diff --git "a/Matching_rows_Format.txt" "b/Matching_rows_Format.txt" --- "a/Matching_rows_Format.txt" +++ "b/Matching_rows_Format.txt" @@ -1 +1 @@ -[{'Title': 'Asstt. Cit vs Hewlett Packard Ltd. on 14 August, 2001', 'DocID': 34884, 'matching_columns': ['"6.1 In consideration of the rights granted and the technology, technical information to be conveyed and technical assistance to be provided hereunder (subject to the payment of additional consideration expressly set forth in article 3 hereof) HCL shall pay to Apollo.\n\n(i) In respect of the Technology conveyed, Technical Information and Technical assistance to be provided under article 3.1 by way of lump sum in the net sum of US $ 1.1 million free of all Indian taxes.\n\n(ii) In respect of the royalty payable for the Licensed Products manufactured by HCL in India, a fixed royalty of eight hundred US dollars (US $ 800) shall be paid on each unit of the licensed product manufactured by HCL in India and sold or leased.\n\n(iii) In respect of licensing of Apollo Software Programs under article 9 thereof, the applicable license fees for each Apollo Software Program reproduced and sublicensed to India end users together with the licensed product, under the then current Apollo Software Program Price List under Ext. 4 of the Agreement which be as per Apollo, is prevailing distributor price list. It is agreed that the price for the operating system, AEGIS and DOMAIN/IX, will during the term of this agreement, not exceed seven hundred US dollars (US $ 700) as stated in Ext. 4.\n\n(iv) In respect of the documentation under article hereof, the applicable license fees for each copy of the documentation reproduced under the List of Documentation under Ext. 6, will be five US Dollars (US $ 5) per copy."', '"4.1 It is understood and agreed by the parties that the technology and any other information which Apollo consider proprietary to itself and its license and which will be conveyed and disclose by Apollo to HCL in carrying out the provisions of this agreement is and shall remain confidential during the terms of this agreement and after the expiration or termination hereof for any reason whatsoever, until such time as same shall enter the public domain or otherwise become generally known without a material breach of this agreement by HCL.\n\n4.2. HCL agrees that they shall maintain the confidentiality of the technology and said other information conveyed and disclosed by Apollo hereunder and shall not without the prior written consent of Apollo disclose same or allow same to be disclosed to anyone, except to their management and employees and to any of HCL\'s sub-licensee(s) sub-contractor(s), agents or suppliers and then only to the extent required for the proper and authorised use of the technology hereunder, unless the technology and said other information;\n\n(a) are contained at the time of disclosure by Apollo hereunder or thereafter in a patent or patent application or other printed publication made by a third party without a breach of this agreement by HCL; or\n \n\n(b) are acquired by HCL from a third party lawfully in possession of same and not subject to any contractual or fiduciary obligation to Apollo to maintain the secrecy of same. HCL agree that, prior to any disclosure of the technology and said other information, they shall enter into confidentiality agreement, containing in substance the provisions of this article 4, with their management and employees and with any of the HCL is sub-licensee(s) sub-contractor(s), agents, or suppliers to whom such disclosure is to be made."', '"5.9 HCL shall use its best efforts to maintain a standard of quality and workmanship in its manufacture of the licensed products equal to that of Apollo and shall manufacture the licensed products out of materials supplied by parties to be mutually agreed between HCL and Apollo. HCL shall permit representatives of Apollo, upon reasonable advance notice and during normal business hours, to inspect the manufacturing facilities of HCL used for the manufacture of the licensed products. In particular, Apollo\'s representative shall be permitted to inspect and monitor the quality control procedures to be used by HCL, as well as to inspect samples of the licensed products and the compliance by HCL, with the quality standards for the licensed products contained in the technology."', '"8.4 HCL agrees to use its best efforts to ensure that each end user so sublicensed continues to comply with the terms of the sub-license. HCL shall maintain records specifically identifying each, Software, Program stocked by HCL and provided to end-users customers of HCL under this procedure, the quantities of such Software Program stocked and provided and the identity of the end-user customer to which they are provided; such records shall be made available to Apollo during regular business upon reasonable notice for purposes of enforcement of this agreement."', '"8.5 Apollo may appoint independent third parties in India to audit HCL\'s records on software licenses granted to end-users in India 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter to determine exact number of sub-license granted to end-users.\n\nApollo shall charge HCL applicable license fees for sub-license and update sublicensed to India end-user customers under Apollo\'s Software Program Price List. HCL shall make payment for total applicable license fees due to Apollo immediately on receiving approval from the Reserve Bank of India for remittance of license fees payable. HCL shall remit payment by telegraphic transfer directly to Apollo\'s designated bank account in West Germany as specified by Apollo. Remittance to Apollo shall be in US dollars at the exchange rate prevailing at the date of remittance. It shall be the sole responsibility of HCL to obtain all necessary approvals to make payment to Apollo. Full payment of applicable license fees shall be made to Apollo by HCL not later than forty-five days after the end of the calendar quarter. Any delay in payment beyond the 45 days period shall entitle Apollo to charge HCL daily interest at the current prime interest rate fixed by the Bank of India."', '"12.1 HCL shall prepare the factory site designated for manufacture of the licensed protect in consultation with Apollo.\n\n12.2 In order to assist HCL in preparing the production of licensed products Apollo may if requested provide assistance including supply of the following date and information. These data shall be in accordance with accepted international customary standard examples as follows:\n\n(a) Plan for assembly line.\n\n(b) Plan for manpower arrangement.\n\n(c) Plan for equipment layout.\n\n(d) Plan for infrastructure e.g. water supply, electricity, air-conditioning, transportation and communication.\n\n(e) Plan for installation and operation of equipments for manufacture.\n\n(f) Plan for production management.\n\n(g) Plan for test and repair of licensed products.\n\nHCL shall submit a production schedule to Apollo within 30 days after parties execute this agreement.\n\nArticle 14 dealing with duration and termination reads as :\n\n"14.1 Unless earlier terminated, this agreement shall have an initial term of 5 years commencing on the effective date hereof. In the event that this agreement is not terminated earlier than said full initial term, then HCL may thereafter continue to manufacture, use and sell the licensed products under the rights granted herein without the obligation of paying any additional consideration to Apollo, including the right to manufacture, use and sell under any patents included in the technology covering the licensed products, provided that HCL shall make no claims against Apollo with respect to the licensed products."', '"14. In our view the principles of Vienna Conversion is guidelines for the countries who are party to this convention. It is also empathic to explain that when an agreement is entered between two countries that should be fulfillled by following its terms and conditions. In our considered view Indian and Italian Governments entered into \'an agreement for avoiding the double taxation in both the countries. Therefore, provisions of section 90 are also overriding on provisions to section 9(1)(vi)."'], 'matching_indents': ['"(ii) Lump sum know how fee : US Dollar 11 lakhs of taxes with tax liability to be borne by the Indian Company."\n', '"6.1 In consideration of the rights granted and the technology, technical information to be conveyed and technical assistance to be provided hereunder (subject to the payment of additional consideration expressly set forth in article 3 hereof) HCL shall pay to Apollo.\n', '"6.1 In consideration of the rights granted and the technology, technical information to be conveyed and technical assistance to be provided hereunder (subject to the payment of additional consideration expressly set forth in article 3 hereof) HCL shall pay to Apollo.\n', '"4.1 It is understood and agreed by the parties that the technology and any other information which Apollo consider proprietary to itself and its license and which will be conveyed and disclose by Apollo to HCL in carrying out the provisions of this agreement is and shall remain confidential during the terms of this agreement and after the expiration or termination hereof for any reason whatsoever, until such time as same shall enter the public domain or otherwise become generally known without a material breach of this agreement by HCL.\n', '"5.9 HCL shall use its best efforts to maintain a standard of quality and workmanship in its manufacture of the licensed products equal to that of Apollo and shall manufacture the licensed products out of materials supplied by parties to be mutually agreed between HCL and Apollo. HCL shall permit representatives of Apollo, upon reasonable advance notice and during normal business hours, to inspect the manufacturing facilities of HCL used for the manufacture of the licensed products. In particular, Apollo\'s representative shall be permitted to inspect and monitor the quality control procedures to be used by HCL, as well as to inspect samples of the licensed products and the compliance by HCL, with the quality standards for the licensed products contained in the technology."\n', '"14.1 Unless earlier terminated, this agreement shall have an initial term of 5 years commencing on the effective date hereof. In the event that this agreement is not terminated earlier than said full initial term, then HCL may thereafter continue to manufacture, use and sell the licensed products under the rights granted herein without the obligation of paying any additional consideration to Apollo, including the right to manufacture, use and sell under any patents included in the technology covering the licensed products, provided that HCL shall make no claims against Apollo with respect to the licensed products."\n', 'Registered Post\n \n\nNo. FC : 71(87)-Comp./SCS.\n', 'Government of India\n \n\nMinistry of Industry\n \n\nDepartment of Industrial Development\n \n\nSecretariat for Industrial Approvals\n \n\nSpecial cases section\n \n\nNew Delhi, the 20-11-1991\n \n\nM/s HCL Ltd.,\n \n\n608, Siddharth,\n \n\n96, Nehru Place,\n \n\nNew Delhi-110 019.\n', 'Subject : Application from M/s. HCL Ltd., for foreign collaboration with M/s Apollo Computer Inc. USA for the manufacture of microprocessor based CAD/GAM work section.\n', '"Subject to written approval of the appropriate government agencies and departments of the United States Export Licensing Authority and an conditions imposed on such approval and compliance therewith, Apollo hereby convey and grants to HCL exclusive right to manufacture, maintain, use and sell the licensed product in India in accordance with pursuant to and under the Technology. Said technology relating to the manufacture of the licensed products in India which is owned by Apollo as of the effective date of this agreement.\n', '"Apollo shall deliver the tangible technical information constituting the technology, in accordance with Ext. 3 be prepaid air mail or air freight C.I.F. or by such other means which are reasonable and obtain from HCL acknowledgement of such delivery to HCL\'s registered office in India or to such other location in India which HCL will designate. Apollo shall provide two copies of said technical information in a form capable of being copies in the English language. HCL may, at their own expense, translate same into the Indian language, subject to the confidentiality provisions of article 4 hereof. Apollo shall use all practical means to ensure that all the technical information under the technology provided to HCL is accurate, comprehensive and up todate and in the event that any of the technical information provided is inaccurate, comprehensive and up todate and in the event that any of the technical information provided is inaccurate, Apollo shall at its own cost rectify the inaccuracy without delay. Apollo will not be liable for any loss or damage suffered by HCL in respect of such inaccuracies.\n', '"Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separately in other articles of this agreement, then the provisions of those articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this article."\n', '"Article, VIII-A\n \n\n(1) Royalties and fees for technical services arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other state.\n', '(2) However, such royalties and fees for technical services may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise, and according to the laws of that state. But insofar as the fees for technical services are concerned, the tax so charged shall not exceed 20 per cent of the gross amount of such fees.\n', '(3) The term "royalties" as used in this article means payment of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films or films or tapes used for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.\n', '"The recitals in the agreement as also the provisions contained in clause (6) thereof showed that the obligation undertaken by the assessed did not end merely with the handing over of the secret processes, but also extended to helping the Indian company in exploiting these processes property, efficiently and economically. The handing over of the know-how or secret processes was intimately connected and concerned with the obligation which was undertaken by the assessed in clause (6). Therefore, it was properly held that part of the technical fees, accrued in India."\n', '"Held, that, firstly, the agreement between the assessed and the foreign company was for a period of ten years only. Secondly, it was in respect of certain secret or patent formulations owned or controlled by the foreign company. The payment, though called \'Research contribution\' in the agreement, was nothing but the consideration correlated to the extent of the exploitation of the secret formulations and patent rights and various other rights belonging to the foreign company by the assessed in India and that it was for the exclusive right to manufacture the products that the payment was made and it was nothing else but \'royalty\' as known to law and to the international commercial world in the context of such agreements. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the payment of Rs. 48,698 made by the assessed to the foreign company during the relevant period was royalty payment and was liable to deduction of tax at other lower rate of 50 per cent as prescribed in the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971."\n']}, {'Title': 'Vodafone India Services P. Ltd, Mumbai vs Assessee on 10 December, 2014', 'DocID': 13060393, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [" 209. The judgment of the Supreme Court would undoubtedly be the\n assessee's main plank and supports its case to a considerable extent,\n especially as it is the very agreements that fall for consideration even in\n the proceedings relating to the assessee's assessment. Mr. Salve rightly\n contended that the Supreme Court had analyzed the Framework\n Agreements and held that the call options are contractual rights; that\n they vested and continue to vest in the assessee and that they had not been\n transferred or assigned by the assessee. We proceed, as indeed we must,\n that before the ITAT, a very heavy burden would rest upon the Revenue\n even regarding the assessee's assessment in view of the judgment in\n Vodafone's case. Every Court, Tribunal, authority or person is bound to\n give the observations of the Supreme Court, including in respect of the\n Framework Agreements, their full effect. The suggestion that they are\n casual observations is rejected. A view to the contrary would tantamount\n to judicial indiscipline. This is not just our prima facie view. Needless to\n\n", 'Framework agreement 2006 Framework agreement 2007.\n', '4.5 below and at a fair market value determined in\naccordance with Clause 4.6 below. (i) at any time, and from time to time,\n and to the extent GSPL or any of its\nGoldspot may exercise the Put Option at any time after: Affiliates or any Person to which the Call\n Option is assigned pursuant to Clause\n', '(a) GSPL or its nominee issues the Subscription Notice 4.10(a) becomes eligible under all\nfor subscribing to such number of Subscription Shares applicable Indian laws or Regulations to\nwhich would result in GSPL or its nomin:.e holding hold such Put Shares. For the avoidance\nmore than 50% of the issued share capital of Centrino; of doubt, in the event that the Sectoral\nor Cap is increased to permit an increased\n level of foreign ownership of HEL, AG\n', ' 2.(47) "transfer", in relation to a capital asset, includes,-\n', '49 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', '49 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', '49 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', ' Hutchison Essar Limited (now Vodafone India Ltd.)\n\n50 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', ' "ThisShareholder\'s Agreement (this "Agreement") is entered into on 5 July 2007,\n among:\n', ' (1) Nadal Trading Company Private Limited (formerly known as Cerntino Trading\n Company Private\' limited). a company incorporated under the Companies Ad , 956, and\n having its registered office at Meher Chambers, 4" and 5th Floors. RK Marg, Ballard\n Estate. Mumbai 400 038 (herein after referred to as "Nadal") of the FIRST PART;\n', ' (2) ND Callus Info Services Private Limited, a company incorporated under the\n Companies Act 1956 and having its registered office at 15. Aurangzebe Road, New Delhi\n 110011 (hereinafter referred to as. "NDC\'\') of the SECOND PART;\n', ' Meaning of international transaction.\n', ' "WHEREAS:\n', ' (A) CGP is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the\n Vendor, CGP owns, directly or indirectly, companies\n which control the Company Interests.\n', ' (B) The Vendor has agreed to produce the sale of, and the\n Purchaser has agreed to purchase, the entire issued\n share capital of CGP on the terms and conditions set out\n in this agreement. The Vendor has further agreed to\n procure the assignment of, and the Purchaser has\n agreed to accept an assignment of, the Loans on the\n terms and conditions set out in this Agreement and the\n Loan Assignments.\n', '95 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', '95 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', '(a) The Call Option Provides an unconditional right to VISPL to buy the\nunderlying shares, whereas the Put Option provides a right in favour of\nAS/AG to require VISPL to purchase the underlying shares.\n', '(b) While providing two separate rights it has been ensured under the\n2007 Framework Agreements that the rights of AS/AG and VISPL are\n99 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', ' "158. SHA also provides for matters such as restriction of transfer of\n shares i.e. Right of First Refusal (ROFR). Right of First Offer (ROFO). Drag-Along\n Rights (DARs) and Tag-Along Rights (TARs). Pre-emption Rights. Call option. Put\n option. Subscription option etc. SHA in a characteristic Joint Venture Enterprise\n may regulate its affairs on the basis of various provisions enumerated above,\n because Joint Venture enterprise may deal with matters regulating the ownership\n and voting rights of shares in the company, control and manage the affairs of the\n company, and also may make provisions for resolution of disputes between the\n shareholders. Many of the above mentioned provisions find a place in SHAs, FWAs,\n Term Sheet Agreement etc. in the present case, hence, we may refer to some of\n those provisions.