Output:
In the Chung Yung
 or Doctrine of the Mean,
 which is another chapter of the Li Chi,
 attributed to Tzu -ssu, the grandson of Confucius, it is said: "Chung
 and shu
 are not far from the Way. What you do not like done to yourself, do not do to others....Serve your father as you would require your son to serve you....Serve your ruler as you would require your subordinate to serve you....Serve your elder brother as you would require your younger

O7O. CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER

brother to serve you....Set the example in behaving to your friends as you would

require

them to behave to you...

^

The illustration given in the Great Learning
 emphasizes the negative aspect of the principle of chung
 and shu;
 that in the Doctrine of the Mean
 emphasizes its positive aspect. In each case the measuring square for determining conduct is in one' s self and not in other things.


Output:
The principle of chung
 and shu
 is at the same time the principle of jen,
 so that the practice of chung
 and shu
 means the practice of jen.
 And this practice leads to the carrying out of one s responsibilities and duties in society, in which is comprised the quality of yi
 or righteousness. Hence the principle of chung
 and shu
 becomes the alpha and omega of one s moral life. In the Analects
 we find the passage: The master said: Shen Lthe personal name of Tseng Tzu, one of his disciples J, all my teachings are linked together by one principle. Quite so, replied Tseng Tzu. When the master had left the room, the disciples asked: What did he mean? Tseng Tzu replied: Our master s teaching consists of the principle of chung
 and shu,
 and that is all. '"(IV, 15.) Everyone has within himself the measuring square for conduct, and can use it at any time. So simple as this is the method of practising jen,
 so that Confucius said: "is jen
 indeed far off? I crave for jen,
 and lo! jen
 is at hand! " (Analects,


Output:
and lo! jen
 is at hand! " (Analects,
 VII, 29.) Knowing Ming


Output:
From the idea of righteousness, the Confucianists derived the idea of doing for nothing." One does what one ought to do, simply because il is morally right to do it, and not for any consideration external to this moral compulsion. In the Analects,
 we are told that Confucius was ridiculed by a certain recluse as "one who knows that he cannot succeed, yet keeps on trying to do it. (XIV, 4-I-) We also read that another recluse was told by a disciple of Confucius: The reason why the superior man tries to go into politics, is because he holds this to be right, even though he is well aware that his principle cannot prevail. (XVIII, 7)

As we shall see, the Taoists taught the theory of doing nothing, whereas the Confucianists taught that of "doing for
 nothing. A man cannot do nothing, according to Confucianism, because for every man there is something which he ought to do.


Output:
Nevertheless, what he does is lor nothing, because the value of doing what he ought to do lies in the doing itself, and not in the external result.

Confucius own life is certainly a good example of this teaching. Living in an age of great social and political disorder, he tried his best to reform the world. He traveled everywhere and, like Socrates, talked to everybody. Although his efforts were in vain, he was never disappointed. lie knew that he could not succeed, but kepi on trying.

0 7 2 CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST

TEACHER

About himself Confucius said: "If my principles are to prevail in the world, it is Ming.
 If they are to fall to the ground, it is also Ming. (Analects,
 XIV, 38.) He tried his best, but the issue he left to Ming.


Output:
Ming
 is often translated as Fate, Destiny or Decree. To Confucius, it meant the Decree of Heaven or Will of Heaven; in other words, it was conceived of as a purposeful force. In later Confucianism, however, Ming
 simply means the total existent conditions and forces of the whole universe. For the external success of our activity, the cooperation of these conditions is always needed. But this cooperation is wholly beyond our control. Hence the best thing for us to do is simply to try to carry out what we know we ought ID carry out, without caring whether in the process we succeed or fail. To act in this way is to know Ming.
 To know Ming
 is an important requirement for being a superior man in the Confucian sense of the term, so that Confucius said: He who does not know Ming
 cannot be a superior man." (Analects,
 XX, 1.)


Output:
Thus to know Ming
 means to acknowledge the inevitability of the world as it exists, and so to disregard one' s external success or failure. If we can act in this way, we can, in a sense, never fail. For if we do our duty, that duty through our very act is morally done, regardless of the external success or failure of our action.

As a result, we always shall be free from anxiety as to success or fear as to failure, and so shall be happy. This is why Confucius said: The wise are free from doubts; the virtuous from anxiety; the brave from fear. (Analects,
 IX, 2.8.) Or again: "The superior man is always happy; the small man sad." (VII, 36.)

 Confucius Spiritual Development

In the Taoist work, the Chuang—tzu,
 we see that the Taoists often ridiculed Confucius as one who confined himself to the morality of humanheartedness and righteousness, thus being conscious only of moral values, and not super-moral value. Superficially they were right, but actually they were wrong.


Output:
Thus speaking about his own spiritual development, Confucius said: "At fifteen 1 set my heart on learning. At thirty I could stand. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Decree of Heaven. At sixty I was already obedient [to this Decree]. At seventy I could follow the desires of my mind without overstepping the boundaries [of what is right]." (Analects,
 II, 4) The learning which Confucius here refers to is not what we now would call learning. In the Analects,
 Confucius said: "Set your heart on the Too."
 (VII, 6.) And again: "To hear the Too
 in the morning and then die at night, that would be all right." (IV, 9.) Here Too
 means the Way or Truth. It was this Too
 which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now call learning means the increase of our knowledge, but the Too
 is that whereby we can elevate our mind.

Confucius also said: "Take your stand in the li
 [rituals, ceremonies, prop-074

CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER


Output:
CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER

er conduct]." (Analects,
 VIII, 8.) Again he said: "Not to know the li
 is to have no means of standing." (XX, 3.) Thus when Confucius says that at thirty he could "stand, he means that he then understood the li
 and so could practice proper conduct.

His statement that at forty he had no doubts means that he had then become a wise man. For, as quoted before, "The wise are free from doubts."


Output:
Up to this time of his life Confucius was perhaps conscious only of moral values. But at the age of fifty and sixty, he knew the Decree of Heaven and was obedient to it. In other words, he was then also conscious of super -moral values. Confucius in this respect was like Socrates. Socrates thought that he had been appointed by a divine order to awaken the Greeks, and Confucius had a similar consciousness of a divine mission. For example, when he was threatened with physical violence at a place called K'uang, he said: "If Heaven had wished to let civilization perish, later generations (like myself) would not have been permitted to participate in it. But since Heaven has not wished to let civilization perish, what can the people of K uang do to me?" (Analects,
 IX, 5.) One of his contemporaries also said: "The world for long has been without order. But now Heaven is going to use the Master as an arousing tocsin. (Analects,


Output: III, 2.4O Thus Confucius in doing what he did, was convinced that he was following the Decree of Heaven and was supported by Heaven; he was conscious of values higher than moral ones.


Output:
The super—moral value experienced by Confucius, however, was, as we shall see, not quite the same as that experienced by the Taoists. For the latter abandoned entirely the idea of an intelligent and purposeful Heaven, and sought instead for mystical union with an undifferentiated whole. The super-moral value which they knew and experienced, therefore, was freer from the ordinary concepts of the human relationships.

At seventy, as has been told above, Confucius allowed his mind to follow whatever it desired, yet everything he did was naturally right of itself. His actions no longer needed a conscious guide. He was acting without effort. This represents the last stage in the development of the sage.

 Confucius' Position in Chinese History

Confucius is probably better known in the West than any other single Chinese. Yet in China itself, though always famous, his place in history has changed considerably from one period to another.


Output:
Historically speaking he was primarily a teacher, that is, only one teacher among many. But after his death, he gradually came to be considered as the
 teacher, superior to all others. And in the second century B.C. he was elevated to an even higher plane. According to many Confucianists of that time, Confucius had actually been appointed by Heaven to begin a new dynasty that would follow that of Chou. Though in actual fact without a crown or a government, he had ideally speaking beco me a king who ruled the whole e mpire. How this apparent

O76 CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER


Output:
O76 CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER

contradiction had happened, these Confucianists said, could be found out by studying the esoteric meaning supposedly contained in the Spring and Autumn Annals.
 This was supposed by them not to be a chronicle of Confucius' native state (as it actually was), but an important political work written by Confucius to express his ethical and political ideas. Then in the first century B.C., Confucius came to be regarded as even more than a king. According to many people of that time, he was a living god among men-a divine being who knew that after his time there woud someday come the Han dynasty (106

B.C.-A.D. 2.2.O), and who therefore, in the Spring and A utumn Annals,
 set forth a political ideal which would be complete enough for the men of Han to realize. This apotheosis was the climax of Confucius'

glory, and in the middle of the Han dynasty Confucianism could properly be called a religion.


Output:
The time of glorification, however, did not last very long. Already beginning in the first century A.D., Confucianists of a more rationalistic type began to get the upper hand. Hence in later times Confucius was no longer regarded as a divine being, though his position as that of the
 Teacher remained high. At the very end of the nineteenth century, to be sure, there was a brief revival of the theory that Confucius had been divinely appointed to be a king. Soon afterward, however, with the coming of the Chinese Republic, his reputation fell until he came to be regarded as something less than the
 Teacher, and at present most Chinese would say that he was primarily a
 teacher, and certainly a great one, but far from being the only teacher.


Output:
Confucius, however, was already recognized in his own day as a man of very extensive learning. For example, one of his contemporaries said: "Great indeed is the Master K ung! His learning is so extensive that he cannot be called by a single name." (Analects,
 IX, 2..) From the quotations given earlier, we may see that he considered himself the inheritor and perpeluator of ancient civilization, and was considered by some of his contemporaries as such. By his work of originating through transmitting, he caused his school to reinterpret the civilization of the age before him. He upheld what he considered to be best in the old, and created a powerful tradition that was followed until very recent years, when, as in Confucius own time, China again came face to face with tremendous economic and social change. In addition, he was China s first teacher. Hence, though historically speaking he was only a
 teacher, it is perhaps not unreasonable that in later ages he was regarded as the
 teacher.

