Output:
4.3     On “Qing Arises from Xing” 情生于性

There are many passages in the pre-Qin classics that discuss the relationship
between xing and qing. For instance, the Xunzi, “Zheng ming,” says: “The emotions
(hao, wu, xi, nu, ai, le) of xing are called qing.” But the connotations of xing and
qing in the pre-Qin classics remain to be dearly distinguished. The Xing zi ming chu
makes two attempts: (1) “emotional (wu, nu, ai, bei) qi is due to xing”9 and

9
  “Qi” here may refer to blood and qi, as in Yu cong no. 1: “Anything that has blood and qi has also
delight and anger, caution and courage.”
60         4 Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
(2) “fondness and dislike are due to xing.” The bamboo text Yu cong no. 2 very
nearly takes all human emotions and desires to “arise from xing”—for instance,
“desire arises from xing,” “dislike arises from xing,” “delight arises from xing,” etc.
These passages all explain that human xing can express all manner of emotions and
that qing is inseparable from xing—there is no such thing as being without qing.
   A similar situation can be found in the Xunzi, in a passage, for instance, that
speaks both of xing and of fondness and dislike: “Nowadays when people’s xing
comes into play, the profit motive comes, too.” I believe that this may have
something to do with the use of “qing xing,” or “xing qing,” in the pre-Qin
classics. We find, for instance, the following:
     The early kings, based on qing xing, . . . (Li ji, “Yue ji”)
        As for the eyes pursuing colors, the ears sounds, the mouth flavors, the mind personal


Output:
benefit, and the body comfort and ease, these are born out of human qing xing. (Xunzi,
     “Xing e”)
        To indulge xing qing prevents one from studying. (Xunzi, “Ru xiao”)


Output:
The qing xing, or xing qing, mentioned here appears to refer either to xing itself
or to the functioning of xing, but we can also say that Xunzi already understood that
there was a distinction between qing and xing. For instance, in the “Tian lun”
chapter, we find the passage, “That emotions (hao, wu, xi, nu, ai, le) are stored
[in the body] is called the natural qing.” The “natural qing” here actually refers to
emotions (qinggan 情感) within the natural xing (i.e., the qing of xing’s emotions
[hao, wu, xi, nu, ai, le]). The various emotions are stored within human xing, which
is the same line of thinking as in the Li ji (“Yue ji”), which says: “The quiescence of
human life is due to natural xing; activity upon response to things is due to desires of
xing.” “Desires” in “desires of xing” refers to none other than qing.10
    It is apparent from this that “Xing is quiescent, qing is active” was a slogan that
may have been common among pre-Qin Ruists (or we must at least say that it was


Output:
an important view among pre-Qin Ruists). For instance, the Xing zi ming chu says:
“Emotional (xi, yue, nu, ai, bei) qi is due to xing. When it manifests externally, it is
due to sensual contact with things (wu qu zhi 物 取 之)”; and again, “What sets the
xing to activity are things (wu). It is the outward expression of human xing excited
internally by external things that manifests as the various emotions (and desires)” it
is another way of saying, “That people are born quiescent is due to the natural xing;
activity upon response to things is due to desires of the xing” (Li ji, “Yue ji”).
Perhaps the most vivid way to put it is the quote from He Ti11 in Li ji zheng yi:
“Xing is to qing as a wave is to water. When it’s calm, it’s water, and when it’s
active, it’s waves. Likewise, when it’s calm, it’s xing, and when it’s active, it’s


Output:
10
   In a response to Emperor Wu, Dong Zhongshu says: “Qing is human desire” (see Han shu,
“Dong Zhongshu zhuan”). Also, Chen Li, in Bai Hu Tong shu zheng, mentions that “Desires of the
xing are qing” (see his note to the line “liu qing ye he wei yen” 六情也何谓也 (what to call the six
qing) in “Xing qing”).
11
   For his biography, see Liang shu, chap. 48, “He Ti zhuan.”
4.4 Distinguishing Qing and Desire                                                                  61


Output:
qing.” This is to say that human xing is our inner quality, and qing is the revealing of
xin’s emotions on becoming active in response to things. Thus, the Zhongyong says:
     The state of pre-activated12 (wei fa 未发) emotions (xi, nu, ai, le) is called moderation, and
     when they are modulated upon activation (yi fa 巳发), it is called harmony. Moderation is
     the great foundation of the world, and harmony is the communicating path of the world.
     Achieving moderation and harmony is where heaven and earth rest and where the myriad
     things flourish. (chap. 1)


Output:
When human xing perceives (gan 感)things, the emotions (qinggan) that are thus
aroused should tally with the cosmic patterning (daoli 道理); tallying with the
cosmic patterning will be of benefit to the growth of the myriad things. Or, as it says
in a commentary to the Zhongyong in the Li ji zheng yi: “with growth and the
acquisition of patterning (li 理), the myriad things are all nurtured.” The same
commentary also says: “The phrase, ‘Harmony is the communicating path of the
world,’ means that although qing and desire activate, if one can achieve harmony,
the cosmic patterning will flow and communicate everywhere.” In short, the arousal
and expression of qing should always conform to patterning.13 We can take the
notion of xing as belonging to preactivation and qing as belonging to activation and
generalize this into the theory of “xing is quiescent, qing is active.” This theory of
“preactivation” and “activation” became an important issue discussed by the Song


Output:
and Ming Ruists, but because it is beyond the scope of this essay, it will be put off
for another time.


Output:
4.4      Distinguishing Qing and Desire

Since ancient times, people have spoken of the “seven qing and six desires.” The
“Li yun” chapter of the Li ji says: “What is human qing? Delight, anger, grief, fear,
love, dislike, desire. These seven are innate abilities.” “Desire” here may be the
“desire” of the subsequent passage: “Drink, food, men, and women are the great
human desires,” which is to say that “drink, food, men, and women” are natural
demands of the human xing. That’s why Gaozi said, “Food and sex are due to xing.”
   Actually, pre-Qin Ruist theories of qing and xing fall into several schools of
thought. Wang Chong mentions in the “Ben xing” chapter of the Lun heng that
there were five such schools of thought and all were expounding on Confucius’
quote, “xing are mutually close” (xing xiang jin 性相近) (17:2). The different
positions held were (1) xing is neither not good (shan 善) nor not not good,


Output:
12
   Translators’ note: the term 发 fa is often translated in terms of “issuing forth” or “arousal.” The
choice is often made depending on whether the usage in a particular passage appears to be active,
passive, transitive, or intransitive. We choose the word “activate” since in its intransitive (admit-
tedly rare in English) use, it means “to become active” and because it can always cover the other
three forms as well.
13
   This issue will be discussed further in the fourth section, “Distinguishing Qing and Desire.”
62         4 Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
(2) xing is good, (3) xing is bad (e 恶), (4) good and bad are mixed (hun 混), and
(5) good or bad depend on whether a person is of higher, middling, or lower quality.
In the “Ben xing” chapter, Wang Chong spoke about the “six qing” as follows: “Of
qing, there are fondness, dislike, delight, anger, grief, and enjoyment,” not listing
desire as one of the qing.
   Mentions of the six qing occurred as early as the pre-Qin era, for instance:
     The people have fondness and dislike, delight and anger, and grief and enjoyment, which
     are expressed in the six qi.14 (Zuozhuan, Duke Shao year 25)
         Dislike, desire, delight, anger, grief, and enjoyment—these six are obstructions of de
     (德).15 (Zhuangzi, “Gengsangchu”)


Output:
Xunzi mentions the six qing several times (see quotations above).16
   As for discussion of the six desires, the earliest may be the passage in the “Gui
sheng” chapter of the Lushi chunqiu that says: “What is called a complete life is that
in which the six desires are all appropriately met,” and to this, Gao You of the Han
Dynasty notes: “The six desires pertain to life, death, the ears, eyes, mouth, and
nose.” The six desires mentioned here all refer to the desires of the senses and are
probably approved of when appropriately met.
   However, the “qing and desire” chapter of the lushi chunqiu says: “The five
sounds that the ear desires, the five colors that the eye desires, and the five tastes that
the mouth desires are of qing.” This may tell us that in the pre-Qin classics, either
qing and desire have not been distinguished yet or that desire is seen as one way of
expressing qing. This would explain why we often see the use of “qing desires”
(qing yu 情欲), as in:


Output:
(qing yu 情欲), as in:
     Before qing desires activate—that is the root origin of human xing. (Shi sari jing zhu shu,
     Li ji, “Zhongyong,” note on “‘Zhong’ is the great root of the world”)17 . . .such are the qing
     desires that humans have. (Xunzi, “Zheng lun”)18 [They] took the reduction of qing desires
     as internal. (Zhuangzi, “Tianxia”)


Output:
However, these three uses of “qing desires” differ significantly. In the note to the
Zhongyong quoted above, “qing desires” refers to qing and whether qing can
be brought into harmony depending on whether they are viewed as good or bad.
The Xunzi advocates the position that xing is bad and therefore takes “qing desires”
to be bad, as in the “Zheng ming” chapter, which says: “Although he be a nobleman
or sovereign, if he nurtures his desires and gives free reign to his qing, he is no


Output:
14
   An annotation to the line “How sages govern the seven qing” of the “Li yun” chapter of the Li ji
quotes Zuozhuan, “Duke Shao year 25,” to say: “Nature has the six qi, which in people become the
six qing and are called delight and anger, grief and enjoyment, and fondness and dislike.”
15
   “Desire” appears among these six but should be taken as “fondness.”
16
   The “Xing qing” chapter of the Han Dynasty Bai Hu Tong yi also mentions the “six qing.”
17
   Also, in Guangya, “Shi gu,” “qing” is glossed as “quiescence.”
18
   Because Xunzi’s “xing is bad” is based on the notion that humans possess desires (e.g., “Now in
regard to human xing, . . . as soon as people are born, they have sensual desires and seek out their
fulfillment. Licentiousness results, and then ritual propriety, yi, culture, and patterning are lost”
[“Xing e”]), one could also say that under this theory, qing is also bad.
4.4 Distinguishing Qing and Desire                                                                   63


Output:
different from a bandit.” Zhuangzi disapproved of desire while approving of
following spontaneous qing, as in “the world is sufficient without desire,” and yet
he believed that the extraordinary person (shen ren 神人) “lives one’s destiny to the
fullest while giving priority to qing.”19 And so, “following” (shuai 率) in the
statement “for qing, nothing is better than following” refers to following what is
genuine. For this reason, xing qing occurs frequently in the Zhuangzi (e.g., “if xing
and qing are not separated, how is one to employ ritual propriety and music?” [“Ma
ti”]). Sometimes, the meaning of xing (or “genuine xing”) in the Zhuangzi can even
include qing (or genuine qing). For instance, the “Ma ti” chapter also says: “the feet
of a horse can cross frost and snow; the fur protects against winter damp. It chews
grass and drinks water, raises its hooves and rears back. This is the genuine xing of
the horse.” The “genuine xing of the horse” is the genuine qing of the horse.