\n', ' (i) Oswal Fats And Oils Limited Vs. Additional Commissioner\n Administration) (2010) 4 SCC 728.\n', "The assessee is an Indian Company which was incorporated on 16 March,\n1999 under the Companies Act, 1956, in the name of 3 Global Services\nPrivate Limited ('3GSPL'). 3GSPL was part of Hutchison Whampoa Limited\n('HWL') Group. It became part of Vodafone International Holdings B.V.\n\n\n\n\n115 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n", ' (a)Terminate the SPA; or\n', ' (a)Terminate the SPA; or\n', ' (b) Complete the SPA to the extent practicable given the defaults\n which have occurred; or\n\n\n123 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', ' (a)Terminate the SPA; or\n', ' (b) Complete the SPA to the extent practicable given the defaults\n which have occurred; or\n\n\n123 | P a g e\n Vodafone India Services Private Ltd.\n', ' "GSPL transfer agreement means the business transfer agreement to\n be entered into between GSPL and an affiliate of HWL relating to\n call centre disposal substantially in the form attached to the\n disclosure letter"\n']}, {'Title': 'Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Hewlett Packard Ltd. on 14 August, 2001', 'DocID': 1282775, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "(ii) Lump sum know how fee : US Dollar 11 lakhs of taxes) with tax liability to be borne by the Indian Company." \n', ' "6.1 In consideration of the rights granted and the technology, technical\ninformation to be conveyed and technical assistance to be provided hereunder\n(subject to the payment of additional consideration expressly set forth in Article 3\nhereof) HCL shall pay to Apollo. \n', ' "6.1 In consideration of the rights granted and the technology, technical\ninformation to be conveyed and technical assistance to be provided hereunder\n(subject to the payment of additional consideration expressly set forth in Article 3\nhereof) HCL shall pay to Apollo. \n', ' "4.1 It is understood and agreed by the parties that the technology and any other information which Apollo consider proprietary to itself and its licence and which will be conveyed and disclose by Apollo to HCL in carrying out the provisions of this agreement is and shall remain confidential during the terms of this agreement and after the expiration or termination hereof for any reason whatsoever, until such time as same shall enter the public domain or otherwise become generally known without a material breach of this agreement by HCL. \n', ' "5.9 HCL shall use its best efforts to maintain a standard of quality and workmanship in its manufacture of the licensed products equal to that of Apollo and shall manufacture the licensed products out of materials supplied by parties to be mutually agreed between HCL and Apollo. HCL shall permit representatives of Apollo, upon reasonable advance notice and during normal business hours, to inspect the manufacturing facilities of HCL used for the manufacture of the licensed products. In particular, Apollo\'s representative shall be permitted to inspect and monitor the quality control procedures to be used by HCL, as well as to inspect samples of the licensed products and the compliance by HCL, with the quality standards for the licensed products contained in the technology." \n', ' "14.1 Unless earlier terminated, this agreement shall have an initial term of 5 years commencing on the effective date hereof. In the event that this agreement is not terminated earlier than said full initial term, then HCL may thereafter continue to manufacture, use and sell the licensed products under the rights granted herein without the obligation of paying any additional consideration to Apollo, including the right to manufacture, use and sell under any patents included in the technology covering the licensed products, provided that HCL shall make no claims against Apollo with respect to the licensed products." \n', 'REGISTERED POST \n \n\n No. FC : 71(87)-Comp./SCS. \n', ' Government of India \n \n\n Ministry of Industry \n \n\n Department of Industrial Development \n \n\n Secretariat for Industrial Approvals \n \n\n Special cases section \n \n\n New Delhi, the 20th Nov., 1991 \n \n\n M/s HCL Ltd., \n \n\n 608, Siddharth, \n \n\n 96, Nehru Place,\t \n \n\n New Delhi- 110019. \n', ' Subject : Application from M/s HCL Ltd., for foreign collaboration with M/s\nApollo Computer Inc. USA for the manufacture of microprocessor based\nCAD/GAM work section. \n', ' "Subject to written approval of the appropriate Government agencies and departments of the United States Export Licensing Authority and all conditions imposed on such approval and compliance therewith, Apollo hereby convey and grants to HCL exclusive right to manufacture, maintain, use and sell the licensed product in India in accordance with pursuant to and under the Technology. Said technology relating to the manufacture of the licensed products in India which is owned by Apollo as of the effective date of this agreement. \n', ' "Apollo shall deliver the tangible technical information constituting the technology, in accordance with Ext. 3 be prepaid air mail or air freight C.I.F. or\nby such other means which are reasonable and obtain from HCL acknowledgement of such delivery to HCL\'s registered office in India or to such other location in India which HCL will designate. Apollo shall provide two copies of said technical information in a form capable of being copies in the English language. HCL may, at their own expense, translate same into the Indian language, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Article 4 hereof, Apollo shall use all practical means to ensure that all the technical information under the technology provided to HCL is accurate, comprehensive and up-to-date and in the event that any of the technical information provided is inaccurate, comprehensive and up-to-date and in the event that any of the technical information provided is inaccurate, Apollo shall at its own cost rectify the inaccuracy without delay. Apollo will not be-liable for any loss or damage suffered by HCL in respect of such inaccuracies. \n', ' "Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separately in other articles of this agreement, then the provisions of those articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this article-" \n', ' "Alt, VIII-A \n \n\n (1) Royalties and fees for technical services arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. \n', ' (2) However, such royalties and fees for technical services may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise, and according to the laws of that State. But insofar as the fees for technical services are concerned, the tax so charged shall not exceed 20 per cent of the gross amount of such fees. \n', ' (3) The term "royalties" as used in this article means payment of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films or films or tapes used for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. \n', ' "The recitals in the agreement as also the provisions contained in Clause (6) thereof showed that the obligation undertaken by the assessee did not end merely with the handing over of the secret processes, but also extended to helping the Indian company in exploiting these processes property, efficiently and economically. The handing over of the know-how or secret processes was intimately connected and concerned with the obligation which was undertaken by the assessee in Clause (6). Therefore, it was properly held that part of the technical fees, accrued in India." \n', ' "Held, that, firstly, the agreement between the assessee and the foreign company was for a period of ten years only. Secondly, it was in respect of certain secret or patent formulations owned or controlled by the foreign company. The payment, though called \'Research contribution\' in the agreement, was nothing but the consideration correlated to the extent of the exploitation of the secret formulations and patent rights and various other rights belonging to the foreign company by the assessee in India and that it was for the exclusive right to manufacture the products that the payment was made and it was nothing else but \'royalty\' as known to law and to the international commercial world in the context of such agreements. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the payment of Rs. 48,698 made by the assessee to the foreign company during the relevant period was royalty payment and was liable to deduction of tax at other lower rate of 50 per cent as prescribed in the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971." \n']}, {'Title': 'Aamir Raza Husain And Anr. vs Cinevistaas Limited And Ors. on 18 September, 2002', 'DocID': 886570, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['"7.7 The grant of rights, representations, warranties, indemnities and, confidentiality obligations contained herein shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement." \n', '"Monday June 24, 2002\n \n\nThis is to state that a meeting was held at the Circuit House, Kargil on Sunday, June 23, 2002 at 18.30 Hrs. in the presence of Shri T. Namgyal, S.P. Kargil. The following were also present- \n', ' From Cinevista \n \n\n', ' 1. Mr. Sunil Mehta \n \n\n']}, {'Title': 'Siemens Aktiengesellschaft vs Income-Tax Officer on 6 July, 1987', 'DocID': 1967060, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' Article III(1) - Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) below, tax shall not be levied in one of the territories on the industrial or commercial profits of an enterprise of the other territory unless profits are derived in the first-mentioned territory through a permanent establishment of the said enterprise situated in the first-mentioned territory. If profits are so derived, tax may be levied in the first-mentioned territory on the profits attributable to the said permanent establishment. \n', " Article III(3) - For the purpose of this Agreement the term 'industrial or commercial profits' shall not include income in the form of rents, royalties, interest, dividends, management charges, remuneration for labour or personal services or income from the operation of ships or aircraft but shall include rents or royalties in respect of cinematographic films. \n", ' Article IX - Income from immovable property may be taxed in the territory in which the property is situated. For this purpose any rent or royalty or other income derived from the operation of a mine, quarry or any other extraction of natural resources shall be regarded as income from immovable property. \n', 'To support this proposition, it was submitted that in Article V and subsequent Articles of the D.T.A. Agreement, the species of income out of the types of income which were enumerated in Article III(3) which alone fell within the ambit of taxation were spelt out. Unless such types of income referred to in Article III(3) fell within the species specified in Article V or any of the subsequent Articles of the D.T.A. Agreement, such amount, it was contended, would not be taxable in India. In this regard reliance was placed on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Visakhapatnam Port Trust [1983] 144 ITR 146.\n', 'Explanation 2. For the purposes of this clause, "royalty" means consideration (including any lump sum consideration but excluding any consideration which would be the income of the recipient chargeable under the head "Capital gains") for :--\n', 'Explanation 2. For the purposes of this clause, "royalty" means consideration (including any lump sum consideration but excluding any consideration which would be the income of the recipient chargeable under the head "Capital gains") for :--\n', '(i) the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of a patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property ;\n', " The words 'subject to the provisions of paragraph (3)' in art. III(1) would in our view indicate that while 'industrial or commercial income' of the foreign enterprise are not taxable in India, the rents, royalties, interest, dividends, etc., derived by the foreign enterprise from sources in India are taxable....Further, in our opinion, the items : rents, royalties, dividends, interest, etc., are taxable only when they satisfy the conditions mentioned for their liability to tax as envisaged in the various specific articles such as arts. V, VI, VII, VIII, etc. \n \n\nonly that type of royalties would be taxable to which there may be reference in Article V and Articles subsequent thereto. The only reference to 'royalty' is in Article IX and the royalty envisaged by such Article is only that royalty derived from the operation of a mine, quarry or any other extraction of natural resources.\n", 'It has come to the notice of the Board that sometimes effect to the provisions of double taxation avoidance agreement is not given by the assessing officers when they find that the provisions of the agreement are not in conformity with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.\n', ' 6.1. In consideration of the supply of technical know-how and training of Siemens India personnel by Siemens with regard to Contract Products (for which Siemens India or its licensees already held manufacturing licences granted by the Government of India) as well as in consideration of the supply of technical know-how on New Developments, Siemens India shall pay to Siemens fees at the rates specified in Annex A hereto, on the basis of the "ex-factory selling price" of the respective Contract Products and parts thereof manufactured and sold by Siemens India and its licensees during the validity of this agreement as defined in Article 9.1 hereof. With regard to this Agreement, Contract Products shall be considered as "sold" when invoiced, by Siemens India to the purchaser ; or if not invoiced, when delivered, dispatched or set apart for the own use of Siemens India. \n', 'The payment is for the supply of technical know-how, the training of Siemens India personnel as also for the supply of technical know-how on new developments for contract products. Contract products are those products which have been set out in Annexure \'A\' to each of the relevant agreements. In the present agreement they are motors, low voltage switchgear, switchboards, high voltage switchgear, etc. The term "new developments" has also been defined. This definition comes in para 1.5 at page 126 of paper book No. I and reads as under :--\n', ' 11.1.1. For services rendered and to be rendered in Germany, a technical assistance fee of 1% of the total aggregate of the net selling prices of the CONTRACT TUBES and CONTRACT SHIELDS produced and sold by BEL reduced by the landed cost of the components and raw materials supplied by SIEMENS in accordance with Clause 9 and consumed in the production of the said CONTRACT TUBES and CONTRACT SHIELDS sold. \n', ' 11.1.1. For services rendered and to be rendered in Germany, a technical assistance fee of 1% of the total aggregate of the net selling prices of the CONTRACT TUBES and CONTRACT SHIELDS produced and sold by BEL reduced by the landed cost of the components and raw materials supplied by SIEMENS in accordance with Clause 9 and consumed in the production of the said CONTRACT TUBES and CONTRACT SHIELDS sold. \n', '8.1 In consideration of the documentation prepared and transmitted in Germany and the technical assistance rendered in Germany comprising the training of CCI personnel by SIEMENS in Germany as per Article 3, CCI shall pay to SIEMENS a lump sum payment of DM 1,30,000 (one hundred thirty-thousand Destuche Marks), subject to the applicable Indian taxes, in three equal instalments as detailed below :\n']}, {'Title': 'Microfibres Inc vs Girdhar And Co. And Ors. on 13 January, 2006', 'DocID': 1210059, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['Provided further that no suit or any other proceeding for relief under this subsection shall be instituted in any court below the court of District Judge.\n', '3) In any suit or any other proceeding for relief under Sub-section (2), every ground on which the registration of a design may be cancelled Under Section 19 shall be available as a ground of defense.\n']}, {'Title': 'Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Stanton & Stavely (Overseas) Ltd. on 16 August, 1982', 'DocID': 1479319, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "income by way of royalties received from Government or a local authority or any Indian concern." \n', ' "In the case of a non-resident company which has not made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment of dividends within India, its income by way of any interest or fees for rendering technical services received from Government or a local authority or any Indian concern.\'" \n', '"(i) Forth to sell and deliver to IISCO copies of all such detailed drawing and specifications as IISCO may reasonably require for the purchase and installation and operation of the Specialist Plant :\n', '"(i) Forth to sell and deliver to IISCO copies of all such detailed drawing and specifications as IISCO may reasonably require for the purchase and installation and operation of the Specialist Plant :\n', '(ii) To lend to IISCO as and when may be required by IISCO on reasonable notice for temporary service with IISCO a qualified engineer whose duties shall be to supervise the erection of the Kulti extension and in particular the installation and starting up of the Specialist Plant;\n', ' "For the purpose of the manufacture of Stanton products (but not further of otherwise) Stanton hereby agrees to grant to IISCO and IISCO hereby agrees to take for the continuance of this agreement or the respec\n\ntive lives of the Stanton patents whichever shall be the shorter full and free licence and authority to manufacture in territory as aforesaid Stanton products in accordance with the specifications of the said Stanton patents or any part thereof or any process or invention therein described and to sell the same for use within IISCO territory. Every such licence shall be in the form specified in the First Schedule hereto." \n', ' "For the purpose of the manufacture of Stanton products (but not further of otherwise) Stanton hereby agrees to grant to IISCO and IISCO hereby agrees to take for the continuance of this agreement or the respec\n\ntive lives of the Stanton patents whichever shall be the shorter full and free licence and authority to manufacture in territory as aforesaid Stanton products in accordance with the specifications of the said Stanton patents or any part thereof or any process or invention therein described and to sell the same for use within IISCO territory. Every such licence shall be in the form specified in the First Schedule hereto." \n', '"(a) A commission at the specified rate (as hereinafter defined) on the nett selling price (as hereinafter defined) of all Stanton products manufactured and sold by IISCO during the continuance of this agreement, such commission to become due and payable in the manner specified in Clause 6 hereof. The specified rate in respect of all Stanton products manufactured prior to the reduced commission date shall be three per centum and thereafter one and a half percentum. The nett selling price above referred to shall mean the nett price at the plant of manufacture realised by IISCO :\n', '(b) Except always in so far as may otherwise be agreed in writing from time to time an amount equivalent to the cost to Stanton of all salary and travelling expenses (including board while in IISCO territory) of the engineer whose services shall be lent to IISCO pursuant to Clause 2 of this agreement and all other engineers or other employees of Stanton whose services Stanton may hereafter agree shall be lent to IISCO in connection with the operation of any plant of IISCO for manufacture of Stanton products or the construction of any plant by IISCO for such purpose or advice in regard thereto, such payment to be made on monthly account nett against invoices ;\n', '"(a) A commission at the specified rate (as hereinafter defined) on the nett selling price (as hereinafter defined) of all Stanton products manufactured and sold by IISCO during the continuance of this agreement, such commission to become due and payable in the manner specified in Clause 6 hereof. The specified rate in respect of all Stanton products manufactured prior to the reduced commission date shall be three per centum and thereafter one and a half percentum. The nett selling price above referred to shall mean the nett price at the plant of manufacture realised by IISCO :\n', '(b) Except always in so far as may otherwise be agreed in writing from time to time an amount equivalent