078


Output:
078

CONFUCIUS, THE FIRST TEACHER

 CHAPTER 5

, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

IHE next major philosopher after Confucius was Mo Tzu. His family name was Mo and his personal name was Ti. As the Shih Chi
 or Historical Records
 does not say where he came from, and in fact tells us almost nothing about his life, there has been a difference of opinion regarding his native state. Some scholars hold that he was a native of Sung (in what is today eastern Honan and western Shantung), and others that he came from Lu, the same state as Confucius. His exact dates are also uncertain, hut probably he lived sometime within the years 479~38l B.C. The main source for the study of his thought is the book bearing his name, the Mo-tzu,
 which contains 53 chapters and is a collection of writings by his followers as well as by himself.


Output:
Mo Tzu was the founder of a school known after his name as the Mohist school. In ancient times his fame was as great as that of Confucius, and his teaching was no less influential. The contrast between the two men is interesting. Confucius felt a sympathetic understanding for the traditional institutions, rituals, music, and literature of the early Chou dynasty, and tried to rationalize and justify them in ethical terms; Mo Tzu, on the contrary, questioned their validity and usefulness, and tried to replace them with something that was simpler but, in his view, more useful. In short, Confucius was the rationalizer and justifier of the ancient civilization, while Mo Tzu was its critic. Confucius was a refined gentleman, while Mo Tzu was a militant preacher. A major aim of his preaching was to oppose both the traditional institutions and practices, and the theories of Confucius and the Confucian ists.

 Social Background of the Mohist School


Output:
Social Background of the Mohist School

During the feudal age of the Chou dynasty, kings, princes, and feudal lords all had their military specialists. These were the hereditary warriors who constituted the backbone of the armies of that time.

With the disintegration of feudalism that took place in the latter part of the Chou dynasty, however, these warrior specialists lost their positions and titles, scattered

0 8 0 MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS


Output:
throughout the country, and made a living by offering their services to anyone who could afford to employ them. This class of people was known as the hsieh
 or yu hsieh,
 terms which can both be translated as knights—errant. Concerning such knights errant, the Shih Chi
 says: "Their words were always sincere and trustworthy, and their actions always quick and decisive. They were always true to what they promised, and without regard to their own persons, they would rush into dangers threatening others. (Ch. 12-4) Such was their professional ethics. A large part of Mo Tzu's teaching was an extension of this ethics.


Output:
In Chinese history both the ju
 or literati and the hsieh
 or knightserrant originated as specialists attached to the houses of the aristocrats, and were themselves members of the upper classes. In later times the ju
 continued to come mainly from the upper or middle classes, but the hsieh,
 on the contrary, more frequently were recruited from the lower classes. In ancient times, such social amenities as rituals and music were all exclusively for the aristocrats; from the point of view of the common man, therefore, they were luxuries that had no practical utility. It was from this point of view that Mu Tzu and the Mohists criticised the traditional institutions and their rationalizers, Confucius and the Confucianists. This criticism, together with the elaboration and rationalization of the professional ethics of their own social class, that of the hsieh,
 constituted the central core of the Mohist philosophy.

There is plenty of evidence for the inference that Mo Tzu and his followers came from the hsieh.


Output:
From the Mo-tzu,
 as well as from other contemporary sources, we know that the Mohists constituted a strictly disciplined organization capable of military action. The leader of the Mohisl organization was called the Chil Tzu,
 "Great Master," and had the authority of life or death over the members of the group. We are also told that Mo Tzu was the first "Great Master" of his group, and that at least once he actually led his followers to prepare for the military defense of Sung, when that state was threatened with invasion from the neighboring state of Ch u.


Output:
The story of this episode is interesting. It is said in the Mo-tzu
 that a noted mechanical inventor, Kung-shu Pan, then employed by the state of Ch u, had completed the construction of a new weapon for attacking city walls. Ch'u was preparing to attack Sung with this new weapon. Hearing of this, Mo Tzu went to Ch'u to persuade its king to desist. There he and Kung-shu Pan made a demonstration before the king of their weapons of attack and defense. Mo Tzu first untied his belt and laid out a city with it, using a small stick as a weapon. Kung-shu Pan thereupon set up nine different miniature machines of attack, but Mo Tzu nine times repulsed him. Finally, Kung—shu Pan had used up all his machines of attack, while Mo Tzu was far from being exhausted in the defense. Then Kung-shu Pan said: "l know how to defeat you, but 1 will not say it." To which Mo Tzu replied: "I know what it is, but I too will not say it.


Output:
On being asked by the king what was meant, Mo Tzu continued: "Kung-O 8 l MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

shu Pan is thinking of murdering me. But my disciples Ch'in Ku-li and others, numbering

three hundred men, are already armed with my implements of defense, waiting on the city wall of Sung for the invaders from Ch' u. Though I be murdered, you cannot exterminate them. To which the King exclaimed: "Very well! Let us not attack Sung." (Ch. 50.) If this story is true, it would give a good example for our present world in settling disputes between two countries. A war would not need to be fought in the field. All that would be necessary would be for the scientists and engineers of the two countries to demonstrate their laboratory weapons of attacking and defense, and the war would be decided without fighting!


Output:
Regardless of whether the story is true or not, it illustrates the nature of the Mohist organization, which is also confirmed from other sources. Thus in the Huai—nun—tzu,
 a work of the second century B.C., it is stated that the disciples of Mo Tzu were one hundred and eighty in number, all of whom he could order to enter fire or tread on sword blades, and whom even death would not cause to turn on their heels. (Ch. 2.0.) And in the Mo—tzu
 itself, no less than nine chapters deal with the tactics of fighting a defensive war and the techniques of building instruments for defending city walls. All of this shows that the Mohists, as originally constituted, were a group of warriors.


Output:
Mo Tzu and his followers, however, differed from the ordinary knights—errant in two respects. In the first place, the latter were men ready to engage in any fighting whatever, only provided that they were paid for their efforts or favored by the feudal lords. Mo Tzu and his followers, on the contrary, were strongly opposed to aggressive war; hence they agreed to fight only in wars that were strictly for self-defense. Secondly, the ordinary hsieh
 confined themselves wholly to their code of professional ethics. Mo Tzu, however, elaborated this professional ethics and gave it a rationalistic justification. Thus though Mo Tzu's background was that of a hsieh,
 he at the sametirne became the founder of a new philosophic school.

 Mo Tzu's Criticism of Confucianism


Output:
Mo Tzu's Criticism of Confucianism

According to Mo Tzu, "the principles of the Confucianists ruin the whole world in four ways": (1) The Confucianists do not believe in the existence of God or of spirits, "with the result that God and the spirits are displeased." (2.) The Confucianists insist on elaborate funerals and the practice of three years of mourning on the death of a parent, so that the wealth and energy of the people are thereby wasted. (3) The Confucianists lay stress on the practice of music, leading to an identical result. (4) The Confucianists believe in a predetermined fate, causing the people to be lazy and to resign themselves to this fate. (The Mo-tzu,
 ch. 4§.) In another chapter entitled "Anti-Confucianism," the Mo-tzu
 also says: "Even those with long life cannot exhaust the learning required for their [Confucianist]

studies. Even people with the vigor of youth cannot perform all the ceremonial duties. And even those who

0 8 4 MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF

CONFUCIUS


Output:
CONFUCIUS

have amassed wealth cannot afford music. They [the Confucianists] enhance the beauty of wicked arts and lead their sovereign astray. Their doctrine cannot meet the needs of the age, nor can their learning educate the people." (Ch.39.)

These criticisms reveal the differing social backgrounds of the Confucian— ists and Mohists.


Output:
Already before Confucius, persons who were better educated and more sophisticated had been abandoning the belief in the existence of a personal God and of divine spirits. People of the lower classes, however, had, as always in such matters, lagged behind in this rise of skepticism, and Mo Tzu held the point of view of the lower classes. This is the significance of his first point of criticism against the Confucianists. The second and third points, too, were made from the same basis. The fourth point, however, was really irrelevant, because, though the Confucianists often spoke about Ming
 (Fate, Decree), what they meant by it was not the predetermined fate attacked by Mo Tzu. This has been pointed out in the last chapter, where we have seen that Ming,


Output: for the Confucianists, signified something that is beyond human control. But there are other things that remain within man's power to control if he will exert himself. Only after man has done everything he can himself, therefore, should he accept with calm and resignation whaL comes thereafter as inevitable. Such is what the Confucianists meant when they spoke of "knowing Ming."


Output:
All—embracing Love

Mo Tzu makes no criticism of the Confucianists' central idea of yen (human— heartedness) and yi
 (righteousness); in the Mo—tzu, indeed, he speaks often of these two qualities and of the man of jen
 and man of yi.
 What he means by these terms, however, differs somewhat from the concept of them held by the Confucianists. For Mo Tzu, jen
 and yi
 signify an all-embracing love, and the man of jen
 and man of yi
 are persons who practice this all-embracing love. This concept is a central one in Mo Tzu's philosophy, and represents a logical extension of the professional ethics of the class of hsieh
 (knightserrant) from which Mo Tzu sprang. This ethics was, namely, that within their group the hsieh
 enjoy equally and suffer equally. (This was a common saying of the hsieh
 of later times.) Taking this group concept as a basis, Mo Tzu tried to broaden it by preaching the doctrine that everyone in the world should love everyone else equally and without discrimination.


