[{"Title": "Pure Diets India Limited vs Lokmangal Agro Industries Ltd. on 25 July, 2023", "DocID": 9193128, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": [" (a).   Nilesh C. Sanghani and Others v. Rakesh V. Zangda\n                                       and Others, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 530;\n", "                                \"17. Among the attributes which must be present for an agreement\n                                to be considered as an arbitration agreement are:\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S Duro Felguera S.A vs M/S. Gangavaram Port Limited on 10 October, 2017", "DocID": 133653680, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["*Substituted by Act 3 of 2016 (w.e.f. 23.10.2015)\n\n", "      \"Sub-Clause 20.6 - Arbitration\n      Any dispute in respect of which amicable settlement has not been reached within\n      the period stated in Sub-Clause 20.5, shall be finally and conclusively settled by\n      Arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by appointing two\n      arbitrators one by each party and a presiding arbitrator to be appointed by the said\n      arbitrators. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction\n      of court of law at Hyderabad, India. The place of Arbitration shall be Hyderabad\n      and the Language of Arbitration shall be English. The Contractor shall continue to\n      attend to discharge all his obligations under the Contract during pendency of the\n      Arbitration proceedings.\"\n", "      \"Sub-Clause 20.6 - Arbitration\n      Any dispute in respect of which amicable settlement has not been reached within\n      the period stated in Sub-Clause 20.5, shall be finally and conclusively settled by\n      Arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by appointing two\n      arbitrators one by each party and a presiding arbitrator to be appointed by the said\n      arbitrators. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction\n      of court of law at Hyderabad, India. The place of Arbitration shall be Hyderabad\n      and the Language of Arbitration shall be English. The Contractor shall continue to\n      attend to discharge all his obligations under the Contract during pendency of the\n      Arbitration proceedings.\"\n", "      \"2.The following documents shall form and be read and construed as part of this\n      Agreement and shall have the priority one over the other in the following sequence:\n", "      \"2.The following documents shall form and be read and construed as part of this\n      Agreement and shall have the priority one over the other in the following sequence:\n", "Similar clauses as to the priority of the documents was incorporated in all other\n\ncontract agreements-Packages No. 6, 7, 8 and 9 awarded to Indian subsidiary\n\n                                                                                                19\n\fFGI. In the sequence of documents of clause (2) of the contract agreement\n\nquoted above, the Tender Document is mentioned in the sequence only as (g)\n\nand all other documents or the other documents like Letters of Award, Special\n\nconditions of contract etc. have priority over the same. While so, the terms\n\ncontained in Original Package No. 4 TD including the arbitration clause cannot\n\nhave priority over the Special Conditions of contract of the split-up contracts.\n", "      \"8. This Corporate Guarantee shall be governed by the Indian Laws. In case of any\n      disputes, the Parties shall endeavor to settle the same amicably. In case of failure to\n      settle the disputes amicably, the same shall be finally settled under the Arbitration and\n      Conciliation Act 1996 of India by appointing two Arbitrators, one by each party and a\n      Presiding Arbitrator to be appointed by the said Arbitrators. The award of the Arbitrators\n      shall be final and binding on the Corporate Company and the Employer. Any such\n      Arbitration proceeding shall be at Hyderabad and within the Jurisdiction of the Court of\n      Law at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India.The Arbitration shall be conducted in English\n      language.\"\n", "      \"1. The Corporate Company hereby guarantees and covenants with the employer\n      that FGI will perform all its obligations and duties as per package 6 to package 9,\n      failing which the corporate company shall take over from FGI, as may be demanded\n      by the employer under this Guarantee, and shall perform or cause to be performed at\n      its own cost and risk and all the responsibilities, obligations and duties of FGI under\n      package 6 to Package 9 so far as and to the extent FGI was liable to perform it,\n      without any additional time and cost implication to the employer, subject to the\n      employer continuing to meet its own obligations under package 6 to package 9 with\n      respect to payments, approvals for drawings and other related matters to the\n      corporate company as if the corporate company were the principal contractor in\n      place of FGI.\n", "      2. In the event of any delay in completion of the works as per the time for completion\n      of the contracts for the reasons attributable to FGI and/or the corporate company,\n      such that these delays in turn results in causing overall delay in completion of all or\n      any one of the contracts, then the corporate company hereby undertakes to\n      compensate for the delay damages to the employer, which shall be based on the\n      overall contract price collectively of all the contracts and any other contract that may\n      be entered into by and between the employer and the corporate company or\n      FGI..........\"\n", "      \"This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been executed at Hyderabad on 11 th\n      August 2012 by and between:\n", "      \u201cWhereas the parties have entered into different\n      package contracts for execution of Bulk Material\n      Handling System under \u201cOriginal Package 4 Tender\n      Document\u201d covering ship unloaders, stackers,\n      reclaimers, in-motion wagon loading system,\n      conveyors, transfer towers, electrical and control\n      works, civil works, etc. and in order to have more\n      clarity on technical and execution related matters,\n      the parties hereby agree that the works shall be\n      carried out as per the following priority of\n      documents;\n", "      1. Annexure I to the Letter of Award issued for\n      Package 4 Contract.\n", "      2. Annexure III to the Letter of Award issued for\n      Package 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 contracts.\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S N.N. Global Mercantile Private ... vs M/S Indo Unique Flame Ltd. on 11 January, 2021", "DocID": 39641512, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["            \u201c9. Security Deposit : You will submit the Bank Guarantee for Rs.5.00 crores\n            for the average stock of washed coal lying at your stockyard. This Bank\n            Guarantee can be issued from any nationalised Bank/first class bank, initially\n            valid for a period of 18 (eighteen) months.\u201d\n\n            Clause 10 of the Work Order incorporates an arbitration clause, which\n\n      reads as:\n", "\f            \u201c10. Arbitration : In case of any dispute due to difference of opinion in\n            interpretation of any clause or terms and conditions or meaning of the work\n            or language the decision of the arbitrator appointed with mutual consent shall\n            be treated as final and binding on both the parties.\u201d\n\n\n1.3         As per Clause 9 of the Work Order, Global Mercantile furnished a\n\n      Bank Guarantee for Rs.3,36,00,000/- on 30.09.2015, in favour of SBI-the\n\n      banker of Indo Unique.\n", "                     \u201cAn arbitration agreement is collateral to the substantial stipulations of the\n                     contract. It is merely procedural and ancillary, it is a mode of settling disputes,\n                     though the agreement to do so is itself subject to the discretion of the court.\u201d\n\n\n                     Lord MacMillan in his opinion stated that :\n", "                     \u201cIt survives for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach,\n                     and the arbitration clause survives for determining the mode of their\n                     settlement. The purposes of the contract have failed, but the arbitration\n                     clause is not one of the purposes of the contract.\u201d\n\n3.6                  This rule has been affirmed in several cases, including Bremer\n\n           Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinefabrik v. South India Shipping\n\n           Corporation2 in which Lord Diplock cited Heyman as an authority for the\n\n           assertion that :\n", "                    \u201cOnce it became accepted that the arbitration clause is a separate\n                    agreement, ancillary to the contract, the logical impediment to referring an\n                    issue of the invalidity of the contract to arbitration disappears. Provided that\n                    the arbitration clause itself is not directly impeached (eg by a non-est factum\n                    plea), the arbitration agreement is as a matter of principled legal theory\n                    capable of surviving the invalidity of the contract.\u201d\n\n3.8                  In Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA\n\n           and others,4 the House of Lords affirmed the view taken in Harbour\n\n           Assurance (supra), wherein it was held that an arbitration agreement is a\n\n           distinct and separable agreement from the underlying or principal contract.\n", "                    \u201cArticle 16. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any\n                    objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration\n                    agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms a part of a\n                    contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of\n                    the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and\n                    void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n3   [1993] 1 Lloyd\u2019s Rep. 455 (CA).\n", "                  \u201c38. \u2026 As we have sought to explain, once the separability of the arbitration\n                  agreement is accepted, there cannot be any question but that there is a valid\n                  agreement.\n", "                                 \u2026\n\n                  If there is a contest about whether an arbitration agreement had come into\n                  existence at all, the court would have a discretion as to whether to determine\n                  that issue itself, but that will not be the case where there is an overall contract\n                  which is said for some reason to be invalid eg for illegality, misrepresentation\n                  or bribery and the arbitration agreement is merely part of the contract. \u2026 \u201d\n\n\n\n3.12              In the Appeal filed in the Fiona Trust case before the House of Lords,\n\n          in Fili Shipping Co Ltd and others v. Premium Nafta Products Ltd and\n\n          others7, Lord Hoffman opined :\n", "                   \u201cBut that is in my opinion exactly the kind of argument which s 7 was intended\n                   to prevent. It amounts to saying that because the main agreement and the\n                   arbitration agreement were bound up with each other, the invalidity of the\n                   main agreement should result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.