to the cost to Stanton of all salary and travelling expenses (including board while in IISCO territory) of the engineer whose services shall be lent to IISCO pursuant to Clause 2 of this agreement and all other engineers or other employees of Stanton whose services Stanton may hereafter agree shall be lent to IISCO in connection with the operation of any plant of IISCO for manufacture of Stanton products or the construction of any plant by IISCO for such purpose or advice in regard thereto, such payment to be made on monthly account nett against invoices ;\n', '(c) Amounts equivalent to any sums paid by Stanton to any engineers or other employees of IISCO who may be sent by IISCO to Stanton\'s plant (for the avoidance of doubt it is hereby agreed and declared that all salaries and travelling expenses including board while in England of any such employees shall be borne solely by IISCO)." \n', ' "If during the continuance of this agreement either party shall make, discover or acquire any further invention, patent, process or design in connection with or improvements upon or addition to the methods of manufacturing Stanton products or any modifications of or developments in machinery or apparatus used in connection therewith such party shall (unless prevented by the terms of any such acquisition) communicate the same to the other party and shall ensure if it shall have acquired the right so to do that such other shall receive full and sufficient licences, information and assistance thereon and in relation thereto and be enabled to use the same for the manufacture (in the case of IISCO) of Stanton products in IISCO territory during the continuance of this agreement and in accordance therewith without payment other than such as is hereinbefore provided or (in the case of Stanton) of or otherwise in relation to any products of Stanton (but not for the manufacture of Stanton products in IISCO territory during the continuance of this agreement) PROVIDED ALWAYS that if such rights shall only have been acquired by the one party subject to payment, that party shall be entitled to require from the other and the other shall if it shall desire to use such rights pay a fair proportion (to be agreed between the parties hereto or failing such agreement to be determined by the respective auditors for the time being of the parties or an umpire previously appointed by such auditors) of such payment." \n', '"8. As regards the foreign participant\'s tax liability also, the first question would be whether the amount received for the supply of technical know-how, is a receipt on capital account or on revenue account. The answer would again depend on the facts of the case. It has to be observed that the nature of the outgoing in the hands of the Indian participant will not always be determinative of the nature of the receipt in the hands of the foreign party. In the U.K., it has been held by courts that a receipt from the sale of know-how would be a capital receipt only where the sale of the technical know-how or the imparting of technical knowledge and information results in the transfer or parting with of the property or assets or any special knowledge or skill which would ripen into a form of property and that after such transfer, the transferor is deprived of using the asset. (Please see Moriarty v. Evans Medical Supplies Ltd. [1959] 35 ITR 707 (HL)). In all other cases, where no capital asset or property is parted with and the transaction is merely a method of trading \n\nby which the recipient acquires the particular sum of money as profits and gains of that trade, the consideration received for the sale of technical know-how will be on revenue account.\n', '9. If the amount received by the foreign participant is a revenue receipt in his hands and the amount is received by him outside India the further questions that would arise are, whether the payment is :\n', '(i) for services rendered abroad, or\n \n\n', '"Royalty, a payment reserved by the grantor of a patent, lease of a mine or similar right, and payable proportionately to the use made of the right of the grantee. It is usually a payment of money, but may be payment in kind, that is, of part of the produce of the exercise of the right.\n', '"Royalty, a payment reserved by the grantor of a patent, lease of a mine or similar right, and payable proportionately to the use made of the right of the grantee. It is usually a payment of money, but may be payment in kind, that is, of part of the produce of the exercise of the right.\n', 'Royalty also means a payment which is made to an author or composer by a publisher in respect of each copy of his work which is sold, or to an inventor in respect of each article sold under the patent,\n \n\nFees, perquisites allowed to officers in the administration of justice, as a recompense for their labour and trouble, ascertained either by Acts of Parliament, by rule or order of court, or by ancient usage, in modern \n\n\ntimes frequently commuted for a salary, e.g., by the Justices Clerks Act, 1877, Sections 2-4 (repealed).\n']}, {'Title': 'The Income Tax Officer, T.D.S. - Viii, ... vs Raj Television Network Ltd., ... on 30 October, 2001', 'DocID': 139044, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' Date of Payment\t\t Amount\n01.02.1996\t\tRs. 2,02,12,500 \n27.03.1966 \t\tRs. 1,02,54,000\n\nTotal ... \t\tRs. 3,04,66,500 \n \n\nThus, the total payment was made in a sum of Rs. 3,04,66, 500/=. According to the Revenue, while making this payment, Raj TV should have deducted tax under Section 195 of the I.T. Act but did not do so. The ITO., (TDS) issued Show Cause Notice for treating the assessee in default under Section. 201(1) of the I.T.Act. The ITO held that the amount paid by RAJ TV to RTV is an income that arose and accrued in India to RTV, England and that the provisions of Section 195 of the I.T. Act will be attracted because of the reasons that RTV has rendered service in Indian Territory by beaming signals across the taxable territory in India which are utilised by the local channels. Further, there was a continuity of business connection between the assessee company and RTV which was effective from 15.11.95. Also, the foreign company has received the transponding hire charges only due to its business connection in India.\n', ' (iva) "The use or the right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment." \n']}, {'Title': 'Shriram Capital Ltd, Chennai vs Dcit, Corp Cir-6(1), Chennai on 18 February, 2022', 'DocID': 176861207, 'matching_columns': ['"7. We heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record.\nThe only issue in the present appeal relates to disallowance u/s14A of the\nAct. Admittedly, assessee made investments which yielded dividend income\nof Rs.61,44,03,001/- and investments were made in subsidiary companies\nfor strategic purpose. Admittedly, assessee itself had offered suo motu\ndisallowance of Rs.73,602/- u/s.14A of the Act. The provisions of Sub Section\n(2) of Section 14A of the Act provides that resort to provisions u/s.14A of\nthe Act can be made only if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the\nclaim of the assessee in respect of expenditure incurred to earn exempt\nincome. Therefore, it is mandatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to\nrecord a satisfaction as to correctness or otherwise of the claim of the\nassessee regarding expenditure incurred to earn exempt income. In the\npresent case, assessee suo motu offered disallowance of Rs.73,602/-. From\nthe perusal of the assessment order, it is clear that there is no findings by the\nAssessing Officer as to the correctness or otherwise of the claim of the\nassessee that only an expenditure of Rs.73,602/- was incurred. In this\nabsences of any findings by the Assessing Officer, resort to provisions of\nSection 14A of the Act cannot be made as ruled by Hon\'ble Bombay High\nCourt in the case of Reliance Capital Asset Management Ltd (supra) and the\nSLP against this judgment was dismissed by Hon\'ble Supreme Court in 259\nTaxman 83. The Hon\'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment\nLtd (supra) has upheld this principle by holding as under:-\n\n "41. Having regard to the language of section 14A(2) of the Act, read\n with rule 8D of the Rules, we also make it clear that before applying\n the theory of apportionment, the Assessing Officer needs to record\n satisfaction that having regard to the kind of the assessee, suo motu\n disallowance under section 14A was not correct. It will be in those\n cases where the assessee in his return has himself apportioned but the\n Assessing Officer was not accepting the said apportionment. In that\n eventuality, it will have to record its satisfaction to this effect.\n Further, while recording such a satisfaction, the nature of the loan\n taken by the assessee for purchasing the shares/ making the\n investment in shares is to be examined by the Assessing Officer\'\'.\n\nRecently, the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal to which one of us i.e. the\nAccountant Member is the author of the order, in the case of City Union Bank\nLtd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2019) 74 ITR Trib (644)\nChennai held as follows:-\n\n "As regards to other limb of the argument of the assessee that in the\n absences of any finding by the Assessing Officer as to how the\n contention of the assessee that no expenditure was incurred is\n incorrect no disallowance should be made. We find from the\n assessment order that the assessee bank itself has offered a sum of\n â\x82¹2,19,751/- under the provisions of Section 14A of the Act. From the\n 7 I.T.A. Nos.3168, 3216, 3255 & 3217/Chny/18\n\n\n perusal of the order of the Assessing Officer, it is clear that the\n Assessing Officer had not assigned any reason whatsoever as to how\n the claim of the assessee is incorrect. In the similar facts, the Hon\'ble\n Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. vs. CIT, 402\n ITR 640 held that in the absence of the finding of the Assessing\n Officer resort to provisions of Section 14A of the Act r.w.r 8D of the\n Rules cannot be made. This decision was followed by the Co-\n ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Karur Vysya Bank\n (supra) cited by holding as under:-\n\n "Ground No. 8 challenges the addition of â\x82¹3,88,882/- invoking\n the provision of Section 14A of the Act. It is the contention of\n the appellant that the appellant had not incurred any\n expenditure to earn exempt income. The Assessing Officer\n had not given any findings as to how the claim of the assessee-\n bank that no expenditure was incurred to earn the exempt\n income was incorrect. In the absence of this finding resort to\n the provisions of rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules cannot be\n made as held by the Hon\'ble Supreme Court in the case of\n Maxopp Investment Ltd vs. CIT, (2018) 402 ITR 640.\n Therefore this ground of appeal filed by the assessee is\n allowed. Accordingly, this ground of appeal stands allowed in\n favour of the assessee\'\'.\n\n Similar view was taken up by the Hon\'ble Delhi High Court in the\n case of CIT vs. Taikisha Engineering India Ltd, 370 ITR 338 and\n PCIT vs. Moonstar Securities Trading and Finance Co. (P) Ltd, 105\n taxmann.com 274. The Hon\'ble Delhi High Court had firmly held\n that mere rejection of the explanation of the assessee per se cannot be\n accepted. This decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Moonstar\n Securities Trading and Finance Co. (P) Ltd, was affirmed by the\n Hon\'ble Supreme Court in the case of dismissal of SLP in PCIT vs.\n Moonstar Securities Trading and Finance Co. (P) Ltd, 105\n taxmann.com 274\'\'.\n\nIn the light of the above decisions, admittedly, in the present case, the\nAssessing Officer had not recorded any findings as to the correctness or\notherwise of the claim of assessee company that only expenditure of\nRs.73,602/- was incurred to earn exempt income. Therefore, the Assessing\nOfficer was not justified in resort to provisions u/s.14A of the Act.\nAccordingly, no disallowance can be made u/s.14A of the Act.\n\n08. It is unnecessary for us to deal with other arguments made by the\nassessee since we had held that no resort can be made to provisions of\nSection 14A of the Act.\n 8 I.T.A. Nos.3168, 3216, 3255 & 3217/Chny/18\n 09. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee stands allowed."'], 'matching_indents': []}, {'Title': 'Sonata Information Technology Ltd. vs Additional Commissioner Of ... on 31 January, 2006', 'DocID': 456079, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['1. Actuate Corporation, USA\n \n\n', '2. Borland Australia Ply Ltd.\n', '3. Business Objects.\n', " Defined generally, the word 'royalty' means a share of the product or profit reserved by the owner for permitting another to use the property; the share of the production or profit it paid to the owner; a share of the product or proceeds therefrom reserved to the owner for permitting another to use the property; the share of the produce reserved to the owner for permitting another to exploit and use the property; a share of the profit, reserved by the owner for permitting another to use the property; the amount reserved or the rental to be paid the original owner of the whole estate.\n", "An asset would be said to be exploited only when it is replicated or distributed or sold. The Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. New India Industries Ltd. , after considering many decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts had observed that-\n", "An agreement was entered into between Microsoft Regional Sales Corporation and the appellant on 1-7-2003. This agreement provided for the appellant to be appointed as its Non-Exclusive Distributor in India for the distribution of Microsoft Corporation product. The Distributor's rights to distribute product under the agreement extended only to the territory defined in the agreement.\n", 'Clause 2 of the agreement provides for appointment, which reads as under:\n', ' 2. Appointment. - Subject to the provisions of this Agreement MRS appoints the Distributor as its non-exclusive distributor of the Products in the Territory.\n', '4. Miscellaneous:\n', '(a) All Confidential Information and Confidential Materials are and shall remain the property of MRS. By disclosing information to Company, MRS does not grant any express or implied right to Company to or under Microsoft patents, copyrights, trademarks, or trade secret information.\n', '(b) If MRS or any MRS affiliate provides pre-release PC operating system software ("Product") as Confidential Information or Confidential Materials under this Agreement:\n', 'Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines as under.-\n', 'Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines as under.-\n', 'Article 10\n \n\nComputer Programmes and Compilations of Data\n \n\n', '1. Computer programmes, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).\n', '7. Material object which is the subject of copyright is different from copyright. - Copyright is different from the material object, which is the subject of the copyright. So, a transfer of the material object does not necessarily involve a transfer of the copyright. Where the plaintiffs sold certain electroblocks for the purpose of printing certain drawings, and the purchasers lent these blocks to the defendants in order that they, in turn, might print from them, it was held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to restrain the defendants from doing so, notwithstanding the permission of the purchasers. The sale of the books could not have had the effect of an assignment of copyright.\n', " In order for an assignment to be valid, it must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the assignor. It has been held that sufficient writing might be provided by an invoice or receipt. The assignment should identify the work concerned with sufficient clarity so that it can be ascertained, though the courts have admitted oral ('parol') evidence to assist in the process of identification. No special form of words is required, so a transfer of 'all the partnership assets' will include a transfer of any copyright owned by the partnership. Assignment of copyright is a distinct legal transaction and is not effected by mere sale or transfer of the work itself. Thus, if a person sells an original painting or manuscript, this (of itself) only transfers the personal property right in the chattel: the copyright remains with its owner. If a vendor wishes to transfer the copyright as well as the personal property in the chattel, this should be done explicitly.\n", '6.9 Indian statutory law treats software as goods and levies sales tax, excise and custom duty on it as goods as the extract below indicates:\n']}, {'Title': 'Lg Electronics India Pvt Ltd vs Bharat Bhogilal Patel & Others on 13 July, 2012', 'DocID': 48055807, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' a) That this court has no territorial jurisdiction to\n entertain and try the present proceedings as no part of\n cause of action qua the said complaint has arisen within\n the jurisdiction of this court. The defendant no. 1 is\n carrying on business in Mumbai and the defendant no. 2\n is the commissioner of customs (Import) Special\n Investigation and is also having office in Mumbai. The\n chief commissioner of customs is added as defendant in\n order to create jurisdiction of this court.\n', ' (a) "goods infringing intellectual property rights" means any\n goods which are made, reproduced, put into circulation or\n otherwise used in breach of the intellectual property laws in\n India or outside India and without the consent of the right\n holder or a person duly authorized to do so by the right\n holder;\n', ' (b) "intellectual property" means a copyright as defined in\n the Copyright Act, 1957, trade mark as defined in the Trade\n\nCS (OS) No.2982/2011 Page 29 of 80\nMarks Act,1999, patent as defined in the Patents Act, 1970,\n design as defined in the Designs Act, 2000 and geographical\n indications as defined in the Geographical Indications of\n Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999;\n', ' "4. It is pertinent to mention that while the mandatory\n obligations under Articles 51 to 60 of the TRIPS dealing\n with border measures are restricted to Copyright and\n Trade Marks infringement only, the said Rules deal with\n\nCS (OS) No.2982/2011 Page 35 of 80\n Patents, Designs and Geographical Indications violations\n as well, in conformity with the practice prevailing in\n some other countries, notably EU countries. While it is\n not difficult for Customs officers to determine\n Copyright and Trade Marks infringements at the\n border based on available data/inputs, it may not\n be so in the case of the other three violations,\n unless the offences have already been established\n by a judicial pronouncement in India and the\n Customs is called upon or required to merely\n implement such order. In other words, extreme\n caution needs to be exercised at the time of\n determination of infringement of these three\n intellectual property rights."\n', 'ARTICLE 51: Suspension of Release by Custom Authorities\nMembers shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below,\nadopt procedures to enable aright holder, who has valid grounds\nfor suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or\npirated copyright goods may take place, to lodge an application in\nwriting with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for\nthe suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free\ncirculation of such goods. Members may enable such an application\nto be made in respect of goods which involve other infringements\nof intellectual property rights, provided that the requirements of\nthis Section are met. Members may also provide for corresponding\nprocedures concerning the suspension by the customs authorities\nof the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from\ntheir territories.\n', ' a) Article 51 provides for the different kind of treatment relating\n to border measures when it comes to trade mark, copyright\n infringement on the one hand vis-a-vis the infringement of\n the other forms of intellectual property rights. The said\n article 51 uses the expression "shall" making it obligatory\n upon the member states to provide for the procedure for the\n suspension of the goods on the basis of the suspicion of the\n right holder relating to the infringement of the trade mark or\n copyright pirated goods. Curiously, the same very article\n uses the expression "may" which making it optional for the\n member countries to provide such mechanism for other\n forms of intellectual properties with the proviso that the\n conditions set out in this chapter are met with.