothing larger in the world than the point of a hair, yet Mount T'ai is small. There is nothing older than a dead child, yet Peng Tsu La legendary Chinese Methuselah J had an untimely death. Heaven and Earth and 1

 came into existence together, and all things with me are one." Here we again have Hui Shih's dictum: "Love all things equally, Heaven and Earth are one body.

 Knowledge of the Higher Level

 This passage in the Ch i Wu Lun, however, is immediately followed by another statement: Since all things arc one, what room is there for speech? But since I have already spoken of the one, is this not already speech? One plus speech make two. Two plus one make three. Going on from this, even l 8 l THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU


Output: the most skillful reckoner will not be able to reach the end, and how much less able to do so are ordinary people! If proceeding from nothing to something we can reach three, how much further shall we reach, if we proceed from something to something! Let us not proceed. Let us stop here. It is in this statement that the Ch i Wu Lun goes a step further than Hui Shih, and begins to discuss a higher kind of knowledge. This higher knowledge is 'knowledge which is not knowledge.


Output: What is really one can neither be discussed nor even conceived. For as soon as it is thought of and discussed, it becomes something that exists externally to the person who is doing the thinking and speaking. So since its all-embracing unity is thus lost, it is actually not the real one at all. Hui Shih said: "The greatest has nothing beyond itself and is called the Great One." By these words he described the Great One very well indeed, yet he remained unaware of the fact that since the Great One has nothing beyond itself, it is impossible either to think or speak of it. For anything that can be thought or spoken of has something beyond itself, namely, the thought and the speaking. The Taoists, on the contrary, realized that the "one" is unthinkable and inexpressible. Thereby, they had a true understanding of the one and advanced a step further than did the School of Names.


Output:
In the Ch'i Wu Lun it is also said: "Referring to the right and the wrong, the being so and not being so : if the right is really right, we need not dispute about how it is different from the wrong; if the being so is really being so, we need not dispute about how it is different fro m 'not being so. ...Let us forget life. Let us forget the distinction between right and wrong. Let us take our joy in the realm of the infinite and remain there.' The realm of the infinite is the realm wherein lives the man who has attained to the Tao. Such a man not only has knowledge of the one, but also has actually experienced it. This experience is the experience of living in the realm of the infinite.

 He has forgotten all the distinctions of things, even those involved in his own life. In his experience there remains only the undifferentiable one, in the midst of which he lives.


Output:
Described in poetical language, such a man is he who chariots on the normality of the universe, rides on the transformations of the six elements, and thus makes excursion into the infinite. He is really the independent man, so his happiness is absolute.

 Here we see how Chuang Tzu reached a final resolution of the original problem of the early Taoists. That problem is how to preserve life and avoid harm and danger. But, to the real sage, it ceases to be a problem. As is said in the Chuang—tzu: The universe is the unity of all things. If we attain this unity and identify ourselves with it, then the members of our body are but so much dust and dirt, while life and death, end and beginning, are but as the succession of day and night, which cannot disturb our inner peace. How much less shall we be troubled by worldly gain and loss, good-luck and bad-luck! " (Ch. 2.O.) Thus Chuang Tzu solved the original problem of the 184 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU


Output:
early Taoists simply by abolishing it. This is really the philosophical way of solving problems.

 Philosophy gives no information about matters of fact, and so cannot solve any problem in a concrete and physical way. It cannot, for example, help man either to gain longevity or defy death, nor can it help him to gain riches and avoid poverty. What it can do, however, is to give man a point of view, from which he can see that life is no more than death and loss is equal to gain. From the "practical"


Output: point of view, philosophy is useless, yet it can give us a point of view which is very useful. To use an expression of the Chuang—tzu, this is the usefulness of the useless. (Ch. 4-) Spinoza has said that in a certain sense, the wise man "never ceases to be. This is also what Chuang Tzu means. The sage or perfect man is one with the Great One, that is, the universe. Since the universe never ceases to be, therefore the sage also never ceases to be. In the sixth chapter of the Chuang—tzu, we read: A boat may be stored in a creek; a net may be stored in a lake; these may be said to be sale enough. l?ul at midnight a strong man may come and carry them away on his back. The ignorant do not see that no matter how well you store things, smaller ones in larger ones, there will always lie a chance for them lo be lost. Bui if you store the universe in the universe, there will be no room left for it to be lost. This is the great truth of things. Therefore the sage makes excursions into that which cannot be lost, and


Output: excursions into that which cannot be lost, and together with it he remains.' ll is in this sense that the sage never ceases to be.