Output:
In the Mo-tzu,
 there are three chapters devoted to the subject of all-embracing love. In them, Mo Tzu first makes a distinction between what he calls the principles of "discrimination' and '

all-embracingness." The man who holds to the principle of discrimina tion says: It is absurd for me to care for friends as much as I would for myself, and to look after their parents as I would my own. As a result, such a man does not do very much for his friends. But the man who holds to the principle of all —embracingness says,

086 MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

on the contrary: I must care for my friends as much as I do for myself, and for their parents as I would my own. As a result, he does everything he can for his friends. Having made this distinction, Mo Tzu then asks the question: Which of these two principles is the right one?

Mo Tzu thereupon uses his "tests of judgment" to determine the right and wrong of these principles.


Output:
According to him, every principle must be examined by three tests, namely: Its basis, its verifiability, and its applicability. A sound and right principle should be based on the Will of Heaven and of the spirits and on the deeds of the ancient sage-kings." Then "it is to be verified by the senses of hearing and sight of the common people." And finally, "it is to be applied by adopting it in government and observing whether it is beneficial to the country and the people." (Mo-tzu,
 ch.

35.) Of these three tests, the last is the most important. Being beneficial to the country and the people is the standard by which Mo Tzu determines all values.


Output: This same standard is the chief one used by Mo Tzu to prove the desirability of all-embracing love. In the third of three chapters, all of which are titled "All-embracing Love, he argues: "The task of the humanhearted man is to procure benefits for the world and to eliminate its calamities. Now among all the current calamities of the world, which are the greatest? I say that attacks on small states by large ones, disturbances of small houses by large ones, oppression of the weak by the strong, misuse of the few by the many, deception of the simple by the cunning, and disdain toward the humble by the honored: these are the misfortunes of the world....When we come to think about the causes of all these calamities, how have they arisen? Have they arisen out of love of others and benefiting others? We must reply that it is not so. Rather we should say that they have arisen out of hate of others and injuring others. If we classify those in the world who hate others and injure others, shall we call them


Output: hate others and injure others, shall we call them 'discriminating' or 'all-embracing'? We must say that they are 'discriminating.' So, then, is not mutual discrimination the cause of the major calamities of the world? Therefore the principle of discrimination is wrong.


Output:
"Whoever criticizes others must have something to substitute for what he criticizes. Therefore I say: Substitute all—embracingness for discrimination. What is the reason why all-embracingness can be substituted for discrimination? The answer is that when everyone regards the states of others as he regards his own, who will attack these other states? Others will be regarded like the self. When everyone regards the cities of others as he regards his own, who will seize these other cities? Others will be regarded like the self. When everyone regards the houses of others as he regards his own, who will disturb these other houses? Others will be regarded like the self.

"Now, when states and cities do not attack and seize one another, and when clans and individuals do not disturb and harm one another, is this a calamity or a benefit to the world? We must say it is a benefit. When we come to consider the origin of the various benefits, how have they arisen?

O88 , MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS


Output: Have they arisen out of hate of others and injuring others? We must say not so. We should say that they have arisen out of love of others and benefiting others. If we classify those in the world who love others and benefit others, shall we call them 'discriminating or 'all-embracing ? We must say that they are 'all-embracing.' Then is it not the case that 'mutual all-embrae-ingness is the cause of the major benefit of the world? Therefore I say that the principle of all—embracingness is right. (Mo—tzu,


Output:
ch. 16.) Thus, using a utilitarianistic argument, Mo Tzu proves the principle of all-embracing love to be absolutely right. The humanhearted man whose task it is to procure benefits for ihe world and eliminate its calamities, must establish all-embracing love as the standard of action both for himself and for all others in the world. When everyone in the world acts according to this standard, then attentive ears and keen eyes will respond to serve one another, limbs will be strengthened to work for one another, and those who know the proper principle will untiringly instruct others. Thus the aged and widowers will have support and nourishment with which to round out their old age, and the young and weak and orphans will have a place of support in which to grow up. When all-embracing love is adopted as the standard, such are the consequent benefits." {Ibid.)
 This, then, is Mo Tzu's ideal world, which can be created only through the practice of all-embracing love.


Output: The Will of God and Existence of Spirits


Output: There remains, however, a basic question: How to persuade people thus to love one another? One may tell them, as was said above, that the practice of all—embracing love is the only way to benefit the world and that every humanhearted man is one who practices all-embracing love. Yet people may still ask: Why should I personally act to benefit the world and why should 1 be a human—hearted man? One may then argue further that if the world as a whole is benefited, this means benefit for every individual in the world as well. Or as Mo Tzu says: "He who loves others, must also be loved by others. He who benefits others, must also be benefited by others. He who hates others, must also be hated by others. He who injures others, must also be injured by others." (Mo-tzu,


Output: ch. 17.) Thus, then, the love of others is a sort of personal insurance or investment, which pays, as Americans would say. Most people, however, are too shortsighted to see the value of a long term investment of this sort, and there are a few instances in which such an investment does, indeed, fail to pay.


Output:
In order, therefore, to induce people to practice the principle of all-embracing love, Mo Tzu, in addition to the foregoing arguments, introduces a number of religious and political sanctions. Thus in the Mo-tzu
 there are chapters on "The Will of Heaven," and also ones titled Proof of the Existence of Spirits." In these we read that Cod exists; that He loves mankind; and that His Will is that all men should love one another. He constantly super

090 , MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

vises the activities of men, especially those of the rulers of men. He punishes with calamities persons who disobey His Will, and rewards with good fortune those who obey. Besides God, there are also numerous lesser spirits who likewise reward men who practice all—embracing love, and punish those who practice "discrimination."


Output:
In this connection there is an interesting story about Mo Tzu: When Mo Tzu was once ill, Tieh Pi came to him and inquired: Sir, you hold that the spirits are intelligent and control calamities and blessings. They reward the good and punish the evil. Now you are a sage. How then can you be ill? Is it that your teaching is not entirely correct or that the spirits are after all not intelligent? Mo Tzu replied: Though I am ill, why should the spirits be unintelligent? There are many ways by which a man can contract diseases. Some are contracted from cold or heat, some from fatigue. If there are a hundred doors and only one be closed, will there not be ways by which robbers can enter? "' (Mo-tzu,
 ch. 48-) In modern logical terminology, Mo Tzu would say that punishment by the spirits is a sufficient cause for the disease of a man, but not its necessary cause.

 A Seeming Inconsistency


Output:
A Seeming Inconsistency

Here it is timely to point out that both the Mohists and the Comfucianists seem to be inconsistent in their attitude toward the existence of spirits and the performance of rituals connected with the spirits.


Output:
Certainly it seems inconsistent for the Mohists to have believed in the existence of the spirits, yet at the same time to have opposed the elaborate rituals that were conducted on the occasion of funerals and of the making of sacrifices to the ancestors. Likewise, it seems inconsistent that the Confucianists stressed those funeral and sacrificial rituals, yet did not believe in the existence of the spirits. The Mohists, for their part, were quite ready to point out this seeming inconsistency as regards the Confucianists. Thus we read in the Mo—tzu:
 Kung — meng Tzu [a Confucianist] said: 'There are no spirits.' Again he said: 'The superior man should learn the rituals of sacrifice. Mo Tzu said: 'To hold that there are no spirits, and yet to learn sacrificial ceremonies, is like learning the ceremonies of hospitality when there are no guests, or throwing fish nets when there are no fish. (Ch. 48.)


Output:
Yet the seeming inconsistencies of the Confucianists and Mohists are both unreal. According to the former, the reason for performing the sacrificial rituals is no longer a belief that the spirits actually exist, though no doubt this was the original reason. Rather, the performance springs from the sentiment of respect toward his departed forebears held by the man who offers the sacrifice. Hence the meaning of the ceremonies is poetic, not religious. This theory was later developed by Hsiln
 Tzu and his school of Confucianism in detail, as we shall see in chapter thirteen of this book. Hence there is no real inconsistency at all.

OOi

MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS


Output: Likewise there is no aetual inconsistency in the Mohist point of view, for Mo Tzu' s proof of the existence of spirits is done primarily in order that he may introduce a religious sanction for his doctrine of all-embracing love, rather than because of any real interest in supernatural matters. Thus in his chapter on Proof of the Existence of Spirits, he attributes the existing confusion of the world to a doubt (among men) as to the existence of spirits and a failure lo understand that they can reward the good and punish the bad. He then asks: "If now all the people of the world could be made to believe that the spirits can reward the good and punish the bad, would the world then be in chaos? (Ch. 31.) Thus his doctrine of the Will of God and the existence of spirits is only to induce people to believe that they will be, rewarded if they practice all—embracing love, and punished if they do not. Such a belief among the people was something useful; hence Mo Tzu wanted it. "Economy of expenditure" in the funeral


Output: it. "Economy of expenditure" in the funeral and sacrificial services was also useful; hence Mo Tzu wanted it too. From his ultra—utilitarian point of view, there was no inconsistency in wanting both things, since both were useful.


Output:
Origin of the State

Besides religious sanctions, political ones are also needed if people are to practice all-embracing love.

In the Mo-tzu,
 there are three chapters titled Agreement with the Superior, in which Mo Tzu expounds his theory of the origin of the state. According to this theory, the authority of the ruler of a state comes from two sources: the will of the people and the Will of God. Furthermore, the main task of the ruler is to supervise the activities of the people, rewarding those who practice all -embracing love and punishing those who do not. In order to do this effectively, his authority must be absolute. At this point we may ask: Why should people voluntarily choose to have such an absolute authority over them?


Output:
The answer, for Mo Tzu, is that the people accept such an authority, not because they prefer it, but because they have no alternative. According to him, before the creation of an organized state, people lived in what Thomas Hobbes has called "the state of nature." At this early time, "everyone had his own standard of right and wrong. When there was one man, there was one standard. When there were two men, there were two standards. When there were ten men, there were ten standards. The more people there were, the more were there standards. Every man considered himself as right and others as wrong.