\n', ' Article 1\n', ' - that the right-holder inform the customs authorities in\n\nCS (OS) No.2982/2011 Page 52 of 80\n writing within 10 working days, or three working days in\n the case of perishable goods, of receipt of the\n notification provided for in Article 9, that the goods\n concerned by the procedure infringe an intellectual\n property right referred to in Article 2(1) and provide\n those authorities with the written agreement of the\n declarant, the holder or the owner of the goods to\n abandon the goods for destruction. With the agreement\n of the customs authorities, this information may be\n provided directly to customs by the declarant, the\n holder or the owner of the goods. This agreement shall\n be presumed to be accepted when the declarant, the\n holder or the owner of the goods has not specifically\n opposed destruction within the prescribed period. This\n period may be extended by a further ten working days\n where circumstances warrant it;\n', ' Article 1\n Nature and Scope of Obligations\n\n', ' Article 1\n Nature and Scope of Obligations\n\n']}, {'Title': 'Asia Publishing House vs John Wiley And Sons, Inc. on 18 August, 1967', 'DocID': 1937130, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['Question-.-(i) Whether Wileys were under the said agreement dated 1st October 1956 and in law entitled to give Asia the notice dated 1st March 1963.\n', 'Question-.-(i) Whether Wileys were under the said agreement dated 1st October 1956 and in law entitled to give Asia the notice dated 1st March 1963.\n', 'Answer:-Yes.\n', 'Question-.-(i) Whether Wileys were under the said agreement dated 1st October 1956 and in law entitled to give Asia the notice dated 1st March 1963.\n', 'Answer:-Yes.\n', 'Question:-(ii) Whether the said Notice was illegal and/or in breach of the Agreement and if so, to what extent.\n', '(1) Is there an error made by the arbitrator in the construction of any of the terms of the reprint agreement? If so, is the error apparent on the face of the award. If there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award, was that question specifically referred as such for decision by the arbitrator, or was it merely an error of law made by the arbitrator in the course of deciding any question in dispute but not specifically referred?\n', '(1) Is there an error made by the arbitrator in the construction of any of the terms of the reprint agreement? If so, is the error apparent on the face of the award. If there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award, was that question specifically referred as such for decision by the arbitrator, or was it merely an error of law made by the arbitrator in the course of deciding any question in dispute but not specifically referred?\n', '(2) Is the award liable to be set aside on the ground that there is such an error apparent on the face of the award as would deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction to so decide?\n', "Memorandum of Agreement made this first day of October, 1956, Between John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 440 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, New York, U.S.A. (hereinafter called the Proprietors) of the one part and Asia Publishing House, Contractor Building, Nicol Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay 1, India, (hereinafter called the Publishers) of the other part whereby it is mutually agreed as follows representing the Proprietors' publications (hereinafter called the said works).\n", '1. The Proprietors hereby grant to the Publishers the sole and exclusive license to print and publish the said works in the English language throughout the Republic of India subject to the terms and conditions following.\n', "2. The Publishers shall inform the Proprietors the titles of the books they are interested in publishing in the Publishers' territory. No printing work shall be carried out by the Publishers until they obtain permission in writing from the Proprietors to do so.\n", " ...The agreement there, although different in certain terms from the present agreement, has certain features very ' much in common. In that case (as in the present) the licensee was to make use of the designs of the licensor, and in both cases, it appears to me, the reputation of the licensor might be affected by the goods manufactured by the licensee. In the case of that agreement there was an express provision for determination in certain specified events, namely, in the event of the commission or remuneration under the agreement not reaching a certain specified sum; and it was because of that express- provision in the agreement that Jenkins J. took the view that it was not determinable on notice.\n", " ...The agreement there, although different in certain terms from the present agreement, has certain features very ' much in common. In that case (as in the present) the licensee was to make use of the designs of the licensor, and in both cases, it appears to me, the reputation of the licensor might be affected by the goods manufactured by the licensee. In the case of that agreement there was an express provision for determination in certain specified events, namely, in the event of the commission or remuneration under the agreement not reaching a certain specified sum; and it was because of that express- provision in the agreement that Jenkins J. took the view that it was not determinable on notice.\n", 'Mr. Sen urged that in the present agreement also there is an express provision for determination in certain specified events and therefore in view of that express provision it should be held that the present agreement was not determinable on notice.\n', ' ...The first thing that one observes is that it is a mere licence, or the operative part of that agreement is a mere licence, to the Canadian company to manufacture, sell and exploit; and accordingly, on the principles which I have adopted, prima facie that licence is terminable. It does not impose any obligation upon the Canadian company to manufacture, sell or exploit any of the Martin-Baker products at all, though it does bar Martin-Baker from entering into any agreement with another party on the American continent to manufacture, sell or exploit if the Canadian company do nothing at all. That alone appears to me to be a consideration which points quite plainly to the view that Martin-Baker cannot have intended that they were to have their hands entirely tied by what may be wholly passive action by the Canadian company. That is one element in this agreement which points strongly in my view to determinability.\n', ' ...The first thing that one observes is that it is a mere licence, or the operative part of that agreement is a mere licence, to the Canadian company to manufacture, sell and exploit; and accordingly, on the principles which I have adopted, prima facie that licence is terminable. It does not impose any obligation upon the Canadian company to manufacture, sell or exploit any of the Martin-Baker products at all, though it does bar Martin-Baker from entering into any agreement with another party on the American continent to manufacture, sell or exploit if the Canadian company do nothing at all. That alone appears to me to be a consideration which points quite plainly to the view that Martin-Baker cannot have intended that they were to have their hands entirely tied by what may be wholly passive action by the Canadian company. That is one element in this agreement which points strongly in my view to determinability.\n', " Furthermore, I think it is plain throughout this agreement that there are terms which involve the highest degree of mutual confidence and trust between the two contracting parties, and therefore that it is an agreement which even on the most limited application of Lord Selborne's doctrine would not be permanent, but would be terminable.\n", ' ...A licence in the strict sense is, as I said during the argument, nothing but a permission which would carry with it immunity from proceedings to those who act upon the permission. It is really a dispensation and nothing more than a dispensation.\n', ' ...A licence in the strict sense is, as I said during the argument, nothing but a permission which would carry with it immunity from proceedings to those who act upon the permission. It is really a dispensation and nothing more than a dispensation.\n', 'In the case of Heap v. Hartley (1880) 42 Ch. D. 461, Cotton L.J. referring to the expression "licence" and what that term carried, said this (p. 468) :\n', ' ...A licence in the strict sense is, as I said during the argument, nothing but a permission which would carry with it immunity from proceedings to those who act upon the permission. It is really a dispensation and nothing more than a dispensation.\n', 'In the case of Heap v. Hartley (1880) 42 Ch. D. 461, Cotton L.J. referring to the expression "licence" and what that term carried, said this (p. 468) :\n', ' ...That is pointedly put in the judgment of Lord Hatherley, then Vice-Chancellor, in this way:-\n', ' ...If tie play be not produced in London by the said George Edwardes within three months from this date all rights of representation as aforesaid shall revert to and become again the absolute property of the licensors.\n', ' ...If tie play be not produced in London by the said George Edwardes within three months from this date all rights of representation as aforesaid shall revert to and become again the absolute property of the licensors.\n', 'It was this clause which it was said compares with clause 11 of the agreement in the present case wherein it is provided that should the publishers be declared bankrupt or should they violate any of the terms of the agreement and not rectify such violations within six months of having received written notice from the proprietors to do so, "then all rights to publish or sell the said works in the English language shall revert to the proprietors..." In that case that Clause (clause 5) weighed heavily in favour of it being held that there was an assignment of the copyright. After referring to clause 1 Lord Hailsham held (p. 15&):\n', ' ...If tie play be not produced in London by the said George Edwardes within three months from this date all rights of representation as aforesaid shall revert to and become again the absolute property of the licensors.\n', 'It was this clause which it was said compares with clause 11 of the agreement in the present case wherein it is provided that should the publishers be declared bankrupt or should they violate any of the terms of the agreement and not rectify such violations within six months of having received written notice from the proprietors to do so, "then all rights to publish or sell the said works in the English language shall revert to the proprietors..." In that case that Clause (clause 5) weighed heavily in favour of it being held that there was an assignment of the copyright. After referring to clause 1 Lord Hailsham held (p. 15&):\n', " .. .That, in my view, plainly operates as an assignment to Mr. George Edwardes of the sole and exclusive right of representation within the area named in the clause, and I think that that view of the clause is strengthened, not only by the expression in clause 2, which stipulates that the copyright in the music shall remain the property of M. Messager, but also by the language of clause 5, which provides that in the event of non-production within three months 'all rights of representation as aforesaid shall revert to and become again the absolute property of the licensers.' That seems to me inept language in which to describe the mere cessation of a licence, and is much more apt to describe the reversion to the licensors of rights which had been assigned by clause I.\n \n\n", " ...In my opinion then by virtue of the provisions of the agreement and Section 1 of the Act, the plaintiffs if they exercise their option in respect of 'Captivity' will have an interest in the copyright. Until they exercise their option they will not be assignees of the copyright wholly or partially, or grantees of an interest in the copyright by licence under Section 5, Sub-section 2; for it is only the exercise of their option that converts then option to become proprietors or owners of a part of the copyright into equitable ownership of part of the copyright or an interest in the copyright. But they have in the meantime an option to become entitled to an interest in the copyright. Their interest has in the course of the case been called an inchoate interest, it is a right in the plaintiffs to acquire an interest in the copyright by signifying their desire to do so, and is an interest in the copyright in the same way as an option to purchase a piece of land or to acquire certain shares is an interest in tile land or shares.\n", ' It seems to me, therefore, that, on the cases, there is none which compels us to hold that a mere referencs to the contract in the award entitles us to look at the contract. It may be that in particular cases a specific reference to a particular clause of a contract may incorporate the contract, or that clause of it, in the award. I think that we are driven back to first principles in this matter, namely, that an award can only be set aside for error which is on its face. It is true that an award can incorporate another document so as to entitle one to read that document as part of the award and, by reading them together, find an error on the face of the award. But the question whether a contract, or a clause in a contract, is incorporated in the award is a question of construction of the award. It seems to me that the test is put as conveniently as it can be in the words of Denning L.J., which I have already cited from Blaiber & Co., Ltd. v. Leopold Newborne [London], Ltd. (1953) 2 Lloyd\'s Rep. at p. 429 \' As I read the cases, if the arbitrator says: "On the wording of this clause I hold\' sj and so, then that clause is impliedly incorporated into the award because he invites the reading of it.\n', ' Any and every dispute difference or question which shall at any time arise between the parties hereto touching the construction meaning or effect of these presents or of any clause or thing herein contained or the rights or liabilities of the parties he-rounder or otherwise howsoever relating to the premises shall be referred to the arbitration of a sole arbitrator to be agreed upon between the parties or failing agreement to be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the time being and this shall be deemed a submission....\n', 'The question raised upon these facts was whether there was a reference to the arbitrator of any question of law as such or merely a general reference to arbitration. Viscount Cave L.C. held that there was in that case a reference to the arbitrator of the question which had arisen on the construction of the deed of cancellation. The arbitration clause in the deed applied in terms to every dispute, difference or question which might arise between the parties touching the "construction, meaning\', or effect" of the deed and the appointment of the arbitrator showed that differences had arisen as to construction, and the arbitrator was appointed to determine those differences. Therefore Viscount Cave L.C. concluded "The reference, therefore, was a reference as to construction", and when there was such a reference the principle applicable \\vas as follows (p. 409):\n', ' Any and every dispute difference or question which shall at any time arise between the parties hereto touching the construction meaning or effect of these presents or of any clause or thing herein contained or the rights or liabilities of the parties he-rounder or otherwise howsoever relating to the premises shall be referred to the arbitration of a sole arbitrator to be agreed upon between the parties or failing agreement to be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the time being and this shall be deemed a submission....\n', 'The question raised upon these facts was whether there was a reference to the arbitrator of any question of law as such or merely a general reference to arbitration. Viscount Cave L.C. held that there was in that case a reference to the arbitrator of the question which had arisen on the construction of the deed of cancellation. The arbitration clause in the deed applied in terms to every dispute, difference or question which might arise between the parties touching the "construction, meaning\', or effect" of the deed and the appointment of the arbitrator showed that differences had arisen as to construction, and the arbitrator was appointed to determine those differences. Therefore Viscount Cave L.C. concluded "The reference, therefore, was a reference as to construction", and when there was such a reference the principle applicable \\vas as follows (p. 409):\n', " If this be so, I think it follows that, unless it appears on the face of the award that the arbitrator has proceeded on principles which were wrong in law, his conclusions as to the construction of the deed must be accepted. No doubt an award may be set aside for an error of law appearing on the face of it; and no doubt a question of construction is (generally speaking) a question of law. But where a question of construction is the very thing referred for arbitration, then the decision of the arbitrator upon that point cannot be set aside by the Court only because the Court would itself have come to a different conclusion. If it appears by the award that the arbitrator has proceeded illegally-for instance, that he has decided on evidence which in law was not admissible or on principles of construction which the law does not countenance, then there is error in law which may be ground for setting aside the award; but the mere dissent of the Court from arbitrator's conclusion on construction is not enough for that purpose.\n", ' By clause 2 of the agreement Asia were to obtain the permission of Wiley before publishing any of the said books, but apart from the question whether such permission can be unreasonably withheld, the sole and exclusive rights to print, publish and sell the said books in India etc. remained in Asia. In other words Wiley are not entitled to withhold permission to Asia and then grant permission to another in the territories of which Asia is the sole and exclusive licensee for the publication of the said books.\n', 'The reply to this pleading before the arbitrator is to be found in the reply on behalf of John Wiley & Sons dated October 14, 1964. In para. 2 Wileys said:\n', " With reference to para 2 of Asia's Statement of Claim, the construction sought to be put by Asia on Clause 2 of the Agreement is incorrect and Unsustainable, Asia acquired no license to print and publish any of the titles of Wileys except those in respect of which Wileys gave their consent in writing. Under the Agreement Wileys have the right to decide in respect of which titles they would give permission to Asia to print and publish them. Wileys are not bound to give any reasons for not giving their consent.\n"]}] \ No newline at end of file +[{'Title': 'Pure Diets India Limited vs Lokmangal Agro Industries Ltd. on 25 July, 2023', 'DocID': 9193128, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' (a). Nilesh C. Sanghani and Others v. Rakesh V. Zangda\n and Others, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 530;\n', ' "17. Among the attributes which must be present for an agreement\n to be considered as an arbitration agreement are:\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S Duro Felguera S.A vs M/S. Gangavaram Port Limited on 10 October, 2017', 'DocID': 133653680, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['*Substituted by Act 3 of 2016 (w.e.f. 23.10.2015)\n\n', ' "Sub-Clause 20.6 - Arbitration\n Any dispute in respect of which amicable settlement has not been reached within\n the period stated in Sub-Clause 20.5, shall be finally and conclusively settled by\n Arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by appointing two\n arbitrators one by each party and a presiding arbitrator to be appointed by the said\n arbitrators. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction\n of court of law at Hyderabad, India. The place of Arbitration shall be Hyderabad\n and the Language of Arbitration shall be English. The Contractor shall continue to\n attend to discharge all his obligations under the Contract during pendency of the\n Arbitration proceedings."