\n                   The one should fall with the other because they would never have been\n                   separately concluded and the arbitration agreement can be invalidated only\n                   on a ground which relates to the arbitration agreement and is not merely a\n                   consequence of the invalidity of the main agreement.\u201d8\n\n3.14               On the issue of whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the\n\n           entire contract is to be decided by the court, or the arbitrator, was considered\n\n           by the U.S. Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin\n\n           MFG. CO.,9\n\n                   The Court held that:\n", "                   \u201cIf the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself an issue\n                   which goes to the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate\u2014the federal court\n                   may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the\n                   federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract\n                   generally.\u2026\u2026\n\n\n                   In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the\n                   unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when\n                   selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and\n                   obstruction in the courts.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n8   [2007] 4 ALL ER 951 at 960, at paragraph 19.\n", "        (i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but\n\n        compulsorily registerable) instrument is valid and enforceable?\n", "              \u201c19. Voidability of agreements without free consent.\u2014When consent to an agreement\n              is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract\n              voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.\n              A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may,\n              if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that he shall be put in\n              the position in which he would have been if the representation made had been true.\n              Exception.\u2014If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence,\n              fraudulent within the meaning of Section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not\n              voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the\n              truth with ordinary diligence.\n", "     (i)     The impugned judgment and order dated 30.09.2020 in W.P. No.\n\n             1801 of 2020 passed by the Bombay High Court is set aside;\n", "            \u201c Whether the statutory bar contained in Section 35 of the Indian\n            Stamp Act, 1899 applicable to instruments chargeable to Stamp Duty\n            under Section 3 read with the Schedule to the Act, would also render\n            the arbitration agreement contained in such an instrument, which is\n            not chargeable to payment of stamp duty, as being non-existent, un-\n            enforceable, or invalid, pending payment of stamp duty on the\n            substantive contract / instrument ? \u201d\n\n\n\n\n                                            52\n\f           In light of the same, the Registry may place this matter before the\n\n     Hon\u2019ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders / directions.\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S Swastik Gases P.Ltd vs Indian Oil Corp.Ltd on 3 July, 2013", "DocID": 23112747, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["            17.0.  Arbitration\n\n\n                 If any dispute or difference(s)  of  any  kind  whatsoever\n           shall arise between the parties hereto  in  connection  with  or\n           arising out of this Agreement, the parties hereto shall in  good\n           faith  negotiate  with  a  view  to  arriving  at  an   amicable\n           resolution and settlement. In the event no settlement is reached\n           within a period of 30 days from  the  date  of  arising  of  the\n           dispute(s)/difference(s), such dispute(s)/difference(s) shall be\n           referred to 2 (two)  Arbitrators,  appointed  one  each  by  the\n           parties and the Arbitrators, so appointed shall be  entitled  to\n           appoint  a  third  Arbitrator  who  shall  act  as  a  presiding\n           Arbitrator and the proceedings thereof shall  be  in  accordance\n           with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory\n           modification or re-enactment thereof in force. The existence  of\n           any  dispute(s)/difference(s)  or   initiation/continuation   of\n           arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone\n           or delay the performance of or to abstain from performing  their\n           obligations pursuant to this Agreement.\n", "            17.0.  Arbitration\n\n\n                 If any dispute or difference(s)  of  any  kind  whatsoever\n           shall arise between the parties hereto  in  connection  with  or\n           arising out of this Agreement, the parties hereto shall in  good\n           faith  negotiate  with  a  view  to  arriving  at  an   amicable\n           resolution and settlement. In the event no settlement is reached\n           within a period of 30 days from  the  date  of  arising  of  the\n           dispute(s)/difference(s), such dispute(s)/difference(s) shall be\n           referred to 2 (two)  Arbitrators,  appointed  one  each  by  the\n           parties and the Arbitrators, so appointed shall be  entitled  to\n           appoint  a  third  Arbitrator  who  shall  act  as  a  presiding\n           Arbitrator and the proceedings thereof shall  be  in  accordance\n           with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory\n           modification or re-enactment thereof in force. The existence  of\n           any  dispute(s)/difference(s)  or   initiation/continuation   of\n           arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone\n           or delay the performance of or to abstain from performing  their\n           obligations pursuant to this Agreement.\n", "           18.0.   Jurisdiction\n                 The Agreement shall  be  subject  to  jurisdiction  of  the\n           courts at Kolkata.\n", "      -\n", "      \u201cThe agreement shall be subject  to  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  at\n      Kolkata.\u201d\n\n\n", " 1. Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286:\n", "      \u201cAny dispute arising out of  this  sale  shall  be  subject  to  Kaira\n      jurisdiction.\u201d\n\n\n", "      -\n", "      \u201cAny legal proceeding arising out of the order shall be subject to the\n      jurisdiction of the courts in Mumbai.\u201d\n\n\n", "      \u201cIn case of any dispute or  difference  arising  between  the  parties\n      hereto or any claim or thing  herein  contained  or  the  construction\n      thereof or as to any matter in any way connected with or  arising  out\n      of these presents or the operation thereof or the  rights,  duties  or\n      liabilities of either party thereof, then and in every such  case  the\n      matter, differences or disputes shall be referred to an arbitrator  in\n      Kolkata, West Bengal, India in accordance  with  and  subject  to  the\n      provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any other\n      enactment or statutory modifications thereof for  the  time  being  in\n      force. The place of arbitration shall be Kolkata.\u201d\n\n\n", "      \u201cSubject to the provisions of clause 32 above it is  expressly  agreed\n      by and between the parties  hereinabove  that  any  suit,  application\n      and/or any other legal proceedings with regard to any matter,  claims,\n      differences and for disputes arising out of this  agreement  shall  be\n      filed and referred to the  courts  in  Calcutta  for  the  purpose  of\n      jurisdiction.\u201d\n\n\n", "      \u201cSubject to the provisions of clause 32 above it is  expressly  agreed\n      by and between the parties  hereinabove  that  any  suit,  application\n      and/or any other legal proceedings with regard to any matter,  claims,\n      differences and for disputes arising out of this  agreement  shall  be\n      filed and referred to the  courts  in  Calcutta  for  the  purpose  of\n      jurisdiction.\u201d\n\n\n"]}, {"Title": "Shailesh Dhairyawan vs Mohan Balkrishna Lulla on 16 October, 2015", "DocID": 48783751, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["\u201c8).  The Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 agree to and hereby do  refer  to\nArbitration of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar (Retd.) the  dispute  as  to  (i)\nthe difference in carpet area of the 5 flats agreed to be  allotted  as  per\nthe Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 being Exhibit-B to the Plaint  by\nDefendant No.1 to the Plaintiff and his family members  (i.e.  800  sq.  ft.\narea) as provided in the said Development  Agreement  dated  27-12-2004  and\nthe actual carpet area of the said 5 flats hereby allotted and  handed  over\nand (ii) the valuation of the deficient area if any,  and  the  damages  for\nthe same.  The Learned Arbitrator to  make  an  award  with  regard  to  the\ncompensation and the damages to be paid by Defendant No.1 to  the  plaintiff\nfor the deficient area, if any, Defendant No.1 shall not raise  any  dispute\nas to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.  The Arbitrator shall  decide  the\nsame as expeditiously as possible in  accordance  with  law  and  under  the\nprovisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.\u201d\n\n\n\nThe said consent terms were taken on record by a Single Judge of the  Bombay\nHigh Court who passed an order dated 8.10.2008 disposing of the suit in  the\nfollowing terms:\n", "\u201c8).  The Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 agree to and hereby do  refer  to\nArbitration of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar (Retd.) the  dispute  as  to  (i)\nthe difference in carpet area of the 5 flats agreed to be  allotted  as  per\nthe Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 being Exhibit-B to the Plaint  by\nDefendant No.1 to the Plaintiff and his family members  (i.e.  800  sq.  ft.\narea) as provided in the said Development  Agreement  dated  27-12-2004  and\nthe actual carpet area of the said 5 flats hereby allotted and  handed  over\nand (ii) the valuation of the deficient area if any,  and  the  damages  for\nthe same.  The Learned Arbitrator to  make  an  award  with  regard  to  the\ncompensation and the damages to be paid by Defendant No.1 to  the  plaintiff\nfor the deficient area, if any, Defendant No.1 shall not raise  any  dispute\nas to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.  The Arbitrator shall  decide  the\nsame as expeditiously as possible in  accordance  with  law  and  under  the\nprovisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.\u201d\n\n\n\nThe said consent terms were taken on record by a Single Judge of the  Bombay\nHigh Court who passed an order dated 8.10.2008 disposing of the suit in  the\nfollowing terms:\n", "\u201c1.    Pursuant  to  the  suggestion  given  by  this  Court,  parties  were\nexploring the possibility of settlement and therefore the  matter  was  kept\npart heard.\n", "\u201cSection 8. Power of Court to appoint arbitrator or umpire.