"The world was in great disorder and men were like birds and beasts. They understood that all the disorders of the world were due to the fact that there was no political ruler. Therefore, they selected the most virtuous and most able man of the world, and established him as the Son of Heaven." (Mo-tzu,
 ch.


Output:
II.) Thus the ruler of the state was first established by the will of the people, in order to save themselves from anarchy.

In another chapter bearing the same title, Mo Tzu says: Of old when God

094

MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

and the spirits established the state and cities and installed rulers, it was not to make their rank high or their emolument substantial....It was to procure benefits for the people and eliminate their adversities; to enrich the poor and increase the few; and to bring safety out of danger and order out of confusion. (Ch.

I2.)According to this statement, therefore, the state and its ruler were established through the Will of God.


Output: No matter what was the way in which the ruler gained his power, once he was established, he, according to Mo Tzu, issued a mandate to the people of the world, saying: "Upon hearing good or evil, one shall report it to one's superior. What the superior thinks to be right, all shall think to be right. What the superior thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong." (Ch. II.) This leads Mo Tzu to the following dictum: "Always agree with the superior; never follow the inferior. (Ibid.)


Output:
Thus, Mo Tzu argues, the state must be totalitarian and the authority of its ruler absolute. This is an inevitable conclusion to his theory of the origin of the state. For the state was created precisely in order to end the disorder which had existed owing to the confused standards of right and wrong. The state's primary function, therefore, is, quoting Mo Tzu, "to unify the standards. Within the state only one standard can exist, and it must be one which is fixed by the state itself. No other standards can be tolerated, because if there were such, people would speedily return to 'the state of nature " in which there could be nothing but disorder and chaos. In this political theory we may see Mo Tzu's development of the professional ethics of the hswh,
 with its emphasis upon group obedience and discipline. No doubt it also reflects the troubled political conditions of Mo Tzu's day, which caused many people to look with favor on a centralized authority, even if it were to be an autocratic one.


Output:
So, then, there can be only one standard of right and wrong. Right, for Mo Tzu, is the practice of mutual all—embracingness, and wrong is the practice of "mutual discrimination." Through appeal to this political sanction, together with his religious one, Mo Tzu hoped to bring all people of the world to practice his principle of all-embracing love.

Such was Mo Tzu's teaching, and it is the unanimous report of all sources of his time that in his own activities he was a true example of it.

MO TZU, THE FIRST OPPONENT OF CONFUCIUS

 CHAPTER 6

THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:

YANG CHU

IN the Confucian Analects,
 we are told that Confucius, while traveling from state to state,


Output:
met many men whom he called yin che,
 ''those who obscure themselves," and described as persons who had "escaped from the world." (XIV, 39-) These recluses ridiculed Confucius for what they regarded as his vain efforts to save the world. By one of them he was described as the one who knows he cannot succeed, yet keeps on trying to do so." 1

(XTV, 41.) To these attacks, Tzu Lu, a disciple of Confucius, once replied: It is unrighteous to refuse: to serve in office. If the regulations between old and young in family life are not to be set aside, how is it then that you set aside the duty that exists between sovereign and subject? In your desire to maintain your personal purity, you subvert the great relationship of society Lthc relationship between sovereign and subject]." (Ibid.,
 XVI11, 7.)

 The Early Taoists and the Recluses

The recluses were thus individualists who "desired to maintain their personal purity.


Output:
They were also, in a sense, defeatists who thought (hat the world was so bad that nothing could be done for it. One of them is reported in ihe Analects
 to have said: "The world is a swelling torrent, and is there anyone to change it? (XVIII, 6.) It was from men of this sort, most of them living far away from other men in the world of nature, that the Taoists were probably originally drawn.

The Taoists, however, were not ordinary recluses who escaped the world, desiring to "maintain their personal purity, ' and who, once in retirement, made no attempt ideologically to justify their conduct. On the contrary, they were men who, having gone into seclusion, attempted to work out a system of thought that would give meaning to their action. Among them, Yang Chu seems to have been the earliest prominent exponent.

Yang Chu s dales are not clear, but he must have lived between the time of Mo Tzu (c.

479-c. 381 B.C.) and Mencius (c. 371-c. 189 B.C.). This is in—

O98 THE FIRST PHASE OF

TAOISM:YANG CHU


Output:
O98 THE FIRST PHASE OF

TAOISM:YANG CHU

dicated by the fact that though unmentioned by Mo Tzu, he, by the time of Mencius, had

become as influential as were the Mohists. To quote Mencius himself: "The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world." (Mencius,
 Illb, 9.) In the Taoist work known as the Lieh-tzu,
 there is one chapter entitled "Yang Chu," which, according to the traditional view, represents Yang Chu's philosophy. But the authenticity of the Lieh-tzu
 has been much questioned by modern scholarship, and the view expressed in most of the "Yang Chu chapter is not consistent with Yang Chu's ideas as reported in other early reliable sources. Its tenets are those ol extreme hedonism (hence Forke s title, Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure"),
 whereas in no other early writings do we find Yang Chu being accused as a hedonist. Yang Chu s actual ideas, unfortunately, are nowhere described very consecutively, but must be deduced from scattered references in a number of works by other writers.


Output:
Yang Chu s Fundamental Ideas

The Mencius
 says: "The principle of Yang Chu is: 'Each one for himself.' Though he might have profited the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it.' (Vila, 26.) The Lii -shih Ch un -ch iu
 (third century B.C.) says: "Yang Sheng valued self."

(XVII, 7.) The Han-fei-tzu
 (also third century) says: There is a man whose policy it is not to enter a city which is in danger, nor to remain in the army. Even for the great profit of the whole world, he would not exchange one hair of his shank....He is one who despises things and values life." (Ch. 50.) And the Huai-nan-tzu
 (second century B.C.) says: Preserving life and maintaining what is genuine in it, not allowing things to entangle one's person: this is what Yang Chu established." (Ch. 13.)


Output:
In fhe above quotations, the Yang Sheng of the Lii—shih Ch un-ch iu
 has been proved by recent scholars to be Yang Chu, while the man who "for the great profit of the whole world, would not exchange one hair of his shank" must also be Yang Chu or one of his followers, because no other man of that time is known to have held such a principle. Putting these sources together, we can deduce that Yang Chu's two fundamental ideas were: "Each one for himself, and the despising of things and valuing of life. Such ideas are precisely the opposite of those of Mo Tzu, who held the principle of an all-embracing love.

The statement of Han Fei Tzu that Yang Chu would not give up a hair from his shank even to gain
 the entire world, differs somewhat from what Mencius says, which is that Yang Chu would not sacrifice a single hair even in order to profit
 the whole world. Both statements, however, are consistent with Yang Chu s fundamental ideas. The latter harmonizes with his doctrine


Output:
* See Anton Forke, Yang Chit's Garden of Pleasure,
 and James Legge, The Chinese Classics,
 Vol II, Prolegomena,
 pp. 91-9-IOO THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU

 of "each one for himself ; the former with that of "despising things and valuing life." Both may be said to be but two aspects of a single theory.

 Illustrations of Yang Chu s Ideas


Output:
Illustrations of Yang Chu s Ideas

 In Taoist literature, illustrations may be found for both the above mentioned aspects of Yang Chu's ideology. In the first chapter of the Chuang-tzu, there is a story about a meeting between the legendary sage—ruler Yao and a hermit named Hsu Yu. Yao was anxious to hand over his rule of the world to Hsu Yu, but the latter rejected it, saying: You govern the world and it is already at peace. Suppose I were to take your place, would I do it for the name? Name is but the shadow of real gain. Would I do it for real gain? The tit, building its nest in the mighty forest, occupies but a single twig. The tapir, slaking its thirst from the river, drinks only enough to fill its belly. You return and be quiet. F have no need of the world." Here was a hermit who would not take the world, even were it given to him for nothing.

 Certainly, then, he would not exchange it for even a single hair from his shank. This illustrates Han Fei Tzu' s account of Yang Chu.


Output: In the above mentioned chapter titled "Yang Chu" in the Lieh-tzu, there is another story which reads: Ch in Tzu asked Yang Chu: If by plucking out a single hair of your body you could save the whole world, would you do it? Yang Chu answered: The whole world is surely not to be saved by a single hair. Ch in Tzu said: But supposing it possible, would you do it? Yang Chu made no answer. Ch in Tzu then went out and told Meng-sun Yang. The latter replied: ' You do not understand the mind of the Master. I will explain it for you. Supposing by tearing off a piece of your skin, you were to get ten thousand pieces of gold, would you do it?' Ch' in Tzu said: I would. Meng—sun Yang continued: Supposing by cutting off one of your limbs, you were to get a whole kingdom, would you do it? For a while Ch in Tzu was silent. Then Meng-sun Yang said: ' A hair is unimportant compared with the skin.


Output:
A piece of skin is unimportant compared with a limb. But many hairs put together are as important as a piece of skin. Many pieces of skin put together are as important as a limb. A single hair is one of the ten thousand parts of the body. How can you disregard it?' " This is an illustration of the other aspect of Yang Chu s theory.

 In the same chapter of the Lieh-tzu, Yang Chu is reported to have said: "The men of antiquity, if by injuring a single hair they could have profited the world, would not have done it. Had the world been offered to them as their exclusive possession, they would not have taken it. If everybody would refuse to pluck out even a single hair, and everybody would refuse to take the world as a gain, then the world would be in perfect order. We cannot be sure that this is really a saying of Yang Chu, but it sums up very well the Iwo aspects of his iheory, and the political philosophy of the early Taoists.