\n', ' "Sub-Clause 20.6 - Arbitration\n Any dispute in respect of which amicable settlement has not been reached within\n the period stated in Sub-Clause 20.5, shall be finally and conclusively settled by\n Arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by appointing two\n arbitrators one by each party and a presiding arbitrator to be appointed by the said\n arbitrators. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction\n of court of law at Hyderabad, India. The place of Arbitration shall be Hyderabad\n and the Language of Arbitration shall be English. The Contractor shall continue to\n attend to discharge all his obligations under the Contract during pendency of the\n Arbitration proceedings."\n', ' "2.The following documents shall form and be read and construed as part of this\n Agreement and shall have the priority one over the other in the following sequence:\n', ' "2.The following documents shall form and be read and construed as part of this\n Agreement and shall have the priority one over the other in the following sequence:\n', 'Similar clauses as to the priority of the documents was incorporated in all other\n\ncontract agreements-Packages No. 6, 7, 8 and 9 awarded to Indian subsidiary\n\n 19\n\x0cFGI. In the sequence of documents of clause (2) of the contract agreement\n\nquoted above, the Tender Document is mentioned in the sequence only as (g)\n\nand all other documents or the other documents like Letters of Award, Special\n\nconditions of contract etc. have priority over the same. While so, the terms\n\ncontained in Original Package No. 4 TD including the arbitration clause cannot\n\nhave priority over the Special Conditions of contract of the split-up contracts.\n', ' "8. This Corporate Guarantee shall be governed by the Indian Laws. In case of any\n disputes, the Parties shall endeavor to settle the same amicably. In case of failure to\n settle the disputes amicably, the same shall be finally settled under the Arbitration and\n Conciliation Act 1996 of India by appointing two Arbitrators, one by each party and a\n Presiding Arbitrator to be appointed by the said Arbitrators. The award of the Arbitrators\n shall be final and binding on the Corporate Company and the Employer. Any such\n Arbitration proceeding shall be at Hyderabad and within the Jurisdiction of the Court of\n Law at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India.The Arbitration shall be conducted in English\n language."\n', ' "1. The Corporate Company hereby guarantees and covenants with the employer\n that FGI will perform all its obligations and duties as per package 6 to package 9,\n failing which the corporate company shall take over from FGI, as may be demanded\n by the employer under this Guarantee, and shall perform or cause to be performed at\n its own cost and risk and all the responsibilities, obligations and duties of FGI under\n package 6 to Package 9 so far as and to the extent FGI was liable to perform it,\n without any additional time and cost implication to the employer, subject to the\n employer continuing to meet its own obligations under package 6 to package 9 with\n respect to payments, approvals for drawings and other related matters to the\n corporate company as if the corporate company were the principal contractor in\n place of FGI.\n', ' 2. In the event of any delay in completion of the works as per the time for completion\n of the contracts for the reasons attributable to FGI and/or the corporate company,\n such that these delays in turn results in causing overall delay in completion of all or\n any one of the contracts, then the corporate company hereby undertakes to\n compensate for the delay damages to the employer, which shall be based on the\n overall contract price collectively of all the contracts and any other contract that may\n be entered into by and between the employer and the corporate company or\n FGI.........."\n', ' "This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been executed at Hyderabad on 11 th\n August 2012 by and between:\n', ' “Whereas the parties have entered into different\n package contracts for execution of Bulk Material\n Handling System under “Original Package 4 Tender\n Document” covering ship unloaders, stackers,\n reclaimers, in-motion wagon loading system,\n conveyors, transfer towers, electrical and control\n works, civil works, etc. and in order to have more\n clarity on technical and execution related matters,\n the parties hereby agree that the works shall be\n carried out as per the following priority of\n documents;\n', ' 1. Annexure I to the Letter of Award issued for\n Package 4 Contract.\n', ' 2. Annexure III to the Letter of Award issued for\n Package 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 contracts.\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S N.N. Global Mercantile Private ... vs M/S Indo Unique Flame Ltd. on 11 January, 2021', 'DocID': 39641512, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' “9. Security Deposit : You will submit the Bank Guarantee for Rs.5.00 crores\n for the average stock of washed coal lying at your stockyard. This Bank\n Guarantee can be issued from any nationalised Bank/first class bank, initially\n valid for a period of 18 (eighteen) months.”\n\n Clause 10 of the Work Order incorporates an arbitration clause, which\n\n reads as:\n', '\x0c “10. Arbitration : In case of any dispute due to difference of opinion in\n interpretation of any clause or terms and conditions or meaning of the work\n or language the decision of the arbitrator appointed with mutual consent shall\n be treated as final and binding on both the parties.”\n\n\n1.3 As per Clause 9 of the Work Order, Global Mercantile furnished a\n\n Bank Guarantee for Rs.3,36,00,000/- on 30.09.2015, in favour of SBI-the\n\n banker of Indo Unique.\n', ' “An arbitration agreement is collateral to the substantial stipulations of the\n contract. It is merely procedural and ancillary, it is a mode of settling disputes,\n though the agreement to do so is itself subject to the discretion of the court.”\n\n\n Lord MacMillan in his opinion stated that :\n', ' “It survives for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach,\n and the arbitration clause survives for determining the mode of their\n settlement. The purposes of the contract have failed, but the arbitration\n clause is not one of the purposes of the contract.”\n\n3.6 This rule has been affirmed in several cases, including Bremer\n\n Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinefabrik v. South India Shipping\n\n Corporation2 in which Lord Diplock cited Heyman as an authority for the\n\n assertion that :\n', ' “Once it became accepted that the arbitration clause is a separate\n agreement, ancillary to the contract, the logical impediment to referring an\n issue of the invalidity of the contract to arbitration disappears. Provided that\n the arbitration clause itself is not directly impeached (eg by a non-est factum\n plea), the arbitration agreement is as a matter of principled legal theory\n capable of surviving the invalidity of the contract.”\n\n3.8 In Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA\n\n and others,4 the House of Lords affirmed the view taken in Harbour\n\n Assurance (supra), wherein it was held that an arbitration agreement is a\n\n distinct and separable agreement from the underlying or principal contract.\n', ' “Article 16. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any\n objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration\n agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms a part of a\n contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of\n the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and\n void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.”\n\n\n\n\n3 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 455 (CA).\n', ' “38. … As we have sought to explain, once the separability of the arbitration\n agreement is accepted, there cannot be any question but that there is a valid\n agreement.\n', ' …\n\n If there is a contest about whether an arbitration agreement had come into\n existence at all, the court would have a discretion as to whether to determine\n that issue itself, but that will not be the case where there is an overall contract\n which is said for some reason to be invalid eg for illegality, misrepresentation\n or bribery and the arbitration agreement is merely part of the contract. … ”\n\n\n\n3.12 In the Appeal filed in the Fiona Trust case before the House of Lords,\n\n in Fili Shipping Co Ltd and others v. Premium Nafta Products Ltd and\n\n others7, Lord Hoffman opined :\n', ' “But that is in my opinion exactly the kind of argument which s 7 was intended\n to prevent. It amounts to saying that because the main agreement and the\n arbitration agreement were bound up with each other, the invalidity of the\n main agreement should result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.\n The one should fall with the other because they would never have been\n separately concluded and the arbitration agreement can be invalidated only\n on a ground which relates to the arbitration agreement and is not merely a\n consequence of the invalidity of the main agreement.”8\n\n3.14 On the issue of whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the\n\n entire contract is to be decided by the court, or the arbitrator, was considered\n\n by the U.S. Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin\n\n MFG. CO.,9\n\n The Court held that:\n', " “If the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself an issue\n which goes to the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court\n may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the\n federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract\n generally.……\n\n\n In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the\n unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when\n selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and\n obstruction in the courts.”\n\n\n\n\n8 [2007] 4 ALL ER 951 at 960, at paragraph 19.\n", ' (i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but\n\n compulsorily registerable) instrument is valid and enforceable?\n', ' “19. Voidability of agreements without free consent.—When consent to an agreement\n is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract\n voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.\n A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may,\n if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that he shall be put in\n the position in which he would have been if the representation made had been true.\n Exception.—If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence,\n fraudulent within the meaning of Section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not\n voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the\n truth with ordinary diligence.\n', ' (i) The impugned judgment and order dated 30.09.2020 in W.P. No.\n\n 1801 of 2020 passed by the Bombay High Court is set aside;\n', ' “ Whether the statutory bar contained in Section 35 of the Indian\n Stamp Act, 1899 applicable to instruments chargeable to Stamp Duty\n under Section 3 read with the Schedule to the Act, would also render\n the arbitration agreement contained in such an instrument, which is\n not chargeable to payment of stamp duty, as being non-existent, un-\n enforceable, or invalid, pending payment of stamp duty on the\n substantive contract / instrument ? ”\n\n\n\n\n 52\n\x0c In light of the same, the Registry may place this matter before the\n\n Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders / directions.\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S Swastik Gases P.Ltd vs Indian Oil Corp.Ltd on 3 July, 2013', 'DocID': 23112747, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' 17.0. Arbitration\n\n\n If any dispute or difference(s) of any kind whatsoever\n shall arise between the parties hereto in connection with or\n arising out of this Agreement, the parties hereto shall in good\n faith negotiate with a view to arriving at an amicable\n resolution and settlement. In the event no settlement is reached\n within a period of 30 days from the date of arising of the\n dispute(s)/difference(s), such dispute(s)/difference(s) shall be\n referred to 2 (two) Arbitrators, appointed one each by the\n parties and the Arbitrators, so appointed shall be entitled to\n appoint a third Arbitrator who shall act as a presiding\n Arbitrator and the proceedings thereof shall be in accordance\n with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory\n modification or re-enactment thereof in force. The existence of\n any dispute(s)/difference(s) or initiation/continuation of\n arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone\n or delay the performance of or to abstain from performing their\n obligations pursuant to this Agreement.\n', ' 17.0. Arbitration\n\n\n If any dispute or difference(s) of any kind whatsoever\n shall arise between the parties hereto in connection with or\n arising out of this Agreement, the parties hereto shall in good\n faith negotiate with a view to arriving at an amicable\n resolution and settlement. In the event no settlement is reached\n within a period of 30 days from the date of arising of the\n dispute(s)/difference(s), such dispute(s)/difference(s) shall be\n referred to 2 (two) Arbitrators, appointed one each by the\n parties and the Arbitrators, so appointed shall be entitled to\n appoint a third Arbitrator who shall act as a presiding\n Arbitrator and the proceedings thereof shall be in accordance\n with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory\n modification or re-enactment thereof in force. The existence of\n any dispute(s)/difference(s) or initiation/continuation of\n arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone\n or delay the performance of or to abstain from performing their\n obligations pursuant to this Agreement.\n', ' 18.0. Jurisdiction\n The Agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the\n courts at Kolkata.\n', ' -\n', ' “The agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the Courts at\n Kolkata.”\n\n\n', ' 1. Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286:\n', ' “Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira\n jurisdiction.”\n\n\n', ' -\n', ' “Any legal proceeding arising out of the order shall be subject to the\n jurisdiction of the courts in Mumbai.”\n\n\n', ' “In case of any dispute or difference arising between the parties\n hereto or any claim or thing herein contained or the construction\n thereof or as to any matter in any way connected with or arising out\n of these presents or the operation thereof or the rights, duties or\n liabilities of either party thereof, then and in every such case the\n matter, differences or disputes shall be referred to an arbitrator in\n Kolkata, West Bengal, India in accordance with and subject to the\n provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any other\n enactment or statutory modifications thereof for the time being in\n force. The place of arbitration shall be Kolkata.”\n\n\n', ' “Subject to the provisions of clause 32 above it is expressly agreed\n by and between the parties hereinabove that any suit, application\n and/or any other legal proceedings with regard to any matter, claims,\n differences and for disputes arising out of this agreement shall be\n filed and referred to the courts in Calcutta for the purpose of\n jurisdiction.”\n\n\n', ' “Subject to the provisions of clause 32 above it is expressly agreed\n by and between the parties hereinabove that any suit, application\n and/or any other legal proceedings with regard to any matter, claims,\n differences and for disputes arising out of this agreement shall be\n filed and referred to the courts in Calcutta for the purpose of\n jurisdiction.”\n\n\n']}, {'Title': 'Shailesh Dhairyawan vs Mohan Balkrishna Lulla on 16 October, 2015', 'DocID': 48783751, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['“8). The Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 agree to and hereby do refer to\nArbitration of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar (Retd.) the dispute as to (i)\nthe difference in carpet area of the 5 flats agreed to be allotted as per\nthe Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 being Exhibit-B to the Plaint by\nDefendant No.1 to the Plaintiff and his family members (i.e. 800 sq. ft.\narea) as provided in the said Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 and\nthe actual carpet area of the said 5 flats hereby allotted and handed over\nand (ii) the valuation of the deficient area if any, and the damages for\nthe same. The Learned Arbitrator to make an award with regard to the\ncompensation and the damages to be paid by Defendant No.1 to the plaintiff\nfor the deficient area, if any, Defendant No.1 shall not raise any dispute\nas to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The Arbitrator shall decide the\nsame as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law and under the\nprovisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.”\n\n\n\nThe said consent terms were taken on record by a Single Judge of the Bombay\nHigh Court who passed an order dated 8.10.2008 disposing of the suit in the\nfollowing terms:\n', '“8). The Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 agree to and hereby do refer to\nArbitration of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar (Retd.) the dispute as to (i)\nthe difference in carpet area of the 5 flats agreed to be allotted as per\nthe Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 being Exhibit-B to the Plaint by\nDefendant No.1 to the Plaintiff and his family members (i.e. 800 sq. ft.\narea) as provided in the said Development Agreement dated 27-12-2004 and\nthe actual carpet area of the said 5 flats hereby allotted and handed over\nand (ii) the valuation of the deficient area if any, and the damages for\nthe same. The Learned Arbitrator to make an award with regard to the\ncompensation and the damages to be paid by Defendant No.1 to the plaintiff\nfor the deficient area, if any, Defendant No.1 shall not raise any dispute\nas to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The Arbitrator shall decide the\nsame as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law and under the\nprovisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.”\n\n\n\nThe said consent terms were taken on record by a Single Judge of the Bombay\nHigh Court who passed an order dated 8.10.2008 disposing of the suit in the\nfollowing terms:\n', '“1. Pursuant to the suggestion given by this Court, parties were\nexploring the possibility of settlement and therefore the matter was kept\npart heard.\n', '“Section 8. Power of Court to appoint arbitrator or umpire.\n', '“19. During the continuance of this piece-work agreement/contract or at any\ntime after the termination thereof, if any difference or dispute shall\narise between the parties hereto in regard to the interpretation of any of\nthe provisions herein contained or act or thing in relation to this\nagreement/contract, such difference or dispute shall be forthwith referred\nto two arbitrators for arbitration in Bombay, one to be appointed by each\nparty with liberty to the arbitrators in case of differences or their\nfailure to reach an agreement within one month of the appointment, to\nappoint an umpire residing in Bombay and the award which shall be made by\ntwo arbitrators or umpire as the case may be shall be final, conclusive and\nbinding on the parties hereto.\n', 'If either party to the difference or dispute shall fail to appoint an\narbitrator within 30 calendar days after notice in writing having been\ngiven by the parties or\xa0shall appoint an arbitrator who shall refuse to act\nthen the arbitrator appointed by the other party shall be entitled to\nproceed with the reference as a sole arbitrator and to make final decision\non such difference or dispute and the award made as a result of such\narbitration\xa0shall be a condition precedent to any right of action against\nany two parties hereto in respect of any such difference and dispute.” [at\npara 7]\n\n\n\n\n', '“21.