Output:
Methodology of Mysticism

 In order to be one with the Great One, the sage has lo transcend and forget the distinctions between things. The way lo do t h i s is lo discard knowledge, and is the method used by the Taoists for achieving sageliness within. The task of knowledge in the ordinary sense is to make distinctions; lo know a thing is to know the difference between it and other things. Therefore lo discard knowledge means to forget these distinctions. Once all distinctions are forgotten, there remains only [he iindifferentiable one, which is the great whole. By achieving this condition, the sage may be said to have knowledge of another and higher level, which is called by the Taoists knowledge which is nut knowledge.


Output:
In the Chuang-tzu there are many passages about ihe method of forgetting distinctions. In the sixth chapter, for example, a report is given of an imaginary conversation between Confucius and his favorite disciple, Yen Hui. The story reads: "Yen Hui said: 'I have made some progress.' 'What do you mean? asked Confucius. 1 have forgotten human -heartedness and righteousness,' replied Yen Hui. 'Very well, but that is not enough,' said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said: 'I have made so me progress. What do you mean? asked Confucius. I have forgotten rituals and music, replied Yen Hui. Very well, but that is not enough,'

 l86 . THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANC TZU

 _

 said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said: 'I have made some progress. What do you mean? asked Confucius. 1 sit in forgetfulness,' replied Yen Hui.


Output: "At this Confucius changed countenance and asked: 'What do you mean b y s i t t i n g i n f o r g et f u ln es s? To wh i ch Yen Hu i r ep l i ed : M y l i mb s ar e nerveless and my intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the Infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forgetfulness. Then Confucius said: If you have become one with the Infinite, you have no personal likes and dislikes. If you have become one with the Great Evolution [of the universe], you are one who merely follow its changes. If you really have achieved this, I should like to follow your steps.


Output:
Thus Yen Hui achieved "sageliness within" by discarding knowledge. The result of discarding knowledge is to have no knowledge. But there is a difference between "having-no knowledge" and "having no-knowledge. The state of "having-no knowledge" is one of original ignorance, whereas that of "having no-kno wl edge" co mes only aft er one has p ass ed through a prior stage of having knowledge.

 The former is a gift of nature, while the latter is an achievement of the spirit.

 Some of the Taoists saw this distinction very clearly. It is significant that they used the word forget t o express th e ess enti al idea of t heir method. Sages are not persons who remain in a state of original ignorance. They at one time possessed ordinary knowledge and made the usual distinctions, but they since forgot them. The difference between them and the man of original ignorance is as great as that between the courageous man and the man who does not fear simply because he is insensible to fear.


Output:
But there were also Taoists, such as the authors of some chapters of the Chuang-tzu, who failed to see this difference. They admired the primitive s t a t e o f s o c i e t y a n d mi n d , a n d c o mp a r e d s a g e s w i t h c h i l d r e n an d t h e ignorant. Children and the ignorant have no knowledge and do not make distinctions, so that they both seem to belong to the undifferentiable one. Their belonging to it, however, is entirely unconsciousness. They remain in the undifferentiable one, but they are not conscious of the fact. They are ones who h ave-no knowl edge, but not who hav e no-knowl edge. It is th e latter acquired state of no -knowledge that the Taoists call that of the knowledge which is not knowledge.

 l88 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU

 CHAFfER 11

 THE LATER MOHISTS


Output:
THE LATER MOHISTS

 J.N the Mo-lzu, there are six chapters (chs. 40-45) which differ in character from the other chapters and possess a special logical interest. Of these, chapters forty to forty-one are titled "Canons" and consist of definitions of logical, moral, mathematical, and scientific ideas. Chapters forty -two to forty —three are titled Expositions of the Canons, and consist of explanations of the definitions contained in the preceding two chapters. And chapters forty—four and forty—five are titled Major Illustrations and Minor Illustrations respectively. In them, several topics of logical interest are discussed. The general purpose of all six chapters is to uphold the Mohist point of view and refute, in a logical way, the arguments of the School of Names. The chapters as a whole are usually known as the "Mohist Canons."