 IO2. ' THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU


Output:
Yang Chu s Ideas as Expressed in the Lao-tzu and Chuang—tzu

 Reflections of Yang Chu's main ideas can be found in portions of the Lao-tzu and some chapters of the Chuang—lzu and the Lil—shih Ch un—ch i— u. In the latter work there is a chapter titled "The Importance of Self," in which it is said: Our life is our own possession, and its benefit to us is very great. Regarding its dignity, even the honor of being Emperor could not compare with it. Regarding its importance, even the wealth of possessing the world would not be exchanged for it. Regarding its safety, were we to lose it for one morning, we could never again bring it back. These three are points on which those who have understanding are careful." (I, 3.) This passage explains why one should despise things and value life. Even an empire, once lost, may some day be regained, but once dead, one can never live again.


Output: The Lao-tzu contains passages expressing the same idea. For example: He who in his conduct values his body more than he does the world, may be given the world. He who in his conduct loves himself more than he does the world, may be entrusted with the world." (Ch. 13.) Or: "Name or person, which is more dear? Person or fortune, which is more important? (Ch. 44-) Here again appears the idea of despising things and valuing life.


Output: In the third chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled "Fundamentals for the Cultivation of Life, we read: When you do something good, beware of reputation; when you do something evil, beware of punishment. Follow the middle way and take this to be your constant principle. Then you can guard your person, nourish your parents, and complete your natural term of years." This again follows Yang Chu s line of thought, and, according to the earlier Taoists, is the best way to preserve one's life against the harms that come from the human world. If a man s conduct is so bad that society punishes him, this is obviously not the way to preserve his life. But if a man is so good in his conduct that he obtains a fine reputation, this too is not the way to preserve his life. Another chapter of the Chuang-tzu tells us: "Mountain trees are their own enemies, and the leaping fire is the cause of its own quenching.


Output:
Cinnamon is edible, therefore the cinnamon tree is cut down. Ch'i oil is useful, therefore the ch'i tree is gashed." (Ch. 4.) A man having a reputation of ability and usefulness will suffer a fate just like that of the cinnamon and ch'i Irees.

 Thus in the Chuang-tzu we find passages that admire the usefulness of the useless. In the chapter just quoted, there is the description of a sacred oak, which, because its wood was good for nothing, had been spared the ax, and which said to someone in a dream: "For a long time I have been learning to be useless. There were several occasions on which I was nearly destroyed, but now I have succeeded in being useless, which is of the greatest use to me. If I were useful, could I have become so great? Again it is said that "the world knows only the usefulness of the useful, but does not know the usefulness of the useless." (Ch. 4.) To be useless is the way to preserve one'

 IO4 , THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU


Output:
s life. The man who is skillful in preserving life must not do much evil, but neither must he do much good. He must live midway between good and evil. He tries to be useless, which in the end proves of greatest usefulness to him.

 Development of Taoism

 In this chapter we have been seeing the first phase in the development of early Taoist philosophy.

 Altogether there have been three main phases. The ideas attributed to Yang Chu represent the first.


Output: Those expressed in the greater part of the Lao-tzu represent the second. And those expressed in the greater part of the Chuang—lzu represent the third and last phase. I say the greater part of the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, because in the Lao-tzu there are also to be found ideas representing the first and third phases and in the Chuang-tzu ideas of the first and second phases. These two books, like many others of ancient China, are really collections of Taoist writings and sayings, made by differing persons in different times, rather than the single work of any one person.


Output:
The starting point of Taoist philosophy is the preservation of life and avoiding of injury. Yang Chu s method for so doing is to escape. This is the method of the ordinary recluse who flees from society and hides himself in the mountains and forests. By doing this he thinks he can avoid the evils of the human world. Things in the human world, however, are so complicated that no matter how well one hides oneself, there are always evils that cannot be avoided. There are times, therefore, when the method of "escaping' does not work.

 The ideas expressed in the greater part of the Lao-tzu represent an attempt to reveal the laws underlying the changes of things in the universe. Things change, but the laws underlying the changes remain unchanging. Tf one understands these laws and regulates one's actions in conformity with them, one can then turn everything to one s advantage. This is the second phase in the development of Taoism.


Output: Even so, however, there is no absolute guarantee. In the changes of things, both in the world of nature and of man, there are always unseen elements. So despite every care, the possibility remains that one will suffer injury. This is why the Lao-tzu says with still deeper insight: "The reason that I have great disaster is that I have a body. If there were no body, what disaster could there be? " (Ch. 13.) These words of greater understanding are developed in much of the Chuang-tzu, in which occur the concepts of the equalization of life with death, and the identity of self with others. This means to see life and death, self and others, from a higher point of view. By seeing things from this higher point of view, one can transcend the existing world. This is also a form of escape ; nol one, however, from society to mountains and forests, but rather from this world to another world. Here is the third and last phase of development in the Taoism of ancient times.


Output:
IO6 . THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU

 All these developments are illustrated by a story which we find in the twentieth chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled "The Mountain Tree." The story runs: "Chuang Tzu was traveling through the mountains, when he saw a great tree well covered with foliage. A tree—cutter was standing beside it, but he did not out it down. Chuang Tzu asked him the reason and he replied: 'It is of no use.' Chuang Tzu then said: 'By virtue of having no exceptional qualities, this tree succeeds in completing its natural span.


Output:
"When the Master (Chuang Tzu) left the mountains, he stopped at the home of a friend. The friend was glad and ordered the servant to kill a goose and cook it. The servant asked: 'One of the geese can cackle. The other cannot. Which shall I kill?' The Master said: 'Kill the one that cannot cackle.' Next day, a disciple asked Chuang Tzu the question: 'Yesterday the tree in the mountains, because it had no exceptional quality, succeeded in completing its natural span. But now the goose of our host, because it had no exceptional quality, had to die. What will be your position?

 "Chuang Tzu laughed and said: My position will lie between having exceptional qualities and not having them. Yet this position only seems to be right, but really is not so. Therefore those who practice this method are not able to be completely free from troubles. If one wanders about with Too and Te (the Way and its spiritual power), it will be otherwise."'


Output: Then Chuang Tzu went on to say that he who links himself with Too and Te is with the ancestor of things, using things as things, but not being used by things as things. When that is so, what is there that can trouble him? "


Output:
In this story, the first part illustrates the theory of preserving life as practiced by Yang Chu, while the second part gives that of Chuang Tzu. "Having exceptional quality' corresponds to the doing of good things, mentioned in the earlier quotation from the third chapter of the Chuang—Iza. "Having no exceptional quality" corresponds to the doing of bad things in that same quotation. And a position between these two extremes corresponds to the middle way indicated in that quotation. Yet if a man cannot see things from a higher point of view, none of these methods can absolutely guarantee him from danger and harm. To see things from a higher point of view, however, means to abolish the self. We may say that the early Taoists were selfish. Yet in their later development this selfishness became reversed and destroyed itself.

 IO8 THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU

 CHAPTER 7

 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS


Output: ACCORDING to the Historical Records (ch. 74), Mencius (371 ?-l8o ? B.C.) was a native of the state of Tsou, in the present southern part of Shantung province in East China. He was linked with Confucius through his study under a disciple of Tzu-ssu, who in turn was Confucius' grandson. At that time, the Kings of Ch i, a larger state also in present Shantung, were great admirers of learning. Near the west gate of their capital, a gate known as Chi, they had established a center of learning which they called Chi—hsia, that is, below Chi. All the scholars living there were ranked as great officers and were honored and courted by having large houses built for them on the main road. This was to show to all the pensioned guests of the feudal lords that it was the state of Ch i that could attract the most eminent scholars in the world." ([bid.)


Output:
Mencius for a while was one of these eminent scholars, but he also traveled to other states, vainly trying to get a hearing for his ideas among their rulers. Finally, so the Historical Records tell us, he retired and with his disciples composed the Mencius in seven books. This work records the conversations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time, and between him and his disciples, and in later times it was honored by being made one of the famous "Four Books," which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis of Confucian education.

 Meneius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism, and the somewhat later Hstin Tzu the realistic wing. The meaning of this will become clear as we go on.

 The Goodness of Human Nature


Output:
The Goodness of Human Nature

 We have seen that Confucius spoke very much about jen (humanheartedness), and made a sharp distinction between yi (righteousness) and li (profit). Every man should, without thought of personal advantage, unconditionally do what he ought to do, and be what he ought to be. In other words, he should

 HO. THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 extend himself so as to include others, which, in essence, is the practice of jen. But though Confucius held these doctrines, he failed to explain why it is that a man should act in this way. Mencius, however, attempted to give an answer to this question, and in so doing developed the theory for which he is most famed: that of the original goodness of human nature.


Output: Whether human nature is good or bad-that is, what, precisely, is the nature of human nature—has been one of the most controversial problems in Chinese philosophy. According to Mencius, there were, in his time, three other theories besides his own on this subject. The first was that human nature is neither good nor bad. The second was that human nature can be either good or bad (which seems to mean that in the nature of man there are both good and bad elements), and the third was that the nature of some men is good, and that of others is bad. (Mencius, Via, 3-6.) The first of these theories was held by Kao Tzu, a philosopher who was contemporary with Mencius. We know more about it than the other theories through the long discussions between him and Mencius which are preserved for us in the Men-cms.


Output: When Mencius holds that human nature is good, he does not mean that every man is born a Confucius, that is, a sage. His theory has some similarity with one side of the second theory mentioned above, that is, that in the nature of man there are good elements. He admits, to be sure, that there are also other elements, which are neither good nor bad in themselves, but which, if not duly controlled, can lead to evil. According to Meneius, however, these are elements which man shares in common with other living creatures. They represent the animal aspect of man s life, and therefore, strictly speaking, should not be considered as part of the human nature.


