Output:
I have already pointed out that Matteo Ricci had some opinions of China’s
Confucianist tradition and attempted to link Western and Eastern cultures. Natu-
rally, he knew clearly that there were many differences and conflicts between
Confucianism and Catholicism and probably would have dealt with these by the
methods of “complementing Confucianism” and “transcending Confucianism.”
If his missionary work were completely according to Catholic doctrines, however,
he would have been confronted with more difficulties. Therefore, he had to make
some revisions of the Catholic doctrines so as to cater to the Chinese tradition and
it is not strange that he was criticized. As to how he adapted Catholicism to
Confucianism, the following should be noted.
(a) In order to fit Catholicism to Chinese society, he explained its differences from
    Chinese society. In the Italian edition of his Lettere dalla China, there is a
    passage describing how the Confucianist offers sacrifices to gods.


Output:
However, according to an old law, there is a grand Confucian temple in every big city
      where the literati gather, with a figure of Confucius enshrined and his name; every year, the
      literati offer sacrifices to him four times, with a candle burning and a beast is killed.
      However, as they do not think of him as godly or want anything of him, such a rite cannot
      be called a real offering.14


Output:
13
     See Lettere dalla China, p. 660.
14
     Ibid., p. 659.
186                       14 The Attempt of Matteo Ricci to Link Chinese and Western Cultures


Output:
In Matteo Ricci’s books, there are many signs of the Catholic stance against
    idolatry; the criticism of Buddhist idolatry is particularly strong. However,
    he never criticizes Confucian offerings to the Sage, nor does he criticize the
    Chinese offerings to their ancestors. The issue concerning offerings is an
    important reason why China later forbad the preaching of Catholicism.
    In 1704, the Vatican gave orders that Chinese Catholics should not follow
    traditional Chinese rites that did not conform to Catholicism. Obviously,
    offering sacrifices to Confucius as well as to ancestors is especially counter
    to Catholicism; this led the Chinese government to limit and even forbid the
    preaching of Catholicism. Since Matteo Ricci well understood Chinese con-
    ditions, he adopted the method of compromising with the Chinese tradition for
    the sake of adapting to Chinese society as well as his missionary work,


Output:
although the attempts did not conform to the doctrines of Catholicism.
(b) He makes some Catholic ideas conform to traditional Chinese Confucianist
    thought so as to enable the Chinese to accept Catholicism. As mentioned
    previously, the “Lord of Heaven” in Catholicism is, of course, the supreme
    personified God, but Ricci’s The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven does not
    mean this according to its original title. In that book, he often uses such words
    as “God” and “Heaven” of Chinese origin, instead of the “Lord of Heaven.”
    According to Fang Hao’s Collected Essays on The History of Chinese
    Catholicism, in contrast to the edition of the Ming Dynasty, it is found that
    the later edition has changed the words “God” or “Heaven” in the Ming to
    “Lord of Heaven” or “Supreme Lord” in 79 places.15 In the Chinese language,
    there are already such words as “God” (shangdi) and “Heaven” (tian), but in
    traditional Chinese thought, tian has several meanings. Among these Ricci


Output:
takes the meanings “God,” “Heaven,” and the supreme personified God, but
    for the Chinese people, there may be some other meanings. In 1715, after
    Ricci’s death, the Pope gave an edict that the name “Lord of Heaven” was a
    legal one and such names as “God” and “Heaven” should no longer be used
    because they could be interpreted in different ways.
       Also, according to Professor Luo Guang, Ricci says in his Twenty-five
    Sayings from Epictetus, “This book is actually composed of 25 chapters.
    Every chapter is short and concise. It advises people to live simply and to
    restrain desire and feeling. Happiness lies in one’s secure state of mind without
    having stirred either by good fortune or misfortune. The purpose of human life
    lies in one’s obedience to the Lord of Heaven.” It is apparent then that the book
    is intended to conform to Chinese conditions.
(c) Ricci made some revisions in the “idea of sin” in order that it should approach


Output:
more closely the “idea of virtue” in China’s Confucianist tradition. As the
    “idea of sin” in Catholicism implies, human nature cannot be considered
    “virtuous,” which is entirely different from the “idea of human nature being
    virtuous” in China’s traditional Confucianist thought. In accordance with St.


Output:
15
     See Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Catholicism, pp. 4–8.
14.2   “Body and Use” and the Correlation of Chinese and Western Harmony            187


Output:
Augustine’s interpretation, man is born to be “sinful” because of his rational
       choice. In the final analysis, what causes man to choose evil with reason is his
       vanity or an egocentric desire that puts himself over God. Such a desire usually
       drives him into following his own intention and holding in contempt God’s
       decree, which is particularly apparent in human desire. Augustine then adds
       that, since man intentionally chooses evil and commits sins violating God, he
       can never recover his original state with his own effort, for such a “sin” causes
       him to degenerate inevitably, being characteristically egocentric in willing
       and desiring and able only to choose “committing sin” or tending to “evil.”
   In this regard in the 7th discourse of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven,
Ricci thinks that the “human nature” refers to what differentiates man from metal
and stone, grass and wood, bird, beast, and even spirit, and this is why man “can


Output:
reason things out.” So he says: “What can reason things out is alone called human
nature, which is different from other creatures.” “Virtue and morality come after
reason, which itself is something dependent, and not human nature itself.” Thus,
“reasoning things out” refers simply to this virtuous “ability,” and “human nature is
born to be virtuous.” This obviously caters to Confucianist ideas. But since Matteo
Ricci could not completely violate the doctrines of the Lord of Heaven, he thinks
that man is “able to reason things out.” How can he get such an ability? Just as
farmers plow, weed, remove the stones, and irrigate before they sow seeds in order
to get good harvests, so “learners should first of all get rid of evil before they could
be virtuous. Only by standing aloof from worldly success can they be successful.”
As this idea is associated with that of “sin” in Catholicism, it could not but conflict
with the so-called idea of “good ability.” Thus, it is quite difficult to reconcile one


Output:
cultural tradition with another.
   From the above four points, we can see that Matteo Ricci preached the doctrines
of Catholicism for the purpose of linking Oriental and Occidental culture together.
Whether his attempt was successful or not will not be evaluated here, but that he
was the very first Westerner to make such an attempt is certainly of historical
importance.


Output:
14.2      “Body and Use” and the Correlation of Chinese
          and Western Harmony

In trying to link Western and Chinese culture, often we encounter the problem of
the “body and use” (tiyong), of Chinese learning and Western learning. In preaching
Catholicism in China, Matteo Ricci could not but consider his relation to traditional
Chinese thought and culture. Similarly, in receiving Catholicism, the Chinese had
to consider such a relation. Above I have discussed how he dealt with this problem.
Now let us consider how the Chinese intellectuals at the time received Catholicism.
In my opinion, such receivers of Catholicism at the time as Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao,
188                       14 The Attempt of Matteo Ricci to Link Chinese and Western Cultures


Output:
and others in receiving or studying Western learning took the attitude: “Chinese
learning as body and Western learning for use”, we know that although the Protes-
tants were active at that time even at the court in Beijing, yet “the Chinese court
made use of them only by employing their techniques.” “For example, Ricci once
repaired clocks and other machines in the court, and Tang Ruowang and Nan
Huairen and others joined in revising the calendar.” “What China’s enlightened
literati were particularly interested in was to learn from them their science and
knowledge.” “They did not have great success in shaping China’s intellectuals”16
for few Chinese intellectuals received the doctrines of Catholicism. As these were
received chiefly due to his association with traditional Chinese thought, especially
the Confucianist morality, his attempt can be regarded as another earlier form of
“regarding Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use” formulated in
the 1860s.


Output:
the 1860s.
    During subsequent centuries, there have been various attempts to correlate
“Chinese learning” and “Western learning” with that between “body” (ti) and
“use” (yong), such as “Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use,”
or “Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use,” and even “both the two
learnings as body and Chinese learning for use” are called “all-Westernizers”
(quanpan xihua pai); those who regard “Chinese learning as body and Western
learning for use” are called “Chinese culture supremacists” (guocui pai). Such
confusions are caused by the attempt to describe the relationship between “Chinese
learning” and “Western learning” with that between “body and use.” As a matter of
fact, none of the above ideas are tenable.
    As a pair of important categories in the history of Chinese philosophy, “body”
and “use” are not substantial categories but rather fundamental relations. “Body”
(ti) generally refers to the “inner transcendental spirit” or “transcendental


Output:
noumenon.” It corresponds to what Mencius means by “conscience” (liangzhi or
liangneng) and Wang Yangming by “mind” (xin), etc.; the latter corresponds to
“God’s will” (tianming), “taiji,” “God’s word” (tianli), and “logos” (dao); “use”
(yong) refers to the various functions demonstrated by such an “inner trans-
cendental spirit” or “transcendental noumenon.” According to traditional Chinese
philosophy, ti and yong are unified, with the former presenting the latter for, as
Wang Bi in the Wei-Jin Dynasty pointed out, there would be no corresponding yong
without ti. The so-called concept of “Chinese learning as body and Western
learning for use” is nothing but an effort to preserve the inner transcendental
noumenon in Chinese tradition, so as to reject the Western spirit. For how could
we make “Western learning for use” if we should do like that? Similarly, it is
impossible to regard “Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use.” The


Output:
former will inevitably result in “Chinese learning both as body and for use” and, the
latter, “Western learning both as body and for use.”
    As for “both the learnings as body and for use interchangeably,” it can be
interpreted as: if something in Chinese learning is good, we should regard


Output:
16
     See the Preface to the Chinese version of Lettere dalla China, p. 23.
14.2     “Body and Use” and the Correlation of Chinese and Western Harmony           189


Output:
“Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use”; also, if something in
Western learning is good, we should in turn regard “Western learning as body and
Chinese learning for use.” Such an idea is obviously untenable. It will do nothing
but include both attitudes in the so-called concept of regarding “both learnings as
body and for use interchangeably,” which is just eclectic. Professor Fang Keli
involves himself in a confused eclectic situation, although he criticizes the above
two attitudes in his “‘Chinese Learning as Body and Western Learning for Use’ and
‘Western Learning as Body and Chinese Learning for Use.’”17
    It would give rise to “stealthily substituting one culture for another” if we use the
relation of tiyong to explain the relationship between Chinese culture and Western
culture. If we do not improve the cultural soil and other conditions, but just
stealthily substitute one culture for another, the cultural foundation will not be