Output: In the last chapter we have seen that in the Ch'i Wu Lun, Chuang Tzu discussed two levels of knowledge. On the first level, he proved the relativity of things and reached the same conclusion as that of Hui Shih. But on the second level, he went beyond him. On the first level, he agreed with the School of Names and criticized common sense from a higher point of view. On the second level, however, he in turn criticized the School of Names from a still higher poinl of view. Thus the Taoists refuted the arguments of the School of Names as well, but the arguments they used are, logically speaking, on a higher level than those of the School of Names. Bolh their arguments and those of the School of Names require an effort of reflective thinking to be understood. Both run counter to the ordinary canons of common sense.


Output:
The Mohists as well as some of the Confucianists, on the other hand, were philosophers of common sense. Though the two groups differed in many ways, they agreed with one another in being practical. In opposition to the arguments of the School of Names, they developed, almost along similar lines of thought, epistemological and logical theories to defend common sense. These theories appear in the Mohist Canons and in the chapter titled On The Rectification of Names" in the Hsun-lzu, the author of which, as we

 190 THE LATER MOHISTS

 ^

 shall see in chapter thirteen, was one of the greatest Coniucianists of the early period.

 Discussions on Knowledge and Names


Output:
Discussions on Knowledge and Names

 The epistemological theory set forth in the Mohist Canons is a kind of naive realism. There is, it maintains, a knowing faculty which "is that by means of which one knows, but which itself does not necessarily know. (Ch. 42..) The reason for this is that, in order to have knowledge, the knowing faculty must be confronted with an object of knowledge. "Knowledge is that in which the knowing [faculty]

 meets the object and is able to apprehend its form and shape." (Ch. 42-) Besides the sensory organs for knowing, such as those of seeing and hearing, there also exists the mind, which is that by means of which one understands the object of knowledge." (Ibid.) In other words, the mind interprets the impressions of external objects which are brought to it by the senses.


Output: The "Mohist Canons" also provide various logical classifications of knowledge. From the point of view of its source, knowledge is to be classified into three types: that derived through the personal experience of the knower; that transmitted to him by authority (i.e., obtained by him either through hearsay or written records); and knowledge by inference (i.e., obtained through making deductions on the basis of what is known about what is unknown). Also from the point of view of the various objects of knowledge, it is to be classified into four kinds: knowledge of names, that of actualities, that of correspondence, and that of action. (Ch. 4°) it will be remembered that names, actualities, and their relationships to one another, were the particular interest of the School of Names. According to the "Mohist Canons," "a name is that with which one speaks about a thing," while "an actuality is that about which one speaks." (Ch. 42.) When one says: "This is a table, "table is a name, and is that with which one


Output: "table is a name, and is that with which one speaks about "this," while "this"


Output:
is the actuality about which one is speaking. Expressed in terms of Western logic, a name is the predicate of a proposition, and an actuality is the subject of it.

 In the "Mohist Canons," names are classified into three kinds: general, classifying, and private. Thing is a general name. All actualities must bear this name. 'Horse' is a classifying name. All actualities of that sort must have that name. 'Tsang' [the name of a person] is a private name. This name is restricted to this actuality.' (Ch. 42.)

 The knowledge of correspondence is that which knows which name corresponds to which actuality.

 Such kind of knowledge is required for the state—

 192 THE LATER MOHISTS

 ment of such a proposition as: "This is a table." When one has this kind of knowledge, one knows that "names and actualities pair with each other." (Ch. 41.)

 The knowledge of action is the knowledge of how to do a certain thing. This is what Americans call "know-how."

 Discussions on Dialectic


Output: Of the chapter titled "Minor Illustrations," a large part is devoted to the discussions of dialectic. This chapter says: "Dialectic serves to make clear the distinction between right and wrong, to discriminate between order and disorder, to make evident points of similarity and difference, to examine ihe principles of names and actualities, to differentiate what is beneficial and what is harmful, and to remove doubts and uncertainties. It observes the happenings of all things, and investigates the order and relation between the various judgments. It uses names to designate actualities, propositions to express ideas, statements to sel forth causes, and taking and giving according to classes."(Ch.45-) The first part of this passage deals with the purpose and function of dialectic; the second part with its methodology. In another part of the same chapter, it is said that there are seven methods of dialectic: A particular judgment indicates what is not all so. A hypothetical judgment indicates what is at


Output: so. A hypothetical judgment indicates what is at present not so. Imitation consists in taking a model. What is imitated is what is taken as a model. If the cause is in agreement with the imitation, it is correcl. If it is not in agreement with the imitation, it is not correct.