Output: To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: "All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others .... If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress....From this cuse we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanheartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs....Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full development and completion. The


Output: to give them full development and completion. The result will be like fire that begins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one's parents." (Mencius, TIa, 6.) 112 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS


Output:
_

 All men in their original nature possess these "four beginnings," which, if fully developed, become the four constant virtues, so greatly emphasized in Confucianism. These virtues, if not hindered by external conditions, develop naturally from within, just as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a flower from the bud. This is the basis of Mencius controversy with Kao Tzu, according to whom human nature is in itself neither good nor bad, and for whom morality is therefore something that is artificially added from without.


Output:
There remains another question, which is: Why should man allow free development to his "four beginnings, instead of to what we may call his lower instincts? Mencius answers that it is these four beginnings that differentiate man from the beasts. They should be developed, therefore, because it is only through their development that man is truly a man. Mencius says: That whereby man differs from birds and beasts is but slight. The mass of the people east it away, whereas the superior man preserves it." (Mencius, IVb, 19.) Thus he answers a question which had not occurred to Confucius.

 Fundamental Difference between Confucianism, and Mohism


Output: Here we find the fundamental difference between Confucianism and Mo— hism. One of Mencius self-appointed tasks was to "oppose Yang Chu and Mo Ti." He says: "Yang's principle of 'each one for himself' amounts to making one s sovereign of no account. Mo s principle of all—embracing love amounts to making one s lather of no account. To have no father and no sovereign is to be like the birds and beasts....These pernicious opinions mislead the people and block the way of humanheartedness and righteousness. (Mencius, Illb, 9») It is very clear that Yang Chu s theory opposes humanheartedness and righteousness, since the essence of these two virtues is to benefit others, while Yang Chu's principle is to benefit oneself. Rut Mo Tzu s principle of all-embracing love also aimed to benefit others, and he was even more outspoken in this respect than the Confucianists. Why, then, does Mencius lump him together with Yang Chu in his criticism?


Output:
The traditional answer is that according to Mohist doctrine, love should have in it no gradations of greater or lesser love, whereas according to Confucianism, the reverse is true. In other words, the Mohists emphasized equality in loving others, while the Confucianists emphasized gradation. This difference is brought out in a passage in the Mo—tzu in which a certain Wu—ma Tzu is reported as saying to Mo Tzu: "[ cannot practice all-embracing love. I love the men of Tsou [a nearby state] better than I love those of Yileh [a distant state]. I love the men of Lu [his own state] better than I love those of Tsou.

 I love the men of my own district better than I love those of Lu. I love the members of my own clan better than I love those of my district. 1 love my parents better than 1 love the men of my clan. And I love myself better than 1 love my parents." (Mo-tzu, ch. 46-) Wu-ma Tzu was a Confucianist, and the representation of him as saying, 114 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS


Output:
"I love myself better than I love my parents, comes from a Mohist source and is probably an exaggeration. Certainly it is not consistent with the Confucianist emphasis on filial piety. With this exception, however, Wu -ma Tzu s statement is in general agreement with the Confucianist spirit. For according to the Confucianists, there should be degrees in love.

 Speaking about these degrees, Mencius says:' The superior man, in his relation to things, loves them but has no feeling of humanheartedness. In his relation to people, he has humanheartedness, but no deep feeling of family affection. One should have feelings of family affection for the members of one' s family, but human -heartedness for people; human -heartedness for people, but love for things."


Output: (Mencius, Vila, 45.) In a discussion with a Mohist by the name of Yi Chih, Mencius asked him whether he really believed that men love their neighbors children in the same way as they love their brothers children; the love for a brother s child is naturally greater. (Mencius, Ilia, 50 This, according to Mencius, is quite proper; what should be done is to extend such love until it includes the more distant members of society. "Treat the aged in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the aged of other people's families. Treat the young in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the young of other people s families. (Mencius, la, 7-) Such is what Mencius calls extending one's scope of activity to include others." (Ibid.) It is an extension based on the principle of graded love.


Output: To extend the love for one s family so as to include persons outside it as well, is to practice that "principle of chung [conscientiousness to others] and shu [altruism]" advocated by Confucius, which in turn is equivalent to the practice of humanheartedness. There is nothing forced in any of these practices, because the original natures of all men have in them a feeling of commiseration, which makes it impossible for them to bear to see the suffering of others. The development of this "beginning" of goodness causes men naturally to love others, but it is equally natural that they should love their parents to a greater degree than they love men in general.


Output:
Such is the Confucianist point of view. The Mohists, on the contrary, insist that the love for others should be on a par with the love for parents. Regardless of whether this means that one should love one s parents less, or love others more, the fact remains that the Confucianisl type of graded love should be avoided at all costs. It is with this in mind that Mencius attacks the Mohist principle of all-embracing love as meaning that a man treats his father as of no account.

 The above difference between the Confucianist and the Mohist theory of love has been pointed out very clearly by Mencius and by many others after him. Besides this, however, there is another difference of a more fundamental nature. This is, that the Confucianists considered human—heartedness as a quality that develops naturally from within the human nature, whereas the Mohists considered all-embracing love as something artificially added to man Il6 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 ^

 from without.


Output:
^

 from without.

 Mo Tzu may also be said to have answered a question that did not occur to Confucius, namely: Why should man practice humanheartedness and righteousness? His answer, however, is based on utilitarianism, and his emphasis on supernatural and political sanctions to compel and induce people to practice all—embracing love is nol consistent with the Confucianist principle that virtue should be done for its own sake. If we compare the Mo—tzu s chapter on "All-Embracing Love, as quoted above in the fifth chapter, with the quotations here from the Mencius on the four moral beginnings in man's nature, we see very clearly the fundamental difference between the two schools.

 Political Philosophy

 We have seen earlier that the Mohist theory of the origin of state is likewise a utilitarianistic one.


Output: Here again the Confucianist theory differs. Mencius says: If men have satisfied their hunger, have clothes to wear, and live at ease but lack good teaching, they are close to the birds and beasts. The sage [Shun, a legendary sage-ruler J was distressed about this and appointed Hsieh as an official instructor to teach men the basic relationships of life. Father and son should love each other. Ruler and subject should be just to each other. Husband and wife should distinguish their respective spheres. Elder and younger brothers should have a sense of mutual precedence. And between friends there should be good faith. (Mencius, Ilia, 4.) The existence of the human relationships and the moral principles based on them is what differentiates man from birds and beasts. The state and society have their origin in the existence of these human relationships. Therefore, according to the Mohists, the state exists because it is useful. But according to the Confucianists, it exists because it ought to exist.


Output: Men have their full realization and development only in human relationships. Like Aristotle, Mencius maintains that man is a political animal and can fully develop these relationships only within state and society. The state is a moral institution and the head of the state should be a moral leader. Therefore in Confucianist political philosophy only a sage can be a real king. Mencius pictures this ideal as having existed in an idealized past. According to him, there was a time when the sage Yao (supposed to have lived in the twenty-fourth century B.C.) was Emperor. When he was old, he selected a younger sage, Shun, whom he had taught how to be a ruler, so that at Yao s death , Shun became Emp eror. Si mi larl y, wh en Shun was old , h e ag ain selected a younger sage, Yii, to be his successor. Thus the throne was handed from sage to sage, which, according to Mencius, is as it ought to be.


Output:
If a ruler lacks the ethical qualities that make a good leader, the people have the moral right of revolution. In that case, even the killing of the ruler is no longer a crime of regicide. This is because, according to Meneius, if a

 Il8 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS j


Output: sovereign does not act as he ideally ought to do, he morally ceases to be a sovereign and, following Confucius theory of the rectification of names, is a "mere fellow," as Mencius says. (Mencius, lib, 8.) Mencius also says: "The people are the most important element L i n a stateJ; the spirits of the land and the grain are secondary; and the sovereign is the least. (Merwius, Vllb, I4-) These ideas of Mencius have exercised a tremendous influence in Chinese history, even as late as the revolution of 1911, which led to the establishment of the Chinese Republic. It is true that modern democratic ideas from the West played their role too in this event, but the ancient native concept of the right of revolution had a greater influence on the mass of the people.


Output: If a sage becomes king, his government is called one of kingly government. According to Mencius and later Confucianists, there are two kinds of government. One is that of the wring or (sage) king; the other is that of the pa or military lord. These are completely different in kind. The government of a sage—king is carried on through moral instruction and education; that of a military lord is conducted through force and compulsion. The power of the wang government is moral, that of the pa government, physical. Mencius says in this connection: "He who uses force in the place of virtue is a pa. He who is virtuous and practices human—heartedness is a wang. When one subdues men by force, they do not submit to him in their hearts but only outwardly, because they have insufficient strength to resist. But when one gains followers by virtue, they are pleased in their hearts and will submit of themselves as did the seventy disciples to Confucius. (Mencius, Ha, 3.) This distinction between wang and pa has always been


Output: distinction between wang and pa has always been maintained by laler Chinese political philosophers. In terms of contemporary politics, we may say that a democratic government is a wang government, because it represents a free association of people, while a Fascist government is that of a pa, because it reigns through terror and physical force.


Output: The sage-king in his kingly government does all he can for the welfare and benefit of the people, which means that his state must be built on a sound economic basis. Since China has always been overwhelmingly agrarian, it is natural that, according to Mencius, the most important economic basis of kingly government lies in the equal distribution of land. His ideal land system is what has been known as the "well-field system. According to this system, each square li (about one third of a mile) of land is to be divided into nine squares, each consisting of one hundred Chinese acres. The central square is known as the "public field, while the eight surrounding squares are the private land of eight fanners with their families, each family having one square. These farmers cultivate the public field collectively and their own fields individually. The produce of the public field goes to the government, while each family keeps for itself what it raises from its own field. The arrangement of the nine squares


Output: own field. The arrangement of the nine squares resembles in form the Chinese character for "well" 7T, which is why it is called the "well—field system. (Mencius Ilia, '■_


Output:
12.0 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 Describing this system further, Meneius states that each family should plant mulberry trees around its five—acre homestead in its own field so that its aged members may be clothed with silk. Each family should also raise fowls and pigs, so that its aged members may be nourished with meal. If ihis is done, everyone under the kingly government can "nourish the living and bury the dead without the least dissatisfaction, which marks the beginning of ihe kingly way. {Mencius, Ta, 3-) It marks, however, only the beginning, because it is an exclusively economic basis for the higher culture of the people. Only when everyone has received some education and come to an understanding of the human relationships, does the kingly way become complete.