Output:
solid. Thus, to my mind, our modern society should have its modern spirit and
various systems embodying such a spirit. If we use the relation of tiyong to explain
this problem, we might probably regard “the modern spirit as body and the systems
and their functions embodying such a spirit for use.” If so, one might ask: What is
the “modern spirit” and what are the “systems and their functions embodying the
spirit”?
    Here I would refer to the point of view put forward by Mr. Yan Fu, who once
criticized the idea of regarding “Chinese learning as body and Western learning for
use.” He also points out that body and use should be unified rather than dual.
Particularly, he lays emphasis on the significance of science and puts forward a very
meaningful proposition: “liberty as body and democracy for use.” I do think that
such an idea of his is probably of certain modern significance. So in my opinion,
“liberty” is the concentrative embodiment of the modern spirit or an inner spirit in


Output:
the modern era and a universal ideal that the people in modern society are pursuing,
whereas “democracy” consists of various systems of modern society ensuring one
“liberty” rather than certain people only. We now live in a Chinese society. It is
most important to give everyone “liberty” and have a set of democratic systems
ensuring its realization if we want to enable our society to become modernized.
Only in this way can people give full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, and
our country set foot on the road not only of the “four modernization” but also of
all-around modernization.


Output:
17
     See Studies of Philosophy, 9 (1987), 29–35.
Chapter 15
The Possible Orientations of Chinese
Culture in the Context of Globalization


Output:
In the context of globalization today, human culture will remain diverse. This is
because since World War II, with the collapse of the colonial system, the former
colonies and oppressed peoples have had the urgent task of confirming their
independent status in all aspects; a nation’s unique culture (language, religion,
values, etc.) is one of the most important pillars for the establishment of this status,
and it therefore provides the conditions for the diversified development of world
culture. In addition, the rise of the postmodern trend of thought in the Western
world in the latter part of the last century and its tremendous impact on the
modernist ideas of clarity, determinacy, the ultimate value, and the integrity of
the theoretical system led to the pursuit of indeterminacy, disorder, and anti-
centrism, which has strengthened multicultural development. Chinese culture, as
a component of human culture, needs to walk out of the debates on “China versus


Output:
the West” and “the ancient versus the contemporary” that have lasted for more than
a hundred years and to approach the new stage of mastering the knowledge of
the four perspectives to realize the transformation of Chinese culture. At present,
due to the diversity of world culture, Chinese culture has also formed its own
diversified pattern.
    In the history of China, there were two significant cultural imports, one being
the import of the Indian Buddhist culture since the first century and the other
being the import of Western culture since the end of the sixteenth century, espe-
cially in the mid-nineteenth century.
    The import of Indian Buddhism into China has undergone three historical
phases. (1) From the late Western Han Dynasty to Eastern Jin Dynasty, Buddhism
first attached itself to astronomy and astrology in the Han Dynasty and then to the
metaphysics in the Wei and Jin dynasties. (2) After the Eastern Jin Dynasty, there


Output: were contradictions and conflicts between Chinese culture and Indian culture due to


Output:
Chinese Culture and Globalization: History and Challenges for the 21st Century, 2009: 33–40

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                             191
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_15
192         15   The Possible Orientations of Chinese Culture in the Context of Globalization


Output:
cultural differences, with the two influencing and absorbing each other. (3) Since
the Sui and Tang dynasties, several Sinicized Buddhist sects, such as Tiantai,
Huayan, and Chan, had come into being, while the Indian Buddhist culture was
influenced by Confucianism and Daoism in China. Meanwhile, Confucianism
reemerged, emphasizing traditional Chinese subjectivity, and Daoism absorbed
Buddhism. It can be maintained that Indian Buddhist thoughts had been completely
fused with Chinese culture by the time of the Song Dynasty. This historical process
of the import of the Indian Buddhist culture into China can function as a frame of
reference for us to draw experiences and inspiration from when we study the import
of Western culture into China.
    When it was imported into China in the late sixteenth century, Western culture,
similarly, attached itself to the Chinese Confucian culture, which was interrupted
due to the famous Rites controversy. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that


Output:
Western culture flooded into China with the invasion of the Western imperialists.
For more than a hundred years, there have been debates on “China versus the West”
and “the ancient versus the contemporary,” which are, in effect, the debates on
“wholesale Westernization” versus “ontological culture.” These indicate that there
has been a tendency to set “the ancient” against “the contemporary” and “China”
against “the West.” This simplified mode of dealing with intercultural issues is
harmful to the healthy and reasonable development of culture. At present, we
should abandon setting “the ancient” against “the contemporary” and “China”
against ‘the West” and walk out of the debates. We might claim that cultural
developments in China at present are at the transitional point from the second
phase of the import of Indian Buddhism (Southern and Northern dynasties) to the
third phase (Sui and Tang dynasties), namely, from the phase of cultural contra-


Output:
dictions and conflicts between the two cultures to the phase when the local culture
begins to digest Western culture. In this third phase, the development of our
Chinese culture will go beyond the debates on “China versus the West” and “the
ancient versus the contemporary” and into the phase when we absorb and fuse
Western culture in an all-round and profound way to help Chinese culture develop
from the traditional to the modern, giving rise to multicultural development. I will
illustrate this orientation with the example of Chinese philosophy. I believe that
under these circumstances, there are at least three “carry-on” orientations for the
construction of modern Chinese philosophy:
A. On the basis of absorbing and fusing Western philosophy, we can “carry on”
   with traditional Chinese philosophy by talking about “Chinese philosophy.”
   “Carry-on” and “abide-by” issues were raised by Mr. Feng Youlan. In his
   view, his “New Confucian Philosophy” carries on rather than abides by the


Output:
Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. By the same token, the
   philosophy of the philosophers in the Song and Ming dynasties, so-called
   Neo-Confucianism, came into being after absorbing and fusing with Indian
   Buddhist philosophy, which had a great impact on it. Such philosophers in the
   1930s and 1940s as Xiong Shili, Feng Youlan, He Lin, Jin Yuelin, Zhang
   Dongsun, and Zhang Shenfu constructed modern Chinese philosophy by
   absorbing Western philosophy under the impact of the latter.
15   The Possible Orientations of Chinese Culture in the Context of Globalization       193


Output:
We can take Feng Youlan as an example. His New Confucian Philosophy is
new because it introduces into Chinese philosophy Plato’s “universals” and
“particulars” as well as the thought of “the latent” of the New Realism Philosophy.
He divides the world into “truth” (or “idea” or “tai chi”) and reality. A matter in
reality becomes a matter relying on the “idea.” In this way, his New Confucian
Philosophy carries on the thought that “the principle is one and its manifestations
are many” of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties on the one
hand and applies the thoughts of “universals” and “particulars” from Western
philosophy into Chinese philosophy on the other hand, giving impetus to the
modern transformation of Chinese philosophy. In reality, the scholars in the
1930s and 1940s were generally like this.
   Of course, Feng Youlan’s “New Confucian Philosophy” has also left unresolved
issues. As is stated in the seventh volume of The Newly Compiled History of


Output:
Chinese Philosophy (The History of Modern Chinese Philosophy), Feng maintains
that idea, is nonexistence but being for one thing and it is still “existence” for
another. There is a clear contradiction here. Therefore, if we attempt to push the
development of Chinese philosophy, we should carry on the “New Confucian
Philosophy” instead of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties.
One of the conditions to achieve this goal is for us to further absorb and digest
Western philosophy and help Chinese philosophy have more universal significance
in the dialogues between China and the West. Meanwhile, we should pay more
attention to the strong points of Chinese philosophy and establish the cultural
subjectivity of our own so as to make a special contribution to human culture.
We can also note that, although there is a tradition of discussing the “relationship
between knowledge and action” in traditional Chinese philosophy and the doctrine


Output:
of “the unity of knowledge and action” once occupied a dominant position, this
doctrine was often linked with morality and ethics, lacking an epistemological
basis. This issue was raised by He Lin in the 1930s when he stated: “Studying the
issue of ‘knowledge and action’ uncritically and discussing morality directly will
definitely lead to dogmatic ethics. Ethics studies the code of conduct and the
concept of good, so if we do not study the relevant knowledge and the truth related
to the good, we will certainly be trapped in baseless dogmatisms.” Therefore, we
“must investigate thoroughly the knowledge basis of ethics.”1 We can see that such
Chinese philosophers in the 1930s and 1940s as Zhang Dongsun, Xiong Shili,
He Lin, Jin Yudin, and Feng Youlan all noticed the lack of “epistemological”
theory in traditional Chinese philosophy and made an attempt to learn from
Western philosophy in order to complement this deficiency. Hence, the establish-


Output:
ment of real modern Chinese philosophy is impossible without Western philosophy.
That is to say, paying constant attention to and drawing nourishment from Western
philosophy is the necessary means by which Chinese philosophy can develop and
enter the world.