Output:
In addition to “qing” and “yu” being used in concatenation to mean “qing,” and
to qing desires being taken to be bad, ever since the Qin and Han dynasties there has
been the saying, “xing is good, qing is bad.” For instance, Dong Zhongshu of the
Han Dynasty discusses good and bad from the perspective of yin and yang in his
Chunqiu fanlu, “Yang zun yin bei”: “The bad belongs only to yin, and the good only
to yang.” Thus, he believed that xing possesses both good and bad and that it is
associated with ren,20 while the bad side of xing is qing, and qing is greedy. There
are also the following:
   Nature has the processes of both yin and yang, and the person has a xing of avarice and
   ren. . .. How can one not but eliminate desire and suppress qing in response to nature?
   (Xunzi, “Shen cha ming hao”)
       Xing is the yang qi (阳气) of people, and it is good. Qing is the yin qi (阴气) of people,
   and it possesses desires. (Shuowen, “Xin bu” 心部)


Output:
Qing is the category of the emotions (xi, nu, ai, wu); qing as such is human desire. (Da
   dai li, “Zizhang wen ru guan,” note on “达诸民之情” [understand the qing of the people])
       Xing is ren, yi, ritual propriety, wisdom, et cetera; xing as such is the material of life,
   (ibid., note on “bu ke bu zhi min zhi xing” 不可本知民之性 [one must understand human
   xing])
       Qing arises from yin and in accord with momentary desires; xing arises from yang in
   accord with the patternings (li 理). Yang qi is ren, and yin qi is avarice, which is why qing is
   marked by base profit and desire, while xing is marked by ren. (Bai Hu Tong yi, “Xing
   qing,” citing Gou Ming Jue)
       Xing arises from yang; qing arises from yin. (Lun heng, “Bing chu”)


Output:
This “xing is good, qing is bad” line of thinking was very popular during the Han
Dynasty but differed considerably from the “xing is quiescent, qing is active” theory of
the pre-Qin Ruists. “Qing is active” ascribes no valuation to either qing or its activity.
It can be good or not, depending on whether it accords with patterning (or ritual
propriety). Therefore, it does no harm to the view that a sage has qing—Confucius was

19
   Cheng Xuanying noted: “Living one’s xing and destiny to the fullest while giving priority to the
transformations of qing amounts to an unprecedented freedom and happiness through giving
oneself over to nature.”
20
   Dong Zhongshu also had a theory called the “Three Grades of Xing,” which differed from this.
See the chapters “Shen cha ming hao” and “Shi xing” of the Chunqiu fanlu.
64         4 Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of “Dao Begins in Qing”


Output:
a sage, and he had qing. However, into the Wei-Jin Period, a debate arose about
whether or not a sage had qing.21 In the Wang Bi zhuan, He Shao says:
     He Yan believed that sages do not have emotions (xi, nu, ai, le), and he discussed it with
     great precision. His view was followed by Zhong Hui and others. Wang Bi disagreed with
     them, believing that sages who surpassed others had extraordinary acuity (shen ming 神明),
     and sages who were on the same level as others had the five qing. Those of surpassingly
     extraordinary acuity could merge with harmony in penetrating nothingness; those on the
     level of the five qing couldn’t help but respond to things with emotions (ai, le). This being
     the case, the qing of the sage responds to things but does not get caught up in them. Those
     who now take not getting caught up in things and call it not responding to things are very
     wide of the mark. (San Guo zhi, “wei zhi,” juan 28; cited in an annotation to the Zhong hui
     zhuan)


Output:
He Yan believed that sages were purely in accord with the natural order (tian dao)
and did not have qing. For him, normal people had qing, and in their emotions (xi,
nu, ai, le), they might disobey the patternings in giving free rein to them. Wang Bi,
however, believed that sages were the same as others in having the “five qing.” The
sage differs from others not in whether he has emotions (qinggan) but in the fact
that sages “are in full possession of their wits” and are “naturally self-sufficient”
(this is the surpassingly extraordinary acuity). Thus:
     Confucius always understood Yan Hui’s difficult situation, but on meeting him, he couldn’t
     help but be happy; and when Yan Hui died, Confucius couldn’t help but grieve. There are
     often narrow people [i.e., Xun Rong] who think that in this way Confucius could not keep
     his qing in step with the patterning, but now we understand that nature cannot be rebelled
     against. (Wang Bi zhuan)


Output:
None of the natural emotions (ganqing) can be eliminated. This is to say that sages
have qing but also that they can “keep their qing in step with the patterning.” It is
apparent that He Yan was influenced by the Han Dynasty view of “xing is good,
qing is bad,” in addition to inheriting the Lao-Zhuang position of no desires (but
differing from Zhuangzi in not separating qing from desires). Wang Bi, on the other
hand, assimilated the “xing is quiescent, qing is active” position of the pre-Qin
Ruist Zhongyong and other texts. As stated above, Zhuangzi did not favor emo-
tionlessness, but rather desirelessness, and therefore he could not help but distin-
guish qing from desire.
   I think that qing and desire must differ in some way. According to the view of the
pre-Qin Ruists, although qing and desire are both generated from activity resulting
from the xing’s perception (gan) of things, and then the emotions (xi, nu, ai, le) are
manifested externally, “qing” does not include any sense of possession, while


Output: “desire” does have a sense of possession, or acquisition.22 Therefore, we can say


Output:
21
   It may be that the theory of sages being free of qing had its origins in Laozi’s passage, “The dao
of tian has no favorites (wu qin 无亲)” (79).
22
   “Now the people are disheartened, yet the sovereign indulges his desires” (Zuozhuan, “Duke
Heng year 6”). “Desires” in this passages is none other than qingyu and has the sense of possession
or acquisition. Zhu Xi says: “Sensual contact is called qing, . . . [W]hat is pursued is called desire”
(Zhuzi yulei, juan 5).
4.4 Distinguishing Qing and Desire                                                  65


Output:
that emotion (qinggan) and desire (qingyu) are different. Emotions are naturally
manifested demands of xing, while desire always arises out of what “selfish motives”
(si xin 私心) pursue, with the object of acquiring it. Although emotion and desire are
different, this does not mean that desire should be dispensed with. In the pre-Qin
classics, there is no clear distinction made between qing (emotion [qinggan]) and
desire. But whether qing or desire could itself be said to be good or bad depends on
whether or not they are in accord with the patterning (or ritual propriety). The Han
Ruist position of “xing is good, qing is bad” had a tremendous influence on Ruists of
all later periods, such as Li Ao of the Tang, whose Fu Xing shu reads: “That one
becomes a sage is due to xing; that one throws one’s xing into confusion is due to
qing.” In the Song Dynasty, “differentiating pattering from desire” and “preserving
natural patterning while destroying human desire” were promulgated. But this


Output:
“human desire” referred to selfish desire and differed from human qing (emotion
[qinggan]).
    Qing is something that flows forth from xing. It is not the case that qing is
innately not good, so how is it that it ends up as not good? It has to do with things
(wu 物). Due to the influence of things, the qing that flows forth from human xing
turns “not good” if it does not pursue or possess patterning (or propriety). This kind
of pursuit or possession that does not conform to patterning (or propriety) becomes
selfish desire, which then has a damaging effect on society. Zhu Xi says: “Just as
xing stands like the quiescence of water and qing proceeds like the movement of
water, so desire is like the flowing of water that turns into a flood.”23 Thus, it is
apparent that Zhu Xi still continues the “xing is quiescent, qing is active” theory but
clarifies the distinctions between qing and desire, thereby returning to the “activa-
tion” and “preactivation” locution of the Zhongyong. If we take as our basis the


Output:
Xing zi ming chu’s “dao begins in qing, and qing arises from xing” and “xing issues
from ming, and ming descends from tian,” we see that the pre-Qin Ruist position of
“xing is quiescent, qing is active” is without a doubt of more profound theoretical
value than “xing is good, qing is bad.” And we can say that “dao begins in qing”
brings to light the basis for the rise of pre-Qin Ruist moral theory.


Output:
23
     Ibid.
Chapter 5
Some Reflections on New Confucianism
in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
My comments on New Confucianism in this essay will be focused on two broad
issues: the rise of New Confucianism in Chinese mainland during the 1990s and the
questions that New Confucianism addresses in this context.1 The rise of New
Confucianism in contemporary Chinese mainland has attracted much attention
internationally, in particular among scholars in the Chinese-speaking world. It is
therefore important to give shape to this development by defining its salient
features. To my mind, the founding of the International Confucianism Association
(Ruxue Lian-hehui, ICA) in October 1994 in Beijing is a very significant moment in
the rise of New Confucianism. To date, the ICA has had little influence on its
immediate social environment, but the very fact of its existence, considered in the
context of the issues I will be discussing below, would tend to suggest that
Confucianism might one day play an important ideological role in several Asian


Output:
countries. But why should Confucianism assume such importance in these coun-
tries? It is worthwhile to note the following points. First, the inaugural conference
to mark the founding of this Confucian federation in Beijing was attended by
representatives from practically every country in the East and Southeast Asian
region. Previously, this kind of conference on Confucianism would attract repre-
sentatives from mainly China, Japan, and South Korea. When I say China, I include
Taiwan and Hong Kong because they are important parts of the Chinese-speaking
world. But at this 1994 conference, in addition to participants from these countries,
there were also academics from Vietnam, Singapore, and even the Philippines.


Output:
Translated by Gloria Davies
Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry, 2001: 123–134
1
  [Translator’s note] Xin ruxue has been translated as “New Confucianism,” not as
“Neo-Confucianism,” in order to mark the term as referring specifically to modern twentieth-century
interpretations of Confucianism and to avoid confusion with the various historical forms of
Neo-Confucianism dating from the Song Dynasty. For this reason, all references to twentieth-
century xin ruxue in this book have been translated as “New Confucianism.”