Output: The practice of this kingly way is not something alien to human nature, but is rather the direct outcome of the development by the sage-king of his own feeling of commiseration. As Mencius says: All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others. The early kings, having this unbearing mind, thereby had likewise an unbearing government." (Mencius, I la, 6.) The unbearing mind and feeling of commiseration are one in Mencius thought. As we have seen, the virtue of human—heartedness, according to the Confucianists, is nothing but the development of this feeling of commiseration; this feeling in its turn cannot be developed save through the practice of love; and the practice of love is nothing more than the "extension of one s scope of activity to include others, which is ihe way of cluing and sliu. The kingly way or kingly government is nothing but the result of the king's practice of love, and his practice of chung and slm.


Output:
According to Mencius, there is nothing esoteric or difficult in the kingly way. The Mencius (1b, 9) records that on one occasion, when an ox was being led to sacrifice, King Hsuan of Ch i saw it and could not endure its frightened appearance, as if it were an innocent person going to the place of death.

 He therefore ordered that it be replaced by a sheep. Mencius then told the King that this was an example of his "unbearing mind," and if he could only extend it to include human affairs, he could then govern in the kingly way. The King replied that he could not do this because he had the defect of loving wealth and feminine beauty. Whereupon Mencius told ihe King that these are things loved by all men.

 If the King, by understanding his own desires, would also come to understand the desires of all his people, and would take measures whereby the people might satisfy these desires, this would result in the kingly way and nothing else.


Output:
What Mencius told King Hsiian is nothing more than the extension of one's own scope of activity to include others, which is precisely the practice of chung and shu. Here we see how Mencius developed the ideas of Confucius. In his exposition of this principle, Confucius had limited himself to its application to the self-cultivation of the individual, while by Mencius its application was extended to government and politics. For Confucius, it was a principle only for sageliness wilhin, but by Mencius il was expand— 122 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 ed to become also a principle for "kingliness without.


Output:
Even in the former sense of "sageliness within," Mencius expresses his concept of this principle more clearly than did Confucius. He says: He who has completely developed his mind, knows his nature. He who knows his nature, knows Heaven." (Mencius, Vila, I.) The mind here referred to is the unbearing mind or the feeling of commiseration. It is the essence of our nature. Hence when we fully develop this mind, we know our nature. And according to Mencius, our nature is 'what Heaven has given to us.' (Mencius, Via, I5-) Therefore, when we know our nature, we also know Heaven.

 Mysticism

 According to Mencius and his school of Confucianism, the universe is essentially a moral universe.


Output: The moral principles of man are also metaphysical principles of the universe, and the nature of man is an exemplification of these principles. It is this moral universe that Mencius and his school mean when they speak of Heaven, and an understanding of this moral universe is what Mencius calls knowing Heaven. If a man knows Heaven, he is not only a citizen of society, but also a "citizen of Heaven," t hen min, as Mencius says. (Mencius, Vila, 19.) Mencius further makes a distinction between human honors and heavenly honors. He says: There are heavenly honors and human honors. Human -hcartedness, righteousness, loyalty, good faith, and the untiring practice of the good: these are the honors of Heaven.


Output: Princes, ministers, and officials: these are the honors of man. (Mencius, VI— a, 16.) In other words, heavenly honors are those to which a man can attain in the world of values, while human honors are purely material concepts in the human world. The citizen of Heaven, just because he is the citizen of Heaven, cares only for the honors of Heaven, but not those of man.


Output:
Mencius also remarks: "All things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to realize this through self-cultivation. And there is no better way to human— heartedness than the practice of the principle of shu. (Mencius, Vila, I.) In other words, through the full development of his nature, a man can not only know Heaven, but can also become one with Heaven. Also when a man fully develops his unbearing mind, he has within him the virtue of humanheartedness, and the best way to humanhearted-ness is the practice of chung and shu. Through this practice, one s egoism and selfishness are gradually reduced. And when they are reduced, one comes to feel that there is no longer a distinction between oneself and others, and so of distinction between the individual and the universe.

 That is to say, one becomes identified with the universe as a whole. This leads to a realization that "all things are complete within us." In this phrase we see the mystical element of Mencius philosophy.


Output:
We will understand this mysticism better, if we turn to Mencius discussion on what he calls the Hao Jan Chih Ch'i, a term which T translate as the

 124-THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 Great Morale. In this discussion Meneius describes the development uf his own spiritual cultivation.

 The Meneius (Ha, 2.) tells us that a disciple asked Meneius of what he was a specialist. Meneius replied: "I know the right and wrong in speech, and am proficient in cultivating my Hao Jan Chih Ch'i." The questioner then asked what this was, and Meneius replied: It is the Ch i, supremely great, supremely strong. If it be directly cultivated without handicap, then it pervades all between Heaven and Earth. It is the Ch' i which is achieved by the combination of righteousness and Too [the way, the truth], and without these it will be weakened.


Output: Hao Jan Chih Ch'i is a special term of Meneius. In later times, under his increasing influence, it came to be used not infrequently, but in ancient times it appears only in this one chapter. As to what it signifies, even Meneius admits that "it is hard to say." (Ibid.) The context of this discussion, however, includes a preliminary discussion about two warriors and their method of cultivating their valor. From this I infer that Meneius Ch i (a word which literally means vapor, gas, spiritual force) is the same ch i as occurs in such terms as yung ch' i (courage, valor) and shih ch i (morale of an army). That is why I translate Hao Jan Chih Ch'i as the "Great Morale." It is of the same nature as the morale of the warriors. The difference between the two, however, is that this Ch' i is further described as hao jan, which means "great to a supreme degree." The morale which warriors cultivate is a matter concerning man and man, and so is a moral value only. Bui ihe Great Morale is a matter concerning man and


Output: ihe Great Morale is a matter concerning man and the universe, and therefore is a super-moral value. It is the morale of the man who identifies himself with the universe, so that Meneius says of it that it pervades all between Heaven and Earth."


Output:
The method of cultivating the Great Morale has two aspects. One may be called the "understanding of Too"; that is, of the way or principle that leads to the elevation of the mind. The other aspect is what Meneius calls the accumulation of righteousness ; that is, the constant doing of what one ought to do in the universe as a "citizen of the universe." The combination of these two aspects is called by Meneius the combination of righteousness and T(u>.

 After one has reached an understanding of Too and the long accumulation of righteousness, the Great Morale will appear naturally of itself. The least bit of forcing will lead to failure. As Meneius says: We should not be like the man of Sung. There was a man of Sung who was grieved that his grain did not grow fast enough. So he pulled it up. Then he returned to his home with great innocence, and said to his people: I am tired today, for I have been helping the grain lo grow. His son ran out to look at it, and found all the grain withered." (Ibid.)


Output:
When one grows something, one must on the one hand do something for it, but on the other never "help it to grow. The cultivation of the Great Morale

 12.6. THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 is just like the growing of the grain. One must do something, which is the practice of virtue. Though Mencius here speaks of righteousness rather than humanheartedness, there is no practical difference, since humanhearted -ness is the inner content, of which righteousness is the outer expression. If one constantly practices righteousness, the Great Morale will naturally emerge from the very center of one s being.


Output:
Although this Hao Jan Chih Chi sounds rather mysterious, it can nevertheless, according to Mencius, be achieved by every man. This is because it is nothing more than the fullest development of the nature of man, and every man has fundamentally the same nature. His nature is the same, just as every man s bodily form is the same. As an example, Mencius remarks that when a shoemaker makes shoes, even though he does not know the exact length of the feet of his customers, he always makes shoes, but not baskets. (Mencius, Via, 7.) This is so because the similarity between the feet of all men is much greater than their difference. And likewise the sage, in his original nature, is similar to everyone else. Hence every man can become a sage, if only he gives full development to his original nature. As Mencius affirms: "All men can become Yao or Shun [the two legendary sage-rulers previously mentioned].

 {Mencius, VIb, 2..) Here is Mencius theory of education, which has been held by all Confucianists.


Output:
12.8

 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS

 CHAPTER 8

 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 1 HE term Ming chia has sometimes been translate d as "sophists," and sometimes as "logicians" or "dialecticians." It is true that there is some similarity between the Ming chia and the sophists, logicians, and dialecticians, but it.is also true that they are not quite the same. To avoid confusion, il is better to translate Ming chia literally as the School of Names. This translation also helps to bring to the attention of Westerners one oi the important problems discussed by Chinese philosophy, namely that of the relation between ming (the name) and shih (the actuality).

 The School of Names and the Debaters


Output:
The School of Names and the Debaters

 logically speaking, the contrast between ming and shih in ancient Chinese philosophy is something like that between subject and predicate in the West. For instance, when we say: "This is a table, or "Socrates is a man, ' "this" and "Socrates" are shih or actualities, while "table" and "man" are ming or names. This is obvious enough. Let us, however, try to analyze more exactly just what the shih or ming are, and what their relationship is. We are then apt to be led into some rather paradoxical problems, the solution of which brings us to the very heart of philosophy.