Output:
1
  He Lin, “New Understanding of the Unity of Knowledge and Action,” in Chinese Philosophy in
the Fifty Years (Liaoning Educational Press, 1989).
194          15   The Possible Orientations of Chinese Culture in the Context of Globalization


Output:
B. We can carry on with Western philosophy to construct Chinese philosophy by
   introducing the ideological resources of the latter into the former. In China’s
   history, there was the experience of carrying on with Indian Buddhist philoso-
   phy. During the Sui and Tang dynasties in China, several Sinicized Buddhist
   sects such as Chan, Tiantai, and Huayan had come into being. They absorbed
   thoughts from Confucianism and Daoism, becoming Chinese Buddhist philos-
   ophy which was different from Indian Buddhist philosophy. We can maintain
   that Chinese philosophy once benefited from Indian Buddhist philosophy, while
   the latter was carried into China.
   For more than a century, various schools of Western philosophy have entered
China one after another and greatly influenced Chinese philosophy. Facing the
Western philosophy of great strength, is it possible for Chinese philosophers to
introduce Chinese philosophical thoughts into Western philosophy to form several


Output:
Sinicized schools of Western philosophy, as they did in the Sui and Tang
dynasties? Here, I will take hermeneutics as an example to illustrate the point.
Currently, there is a “trend of hermeneutic thoughts” in the West, and since the
1980s, scholars from a variety of disciplines in the Chinese academia have been
applying Western hermeneutics to the investigation of the different aspects of
Chinese culture; thus, some Chinese scholars (including the overseas ones) have
been trying to construct “Chinese hermeneutics.” Because there is a very long
history of interpreting the classic and rich archives of thoughts in China, the issue of
the construction of Chinese hermeneutics has been raised under the influence of
Western hermeneutics.
   In his The Modern Interpretations of Chinese Philosophy, Professor Jing
Haifeng takes four people, Fu Weixun, Cheng Zhongying, Huang Junjie, and
Tang Yijie, as an example to illustrate the efforts to construct Chinese herme-


Output:
neutics. Fu’s “creative hermeneutics” divides a philosopher’s thinking into five
levels, constructing Chinese hermeneutics from the perspective of hermeneutic
methodology. This is characterized by the introduction of the thinking methodology
of Taoist philosophy (such as Lao Zhuang philosophy) and Chinese Buddhist
philosophy (such as Chan) into hermeneutics. Cheng differs from Fu in his empha-
sis on the hermeneutic theory of the methodology, paying special attention to the
ontological meanings of interpretations. He mainly introduces the thoughts of
The Book of Changes into hermeneutics, believing that Chinese ontological
hermeneutics is different from Western hermeneutics, which is characterized by
the static “interpretation of ontology,” in that it is characterized by the dynamic
“interpretation of ontology,” which is based on “life ontology,” with knowledge
being unified in the mind. Based on his analysis of Mencius and his study of


Output:
Mencius’ thinking, Huang reveals the characteristics of the interpretation of the
classic in China. Tang has sorted out the history of interpreting the classic in China
by analyzing the different types of interpretations in pre-Qin philosophy. Despite all
these attempts, more efforts are still needed to establish “Chinese hermeneutics.”
   However, all these attempts are of great significance at any rate, as they will
enrich hermeneutic theory. In fact, in the last century, some scholars attempted to
15   The Possible Orientations of Chinese Culture in the Context of Globalization   195


Output:
establish “Chinese phenomenology and Chinese semiotics.” In this connection, the
current philosophical circles in China are perhaps adding Chinese philosophical
thinking resources to the branches of Western philosophy to form some Sinicized
branches of the latter, as they did in the Sui and Tang dynasties. This attempt by
Chinese philosophers to introduce Chinese philosophical thinking into a branch
of Western philosophy to form a philosophy different from the latter will enrich
Western philosophy (as Chan, Tiantai, and Huayan did during the Sui and Tang
dynasties) on the one hand and will open up more extensive space for the develop-
ment of Chinese philosophy (such as the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming
dynasties), helping Chinese philosophy to enter the diversified philosophy of the
world in a better way.
C. We should establish Marxist philosophy with Chinese features: Marxism was
   originally a branch of Western philosophy. It is quite necessary for us to make


Output:
a separate study of Marxism because it had a tremendous impact on Chinese
   society during the twentieth century. Here, I would like to take the late philos-
   opher Feng Qi as an example. Feng attempted to make Marxist philosophy one
   with Chinese features by absorbing traditional Chinese philosophy and Western
   analytical philosophy. In the “introduction” of his Three Discussions on
   Wisdom, he states: “This book aims at understanding humanity and nature
   based on the dialectics of the epistemological process of practice, particularly
   through the leap of ‘transforming knowledge into wisdom.’”
   First of all, Feng does not aim to solve the problem of Western philosophy, but
that of “humanity and nature” in Chinese philosophy through practical, materialist
dialectics. Second, he thinks that “transforming knowledge into wisdom” (namely,
the intuition of wisdom) is the way of solving the problem. “Transforming
knowledge into wisdom” is borrowed from the language of Buddhism, which


Output:
requires that “knowledge” be elevated to “wisdom” to reach the spiritual realm of
transcendence. Third, he believes that the purpose of philosophy is to regard the
process of understanding the world and that of understanding oneself as the same as
achieving the transformation of theories into methods and virtues. Marxism
believes that theories and methods are unified, while Chinese philosophy has
always maintained that “theories” and “virtues” are unified. Feng Qi requires that
“theories,” “methods,” and “virtues” should be unified. He explains that, in one
sense, philosophical theories “should be transformed into thinking methods and
implemented in their own activities and research areas.” But in addition they should
also “be transformed into their own virtues and embodied as their own personalities
through their own practice.”
   Thus, although based on Marxist materialist dialectics, Feng’ s philosophy is to
settle the issue of Chinese philosophy and its way is to reach the ideal moral realm


Output:
of life by absorbing the Buddhist way of thinking into Chinese philosophy
(“transforming knowledge into wisdom”). Undoubtedly, this is Marxist philosophy
with Chinese “features.” The Chinanization of traditional Marxism will make
Marxism in China have more epochal and ethnic characteristics, as did Western
Marxism (such as the Frankfurt School) in the last century.
196         15   The Possible Orientations of Chinese Culture in the Context of Globalization


Output:
Of course, for more than a century, there have been cultural “revivalists”
in Chinese academia. After World War I, traveling back from Europe, Liang
Qichao claimed that Western culture had declined and would be rescued by
Chinese culture; the “Declaration of the Chinese Cultural Ontology” also
appeared in the 1930s. Especially in the twenty-first century, some Chinese
scholars have raised the issue of “reestablishing Chinese Confucianism.” They
maintain that “the all-round rejuvenation of Confucianism must be achieved in
response to the challenges posed by Western civilization” and that “the rejuve-
nation of Confucianism is the urgent task on hand for the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation.” Therefore, they advocate Confucianism as the state religion
in China to achieve the so-called unification of the state and the religion practiced
ever since ancient times. I think that this attempt to close one’s own culture and to
exclude without analysis Western culture is certainly inadvisable and against the


Output:
current trend of globalization and so cannot be realized.
   The above mentioned three possible orientations of the development of Chinese
philosophy might be ways for Chinese philosophy to go beyond the debates on
“China versus the West” and “the ancient versus the contemporary,” to approach
the new road that fuses the knowledge of the ancient and the contemporary as well
as of China and the West, and to let various schools of philosophical thought strive
in more extensive fields. That is to say, to construct modern Chinese philosophy,
we should uphold the subjectivity of Chinese philosophy on the one hand and have
a good absorption of the essence of Western philosophy on the other hand.
This requires that we should not only carry on traditional Chinese philosophy but
also have the courage to carry on Western philosophy (or the Sinicization of a
branch on of Western philosophy). We should not simply abide by Chinese and
Western philosophy as they existed in history, but carry them on instead, which will


Output:
open up new prospects for the development of philosophy.
Chapter 16
Prospects for the Study of the History
of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue
of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful
in China’s Traditional Philosophy


Output:
Confronting us now is the problem of prospects for the study of Chinese
philosophy, that is, the problem of how to evaluate the traditional philosophy
of China.
   China is a great country with a long history and cultural tradition. The traditional
philosophy of China is rich in content and displays an originality. Because society
has moved forward and China has been in a backward position for more than
100 years, and also because we failed to adopt a scientific attitude toward the
study of China’s traditional thought and culture, we have been unable, over a long
period of time, to acquire a true understanding of the value of China’s traditional
philosophy or to find out where its shortcomings and problems lie. However, things
have been changing dramatically in this area in recent years.
   In addressing the rally commemorating the 100th anniversary of Marx’s death,
Comrade Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, said:


Output:
“The mistaken tendency to split Marxism from the cultural achievements of
mankind and pit the one against the other must be opposed; we must acquire a
standpoint of respecting the knowledge of science and culture.” Note that in recent
years, a very important phenomenon has appeared in China’s newspapers and
periodicals, namely, large numbers of articles on problems in real life all quoting
philosophical remarks made in ancient China.
   For example, Guangming ribao (Bright Daily) carried two short articles
on February 19 this year. One article was entitled “Remain Tenacious after a
Thousand Whettings and Ten Thousand Thrashings.” It was a line from Zheng
Banqiao’s poem “On Bamboo,” which the article used to encourage an indomitable
behavior among the people. Another article, entitled “King of Wei Killed Those
Who Knew him and the Fake King of Wei,” dwelt on the suspicious character of
Cao. The article quoted from the Chronicle of the Reign of Zhengguan what


Output:
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 5–16

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                       197
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_16
198         16   Prospects for the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue. . .


Output:
Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty said to Feng Deyi: “Whether a flowing water
is clear or muddy hinges on its source. An emperor is the source of government and
the common people are like the water. If the emperor plays tricks himself and
expects his ministers to behave honestly, it is like a muddy source expecting its
flow to be clear; it is unreasonable.” The same goes for quite a few literary works.
Take, for example, “A Wreath at the Foot of a High Mountain,” a controversial
short story, which describes how a FLA commander criticized a high-ranking
cadre’s wife. As an admonition, the commander quoted from Du Mu’s “Epic of
E-Pang Palace” by saying: “People of Qin had no time to lament and were lamented
by people after Qin. If the people after Qin lamented but did not take warning, then
they would be lamented by those after them.”
    There are many examples like this which can be found everywhere in
newspapers and periodicals. All this has raised a question: Since so many ancient


Output:
sayings in China still bear great significance for us today and serve as an indis-
pensable guide to our behavior in real life, what value does the traditional philo-
sophy of China have in its entirety? A reevaluation of China’s traditional
philosophy seems called for.
    If we say that philosophical ideas may embody the problems of the true, the
good, and the beautiful, then does not the traditional Chinese philosophy have
something valuable or unique in this regard? I think it does, and very remarkably
so. We can approach this issue from two aspects: one is the contents of its thinking,
and another is its attitude toward life, both of which aspects are closely related.