\xa0If any question or difference or dispute shall arise between the\nparties hereto or their representatives\xa0at any time\xa0in relation to or with\nrespect to the meaning or effect of these presents or with respect to the\nrights and liabilities of the parties hereto then such question or dispute\nshall be referred either to Mr. N.A. Palkhivala or Mr. D.S. Seth, whose\ndecision in the matter shall be final and binding on both the parties.” [at\npara 2]\n\n\n', '“Section 15(2) of the Act provides that where a substitute arbitrator has\nto be appointed due to termination of the mandate of the previous\narbitrator, the appointment must be made according to the rules that were\napplicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. No further\napplication for appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 11\nwill lie where there has been compliance with the procedure for appointment\nof a substitute arbitrator. On appointment of the substitute arbitrator in\nthe same manner as the first, no application for appointment of independent\narbitrator under Section 11 could be filed. Of course, the procedure agreed\nupon by the parties for the appointment of the original arbitrator is\nequally applicable to the appointment of a substitute arbitrator, even if\nthe agreement does not specifically say so. Reference may be made to the\njudgment of this Court in Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd.\xa0v.\xa0Simplex\nConcrete Piles India Ltd.\xa0[(2006) 6 SCC 204].\n', '“Section 15(2) of the Act provides that where a substitute arbitrator has\nto be appointed due to termination of the mandate of the previous\narbitrator, the appointment must be made according to the rules that were\napplicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. No further\napplication for appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 11\nwill lie where there has been compliance with the procedure for appointment\nof a substitute arbitrator. On appointment of the substitute arbitrator in\nthe same manner as the first, no application for appointment of independent\narbitrator under Section 11 could be filed. Of course, the procedure agreed\nupon by the parties for the appointment of the original arbitrator is\nequally applicable to the appointment of a substitute arbitrator, even if\nthe agreement does not specifically say so. Reference may be made to the\njudgment of this Court in Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd.\xa0v.\xa0Simplex\nConcrete Piles India Ltd.\xa0[(2006) 6 SCC 204].\n']}, {'Title': 'Bipromasz Bipron Trading Sa vs Bharat Electronics Limited(Bel) on 8 May, 2012', 'DocID': 131059124, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' “Arbitration – All disputes regarding this order shall be\n referred to B E L Chairman & Managing Director or his nominee\n for arbitration who shall have all the powers conferred by the\n Indian Arbitration & Conciliation Bill 1996 or any statutory\n modification thereof in force.”\n\n\n', ' “20.05.2011 – Notice, through counsel was sent to the\n respondent seeking appointment of Arbitrator.\n 29.06.2011 – Petitioner sworn affidavit in Poland for filing\n of the petition for appointment of Arbitrator.\n 29.06.2011 – Respondent’s sent reply to the advocate at New\n Delhi received on 1.7.2011 stating that the\n correspondence is being placed before the\n Chairman and Managing Director.\n']}, {'Title': 'Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Master Construction Co on 25 April, 2011', 'DocID': 1682326, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "70. Arbitration-All disputes, between the parties to the \n\n Contract (other than those for which the decision of the \n\n C.W.E. or any other person is by the Contract expressed to \n\n be final and binding) shall, after written notice by either \n\n party to the Contract to the other of them, be referred to the \n\n sole arbitration of an Engineer Officer to be appointed by \n\n the authority mentioned in the tender documents.\n\n\n Unless both parties agree in writing such reference shall \n\n not take place until after the completion or alleged \n\n completion of the works or termination or determination of \n\n the contract under Condition Nos. 55, 56 and 57 hereof.\n\n\n Provided that in the event of abandonment of the works or \n\n cancellation of the Contract under Condition Nos. 52,53 or \n\n 54 hereof, such reference shall not take place until \n\n alternative arrangements have been finalized by the \n\n\n1 (2009) 1 SCC 267\n\n2 (2004) 2 SCC 663\n\n3 (2006) 13 SCC 475\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\n\x0c\nGovernment to get the works completed by or through any \n\nother Contractor or Contractors or Agency or Agencies.\n\n\nProvided always that commencement or continuance of \n\nany arbitration proceeding hereunder or otherwise shall not \n\nin any manner militate against the Government\'s right of \n\nrecovery from the contractor as provided in Condition 67 \n\nhereof.\n']}, {'Title': 'Dharma Prathishthanam vs M/S. Madhok Construction Pvt. Ltd on 2 November, 2004', 'DocID': 421126, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['\t"Settlement of disputes shall be through \narbitration as per the Indian Arbitration Act."\n', '"Section 8 Power of Court to appoint arbitrator \nor umpire \x16 (1) In any of the following cases, -\n', '(a)\twhere an arbitration agreement \nprovides that the reference shall be to one \nor more arbitrators to be appointed by \nconsent of the parties, and all the parties do \nnot, after differences have arisen;, concur \nin the appointment or appointments; or\n', '"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants\' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith."\n', '"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants\' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith."\n', '"He is private in so far as (1) he is chosen and paid \nby the disputants (2) he does not sit in public (3) he \nacts in accordance with privately chosen procedure \nso far as that is not repugnant to public policy (4) so \nfar as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of \nthe State Courts (5) his authority and powers are \nonly whatsoever he is given by the disputants\' \nagreement (6) the effectiveness of his powers \nderives wholly from the private law of contract and \naccordingly the nature and exercise of these powers \nmust not be contrary to the proper law of the \ncontract or the public policy of England, bearing in \nmind that the paramount public policy is that \nfreedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered \nwith."\n']}, {'Title': 'Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd vs Gupta Coal India Ltd. And Anr on 10 March, 2015', 'DocID': 169405928, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "Thus Article 23 of the ICC Rules permits parties to apply to a\n competent judicial authority for interim and conservatory\n measures. Therefore, in such cases an application can be made\n under Section 9 of the said Act."\n', ' "(b) This agreement shall be construed in accordance with and\n governed by the laws of the State of Michigan, United States,\n without regard to the conflicts of law rules of such\n jurisdiction. Disputes between the parties that cannot be\n resolved via negotiations shall be submitted for final, binding\n arbitration to the London Court of Arbitration.\n', ' (c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this agreement,\n the shareholders shall at all times act in accordance with the\n Companies Act and other applicable Acts/rules being in force, in\n India at any time."\n', ' "13. Settlement of disputes\n 13.1. This agreement, its construction, validity and\n performance shall be governed by and constructed in accordance\n with the laws of England and Wales;\n', ' "4. Applicable law and arbitration - Except the change of\n venue/seat of arbitration from London to Paris, Articles 32 and\n 33 of the contract shall be deemed to be set out in full n this\n agreement mutatis mutandis and so that references therein to the\n contract shall be references to this agreement."\n', ' "3. Final partial award as to seat\n 3.1. Upon the agreement of the parties, each represented by duly\n authorised representatives and through counsel, the Tribunal\n hereby finds, orders and awards:\n', " (a) That without prejudice to the right of the parties to\n subsequently agree otherwise in writing, the juridical seat\n (or legal place) of arbitration for the purposes of the\n arbitration initiated under the claimants' notice of\n arbitration dated 16-12-2010 shall be London, England.\n", ' "In this case, the parties have by agreement provided that the\n juridical seat of arbitration will be in London. On the basis of\n the aforesaid agreement, necessary amendment has been made in\n the PSCs. On the basis of the agreement and the consent of the\n parties, the Arbitral Tribunal has made the "final partial\n consent award" on 14-9-2011 fixing the juridical seat (or legal\n place) of arbitration for the purposes of arbitration initiated\n under the claimants\' notice of arbitration dated 16-12-2010 in\n London, England. To make it even further clear that the award\n also records that any hearing in the arbitration may take place\n in Paris, France, Singapore or any other location the Tribunal\n considers convenient. Article 33.12 stipulates that arbitration\n [pic]proceedings shall be conducted in English language. The\n arbitration agreement contained in Article 33 shall be governed\n by the laws of England. A combined effect of all these factors\n would clearly show that the parties have by express agreement\n excluded the applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act,\n 1996 (Indian) to the arbitration proceedings."\n', ' 16. The law which would apply to the filing of the award,\n to its enforcement and to its setting aside would be the law\n governing the agreement to arbitrate and the performance of\n that agreement."\n', " 28. After so holding, the Court referred to the legal position\n stated in Dozco's case wherein it has been ruled thus:\n", ' "5. If any dispute or difference should arise under this\n charter, general average/arbitration in London to apply, one to\n be appointed by each of the parties hereto, the third by the two\n so chosen, and their decision or that of any two of them, shall\n be final and binding, and this agreement may, for enforcing the\n same, be made a rule of Court. Said three parties to be\n commercial men who are the members of the London Arbitrators\n Association. This contract is to be governed and construed\n according to English Law. For disputes where total amount claim\n by either party does not exceed USD 50,000 the arbitration\n should be conducted in accordance with small claims procedure of\n the London Maritime Arbitration Association."\n', ' (i) The clear language of Articles 22 and 23 of the\n distributorship agreement between the parties in this case\n spells out a clear agreement between the parties excluding Part\n I of the Act.\n', ' "..... As indicated hereinabove, Clause 28 indicates that the\n governing law of the agreement would be the law of India i.e.\n the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned counsel\n for the parties have quite correctly spelt out the distinction\n between the "proper law" of the contract and the "curial law" to\n determine the law which is to govern the arbitration itself.\n While the proper law is the law which governs the agreement\n itself, in the absence of any other stipulation in the\n arbitration clause as to which law would apply in respect of the\n arbitral proceedings, it is now well settled that it is the law\n governing the contract which would also be the law applicable to\n the Arbitral Tribunal itself. Clause 27.1 makes it quite clear\n that the curial law which regulates the procedure to be adopted\n in conducting the arbitration would be the SIAC Rules. There is,\n therefore, no ambiguity that the SIAC Rules would be the curial\n law of the arbitration proceedings. It also happens that the\n parties had agreed to make Singapore the seat of arbitration.\n Clause 27.1 indicates that the arbitration proceedings are to be\n conducted in accordance with the SIAC Rules."\n', ' "It is of course both useful and frequently necessary when\n construing a clause in a contract to have regard to the overall\n commercial purpose of the contract in the broad sense of the\n type and general content, the relationship of the parties and\n such common commercial purpose as may clearly emerge from such\n an exercise. However, it does not seem to me to be a proper\n approach to the construction of a default clause in a commercial\n contract to seek or purport to elicit some self-contained\n \'commercial purpose\' underlying the clause which is or may be\n wider than the ordinary or usual construction of the words of\n each sub-clause will yield."\n', ' "In this connection [counsel] has rightly made the point that,\n when construing the effect of particular words in a commercial\n contract, it is wrong to put a label on the contract in advance\n and this to approach the question of construction on the basis\n of a pre-conception as to the contact\'s intended effect, with\n the result that a strained construction is placed on words,\n clear in themselves, in order to fit them within such pre-\n conception...\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S. Vfpl Asipl Jv Company vs Union Of India And Others ..... Opp. ... on 15 October, 2020', 'DocID': 150447404, 'matching_columns': ['"6. TIME FOR COMPLETION OF CONTRACT -\nEXTENSION THEREOF, DEFAULTS &\nCOMPENSATION FOR DELAY:\n\n xx xx xx\n\n6.2 In the event of the contractor\'s failure to\ncomply with the required progress in terms of the\nagreed time and progress chart or to complete the\nwork and clear the site on or before the date of\ncompletion of contract or extended date of\ncompletion, he shall without prejudice to any other\nright or remedy available under the law to the\ncompany on account of such breach, shall become\nliable to pay for penalty as under:\n\n(a) If the average daily progress of work during the\ncalendar months is less than the stipulated rate\nindicated in the detailed tender notice, penalty as\ndetailed below will be levied.\n\n(i) If the average daily progress of work executed\nduring the calendar month is more than 80% and\nless than 100 % of stipulated rate of progress,\npenalty equal to 10% of the contract value of the\nshort fall in work shall be levied.\n\n(ii) If the average daily progress of work executed\nduring the calendar month is less than 80% of\nstipulated rate, penalty equal to 20% of contract\nvalue of the short fall in work shall be levied.\n\nThe aggregate of the penalties so levied shall not\nexceed 10% of the total contract value.\n\nPenalties will be calculated every month and\nwithheld. The contractor shall be allowed to make\nup the shortfall in the succeeding three months\nwithin the stipulated time of completion. Once the\nshortfall is fully made up the so withheld penalty\nwill be released."', '"9. TERMINATION, SUSPENSION,\nCANCELLATION & FORECLOSURE OF\nCONTRACT.\n\nxx xx xx\n 30\n\n\n\n\n9.2. On cancellation of the contract or on\ntermination of the contract, the Engineer-in-charge\nshall have powers:\n\n(a) to take possession of the site and carry out\nbalance work through any other agency.\n\n(b) after giving notice to the contractor to measure\nup the work of the contractor and to take such\nwhole or the balance or part thereof, as shall be\nunexecuted out of his hands and to give it to\nanother contractor or take up departmentally, to\ncomplete the work. The contractor whole contract is\nterminated shall not be allowed to participate in\nfuture bidding for period of minimum twelve\nmonths.\n\nIn such an event, the contract shall be liable for\nloss/damage suffered by the employer because of\naction under this clause and to compensate for this\nloss or damage, the employer shall be entitled to\nrecover higher of the following:\n\n(i) Forfeiture of security deposit comprising of\n performance guarantee and retention money\n and additional performance security, if any,\n at disposal of the employer.\n\n Or\n\n(ii) 20% of value of incomplete work. The value\n of the incomplete work shall be calculated for\n the items and quantities remaining\n incomplete (as per provision of agreement) at\n the agreement rates including price variation\n as applicable on the date, when notice in\n writing for termination of work was issued to\n the contractor.\n\nIt is being clarified that the above liability is over\nand above the penalties payable by the contractor\non account of shortfall in quantities as per\nprovision of clause 6.\n\nThe amount to be recovered from the contractor as\ndetermined above, shall, without prejudice to any\nother right or remedy available to the employer as\n 31\n\n\n\n\nper law or as per agreement, will be recovered from\nany money due to the contractor on any account or\nunder any other contract and in the event of any\nshortfall, the contractor shall be liable to pay the\nsame within 30 days. In case of failure to pay the\nsame the amount shall be debt payable\n\nIn the event of above course being adopted by the\nEngineer-in-charge, the contractor shall have no\nclaim to compensation for any loss sustained by\nhim by reasons of his having purchased materials,\nequipments or entered into agreement or made\nadvances on any account or with a view to the\nexecution of work or performance of the contract.\nAnd in case action is taken under any provision\naforesaid, the contractor shall not be entitled to\nrecover or to be paid any sum for any work thereof\nor actually performed under this contract unless\nand until the engineer-in-charge has certified in\nwriting the performance of such work and value\npayable in respect thereof and he shall only be\nentitled to be paid the value so certified.\n\nThe need for determination of the amount of\nrecovery of any extra cost/expenditure or of any\nloss/damage suffered by the company shall not be\nhowever arise in the case of termination of the\ncontract for death/demise of the contractor as\nstated in 9.1(d)."', '"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx xx xx\n\n13A. Settlement of Disputes through\nArbitration\n\nIf the parties fail to resolve the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n 32\nIn case of parties other than Govt. agencies the\nredressal of disputes/differences shall be sought\nthrough Sole Arbitration as under.\n\nSole Arbitration:\n\nIn the event of any question, dispute or difference\narising under these terms & conditions or any\ncondition contained in this contract or\ninterpretation of the terms of, or in connection with\nthis Contract (except as to any matter the decision\nof which is specially provided for by these\nconditions), the same shall be referred to the sole\narbitration of a person, appointed to be the\narbitrator by the Competent Authority of CIL/CMD\nof Subsidiary Company (as the case may be). The\naward of the arbitrator shall be final and binding\non the parties of this Contract."'], 'matching_indents': [' "8. Eligibility Criteria :\n', ' xx xx xx\n\n C. Fleet Requirement : The bidder is required to\n give an undertaking in the form of an Affidavit in\n the prescribed format to deploy the following\n matching equipment/Tippers/Pay-Loaders either\n owned or hired.\n', '(i) Forfeiture of security deposit comprising of\n performance guarantee and retention money\n and additional performance security, if any,\n at disposal of the employer.\n', '"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx xx xx\n\n13A. Settlement of Disputes through\nArbitration\n\nIf the parties fail to resolve the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n', '"13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES\n\nxx xx xx\n\n13A. Settlement of Disputes through\nArbitration\n\nIf the parties fail to resolve the\ndisputes/differences by in house mechanism, then,\ndepending on the position of the case, eight the\nemployer/owner or the contractor shall give notice\nto other party to refer the matter to arbitration\ninstead of directly approaching Court. The\ncontractor shall, however, be entitled to invoke\narbitration clause only after exhausting the remedy\navailable under the clause 12.\n', "Sl Month Agreed Qty Achieved Qty Total Shortfall Penalty\nNo Shortfall due to amount\n contractor' deducted/wit\n s fault hheld (in Rs)\n (Tonnes)\n"]}, {'Title': 'Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar vs M/S.Sahu Trust on 18 October, 2008', 'DocID': 521851, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['(i)\tThe total amount agreed to be paid to the defendants by the plaintiff was Rs.3.75 Crores.\n', '(ii) The defendants must pay out of the 3.75 Crores, a sum of Rs.1.00 Crore towards the liabilities to the government of Orissa in respect of 40 acres of land allotted on lease to the plaintiff.