Output:
This is the method of imitation. The method of comparison consists in using one thing to explain another.

 The method of parallel consists in comparing two series of propositions consistently throughout. The method of analogy says: You are so. Why should I alone not be so? The method of extension consists in attributing the same to what is not known as to what is known. When the other is said to be the same [as thisj, how can I say that it is different?" (Ch. 45.)

 The method of imitation in this passage is the same as that of "using slale-ments to set forth causes" of the preceding quotation. And the method of extension is the same as the "taking and giving according to classes" of the preceding passage. These are the two most important of the methods, and correspond roughly to the deductive and inductive methods oi Western logic.


Output:
Before giving further explanation of these two methods, something may be said regarding what in the "Mohist Canons" is called a cause. A cause is defined as "thai with which something becomes," and is also classified into

 194 ■ THE LATER MOHISTS

 two kinds, the major and minor. (Ch. 4°) "A minor cause is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. "A major cause is one with which something will necessarily be so, and without which it will never be so." (Ch. 42..) It is evident that what the "Mohist Canons" call a minor cause is what in modern logic would be called a necessary cause, while what the "Mohist Canons" call a major cause is what modern logic would describe as a necessary and sufficient cause. In modern logic there is the distinction of yet another kind of cause, the sufficient cause, which is one with which something will necessarily be so, but without which it may or may not be so. This distinction the Mohists failed to make.


Output: In modern logical reasoning, if we want to know whether a general proposition is true or not, we verify it with facts or experiment. If, for example, we want to make sure that certain bacteria are the cause of a certain disease, the way to verify the matter is to take as a formula the general proposition that the bacteria A are the cause of the disease B, and then make an experiment to see whether the supposed cause really produces the expected result or not. If it does, it really is the cause; if not, it is not.


Output: This is deductive reasoning and is also what the "Mohist Canons" call the method of imitation. For to take a general proposition as a formula is to take it as a model, and to make an experiment with it is to make an imitation of it. That the supposed cause produces the expected result, means that the cause is in agreement with the imitation. And that it does not, means that the cause is not in agreement with the imitation." It is in this way that we can distinguish a true from a false cause, and determine whether a cause is a major or minor one.


Output:
As regards the other form of reasoning through extension, it may be illustrated through the dictum that all men are mortal. We are able to make this dictum, because we know that all men of the past were mortal, and that men of today and of the future are the same in kind as those of the past. Hence we draw the general conclusion that all men are mortal. In this inductive reasoning, we use "the method of extension.' That men of the past were mortal is what is known. And that men of today and of the future are and will be mortal is what is not known. To say that all men are mortal, therefore, is ' to attribute the same to what is not known as to what is known. We can do this because "the other is said to be the same [as this]."We are "taking and giving according to class.

 Clarification of All-embracing Love

 Versed in the method of dialectic, the later Mohists did much in clarifying I96 THE LATER MOHISTS

 L

 and defending the philosophical position of their school.


Output: Following the tradition of Mo Tzu s utilitarianistic philosophy, the later Mohists maintain that all human activities aim at obtaining benefit and avoiding harm. Thus in the Major Illustrations we are told: When one cuts a finger in order to preserve a hand, this is to choose the greater benefit and the lesser harm. To choose the lesser harm is not to choose harm, but to choose benefit....If on meeting a robber one loses a finger so as to save one's life, this is benefit. The meeting with the robber is harm.


Output:
Choice of the greater benefit is not a thing done under compulsion. Choice of the lesser harm is a thing done under compulsion. The former means choosing from what has not yet been obtained. The latter means discarding from what one has already been burdened with." (Ch. 44-) Thus for all human activities the rule is: "Of the benefits, choose the greatest; of the harms, choose the slightest." (Ibid.) Both Mo Tzu and the later Mohists identified the good with the beneficial. Beneficialness is the essence of the good. But what is the essence of beneficialness? Mo Tzu did not raise this question, but the later Mohists did and gave an answer. In the first 'Canon, it is said: "The beneficial is that with the obtaining of which one is pleased. The harmful is that with the obtaining of which one is displeased. (Ch.