Output:
16.1    Chinese Philosophy as a Threefold Integration

Regarding the issue of the true, the good, and the beautiful, traditional Chinese
philosophy has had three propositions exerting an extended influence over Chinese
thinking: the “integration of Heaven with man,” which inquires into the unity of
the world; the “integration of knowledge with practice,” the problem of an ethical
norm; and the “integration of feeling with scenery,” involving the creation and
appreciation of artistic works.

16.1.1 Integration of Heaven with Man: The True


Output:
16.1.1 Integration of Heaven with Man: The True

How to define the two concepts of “Heaven” and “man” varies with different
philosophers. Nevertheless, the “Way of Heaven” refers to the basics of the
universe or the universe as a whole. The “way of man” often refers to the society
of man or man himself. The relationship between Heaven and man has always been
the fundamental issue studied by Chinese thinkers.
   Sima Qian called his Historical Records a book that “probes into the relations
between heaven and man.” Dong Zhongshu described what he said as a branch of
16.1   Chinese Philosophy as a Threefold Integration                                199


Output:
learning that “studies how man is related to Heaven.” He Yan, one of the founders
of the metaphysics of the Wei and Jin dynasties, called another founder, Wang Bi,
a philosopher “qualified to discuss the relations between Heaven and man.”
Tao Hongjing, the true founder of the Maoshan sect of China’s Daoism (Taoism),
said only Yan Huan, another Daoist leader, understood that “what he had in mind”
was the problem “between Heaven and man.” The “relationship between Heaven
and man” has been explained by different theories in traditional Chinese philoso-
phy. For example, Zhuangzi required that a “distinction be made between Heaven
and man,” and Zhuangzi theorized that “those who are ignorant of Heaven know
nothing about man.” Furthermore, the question of “relations between Heaven and
man” often has found expression in the discussion about the relation between
“nature” and the “Confucian ethical code.” Nevertheless, the mainstream of tradi-


Output:
tional Chinese philosophy has taken as its main task the demonstration or explana-
tion of how “Heaven is integrated with man.”
   Confucius said more about “human affairs” and less about “the Mandate of
Heaven.” Nonetheless, he also believed that “what the saint says” is in keeping with
“the Mandate of Heaven.” Mencius, it can be said, is the philosopher who first
proposed the idea of “integration of Heaven with man” in a complete sense.
For example, he said: “Do with all your heart, know your lot, and understand
Heaven”; “keep up with Heaven and earth above and below.” Even though Xunzi
advocated that a “distinction be made between Heaven and man,” his fundamental
goal was to “bend the will of Heaven to our use” so that “Heaven” would be
integrated with man. Laozi (Lao Tzu) of the Daoist school urged: “Man follows
earth, earth follows Heaven, Heaven follows the Way, and the Way follows nature.”
   Even Zhuangzi who was “ignorant of Heaven and knows nothing about man”


Output:
had this to say: “Heaven and earth live side by side with me, and all things on earth
are identified with me.” He also said that the superior man can “communicate with
Heaven, earth, and spirit.” Dong Zhongshu preached the idea that “Heaven and man
respond to each other,” and his argument was that the two were integrated. The
metaphysics of the Wei and Jin dynasties focused its discussion on the relationship
between “nature” and “the Confucian ethical code.” Even though Ji Kang
(Chi Kang) and Yuan Ji advocated that the “ethical code be overstepped and nature
followed,” the mainstream of the metaphysics school stressed that the “ethical
code” be reconciled with “nature.” As Wang Bi embraced the idea that “the
intrinsic and the extrinsic are like one,” he urged that “the essentials (nature and
the Way of Heaven) be upheld to rule the nonessentials (ethical code and mundane
affairs).” In stressing “the intrinsic and the extrinsic are like one,” Guo Xiang


Output:
believed “there is no intrinsic beyond the extrinsic” and therefore concluded that
“Heaven is the general term for all things on earth.”
   By the time of the Song Dynasty, the Confucian philosopher Zhou Dunyi noted
in more explicit terms: “A saint shares virtue with Heaven and earth,” and “a saint
aspires to Heaven.” Zhang Zai stated in his West Inscription: “That which blocks
heaven and earth is my intrinsic; that which commands heaven and earth is my
character.” The two Cheng theorized that “the intrinsic and the extrinsic come from
the same source” and stated: “In Heaven it is destiny, in man it is character, and it is
200         16   Prospects for the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue. . .


Output:
the heart that commands the body. They are actually one and the same.” Zhu Xi
stated that: “Heaven is man, and man is Heaven. The beginning of man is derived
from Heaven. Since this man is born, Heaven rests in him.” And he added:
“A saint. . .is integrated with Heaven.” Wang Yangming said: “The heart is Heaven.
Stressing the importance of the heart upholds Heaven, earth, and all things.” “Man
is actually one with Heaven, earth and all things.” “The heart has no intrinsic but
takes the response of Heaven, earth, and all things as the intrinsic.” Later Wang
Fuzhi advanced the idea that man moves along with the vaporization of Heaven to
explain why Heaven is integrated with man. He said: “Destiny is realized by days
and character is formed by days.” “There is not a day that Heaven stops thinking of
destiny, and there is not a day that man does not submit his destiny to Heaven.”
    As far as traditional Chinese philosophy is concerned, the major philosophers,


Output:
either materialist or idealist, all talked about the problem of “integration of Heaven
with man.” By analyzing their theories, we can roughly arrive at the following
conclusions: First, in traditional Chinese philosophy, the concept of “integration of
Heaven with man” gives expression to the idea of observing things in their entirety.
It is a direct description rather than a detailed analysis; we can call it a directly
perceived “overall concept.” Second, in traditional Chinese philosophy, the basic
argument for the idea of “integration of Heaven with man” is, “The intrinsic and the
extrinsic are like one”: unity of the ways of Heaven and man is “both the intrinsic
and the extrinsic,” the Way of Heaven serving as the intrinsic and the way of man
the extrinsic. This can be termed as an “‘absolute’ concept of unity.” Third,
traditional Chinese philosophy does not see the “way of man” as something rigid;
what is more, it also sees in the “Way of Heaven” liveliness and unending vitality.


Output:
“Heaven moves along a healthy track, and a gentleman should make unremitting
efforts to improve himself.” That human society should move forward and man
should improve himself is due to the necessity of keeping up with the development
of the “Way of Heaven.” This can be called the unlimited “concept of develop-
ment.” Fourth, in traditional Chinese philosophy, “Heaven” is object and the “way
of man” must be brought in line with the “Way of Heaven.” However, “man” is the
heart of Heaven and earth; he should install a heart for Heaven and earth. Without
“man,” Heaven and earth would have no vitality, rationality, or morality. This can
be called the “humanistic concept” of ethics. The abovementioned four concepts
comprise the total implication of the idea of “integration of Heaven with man” in
traditional Chinese philosophy.


Output:
16.1.2 Integration of Knowledge with Practice: The Good

The problem of “knowledge and practice” is an issue of the theory of knowledge; in
traditional Chinese philosophy, however, it poses even more a problem of ethics
and morality. If, in traditional Chinese philosophy, a question of the theory of
knowledge had not been linked to the question of ethics, it would have been difficult
for it to be passed down as a part of traditional philosophy. Therefore, the problem
16.1   Chinese Philosophy as a Threefold Integration                             201


Output:
of a theory of knowledge is often also the problem of ethics. This is why the
philosophers advocated that man not only should seek “knowledge” but must also
pay special attention to “conduct” (practice).
   What is the “good”? The criterion for the “good” can vary, but, according to
traditional Chinese philosophy, unity of “knowledge” and “practice” must be
regarded as a prerequisite. From the history of Chinese philosophy, we can come
across many different explanations about the relationship between knowledge and
conduct. In History Classic (Chapter 1, “On Destiny”), it was said long ago that
“it is not difficult to know but difficult to put it in practice.” Later, the two
Cheng advocated: “Knowledge precedes practice.” Zhu Xi was of the opinion
that “knowledge and practice each give rise to the other.” Wang Fuzhi theorized
that “practice precedes knowledge,” and Sun Zhongshan advanced the idea that “to
know about a thing is more difficult than to do it” and so forth. Taking things as a


Output:
whole, however, the concept of an “integration of knowledge with practice”
actually has run through traditional Chinese philosophy from beginning to end.
   Starting from the time of Confucius, the “agreement of one’s words with one’s
deeds” has always been used as an ethical criterion to differentiate a gentleman
from a villain. Confucius said: “A gentleman feels it a shame not to be able to match
his words with actions.” Mencius stressed “intuitive knowledge” and “intuitive
ability.” Even though he regarded the four factors including the “sense of pity” as
inherent, he thought it is necessary to “foster and enhance” benevolence, righteous-
ness, rite, and wisdom, which had already become moral codes. As they could be
acquired only through moral practice, he advocated that “a noble spirit be culti-
vated.” Zhuangzi stressed “practice” as the purpose of seeking “knowledge”; at the
same time, he also admitted the guidance “knowledge” provided for “practice.”


Output:
He said: “One who practices it knows it. One who knows it is a saint.” As a saint,
therefore, one must “integrate knowledge with practice.”
   By the Song Dynasty, the Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi, regardless of his
opinion that “knowledge precedes practice,” argued in terms of morality and
self-cultivation that “one who knows but cannot practice is one who does not
truly know.” Therefore, Huang Zongxi noted: “Mr. Cheng already had the idea of
integrating knowledge with practice” (Academic Files of the Song and Yuan
dynasties, Volume 75). Zhu Xi inherited Cheng Yi’s theory that “knowledge
precedes practice,” but he stressed in particular that “knowledge and practice are
mutually dependent” and “efforts on knowledge and practice should be pushed
forward side by side.” He reasoned: “In terms of sequence, knowledge precedes;
in terms of importance, practice is more important.” Therefore some people
described Cheng and Zhu’s as “a theory of integration of knowledge with practice


Output:
with emphasis on the latter.” Even though “knowledge” is the foundation of
“practice,” “knowledge is shallow when knowledge has just been acquired and
yet to be put into practice.” “When one personally experiences it, his knowledge
will be deeper, different from what he knew before.” That Zhu Xi stressed
“practice” resulted because he basically regarded “knowledge” and “practice” as
an issue of morality. This is why he remarked: “Wherever the good is, one must
practice it. Having practiced it for a long time, it will become identified with
202         16   Prospects for the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue. . .