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                                    67
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_5
68       5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
Participation from across the Asian region greatly broadened the cultural scope of
this conference and clearly exceeded the scope of the previous ones. Second,
scholars such as Zhang Dainian who took part in this conference and those who
participate in the activities of the ICA are among the foremost scholars of Confu-
cianism in the world today.2 There were also several young scholars in attendance.
The conference was graced by the presence of distinguished scholars such as Kenji
Shimada from Japan and a notable number of prominent scholars based in the
United States such as Theodore de Bary, Tu Weiming, and Cheng Zhongying.
There were also several Taiwanese and Russian scholars there. By contrast, there
were very few scholars from the European countries.
    The obvious disparity at this conference between a minority of European
scholars and the majority of predominantly Asian scholars from various countries
is noteworthy and constitutes a salient feature of contemporary New Confucianism.


Output:
Another feature is the importance attached to this conference by the Chinese
government. This is crucial for understanding the rise of New Confucianism in
Chinese mainland. At the conference, both Deputy Premier Li Lanqing and the
chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Li Ruihuan,
delivered speeches. When the proceedings were over, President Jiang Zemin met
with a number of prominent scholars who were participants at the conference. From
these facts, it is evident that the Chinese government set considerable store by the
conference. The topics discussed there were also diverse, including, among other
things, the history of Confucianism, the renaissance of Confucian studies, the
influence of Confucianism on global culture, and the relation between Confucian-
ism and modern industry.3 At one point during the conference, I said to my friend
Sun Changjiang, “At present, Confucianism in Chinese mainland is like speculating
in shares. The slightest move will send its stock soaring.”


Output:
The major week-long Commemoration Conference for the 2,550th birthday of
Confucius, which began in Beijing and ended in Qufu on 12 October 1999, provides
more recent evidence of the growing importance of Confucianism in the public
culture of Chinese mainland as well as the East Asian region. Jointly sponsored by
the ICA, China’s Confucius Foundation, and UNESCO, the conference drew
together academics and business and political figures. According to Kim Yersu,
who represented UNESCO at the conference, “Today the whole world is taking a
second look at Confucianism as the source of inspiration for the ideas and values
needed to deal with the problems facing humanity as it looks forward to the new
millennium.”4


Output:
2
  [Translator’s note] Zhang Dainian, a professor of philosophy at Peking University, is an inter-
national authority on Chinese cultural and philosophical issues. Tang and Zhang were both
founders of the Academy of Chinese Culture, a leading minjian (nonofficial) enterprise in the
Culture Fever of the 1980s. See Chen Fong-ching’s chapter in this book.
3
  [Translator’s note] The conference proceedings were edited by a committee of the International
Confucianism Association and published by Beijing renmin chubanshe in 1995 under the title
International Studies of Confucianism (Guoji ruxue yanjiu).
4
  [Translator’s note] See the report of the conference in China Daily, 20 October 1999.
5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s              69


Output:
The rise of New Confucianism in contemporary Chinese mainland is also the
outcome of critical reflection on the “Culture Fever” of the 1980s. In the more sober
climate of the 1990s, several Chinese mainland scholars came to regard the Culture
Fever as “radical, overly hasty, irresponsible, Westernized,” and so forth. The
legacy of the May Fourth Movement, often invoked during the 1980s, was also
placed under critical scrutiny. Some scholars have now come to regard the Culture
Fever of the 1980s as having inherited the so-called radical tradition of the May
Fourth Movement. They adopt a negative attitude toward the kind of knowledge
associated with the May Fourth Movement, thus challenging the once unquestioned
authority of the May Fourth Movement as the inaugural moment of modern Chinese
thought.
    It is important to remember that although cultural conservatism has flourished in
Chinese mainland since the 1990s, scholarly inquiry into the viability of cultural


Output:
conservatism had already begun during the 1980s. In order to explore what is at
issue in cultural conservatism, one needs to distinguish between those who adopt a
culturally conservative stance and those who study traditional Chinese culture but
are not culturally conservative in their views. This is an extremely complex task.
Some eminent scholars such as Luo Yijun and Chen Lai openly acknowledge that
they are culturally conservative.5 However, to claim a position of cultural conser-
vatism does not mean that one is automatically aligned to neoconservatism in
contemporary Chinese politics. There is a distinct difference between cultural and
political conservatism. Naturally, there are also those who see a direct relation
between their own cultural conservatism and political neoconservatism. It should
also be noted in this context that scholars like Jiang Qing who seem to be radically
conservative in their cultural attitude are not likely to see too much of a connection


Output:
between their own stance and political neoconservatism in the People’s Republic of
the 1990s. Then there are those who are engaged in research on cultural conserva-
tism but do not themselves adopt a conservative approach to the subject of their
research.
    One may ask why there is now a demand for research into issues of cultural
conservatism. To my mind, the main reason is the emergence of critical attitudes
toward the new “traditional” concepts that have emerged over the last few decades
in Chinese mainland.6 Because these new “traditional” concepts have led to the
view that radicalism is the only effective approach to cultural development, con-
temporary research on cultural conservatism represents a critical response toward
this view. To my mind, this response is not at all surprising at this present stage, nor
is it surprising that some have taken to calling themselves cultural conservatives.


Output:
5
  [Translator’s note] See also Liu Qingfeng’s description of Luo Yijun as someone who “obviously
worshiped Mou Zongsan” and who “became very angry whenever anything was said that did not
accord with Mou Zongsan’s view” in her chapter in this book.
6
  [Translator’s note] This is referring to the “tradition” of Mao Zedong Thought and party
orthodoxy since the 1940s.
70       5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
Let us take Chen Lai, for instance.7 He has reflected at length on formulations of the
past such as “Chinese (ethical) knowledge as the foundation, Western knowledge
(and technology) for practical application” (Zhong xue wei ti Xi xue wei yong); its
reverse, “Western knowledge (and technology) as the foundation, Chinese (ethical)
knowledge for practical application” (Xi xue wei ti Zhong xue wei yong); or yet
another alternative, “Chinese and Western knowledges both as foundation and for
practical application” (Zhong Xi hu wei ti yong). Chen observes that notions such as
“foundation” and “practical application” are inappropriate when applied to Eastern
and Western cultures. He proposes instead a different formulation: “Humanity as the
foundation and synthesis (of Chinese ethical knowledge and Western knowledge and
technology) for practical application” (Renyi wei ti, zonghe wei yong). Chen argues
that what our age requires is the spirit of synthetic culture (zonghe wenhua de


Output:
jingshen). In this formulation, the cultural conservatism of his intellectual orientation
is evident.
    The call for “academic standardization” constitutes yet another aspect of cultural
conservatism in contemporary Chinese mainland, and it has come from two differ-
ent sources. The first is the journal Xueren (Scholars—now defunct), which came
into existence in 1992. In the “Commentary” section of its first issue, the question of
academic standardization was explicitly raised but along quite traditional lines.
Zhongguo shehui kexuejikan (The Journal of Social Sciences), edited by Deng
Zhenglai, also raised the question of academic standards. Broadly speaking, this
journal advocates the adoption of Western sociological standards in Chinese
academic work. The journal later took up the issue of standardization versus
indigenization. To my mind, raising the question of standardization has had a
positive effect on the progress of scholarship in China. At the same time, we


Output:
must not forget that there is clearly room for discussing what standardization really
means. Given that those who have raised this question of academic standardization
are implicitly criticizing what they view as the rashness and superficiality of the
Culture Fever of the 1980s, standardization, if simply accepted in these terms,
brings with it certain problems. Such a view of standardization would tend to be
defined predominantly in terms of negating the Culture Fever of the 1980s. It has
been said that the Culture Fever of the 1980s produced ideas but lacked scholarship,
while the craze for national studies in the 1990s has produced scholarship but is
lacking in ideas. Evidently, comments of this kind are groundless, but nonetheless
they give us some idea of what people are thinking.
    One other outcome of the critical reevaluation of the Culture Fever of the 1980s
is the emergence or resurgence of a keen interest in historical studies of the late


Output:
Qing period among contemporary Chinese mainland scholars. This new trend is
bound up with ideas of reformism (as opposed to revolution) and positive
reevaluations of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the nineteenth century.


Output:
7
 [Translator’s note] Professor Chen Lai teaches Chinese philosophy at Peking University and is a
specialist in the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. He has also published on the
popular reception of Confucianism and on Confucian ethics in relation to Chinese modernization.
5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s              71


Output:
Thus, two different editions of the Collected Works of Zeng Guofan have been
published in Chinese mainland, together with a collection of his personal corre-
spondence and several biographies about him. We have also seen the publication of
biographies of Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang and other such case studies of
influential individuals and events of the late Qing. This surge of interest in studies
of the late Qing is part of a growing intellectual trend that views revolution as being
inferior to reform. It is based on the belief that China would have been better off had
it continued along the path of reform (gailiangzhuyi) and Western-style “self-
strengthening” (Yangwu yundong).
    Naturally, essays like the ones that appear in Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu’s contro-
versial book Farewell to the Revolution (Gaobie geming) have elicited two kinds of
responses in Chinese mainland, of which the views of Sun Changjiang and Fang
Keli can be taken as representative. Sun Changjiang is strongly opposed to the kind


Output:
of view put forward by Li Zehou in Farewell to the Revolution and accuses Li of
lacking any sense of social responsibility and historical mission by regressing to
such a standpoint. Fang Keli, on the other hand, has analyzed Li Zhou’s essays as
being a case of not merely “bidding farewell to the revolution” but opposing
revolution altogether. Thus, when Sun Changjiang told me that he wanted to
publish his criticism of Li Zehou, I told him that Fang Keli had already criticized
him in print and that he should wait for a while or Li Zehou would be under siege
from all sides. For this reason, he delayed publishing his criticism of Li Zehou.8
    One important cultural and ideological context for the rise of New Confucianism
is the deepening challenge posed to Marxism in Chinese mainland. For instance, a
certain member of the Chinese leadership raised the issue of “national studies”
(guoxue) at a speech given at a university in Beijing. When members of the


