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+THE ART OF WAR 
+
+
+
+By Sun Tzu 
+
+Translated with introduction and notes by 
+
+Lionel Giles, M.A. 
+
+19th May 2004 
+
+
+
+Contents 
+
+
+
+1 INTRODUCTION 4 
+
+1.1 Sun Wu and his Book 4 
+
+1.2 The Text of Sun Tzu 14 
+
+1.3 The Commentators 16 
+
+1.4 Appreciations of Sun Tzu 20 
+
+1.5 Apologies for War 21 
+
+2 LAYING PLANS 28 
+
+3 WAGING WAR 32 
+
+4 ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 36 
+
+5 TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 42 
+
+6 ENERGY 46 
+
+7 WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 52 
+
+8 MANEUVERING 59 
+
+9 VARIATION IN TACTICS 68 
+
+10 THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 74 
+
+11 TERRAIN 85 
+
+12 THE NINE SITUATIONS 92 
+
+13 THE ATTACK BY FIRE 114 
+
+14 THE USE OF SPIES 120 
+
+
+
+CONTENTS 
+
+
+
+This Etext has been prepared and released by Project Gutenberg PROJECT GUTENBERG OFFICIAL 
+HOME SITE http : / /www . promo . net /pg/. Re-editing and conversion to ffljiXformat independently 
+from Project Gutenberg and/or previous editors by Tomas Ulfkonen 2004. This etext is a "public domain" 
+worlf. Editors disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses including legal fees, and YOU 
+HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF 
+WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, 
+PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 
+SUCH DAMAGES. 
+
+
+
+CONTENTS 
+
+
+
+To my brother Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. in the hope that a work 2400 
+years old may yet contain lessons worth consideration by the soldier of 
+today this translation is affectionately dedicated. 
+
+
+
+Preface to the Project Gutenburg Etext 
+
+When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR, the work was 
+virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 when a French 
+Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it into 
+French. It was not a good translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a 
+great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did." 
+
+The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E. F. 
+Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles, "excessively 
+bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a question of downright blun- 
+ders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard 
+passages were willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. 
+They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar 
+standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 
+a new edition of Capt. Calthrop's translation was published in London. It was an im- 
+provement on the first - omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected - but 
+new errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, wrote: 
+"It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; but I could not 
+help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, 
+at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." 
+
+Clearly, Dr. Giles' work established much of the groundwork for the work of later 
+translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR 
+I have examined; two feature Giles' edited translation and notes, the other two present 
+the same basic information from the ancient Chinese commentators found in the Giles 
+edition. Of these four, Giles' 1910 edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader 
+an incredible amount of information concerning Sun Tzu's text, much more than any 
+other translation. 
+
+The Giles' edition of the ART OF WAR, as stated above, was a scholarly work. 
+Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the Department of 
+Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted 
+to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps some- 
+thing that would become a standard translation. It was the best translation available for 
+50 years. But apparently there was not much interest in Sun Tzu in English- speaking 
+countries since it took the start of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. 
+Several people published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In 1944, Dr. 
+Giles' translation was edited and published in the United States in a series of military 
+science books. But it wasn't until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. 
+Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles' translation. While 
+this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles' translation, it lacks his copious notes that 
+make his so interesting. 
+
+
+
+CONTENTS 4 
+
+Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese civiliza- 
+tion and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzu, the English translation, and 
+voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and 
+footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conver- 
+sion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete ignorance 
+of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the 
+difficult task of paraphrasing it while retaining as much of the important text as I could. 
+Every paraphrase represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text 
+as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to trans- 
+literate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text more obscure. 
+However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transform- 
+ation made possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from this task 
+with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a background in Chinese 
+can do a better job than I did; any such attempt would be welcomed. 
+
+Bob Sutton 
+
+al876 @ cleveland.freenet.edu 
+
+bobs@gnu.ai.mit.edu 
+
+
+
+Chapter 1 
+INTRODUCTION 
+
+1.1 Sun Wu and his Book 
+
+Ssu-ma Ch'ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu:' 
+
+Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch'i State. His ART OF WAR brought 
+him to the notice of Ho Lu,^ King of Wu. 
+
+Ho Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I 
+submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?" 
+
+Sun Tzu replied: "You may." 
+
+Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" 
+
+The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to 
+bring 1 80 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two com- 
+panies, and placed one of the King's favorite concubines at the head of 
+each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and addressed 
+them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front and back, 
+right hand and left hand?" 
+
+The girls replied: Yes. 
+
+Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. 
+When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say 
+"Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About 
+turn," you must face right round towards your back." 
+
+Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus ex- 
+plained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. 
+Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls 
+only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are not clear 
+and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to 
+blame." 
+
+
+
+'SHICHI, ch. 65. 
+
+^He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6 
+
+So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," 
+whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: "If 
+words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly 
+understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders ARE clear, and the 
+soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." 
+
+So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. 
+Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised 
+pavilion; and when he saw that his favorite concubines were about to be 
+executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following 
+message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle 
+troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will 
+lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded." 
+
+Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's commission to 
+be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty 
+which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." 
+
+Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed 
+the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, 
+the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through 
+all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or 
+wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, 
+not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King 
+saying: "Your soldiers. Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and 
+ready for your majesty's inspection. They can be put to any use that their 
+sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will 
+not disobey." 
+
+But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. 
+As for us. We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." 
+
+Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot 
+translate them into deeds." 
+
+After that. Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how to handle an 
+army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the Ch'u 
+State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear 
+into the States of Ch'i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the 
+feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King. 
+
+About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch'ien has to tell us in this chapter. But 
+he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant. Sun Pin, born about a hundred years 
+after his famous ancestor's death, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. 
+The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzu 
+had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war."'' It seems likely, then, 
+that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was 
+invented in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the 
+
+
+
+'SHICHI, ch. 130. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7 
+
+crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P'ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in 
+Chapter V. ss. 19, note. 
+
+To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two other passages of the SHIH 
+CHI: 
+
+In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the 
+field with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P'ei, and attacked Ch'u. He 
+captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince's sons who had formerly 
+been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the 
+capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not 
+yet possible. We must wait".... [After further successful fighting,] "in the 
+ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu, 
+saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter 
+Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "Ch'u's general Tzu- 
+ch'ang, * is grasping and covetous, and the princes of T'ang and Ts'ai both 
+have a grudge against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand 
+attack, you must win over T'ang and Ts'ai, and then you may succeed." 
+Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat Ch'u in five pitched battles and marched 
+into Ying.]^ 
+
+This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not appear to 
+have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496. 
+In another chapter there occurs this passage:^ 
+
+From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the 
+other: Kao-fan,' who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu,* in the 
+service of Ch'i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed 
+and threw light upon the principles of war. 
+
+It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch'ien at least had no doubt about the reality of Sun 
+Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is 
+by far the most important authority on the period in question. It will not be necessary, 
+therefore, to say much of such a work as the WU YUEH CH'UN CH'IU, which is 
+supposed to have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is 
+somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, 
+based as it is on the SHIH CHI and expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun 
+Tzu will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth 
+noting are: (1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzu-hsu. (2) He is 
+called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his contemporaries 
+were unaware of his ability. 
+
+The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: "When sovereign and ministers 
+show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe." 
+
+
+
+''The appellation of Nang Wa. 
+'SHI CHI, ch. 31. 
+
+
+
+'SHI CHI, ch. 25. 
+
+'The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. 
+
+*Wang-tzu Ch'eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8 
+
+Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we 
+have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu died in 122 B.C., 
+many years before the SHIH CHI was given to the world. 
+
+Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzu at the head of 30,000 men 
+beat Ch'u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." 
+
+Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu's 
+grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch'i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu's father Sun P'ing, rose 
+to be a Minister of State in Ch'i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Ch'ang-ch'ing, 
+fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of 
+T'ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun 
+Pin. According to this account then. Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering 
+that Sun Pin's victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as chronolo- 
+gical impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, 
+but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. 
+
+An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is 
+the short preface written by the Great Ts'ao Ts'ao, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun 
+Tzu. I shall give it in full: 
+
+I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage.' 
+The SHU CHU mentions "the army" among the "eight objects of gov- 
+ernment." The I CHING says: "'army' indicates firmness and justice; the 
+experienced leader will have good fortune." The SHIH CHING says: "The 
+King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled his troops." The Yellow 
+Emperor, T'ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and battle- 
+axes in order to succor their generation. The SSU-MA FA says: "If one 
+man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He 
+who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies 
+solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch'ai'° 
+on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. ' ' In military matters, the 
+Sage's rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only 
+when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by 
+necessity. 
+
+Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work 
+composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzu was a 
+native of the Ch'i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the ART 
+OF WAR in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested 
+on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army 
+westwards, crushed the Ch'u state and entered Ying the capital. In the 
+north, he kept Ch'i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his 
+
+
+
+'"They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make arrows. The use of bows 
+and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." 
+
+'"The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yueh, 
+in 473 B.C. See post. 
+
+' ' King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: "His humanity brought 
+him to destruction." 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9 
+
+time. Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] '^ In his treatment of 
+deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field, '^ 
+clearness of conception, and depth of design. Sun Tzu stands beyond the 
+reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to 
+grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice 
+the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked its 
+essential purport. That is the motive which has led me to outline a rough 
+explanation of the whole. 
+
+One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 chapters were 
+specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of I. ss. 
+15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed. 
+
+In the bibliographic section of the HAN SHU, there is an entry which has given 
+rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzu of Wu in 82 P'lEN (or chapters), with 
+diagrams in 9 CHUAN." It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known 
+to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition 
+of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR of which the "13 chapters" formed the first CHUAN, 
+adding that there were two other CHUAN besides. This has brought forth a theory, that 
+the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu - we should call 
+them apocryphal - similar to the WEN TA, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine 
+Situations' "* is preserved in the T'UNG TIEN, and another in Ho Shin's commentary. 
+It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had only written the 
+13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of question and 
+answer between himself and the King. Pi I-hsun, the author of the SUN TZU HSU 
+LU, backs this up with a quotation from the WU YUEH CH'UN CH'IU: "The King of 
+Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he 
+set forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." 
+As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above- 
+mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be considerable. 
+Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzu might be included. The fact 
+that the HAN CHIH mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 P'lEN, whereas the 
+Sui and T'ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to the " 13 chapters," is 
+good proof. Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 P'lEN. Without 
+pinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the WU YUEH CH'UN CH'IU, 
+or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may see in 
+this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku 
+there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the 
+magic name of Sun Tzu, and the 82 P'lEN may very well represent a collected edition 
+of these lumped together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, 
+that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely ignored 
+by him.'^ 
+
+
+
+'^The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in tlie T'U SHU, and may be an interpolation. It was 
+known, liowever to Qiang Sliou-cliieli of tlie T'ang dynasty, and appears in tlie T'AI PTNG YU LAN. 
+
+"Ts'ao Kung seems to be tliinking of tlie first part of cfiap. II, perhaps especially of ss. 8. 
+
+'*Seechap. XI. 
+
+' ' On the other hand, it is noteworthy that WU TZU, which is not in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the 
+HAN CHIH. Likewise, the CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10 
+
+Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti 
+strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," which in turn may have resulted from a misun- 
+derstanding of the final words of Ts'ao King's preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points 
+out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other 
+words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little 
+acceptance. Thus, the SSU K'U CH'UAN SHU says: "The mention of the 13 chapters 
+in the SHIH CHI shows that they were in existence before the HAN CHIH, and that 
+latter accretions are not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu's assertion 
+can certainly not be taken as proof." 
+
+There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the time of 
+Ssu-ma Ch'ien practically as we have them now. That the work was then well known 
+he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Ch'i's Art of War are the 
+two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of 
+them are widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go further back, 
+serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the TSO 
+CHUAN, the greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, 
+either as a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, 
+that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the 
+SHIH CHI, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man 
+at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the 
+following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin:'^ 
+
+It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history that Sun Wu was a native of the Ch'i 
+State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed 
+Ch'u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso's Commentary no 
+Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso's Commentary need not contain 
+absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted 
+to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K'ao-shu," 
+Ts'ao Kuei,'*, Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu". In the case of Sun 
+Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much 
+more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his con- 
+temporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P'ei.'" Is it credible that Sun Wu 
+alone should have been passed over? 
+
+In point of literary style. Sun Tzu's work belongs to the same school as 
+KUAN TZU,'' LIU T'AO," and the YUEH YU" and may have been the 
+production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring 
+
+
+
+the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that P'lEN might simply mean "leaves." 
+
+'(■Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. 
+
+' ' He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. 
+
+' * See Chapter 7, ss. 27 and Chapter 1 1, ss. 28. 
+
+' ' See Chapter 1 1 , ss. 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name. 
+
+'"i.e. Po P'ei. See ante. 
+
+- ' The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have been made by later hands. 
+Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. 
+
+"See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. 
+
+' ' I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another work. Why that chapter should be 
+singled out, however, is not clear. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11 
+
+and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period.^"* The story 
+that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the out- 
+come of big talk on the part of his followers. 
+
+From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty'^ down to the time of the 
+"Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, 
+and the class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, 
+did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States"'^ that 
+this custom changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is 
+conceivable that Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was 
+a great general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, 
+about Jang-chu '' and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless 
+fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Ho Lu's experiment on the 
+women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and incredible. 
+
+Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch'ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed Ch'u and 
+entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression left on the reader's 
+mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; 
+but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI either that Sun Tzu was general 
+on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as 
+we know that Wu Yuan and Po P'ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its 
+success was largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, 
+it is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent part 
+in the same campaign. 
+
+Ch'en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note: 
+
+Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact 
+that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN, although he is said to have 
+served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really 
+belonged to. 
+
+He also says: 
+
+The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch'i may be of genuine antiquity. 
+
+It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch'en Chen-sun, while rejecting the per- 
+sonality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history, are inclined to accept the 
+date traditionally assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of 
+the HSU LU fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on 
+Ch'en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which 
+certainly tell in favor of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says. 
+
+
+
+^"t About 480 B.C. 
+
+^^That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. 
+
+"in the 3rd century B.C. 
+
+"Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T'ien, lived in the latter half of the 6th century B.C., and 
+is also believed to have written a work on war. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the 
+INTRODUCTION. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12 
+
+"must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently pla- 
+giarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch'in and Han dynasties." The two most 
+shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch'i and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them im- 
+portant historical personages in their day. The former lived only a century after the 
+alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was 
+to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that Tseng Shen delivered the TSO CHUAN, which 
+had been entrusted to him by its author.^^ Now the fact that quotations from the ART 
+OF WAR, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of differ- 
+ent epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all, - in other words, that Sun 
+Tzu's treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th century B.C. Further 
+proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings 
+attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be 
+extended, is given in the HSU LU; and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, 
+the main argument is hardly affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh 
+Shui- hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 
+13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually 
+engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that 
+he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly be- 
+lieved the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated 
+Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus in 
+XIII. ss. 1, there is an unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which 
+had already passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in 
+a modified form.'' The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried on between the 
+various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to 
+have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, 
+a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. 
+
+But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its being 
+other than a bona fide production are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries 
+did not come until long after. That it should have been forged in the period immedi- 
+ately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify 
+himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a literary 
+recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another 
+after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their essence has been distilled from 
+a large store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only 
+of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a practical 
+soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing of 
+the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains 
+of Chinese history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and 
+common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in 
+the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a 
+military man living towards the end of the "CH'UN CH'IU" period, are we not bound, 
+in spite of the silence of the TSO CHUAN, to accept Ssu-ma Ch'ien's account in its 
+entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume 
+
+
+
+^^See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the TSO CHUAN must have been 
+written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C. 
+-'See MENCIUS III. 1. iii. 13-20. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13 
+
+that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu's biography were false and untrustworthy? 