\n", "\u201c19. During the continuance of this piece-work agreement/contract or at  any\ntime after the termination thereof,  if  any  difference  or  dispute  shall\narise between the parties hereto in regard to the interpretation of  any  of\nthe provisions herein  contained  or  act  or  thing  in  relation  to  this\nagreement/contract, such difference or dispute shall be  forthwith  referred\nto two arbitrators for arbitration in Bombay, one to be  appointed  by  each\nparty with liberty to the  arbitrators  in  case  of  differences  or  their\nfailure to reach an agreement  within  one  month  of  the  appointment,  to\nappoint an umpire residing in Bombay and the award which shall  be  made  by\ntwo arbitrators or umpire as the case may be shall be final, conclusive  and\nbinding on the parties hereto.\n", "If either party to the difference  or  dispute  shall  fail  to  appoint  an\narbitrator within 30 calendar days  after  notice  in  writing  having  been\ngiven by the parties or\u00a0shall appoint an arbitrator who shall refuse to  act\nthen the arbitrator appointed by  the  other  party  shall  be  entitled  to\nproceed with the reference as a sole arbitrator and to make  final  decision\non such difference or dispute and  the  award  made  as  a  result  of  such\narbitration\u00a0shall be a condition precedent to any right  of  action  against\nany two parties hereto in respect of any such difference and  dispute.\u201d  [at\npara 7]\n\n\n\n\n", "\u201c21.\u00a0If any question or  difference  or  dispute  shall  arise  between  the\nparties hereto or their representatives\u00a0at any time\u00a0in relation to  or  with\nrespect to the meaning or effect of these presents or with  respect  to  the\nrights and liabilities of the parties hereto then such question  or  dispute\nshall be referred either to Mr. N.A. Palkhivala  or  Mr.  D.S.  Seth,  whose\ndecision in the matter shall be final and binding on both the parties.\u201d  [at\npara 2]\n\n\n", "\u201cSection 15(2) of the Act provides that where a  substitute  arbitrator  has\nto  be  appointed  due  to  termination  of  the  mandate  of  the  previous\narbitrator, the appointment must be made according to the  rules  that  were\napplicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.  No  further\napplication for appointment of an independent arbitrator  under  Section  11\nwill lie where there has been compliance with the procedure for  appointment\nof a substitute arbitrator. On appointment of the substitute  arbitrator  in\nthe same manner as the first, no application for appointment of  independent\narbitrator under Section 11 could be filed. Of course, the procedure  agreed\nupon by the parties for  the  appointment  of  the  original  arbitrator  is\nequally applicable to the appointment of a substitute  arbitrator,  even  if\nthe agreement does not specifically say so. Reference may  be  made  to  the\njudgment  of  this  Court  in  Yashwith  Constructions  (P)  Ltd.\u00a0v.\u00a0Simplex\nConcrete Piles India Ltd.\u00a0[(2006) 6 SCC 204].\n", "\u201cSection 15(2) of the Act provides that where a  substitute  arbitrator  has\nto  be  appointed  due  to  termination  of  the  mandate  of  the  previous\narbitrator, the appointment must be made according to the  rules  that  were\napplicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.  No  further\napplication for appointment of an independent arbitrator  under  Section  11\nwill lie where there has been compliance with the procedure for  appointment\nof a substitute arbitrator. On appointment of the substitute  arbitrator  in\nthe same manner as the first, no application for appointment of  independent\narbitrator under Section 11 could be filed. Of course, the procedure  agreed\nupon by the parties for  the  appointment  of  the  original  arbitrator  is\nequally applicable to the appointment of a substitute  arbitrator,  even  if\nthe agreement does not specifically say so. Reference may  be  made  to  the\njudgment  of  this  Court  in  Yashwith  Constructions  (P)  Ltd.\u00a0v.\u00a0Simplex\nConcrete Piles India Ltd.\u00a0[(2006) 6 SCC 204].\n"]}, {"Title": "Bipromasz Bipron Trading Sa vs Bharat Electronics Limited(Bel) on 8 May, 2012", "DocID": 131059124, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["           \u201cArbitration \u2013  All  disputes  regarding  this  order  shall  be\n           referred to B E L Chairman & Managing Director  or  his  nominee\n           for arbitration who shall have all the powers conferred  by  the\n           Indian Arbitration & Conciliation Bill  1996  or  any  statutory\n           modification thereof in force.\u201d\n\n\n", "      \u201c20.05.2011  \u2013     Notice,  through  counsel  was  sent  to  the\n                       respondent seeking appointment of Arbitrator.\n      29.06.2011 \u2013     Petitioner sworn affidavit in Poland for filing\n                       of the petition for appointment of Arbitrator.\n      29.06.2011 \u2013     Respondent\u2019s sent reply to the advocate at  New\n                       Delhi received on  1.7.2011  stating  that  the\n                       correspondence  is  being  placed  before   the\n                       Chairman and Managing Director.\n"]}, {"Title": "Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Master Construction Co on 25 April, 2011", "DocID": 1682326, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["         \"70.     Arbitration-All   disputes,   between   the   parties   to   the \n\n         Contract   (other   than   those   for   which   the   decision   of   the \n\n         C.W.E. or any other person is by the Contract expressed to \n\n         be   final   and   binding)   shall,     after   written   notice   by   either \n\n         party to the Contract to the other of them, be referred to the \n\n         sole arbitration  of an Engineer  Officer to be appointed  by \n\n         the authority mentioned in the tender documents.\n\n\n         Unless   both   parties   agree   in   writing   such   reference   shall \n\n         not   take   place   until   after   the   completion   or   alleged \n\n         completion of the works or termination or determination of \n\n         the contract under Condition Nos. 55, 56 and 57 hereof.\n\n\n         Provided that in the event of abandonment of the works or \n\n         cancellation of the Contract under Condition Nos. 52,53 or \n\n         54   hereof,   such   reference   shall   not   take   place   until \n\n         alternative   arrangements   have   been   finalized   by   the \n\n\n1 (2009) 1 SCC 267\n\n2 (2004) 2 SCC 663\n\n3 (2006) 13 SCC 475\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                             6\n\n\f\nGovernment to get the works completed by or through any \n\nother Contractor or Contractors or Agency or Agencies.\n\n\nProvided   always   that   commencement   or   continuance   of \n\nany arbitration proceeding hereunder or otherwise shall not \n\nin   any   manner   militate   against   the   Government's   right   of \n\nrecovery   from   the   contractor   as   provided   in   Condition   67 \n\nhereof.\n"]}, {"Title": "Dharma Prathishthanam vs M/S. Madhok Construction Pvt. Ltd on 2 November, 2004", "DocID": 421126, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["\t\"Settlement of disputes shall be through \narbitration as per the Indian Arbitration Act.\"\n", "\"Section 8  Power of Court to appoint arbitrator \nor umpire \u0016 (1) In any of the following cases, -\n", "(a)\twhere an arbitration agreement \nprovides that the reference shall be to one \nor more arbitrators to be appointed by \nconsent of the parties, and all the parties do \nnot, after differences have arisen;, concur \nin the appointment or appointments; or\n", "\"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith.\"\n", "\"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith.\"\n", "\"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith.\"\n"]}, {"Title": "Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd vs Gupta Coal India Ltd. And Anr on 10 March, 2015", "DocID": 169405928, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["           \"Thus Article 23 of the ICC Rules permits parties to apply to  a\n           competent  judicial  authority  for  interim  and   conservatory\n           measures. Therefore, in such cases an application  can  be  made\n           under Section 9 of the said Act.\"\n", "           \"(b) This agreement shall be construed in  accordance  with  and\n           governed by the laws of the State of  Michigan,  United  States,\n           without  regard  to  the  conflicts  of  law   rules   of   such\n           jurisdiction.  Disputes  between  the  parties  that  cannot  be\n           resolved via negotiations shall be submitted for final,  binding\n           arbitration to the London Court of Arbitration.\n", "           (c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this  agreement,\n           the shareholders shall at all times act in accordance  with  the\n           Companies Act and other applicable Acts/rules being in force, in\n           India at any time.\"\n", "            \"13. Settlement of disputes\n              13.1.  This  agreement,  its   construction,   validity   and\n           performance shall be governed by and constructed  in  accordance\n           with the laws of England and Wales;\n", "           \"4.  Applicable law and  arbitration  -  Except  the  change  of\n           venue/seat of arbitration from London to Paris, Articles 32  and\n           33 of the contract shall be deemed to be set out in full n  this\n           agreement mutatis mutandis and so that references therein to the\n           contract shall be references to this agreement.\"\n", "           \"3. Final partial award as to seat\n           3.1. Upon the agreement of the parties, each represented by duly\n           authorised representatives and  through  counsel,  the  Tribunal\n           hereby finds, orders and awards:\n", "              (a) That without prejudice to the right  of  the  parties  to\n              subsequently agree otherwise in writing, the  juridical  seat\n              (or legal place) of  arbitration  for  the  purposes  of  the\n              arbitration  initiated  under  the   claimants'   notice   of\n              arbitration dated 16-12-2010 shall be London, England.\n", "           \"In this case, the parties have by agreement provided  that  the\n           juridical seat of arbitration will be in London. On the basis of\n           the aforesaid agreement, necessary amendment has  been  made  in\n           the PSCs. On the basis of the agreement and the consent  of  the\n           parties, the Arbitral  Tribunal  has  made  the  \"final  partial\n           consent award\" on 14-9-2011 fixing the juridical seat (or  legal\n           place) of arbitration for the purposes of arbitration  initiated\n           under the claimants' notice of arbitration dated  16-12-2010  in\n           London, England. To make it even further clear  that  the  award\n           also records that any hearing in the arbitration may take  place\n           in Paris, France, Singapore or any other location  the  Tribunal\n           considers convenient. Article 33.12 stipulates that  arbitration\n           [pic]proceedings shall be conducted  in  English  language.  The\n           arbitration agreement contained in Article 33 shall be  governed\n           by the laws of England. A combined effect of all  these  factors\n           would clearly show that the parties have  by  express  agreement\n           excluded the applicability of Part I  of  the  Arbitration  Act,\n           1996 (Indian) to the arbitration proceedings.\"\n", "                 16. The law which would apply to the filing of  the  award,\n              to its enforcement and to its setting aside would be the  law\n              governing the agreement to arbitrate and the  performance  of\n              that agreement.\"\n", " 28.   