Output:
oneself. Having identified with it, it will become a part of oneself. Failing to
practice it, the good remains the good, and oneself remains oneself; they have
nothing to do with each other.”
    Traditional Chinese philosophy often advocated “practicing the Way (Dao).”
This idea perhaps had a twofold implication: One was to “take the Way as the
intrinsic,” another to practice the “intrinsic way,” namely, to earnestly practice
the “intrinsic way” one advocated. Therefore, this is not merely an issue of
understanding. As for Wang Yangming’s theory of “integration of knowledge
with practice,” naturally we all know about it; however, our understanding about
it seems not to be totally correct. By quoting his remark, “practice begins once an
idea is struck upon,” people often describe him as “ascribing practice to knowl-
edge” and “taking knowledge to be practice.” In fact, Wang Yangming did not
equate “knowledge” with “practice” completely. The remark that “practice


Output:
begins once an idea is struck upon” was made in the context of morality and
self-cultivation. Immediately after that, he added: “If the idea is no good, we
have to overcome it. We have to overcome it thoroughly and thoroughly so that
the no-good idea will not lay hidden in our hearts.” He also said: “A close and
solid knowledge is where practice lies, and a conscious and precise practice is
where knowledge lies. Efforts on knowledge and practice were originally insepa-
rable. Only scholars in later ages split them into two and lost the essence of
knowledge and practice.”
    In regard to the relations between knowledge and practice, Wang explained
clearly: “Knowledge gives the idea to practice, and practice is the efforts made of
knowledge. Knowledge is the beginning of practice and practice is the end result
of knowledge.” From the angle of the theory of knowledge, Wang Yangming could
be suspected of “including practice in knowledge.” In the perspective of morality


Output:
and self-cultivation, however, emphasis on “integration of knowledge with prac-
tice” had a positive significance.
    By the time between the Ming and Qing dynasties, Wang Fuzhi advanced the
idea that “practice precedes knowledge” and “practice can also gain knowledge.”
However, he still stressed “integration of knowledge with practice” when
addressing the issue of ethics. He opined that “knowledge and practice
complementing each other is use and the two progressing alongside is achieve-
ment.” He criticized Wang Yangming’s idea of “integration of knowledge with
practice” and called Wang “ignorant of the fact that they each have their own use
and complement each other.” Nevertheless, Wang Fuzhi, too, was an advocator of
“integration of knowledge with practice.” He said:
  In calling someone engaged in pursuing knowledge and practice we mean he devotes
  himself to the pursuit of knowledge and makes every effort to practice. Because of his


Output:
devotion and efforts, achievements can be made and divided. Since achievements can be
  made and divided, an order of succession can be established. Since an order of succession
  can be established, the antecedent and the subsequent can complement each other. From
  knowledge one knows what is being practiced, and from practice one practices what is
  being known. Thus it can be said the two progress alongside and therefore make
  achievements.
16.1   Chinese Philosophy as a Threefold Integration                              203


Output:
That knowledge and practice can progress alongside arises because the two, in
the final analysis, are a moral issue. According to Wang Fuzhi’s opinion: “A wise
man is one who knows the rites. A man of ritual is one who practices knowledge.
In practicing knowledge, all rituals will be properly performed; in knowing the
rites all essentials will go to the mind. Thus one will improve oneself with each
passing day and there will be no end to it.” A saint “combines his intelligence with
sincerity. He practices what he knows and what he practices becomes his knowl-
edge.” This is how traditional Chinese philosophy envisages that a man should
behave himself.
    Now prevailing in the study of traditional Chinese philosophy is a viewpoint
which asserts that “since the Song and Ming dynasties the neo-Confucianists,
when discussing knowledge and practice, often mixed up this issue of theory of
knowledge with the issue of ethics.” It insists that this is where the limitations and


Output:
mistakes of Chinese ancient philosophers lay. In this regard, two questions deserve
to be discussed.
    First, Neo-Confucianists since the Song and Ming dynasties, as a matter of
fact, did not regard knowledge and practice merely as an issue of the theory of
knowledge. They thought the issue was important precisely because it was related
to morality and self-cultivation. The final purpose of their discussion of relations
between knowledge and practice was to improve moral cultivation. Therefore, it is
out of the question to assert that the Neo-Confucians confused the issue of the
theory of knowledge with that of morality. Second, as an issue of morality and
self-cultivation, the theory of integration of knowledge with practice and the
viewpoint of unity between knowledge and practice cannot be said to be without
positive significance. Ethically, knowledge and practice cannot be separated
into two ends; what is necessary is that “knowledge be integrated with practice.”


Output:
The remark made by Wang Yangming that “knowledge is the purpose of practice
and practice is the work of knowledge; knowledge is the beginning of practice and
practice is the end result of knowledge” can be seen as the best summary the
Chinese ancient philosophers ever made about this issue.


Output:
16.1.3 Integration of Feeling with Scenery: The Beautiful

This is an aesthetic issue which Wang Guowei made a thorough discussion in his
Random Talks about Poetry. He said: “Realm is the top quality in poetry writing.
Having realm, a poem is naturally of a high quality and carries famous lines.”
   What does “realm” mean? Wang explained that “realm does not refer to scenery
alone. Delight, anger, sorrow, and joy are also a realm in man’s heart. Therefore a
poem that can depict true scenery and true feelings can be said to have realm.
Otherwise it should be said to have no realm.” Obviously, the term “realm” refers
not only to scenery but to “sentiments” as well. In Jialing Manuscripts Discussing
204           16   Prospects for the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue. . .


Output:
Poetry, Ye Jiaying made a very perceptive explanation about Wang Guowei’s
“realm theory.” According to Ye:
   The generation of realm depends entirely on our sense of perception. The existence of realm
   depends entirely on what our sense of perception can reach. Therefore the outside world
   cannot be called realm before we can reproduce it through the function of our perception
   sense. Judging by such a conclusion, the theory of realm as advocated by Wang, as a matter
   of fact, can be traced to the same origin as the theory of interest by Canglang and the theory
   of romantic charm by Yuan Tingzhi.


Output:
Bu Yentu, after Wang Guowei, also said in his Questions and Answers on the
Methods of Painting: “Landscape painting is no more than portraying feeling and
scenery, and feeling and scenery is realm.” This is why Wang Guowei remarked:
“When people in the past discussed poetry, they divided the verses into those
describing scenery and those depicting feeling. They did not know all verses
describing scenery depict feeling.” Obviously, Wang Guowei regarded as
top-grade creative writings literary pieces that “integrate feeling with scenery.”
However, this aesthetic viewpoint of “integration of feeling with scenery” did not
start with Wang Guowei.
   Generally speaking, it was in the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties that the
theory of China’s literature and art truly became independent as a branch of
learning, and by that time, the idea of “integrating feeling with theory” already
emerged. In Introduction to the Grades of Poetry, Zhong Rong states:


Output:
The four-characters-to-a-line poems, they can be useful if they imply more in fewer words
   and model on works of literary excellence. However, the problem is they often involve a lot
   of words but connote little contents. Therefore few people learn to write them. The five-
   characters-to-a-line poems occupy the primary position in writing and stand out as the most
   savory among a variety of genres, thus winning the praise of being popular. Isn’t it because
   they are the most detailed and truthful in narrating events, conjuring images, expressing
   feelings, and portraying things? Therefore there are three approaches to writing poetry: First,
   implication; second, comparison; third, narration. The idea that there is more to the poem
   than the words state is what we call implication. Citing things to indicate one’s intention is
   comparison. A direct account of the happening, thus embodying the idea, is narration. Take


Output:
the three approaches into consideration and choose the most appropriate, enhancing it with
   charm and force and polishing it with color so that those who read it will find unlimited savor
   and those who listen to it will be stirred. This will be a poem of the top grade.


Output:
A “masterpiece,” a “superb work,” should “express feelings and portray things.”
This was the forerunner of the idea of “integration of feeling with scenery.”
Xie Zhen, one of the later seven scholars of the Ming Dynasty, said in Four Seas
Poetic Discussions: “Writing poetry rests on feeling and scenery. Neither can work
without the other or conflict with the other.” He also said: “poetry is the tool for the
portrayal of feeling and scenery. Feeling melts inside, running deep and long;
scenery shines on the outside, stretching far and wide.” In Poetic Discussions
from the Ginger Studio, Wang Fuzhi put it in an even clearer way: “In name feeling
and scenery are two things, but in fact they are inseparable.”
    Those skillful in writing poems have unlimited chances to hit upon good ones.
In an ingenious piece, there is “scenery in feeling and feeling in scenery.” “Feeling
is generated from amid scenery and scenery is generated from amid feeling. This is


Output:
why we say scenery is the scenery of feeling, and feeling is the feeling of scenery.”
16.2   The Study of Chinese Philosophy and the Reason for Being Human                 205


Output:
“Once feeling is integrated with scenery, witty expressions are readily available.” This
last sentence perhaps constitutes the basic proposition for China’s traditional theory of
art and literature, manifesting its basic view on “beauty.” In the traditional thinking in
China, what is beautiful has always been linked to what is good. “The substantial is
called the beautiful” refers to a spiritual realm in which one has a noble enjoyment.
Having listened to the music of “Wu” (nothing, e.g., the silence that follows sound),
Confucius commented: “It has all the beautiful but not all the good,” and after listening
to the music of “Shao” (few), he remarked: “It has all the good and also all the
beautiful.” Only music that “has all the good and also all the beautiful” can be regarded
as the highest and most ideal music. This applies to music and should apply to other
arts as well. An art that “has all the good and also all the beautiful” is designed to


Output:
elevate man’s spiritual realm and help him derive there from the highest enjoyment of
beauty. Because of this, the creator of artistic and literary works must be one who has
“realm,” and his works must “integrate feeling with scenery.”