\n', '(iii) The plaintiff must transfer 7 acres of land out of 40 acres as 33 acres were already remitted to the government.\n', '\t"10. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act says that the Application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. As already stated in the earlier part of the judgment, defendant NO.3 had moved an Application on 25.11.2004 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceedings of the title suit and for referring the matter to arbitration. He filed a supplementary petition to the aforesaid Application on 16.12.2004. Herein also reference was made to Sec.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940. Thereafter, he filed an application on 28.02.2005 praying that as the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been repealed and the suit is of the year 1998, to avoid any confusion, his earlier petitions may be treated to have been filed under Sec.8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. None of these petitions were accompanied by the original arbitration agreement dated 17.02.1992 or a duly certified copy thereof. In fact, there is no requirement of filing the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof under Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and as such there was no occasion for defendant No.3 to file the aforesaid document. The third petition filed on 28.2.2005 contained the following prayer:\n', ' "16. We need not dilate on this issue as this aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co.1 wherein this Court noticed: (SCC pp. \t285-86, paras 24-25)\n\x1324. Section 34 of the repealed 1940 Act employs the expression \x11steps in the proceedings\x12. Only in terms of Section 21 of the 1940 Act, the dispute could be referred to arbitration provided the parties thereto agreed. Under the 1940 Act, the suit was not barred. The court would not automatically refer the dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal. In the event, it having arrived at a satisfaction that there is no sufficient reason that the dispute should not be referred and no step in relation thereto was taken by the applicant, it could stay the suit.\n', '\t"11. It is evident from the Purchase Order placed by the revision petitioners that the order was placed subject to the Indian Railway Standard Conditions of Contract. It was only on the basis of the said Purchase order, the respondent had supplied the materials to the revision petitioners and as such, the general conditions of contract of the railways governs the transaction. As per clause 2900 of the terms of contract, in the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under the conditions or special conditions of contract, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Gazetted Railway Officer appointed to be the Arbitrator, by the General Manager in the case of contracts entered into by the Zonal Railways and Production Units; by any Member of the Railway Board, in the case of contracts entered into by the Railway Board; and by the Head of the Organization in respect of contracts entered into by the other organizations under the Ministry of Railways.\n', '\t12. The learned trial judge rejected the Application filed by the Revision petitioners on the ground that the arbitration agreement has not been produced before the Court. However, the learned trial judge failed to note that even the Purchase Order produced by the respondent refers to the standard terms contract of Indian Railways and there is a clear indication in the Purchase Order that the order has been placed as per the terms of the said contract. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial judge was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground of non-production of the Arbitration Agreement.\n', "\t13. It is trite that an agreement containing a clause for arbitration need not expressly refer the term 'arbitration' and in case there is indication that the parties have agreed to a specific procedure for settlement of their dispute by referring the matter, the said consensus could be termed to be an Arbitration Agreement.\n", '\t"15. Before considering the above issue, it would be useful and appropriate to analyse the provisions contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 which are having utmost relevance and importance to be borne in view to decide the issue:\n', '\t"10. Though initially the counsel for the first respondent has raised an objection with regard to non-filing of the arbitration agreement along with with I.A.No.54 of 2003, stating that it is mandatory, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 later fairly submitted that they are not pressing that point. In view of the said fact and also in view of the fact that it has been held by the Apex Court as well as by this court that the agreement between the parties need not be produced along with the Application under section 8(3) of the said act, I am constrained to hold that non-production of the agreement between the parties along with the application will not disentitle the petitioner from claiming the relief under the said Act.\n', '\t"13. It is obligatory on the part of the Court if it is brought to the notice of the Court that there exists an agreement containing a clause to refer the matter for arbitration. The arbitrator has got ample power to decide whether there is an existence of the arbitration clause in the agreement or he can give his own ruling about the validity of the arbitration agreement. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to Section 16(1) of the said Act which reads as follows:\n', '\t(i) to comprehensively cover international and commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation;\n', '\t(ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration.\n', '\t"45. The scope of the enquiry under Sec.8, is only peripheral in nature in the sense that it is confined to the examination of a few aspects namely (a) the existence of an Arbitration Agreement, (b) whether the action brought before the Court is by one of the parties to the said Agreement against the other party, (c)whether the subject matter of the action before the Court is the same as the subject matter of the Arbitration Agreement, and (d) whether the other party moves the Court seeking a reference to Arbitration, before submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. In other words, the Judicial Authority is not empowered under Section 8 to get into the merits of the case to decide whether the parties should be referred to Arbitration under section is only on the Arbitration Agreement and not on the merits of the dispute that has arisen between the parties. It is perhaps on account of this fact that Section 7(2) equated an Arbitration Agreement made out in the form of a separate Agreement to an Arbitration clause contained in a main agreement."\n', '\t"4. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for both the sides and at the end of the day we are satisfied that the whole proceedings were started, continued and concluded under misconception of law. In the first place, Section 8 is not intended to restrain arbitration proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. The situation contemplated by Section 8 can arise only at the first instance of an opponent and defendant in a judicial proceeding, or, at the highest, suo motu at the instance of the judicial authority, when the judicial authority comes to know of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In either event, there is no question of the court under Section 8 of the 1996 Act restraining the arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. In fact, Section 8 is intended to achieve, so to say, the converse result. Unfortunately, in this case the application for interim relief was made by the respondent who was the plaintiff before the civil court. The relief sought therein is the restraint of arbitral proceedings. It could only have been decided as an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 for whatever it was worth. Once the objection to this application was filed by the appellant bringing to the notice of the court the existence of an arbitration agreement, thereafter the proceedings could have been continued only within the parameters of Section 8 of the 1996 Act. A proceeding under Section 8 could never result in an order restraining the arbitral proceedings, which is what finally the impugned order before us does."\t\n', '\t"In the event of there being any disputes or differences arising and touching the terms of this agreement, the parties agree to refer the disputes to arbitration and the provisions of Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act would apply to such disputes or proceedings."\t\n', '\t"7. In the event of any disputes or differences arising out of and touching the terms of this Memorandum of Settlement, the same shall be referred to Arbitration and the Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act will govern. The parties agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the Courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute which may henceforth arise between the parties as a consequence of this Settlement Agreement."\n', '\t"Both the parties to this final settlement mutually agree that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will govern their future disputes. The parties further agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute or difference arising out of the Settlement Agreement dated 13/14.9.2006 and this Supplemental Agreement."\n']}, {'Title': 'Iqbal Singh Sethi & Ors vs Prasad Ivf Clinic Pvt Limited on 9 March, 2022', 'DocID': 122437223, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "18.1 The Parties hereto have mutually agreed to and\n decided that any dispute that may arise from this\n Agreement, whether before or after the\n termination, of this Agreement which cannot be\n amicably settled within one month of receipt of\n written request, shall be referred to sole\n Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration\n and Conciliation Act, 1996 as mutually\n appointed by both the parties. The seat of the\n arbitration tribunal shall be in Delhi. This\n Agreement is made under and shall be construed\n\n\n\nSignature Not Verified\nDigitally Signed\nBy:Dushyant Rawal\nSigning Date:15.03.2022\n according to the laws of India. The language of\n the arbitration shall be the English language."\n', ' "18.1 The Parties hereto have mutually agreed to and\n decided that any dispute that may arise from this\n Agreement, whether before or after the\n termination, of this Agreement which cannot be\n amicably settled within one month of receipt of\n written request, shall be referred to sole\n Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration\n and Conciliation Act, 1996 as mutually\n appointed by both the parties. The seat of the\n arbitration tribunal shall be in Delhi. This\n Agreement is made under and shall be construed\n\n\n\nSignature Not Verified\nDigitally Signed\nBy:Dushyant Rawal\nSigning Date:15.03.2022\n according to the laws of India. The language of\n the arbitration shall be the English language."\n']}, {'Title': 'Ms. Neetu vs M/S Summit Digital Infrastructure ... on 11 October, 2023', 'DocID': 36137720, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "15. ARBITRATION\n It is mutually agreed between the Parties, that in the event of any dispute,\n or differences in the matter of interpretation, execution or carrying out the\n objects and functions under this Agreement, the same shall be referred to a\n sole arbitrator, to be appointed by RELIANCE JIO INFOCOMM\n LIMITED. The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,\n including its statutory modification and re-enactment in force from time to\n time, shall1apply to the proceedings which shall be conducted in English\n and the venue of such proceedings shall be at Delhi. The decision of such\n sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. For all\n matters concerning this Agreement, only the competent courts at Delhi\n shall have the exclusive jurisdiction."\n', ' "15. ARBITRATION\n It is mutually agreed between the Parties, that in the event of any dispute,\n or differences in the matter of interpretation, execution or carrying out the\n objects and functions under this Agreement, the same shall be referred to a\n sole arbitrator, to be appointed by RELIANCE JIO INFOCOMM\n LIMITED. The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,\n including its statutory modification and re-enactment in force from time to\n time, shall1apply to the proceedings which shall be conducted in English\n and the venue of such proceedings shall be at Delhi. The decision of such\n sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. For all\n matters concerning this Agreement, only the competent courts at Delhi\n shall have the exclusive jurisdiction."\n']}, {'Title': 'Gurinder Singh Sethi vs M/S Sagar Fossil Fuel Technologies (P) ... on 12 July, 2021', 'DocID': 81257869, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "27. That a mutually agreed arbitrator shall be appointed in\n case of any dispute that may arise between both the\n parties in respect of this Agreement and this agreement\n is to be adjudicated within the Jurisdiction of Delhi\n Courts only."\n']}, {'Title': 'H.T. Somashekar Reddy vs Government Of Karnataka And Another on 21 September, 1998', 'DocID': 1615586, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['Bangalore and Mysore are two very important cities of the State of Karnataka and are connected by existing Bangalore-Mysore Highway SH-17 which was built over 100 years ago. With the passage of time and modernisation of technology, the traffic on the roads has increased and heavy and fast moving vehicles have come in place of the slow moving traffic at that time. These two cities have been exposed to shock of industrialisation, heavy development and over-population. In order to meet the ends of the industry, and transportation, the State of Karnataka invited tenders for designing, constructing, maintaining and operating of an Express Highway between Bangalore and Mysore on 28th September, 1988. In response to the said advertisement only one bid was received with certain stringent conditions which were not acceptable to the Government. The said conditions were: \n', '"Land\n \n \n \n\nRoad \n (acres)\n \n \n \n\nTownship \n (acres)\n \n \n \n\nTotal \n (acres)\n \n \n \n\nPercentage\n \n \n \n \n \n \n\nKharab\n \n \n \n\n1,740\n \n \n \n\n5,818\n \n \n \n\n7,558\n \n \n \n\n37\n \n \n \n \n \n\nDry\n \n \n \n\n2,936\n \n \n \n\n6,881\n \n \n \n\n10,817\n \n \n \n\n54\n \n \n \n \n \n\nWet\n \n \n \n\n1,183\n \n \n \n\n479\n \n \n \n\n1,662\n \n \n \n\n8\n \n \n \n \n \n\nGarden\n \n \n \n\n140\n16\n156\n1\n \n \n \n \n \n\nTotal\n \n \n \n\n6,999\n \n \n \n\n13,194\n \n \n \n\n20,193\n \n \n \n\n100"\n', ' " \'Best efforts\' means a commitment to pursue all legal avenues and conscientiously and diligently in order to accomplish the desired results. It is not a guarantee that the results will be reached but assures a procedure calculated to overcome known and foreseeable obstacles in a timely manner by exercising due diligence and good faith in an effort to accomplish the desired results". \n', ' 1. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.--Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v).\n', ' 1. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.--Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v).\n', '"8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreements for development and maintenance of National Highways.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may enter into an agreement with any person in relation to the development maintenance of the whole or any part of a National Highway. \n']}, {'Title': 'Indiabulls Real Estate Limited vs M/S Virasat Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. on 5 May, 2010', 'DocID': 167208736, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "9.7 Disputes, if any, that may arise between the\n Parties with respect to this Agreement, or interpretation\n of terms, or its performance or execution unless resolved\n mutually shall be referred to a mutually agreed\n arbitrator and law under the provisions of Indian\n Arbitration Act shall be applicable to all proceedings.\n The venue of arbitration shall be Gurgaon/Delhi.\n', ' "AND WHEREAS the Purchaser has conducted a due\n diligence with respect to the Company, the land owned by the\n Company and with respect to the license applied before the\n Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana and the\n Purchaser is satisfied with the due diligence conducted by it.\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. ... vs Bokaro Steel Officers Housing ... on 16 June, 2022', 'DocID': 46448295, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' The petitioner-applicant was awarded the design, construction\n and development contract for construction of 448 units comprising of 09\n towers spread over an area of 7.5 acres for the members of Bokaro Steel\n Officers Housing Co-operative Society Limited (a registered society), for\n the officers of Steel Authority of India Limited/Bokaro Steel Plant vide\n letter dated 27.12.2013. Pursuant to the award of the work, the parties\n agreed on terms and conditions which was captured in the form of\n Construction Agreement dated 25.01.2014 and executed between the\n 2\n\n\npetitioner and the respondent society on 04.04.2014. The petitioner\nundertook to carry out the construction, designing and development of\nthe 448 units at the rate of Rs. 1790 per sq. ft.\n', ' ―43. Arbitration: Any dispute and difference, if arise between the parties,\n same shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator, appointed on mutual consent\n of the parties and in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration. Such\n disputes or difference shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration\n and Conciliation Act, 1996. The place of arbitration shall be BOKARO\n STEEL CITY. All legal disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of\n courts in Bokaro only.‖\n\n', ' ―43. Arbitration: Any dispute and difference, if arise between the parties,\n same shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator, appointed on mutual consent\n of the parties and in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration. Such\n disputes or difference shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration\n and Conciliation Act, 1996. The place of arbitration shall be BOKARO\n STEEL CITY. All legal disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of\n courts in Bokaro only.‖\n\n', ' "35. In view of the language of Article 20 of the arbitration agreement\n which provided that the arbitration proceedings would be held in\n accordance with the rules and procedures of the International Chamber\n of Commerce or UNCITRAL, Devas was entitled to invoke the Rules of\n Arbitration of ICC for the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. Article\n 19 of the agreement provided that the rights and responsibilities of the\n parties thereunder would be subject to and construed in accordance with\n the laws of India. There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the law\n which was to operate as the governing law of the agreement and the law\n which was to govern the arbitration proceedings. Once the provisions of\n the ICC Rules of Arbitration had been invoked by Devas, the proceedings\n initiated thereunder could not be interfered with in a proceeding under\n Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The invocation of the ICC Rules would, of\n course, be subject to challenge in appropriate proceedings but not by\n way of an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. Where the\n parties had agreed that the procedure for the arbitration would be\n governed by the ICC Rules, the same would necessarily include the\n appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in terms of the arbitration\n agreement and the said Rules. Arbitration Petition No. 20 of 2011 under\n Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for the appointment of an arbitrator must,\n therefore, fail and is rejected, but this will not prevent the petitioner from\n taking recourse to other provisions of the aforesaid Act for appropriate\n relief.