+The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objec- 
+tion to the chronology involved in the story as told in the SHIH CHI, which, so far as I 
+am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he 
+alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. ss. 21: 
+
+Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in 
+number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say 
+then that victory can be achieved. 
+
+The other is in XL ss. 30: 
+
+Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I should answer. 
+Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are 
+crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come 
+to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. 
+
+These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of composition. 
+They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much 
+has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also 
+seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative. As we have seen above, 
+the first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken 
+of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction 
+to that monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been 
+written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the capture 
+of Ying in 506, Ch'u and not Yueh, was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two 
+states, Ch'u and Wu, had been constantly at war for over half a century, ^° whereas the 
+first war between Wu and Yueh was waged only in 510, " and even then was no more 
+than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch'u. Now 
+Ch'u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were 
+written at a time when Yueh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch'u 
+had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found 
+useful. 
+
+
+
+^"When Wu first appears in the CH'UN CH'IU in 584, it is already at variance with its powerful neighbor. 
+The CH'UN CH'IU first mentions Yueh in 537, the TSO CHUAN in 601. 
+
+31 
+
+
+
+' This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN, XXXII, 2. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
+
+
+
+14 
+
+
+
+B.C. 
+
+
+
+
+514 
+
+
+Accession of Ho Lu. 
+
+
+512 
+
+
+Ho Lu attacks Ch'u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, 1 the capital. SHI CHI rr 
+
+
+511 
+
+
+Another attack on Ch'u. 
+
+
+510 
+
+
+Wu makes a successful attack on Yueh. This is the first war between 
+
+
+508 or 509 
+
+
+Ch'u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang 
+
+
+506 
+
+
+Ho Lu attacks Ch'u with the aid of T'ang and Ts'ai. Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Yi 
+
+
+505 
+
+
+Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is beaten by Ch'ir 
+
+
+504 
+
+
+Ho Lu sends Fu Ch'ai to attack Ch'u. 
+
+
+497 
+
+
+Kou Chien becomes King of Yueh. 
+
+
+496 
+
+
+Wu attacks Yueh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. Ho Li 
+
+
+494 
+
+
+Fu Ch'ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fuchaio, and enters th 
+
+
+485 or 484 
+
+
+Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzu-hs 
+
+
+482 
+
+
+Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch'ai. 
+
+
+478 to 476 
+
+
+Further attacks by Yueh on Wu. 
+
+
+475 
+
+
+Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. 
+
+
+473 
+
+
+Final defeat and extinction of Wu. 
+
+
+
+The sentence quoted above from VI. ss. 21 hardly strikes me as one that could have 
+been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at 
+least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. 
+Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which 
+date Yueh does not appear to have scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died 
+in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period 
+505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted 
+by its supreme effort against Ch'u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the 
+tradition connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the 
+light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yueh was once 
+again becoming a very serious menace. ^^ We may feel fairly certain that the author, 
+whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. 
+On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far outweighs any shred of 
+authority still attaching to the SHIH CHI, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun 
+Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from 
+the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu's 
+exploits, because the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State. 
+
+How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity 
+of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was felt 
+to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should have 
+solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the 
+greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the 
+surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what 
+more natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy. Sun Wu, 
+should be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that 
+his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him 
+
+
+
+'^^There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to grow more bitter after each 
+encounter, and thus more fully justify the language used in XI. ss. 30. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 15 
+
+in conjunction with Wu Yuan,^^ Po P'ei and Fu Kai? 
+
+It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzu's life must 
+be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he 
+probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu's accession, and gathered 
+experience, though only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense mil- 
+itary activity which marked the first half of the prince's reign. ^'' If he rose to be a gen- 
+eral at all, he certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. 
+He was doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's 
+sudden collapse in the following year. Yueh's attack at this critical juncture, when her 
+rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that this upstart 
+kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be 
+directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his 
+famous book, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, 
+rather than the beginning of Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women may possibly have 
+grown out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we hear no more 
+of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron 
+or to have taken part in the death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at 
+Tsuili. 
+
+If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the fate 
+which decreed that China's most illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with 
+her greatest writer on war. 
+
+1.2 The Text of Sun Tzu 
+
+I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzu's text. The quo- 
+tations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma 
+Ch'ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for it 
+that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from 
+discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: 
+
+During the Ch'in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR was in 
+general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated 
+it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the 
+benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write 
+a commentary on it. 
+
+As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that Ts'ao Kung 
+tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of edi- 
+tions which appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the T'ang and 
+Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed 
+
+
+
+'^^ With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: - a spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him 
+simply because he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the 
+other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. 
+
+^^From TSO CHUAN: "From the date of King Chao's accession [515] there was no year in which Ch'u 
+was not attacked by Wu." 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 16 
+
+to creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief com- 
+mentaries on Sun Tzu were in existence, a certain Chi T'ien-pao published a work in 
+15 CHUAN entitled "Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of ten writers." There 
+was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also 
+had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions. Sun Hsing- 
+yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no longer put into circula- 
+tion. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field 
+was one derived from Chi T'ien-pao's edition, although no actual copy of that import- 
+ant work was known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzu which 
+appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the KU 
+CHIN T'U SHU CHI CH'ENG. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically 
+the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the "Eleven philosophers of 
+the Chou and Ch'in dynasties" [1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's 
+first edition is evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese channels. 
+So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and 
+classical scholar, who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu,^^ accidentally 
+discovered a copy of Chi T'ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the library 
+of the Hua-yin temple.^ ^ Appended to it was the I SHUO of Cheng Yu-Hsien, men- 
+tioned in the T'UNG CHIH, and also believed to have perished. This is what Sun 
+Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)" - a rather misleading name, for 
+it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzu in its pristine purity. 
+Chi T'ien-pao was a careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce 
+the somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with 
+the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older 
+than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the T'UNG TIEN, Tu 
+Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the T'AI P'ING 
+YU LAN encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into 
+fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of dif- 
+ferent sections. Considering that the YU LAN takes us back to the year 983, and the 
+T'UNG TIEN about 200 years further still, to the middle of the T'ang dynasty, the 
+value of these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of 
+utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting 
+under Government instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his 
+own account: 
+
+Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his editors 
+had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of 
+Chi T'ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and 
+corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, 
+and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to 
+
+
+
+'^^Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed 
+to say that I only read my ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without comprehending the military 
+technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!" 
+
+^'Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T'ung-kuan on the eastern border of Shensi. The temple in question 
+is still visited by those about the ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being 
+"situated five LI east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the 
+T'ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 17 
+
+this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the 
+whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for military men. 
+
+The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text of Sun 
+Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen's commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they 
+really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared 
+in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one co- editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the 
+"original edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as 
+well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as the I SHUO, 
+succeeded in restoring a very large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on 
+the whole, what must be accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to get 
+to Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard 
+text." 
+
+The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. it is in 6 PEN, form- 
+ing part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 PEN.^^ It opens 
+with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the 
+traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and summing up in remarkably 
+concise fashion the evidence in its favor. This is followed by Ts'ao Kung's preface to 
+his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI, both translated above. 
+Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I SHUO,^* with author's preface, and next, a 
+short miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled SUN TZU HSU 
+LU, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate sentence is 
+followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the various commentaries apper- 
+taining to it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss 
+briefly, one by one. 
+
+1.3 The Commentators 
+
+Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, which 
+would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he wrote 
+before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the 
+artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a 
+great variety of ways. 
+
+1. TS'AO TS'AO or Ts'ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 155-220]. 
+There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary on Sun Tzu 
+actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose biography in the 
+SAN KUO CHIH reads like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses 
+that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was 
+especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found 
+expression in the line "Talk of Ts'ao Ts'ao, and Ts'ao Ts'ao will appear." Ou- 
+yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength 
+against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and vanquished 
+
+'^See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. 
+^'This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 18 
+
+them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made 
+himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by Wei 
+on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready; those 
+generals who made use of them did not lose one battle in ten; those who ran 
+counter to them in any particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put 
+to flight." Ts'ao Kung's notes on Sun Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so 
+thoroughly characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard 
+indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere LITTERATEUR. Sometimes, 
+indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand 
+no less in need of a commentary than the text itself.^' 
+
+2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name 
+is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his per- 
+sonal name has not been recorded. Chi T'ien-pao's edition places him after Chia 
+Lin,and Ch'ao Kung- wu also assigns him to the T'ang dynasty,*" but this is a 
+mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dyn- 
+asty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K'ang of the 3rd century. 
+He is named in one work as the last of the "Five Commentators," the others being 
+Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao and Chia Lin. 
+
+3. LI CH'UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military tactics. One 
+of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The T 'UNG CHIH 
+mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the T'ang dynasty" as 
+written by him.'" According to Ch'ao Kung-wu and the T'lEN-I-KO catalogue, 
+he followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs considerably from 
+those now extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently 
+illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. 
+
+4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes 
+being taken from the T 'UNG TIEN, the encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution 
+which was his life- work. They are largely repetitions of Ts'ao Kung and Meng 
+Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient commentaries of 
+Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar arrangement of T 'UNG TIEN, he 
+has to explain each passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes 
+his own explanation does not agree with that of Ts'ao Kung, whom he always 
+quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentat- 
+ors," he was added to their number by Chi T'ien-pao, being wrongly placed after 
+his grandson Tu Mu. 
+
+5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet - a bright star even in 
+the glorious galaxy of the T'ang period. We learn from Ch'ao Kung-wu that 
+although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely fond of dis- 
+cussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military history of the 
+
+
+
+^'Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His commentary is frequently obscure; it fur- 
+nishes a clue, but does not fully develop the meaning." 
+
+""WEN HSIEN T'UNG K'AO, ch. 221. 
+
+""it is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the 
+"Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. Vlll, nos. 3-4, p. 525. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 19 
+
+CH'UN CH'IU and CHAN KUO eras. His notes, therefore, are well worth at- 
+tention. They are very copious, and replete with historical parallels. The gist of 
+Sun Tzu's work is thus summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, 
+but on the other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." He 
+further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand years 
+which had elapsed since Sun Tzu's death would, upon examination, be found to 
+uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims contained in his book. 
+Tu Mu's somewhat spiteful charge against Ts'ao Kung has already been con- 
+sidered elsewhere. 
+
+6. CH'EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch'ao Kung- 
+wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzu because 
+Ts'ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu Mu 
+on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle 
+of the 11th century, calls Ts'ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch'en Hao the three chief 
+commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Ch'en Hao is continually attacking 
+Tu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank 
+below those of his predecessors. 
+
+7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T'ang dynasty, for his commentary 
+on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T'ang Shu and was afterwards republished by 
+Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. 
+It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least 
+valuable of the eleven. 
+
+8. MEI YAO-CH'EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei Sheng- 
+yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published with 
+a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the fol- 
+lowing: 
+
+Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying to make 
+them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have 
+not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu 
+has not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary 
+for Sun Tzu's work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were in- 
+tended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned 
+with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient 
+dynasties,'*^ nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of 
+War.*^ Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always deep. 
+Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the 
+enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the 
+sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been ob- 
+scured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his 
+
+
+
+"^^The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, 
+it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the board. 1 
+can suggest no other explanation of the passage. 
+
+"See CHOU LI, xxix. 6-10. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 20 
+
+own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of 
+these critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In 
+this way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. 
+I am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by side 
+with the three great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the say- 
+ings, coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. 
+
+Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to en- 
+dorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly place him above Ch'en Hao 
+in order of merit. 
+
+9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his in- 
+terpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch'en, and on the whole not 
+a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with 
+that of Ts'ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn 
+from Ch'ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzu, filling 
+up lacunae and correcting mistakes.'*'* 
+
+10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is 
+given as above by Cheng Ch'iao in the TUNG CHIH, written about the middle 
+of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the YU HAI, and Ma 
+Tuan-lin quotes Ch'ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. 
+There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch'iao 's statement, otherwise I 
+should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Ch'u- 
+fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the 1 1th 
+century. Ho Shih's commentary, in the words of the T'lEN-I-KO catalogue, 
+"contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly remarkable for the 
+copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic histories and other 
+sources. 
+
+1 1 . CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality perhaps, 
+but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator is based 
+on that of Ts'ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop 
+in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts'ao 
+Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and 
+therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the T'UNG 
+K'AO, or the YU HAI, but it finds a niche in the T'UNG CHIH, which also 
+names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous Generals."*^ 
+
+It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished within 
+so short a space of time. Ch'ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: "During 
+the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, 
+and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao's rebellion 
+came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court 
+made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became the 
+
+
+
+'^''T'UNG K'AO, ch. 221. 
+
+'''This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 21 
+
+vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun 
+Tzu in our dynasty belong mainly to that period."** 
+
+Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not come 
+down to us. The SUI SHU mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu 
+as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu- shang; ChiaHsu of Wei;*' and Shen Yu of Wu. The T'ANG 
+SHU adds Sun Hao, and the T'UNG CHIH Hsiao Chi, while the T'U SHU mentions 
+a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been 
+merely collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T'ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, 
+mentioned above. 
+
+
+
+1.4 Appreciations of Sun Tzu 
+
+Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China's greatest 
+men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages with en- 
+thusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (d. 196 E.G.),** Feng I (d. 34 A.D.),*' Lu Meng 
+(d. 219),'" and Yo Fei (1 103-1 141).' ' The opinion of Ts'ao Kung, who disputes with 
+Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been recorded.'' 
+Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su 
+Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p'o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of 
+which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is 
+preserved in the YU HAI:" 
+
+Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering,'* is 
+very different indeed from what other books tell us." Wu Ch'i was a man 
+of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they 
+are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch'i's 
+remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely 
+stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzu's work, where 
+the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out. 
+
+The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature" 
+by Cheng Hou: 
+
+
+
+'*'*T'UNG K'AO, loc. cit. 
+
+""A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 10. 
+
+"•"SeeXI. ss. 58, note. 
+
+"'HOU HAN SHU, ch. 17 ad init. 
+
+5" SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 54. 
+
+5' SUNG SHIH, ch. 365 ad init. 
+
+"The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not 
+behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord 
+Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu's 
+maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 1 1 [in Chapter VIII] is one that the people of this 
+country would do well to take to heart." 
+
+"Ch. 140. 
+
+"SeelV. ss. 3. 
+
+"The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 22 
+
+Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men's 
+training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of 
+letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous 
+and eminently practical. Such works as the LUN YU, the I CHING and 
+the great Commentary,^* as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun K'uang 
+and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzu. 
+
+Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, although he 
+dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical works. Language of 
+this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless 
+militarism." 
+
+1.5 Apologies for War 
+
+Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on earth, 
+we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has 
+also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back 
+to a point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall 
+and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the first 
+Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the 
+ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the 
+centralization of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow 
+of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have 
+flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash 
+of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire. 
+
+No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can 
+point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the most 
+fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch'i stands out conspicuous in the period when 
+Ch'in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The 
+stormy years which followed the break-up of the Ch'in dynasty are illuminated by 
+the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to 
+its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts'ao Ts'ao dominates the scene. And in the 
+establishment of the T 'ang dynasty,one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the 
+superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T'ai Tsung) was seconded 
+by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with 
+the greatest names in the military history of Europe. 