After so holding, the  Court  referred  to  the  legal  position\n      stated in Dozco's case wherein it has been ruled thus:\n", "           \"5.   If any dispute  or  difference  should  arise  under  this\n           charter, general average/arbitration in London to apply, one  to\n           be appointed by each of the parties hereto, the third by the two\n           so chosen, and their decision or that of any two of them,  shall\n           be final and binding, and this agreement may, for enforcing  the\n           same, be made  a  rule  of  Court.  Said  three  parties  to  be\n           commercial men who are the members  of  the  London  Arbitrators\n           Association.  This contract is  to  be  governed  and  construed\n           according to English Law.  For disputes where total amount claim\n           by either party does  not  exceed  USD  50,000  the  arbitration\n           should be conducted in accordance with small claims procedure of\n           the London Maritime Arbitration Association.\"\n", "              (i)  The  clear  language  of  Articles  22  and  23  of  the\n           distributorship agreement  between  the  parties  in  this  case\n           spells out a clear agreement between the parties excluding  Part\n           I of the Act.\n", "           \"..... As indicated hereinabove, Clause 28  indicates  that  the\n           governing law of the agreement would be the law  of  India  i.e.\n           the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned  counsel\n           for the parties have quite correctly spelt out  the  distinction\n           between the \"proper law\" of the contract and the \"curial law\" to\n           determine the law which is to  govern  the  arbitration  itself.\n           While the proper law is the  law  which  governs  the  agreement\n           itself,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  stipulation  in   the\n           arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the\n           arbitral proceedings, it is now well settled that it is the  law\n           governing the contract which would also be the law applicable to\n           the Arbitral Tribunal itself. Clause 27.1 makes it  quite  clear\n           that the curial law which regulates the procedure to be  adopted\n           in conducting the arbitration would be the SIAC Rules. There is,\n           therefore, no ambiguity that the SIAC Rules would be the  curial\n           law of the arbitration proceedings. It  also  happens  that  the\n           parties had agreed to make Singapore the  seat  of  arbitration.\n           Clause 27.1 indicates that the arbitration proceedings are to be\n           conducted in accordance with the SIAC Rules.\"\n", "           \"It is of course  both  useful  and  frequently  necessary  when\n           construing a clause in a contract to have regard to the  overall\n           commercial purpose of the contract in the  broad  sense  of  the\n           type and general content, the relationship of  the  parties  and\n           such common commercial purpose as may clearly emerge  from  such\n           an exercise.  However, it does not seem to me  to  be  a  proper\n           approach to the construction of a default clause in a commercial\n           contract to  seek  or  purport  to  elicit  some  self-contained\n           'commercial purpose' underlying the clause which is  or  may  be\n           wider than the ordinary or usual construction of  the  words  of\n           each sub-clause will yield.\"\n", "           \"In this connection [counsel] has rightly made the  point  that,\n           when construing the effect of particular words in  a  commercial\n           contract, it is wrong to put a label on the contract in  advance\n           and this to approach the question of construction on  the  basis\n           of a pre-conception as to the contact's  intended  effect,  with\n           the result that a strained  construction  is  placed  on  words,\n           clear in themselves, in order  to  fit  them  within  such  pre-\n           conception...\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S. Vfpl Asipl Jv Company vs Union Of India And Others ..... Opp. ... on 15 October, 2020", "DocID": 150447404, "matching_columns": ["\"6. TIME FOR COMPLETION OF CONTRACT -\nEXTENSION    THEREOF,   DEFAULTS   &\nCOMPENSATION FOR DELAY:\n\n      xx          xx           xx\n\n6.2 In the event of the contractor's failure to\ncomply with the required progress in terms of the\nagreed time and progress chart or to complete the\nwork and clear the site on or before the date of\ncompletion of contract or extended date of\ncompletion, he shall without prejudice to any other\nright or remedy available under the law to the\ncompany on account of such breach, shall become\nliable to pay for penalty as under:\n\n(a) If the average daily progress of work during the\ncalendar months is less than the stipulated rate\nindicated in the detailed tender notice, penalty as\ndetailed below will be levied.\n\n(i) If the average daily progress of work executed\nduring the calendar month is more than 80% and\nless than 100 % of stipulated rate of progress,\npenalty equal to 10% of the contract value of the\nshort fall in work shall be levied.\n\n(ii) If the average daily progress of work executed\nduring the calendar month is less than 80% of\nstipulated rate, penalty equal to 20% of contract\nvalue of the short fall in work shall be levied.\n\nThe aggregate of the penalties so levied shall not\nexceed 10% of the total contract value.\n\nPenalties will be calculated every month and\nwithheld. The contractor shall be allowed to make\nup the shortfall in the succeeding three months\nwithin the stipulated time of completion. Once the\nshortfall is fully made up the so withheld penalty\nwill be released.\"", "\"9. TERMINATION,                  SUSPENSION,\nCANCELLATION  &             FORECLOSURE    OF\nCONTRACT.\n\nxx                xx                        xx\n                         30\n\n\n\n\n9.2. On cancellation of the contract or on\ntermination of the contract, the Engineer-in-charge\nshall have powers:\n\n(a) to take possession of the site and carry out\nbalance work through any other agency.\n\n(b) after giving notice to the contractor to measure\nup the work of the contractor and to take such\nwhole or the balance or part thereof, as shall be\nunexecuted out of his hands and to give it to\nanother contractor or take up departmentally, to\ncomplete the work. The contractor whole contract is\nterminated shall not be allowed to participate in\nfuture bidding for period of minimum twelve\nmonths.\n\nIn such an event, the contract shall be liable for\nloss/damage suffered by the employer because of\naction under this clause and to compensate for this\nloss or damage, the employer shall be entitled to\nrecover higher of the following:\n\n(i)    Forfeiture of security deposit comprising of\n       performance guarantee and retention money\n       and additional performance security, if any,\n       at disposal of the employer.\n\n                   Or\n\n(ii)    20% of value of incomplete work. The value\n       of the incomplete work shall be calculated for\n       the    items    and    quantities   remaining\n       incomplete (as per provision of agreement) at\n       the agreement rates including price variation\n       as applicable on the date, when notice in\n       writing for termination of work was issued to\n       the contractor.\n\nIt is being clarified that the above liability is over\nand above the penalties payable by the contractor\non account of shortfall in quantities as per\nprovision of clause 6.\n\nThe amount to be recovered from the contractor as\ndetermined above, shall, without prejudice to any\nother right or remedy available to the employer as\n                        31\n\n\n\n\nper law or as per agreement, will be recovered from\nany money due to the contractor on any account or\nunder any other contract and in the event of any\nshortfall, the contractor shall be liable to pay the\nsame within 30 days. In case of failure to pay the\nsame the amount shall be debt payable\n\nIn the event of above course being adopted by the\nEngineer-in-charge, the contractor shall have no\nclaim to compensation for any loss sustained by\nhim by reasons of his having purchased materials,\nequipments or entered into agreement or made\nadvances on any account or with a view to the\nexecution of work or performance of the contract.\nAnd in case action is taken under any provision\naforesaid, the contractor shall not be entitled to\nrecover or to be paid any sum for any work thereof\nor actually performed under this contract unless\nand until the engineer-in-charge has certified in\nwriting the performance of such work and value\npayable in respect thereof and he shall only be\nentitled to be paid the value so certified.\n\nThe need for determination of the amount of\nrecovery of any extra cost/expenditure or of any\nloss/damage suffered by the company shall not be\nhowever arise in the case of termination of the\ncontract for death/demise of the contractor as\nstated in 9.1(d).\"", "\"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx                xx                        xx\n\n13A.    Settlement      of   Disputes      through\nArbitration\n\nIf    the     parties    fail   to    resolve    the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n                          32\nIn case of parties other than Govt. agencies the\nredressal of disputes/differences shall be sought\nthrough Sole Arbitration as under.\n\nSole Arbitration:\n\nIn the event of any question, dispute or difference\narising under these terms & conditions or any\ncondition    contained     in    this   contract   or\ninterpretation of the terms of, or in connection with\nthis Contract (except as to any matter the decision\nof which is specially provided for by these\nconditions), the same shall be referred to the sole\narbitration of a person, appointed to be the\narbitrator by the Competent Authority of CIL/CMD\nof Subsidiary Company (as the case may be). The\naward of the arbitrator shall be final and binding\non the parties of this Contract.\""], "matching_indents": ["                \"8. Eligibility Criteria :\n", "                xx                        xx                        xx\n\n                C. Fleet Requirement : The bidder is required to\n                give an undertaking in the form of an Affidavit in\n                the prescribed format to deploy the following\n                matching equipment/Tippers/Pay-Loaders either\n                owned or hired.\n", "(i)    Forfeiture of security deposit comprising of\n       performance guarantee and retention money\n       and additional performance security, if any,\n       at disposal of the employer.\n", "\"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx                xx                        xx\n\n13A.    Settlement      of   Disputes      through\nArbitration\n\nIf    the     parties    fail   to    resolve    the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n", "\"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx                xx                        xx\n\n13A.    Settlement      of   Disputes      through\nArbitration\n\nIf    the     parties    fail   to    resolve    the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n", "Sl    Month     Agreed Qty   Achieved Qty     Total        Shortfall      Penalty\nNo                                           Shortfall      due to        amount\n                                                          contractor'   deducted/wit\n                                                            s fault     hheld (in Rs)\n                                                           (Tonnes)\n"]}, {"Title": "Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar vs M/S.Sahu Trust on 18 October, 2008", "DocID": 521851, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["(i)\tThe total amount agreed to be paid to the defendants by the plaintiff was Rs.3.75 Crores.