Output:
16.2     The Study of Chinese Philosophy and the Reason
         for Being Human


Output:
With regard to the true, the good, and the beautiful, why does traditional Chinese
philosophy consistently pursue the three “integrations”? In my opinion, it is
because the basic spirit of Chinese philosophy is to teach how one should behave
like a man. To be a “man” one must have set for oneself a demand, must have an
ideal realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful. One who has attained such an
ideal realm in which “Heaven is integrated with man,” “knowledge is integrated
with practice,” and “feeling is integrated with scenery” is a saint. Therefore, the
prospects for traditional Chinese philosophy lie in bringing this demand to be a
“man” in line with the need of the modernization program and thus realizing
it. One’s ideal may find expression in an immense variety of ways; nevertheless,
one must have an ideal and noble spiritual realm. The three integrations advocated
by traditional Chinese philosophy are in fact a unified realm for one to be a “man.”
They cannot be separated, at least theoretically.


Output:
They cannot be separated, at least theoretically.
    The proposition of “integration of Heaven with man,” though designed to
illustrate the relations between man and the entire universe, was made in view of
man as center of the universe. The Golden Mean states: “Honesty is the Way
of Heaven; to be honest is the way of man.” “An honest man who hits the target
without difficulty, arrives at the right idea without brain-racking, and conforms to
the Way without hurry is a saint.” The role of a saint is to “foster a heart for Heaven
and earth, create a life for living creatures, carry forward peak learnings for
posterity, and open up peace for thousands of generations to come.” Therefore, a
“man” (mainly, the saint) must behave in accord with the requirements of the Way
of Heaven and should assume it his responsibility to fulfill them. Being alive in the
world, one must not take a passive attitude; rather, one should “make unremitting


Output: 206           16   Prospects for the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy and the Issue. . .


Output:
efforts to improve oneself” so as to embody the evolution of the immense universe.
In this way, one will set oneself a demand, find a reason for one’s being, and foster a
noble spiritual realm. Since one has set a demand for oneself and has a reason for
one’s being, the most important thing is for one to “integrate his knowledge with
his practice.” One must have an ethical standpoint unifying the two. The three
programs and the eight items listed in the Great Learnings tell us the exact reason
for this. It says:
   The Way of the great learning lies in shedding light on the bright principles, being close to
   the people, and stopping at nothing but the utmost good. Those in ancient times who wanted
   to shed light on the bright principles for the world had to first bring order to their own
   kingdoms. To bring order to their kingdoms they had to first bring their own houses to
   order. To bring their houses to order they had to first cultivate their own moral character.


Output:
To cultivate their own moral character they had to first set their minds straight. To set their
   minds straight they had to first foster a sincere desire. To foster a sincere desire they had to
   first carry knowledge to the utmost degree. To carry knowledge to the utmost degree they
   had to first inquire into the properties of things. Having inquired into the properties of
   things, they were able to carry knowledge to the utmost degree. Having carried knowledge
   to the utmost degree, they were able to foster a sincere desire. Having fostered a sincere
   desire, they were able to set their minds straight. Having set their minds straight, they
   were able to cultivate their own moral character. Having cultivated their own moral
   character, they were able to bring their houses to order. Having brought their houses to
   order, they were able to bring order to their kingdoms. Having brought order to their
   kingdoms, the whole world would be at peace.


Output:
“Knowledge” must be integrated with “practice.” From “inquiring into the
properties of things to carry knowledge to the utmost degree” to “bringing order
to their kingdoms and peace to the world” is a process of cognition and, more
important, a process of moral practice. Man must have an ideal. The highest ideal is
to “achieve peace” and thus enable human society to attain a realm of “Great
Harmony.” The basic demand of a society of “Great Harmony” is that everyone
should set on himself a demand, find a reason for his “being,” and “not do to others
what he does not wish done to himself.” Said Confucius: “My way is consistent; it is
nothing more than honesty and forbearance.” Leading a life in this world, one
should behave like a “man” and must enjoy the pleasure of “being a man” and
appreciate the creation of the universe.
   In order to have a genuine appreciation of the creation of the universe, one
should have the ability to display man’s creativity through the reproduction of


Output:
“the creation of the universe.” One should display the spiritual realm of man, the
why and how for a man to exist as a man: this makes it possible to render a writing
into a “masterpiece,” a painting into a “superb work,” and music into the “sound of
nature.” Therefore, art requires “integration of feeling with scenery” so that
“feeling is generated amid scenery and scenery is generated amid feeling.” In the
realm of creation, one reaches a situation in which the true, the good, and the
beautiful are integrated; there lies the meaning of life and the man’s highest ideal.
Confucius professed: “At the age of seventy, I can do everything as my heart
pleases without violating the rule.” What he described was probably such a realm
in which all one did and said was in harmony with the universe, human society,
16.2   The Study of Chinese Philosophy and the Reason for Being Human               207


Output:
others, and oneself—both body and mind, inside and without. This realm of life is,
of course, that of the saint.
    Traditional Chinese philosophy still bears existential value precisely because it
tells us the reason for being a man. To be a man is by no means easy, and it is even
more difficult to have harmony with nature, society, other people, and oneself in
both body and mind, inside and outside. But is this not necessary for today’s world?
Therefore, we cannot underestimate traditional Chinese philosophy and ignore its
proper value. Precisely, because traditional Chinese philosophy tells us only the
reason for being a man, it is inappropriate to set undue demands upon it in other
regards, and it should come as no surprise to us that it is inadequate in certain areas.
For example, it does not emphasize issues of logic and the theory of knowledge nor
provide a well-conceived demonstration of the structure of its own theory; we


Output:
should not be overcritical of this. Under such circumstances, can we further develop
traditional Chinese philosophy while engaged in studying its value? We should
and we can. Note that, aside from the Book of Change, the pre-Qin Dynasty
Confucians are seldom touched upon problems of ontology. Under the impact of
Buddhism, however, Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties founded a
very significant theory of ontology which made great progress and became
Neo-Confucianism. As the mainstream of China’s traditional philosophy, thinking,
and culture, the Confucian philosophy has sustained today an even heavier impact
than in the past. Having made a profound criticism of it, we are now reexamining its
value. Is it inconceivable that we can develop it again or impossible under the new
impact to establish a new logic and theory of knowledge proper to it? Traditional
Chinese philosophy should have a third phase development because “one must have


Output:
a reason for being a man.” Whether or not it can be developed depends on whether
or not it can establish for itself a new system of logic and theory of knowledge.
“Man can enhance the Way, not the Way can enhance man.” The outcome depends
upon our efforts.
Chapter 17
Questions Concerning the Categorical
System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
Aristotle’s Categories outlined the philosophical categories of ancient Greece,
putting forward and thoroughly analyzing ten categories. Hegel’s Logik outlined
contemporary Western philosophical categories in a comparatively complete cate-
gorical system. Did China’s traditional philosophy (China’s ancient philosophy)
have a categorical system? Why and how should we study the question of tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy’s concepts and categories? This essay attempts to
contribute to the discussion of these questions.

17.1     The Significance of Studying the Categorical
         System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
1. The study of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has its
   general and particular significance. Its general significance can be expounded in
   at least the following three aspects:
   First, while the study of the history of philosophy necessarily requires the study
      of the historical function of philosophers and philosophical schools, the
      ultimate value of such a study is to reveal the necessary logic that determined
      the specific development of certain philosophical thinking in history.
      For instance, what is the necessary logic of the development of the pre-Qin
      philosophical thinking from Confucius to Mencius to Xunzi? A scientific
      history of philosophy with Marxism as its guiding thought should reveal not


Output:
Translated by Liu Bingwen
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, and Chinese Culture, 1991: 17–37
The tables on p. 222 and p. 228 are taken from Social Sciences in China, A Quarterly Journal
(Beijing: The Social Sciences Publishing House; no. 4, 1982), III, 204, and 210, respectively.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                              209
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_17
210     17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
only the developmental causes of philosophical thought but also the inner
    logic of the growth of such thought. Since philosophy is a science of the most
    general laws of nature, society, and human thought presented in the form of
    abstractions, the development of the content of philosophical thought is
    therefore a history of the continuous advancement of concepts and categories
    and of their continuous clarification, enrichment, and growth. We should
    study how concepts and categories were advanced in the history of philoso-
    phy; how their contents became clearer, richer, and more systematic; and how
    the categorical system became more complicated, more comprehensive, and
    more systematic; we should conduct a concrete analysis of the development
    of concepts and categories. This will enable us to discover the laws governing
    the development of philosophical thought and reveal its inner logic.
  Second, when we say that the history of philosophy is one of the struggle


Output:
between materialism and idealism, we do not mean to imply that this struggle
    and the development of man’s cognition are two separate processes. It was
    the one and same process through which man’s knowledge of the world has
    been developing in the struggle between materialism and idealism which
    manifests the law of the development of man’s knowledge. As the process
    of knowledge calls for the use of concepts and categories, every stage of
    development in the history of philosophy is marked by differing explanations
    of certain basic concepts and categories out of which emerged materialism
    and idealism. In the history of Chinese philosophy, for example, the struggle
    between materialism and idealism before the Qin Dynasty generally centered
    around the differing explanations of the heavenly way and the human way,
    name and content, knowledge and conduct, and the variable and the constant.
    During the Wei and Jin dynasties, it centered around such pairs of concepts as


Output:
being and nonbeing, essence and function, word and idea, ethical code and
    spontaneity. During the Song and Ming dynasties, it focused on principle and
    force, mind and matter, mind and nature, subject and object. A study of the
    development of concepts and categories is a key to the exposure of the law
    governing the struggle between materialism and idealism.
  What is more is that this study will enable us to understand the necessity of the
    emergence of certain concepts and categories in the history of cognition and
    to overcome the shortcomings of maintaining an oversimplified negative
    attitude toward idealism which can be found in the past studies of the history
    of philosophy. Wang Bi was an idealist philosopher, but it was he who
    advanced some categories such as essence and function, the one and the
    many, word and idea “which help us recognize and master the focal point
    in the web of natural phenomena.” Despite his incorrect presentation of