+
+In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzu downwards, 
+and especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consist- 
+ently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon 
+thing to find any of the literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it 
+worth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is 
+upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of 
+Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price: 
+
+
+
+5'^The TSO CHUAN. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 23 
+
+Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and 
+cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, 
+and to succor those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins 
+and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so 
+will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and 
+anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; 
+when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law 
+which governs his being.... What then shall be said of those scholars of 
+our time, blind to all great issues, and without any appreciation of relat- 
+ive values, who can only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and 
+"civilization," condemning the use of military weapons? They will surely 
+bring our country to impotence and dishonor and the loss of her rightful 
+heritage; or, at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, 
+sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse 
+to modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the 
+family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dis- 
+pensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be allowed to 
+fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be 
+exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who 
+bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious. ^^ 
+
+The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his commentary on Sun Tzu: 
+
+War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of gov- 
+ernment. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch'iu, both disciples 
+of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the 
+imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market- 
+place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throw- 
+ing down of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into cap- 
+tivity, and the beheading of traitors - this is also work which is done by 
+officials. The objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially 
+the same. There is no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flog- 
+ging and cutting off heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which 
+are easily dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed: 
+hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both 
+cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give 
+comfort and relief to the good.... 
+
+Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you. Sir, acquired your military 
+aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired 
+by study."'* "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a 
+disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by 
+Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and 
+military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting 
+has not yet gone very far." 
+
+
+
+"SHIH CHI, ch. 25, fol. I. 
+^^Cf. SHIH CHI, ch 47. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 24 
+
+Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and 
+the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or 
+in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can 
+say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing 
+class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a 
+shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are 
+at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. 
+This is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, 
+men unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles. 
+
+When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch'eng Wang, he regulated 
+ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and 
+learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted,^' he sallied 
+forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke 
+of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku,^° he said: "If pacific ne- 
+gotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have been made 
+beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch'i, who cowered 
+under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these 
+two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? 
+
+We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high esteem. He also appeals to 
+the authority of the Classics: 
+
+Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never 
+studied matters connected with armies and battalions."^' Replying to K'ung 
+Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." 
+But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force 
+against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch'i was overawed. Again, 
+when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, the ordered his officers to attack them, 
+whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the 
+words: "If I fight, I conquer."^^ And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises 
+both civil and military functions."" Can it be a fact that Confucius never 
+studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he 
+did not specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be 
+the subject of his teaching. 
+
+Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain: 
+
+Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters."^'' He also said: "If 
+I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. 
+Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial," and 
+
+
+
+^'See SHU CHING, preface ss. 55. 
+''"SeeSHIHCHI, ch. 47. 
+'''LunYu, XV. 1. 
+'* I failed to trace this utterance. 
+"Supra. 
+"Supra. 
+
+^^The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and festive rites. See SHU CHING, 
+ii. 1. III. 8, and CHOU LI, IX. fol. 49. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 25 
+
+must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words 
+"I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are things which even 
+an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and 
+devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command 
+the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wu 
+Tzu-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark added by 
+Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." 
+
+The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of 
+Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the 
+art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the 
+example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father's books to no purpose,*^ 
+as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on 
+war have to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and 
+the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of 
+a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and 
+the civil administration of our officials also require steady application and 
+practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly chary 
+of allowing mere novices to botch their work." Weapons are baneful^* 
+and fighting perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, 
+he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle.^' Hence it is essential 
+that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should be studied. 
+
+Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi'" in the art of war. Chi got 
+a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his 
+studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally 
+defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices 
+of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King 
+Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The 
+treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and 
+stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius 
+himself having violated an extorted oath,' ' and also of his having left the 
+Sung State in disguise.'' Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for dis- 
+regarding truth and honesty? 
+
+
+
+'^'^See XIII. ss. II, note. 
+
+"This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN, where Tzu-ch'an says: "If you have a piece of 
+beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up." 
+'"Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 31. 
+
+''Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See LUN YU, XIII. 29, 30. 
+'"Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. 
+" SHIH CHI, ch. 47. 
+"SHIHCHI, ch. 38. 
+
+
+
+Bibliography 
+
+
+
+[1] WU TZU, in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch'i (d. 381 B.C.). A genuine work. 
+See SHIH CHI, ch. 65. 
+
+[2] SSU-MA FA, in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu 
+of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the three 
+ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64. 
+The SSU K'U CH'UAN SHU (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three treatises 
+on war, SUN TZU, WU TZU and SSU-MA FA, are, generally speaking, only 
+concerned with things strictly military - the art of producing, collecting, training 
+and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, 
+laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of soldiers - in strong contrast 
+to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, 
+divination and magical arts in general. 
+
+[3] LIU T'AO, in 6 CHUAN, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu Shang, also 
+known as T'ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C.^^ But its style does not belong to the 
+era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and 
+enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery cannot have been 
+later than Sui dynasty. 
+
+[4] WEI LIAO TZU, in 5 CHUAN. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who stud- 
+ied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work appears to have been originally in 3 1 
+chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough 
+in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the 
+Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-known 
+Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. 
+
+[5] SAN LUEH, in 3 CHUAN. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage 
+who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on a 
+bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the Ch'in or Han 
+period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one 
+of his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later on. 
+
+
+
+''See XIII. ss. 27, note. Further details on T'ai Kung will be found in the SHIH CHI, ch. 32 ad init. 
+Besides the tradition which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there 
+given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by Wen 
+Wang. 
+
+
+
+26 
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY 27 
+
+in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it 
+to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier. 
+
+[6] LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue between 
+T'ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed to the latter. Com- 
+petent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed 
+in the art of war. 
+
+[7] LI CHING PING FA (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short treatise 
+in 8 chapters, preserved in the T'ung Tien, but not published separately. This fact 
+explains its omission from the SSU K'U CH'UAN SHU. 
+
+[8] WU CH'I CHING, in 1 CHUAN. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng Hou, 
+with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (d. 121 B.C.), and 
+said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300 A.D.). Yet 
+the earliest mention of it is in the SUNG CHIH. Although a forgery, the work is 
+well put together. 
+
+Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been held, 
+it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) 
+the SHIH LIU TS'E (1 CHUAN), preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN; (2) CHIANG 
+YUAN (1 CHUAN); and (3) HSIN SHU (1 CHUAN), which steals wholesale from 
+Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. 
+
+Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to the 
+literature of war. The following references may be found useful: 
+
+T'UNG TIEN (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. 
+
+T'AI P'ING YU LAN (983), ch. 270-359. 
+
+WEN HSIEN TUNG K'AO (13th cent), ch. 221. 
+
+YU HAI (13th cent), ch. 140, 141. 
+
+SAN TS'AI T'U HUI (16th cent). 
+
+KUANG PO WU CHIH (1607), ch. 31, 32. 
+
+CH'IEN CH'IO LEI SHU (1632), ch. 75. 
+
+YUAN CHIEN LEI HAN (1710), ch. 206-229. 
+
+KU CHIN T'U SHU CHI CH'ENG (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81- 90. 
+
+HSU WEN HSIEN T'UNG K'AO (1784), ch. 121-134. 
+
+HUANG CH'AO CHING SHIH WEN PIEN (1826), ch. 76, 77. 
+
+The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve mention: 
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 
+
+CH'IEN HAN SHU, ch. 30. 
+
+SUISHU, ch. 32-35. 
+
+CHIU T'ANG SHU, ch. 46, 47. 
+
+HSIN T'ANG SHU, ch. 57,60. 
+
+SUNG SHIH, ch. 202-209. 
+
+T'UNG CHIH (circa 1150), ch. 68. 
+
+To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial Library: 
+
+SSU K'U CH'UAN SHU TSUNG MU T'l YAO (1790), ch. 99, 100. 
+
+The previously mentioned works are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzu. 
+The notes on each have been drawn principally from the SSU K'U CH'UAN SHU 
+CHffiN MING MU LU, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 2 
+
+LAYING PLANS 
+
+
+
+[Ts'ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this chapter, says it 
+refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, 
+or as we should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. 
+
+2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it 
+is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. 
+
+3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into 
+account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions 
+obtaining in the field. 
+
+4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Com- 
+mander; (5) Method and discipline. 
+
+[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral Law" a prin- 
+ciple of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One 
+might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an 
+attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.] 
+
+5., 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord with their 
+
+ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by 
+any danger. 
+
+[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers 
+will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant 
+practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at 
+hand."] 
+
+7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 
+
+[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words 
+here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of 
+
+29 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 2. LAYING PLANS 30 
+
+Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant 
+is "the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four 
+seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.] 
+
+8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open 
+ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 
+
+9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevol- 
+ence, courage and strictness. 
+
+[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; 
+(2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self- control, or "proper feeling;" 
+(4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" 
+are put before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of 
+"courage" and "strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self- 
+respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"] 
+
+10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marshaling 
+of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the 
+officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, 
+and the control of military expenditure. 
+
+1 1. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them 
+will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. 
+
+12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military 
+conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise: 
+
+13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? 
+[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.] 
+
+(2) Which of the two generals has most ability? 
+
+(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? 
+[See ss. 7,8] 
+
+(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 
+
+[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A.D. 155-220), 
+who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own 
+severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself 
+to death for having allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, 
+in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice 
+by cutting off his hair. Ts'ao Ts'ao 's own comment on the present passage 
+is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a law, see that it is not 
+disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."] 
+
+(5) Which army is stronger? 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 2. LAYING PLANS 31 
+
+[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, freely rendered, 
+"ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"] 
+
+(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? 
+
+[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers 
+will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant 
+practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at 
+hand."] 
+
+(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and pun- 
+ishment? 
+
+[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be prop- 
+erly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] 
+
+14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. 
+
+15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will con- 
+quer: -let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens 
+not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: -let such a one be 
+dismissed! 
+
+[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was com- 
+posed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.] 
+
+16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful 
+circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. 
+
+17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans. 
+
+[Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." 
+He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as 
+Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly 
+enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the ac- 
+tions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual 
+warfare." On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, command- 
+ing the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his 
+plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he 
+might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to 
+frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then 
+said: "Who will attack the first tomorrow - I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," 
+replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not 
+given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, 
+how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?" '] 
+
+18. All warfare is based on deception. 
+
+
+
+[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 2. LAYING PLANS 32 
+
+[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every 
+soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many milit- 
+ary qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with 
+which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] 
+
+19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, 
+we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy be- 
+lieve we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are 
+near. 
+
+20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 
+
+[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush 
+him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses 
+of deception in war.] 
+
+21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior 
+strength, evade him. 
+
+22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be 
+weak, that he may grow arrogant. 
+
+[Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his 
+adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immob- 
+ility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] 
+
+23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 
+
+[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch'en has the note: "while 
+we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The YU 
+LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."] 
+
+If his forces are united, separate them. 
+
+[Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the commentators: 
+"If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."] 
+
+24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 
+
+25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged before- 
+hand. 
+
+26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple 
+ere the battle is fought. 
+
+[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be 
+set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order 
+that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] 
+
+The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many 
+calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calcu- 
+lation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or 
+lose. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 3 
+
+WAGING WAR 
+
+
+
+[Ts'ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the cost," which 
+prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect 
+from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thou- 
+sand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail- 
+clad soldiers, 
+
+[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used 
+for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for pur- 
+poses of defense. Li Ch'uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but 
+this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between 
+early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the 
+war- chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round 
+which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the 
+numbers given here, we are informed that each swift chariot was accom- 
+panied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the 
+whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consist- 
+ing of two chariots and a hundred men.] 
+
+with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI, 
+
+[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since 
+Sun Tzu's time.] 
+
+the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, 
+small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, 
+will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost 
+of raising an army of 100,000 men. 
+
+2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then 
+men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay 
+siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 
+
+33 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 3. WAGING WAR 34 
+
+3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be 
+equal to the strain. 
+
+4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength 
+exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take 
+advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to 
+avert the consequences that must ensue. 
+
+5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never 
+been seen associated with long delays. 
+
+[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the 
+commentators. Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and 
+Mei Yao-ch'en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally 
+stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho 
+Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of 
+energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they 
+bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remark- 
+ing: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expen- 
+ded, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness 
+insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So 
+long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilat- 
+oriness." Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implic- 
+ation, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy 
+operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely 
+that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be 
+anything but foolish - if only because it means impoverishment to the na- 
+tion. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example 
+of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general de- 
+liberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals's 
+isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to 
+suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot 
+question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. 
+Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative 
+presumption in their favor.] 
+
+6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 
+
+7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can 
+thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. 
+
+[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a 
+long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to 
+a close. Only two commentators seem to favor this interpretation, but it 
+fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who 
+does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly 
+pointless.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 3. WAGING WAR 35 
+
+8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply- 
+wagons loaded more than twice. 
+
+[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for rein- 
+forcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses 
+the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to 
+recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon 
+Bonaparte, the value of time - that is, being a little ahead of your oppon- 
+ent - has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest 
+calculations with regard to commissariat.] 
+
+9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus 
+the army will have food enough for its needs. 
+
+[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things 
+to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedi- 
+menta of an army, apart from provisions.] 
+
+10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by con- 
+tributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance 
+causes the people to be impoverished. 
+
+[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, 
+though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so 
+awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never 
+seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be ne- 
+cessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese 
+words Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment 
+clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their 
+contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them to 
+maintain an army in this way, except because the State or Government is 
+too poor to do so?] 
+
+11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and 
+high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. 
+
+[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. 
+Ts'ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier.] 
+
+12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by 
+heavy exactions. 
+
+13. ,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the 
+
+people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dis- 
+sipated; 
+
+[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, 
+but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our 
+text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The PEOPLE being regarded as 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 3. WAGING WAR 36 
+
+the essential part of the State, and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not 
+right that those in authority should value and be careful of both?"] 
+
+while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast- 
+plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, 
+draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total rev- 
+enue. 
+
+15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cart- 
+load of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and 
+likewise a single PICUL of his provender is equivalent to twenty from 
+one's own store. 
+
+[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting 
+one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 
+pounds (65.5 kilograms).] 
+
+16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there 
+may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see 
+the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from 
+the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a 
+keen desire to fight, each on his own account."] 
+
+17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, 
+those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be 
+substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in 
+conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and 
+kept. 
+
+18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. 
+
+19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. 
+
+[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu here 
+reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."] 
+
+20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's 
+fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or 
+in peril. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 4 
+
+ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 
+
+
+
+Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the 
+enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. 
+So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture 
+a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. 
+
+[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nom- 
+inally of 12500 men; according to Ts'ao Kung, the equivalent of a regi- 
+ment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any 
+number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains 
+from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact 
+figures of 100 and 5 respectively.] 
+
+Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; 
+supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without 
+fighting. 
+
+[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old 
+Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge 
+French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] 
+
+Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; 
+
+[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the 
+Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby one 
+might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an 
+active policy of counter- attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: 
+"When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate 
+him by delivering our own attack first."] 
+
+the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; 
+
+[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in speak- 
+ing of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities 
+into which the China of his day was split up.] 
+
+37 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 38 
+
+the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; 
+
+[When he is already at full strength.] 
+
+and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 
+
+4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. 
+
+[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it 
+in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, 
+Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would 
+have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously 
+to oppose them.] 
+
+The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of 
+war, will take up three whole months; 
+
+[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", 
+described. Ts'ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get 
+a better idea of them from Li Ch'uan, who says they were to protect the 
+heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This 
+seems to suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says 
+they were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied 
+by Ch'en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on 
+city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from 
+several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four 
+wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in 
+sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of 
+filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now 
+called "wooden donkeys."] 
+
+and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months 
+more. 
+
+[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of 
+the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the defense, and 
+also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] 
+
+5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the 
+assault like swarming ants, 
+
+[This vivid simile of Ts'ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army 
+of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience 
+at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before 
+his engines of war are ready.] 
+
+with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still 
+remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 39 
+
+[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, 
+in the most recent siege which history has to record.] 
+
+6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fight- 
+ing; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows 
+their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. 
+
+[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm 
+to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an 
+end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."] 
+
+7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, 
+without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. 
+
+[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of 
+the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the 
+weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] 
+
+This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 
+
+8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround 
+him; if five to one, to attack him; 
+
+[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] 
+
+if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. 