\n", "(ii) The defendants must pay out of the 3.75 Crores, a sum of Rs.1.00 Crore towards the liabilities to the government of Orissa in respect of 40 acres of land allotted on lease to the plaintiff.\n", "(iii) The plaintiff must transfer 7 acres of land out of 40 acres as 33 acres were already remitted to the government.\n", "\t\"10. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act says that the Application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.  As already stated in the earlier part of the judgment, defendant NO.3 had moved an Application on 25.11.2004 under Section 34  of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceedings of the title suit and for referring the matter to arbitration.  He filed a supplementary petition to the aforesaid Application on 16.12.2004.  Herein also reference was made to Sec.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940.  Thereafter, he filed an application on 28.02.2005 praying that as the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been repealed and the suit is of the year 1998, to avoid any confusion, his earlier petitions may be treated to have been filed under Sec.8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.  None of these petitions were accompanied by the original arbitration agreement dated 17.02.1992 or a duly certified copy thereof.  In fact, there is no requirement of filing the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof under Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and as such there was no occasion for defendant No.3 to file the aforesaid document.  The third petition filed on 28.2.2005 contained the following prayer:\n", " \"16. We need not dilate on this issue as this aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co.1 wherein this Court noticed: (SCC pp. \t285-86, paras 24-25)\n\u001324. Section 34 of the repealed 1940 Act employs the expression \u0011steps in the proceedings\u0012. Only in terms of Section 21 of the 1940 Act, the dispute could be referred to arbitration provided the parties thereto agreed. Under the 1940 Act, the suit was not barred. The court would not automatically refer the dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal. In the event, it having arrived at a satisfaction that there is no sufficient reason that the dispute should not be referred and no step in relation thereto was taken by the applicant, it could stay the suit.\n", "\t\"11. It is evident from the Purchase Order placed by the revision petitioners that the order was placed subject to the Indian Railway Standard Conditions of Contract.  It was only on the basis of the said Purchase order, the respondent had supplied the materials to the revision petitioners and as such, the general conditions of contract of the railways governs the transaction.  As per clause 2900 of the terms of contract, in the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under the conditions or special conditions of contract, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Gazetted Railway Officer appointed to be the Arbitrator, by the General Manager in the case of contracts entered into by the Zonal Railways and Production Units; by any Member of the Railway Board, in the case of contracts entered into by the Railway Board; and by the Head of the Organization in respect of contracts entered into by the other organizations under the Ministry of Railways.\n", "\t12. The learned trial judge rejected the Application filed by the Revision petitioners on the ground that the arbitration agreement has not been produced before the Court.  However, the learned trial judge failed to note that even the Purchase Order produced by the respondent refers to the standard terms contract of Indian Railways and there is a clear indication in the Purchase Order that the order has been placed as per the terms of the said contract.  Therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial judge was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground of non-production of the Arbitration Agreement.\n", "\t13. It is trite that an agreement containing a clause for arbitration need not expressly refer the term 'arbitration' and in case there is indication that the parties have agreed to a specific procedure for settlement of their dispute by referring the matter, the said consensus could be termed to be an Arbitration Agreement.\n", "\t\"15. Before considering the above issue, it would be useful and appropriate to analyse the provisions contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 which are having utmost relevance and importance to be borne in view to decide the issue:\n", "\t\"10. Though initially the counsel for the first respondent has raised an objection with regard to non-filing of the arbitration agreement along with with  I.A.No.54 of 2003, stating that it is mandatory, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 later fairly submitted that they are not pressing that point.  In view of the said fact and also in view of the fact that it has been held by the Apex Court as well as by this court that the agreement between the parties need not be produced along with the Application under section 8(3) of the  said act, I am constrained to hold that non-production of the agreement between the parties along with the application will not disentitle the petitioner from claiming the relief under the said Act.\n", "\t\"13. It is obligatory on the part of the Court if it is brought to the notice of the Court that there exists an agreement containing a clause to refer the matter for arbitration.  The arbitrator has got ample power to decide whether there is an existence of the arbitration clause in the agreement or he can give his own ruling about the validity of the arbitration agreement.  At this juncture, it is useful to refer to Section 16(1) of the said Act which reads as follows:\n", "\t(i) to comprehensively cover international and commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation;\n", "\t(ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration.\n", "\t\"45. The scope of the enquiry under Sec.8, is only peripheral in nature in the sense that it is confined to the examination of a few aspects namely (a) the existence of an Arbitration Agreement, (b) whether the action brought before the Court is by one of the parties to the said Agreement against the other party, (c)whether the subject matter of the action before the Court is the same as the subject matter of the Arbitration Agreement, and (d) whether the other party moves the Court seeking a reference to Arbitration, before submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute.  In other words, the Judicial Authority is not empowered under Section 8 to get into the merits of the case to decide whether the parties should be referred to Arbitration under section is only on the Arbitration Agreement and not on the merits of the dispute that has arisen between the parties.  It is perhaps on account of this fact that Section 7(2) equated an Arbitration Agreement made out in the form of a separate Agreement to an Arbitration clause contained in a main agreement.\"\n", "\t\"4. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for both the sides and at the end of the day we are satisfied that the whole proceedings were started, continued and concluded under misconception of law. In the first place, Section 8 is not intended to restrain arbitration proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. The situation contemplated by Section 8 can arise only at the first instance of an opponent and defendant in a judicial proceeding, or, at the highest, suo motu at the instance of the judicial authority, when the judicial authority comes to know of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In either event, there is no question of the court under Section 8 of the 1996 Act restraining the arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. In fact, Section 8 is intended to achieve, so to say, the converse result. Unfortunately, in this case the application for interim relief was made by the respondent who was the plaintiff before the civil court. The relief sought therein is the restraint of arbitral proceedings. It could only have been decided as an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 for whatever it was worth. Once the objection to this application was filed by the appellant bringing to the notice of the court the existence of an arbitration agreement, thereafter the proceedings could have been continued only within the parameters of Section 8 of the 1996 Act. A proceeding under Section 8 could never result in an order restraining the arbitral proceedings, which is what finally the impugned order before us does.\"\t\n", "\t\"In the event of there being any disputes or differences arising and touching the terms of this agreement, the parties agree to refer the disputes to arbitration and the provisions of Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act would apply to such disputes or proceedings.\"\t\n", "\t\"7. In the event of any disputes or differences arising out of and touching the terms of this Memorandum of Settlement, the same shall be referred to Arbitration and the Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act will govern.  The parties agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the Courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute which may henceforth arise between the parties as a consequence of this Settlement Agreement.\"\n", "\t\"Both the parties to this final settlement mutually agree that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will govern their future disputes.  The parties further agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute or difference arising out of the Settlement Agreement dated 13/14.9.2006 and this Supplemental Agreement.\"\n"]}, {"Title": "Iqbal Singh Sethi & Ors vs Prasad Ivf Clinic Pvt Limited on 9 March, 2022", "DocID": 122437223, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                                      \"18.1 The Parties hereto have mutually agreed to and\n                                            decided that any dispute that may arise from this\n                                            Agreement, whether before or after the\n                                            termination, of this Agreement which cannot be\n                                            amicably settled within one month of receipt of\n                                            written request, shall be referred to sole\n                                            Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration\n                                            and Conciliation Act, 1996 as mutually\n                                            appointed by both the parties. The seat of the\n                                            arbitration tribunal shall be in Delhi. This\n                                            Agreement is made under and shall be construed\n\n\n\nSignature Not Verified\nDigitally Signed\nBy:Dushyant Rawal\nSigning Date:15.03.2022\n                                                according to the laws of India. The language of\n                                               the arbitration shall be the English language.