 40.) Thus the later Mohists provided a hedonistic justification for the ulilitarianistic philosophy of the Mohist school.


Output:
This position reminds us of the "principle of utility" of Jeremy Bentham. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham says: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do....The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law." (P. I.) Thus Bentham reduces good and bad to a question of pleasure and pain. According to him the aim of morality is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." (Ibid.)

 This is also what the later Mohists do. Having defined "the beneficial," they go on to define the virtues in the light of this concept. Thus in the first Canon we find: Righteousness consists in doing the beneficial. Loyalty consists in benefiting one's ruler." "Filial piety consists in benefiting one's parents.


Output:
Meritorious accomplishment consists in benefiting the people. (Ch. 4°.) "Benefiting the people means "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

 Regarding the theory of all—embracing love, the later Mohists maintain that its major attribute is its all-embracing character. In the "Minor Illustrations we read: In loving men one needs to love all men before one can

 196 THE LATER MOHISTS


Output:
196 THE LATER MOHISTS

 regard oneself as loving men. In not loving men one does not need not to love any man [before one can regard oneself as not loving men]. Not to have all-embracing love is not to love men. When riding horses, one need iiol ride all horses in order to regard oneself as riding a horse. For if one rides only a few horses, one is still riding horses. But when not riding horses, one must ride no horse at all in order to regard oneself as not riding horses. This is the difference between all-inclusiveness [in the case of loving men] and the absence of all-inclusiveness [in the case of riding horses]. "(Ch. 44.) Every man, as a matter of fact, has someone whom he loves. Every man, for example, loves his own children. Hence the mere fact that a man loves someone does not mean that he loves men in general. But on the negative side, the fact that he does wrong to someone, even his own children, does mean that he does not love men. Such is the reasoning of the Mohists.


Output:
Defense of All-embracing Love

 Against this view of the later Mohists, there were at that time two main objections. The first was that the number of men in the world is infinite; how, then, is it possible for one to love them all? This objection was referred to under the title: Infinity is incompatible with all—embracing love. And the second objection was that if failure to love a single man means failure to love men in general, there should then be no such punishment as killing a robber." This objection was known under the title: To kill a robber is to kill a man." The later Mohists used their dialectic to try to refute these objections.


Output: In the second Canon there is the statement: Infinity is not incompatible with all-embracingness. The reason is given under 'full or not.'" (Ch. 40.) The second Exposition of the Canons develops this statement as follows: "Infinity: (Objection:) ' I f the South has a limit, it can be included in toto. [Theke was a common belief in ancient China that the South had no limit] If it has no limit, it cannot be included in toto. It is impossible to know whether it has a limit or not and hence it is impossible to know whether it can all be included or not. It is impossible to know whether people fill this [space] or not, and hence it is impossible to know whether they can be included in toto or not. This being so, it is perverse to hold that all people can be included in our love. (Answer:) If people do not fill what is unlimited, then [the number of] people has a limit, and there is no difficulty in including anything that is limited [in number]. But if people do fill what is unlimited, then what is [supposed to


Output: fill what is unlimited, then what is [supposed to be] unlimited is limited, and then there is no difficulty in including what is limited. " (Ch. 43-) To kill a robber is to kill a man is the other major objection to the Mo— 2.OO . THE LATER MOHISTS


Output:
hists, because killing a man is not consistent with loving all men equally and universally. To this

 objection the Minor Illustrations answers as follows:

 "A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride a horse. Huo [name of a person J is a man. To love Huo is to love a man. Tsang [ name of a person ] is a man. To love Tsang is to love a man. This is to affirm what is right.

 "But Huo's parents are men. Yet when Huo serves his parents, he is not serving men. His younger brother is a handsome man. Yet when he loves his younger brother, he is not loving handsome men. A cart is wood, but to ride a cart is not to ride wood. A boat is wood, but to ride a boat is not to ride wood.

 A robber is a man, but that there are many robbers does not mean that there are many men; and that there are no robbers does not mean that there are no men.


Output:
"How is this explained? To hate the existence of many robbers is not to hate the existence of many men. To wish that there were no robbers is not to wish that there were no men. The world generally agrees on this. And this being the ease, although a robber—man is a man, yet to love robbers is not to love men, and not to love robbers is not to love men. Likewise to kill a robber-man is not to kill a man.