Output:
The members of the School of Names were known in ancient times as pien che (debaters, disputcrs, arguers). In the chapter of the Chuang-tzu titled "The Autumn Flood," Kung-sun Lung, one of the leaders of the School of Names, is represented as saying: 1 have unified similarity and difference, and separated hardness and whiteness. I have proved the impossible as possible and affirmed what others deny. I have controverted the knowledge of all the philosophers, and refuted all the arguments brought agamsl me. (Chuang-tzu, eh. TJ.) These words are really applicable to the School of Names as a whole.

 Its members were known as persons who made paradoxical statements, who were ready to dispute with others, and who purposely affirmed what others denied and denied what others affirmed. Ssu-ma Tan

 130

 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES


Output:
130

 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 (died 110 B.C.), for example, in his essay, "On the Essential Ideas of the Six Schools," wrote: "The School of Names conducted minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute their ideas." (Historical Records, ch. I2O.) Hsiin Tzu, a Confucianist of the third century B.C., describes Teng Hsi (died 501 B.C.) and Hui Shih as philosophers who "liked to deal with strange theories and indulge in curious propositions."

 (Hsiin-tzu, ch. 6.) Likewise, the Lii—shih Ch un—ch IU mentions Teng Hsi and Kung—sun Lung as among those known for their paradoxical arguments. (XVIII, 4 and 5.) And the chapter titled "The World" in the Chuang-tzu, after listing the paradoxical arguments famous at that time, mentions the names of Hui Shih, Huan T uan, and Kung—sun Lung. These men, therefore, would seem to have been the most important leaders of this school.


Output: About Huan T'uan we know nothing further, but about Teng Hsi, we know that he was a famous lawyer of his time; his writings, however, no longer are preserved, and the book today bearing the title of Teng—hsi—tzu is not genuine. The Lii-shih Ch'un-ch'iu says that when Tzu-ch'an, a famous statesman, was minister of the state of Cheng, Teng Hsi, who was a native of that state, was his major opponent. He used to help the people in their lawsuits, for which services he would demand a coat as a fee for a major case, and a pair of trousers for a minor one. So skilful was he that he was patronized by numerous people; as their lawyer, he succeeded in changing right into wrong and wrong into right, until no standards of right and wrong remained, so that what was regarded as possible and impossible fluctuated from day to day. (XVIII, 4.)


Output:
Another story in the same work describes how, during a flood of the Wei River, a certain rich man of the state of Cheng was drowned. His body was picked up by a boatman, but when the family of the rich man went to ask for the body, the man who had found it demanded a huge reward. Thereupon the members of the family went to Teng Hsi for advice. He told them: "Merely wait. There is nobody else besides yourselves who wants the body." The family took his advice and waited, until the man who had found the body became much troubled and also went to Teng Hsi. To him Teng Hsi said: "Merely wait.

 There is nobody else but you from whom they can get the body." (Ibid.) We are not told what was the final end of this episode!


Output:
It would thus seem that Teng Hsi' s trick was to interpret the formal letter of the law in such a way as to give varying interpretations in different cases at will. This was how he was able to "conduct minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute his ideas." He thus devoted himself to interpreting and analyzing the letter of the law, while disregarding its spirit and its connection with actuality. In other words, his attention was directed to names," instead of to "actualities." Such was the spirit of the School of Names.

 From this we may see that the pien che were originally lawyers, among 132.. THE SCHOOL OK NAMES

 whom Teng Hsi was evidently one of the first. He was, however, only a beginner in the analysis of names, and made no real contribution to philosophy as such. Hence the real founders of the School of Names were the later Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung.


Output: Concerning these two men the Lu-shih Ch'un-ch iu tells us: "Hui Tzu [Hui Shih] prepared the law for King Hui of Wei (370-319). When it was completed and was made known to the people, the people considered it to be good. (XVIII, 5-) And again: The states of Chao and Ch in entered into an agreement which said: 'From this time onward, in whatever C h i n desires to do, she is to be assisted by Chao, and in whatever Chao desires to do, she is to be assisted by Ch in. But soon afterward Ch in attacked the state of Wei, and Chao made ready to go to Wei's assistance. The King of Ch in protested to Chao that this was an infringement of the pact, and the King of Chao reported this to the Lord of P ing—yuan, who again told it to Kung—sun Lung. Kung-sun Lung said: 'We too can send an envoy to protest to the King of Ch'in, saying: "According to the pact, each side guarantees to help the other in whatever either desires to do. Now it is our desire to save Wei, and if you do not help us to do so, we shall charge you with


Output: do not help us to do so, we shall charge you with infringement of the pact."'" (Ibid.)


Output:
Again we are told in the Han—fei—tzu: When discussions on hardness and whiteness and having no thickness' appear, the governmental laws lose their effect." (Ch. 41-) We shall see below that the doctrine of "hardness and whiteness" is one of Kung-sun Lung, while that of "having no thickness" is one of Hui Shih.

 From these stories we may see that Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung were, to some extent, connected with the legal activities of their time. Indeed, Kung— sun Lung s interpretation of the pact between Chao and Ch in is truly in the spirit of Teng Hsi. Han Fei Tzu considered the effect of the "speeches" of these two gentlemen on law to be as bad as that of the practice of Teng Hsi. It may seem strange that Han Fei Tzu, himself a Legalist, should oppose, as destructive to law, the discussions of a school which had originated with lawyers. But, as we shall see in chapter 14, Han Fei Tzu and the other Legalists were really politicians, not jurists.


Output:
Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung represented two tendencies in the School of Names, the one emphasizing the relativity of actual things, and the other the absoluteness of names. This distinction becomes evident when one comes to analyze names in their relationship to actualities. Let us take the simple statement, "This is a table." Here the word "this refers to the concrete actuality, which is impermanent and may come and go. The word table, however, refers to an abstract category or name which is unchanging and always remains as it is. The "name" is absolute, but the "actuality ' is relative.

 Thus "beauty" is the name of what is absolutely beautiful, but "a beautiful thing" can only be relatively so. Hui Shih emphasized the fact that actual things are changeable and relative, while Kung-sun Lung emphasized the

 134 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 fact that names are permanent and absolute. Hui Shih's Theory of Relativity


Output:
Hui Shih (fl. 350-260) was a native of the state of Sung, in the present province of Honan. We know that he once became premier of King Hui of Wei (370-319)? and that he was known for his greal learning.

 His writings, unfortunately, are lost, and what we know of his ideas may be deduced only from a series of "ten points" preserved in the chapter titled "The World" in the Chuang—tzu.


Output: The first of these points is: "The greatest has nothing beyond itself, and is called the Great One. The smallest has nothing within itself, and is called the Small One." These two statements constitute what are called analytical propositions. They make no assertions in regard to the actual, for they say nothing about what, in the actual world, is the greatest thing and the smallest thing. They only touch upon the abstract concepts or names: "greatest" and smallest. In order to understand these two propositions fully, we should compare them with a story in the chapter titled "The Autumn Flood in the Chuang-tzu. From this it will become apparent that in one respect Hui Shih and Chuang Tzu had very much in common.


Output: This story describes how in autumn, when the Yellow River was in flood, the Spirit of the River, who was very proud of his greatness, moved down the river to the sea. There he met the Spirit of the Sea, and realized for the first time that his river, great as it was, was small indeed in comparison with the sea. Yet when, full of admiration, he talked with the Spirit of the Sea, the latter replied that he himself, in his relationship to Heaven and Earth, was nothing more than a single grain lying within a great warehouse.


Output:
Hence he could only be said to be small, but not to be great. At this the River Spirit asked the Sea Spirit: "Are we right then in saying that Heaven and Earth are supremely great and the tip of a hair is supremely small? The Sea Spirit answered: What men know is less than what they do not know. The time when they are alive is less than the time when they are not alive....How can we know that the tip of a hair is the extreme of smallness, and Heaven and Earth are the extreme of greatness? And he then went on to define the smallest as that which has no form, and the greatest as that which cannot be enclosed (by anything else). This definition of the supremely great and supremely small is similar to that given by Hui Shih. {Chuang-tzu, eh. 17.)

 To say that Heaven and Earth are the greatest of things and that the tip of a hair is the smallest is to make assertions about the actual, the shih. It makes no analysis of the names of the actualities, the ming.


Output:
These two proposi tions are what are called synthetic propositions and both may be false. They have their basis in experience; therefore their truth is only contingent, but not necessary. In experience, things that are great and things that are small are all relatively so. To quote the Chuang-tzu again: "If we 136 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

 call a thing great, because it is greater than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not great. If we call a thing small because it is smaller than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not small.


Output: We cannot through actual experience decide what is the greatest and what is the smallest of actual things. But we can say independently of experience that that which has nothing beyond itself is the greatest, and that which has n o t h i n g w i t h i n i t s el f i s t h e s mal l es t . G r e at es t an d " s m al l es t , d ef i n e d i n this way, ar e absolute and unchanging con cepts. Thus by analyzing th e n a m e s , " G r e a t O n e " a n d " S ma l l O n e , " H u i S h i h r e a c h e d t h e c o n c e p t o f what is absolute and unchanging. From the point of view of this concept, he realized that the qualities and differences of actual concrete things are all relative and liable to change.


Output:
Once we understand this position of Hui Shih, we can see that his series of "points," as reported by the Chuang-tzu, though usually regarded as paradoxes, are really not paradoxical at all. With the exception of the first, they are all illustrations of the relativity of things, and expressions of whal may be called a theory of relativity. Let us study them one by one.

 "That which has no thickness cannot be increased [ i n thickness], yet it is so great that it may cover one thousand miles. This states that the great and the small are so only relatively. It is impossible for that which has no thickness to be thick. In this sense it may be called small. Nevertheless, the ideal plane of geometry, though without thickness, may at the same time be very long and wide. In this sense it may be called great.


Output: "The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes." This, too, states that the high and the low are so only relatively. The sun at noon is the sun declining; the creature born is the creature dying. This states that everything in the actual world is changeable and changing.