\n', ' ―7. Arbitration agreement. - (1) In this Part, ―arbitration agreement‖\n means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain\n disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect\n of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.\n (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause\n in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.\n', ' (3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.\n', ' Clause 43.\n', ' Clause 43.\n', ' ―This agreement is made in Bokaro, Jharkhand on this 1st July 2015 by\n and between\n M/s Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. a Private Limited Company CIN\n No. U45200DL2013PTC256103 having its registered office at 23, Block\n No. B/6-7, Local Shopping Centre, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-\n 110029 represented by Mr. Anand Anu, Director, hereinafter referred to\n as ―Contractor‖ (which expression shall unless it is repugnant to the\n context shall mean and include its successors in interest) of the first part.\n', ' ―This agreement is made in Bokaro, Jharkhand on this 1st July 2015 by\n and between\n M/s Akarshan Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. a Private Limited Company CIN\n No. U45200DL2013PTC256103 having its registered office at 23, Block\n No. B/6-7, Local Shopping Centre, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-\n 110029 represented by Mr. Anand Anu, Director, hereinafter referred to\n as ―Contractor‖ (which expression shall unless it is repugnant to the\n context shall mean and include its successors in interest) of the first part.\n', " AND\n M/s NSS AND COMPANY, a proprietorship firm having its registered\n office at N2/146, IRC Village, Nayapally, Bhubhneshwar-751015\n (Orissa) represented by its proprietor Mr. Nilesh Singh Solankee PAN\n No. AOUPS1814E, hereinafter referred to as ‗Sub-Contractor' (which\n expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context shall mean and\n include its successor(s) in-interest) of the second part.‖\n\n It further appears from the aforesaid agreement which does not\n contain any arbitration clause. The question which now is to be decided\n by this Court is that in absence of any arbitration clause in the said\n contract agreement dated 01.07.2015, can this application for\n 20\n\n\n impleadment of party to the proceeding in the original application is fit\n to be allowed?\n"]}, {'Title': 'Cherian And Kurian vs State Of Kerala on 16 June, 2006', 'DocID': 1859066, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['(a) The date of both the agreements is 3-10-2000. The agreements contain different printed forms, different cyclostyled forms and different typed forms. Various blank spaces in the said forms which required to be filled are filled up in writing with pen. The Articles of Agreement between the parties is made by filling up the blanks in a printed form which is in the form of a booklet printed by the Government of Kerala in 1987, going by the endorsement of the Government Press/Store on the facing sheet of the said document. It is signed by the parties after filling the necessary blank spaces. Among the terms agreed, Clause 3 among the printed conditions in the Articles of Agreement reads as follows: \n', ' The parties to this contract agreed to undertake the condition that arbitration shall not be a means of settlement of disputes or claim or anything on account of this contract.\n', '(a) The date of both the agreements is 3-10-2000. The agreements contain different printed forms, different cyclostyled forms and different typed forms. Various blank spaces in the said forms which required to be filled are filled up in writing with pen. The Articles of Agreement between the parties is made by filling up the blanks in a printed form which is in the form of a booklet printed by the Government of Kerala in 1987, going by the endorsement of the Government Press/Store on the facing sheet of the said document. It is signed by the parties after filling the necessary blank spaces. Among the terms agreed, Clause 3 among the printed conditions in the Articles of Agreement reads as follows: \n', ' The parties to this contract agreed to undertake the condition that arbitration shall not be a means of settlement of disputes or claim or anything on account of this contract.\n', 'As part of the agreements, are the mutually agreed conditions in the notices inviting tenders for the work, which again, are in printed forms, printed in 1992 wherein, among other things, Clause 24 reads as follows: \n']}, {'Title': 'Vinayak Balkrishna Samant And Others vs The Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited on 21 November, 1995', 'DocID': 337120, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "That it is hereby expressly agreed that if at any time there shall arise any dispute, doubt, difference or question with regard to the interpretation of meaning or any of the terms and conditions of this demise or in respect of the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties hereto or in any way touching or arising out of these presents or otherwise in relation to the premises then every such dispute, difference, doubt or question (except the decision whereof is herein expressly provided for) shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director General Posts and Telegraphs or in case his designation is changed or his office is abolished, the officer who for the time being is entrusted whether or not in addition to other functions, with the functions of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, by whatsoever designation such official may be called or if he be unable or unwilling to act, then of an officer appointed by him in this behalf. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the person appointed is a Government Servant, that he had to deal with the matters to which the indenture of lease relates and that in the course of his duties as such Government servant has expressed views on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference. The decision of the Arbitration shall be final and binding on the parties to this deal. The provision of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, or any statutory modifications or re-enactments thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to such arbitration and this deed shall be deemed to be a submission to arbitration within the meaning of the said Act." \n', ' "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction ........ \n', ' "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction ........ \n', ' (b) elsewhere, the court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is no such Civil Judge, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions; and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question." \n']}, {'Title': 'Wellington Associates Ltd. vs Mr. Kirit Mehta on 4 April, 2000', 'DocID': 1604568, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "Section\t33: Arbitration agreement or award to be\ncontested by application -\n', ' In the light of the finding on Point 2, it is\n\n obvious that I have to dismiss this petition. It may\nbe\n\n that if the petitioner files a suit in Bombay, there\ncan\n\n be considerable\tdelay.\t But that is no ground to\nconstrue\n\n the clause differently. I may state however, that in\n\n case a Civil suit is filed, it will be for the\n\n petitioner to seek an early disposal of the case and I\n\n have no\treason\tto doubt that the civil\t court\twill\ntreat\n\n the request of the petitioner for early disposal with\n\n due consideration.\n', '\n With the above observations, this petition is\n\n dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.\n\n\n\n\n']}, {'Title': 'Bisra Stone Lime Company Ltd. & Anr. Etc vs Orissa State Electricity Board & Anr on 21 October, 1975', 'DocID': 888433, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': ['\t "The tariff and conditions of supply mentioned in\n this Agreement shall be subject to any revision that\n may be made by the Supplier from time to time".\n', '\t "The tariff and conditions of supply mentioned in\n this Agreement shall be subject to any revision that\n may be made by the Supplier from time to time".\n', '\t (1) The Board has no power to levy a surcharge\n\t under the provisions of the Act.\n', '\t (2) Clause 13 of the agreement cannot take in the\n\t levy of\tsurcharge. It is, therefore, not a\n\t matter for reference to arbitration under\n\t clause 23 of the agreement.\n', '\t "Now, the effect of\tthe levy of coal surcharge\n would be to enhance the\t rates\tfor the supply of\n electricity stipulated under the agreement".\n']}, {'Title': 'Great Offshore Ltd vs Iranian Offshore Eng&Constn. Co on 25 August, 2008', 'DocID': 123878146, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "This Agreement is subject to IOEC [respondent]\n providing a suitable barge and AHT acceptable to\n GE Shipping [applicant] for a period of 45-55 days\n on mutually agreed rates for commencement\n between 25th October and 10th November 05 for\n BHN MOL project works."\n', ' "This Agreement is subject to IOEC [respondent]\n providing a suitable barge and AHT acceptable to\n GE Shipping [applicant] for a period of 45-55 days\n on mutually agreed rates for commencement\n between 25th October and 10th November 05 for\n BHN MOL project works."\n', ' 1. Place & Date. Mumbai, India. 22nd August 2005. ...\n', '17. I must provide some background before dealing with\n\nother documents, as the faxed CPA sits at the center of this\n\ndispute.\n', ' "Taking into account the number of problems\n associated with the vessel, it is the conclusion of\n Likpin and IOEC that the Gal Constructor is not\n suitable as a riser installation. ... the vessel size\n combined with the limited crane reach cannot be\n corrected or overcome and hence the vessel should\n not be chartered for riser installation operations."\n', ' "You are aware that initially, we intended to hire the\n vessel combination for only 170 days. However,\n since you agreed to take barge and AHT from us for\n 45-55 days, we agreed to extend the intended hire\n period from 170 days to 200 days and accordingly\n in this background the said LOI was issued.\n However, since thereafter you unilaterally declined\n to take our barge and AHT on the ground of\n difference in rate levels offered by us, we, in view of\n the said condition and in the light of your refusal to\n accept our barge and AHT, asked you for absolute\n subletting right of the said vessels to compensate\n us/minimize our expenses for risk of additional\n days than the originally intended 170 days. The\n correspondences which were exchanged between us\n make it aptly clear that negotiations and change in\n terms and conditions from your side continued even\n after issuance of LOI and therefore the question of\n concluding the CPA in respect of RSPPM project\n phase-II does not arise at all."\n', ' "When parties carry on lengthy negotiations, it may\n be difficult to say when and whether a contract has\n been concluded. The court must then look at the\n whole correspondence and decide, whether on its\n true construction, the parties had agreed to the\n same terms."\n', ' (1)In this part, "arbitration agreement" means an\n agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration\n all or certain disputes which have arisen or\n which may arise between them in respect of a\n defined legal relationship, whether contractual or\n not.\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S Hrd Corporation vs Gail (India) Ltd on 3 November, 2011', 'DocID': 590009, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' ―The agreement dated 01.01.1999 between Gas Authority\n of India Limited and Marcus Oil and Chemical division of\n HRD Corporation, which contains the Arbitration clause, is\n an agreement between a body corporate incorporated in\n USA. The is evident from the recitals contained in the\n agreement dated 01.04.1999 between Petitioner and the\n\nArb. P.No.113/2011 Page 8 of 34\n Respondent.‖\n\n ―The Arbitration between the Petitioner and the\n Respondent is an international commercial Arbitration.\n Therefore, this court would not have the jurisdiction to\n entertain the present Application and the same is liable to\n be dismissed as such.‖\n\n\n', ' ―6.4. After the expiry of every three years the SELLER and\n the BUYER will review the price determination\n Mechanism. In case during the preceding three years large\n fluctuations in the prices of Ethylene have occurred it will\n be open to the parties to mutually agree upon any other\n product to which the price is to be indexed or if any other\n publication indicative in the price of ethylene are available\n agree upon such publication to be used for reference.‖\n\n\n', ' ―11. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator -\n', ' (1) In addition to the circumstances referred to in rule 9 or\n rule 10, the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate -\n', ' (a) Where he withdraws from office for any reason; or\n\n']}, {'Title': 'M/S. Madras Fertilizers Ltd vs M/S. Sicgil India Ltd on 9 August, 2021', 'DocID': 53032376, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [" (a) directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.378.24 lacs\n\n towards damages arising from the breach of the agreement\n\n dated 30.12.1993 together with interest at 18% on the amount\n\n so ascertained by the Hon'ble Arbitrator from the date of\n\n\n\n 3/22\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in\n\x0c O.P.No.543 of 2017\n\n award till the date of payment.”\n\n\n\n", ' “1. The respondent shall pay to the claimant a sum of\n\n Rs.3,25,40,500/- (Rupees three crores twenty five lakhs forty\n\n thousand five hundred only) with interest at the rate of 18%\n\n per annum from this date till date of realisation.\n\n']}, {'Title': 'Chaudrhary Avadhesh Kumar vs Volleyball Federation Of India on 31 May, 2018', 'DocID': 10924134, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [" '(b) Disputes / Conflict within the Federation:\n"]}, {'Title': 'Vandana Batra vs Aerens Goldsouk International Ltd. on 1 October, 2014', 'DocID': 131031700, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "a. allow the present application under Section 8 of\n Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and direct the\n parties to resolve the dispute through arbitration by\n appointing a mutually agreed arbitrator as per clause 9 of\n\n\nCS(OS) No.988/2012 Page 2 of 12\n the said Lease Deed to arbitrate the dispute involved in\n the present case.\n', ' "...In CS(OS) No.988/2012 titled Vandana Batra v Aerens\n Goldsouk International Ltd., on an application u/s 8 of the\n Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, by the defendant,\n vide order dated 13.09.2012 the Hon\'ble High Court was\n pleased to allow the application and relegate the parties\n to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the\n Lease Deed dated 15.01.2010.\n', ' "Pursuant to the order dated 15.07.2013 passed by the\n Arbitrator, and the claimant having filed IA 12399-\n\n\n\nCS(OS) No.988/2012 Page 7 of 12\n 12400/2013 in CS(OS) 988/2012, these arbitration\n proceedings were adjourned sine die. The claimant has\n now prayed for termination of these proceedings and in\n making such a request the claimant has filed a copy of the\n order dated 03.03.2014 passed by the Hon\'ble High Court\n in the aforesaid suit.\n', ' (i) The court should, before admitting any document into\n evidence or acting upon such document, examine whether\n the instrument/document is duly stamped and whether it is an\n instrument which is compulsorily registrable.\n', ' (ii) If the document is found to be not duly stamped, Section\n 35 of Stamp Act bars the said document being acted upon.\n']}, {'Title': 'K.N.Venkiteshwara Pai vs K.G.Sathish Chandra Babu on 16 March, 2011', 'DocID': 197577142, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "17. On death, retirement, insolvency or\n\n resignation of any one of the partners, the\n\n legal heirs of the deceased partner or the\n\n retired or resigned partner shall be entitled to\n\n receive from the firm, the balance standing to\n\n the capital account, current account and loan\n\n account together with the interest, if any, as\n\n increased or reduced by the share of profit or\n\n loss as the case may be till the date of death\n\n or retirement or resignation.\n', ' "17. On death, retirement, insolvency or\n\n resignation of any one of the partners, the\n\n legal heirs of the deceased partner or the\n\n retired or resigned partner shall be entitled to\n\n receive from the firm, the balance standing to\n\n the capital account, current account and loan\n\n account together with the interest, if any, as\n\n increased or reduced by the share of profit or\n\n loss as the case may be till the date of death\n\n or retirement or resignation.\n', ' 18. Retirement, death or insolvency of\n\n any partner shall not dissolve the firm but the\n\n firm shall stand reconstituted among the\n\n remaining partners.\n', ' "Any dispute arising among the partners\n\n or between the legal representatives of a\n\n deceased partner and the remaining partners\n\n regarding the interpretation of this deed or\n\n their rights and liabilities hereunder or in\n\n relation to any other matter whatsoever\n\n touching the partnership, shall be referred to\n\n arbitration by a sole arbitrator to the\n\n mutually agreed upon and if the parties\n\n cannot agree upon the choice of a sole\n\n arbitrator, each party to the dispute shall\n\n nominate one arbitrator and reference shall\n\n be made to such arbitrators jointly and the\n\n provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940\n\n shall apply thereto."\n', 'AR No.10/2010 5\n']}, {'Title': 'B. Gopal Das, Bombay And Ors. vs Kota Straw Board (P) Ltd., Kota on 21 October, 1970', 'DocID': 452708, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' "(10). That in case of any dispute arising between us, the matter may be\nreferred to arbitration mutually agreed upon and acceptable by you and us." \n', ' "(a) \'arbitration agreement\' means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not." \n', ' "The essential requirement is that the parties should intend to make a submission to arbitration." \n', ' "In the event of any dispute arising out of this contract the same can be settled by Arbitration held by a Chamber of Commerce at Madras. Their decision shall be binding to. the Buyers and the Sellers". \n', ' "Any complaint, claim, dispute, doubt or question (not otherwise settled by mutual consent) arising out of this indent, may at the instance of either party thereto be referred to arbitration to two European merchants with power, in the event of disagreement, to appoint an umpire." \n']}, {'Title': 'Kirtikumar Fakrichand Mehta vs Dilipkumar Jayantilal on 14 June, 2013', 'DocID': 103436462, 'matching_columns': [], 'matching_indents': [' Clause\nNo.9: \n', 'Said\npartnership has been executed for the time specified at will i.e. the\npartnership is at will. \n', '(i)\n\tManibhai Shankerbhai Patel v. Swashray \t\t\tConstruction Co. &Ors.\n', '(i)\tAIR\n1991 SC 1020\n \n\n\n', '(i)\tAIR\n1991 SC 1020\n \n\n\n', '(ii)\tAIR\n2005 Bombay 301\n \n\n\n', '(iii)\tAIR\n1982 Delhi 131\n \n\n\n', '\t The\nconclusion which we must, therefore, inevitably reach is that the\nretirement of partner from a firm does not dissolve, the firm, that\nis determine the partnership inter-se between all the partners but\nmerely severs the partnership between the retiring partner and the\ncontinuing partners leaving the partnership amongst the continuing\npartners unaffected and the firm continues with the changed\nconstitution comprising the continuing partners. \n', '\t\tSo\nfar as clause 7 is concerned, it further finds in para 5 that it is\nclear from the foregoing discussions that clause 7 of the partnership\ndeed which contains provision for retirement of a partner which is\nnot constituted an expressed provision made by contract between the\npartners for determination of their partnership within the\nmeaning of section 7 and, therefore, it is not operated to exclude\nthe partnership from the category of partnership at will. \nDissolution of the partnership between all the partners is what is\ncontemplated in the definition of partnership at will and retirement\nof a partner has no bearing on it. Learned Advocates for the\npetitioners have then submitted that so far as the partnership at\nwill is concerned, this judgment of Division Bench is binding\nauthority which binds this court and I am in agreement with the same.\n']}] \ No newline at end of file