\"\n", "                                      \"18.1 The Parties hereto have mutually agreed to and\n                                            decided that any dispute that may arise from this\n                                            Agreement, whether before or after the\n                                            termination, of this Agreement which cannot be\n                                            amicably settled within one month of receipt of\n                                            written request, shall be referred to sole\n                                            Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration\n                                            and Conciliation Act, 1996 as mutually\n                                            appointed by both the parties. The seat of the\n                                            arbitration tribunal shall be in Delhi. This\n                                            Agreement is made under and shall be construed\n\n\n\nSignature Not Verified\nDigitally Signed\nBy:Dushyant Rawal\nSigning Date:15.03.2022\n                                                according to the laws of India. The language of\n                                               the arbitration shall be the English language.\"\n"]}, {"Title": "Ms. Neetu vs M/S Summit Digital Infrastructure ... on 11 October, 2023", "DocID": 36137720, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                                                \"15. ARBITRATION\n                                                It is mutually agreed between the Parties, that in the event of any dispute,\n                                                or differences in the matter of interpretation, execution or carrying out the\n                                                objects and functions under this Agreement, the same shall be referred to a\n                                                sole arbitrator, to be appointed by RELIANCE JIO INFOCOMM\n                                                LIMITED. The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,\n                                                including its statutory modification and re-enactment in force from time to\n                                                time, shall1apply to the proceedings which shall be conducted in English\n                                                and the venue of such proceedings shall be at Delhi. The decision of such\n                                                sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. For all\n                                                matters concerning this Agreement, only the competent courts at Delhi\n                                                shall have the exclusive jurisdiction.\"\n", "                                                \"15. ARBITRATION\n                                                It is mutually agreed between the Parties, that in the event of any dispute,\n                                                or differences in the matter of interpretation, execution or carrying out the\n                                                objects and functions under this Agreement, the same shall be referred to a\n                                                sole arbitrator, to be appointed by RELIANCE JIO INFOCOMM\n                                                LIMITED. The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,\n                                                including its statutory modification and re-enactment in force from time to\n                                                time, shall1apply to the proceedings which shall be conducted in English\n                                                and the venue of such proceedings shall be at Delhi. The decision of such\n                                                sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. For all\n                                                matters concerning this Agreement, only the competent courts at Delhi\n                                                shall have the exclusive jurisdiction.\"\n"]}, {"Title": "Gurinder Singh Sethi vs M/S Sagar Fossil Fuel Technologies (P) ... on 12 July, 2021", "DocID": 81257869, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                                \"27. That a mutually agreed arbitrator shall be appointed in\n                                     case of any dispute that may arise between both the\n                                     parties in respect of this Agreement and this agreement\n                                     is to be adjudicated within the Jurisdiction of Delhi\n                                     Courts only.\"\n"]}, {"Title": "H.T. Somashekar Reddy vs Government Of Karnataka And Another on 21 September, 1998", "DocID": 1615586, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["Bangalore and Mysore are two very important cities of the State of Karnataka and are connected by existing Bangalore-Mysore Highway SH-17 which was built over 100 years ago. With the passage of time and modernisation of technology, the traffic on the roads has increased and heavy and fast moving vehicles have come in place of the slow moving traffic at that time. These two cities have been exposed to shock of industrialisation, heavy development and over-population. In order to meet the ends of the industry, and transportation, the State of Karnataka invited tenders for designing, constructing, maintaining and operating of an Express Highway between Bangalore and Mysore on 28th September, 1988. In response to the said advertisement only one bid was received with certain stringent conditions which were not acceptable to the Government. The said conditions were: \n", "\"Land\n  \n   \n   \n\nRoad \n (acres)\n  \n   \n   \n\nTownship \n (acres)\n  \n   \n   \n\nTotal \n (acres)\n  \n   \n   \n\nPercentage\n  \n \n   \n  \n   \n   \n\nKharab\n  \n   \n   \n\n1,740\n  \n   \n   \n\n5,818\n  \n   \n   \n\n7,558\n  \n   \n   \n\n37\n  \n \n  \n   \n   \n\nDry\n  \n   \n   \n\n2,936\n  \n   \n   \n\n6,881\n  \n   \n   \n\n10,817\n  \n   \n   \n\n54\n  \n \n  \n   \n   \n\nWet\n  \n   \n   \n\n1,183\n  \n   \n   \n\n479\n  \n   \n   \n\n1,662\n  \n   \n   \n\n8\n  \n \n  \n   \n   \n\nGarden\n  \n   \n   \n\n140\n16\n156\n1\n  \n \n  \n   \n   \n\nTotal\n  \n   \n   \n\n6,999\n  \n   \n   \n\n13,194\n  \n   \n   \n\n20,193\n  \n   \n   \n\n100\"\n", " \" 'Best efforts' means a commitment to pursue all legal avenues and conscientiously and diligently in order to accomplish the desired results. It is not a guarantee that the results will be reached but assures a procedure calculated to overcome known and foreseeable obstacles in a timely manner by exercising due diligence and good faith in an effort to accomplish the desired results\". \n", "  1. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.--Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v).\n", "  1. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.--Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v).\n", "\"8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreements for development and maintenance of National Highways.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may enter into an agreement with any person in relation to the development maintenance of the whole or any part of a National Highway. \n"]}, {"Title": "Indiabulls Real Estate Limited vs M/S Virasat Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. on 5 May, 2010", "DocID": 167208736, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["              \"9.7 Disputes, if any, that may arise between the\n              Parties with respect to this Agreement, or interpretation\n              of terms, or its performance or execution unless resolved\n              mutually shall be referred to a mutually agreed\n              arbitrator and law under the provisions of Indian\n              Arbitration Act shall be applicable to all proceedings.\n              The venue of arbitration shall be Gurgaon/Delhi.\n", "              \"AND WHEREAS the Purchaser has conducted a due\n              diligence with respect to the Company, the land owned by the\n              Company and with respect to the license applied before the\n              Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana and the\n              Purchaser is satisfied with the due diligence conducted by it.\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. ... vs Bokaro Steel Officers Housing ... on 16 June, 2022", "DocID": 46448295, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["              The petitioner-applicant was awarded the design, construction\n     and development contract for construction of 448 units comprising of 09\n     towers spread over an area of 7.5 acres for the members of Bokaro Steel\n     Officers Housing Co-operative Society Limited (a registered society), for\n     the officers of Steel Authority of India Limited/Bokaro Steel Plant vide\n     letter dated 27.12.2013. Pursuant to the award of the work, the parties\n     agreed on terms and conditions which was captured in the form of\n     Construction Agreement dated 25.01.2014 and executed between the\n                                  2\n\n\npetitioner and the respondent society on 04.04.2014. The petitioner\nundertook to carry out the construction, designing and development of\nthe 448 units at the rate of Rs. 1790 per sq. ft.\n", "           \u201543. Arbitration: Any dispute and difference, if arise between the parties,\n           same shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator, appointed on mutual consent\n           of the parties and in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration. Such\n           disputes or difference shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration\n           and Conciliation Act, 1996. The place of arbitration shall be BOKARO\n           STEEL CITY. All legal disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of\n           courts in Bokaro only.\u2016\n\n", "           \u201543. Arbitration: Any dispute and difference, if arise between the parties,\n           same shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator, appointed on mutual consent\n           of the parties and in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration. Such\n           disputes or difference shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration\n           and Conciliation Act, 1996. The place of arbitration shall be BOKARO\n           STEEL CITY. All legal disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of\n           courts in Bokaro only.\u2016\n\n", "          \"35. In view of the language of Article 20 of the arbitration agreement\n          which provided that the arbitration proceedings would be held in\n          accordance with the rules and procedures of the International Chamber\n          of Commerce or UNCITRAL, Devas was entitled to invoke the Rules of\n          Arbitration of ICC for the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. Article\n          19 of the agreement provided that the rights and responsibilities of the\n          parties thereunder would be subject to and construed in accordance with\n          the laws of India. There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the law\n          which was to operate as the governing law of the agreement and the law\n          which was to govern the arbitration proceedings. Once the provisions of\n          the ICC Rules of Arbitration had been invoked by Devas, the proceedings\n          initiated thereunder could not be interfered with in a proceeding under\n          Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The invocation of the ICC Rules would, of\n          course, be subject to challenge in appropriate proceedings but not by\n          way of an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. Where the\n          parties had agreed that the procedure for the arbitration would be\n          governed by the ICC Rules, the same would necessarily include the\n          appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in terms of the arbitration\n          agreement and the said Rules. Arbitration Petition No. 20 of 2011 under\n          Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for the appointment of an arbitrator must,\n          therefore, fail and is rejected, but this will not prevent the petitioner from\n          taking recourse to other provisions of the aforesaid Act for appropriate\n          relief.