 There is no difficulty in this proposition." (Ch. 45-)

 With such dialectic as this the later Mohists refuted the objection that the killing of a robber is inconsistent with their principle of all-embracing love.

 Criticsm of Other Schools


Output: Using their dialectic, the later Mohists not only refute the objections of other schools against them, but also make criticisms of their own against these schools. For example, the "Mohist Canons" contain a number of objections against the arguments of the School of Names. Hui Shih, it will be remembered, had argued for the "unity of similarity and difference." In his ten paradoxes he passed from the premise that all things are similar lo each other," to the conclusion: "Love all things equally. Heaven and Earth are one body." This, for the later Mohists, is a fallacy arising from the ambiguity of the Chinese word t ung. T ung may be variously used to mean identity, "agreement, or "similarity. In the first "Canon there is a statement which reads: "Tung: There is that of identity, that of part-and-whole relationship, that of co—existence, and that of generic relation. (Ch. 4®-) And the Exposition" explains further: "T ung: That there are two names for one actuality is identity. Inclusion in one whole is


Output: actuality is identity. Inclusion in one whole is part—and—whole relationship. Both being in the same room is co-existence. Having some points of similarity is generic relation. (Ch. 42-)The same Canon and Exposition also have a


Output:
2-OX THE LATER

 MOHISTS

 discussion on "difference," which is just the reverse of t'ung.

 The Mohist Canons fail actually to mention Hui Shih by name. As a matter of fact, no name is ever mentioned in these chapters. But from this analysis of the word t' ung, Hui Shih' s fallacy becomes dear.

 That all things are similar to each other means that they have generic relationship, that they are of the same class, the class of "things." But that Heaven and Earth are one body means that they have a part—and—whole relationship. The truth of the one proposition as applied to a particular situation cannot be inferred from the truth of the other, even though the same word, t ung, is used in both cases.


Output:
As regards Kung-sun Lung s argument for "the separation of hardness and whiteness, the later Mohists thought only in terms of concrete hard and white stones as they actually exist in the physical universe. Hence they maintained that the qualities of hardness and whiteness both simultaneously inhere in the stone. As a result, they are not mutually exclusive, but "must pervade each other." (Chaps.

 40, 42.)

 The later Mohists also criticized the Taoists. In the second Canon we read: "Learning is useful. The reason is given by those who oppose it." (Ch. 41-) The second "Exposition' comments on this: "Learning: By maintaining that people do not know that learning is useless, one is thereby informing them of this fact. This informing that learning is useless, is itself a teaching. Thus by holding that learning is useless, one teaches. This is perverse." (Ch. 43.)

 This is a criticism of a statement in the Lao-tzu: Banish learning and there will be no grieving." (Ch.


Output:
10.) According to the later Mohists, learning and teaching are related terms. If learning is to be banished, so is teaching. For once there is teaching, there is also learning, and if teaching is useful, learning cannot be useless. The very teaching that learning is useless proves in itself that it is useful.

 In the second "Canon" we read: "To say that in argument there is no winner is necessarily incorrect.

 The reason is given under 'argument'." The second "Exposition comments on this: "In speaking, what people say either agrees or disagrees. There is agreement when one person says something is a puppy, and another says it is a dog. There is disagreement when one says it is an ox, and another says it is a horse. [That is to say, when there is disagreement, there is argumencj When neither of them wins, there is no argument. Argument is that in which one person says the thing is so, and another says it is not so.

 The one who is right will win." (Ch. 43.)


Output:
The one who is right will win." (Ch. 43.)

 In the second Canon we also read: To hold that all speech is perverse is perverse. The reason is given under speech.'" (Ch. 41.) The second "Exposition comments on this: [To hold that all speech J is perverse, is not

 2.04 THE LATER MOHISTS

 permissible. If the speech of this man Lwho holds this doctrine J is permissible, then at least ihis speech is not perverse, and there is some speech that is permissible. If the speech of this man is not permissible, then it is wrong to take it as being correct. (Ch. 43>)

 The second "Canon" also says: "That knowing it and not knowing it are the same, is perverse. The reason is given under no means. (Ch. 4L) And the second "Exposition" comments: "When there is knowledge, there is discussion about it. Unless there is knowledge, there is no means [of discussion]."

 (Ch. 43.)