+
+[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears 
+to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a 
+clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being two to the enemy's one, we may use 
+one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special 
+diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is 
+twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two 
+divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; 
+if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to 
+the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front." This is what is meant by 
+saying that 'one part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some 
+special diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army 
+is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical 
+method, and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."] 
+
+9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; 
+
+[Li Ch'uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If at- 
+tackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general 
+will fight."] 
+
+if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 40 
+
+[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great improve- 
+ment on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good 
+authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies 
+if the other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more 
+than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.] 
+
+if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 
+
+10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end 
+it must be captured by the larger force. 
+
+1 1. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at 
+all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State 
+will be weak. 
+
+[As Li Ch'uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the general's 
+ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), 
+his army will lack strength."] 
+
+12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army: 
+
+13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of 
+the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a thor- 
+oughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of "the 
+ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements 
+of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the 
+reverse, and quote the saying of T'ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be 
+governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of 
+course it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with 
+the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a 
+little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position 
+as a whole, and give wrong orders.] 
+
+14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a 
+kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This 
+causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the civil 
+sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid gloves." And 
+Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to 
+govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other 
+hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of 
+an army"-to that of a State, understood.] 
+
+15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, 
+[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 41 
+
+through ignorance of the miUtary principle of adaptation to circumstances. 
+This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. 
+
+[I follow Mei Yao-ch'en here. The other commentators refer not to the 
+ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If 
+a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrus- 
+ted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer 
+of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and 
+the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the 
+brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick 
+at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death."] 
+
+16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from 
+the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, 
+and flinging victory away. 
+
+17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will 
+win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if 
+he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invari- 
+ably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the 
+defensive.] 
+
+(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. 
+
+[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly, as 
+Li Ch'uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more sat- 
+isfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force 
+to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, 
+and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a su- 
+perior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult 
+ground.'"] 
+
+(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all 
+its ranks. 
+
+(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unpre- 
+pared. 
+
+(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the 
+sovereign. 
+
+[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's function to give 
+broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general." 
+It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by 
+undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home gov- 
+ernment. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success 
+to the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 42 
+
+18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need 
+
+not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the 
+enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch'in, who in 383 A.D. 
+marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to 
+despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh 
+An andHuan Ch'ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight 
+provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; 
+why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their 
+whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his 
+forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was 
+obliged to beat a hasty retreat] 
+
+If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every 
+battle. 
+
+[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, 
+knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack 
+is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack." It would be 
+hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 5 
+
+TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 
+
+
+
+[Ts'ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of this chapter: 
+"marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discov- 
+ering each other's condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an army 
+that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition 
+will remain secret, which leads to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition 
+will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general 
+can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the 
+possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the 
+enemy. 
+
+2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportun- 
+ity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. 
+
+[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part] 
+
+3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, 
+
+[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, 
+covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] 
+
+but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 
+
+4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without being able to 
+DO it. 
+
+5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the en- 
+emy means taking the offensive. 
+
+[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, in spite of the fact 
+that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who 
+cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.] 
+
+
+
+43 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 44 
+
+6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a su- 
+perabundance of strength. 
+
+7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of 
+the earth; 
+
+[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating 
+the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his 
+whereabouts."] 
+
+he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. 
+
+[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunder- 
+bolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most 
+of the commentators.] 
+
+Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a 
+victory that is complete. 
+
+8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not 
+the acme of excellence. 
+
+[As Ts'ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has germin- 
+ated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch'uan alludes 
+to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior 
+army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch'eng-an, 
+said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and 
+shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, 
+and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in 
+his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was 
+able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] 
+
+9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole 
+Empire says, "Well done!" 
+
+[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move surrepti- 
+tiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last 
+the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves 
+his approbation for things that "the world's coarse thumb And finger fail 
+to plumb. " ] 
+
+10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; 
+
+["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in au- 
+tumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in 
+Chinese writers.] 
+
+to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of 
+thunder is no sign of a quick ear. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 45 
+
+[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: 
+Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a 
+distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard 
+seed; and Shih K'uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of 
+a mosquito.] 
+
+11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but 
+excels in winning with ease. 
+
+[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." 
+Mei Yao-ch'en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with 
+difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] 
+
+12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for 
+courage. 
+
+[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained 
+over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows 
+nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the 
+hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no 
+credit for courage."] 
+
+13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile 
+attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One 
+who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at win- 
+ning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas 
+he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet 
+manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] 
+
+Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it 
+means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. 
+
+14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat 
+impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. 
+
+[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not 
+be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the 
+arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase 
+the safety of his army.] 
+
+15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the 
+victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and 
+afterwards looks for victory. 
+
+[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which 
+will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin 
+with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be 
+assured."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 46 
+
+16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to 
+method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. 
+
+17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly. Measurement; secondly. Es- 
+timation of quantity; thirdly. Calculation; fourthly. Balancing of chances; 
+fifthly. Victory. 
+
+18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Meas- 
+urement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to 
+Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. 
+
+[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The 
+first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable 
+us to form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and to make calculations 
+based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, 
+or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the 
+scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which 
+in the Chinese some commentators take as a calculation of NUMBERS, 
+thereby making it nearly synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the 
+second term should be thought of as a consideration of the enemy's general 
+position or condition, while the third term is the estimate of his numerical 
+strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength 
+having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into 
+play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it 
+points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] 
+
+19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed 
+in the scale against a single grain. 
+
+[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed against a SHU 
+(1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against an I." The point is 
+simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with 
+victory, has over one demoralized by defeat." Legge, in his note on Men- 
+cius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu 
+Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch'uan of the T'ang 
+dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] 
+
+20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into 
+a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 6 
+
+ENERGY 
+
+
+
+Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the 
+control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. 
+
+[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with sub- 
+ordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's 
+famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large 
+an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your 
+Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more 
+the better."] 
+
+Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from 
+fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and 
+signals. 
+
+To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's 
+attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by maneuvers direct and in- 
+direct. 
+
+[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, 
+the discussion of the CHENG and the CHT." As it is by no means easy to 
+grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them consist- 
+ently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of 
+the commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li 
+Ch'uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CHT. 
+Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in nor- 
+mal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal maneuvers must be 
+employed." Mei Yao-ch'en: "CHT is active, CHENG is passive; passivity 
+means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho 
+Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as 
+one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be 
+CHT, and CHT may also be CHENG." He instances the famous exploit of 
+Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin- chin (now Chao-i 
+
+
+
+47 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6. ENERGY 48 
+
+in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden 
+tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, 
+we are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise man- 
+euver was CH'I." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on 
+the words: "Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of 
+CH'I and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare 
+favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' Ts'ao Kung 
+says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on 
+the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. 
+A.D.] says: 'In war, to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning move- 
+ments, on the other hand, are CH'I.' These writers simply regard CHENG 
+as CHENG, and CH'I as CH'I; they do not note that the two are mutually 
+interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle [see 
+infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung goes to the 
+root of the matter: 'A CH'I maneuver may be CHENG, if we make the 
+enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real attack will be CH'I, and vice 
+versa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot 
+fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack 
+or other operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention 
+fixed; whereas that is CH'I," which takes him by surprise or comes from 
+an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant 
+to be CH'I," it immediately becomes CHENG."] 
+
+4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an 
+egg - this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. 
+
+5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect 
+methods will be needed in order to secure victory. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding 
+the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect 
+tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night 
+march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. ' 
+
+6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, 
+unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they 
+end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once 
+more. 
+
+[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of CH'I and 
+CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at all, un- 
+less, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to 
+it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, 
+the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they 
+cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in 
+figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.] 
+
+
+
+"Forty-one Years in India," cliapter 46. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6. ENERGY 49 
+
+7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these 
+five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 
+
+8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and 
+black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been 
+seen. 
+
+9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), 
+yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. 
+
+10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct and 
+the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of 
+maneuvers. 
+
+1 1. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving 
+in a circle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities 
+of their combination? 
+
+12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones 
+along in its course. 
+
+13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which 
+enables it to strike and destroy its victim. 
+
+[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used 
+defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "the 
+measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite 
+fit the illustrative simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, 
+it seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps 
+the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with 
+the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous 
+quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able to reserve 
+their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective. When the 
+"Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, 
+she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before 
+replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close 
+range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the 
+enemy's nearest ships.] 
+
+14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his 
+decision. 
+
+[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance 
+mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot 
+help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the word in a figurative sense 
+comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, 
+which after describing the falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just 
+how the 'psychological moment' should be seized in war."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6. ENERGY 50 
+
+15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the 
+releasing of a trigger. 
+
+[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of 
+energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- bow until released by the 
+finger on the trigger.] 
+
+16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and 
+yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be 
+without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previ- 
+ously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and join- 
+ing, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a 
+battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is pos- 
+sible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all 
+topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] 
+
+17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates 
+courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. 
+
+[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down 
+the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts'ao Kung throws out a 
+hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy 
+formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it 
+quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy 
+on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity 
+in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish 
+to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you 
+must have exceeding strength."] 
+
+18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdi- 
+vision; [See supra, ss. 1.] 
+
+concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent 
+energy; 
+
+[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here dif- 
+ferently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that 
+we are favorably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will 
+believe that we are really afraid."] 
+
+masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. 
+
+[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Em- 
+peror: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on 
+their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all 
+their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm sol- 
+diers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6. ENERGY 51 
+
+all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone op- 
+posed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally 
+inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies 
+have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse 
+on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack." The 
+Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found 
+himself surrounded at Po-teng."] 
+
+19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains 
+deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu 
+says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness may 
+be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to 
+believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the 
+enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we choose to 
+give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun 
+Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch'i State being at war with Wei, sent T'ien Chi and 
+Sun Pin against the general P'ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly 
+personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch'i State has a reputation 
+for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this 
+circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the 
+border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first 
+night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P'ang Chuan 
+pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch'i were 
+cowards: their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In 
+his retreat. Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, with he calculated that his 
+pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, 
+and inscribed upon it the words: "Under this tree shall P'ang Chuan die." 
+Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush 
+near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P'ang 
+Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to 
+read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley 
+of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu 
+Mu's version of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably 
+with more historical truth, makes P'ang Chuan cut his own throat with an 
+exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ] 
+
+He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 
+
+20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of 
+picked men he lies in wait for him. 
+
+[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in 
+wait with the main body of his troops."] 
+
+21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not 
+require too much from individuals. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6. ENERGY 52 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; 
+afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men ac- 
+cording to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untal- 
+ented."] 
+
+Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. 
+
+22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like 
+unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain 
+motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, 
+to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. 
+
+[Ts'au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] 
+
+23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a 
+round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much 
+on the subject of energy. 
+
+[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the paramount 
+importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," 
+he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 7 
+
+WEAK POINTS AND 
+STRONG 
+
+
+
+[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, on 
+Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, 
+dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with 
+the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect meth- 
+ods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before proceeding 
+to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises 
+out of attack and defense, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again 
+on the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter 
+on Energy."] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the 
+enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to 
+hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. 
+
+2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does 
+not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. 
+
+[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not 
+at all. ' ] 
+
+3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of 
+his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the 
+enemy to draw near. 
+
+[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will strike 
+at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] 
+
+4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; 
+
+
+
+See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. 490. 
+
+
+
+53 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 54 
+
+[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch'en's inter- 
+pretation of I. ss. 23.] 
+
+if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he 
+can force him to move. 
+
+5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to 
+places where you are not expected. 
+
+6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through 
+country where the enemy is not. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt 
+from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, 
+attack in unexpected quarters."] 
+
+7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places 
+which are undefended. 
+
+[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, 
+where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the 
+walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where 
+relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are 
+variance amongst themselves."] 
+
+You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that 
+cannot be attacked. 
+
+[I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is 
+rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu 
+Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In order 
+to make your defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that 
+are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, 
+those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less 
+well with the preceding-always a consideration in the highly antithetical 
+style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come 
+nearer the mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from 
+the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it impossible for the 
+enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack 
+are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in 
+defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible 
+for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I 
+shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] 
+
+8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know 
+what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not 
+know what to attack. 
+
+[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 55 
+
+9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, 
+through you inaudible; 
+
+[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference 
+to the enemy.] 
+
+and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. 
+
+10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the en- 
+emy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your move- 
+ments are more rapid than those of the enemy. 
+
+11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though 
+he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is 
+attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of 
+communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if 
+we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign him- 
+self." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, 
+was no believer in frontal attacks.] 
+
+12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even 
+though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. 
+All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. 
+
+[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia 
+Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch'uan 
+says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu 
+finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes-one of Chu-ko 
+Liang, who when occupying Yang-p'ing and about to be attacked by Ssu- 
+ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and 
+flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping 
+and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the intended 
+effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and 
+retreated. What Sun Tzu is advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor 
+less than the timely use of "bluff."] 
+
+13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, 
+we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. 
+
+[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei Yao- 
+ch'en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's dispositions are visible, we 
+can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being kept 
+secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard 
+against attack from every quarter."] 
+
+14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into 
+fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a 
+whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 56 
+
+15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our 
+opponents will be in dire straits. 
+
+16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the 
+enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different 
+points; 
+
+[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by say- 
+ing that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what 
+he was going to do, HE was thinking most of what he was going to do 
+himself."] 
+
+and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we 
+shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. 
+
+17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should 
+he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, 
+he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his 
+left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. 
+
+[In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we read: 
+"A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those 
+generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, 
+while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only 
+the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in 
+small misfortunes to avoid greater."] 
+
+18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible at- 
+tacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these 
+preparations against us. 
+
+[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to compel the 
+enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against 
+each fraction in turn."] 
+
+19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate 
+from the greatest distances in order to fight. 
+
+[What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances 
+and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to di- 
+vide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards 
+to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order 
+to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such suc- 
+cessful junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic 
+and decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical moment on 
+the field of Waterloo.] 
+
+20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent 
+to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 57 
+
+unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more 
+so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI 
+apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI! 
+
+[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the 
+mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advan- 
+cing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of which has 
+orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detach- 
+ments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time 
+and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in de- 
+tail. Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do not know the 
+place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day on which they 
+will join battle, our unity will be forfeited through our preparations for 
+defense, and the positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening 
+upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, 
+and no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, 
+especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost 
+divisions of the army."] 
+
+21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in 
+number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say 
+then that victory can be achieved. 
+
+[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended 
+in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation 
+in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death. With his present 
+assertion compare IV. ss. 4. Chang Yu is the only one to point out the 
+seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on 
+Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without 
+being able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that 'victory' 
+can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the former chapter, where 
+the offensive and defensive are under discussion, it is said that if the en- 
+emy is fully prepared, one cannot make certain of beating him. But the 
+present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according 
+to Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place 
+of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be 
+achieved."] 
+
+22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fight- 
+ing. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. 
+
+[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans 
+conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure." 
+
+23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. 
+
+[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on 
+being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 58 
+
+lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent 
+the scornful present of a woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad 
+him out of his Fabian tactics.] 
+
+Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. 24. 
+Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may 
+know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. 
+
+[Cf. IV. ss. 6.] 
+
+25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to con- 
+ceal them; 
+
+[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is 
+perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra ss. 9) as "showing no 
+sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.] 
+
+conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the 
+subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. 
+
+[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable of- 
+ficers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."] 
+
+26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics- 
+that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. 
+
+27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is 
+the strategy out of which victory is evolved. 
+
+[I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot 
+see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the 
+battle.] 
+
+28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your 
+methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. 
+
+[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root- principle underlying 
+victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this 
+compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They 
+may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or 
+a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead 
+an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to 
+write like Gibbon."] 
+
+29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs 
+away from high places and hastens downwards. 
+
+30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. 
+[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 59 
+
+31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which 
+it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is 
+facing. 
+
+32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are 
+no constant conditions. 
+
+33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby 
+succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- born captain. 
+
+34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally 
+predominant; 
+
+[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] 
+
+the four seasons make way for each other in turn. 
+
+[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] 
+
+There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and 
+waxing. 
+
+[Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want 
+of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The 
+comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phe- 
+nomena which Sun Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 8 
+
+MANEUVERING 
+
+
+
+Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sover- 
+eign. 
+
+Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and 
+harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. 
+
+["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between 
+the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes 
+a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the State, no 
+military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no 
+battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represen- 
+ted as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war 
+should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the 
+external foe."] 
+
+After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more 
+difficult. 
+
+[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts'ao Kung, 
+who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until 
+our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most 
+difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said 
+to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch'ien Hao's 
+note gives color to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing 
+and entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. 
+The real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu 
+also observes that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy 
+in seizing favorable position."] 
+
+The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into 
+the direct, and misfortune into gain. 
+
+
+
+60 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 61 
+
+[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat en- 
+igmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. This is how it is ex- 
+plained by Ts'ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then 
+cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." 
+Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely 
+while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly 
+different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and 
+natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into 
+actual advantage by celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying 
+are afforded by the two famous passages across the Alps-that of Hanni- 
+bal, which laid Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years 
+later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] 
+
+4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of 
+the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before 
+him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION. 
+
+[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the 
+town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch'in army. The King of 
+Chao first consulted Lien P'o on the advisability of attempting a relief, 
+but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country 
+too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully 
+admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be 
+like two rats fighting in a whole-and the pluckier one will win!" So he left 
+the capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 LI when he 
+stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued 
+strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the 
+intelligence to the enemy. The Ch'in general was overjoyed, and attributed 
+his adversary's tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the 
+Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had 
+no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two 
+days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing 
+rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the "North 
+hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat 
+followed for the Ch'in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu 
+in all haste and retreat across the border.] 
+
+5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multi- 
+tude, most dangerous. 
+
+[I adopt the reading of the T'UNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and the T'U 
+SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to 
+make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to 
+mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all 
+depends on the ability of the general.] 
+
+6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, 
+the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 62 
+
+a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and 
+stores. 
+
+[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, 
+who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much 
+enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in 
+the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a 
+lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.] 
+
+7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced 
+marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance 
+at a stretch, 
+
+[The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; but on one 
+occasion, when pursuing Liu Pel, Ts'ao Ts'ao is said to have covered the 
+incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.] 
+
+doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your 
+three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. 
+
+8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on 
+this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. 
+
+[The moral is, as Ts'ao Kung and others point out: Don't march a hundred 
+LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Man- 
+euvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall 
+Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful 
+than the dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for ex- 
+traordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a 
+rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed. ' ] 
+
+9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the 
+leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. 
+
+[Literally, "the leader of the first division wiU be TORN AWAY."] 
+
+10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will 
+arrive. 
+
+[In the T'UNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of 
+maneuvering."] 
+
+1 1. We may take it then that an army without its baggage- train is lost; without 
+provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. 
+
+[I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But Tu Yu says 
+"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi 
+says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] 
+
+
+
+' See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 63 
+
+12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of 
+our neighbors. 
+
+13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the 
+face of the country-its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, 
+its marshes and swamps. 
+
+14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make 
+use of local guides. 
+
+[ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XL ss. 52.] 
+
+15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. 
+
+[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the 
+numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. ^ ] 
+
+16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by cir- 
+cumstances. 
+
+17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, 
+
+[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, 
+as Mei Yao-ch'en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] 
+
+your compactness that of the forest. 
+
+[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, 
+order and ranks must be preserved"-so as to guard against surprise attacks. 
+But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess 
+the quality of density or compactness.] 
+
+18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, 
+
+[Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man 
+can check."] 
+
+is immovability like a mountain. 
+
+[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dis- 
+lodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into 
+a trap.] 
+
+19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall 
+like a thunderbolt. 
+
+[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T'ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: 
+"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting- 
+so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it 
+cannot be parried.] 
+
+
+
+For a number of maxims on this liead, see "Marslial Turenne" (Longmans, 1907), p. 29. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 64 
+
+20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your 
+men; 
+
+[Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by in- 
+sisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may 
+afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] 
+
+when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of 
+the soldiery. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and 
+plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they 
+invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their 
+most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch'ao 
+who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu- 
+k'ang-an and Tso Tsung-t'ang.] 
+
+21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 
+
+[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not break camp 
+until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness 
+of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. ss. 13.] 
+
+22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. [See supra, SS. 3, 
+4.] 
+
+Such is the art of maneuvering. 
+
+[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there 
+now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier 
+book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzu 
+wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeable different from that of 
+Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.] 
+
+23. The Book of Army Management says: 
+
+[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any 
+information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch'en calls it "an ancient military 
+classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous 
+amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time 
+between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself 
+improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been made 
+and written down at some earlier period.] 
+
+On the field of battle, 
+
+[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] 
+
+the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs 
+and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the 
+institution of banners and flags. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 65 
+
+24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes 
+of the host may be focused on one particular point. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the 
+same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like 
+those of a single man."!] 
+
+25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the 
+brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. 
+
+[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against 
+orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this 
+connection of Wu Ch'i, when he was fighting against the Ch'in State. Be- 
+fore the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, 
+sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned 
+to camp. Wu Ch'i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer 
+ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, and ought 
+not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch'i replied: "I fully believe he was a 
+good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."] 
+
+This is the art of handling large masses of men. 
+
+26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in 
+fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears 
+and eyes of your army. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at the head of 
+500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that 
+though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to 
+dispute their passage.] 
+
+27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; 
+
+["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all 
+ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. 
+Now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have 
+newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, 
+but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. 
+It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch'uan 
+and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the TSO CHUAN, year 10, 
+ss. 1) of Ts'ao Kuei, a protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State 
+was attacked by Ch'i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch'ang-cho, 
+after the first roll of the enemy's drums, when Ts'ao said: "Not just yet." 
+Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word 
+for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch'i were utterly defeated. 
+Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts'ao 
+Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first 
+roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already 
+on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 66 
+
+spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzu 
+(chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, 
+and continues: "The value of a whole army-a mighty host of a million 
+men-is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] 
+
+a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most important asset. 
+It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire 
+courage into the panic- stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571- 
+649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled 
+cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of as- 
+sailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."] 
+
+28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; 
+
+[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of 
+the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas 
+Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, Iv. 
+1 and 8.] 
+
+by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only 
+on returning to camp. 
+
+29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but 
+attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of 
+studying moods. 
+
+30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub 
+amongst the enemy:-this is the art of retaining self-possession. 
+
+31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease 
+while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy 
+is famished:-this is the art of husbanding one's strength. 
+
+32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, 
+to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:- 
+this is the art of studying circumstances. 
+
+33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to op- 
+pose him when he comes downhill. 
+
+34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose 
+temper is keen. 
+
+35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, take 
+these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by 
+the enemy. Ch'en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying 
+has a wider application.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 67 
+
+Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. 
+
+[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying 
+that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death 
+against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an op- 
+ponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible 
+is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous 
+tale is told of Ts'ao Ts'ao's courage and resource in ch. 1 of the SAN 
+KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu 
+Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts'ao's retreat. The 
+latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in 
+between two enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in 
+which he had engaged himself. In this desperate plight Ts'ao waited until 
+nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an am- 
+bush in it. As soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell 
+on his rear, while Ts'ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so 
+that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts'ao Ts'ao said af- 
+terwards: "The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought 
+me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] 
+
+36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. 
+
+[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, 
+as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road to safety, 
+and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds 
+pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."] 
+
+Do not press a desperate foe too hard. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay 
+will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has 
+burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all 
+on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih 
+illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch'ing. That 
+general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a 
+vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was 
+bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits 
+for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced 
+to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks 
+thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch'ing exclaimed: "We are desperate 
+men. Far better to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into 
+captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the northeast and 
+darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was 
+for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but 
+luckily another officer, Li Shou- cheng by name, was quicker to see an 
+opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in the midst of 
+this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the 
+
+
+
+CHAPTERS. MANEUVERING 68 
+
+strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu Yen- 
+ch'ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, 
+routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.] 
+
+37. Such is the art of warfare. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 9 
+
+VARIATION IN TACTICS 
+
+
+
+[The heading means Uterally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu does not appear 
+to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V SS. 6-11) that such de- 
+flections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little option 
+but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. 
+"All it means is that in warfare we ought to very our tactics to the utmost degree.... I 
+do not know what Ts 'ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been 
+suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XL This is the 
+view adopted by Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something 
+has been lost-a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some 
+weight.] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sover- 
+eign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. 
+
+[Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may 
+have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the 
+chapter.] 
+
+2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads 
+intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated 
+positions. 
+
+[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the begin- 
+ning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. ss. 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines 
+this situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li 
+Ch'uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks 
+or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and 
+precipices, without a road by which to advance."] 
+
+In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate posi- 
+tion, you must fight. 
+
+3. There are roads which must not be followed, 
+
+69 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9. VARIATION IN TACTICS 70 
+
+["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch'uan, "where 
+an ambush is to be feared."] 
+
+armies which must be not attacked, 
+
+[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be at- 
+tacked." Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival ad- 
+vantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, 
+for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."] 
+
+towns which must not be besieged, 
+
+[Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts'ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own ex- 
+perience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of 
+Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the 
+country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of 
+no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town 
+should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will 
+not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: 
+"The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will 
+be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing- 
+stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of 
+war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, 
+countermarches and maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste 
+men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a 
+province." ' ] 
+
+positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which 
+must not be obeyed. 
+
+[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, 
+and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are 
+baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander 
+is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that 
+even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] 
+
+4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany 
+variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 
+
+5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with 
+the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his know- 
+ledge to practical account. 
+
+[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only se- 
+curing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every 
+possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is characterized by 
+certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of 
+
+
+
+"Marshal Turenne," p. 50. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9. VARIATION IN TACTICS 71 
+
+plan. How it is possible to turn these natural features to account unless 
+topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] 
+
+6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his 
+plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to 
+make the best use of his men. 
+
+[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous 
+lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if 
+an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, 
+it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; 
+and if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must be 
+obeyed." But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general 
+to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest 
+way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that 
+the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile 
+force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and 
+likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] 
+
+7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of dis- 
+advantage will be blended together. 
+
+["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says 
+Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."] 
+
+8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed 
+in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must 
+not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy 
+also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calcula- 
+tions."] 
+
+9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to 
+seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I 
+must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my own 
+ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two 
+considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... 
+For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting 
+an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pur- 
+sue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a 
+bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free myself from 
+the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao, VII. ss. 35, note.] 
+
+10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9. VARIATION IN TACTICS 72 
+
+[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which 
+would only occur to the Oriental mind:-"Entice away the enemy's best and 
+wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors 
+into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Fo- 
+ment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and 
+his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration 
+amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by in- 
+sidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by 
+presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a 
+different interpretation of Sun Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position 
+where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] 
+
+and make trouble for them, 
+
+[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be 
+make for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we might say, "as- 
+sets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony 
+amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a 
+whip-hand over the enemy.] 
+
+and keep them constantly engaged; 
+
+[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent the from having 
+any rest."] 
+
+hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. 
+
+[Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: 
+"cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their 
+first impulse), and hasten in our direction."] 
+
+1 1. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not 
+coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of 
+his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position 
+unassailable. 
+
+12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: 
+
+(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; 
+
+["Bravery without forethought," as Ts'ao Kung analyzes it, which causes 
+a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an oppon- 
+ent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may 
+be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In 
+estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive at- 
+tention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many 
+qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone 
+to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of 
+what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive 
+remark: "Simply going to one's death does not bring about victory."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9. VARIATION IN TACTICS 73 
+
+(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as 
+being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an ad- 
+vantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." 
+Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," 
+this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing 
+is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T'ai Kung 
+said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself 
+real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the 
+Yangtsze and fought a naval battle with him at the island of Ch'eng-hung. 
+The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents 
+were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store 
+for him should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of 
+his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment's notice. 
+The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly 
+quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fire- 
+ships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's 
+forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and 
+nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story of Chao 
+Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of 
+Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing 
+in case of defeat to be the first to get across.] 
+
+(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; 
+
+[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, 
+Teng Ch'iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to 
+fight. Teng Ch'iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily 
+provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he 
+will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is 
+doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out 
+to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and 
+finally attacked and slain.] 
+
+(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; 
+
+[This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a defect in 
+a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness 
+to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, 
+however undeserved. Mei Yao- ch'en truly observes, though somewhat 
+paradoxically: "The seek after glory should be careless of public opin- 
+
+
+
+(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. 
+
+[Here again. Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless of 
+the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sac- 
+rificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9. VARIATION IN TACTICS 74 
+
+men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will 
+suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which 
+will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a 
+general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detach- 
+ment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that 
+our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were 
+so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in 
+the end, relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct 
+resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment 
+in favor of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who failed most 
+conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to defend him to me on 
+the ground that he was always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he 
+but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.] 
+
+13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of 
+war. 
+
+14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely 
+be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of 
+meditation. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 10 
+
+THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 
+
+
+
+[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in ss. 1 than by this head- 
+ing.] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and 
+observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in 
+the neighborhood of valleys. 
+
+[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to sup- 
+plies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," 
+i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu- 
+tu Ch'iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan 
+was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch'iang having found a refuge in the 
+hills. Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the fa- 
+vorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch'iang was 
+soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced 
+to make a total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the 
+neighborhood of valleys."] 
+
+2. Camp in high places, 
+
+[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding 
+country.] 
+
+facing the sun. 
+
+[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch'en Hao "facing east." 
+Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13. 
+
+Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. 
+
+3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. 
+
+["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts'ao Kung, 
+and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." 
+
+75 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 76 
+
+The T'UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY crosses a river," etc. But in 
+view of tfie next sentence, tfiis is almost certainly an interpolation.] 
+
+4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance 
+to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and 
+then deliver your attack. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu 
+at the Wei River. Turning to the CHTEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, 
+we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up 
+on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to 
+take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher 
+up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a 
+time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the 
+other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and 
+exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued 
+him and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party 
+to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which 
+swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from 
+getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and 
+annihilated it. Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the 
+army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.] 
+
+5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a 
+river which he has to cross. 
+
+[For fear of preventing his crossing.] 
+
+6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. 
+
+[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water 
+is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshaled 
+on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case 
+it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other 
+commentators are not at all explicit.] 
+
+Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp 
+on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices 
+and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- hou has remarked that 'in river 
+warfare we must not advance against the stream,' which is as much as to 
+say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then 
+they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short work 
+of us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the 
+enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.] 
+
+So much for river warfare. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 77 
+
+7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them 
+quickly, without any delay. 
+
+[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and 
+last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] 
+
+8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near 
+you, and get your back to a clump of trees. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where 
+there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] 
+
+So much for operations in salt-marches. 
+
+9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising 
+ground to your right and on your rear, 
+
+[Tu Mu quotes T'ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a 
+marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] 
+
+so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for 
+campaigning in flat country. 
+
+10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge 
+
+[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and 
+(4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. 1.] 
+
+which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. 
+
+[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch'en asks, with some plaus- 
+ibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of Huang 
+Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) 
+speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch'ih Yu. In the LIU T'AO 
+it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire." 
+Ts'ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to in- 
+stitute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the number 
+of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch'uan tells us that the art 
+of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng 
+Hou.] 
+
+1 1. All armies prefer high ground to low. 
+
+["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch'en, "is not only more agreement and 
+salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground 
+is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."] 
+
+and sunny places to dark. 
+
+12. If you are careful of your men. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 78 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn 
+out your animals to graze."] 
+
+and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every 
+kind, 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of 
+illness."] 
+
+and this will spell victory. 
+
+13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope 
+on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers 
+and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. 
+
+14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish 
+to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. 
+
+15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, 
+deep natural hollows, 
+
+[The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with 
+pools of water at the bottom.] 
+
+confined places, 
+
+[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices 
+on three sides-easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] 
+
+tangled thickets, 
+
+[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears can- 
+not be used."] 
+
+quagmires 
+
+[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for 
+chariots and horsemen."] 
+
+and crevasses, 
+
+[Defined by Mei Yao-ch'en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling 
+cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and inter- 
+sected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin 
+explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes 
+much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators cer- 
+tainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the 
+Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning 
+of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates something in the nature 
+of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 79 
+
+
+
+should be left with all possible speed and not approached. 
+
+16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to ap- 
+proach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on 
+his rear. 
+
+17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, 
+ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or 
+woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and 
+searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies 
+are likely to be lurking. 
+
+[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors 
+who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and over- 
+hearing our instructions."] 
+
+18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the 
+natural strength of his position. 
+
+[Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of which 
+is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. 
+Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."] 
+
+19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the 
+other side to advance. 
+
+[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to 
+dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a 
+battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of 
+our responding to the challenge."] 
+
+20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. 
+
+21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advan- 
+cing. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and Chang 
+Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the 
+enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he 
+may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's 
+march."] 
+
+The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means 
+that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. 
+
+[Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts'ao Kung's, is as follows: "The 
+presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation 
+is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed 
+these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that 
+these "screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which 
+the retreating enemy happened to come across.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 80 
+
+22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. 
+
+[Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying 
+along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are 
+in ambush at the spot beneath."] 
+
+Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. 
+
+23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots ad- 
+vancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the 
+approach of infantry. 
+
+["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated 
+as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying 
+that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also 
+follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would 
+be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army 
+on the march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust 
+raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the commander-in- 
+chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile 
+country, your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of 
+him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc."' ] 
+
+When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been 
+sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify 
+that the army is encamping. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a cantonment, light 
+horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and 
+strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust 
+and its motion."] 
+
+24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about 
+to advance. 
+
+["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is 
+to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." 
+Chang Yu alludes to the story of T'ien Tan of the Ch'i-mo against the Yen 
+forces, led by Ch'i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T'ien 
+Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses 
+of their Ch'i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us; 
+that would be the undoing of our city.' The other side being informed of 
+this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the city were 
+enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only 
+lest they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend them- 
+selves more obstinately than ever. Once again T 'ien Tan sent back conver- 
+ted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is 
+
+
+
+"Aids to Scouting," p. 26. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 8 1 
+
+that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and 
+by inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint- 
+hearted.' Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the 
+corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the out- 
+rage from the city -walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out 
+and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T'ien Tan knew then that his 
+soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself 
+too a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst 
+his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and con- 
+cubines. He then served out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat 
+their fill. The regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls 
+were manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, 
+envoys were dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, 
+whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T'ien Tan also collected 
+20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens of 
+Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the town 
+capitulated, he would allow their homes to be plundered or their women to 
+be maltreated. Ch'i Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but 
+his army now became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T'ien 
+Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, 
+painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and fastened sharp 
+blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their tails. When night 
+came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove the oxen through a 
+number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing them up with a 
+force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed 
+furiously into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion 
+and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern 
+on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any 
+with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 
+had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the 
+enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those 
+that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums 
+and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed 
+by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued 
+by the men of Ch'i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch'i Chien.... 
+The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities 
+which had belonged to the Ch'i State."] 
+
+Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he 
+will retreat. 
+
+25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, 
+it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. 
+
+26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. 
+[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch'uan indicates "a treaty confirmed by 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 82 
+
+oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply 
+say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] 
+
+27. When there is much running about 
+
+[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental ban- 
+ner.] 
+
+and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. 
+
+28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. 
+
+29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want 
+of food. 
+
+30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army 
+is suffering from thirst. 
+
+[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from 
+the behavior of a single man."] 
+
+31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure 
+it, the soldiers are exhausted. 
+
+32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. 
+
+[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch'en Hao says, the 
+enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] 
+
+Clamor by night betokens nervousness. 
+
+33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the 
+banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are 
+angry, it means that the men are weary. 
+
+[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army 
+are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" 
+owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] 
+
+34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, 
+
+[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the 
+horses chiefly on grass.] 
+
+and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp- fires, 
+showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are 
+determined to fight to the death. 
+
+[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 
+71, given in abbreviated form by the P'EI WEN YUN FU: "The rebel 
+Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch'en- ts'ang, and Huang- 
+fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 83 
+
+against him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf 
+ear to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to 
+throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing 
+to the attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war not to pursue desperate 
+men and not to press a retreating host' Sung answered: 'That does not 
+apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating 
+host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a 
+band of desperate men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported 
+by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain."] 
+
+35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in sub- 
+dued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. 
+
+36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; 
+
+[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always 
+a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good 
+temper.] 
+
+too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. 
+
+[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity 
+is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] 
+
+37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, 
+shows a supreme lack of intelligence. 
+
+[I follow the interpretation of Ts'ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch'uan, Tu 
+Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia 
+Lin, Mei Tao-ch'en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first tyran- 
+nical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." 
+This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and 
+punishments.] 
+
+38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that 
+the enemy wishes for a truce. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, it 
+is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength 
+is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to 
+draw such an obvious inference.] 
+
+39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long 
+time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situ- 
+ation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time 
+for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 84 
+
+40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply suffi- 
+cient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. 
+
+[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG tactics and frontal 
+attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] 
+
+What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a 
+close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. 
+
+[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in 
+squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch'uan, who appears to of- 
+fer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." 
+Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language 
+which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favorable 
+opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver 
+a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our sutlers and 
+camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close 
+watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid 
+borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, 
+ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but 
+their real value will be not more than half that figure."] 
+
+41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure 
+to be captured by them. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and scorpions 
+carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, 
+then, should not be treated with contempt."] 
+
+42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will 
+not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically use- 
+less. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are 
+not enforced, they will still be unless. 
+
+43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but 
+kept under control by means of iron discipline. 
+
+[Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared 
+him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu 
+Tzu, ch. 4 init: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike tem- 
+per; the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tender- 
+ness."] 
+
+This is a certain road to victory. 
+
+44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be 
+well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. 
+
+45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders 
+being obeyed. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 0. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 85 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence 
+in his men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come 
+to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, be- 
+cause they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, 
+however, would lead one rather to expect something like this: "If a general 
+is always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc."] 
+
+the gain will be mutual. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his com- 
+mand, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is 
+mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The 
+art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be 
+swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of 
+sapping the confidence of an army.] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 11 
+TERRAIN 
+
+
+
+[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, deals with "terrain," the 
+subject being more fully treated in ch. XL The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 
+14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though 
+not less interesting, perhaps, on that account] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: 
+
+(1) Accessible ground; 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of com- 
+munications."] 
+
+(2) entangling ground; 
+
+[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you 
+become entangled."] 
+
+(3) temporizing ground; 
+
+[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] 
+
+(4) narrow passes; 
+
+(5) precipitous heights; 
+
+(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy. 
+
+[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A 
+strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's unquestion- 
+ing acceptance of glaring cross- divisions such as the above.] 
+
+2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called ACCESS- 
+IBLE. 
+
+3 . With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the 
+raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. 
+
+86 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 87 
+
+[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not 
+to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of Napoleon's 
+dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," ' we could wish 
+that Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject 
+here and in I. ss. 10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of 
+supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart 
+to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his adversary's 
+point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is com- 
+pelled to conform to his adversary's movements, and to content himself 
+with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose communications 
+are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be 
+fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into 
+more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on 
+ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not 
+be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole 
+army." ^ 
+
+Then you will be able to fight with advantage. 
+
+4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called EN- 
+TANGLING. 
+
+5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally 
+forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and 
+you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. 
+
+6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first 
+move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation 
+remains at a deadlock."] 
+
+7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attract- 
+ive bait, 
+
+[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is 
+only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] 
+
+it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the 
+enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may 
+deliver our attack with advantage. 
+
+8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them first, let them 
+be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. 
+
+[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by 
+making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our 
+mercy."] 
+
+
+
+'See "Pensees de Napoleon ler," no. 47. 
+'"The Science of War," chap. 2. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 88 
+
+9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if 
+the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. 
+
+10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are beforehand with your 
+adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait 
+for him to come up. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and de- 
+files is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the 
+enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells 
+the following anecdote of P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent 
+on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his 
+camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and 
+ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters 
+to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested 
+loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P'ei 
+Hsing- chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the 
+camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came 
+on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over 
+twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned 
+that they had been in the wrong. 'How did you know what was going to 
+happen?' they asked. P'ei Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward 
+be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.' From 
+this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are 
+advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from 
+disastrous floods."] 
+
+1 1. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat 
+and try to entice him away. 
+
+[The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. against the 
+two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch'ung, Prince 
+of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spike of which 
+Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was 
+defeated and taken prisoner. See CHIU T'ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and 
+also ch. 54.] 
+
+12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of 
+the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, 
+
+[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome 
+march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and 
+our adversary fresh and keen."] 
+
+and fighting will be to your disadvantage. 
+
+13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. 
+
+[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. ss. 8.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 89 
+
+The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study 
+them. 
+
+14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural 
+causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: 
+
+(1) Flight; 
+
+(2) insubordination; 
+
+(3) collapse; 
+
+(4) ruin; 
+
+(5) disorganization; 
+
+(6) rout. 
+
+15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten 
+times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT of the former. 
+
+16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the 
+result is INSUBORDINATION. 
+
+[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T'ien Pu [HSIN T'ANG SHU, ch. 148], 
+who was sentto Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang 
+T'ing-ts'ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated 
+him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding 
+about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T'ien Pu was 
+powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had 
+passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and 
+dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed 
+suicide by cutting his throat.] 
+
+When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the 
+result is COLLAPSE. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the 
+common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] 
+
+17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the 
+enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, be- 
+fore the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to 
+fight, the result is RUIN. 
+
+[Wang Hsi's note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, and 
+at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; 
+thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his 
+head."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 90 
+
+18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not 
+
+clear and distinct; 
+
+[Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with 
+decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are 
+made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing 
+their duty." General Baden- Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret 
+of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell-in 
+the clearness of the instructions they receive." ^ Cf. also Wu Tzu ch. 3: 
+"the most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities 
+that befall an army arise from hesitation."] 
+
+when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] 
+
+and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is 
+utter DISORGANIZATION. 19. When a general, unable to estimate the 
+enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls 
+a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked 
+soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT. 
+
+[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: "Whenever 
+there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve 
+in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men 
+and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello 
+Gallico," V. 28, 44, etal.).] 
+
+20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by 
+the general who has attained a responsible post. [See supra, ss. 13.] 
+
+21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; 
+
+[Ch'en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to 
+those connected with ground."] 
+
+but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, 
+and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes 
+the test of a great general. 
+
+22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into prac- 
+tice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will 
+surely be defeated. 
+
+23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the 
+ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight 
+even at the ruler's bidding. 
+
+
+
+"Aids to Scouting," p. xii. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 91 
+
+[Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said to 
+have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the SAN LUEH, 
+has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of setting an army in 
+motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are con- 
+trolled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the 
+god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble 
+part in furthering their country's cause [lit, kneel down to push the chariot 
+wheel]." This means that "in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision 
+of the military commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the 
+saying: "Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a 
+camp."] 
+
+24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without 
+fearing disgrace, 
+
+[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a 
+soldier is to retreat.] 
+
+whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his 
+sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. 
+
+[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such 
+a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret 
+his conduct."] 
+
+25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the 
+deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will 
+stand by you even unto death. 
+
+[Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of 
+the famous general Wu Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently 
+had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food 
+as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a 
+mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and 
+shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering 
+from an abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier's 
+mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, 
+saying: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet 
+the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The 
+woman replied, 'Many years ago. Lord Wu performed a similar service for 
+my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at 
+the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he 
+too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Ch'uan mentions the Viscount 
+of Ch'u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke 
+of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the 
+cold." So he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging 
+the men; and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined 
+with floss silk.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11. TERRAIN 92 
+
+26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; 
+kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, 
+of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; 
+they are useless for any practical purpose. 
+
+[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, 
+they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern 
+military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was oc- 
+cupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his 
+army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. 
+Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to 
+be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging 
+to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a 
+protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the fact of his being 
+also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of 
+discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears 
+rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the 
+army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped 
+in the highway were not picked up.] 
+
+27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware 
+that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards 
+victory. 
+
+[That is, Ts'ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] 
+
+28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that 
+our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway 
+towards victory. [Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).] 
+
+29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men 
+are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground 
+makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards 
+victory. 
+
+30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once 
+he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. 
+
+[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures 
+so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move reck- 
+lessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mis- 
+takes."] 
+
+31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory 
+will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may 
+make your victory complete. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things-the 
+affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth-, 
+victory will invariably crown your battles."] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 12 
+
+THE NINE SITUATIONS 
+
+
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: 
+
+(1) Dispersive ground; 
+
+(2) facile ground; 
+
+(3) contentious ground; 
+
+(4) open ground; 
+
+(5) ground of intersecting highways; 
+
+(6) serious ground; 
+
+(7) difficult ground; 
+
+(8) hemmed-in ground; 
+
+(9) desperate ground. 
+
+2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. 
+
+[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to 
+see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded 
+by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu 
+Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they 
+will find harbors of refuge."] 
+
+3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is 
+facile ground. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and 
+the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When 
+your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, 
+in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after 
+home."] 
+
+93 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 94 
+
+4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is 
+contentious ground. 
+
+[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts'ao Kung 
+says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and 
+the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch'uan. Thus, 
+Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even 
+for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and 
+thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who 
+have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow 
+pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to 
+Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Li- 
+ang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu 
+Chien, King of Ch'in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into 
+the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch'ang, counseled him, saying: 
+"Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vig- 
+orous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, 
+we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. 
+Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus 
+cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated 
+with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think 
+that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a stand against him 
+at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang 
+himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these 
+two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed 
+and swept away by the invader.] 
+
+5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. 
+
+[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of 
+ground. Ts'ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of 
+roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which inter- 
+communication is easy."] 
+
+6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, 
+
+[Ts'au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy's and a 
+third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small 
+principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch'i, on 
+the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch'u.] 
+
+so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, 
+
+[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of 
+them to become his allies.] 
+
+is a ground of intersecting highways. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 95 
+
+7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a 
+number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. 
+
+[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached 
+such a point, its situation is serious."] 
+
+8. Mountain forests, [Or simply "forests."] 
+
+rugged steeps, marshes and fens-all country that is hard to traverse: this is 
+difficult ground. 
+
+9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can 
+only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would 
+suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. 
+
+10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without 
+delay, is desperate ground. 
+
+[The situation, as pictured by Ts'ao Kung, is very similar to the "hemmed- 
+in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty mountain 
+in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch'en 
+Hao says: "to be on 'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat 
+or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid 
+description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army 
+invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides: - it falls into a 
+fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on 
+the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together 
+and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut 
+off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is 
+time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming 
+strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take 
+a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a 
+pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us has 
+a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and 
+months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain 
+the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of 
+water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses 
+are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength and skill 
+unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check 
+the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, 
+all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:-in this terrible plight, 
+even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, 
+how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek 
+history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, 
+and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See 
+Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].] 
+
+1 1. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On 
+contentious ground, attack not. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 96 
+
+[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous 
+position first. So Ts'ao Kung. Li Ch'uan and others, however, suppose the 
+meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that it would 
+be sheer madness to attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King 
+of Wu inquires what should be done in this case. Sun Tzu replies: "The 
+rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the 
+advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by 
+the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee- 
+show your banners and sound your drums-make a dash for other places 
+that he cannot afford to lose-trail brushwood and raise a dust-confound 
+his ears and eyes-detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly 
+in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] 
+
+12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. 
+
+[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force 
+itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow 
+that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts 'ao Kung's brief note: "Draw 
+closer together"-i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.] 
+
+On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. 
+
+[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."] 
+
+13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. 
+
+[On this, Li Ch'uan has the following delicious note: "When an army pen- 
+etrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not to alienate the 
+people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao 
+Tsu, whose march into Ch'in territory was marked by no violation of wo- 
+men or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may 
+well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 
+A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think 
+that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but 'do not plunder.'" Alas, 
+I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator's feelings outran his 
+judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says: "When en- 
+camped on 'serious ground,' there being no inducement as yet to advance 
+further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a pro- 
+tracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close 
+watch on the enemy."] 
+
+In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. 
+
+[Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.] 
+
+14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. 
+
+[Ts'au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu 
+amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be de- 
+vised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 97 
+
+the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on 
+the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the moun- 
+tains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the 
+dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes 
+was remarkably like that which T 'ien Tan had also employed with success 
+exactly 62 years before. [See IX. ss. 24, note.] When night came on, 
+bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on 
+fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side 
+towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle 
+of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans 
+that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed safely 
+through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] 
+
+On desperate ground, fight. 
+
+[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a 
+chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."] 
+
+15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge 
+between the enemy's front and rear; 
+
+[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."] 
+
+to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the 
+good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. 
+
+16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in dis- 
+order. 
+
+17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when other- 
+wise, they stopped still. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in 
+thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure 
+any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they 
+would remain where they were."] 
+
+18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and 
+on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing 
+something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to 
+your will." 
+
+[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts'ao Kung thinks it 
+is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu 
+says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the ac- 
+complishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our fa- 
+vorable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own 
+communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these 
+three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. ss. 3.] By boldly 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 98 
+
+seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other side on the 
+defensive.] 
+
+19. Rapidity is the essence of war: 
+
+[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in war- 
+fare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science, 
+and the chief business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho 
+Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest 
+generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch'eng under the Wei 
+Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had 
+entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that 
+State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military governor of Wan, and 
+getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to 
+anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message 
+of friendly import. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta 
+has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly 
+investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an 
+unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is 
+still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of 
+forced marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch'eng with 
+in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to 
+Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news of my revolt 
+reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be 
+a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will 
+be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the 
+generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The 
+next letter, however, was filled with consternation: "Though only eight 
+days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at 
+the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- 
+ch'eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See CHIN SHU, ch. 
+1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from K'uei-chou in Ssu-ch'uan 
+to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at 
+the modern Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze 
+being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would 
+venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no pre- 
+parations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was 
+just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his 
+departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li 
+Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount im- 
+portance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, 
+before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If we 
+seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear be- 
+fore his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard 
+before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. ss. 19, note.] 
+This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, 
+he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 99 
+
+oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as 
+he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating 
+that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] 
+
+take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected 
+routes, and attack unguarded spots. 
+
+20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The 
+further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of 
+your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. 
+
+21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. 
+[Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch'uan does not venture on a note here.] 
+
+22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, 
+
+[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them 
+plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."] 
+
+and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. 
+
+[Ch'en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous general 
+Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of 
+the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch'u State, where a universal levy 
+was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, 
+he declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defens- 
+ive. In vain did the Ch'u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang 
+Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole 
+time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He 
+took care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, 
+provided facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious 
+indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some 
+time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were 
+amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one 
+another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard 
+that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spir- 
+its had been strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready 
+for fighting. By this time the Ch'u army, after repeating their challenge 
+again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch'in gen- 
+eral immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle 
+that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the 
+whole of Ch'u was conquered by Ch'in, and the king Fu-ch'u led into 
+captivity.] 
+
+Keep your army continually on the move, 
+
+[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has 
+struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army to- 
+gether."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 100 
+
+
+
+and devise unfathomable plans. 
+
+23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they 
+will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they 
+may not achieve. 
+
+[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one man were to 
+run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to 
+get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and 
+that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado 
+and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] 
+
+Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely 
+exert their united strength to get out of it."] 
+
+24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place 
+of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show 
+a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard. 
+
+25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on 
+the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; 
+
+[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] 
+
+without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can 
+be trusted. 
+
+26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, 
+until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. 
+
+[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into 
+cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang 
+Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no 
+officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for 
+fear the soldiers' minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," 
+he continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will 
+never falter in their resolution until they die."] 
+
+27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have 
+a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they 
+are disinclined to longevity. 
+
+[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are 
+things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or 
+fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike 
+them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating 
+that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations 
+to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 101 
+
+28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, 
+
+[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine 
+grief than tears alone.] 
+
+those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the 
+tears run down their cheeks. 
+
+[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts'ao Kung says, "all have 
+embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the 
+heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang 
+Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K'o and 
+his friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of 
+Ch'in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down 
+like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The 
+shrill blast is blowing. Chilly the burn; Your champion is going-Not to 
+return." ' ] 
+
+But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of 
+a Chu or a Kuei. 
+
+[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State 
+and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu 
+Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang 
+Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at 
+a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to 
+pieced by the king's bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero 
+referred to, Ts'ao Kuei (or Ts'ao Mo), performed the exploit which has 
+made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice 
+defeated by Ch'i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a 
+large slice of territory, when Ts'ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, the 
+Duke of Ch'i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his 
+chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts'ao 
+Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu was being un- 
+justly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan Kung, in 
+peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts'ao Kuei flung away 
+his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified assemblage 
+without having so much as changed color. As was to be expected, the 
+Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his wise old coun- 
+selor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word, 
+and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what 
+she had lost in three pitched battles.] 
+
+29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. Now the SHUAI- 
+JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch'ang mountains. 
+
+
+
+'Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 102 
+
+["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was 
+doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this 
+passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of 
+"military maneuvers."] 
+
+Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, 
+and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be 
+attacked by head and tail both. 
+
+30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, 
+
+[That is, as Mei Yao-ch'en says, "Is it possible to make the front and rear 
+of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though 
+they were part of a single living body?"] 
+
+I should answer. Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; 
+[Cf. VI. ss. 21.] 
+
+yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, 
+they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the 
+right. 
+
+[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common 
+peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together 
+as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notori- 
+ous that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, 
+especially in the case of allied armies.] 
+
+31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the 
+burying of chariot wheels in the ground 
+
+[These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall the 
+Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of 
+Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See 
+Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight im- 
+possible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your 
+men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sym- 
+pathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the 
+SHUAI-JAN.] 
+
+32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of 
+courage which all must reach. 
+
+[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If 
+the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the 
+resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or 
+at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly 
+ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever 
+commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 103 
+
+particular-unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian 
+defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would 
+almost certainly have lost the day.] 
+
+33. How to make the best of both strong and weak-that is a question involving 
+the proper use of ground. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of 
+strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental fea- 
+tures of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, 
+will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The ad- 
+vantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. 
+Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary 
+tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often 
+overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the 
+selection of positions... and to the immense advantages that are to be de- 
+rived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper utilization 
+of natural features." ^ ] 
+
+34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading 
+a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does 
+it."] 
+
+35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright 
+and just, and thus maintain order. 
+
+36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and ap- 
+pearances, 
+
+[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] 
+
+and thus keep them in total ignorance. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must 
+not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only 
+rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and 
+surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been fre- 
+quently pointed out. But how about the other process-the mystification 
+of one's own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic 
+on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on Stone- 
+wall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which 
+Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his 
+movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough 
+would have pronounced useless"-etc. etc. ^ In the year 88 A.D., as 
+we read in ch. 47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch'ao took the field 
+
+
+
+^"The Science of War," p. 333. 
+'"Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 104 
+
+with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the ob- 
+ject of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his 
+chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the king- 
+doms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t'ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch'ao 
+summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and 
+said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against 
+the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in 
+a different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly 
+route, and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until 
+the evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch'ao now secretly 
+released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha 
+was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set 
+off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch'ao's retreat in 
+the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in or- 
+der to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch'ao knew that the 
+two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well 
+in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as 
+it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and 
+were closely pursued by Pan Ch'ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back 
+as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and 
+valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha and the 
+other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time forward. 
+Pan Ch'ao's prestige completely overawed the countries of the west." In 
+this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in 
+ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his 
+army in order to deceive the enemy.] 
+
+37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, 
+
+[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] 
+
+he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. 
+
+[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war 
+is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You 
+must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without 
+letting them know why."] 
+
+By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy 
+from anticipating his purpose. 
+
+38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed 
+up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men 
+deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. 
+
+[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is, takes some decisive 
+step which makes it impossible for the army to return-like Hsiang Yu, 
+who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch'en Hao, followed by Chia 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 105 
+
+Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his 
+command."] 
+
+39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving 
+a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows 
+whither he is going. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat; 
+it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."] 
+
+40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:-this may be termed the busi- 
+ness of the general. 
+
+[Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming 
+a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns again and again to this 
+point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt 
+a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] 
+
+41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for 
+the nine varieties of ground.] 
+
+the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental 
+laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. 
+
+42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating 
+deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. [Cf. 
+supra, ss. 20.] 
+
+43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across 
+neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. 
+
+[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it does not figure 
+among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One's first 
+impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust 
+the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch'en says 
+it is "a position not far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near 
+enough to home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two." Wang 
+Hsi says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose 
+territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent 
+on us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of 
+rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine 
+Situations.] 
+
+When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is 
+one of intersecting highways. 
+
+44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you 
+penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 106 
+
+45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes 
+in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, 
+it is desperate ground. 
+
+46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of 
+purpose. 
+
+[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the de- 
+fensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.] 
+
+On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all 
+parts of my army. 
+
+[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: 
+"(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of 
+the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei Yao-ch'en says: "On the march, the 
+regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be 
+continuity between the fortifications."] 
+
+47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. 
+
+[This is Ts'ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We 
+must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the 
+goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. 
+Mei Yao-ch'en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing 
+the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind 
+him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." 
+Ch'en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to 
+select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu warns us against 
+coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather 
+vaguely expressed: "If there is a favorable position lying in front of you, 
+detach a picked body of troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on 
+their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on 
+their rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was thus, 
+he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch'in. (See p. 57.)] 
+
+48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground 
+of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. 
+
+49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. 
+
+[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one 
+might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] 
+
+On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. 
+
+50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 107 
+
+[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, 
+whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy's lines." 
+Mei Yao-ch'en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation." 
+Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu 
+points out that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy who 
+is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized 
+as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh- chu Chao and 
+others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 
+horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not 
+been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But 
+Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all 
+the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and 
+donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was 
+nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary 
+pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the 
+opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught] 
+
+On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of 
+saving their lives. 
+
+[Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your 
+stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, 
+and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to 
+the death." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up 
+all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" 
+and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which 
+bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory 
+and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly 
+in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at 
+all, but only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent 
+list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt 
+with in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new 
+grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned 
+again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in 
+the next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par 
+excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down 
+to ss. 14. In SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 
+8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed in 
+chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more from 
+beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different 
+from those previously given. Though it is impossible to account for the 
+present state of Sun Tzu's text, a few suggestive facts maybe brought into 
+prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine 
+variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. 
+(3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are defined 
+twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding 
+variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 108 
+
+that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from 
+these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot 
+have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII 
+is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to con- 
+tain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear 
+elsewhere.] 
+
+51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when sur- 
+rounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly 
+when he has fallen into danger. 
+
+[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch'ao's devoted followers in 73 
+A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 47: "When Pan 
+Ch'ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him 
+at first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his be- 
+havior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. 
+Pan Ch'ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: 'Have you no- 
+ticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must 
+signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that con- 
+sequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to 
+throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are 
+told, can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more, 
+then, those that are already manifest! ' Thereupon he called one of the nat- 
+ives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 
+'Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' 
+The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently 
+blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch'ao, keeping his informant carefully 
+under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, 
+thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine had moun- 
+ted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by 
+addressing them thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated 
+region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great exploit. Now it 
+happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom 
+only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended 
+towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail 
+upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones 
+will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' With 
+one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in peril of our lives, 
+we will follow our commander through life and death.' For the sequel of 
+this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1, note.] 
+
+52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are ac- 
+quainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march un- 
+less we are familiar with the face of the country-its mountains and forests, 
+its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to 
+turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12. THE NINE SITUATIONS 109 
+
+[These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 - in order to em- 
+phasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to 
+regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the fol- 
+lowing words. With regard to local guides. Sun Tzu might have added that 
+there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or 
+some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are 
+told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of Casinum, where 
+there was an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, 
+unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to under- 
+stand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he 
+took the army in that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they 
+had almost arrived.] 
+
+53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not 
+befit a warlike prince. 
+
+54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows it- 
+self in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes 
+his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. 
+
+[Mei Tao-ch'en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much 
+affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide 
+her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superi- 
+ority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, 
+the neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring states are 
+frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her." The fol- 
+lowing gives a stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated 
+(before she has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will 
+hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces." Ch'en Hao and Chang 
+Yu take the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful 
+though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to 
+raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he 
+dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, 
+simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu 
+puts his view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people 
+will be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our 
+display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other 
+chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."] 
+
+55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he 
+foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, 
+keeping his antagonists in awe. 
+
+[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch'uan, appears to be this: Secure 
+against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling 
+alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him 
+to dispense with external friendships."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 2. THE NINE SITUATIONS 1 1 
+
+Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. 
+
+[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch'in State became 
+a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous 
+Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih 
+Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun 
+Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty 
+isolation.] 
+
+56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, 
+
+[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and 
+retreat be heavily punished."] 
+
+issue orders 
+
+[Literally, "hang" or post up."] 
+
+without regard to previous arrangements; 
+
+["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning 
+is made clear by Ts'ao Kung's quotation from the SSU-MA FA: "Give 
+instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see de- 
+serving deeds." Ts'ao Kung's paraphrase: "The final instructions you give 
+to your army should not correspond with those that have been previously 
+posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not 
+be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity 
+in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in letting your 
+plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at 
+the last moment.] 
+
+and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with 
+but a single man. [Cf. supra, ss. 34.] 
+
+57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your 
+design. 
+
+[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any 
+order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for 
+his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to 
+a judge.] 
+
+When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing 
+when the situation is gloomy. 
+
+58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate 
+straits, and it will come off in safety. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 2. THE NINE SITUATIONS 1 1 1 
+
+[These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation 
+of tlie tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already al- 
+luded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, 
+and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the 
+enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body 
+of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. 
+Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and keep 
+a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in full flight," 
+Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This 
+must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and 
+set up the red banners of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other 
+officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not 
+likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of 
+the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through 
+the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of 
+10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to 
+the River Ti. Seeing this maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into 
+loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, display- 
+ing the generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, 
+and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, last- 
+ing for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, 
+leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river 
+bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to 
+pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of 
+men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was 
+fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 
+horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao fol- 
+lowing up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore 
+up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the Chao 
+army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them 
+with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their 
+king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay 
+the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides 
+and completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst 
+whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of Han Hsin's of- 
+ficers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we are told to have 
+a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. 
+[This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzu and T'ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and 
+note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the 
+river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain 
+the victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not stud- 
+ied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: 'Plunge 
+your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in 
+deadly peril and it will survive'? Had I taken the usual course, I should 
+never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the Military 
+Classic-' Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.' 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 2. THE NINE SITUATIONS 1 1 2 
+
+[This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had not 
+placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their 
+lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would 
+have been a general debandade, and it would have been impossible to do 
+anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his argument, and 
+said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See 
+CHTEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] 
+
+59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable 
+of striking a blow for victory. 
+
+[Danger has a bracing effect.] 
+
+60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the 
+enemy's purpose. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity "-by an appearance of yielding and 
+falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the meaning 
+clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do 
+so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his 
+intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we 
+deliver our attack.] 
+
+61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, 
+
+[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one 
+direction." Ts'ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy." 
+But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.] 
+
+we shall succeed in the long run 
+
+[Literally, "after a thousand LI."] 
+
+in killing the commander-in-chief. 
+
+[Always a great point with the Chinese.] 
+
+62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. 
+
+63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, 
+destroy the official tallies, 
+
+[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as 
+a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the "border- 
+warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this 
+half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorized to open 
+the gate and let the traveler through.] 
+
+and stop the passage of all emissaries. 
+
+[Either to or from the enemy's country.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 2. THE NINE SITUATIONS 1 1 3 
+
+64. Be stern in the council-chamber, 
+
+[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sover- 
+eign.] 
+
+so that you may control the situation. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest 
+precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] 
+
+65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. 
+
+66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, [Cf. supra, ss. 18.] 
+
+and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. 
+
+[Ch'en Hao's explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable position, but 
+the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained can- 
+not be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to occupy 
+a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful 
+appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going 
+there as well." Mei Yao-ch'en explains that this "artful appointment" is to 
+be made through the medium of the enemy's own spies, who will carry 
+back just the amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, 
+having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though start- 
+ing after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start after 
+him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive before him in 
+order to capture the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage 
+lends some support to Mei Yao-ch'en's interpretation of ss. 47.] 
+
+67. Walk in the path defined by rule, 
+
+[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot 
+be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that 
+this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly 
+much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans 
+of the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every 
+accepted canon of warfare.] 
+
+and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive 
+battle. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a favorable opportun- 
+ity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decis- 
+ive."] 
+
+68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you 
+an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will 
+be too late for the enemy to oppose you. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 2. THE NINE SITUATIONS 1 14 
+
+[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly ap- 
+pears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed. The 
+words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly 
+as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] 
+
+
+
+Chapter 13 
+
+THE ATTACK BY FIRE 
+
+
+
+[Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, after 
+which the author branches off into other topics.] 
+
+1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to 
+
+burn soldiers in their camp; 
+
+[So Tu Mu. Li Ch'uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" 
+(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch'ao, sent on a diplomatic 
+mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XL ss. 51, note], found himself 
+placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the 
+Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his 
+officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! ' The only course 
+open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover 
+of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting 
+by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the 
+King's courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of 
+our mission.' the officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss 
+the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch'ao then fell into a passion: 
+'It is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant 
+is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly 
+be afraid, and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is 
+no worthy fate for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. 
+Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made 
+their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. 
+Pan Ch'ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the 
+enemy's barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, 
+they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of 
+his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the 
+gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, 
+whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front 
+
+
+
+' "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger's cubs.' 
+
+115 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 3 . THE ATTACK B Y FIRE 1 1 6 
+
+and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. 
+Pan Ch'ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions 
+cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more 
+than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following day. Pan 
+Ch'ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although you did 
+not go with us last night, I should not think. Sir, of taking sole credit for 
+our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch'ao, having sent for 
+Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. 
+The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch'ao 
+took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the 
+king's sons as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU 
+HAN SHU, ch. 47, ff. 1,2.]] 
+
+the second is to burn stores; 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebel- 
+lious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui 
+dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy 
+which in the long run proved entirely successful.] 
+
+the third is to burn baggage trains; 
+
+[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao's wagons and impedi- 
+menta by Ts'ao Ts'ao in 200 A.D.] 
+
+the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; 
+
+[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are 
+the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and cloth- 
+ing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.] 
+
+the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. 
+
+[Tu Yu says in the T'UNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the enemy's camp. 
+The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by 
+dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows 
+into the enemy's lines."] 
+
+2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. 
+
+[T'sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are referred to. But 
+Ch'en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have favorable 
+circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: 
+"We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] 
+
+the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. 
+
+[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, reeds, 
+brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material cause. Chang 
+Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 3 . THE ATTACK B Y FIRE 1 1 7 
+
+3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for 
+starting a conflagration. 
+
+4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are 
+those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the 
+Wing or the Cross-bar; 
+
+[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight 
+Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater 
+and Corvus.] 
+
+for these four are all days of rising wind. 
+
+5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible devel- 
+opments: 
+
+6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an 
+attack from without. 
+
+7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, 
+bide your time and do not attack. 
+
+[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into con- 
+fusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to 
+receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.] 
+
+8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with 
+an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find the 
+difficulties too great, retire."] 
+
+9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait 
+for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. 
+
+[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking 
+out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incendiaries) 
+inside the enemy's camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a 
+waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp 
+in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him 
+at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of an outbreak 
+occurring within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the 
+surrounding vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The 
+famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The 
+latter, taking advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese 
+general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the 
+neighborhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts'ai, 
+a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. 
+through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army 
+he was besieging Ch'ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 13. THE ATTACK BY FIRE 118 
+
+garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded 
+the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: "In war, 
+there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not count 
+for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 
+10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass 
+which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, 
+they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack 
+them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T'ien Tan.' 
+[See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu 
+Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount 
+guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who 
+stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud 
+shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city 
+walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which 
+threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [HOU 
+HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ] 
+
+10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the 
+leeward. 
+
+[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will 
+retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will 
+fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather more 
+obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin 
+burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from 
+that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the 
+west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy."] 
+
+11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. 
+
+[Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morn- 
+ing." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch'en and Wang Hsi say: "A 
+day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This 
+is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be 
+correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent] 
+
+12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, 
+the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper 
+days. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, 
+and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack 
+with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not 
+only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard 
+against similar attacks from them."] 
+
+13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those 
+who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 3 . THE ATTACK B Y FIRE 1 1 9 
+
+14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his 
+belongings. 
+
+[Ts'ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's road or di- 
+vide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can 
+do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is 
+the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple 
+of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. 
+4) speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on low-lying 
+marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rain- 
+fall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in 
+wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited 
+by frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire."] 
+
+15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his 
+attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of 
+time and general stagnation. 
+
+[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. Ts'ao Kung says: 
+"Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu 
+Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, 
+your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will en- 
+sue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array 
+of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei 
+Yao-ch'en alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make 
+sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the favorable 
+moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic meas- 
+ures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water 
+and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still 
+and simply hold to the advantages they have got."] 
+
+16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the 
+good general cultivates his resources. 
+
+[Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The warlike 
+prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good 
+faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will 
+be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."] 
+
+17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is 
+something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. 
+
+[Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far 
+in that direction as the remarkable passage in the TAO TE CHING, ch. 69. 
+"I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not 
+advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] 
+
+18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; 
+no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1 3 . THE ATTACK B Y FIRE 1 20 
+
+19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. 
+
+[This is repeated from XL ss. 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an 
+interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought to follow immediately on 
+ss. 18.] 
+
+20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by 
+content. 
+
+21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into 
+being; 
+
+[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] 
+
+nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. 
+
+22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of cau- 
+tion. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. 
+
+
+
+Chapter 14 
+
+THE USE OF SPIES 
+
+
+
+Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching 
+them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the 
+resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand 
+ounces of silver. [Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.] 
+
+There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down 
+exhausted on the highways. 
+
+[Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles 
+and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the 
+saying: 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why then should carriage 
+and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?-The answer is, that 
+not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to 
+the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that 
+when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must 
+be provided against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy 
+for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow 
+of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions 
+being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."] 
+
+As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their 
+labor. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- tail." The al- 
+lusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of 
+about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State 
+by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that 
+their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. 
+[See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in 
+the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy 
+of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- bodied soldier to each family) the 
+husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.] 
+
+
+
+121 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 122 
+
+2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which 
+is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the 
+enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred 
+ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, 
+
+["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of 
+this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this 
+point.] 
+
+is the height of inhumanity. 
+
+[Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the 
+frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war al- 
+ways brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's 
+condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on 
+for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it 
+is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for 
+their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively 
+trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up 
+an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders 
+of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies 
+is nothing less than a crime against humanity.] 
+
+3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, 
+no master of victory. 
+
+[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the na- 
+tional temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these 
+memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch'u State: "The 
+[Chinese] character for 'prowess' is made up of [the characters for] 'to 
+stay' and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in 
+the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the 
+appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of 
+happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffu- 
+sion of wealth."] 
+
+4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and 
+conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FORE- 
+KNOWLEDGE. 
+
+[That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to 
+do.] 
+
+5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be ob- 
+tained inductively from experience, 
+
+[Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reason- 
+ing from other analogous cases."] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 123 
+
+nor by any deductive calculation. 
+
+[Li Ch'uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, 
+are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions can- 
+not be so calculated."] 
+
+6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other 
+men. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the spirit- 
+world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science may 
+be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified 
+by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascer- 
+tainable through spies and spies alone."] 
+
+7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: 
+
+(1) Local spies; 
+
+(2) inward spies; 
+
+(3) converted spies; 
+
+(4) doomed spies; 
+
+(5) surviving spies. 
+
+8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret 
+system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sover- 
+eign's most precious faculty. 
+
+[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, 
+had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect all 
+possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., 
+and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge 
+of the enemy's moves thus gained." ' ] 
+
+9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the inhabitants 
+of a district. 
+
+[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind treatment, 
+and use them as spies."] 
+
+10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the enemy. 
+
+[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in 
+this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, crimin- 
+als who have undergone punishment; also, favorite concubines who are 
+greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions. 
+
+
+
+"Aids to Scouting," p. 2. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 124 
+
+or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are 
+anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have 
+a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who al- 
+ways want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several kinds," 
+he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests 
+by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the 
+state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being 
+formed against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach 
+between the sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme cau- 
+tion, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an historical 
+incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his 
+general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at 
+P'i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li 
+Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain P 'o-t'ai, a native of Wu-tu. 
+He began to have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off 
+to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him 
+from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for mak- 
+ing a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march out all 
+his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to 
+attack at P'o-t'ai's bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, 
+had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; and P 'o-t'ai, having 
+reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon- 
+fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and began climbing the 
+ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered 
+from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city 
+in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then 
+charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the 
+enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho 
+Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or 
+that of his father Li T'e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.] 
+
+1 1. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using 
+
+them for our own purposes. 
+
+[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the 
+enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information as 
+well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao 
+Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to 
+let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the 
+commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that it is not what 
+Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about 
+treating the converted spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three 
+occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 
+(1) by T'ien Tan in his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao 
+She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 
+B.C., when Lien P'o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch'in. 
+The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P'o's cautious and dilatory 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 125 
+
+methods, which had been unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and 
+therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly 
+gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: 
+"The only thing which causes Ch'in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be 
+made general. Lien P'o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be 
+vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the famous 
+Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study 
+of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was 
+no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His 
+father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy 
+with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared 
+that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies 
+of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own 
+mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed 
+Lien P'o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po 
+Ch'i and the great military power of Ch'in. He fell into a trap by which 
+his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and after a 
+desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers 
+devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole 
+force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword.] 
+
+12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for purposes of de- 
+ception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the 
+enemy. 
+
+[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do 
+thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that 
+they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured 
+in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the en- 
+emy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do something 
+quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example 
+of doomed spies. Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch'ao 
+in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T'ang 
+Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T'ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn 
+Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing 
+blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by 
+killing T 'ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and 
+the New T'ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) 
+that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar 
+part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negoti- 
+ations with Ch'i. He has certainly more claim to be described a "doomed 
+spy", for the king of Ch'i, being subsequently attacked without warning by 
+Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, 
+ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] 
+
+13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from the en- 
+emy's camp. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 126 
+
+[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regu- 
+lar part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of 
+keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, 
+but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical 
+strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, 
+able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." 
+Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta'hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When 
+he was governor of Eastern Ch'in, Shen-wu of Ch'i made a hostile move- 
+ment upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T'ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu 
+to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three 
+were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark, they 
+dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy's camp and stealthily 
+crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the passwords used in 
+the army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly passed through 
+the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, hap- 
+pening to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of dis- 
+cipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgeling! Thus 
+they managed to return with the fullest possible information about the en- 
+emy's dispositions, and received warm commendation from the Emperor, 
+who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on 
+his adversary."] 
+
+14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations 
+to be maintained than with spies. 
+
+[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch'en point out that the spy is privileged to enter 
+even the general's private sleeping-tent.] 
+
+None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should 
+greater secrecy be preserved. 
+
+[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be 
+carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted 
+from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous 
+commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who 
+pays them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor 
+should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, 
+secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as 
+hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them but what 
+is absolutely necessary that they should know. ^ ] 
+
+15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from 
+falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing.' 
+Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of "intu- 
+itive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these 
+
+
+
+"Marshal Turenne," p. 311. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 127 
+
+attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure 
+ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experi- 
+ence and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition 
+are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to 
+penetrate such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on 
+the passage."] 
+
+16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightfor- 
+wardness. 
+
+[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you 
+must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with 
+all their might."] 
+
+17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of 
+their reports. 
+
+[Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies 
+going over to the service of the enemy."] 
+
+18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. [Cf. 
+VI. ss. 9.] 
+
+19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he 
+must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. 
+
+[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before 
+[our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in this passage 
+is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the 
+secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as Ch'en Hao puts it, 
+"to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already 
+been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way. Sun 
+Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to 
+defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy 
+would certainly not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains 
+to worm it out of him."] 
+
+20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate 
+an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of 
+the attendants, the aides-de- camp, 
+
+[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it 
+is to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally neces- 
+sitates frequent interviews with him.] 
+
+and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must 
+be commissioned to ascertain these. 
+
+[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important 
+functionaries can be won over by bribery.] 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 128 
+
+21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, temp- 
+ted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become 
+converted spies and available for our service. 
+
+22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able 
+to acquire and employ local and inward spies. 
+
+[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the en- 
+emy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy 
+into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants 
+are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."] 
+
+23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to 
+carry false tidings to the enemy. 
+
+[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can 
+best be deceived."] 
+
+24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on ap- 
+pointed occasions. 
+
+25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the 
+enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from 
+the converted spy. 
+
+[As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but 
+makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] 
+
+Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost lib- 
+erality. 
+
+26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty 
+
+[Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was 
+changed to Yin by P'an Keng in 1401. 
+
+was due to I Chih 
+
+[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part 
+in Ch'eng T'ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.] 
+
+who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty 
+was due to Lu Ya 
+
+[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he af- 
+terwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T'ai Kung, a title be- 
+stowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on 
+war, erroneously identified with the LIU T'AO.] 
+
+who had served under the Yin. 
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 14. THE USE OF SPIES 129 
+
+[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to in- 
+troduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by 
+no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt 
+that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of 
+the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that 
+the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge 
+of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers were 
+able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch'en appears to resent any such 
+aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not 
+rebels against the Government. Hsia could not employ the former, hence 
+Yin employed him. Yin could not employ the latter, hence Hou employed 
+him. Their great achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho 
+Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I 
+and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them simply 
+means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter which 
+requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom 
+and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize 
+this point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on 
+account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] 
+
+27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the 
+
+highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they 
+achieve great results. 
+
+[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a 
+boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance 
+on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter 
+destruction."] 
+
+Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an 
+army's ability to move. 
+
+[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with ears or eyes.]