\n", "         \u20157. Arbitration agreement. - (1) In this Part, \u2015arbitration agreement\u2016\n         means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain\n         disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect\n         of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.\n         (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause\n         in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.\n", "         (3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.\n", "    Clause 43.\n", "    Clause 43.\n", "          \u2015This agreement is made in Bokaro, Jharkhand on this 1st July 2015 by\n          and between\n          M/s Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. a Private Limited Company CIN\n          No. U45200DL2013PTC256103 having its registered office at 23, Block\n          No. B/6-7, Local Shopping Centre, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-\n          110029 represented by Mr. Anand Anu, Director, hereinafter referred to\n          as \u2015Contractor\u2016 (which expression shall unless it is repugnant to the\n          context shall mean and include its successors in interest) of the first part.\n", "          \u2015This agreement is made in Bokaro, Jharkhand on this 1st July 2015 by\n          and between\n          M/s Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. a Private Limited Company CIN\n          No. U45200DL2013PTC256103 having its registered office at 23, Block\n          No. B/6-7, Local Shopping Centre, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-\n          110029 represented by Mr. Anand Anu, Director, hereinafter referred to\n          as \u2015Contractor\u2016 (which expression shall unless it is repugnant to the\n          context shall mean and include its successors in interest) of the first part.\n", "                                              AND\n          M/s NSS AND COMPANY, a proprietorship firm having its registered\n          office at N2/146, IRC Village, Nayapally, Bhubhneshwar-751015\n          (Orissa) represented by its proprietor Mr. Nilesh Singh Solankee PAN\n          No. AOUPS1814E, hereinafter referred to as \u2017Sub-Contractor' (which\n          expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context shall mean and\n          include its successor(s) in-interest) of the second part.\u2016\n\n             It further appears from the aforesaid agreement which does not\n    contain any arbitration clause. The question which now is to be decided\n    by this Court is that in absence of any arbitration clause in the said\n    contract agreement dated 01.07.2015, can this application for\n                                     20\n\n\n    impleadment of party to the proceeding in the original application is fit\n    to be allowed?\n"]}, {"Title": "Cherian And Kurian vs State Of Kerala on 16 June, 2006", "DocID": 1859066, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["(a) The date of both the agreements is 3-10-2000. The agreements contain different printed forms, different cyclostyled forms and different typed forms. Various blank spaces in the said forms which required to be filled are filled up in writing with pen. The Articles of Agreement between the parties is made by filling up the blanks in a printed form which is in the form of a booklet printed by the Government of Kerala in 1987, going by the endorsement of the Government Press/Store on the facing sheet of the said document. It is signed by the parties after filling the necessary blank spaces. Among the terms agreed, Clause 3 among the printed conditions in the Articles of Agreement reads as follows: \n", "  The parties to this contract agreed to undertake the condition that arbitration shall not be a means of settlement of disputes or claim or anything on account of this contract.\n", "(a) The date of both the agreements is 3-10-2000. The agreements contain different printed forms, different cyclostyled forms and different typed forms. Various blank spaces in the said forms which required to be filled are filled up in writing with pen. The Articles of Agreement between the parties is made by filling up the blanks in a printed form which is in the form of a booklet printed by the Government of Kerala in 1987, going by the endorsement of the Government Press/Store on the facing sheet of the said document. It is signed by the parties after filling the necessary blank spaces. Among the terms agreed, Clause 3 among the printed conditions in the Articles of Agreement reads as follows: \n", "  The parties to this contract agreed to undertake the condition that arbitration shall not be a means of settlement of disputes or claim or anything on account of this contract.\n", "As part of the agreements, are the mutually agreed conditions in the notices inviting tenders for the work, which again, are in printed forms, printed in 1992 wherein, among other things, Clause 24 reads as follows: \n"]}, {"Title": "Vinayak Balkrishna Samant And Others vs The Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited on 21 November, 1995", "DocID": 337120, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["  \"That it is hereby expressly agreed that if at any time there shall arise any dispute, doubt, difference or question with regard to the interpretation of meaning or any of the terms and conditions of this demise or in respect of the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties hereto or in any way touching or arising out of these presents or otherwise in relation to the premises then every such dispute, difference, doubt or question (except the decision whereof is herein expressly provided for) shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director General Posts and Telegraphs or in case his designation is changed or his office is abolished, the officer who for the time being is entrusted whether or not in addition to other functions, with the functions of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, by whatsoever designation such official may be called or if he be unable or unwilling to act, then of an officer appointed by him in this behalf. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the person appointed is a Government Servant, that he had to deal with the matters to which the indenture of lease relates and that in the course of his duties as such Government servant has expressed views on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference. The decision of the Arbitration shall be final and binding on the parties to this deal. The provision of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, or any statutory modifications or re-enactments thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to such arbitration and this deed shall be deemed to be a submission to arbitration within the meaning of the said Act.\"  \n", "  \"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction ........  \n", "  \"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction ........  \n", " (b) elsewhere, the court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is no such Civil Judge, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions; and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question.\"  \n"]}, {"Title": "Wellington Associates Ltd. vs Mr. Kirit Mehta on 4 April, 2000", "DocID": 1604568, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["      \"Section\t33:   Arbitration agreement or award  to  be\ncontested by application -\n", "      In the light of the finding on Point 2, it is\n\n      obvious  that I have to dismiss this petition.  It may\nbe\n\n      that  if the petitioner files a suit in Bombay,  there\ncan\n\n      be  considerable\tdelay.\t But that is  no  ground  to\nconstrue\n\n      the clause differently.  I may state however, that in\n\n      case a Civil suit is filed, it will be for the\n\n      petitioner to seek an early disposal of the case and I\n\n      have  no\treason\tto doubt that the civil\t court\twill\ntreat\n\n      the request of the petitioner for early disposal with\n\n      due consideration.\n", "\n      With the above observations, this petition is\n\n      dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.\n\n\n\n\n"]}, {"Title": "Bisra Stone Lime Company Ltd. & Anr. Etc vs Orissa <b>State</b> Electricity Board & Anr on 21 October, 1975", "DocID": 888433, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["\t  \"The tariff  and conditions of supply mentioned in\n     this Agreement  shall be  subject to  any revision that\n     may be made by the Supplier from time to time\".\n", "\t  \"The tariff  and conditions of supply mentioned in\n     this Agreement  shall be  subject to  any revision that\n     may be made by the Supplier from time to time\".\n", "\t  (1)  The Board  has no  power to  levy a surcharge\n\t       under the provisions of the Act.\n", "\t  (2)  Clause 13 of the agreement cannot take in the\n\t       levy of\tsurcharge. It  is, therefore,  not a\n\t       matter for  reference  to  arbitration  under\n\t       clause 23 of the agreement.\n", "\t  \"Now, the  effect of\tthe levy  of coal  surcharge\n     would be  to  enhance  the\t rates\tfor  the  supply  of\n     electricity stipulated under the agreement\".\n"]}, {"Title": "Great Offshore Ltd vs Iranian Offshore Eng&Constn. Co on 25 August, 2008", "DocID": 123878146, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["     \"This Agreement is subject to IOEC [respondent]\n     providing a suitable barge and AHT acceptable to\n     GE Shipping [applicant] for a period of 45-55 days\n     on mutually agreed rates for commencement\n     between 25th October and 10th November 05 for\n     BHN MOL project works.\"\n", "     \"This Agreement is subject to IOEC [respondent]\n     providing a suitable barge and AHT acceptable to\n     GE Shipping [applicant] for a period of 45-55 days\n     on mutually agreed rates for commencement\n     between 25th October and 10th November 05 for\n     BHN MOL project works.\"\n", "      1. Place & Date. Mumbai, India. 22nd August 2005. ...\n", "17.   I must provide some background before dealing with\n\nother documents, as the faxed CPA sits at the center of this\n\ndispute.\n", "      \"Taking into account the number of problems\n      associated with the vessel, it is the conclusion of\n      Likpin and IOEC that the Gal Constructor is not\n      suitable as a riser installation. ... the vessel size\n      combined with the limited crane reach cannot be\n      corrected or overcome and hence the vessel should\n      not be chartered for riser installation operations.\"\n", "      \"You are aware that initially, we intended to hire the\n      vessel combination for only 170 days. However,\n      since you agreed to take barge and AHT from us for\n      45-55 days, we agreed to extend the intended hire\n      period from 170 days to 200 days and accordingly\n      in this background the said LOI was issued.\n      However, since thereafter you unilaterally declined\n      to take our barge and AHT on the ground of\n      difference in rate levels offered by us, we, in view of\n      the said condition and in the light of your refusal to\n      accept our barge and AHT, asked you for absolute\n      subletting right of the said vessels to compensate\n      us/minimize our expenses for risk of additional\n      days than the originally intended 170 days. The\n      correspondences which were exchanged between us\n      make it aptly clear that negotiations and change in\n      terms and conditions from your side continued even\n      after issuance of LOI and therefore the question of\n      concluding the CPA in respect of RSPPM project\n      phase-II does not arise at all.\"\n", "       \"When parties carry on lengthy negotiations, it may\n       be difficult to say when and whether a contract has\n       been concluded. The court must then look at the\n       whole correspondence and decide, whether on its\n       true construction, the parties had agreed to the\n       same terms.\"\n", "      (1)In this part, \"arbitration agreement\" means an\n         agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration\n         all or certain disputes which have arisen or\n         which may arise between them in respect of a\n         defined legal relationship, whether contractual or\n         not.\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S Hrd Corporation vs Gail (India) Ltd on 3 November, 2011", "DocID": 590009, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["             \u2015The agreement dated 01.01.1999 between Gas Authority\n             of India Limited and Marcus Oil and Chemical division of\n             HRD Corporation, which contains the Arbitration clause, is\n             an agreement between a body corporate incorporated in\n             USA. The is evident from the recitals contained in the\n             agreement dated 01.04.1999 between Petitioner and the\n\nArb. P.No.113/2011                                                Page 8 of 34\n               Respondent.\u2016\n\n              \u2015The Arbitration between the Petitioner and the\n              Respondent is an international commercial Arbitration.\n              Therefore, this court would not have the jurisdiction to\n              entertain the present Application and the same is liable to\n              be dismissed as such.\u2016\n\n\n", "              \u20156.4. After the expiry of every three years the SELLER and\n              the BUYER will review the price determination\n              Mechanism. In case during the preceding three years large\n              fluctuations in the prices of Ethylene have occurred it will\n              be open to the parties to mutually agree upon any other\n              product to which the price is to be indexed or if any other\n              publication indicative in the price of ethylene are available\n              agree upon such publication to be used for reference.\u2016\n\n\n", "         \u201511. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator -\n", "         (1)    In addition to the circumstances referred to in rule 9 or\n                rule 10, the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate -\n", "                (a)   Where he withdraws from office for any reason; or\n\n"]}, {"Title": "M/S. Madras Fertilizers Ltd vs M/S. Sicgil India Ltd on 9 August, 2021", "DocID": 53032376, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                                 (a) directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.378.24 lacs\n\n                                 towards damages arising from the breach of the agreement\n\n                                 dated 30.12.1993 together with interest at 18% on the amount\n\n                                 so ascertained by the Hon'ble Arbitrator from the date of\n\n\n\n                          3/22\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in\n\f                                                                                        O.P.No.543 of 2017\n\n                                 award till the date of payment.\u201d\n\n\n\n", "                                 \u201c1.   The respondent shall pay to the claimant a sum of\n\n                                 Rs.3,25,40,500/- (Rupees three crores twenty five lakhs forty\n\n                                 thousand five hundred only) with interest at the rate of 18%\n\n                                 per annum from this date till date of realisation.\n\n"]}, {"Title": "Chaudrhary Avadhesh Kumar vs Volleyball Federation Of India on 31 May, 2018", "DocID": 10924134, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                                   '(b) Disputes / Conflict within the Federation:\n"]}, {"Title": "Vandana Batra vs Aerens Goldsouk International Ltd. on 1 October, 2014", "DocID": 131031700, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["       \"a. allow the present application under Section 8 of\n       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and direct the\n       parties to resolve the dispute through arbitration by\n       appointing a mutually agreed arbitrator as per clause 9 of\n\n\nCS(OS) No.988/2012                                            Page 2 of 12\n       the said Lease Deed to arbitrate the dispute involved in\n      the present case.\n", "      \"...In CS(OS) No.988/2012 titled Vandana Batra v Aerens\n      Goldsouk International Ltd., on an application u/s 8 of the\n      Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, by the defendant,\n      vide order dated 13.09.2012 the Hon'ble High Court was\n      pleased to allow the application and relegate the parties\n      to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the\n      Lease Deed dated 15.01.2010.\n", "      \"Pursuant to the order dated 15.07.2013 passed by the\n      Arbitrator, and the claimant having filed IA 12399-\n\n\n\nCS(OS) No.988/2012                                        Page 7 of 12\n        12400/2013 in CS(OS) 988/2012, these arbitration\n       proceedings were adjourned sine die. The claimant has\n       now prayed for termination of these proceedings and in\n       making such a request the claimant has filed a copy of the\n       order dated 03.03.2014 passed by the Hon'ble High Court\n       in the aforesaid suit.\n", "     (i) The court should, before admitting any document into\n     evidence or acting upon such document, examine whether\n     the instrument/document is duly stamped and whether it is an\n     instrument which is compulsorily registrable.\n", "     (ii) If the document is found to be not duly stamped, Section\n     35 of Stamp Act bars the said document being acted upon.\n"]}, {"Title": "K.N.Venkiteshwara Pai vs K.G.Sathish Chandra Babu on 16 March, 2011", "DocID": 197577142, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["                \"17. On death, retirement, insolvency or\n\n           resignation of any one of the partners, the\n\n           legal heirs of the deceased partner or the\n\n           retired or resigned partner shall be entitled to\n\n           receive from the firm, the balance standing to\n\n           the capital account, current account and loan\n\n           account together with the interest, if any, as\n\n           increased or reduced by the share of profit or\n\n           loss as the case may be till the date of death\n\n           or retirement or resignation.\n", "                \"17. On death, retirement, insolvency or\n\n           resignation of any one of the partners, the\n\n           legal heirs of the deceased partner or the\n\n           retired or resigned partner shall be entitled to\n\n           receive from the firm, the balance standing to\n\n           the capital account, current account and loan\n\n           account together with the interest, if any, as\n\n           increased or reduced by the share of profit or\n\n           loss as the case may be till the date of death\n\n           or retirement or resignation.\n", "                18. Retirement, death or insolvency of\n\n           any partner shall not dissolve the firm but the\n\n           firm shall stand reconstituted among the\n\n           remaining partners.\n", "                 \"Any dispute arising among the partners\n\n           or between the legal representatives of a\n\n           deceased partner and the remaining partners\n\n           regarding the interpretation of this deed or\n\n           their rights and liabilities hereunder or in\n\n           relation to any other matter whatsoever\n\n           touching the partnership, shall be referred to\n\n           arbitration by a sole arbitrator to the\n\n           mutually agreed upon and if the parties\n\n           cannot agree upon the choice of a sole\n\n           arbitrator, each party to the dispute shall\n\n           nominate one arbitrator and reference shall\n\n           be made to such arbitrators jointly and the\n\n           provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940\n\n           shall apply thereto.\"\n", "AR No.10/2010                     5\n"]}, {"Title": "B. Gopal Das, Bombay And Ors. vs Kota Straw Board (P) Ltd., Kota on 21 October, 1970", "DocID": 452708, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": ["  \"(10). That in case of any dispute arising between us, the matter may be\nreferred   to arbitration   mutually   agreed upon and acceptable by you and us.\" \n", "  \"(a) 'arbitration agreement' means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not.\"  \n", "  \"The essential requirement is that the parties should intend to make a submission to arbitration.\" \n", "  \"In the event of any dispute arising out of this contract the same can be settled by Arbitration held by a Chamber of Commerce at Madras. Their decision shall be binding to. the Buyers and the Sellers\". \n", "  \"Any complaint, claim, dispute, doubt or question (not otherwise settled by mutual consent) arising out of this indent, may at the instance of either party thereto be referred to arbitration to two European merchants with power, in the event of disagreement, to appoint an umpire.\" \n"]}, {"Title": "Kirtikumar Fakrichand Mehta vs Dilipkumar Jayantilal on 14 June, 2013", "DocID": 103436462, "matching_columns": [], "matching_indents": [" Clause\nNo.9:  \n", "Said\npartnership has been executed for the time specified at will i.e. the\npartnership is at will. \n", "(i)\n\tManibhai Shankerbhai Patel v. Swashray \t\t\tConstruction Co. &Ors.\n", "(i)\tAIR\n1991 SC 1020\n \n\n\n", "(i)\tAIR\n1991 SC 1020\n \n\n\n", "(ii)\tAIR\n2005 Bombay 301\n \n\n\n", "(iii)\tAIR\n1982 Delhi 131\n \n\n\n", "\t The\nconclusion which we must, therefore, inevitably reach is that the\nretirement of partner from a firm does  not dissolve, the firm, that\nis determine the partnership inter-se between all the partners but\nmerely severs the partnership between the retiring partner and the\ncontinuing partners leaving the  partnership amongst the continuing\npartners unaffected and the firm continues with the changed\nconstitution comprising the continuing partners. \n", "\t\tSo\nfar as clause 7 is concerned, it further finds in para 5 that it is\nclear from the foregoing discussions that clause 7 of the partnership\ndeed which contains provision for retirement of a partner which is\nnot constituted an expressed provision made by contract between the\npartners for determination of  their partnership  within the\nmeaning of section 7 and, therefore, it is not operated to exclude\nthe partnership from the category of partnership at will. \nDissolution of the partnership between all the partners is what is\ncontemplated in the definition of partnership at will and retirement\nof a partner has no bearing on it.  Learned Advocates for the\npetitioners have then submitted that so far as the partnership at\nwill is concerned, this judgment of Division Bench is binding\nauthority which binds this court and I am in agreement with the same.\n"]}]