Output:
these categories, his advancement of them marked a step forward in man’s
    knowledge, which deserves recognition for its position in the history of
    philosophy. Only after Wang Bi first posed the concepts of “taking nonbeing
    as essence” and “forget the words having grasped the concept” did there
    appear Ouyang Jian’s later theory of “The Word Expresses the Concept”
    (Yan jin yi lun) and Pei Wei’s “On the Exaltation of Being” (Chong you lun).
    Therefore, the study of the concepts and categories in the history of
17.1   The Significance of Studying the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese. . .   211


Output:
philosophy and their development constitutes an indispensable link in cor-
     rectly appraising materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy.
   Third, Engels believed that the study of philosophies of the past was the only
     way to temper one’s theoretical thinking. A scientific history of philosophy
     can certainly play such a role, and a scientific history of man’s knowledge
     essentially would be the history of the development of concepts and catego-
     ries. Since concepts and categories in the history of philosophy reflect man’s
     deepening knowledge, when we study its development, we are rethinking in
     our own thought the process of man’s coming to know the world. Of course
     we discard the accidental and secondary factors and grasp the essential,
     normative content. This process of rethinking inevitably deepens our own
     thought. In our study of the development of concepts and categories, we not


Output:
only relive the process of mankind using concepts and categories to under-
     stand the world but invariably use certain methods to revisualize them.
     That method can only be one of making a theoretical analysis of the contents
     of the concepts and categories and the relationships between them and the
     logical relationships in their development. Such a process of analysis itself is
     a kind of theoretical thinking. In this sense, this study can help us improve our
     ability for theoretical thinking.
    The abovementioned three points give only the general significance of studying
philosophical concepts and categories, for that significance exists in the study of the
history of any philosophy (e.g., the Western or Indian). However, the study of the
categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and its history of development has also
its particular significance; namely, it will enable us to understand the characteristics


Output:
and level of development of traditional Chinese philosophy. Western philosophy
has its own categorical system; its characteristics and the different levels of
development of its philosophical thinking at different historical stages are reflected
in the development from Aristotle’s Categories to Hegel’s Logik. The categories
used in the primitive Indian Buddhism and the categories of the Kunya and Bhava
sects of Mahayana, more or less in succession and each with its striking features,
represent the fairly high-level Indian Buddhism attained in logical thought and
categorical analysis. Traditional Chinese philosophy has its own concepts and
categories which gradually formed a fairly comprehensive system. Because of
this, it will not do just to take them in terms of the concepts and categories of
Western philosophy nor will it do to take them in terms of the Marxist philosophical
concepts and categories.
    Except for a few concepts taken from Indian Buddhism, the concepts and


Output:
categories which have taken form in the long history of Chinese philosophy
basically developed independently, hence their striking features. For example, the
heavenly way (Tian dao) and the human way (ren dao) as a pair of categories
were very important in the history of Chinese philosophy. Therefore, traditional
Chinese philosophy not only paid considerable attention to the study of the rela-
tionship between the Heaven and man but paid special attention to the study of the
212      17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
relationships between man and man (society). Another example is the pair of
categories ti and yong which contain the meanings of not only noumenon and
phenomenon but also base and function, whole and part, and abstract and concrete.
Such series of pairs of concepts and categories reflect not only the characteristics of
traditional Chinese philosophy but also the level of theoretical thinking at a certain
stage of historical development. To make a not completely apt comparison:
traditional Chinese medicine certainly has its own particular tradition with its
own particular theoretical system, medical terms, and concepts. Despite the fact
that we have not found clear scientific explanations for some of the theories and
achievements, since it does achieve good results in medical treatment, it must
reflect certain aspects of objective reality and contain fairly profound truths.
Since concepts and categories are necessary conditions for the formation of knowl-


Output:
edge and play a pivotal role in linking the subjective to the objective, definite
concepts and categories reflect definite achievements made by man in recognizing
certain aspects of objective reality through his theoretical practice; hence,
different concepts and categories mark different depths of man’s cognition.
Therefore, when we study the concepts and categories at different stages of the
development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we can see the level of theoretical
thinking at the different stages of development of Chinese history.
    In the history of Chinese philosophy, there are three periods during which
schools made major contributions to the formation of the categorical system of
traditional Chinese philosophy, namely, the various pre-Qin schools, the metaphys-
ical school (xuanxue) of the Wei and Jin, and the Neo-Confucianism (Lixue) of the
Song and Ming dynasties. When we compare the categorical system of traditional


Output:
Chinese philosophy in the three stages with those of the Western philosophy, we are
impressed by its distinct features and fairly high level. This comparison between the
categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and those of other countries,
nations, and regions constitutes an important subject in comparative philosophy.


Output:
17.2    How to Study the Concepts and Categories
        of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
Fundamentally speaking, the study of the concepts and categories of traditional
Chinese philosophy requires the scientific analytical method of Marxism. Merely to
pose the concepts and categories used in the history of Chinese philosophy is
contrary to the goal of our study. For that will not uncover the laws governing the
development of philosophical thought, nor will it help us better to understand
the laws of the struggle between materialism and idealism, or to improve our
theoretical thinking; in particular, we will be unable to recognize the characteristics
and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. To achieve our goal, it is necessary to
use the scientific analytical method of Marxism to (1) analyze the meaning of
the concepts and categories, (2) investigate the development of those meanings,
(3) analyze the systems of concepts and categories of philosophers or philosophical
schools, and (4) study the similarities and differences between the concepts and


Output: 17.2     How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy          213


Output:
categories of Chinese and foreign philosophies. It is only on the basis of such an
analysis that it is possible to advance the study of the history of Chinese philosophy
along a scientific path.

17.2.1 Analysis of the Meaning of Concepts and Categories


Output:
The advancement of one or of a pair of concepts (categories) marks the level of
man’s understanding of the world, yet it is up to us to make an analysis of the
meaning of such a concept or pair of concepts. When ancient philosophers
advanced a new concept, they did not have as clear and scientific an understanding
of its meaning as we do today; this is particularly true of the concepts they used to
explain the origin of the world. For instance, Laozi (Lao Tzu) was the first man to
advance the “way” (dao) as the paramount category in his philosophical system.
This concept of the “way” he advanced as an antithesis to the contemporary concept
of “respecting Heaven.” By taking the “way” as the origin of the world, Laozi
(Lao Tzu) certainly raised the level of ancient Chinese philosophical thinking. But
what was the meaning of the “way”? Laozi (Lao Tzu) himself found it difficult to
give a clear definition. He said: “I do not know its name; I call it Dao. If forced to


Output:
give it a name, I shall call it Great.” Therefore, he used quite a number of adjectives
to describe the “way,” such as “soundless and formless,” “eluding and vague,” and
“deep and obscure.” Obviously, with the limitations of the objective conditions
and their level of knowledge, the ancient philosophers found it difficult to give lucid
definitions of the concept of the origin of the world.
   Thus, it is necessary for us to investigate the meaning of the concept of the
“way” in the light of the book Laozi (Lao Tzu).1 The term “spontaneity” (ziran) was
widely used by ancient Chinese philosophers, but each had his own definition.
It was Laozi (Lao Tzu), too, who was the first to use “spontaneity” as a philosoph-
ical concept, by which he generally meant non-activity. Wang Chong of the Han
Dynasty continued this usage when he wrote: “The Heavenly way is spontaneous
non-activity.” By the time of the Wei and Jin dynasties, the proponents of


Output:
non-activity such as Wang Bi and Xiahou Xuan practically took “spontaneity” for
the “way”—that is, the primal stuff of the universe. Xiahou Xuan wrote: “Heaven
and earth operate with spontaneity and the sage functions following spontaneity.
Spontaneity is the way, which originally had no name and Laozi (Lao Tzu) was
forced to give it a name.”
   Even the same philosopher had different definitions for “spontaneity.” We can
use Guo Xiang’s definitions of “spontaneity” as an example for analysis. He
identified at least five connotations for “spontaneity.” First, the actions of Heaven
and man are “spontaneous.” In his annotations of Zhuangzi (the chapter, The Great
Teacher), he wrote: “He who knows the deeds of both Heaven and man is a sage,


Output:
1
    See “Early Daoist Theories of Life and Death, and Spirit and Form,” Zhexue Yanjiu, 1 (1981).
214      17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
means knowing the deeds of Heaven and man is spontaneity.” Thus, Guo Xiang
looked not only at the natural phenomena but also at man’s deeds as in a sense
spontaneous; in what sense could this be so? Second, “working for oneself” (ziwei)
is “spontaneity.” Guo Xiang said: “To say that matter is spontaneous means
non-activity.” He also wrote: “We value this non-activity and matter’s working
for itself.” Then why is “working for itself” a kind of “non-activity”? Third,
“being self-willed” is “spontaneity.” Guo Xiang held that “working for oneself”
is “spontaneity,” but “working for oneself” does not mean acting wilfully but
“acting by one’s nature,” namely, “acting in accordance with one’s nature, that
is, spontaneity, thus called nature (xing).” “According to spontaneity” means
“according to one’s nature,” that is, neither making others succumb to oneself nor
allowing oneself succumb to another. Fourth, “inevitability” is “spontaneity.” Guo


Output:
Xiang wrote: “Knowing the reality of destiny one will not seek what lies beyond it,
but just to fulfill one’s nature.” One who “knows his destiny” will not ask for what
cannot be done—this is called “spontaneity.” Destiny here means “inevitability.”
Fifth, “chance is spontaneity.” Guo Xiang wrote: “Things are all spontaneous,
acting without knowing why or how it should be so.” By not knowing the reason
of action, “spontaneity” implies “chance.” Therefore, when the philosophers were
trying to explain “self-generation,” they often employed such terms as “suddenly”
or “abruptly”—all meaning that things exist without reason, the causality being
beyond explanation.
    According to Guo Xiang, “spontaneity” has the abovementioned five
interconnected meanings, of which the last two are most important, that is, “spon-
taneity” has the meaning of both “inevitability” and “chance.” Actually, they are a
pair of antagonistic concepts and, from the dialectical point of view, are mutually


Output:
connected and transform themselves into each other, with inevitability manifesting
itself through chance. Guo Xiang used the term “spontaneity” to explain both
“inevitability” and “change,” precisely because he saw the relationship of mutual
dependence between them: that a matter so exists is “inevitable” in one respect
because “things emerge by themselves abruptly.” In Guo Xiang’s philosophical
system, things must have these two aspects. From this analysis of Guo Xiang’s
definition of the concept of “spontaneity,” we can see the general characteristics
and level of the philosophy of Guo Xiang.