Output:
audience then asked him whether explicit reference to national studies might not
be seen to constitute a blatant promotion of Confucianism and traditional Chinese
culture, they were implicitly asking this leader to clarify whether it was necessary to
dress national studies in Marxist garb. This leader made it quite clear that national
studies could be advocated without resort to such political packaging. On another
occasion, when this member of the Chinese leadership was conversing with a
foreign political scientist, the foreign political scientist asked him whether China
would invade other countries once it had become strong. The Chinese leader replied
that China would not “because we have Confucianism.” At the inaugural meeting of
the ICA, another political leader, Li Ruihuan, quoted from Mencius in at least five
or six places in his speech and was roundly applauded by the audience each time.
    The work of compiling and editing textbook materials for ethical and moral


Output:
education proceeded apace in the 1990s, and it is not surprising that most of these
materials are based on Confucianism. What needs to be noted is that this kind of


Output:
8
  [Translator’s note] Sun Changjiang eventually published the review in 1996 under the name
Chang Jiang, “Zhehui zhuanxing qi de yizhong wenhua xianxiang: Ping Gao bie geming” (“A
Curious Cultural Phenomenon during Social Transition: A Critique of Farewell to the Revolution,”
Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century), no. 33 (February 1996): 68–71.
72       5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
work has the full support of the government. Since the appearance of the highly
significant full-page article “The Quiet Rise of National Studies at Old Peking
University” (“Guoxue zai yanyuan qiaoran xingqi”) in the 16 August 1993 issue of
Renmin rihao (The People’s Daily), Confucianism has gained ever increasing
official support. In 1993, The People’s Daily was commended for publishing this
article, which was said to have been circulated to all members of the party
leadership. In 1999, particularly at the time of the Commemoration Conference
for the 2,550th birthday of Confucius, party leaders publicly emphasized the
importance of turning to Confucianism for solutions to contemporary social
problems.9
    The journal Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophical Studies) published several articles in
its June 1994 issue that criticized the rise of national studies and expressed alarm at
the deviation it represented from the new socialist culture of post-Mao China. Hu


Output:
Sheng, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), published an
article in Liaowang (Outlook), a journal widely read in official circles, in the same
year endorsing these published critiques of national studies. The appearance of this
concerted attack on national studies led the journal Kong xue yanjiu (Confucian
Studies) to hold a conference in early 1995 that, in turn, criticized Philosophical
Studies and Hu Sheng, singling out the detractors of national studies by name. This
was something quite unprecedented, for Hu Sheng was someone whom most would
not have dared to openly criticize. The organizers of the conference took the further
step of publishing a summary of the conference in the first issue of Confucian
Studies for 1995. The third issue of this journal in the same year carried an article by
Liu Hongzhang entitled “Some Thoughts on the Relation between Marxism and
Confucianists” (“Guanyu Makesizhuyi yu rujia guanxi de sikao”) that further


Output:
affirmed these criticisms of the president of the CASS. In these various examples,
it is evident that the ideological authority of Marxism was being actively challenged
in society and, in particular, within the precincts of the university.
    Another important context for the rise of New Confucianism is the support that
Confucian studies have received from the commercial sphere in contemporary
Chinese mainland. In the 1990s, a considerable number of conferences and publi-
cations and even some scholarships and grants for research on traditional Chinese
culture received financial support from business enterprises. For instance, I
attended a symposium in 1995 on Confucianism and modern business jointly
organized by the Shenzhen-based Chao Shun Group and the Oriental Cultures
Research Association (Dongfang wenhua yanjiu hui). In October of the same
year, another symposium called “China’s Buddhist Culture and Modern Society”
received funding from the entrepreneur Mei Zi.10 Several conferences on Chinese


Output: or Confucian studies sponsored by business enterprises have been held in different


Output:
9
 [Translator’s note] See also the short critical review by Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hi-tech Confucian
Future,”FreeRepublic.com, www.freerepublic.com/forum/a38058d9d3d3c.htm, 14 October 1999.
10
   Mei Zi is a female entrepreneur based in Beijing who owns real estate in the Beijing suburb of
North Putuo used mainly for film and television production.
5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s             73


Output:
cities across China. The journal Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture), edited by Liu
Mengxi, receives an annual donation of some 200,000 yuan from another entrepre-
neur, Xie Yongjian. Similarly, Yuan dao (Original Path), edited by some of the
younger scholars at Peking University, receives funding from a business enterprise
in Hainan. The chief executive officer of the Chao Shun Group, Wu Xiegang, has
also provided scholarship funds for the establishment of the Society for Moral
Cultivation (Xiusheng xuehui) at Peking University. There are many such examples
demonstrating that research on Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture has
received substantial financial support from the Chinese business sector. Besides
these more conspicuous examples, large numbers of business people show an avid
interest in Confucian studies, and some, such as the aforementioned Chao Shun
Group, even invoke Confucian values by stating that the company’s philosophy is


Output:
“Harmony as the supreme value” (he wei gui). To gain perspective on the trend for
national studies and the emergence of what has been called cultural conservatism in
Chinese mainland of the 1990s, one needs to reflect on the important role played by
the commercial sector in fueling this trend.
    My own view on the trend toward national studies is that it is likely to have at
least three important and culturally complex outcomes. It may serve the interests of
the government and become the basis for opposing Westernization. It may be
hailed, in the name of patriotism, as the return to nationalism through the celebra-
tion of Chinese cultural quintessence. This is not only a likely scenario but also an
unfortunate reality to some extent, for several instances of such sentiment have
been publicly and even violently expressed over the last few years. Most people
know that the emphasis on patriotism and national pride in contemporary Chinese


Output:
mainland is closely linked to, and a development out of, the “opposition to
bourgeois liberalization” within the national ideology. As early as 1993, I expressed
my concern over the likely negative social effects of national studies deployed for
ideological and political purposes. Today, such effects are evident in Chinese
mainland society. In this regard, the undermining of Marxism as the ideological
foundation of the People’s Republic of China, to which I refer earlier, requires
careful analysis. More positively, the turn toward cultural conservatism is likely to
produce substantial research in traditional Chinese studies. For some decades, in the
periods before and during the Cultural Revolution, a negative attitude to traditional
Chinese culture prevailed. In statistics produced at a 1984 symposium in Shanghai
organized by the Shanghai People’s Press, it became clear that there was a notable
discrepancy in the numbers of publications on Chinese culture between two thirty-


Output:
year periods, 1919–1949 and 1949–1979.11 Between 1919 and 1949, there were
more than 200 types of publications dealing specifically with Chinese culture. In the
period from 1949 to 1979, there was only one kind of publication dealing specif-
ically with Chinese culture, not including philosophy textbooks. At this sympo-
sium, it was decided that the gap should be addressed by the publication of a series


Output:
11
   This was a symposium dealing with issues emerging from the editing of the History of Chinese
Culture Series.
74       5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
on the history of Chinese culture that would comprise 100 books. The relatively
long period of stagnation that research on traditional Chinese culture underwent
from 1949 to 1979, and perhaps even some years beyond that, has clearly affected
its development.
    Thus, the question is whether the contemporary trend toward national studies
can produce substantial research on traditional Chinese culture and exercise a
decisive influence, irrespective of whether one regards this influence as positive
or negative. For instance, a number of scholars have begun to conduct meticulous
research on specific aspects of traditional Chinese culture. Everyone is aware of the
tremendous interest that The Book of Changes (Yi Jing) has attracted in Chinese
mainland in recent years. There are, however, few people who actually know a great
deal about The Book of Changes. The Book of Changes developed out of the
practice of divination by tortoiseshell and straws (bu shi). The practice of divination


Output:
led to the study of diagrams and the positions of strokes within diagrams (xiang
shu), which later became constitutive of the principles of The Book of Changes.
Nowadays, most people who make use of, write about, or read The Book of Changes
are familiar only with the principles of this classic. They are ignorant of the ancient
practice of divination and the study of diagrams and stroke positions that preceded
these principles. Thus, they are unable to produce any rigorous interpretation of The
Book of Changes. In order to engage with this text in a significant way, one would
need to examine the specific contexts of its emergence and dissemination. A
somewhat different example would be the Mawangdui silk scrolls that have now
been almost entirely reproduced in print. In the past, studies of the Mawangdui silk
scrolls were based mainly on existing commentaries. Now that the original
Mawangdui texts have been published and made widely available, Mawangdui


Output:
research based on secondary sources alone is no longer regarded as valid. This is
one instance in which a decisive shift toward substantial research on traditional
Chinese culture has taken place.
    In referring to substantial research on traditional Chinese culture, I mean both
the study of specific aspects of Chinese culture and the study of traditional Chinese
culture as a whole, as several scholars have already posed the question of how
traditional Chinese culture should be approached as a totality. Among these
scholars is the late Professor Feng Qi, who is the author of The Quest for Wisdom
(Zhihui de tansuo) and Three Essays on Wisdom (Zhihui san lun).12 Professor Feng
was a Marxist who happened to have studied under two eminent modern philoso-
phers, Jin Yuelin and Feng Youlan, in his youth at the West China Union University
(Xinan lianda) during the War of Resistance against Japan. Thus, he had consider-
able expertise in logical analysis. In the last years of his life, he set himself the task


Output: of applying the Western method of logical analysis to traditional Chinese culture in


Output:
12
   [Translator’s note] Feng Qi (1915–1995) became the foundational professor of philosophy when
the Department of Philosophy was established at East China Normal University, Shanghai, in
1986. The ten-volume Collected Works of Feng Qi (Feng Qi wenji) was published by Huadong
shifandaxue chubanshe in 1996.
5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s           75


Output:
order to produce a new understanding of Chinese culture. Unfortunately, this highly
significant project could not be completed because Feng passed away in 1995.
When he turned eighty in 1994, I wrote to him, mentioning that I had read the
doctoral dissertation he wrote on “wisdom” when he was at the West China Union
University. I asked him whether he had considered resuming and further developing
the path he had mapped in his doctoral dissertation, one that his former teacher Jin
Yuelin had laid down. At that time, I had not had the chance to read his then
forthcoming publication Three Essays on Wisdom. After reading it, I discovered
that he had done precisely that. The point of this anecdote is to illustrate the
importance of the approach that one adopts in relation to studies of Chinese
culture. In order to produce meaningful substantial studies of traditional Chinese
culture, one needs to be mindful of the global context in which we now conduct


Output:
our research. In other words, we must locate our research on traditional Chinese
culture within the general trend toward the development of global culture in
our time. If we were to depart from this trend, the consequences could be
extremely dangerous, for national studies might easily be manipulated to serve
the interests of cultural chauvinism and nationalism, resulting in the
politicization of academic research.
    We need to also consider the nature of the relationship between the old Chinese
tradition of several thousand years and the “new tradition” of the last few decades.
Evidently, the nature of this relationship is highly complex. One can see this in the
work of Jin Guantao. In this regard, the extreme leftism of Marxist dogmatism that
prevailed in China for several decades in this century needs to be considered as
well. Is there a significant difference between the principles informing this form of
dogmatism and Confucianism? To my mind, there is a significant difference


Output:
between the two. This difference can be explored through a number of central
issues. The first is that of struggle (douzheng) versus harmony (hexie). One of the
first attempts to address this issue was undertaken by scholars like Chen Fong-
ching and Liu Shu-hsien at a symposium in Hong Kong in 1985, which I attended.
At that time, the problem was defined in terms of the difference between Confu-
cianism and the kind of Marxism that was based on class struggle as its guiding
principle. Thus, there was no question that the difference between the two was
immense. Feng Youlan had also discussed this issue in his seven-volume A New
History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zexue shi xin hian). The seventh
volume of this collection deals with this issue and for this reason could not be
published in Chinese mainland. It was eventually published in Taiwan.13 Feng
addresses the gulf between Confucianism and Marxism in the form of Mao
Zedong Thought, arguing that the latter was a philosophy of struggle based on


Output: the idea that “enmity must remain enmity to the end” (chou bi chou daodi). This


Output:
13
  [Translator’s note] See Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi xin bian, 7 vols. (Taipei, Taiwan:
Lan Deng wenhua shiye gufen gongsi, 1991). Editions of the same work published in Chinese
mainland contain only six volumes.
76      5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
means that the struggle must continue until one’s enemy is vanquished. Confu-
cianism, however, is entirely different from this, for it proposes that “enmity must
be harmonized and thereby dispelled” (chou bi he er jie). Although “through
opposing positions, enmity arises” (you dui si you chou), at the end of struggle, the
need for conciliation will also certainly emerge. This notion first appeared in the
Correct Discipline for Beginners (Zheng Meng) by Zhang Zai (1020–1077) and
was later elaborated by Wang Fuzhi (1619–1693) in his Commentary on the
Correct Discipline for Beginners (Zheng Meng zhu).
    Another significant difference between Marxism and Confucianism is that
Marxism is primarily a form of scientism. It is a mode of thinking grounded in
the principles of science, whereas Confucianism is a humanistic mode of thinking.
Confucianism does not proceed along the path of science nor does it subscribe to
principles of science. As a mode of thinking, Confucianism is not based on


Output:
demonstrable proof or evidence (lunzheng). Rather, it relies on intuition (zhijue).
A third difference between Confucianism and Marxism can be defined in terms of
the debate between Liang Shuming and Mao Zedong. Liang Shuming was opposed
to the Marxist concepts of class struggle and the class nature of social existence. He
subscribed instead to the idea of universal humanity. This was what Liang Shuming
told me in 1938 or 1939. When he read Mao Zedong’s The Protracted War (Lun
chijiu zhan), he was most impressed and felt that what Mao had written of the
“protracted war” was very convincing. Thus, Liang went to Yan’an to meet with
Mao. On the first day that he met with Mao, things went very well because the
discussion was confined primarily to Mao’s book on protracted war. By the second
day, however, when the discussion shifted to class struggle, the two men quarreled
right through the night. The debate turned on questions about whether there was


Output:
such a thing as universal humanity and what was meant precisely by “class
struggle.” That the difference between Confucianism and Marxism is significant
can be gleaned from the incommensurability of these two questions.
    Thus, while the new tradition of the last few decades and the old tradition of
several thousand years are complexly related to one another, one should note that
the new “tradition” that we have been advocating for the last few decades differs
significantly in content from the old tradition. From this an important question
arises: Can Confucianism be steered toward radicalism, to the extent that it
becomes a form of leftist extremism? This is a question worthy of further reflection,
for if it can be demonstrated that Confucianism can become extreme and usher in an
ideological trend of leftist extremism or radicalism, then the argument I have put
forward in the preceding becomes problematic. In this context, I think it is neces-


Output:
sary to distinguish between different tendencies within Confucianism itself. One
should distinguish between those aspects of Confucianism that are compatible with
the new “tradition” of the last few decades and those that are not.
    Two individuals can be named to illustrate this distinction. The first is Tu
Weiming, especially in relation to his more recent ideas. At a conference that we
both attended in Hangzhou in November 1994, Tu Weiming was, to my surprise,
critical of certain fundamental features of traditional Chinese culture such as the
complementary relation between “the three bonds” (san gang) and “the five
5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s                   77


Output:
constant virtues” (wu chang).14 He observed that “the three bonds” were no longer
acceptable, called for their repudiation, and proposed that “the three bonds” be
regarded separately from “the five constant virtues.” This came as a total surprise to
me because he would not have made this sort of distinction in the past. When he
raised this issue, another scholar at the same conference, Wang Yuanhua, immedi-
ately responded by saying, “How do you propose to distinguish between them? It is
impossible to separate the two as they are bound together in their historical
development.” Naturally, Tu Weiming then proceeded to defend his argument,
but, as his explanation is not relevant to the point I am making here, I shall not
elaborate on it.
    What this exchange between Tu and Wang makes clear is that there is a crucial
difference in their views on Confucianism. It is also clear that Tu Weiming has
shifted from his previous position on Confucianism. When I later reflected on what


Output:
this crucial difference might be, it occurred to me that Tu Weiming has had to adapt
New Confucianism to the demands of contemporary global cultural discourse,
especially within the modern Western cultural context where “the three bonds”
might not be readily acceptable.15 If he did not do this, then his advocacy of New
Confucianism might meet with a good deal of resistance. Thus, I am of the opinion
that the separation Tu Weiming has sought to effect between “the three bonds” and
“the five constant virtues” is largely the practical outcome of advocating New
Confucianism from a particular vantage point—and not the result of attempting
to resolve a philosophical conundrum. Wang Yuanhua, on the other hand, bases his
argument on historical fact. As the “three bonds” and “the five constant virtues”
have developed together in history, one cannot easily distinguish between them or
treat them separately without distorting their conceptual and historical significance.


Output:
But what is interesting to note is that Wang Yuanhua has also changed his view
quite considerably. Most people are aware that before June Fourth, Wang was an
advocate of “the New Enlightenment” (Xin Qimeng). What is more, in the years
before the Cultural Revolution, he was recognized as someone who firmly upheld
the value of the May Fourth Movement. But in the 1990s, he has turned his research
interests to Du Yaquan and has moreover written about Du in highly positive terms.


Output:
14
   [Translator’s note] The three bonds refer to the three axiomatic human relationships named by
Confucius: between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife. In general, the three
bonds are regarded as the basis for defining different modes of proper or ethical conduct in social
life, depending on the social position one occupies. The five constant virtues are regarded as innate
properties of the cosmic order that manifest in human form as love (ren), righteousness (yi),
propriety (li), wisdom (zhi), and good faith (xin). The common phrase san gang wu chang indicates
how well entrenched the idea of mutual interdependence between these concepts is in the Chinese
language.
15
   [Translator’s note] This is referring to the emphasis Tu Weiming places on the relevance of
Confucianism for contemporary Western (or even more specifically North American) cultural
enrichment in the context of Tu’s institutional prominence as director of the Harvard-Yenching
Institute.


Output:
Institute.
78        5 Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Chinese Mainland Culture of the 1990s


Output:
In 1993, there was even a conference on Du Yaquan held in Zhejiang.16 The
changes in Tu Weiming’s and Wang Yuanhua’s views allow us to consider a new
question and that is whether antitraditionalist and traditionalist positions of a former
era might not converge or become collaborative rather than opposed to one another
in the present-day context. This question will in turn require us to reconsider the
needs of contemporary Chinese scholarship in new ways.
   What we must also remember is that the government is interested in advocating
traditional Confucianism as the ethical and cultural core of Chinese society. It is
not interested in scholarly or critical inquiries of the kind that are currently being
pursued in the name of modern New Confucianism. As I noted earlier, one of the
main reasons for this new turn to Confucianism has to do with the decline of
Marxism as state ideology. Indeed, one could say that, since the end of the Cultural


Output:
Revolution, most Chinese mainland have lost their faith in Marxism. Yet the
government needs a strong and dynamic ideology to serve as its raison d’eˆ tre in
                                                                                ˙
order to achieve its contemporary goal of a united China that includes not only
Hong Kong and Macau but Taiwan as well. In this regard, traditional Confucianism
provides the Chinese mainland government with a wholly valid historical basis for
claiming cultural unity between Chinese mainland and Taiwan. For this reason, we
will need to pay attention to popular response to this ideological shift in Chinese
mainland. In this context, the claim that Confucianism provides the basis for “the
Asian mode” of economic success commonly heard within the Chinese mainland
business sector, not to mention similar claims by governments and business sectors
in other Asian countries, must be treated with great caution.


Output:
16
   [Translator’s note] Du Yaquan (1873–1933), a self-taught writer of popular science and
translator, was an important intellectual figure during the May Fourth era. He founded and edited
the original Dongfang zazhi (The Orient Magazine) and compiled several of China’s first modern
dictionaries of science. According to Xu Jilin, Wang Yuanhua’s interest in Du Yaquan began when
Xu invited Wang to write the foreword for an anthology of Du Yaquan’s selected essays that was
about to be published. Wang found Du Yaquan’s ideas extremely engaging and ended up writing a
foreword of more than ten thousand characters for the anthology. Xu Jilin describes Du Yaquan as
“a cultural conservative and a Confucian liberal at that” and suggests that this was the reason for
his relative anonymity in studies of modern Chinese intellectual history in Chinese mainland until
quite recently. See Xu Jilin’s interesting anecdotal and critical account, “Du Yaquan yu duoyuan


Output:
de Wu Si qimeng,” in Xin yusi dianzi wenku. www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/literature/essays/
Duyaquan.txt, 5 January 2000.
Chapter 6
The Problem of Harmonious Communities
in Ancient China


Output:
In my essay “On the Problem of Truth, Goodness and Beauty in Chinese
Philosophy,” I suggested that the conceptions of truth, goodness, and beauty rest
on three propositions: the unity of Heaven and man, the unity of knowledge and
action, and the unity of sentiment and scenery. Among these, the unity of Heaven
and man is the most fundamental, and it is from this that the other two unities
are derived. The unity of knowledge and action requires that people realize both the
“heavenly way” and the “human way” and practice them in daily life, while the
unity of sentiment and scenery requires that people express Heaven’s work in their
thoughts and feelings.
    Why did the ancient Chinese philosophers pursue these three unities? In my
opinion, Chinese philosophy does not engage in investigating the external world,
but is concerned rather with pursuing internal human values. In other words,
traditional Chinese philosophy teaches people how to be human by making


Output:
demands upon themselves, i.e., to cherish an ideal form of human life. Sagehood
is defined by the attainment of the three unities. Beginning with Confucius, Chinese
philosophers have always aspired to the creation of harmonious societies and have
attempted to bring them into being. Even when unsure of the outcome of their
efforts, they still consider the endeavor to be obligatory. Thus, it was said of
Confucius that he “knew the impossibility [of the task] and yet con-tinued to do
it.” The ideal societies they sought are characterized by harmony, for example, the
Confucian description of a society of “Great Harmony” in the Li Yun chapter of the
Book of Rites, and the “small country with a small population” in Chapter 80 of the
Daoist classic Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching). Such communities exhibit a concor-
dance between man and Heaven, a unity of knowledge and action, and an
intermingling of sentiment and scenery.


Output:
Translated by Yuk Wong
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 55–57

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                     79
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_6
80                          6 The Problem of Harmonious Communities in Ancient China


Output:
But these ideals may not be realized in the actual world. Whether we should
pursue the ideal of harmony is a matter of attitude. Ancient Chinese philosophers
believed that some of their ideals might only be realized in their minds. Why was
Zhang Zai’s “West inscriptions” so highly esteemed by later thinkers? I think it is
because the essay reveals the spirit of an ideal harmonious society. The essay begins
“People are my compatriots; things, my fellow-beings” and ends “Living is fol-
lowing my nature; death, my tranquility.” When alive, one must fulfill the respon-
sibility of realizing the ideal of “Great Harmony.” Thus, one can enjoy serenity
without feeling shame to the end of one’s life.
   This search for an ideal harmonious society differs from Western humanism,
though it can be looked at as humanism of a Chinese type. According to the ancient
Chinese thinkers, only human beings are the most important link between Heaven
and Earth. Sages are capable of “establishing the mind of Heaven and Earth,


Output:
determining the destiny of human lives, restoring discontinued traditions of learning
from the past, and commencing a period of supreme peace for one’s descendants.”
Hence the Confucian notion that men can expand the Way, rather than the other way
around. Although the Way of Heaven is an objective Being, it needs human embodi-
ment. According to ancient Chinese thought, a man can embody the Way when he
understands the unity of Heaven and man, practices the unity of knowledge and
action, and creatively reveals the unity of sentiment and scenery. Conceiving of the
loftiest possible realm of humanity, one may concentrate on the above-described
ideal in one’s mind in order to actualize it. Such a realm harmonizes individual words
and deeds with all human societies and even extends this harmony to the whole
universe. In traditional Chinese philosophy, the major role of human beings is to “be
human” in pursuing the ideal of a harmonious society. As the central element in


Output:
nature and the community, man assumes a great responsibility.
   Chinese philosophy profoundly influenced the Chinese national mentality. I
believe that this mentality reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese
thought culture.
   In brief, the Chinese mentality may be characterized by the pursuit of harmony
and unity. Most distinguished Chinese philosophers viewed reality positively and
endeavored to transform the conflict-ridden societies in which they lived into
harmonious communities. Although their ideals and doctrines did not bring about
actual political changes, Chinese rulers used philosophical ideas as window dress-
ing. For instance, the ideals of Great Harmony and supreme peace degenerated into
emperors’ reign titles, and rulers called themselves the emperor or empress of
supreme peace. Peasant revolts throughout history used “supreme peace” as a
catchword for their righteous cause. At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–


Output:
220), the Yellow Turban Rebellion used the slogan “The Way of Supreme Peace” to
organize farmers; Song Dynasty (960–1279) peasant revolts were aimed at
“destroying all inequality in order to achieve supreme peace”; in modern times,
the peasant rebellion led by Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch’uan) was known as the
“Supreme Peace Army” (Taiping Jun) belonging to the “Heavenly Kingdom of
Supreme Peace” (Taiping Tianguo).
   Despite its preeminence in the Chinese mind, the ideal of attaining supreme
peace has never been actualized. At most, the illusion of “supreme peace and a
6 The Problem of Harmonious Communities in Ancient China                             81


Output:
prosperous world” was realized during short periods of history. Chinese traditional
idealism is basically fantasy. Past sages might have promulgated the ideal of
“governing the country and bringing peace to the world” with true sincerity, but
since its actualization is impossible, their intentions have to be looked at as little
more than idealized feudalism.
    We can observe that Chinese thought has always been characterized by a search
for unity. From its earliest beginnings, Chinese philosophy stressed the unity of two
concepts or the mutual relationship between several concepts. In the Book of
Changes, Qian and Kun (later yin and yang) represent concepts of duality in
unity, the “Great Principle” chapter in the Book of Rites was based on the system
of “five elements” related through dualistic unities. Once Heaven and man were
looked upon as dualistic philosophical concepts, Chinese philosophy began to place
more emphasis on the unity of Heaven and man. This way of thinking is rational in


Output:
its stress on harmony and unity and in its objection to excess and insufficiency.
    Under certain conditions, this ideal is beneficial to social stability and social
development, as well as to the investigation of the actual relationships between
objects. Social development requires a period of relative stability, while thought
cultures benefit significantly by mutual assimilation and confluence. History has
alternating periods of maintaining the status quo and reformation. Since the Qin
and Han dynasties (221 B.C.–A.D. 220), China has been in a state of great unity.
Situations of fragmentation or division were always temporary. The Han people and
the minority nationalities formed a unified country while at the same time assimilat-
ing foreign cultures. Based also on the concept of unity, Chinese medicine stresses an
organic connection between man and his environment, between the human body and
human spirit, between the organs of the body, as well as between various remedies.


Output:
Qi (vitality) was used to explain the unity of things and the reason behind their mutual
influence. There is a similarity here to the findings of modern physics.
    Despite the contributions of Chinese philosophy, we cannot overlook the short-
comings in this national way of thinking. An overemphasis upon harmony and unity
resulted in the prolonged stagnation of feudal society, the slow growth of capital-
ism, exaggerated national pride, and a lack of progressive thinking. Chinese
traditional philosophy lacks a systematic epistemology and a tradition of logic.
Theoretical thinking in Chinese philosophy has not undergone analysis and is rich
in terms of the cognition of essences, similar to some of the conclusions of modern
science. But without the necessary analysis and argument, it cannot develop into
modern science. Because of the excessive attention paid to mutual relationships and
unity and the total disregard of advanced anatomy, the traditional Chinese failed to


Output:
mature along the path taken by modern science in the West. We must reform our
traditional ways of thinking, applying logical discourse and scientific epistemology
to the concepts of relationship, unity, and cosmic harmony. We should stress
specific analysis, avoid the long-recognized shortcomings in our philosophy, and
make good use of the tenets of Western philosophy, in order to establish a school of
scientific philosophy with Chinese traits.
Chapter 7
An Inquiry into the Possibility
of a Third-Phase Development
of Confucianism


Output:
Is there the possibility for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? In
saying this, we mean to regard the school of thought advocated by Confucius,
Mencius, and Xunzi during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States
as the first-phase development of Confucianism. After the Han Dynasty, Buddhism
spread to China. Under the impact of Buddhist ideas, a Confucian school of idealist
philosophy emerged during the Song and Ming dynasties. It greatly pushed forward
the Confucian doctrines and constituted the second-phase development of Confu-
cianism. Over the last century, Western civilization has found its way into China.
Especially around the time of the “May Fourth” [1919] Movement, Marxism was
also disseminated into our country. That gave an even bigger and more serious
impact on China’s traditional thought and culture. Under such circumstances, is it
possible for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? Can it be brought


Output:
back to life? Can it still have a role to play in China and the world? In my opinion, it
is perhaps too early to conduct an all- round discussion of this issue. However, to
raise questions and opinions from certain angles in an attempt to push the inquiry
forward may prove helpful.
   In discussing whether it is possible for Confucianism to have a third-phase
development, we must, first of all, acquire a clear understanding about the basic
spirit of Confucianism. Regarding this basic spirit, there have been in the past, and
may be in the future, a variety of different views. The existence of different views is
not necessarily a bad thing; it may help deepen the study of this issue. In clarifying
the basic spirit, I think attention should be paid to two parts: the part of thoughts that
have been constantly effective in the entire course of development of Confucianism
and the part of thoughts that still have vitality today. To combine the two for


Output:
Tang Yijie, “Guanyu rujia sixiang disanqi fazhan kenengxin de tantao.” Beijing University
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 51–54

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                                83
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_7
84          7 An Inquiry into the Possibility of a Third-Phase Development of Confucianism


Output:
consideration, we may perhaps find out whether a third-phase development of
Confucianism is possible from a certain aspect.
    Running through the entire course of development of Confucianism, I believe
there are two basic elements that still bear a major significance to us today: one is
idealism and the other humanism; and the two are connected.
    Confucianism is a kind of idealism. Starting from Confucius, this school of
thought has cherished the ideal of having a society in which “right principles
prevail” and has made every effort to materialize the ideal in the real world. Despite
its acknowledgment of the unattainability of such a goal, it still insists that one
should foster the ideal and dedicate oneself to realize it in the spirit of “doing the
impossible.” Therefore, when Zigong asked Confucius: “What if one can gener-
ously give to the people and provide relief to them? Can that be called benevo-
lence?” Confucius answered: “One who behaves with benevolence must be a saint!


Output:
Even Yao and Shun fell short of that.” Evidently, Confucius did not regard the
society of Yao and Shun’s time as a society of man’s highest ideal. Thus, it involves
the problem of what we should see as an ideal society. According to the Confucians,
an ideal society is an ideal, which has the possibility, and not the necessity, of being
realized. Despite the fact that an ideal society has never been realized before, it is a
matter of fundamental importance, a problem of one’s attitude toward life, whether
or not one should seek to realize it. It is the Confucians’ belief that one should
ceaselessly seek after it. This is why, as I see it, people at that time criticized
Confucians as “being ignorant of world affairs.” Though it is not necessary that an
ideal society be realized in the real world, it can be, as far as the Confucian
philosophers are concerned, realized in their minds. Why is it that West Inscription
by Zhang Zai was so highly respected by later Confucians? It was that, as I see it,


Output:
West Inscription embodied the Confucian spirit of seeking to realize an ideal
society, plus that Zhang Zai had already built in his mind the ideal society. True,
whether the ideal society in which “the people are my brothers and I share my
things with them,” as Zhang Zai conceived, could be realized in the real world was
important to him, but more important was whether one could have a world outlook
of pursuing an ideal society. Therefore, the last sentence of West Inscription says: “I
carry on my pursuit when alive, and rest at ease when I die.” While one lives, one
has a duty to fulfill. The duty is to exert oneself for the realization of the ideal
“world of commonweal.” It can be said that this is an attitude of “concerning
oneself only about the cultivation instead of the gains.” Whoever holds such an
attitude toward life has a clear conscience. Don’t we today need to have an attitude
like this more than ever?
    Confucianism is a kind of idealism that has humanism as its prerequisite. Why is


Output:
it that man must have an ideal and seek to build an ideal society? According to the
Confucians, man is the most important factor in the world, because he can “formu-
late ethics for the universe, provide sustenance for the people, carry forward
consummate learnings into posterity, and win peace for thousands of generations
to come.” Confucius said: “Man can enhance the Way and not the reverse.” The
“Way” or the “Way of Nature” is an objective existence. But it needs to be
enhanced and carried forward by man; it has to be effected by man through practice.
7 An Inquiry into the Possibility of a Third-Phase Development of Confucianism                        85


Output:
How can man embody the “Way of Nature”? If, as the Confucians envisaged, man
can understand how “Heaven is integrated with man,” “knowledge is integrated
with practice,” and “feeling is integrated with scenery,” man can then attain the
loftiest realm of being a man. In other words, man can congeal in his heart the ideal
of the true, the good, and the beautiful.
    The integration of Heaven with man, knowledge with practice, and feeling with
scenery are the three basic propositions the Chinese traditional philosophy made
about the true, the good, and the beautiful; they are the ideal realms the Confucian
school has been trying to attain. Why is it that Confucianism is in pursuit of the
three integrations? In my opinion, Confucianism is nothing more than a teaching
that teaches one how to behave oneself, namely, one should set a demand on oneself
and hold oneself responsible to the world and the nation. This is a very common
question, but involves a task extremely difficult to fulfill. Whoever has attained


Output:
such an ideal realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful is a saint.
    Although the proposition of integrating Heaven with man is designed to
illustrate the relations between man and the entire universe, it begins with man as
the center of the universe. Zhongyong [The Golden Mean] stated: “Being honest is
the Way of Heaven. Striving to be honest is the Way of man. An honest man hits the
right Way without difficulty and understands it without deliberation. One who
conforms oneself to the Way of Heaven without qualm is a saint.” Therefore, a
saint not only behaves himself in conformity with the requirements of the Way of
Heaven but also assumes as his responsibility the fulfillment of such requirements.
In living a life in this world, one should not behave oneself with a passive attitude;
rather, one should “make unremitting efforts to improve oneself” in order to embody
the ceaseless flow and evolution of nature. In this way, man will set a demand on


Output:
himself; he will find a reason for his existence and foster a lofty ideal. Since one has
set a demand on oneself and found a reason for one’s existence, the most important
thing is for one to “integrate one’s understanding with one’s behavior” so that one
can have a unified viewpoint on understanding and behavior in terms of morality and
self-cultivation. The three programs and eight articles outlined in Daxue [The Great
Learning] tell us exactly what this is about. It is said in Daxue:
   The Way of the great learning lies in shedding light on the bright principles, being close to
   the people, and stopping at nothing but the utmost good. Those in ancient times who wanted
   to shed light on the bright principles for the world had to first bring order to their own
   kingdoms. To bring order to their kingdoms they had to first bring their own houses to
   order. To bring their houses to order they had to first cultivate their own moral character. To


Output:
cultivate their own moral character they had to first set their minds straight. To set their
   minds straight they had to first foster a sincere desire. To foster a sincere desire they had to
   first carry knowledge to the utmost degree. To carry knowledge to the utmost degree they
   had to first inquire into the properties of things. Having inquired into the properties of
   things, they were able to carry knowledge to the utmost degree. Having carried knowledge
   to the utmost degree, they were able to foster a sincere desire. Having fostered a sincere
   desire, they were able to set their minds straight. Having set their minds straight, they were
   able to cultivate their own moral character. Having cultivated their own moral character,
   they were able to bring their houses to order. Having brought their houses to order, they
   were able to bring order to their kingdoms. Having brought order to their kingdoms, the
   whole world would be at peace.


Output:
whole world would be at peace.
86          7 An Inquiry into the Possibility of a Third-Phase Development of Confucianism


Output:
This is a process of cognizance, still more a process of moral practice. Man must
have an ideal, and the highest ideal is to “achieve peace” so that human society can
attain a realm of “Great Harmony.” And the world of “Great Harmony” requires
that everyone should set for himself a demand for being a man, a reason for being a
man, and “not do to others what one does not wish done to oneself.” Noted
Confucius: “To implement my principle is nothing more than being honest and
just.” Whether the ideal society of “Great Harmony” can be attained or not remains
a question, of course. But a Confucian must have such a goal and find pleasure in
pursuing it. To lead an existence in the world and be a man, one must find pleasure
in doing it and appreciate the creation of the universe. And to have a true appreci-
ation of Nature, one must be able to display creativity and man’s spiritual realm in
reproducing the “creation of the universe.” One must be able to show why man


Output:
should be a man and to create poetry and prose “masterpieces,” paintings of “superb
work,” and music like “sounds of nature.” This is why art requires that “feeling be
integrated with scenery.” Wang Fuzhi observed: “In name feeling and scenery are
two things but in reality they are inseparable. Those gifted in writing poetry are
capable of unlimited wit. A witty line naturally has feeling in the midst of scenery
and scenery in the midst of feeling.” “Once feeling is integrated with scenery, a
witty remark is ready at hand.” When one enters the realm of creation, it will be a
realm in which the true, the good, and the beautiful are integrated with one another.
This is precisely where the meaning of life and the highest ideal of mankind lie.
Confucius described himself as “doing things at will without violating rules at the
age of seventy.” Probably, it was the ideal realm as mentioned above. Indeed, it
must be the realm of a saint when whatever one says and does is in harmony with


Output:
the entire universe, society, and one’s own frame of mind.
   That Confucianism still has a value for its continued existence is perhaps due to
the sole fact that it provides us a reason for being a man. It is most difficult for one
to be a man and still more to maintain a harmony between oneself and nature,
society and others, or between one’s inside and outside in body and soul. Is such a
requirement unnecessary in today’s world? As Confucianism only tells us the
reason for being a man, we should not set demands on it in other aspects. And it
should come as no surprise that it suffers from some inadequacies.
Chapter 8
Immanence and Transcendence in Chinese
Chan Buddhism


Output:
When Buddhism transmitted into China, it had developed into several schools until
Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties: Tiantai, consciousness-only, Vinaya,
Pure Land, Huayan, Chan, etc. Since Tang Dynasty, Chan Buddhism has become
increasingly influential and even has been particularly thriving to surpass all the other
schools that were declined early or late. No doubt that there are many reasons for its
thriving, perhaps one of the reasons is that Chan Buddhism can particularly reflect the
characteristic of Chinese philosophy—“immanent transcendence,” to which scholars
probably should pay more attention.
   As a religion, Buddhism has its doctrinal scriptures, its regular rituals, its
precepts, its worshiped objects, and so on, but Chan Buddhism after Huineng
(638–713) renounced all things above. So in Chan Buddhism, there is no need to
chant scriptures, observe precepts, follow any rituals, and worship any images, and
even leaving home and becoming a monk or nun becomes dispensable; hence, to


Output:
become a Buddha and attain the state of Nirvana can only rely on the awareness of
the own mind. It is said: “one who can be aware within one thought is a Buddha, but
confused within one thought a sentient being.” That is to say, to become a Buddha
and attain the transcendental state completely depends on the role of the immanent
essential mind.


Output:
[Chan is more famous for its Japanese name—Zen, and itself derived from the Sanskrit dhyana.
In English, Chan is usually rendered as “meditation”—editor.]
Journal of Sino-Western Communications, 2010, 2(2): 51–68
Translated by Yang Hao from hh佛教与中国文化ii, 宗教文化出版社 1999 年版, “论禅宗思想中
的内在性与超越性”。引文有所修订。

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd                             87
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Y. Tang, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45533-3_8
88                                 8 Immanence and Transcendence in Chinese Chan Buddhism

8.1      Chinese Chan Buddhism Neither Valued Scriptures
         nor Established in Words, but Claimed Everything
         Should Listen to the Essential Mind


Output:
There is a Chan story called “Buddha twirls a flower and Maha-Kashapa smiles,”
which is recorded in Zhi-yue-lu [Record of Fingers Pointing to the Moon]:
     When Buddha was in Grdhrakuta mountain he turned a flower in his fingers and held in
     before his listeners. Every one was silent. Only Maha-Kashapa smiled at this revelation,
     although he tried to control the lines of his face. Buddha said: “I have the eye of the true
     teaching, the heart of Nirvana, the true aspect of non-form, and the ineffable stride of
     Dharma. It is not expressed by words, but especially transmitted beyond teaching. This
     teaching I have given to Maha-Kashapa.”


Output:
Chan Buddhism considered itself as “transmitted beyond teaching” and
proclaimed itself as distinguished from the other schools by telling this story. At
the beginning of Buddhism in India, it was quite simple and originally a philosophy
of life, in which Shakyamuni Buddha avoided discussing those theories unrelated
with real life, say, concerned little about the following problems—“whether the
universe is permanent or impermanent,” “whether the universe is limited or unlim-
ited,” “whether life exists or not after death,” “whether life and body are one or
not,” etc.—which were often heatedly discussed at his time in India. Later Indian
Buddhism became more and more complicated during its developing, further and
further away from real life, and its system became larger and larger, its worshiped
images more and more, and its technical terms innumerable, which were
completely incompatible with Chinese traditional thoughts. After Sui and Tang


Output:
dynasties, many Chinese Buddhist schools were trying every possible way to get
over this complication of Indian Buddhism, such as “one billion worlds entered into
one thought” in Tiantai school and “principle and matter integrated into one real
mind” in Huayan school both emphasized the role of the essential mind. This
tendency was further intensified in Chan Buddhism after Huineng, hence its
insistence on establishment in no words and renunciation of all scriptures.
    Huineng himself did not renounce the scriptures and advocate establishment in
no words yet. It is recorded in Platform Sutra that Huineng taught his disciples
about Diamond Sutra and Lotus Sutra, but he maintained that “all scriptures and
books exist and tell something in accordance with people” (Platform Sutra) and are
only the tools to conduct people; hence, one should not cling to the scriptures
because one cannot become a Buddha by chanting the scriptures, and one can be


Output:
liberated only by relying on one’s essential mind. The reasons are, on the one hand,
the principles and methods of becoming a Buddha originally exist in one’s own
essential mind, so “the twelve-part canons of the Buddhas of past, present, and
future are originally inherent in one’s nature” (Platform Sutra). Thus, there is no
need seeking outside, no need to search the Buddha out of mind, because to be a
Buddha and become enlightened totally depends upon oneself, and the extrinsic
words just have nothing to do with it. On the other hand, words are outside things.
If one attaches to these outside things, one “attaches to the forms,” and “one’s own
8.1 Chinese Chan Buddhism Neither Valued Scriptures nor Established in Words. . .                89


Output:
essential nature inherently has the insight of prajna [wisdom], if one is continually
observant, using one’s own insight; therefore, one does not depend on words”
(Platform Sutra). In order to break the bondage of the scriptures, Chan masters
after Huineng were simply against chanting the scriptures and even against all kinds
of words. It is recorded in Wu-deng-hui-yuan [The Five Lamps Meet at the Origin]:
Wei-shan (771–853) asked Yang-shan (814–890), “Nirvana Sutra has forty
volumes. How many are said by Buddha? How many by mara [devil]?” (Vol. 9)
Yang-shan answered: “all are said by mara [devil].” If one attaches the sutras as
Dharma itself, one has already been bewitched and hoodwinked by devils. Gu-zun-
su-yu-lu [Recorded Sayings of the Ancient Worthies] records: “as to those things
which are considered as Buddhas, interpreted as Buddhas, if one sees something,
finds something and attaches something, all of these are called dung of intellectual


Output:
play, coarse words and dead language” (Vol. 2). Jing-de-chuan-deng-lu [Record of
the Transmission of the Lamp] records: Lin-ji (787?–867) “went to Huang-bo
mountain (where his master lived) in a mid-summer, and saw his master Huang-
bo (?–850) reading a sutra. He said: ‘I thought there is a man but actually an old
monk who puts black soy beans into his mouth’” (Vol. 12). All scriptures are
nonsense. By attaching to these nonsense, how can one be liberated and become a
Buddha? Since Buddhist scriptures are “dead language” and “said by mara [devil],”
not the tools to awaken, naturally they are not to be fallen back on to attain the goal
of becoming a Buddha. Gu-zun-su-yu-lu records Nan-quan (748–834)’s saying:
“the Way does not belong to the category of knowing or not knowing, because
knowing is false awareness and not knowing is no memory. If one really attains the
Way of no-doubt which is like great emptiness, wide, vast and open, how can one


Output:
tell right or wrong? (Vol. 13).” The way does not belong to the category of
knowledge which have the difference between subject and object, that is, concep-
tual thoughts, but the enlightenment to the way relies on the self-awareness of the
mind. If so, the self can’t be not self-aware; if the self isn’t self-aware, it is “avidya
[ignorance],” therefore “not knowing is no memory.”
    Chan masters thought that the words were unnecessary and the language cannot
be beneficial to the enlightenment and becoming a Buddha. Only through language
one cannot comprehend the Buddhist Dharma. Someone asked Wen-yi (885–958):
“what is the first meaning (of Buddhist Dharma)?” Wen-yi replied: “If I tell you, it
is already the second meaning” (Wen-yi-chan-shi-yu-lu [Recorded Sayings of Chan
Master Wen-yi]). The Dharma is ineffable, and what has been said is already not the
Dharma itself. Therefore, is there any method that may lead people to the enlight-


Output:
enment? As far as Chan Buddhism sees, hardly is there a method for becoming
enlightened but through one’s own awareness. However, Chan Buddhism also used
very special methods, such as “stick and shout” to instruct disciples. It is recorded in
Wu-deng-hui-yuan:
   A monk asked: “what is bodhi [awakening]?” Master (De-shan, 782–865) struck him and
   said: “Get out! Don’t shit here!” One asked: “what is Buddha?” Master said: “Buddha is an
   old bhiksu [monk] in India.” Xue-feng (822–908) asked: “by inheriting from patriarchs
   before, do you still have discriminations?” Master struck him with a stick and asked: “What
   does this mean?” Xue-feng answered: “I can’t understand.” On the next day, Xue-feng
   asked for more teaching, Master said: “there are neither languages nor sentences taught in
   our school, and I have no Dharma to give.” Hence Xue-feng became aware. (Vol. 7)
90                                 8 Immanence and Transcendence in Chinese Chan Buddhism


Output:
It is also recorded in Gu-zun-su-yu-lu:
     (Lin-ji came to) see Jing-shan. When Jing-shan just raised his head to see who was coming,
     Master (Lin-ji) shouted. When he just intended to open his mouth to say, Master leaved
     with a flick of his sleeve. (Vol. 5)


Output:
This is so-called De-shan’s stick and Lin-ji’s shout. These special methods
intended to break down the attachment and listen to the essential mind. As far as
Chan Buddhism sees, one loses one’s essential nature because one always attaches
to something; therefore, a sudden shout and an unexpected strike on the head would
make one suddenly become enlightened and attain the Buddhahood by oneself. As
Yuanwu (1063–1135) said in Yuan-wu-fo-guo-chan-shi-yu-lu [Recorded Sayings of
Chan Master Yuan-Wu Fo-guo]: “De-shan’s stick and Lin-ji’s shout are both
thorough and complete, and directly cut off the root of the old attachment. They
are great knacks and uses, reaching the same end by innumerable means, and could
remove bondages from the disciples” (Vol. 14). Lin-ji’s master—Huang-bo—said
in his Chuan-xin-fa-yao [Essential Teachings on the Transmission of Mind]:
     This spiritually enlightening nature. . .cannot be looked for or sought, comprehended by


Output:
wisdom or knowledge, explained in words, contacted materially or reached by meritorious
     achievement. All the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, together with all wriggling things
     possessed of life, share in this great Nirvanic nature. This nature is Mind; Mind is the
     Buddha, and the Buddha is the Dharma.


Output:
Since this spiritually enlightening nature everyone has cannot be revealed by
knowledge and language, the only way is to use stick and shout to break down the
attachment (of course not necessarily to use stick and shout, any other method could
make it if only they could break down the attachment); hence, the mind has nothing
to observe, and one attains the transcendental state denying object and mind.

8.2      Chinese Chan Buddhism Broke Outmoded
         Conventions and Abolished Sitting in Meditation,1
         but Only Valued Seeing the Nature and Accomplishing
         the Buddhahood


Output:
Sitting in meditation is a practicing method used in every Buddhist schools.
Shakyamuni Buddha became enlightened under the bodhi [awakening] tree by
sitting in meditation for 49 days; Bodhidharma came to China and faced the wall
by sitting in meditation for 3 years. After Huineng, there has been a great change in
Chinese Chan Buddhism. In Platform Sutra, Huineng said: “it is only a matter of
seeing the nature, not a matter of meditation or liberation.” It is clear that Huineng

1
  Sitting in meditation [zuo-chan] literally means sitting Chan and is more famous for its Japanese
name Zazen—editor.
8.2 Chinese Chan Buddhism Broke Outmoded Conventions and Abolished. . .                            91


Output:
insisted on “seeing the nature and accomplishing the Buddhahood” and believed
only through meditation one cannot be liberated; hence, he said:
   Deluded people stick to the appearances of things: they cling to the idea of absorption in
   one practice as only meaning constantly sitting unmoving, not letting the mind be aroused
   at random. They identify this with absorption in one practice, but those who make this
   interpretation are equivalent to inanimate objects. This is a condition that obstructs the
   Way. The Way should be fluid, free-flowing. Why then do you stagnate? When the mind
   does not dwell on things, then the Way is fluid. If the mind dwells on things, that is called
   self-binding. If you say constant sitting is right, that is contradicted by the fact that
   Shariputra was scolded by Vimalakirti for sitting quietly in the forest. (Platform Sutra)


Output:
Those who attach to sitting in meditation and believe deluded thought cannot
arise through their sitting actually regard a human being as a dead thing and know
nothing about “the Way should be fluid.” The mind should move and not dwell on
things; otherwise the mind is bound, and then how could one be liberated? Gu-zun-
su-yu-lu records: Ma-zu (709–788) “lived in Nan-yue-chuan-fa Monastery (where
his master Huai-rang (677–744) presided) and stayed in a hut alone by practicing
sitting in meditation without paying attention to the visitors (even to his master
Huai-rang). . .. One day, (in order to instruct Ma-zu) Huai-rang put a tile in front of
the hut and began to grind it. Ma-zu didn’t pay attention to it at the beginning, but
after a long time, Ma-zu got very curious and then asked: ‘for what by grinding?’
Huai-rang said: ‘grinding into a mirror.’ Ma-zu laughed: ‘how can a tile become a
mirror by grinding?’ Huai-rang retorted: ‘if a tile cannot become a mirror by


Output:
grinding, how could one become a Buddha by sitting in meditation?’” (Vol. 1)
Ma-zu sat in meditation and was bound by it; hence, Huai-rang used “grinding a tile
into a mirror,” a metaphoric method, to inspire him to be enlightened. This is an
example freeing from one’s bondage by relying on others. Another example is Hui-
leng (854–932) who had worn seven cattail hassocks by sitting in meditation for
more than 20 years but still did not see the nature. Until one day when rolling up a
curtain by a chance, he suddenly got enlightened and composed a verse: “it was
really a mistake, really a mistake, until I see the world when rolling up a curtain. If
one asks me what kind of teaching I know, I shall pick up a whiskbroom and strike
right toward his mouth” (Wu-deng-hui-yuan, Vol. 7). Hui-leng rolled up a curtain
accidentally and saw that one billion worlds are just as they are and then “witnessed
the mind and saw the nature.” He released the bondage of sitting in meditation,