Output:
17.2.2 Analysis of the Development of the Meanings
       of Concepts and Categories

Not only do the meanings of concepts and categories differ from one philosopher
to another, at different times, they also differ in meaning. Nevertheless, if philo-
sophical thoughts follow one another, it is always possible to discover the relation-
ship of succession between these concepts and categories. The study of their
development is extremely important for understanding the laws of the development
17.2   How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy   215


Output:
of man’s knowledge. In the following, we will analyze the growth of the concept
of qi (often translated as material force, ether, or fluid—tr.) in traditional Chinese
philosophy.
    Some thinkers as early as the spring and autumn period already discussed the
impact of qi on man. For example, the Zuo Zhuan mentioned “the six qi” in the
medical theory recorded in the first year of the reign of Duke Zhao of Lu (B.C. 541).
By the Warring States period, qi became a general concept. People not only
believed that the body of man was made of qi, but some believed that the spirit of
man also was made of qi. In “White Heart,” “Inner Function,” and “Mechanism of
the Heart” chapters of the book Guanzi, it was said: “As for essence ( jing), it is the
essence of qi”; “the qi of all things changes and thus becomes life”; “when qi goes
to the ground, grains grow; when it goes into the heavens, there emerge the
constellations; when it floats in the air, it becomes ghosts and spirits; when it


Output:
goes into man’s chest, the man becomes a sage,” and “therefore when there is qi,
there is life; when there is no qi, there is death,” etc. According to these thinkers,
among the “qi” there is an “essential qi” the life giver. When such an “essential qi”
enters the body of a man, he becomes wise and turns into a sage.
    During the Warring States period, this unscientific theory of “essential qi” was
used to explain man’s spirit. If we considered it materialist, it would be a materialist
viewpoint with grave defects which, under certain circumstances, were used by
idealists and turned into a component part of their system. It could also be utilized
by the supernaturalists who transformed it into a basis for advocating “life without
end.” We know that Mencius also talked about qi and posed a sort of qi called the
“qi of vastness” (hao ran zhi qi). The “White Heart” chapter of the book Guanzi
mentions the “essential qi” that can give man wisdom and “this qi should not be


Output:
checked by strength but should be accommodated by power (de)” which is to say, qi
itself possesses an intelligence which should be consolidated by moral power.
And in the theory of Mencius, his “qi of vastness” is “obtained through accentuating
righteousness.” Obviously, qi in Mencius’ theory has already become spiritual.
    By the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu went a step further and moralized and
mystified qi which became the manifestation of the will and power of God. Dong
Zhongshu held that qi had the power of meting out punishment and award, that
there were good and vicious qi, and that qi had emotions such as happiness, anger,
grief, and joy. So qi, though still retaining material appearance, already lost its
material substance. Later, during the Han period, there were all sorts of supersti-
tious explanations of qi which were indeed the outgrowth of the viewpoint of Dong
Zhongshu.
    From the historical data of the pre-Qin period and the Han Dynasty, we can see


Output:
that the concept of qi is closely linked with questions of spirit and form and thus has
much to do with the question of the preservation of health, which often was deemed
a means to becoming a deity. In Zhuangzi the “true man” (zhenren), the “spiritual
man” (shenren), and others were often described as “with the spirit guarding the
form to achieve longevity,” “drinking dew and breathing the wind instead of eating
grain,” “unifying their nature and preserving their qi.” They made their spirit
integrate with their form so that they could accomplish the goal of “keeping their
216      17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output:
form perfect and replenishing their spirit to be merged into one with Heaven and
earth.” The L€u Shi Chun Qiu includes numerous discussions of the “preservation of
good health” and considers that to “achieve longevity,” qi “should be made to flow
constantly within the body,” and “with essential qi renewed daily, the vicious qi
will go and a full life span will be reached; this is called truth.” In Huai Nan Zi the
preservation of qi, of form, and of nature is the same thing; moreover, all are linked
together with qi. The writers of both of these two books were influenced by the
“theory of essential qi,” in “White Heart,” and other philosophical works. They all
thought that “spirit” (Jingshen) is also a kind of qi, or “essential qi which can reside
or leave the body and that when spirit and body are at one, there will be long life.”
   Meanwhile, some philosophers of the pre-Qin and Han periods held a materialist
view of qi and considered it to be the matter that constitutes the world. Xunzi held


Output:
that everything in the universe, including man, was made of qi. He wrote: “Water
and fire have qi but no life, plants have life but no senses, birds and beasts
have senses but know not righteousness and man has qi, life, senses and also
righteousness.” The chapter “On Spirit” of the book Huai Nan Zi says that the
universe was originally a murky body of original qi without any shape and that later
the interaction of the positive and negative forces gave birth to everything, so
“the dirty qi became worms and the pure essential qi became human beings.”
Wang Chong put it with even greater clarity. He wrote: “The merging of the qi of
Heaven and earth gave birth to everything,” and that was the result of the movement
of qi. He said: “When Heaven moves, it gives qi. . .qi comes out and it gives birth to
things.” In order to oppose Dong Zhongshu’s idealist view of qi, Wang Chong
particularly pointed out that qi has no will, no aim. He said: “qi is void of ambition,


Output:
purpose or scheme”; “qi is like smoke and cloud, how can it listen to man’s
request”? Nevertheless, like the book Huai Nan Zi, Wang Chong took the spirit
of man (or the phenomenon of life) as “essential qi.” He said: “Man lives because he
has essential qi; when man dies, the essential qi vanishes.” An analysis of the
contents of the concept qi in the history of ancient Chinese philosophy reveals
clearly the development of this concept. The three doctrines, or rather definitions,
mentioned above, however, were all merged into the thought of Daoism (Taoism)
toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, which we will not discuss here.


Output:
17.2.3 Analysis of the Systems of Concepts and Categories
       of Philosophers (or Philosophical Schools)

Historically major philosophers, in establishing their philosophical systems, have
invariably used a series of concepts and categories. Thus, the study of the relation-
ships between these concepts and categories is necessary for us to make a thorough
analysis of their theoretical systems. The level a philosopher’s thought reaches
often can be judged by how richly and systematically his concepts and categories
reflect the essential relationships between the objects they are meant to reflect.
17.2   How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy     217


Output:
Divergent views in the study of a past philosopher (or philosophical school)
sometimes arise from the lack of a comprehensive, systematic study of the system
of concepts and categories of that philosopher or school. For example, if we merely
take into account Guo Xiang’s concepts of “being” and “nonbeing” and their
relationship, we might conclude that he was a materialist. But the reason why
Guo Xiang’s philosophy was the zenith of the Wei and Jin metaphysical school was
not that he put forth a view different from that of Wang Bi’s on the relationship
between “being” and “nonbeing” but that he had a fairly complete philosophical
system, an analysis of which reveals that it comprises the following four groups of
basic concepts. (Though there are other important concepts in Guo’s philosophical
system, we will not deal with them here.)
    “Being” and “nonbeing”: The central topic of discussion among the Wei and
Jin metaphysicians was the question of “origin and outcome, being and nonbeing.”


Output:
The philosophy of Guo Xiang might be considered to originate from the discussion
on this topic. Guo believed that “being” (the “being of everything”) is the only thing
that exists; it is constantly present; although being undergoes infinite changes and
transformations, it cannot in any instance become “nonbeing,” and “we say the
Heaven and earth constantly exist because there is no time they have not existed.”
As for “nonbeing,” he held that the creator above “being,” or “the nonbeing”
serving as noumenon, is nonexistence, that is, “nothing.” Thus he said: “Nonbeing
is simply nonbeing, it cannot produce being,” and “I venture to ask whether there is
a creator or not? If not, how can he create things?” Therefore, from the very
beginning, Guo Xiang denied the existence of a “creator” above the being of
“everything” or a “nonbeing” which is the antithesis of “being” which as the primal
body serves as the basis for the existence of being. However, Guo Xiang’s philos-
ophy did not stop here, but went further.


Output:
ophy did not stop here, but went further.
    “Nature” and “destiny”: Since the existence of things is not based on “nonbeing”
as the primal body, then is there an inherent cause for the existence of things?
According to Guo Xiang, one cannot say that the being of “everything” is ground-
less. Since things exist, their very existence is the basis for their existence.
    Specifically, the basis of their existence is their own “nature”: “Everything
has its own nature and every nature has its limit.” “The nature” Guo Xiang meant
is “the reason that things are what they are” which has the sense of “necessity.”
Thus, he said: “Each gets what he deserves by nature; there is no avoiding it nor
adding more.” He also said: “Things have their own nature, so the wise stays wise
till his last day while the dull goes on being dull till his death, neither able to change
halfway.” As for “destiny,” Guo Xiang defined it as “inevitability”; as he put it


Output:
“destiny means things all act spontaneously without anything acting on them” and
“being aware of the impossible.” Obviously, his “nature” and “destiny” are two
concepts he employed to prove the point that “being” alone exists and that
“nonbeing” as creator or primal body is absolutely nonexistent.
    “Self-generated” and “self-sufficient”: The “nature” of things is the basis for
their existence, but how does this “nature” originate? Is its emergence with some
purpose, or condition? Guo Xiang said: “Things exist by themselves without a
source; this is the way of Heaven” and “the emergence of things is just out of their
218      17   Questions Concerning the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy